Nations and Nationalism 4 volumes : A Global Historical Overview

Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

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volume 1 1770 to 1880

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 1 1770 to 1880

GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors

S A N TA B A R B A R A , C A L I F O R N I A

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Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nations and nationalism : a global historical overview / Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-907-8 (alk. paper) 1. History, Modern—18th century. 2. History, Modern—19th century. 3. History, Modern—20th century. 4. Nationalism—History. I. Herb, Guntram Henrik, 1959– II. Kaplan, David H., 1960– D299.N37 2008 320.54—dc22 2008004478

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an ebook. Visit abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 Senior Production Editor Cami Cacciatore Production Editor Kristine Swift Production Manager Don Schmidt Media Manager Caroline Price Media Editor Katherine Jackson File Management Coordinator Paula Gerard This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

volume 1 1770 to 1880

Contents List of Contributors

vii

147 Denmark Marianne Rostgaard

Preface xi

158 England Ben Wellings

Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii

169 France Elizabeth Rechniewski

Thematic Essays 1 The Class Nature of Nationalism Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood

195 The Netherlands Hans Knippenberg

14 Nationalism and Conflict Ray Taras

207 Poland Daniel Stone

29 Education and Nationalism Klaus Schleicher

219 Scandinavia Byron Nordstrom

43 Gender and Nationalism Jennifer Heuer

232 Scotland Graeme Morton

59 Landscape, Monuments, and National Identity Kenneth R. Olwig

244 Switzerland Daniel Speich

72 Nationalism and Music Ben Curtis

Middle East 256 Egypt Mona Russell

85 Philosophy and Nationalism Nenad Miscevic 99 Religion and Nationalism Christopher Marsh

Americas 268 Argentina Alberto Spektorowski

111 National Symbols Michael E. Geisler

282 Brazil Roderick J. Barman

126 Technology and Nationalism Joshua Barker and Sharon Kelly

298 Canada Colin M. Coates

Europe 137 Belgium Robert Kerr

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181 Germany Celia Applegate

309 Central America Jordana Dym

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323 Chile Patrick Barr-Melej

367 Peru Nils Jacobsen

332 Haiti Chris Dixon

381 United States John M. McCardell Jr.

344 Mexico Will Fowler

393 Uruguay Luis Roniger Index

358 Paraguay Jerry Cooney

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List of Contributors

Marco Adria University of Alberta

Linda Bryder University of Auckland

Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University

Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University

Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University

Roderick D. Bush St. John’s University

Stephen Alomes Deakin University

Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico

Celia Applegate University of Rochester

Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii

Christopher P. Atwood Indiana University

Colin M. Coates York University

Ghania Azzout University of Algiers

Saul B. Cohen Queens College CUNY

Alan Bairner Loughborough University

Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor)

Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Joshua Barker University of Toronto Roderick J. Barman University of British Columbia Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Stefan Berger Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Brett Bowden University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Stella Coram Independent Scholar Stéphane Corcuff University of Lyon Jeffrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Ralph Coury Fairfield University Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Ben Curtis Seattle College Patrice M. Dabrowski Harvard University

David Brandenberger University of Richmond

Dev Raj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal

David Brown Murdoch University

Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jason Dittmer University College London

Dennis Hart Kent State University

Chris Dixon University of Queensland

David Allen Harvey New College of Florida

Christine Doran Charles Darwin University

Stephen Heathorn McMaster University

Maria Dowling St. Mary’s College

Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University

Stéphane Dufoix Universite Paris X–Nanterre

Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol

Jordana Dym Skidmore College

Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands

Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University

Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University

Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University

Hugh Hudson Georgia State University

Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University

Bonny Ibhawoh McMaster University

Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen

Grigory Ioffe Radford University

Will Fowler University of St. Andrews

Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, The Behrend College

Michael E. Geisler Middlebury College Paul Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere

Tareq Y. Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto

Seyoum Hameso University of East London

Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna

Paul Hamilton Brock University

Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Samira Hanifi University of Algiers

Cynthia Joseph Monash University

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John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh

Christopher Marsh Baylor University

Gregory Jusdanis The Ohio State University

Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio

Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University

John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia

Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University

John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College

Martha Kaplan Vassar College

John McLane Northwestern University

Sharon Kelly University of Toronto

Kim McMullen Kenyon College

James Kennedy University of Edinburgh

Neil McWilliam Duke University

Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma

Nenad Miscevic Central European University

P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California

Graeme Morton University of Guelph

David B. Knight University of Guelph Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Taras Kuzio George Washington University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Orion Lewis University of Colorado, Boulder Hong-Ming Liang The College of St. Scholastica Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers

Joane Nagel University of Kansas Byron Nordstrom Gustavus Adolphus College Kevin C. O’Connor Gonzaga University Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Brian S. Osborne Queen’s University Cynthia Paces The College of New Jersey

Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee

Razmik Panossian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University

Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College

Fouad Makki Cornell University

Hooman Peimani Bradford University

Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London

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CONTRIBUTORS

Linda Racioppi Michigan State University

Ray Taras University of Colorado

Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki

Jessica Teets University of Colorado, Boulder

Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst

Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University

Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney

Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion

Toon van Meijl University of Nijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber University of Applied Languages (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings The Australian National University George W. White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David N. Yaghoubian California State University, San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu

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Preface

What is a nation? What is nationalism? What does it mean to examine them in global perspective? We conceive of a nation or national identity as a form of loyalty. People have a multitude of loyalties: to family, friends, places, clubs, institutions, regions, countries, even to their place of work or brands of products. What distinguishes loyalty to a nation is the primacy it holds on people’s allegiance. It is so powerful that people are willing to give their lives to ensure the continued existence of the group members and territory that make up their nation. By extension, we call nationalism the process that defines, creates, and expresses this essential loyalty to the nation. We view the term nationalism in a neutral sense. While this process can take extreme forms and lead to violent aggression and the extermination of others, nationalism can also be benign and form the basis for peaceful coexistence. Nations and nationalism have found a bewildering range of expressions across the world and through time, and it is this geographic and temporal variation that we seek to address in a systematic fashion. Given the sheer number of nations that exist or have existed historically—some scholars argue that there are as many as 4,000–5,000 in just the contemporary era—our global perspective does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead we have chosen to follow cross-sections through time and space. We identify major historical eras in the development of nations and nationalism to examine characteristic themes and representative cases from all major regions of the world. Our emphasis is on depth rather than breadth. The 146 entries in this encyclopedia are full-length articles that go in depth to cover major debates and issues instead of brief descriptions of general features. They are authored by reputable scholars and try to provide accessible introductions to topics that are ambiguous, complex, and frequently misunderstood. Because literature on nations and nationalism arguably ranks among the most diverse and convoluted, our goal is to provide students, nonspecialists, and even junior scholars with concise information on this subject. In deciding what cases and themes to use, we take representative examples from each world region. These run the gamut from large powerful nations such as China and Russia to smaller nations that do not enjoy any form of sovereignty, like Tibet and Wales. We try to cover both prosperous nations of the developed world along with ex-colonial nations in the less-developed world. Similarly, some nations only appear during one time period, and others do not appear at all, because the most important consideration for us was that at least one representative example from all major regions of the world was included, even if scholarship has sorely neglected or sidelined that area, such as in Africa. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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PREFACE

The selection of specific themes and cases that are treated intensively means that our coverage will have some unavoidable gaps. For example, there are no thematic chapters that treat race independently. This omission is not because we consider the issue to be of little significance, but because we feel that race is so elemental to discussions of nations and nationalism that it cannot be separated out. Similarly, it was not always possible to stick to the neat historical categorization into the four time periods. Some of our entries bridge several volumes to provide the most effective treatment of individual cases and themes. This encyclopedia is arranged chronologically in four volumes. The first volume traces the origins and formative processes of nations and nationalism from 1770 to 1880. The second volume covers the aggressive intensification of nationalism during the age of imperialism, from 1880 to 1945. The third volume deals with the decline of nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, from 1945 to 1989. The final volume outlines the transformations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War in 1989. All 104 country essays have the same format, and each is approximately 4,000 words. Each includes a chronology to position the reader in time; a discursive essay on main features; illustrations to help the reader visualize specific issues, situations, or persons; and a brief bibliography to guide additional inquiries. The case study essays also contain sidebars that highlight unique events, persons, or institutions. The main essays all contain five sections that help structure the inquiry and provide a universal key to access the information: (1) “Situating the Nation” places the national case in a historical, political, social, and geographic context; (2) “Instituting the Nation” examines key actors and institutions as well as philosophical foundations; (3) “Defining the Nation” discusses the role of ethno-cultural, civilizational, and geographic markers in creating the us–them distinction that is at the heart of national identity; (4) “Narrating the Nation” addresses particular events, stories, and myths that are used to create a community of belonging; and (5) “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” focuses on actions and strategies that help legitimize the national idea. Our 42 thematic essays address the interplay between national identity, politics, culture, and society and are generally 6,000 words long. They focus on geopolitical contexts and economic conditions, such as postcolonialism and globalization; social relations, such as gender and class; dominant philosophies and ideologies, such as fascism and fundamentalism; and nationalist cultural creations and expressions, such as art, literature, music, or sports. Though specific themes vary in each of the four volumes, each of the thematic essays include bibliographies and illustrations, and touch on the following questions: (1) How were the issues/phenomena under discussion important? (2) What is the background and what are the origins? (3) What are major dimensions and impacts on different groups, societal conditions, and ideas? (4) What are the consequences and ramifications of this issue for the character and future development of nations and nationalism? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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We feel that our encyclopedia makes an important addition to the current reference literature on nations and nationalism. Existing encyclopedias in the field generally contain only very brief entries (Spira 1999, 2002; Leoussi 2001); are dated (Snyder 1990); neglect such civic nations as the United States or Switzerland (Minahan 2002); or are uneven because they combine a few excessively long survey articles with several extremely short entries (Motyl 2001). A universal and significant shortcoming is the lack of maps and illustrations. Except for a limited number of general maps and select illustrations in Minahan, the other works do not have a single map, figure, or image. We believe that an encyclopedia on nationalism must contain visual information for it to effectively convey the contexts within which nationalist movements arose and to depict the important symbology that was used to galvanize national sentiment. Our encyclopedia also offers a unique and novel way to access information on nations and nationalisms. The thematic entries give insights into the larger contexts for the country essays and illustrate linkages among them in regard to general topics such as national education. The individual country entries allow readers to compare and contrast developments in different places and to examine trends in major regions of the world during different time periods. Finally, since some of the places and themes appear in all four volumes, it is possible to trace developments and identify linkages not only among places, but also through time. We hope that this encyclopedia helps to further an understanding of perhaps the most influential set of identities and ideologies in the world today. We also hope that this collection of cases and themes selected across space and time sheds some light on the different ways in which these loyalties are manifested. While this encyclopedia constitutes a very large body of work, it can only scratch the surface of all of the different varieties inherent in a study of nations and nationalism. We encourage the reader to follow up on some of the selected readings that are listed at the end of each entry and to further explore some of the various cases and themes that have not been explicitly addressed. References Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Minahan, James. 2002. Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. San Diego: Academic Press. Snyder, Louis. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House. Spira, Thomas. 1999 (vol. 1), 2002 (vol. 2). Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

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Acknowledgments

An enormous undertaking such as this four-volume work could not be accomplished without the help of several individuals. Of course we would like to thank all of our contributors, who were wonderful about following formatting guidelines, making revisions, and cheerfully supplying additional material as the need arose. We are very saddened that one of our contributors, Jeffrey Cormier, did not live to see the publication of this work. We would also like to pay special thanks to the people at ABC-CLIO, among them Ron Boehm, Wendy Roseth, Kristin Gibson, and especially Alex Mikaberidze. The efforts of ABC-CLIO’s publication team have allowed us to complete this project in a sustained and timely manner. Above all we wish to extend our gratitude to those people who have worked tirelessly in assisting us in this endeavor. Their efforts are reflected throughout these four volumes. Kathleen Woodhouse from Kent State University was instrumental in helping to conceive of this project, in identifying and lining up the contributors, and in evaluating and editing each and every entry in Volumes 3 and 4. She also played a major part in the development of three of the essays. She has been an enormous asset and has worked tirelessly to see this project from start to finish. Gruia Badescu, Zachary Hecht-Leavitt, Jonathan Hsu, and Conor Stinson provided invaluable assistance in Middlebury, Vermont. Their contributions would not have been possible without the generous support of Middlebury College, which is deeply appreciated. Zach and Gruia aided in identifying contributors, selecting illustrations, and managing numerous administrative tasks. Zach’s excellent writing and editorial skills ensured that many of the entries authored by non-native English speakers were transformed into stylistically polished pieces. Gruia’s remarkable linguistic skills and knowledge of the scholarship of nationalism allowed him to contribute deep insights to the review process as well as to the drafting of two introductory essays. Jonathan Hsu and Conor Stinson are to be credited for the beautiful cartographic design. Producing maps for these volumes proved to be a challenging and enormous project. The maps needed to vary greatly in scale—from small areas, such as Estonia, to giant regions, such as Russia—but at the same time needed to allow for easy comparisons. The historical maps were particularly difficult given the numerous border changes that took place and the lack of good reference sources, but Jonathan mastered this hurdle with ease. He is not only a gifted cartographer but an excellent researcher. Putting on the finishing touches to turn the massive manuscript and numerous images and maps into a coherent and beautiful set of volumes was also an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

enormous challenge, and we were fortunate to have the able assistance of Cami Cacciatore, Kristine Swift, and Kerry Jackson at ABC-CLIO and of Samuel Lazarus, Caitlin Sargent, and Mithra Harivandi at Middlebury College. Finally, we would like to thank our families for the unwavering support they gave us throughout this giant undertaking. We dedicate this work to the memory of David Woodward.

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Introduction Volume I: 1770 to 1880

The first volume in our encyclopedia covers the period from 1770 to 1870. It was at the beginning of that era that we saw the emergence of the modern idea of the nation and nationalism. Although “nation” was used as early as medieval times to distinguish groups of students who came from the same region or country, it only became politicized in the 1770s. The influence of the new conception of the nation was striking. Over the next 100 years, revolutions carried the idea across the Atlantic world and redrew the political map. Most of the European colonies in the Americas became independent states, France became a republic, and new nation-states such as Germany, Italy, and Belgium appeared in the center of Europe. The rest of the world was largely untouched by the new concept. China, India, Japan, and the African kingdoms focused inward and tried to resist European incursions. The only exception was Egypt, where Napoleon’s conquest and occupation laid the first seeds for national consciousness. The geographically limited spread of the modern concept of the nation during this early period explains why our first volume does not include case studies from sub-Saharan Africa or Asia. We can identify four major changes that led to the politicization and subsequent spread of the idea of the nation and nationalism. First, the growing importance of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, which offered attractive alternatives to the prevailing absolutist and dynastic order. Second, commercial, industrial, and agricultural revolutions dramatically restructured societies in Europe and the Americas. Third, the control of empires and states over their populations increased and engendered resistance. Fourth, advances in communication intensified social interaction, which allowed for more effective dissemination of information. To elaborate, the first major change has to do with the Enlightenment thinkers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, who provided the foundation for the new perspective on the idea of the nation. The world of the late eighteenth century was dominated by empires. On all continents, political structures were highly hierarchical, and rule was absolute with very few exceptions. People were simply subjects of the authority and mired in rigid social codes, with little chance for mobility, by an order that was supposedly imposed by divine will. The Enlightenment offered an attractive alternative to this worldview. It stressed the fundamental freedom of the individual, secularization, general education, and new democratic forms of government. It argued that political power should rest in the people, who were termed a “nation” because they were deemed to share a common interest and identity. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Initially, nation referred to the population in a given political territory. This was the principle behind the revolutions in the Americas and France. In the Americas, the populations were heterogeneous, made up of a mix of European immigrants and indigenous inhabitants. While racism within these populations was prevalent and in most cases virulent, the fight against a clearly defined “other”—the colonizer—provided at least initially a common identity. In France, the existence of common government institutions, administration, and commerce over several centuries created social homogeneity and commonality among the people living in the state territory. The idea of the nation took on a different meaning when it was adopted by proponents of Romanticism, such as Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This philosophical and cultural movement developed as a reaction to the Enlightenment and proposed a different alternative to the prevailing dynastic and absolutist order. Instead of rational thinking and freedom of the individual as in Enlightenment thinking, Romanticism stressed the subjective, the emotional, the passionate in human beings, and the need for individuals to find solace in the “organic” community that was made up of those who spoke the same language, shared the same folklore and customs, and were attached to the same native soil. This meant that individuals had to follow the call of their blood and celebrate their ethnic culture. While there was still room for divine order, the emphasis in Romanticism on popular culture, common people, and idyllic communities in which everyone was equal made it incompatible with the hierarchical order of absolutist dynasties. The Romantic version of the nation found an enthusiastic reception in central and eastern Europe where ethnic groups, such as the Germans, Italians, Poles, Czechs, and many others, lived in a complex regional mosaic. There were regions with homogenous populations, but the border zones were always intermixed. Moreover, some of these groups, such as the Germans, were widely dispersed into the main settlement regions of other groups. Finally, political borders of different empires cut across the ethnic groups and subjugated them to rule by other ethnicities. As a result, identity developed along ethnic lines rather than in existing state territories. The Romantic idea of an ethnic nation was much more volatile than the Enlightenment version of the inhabitants of existing states (civic nation)— it required redrawing political boundaries to give an ethnic nation sovereign control over its affairs in its own state. Given the complex mosaic of the distribution of ethnic groups and their intermixing at the borders, this Romantic version of nation invariably led to conflict. The modern idea of the nation thus meant that self-determination could be demanded by ethnically heterogeneous inhabitants of existing states (civic nations) and by ethnic groups that occupied a state, part of a state, or were dispersed across existing political boundaries (ethnic nations). Starting in the late eighteenth century, the rallying call of the nation would be used to dethrone monarchs and to liberate oppressed people, but also to expel or exterminate those who were considered different (“others”) or to wage wars of expansion. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The second major change that took place in this era was a radical restructuring of societies in Europe and the Americas through commercial, industrial, and agricultural revolutions. This period constituted the birth of the modern age. Expanding trade with overseas colonies and at home brought tremendous wealth to merchants and associated professions. A middle class, the bourgeoisie, emerged that had virtually no power but often had more wealth than aristocrats. The idea of the nation was an attractive proposition for this class since it promised a redistribution of power from the aristocracy to the general population. The Industrial Revolution created huge job opportunities around factories and led to large-scale population movements from rural areas to urban centers. The agricultural revolution rang the death knell for the rural subsistence way of life. Family farming was replaced by large-scale mechanized agriculture. Villages became depopulated as younger people moved to cities, craftsmanship was no longer passed on through the generations in the same family but supplanted by specialized industrial production, places of residence and work were segregated, and people commuted increasing distances to their place of employment. As a result of these commercial, industrial, and agricultural revolutions, traditional social ties in towns and in the countryside were severed; instead of communities where everyone knew each other (Gemeinschaft), we see the development of a society stratified by classes (Gesellschaft). For the growing middle class, a key issue was access to power; for the masses, it was the breakup of extended families and being crowded together with people from different places. Since traditional religions could not provide the spiritual support to meet these new challenges, the nation filled the gap. It offered solace from the alienation of modern living and a powerful sense of belonging. The third change has to do with an increasing assertion of state power and a commensurate increase in resistance and demands for liberation. As economies became more complex from expanding overseas and domestic trade, and as people moved to urban areas and increased in numbers—this period was the start of a tremendous growth in the size of the human population—states and empires were challenged to centralize control over industries, commerce, financial systems, and their populations. To maintain an efficient administration, to have sufficient food to prevent famines, to recruit enough soldiers for their standing armies, and to procure weapons of war for defense and expansions, states had to collect more information, whether in the form of surveys, maps, or censuses. As state surveillance increased, so did resistance. Increasing state involvement in the educational system was a further factor. The need for a better-educated workforce and a uniform language for an efficient economy and army meant centralization and homogenization of the curriculum. Considering that empires and states included populations speaking various languages and practicing diverse religions, this standardization was bound to engender resistance, particularly when the dominant language and culture favored a small minority. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The fourth major change involves advances in communication. Newspapers and other literature were printed in larger numbers and disseminated through an improved transport system, such as regular postal services in Europe and the Americas. People could find out much more easily and quickly about new ideas or events. The 1848 republican uprisings started in Sicily and spread to France, Germany, Italy, and the Austrian empire within a few months. Increased communication and social contact meant that rulers could no longer keep their population completely isolated and in the dark. Greater dissemination of the printed word also provided language with a fixed form and helped establish a dominant national language. Local dialects and the social and cultural differences they expressed became less important. For example, in the middle of the 19th century, the Germans Wilhelm and Jacob Grimm not only helped create a German national consciousness through their compendiums on German mythologies and fairytales but established a uniform German language through their dictionaries and grammar books. The national uprisings in the Americas in the early 1800s similarly were augmented by newspapers that helped Creoles in the different colonies create “imagined communities,” to use the famous title of Benedict Anderson’s 1991 book. Printed language became the vector for the national idea, and its spread was unstoppable. Gun t ram H. Herb Gru i a B ad e s cu

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The Class Nature of Nationalism Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood Relevance The relationship between nationalism and social class is a highly complex one, and this article will only begin to tease out their multiple points of intersection. The most fundamental distinction that we might begin with concerns the changing relationship between stratification (by the term stratification we mean the variety of processes by which human societies are compartmentalized in hierarchical fashion) and nationalism. Disruptions in the status hierarchy and in traditional regimes of status deference (Shils 1972) are crucial elements in nationalism’s emergence in a variety of societies, and, conversely, nationalism tends to have a considerable impact on, and even remake, the stratification system. In all the cases studied in detail (that is, English, French, Russian, German, Japanese, and North and Latin American societies), nationalism originated in response to the disintegration, or relative opening, of rigidly closed systems of stratification (Greenfeld 1992). The effect of the nationalist response was to undermine the legitimacy of explicit distinctions among social ranks and to render the system of stratification open by definition. Nationalism implies a social order that is essentially undivided by social rank, or at least one that insists that one’s primary identity is national and that hierarchical distinctions are incidental, contingent, and less fundamental than national identity (Greenfeld 1992). Open stratification is the definitive characteristic of class stratification. Ironically, therefore, nationalism plays an important part in creating the cultural blueprint for the class society. Preliminary Definitions Before we can come to terms with “the class nature of nationalism” for the period in question, we need to establish certain terminological points. First, we need to have at least a provisional understanding of what a “social class” is and what, therefore, it would mean for something like nationalism to have a “class nature.” As is generally the case, there has been little consensus among social scientists with regard to this issue. The most influential social class theorist, Karl Marx, saw history as the unfolding of “class struggle.” According to the dialectical materialist schema that Marx originated (which is similar to Adam Smith’s earlier ideas), history is marked by the extension of the division of labor. As the division of labor has developed over time, certain forces of production have come to the fore and achieved predominance. In the capitalist era, the relevant forces of production were capital (that N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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is, wealth in a variety of forms that can be reinvested in further economic activity) and labor (all human productive activity—activity that, for Marx, defines our essence). These two forces of production, according to Marx, corresponded to the social classes of the period; in a more mystical form of Marxist doctrine, classes themselves actually became the collective personifications of these forces of production. For Marx, each period in history had a distinctive mode of production in which relative equilibrium was reached among the forces of production characteristic of the era (Marx 1978c). The mode of production in question was the defining feature of the period. Thus, for Marx, the 19th century was the capitalist era precisely because it was the era of the capitalist mode of production. The period was characterized by a temporary equilibrium in which the bourgeois, or capitalist class (the owners of capital), exerted control, through the state and through ideology, over society at large, allowing this class to exploit the proletariat, which was the personification of labor (the owners of the labor force), the true source of all value. Modes of production would survive, according to Marx, only until their existing structures became “fetters” on growth; then, revolutionary change would take place (Marx 1978a, 477–478). The force of production furthering growth at this point in time, and represented by the “ascendant” class, would wrestle power from the hands of the “ruling” class and establish relations of production favorable to itself. The ascendant class in the feudal era, after the prevailing agricultural mode of production had outlived itself and foisted “fetters” on growth, was the very same bourgeoisie that would be the new ruling class of the capitalist era (Marx 1978a). The Marxist conception of class has been criticized on a number of grounds, both empirical (historical) and theoretical. For the purposes of stratification theory, the most important criticisms of Marx’s approach are that (1) he never defined class (he did not complete the section of the third volume of Capital, in which he was to have done so) (Grusky 2001, 15); (2) his model seems to allow for only two large classes in any given historical moment, thus giving at best an extremely simplified (and at worst simply wrong) picture of any known historical society, though admittedly it leaves room for what he and his followers have called “class fragments” and the like (Grusky 2001, 15–17); and (3) the unfolding of industrial and postindustrial societies in the 20th century did not fit the pattern that he predicted (Bell 1999, 148; Grusky 2001, 16): increasing “pauperization” and “immiseration” (that is, growth in both the size and absolute exploitation of the proletariat), eventual revolution, the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” the “withering away” of the state, and the glorious future in which the division of labor would disappear (Marx 1978a, 483, 490–491). Another element of these unsubstantiated predictions is Marx’s related claim that nationalism would disappear, since it was essentially a form of false consciousness that prevented—or at least temporarily reduced—the realization of true international class consciousness (Marx 1978a, 1978b, 1978c). Theorists and social scientists in the Marxist tradition have attempted to resolve these problems in myriad ways. Some, such as Erik Olin Wright, have proposed a more detailed class typology (Wright 2001). Others N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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tried to show what Marx might have missed so as to save the broader theory by rejecting some of its more specific claims ( for an example, see Dahrendorf 2001). Their efforts, generally, were not successful in adding to the explanatory value of Marx’s class theory. The other major tradition of social science class conceptions is rooted in the work of Max Weber. In an essay translated as “Class, Status, and Party,” Weber (1958) drew distinctions among a variety of different elements of stratification systems. He posited the existence of at least three orders in any given society: the social order (by which prestige, deference, or status is distributed), the political order (by which political power is distributed), and the economic order (by which access to or control over goods and resources is distributed), characterized by “classes” (M. Weber 1958, 181). The orders are to be understood as analytical rather than ontological, that is, they are pure types constructed for the purposes of social analysis. Weber recognized that in actual practice the orders are tightly intermixed and that, moreover, relationships among them vary from society to society. In general, where a Marxist theorist sees determination and uniformity, a Weberian one sees contingency and heterogeneity. But there is more to the difference between the Marxist and the Weberian positions. Weber refers to status stratification as the “social” order (“class” is “merely” the economic order) because only status groups represent actual communities characterized by common culture (M. Weber 1958, 186–187). As a result, belonging to a status group defines the individual’s values, beliefs, and style of life, thereby defining one’s identity. “Classes,” in their ideal form, do not designate cultural units; they are not communities but simply categories of classification (M. Weber 1958, 181). They are defined quantitatively, by the amount of money one commands at the market or by the level of education, rather than qualitatively, or by a characteristic style of life and set of values. One cannot usually derive from someone else’s class position any of their other characteristics (such as profession, hobbies, tastes, and so on). In contrast to status groups such as castes or estates, seen in qualitative cultural (religious and/or legal) and therefore absolute terms, classes are quantitative and therefore relative terms, forming a relative hierarchy of lower, middle, and upper classes (M. Weber 1958). The quantitative distinctions of class stratification acquire significance, that is, they become meaningful to their members and outsiders, only when class— one’s economic position—becomes a basis for status and therefore for the social order. Certain societies show remarkable isomorphism between status and class (M. Weber 1958). These are the societies that we refer to as “class societies.” Quantitative goods (such as wealth and years of education) are transferable, however. Therefore, the isomorphism of social and economic orders and the dependence of status on class imply social mobility, or the open system of stratification. One’s identity (the community to which one belongs, one’s values, and one’s style of life) becomes a matter of choice and achievement rather than ascription, as when the status hierarchy is independent from class. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Weberian perspective, unlike the Marxist one, has considerable explanatory value, among other things, because it helps us draw important distinctions between types of stratification systems. This aspect is particularly important to the present task, since the rise of nationalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in much of Europe and elsewhere involved a transformation from an estate (rigidly stratified) to a class (open) system or, in Weber’s terms, from an honor society in which the “social order” and the “economic order” were relatively independent to one in which social status is essentially identical with class position. Now that we have achieved some level of clarity regarding our use of the term “class,” it is important that we also clarify what is meant by “nationalism.” We do not consider nationalism as being patriotic feeling, in-group solidarity, or xenophobia. Something like patriotism, or certainly the sense of identification with and solidarity with a group and some differential treatment (if not hostility) toward outsiders, is an essentially human universal. Human beings have always classified themselves socially and constructed boundaries between their own kind and others. Nationalism, however, is a particular cultural form of such boundary construction. It is an historical phenomenon, not a human universal; it has a beginning, a process of development, and possibly an end. Like all historical phenomena not bound up in human nature, it is contingent and therefore unpredictable. If we imagine the viewpoint of a 15th-century European, for example, we will readily see that the division of the world into nations, in the sense discussed below, was quite an improbable political development. To understand this historical form of identity, indeed, the most central form of identity in the modern world, we need to focus on and explain what is distinctive to it. In other words, we must determine what separates it from the most salient forms of identity that preceded it. In the European context, the relevant comparisons are with religious identity, in which virtually the entire population partook, and with the estate identity, as understood above, which corresponded to one’s position in the rigid social hierarchy. We hesitate to describe whole eras in such stark terms, but, for analytical purposes, it is justifiable to view the forms of identity characteristic of prenational Europe as essentially religious and hierarchical in nature (Bruce 1997). National identity is in many ways the inverse of these previous forms of identity. It is resolutely egalitarian (Greenfeld 1992). It identifies the dignity of the individual with his or her membership in the nation itself, and this nation is imagined as fundamentally unstratified. From the point of view of the national image, there is little difference in the inherent worth of the various members of the society. Obviously, stratification in national societies persists, though it changes its nature. The persistence of some kind of stratification does not remain unnoticed, but it is treated by members of national societies as essentially superficial. Put differently, the fundamental equality of national membership is understood in meritocratic terms; we are all born equal, such national thought asserts, but we justify the superficial inequality of our world by our deeds (such as individual economic performance or service to the nation) (Greenfeld 1992). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In addition to being egalitarian, nationalism is also inseparably bound to the notion of popular sovereignty. Whereas in pre-national societies legitimate authority was understood to have an ultimately transcendental source, under nationalism it is the will of the people, whether expressed through one leader or the majority of the voting population, that is the ultimate source of legitimate authority. For this reason, the national image of the world is a secular one since it asserts, at least implicitly, that the final arbiter is the community itself (Greenfeld 1992).

Origins The need for identity ( for a definite position in the social world, or for a status) is an elemental feature of human nature. Our relative genetic impoverishment—the fact that we need extrinsic, cultural sources of information to pass on our social order and to construct our sense of self (Geertz 1973)—leaves us in a particularly vulnerable position, because extrinsic sources of information can be susceptible to disruption, confusion, or other disturbances. The term “status inconsistency” refers to one such disturbance when our society sends us mixed or irreconcilable messages about our place in the social order or about that order’s very structure. It must be emphasized that status inconsistency is much more than a mere nuisance. It causes considerable psychological distress, particularly among those who are acutely sensitive to cultural messages, and is one of the most disruptive forces known to observers of social reality. Status inconsistency is the characteristic form of what Durkheim called anomie (Durkheim 1997). As Greenfeld has written, “Anomie, commonly translated as ‘normlessness,’ refers to a condition of cultural insufficiency, a systemic problem which reflects inconsistency, or the lack of coordination, between various institutional structures, as a result of which they are likely to send contradictory messages to individuals within them” (Greenfeld 2006a, 212). Such contradictory messages, by pulling individuals simultaneously in different directions, tear the social fabric and are found behind all kinds of traumatic phenomena, from revolutions to increased rates of suicide and mental disease. Acute status inconsistency lay behind the emergence of nationalism, as well as its spread around much of the globe, though its nature and sources varied from time to time and place to place. In early 16th-century England, where nationalism first appeared, the status inconsistency that preceded the invention of its national image was rooted in the devastation of the traditional nobility in the War of the Roses, in the rise from the periphery of the new Tudor dynasty, and in the Tudors’ strategy of recruiting from lower strata to fill top positions in their state bureaucracy (Greenfeld 1992). The vacuum on the top of the social hierarchy and the recruitment of commoners to fill it inaugurated the age of social mobility. For about a century, upward mobility visibly predominated over downward movement. It is worth emphasizing that, although upward social mobility seems N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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generally preferable to downward mobility, even upward movement, particularly in certain sociocultural contexts, unsettles status situations and produces status inconsistency (Durkheim 1997). In early Tudor England, the self-understanding of the time was appropriate to a society of orders model, meaning that one’s social position was essentially ascribed, established at and by birth, as ordained by God. There was, therefore, something positively unnatural about leaving one’s station and moving up, and this fairly common experience required a new rationalization. Nationalism provided this rationalization. The term “nation” had, in the immediate period preceding this transformation, referred to “an elite” (Greenfeld 1992, 6). Redefining the people of England as a nation allowed a new elite from the people (the new Tudor aristocracy) to render its newfound social success intelligible and, thereby, to justify it. At the same time, it necessarily implied the redefinition of the social order itself—as egalitarian, based on popular sovereignty, and secular. As a result, the system of stratification was redefined and, thus, reconstructed as open, based on individual achievement, and presupposing constant social mobility. Precisely because status inconsistency in England was caused by upward mobility, England was not only the site of nationalism’s invention, as far as research has shown, but it was the only society in which nationalism captured the imaginations of more than a handful of individuals, and from more than one social stratum, for several centuries. In fact, most nationalisms in the European and American contexts developed between the late 18th and the late 19th centuries. Several cases are paradigmatic, hence we will focus on them here. For reasons of chronology, we start with France. The French case transcends simple historical interest for a couple of reasons. First, it seems to have been the first nation to understand itself in collectivistic and civic terms, meaning that it was the first to see the nation as a sort of superentity and site of agency rather than as an association of individuals, like England had done before it. Nevertheless, France drew boundaries between members of the nation and those outside it in terms of civic, not ethnic, criteria. Therefore, it originated a new “collectivistic and civic” type of nationalism, as opposed to the English “individualistic and civic” and the most common variety at present, the “collectivistic and ethnic” type (Greenfeld 1992). French nationalism, importantly, was an aristocratic nationalism at its birth. That is, although it was, like English nationalism before it, a response to acute status inconsistency, the social group experiencing this instability was a different one—mostly the traditional aristocracy—and the cause for its status inconsistency was humiliation rather than social success. The well-documented marginalization and chronic disempowerment of the aristocracy under Louises XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI deprived members of this estate of the justification for their privileges and the deference they expected. Their privileges were diluted by the virtual torrent of new “creations” (ennobled commoners), which washed away the boundaries of their identity. Members of the aristocracy experienced their society as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Painting from 1755 depicting an evening in Madame de Geoffrin’s salon. One of the bestknown women of the Enlightenment, Madame de Geoffrin was the hostess of a salon that attracted artists, philosophers, politicians, and many other intellectuals during this critical period in France’s development. (Réunion des Musées Nationaux/Art Resource, NY)

profoundly unjust. Some articulated this dissatisfaction in terms of the old order, attempting to restate the traditional grounds for their noble status and argue that the king had overstepped the traditionally established bounds. What has been seldom recognized, at least until recently, is that this reflection on noble status also led many aristocrats, paradoxically, to reject the old order and its traditions and turn to an ideology that would ultimately lead to their near-total eradication: nationalism. To these nobles, their counterparts in Britain seemed to have maintained their traditional prerogatives through the strength of the English Parliament, a stark contrast to the capacity of opponents of the French Crown to assert themselves. Some recognized, perhaps unconsciously, that the language in which parliamentary authority was articulated could also be used to express their grievances. Their humiliation could be redressed after being reinterpreted as an attack on the nation. The king’s use and the alleged abuse of his authority could be understood as a violation of the principle of popular sovereignty. When the Crown privileged commoners with money, the act could be understood as a violation of the principle of equality, regardless of how foreign egalitarian principles might be to the traditional order. For this reason, many of the initial movers of the French Revolution came from the aristocracy, though, it must be admitted, some of them abandoned ship when other revolutionaries saw further implications ( for them!) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of the ideas they had championed. In the process, however, the aristocracy largely redefined itself as a cultural elite (Greenfeld 1992). This type of redefinition was of central significance in the development of Russian nationalism. The identity of the small service nobility, in whose midst Russian nationalism first emerged, began metamorphosing into that of the Russian intelligentsia in the late 18th century. The chief reason for this transformation was the near-absolute dependence of the noble status on the favor and satisfaction of the autocrat. In his efforts to modernize Russia, Peter the Great single-handedly created the conditions for the status inconsistency in his nobility and introduced it to the idea of the nation. As with France, nationalism alone was not enough to resolve this status inconsistency but, in fact, exacerbated it and made it intolerable. The transformation of the ascribed noble identity into that of cultural elite, in principle based on achievement (specifically, service to the nation), made the nobles again confident in deserving their high status, but it also created a rift between the intelligentsia and the government. In the view of the intelligentsia, the government never sufficiently acknowledged its dignity and authority. This rift exists to this day, for belonging to the intelligentsia denotes a high aristocratic status in Russia, one that is opposed to the “common” people (Greenfeld 1992, 1995, 2006b). Most Latin American nationalisms, which emerged a generation later, had similar geneses to the French. Particularly in more peripheral areas of the Spanish colonial world, such as in Caracas or Buenos Aires, traditional elites had long been accorded a sort of de facto autonomy and had effectively set themselves up as an American nobility. This status was perhaps most pronounced in colonial Caracas (Ferry 1989). Certain groups (the Bolívar family, for example) were long accustomed to deference and privileges. When the reforms of the Bourbons, which took place over the mid- to late 18th century, upset these deferential patterns and privileges, considerable discontent was produced. Though for many years the status inconsistency generated by these changes did not lead the local elite to turn to nationalism, Napoleon’s intervention in Spain allowed marginal voices to assume center stage, and a variety of nationalisms were born. In what became the nation of Venezuela, the early nationalists were often first American nationalists and only then Colombian or Venezuelan ones (Eastwood 2006). This pattern was similar to the one set throughout the region. The Latin American wars of independence were bloody and long, yet events here deviated from the French model in that society was not entirely reconfigured to make it consistent with the national view. As has often been noted, a new, predominantly agricultural elite sprung up and essentially mimicked the forms of political and economic domination of the elite that preceded them (Lynch 1986, 219–227), though with the important difference that it was rationalized in national terms. In other words, in much of Latin America, patrimonial forms of political relations persisted, but they were now expressed in national language, and the caudillos or strongmen of the 19th century invariably presented themselves as saviors and/or representatives of the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In all cases where nationalism has an aristocratic genesis, such as in France, Russia, or Latin America, a national image of the world (that the world is divided into nations, imagined as sovereign communities of equals) is eventually realized, or at least closer and closer approximations of the implied reality in question are achieved. The elite class that first imports the idea of the nation to promote its own status-oriented agenda articulates an image of the polity and the social structure and creates a new form of political rhetoric that is then seized upon and transformed by other actors in different social positions. Sometimes members of the very first aristocratic, revolutionary class see the gap between the national ideals they proclaim and the reality of a society that does not live up to the standards the new national elite sets for it. A variety of solutions might then be proposed, such as extensive programs of national education and/or temporary authoritarian rule, until the members of the nation are “civilized” or judged capable of self-government. The most striking example comes from Japan, whose first nationalists came from the samurai elite of the pre-national era. One of them, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the “apostle of Japanese nationalism,” relates a story of the initial unpreparedness of the Japanese peasant masses for nationalism. Peasants were unable to comprehend its egalitarian implications. Once he encountered a peasant on the road who, in recognizing Fukuzawa’s superiority, got off his horse and bowed to him. Fukuzawa protested, but the peasant persisted in traditional expressions of deference. “Get back on your horse,” Fukuzawa commanded. “If you don’t, I’ll beat you” (Greenfeld 2001, 278). As Eugen Weber has famously documented with regard to the French case, it may take a considerable period of time before the bulk of a population is actually brought into the orbit of national discourse and comes to see the world in national terms (E. Weber 1976). This was certainly true in much of Latin America, where personalist caudillos ruled for much of the 19th century over essentially agricultural societies, while the bulk of the population remained in semifeudal conditions. Thus far we have considered two models of nationalism’s origins in status inconsistency: the original case of England, in which nationalism was a response to the novel experience of upward social mobility among the lower gentry, and much of the urban population, under the Tudors; and the aristocratic origins model, in which a threatened traditional elite is placed into a position of status inconsistency and imports nationalism to deal with this problem. A third pattern of the emergence of nationalism in response to status dynamics is exemplified by Germany (Greenfeld 1992). There, the relevant social group was the non-noble intellectuals, a new class of individuals produced by the growing university system established throughout the German lands in the 18th century. In distinction to the aristocracy, these intellectuals were indeed a class, not an estate. Their social position was a result of a choice and individual achievement rather than of birth. The university system and the general cultural climate of the Enlightenment offered talented young men from the lower urban strata— burghers—an opportunity for upward mobility. The broader social structure of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the German principalities, however, was still that of a society of orders—an estate structure quite deaf to the Enlightenment’s new ideas. In this rigid traditional structure, class and social mobility were anomalies. Indeed, it was the Enlightenment and the growing prestige of learning that lay behind the growth of German universities and not, as one might expect, a developing capitalist economy that could be used to explain their rise in functionalist terms. What this meant was that high numbers of German intellectuals, with great aspirations, were sent out into a society not prepared to receive them, and they invariably suffered from the status inconsistency this situation generated; the high expectations they had cultivated were met with meager returns. These were the essential preconditions for the development of German Romanticism, which, in turn, constructed the cultural material out of which German nationalism was born. The process was a classic instance of what Nietzsche called ressentiment and the “transvaluation” of values (Nietzsche 1998, 19–23; Scheler 1994). First, the Enlightenment was turned upon, and the opposites of Reason, a supreme value of the Enlightenment, were championed: emotions, the will (above all), and the cult of death and of nature instead of the corrupting, false, and inauthentic ( from the Romantic point of view) society that had spurned them (Greenfeld 1992). Then, following the Napoleonic invasion, this transvaluation was recast in national terms. The ultimate embodiment of the romantic ideal was the German nation, and the pains and humiliations of its unhappy intellectuals were projected onto that nation, which was then declared morally superior to and, in today’s parlance, “deeper” than the shallow, materialistic societies of “the west,” meaning essentially France and England. The political unification of Germany would have to wait for Bismarck, but its national consciousness was alive and well among its intellectuals for two generations before him. The German case is the paradigmatic instance of a ressentiment-laden, “collectivistic and ethnic” type of nationalism, as noted above—the most common variety of nationalism today (Greenfeld 1992).

Dimensions As we have tried to show, in so far as its “class origins” are concerned, transformation in a society’s self-understanding, that is, the emergence of national consciousness, has historically taken three forms. The first form, of course, was highly singular, for it was not simply the importation of nationalism and squaring it with indigenous traditions and forms of self-understanding but, rather, its very invention. Most subsequent nationalisms, however, have taken either the path blazed by France or by Germany in the sense that either traditional noble elites (often cum intellectuals) or the non-noble intellectuals have been the first converts to nationalism (Greenfeld 1992). Another common case in the 20th century, whereby nationalism is essentially forced (by a political elite) onto a society whose boundN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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aries are carved by colonial powers, lies beyond the purview of this article. Likewise, societies such as Australia, the United States, or Canada, which essentially inherited their nationalism from England/Britain (though their independence movements achieved a transformation in the geopolitical referent for national loyalty) do not concern us here. The genesis of a given nationalism, and in particular the nature of the original nationalist stratum, exerts considerable influence over the content of the nationalism in question and, in turn, over that nationalism’s subsequent “class nature.” In cases where nationalism is adopted as a solution for elite status problems, the social group in question will often attempt to construct the new nationalism in its own interest, arrogating to itself the exclusive right to interpret the will of the nation. Such societies are thus generally imagined in collective terms, as superagents and not mere associations of individuals (Greenfeld 1992). This form allows for a convenient rationalization of elite dominance in a variety of ways, since elites (particularly intellectual elites) can claim special expertise or prerogatives in guiding the nation and can legitimate the differential rewards they receive. It is not at all surprising, for this reason, that the systems of stratification (or class systems) of collectivistic nationalisms show important differences when compared to the systems of stratification characteristic of individualistic nationalisms. Collectivistic nationalisms tend to preserve inequality in new forms, by awarding privileged status to representatives of the very groups who first turned to nationalism. Ethnic nationalisms carry the potential to add to this class stratification a hierarchy of ethnic groups, which often takes the form of virtual caste distinctions.

Consequences As noted above, after nationalism emerges, its spread throughout the population is a secondary process. In terms of nationalism’s intersection with class, it is again worth noting that nationalism’s most fundamental consequence is its open stratification (Greenfeld 2006a). Given that it presents an image of the social world as essentially unstratified, it implies that qualitative status distinctions within the national population are false or inauthentic and must be done away with. In addition, given that nationalism becomes the fundamental framework for organizing social life, it expresses this demand with a high degree of normative force. Thus, it implies that national societies will be class societies (as defined above) and that social mobility will be possible. It hardly needs to be added that nationalism is perhaps the most important out of several factors (along with the spread of industrial capitalism and the growth of technology, for example) that converged in the 19th century in Europe to create the classic class societies that so concerned the founders of the social sciences. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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To conclude, the traditional account of nationalism as having “bourgeois” origins is misleading. The notion of the bourgeoisie as the class representing the productive force of capital, according to Marxist class theory, is a myth rather than a reality, and in all the cases considered here, whatever might be called the bourgeoisie was not the central actor in nationalism’s emergence. Instead, the importers and articulators of nationalism tended to come from the cultural elite, for nationalism is a response to a cultural problem, not a class situation. It has no specific “class basis.” Rather, it is the basis of classes; it creates the very framework in which class systems develop. Selected Bibliography Bell, D. 1999. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. Special Anniversary Edition. New York: Basic Books. Bruce, S. 1997. “The Pervasive World-View: Religion in Pre-Modern Britain.” British Journal of Sociology 8, no. 4: 667–680. Dahrendorf, R. 2001. “Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. In Social Stratification: Race, Class, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, edited by D. Grusky, 105–111. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Durkheim, E. 1997. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press. Eastwood, J. 2006. The Rise of Nationalism in Venezuela. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Ferry, R. 1989. The Colonial Elite of Early Caracas: Formation and Crisis, 1567–1767. Berkeley: University of California Press. Geertz, C. 1973. “Religion as a Cultural System.” The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Greenfeld, L. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenfeld, L. 1995. “Russian Nationalism as a Medium of Revolution.” Qualitative Sociology 18, no. 2: 189–209. Greenfeld, L. 2001. The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenfeld, L. 2006a. “Nationalism and the Mind.” Nationalism and the Mind. Oxford: Oneworld. Greenfeld, L. 2006b. “Nationalism and Modernity.” Nationalism and the Mind. Oxford: Oneworld. Grusky, D. 2001. “Introduction: The Past, Present, and Future of Social Inequality.” In Social Stratification: Race, Class, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, edited by D. Grusky, 3–51. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hobsbawm, E. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lynch, J. 1986. The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826, 2nd ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Marx, K. 1978a. “Manifesto of the Communist Party.” In Marx-Engels Reader, edited by R. C. Tucker, 469–500. New York: W. W. Norton. Marx, K. 1978b. “The German Ideology: Part 1.” In Marx-Engels Reader, edited by R. C. Tucker, 146–200. New York: W. W. Norton. Marx, K. 1978c. “Marx on the History of His Opinions.” In Marx-Engels Reader, edited by R. C. Tucker, 3–6. New York: W. W. Norton.

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Nietzsche, F. 1998. On the Genealogy of Morality. Translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Scheler, M. 1994. Ressentiment. Translated by Lewis B. Coser. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Shils, E. 1972. “Deference.” The Constitution of Society, 143–175. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Weber, E. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Weber, M. 1958. “Class, Status, and Party.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 180–195. New York: Oxford University Press. Wright, E. O. 2001. “A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure.” In Social Stratification: Race, Class, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, edited by D. Grusky, 116–127. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Nationalism and Conflict Ray Taras Relevance It was during the late 17th and early 18th centuries that nationalism first emerged as a political force that shaped both international and domestic politics. Until then, political nationalism did not exist. The nation was identified with the state or, more precisely, with the dynastic rulers of the state. Their subjects formed part of the nation only insofar as they expressed their loyalty to a dynasty. Nationalism of the people was nonexistent. During most of this period, political nationalism was infused with liberal ideas that spoke in favor of cooperation among, rather than conflict between, contending parties—whether they be dynastic states or emergent nation-states. Modern liberalism, especially as it applies to international relations between states, can be traced to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who advanced the notion of a “perpetual peace.” His proposal for a liberal constitution to be adopted by states so that such a peace could be achieved included the following requirements: (1) the state should be a republic in which the consent of citizens for going to war was mandatory; (2) a league of free states should be formed that would guarantee the emergence of a pacific federation; and (3) in such a universal community, a citizen’s rights should be respected everywhere, hence the idea of a “cosmopolitian right”—the precursor to human rights—was put forward (Kant 1991, 99–108). Kant’s ideas became widely accepted (though not always practiced) during this period, and a liberal form of nationalism emerged that did not often foment conflicts among peoples. To be sure, conflicts did break out, and among those discussed here were those between, on the one hand, Napoleon’s military campaigns in Europe and overseas and, on the other, national uprisings by peoples against the invading French armies. Conflict also occurred between imperial powers (Austria, Russia, Turkey) and the peoples subjugated by them; the events of 1848 were the most dramatic examples. Finally, as this period came to a close, the liberal content of nationalism began to erode as European powers scrambled for colonies and their nationalist programs became inseparable from political and economic expansion. We must not lose sight of the bottom line, however: liberal nationalism in the 19th century was an ideology that stressed the spread of political liberties and cooperation among peoples—not oppression of or conflict between them. Before the outbreak of the 1789 revolution, French political thinkers debated new understandings of government and the organization of nations. Voltaire (1694–1778) rejected the narrowness of national and religious parochialism and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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advocated cultural and commercial progress in nations. He stressed the importance of creating a civilized society based on a common sense of citizenship. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) believed that government had to be based on the general will of the people, in this way introducing the notion of popular sovereignty. The state had to provide for the liberty and happiness of its inhabitants. In turn, it was itself dependent on the virtue of its citizens. The state derived its strength from citizens who felt a responsibility for the good of the commonweal. The way that the state bound individuals together in a community was through the popular expression of national civic feelings. For Rousseau, liberty and justice were the underpinnings of the national state. Fusing private individuality with the collective organism of a state was also a method of restoring the original goodness of human beings. Although their approaches differed, Voltaire and Rousseau were both precursors of 19th-century liberal nationalism. The revolutionaries who overthrew Louis XVI (1754–1793) in 1792 invoked the will of the people—the French nation—for their actions. To be sure, the French constitution adopted a year earlier, in 1791, and accepted by Louis, referred to him as “King of the French” rather than, as earlier, “King of France and Navarre.” This change in title symbolized a move to a popular monarchy from a dynastic one. It also underscored the monarchy’s direct links to the people rather than to the territory of France. Rousseau’s followers who insisted on constitutional change assumed that unity and fraternity among the French would be promoted by giving them rights and liberties. They also wished to suppress the privileges of the upper class. In this way, they recognized nationalism as both a revolutionary and democratic ideology. The equation nation = state = people was applicable not just to France but to other countries when they achieved popular self-determination. As the French Declaration of Rights of 1795 asserted: “Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of the territory it occupies” (cited in Hobsbawm 1993, 19). The ideas of the French Revolution were to have a major impact on many different nationalities within 19th-century European empires. The movement for popular sovereignty also soon spread beyond Europe, illustrated by nationalist uprisings from Egypt to Latin America early in the 19th century. At that time, nationalism was a term synonymous with political liberty. It remained that way until the end of the period under discussion. The desire for political liberty inevitably entailed a conflict with political elites unwilling to be held accountable to the people. Another defining feature of nationalism at that time, therefore, was the mobilization of forces seeking regime changes. As with the French Revolution, which overthrew what became known as the ancien régime, the political objective of nationalist forces in other countries also was to effect regime change and replace dynastic or autocratic rule with popular sovereignty. Nationalism threatened the power of long-ruling political elites by seeking to empower hitherto disenfranchised groups. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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There was a more circuitous way that the French Revolution and its aftermath stirred nationalist movements in other European countries. In the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars fought from 1792–1815, France invaded and occupied many European states. Napoleon’s imperial vision marked a contrast to the multicultural practices of the Habsburg empire because it insisted that all conquered peoples had to introduce French laws and administration and pay tribute to France. In reality, then, Napoleon’s objective was to weaken rather than liberate other nations, even though he had announced—and many Europeans believed— that he stood as the champion of oppressed peoples. Napoleon’s logic was a political variant of the 16th-century principle of cuius regio, eius religio, that is, the religion of the ruler is the religion of the people of a region. The principle suggested that, through the will of the emperor, national loyalty could be switched from a weak nation to a stronger one. Napoleon’s failure in this endeavor is symbolized in the reaction of Vienna-based composer Ludwig van Beethoven, who was initially infatuated by the French ruler’s idealism. On hearing that Napoleon had taken the title of emperor in 1804, Beethoven angrily tore up the dedication page of his Third Symphony, which was to be named after the French commander. After Napoleon’s victory over the Prussians at Jena in 1806, Beethoven’s disillusionment with French national emancipation was complete. He inveighed: “It is a pity I do not understand the art of war as well as I do the art of music. I would conquer him!” (cited in Clubbe 2006). It is usually assumed that nationalism must be anchored in a national language spoken by all subjects in a country. In other words, cuius regio, eius linguo, that is, the ruler’s language is the country’s language. As late as 1789, one-half of all people living in France could not speak French, and many decades after the birth of French nationalism in 1789, that principle had not been realized. Thus, in 1863 more than one-fifth of schoolchildren in France still did not understand French, and one-half considered it a foreign language (Weber 1976, 67–68). The nations that battled the invading Napoleonic armies were asserting a national principle of their own. Most of the national movements of the 19th century—Italian, German, Polish, Hungarian, South Slav, Greek—were in some measure stimulated by revolutionary France and Napoleon. Nationalist ideas soon spread to Latin America, and in the early 19th century, Simón Bolivar’s (1783–1830) dream of establishing a unified South America independent from Spain ran aground on the particularist nationalisms—Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and later Panama—of the various administrative parts of the Spanish viceroyalty of New Granada. European nationalism had found its reflection on a distant continent. Sweeping political changes invariably transform a nation’s culture. The French Revolution replaced a cultural establishment with a revolutionary vanguard. This new cultural elite set out to revolutionize the arts, paradoxically looking to classical antiquity for ways to express the newfound sovereignty of the people. The fusion of nationalist forms of expression with universal values was the aim of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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French cultural avant-garde, foreshadowing the modern idea of “national in form, global in content”—the characteristic of a culture in the age of globalization. The breakthrough of political nationalism in the late 18th century continues to shape our world today. While the term now often has negative associations, it continues to provide fuel for political leaders, their followers, and the cultural intelligentsia in most countries of the world. Nationalism has served many noble purposes, such as the emancipation of subjected peoples, but it has also been harnessed in support of xenophobic, racist, and imperialist movements.

Origins If the catalyst for the emergence of modern nationalism was the French Revolution, itself inspired by the ideas of 18th-century French thinkers, much of the intellectual spadework had been carried out by German intellectuals. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), regarded as the father of German liberalism, was in a more indirect way a source of German nationalism. To be sure, he considered himself to be a citizen of the world, but this identity did not refute his Germanic origins since being German signified, he believed, being cosmopolitan. The positive attribute of the German-speaking people of his time was, Kant advanced, their belief in reason. National passions had little place in their lives. German lands, accordingly, were to constitute the abode of reason. The philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) and his contemporary Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) shared the idea that the greatness of the German nation lay in its language and culture. Specifically, Fichte sought to awaken a hitherto fragmented German nation through educational expansion. Like Kant, Fichte ascribed a universalist mission to the German people; they were to bring about the religious and moral regeneration of humanity, for only Germans had maintained linguistic continuity and encouraged different social classes to take part in the development of German culture. One of the most influential German philosophers of this period was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), whose writings on nationalism are often overshadowed in his overall oeuvre. Like Beethoven, Hegel was shaken by Napoleon’s victory over Prussia at Jena, but he drew different lessons from it. For one, displaying his skepticism about Germany’s claim to being a great nation, Hegel found the Jena outcome proof that civilized nations were stronger than primitive ones. He stood in opposition to the German national aspirations of his time and rejected political Romanticism. He also contended that the political disintegration and demoralization of a nation could only be prevented by the selection of a strong leader. Yet Hegel was more concerned with building the state than the nation; it was in the state, he was convinced, that reason and morality resided. Hegel’s work had a strong appeal to Karl Marx (1818–1883), who also deprecated the emergent nationalism of his German homeland. Marx’s belief that N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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social class was more important than national affiliation shaped and scarred the movement that bore his name for the next century. His reference to “historic nations”—Hungary, Poland, Ireland—was an ideological construct that acknowledged only revolutionary peoples with an insurrectionist tradition. His denigration of Russia as backward illustrated his capricious, arbitrary, and hostile approach to nationalism. It is ironic, then, that his attempts in the 1860s to establish an International Workingmen’s Association foundered as a result of disagreements among socialists coming from different European nations. Marx’s internationalist orientation stood in sharp contrast with the nationalist views of German economist Friedrich List (1789–1846). List held that the way for Germany to catch up with England, France, and America was by developing into a great economic power. Advancing a theory of national economics, List held that the political union linking state and people had to be transformed into a commercial union. The state had a particular responsibility to promote the interests of its merchants and manufacturers so that the nation as a whole could prosper. Whereas Marx opposed capitalist development, List tried to show how a nation could adopt this strategy to catch up with the advanced economies. German writing about German nationalism is more eclectic than what is found in other European nations of this period. The explanation for this diversity was that “it was precisely because there were so many untested and wholly Utopian theories about the reality of a German nation, her boundaries and internal order, that German nationalism became so attractive. . . . Nationalism was open to all kinds of content; it could be made religious, Liberal, democratic and egalitarian. . . . In short, it formed the ideal vehicle for every kind of anti-establishment creative idea” (Schulze 1991, 98). The collapse of the German revolution in 1848–1849 put an end to the hopes for a liberal, all-German nation-state and seemed to back up Marx’s preference for an illiberal and internationalist solution. English nationalism during this period did not stir either the passions of intellectuals to the same degree as in Germany or the actions of the revolutionaries that dominated France. In his essay “Of National Character,” Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1766) argued that Britain’s mixed form of government and the freedom enjoyed by all its social classes and religions hindered the emergence of a national character. He took pride in the fact that the English “of any people in the universe have the least of a national character, unless this very singularity may pass for such” (Hertz 1944, 44). Lacking a national character, embracing a banal, low-key form of patriotism, and putting individual liberties ahead of national interests seemed to be the qualities that made England, paradoxically, the first modern nation. English nationalism was also shaped by the country’s move away from mercantalism. Mercantalism’s state-led approach to economic development may have suited the overseas English trading companies of the 16th century, but promoting a national economy was at odds with the new spirit of liberty and individualism emerging in the late 18th century. Mercantalism fettered England’s economic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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growth in the age of industrialization because economic growth was promoted most efficiently when the government refrained from regulating commerce and adopted laissez-faire economic relations. The publication by Adam Smith (1723–1790) of The Wealth of Nations in 1776 was a turning point that signaled England’s impending embrace of free market and free trade economics. Smith argued that enjoying economic freedom was more valuable than having state regulation, and that competition was invariably preferable to monopoly. He viewed political economy as based on the commonweal of the whole nation—not just a particular social class—and on cooperation among citizens organized through a division of labor. For Smith, the economic interests of all nations were best served through a free exchange of commodities. Economic liberalism was therefore essential to the promotion of a nation’s wealth, resources, and even the development of civilized culture. War would become pointless when all nations accepted economic liberalism as the pathway to mutual prosperity and cultural development. The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) advanced a political version of this argument by stating that nations should be associates instead of rivals in the grand social enterprise of building civilization. Smith has sometimes been portrayed as a liberal imperialist because he believed that a fair and just imperial structure based, for example, on English commerce could come to pass. This conclusion was opposite to the one Marxists drew, which was that cutthroat capitalist competition and, eventually, imperial ambitions would lead to war among nations. Predictions of whether economic liberalism would lead to peace or conflict depended on rival world outlooks. That it led to the strengthening of the nationstate was a less controversial proposition, however. The historian Eric Hobsbawm asked whether it was “historically fortuitous that the classic era of free trade liberalism coincided with that ‘nation-making’ which [Walter] Bagehot [1826–1877] saw as so central to his century” (Hobsbawm 1993, 25). He answered his own question by postulating that the nation-state performed indispensable functions for the development of capitalism. It was especially important that this state was based on the principle of consent. In Considerations on Representative Government published in 1861, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) defined the nation as a collectivity informed by national sentiment. A crucial factor was that its members wanted to be ruled by the same government that they themselves would establish. Throughout the 19th century, the peculiar nature of English nationalism harbored both liberal political and economic principles and imperial expansion and pride. Both owed much to the nature of the British state, supported by the British people, which acted as an invisible hand as well as a rudder for a far-flung empire in the making. A type of nationalism very different from that in France, Germany, or England was emerging in Russia. Empress Catherine the Great (1729–1796) saw herself N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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as a “philosopher on the throne” and looked to the West, mostly to France and its philosophes, for ideas. The language of her court was French, but she also took care to learn the language of her subjects, Russian. Like Peter the Great (1672–1725) before her, Catherine was intent upon Russia becoming part of a modernizing western Europe. These two absolutist monarchs were pivotal in putting Russia on the road to becoming a nation—rather than a loose association of disparate peoples. The social class most receptive to the ideology of nationalism was Russia’s extensive nobility. “The protracted crisis of identity within the nobility, similarly to the development in other countries, rendered this elite stratum sympathetic to the nationalist ideas that had been forcefully promoted by Russia’s energetic despots, Peter and Catherine the Great” (Greenfeld 1992, 220). Although, at the turn of the 19th century, most of the country’s leaders had apparently been seduced by the appeal of nationalism, a schism arose that divided the movement. Some thinkers saw the path to greatness as modeling Russia on the West, while others were certain that Russia’s greatness lay in its own unique attributes and institutions. Slavophilism was the name given to the latter orientation, and it was most clearly manifested in 19th-century Russian literature, music, and architecture. Many of its proponents were motivated by an envy of the West, and they took pride in Russia not having a full European identity. They regarded the Russian Orthodox Church—which used Church Slavonic as its language and the Eastern rite as its liturgy—as the last preserver of the original form of Christianity. Slavophiles also extolled the virtues of the village commune, where individual identity was subsumed under a collective one. It represented a distinctive Russian institution that gave the nation organizational and moral superiority over the West. The Russian national idea propagated by the Slavophiles was based on the nation “(1) defined as a collective individual, (2) formed by ethnic, primordial factors such as blood and soil, and (3) characterized by the enigmatic soul, or spirit” (Greenfeld 1992, 261). At the same time, it was the educated elite who were needed to interpret this spirit of the people, putting Russia on a course for continued autocratic rule. Slavophilism was also closely linked to pan-Slavism—the idea that all Slav peoples should be united under Russian leadership. In this respect, Slavophiles were supporters of a multinational, Russian-led state. The Westernizers in Russia—the Slavophiles’ opponents—were convinced that the country’s efforts to identify with the West best served Russia’s interests. It was in western Europe that Enlightenment ideas, scientific discovery, industrialization, capitalist development, and technological progress had been recorded. In many respects, Russia’s Westernizers shared the economic nationalism advanced by Germany’s List—the way for a backward country to catch up with more advanced states was through economic development based on a capitalist system. Becoming interdependent with western Europe was part of that process. The ruler with the most radical agenda for political unification with the West was Czar Alexander I (1777–1825), during whose reign Napoleon’s armies had been N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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driven out of Russia. He called for a European confederation of Christian states that would prevent future European wars. Before there was a French Revolution, there was the American Revolution. It was in America that many of the European ideals of the age of Enlightenment had been put into practice. European elites admired the liberties, religious tolerance, and prosperity enjoyed by the inhabitants of the British colonies. The English traditions of constitutional liberty, common law, and participation by citizens in the commonweal infused the colonists with a new sense of nationhood. The American Revolution of 1763–1783 is usually depicted as a backlash against English tyranny. But it was also fueled by the belief among American settlers that they were already among the freest people on Earth. The Revolution also enabled Americans to emancipate themselves from their own European past. Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) bore witness to this idea: “Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world” (Kohn 1969a, 276). The American Revolution had an indelible impact on many of the world’s nations. The clearest immediate effect was the political and national awakening of the French, which followed in the aftermath of the American Declaration of Independence. In central Europe, Poland believed it could stave off partition by enacting the democratic constitution of 1792, which captured the spirit of the American

Memorialized in this famous painting by Emanuel Leutze, George Washington crossed the Delaware River to attack the British in Trenton, New Jersey, in December 1776 during the American Revolution. (National Archives and Records Administration)

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document. Analyzing the fate of Poland, Rousseau insisted that large independent states with recognizable national communities had the right to remain independent: “It is making fools of people to tell them seriously that one can at one’s pleasure transfer peoples from master to master, like herds of cattle, without consulting their interests or their wishes” (Cobban 1969, 32). This, too, was a lesson learned from the American experience of nation-building. For American federalism to flourish, a centralizing power was needed to manage its geographic and ethnic breadth. Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804) set out to create a strong national government and a national economy that, in the process, would develop a national character. Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) elaborated an ideological foundation for the new nation that complemented its political independence. He advocated a new egalitarianism, popular democracy, and public support for the national idea as prerequisites for the nation’s existence. For Jefferson, as for nationalist thinkers in other messianic societies, America’s nationhood also had a universal importance. Its form of government constituted “a standing monument and example for the aim and the imitation of the people of other countries” (Kohn 1969a, 310). As with the nationalisms of certain other peoples, the claim was being advanced that American nationalism represented universalist ideals. This youthful, liberal, idealistic American nationalism was gradually transformed into an expansionist program—termed Manifest Destiny—by political leaders at the turn of the 19th century. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 involved a combination of secret diplomacy and antidemocratic measures; inhabitants of Louisiana—many of whom were French speakers with a distinct culture originating in Acadia—were not given the opportunity to say whether they endorsed incorporation into the United States. The U.S. annexation of West Florida in 1810 was the result partly of diplomacy, partly of military action. The brutal 1817–1818 attack on the Seminole Indians, who included runaway slaves, led to the U.S. takeover of the rest of Florida from the Spanish. The War of 1812 against the British represented a rare military failure. It started as an attempt to conquer British North America, fed by Americans’ heightened awareness of their nationhood. Instead, their new capital, Washington, was burned down, and their armies were driven out of Canada. The conquest of the American West after 1815 marked an additional phase of expansion, tarnished by mass killings of Native Americans. The Mexican-American War of 1846–1848 led to the annexation of California (where the discovery of gold in 1848 led, two years later, to statehood) and New Mexico, as well as recognition of the 1845 U.S. annexation of Texas—an independent state from 1836 to 1845. Although this expansion was largely driven by conflict, it did allow most residents of annexed territories to experience greater political liberty and equality than they had before. In contrast to European nationalisms, then, the idea of the American nation was not a simple product of blood or soil or shared memories. It was informed by a universal ideal of liberty that meant that just about everyone could be incorporated into it. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Dimensions Nationalism became the foremost kind of political discourse in the first part of the 19th century at a time when European societies were being transformed by the spread of literacy, primary education, and mass-circulation newspapers. Liberal nationalism evolved as a result of the philosophical, political, and economic programs developed by intellectual elites, combined with rising popular demands for greater freedoms. The liberal component of nationalism, therefore, gave it broad appeal as a desirable movement and ideology. For subjected and established nations alike, it offered a blueprint for political, economic, and cultural growth. Liberal nationalism was attractive to disadvantaged peoples, but it also was embraced by established elites intent on acquiring democratic legitimacy. Nationalism was not yet seen as threatening the stability of the international system, which, at this time, constituted a classic balance-of-power equilibrium. Historian E. H. Carr believed that the period extending from the time of Napoleon to the outbreak of World War I “succeeded in delicately balancing the forces of ‘nationalism’ and ‘internationalism’; for it established an international order or framework strong enough to permit of a striking extension and intensification of national feeling without disruption on any wide scale of regular and peaceful international relations” (Carr 1945, 6). A historian of nationalism, Hans Kohn had a different assessment of this period: “The great voices of former ages—Aquinas, Erasmus, Voltaire—spoke for Christendom or Europe; Bentham, Rousseau and Kant were concerned with mankind; but in the 19th century the European society and the European mind lost the oneness of the preceding age and dissolved into conflicting groups and culture patterns” (Kohn 1969b, 15). Nationalism made for fractious international politics, Kohn contended, and it did not possess the universal values with which previous ideologies had been able to forge consensus. A third perspective—that taken by Eric Hobsbawm—made reference to the major changes produced by liberal nationalism. Accepting Bagehot’s thesis that nation-making was the chief characteristic of 19th-century politics, this view rested on what were seen as the contradictory developments in the “era of triumphant bourgeois liberalism” from 1830 to 1880: The European balance of power was transformed by the emergence of two great powers based on the national principle (Germany and Italy), the effective partition of a third on the same grounds (Austria-Hungary after the Compromise of 1867), not to mention the recognition of a number of lesser political entities as independent states claiming the new status as nationally based peoples, from Belgium in the west to the Ottoman successor states in southeast Europe (Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria), and two national revolts of the Poles demanding their reconstitution as what they thought of as a nation-state. (Hobsbawm 1993, 23)

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In short, the era of liberal nationalism proved messy because it stirred the political aspirations of many European peoples. The impact of liberal nationalism was felt most acutely during the so-called springtime of peoples in 1848. To be sure, the Greek Christian uprising against Turkish rule in 1821 and the Belgian rebellion against the Netherlands in 1830 represented successful nationalist revolts that produced political independence. The Poles, in addition, rose up against the Russian tsars in 1831 and 1863, although they suffered only greater oppression. But in 1848, most of Europe was caught up in democratic nationalist uprisings. The Czechs, Danes, Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs, Italians, and, in 1850, Bulgarians demanded national self-determination and their own liberal states. Although the revolutions shook the Habsburg monarchy and brought the French one down, none led to the immediate establishment of new independent states. On the other hand, over the longer term the middle class throughout Europe became infused with the nationalist idea, which, internationally, was to lead to changes in the European political map and, in individual countries, was to challenge the grip on power held by conservative groups. The first delayed national product of the 1848 revolutions was the creation of an independent Italy. In 1861 a series of political and military actions led to the proclamation of a united Kingdom of Italy, and the process of Italian unification was completed in 1870 when Italian troops drove the French out of Rome and the city became the capital of the kingdom. The intellectual father of unification was Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872), who stressed the importance of moral unity in the struggle for a national state. Mazzini’s influence reached beyond Italy; his political program, which combined democracy, republicanism, national unity, and state independence, was popular not only in Europe but as far away as India. His vision of creating a United States of Europe, however, on the framework of diverse nationalist movements failed, just as Bolivar’s had in South America. German unification took about a decade longer to achieve, but, again, the 1848 revolution was instrumental to eventual statehood. The revolt, aimed at achieving political liberty and national unity, was largely peaceful and encouraged cooperation with other oppressed nations. Yet when the German empire was proclaimed in 1871 as a federation of smaller states, it was more the making of one man than of popular desire for unity or sovereignty. Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) displayed an extraordinary gift for statecraft, and, combined with the military victories of the Prussian army over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1871, he had obtained the support of most of Europe’s leaders for the creation of a unified German state. Hungary’s accession in 1867 to equal status with Austria in what became known as the dual monarchy is another result of the 1848 revolutions. Hungarians had risen up in that year, demanding parliamentary government and the transformation of Habsburg rule into a constitutional monarchy. Defeated by Austrian forces, Hungary’s nationalist movement seemed unlikely to achieve these objectives. But military defeat by a French-Italian coalition a decade later, then by the Prussians in 1866, weakened Austria, and in 1867 a refashioned AustroHungarian empire was established. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Why did the 1848 springtime of peoples take two decades to percolate and produce changes on the map of Europe? For Benedict Anderson, many of the nationalisms that underpinned independence movements were modeled on American and French precedents and so constituted “reactionary, secondary modelling.” In turn, existing empires decided that they, too, might “appear attractive in national drag” and adopted nationalist policies. Thus, “ ‘official nationalism’—willed merger of nation and dynastic empire . . . developed after, and in reaction to, the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s” (Anderson 1993, 86–87). So ended the halcyon days of liberal nationalism. After the civil war in the United States and the French-Prussian war of 1870–1871, a wave of economic protectionism took hold of Europe. More and more political leaders implicitly accepted a principal tenet of economic nationalism—that vital goods should be produced domestically rather than be imported. Among other results, this led to the imposition of the 1879 German tariff regime. The protectionist backlash against global interdependence in the second half of the 19th century had begun to take shape. Ineluctably, nationalism slipped out of the hands of its liberal creators and was taken over by an illiberal variant. By the 1870s, the competing nationalisms of European states expanded beyond economic issues and inspired a drive for colonial expansion. Not long afterward, at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference, rival European powers carved up possessions in Africa among themselves. Colonialism had become an integral part of European states’ emerging aggressive nationalism (see Figure 1). Political Nationalism

Economic Nationalism

Liberal philosophical ideas Mercantalism ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ The French Revolution Economic liberalism ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Nationalist backlash to Growth strategy for Napoleonic nationalism national economy ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ National unification and Capitalist expansion and statehood the search for markets ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ → European empire-building ← FIGURE 1

The Rise and Decline of Liberal Nationalism, 1770s–1870s

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Consequences The 100-year period of nationalism considered here suggests that the phenomenon had a contagious effect. The liberating ideas of the French Revolution spread quickly to other countries in Europe. The belief that strengthening the national economy was the surest road to great power status was viewed as a truth in late 18th-century England and, some 50 years later, became dogma for many German nationalists. When a European state’s nationalism was defined so as to include the search for overseas colonies, English, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese empires became models for the new nationalisms of Belgium and Germany. Th e diffusion of specific nationalist ideas across countries is a pattern appearing throughout this period. Modern nationalism was largely a 19th-century European creation. It was more precocious in western Europe, where nations had existed before there were state structures. It was slower to appear in eastern Europe where the establishment of states usually preceded nation-building. The latter process also seemed to apply to Latin America, where administrative boundaries drawn by the Spanish colonists were transformed in the 1820s into state boundaries, with individual “nations” like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia being constructed subsequently. Nationalist unrest in the colonized world was a common, if sometimes underemphasized, feature throughout the 19th century. It represented an inevitable backlash against the expansionist nationalism of Western powers. As in the case of Europe, the French Revolution was instrumental in sowing the intellectual seeds of nationalism in other parts of the world, and Napoleon’s military campaigns overseas often proved the catalyst for galvanizing nationalist opposition. In 1791 a slave revolt took place in the French Caribbean colony of SaintDomingue (now Haiti). A decade later, a new constitution, enacted by moderate black political leaders, formally abolished slavery in the colony. In 1802 Napoleon dispatched an expeditionary force to crush the antislavery forces and protect French plantation owners. The conflict only worsened, with both black and French residents of the island brutally slaughtered. Finally in 1804 anticolonial ex-slaves proclaimed the independence of the colony, thereby establishing the first free black republic in the world. A remarkable and precocious watershed in anticolonial nationalism, the revolutionary movement began subsequently to drift in a different direction, and France was able to extract large indemnities from SaintDomingue for the losses it had suffered. Napoleon faced another nationalist backlash in a different part of the world to which he had sent troops. In 1798 his army invaded the Ottoman province of Egypt. Within a year, however, his campaign was bogged down by first Mamluk and then Turkish military forces in the country. In Cairo, Muslim groups fought French soldiers on the streets. The result was the emergence of a still-inchoate form of anticolonialism in much of Egypt. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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British colonial practices also sparked nationalist backlashes. Chinese outrage at the British-run opium trade in the country led to a revolt in 1839 that precipitated the Anglo-Chinese war. It ended in 1842 with the imposition of the Nanking Treaty, which gave the British extraterritorial rights and many trading privileges in China. The “unequal treaty” became a rallying cry for the Chinese nationalist movement. The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 has been described as India’s first war of independence against Britain. At that time, Indian troops made up 95 percent of the British Army in the Raj (the British Indian empire), and when they were subjected to culturally offensive practices, their officers led a revolt that ended with the taking of Delhi and Lucknow. The British Army quickly retook these cities, but Britain’s hand had been forced; it had to resort to direct rule over India the following year, and the birth of an organized Indian nationalism soon followed. In southern Africa, the Zulus struggled to prevent European colonialists from taking control over their traditional homelands. Zulu armies attacked the Dutchspeaking Boers in 1838, then the British in 1879, inflicting unprecedented defeats upon European colonial powers. Zulu victories on the battlefield were short-lived, but they earned the respect of British political leaders, who until then had taken their imperial rule largely for granted. Like China and other subject Asian nations, in this period the Japanese were forced to sign unequal treaties with Western powers. In 1867 the Meiji Restoration took place, marking a change of political system and strengthening the power of the emperor. Many domestic reforms followed, most of which were aimed at modernizing Japan and allowing it to catch up economically and militarily with the West. Outside of Europe, then, the staging of nationalist revolts, the organizing of nationalist movements, and the writing of nationalist manifestos were primarily the result of subjugated peoples’ experience of colonialism. It was on nationalist platforms that anticolonial political leaders emerged to challenge the authority of the metropole (or colonial center). Although nationalism generally embodies the spirit of rebellion, by the end of this period, the European states’ nationalism had become an established creed; that of colonized peoples, however, had turned into an oppositional force. Nationalism was framed differently in status quo–oriented powers compared to nations of the periphery. In the first, nationalism was the blueprint for greater prosperity, prestige, and power. In the second, nationalism was the framework for obtaining basic freedoms. In any given country, nationalism could be a unifying force or a fragmenting one. It could promote stability, but it could also cause instability. Its consequences largely depended on the focus of identity for the people living in a particular country. Where the primary identity was national, elite-driven nationalism had either accomplished its mission already or was well equipped to reinforcing unity. Where the primary identity was religious, ethnic, or regional—as was commonplace in multinational states like the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Tsarist empires— “subnationalisms” embraced by these groups could produce centrifugal tendencies, as the 1848 insurrections illustrated. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The liberal nationalism characterizing Europe for much of the 19th century was generally a positive development. It represented an ideology of emancipation, self-determination, and development—political, economic, and cultural. To the extent that it became diffused and led to national awakenings elsewhere, on balance European nationalism was also positive. The negative features of nationalism—conflict, oppression, injustice, intolerance, xenophobia—began to surface only as the period in question was drawing to an end. While nationalism is recognized today as a political force with staying power —it is over three centuries old—the contribution made by 19th-century liberal nationalism is not fully recognized. The romantic nationalism of the early 19th century that fired the imagination of artists, philosophers, and political leaders in distant parts of the world is often forgotten. The rising of the nations of Europe in 1848 and of downtrodden peoples around the world in the decades before and after is not as familiar to us as it should be. Many of the nationalist ideas proclaimed in 1989—the year the communist bloc unraveled—were the ones that had inspired national revolutionaries over a century earlier. The study of 19thcentury liberal nationalism is relevant today for teasing out the positive aspects of the phenomenon from the negative ones. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1993. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso Books. Carr, E. H. 1945. Nationalism and After. London: Macmillan. Clubbe, John. 2006. “Beethoven, Byron, and Bonaparte.” Fondation Napoléon. (Retrieved June 13, 2006), http://www.napoleon.org/en/reading_room/articles/files/clubbe_beethoven_ byron.asp. Cobban, Alfred. 1969. The Nation State and National Self-Determination. London: Collins. Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hertz, Frederick. 1944. Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character. New York: Oxford University Press. Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1993. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kohn, Hans. 1969a. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Collier Books. Kohn, Hans. 1969b. Prophets and Peoples: Studies in 19th Century Nationalisms. London: Collier Books. Schulze, Hagen. 1991. The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763–1867. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Szporluk, Roman. 1991. Marxism and Nationalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Taras, Ray. 2002. Liberal and Illiberal Nationalisms. London: Palgrave. Weber, Eugen. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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Education and Nationalism Klaus Schleicher The existence of nationalism in education presupposes the development of the concepts of state and nation. The concept of nation originated in Europe and spread to all continents in the 18th century. Its goals were and still are to integrate a country, legitimize a power system, and influence public opinion. These goals were often accomplished through national educational systems and particularly through the subjects of history, geography, and civics. Additionally, since fewer people could read and write in those days, non-formal education was also used by states to further nationalistic goals. Both educational strategies developed national emotional ties while degrading the importance of other cultures and nations. The American and French revolutions were particularly notable for such emotionalizations. Since those days, national identity has been increasingly emphasized by formal educational systems, school directives, and curricula almost everywhere. Nonetheless, informal education continues to play a strong, or perhaps stronger, role through national festivals, symbols, literature, national competition, and, last but not least, war.

Relevance The role of education in nationalism is complex and multifaceted. First, nobody is asked at birth what nation he or she would like to be born into. Thus, children are born without national identities and prejudices and they are socialized and educated in their early years to conform to ethnic and national traditions (Piaget and Weil 1951). This informal enculturation is of great importance to the transfer of social and national values, attitudes, traditional rituals, and stereotypes to children. It occurs by parents, local communities, the church, and so on. Children thus develop emotional loyalties to their nation, such as pride in their milieu and identification with their language, heroes, and national celebrations, before the teaching of history, geography, and literature adds more rational details. Teaching with the goal of creating a national consciousness became common in the 18th century in France and England because a certain agreed-upon national history was available; however, in Germany no such common history existed until 1871. Generally, the ruling classes used education, particularly the teaching of religion and history, to protect their social and political status quo insteas of increasing the understanding and participation among the common people. Accordingly, heromodels became touchstones for national value systems, historical developments N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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were cast so as to bring glory to the fatherland, and educators envisaged an orientation toward authority and not toward economic and social changes, so much so that average citizens were often more alienated from their daily life than connected to it. Such formal nationalistic education was accompanied by informal education through symbols, architecture, media, and so on. For instance, in the French Revolution, different types of media were used to emotionalize the masses. Furthermore, the stronger the focus on the fatherland or nation became, the more human rights and notions of transnational cooperation or peace suffered, as is illustrated by the hypertrophic attitudes of so-called “grand” nations, cultures, races, and religions. The concept of nation was elaborated in philosophy and literature as local and universal loyalties decreased. National visions, constructs, and policies helped integrate geographic and/or cultural areas in administrative and legal terms. Certainly, national orientations did not become powerful unless they gained public support. Here, education, specifically in history and civics, was called upon to support national ideals and interests. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the European nation-states also dominated, administered, and educated South America, Asia, and Africa. There they constructed states and inculcated them with an artificial nationalism that did not take into account existing tribes, feuds, cultures, and languages. Nevertheless, the colonial upper classes regarded the establishment of the new states as a chance to gain some affluence and to finally liberate themselves from their masters. In sum, national developments occurred topdown through the dominating powers and not bottom-up. The process supported a centralization of language(s), economics, traffic, and so on. It led to a definition of cultures and states as well as the development of educational systems, because the existence of a nation depends—at least in principle—on daily plebiscites to hold up common traditions and to instill responsibility for a common future.

Origins State school systems arose out of the ruins of church, town, or private educational structures. On the one hand, there was a strong belief in the 18th century that the world and its social problems could be solved by education. On the other hand, governments and cultural elites tried to strengthen the very institutions the philanthropists sought to change, using the very same means. For instance, in 1772, when the territory of the Poles was divided by Russia and Prussia, J. J. Rousseau asked the Poles to strengthen their patriotism through education, whereas J. G. Herder used his “letters to encourage humanity” in 1797 to demand comprehensive education in Germany. Rousseau stressed that “education offers an important chance to develop national perspectives and minds, in fact, a chance to direct public opinion so that citizens become patriots. Because, if we have no fatherN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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lands we are nobody.” On the other hand, Herder saw national traditions in the following way: “A lazy inherited glory leads to vanity, but not what the fatherland was or is now and what we can love. This could be a good constitution or a fair competition of the peoples without discrimination of others” (Vogt 1967, 14, 32). But in France, about half the population neither spoke nor understood French at the beginning of the revolution. Nevertheless, the national self-interpretation of the ancien régime was quickly pushed aside in the Revolution, first by the bourgeoisie, then by the propaganda of the Jacobins, and, finally, by Napoleon. Since the French Revolution, many states established educational systems, and their feudal orientation in education changed toward an emphasis on national identity to overcome social, regional, and language differences. Again, informal education was of great importance. Influential in the formation of nationalism were social organizations (e.g., theaters) and culturally potent individuals (poets, musicians, architects, etc.). Additionally, military training was of considerable importance. National symbols had a considerable impact, for example, the layout of capitals and government buildings, such as in Rome or Washington. Additional veins for the expression of nationalistic ideas were poetry ( for example, F. Dostojewski’s pan-Slavism and Schiller’s “Wilhelm Tell”), music (R. Wagner’s operas), philosophers (Fichte’s “Addresses to the German Nation”), and the press (the Irish weekly The Nation or the later The United Irishman). Also museums were used to strengthen national traditions and consciousness, as were national festivals, stamps, and anthems. For instance, in western Europe and South America, national hymns were created in the first decades of the 19th century, either to praise the sovereigns (e.g., in England, Spain, or Austria) or to promote a liberation movement (e.g., in the United States, France, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and so on). Certainly, Romanticism supplemented nationalism, emphasizing native traditions and folklore to glorify a distant past.

Dimensions The national principle, that is, the setting of territorial boundaries, the determination of economic life, the regulation of law and order, and the integration of administration, was developed in Europe along with the use of education to confirm its legacy. The importance of the aforementioned aspects differed given the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and political contexts. Altogether, national consciousness was and is a political fact that influences not only concepts of value, mental communities, and attitudinal behavior but also political and educational developments. The point must also be made that European nations dominated, administrated, and educated Asia and Africa until these countries created their own national perceptions to liberate themselves. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Revolutionary Impulses from the 1750s to 1815 Before 1750, “nation” was a fairly benign concept. Then, states began to develop national law, administrative structures, and some ideas about their identity— even if some sparks of chauvinism could be detected—as illustrated in the poem of J. Thomson (1740): When Britain first, at Heaven’s command, arose from out the azure main; this was the charter of land . . . The nations, not so blest as thee must, in their turn, to tyrants fall: While thou shalt flourish great and free . . . Rule, Britannia, rule the waves; Britons never will be slaves . . .

As another example, Abbé Coyer in 1755 “was writing that French mothers should understand that they were bearing children for la patrie; that soldiers should learn to die for it . . . and priests belonged first and foremost to the nation” (Gelber 2001, 63). Nationalism and national education spread in France until 1815, as they did in the United States as well. The United States of America was the first European colonial territory that developed into a nation in its own right. The immigrants had already started with a strong engagement in independence (note the Mayflower Compact in 1629). Democratic self-organization increased ( for example, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut in 1639) along with the development of some transregional information (the almanac for New England from 1639), and then some states linked specific aspects in their constitutions to compulsory education (Massachusetts in 1642). Furthermore, a few American history books were already published in the 17th century (see E. Johnson, A History of New England, 1653). The origins of national consciousness were emphasized in the War of Independence because a patchwork of some 3 million people had to be transformed after the war into a sovereign nation. Individuals from various nations had to be melted into a new nation-state. Accordingly, early efforts (by some founding fathers) were made to promote a republican education, even though the regional states were in charge of education. By and by, an Americanized form of education evolved through the teaching of geography and history. Some civics books became available at the turn of the century (e.g., E. Winchester, A Plain Political Catechism, 1796). Schools received a new role, for they had to shift emotional ties to an impersonal state and had to educate the people for responsible participation. Thomas Jefferson proposed “New Education Laws for Virginia” in 1782 and recommended that every citizen “should receive an education proportional to the condition and pursuits of his life” (Calhoun 1969, 107). Soon Noah Webster became one of the leading protagonists of a national education: “Nothing but the establishment of schools and some uniformity in the use of books, can annihilate differences in speaking and preserve the purity N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Illustration from the 1800s of an American colonial schoolmistress. The United States educational system played a role in fostering nationalist sentiment in the young nation. (Library of Congress)

of the American tongue. . . . Our political harmony is therefore concerned in an uniformity of language” (ibid., 89). Webster made a great career for himself. He started out as a poor teacher during the War of Independence, but soon his national “speller” became a best-seller (1783). Then, “he invented the concept of ‘America’ in his textbooks for children, . . . [which gave] for more than a century . . . millions of illiterate native and foreign-born children a new, common heritage as well as a new, common language.” He published many revised editions of a Compendious Dictionary of the American Language (in 1806, 1812, and 1828) to assimilate immigrants from various countries. In a nutshell, the American Revolution led to the first liberal and somehow democratic nationalism in the world. National integration was supported by books about geography and history and by didactic tales written for children and other juvenile literature. Education was regarded as crucial for national integration, although the content of curricula and textbooks was left to the authorities at regional and/or school levels. In Europe, the development of nations, educational systems, and nationalism in education was quite different. National education was dependent on the states for organizing, financing, and controlling mass educational systems. In Austria, for example, Chancellor Kaunitz proclaimed in 1765 that education was to cultivate N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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love and dedication to the royal family and the fatherland. In Prussia, a similar state domination of education and teacher training was not established until 1807. The earlier “general school reform plan” of 1787 was supplemented by programmatic discussions, for example, by the Freiherr von Stein, who supported education to enhance civilian participation (1807), or by Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation, in which he proposed education for inculcating humanity and nationality (1808). But these programs had limited practical consequences. A new national and nationalistic impetus, however, resulted from the French Revolution. It called for the universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity for all when the States-General met in 1789 and declared that it represented the nation. “Plans for national education” were developed by L. M. Lepeletier when he stressed in 1792 that “the national convent owes to history three monuments: The Constitution, a Codex of Civil Law, and Public Education.” In other words, Lepeletier argued that the French had to create and educate a new population and spread knowledge to all classes at all levels. Additionally, Lepeletier noted that, “with 5 years the fatherland will receive the children from nature and with 12 it will give it back to society.” He thus argued that education must be compulsory in a child’s early years because this initial basis will determine his long-term contribution to society. The cosmopolitan approach of the early revolution, however, was quickly altered thanks to successful military action abroad and Jacobinism in the country. Radicalism eroded human rights, leading to internal mass execution and external conquest. In 1794 Abbé Gégoire asked the National Assembly to introduce French as the standard language and to eliminate all dialects and minority languages. In addition, Napoleon introduced a militaristic and bureaucratic dimension to the nation-state, in which other cultures were subordinated to the French “mission civilisatrice,” a doctrine that even spread overseas (Wiggin 1962, 6, 18). But, Napoleon’s occupations also led to patriotic liberation and national movements in other countries, which either called for political unification, as in Prussia with Stein and Hardenberg, or for separation, as with the Magyar and Czech language groups in the Habsburg empire. In Germany at this time, a number of national education plans were developed with the goal of furthering the participation of the German public, with specific attention given toward the subject of civics. A different point of view dominated the Batavic revolution in the Netherlands (1795–1806), where seven small states united and introduced educational reforms. The first educational minister was asked to establish a common language and to produce schoolbooks to form a new nation. In other European areas, like Ireland, nationalism had a regional dimension. In central Europe, outstanding reformers of education, such as Humboldt in Prussia, Basedow in Austria, or Pestalozzi in Switzerland, pleaded more or less simultaneously for national resistance against French suppression as well as for a neo-humanistic, liberal, and civic education. These calls came because in France N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the political practice was quite nationalistic, in spite of the fact that the revolutionary theory was largely humanistic. National perceptions and educational policies thus differ according to regional experiences. The United States regarded itself as a nation in spite of its rather autonomous states and manifold immigrants. In France, centralization, ethnicity, and national identity were stressed, whereas different nationalities had to be considered in Switzerland and Austria (where Maria Theresa supported elementary education in different regional languages). Additionally, in Germany, several kingdoms, cultures, and regional identities were held together only by loose cultural bonds until 1871—with some long-term consequences, as can be seen in the federal structure of today’s German republic (see Green 2001). To sum up, European and American history and historical textbooks tried to legitimize nationalism in similar ways. “In history textbooks a selective approach is taken to the past, by choosing what is considered necessary to better understand the present. . . . It is through such textbooks that the notion of ‘what a nation stands for’ is passed from one generation to the next” (Schiffauer and Sunier 2004, 33). Although the presented concepts were more ideological than based in reality, they were used to introduce the young to the so-called national culture while at the same time painting a less-than-positive picture of other nations. Restorative Nationalism between 1818 and 1848 Between 1818 and 1848, Europe was largely backward-oriented, reconsolidating its royal systems, controlling its expanding educational systems, and limiting civic participation. At the same time, South America became freer from the control of conservative Spain. Even here, oligarchic groups stayed in power, and the lower social strata were barely educated. Meanwhile, the United States developed a more colonial attitude by trying to export its democratic ideals and expanding its domination of the continent. In Europe, poets, philosophers, and educators helped spread national enthusiasm in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat, while most governments felt endangered by national idealism and civilian interest in political participation. Accordingly, the Vienna Congress of 1819 tried to reconstitute ancient political structures with its chessboard politics. It regarded constitutional liberty as Jacobinism and suppressed popular movements; therefore, neither the populations that fought against Napoleon nor those at the European periphery (e.g., Greece, Hungary, Poland, or Ireland) gained in national liberty or self-determination. But, the hopes and frustrations of the people came to the surface in 1848, when the educated middle classes attempted to reform governments with an eye toward constitutional liberties. This effort failed, however, because there was not sufficient homogeneity and communication among the reformers. For instance, the German National Assembly adopted a declaration for the protection of national minorities in 1848, “accepting the legal rights of non-German ethnicities . . . to follow their traditional folk rituals, religion, literature, administration and education.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The academic institution had too little power to carry through its intentions (Alter 1994, 192). Well-known educationists like J. H. Pestalozzi and F. Fröbel also argued for a self-reliant, humanistic education as necessary for national engagement. Nevertheless, states tried to reinforce religious education, control teaching, and strengthen obedience to the authorities, especially after the Hambacher Festival in 1832 and after the surfacing of the social question in 1848. National developments in Europe were not quite identical, however. In central Europe, national revolutions failed because no collective separation from the established monarchies took place as it did in France in 1789. In Germany, the task was not to reform the state’s constitution but, rather, to form the state itself. Austria lacked the strong sociopolitical and ethno-cultural homogeneity to enforce political representation on the monarch, and Italy still stayed under Austrian control in spite of several uproars and Mazzini’s passionate call for national unity. Nevertheless, all the states regarded themselves as more and more responsible for education, as is evident by the passing of legislation on primary education in Saxony in 1835, Württemberg in 1836, and Hannover in 1845. In England, which was a model constitutional monarchy, the traditions of individualism and public consent dominated the political perception. Public education, though, was limited until the right to vote was expanded in 1832, 1867, and 1884/1885. Only after this expansion did state engagement in education spread with the requiring of education reports and the introduction of legislation to set up new educational structures. Civic education, however, was not emphasized at all and often regarded as indoctrination. In France, the situation differed, for the coup d’état of Napoleon III had left France with a dictatorship and a strong emphasis on the French language, while education was used to praise French genius. In Spain, a restorative absolutism prevented popular representation in spite of the liberal constitutionalism of Cadiz in 1812 and a draft law to create a national educational system in 1814, which was intended to create honorable citizens with respect for the law and constitutional powers. Nonetheless, patriotism was not made part of education in general nor in history textbooks, which stayed rather vague about national geography, the liberal revolutions, and civil wars after 1820 (Thomson 2002, 195). On the whole, European revolutions generally failed because they were too national and academic in scope, hence the monarchies—except for France—hardly changed. Almost everywhere educational curricula and teacher training were strongly controlled, and history teaching was used to support the ruling classes. In North and South America, national development and national education differed as well. In the United States, common values were urgently needed to unify the 13 states as well as their multiethnic inhabitants. The dream of the United States was to base the society and the spirit of education on republican law, on respect for political institutions, and above all on a firm belief in liberty, equality, and a great common future. In comparison, education in France or BritN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ain had only to reinforce established social structures and behaviors. The challenge of nation-building in America was made more difficult by its expansion, first to the West and then to Florida, Canada, and finally Mexico. The United States depended on an enlightened public opinion. Thus, the “common school” became the main method to help citizens exercise their rights and duties nationwide. In fact, the beginning of “civics” can be dated to 1827 when American history became compulsory in Massachusetts. In addition, the “common school” stressed symbols of national unity, such as national holidays, the flag, and the anthem. However, the United States had no qualms with borrowing from traditions of Pestalozzi and Herbat, as well as from Prussia later on. As Horace Mann pointed out in his “7th Annual Report” to the Massachusetts Board of Education in 1843, “Prussia has long enjoyed the most distinguished reputation for the excellence of its schools,” which was worth observing, although with a skeptical attitude (Binder 1970, 323). In South America, independence from Spain (1810–1830) led to the creation of republics. The state borders, however, were artificially defined by the colonial oligarchies. The states tried to identify the new republics with flags, national anthems, and books of history. They also used education to strengthen nationalism in the face of border disputes and other territorial claims involving neighboring countries. Certainly, it was in their interest to integrate their underdeveloped and quickly growing populations so that they could function in a largely class-ridden, scholastic, and Catholic culture. “Colonial education in South America was thus more or less of the same kind and quality as that provided by Spain, . . . so South Americans were . . . (more or less) socialized into a European civilization,” and even the native Indians were assimilated under the imposed language of Castille, the Catholic religion, imported agricultural methods, and arts, crafts, music, songs, and dances (Romo 1993, 213). On the whole, education was not related to specific cultures and practical demands of the day but largely dominated by religion and Spanish traditions. Until about 1848, European nationalism was primarily directed toward internal integration and stabilization of the ruling classes. It was also exported and imitated in various countries. In South America it was used to liberate countries from colonization, although the governing groups kept their hierarchical structures. In the United States, some new colonial attitudes emerged that were concealed by nationalism and some liberation ideas. The traditionalism of this period is obvious in the political architecture of capital cities (e.g., Washington, Paris, Munich, and so on). It is also evident in the construction of national symbols (e.g., the British Museum, the so-called “Spree-Athen” in Berlin, the “Zwinger” in Dresden, and the “Emeritage” in Petersburg). Belligerent Nationalism, 1848–1870 In the second half of the 19th century, national developments and perceptions reacted to specific political and social challenges in Europe, America, and the developing countries. In Europe, the revolutionary dreams of 1848 did not materialize N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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anywhere, although the liberal bourgeoisie and socialist movements called for more political legitimacy. Two socialist statements illustrate these political dreams. F. Lassale stressed in 1859, “We repeat, the principle of democracy has its basis and habitat in the principle of free nationalities.” M. Bakunin added in 1865 that “the international federation of revolutionary populations . . . will be based on revolutionary principles,” that is, each country, nation, and province, whether weak or strong, has the right to decide their future (cited in Alter 1994, 96). During the same period, the civil war in the United States demanded new energies and educational initiatives to integrate the country. South American countries searched for their identities as well during this time, although national education was hardly available. Most African countries still depended on the colonial powers for their educational input. Quite different was Japan, though; it vigorously constructed its own identity, introduced compulsory education, and used it to build a national consciousness. In Europe, the political and educational situation altered with the consolidation of the German nation-state in the center, Russia’s isolation through the Crimean War in spite of increasing pan-Slavic ambitions, Austria’s engagement in the Balkans, and England’s imperial focus on Suez, India, and North America. On the one hand, political stability was sought in Prussia through constitutionalism, in France with Bonapartism, and in Spain by the overthrow of Queen Isabel II, which led to a short republican interval. On the other hand, governments tried to gain national support in so-called “cabinet wars,” as in the Franco-Austrian war related to Italy’s unification in 1859 or in the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866. However, populations were not yet ready to fight each other under national flags and images until the French-German war in 1870, when national emotions were strongly swayed by the media. Generally, governments, the media, history, and education were paying increased attention to nation-states and nationalism in the second half of the 19th century. In history books and in history instruction, nationalistic points of view began to overturn patriotic self-awareness. In German schools, history and geography “readers” tried to awaken love in “regional fatherlands” and their rulers until the mid-1860s. But with the emergence of the French threat and war in 1870, the particularistic (i.e., local or regional) outlook—tied to quite different cultural perceptions —changed to a new type of national education. The majority of the population was not really moved by the national unification in 1871, however. Since the Reichstag had only limited influence on education, new national ambitions were less influenced by education than by political symbols (the new national flag, the celebration of Sedan Day, and monuments like the victory column in Berlin). In France, the concentration on national history was much stronger due to French absolutism, its earlier revolution, and its cultural vision. The idea is largely maintained even today in French history books that the revolutions of 1798, 1830, and 1848 mark phases in the battle of rationality against irrationality (Schiffauer and Sunier 2004, 38). In comparison, English national identity and consensus N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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were based on old constitutional, juridical, and social structures as well as on an unchallenged national common sense and an imperial development, as John Stuart Mill commented in 1861. Thus, a national or civic education could not become popular until the right to vote and state education expanded so that socialistic initiatives (e.g., the Fabian Society in 1883/1884) or university developments (e.g., the London School of Economics in 1895) could give a new impetus to it. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Eurocentrism was common to European teaching and history books in the 19th century. During this period, the American continents experienced some revolutionary and independence movements in South America, a civil war in the United States (1861–1865), and some French intervention in Mexico. In the United States, all adult, white, native-born and immigrant males could already vote, whereas the Europeans still fought for civil rights in 1848. Nonetheless, the United States feared a revolutionary influx from Europe with regard to slavery (Roberts 2002, 76) and an increasing instability due to her large territorial expansions in Oregon, California, New Mexico, and Texas after 1845. Political integration and democratic awareness became even more important after the American Civil War. Thus, “comprehensive education” was encouraged by the political elite of the United States to cope with regional, social, and ethnic differences. Also, the social and political sciences made quick progress (with many associations, academies, and quarterlies coming about) and influenced national education and education on nationalism. A surprising case is the development in Mexico, which lost large territories to the United States, suffered from French occupation, was colonized again until 1867, and had an adult literacy rate below 40 percent until the end of the century. In spite of all this, at least 40 political catechisms were published between 1808 and 1861 that instructed children on the merits of republican government, the meaning of the Mexican nation, and the rights and duties of citizens. However, after independence, that is, after these rights had been won, the centralizing state pointed largely to the past instead of educating for the national future (Thomson 2002, 192). In South America, most countries were liberated from Spanish rule by 1828. Thus, the European revolutions of 1848 had a limited impact on the moderate governments and monarchies of South America, although they were echoed in Chile (1850–1851), Colombia (1849–1854), and Argentina (1852) when the Rosa dictatorship was overthrown (Lida 2002, 46). Generally, the South American states tried to find and articulate their national identity, but education was scarce and hardly capable of supporting those intentions. In the second half of the 19th century, many regions of Asia and Africa were still dominated by foreign powers. Colonial administrations set up on “their” territories hardly cared whether they cut across regional, ethnic, or language differences. Soon a small, native elite was incorporated into governmental tasks and educated by the occupation forces. By and by, the religious and national education N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ideas of the European states spread to and socialized larger sections of the population, particularly in the French colonies. After a while, the integrated native upper classes accepted their new state boundaries as well as the language, culture, and Christian mission of their colonizers. However, by the end of the century some colonial leaders used European strategies and educational concepts to liberate their states and redirect parts of their education to suit their own traditions and literature (Shafer 1972, 273). Japan is a special case. The country developed its national identity by using European models and tying them to its own traditions. The term “nation” (Ishin in Japanese) became common after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when the nationstate was established and tried to legitimize itself through connections with archaic Japanese customs (Shimanda 2000, 183). It was simply presupposed that a Japanese people existed. The national idea was amended by Darwin’s theory of descent and Gobineau’s perception of racism. “Since the Meiji Restoration Japan has been known for her nationalistic orientation in education,” using the “Tenno” as a symbol of national identification. With the adoption of the Western nationstate concept and other modernization efforts, education began to play a central role in unifying the country. Compulsory and standardized education came under the control of a Ministry of Education in 1869, and the nationalistic orientation in education increased again after the country became a constitutional monarchy in 1889 (Kim 1993, 243).

Consequences Between 1770 and 1870, nationalism spread from Europe to the colonies. The concept took root in increasing numbers of people and manifested itself in media campaigns as well as in economic competition, as Max Weber pointed out in 1885. On the whole, it is obvious that national integration did not increase peace among the nations but rather created belligerent competition. During this period, patriotic, national, and nationalistic attitudes and values were perpetuated not only by a complex process of formal education via curricula, school books, teacher training, and state control but also by non-formal and informal socializations via symbols such as national anthems, flags, celebration days, memorials, and military training. Interest in national identification was most strong among the ruling strata, which tried to line up people and education to its own purposes. Nationalism was sometimes tied to integrational approaches (as in the United States and France) or to bridge ethnic differences (as in Austria or Canada). It was also related to self-determination (as in the German resistance against Napoleon) or used to justify a “manifest destiny” agenda (as in the United States at the end of the century). In this process, national education was a result of state developN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ment linked on the one hand with the erosion of religious traditions and the ancien régime and on the other hand with a new economic and scientific dynamic. Between 1770 and 1870, many countries developed a canonical history used in education that was little reflected upon or discussed in comparative contexts. In sum, nationalism spread throughout the world since the end of the 18th century, with national wars becoming more common in the late 19th century. State-dominated educational systems and curricula became the norm in most countries. It was a century of increasing nationalism, as Leopold von Ranke predicted, but it was also one of racial differentiation, as H. St. Chamberlain stressed. Sometimes nationalism was brought into line with democratic developments, however, more often an authoritarian nationalism led to war. In spite of the early link between humanism and nationalism, J. G. Zinnermann stressed in 1758 that “the spectacles of self-love tend to sit on the nose of every large and small nation boasting themselves on something which other nations do not have” (Vogt 1967, 61). These traditions are still so powerful today that hardly any states subordinate their educational support for national identity to a critical comparison of different national perceptions, a move necessary for global cooperation. Selected Bibliography Alter, P., ed. 1994. Nationalismus: Dokumente zur Geschichte und Gegenwart eines Phänomens. München: Piper. Binder, F. 1970. Education in the History of Western Civilisation. London: MacMillan. Calhoun, D., ed. 1969. The Educating of Americans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gelber, H. G. 2001. Nations Out of Empires: European Nationalism and the Transformation of Asia. New York: Palgrave. Green, A. 2001. Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kim, J. 1993. “Nationalism and Internationalism in Korean and Japanese Education.” In Nationalism in Education, edited by K. Schleicher, 237–254. Frankfurt am Main, NY: P. Lang. Lida, C. E. 2002. “The Democratic and Social Republic and Its Repercussions in the Hispanic World.” In The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas, edited by G. Thomson, 46. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. The Nationalism Project. (Retrieved August 15, 2005), http://www.nationalismproject.org/ about.htm. Piaget, J., and A. Weil. 1951. “The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries.” International Social Science Bulletin 3:561. Roberts, T. 2002. “The United States and the European Revolutions of 1848.” In The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas, edited by G. Thomson, 76. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. Romo, L. 1993. “Nationalism and Regionalism in South America: Implications and Consequences for Education.” In Nationalism in Education, edited by K. Schleicher, 213–236. Frankfurt am Main, NY: P. Lang. Schiffauer, W., and T. Sunier. 2004. “Representing the Nation in History Textbooks.” In Civic Enculturation, edited by W. Schiffauer and G. Baumann, 33. New York: Berghahn.

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Shafer, B. C. 1972. Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths. New York/London: Harvest Book. Shimanda, S. 2000. Die Erfindung Japans: Kulturelle Wechselwirkungen und nationale Identitätskonstruktion. Frankfurt/M.: Campus. Smith, R. M. 2003. Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thomson, G. 2002. “Liberalism and Nation-Building in Mexico and Spain during the Nineteenth Century.” In Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America, edited by J. Dunkerley, 189. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. Vogt, H. 1967. Nationalismus gestern und heute. Opladen: Leske. Wiggin, G. A. 1962. Education and Nationalism: An Historical Interpretation of American Education. New York: McGraw-Hill.

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Gender and Nationalism Jennifer Heuer Relevance In 1792, the brand-new French Republic decreed that the seal of the state would henceforward be a woman dressed in classical clothing. In her right hand, she would hold a pike adorned with a Phrygian hat or a bonnet of liberty; the left was to hold a fasces. The rudder of the ship of state lay under her feet. The armed woman, soon dubbed “Marianne,” was to replace the dethroned king as the symbol of the nation, an image reproduced on coins, medals, and official decrees. The image of Marianne—one of the most well-known and most analyzed symbols of the age—suggests that gender played a role in the iconography of revolutionary nationalism. More than this, however, she points us toward changes in national identity and in gender roles that took place between approximately 1770 and 1870. Over the course of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the modern map of nation-states began to take shape, from the independence of the United States of America and subsequently of many Latin American countries, to the official creation of Italy and Germany. Perhaps more importantly, even established states, like France, dramatically redefined what it meant to be part of a nation or to promote a nationalist cause. At the same time, ideas about gender roles also changed, in ways that often seemed contradictory. If the period fostered images of armed citizenesses and defenders of national causes, it also reinforced divisions between men and women and distanced women from political life. Perhaps most notably, the seemingly traditional ideology of “separate spheres” and the middle-class model of a male breadwinner and female housewife were themselves products of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Looking at gender and nationalism together can help us better understand how contemporaries imagined who could or should participate in new or transformed nations. It illuminates how they defined the rights or obligations men and women had as citizens or as members of a national group or state, and the assumptions behind these definitions. Conversely, and perhaps less obviously, looking at the role of gender in national symbols and social orders gives us insights about how nationalists tried to win people over to their movements. This is especially important for the frequent moments in this tumultuous era when the “nation” existed more as a loose cultural or political movement than as a clearly defined, or easily understandable, entity. It helps us better understand emerging forms of nationalism and why nationalist movements did—or did not—resonate with contemporary populations.

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Eugene Delacroix’s painting Liberty Leading the People, ca. 1830. (Bettmann/Corbis)

To trace these interactions, this essay focuses on gender and nationalism in Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Americas. This is in part a logistical choice. The author is a European historian; historians of Asia or Africa would write different overviews. But it also corresponds to some of the most influential developments in the period. Europe and the Americas generated models of national identity, nationalism, and gender order that would be imposed upon, adopted, rejected, or adapted by much of the rest of the world. We begin with a general overview of some of the origins, turning points, and longer-term patterns in the development of nationalism in the period, focusing especially on shifts that had particular potential for changing men and women’s roles or were particularly likely to be shaped by expectations about gender. We then turn to a series of subthemes to investigate these interactions in depth, beginning with the use of gendered images as national symbols. New (or newly transformed) nations sought icons to represent them publicly and inspire citizens to identify with a larger collectivity. Such cultural expressions of nationalism often played with gendered imagery, sometimes with unanticipated results. We look next at the activities and anticipated roles of real, as well as symbolic, men and women in the nexus of revolution, war, and nationalism that characterizes N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the 18th and early 19th centuries. A third subsection explores both the gendered aspects of cultural nationalism over the longer term and the development of women’s suffrage movements. Finally, we turn to a topic often neglected in historical accounts of European nationalism in the period: colonialism. While the connections between gender, imperialism, and nationalism would become even more pronounced during the later 19th and 20th centuries, both colonial and anticolonial nationalism in our period drew on, and were shaped by, gendered imagery and expectations. After addressing these themes, the essay briefly returns to the general rubrics of this collection. We will look further at the relevance of these changes for different groups, focusing especially on the role of industrialization and class divisions. We will conclude by briefly examining some of the consequences of such developments both for later history and for the contemporary world.

Origins Discussing “nationalism” in the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries is a tricky endeavor. Many modern scholars have tried to develop a precise vocabulary for discussing national identity and nationalism. One common distinction is between a more aggressive nationalism and a more desirable patriotism. This distinction is hard to apply for our period, in part because the very word “nationalism” did not exist before the 1790s. It seems to have appeared first in Abbé Barruel’s Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism, published in French in 1797 and in an English translation a year later. Other European languages later adopted cognates for the term. Yet both “nation” and “nationalism” were subject to constant redefinitions, while nationalist movements and activities varied dramatically. In looking at gender and nationalism during the period, it is thus useful to cast a wide net, to consider groups that characterized themselves as either national or patriotic, and both movements that were self-consciously nationalist and ones that proclaimed the importance of national identity or unity even as they invoked other causes. Nonetheless, one can identify a series of turning points, as well as more longterm evolutions. At the beginning of the period, both the American and French revolutions not only affected their own countries and their immediate neighbors and rivals but also created powerful models of national identity. They introduced new visions of national belonging, proclaiming that all citizens had rights as members of the nation-state, not because they lived in particular localities or belonged to particular communities. Citizens also had new obligations toward the state, most dramatically, the quasi-universal obligation of men to risk death for the nation. The American Revolution mobilized the male population to fight, while the French revolutionary government linked citizenship to voluntary military service and eventually instituted mass conscription. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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These revolutions inspired both men and women to action and called into question existing gender roles. Both the new American and French republics transformed family relations, although French revolutionaries did so more dramatically. For example, both revolutions led to the creation or generalization of divorce, but the 1792 divorce law in France was far more egalitarian, including measures for mutual incompatibility. The idea that all inhabitants of the country—or more precisely, especially in the new United States, all white citizens—had equal rights also provided powerful grounds for women to claim legitimate political participation in the nation. On the other hand, the cause of revolutionary nationalism, especially in connection to war, could also trump individual demands for rights and lead to an increased insistence on “natural” differences between the sexes. The Napoleonic empire marks one of the next controversial turning points in the history of nationalism and gender. Napoleon extended French territorial control over much of the European continent; at the empire’s height in 1812, Napoleon and his government controlled not only France but also Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, the Italian peninsula, much of modern-day Germany, and a variety of central and eastern European lands, including parts of the Balkans and modern-day Poland (the last was officially independent, but only in name). Some historians have viewed the Napoleonic wars as a vital catalyst for the spread of nationalism, bringing together previously disparate groups against a common enemy, often by emphasizing a national unity based on shared language and culture. Other scholars have questioned whether anti-Napoleonic resistance was necessarily nationalist, attempting to determine how much such sentiments extended beyond elites and the degree to which individuals identified themselves with a larger nation rather than with their immediate families or threatened hometowns. As we will see, the contemporary militarization of society and attempts to define and create national unity could, and often did, reshape gender order throughout the empire. At the same time, looking more closely at gender helps illuminate the historiographic debate of whether, why, and how much nationalist movements rallied men and women to their causes. The 1815 Congress of Vienna aimed to prevent another French Revolution or another Napoleon from threatening European stability and dynastic order. It explicitly rejected the principle that states should correspond to ethnic or cultural boundaries. Yet this principle did not disappear. On the contrary, specific nationalist movements repeatedly challenged political order, including the movement for Greek national independence from the Ottoman empire in the 1820s and the Polish uprisings in the 1830s against Russia. These movements were paralleled in part by the ongoing wars for independence in much of Latin America through the 1820s. Such movements continued to try to mobilize citizens to join their cause and to determine who, men or women, could, or should, be included as members of that citizenry. Even in areas that already existed as nation-states, romantic or cultural nationalism became increasingly important in the first half of the 19th century. Its N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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proponents celebrated and sometimes invented “traditional” folklore and customs, depicting a common and deep-rooted national culture. As we will see, women were often supposed to play a particular role in embodying and transmitting such cultural nationalism—from wearing newly defined “national costumes,” especially in Scandinavian countries, to teaching children a “national” language. The early 19th century was also the age of the first Industrial Revolution. Industrialization advanced earliest and most quickly in Britain, but it also developed in America and parts of continental Europe, especially northern and western Europe. Romantic nationalist movements and industrial change combined to feed a new wave of revolutions in 1848. Revolutionaries were most active in major cities, including Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Vienna; as in earlier movements, both men and women participated in revolutionary uprisings, although often in different ways. Similar patterns recurred across Europe. After dizzying initial victories against traditional orders, revolutionary coalitions fell apart. Liberals and radicals fought over the kinds of governments they wanted. Those more interested in general political change sometimes clashed with more fervent nationalists, while different groups of nationalists, most notably in the Austrio-Hungarian empire, were also divided among themselves. Conservative governments returned to power in the wake of the 1848 revolutions across Europe and retained control in many areas for the following decades. Indeed, although the creation of Italy in 1861 and Germany in 1871 corresponded to certain dreams for national unification expressed in 1848, the new nations were established not through popular nationalist uprisings but through diplomacy, war, and the economic power of Piedmont-Sardinia and Prussia. The particular means of national unification would have implications not only for the later political development of such countries but also for how they defined and instituted gender order. While often neglected in historical accounts of nationalism in the period, there is at least one other important dimension to its development: colonialism. The “great scramble” for Africa and Southeast Asia took place primarily in the later 19th and early 20th centuries. Yet imperialism played vital roles in the development of European and anticolonial national identities over the course of the 19th century. The narrative may initially appear to be one of liberation, including national liberation. French revolutionaries abolished slavery in their empire in 1794, and the eventual independence of Haiti sent shock waves around the Caribbean. Napoleon reestablished slavery in 1802, and it was not outlawed permanently until 1848. The British abolished it in 1832 in their empire; it would take the Civil War to end it in the United States. Yet ironically, more virulent forms of racism followed the elimination of slavery, sometimes applied even to those who might otherwise have been deemed “white.” For example, images of Irishmen took on harder racial classifications in the 1860s after the nationalist group, the Fenians, began to plan for uprisings against the British to establish independence for Ireland. Many of the categories of “natural” differences between races were shaped by ideas of “natural” gender differences and were used to support certain N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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visions of appropriate gender roles. As ideas about racial differences shifted, European empires also began to expand afresh. The French laid claim to their most important colony, Algeria, in 1830, while India was transformed from a domain controlled by the East India Company into an integral part of the British empire in 1857. Nationalist imperialism would develop even more dramatically as the century progressed, both reacting to and imposing new forms of sexual and racial hierarchies.

Dimensions Gender and National Symbols Marianne was far from the only image of a woman to represent a nation in this tumultuous period. Indeed, abstract national symbols often took the forms of iconic women or, less often, men. The best known include Marianne, Britannia and John Bull in the United Kingdom, Uncle Sam of the United States, Mother Russia, and Germania. Many other groups—particularly, although not exclusively, within Europe—also adopted figures to depict the nation or national inspirations: from the Maiden of Finland to Helvetia of Switzerland and from Slavia to Pannonia, symbols respectively of Czech and Hungarian nationalist movements within the Austrian-Hungarian empire. Some of these symbols have long histories; Britannia, for example, can be traced to the Roman conquest of Britain and gradually evolved from the symbol of a conquered province to the icon of a powerful empire. Yet even long-established symbols became increasingly popular in the later 18th and especially 19th centuries. Scholars have looked closely at the reasons for the power of this iconography. One factor is that such figures were simultaneously abstract and accessible in an age of increasing democratization and political experimentation. They could exist alongside a monarchy that also represented the nation, as in Prussia and England, though they were often overshadowed by it. Indeed, in many countries where monarchy remained, it often continued as the primary symbol of the nation. Abstract symbols of the nation as a man or woman were perhaps most often used to symbolize newly created or transformed nations and aspiring nationalist movements. Why, particularly, were such figures often women? Part of the answer is straightforward. Many country names and associated terms were grammatically feminine. In France, for example, not only were “France,” “nation,” and “patrie” feminine terms, but so were the words for republic (la république), liberty (la liberté), and so on. Feminine allegories were thus natural choices to represent the nation. But the answer is not simply linguistic. The choice of a masculine or a feminine national symbol, as well as the particular kind of woman or man it portrayed, often served to promote particular forms of nationalism or imagined connections to the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In one recent and controversial work, Joan Landes has argued that the nation was often depicted as a desirable female body during the French Revolution. Such imagery eroticized patriotism and served to bind male subjects to the nationstate. Other historians have emphasized maternal representations of the nation and the use of expressions like “mother-country.” Such representations were often invented or particularly mobilized during wartime as a means of rallying the “sons of the country” to accept unprecedented sacrifices for the nation. The armed figure of Marianne was used to inspire resistance against the enemies of the French revolutionary nation. Germania appeared in 1813 when Germanic countries were at war with Napoleon. After an eclipse, the symbol reappeared in the 1840s and reached another apogee in 1870, during another war: the war against France that led to the creation of Germany as a nation. Such images of women often served both to inspire men to fight and to protect family and state. Indeed, even though Germania often wore a helmet and armor, she was usually depicted as not actively involved in battle but rather as a protector of the country, or as a bride awaiting her groom. Images of the nation as a woman, especially in Romantic art and literature in the 1820s and 1830s, could also serve to dramatize national oppression and, implicitly, the need to rally to its defense. One of the most famous examples is Eugene Delacroix’s 1827 Greece Expiring on the Ruins of Missolonghi. The painting depicts the Greek uprisings against the Ottoman empire and, particularly, the Turkish repression in Missolonghi in 1826. Greece appears as a woman in a gesture of martyrdom, appealing to her viewers for help. A Greek fighter is crushed under the ruins of the city, while a Turkish soldier looms in the background. The uses and interpretations of such gendered symbols, however, were also open to constant revision. This is scarcely surprising given that individual monarchs—particularly, perhaps, queens—were themselves contentious symbols of the nation. In Spain, for example, the followers of Queen Isabel II (reign 1833–1869) depicted her as a Catholic mother figure and as the hope of the nation after political turmoil; republicans portrayed her instead in terms similar to those used to attack Marie Antoinette during the French Revolution, as the sign of both sexual and national disorder. In the case of the abstract symbol of Marianne, officials tried hard to control the image of the republic that she conveyed. After Napoleon’s ascent to power in 1799, Marianne was used less and less often as a symbol of France. She reappeared again during moments of revolution, particularly during the Second Republic of 1848 and the Third Republic beginning in 1871. She became an official symbol again in 1882. As Maurice Aghulon has shown, her dress and position often represented a particular image of the republic. In later versions, she is often a more sedate figure, often seated rather than exalted on the barricades and demurely dressed rather than bare breasted and militant. As has often been noted, the symbolic status of women as icons of the nation jarred with the inability of real women to participate fully in the polity. Marianne N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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may well have carried a pike or Germania donned armor, but individual French and German women were rarely supposed to carry arms or be able to vote to determine the nation’s future. To understand better how and why nationalist movements challenged or reinforced expectations about gender roles, let us turn to some of the revolutionary movements and military engagements of the period. Gender and Nation on the Barricades The period from 1770 to 1870 is often identified as the age of revolution. It is less often associated with wars, largely because the carnage of the world wars in the 20th century dwarfs the violence of earlier conflicts. Nonetheless, there were devastating wars, including the American War of Independence, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the Crimean War of 1853–1856, the American Civil War, the Italian Risorgimento, the Franco-Prussian and Austria-Prussian wars, and colonial conflicts. The nexus of revolution and war often overlapped with nationalism and provides a useful lens for looking more closely at the activities and anticipated roles of men and women. The first of these major conflicts, the American Revolutionary War, was simultaneously a civil war and a war for national liberation. Women often participated actively in nationalist activities, although the extent of such participation can be difficult to measure. They were engaged in the early waves of economic resistance to Britain in the late 1760s and early 1770s, particularly in the boycott of imports from Britain and the manufacture of American textiles as substitutes. Some contributed to military resistance. Many accompanied armies as cooks, nurses, or laundresses—a traditional pattern of war, but one with a new importance because of the goals of the American uprising. A few women were active directly as soldiers or spies, like Margaret Corbin, who took the place of her husband who died in combat, or Deborah Sampson, who enrolled under the name of Robert Shirtliff. Such participation in a common national struggle was sometimes connected to specific demands for women’s rights. Abigail Adams’s correspondence with her husband John Adams, a delegate at the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, is one of the best-known examples. In a celebrated and often published passage, she exhorted her husband and other legislators to “remember the ladies” as they established a new constitution. Her pleas, however, had little impact. The longerterm consequences of the American Revolution and national independence on gender roles are harder to determine. The historian Linda Kerber has analyzed the complicated legacy of the American Revolution in terms of the idea of “Republican motherhood.” Leaders of the nation turned to mothers to raise the children of the nation as better citizens; women could thus claim a political role by their ability and obligation to raise a patriotic child. But the development of the republican ideal as an independent male citizen also cast women in the opposite role as dependent, unreliable, and weak. In the French Revolution, women were involved in collective political action to a far greater extent than in the new United States, acting as citizens or deN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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manding rights as vital members of the sovereign nation. Some of the most famous examples include the women’s March on Versailles in October 1789, Olympe de Gouges’s version of the “Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen,” and the founding of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women in 1793. Yet the story of the French Revolution is also partially one of repression for women: the government of the Terror closed women’s political clubs in the fall of 1793 after women led an invasion of the National Convention in the spring of 1795, the postTerror government forbade them to attend any political assembly, and the Napoleonic Civil Code reinstituted a deeply patriarchal order. Historians thus often give very different interpretations of the revolution’s legacy. Some emphasize its importance in establishing lasting precedents for women to claim rights as citizens. Others contend that it led to the systematic exclusion of women from the nation. While both men and women had had different rights in the old regime depending not only on their sex but also on their occupations, religion, and residence, all men were now declared to be equal in rights; women were not. In the French case, however, there is another aspect of the connections between nationalism and gender that is often overlooked: war. War continued long after the revolution as such was proclaimed to be over, and gender played important roles in promoting both Napoleon’s conquests and the resistance, including nationalist resistance, to Napoleonic rule. During the revolution, the French Army was officially based on volunteers; after 1799, the government instituted mass conscription, establishing unprecedented links between manhood and military service to the nation. In both cases, the state attempted to persuade would-be soldiers and their families of the need to fight for their country. Revolutionaries sometimes emphasized symbolic attacks on homes; the founding anthem of the republic, the “Marseillaise,” cursed the fearsome soldiers of the enemy who “slaughter your sons and consorts.” As Napoleon consolidated his reign, he increasingly promoted an image of himself as “father of the country,” looking after his soldier-children. The government portrayed love and marriage as a reward for military glory, attempting to use state-sponsored weddings and dowries for particularly deserving veterans as a means to foster support for continued fighting. Gendered imagery and the participation of men and women were also important in the resistance to the Napoleonic empire. Two examples show the range of such participation and long-term impact: Spain and Prussia. In Spain, the conditions of guerrilla war encouraged the participation of women in resistance to Napoleon. In situations like the 1808 uprising in Zaragoza, women engaged directly in combat; some, like Augustina of Aragon, even became national heroines because of their bravery. But as John Tone has argued, the widespread image of heroic Spanish Amazons standing in for male combatants at decisive moments often exaggerated or misrepresented the actual activities of contemporary women. The image served instead to represent and inspire national unity against outsiders. As Spain was divided by civil war during much of the 19th century, such stories also served later to invoke an imagined moment of nationalist cohesion, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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in which the joint struggle of both sexes against the invader symbolized the unity of the people of the whole. As such, images did little to change gender relations more generally. In Prussia, as in Spain, the wars against Napoleon entailed the mobilization of both men and women in the name of unified national resistance; similarly, the wars were later seen as critical for creating a Prussian and ultimately a German national identity. Yet the nature of the war in Prussia led to the introduction of universal conscription and close association of the army with the “nation” (as opposed to just the state). Karen Hagemann has argued that a patriotic, defense-oriented national identity was thus formed based on a male citizenry able and willing to bear arms and was explicitly masculine in character. A Prussian “national character” was elaborated for both men and women that strictly separated the two in their contributions to the common nation. In both countries, gender, war, and nascent nationalism were deeply intertwined, but were configured differently. Later revolutionary movements, particularly the 1848 uprisings across Europe, stirred similar dreams of dramatic social change. Women and men fought on the barricades and renewed demands for certain rights. Yet many, like Kathinka Zta-Halein, a German writer and democratic activist, also counseled patience in pushing what later observers would term a “feminist agenda”; women’s rights were secondary to the success of the revolution. The revolution Zta-Halein dreamed of, however, did not succeed. Some of the nationalist aspirations associated with the 1848 uprisings were later realized, but women were less militantly involved in the Italian Risorgimento or German unification in 1871 than in earlier uprisings. Late 19th-century wars leading to unification, especially the Austrio-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, were largely fought by professional armies, not citizen armies on the scale of those organized during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. As such, they did not mobilize national populations in the same way. But this did not mean that gender was absent from nationalist rhetoric and movements. On the contrary, it was often central. The Risorgimento provides a particularly clear case of such dynamics. In the early 19th century, both foreign commentators and Italian patriots often viewed the country as effeminate—attractive, but also indolent, demilitarized, and degenerate. As Silvana Patriarca has recently shown, nationalists’ desire to redeem the Italian patria was often framed as the recovery of manly honor. Such language persisted and intensified with the formal unification of the country under Piedmont-Sardinia. Cultural Nationalism, Political Rights, and Women’s Suffrage Although revolutions and war provide particularly dramatic moments in the history of nation-building, many contemporary developments in cultural nationalism were often quieter and longer term but, nonetheless, significant. Throughout the 19th century, women remained, or were made, central to projects of cultural nationalism. They were asked to, or claimed an ability to, further the cause of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nation by cultivating its language, literature, and customs. Such projects could be double-edged. The case of Greek nationalist resistance against the Ottoman empire suggests some of the complexities of such participation. As Eléni Varikas has shown, one of the ways in which elite women participated in such movements was by helping to foster a cultural nationalism, translating or publishing at their expense works deemed to be “useful for the nation,” and memorializing insurgents’ patriotic exploits. After the country’s independence, activists for women’s rights drew on an ideology of the Greek nation’s “civilizing mission” to demand the emancipation of Greek women as a precondition for fully realizing national aspirations. At the same time, however, traditional values about the relationship between the sexes were one of the few matters of national cohesion, especially in the face of Greece’s industrial backwardness. More generally, women’s roles in promoting national culture could provide platforms for demanding participation in the nation. This was especially the case where the “nation” or national culture elided official definition, or where it appeared threatened by alien forces. Indeed, Lynn Abrams has argued that it is precisely because of the continually shifting nature of cultural nationalism that women could find it a useful place to nurture their own aspirations. Yet nationalist organizations and governments also sought to limit and channel women’s activities to desirable ends. As Malgorzata Fidelis has shown, in Poland, for example, the traditional ideal of womanhood was defined by national ideology: women were to promote national strength and solidarity but were to do so in the home by preserving language and culture, producing sons, and supporting soldiers. If cultural nationalism was a phenomenon of growing importance during the 19th century, so, too, was another well-known issue: campaigns for women’s suffrage. Some of the earliest and most famous calls for women’s suffrage emerged during moments of revolution, like Condorcet’s call for gender equality during the French Revolution or Mary Wollstonecraft’s 1792 Vindication of the Rights of Women. But organized suffrage movements were largely a product of the later 19th century, even though later movements sometimes referred deliberately back to moments of national founding. The 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration lamented that women were prevented from exercising their “inalienable right to the elective franchise.” Its authors, Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, deliberately adapted the founding document of the United States, the Declaration of Independence, proclaiming, “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal . . . .” Despite Mott and Cady Stanton’s claims, women would not obtain the right to vote in the United States until 1919. Nor did women gain suffrage quickly elsewhere; the first country to grant women the vote, New Zealand, did so only in 1893. Many other democratic countries did not institute female suffrage until the 20th century; in particularly notorious cases, France did not do so until after World War II and Switzerland not until 1971. While a full analysis of suffrage is beyond the scope of this essay, it is striking that invocations of women’s rights as N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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citizens, of their roles in cultural nationalism, and of their service to the state could all affect debates over suffrage. This is particularly clear in Finland, the country in Europe where women first gained the franchise in national parliamentary elections, in 1906. As Aura Korppi-Tommola has shown, a series of factors were at work, including the late introduction of universal suffrage and the relative proportion of highly educated women and women in the workplace. However, Finns of both sexes were particularly united by the common struggle against Russian rule, and in nationalist resistance against the Russianification of language and institutions; in this context, women’s suffrage appeared partly as a recognition of, and reward for, such resistance. Colonialism, Gender, and Nationalism Let us turn to our final theme in exploring the interactions of gender and nationalism: colonialism. European imperialists often linked national pride and prosperity to colonial conquest. Some measured the status of civilizations by their treatment of women, justifying colonialism partly because of the perceived barbarity of native populations. Champions of this perspective in the early 19th century often characterized “Oriental” societies by emphasizing customs of polygamy, veiling, and the seclusion of women in harems, themes that appeared simultaneously fascinating and horrific to Western audiences. Conversely, anticolonial nationalists often assigned women the task of preserving indigenous traditions and identities against outsiders, a trend that would become more pronounced in the later 19th and 20th centuries. More generally, both imperialists and anti-imperialists represented relations of power through gender and family imagery. One particularly powerful trope was that of colonial powers as parents and of conquered peoples as children: weak, immature, and in need of guidance. In the 18th and early 19th century, this was often combined with paternalistic justifications of slavery, as some of the most valuable colonies in existence were plantation economies in the Caribbean. Critics of slavery and colonialism sometimes adopted the same rhetoric; even European abolitionists often championed gradual emancipation by referring to slaves with expressions like “children in the cradle,” “minors, children of the country,” or children “under the guidance of those charged to better their lot.” But family imagery also implicitly empowered such “children” to demand eventual independence, both individually and as nations. Indeed, several commentators on the Haitian revolution equated colonies to adult children who had found metropolitan authority to be a gentle guide in their political infancy but later experienced it as an intolerable yoke. Colonized peoples, or those whose lands were subject to colonization, were also often depicted as women—seductive and desirable, but passive and incapable of acting sensibly or fully independently. Such imagery played on and reinforced contemporary images of sexual subordination and hierarchy. Yet contemporary iconography also often made key racial distinctions; where “white, virtuous” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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women appeared, they were almost always represented fully dressed, whereas native women were often shown in naked or half-naked poses. In some cases, colonized peoples and regions were represented as male, but only as a certain kind of man: irrational, savage, and threatening to European women. One of the most dramatic examples of this dynamic corresponds to the British decision to take direct control of India from the East India Company in 1857. The Sepoy Mutiny, otherwise known as the Indian Mutiny or the First War of Indian Independence, was provoked by a seemingly trivial event, new ordinances that required Indian soldiers serving under the East India Company to use rifle cartridges greased with animal fat. The procedure violated both Hindi religious bans on eating beef and Muslim bans on pork and served as a trigger for what became a widespread uprising, including attacks on Europeans in the town of Cawnpore. Both official English accounts and popular literature focused on brutalities against English women. While such accounts corresponded to some real atrocities, they also dramatized the mutiny as an irrational and savage attack rather than as a legitimate political and nationalist uprising, and justified the British government’s decision to claim full control of the country. Impact on Different Groups Men and women did not act only as individuals but also participated in different groups that made competing claims to national territory and appropriate forms of government. The rival nationalist movements within the Austria-Hungarian empire or among Latin American independence movements reveal divisions among these groups with particular clarity, as do certain imperialist and anticolonialist organizations. One can also see forms of relevant cleavage among other kinds of groups, including those among competing political movements that each identified their causes with national advancement, among different generations, and among different cultural movements. I want to focus here, however, on another form of division that both influenced and was influenced by nationalism: that of class. Social divisions were fundamentally entangled with nationalism. Often more educated and elite figures were the most prominent in calling for national unification; these people were usually, although not always, men. Peasants of both sexes were inclined to continue to think in terms of local or regional identities. Ironically, the peasant woman imagined to incarnate national traditions—by teaching children their national language and culture or literally embodying the nation by wearing “national clothes” and producing new members of the nation—was often far removed from direct nationalist activity or even consciousness. Indeed, some of the social elites who wrote on patriotism and fashion in late Enlightenment Germany recommended folk costumes to those they considered their inferiors, but were unwilling to don such clothing themselves. Class divisions have another saliency in the period, precisely because of the contemporary dynamics of the Industrial Revolution. Industrialization fostered N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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an increasing tendency for people to think of social relations in terms of classes. It also contributed to the rise of particular views of appropriate middle-class life, in which men were to be the sole breadwinners and women, especially married women, were not supposed to work outside the home. While this view was often far from the realities of industrialization for workers (textile mills relied on cheap female labor) and even for those on the margins of the middle and upper classes, industrialization meant that national pride was often identified in part with specific class behavior. Middle-class moralists often tried to impose their ideas of appropriate behavior on the rest of population and depict them as signs of national identity. The British national icon of Queen Victoria, surrounded by her children and dogs, simultaneously embodies a very middle-class and a very gendered image of national prosperity. Similarly, the English women attacked in the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny were imagined to embody a class-specific modesty and virtue. Where it was not possible to identify the nation and the middle class, political leaders sometimes adopted other strategies. This is particularly true in Belgium, where women miners became symbolic of the country after its independence in 1830. As Patricia Hilden has argued, such women were portrayed as young, strong, and hard working, linked to industrial progress and national pride. Other parts of industrializing Europe often tried to implement marriage bars to both exploit and limit women’s labor; in England, for example, employers in many trades refused to hire married women on the grounds that this would degrade home life. Belgium’s circumstances made this “solution” to the problem of controlling potentially independent working women difficult to implement. Belgium thus celebrated its women coal miners, while turning them into nonthreatening icons of the nation. Not everyone embraced the image of the nation as middle class or of nationalism as a bourgeois movement. The nation invoked by revolutionaries during 1848 was often specifically defined in contrast to bourgeois power, a “workers’ republic” par excellence. In contrast, Marx’s famous demand in the Communist Manifesto that the workers of the world unite explicitly attempted to counter national identities in all forms. Indeed, Marx explicitly linked contemporary family structures, property, and national rivalries to oppressive capitalist order, implying that both gender and national structures should be transformed. For many later socialist activists, especially women, it could be difficult to balance the desire for national change with the dreams of international movements, and to balance hopes for women’s rights with those of workers’ rights. In the case of the 1871 Paris Commune, for example, female leaders struggled to defend Paris and the French nation, defining themselves repeatedly as citizenesses. But as Carolyn Eicher has pointed out, they also viewed the Commune as the beginning of international socialism, espousing social and economic rights, while leaving aside questions of women’s suffrage and political rights in the nation. As Marxism became a stronger movement in the later 19th century, it often N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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proved increasingly difficult for socialist women to champion political rights within the nation.

Consequences Marxism and other forms of socialism, along with the cosmopolitan ideals of the French Revolution and other revolutionary uprisings and a variety of international movements—from antislavery societies to religious movements—all developed contemporaneously with new forms of nationalism. In the case of an internationalist women’s or “feminist” movement (though the term was not widely used until the 1890s), connections between different groups, particularly Americans and British, often cross-cut national identities even as women claimed rights specifically as citizens of their home countries. Whereas Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton played on references to American national identity in the Seneca Falls Declaration, other calls for women’s rights made explicit references to international developments. To take an example from one of the best-known treatises for women’s rights, The Subjection of Women (1869), John Stuart Mill and his unsigned coauthor, Harriet Taylor Mill, argued for suffrage in part by noting the emergence of a women’s movement not only in Britain, but also in France, Italy, Switzerland, and Russia. However passionate the debates over the nature of citizenship or the appropriate forms of national identity might become, national arenas were not only the ones that shaped changing gender roles. Yet the nationalist experiments of the age of revolution did have dramatic effects in providing new opportunities—and sometimes new obligations—for men and women to act on behalf of a nation. They redefined the rights and duty of citizens, forcing contemporaries to address whether both women and men should be included as part of the citizenry entitled to such rights or subject to such obligations, and what legitimated such inclusion or exclusion. At the same time, nationalist experiments were themselves shaped by gendered expectations, from the uses of national symbols to the definitions of citizenship, from the tasks of embodying or cultivating national identities to the ways in which imperial enterprises were promoted and justified. Selected Bibliography Abrams, Lynn. 2002. The Making of the Modern Woman: Europe, 1789–1918. London: Pearson. Agulhon, Maurice. 1981. Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880. Translated by Janet Llyod. New York: Cambridge University Press. Blom, Ida, Karen Hagemann, and Catherine Hall, eds. 2000. Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Berg. Dudink, Stefan, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh, eds. 2004. Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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Hagemann, Karen. 2004. “Female Patriots: Women, War and the Nation in Prussia during the Anti-Napoleonic Wars.” Gender and History 16, no. 2: 397–424. Hilden, Patricia. 1991. “The Rhetoric and Iconography of Reform: Women Coal Miners in Belgium, 1840–1914.” Historical Journal 34, no. 2: 411–436. Kerber, Linda. 1998. No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship. New York: Hill and Wang. Korppi-Tommola, Aura. 1990. “Fighting Together for Freedom: Nationalism, Socialism, Feminism, and Women’s Suffrage in Finland, 1906.” Scandinavian Journal of History 15, no. 3: 181–191. Landes, Joan. 2001. Visualizing the Nation: Gender, Representation, and Revolution in EighteenthCentury France. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mosse, George. 1985. Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Patriarca, Silvana. 2005. “Indolence and Regeneration: Tropes and Tensions of Risorgimento Patriotism.” American Historical Review 110, no. 2: 380–408. Pierson, Ruth Roach, Nupur Chaudhuri, and with the assistance of Beth McAuley, eds. 1998. Nation, Empire, Colony: Historicizing Gender and Race. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tone, John Lawrence. 1999. “Spanish Women in the Resistance to Napoleon, 1808–1814.” In Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain, edited by Victoria Lorée Enders and Pamela Beth Radcliff, 259–282. Albany: State University of New York Press. Varikas, Eléni. 1993. “National and Gender Identity in Fin-De-Siècle Greece.” Gender and History 5, no. 2: 269–283. Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender & Nation. London: Sage Publications.

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Landscape, Monuments, and National Identity Kenneth R. Olwig Relevance Throughout Europe and the Americas, the linking of national identity and landscape scenery became both ubiquitous and taken for granted as “natural” in the period from about 1770 to 1870. It is difficult to survey the connection between landscape and national identity, because landscape scenery is not a clearly defined object in and of itself but a way of looking at the world, derived ultimately from the arts. During this period, it became natural to apprehend the landscape as scenery and as an expression not just of nature but of a natural process of national development incorporating the individual and giving the individual identity. It was thus natural to involve the landscape in expressions of national feeling, but it was not natural to reflect on just what it was that constituted landscape, why it was identified with nature, or why it was relevant to national identity. There were exceptions, however. The American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) showed an acute awareness of the constructed character of landscape when he wrote in his classic 1836 essay, Nature: “Miller owns this field, Locke that, and Manning the woodland beyond. But none of them owns the landscape. There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet. This is the best part of these men’s farms, yet to this their warranty-deeds give no title” (Emerson 1991, 7). Emerson does not explain what landscape is, but he does tell us that it is not simply an object to be gazed upon but rather a totality that must be integrated by the eye of a poet to be seen, and it is only with such an eye that one can receive “title” to the “best part” of the land. Emerson refers to the eye of the “poet,” but it was the eye of the painter that first integrated the parts of a landscape into a visual totality with which people felt they could identify and to which they could feel entitled. Before returning to Emerson’s poet, it is useful to take a look at the historical background of landscape art to understand its relation to place identity.

Origins The representation of scenes from particular places first emerged as an artistic genre, called “landscape,” north of the Alps in the early 16th century and gained particular prominence in the flourishing artistic world of the 17th-century N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Netherlands. Newly developed perspective methods of scenic representation, in tandem with related techniques developed in cartography, facilitated a unified visual perception of the lands making up the countryside of a historical region or country as shaped by the people and their customs. The sense of identity fostered by these pictures was particularly important in places such as Switzerland and the Netherlands where there was a federation of differing historical regions (or countries), often termed Landschaft (German) or landschap (Dutch), and no monarch—and hence no royal iconography and portraiture to act as a unifying symbol. Germanic northern Europe in general was politically and culturally fragmented at this time, lacking the sense of identity imparted by a unified territorial state, as in France and Spain, or a glorious imperial past upon which to build a Renaissance, as in Italy. Landscape art, in tandem with cartography and topographical description, helped create a larger sense of both local and regional identity. Connoisseurs throughout Europe collected landscape paintings not because they depicted specific known places but, rather, for their esthetic value. Similarly, a portrait of a person might be collected for its esthetic value rather than for its portrayal of a particular, known person. These paintings, taken thus out of context, stimulated a general interest in the painting of landscape scenery as a genre, alongside other genres such as portraiture. By the latter half of the 18th century, when the period under study begins, the original Germanic meaning of landscape as “a region, the prospect of a country,” was still current in English as Samuel Johnson made clear in his classic dictionary from 1755. A landscape, however, could also simply be a form of picture: “A picture, representing an extent of space, with the various objects in it” (Johnson 1968, “landscape” entry). Finally, it was possible to use the term to mean the scenery of a place, which a person perceives of as if in a picture (Oxford English Dictionary 1971, “landscape” entry). Landscape had thus become synonymous with scenery, as in the modern definition: “a portion of land or territory that the eye can comprehend in a single view including all the objects so seen” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 2000, “landscape” entry). The link between landscape and modern nation-state identity involved, however, not just a process of simple pictorial representation; it also required a notion of an organic incorporation of the individual into a given national territory. This understanding of landscape appears to have grown out of the way landscape was used in the theater. The modern notion of nationality as being naturally linked to a state now tends to be taken for granted. The historical root of nation, like that of nature, derives, however, from a Latin word meaning birth. A nation is thus, by implication, a people or race united by blood ties of birth, whether or not they live together in one territory or have their own state. A modern nation, however, is usually assumed to be a people, often of differing ethnicities, united by the territorial bounds of the nation-state in which they are citizens. The nature of this territory, furthermore, is characterized by the landscape scenery within its boundaries—defined “naturally” by a terrestrial coast or a river, or even by a celestially defined line of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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latitude or longitude. The American nation is thus identified with its “purple mountain majesties, and fruited plains, from sea to shining sea,” described in the popular national song, “America the Beautiful” (Bates 1974). Under medieval feudalism, the state, though it might be made up of geographically dispersed territories, was symbolically unified and embodied in the monarch or prince, to whom the feudal nobility owed fealty. The centralized Renaissance state, by contrast, tended to take the form of a unified territorial body that could be inscribed upon a map and divided into administrative regions, supervised by a state bureaucracy under the watchful gaze of the monarchical head of state. The difference became apparent in 1603, for example, when King James VI of Scotland (1566–1625) was crowned King James I of England, thereby uniting the two states in his person. James’s court saw the possibility of creating a centralized state, but this required the cooperation of the parliaments of the two countries. James therefore gave a speech to the English Parliament in which he described Britain as a geographical and dynastic unity incorporated in his body: “What God hath conjoined then, let no man separate. I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the Head, and it is my Body . . .” (James I [1616] 1918, 271–273). In this way, he maintains the medieval idea of the state as being incorporated in the body of the monarch. He adds to it, however, the notion that the state is also naturally defined by a geographical body, thereby becoming the “perfect union of bodies, politic as well as natural,” as Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626), James’s lord chancellor, the scientist, jurist, and courtier, put it (cited in Kantorowicz 1957, 24). “Natural” ties of birth and blood united Britain, but it was not the extended family ties of birth and blood that united, for example, the Scottish clans. This unification of the Scots, the English, and the Welsh within the geographical body of Britain, with James as its head, provided the basis for William Camden’s (1551–1623) claim, made in his classic 1607 chorography (regional geography) of the territory called Britannia, that Britain now formed “one large state, united under one august monarch,” and the two “nations” now formed “one people” (Camden 1806, 4:17). Britain was being born as a nation-state. The problem for the court was to create a convincing picture of this Britain with which the leading segments of society could identify. It was here that the court stage designer and architect, Inigo Jones (1573–1652), played an important role through his pioneering use of central point perspective to create progressively shifting “landtschap” scenography for theater pieces, in which the eye of the head of state was the focal point for the lines of perspective that integrated the scene on stage—called “the bodily part.” The shifting stage scenes typically represented the stages of Britain’s development into a peaceful and fruitful state, dotted with monuments marking the progress of that state, under the ruling gaze of the monarch (Olwig 2002, 62–98). The modern French philosopher Regis Debray has noted that, because nobody has ever seen or heard a state, a state must, at any price, make itself visible and let itself be heard: “It is the theater of the state N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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which creates the state, just as the monument creates memory” (Debray 1994, 66). This opinion also seems to have been that of the artist Abraham Bosse when he sought to create a fitting illustration for the title page of Thomas Hobbes’s 1651 classic study of the nature of the central state, Leviathan (Hobbes 1991). He made the state visible in the figure of the state as a giant body, composed of the bodies of its citizenry, with a head that commanded, with its gaze, a landscape scene that could have been the set of a stage scene by Jones. During the course of the 18th century, the role of landscape as the natural embodiment of the nation increased in importance in tandem with the role of representative national government, as that of the monarchical head of state lessened. Particularly after 1707 when the Parliament of Westminster passed the Act of Union linking Scotland to England and Wales, it became the landscape of the geographical body of Britain, as represented in Parliament, that came into focus rather than the head of state. It was during this time that the memory of Jones’s work was revived by the pioneering landscape architect William Kent (1684–1748) and his architect partner Lord Burlington (1694–1753). They created gardens that looked to be straight out of Jones’s theater scenes, complete with monuments. These gardens were seen to emulate nature, and for the first time, nature and landscape began to be treated as synonyms. By the end of the 18th century, when our period begins, a British vogue had developed for landscape arts ranging from painting to gardening to picturesque travel, sketchbook in hand, and as a framework for scientific understanding. Now, it became a mark of education and citizenship to be able to perceive the world from the integrative perspective of landscape, which provided a common denominator for national identity. The vogue for landscape was identified, throughout Europe, with Britain, as was the institution of parliamentary rule.

Dimensions Britain, by the beginning of our period, had become the site of an ongoing social, political, and agricultural and industrial revolution that helped make it a symbol of social and economic progress throughout Europe. One early influential anglophile was Charles-Louis Montesquieu (1689–1755), who admired not only Britain’s tripartite form of government, with its executive, judiciary, and parliamentary branches of government, but also its landscape gardens, which he emulated on his own French estate. The landscape garden, with its lawns among freely growing groves of fully crowned individual trees, represented, for Montesquieu, the quintessence of the British political landscape. Montesquieu gained European prominence for his influential writings on law and constitutionality in the book The Spirit of the Laws, from 1748. Following the lead of the ancient Roman author, Tacitus (ca. 56–120), he saw the ancient northern “nations,” living scattered among N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Title page of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. (Bettmann/Corbis)

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the forests of northern Europe, Germania, and Scandinavia, as freedom-loving sources of individual liberty and parliamentarian government. England became the repository of these liberties through the settlement of the Anglo-Saxons. Montesquieu thus helped generate a European fashion for things British, including landscape gardens. Monumental Landscapes Montesquieu’s writings drew attention to the Roman author Tacitus’s Germania (Tacitus 1942) as a model by which northern Europeans could construct an alternative identity in opposition to a southern European “other,” with its Roman heritage. Tacitus defined Germany in opposition to Rome as a natural, egalitarian society where families lived not in towns, as in classical Rome, but in family households dispersed among the forest. Thus, if Rome, and the inheritors of the Roman culture, had its pagan monuments of carved marble, northern Europe’s monuments of rough earth and stone could be seen as springing from nature itself. Protestantism, which predominated in much of northern Europe, had largely de-sacralized nature. It removed the associations with various Christian saints characterizing the pilgrim sites of southern Europe. This allowed the landscape to become re-sacralized as a national monument, often as the home site of the ancient pagan Nordic gods, or a godlike “Nature.” As early as 1819, we find the German geographer and natural philosopher Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), in his book on his expedition to the equatorial regions of America, using the concept of “monuments of nature” in reference to large, old trees (Sundin 2005, 10). Scandinavia became important in this context because it lay beyond the direct influence of ancient Rome. Scandinavia was seen as the repository of the ancient Germanic language and folklore, a thinly populated area dominated by nature and unsullied by Roman culture. The close association between landscape, nature, and national identity developed in Germanic northern Europe in counterdistinction to southern Europe, with its Roman cultural heritage and romance languages. This tended to exclude southern Europeans from cultivating this form of identity—unless they chose to identify with the northern “gothic” heritage being promoted in northern Europe. Likewise, the well-established state boundaries of France and Spain, coupled to weak parliamentary institutions and strong kings or emperors, also made these areas less fertile ground for the linking of landscape and national identity. Thus, though landscape may have become an ubiquitous component in national iconography throughout Europe and the Americas at this time, it did not play the same core role in nation-state identity building in southern Europe as was the case in northern Europe. It was largely from the core area of northern Europe, especially Britain, that the link between landscape and national identity spread early on to the United States of America, which gained independence at the beginning of the period discussed here and which helped play a formative role in developing and spreading national identification with landscape. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Like Germany and Scandinavia, the United States lacked the heritage of marble monuments linking the country to a glorious, ancient past. It did have monumental natural landscapes, however, ranging from Virginia’s natural bridge to Yosemite and the Grand Canyon to the monumental redwood trees of California. Thomas Jefferson (1743–1846) purchased the natural bridge and gave it to the nation, making it the first American national monument. At his Monticello estate, he emulated the British tradition established by Kent and Burlington of Palladian mansions set in landscape gardens. The natural bridge, from this perspective, could be seen as a monument in a vast extended landscape garden, which was America itself. This was an America Jefferson himself had greatly extended when he bought and mapped the vast western area acquired with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. For Jefferson, a man of the Enlightenment, the designer of America was no landscape architect but, rather, “Nature,” a subject for science although spelled with a capital, like “God,” the subject of religion. Jefferson, in this respect, was not just an inheritor of British tradition but also of German tradition, as personified, for example, in the work of the geographer and explorer Alexander von Humboldt. Humboldt, though a natural scientist, also had a highly spiritual feeling for the totality of landscape and nature, as illustrated by his classic work of synthesis, Cosmos, which was published between 1849 and 1858. Humboldt’s books were read all over the world, not least in the Americas, where he traveled widely and met Jefferson. It was thus appropriate that it was the American painter Frederic Edwin Church (1826–1900), a devotee of Alexander Humboldt’s scientific and spiritual approach to landscape, who popularized the monumentality of the bridge in an 1852 painting. This structure was the work of Nature, as well as the nature of the American continents that Humboldt explored and glorified. Church, easel in hand, followed literally in Humboldt’s footsteps. The transformation of America’s landscape into monuments was in large measure inspired by the landscape paintings of artists who were either from northern Europe, such as Albert Bierstadt (1830–1902), or who were inspired, like Church, by German and Nordic art. The United States was born a republic, thus rejecting the monarch as the head of state and embodiment of the nation. This allowed the national landscape particular force as a source of national identity. The phrase “purple mountains majesty” in the popular national song, “America the Beautiful,” can thus be taken almost literally as a landscape substitute for a monarch (Bates 1974). The 20thcentury carving of the faces of the nation’s founding fathers into the face of a mountain by Gutzon Borglum (1867–1941), the scion of Danish immigrants, was a further concretization of this idea. The monumental heads of the “fathers” of the nation were literally carved into the body of the continent that gave the nation its name. The national identification with the body of the continent, and its natural landscape scenery, also had the effect of legitimizing the European settlers’ right to the land because it systematically overlooked the cultural landscapes of the native American population and the earlier Mexican settlers. Through the mediums of popular songs like “America the Beautiful,” dramatic landscape paintings N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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displayed in monumental places like the Capitol building and disseminated as inexpensive lithographs, spectacular panorama shows, and tourist visits to what were to become national monuments and parks, the idea of landscape as a source of national identity was to spread, by 1870, from the enlightened precincts of Jefferson’s mansion to the family homes of ordinary Americans. The identity between nation and landscape scenery was furthered by the tendency to identify the cultural and political heritage of the United States with that of northern Europe. New Englanders were widely thought of as the inheritors of the Anglo-Saxon democratic traditions originally brought to old England from Germany and Scandinavia. America, furthermore, was characterized by a heavily wooded and thinly populated landscape scene that was being cleared by Anglo-Saxon woodsmen who bore a distinct resemblance, in national mythology, to the freedom-loving northern Europeans described by Tacitus, and later by Montesquieu. The idea that the freedom-loving ancient Northmen created the foundation for democracy was not only influential in 19th-century America but also in Europe, where the idea had originally developed. In the following paragraphs, I will illustrate this idea by focusing on the way that certain individuals, in the course of their lives, became caught up in the nationalist movements of the 19th century and, in turn, came to influence the course of nationalism. The focus will initially be upon the philosopher and natural scientist Henrik Steffens (1773–1845), because of the way his life was transformed due to the way nationalism fragmented a cosmopolitan northern European world into rivaling nations. The point is to show that nationalism was not simply the outcome of ideas and socioeconomic forces but of lived experience that forced people to redefine their world and their landscape in national terms. Steffens is particularly interesting as a case study because he speculated directly on the relationship among nature, the individual, and national identity. His work played an important role in linking the philosophy and natural science of his time to the issue of national identity, and he became a catalytic figure in the development of national identity both in Germany and Scandinavia, as well as in America. Steffens thus serves as an ideal figure upon which to focus, because he provides a means of comprehending the role of the broad intellectual currents that shaped ideas concerning the relationship among landscape, nature, and national identity. Landscape, Natural Science, Art, and Philosophy Henrik Steffens (1773–1845) embodied the contradictions, shared by many in his time, of being born into a multinational state that was in the process of being divided into national entities. He was born to the son of a Danish mother and a father from Holstein (now Germany) in what was to eventually become the Norwegian nation-state, but the entire area was then under the suzerainty of the Danish monarch. Steffens received his secondary schooling in Denmark, did his doctorate in Germany, married a German, and became a prominent natural scientist, natural philosopher, and German patriot. Steffens’s biography illustrates N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the paradox of national identity-building at this time in that national identity tended to be constructed according to an international body of ideas and principles, by people with multinational cultural roots, yet it divided people into what often became warring national groups. As a student of the noted German geologist Abraham Werner (1749–1817), Steffens learned to understand the physical landscape as a layered phenomenon, with geological layers overlain by a layer of flora and associated fauna. Through his contact with such Dresden landscape artists as Caspar David Friedrich (1774– 1840), who was born in (then) Swedish Greifswald and who had worked in Copenhagen, and the Norwegian-born Jens Christian Dahl (1788–1857), he was exposed to artists who gave visual expression to the landscape as a mystic unity between Nordic nature and nation. As a friend and neighbor of Jacob (1785–1863) and Wilhelm (1786–1859) Grimm, he helped with the German translation of Scandinavian folk stories, which were seen to be an expression of Scandinavia’s physical landscape. In Jena, Steffens was exposed to German “universal romanticism,” as developed by Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) and the brothers August Wilhelm (1767–1845) and Friedrich (1772–1829) Schlegel, and through them was introduced to ideas concerning the relationship between individual subjectivity and objective nature. Steffens was thus in a position to synthesize these developments in the arts and sciences into a comprehensive natural philosophy. It was this philosophy that he brought with him to Copenhagen in 1802, where he delivered a series of epochal lectures that provided the starting point for a Scandinavian national Romantic artistic and philosophical movement that was influential both in Europe and America. Steffens’s Copenhagen lectures demonstrate the way landscape served as an underlying conceptual framework that gave structure and meaning to national identity. The generative process of national development occurs, according to Steffens, through a reciprocal historical interaction between the individual and the nation, founded upon nature and expressed in terms of changing landscape scenery. It is through this process of interaction that an identity between the individual and the national landscape is formed (Steffens 1905, 91). Steffens’s lectures sum up the contemporary tendency to see the landscape as a series of pictures depicting human progress as a developing interaction between the individual, the nation, and nature. He provided a way to link landscape to a notion of individual and national progress from a primitive state to that of a civilized state. It is difficult to grasp how landscape works this way without an example, so it is useful to return to Emerson’s “poet,” who integrates the elements of the landscape into a unified picture. The poet, unlike the painter, makes use of a medium that lends itself to a narrative flow through time. The painter may paint a series of pictures, but it is the author who connects them together into a narrative. Steffens’s lectures had a catalytic effect upon a young man who was to become one of the most celebrated Romantic poets in Europe, Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850). The national theme was central to Oehlenschläger’s serious poetry N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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and drama, but it was in one of his most simple and popular poems that he successfully captured the pictorial approach to history of his mentor, Steffens. The success of the poem is measured by the fact that it became the Danish national anthem, popular to this day on national occasions. Oehlenschläger is thus a good example of the role of the poet in integrating all of the landscape’s parts into a whole to the people of a nation could feel entitled. Landscape Poetry Adam Oehlenschläger’s poem “There Is a Delightful Land” was probably written in 1819. It was published in 1823, put to music in 1835, and by midcentury had gained general acceptance as Denmark’s “National Anthem.” The verses most commonly used when sung are as follows (Oehlenschläger 1823, my translation): There is a lovely land, It stands with broad beech trees Near the eastern strand; It curves through hill and dale, Its name is olden Denmark, And it is Freya’s bower. There sat in days of yore, The armor-clad warriors, Rested from strife; They then set out to the enemy’s harm, Now rest their bones Behind the grave barrow’s monolith. This land is still beautiful, For the sea belts blue around the land, And the leaves stand green; And noble women, lovely maids And men and hearty lads Inhabit the Dane’s isles. Hail king and fatherland! Hail every Danish citizen, Who does his very best. Our ancient Denmark shall endure, As long as the beech reflects Its top in the waves of blue.

Unlike the single image of a landscape painting, Oehlenschläger’s poem provides a series of textual images illustrating the way poetry was able to weave a narrative that linked national identity to a process of transformation appropriate to the generation of national identity at a time of change. Oehlenschläger’s poem progresses, stage by stage, like the changes in theater stage scenery in the dramas that he wrote as poet laureate for the national theN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ater. Each stage provides the landscape scenery within which the drama of national history takes place. In the first scene, the stage floor, upon which the national drama is to be played, is presented in the form of the feminine curves of the natural landscape, the home of the pagan Nordic fertility goddess Freya, with its stands of beech trees. In the next scene, a layer of culture is added, as Denmark becomes the homeland retreat of ancient marauding warriors who now lie buried behind their monolithic memorial stones. Finally comes a modern scene with its hail and hearty citizenry willingly serving a fatherland that will endure as long as the broad beeches of the landscape reflect in the blue sea. The progressive movement in the poem through stages of development might seem contradictory to the development of identity, because the root of “identity” derives from the Latin idem, meaning “the same” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 2000, “identity” entry), as opposed to the idea of change. The trick, however, as illustrated by Oehlenschläger’s poem, lies in the fact that the natural landscape of terrain, coast, and monumental beech trees remains constant, while society and its cultural landscape undergo transformation. In Oehlenschläger’s poem, Denmark progresses from a childhood state of nature under a feminine pagan goddess, to a youthful male warrior stage, to one in which the men and women of Denmark are described neither as warriors nor as subjects but as hard-working citizens. The Danish word for citizen, borger (burgher in German), also means a member of the bourgeoisie—a class of people whose rise to power supplanted that of noble warrior classes that dominated ancient and medieval society, and who were then, throughout Europe, demanding a greater say in government based upon liberal principles of individual representation. Oehlenschläger’s beech trees, as a symbol of the nation, are rooted in the tradition of Tacitus and Montesquieu in which the people of the north are seen as being freedom-loving individualists living among the trees, even if Denmark itself was an absolute monarchy at the time of the poem’s writing; Oehlenschläger dutifully included a “hail” to the king. By 1849, however, when the poem gained popular acceptance as the national anthem, Denmark had become a constitutional monarchy, and the bourgeois citizenry was assuming political power. In the course of the century, popular poetry and songs, such as Oehlenschläger’s, along with, as in America, the greater availability of landscape images, would broaden the appeal of landscape in relation to national identity. Blood, Soil, and Gender The foundation for national progress, as outlined by Steffens and implemented by Oehlenschläger, remains nature, as studied by the scientist and as experienced by the people. This is a point that Steffens later made more emphatically when he wrote: “Man is wholly a product from the hands of nature. Only in his being this wholly—not partly, but wholly—do we confess that in him nature centers all her mysteries. And so it became plain to me that natural science is bringing a new element into history, which is to become the basis of all knowledge of our race. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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History and nature must be in perfect concord, for they are really one” (Steffens 1874, 100). What we see occurring in these texts is the completion of a swing from the Renaissance idea of the landscape as the embodiment of the monarch as head of state to the landscape as the natural organic embodiment of a nation that progressively develops through interaction with its natural foundation. There is also, as in Oehlenschläger’s poem, the suggestion that this development follows the same pattern as the development of an individual from birth out of the womb of a feminine natural landscape, through a youthful wild state, to adult maturity. The native of the nation is thus defined by nativity in this natural landscape. The power of this idea, by the beginning of the 20th century, is reflected in the statement by the German philosopher of history, Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), that “cultures grow with original vigor out of the lap of a maternal natural landscape, to which each is bound in the whole course of its existence” (translation in Sauer 1969, 325). The identification between blood and soil implied by this conception of landscape helped create a strong collective bond to the nation, but it also excluded immigrants and those, such as the Jews and the Romany, who were seen to be of foreign nomadic stock, without ties of blood to the national soil. Though blood and soil ideology is often identified particularly with German nationalism, it is, in fact, built into the very structure of the spatially and historically layered conception of landscape as scenery. In America, it thus helped generate the notion of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant superiority, due to the idea that America was founded by the pioneer woodsman descendents of the Anglo-Saxons.

Consequences The visualization of landscape as scenery grew out of the arts. As used in the theater, it provided the layered scenic foundation for the drama on the birth of the nation. The changing of scenes, in turn, helped stimulate the idea of progressive historical stages of national development within the territory of the state. Landscape thus acted as an underlying framework in which the nation, as a body of individuals, was seen to grow organically out of the national environment in a series of natural stages that move from the wild to the civilized. At the end of the 18th century, the link between landscape and national identity was primarily cultivated by the rising bourgeoisie, for whom it was also tied to the rise of representative democracy and the individual’s role in the political and economic process. By the latter part of the 19th century, the link between landscape and national identity had broadened as landscape scenery was incorporated into songs and popular iconography. The implied link between blood and soil, however, excluded immigrants and groups like the Jews and the Romany, who were seen to be nomadic or foreign, without an historic link to the national N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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soil. It also excluded peoples such as Native Americans whose group identity was based on clan or tribal bonds rather than bonds to the territory of a state. The power of landscape lay in the way it tended to be taken for granted as an expression of nature and progressive natural development through time. The paradox of this power, however, was that the bond between nation and landscape was, in fact, constructed by artists, poets, and scientists through a long period of cultural history. Identification with the landscape thus worked to naturalize national identity and strengthen its links to the national territory, even though the construction of national identity was very much a social process. Selected Bibliography Bates, Katharine Lee. 1974. “America, the Beautiful.” In The Good Times Songbook, edited by James Leisy, 24–26. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press. (Orig. pub. 1895.) Camden, William. 1806. Britannia. London: John Stockdale, 2nd ed. 4 vols. (Orig. pub. 1607.) Debray, Régis. 1994. L’État séducteur: Les révolutions médiologiques du pouvoir. Mesnil-surl’Estrée: Gallimard. Emerson, Ralph Waldo. 1991. “Nature.” In Nature/Walking, edited by John Elder, 1–67. Boston: Beacon Press. (Orig. pub. 1836.) Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Orig. pub. 1651.) James I. [1616] 1918. “A Speach, As It Was Delivered In The Vpper Hovse Of The Parliament To The Lords Spiritvall And Temporall, And To The Knights, Citizens And Burgersses There Assembled, On Mvnday The XIX. Day of March 1603.” In The Political Works of James I, edited by Charles Howard McIlwan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Johnson, Samuel. 1968. A Dictionary of the English Language. London: W. Strahan. (Orig. pub. 1755.) Kantorowicz, Ernst H. 1957. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Oehlenschläger, Adam Gottlob. 1823. “Fædrelands-sang (Der er et yndigt Land).” Samlede Digt, vol. 2, 102–104. Copenhagen: by author. Olwig, Kenneth Robert. 2002. Landscape, Nature and the Body Politic: From Britain’s Renaissance to America’s New World. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Oxford English Dictionary. 1971. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sauer, Carl O. 1969. “The Morphology of Landscape.” In Land and Life: A Selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer, edited by John Leighly, 315–350. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Orig. pub. 1925.) Steffens, Henrik. 1874. German University Life: The Story of My Career as Student and Professor. Philadelphia: Lippincott. (Orig. pub. 1840–1844.) Steffens, Henrik. 1905. Indledning til Philosophiske Forelæsninger i København 1803. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Sundin, Bosse. 2005. “Nature as Heritage: The Swedish Case.” International Journal of Heritage Studies 11, no. 1: 9–20. Tacitus. 1942. “Germany and Its Tribes.” In The Complete Works of Tacitus, edited by Moses Hadas, 709–732. New York: Modern Library. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language. 2000. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster.

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Nationalism and Music Ben Curtis Relevance The interaction of nationalism with music is one of the defining features of this art form during the period 1770–1870. Indeed, around the mid-19th century in Europe and for two or three decades thereafter, the influence of nationalism was so pervasive in Western music at a variety of levels that it can be said that no art form was more deeply affected by nationalist currents. Nationalist music eventually reached across the whole of Europe, with some of the key ideas traveling beyond to the Americas as well. At its heart, the interaction of nationalism and music in this period sought to define a unique and uniquely recognizable musical style and tradition for every putative nation. The development of a national music was supposed to help codify the values, history, and identity of the nation—in other words, a national music was supposed to form an essential part of the national culture that would define the nation both for its own people and for people internationally. This chapter first outlines the historical background of nationalism and music from roughly 1770 to 1870, focusing on some of the major figures in the development of the relationship. Then the chapter examines nationalist music’s impact and dimensions in the context of the broader nationalist movement. Here, several key themes receive special attention, including the typical tropes that constituted nationalist music, the role of folk inspirations therein, the importance of national opera, and how the creation of a national musical tradition often depended upon an idea of resistance to what was perceived as cultural domination by other nations. Finally, the chapter summarizes the consequences of music’s wide-ranging historical role within nationalism.

Origins The interaction of nationalism and music fits squarely into the familiar processes of nation-building and is, in fact, inseparable from such processes during the time period under consideration. One of the fundamental elements underlying the entire concept of the nation is that a national community will share a common culture. This culture is in large part what binds the members of the national community together; features such as language, history, myths, and the particuN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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larities of the ostensible national character are understood to be the inheritance and common property of all members of the nation. Particular forms of cultural expression, such as music, painting, dress, and even architecture, have typically been held as essential elements of the larger national culture that define the nation and give it its identity. As with all features of the national identity, cultural forms such as music are subject to a process that elaborates their content, that defines them as “national,” and that propagates the idea of them as innate characteristics of the national community. This national culture, then, is neither given nor inherently national but is rather constructed, like the very idea of “the nation” itself. Both the national culture and the idea of the nation are elaborated at least at first by elites known as nationalist intellectuals; in the case of music, the key figures are a few writers and especially nationalist composers. The historical period 1770–1870 was when the idea of music as national first emerged and is hence key for understanding how this art form came to be constructed into a defining feature of nationality. The figure who in many ways set the tone for the subsequent connections between nationalism and music was the German philologist, philosopher, and playwright Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803). Herder advanced what was to become the enormously influential concept of the Volksgeist, which stated that every people had its own unique “spirit” or character. Herder applied this concept in his researches into the musical traditions of various peoples, with a particular interest in folk songs, that is, the music and poetry of peasant peoples or the peasant classes within an individual country. His claim was that the peasant traditions embodied the pure essence of a people’s Volksgeist, which presupposed that the urban classes of a society were somehow removed from that essence, denationalized in one way or another. Herder’s interest in folk songs was matched by many roughly contemporaneous and subsequent investigators across Europe. Besides several other figures in Germany, including such names as Ludwig Christian Erk, Achim von Arnim, and Clemens Brentano, collectors across Europe compiled volumes of folk songs, including Scots such as James Johnson and Robert Burns, Czechs such as František Ladislav Cˇ elakovský and Karel Jaromír Erben, Norwegians such as Ludvig Mathias Lindeman, and Swedes such as Erik Gustaf Geijer and Arvid August Afzelius. Again in Germany, the diffusion of this interest in folk songs among a broader population was catalyzed by the Napoleonic invasions, which marked the first outbreak of anything resembling a mass nationalism among the scattered states of German-speaking Europe. The result in musical terms was that composers such as Carl Maria von Weber (1786–1826) began setting to music patriotic verses by poets such as Theodor Körner protesting the French occupation. These songs were often taken up by choral groups such as the Männersangvereine (the men’s singing unions); their performances expressed nationalistic feelings through music as well as mobilized people for resistance. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The early decades of the 19th century witnessed a shift in emphasis away from folk products as the sole emblems of nationality in music to an increasing trend by composers to create their own, artistically ambitious nationalistic pieces. This shift was predicated upon the idea that out of these folk products composers should fashion works of high art that would display the values of the nation and help build a national culture. One of the most important early examples of this trend was Weber’s efforts to create a German national opera; his opera Der Freischütz (1821) is considered the culmination of his efforts. A number of German composers followed in Weber’s footsteps, most notably Richard Wagner (1813–1883), who in his voluminous prose writings such as Deutsche Kunst und deutsche Politik often espoused the primacy of nationality in music. Most of his operas, as well, including Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, were conceived partly with the intent of expressing his idea of Germanness through this art form. By the middle decades of the century, so-called “national schools” had begun to develop in several other European countries as well, as composers and other musicians responded to ideas similar to those that had motivated the Germans. Frédéric Chopin (1810–1849) was a self-avowed Polish patriot and wrote many polonaises and mazurkas inspired by Polish folk music; his compatriot Stanisław Moniuszko (1819–1872) premiered what is considered to be the quintessential Polish national opera, Halka, in 1858. Deeply influenced by Wagner, by Chopin, and by the Hungarian composer Franz Liszt (1811–1886) was the Czech Bedˇrich Smetana (1824–1884), generally considered the founder of Czech national music. Smetana’s treatments of Czech folk dances, his tone poems depicting elements of the Czech landscape, and his national operas such as The Bartered Bride and Dalibor influenced several generations of subsequent Czech composers. Among

Bedrˇich Smetana (1824–1884), the founder of Czech national music. (Library of Congress)

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them stands Antonín Dvoˇrák (1841–1904), who though less dedicated to the cause of a Czech national music produced a number of nationalist works and even encouraged the creation of an American national music during his stay in the United States in the 1890s. The interest in national music also passed to Scandinavia, where its most famous exponent was the Norwegian Edvard Grieg (1843–1907), many of whose works were based on Norwegian folk tunes, dances, and legends, for example, his set of Symphonic Dances of 1898. A very strong Russian national school also emerged with Mikhail Glinka (1804–1857) as an important early light. His notable successors included Mili Balakirev (1837–1910) and Modest Mussorgsky (1839–1881), the latter regarded as perhaps the greatest talent of the group for his achievements, such as the opera Boris Godunov. Unquestionably the greatest Italian composer of the 19th century, Giuseppe Verdi (1813–1901), was himself an avid proponent of Italian nationalism, and some of his works, such as the opera Nabucco, played an important role in fomenting national feeling. Not infrequently, nationalist composers were also linked to nationalist political figures in their countries; Smetana and Verdi in particular were closely involved in the politics of the Czech lands and Italy, respectively. Though the typical ideas and practices of nationalist music in the period 1770–1870 were developed overwhelmingly in Europe—and most of the bestknown composers and works representative of this trend are European—other parts of the world, particularly in the Americas, also began to be influenced by these same ideas. The interaction between nationalism and music in the Americas

Modest Mussorgsky (1839–1881), one of the “mighty handful” of Russian nationalist composers that also included Balakirev, Borodin, Cui, and Rimsky-Korsakov. (Library of Congress)

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truly blossomed only in the last two decades of the 19th century, but already by the 1840s the composer Louis Moreau Gottschalk (1829–1869) was creating an American musical tradition by fusing Creole musical styles from his native New Orleans with European forms. Also in the United States, people like the composer and critic William Henry Fry (1813–1864) and the composer George Bristow (1825–1898) began both arguing for the need for a distinctly American music and composing works to meet that perceived need. Toward the end of the century, George Chadwick (1854–1931) and Edward MacDowell (1860–1908) also each contributed to the furthering of an American art music tradition, though still relying on many of the typical European tropes of what makes music national, as in MacDowell’s Indian Suite, which incorporates American folk songs. Music throughout the rest of the Americas was similarly strongly influenced by European styles even as rich indigenous traditions developed, though it was again not until the last decades of the 19th century that ideas of a national music began to take root in countries such as Cuba or Argentina. Although most Latin American countries were relatively quick to adopt national anthems after they achieved independence in the early decades of the 1800s, that event was not accompanied by any immediate drive to build an independent national music, and Italian and French music tended to dominate in urban centers. Only a few composers before 1900 explored the idea of a national music, among them the Cuban composer Ignacio Cervantes (1847–1905) who incorporated Afro-Cuban rhythms into his art music, or the Peruvian José María Valle-Riestra (1858–1926) whose opera Ollanta contains a storyline dealing with the Incas. These earlier generations of Latin American composers were succeeded by a number of better-known figures who took an active interest in creating a national music, including Carlos Chávez and Silvestre Revueltas in Mexico and Heitor Villa-Lobos in Brazil, among others. The other notable development in national styles in Latin America also gained momentum at the very end of the 19th century: the growth of recognizable national popular music styles such as the tango in Argentina, samba in Brazil, ranchera in Mexico, and rumba in Cuba. These styles typically developed in working-class urban neighborhoods and often involved a fusion of European forms with African-influenced rhythms. Over time they came to be adopted by the middle classes as well, and in the 20th century more classically minded composers would incorporate, for instance, tango or samba inflections in their own art music because such styles were already viewed as national and belonging to all the people, much as what had transpired with peasant musics in Europe. The example of popular music styles points to one of the key questions in the interaction between nationalism and music: How does music become national? Broadly speaking, there are two main answers that are not mutually exclusive. Music can become national by public reception of it as such, and also by design. Reception deals with the public’s acceptance of a work of music or of another cultural product as embodying, expressing, or representing the values of the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Design means that a nationalist activist such as a composer employs certain tropes and devices that he or she considers national in an attempt to configure a work as national for the public. In the period 1770–1870, the design element predominated in creating a national music, for this was the first period of nationbuilding in Europe and certain other countries worldwide; nationalist intellectuals, including composers, were actively attempting to construct an idea of the national culture. In turn, they were also attempting to construct a public, in the sense of convincing their country’s population that, for example, Grieg’s music was also Norway’s music. Historically, there first had to be a somewhat self-conscious national public before a work could be received as national—and that public had to be made. Very rarely did a work come to be regarded as national by spontaneous mass public acclaim; one famous exception is the chorus “Va pensiero” from Verdi’s Nabucco, which even at its premiere was ecstatically received as a hymn lamenting the oppression of Italy. The instant successes—Weber’s Der Freischütz was another—are actually the exceptions that prove the rule, however. Often, nationalist composers in the early part of their careers battled to convince their publics of both the need for and existence of a national music. Even subsequently canonical national artists like Wagner, Smetana, and Grieg initially struggled with audiences that were not especially receptive to their ideas of what would constitute the national music. While folk music was one of the first elements to be accepted as “national” by mass publics, even that was a gradual process: the folk music that was eventually embraced by the urban bourgeoisie was rarely the actual music as practiced by the peasants. It was rather the idealized version presented in composed art pieces. Reception of national music, then, depended in large part on the progress of nation-building, as publics increasingly became inculcated with the ideas of what would constitute the national culture and could apply these ideas both to new musical works and old. Though the particularities in each country of course varied, in general both composers’ ideas of how to create national music and public standards for receiving a piece as national were very similar across Europe and beyond. The diffusion of these ideas has two main explanations. First, nationalist composers were aware of what their contemporaries and forebears had achieved and the principles by which they had operated. Hence Wagner could take inspiration from Weber, Smetana would be influenced by Wagner, later nationalist Czech composers borrowed from Smetana, and Russians could look to previous nationalist composers as models either to follow or reject. Second, nationalist music came to be very popular in Europe after the mid-19th century, in part for reasons of exoticism and novelty that will be discussed below. But as ostensibly national symphonies, operas, or chamber works were increasingly either published or performed not just in their home countries but internationally, the typical traits of nationalist music became cemented in public understanding. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Dimensions The ideas guiding the interaction of nationalism and music are common to most nationalist discourse and cultural production. Several key themes reappear in nationalist music across the globe: references to the national language, landscape, and history; an emphasis on national opera and a tendency to define national identity through negative comparisons or “othering”; and the reliance on folk materials. These different themes help illustrate the sociopolitical function of music within nationalism. Language, Landscape, and History Language as one of the indispensable markers of group identity is fundamental to most nationalisms and again traces its lineage partly to Herder. In music, language is similarly viewed as one of the elements that can make a piece national. Therefore, many nationalist activists in the 19th century insisted on having music in their national language; they wanted songs, choruses, and operas in German, Russian, Czech, Hungarian, and so on. One of the motivations was the idea that the national language inherently reflected elements of the national character, and that these elements would thereby come out in vocal music. An example is Smetana’s determination to have Czech art music reflect the distinctive speech patterns or rhythms of the Czech language. The idea of the Volksgeist is again at play here; just as the national language was viewed as a natural outgrowth of the national spirit, so would music sung in that national language also express the national spirit. An obvious additional motivation for the emphasis on national languages in music was the belief that audiences in Dresden, St. Petersburg, Prague, or Budapest should have opera in a language they could more readily understand, rather than in French or Italian, the two dominant languages of opera in the earlier part of the century. More importantly, however, many nationalists had a desire to prove that their language was the equal of French or Italian as a vehicle for high culture, that Norwegian, Czech, or Polish could be as expressive and artistic as the more “prestigious” languages. Much the same desire motivated many poets who set about writing verse in their native languages to prove its poetic capacities. Many composers, in turn, set to music the poems of these poets, translating the artistic aspirations from the verse realm to the musical one. Examples include Glinka’s and Mussorgsky’s settings of Pushkin’s works, or the close relationship between Grieg and the writer Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. Evocations of the national landscape count as among the most famous works of nationalist music. Several of the tone poems in Smetana’s cycle Má vlast (My country) are representative here, such as the piece depicting the river Vltava, or the fourth in the cycle titled “From the Czech Woods and Meadows.” Alexander Borodin’s The Steppes of Central Asia, written to extol that feature of the Russian

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landscape, is also well known; less-familiar works from this time period include Balakirev’s On the Volga or the Hungarian composer Mosonyi’s Puszta Life, depicting life on the Hungarian plains. Such pieces are obvious expressions of the patriots’ love for the physical features of their nation, whether rivers, plains, mountains, or even ruined castles, and they also help fix in the national culture an idea of what the most salient, most national features of the landscape are. Sometimes, as in the case of Smetana’s musical references to the mountain of Blaník in Má vlast or Wagner’s choice of the Wartburg as the setting of his opera Tannhäuser, these places in the landscape are tied inextricably to what nationalists view as key elements of their nation’s history. In Smetana’s case, Blaník mountain is connected with a legend concerning the Hussite wars of the 15th century; in Wagner’s, the Wartburg was commonly regarded by German nationalists as the epicenter of a previous golden age. As both those examples attest, the line between history and myth is easily blurred in nationalist discourse. The objective in nationalist music, though, is again identical to that in other areas of the discourse: namely, to make reference to important elements that are conceived of as uniting all the nation’s people. That history is ostensibly commonly shared between, say, the Czechs of the year 900 and the Czechs of 1900. Historical and mythical subjects are thus a very common feature of nationalist music. Grieg wrote several works connected to the historical Norwegian king Olav Trygvason, Balakirev evoked the myths and history of Russia in his symphonic poem Rus, and later in the 19th century Jean Sibelius produced several works based on Finnish myths, such as Kullervo. Opera lent itself especially well to historical subjects since onstage the nation’s past could be dramatized and brought to life for the present. Many national operas leading up to 1900 took their inspiration from historical and/or mythical material, among them Mikhail Glinka’s A Life for the Tsar, Ferenc Erkel’s Bánk bán, Smetana’s Dalibor, Wagner’s Ring, and even Verdi’s little-known La battaglia di Legnano. National Operas and the “Other” Another major theme in the interaction between nationalism and music is that nationalist music was often a reaction against the perceived dominant or hegemonic trends in art that were identified with other nations. The question of the exoticism of folk sources is related here in that such sources seemed exotic precisely because they stood outside the cultivated “classical” traditions of art music. In the early decades of the 19th century, those cultivated traditions were identified with France and Italy, above all in opera. The reason that Weber and, later, Wagner were intent on creating a uniquely German opera was because they believed that Germans needed to express themselves in this art form which was dominated by Italian and French composers. Wagner, in particular, railed against what he saw as the pernicious influence of French and Italian music on German art. Interestingly, by the end of the century, and in part thanks to Wagner, German music had attained a position of such primacy within the art form that later

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nationalist composers—including Balakirev, Grieg, and even Verdi—complained about the hegemony of German music and voiced their intent to free their own nations’ musical expression from German influence. This example of resistance and scapegoating within nationalist music again demonstrates how this art form was a part of the larger nation-building project. One of the ideas behind developing a uniquely national music was to establish boundaries between one’s own nation’s musical culture and the culture of other nations. By recurring to the common theme of an antithetical opponent or “other”— so common in nationalist discourse—activists in the realm of national music sought to help define their own nation’s identity. This example also raises the question of why some countries, namely the French, never developed their own nationalist music. The answer does lie partly in the fact that the French and Italian traditions were dominant, at least in opera, in Europe until after the 1850s. Also, France in 1850—unlike Germany, Italy, Norway, the Czech lands, Hungary, Poland, and many other areas within Europe—was already a secure, established state. For those nationalist movements engaged in asserting political sovereignty, however, elaborating a national culture (i.e., determining the content of that culture as well as who belonged to it) seemed to require the conscious creation of a unique, and uniquely national, cultural identity. Finally, opera, with its blend of music, acting, and visuals, was regarded throughout the 19th century as perhaps the paramount art form. Opera was certainly the main nexus of 19th-century urban cultural life, above all for the bourgeoisie and upper classes. The theater in general was one of the main means of mass communication in the era. Its appeal to nationalists is therefore easily understandable; onstage a fully realized vision of the nation can be represented through the depiction of the nation’s past, present, future, landscape, and folk life. It also provided a vehicle for the artistic development of the national language. As a method of both elaborating and propagating the values of the national culture and of establishing a prestigious art work in an internationally valorized genre, national opera thus became a goal for many nationalists during this period. Folk Inspirations One of the most significant aspects of nationalist music is its treatment of folk inspirations or sources such as folk songs, dances, or tales. Indeed, the relationship between “the folk” and nationalist music is one of the best demonstrations of how such music was not merely an artistic phenomenon but one with social and political ramifications as well. It must be noted, however, that the incorporation of folk inspirations is not the sine qua non of nationalist music since music can be nationalist even when it is not based on a folk dance or folktale—references to other features such as landscape or history, or even a composer’s intent or the public’s reception, can also make a piece nationalist. The nationalist’s conception of folk music united what were originally often highly localized regional songs, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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dances, or tales beneath a broader heading of belonging to and representing the entire nation. Hence, for example, a song from the Mazury region in Poland comes to be seen as belonging not just to that region but to all Poles throughout the country. When folk song collectors made their expeditions into the rural areas to gather melodies, texts, and dances, their eventual collections performed this unifying function, constituting a kind of national canon from very diverse sources. The nationalist understanding of folk music presupposes another kind of unification as well: a bridging of the urban/rural divide in society. According to this understanding, a folk dance from rural Russia belongs just as much to the city dwellers in St. Petersburg as it does to the peasants who originally practiced that dance. The reason is because the urbanite and the peasant are all ostensibly members of the same nation; despite whatever class differences may exist between them, they are all Russians, for example. This process of unification is one of the central goals of the nation-building movement, and nationalist music plays its part by effecting this unification artistically. When a folk tune is incorporated into a symphony, the culture of the countryside is bound to the culture of the city, and the resulting artwork is understood to belong equally to all members of the nation, whether pig farmer or professor. Folk elements did not appear in European art music solely for nationalist motivations, however. Composers prior to the 19th century took inspiration from folk dances as well. Part of the reason is that folk elements had a certain exotic value—they were seen as novel, as original and characteristic sources of musical material. This exotic appeal was one reason for the success of nationalist composers; for instance, Edvard Grieg’s pieces based on Norwegian folk dances would indeed have seemed quite unusual and original to Parisian audiences. What defines nationalists’ use of folk elements is the ideas of national unification and representativity mentioned above. Also, nationalist composers such as Smetana commonly insisted that folk elements, while valuable for being characteristic, nonetheless needed to be “idealized” or edified by artistic treatment to be of value for the whole society. Hence, as examples such as Chopin, Liszt, or Smetana show, composers preferred to transpose folk material into the realms of high art with the intention of making that material more “worthy” for the national culture. This somewhat supercilious attitude toward the “raw” products of folk culture evinces the predominantly urban, bourgeois bias of most 19th-century European nationalist movements. Though the ostensible goal of such movements —and of individual activists whose aim it was to create a national culture—was to unify the entire populace on a national basis, in actual fact the target of most nationalist appeals (particularly in the realm of art) was the urban middle and upper classes. Few peasants, after all, ever attended opera. Not surprisingly, then, one frequent component of nationalist composers’ discourse was that the lower classes and rural people needed to be lifted up or educated into the values of the national art. Some variant of this educational idea was espoused by composers from Weber to Borodin to Grieg and even to Zoltán Kodály (1882–1967) in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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20th century. Moreover, uplifting the peasantry was an analogue to the insistence on “idealizing” the folk inspirations themselves, since most nationalist composers of the day regarded it as essential that both folk tunes and the folk people be refined to be of service to the nation.

Consequences Nationalist music is overall a phenomenon of unification in that it purports to provide a common musical culture for all the nation’s people, bridging regional and class divides. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that consensus about the attributes of the national music was not always reached easily or without conflict. For instance, in the Czech lands in the 1860s and 1870s there was much debate among the cultural elites about what form the national music should take. Some figures held that Czech art music should be based exclusively on folk tunes, while other activists such as Smetana insisted that Czechs should look to what were regarded as the most “modern” musical standards of the day, namely those espoused by Berlioz, Liszt, and Wagner. This insistence in turn led to a fight about what some viewed as an unacceptable amount of German influence in Czech music, another example of how national musics by the end of the 19th century often came to oppose German culture for its supposed hegemony in music. A similar case of internal conflict and backlash took place in Russian efforts to create a national music. There the circle of composers around Mili Balakirev (a group that received the nickname “the mighty handful” and included Cesar Cui, Modest Mussorgsky, Alexander Borodin, and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov) believed that a Russian music must be drawn from uniquely Russian sources and that the cosmopolitanism of international trends originating in Paris or Vienna would only dilute the Russianness of the music they sought to create. They waged a battle against other Russian composers such as Anton Rubinstein or (to a much lesser extent) Piotr Tchaikovsky, whom they regarded as beholden to just such cosmopolitan trends. The importance of the interaction between nationalism and music in the period 1770–1870 lies above all in music’s contribution to nation-building. From the original interest in collecting folk songs as expressions of the nation’s Volksgeist to the building of prestigious national theaters for staging national operas, the various facets of this interaction all involved efforts to define aspects of the national identity through music. The creative products of these efforts—whether folk tune collections, patriotic songs, tone poems, or operas—all contributed to building a distinctive national culture. This process of nation-building through music followed the typical patterns of most nationalist movements and went hand in hand with other contemporaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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neous efforts to elaborate a national identity. The process consistently began with a few committed activists who began advocating the need to preserve the nation’s culture by collecting its songs or rehabilitating its language. From there, the next stage was usually undertaken by a subsequent generation of activists who insisted on the need to publicize and propagate more widely their ideas on the constitutive elements of the national identity. The goal behind their publicizing and propaganda was actually to begin nationalizing the public. Nationalist composers fit into this category of activist because their ideas of writing national music were aligned both ideologically and practically with the ideas of nationalist intellectuals in other fields, whether in literature or politics. Most nationalist composers operated out of a desire to give some expression to their nation’s spirit or culture in the realm of art music, and some nationalist composers went even farther by believing that their music would actually help nationalize the people by inculcating them with the music’s national values. There were many facets to how composers in the 19th century thought the populace could be nationalized through music. Besides creating symphonies, songs, chamber works, and operas inspired by some idea of nationality, many nationalist composers also engaged in institution-building; national theaters or conservatories were believed to perform the function of directly educating people in the values of the national culture. The combined effects of the process of nation-building are visible, for music, through the growth of audiences for nationalist music as the 19th century progressed. The reception and acceptance of the ostensible defining features of the nation’s culture—the trove of ideas about language, history, landscape, and the relationship to the folk—are demonstrated by the canonization of many of these features and their subsequent reproduction not just in elite but in popular discourse and their consistent use by a variety of nationalist artists. Likewise, whereas at the beginning of the century few would have been drawn to an explicitly national opera, already by the 1870s in many European countries, such operas were very popular and produced in significant numbers. Though the development of this consensus on the values of the national culture was not due to nationalist music alone, the consensus does nonetheless show how elites were successful in elaborating and propagating ideas of that culture, how publics received those ideas, and how music was an indispensable part of that elaboration and propagation. Nationalist music, thus, has historically formed a critical element in many nationalist movements. Though naturally the content of the tropes varies from country to country, many of the basic tropes themselves are consistent across not just geographical space but even time periods. Composers in the decades after the 1870s developed their own meanings for and understandings of what nationalist music could and should do, but usually the principle of every nation needing its own musical characteristics has remained unquestioned. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Selected Bibliography Beckerman, Michael. 1986. “In Search of Czechness in Music.” 19th-Century Music 10, no. 1: 61–73. Bohlman, Philip V. 2004. The Music of European Nationalism. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Brusatti, Otto. 1978. Nationalismus und Ideologie in der Musik. Tutzing: Hans Schneider. Curtis, Ben. 2002. “On Nationalism and Music.” PhD diss., University of Chicago. Dahlhaus, Carl. 1980. Between Romanticism and Modernism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dahlhaus, Carl. 1989. Nineteenth-Century Music. Berkeley: University of California Press. Finkelstein, Sidney. 1989. Composer and Nation: The Folk Heritage in Music. 2nd ed. New York: International Publishers. Ling, Jan. 1997. A History of European Folk Music. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Taruskin, Richard. 1997. Defining Russia Musically. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Taruskin, Richard. 2001. “Nationalism.” In The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, edited by Stanley Sadie, 689–706. New York: Grove’s Dictionaries. White, Harry, and Michael Murphy, eds. 2001. Musical Constructions of Nationalism: Essays on the History and Ideology of European Musical Culture 1800–1945. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press. Wiora, Walter. 1957. Europäische Volksmusik und abendländische Tonkunst. Kassel: Johann Philipp Hinnenthal-Verlag.

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Philosophy and Nationalism Nenad Miscevic Relevance The period under consideration, roughly from the French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian war, is the time of the birth of nationalism as an explicit and elaborated political ideology. This period has produced ideas and proposals of crucial significance for the history of nation and nationalism. The thinkers promoting the new political paradigm, based on cultural-national belonging, sought to provide an answer to two crucial questions: First, is there one kind of politically relevant group (smaller than the whole of mankind and bigger than the family) that is morally of central importance to every human being or not? Their answer was that there is just one, namely, the nation. They also addressed the second question, what is the ground of obligation that the individual has to her community or communities, voluntary choice or involuntary belonging? Many of these thinkers saw the nation as essentially a nonvoluntary community to which one belonged by birth and early nurture, but they often stressed that this unreflective belonging had to be refined and strengthened by a reflexive, “self-conscious” acceptance. Some important authors, like John Stuart Mill and Ernest Renan, define nation in a more voluntaristic way, as any community striving for self-government. One can represent these answers in a table.

Basis of Political Obligation

Is there a unique community of central cultural, moral, and political importance for each individual? Yes: The Nation

No: Only Humankind

Nonvoluntary belonging

classical nationalism: Herder, Fichte, Romantics

strict cosmopolitanism: Condorcet, Kant

Voluntary choice

voluntarism: Mill, Renan

liberal non-nationalist political programs: Rawls, Lord Acton

The columns stand for the number of relevant kinds of groups, whereas the rows determine the relative importance of voluntary versus nonvoluntary association. The righthand column mentions alternatives to nationalism. Of course, every such attempt involves oversimplifying the matter and obscuring the rich cluster of possible intermediate positions, so the table is meant only as a very rough guide to the actual diversity of views and positions.

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Origins The background to the birth of philosophical reflections on nation and of philosophical pro-nationalism was the cosmopolitan and humanistic intellectual climate of the mid-18th century. The ideas of common humanity, of human rational nature, and of progress toward free and rationally organized society became an intellectual fashion among the elites of the time. French, British, and German intellectuals developed various kinds of cosmopolitan doctrines, most importantly moral, political, cultural, and economic cosmopolitanism (see Kleingeld 1999). Jean Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) is perhaps the most typical figure, and Anacharsis Cloots (1755–1794), the most picturesque activist. They were not inimical to the idea of nation; they described it, however, in rather low-key terms as a group whose members live on the same territory and under the same government, a view that formed the kernel of the famous definition offered by Sieyès (1748–1836) in his 1788/1789 pamphlet What Is a Nation? The answer to the question raised in the title is that “it is a body of associates living under a common law, represented by the same legislature” (Sieyès 2003, 96). Some forms of cosmopolitanism are not inimical to pro-nationalist considerations. A good example is cultural cosmopolitanism (as represented, for instance, in Germany through Georg Forster [1754–1794]), that is, the view that “humanity expresses itself in a rich variety of cultural forms, that we should recognize different cultures in their particularity, and that attempts to achieve cultural uniformity lead to cultural impoverishment” (Kleingeld 1999, 51). Since such cosmopolitanism is not a definitive political view, like those represented in our table, and since it insists on differences among cultures, it is a small step from there to the more nation-centered view claiming that each cultural form corresponds to some particular nation. Similarly, economic cosmopolitanism, advocating a single global sphere of free trade in the interest of perpetual peace, is in principle compatible with the important role assigned to the national state in other areas. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) are the two most famous philosophers writing in the late 18th century whose work illustrates the interplay of non-nationalist ideas, cosmopolitan or purely republican on the one hand and some interest in what a nation as a distinct political entity can achieve on the other. In his central political works, in particular in The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau focuses on universal political principles meant to be valid for all humanity. He does mention tradition and “mores,” but these are secondary to the voluntaristic and contractualist components of his political theory. In Émile he contrasts patriotism and humanism and expresses his preference for the latter. However, in his The Government of Poland (1772), he glorifies “patriotism” and patriotic education that makes the citizen see only his fatherland and nothing else and feel himself more a Pole, a Frenchman, or a Russian than a man in general. Many have interpreted the glorification literally; according to their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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reading, it is the national pre-political unity that, in Rousseau’s view, grounds civic virtue. Some interpreters point to the artificial character of the political unity described by Rousseau: it is a unity forged by a legislator that determines the character and the virtue of the future state. Indeed, Rousseau glorifies the tactics of Moses, who, wishing to prevent his people from melting away among foreign peoples, gave them customs and usages incompatible with those of other nations. Moses constructed the identity of his people on the basis of induced xenophobia; he made them “forever strangers among other men,” and at the same time taught them to be alert when dealing with the Gentiles. It seems, therefore, that Rousseau oscillates among three options in our table; his initial preference for humanism over nationalism places him under the rubric of cosmopolitanism, his insistence on the artificial and choice-based nature of the community puts him under voluntaristic nationalism, and some of his remarks put him close to classical nationalism. Kant is more consistent in his political philosophy than Rousseau. He stands firmly in the tradition of moral cosmopolitanism, the view that all human beings are members of a single moral community and that they have moral obligations to all other human beings. The view is a direct consequence of his central moral doctrine, which enjoins respect for humanity and treating each individual never purely as a means but always as an end. The transition from purely moral considerations to legal and political ones is provided by the requirement of “perpetual peace,” the only kind of global political condition that is compatible with central moral imperative(s). In his Metaphysics of Morals and, more explicitly, in This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity, Kant argues for a world government as the only guarantee of such a peace; there is no justice within a country without justice in international relations, and there are no just and stable international relations without the global alliance of all peoples. In his most famous defense of legal and political cosmopolitanism, Perpetual Peace (1795), he is less sanguine about the world-state. He notes the potential dangers hidden in the overwhelming power that such a state would command and offers a sketch of a “contract concerning perpetual peace” upon which nations should agree to avoid war and internal and external instability. (Some historians speculate that he counted on revolutionary France to make the first step in the process.) The sketch comprises two stages: a preliminary one that could be implemented in the foreseeable future, and the “definitive” one left for better times to come. Among the preliminary articles some are specific to 18th-century circumstances, such as the one forbidding exchange, purchase, or donation of an independent state. Some seem to reaffirm already established principles of the laws of nations, for example, that no state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state. Others strike the contemporary reader as visionary, like the one stating that no peace treaty shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war. This article reminds the reader of how major wars of the 20th century developed from crises created in part by inadequate N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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peace treaties that one side found extremely and unbearably frustrating. Among the most radical articles is the demand for the abolishment of standing armies, since their very existence leads to competition and incites renewed conflict. The permanent articles are even more demanding. The civil constitution of every state should respect the principle of separation of the executive power from the legislative, which Kant characterizes as the republican principles. Republicanism gives a favorable prospect for perpetual peace since it implies that citizens will be asked for their opinion about declaring a war. Citizens are much more cautious in regard to war than dynasties and despotic governments that have little to loose and everything to gain by aggressive warfare. Finally, the law of nations would be founded on a federation of such free republican states. Kantian cosmopolitanism had less success in the century immediately following its introduction, but it has been an important source of inspiration to contemporary thinkers such as Habermas, O’Neill, and Pogge.

Dimensions Universalistic Culture-Based Nationalism It is a matter of dispute what social and political factors have prompted the turn from cosmopolitan and moderately nation-focused views to explicitly (pro-) nationalist paradigm in political thought. Here we concentrate on thinkers themselves. The thinker who initiated the turn from the predominantly universalistic, individualistic, and cosmopolitan paradigm to recognizably nationalistic theorizing is J. G. Herder (1744–1803), who proposed an original, clear, and attractive rationale for an alliance between nationalism and universalism. Herder’s picture of the plurality of nations starts with a mosaic of independent units each pursuing its own particular way as dictated by its circumstances, character, and traditions. Each nation is like a living organism, with its laws, potentialities, and limitations. But his “living organisms” apparently do not grow at the expense of others; expansionism is unnatural, as are ethnically mixed empires, which he condemns as “monstrosities.” This brings us to the crucial contribution Herder makes to the pro-nationalist view of culture: the thesis that the right and natural unit of culture is a nation, that is, the culture is first of all (or essentially) a national culture. In his argument he draws upon language as his central example. Meanings exist only within a given language, and only through that language can one apprehend them. They are learned together with words and sentences and become fused in conscious understanding and speech. But for the native speaker of a language, the contents apprehended are not just abstract meanings. The words carry with them their emotional significance. One’s mother tongue is thus one’s first and perhaps most important window to the realm of concepts, knowledge, social and cultural sigN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder. (Library of Congress)

nificance, and so on. We, the speakers of the language, owe our humanity, indeed our very identity, to it. The same point generalizes to culture in its totality. Similar points are made by various defenders of tradition, for instance, E. Burke (1729–1797) in his criticism of the French Revolution. In his view, good lives do not just spring from rational discussion or reflection; they take centuries of experience and innovation to develop. Traditionalists in general insist upon the initial, nonvoluntary belonging to given, native traditions. They are more impressed by the fact that people are usually “born into” certain traditions than with people’s free choices of the tradition they pledge allegiance to. To return to Herder, since nature produces particular national cultural characters, pursuing a particular “national” way is, according to him, the natural and moral destiny of nations. Next, due to common humanity, each nation reflects in its particular way the totality of the mosaic, which guarantees that the resulting mosaic is a harmonious one. The mosaic resulting from all particular efforts is the cultural, moral, and humanistic ideal to be realized by the history of humanity. He can be usefully read as proposing an argument for nationalism that starts from the intrinsic value of a nation and from the cultural proximity of its members, as well as an argument about the value of diversity. Each cultural national community has intrinsic value, that is, it is valuable in itself since it is the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that produce and transmit important meanings and values. It also provides for a special cultural proximity among its members. The underlying traits of the cultural nation make for a very close proximity, and thus their carriers constitute a network of mutually very close agents in a moral sense as well. The network is therefore a moral community, with special, very strong ties of obligation. Each individual has a prominent N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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obligation to the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all to its language and customs; they ought to be cherished, protected, preserved, and reinforced. From this obligation, the nationalist finally derives the community’s right to dictate the political and cultural duties of its citizens. Finally, Herder adds his argument about diversity, that each national culture gives its contribution to the diversity of human cultures in general. The “physiognomies” of cultures are unique: each presents a wonderful exfoliation of human potentialities in its own time and place and environment. The carrier of basic value is thus the totality of cultures. The argument ascribes a value—either general or particularly moral, or both—to each particular culture from a pluralistic viewpoint of the totality of cultures available. Assuming that the (cultural) nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the (ethno-)national culture. The attractive combination of particularism and universalism that can be—and has often been—derived from Herder’s reflections can be described as universalizing nationalism. Later authors, like Mazzini, have been more precise and demanding in regard to the obligations that follow from it. The final upshot can be summarized as follows: Each member of a given nation has serious duties toward his or her people, a valid obligation for all peoples and their members. One should value what is part of one’s cultural tradition for the tradition’s sake. The French should live and feel French, the Germans, in their “German fashion.” The “should” is to be taken seriously here; when it comes to organizing the cultural life, high priority should be given to one’s own cultural tradition. The same is valid not only for individuals but for collectives and institutions as well. Once a national state has been formed and the dominant cultural community has established itself as its “rightful owner,” it has to guard its full sovereignty. It has a duty to promote the ethno-national culture of its owners in a recognizable form, defending it from spontaneous mixing with foreign influences, preferring a kind of isolationism if the purity of national tradition is threatened. The citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other. However, this is all in accord with the Golden Rule: all peoples should act as my people do, namely, to promote their respective values. This universalistic attitude usually means that nations are viewed as being of central importance, but not in absolute terms; national demands don’t automatically trump all other claims, above all those that nowadays take the form of human rights. Classical Particularistic Nationalism It was J. G. Fichte (1762–1814) whose Addresses to the German Nation, delivered in the midst of the military and political crises of 1808, proposed a model for nationalist thought that can be regarded as classical and central for the future development of nationalism. Fichte started from Kantian cosmopolitanism, passed through a stage of isolationist republicanism, and then, moved by military defeats and the French occupation of his fatherland, reformulated his political phiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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losophy in a clearly nationalist fashion. In his Addresses one finds a protracted argument for the primacy of one’s own nation, which will serve as a model for nationalist thinkers of smaller nations. It is the decisive step in the formulation of particularist nationalism, the nationalist political doctrine according to which there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character, the interests and values of which take priority over all or almost all other interests and values, and that nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty. Fichte’s argument for the particular character of the German nation starts with language. In general, the sameness of language guarantees, through mutual understanding, the existence of bonds of solidarity, which Fichte depicts in an exaggerated fashion; the speakers of the same language belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole, a stream of original and independent life, as he puts it. No wonder that a member of the nation has natural duty to sacrifice his or her life for it. In regard to the particularities, the German language and national character has depth and universality, whereas French and other romance languages don’t. Here, Fichte abandons the principled egalitarianism of Herder. Instead, the “essence of humanity” is present in “extremely diverse gradations” in different peoples. Some peoples or nations just partake in the common essence of humanity in a much more intensive fashion than others, and Germans do so in the fullest possible measure. (In his ninth address, Fichte notes that a crucial advantage of Germans is that they have his, Fichte’s, philosophy, which expresses the deepest German philosophical spirit.) One national culture, Germans, thus possesses distinct claims to virtue. This view implies that patriotism requires that one believes one’s nation is better than others, in other words, that other cultures are inferior to it. Patriotic loyalty thus involves a negative judgment about other nations. In important places in the Addresses, Fichte tempers the consequences of this extremely antiegalitarian view of nations by redefining the notion of nation and of national belonging. There is such a thing as “being German” in the spiritual fashion, he explains; in this spiritual sense, a person whom one would classify as, say, French in the literal sense can be spiritually German more than another person who would be classified as German in the literal sense. Contemporary interpreters sympathetic to Fichte stress this feature as the redeeming quality of his nationalism. Unfortunately, the political message of the Addresses makes sense only if actual Germans in the literal sense are for the most part also German in the spiritual sense, and conversely, the literal non-Germans also for the most part lack “spiritual German” traits. In this case, the special character of the actual majority of Germans, who are such in both a literal and a spiritual sense, justifies the special status of Germany and its future mission. The Addresses thus offer the model of a refined particularistic nationalism. Its proponents typically claim that their own group has reasons particularly to foster its own heritage, since it is objectively so much more perfect than anyone else’s, and that other groups have proportionally N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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less reason to concentrate upon their own heritage. The stance has begotten an apparently altruistic rhetoric where one’s own nation is depicted as bringing cultural salvation to others. A decade before Fichte, the conservative thinker Joseph de Maistre (1994/1796, 42) had already anticipated this conclusion: “Each nation, like each individual, has obtained a mission, which she has to fulfill.” The further development of this line of thought was achieved through the work of the Romantics, above all, German ones. Most of them conserve important elements of universalism, which makes them difficult to classify into a simple scheme. Novalis (1772–1801) is viewed by some as more of a nationalist, by others, as a romantic cosmopolitan. Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) offers similar ambiguities. Their spiritualizing of the state can be seen either as extreme, totalitarian nationalism, or as harmless poetic fantasy without serious political implications. But they all insist on an organicist view of the nation, and Schlegel offers new arguments for the primacy of German culture, spirit, or character. Much more clearly nationalist are Adam Müller (1779–1829) and Joseph Görres (1776–1848). In the writings of the latter, nationalism is formulated in stark terms, as well as a xenophobia toward the French. The love for country Görres demands is unrestrained, devoid of any universalistic considerations. In consequence, the fatherland is not to be loved for its actual qualities or for the universal values it happens to incarnate but rather for being just what it is, one’s fatherland. The political activism of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778–1852), who organized nationalistically minded gymnastic societies as instruments for the physical, military, and spiritual rebirth of Germans, forms the connection between Romantic particularistic nationalism and political reality. G. W. F. Hegel’s (1770–1831) philosophical contribution to the debates about nation and nationality is much more subtle and open to contrasting interpretations. Of immediate relevance to the issue of nation and nationalism is his notion of Volksgeist, the spirit of “people,” where “people” means a group with a pronounced national character. History is a process in which a particular Volksgeist dominates at a particular period. It should be noted that the “spirits” are conceived more broadly than the actual nations as we identify them today; there is a German spirit and a Slavic spirit, but not a Dutch or a Bulgarian spirit. The other important notion is the ethical and metaphysical importance of the state: only those peoples that achieve a state achieve freedom and become noticeable in history. This interdependence of the spiritual character of a people, its freedom, its statehood, and its role in history makes his views interesting for a nationalist thinker. Translated into more concrete terms, it suggests that national culture is essential for identity, moral development, and survival of the members of the people/nation. For a culture to preserve its own identity, it normally has to acquire (always or, at least, in most cases) the political form of a state. The institution of the state of the particular cultural-spiritual nation will promote its interests and fight all interests that oppose it, including those of its own members that happen not to coincide with the interests of the nation. The state should N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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enjoy full sovereignty and expand if possible. It should provide for freedom, identity, flourishing, and thereby ethical development of its citizens, and this requirement takes precedence over most others, including the “arbitrary” decision of each citizen about whether to identify oneself with one’s nation. The only way for a state to perform its function is to focus upon the particular national culture, thereby becoming the desired framework for the Volksgeist it embodies. Hegel’s criticism of Kantian cosmopolitan pacifism adds important elements to the picture. In his Philosophy of Right he explains many advantages of war, in particular, added strength and internal peace of the state. Peace often ends with ossification and the death of a state (1991, 324). As opposed to the cosmopolitan ideal of suprastate institutions, he affirms the legitimacy and moral advantages of the system of independent sovereign states (the so-called “Westphalian” order); a supranational league might be more fanatical against its enemies than any existing state is against those who oppose it. Hegel’s view appears to be an attempt to synthesize voluntaristic elements with the classical nationalist stress on spontaneous, nonchosen belonging. Although his “spirit” of a people is decidedly more encompassing than particular national cultures, his general ideas have been used by defenders of particularistic national identities, who simply ignored the considerations of size and talked about spirit of their particular nation in Hegelian terms. The ideas just sketched, including those of Fichte, German Romanticists, and Hegel, have undergone some interesting variations in the hands of thinkers of Slavic, predominantly Russian, culture. The most interesting variety concerns pan-Slavism. A central topic in Russian culture for two centuries has been the socalled Russian Idea, a syndrome of views and attitudes about the special role Russia is called upon to play in world history. Many leading intellectuals, from Dostoyevski on, have been inventing theories about the special character of Russian people and the beastly nature of its enemies, from East or West, as the case may be. In such a perspective, cultural Russification and Orthodox proselytizing have been justified as bringing moral, cultural, and religious salvation to backward neighbors. The actual background to the messianic nationalism has been the social and political backwardness of czarist Russia, characterized by the very strong position of the gentry, by poverty and the extreme lack of education of the most numerous class—the peasantry—and by a triad of political principles: autocracy, orthodoxy (implying the lack of separation of church and state), and nationality (narodnost). Faced with the almost impossible task of bringing more democratic, Western values to their country, many intellectuals—for instance, Fedor Dostoyevski (1821–1881) and his brother Mihailo, as well as biologist and culturologist Nikolai Danilevski (1822–1885)—gave up and decided to take the opposite course, arguing that the “apparent” deficiencies of Russian society in fact constituted its specific and precious national character, to be cherished, preserved, and offered as a gift to other Slavic “brotherly nations.” Others used the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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messianic program to improve their position with the czar, or to further their imperial dreams. The idea had been anticipated by Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826), an early precursor writing at the very beginning of the 19th century. In short, the argument was that Russia is a special and great nation, with a first-rate role to play in world history. It has preserved an organic spiritual unity, a familylike political structure, with the czar as the father of the nation and a pure, unadulterated, and original Christian faith that saves it from the liberal egoism of the West. Danilevski, in his Russia and Europe (1869), gives a quasi-scientific typology of cultures, diagnoses the inevitable future decay of the European culture-type, and argues that Russians and Slavs in general have to engage in a bitter struggle against Europe’s political power and its nefarious intellectual influence. In the later 19th and early 20th centuries, the tradition continued through contributions by important thinkers like the creator of contemporary phonology, Prince Trubetskoy, the biologist Gumilev, son of the poet Ana Akhmatova, and the art historian Losev (Russkaya ideya 1992). They have argued for the special mission of Russia, Trubetskoy in anti-European terms, others stressing Russia’s task to guard Christianity from its alleged Asian, presumably Muslim, enemies (quoted in Ryazanaovsky 1993, 118). Trubetskoy’s general ideas about nation are quoted with approval by the moderate. One of the well-known fathers of linguistic structuralism, N. S. Trubetzkoy, was also an important although less well-known philosopher of 20th-century nationalism. He expressed the view that in the story of the Tower of Babel the Bible demonstrated a clear preference for the variety of languages and cultures over one language and culture. The fact that they had only one language and culture brought the tower builders to the boring emptiness that ended in the arrogant project of building the tower. In Trubetzkoy’s opinion, the “confounding of the languages”—that is, the imposition of cultural variety—is not a curse or a punishment but a solution to the problem of the sin that results from cultural homogeneity. Moderate and Voluntaristic Views The ideas proposed by the original pro-nationalist thinkers of the first generation, such as Fichte, Müller, and Görres, spread around Europe in the first half of the 19th century and ignited movements for national and social liberation. Among the most important thinkers and activists who combined social liberation, universalism, and a strong national enthusiasm is the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872). He is best known for his dual loyalty to the ideals of humanity and of nation, two “altars” of the “new religion” of which he sees himself as an apostle. In his considered view, the former has primacy over the latter, but he does not think of the two as being in any significant way contrary to each other; love for humanity finds its natural expression in loyalty to one’s nation, which is ideally a community of free and equal citizens. His revolutionary “faith” is quite demanding: Mazzini is inimical to utilitarianism, happiness, and mateN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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rial prosperity as political goals and focused on the duties of the individual toward one’s fellow citizens and fellow human beings, in particular, the duty to fight for their freedom. His ideas are now often quoted by proponents of moderate and liberal nationalism. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) offers a much less loaded definition of nationality than the ones proposed by German and Russian thinkers. According to Mill, “a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively”(1975, 380). He then lists various causes of this feeling of nationality, like identity of “race and descent,” community of language and of religion, common territory, and, the strongest of all, identity of political antecedents that encompass a national history producing, in its turn, a common pool of memories. The sympathy then generates the desire and decision to unite under a common government. Since the issue of government ought to be decided by the governed, it follows that the mere presence of the sentiment of nationality yields a prima facie case for a common government distinct and separate from others. The importance of this intermediate role of desire and decision turns Mill into a proponent of a more voluntaristic conception of the nation-state than the one traditionally associated with the Germanic tradition. The French scholar and political thinker Ernest Renan (1823–1892) developed a famous proposal along similar lines. The immediate occasion was the issue of who was to govern Alsace and Lorraine—the French or the Germans—and the interesting circumstance was that many inhabitants of the two regions had a Germanic culture but apparently wished to join the French state. To offer a theoretical solution to this issue, Renan, in his What Is a Nation? (1882), proposes a simple and elegant argument for a definition of nationality of the kind encountered in Mill’s work. It involves commonality of tradition and present-day solidarity, as well as willingness of the members of a nationality to live together. He reviews various traditionally proposed candidates for the defining feature(s) of a nation—dynastic belonging derived from an earlier conquest, commonality of blood, of race, of language, of interest, or of something else. He concludes that it is not a single dynastic rule, for first Switzerland and then the United States formed themselves without any dynastic basis, and, second, France, immediately following the dynasty’s fall, was able to stand without it. It is not a population’s race or blood either. Such ethnographic considerations have played no part in the constitution of modern nations; even the initial carving out of the barbarian kingdoms had nothing ethnographic about it. Moreover, “there is no pure race,” so to make politics dependent on ethnographic analysis is to surrender it to a chimera, he writes. It is not language either. Language invites people to unite, but there is nothing compelling about the invitation. The United States and England share a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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language, a great part of Latin America and Spain speak the same languages, yet these do not form single nations. It is obviously not religion. It is not mere community of interest, since nationality has an important sentimental side to it. Renan comes to the same conclusion as Mill did: all these commonalities are neither necessary nor sufficient for common nationality. According to Renan, the real essence of the nation lies elsewhere and has two related components. The first, derived from the past, is a rich commonality of memories. The second concerns the present and is the actual consent, consisting in the desire to live together and the will to preserve the common heritage. The second exploits the “social capital” (as Renan puts it) of common past glories. Nation is thus defined through large-scale solidarity, stemming from common past sacrifices and prompting such sacrifices in the future. He is famous for his characterization of the nation as “a daily plebiscite,” decided on the grounds just listed. His characterization has shaped the understanding of the nation in the French republican tradition and influenced other thinkers, all the way to contemporary French republican thinkers such as Dominique Schnapper.

Consequences The ideas just discussed have become politically successful to an extraordinary extent. Already in the 1770s–1880s they were spreading across Europe, North and South America, and parts of Asia, and then continued their triumphant march into the rest of the world. We just mentioned Russia and Italy; another big area of immediate influence was the Austro-Hungarian empire, encompassing, besides Austrians, Hungarians and several Slavic peoples. There are many examples of nationalist philosophers from these areas. One is the early Polish nationalistdemocratic thinker, Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko (1746–1817), active in both Poland and America. In the mid-19th century, Hungary fostered a whole group of pronationalist thinkers and activists, but the deepest and most liberal is probably Jószef Eötvös (1813–1871). His Czech counterpart is František Palacký (1798–1876), the author of a monumental history of the Czech people. Slovak L’udovit Štúr (1815–1856) codified the Slovak literary language and produced a very influential, although not quite consistent, nationalist ideology. In Croatia, the thinker who comes closest to Fichte’s line of thought is Ante Star evi (1823–1896), who uses the same ambiguity between nationality in the “spiritual or moral” sense and in the literary sense to justify his explosive mix of democratic republicanism and extreme xenophobia. Bulgaria had its own, more tragic version of Mazzini in Vasil Levski (1837–1873). These are just a few examples among several patriotic or nationalist thinkers of various nationalities through the 19th century. Historians have been looking for common patterns to explain why and how particular ideas were adopted in particular contexts, but it seems that the overall similarities among those ideas and the mutual borrowing that characterizes them are N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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much more common than any stark contrast between various versions of pronationalist doctrines. For almost two centuries it was customary to link the nationalistic view to organicist metaphors of society. Isaiah Berlin, writing as late as the early 1970s, proposed as a part of his definition that nationalism is the conviction that people belong to a particular human group and that “the characters of the individuals who compose the group are shaped by, and cannot be understood apart from, those of the group” (1972, 341). In the first half of the 20th century, this idea was supplemented by the metaphor of “national character.” However, contemporary proponents of nationalism, above all its philosophical defenders, don’t use this language any more; it is hard to find the organicistic metaphor any more except in the most radical and extreme writers. Elsewhere, it has been replaced by one central idea, that of national identity: individuals have an identity as individuals, nations have national identities, but the identities of individuals somehow depend on their participation in the identity of the nation. The most interesting recent development in pro-nationalist thought is the revival of interest in combining a moderate nationalistic agenda with a liberal democratic framework. In the English-speaking world, the main impetus for this idea has been Isaiah Berlin, who also revived Herder’s argument about diversity. More recently this notion has been expanded upon by M. Walzer and A. Margalit. Berlin’s former pupil, Yael Tamir, an admirer of Mazzini, has offered the now standard version of liberal nationalism, and Will Kymlicka sometimes characterizes his own view as belonging to the same category. Another important development is the return to a variety of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, reformulated for the age of globalization. Closest to Kant himself is J. Rawls, whereas more radically cosmopolitan ideas have been proposed by J. Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, Onora O’Neill, Brian Barry, and Thomas Pogge. They typically radicalize Kant’s principles; Pogge, for instance, reinterprets Kant’s modest principle of hospitality as involving the right of free migration of labor and a very substantial right to political asylum. With these authors, the history of political ideas around the issues of cosmopolitanism and nationalism almost seems to have come full circle. Selected Bibliography Berlin, I. 1972. “Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power.” Against the Current, 333–356. New York: Penguin. Berlin, I. 1976. Vico and Herder. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fichte, J. G. 1922. Addresses to the German Nation. Translated by R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. Philosophy of Right. Edited by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herder, J. G. 2002. “This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity.” In Philosophical Writings, translated and edited by Michael N. Forster, 268–358. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kant, I. 2003. To Perpetual Peace. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Kleingeld, P. 1999. “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteen-Century Germany.” Journal of the History of Ideas 60: 505–524. Kohn, H. 1967. Prelude to Nation-States. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Maistre, Joseph de. 1994. Considérations sur la France. Paris: Imprimerie nationale. (Orig. pub. 1796.) Meinecke, F. 1979. Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Translated by R. B. Kimber. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mill, J. S. 1975. Three Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Renan, E. 1990. “What Is a Nation?” In Nation and Narration, edited by Homi Bhabha, 8–22. London: Routledge. (Orig. pub. 1882.) Rousseau, J. J. 1997. “Considerations on the Government of Poland.” The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Russkaya ideya. 1992. Moskva: Respublika. Ryazanaovsky, Nicholas V. 1993. “Prince N. S. Trubetskoi’s Europe and Mankind.” Collected Writings. Los Angeles: Charles Schlacks, Jr. Sieyès, E. J. 2003. Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

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Religion and Nationalism Christopher Marsh Relevance The Sacred, the Secular, and the National National identity, or the affinity one feels toward a nation, can be based on any combination of myriad characteristics, including language, cultural values, shared history, and physical characteristics, just about anything that a group of people feels binds them together and makes them one people. While the ingredients of various forms of national identity vary, each has some set of these at its core. Of the many features that can serve as the basis for a national identity, religion is perhaps the most potent characteristic that can be attached to nationalism. Nothing else relates so directly to matters of ultimate concern such as justice, salvation, and the afterlife quite the same way religion does. It is no surprise then that religion has come to reinforce nationalism and national unity in many parts of the world, both historically and today. Religious difference, however, can perhaps serve just as easily as a force for division within society—even among people who share characteristics such as ethnic composition and language—as in the case of Protestants and Catholics in Bismarck’s Germany. Nationalism shares several features with religion. Émile Durkheim, one of the fathers of the sociological study of religion, began his study of the elementary forms of religious life by identifying things sacred and profane, and he defined religion as the rituals that surround the sacred. Nations, too, often have sacred images and objects. We can thus think of nationalism in some ways as a civil religion, as religious language and symbolism become used to legitimate the state and provide divine sanction to political authority. In similar fashion, religious language and symbolism give legitimacy and authority to nations that do not have a state, for example, in ethnic nationalist and separatist movements, particularly in cases where the secessionist nation does not share a religious tradition with the overarching state. In America, civil religion has been a way in which religious meaning and symbolism have become attached to American nationalism. Items such as the flag and the Constitution are its sacred objects, leaders such as Lincoln and Jefferson are its high priests, and the monuments to these men are its temples. The American case is not exceptional. In many societies religion and nationalism have become intertwined, to greater or lesser degrees. In some cases, religion has become so bound up with nationalism that it is hard to see where one ends and the other begins. This is especially true in situations in which nationalism has drawn upon

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the resources of a genuine religion, such as the fusion between Christianity and American civil religion or between Russian Orthodox Christianity and Russian nationalism. Religion and nationalism seem more prone to become mutually supportive when there is a strong attachment to a given territory. This sacralization of land is common in many cultures, from the concept of Holy Russia to that of the Holy Land. In Japanese Shinto, the islands of Japan are seen as the home of kami, or divine spirits, thus in some ways conflating the this-worldly with the transcendental. The phenomenon of the sacralization of land can also be quite effective in arguing for divine sanction for the state. As Pope Boniface phrased it in the late 13th century, as with “the people of Israel, . . . the kingdom of France [is] a peculiar people chosen by the Lord to carry out the orders of Heaven” (Davis 1958, 298). From the moment the Pilgrims arrived in the New World, they, too, began to associate their journey and settlement with divine providence, stating in the Mayflower Compact that they had undertaken the journey “for the glory of God, and advancement of the Christian faith and honor of our king and country.” If religion is a sacred canopy and provides a society with cosmological significance, then that society can quite easily be conceived of as a nation with divine sanction and purpose as well. Religion might be more prone to becoming an important part of a nation’s group identity when a particular nation has an historic attachment to a certain religion that is distinct from that of neighboring nations. For instance, Catholicism is an important component of Irish nationalism perhaps because it is a major line of demarcation between the Irish and the British. Likewise, Catholic Poles stand in contrast to the Orthodox of Russia, and their independent identity has been historically stronger than that of other nations that are coreligionists of the Russians, such as the Belarusians, despite the fact that all three nations are Slavic. In this way, religion has also played an important role as a national identifier in the Balkans, not only between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, but between the southern Slavs in general and the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the historic Battle of Kosovo of 1389, during which the Slavic peoples of the Balkans fought to the end against the Turkic encroachment of the region, has had a lasting significance on nationalism in that part of the world. Celebrated by Serbs as the “Balkan Alamo,” it was perhaps a significant factor in the failure of the people of the region to form an umbrella “Yugoslav” identity. It certainly contributed to the development of the metaphor of Prince Lazar as a Christ prince, and almost by definition Slavic Muslims came to be viewed as Christ killers and Turkifiers ( poturice ). The 19th-century epic The Mountain Wreath did much to connect this metaphor to modern Serb nationalism and to take the battle from the pages of history and make it applicable to the present day, vilifying the Muslims of Bosnia in the process. Forms of nationalism that have strong connections with particular religious traditions could very easily be referred to as religious nationalism (and many N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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scholars do). Their distinction from other forms of nationalism is that religion is an important factor in the formation of the nation and the understanding of the nation’s distinctive role in history. It is important to bear in mind that religious nationalism is still a form of nationalism, however, and that religious nationalism is not loyalty to one’s religion or religious group but rather an attachment to the nation proper. The line that separates the two may become so blurred in some cases that it can be hard to distinguish between them. It is not uncommon for people of various levels of belief to fuse their religious convictions with state authority, and for state authority to become seen in people’s minds as divinely ordained for some specific purpose. Indeed, this is the purpose of civil religion, and religion is quite often used by political leaders in this way to great effect as citizens are called upon to serve both “God and country.” Of course, throughout history religion’s relationship with nationalism has been competitive as well as complementary. Nationalism has often competed directly against religion for the loyalty of the people, and hence nationalism has sometimes developed strong antireligious dimensions. This seems to have been particularly the case when the religion in question was perceived as foreign. For example, in 19th-century China under the Qing dynasty, a form of Christianity competed for the loyalty of the empire’s subjects, leading to the Taiping Rebellion, the bloodiest civil war in history. Christianity appeared to pose the same dangers for Japan, where not long after its arrival it became tied up with revolutionary movements and thus contributed to the decision to close off communication with the outside world as a way of protecting Japanese society from foreign “contamination.”

Origins Religion, Nationalism, and Political Legitimacy Religion has been a very common basis for group identity throughout history, and prior to the rise of the nation-state, religion often functioned in place of nationalism. As Leopold von Ranke observed in 1872, “in most periods of world history nations were held together by religious ties alone” (Baron 1947, 20). Throughout almost its entire history from the 13th to the early 20th centuries, for example, the Ottoman Empire was ordered along religious lines, not national ones. In fact, there was no national identity per se, with all Muslims enjoying the same rights and privileges no matter what their ethnic background—Turkic, Arabic, Slavic, or so on. All non-Muslims (dhimmi) in the empire, meanwhile, were placed by the Sublime Porte into a confessional community, or millet. This system provided a high degree of tolerance for ethnic differences and even religious diversity and worked well for hundreds of years. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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After the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century, however, empires had to deal with the issue of their own national identity, as well as with the national question and the aspirations of the newly cognizant nations within their borders. In fact, one of the factors contributing to the Ottoman Empire’s downfall was its inability to manage the national question and its relationship to religion, particularly Islam. France had a similar problem in forging a national identity. In the words of Eugene Weber, France had to go about making “peasants into Frenchmen” (Weber 1979, 73). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, however, the problem was making Ottomans out of such an ethnically and religiously diverse population. Prior to the rise of the nation-state, political authority was often legitimated by religion, as church and state were often mutually supporting institutions. While history is replete with examples of each trying to bend the other to its will in an attempt to gain the upper hand, these two pillars of society were taken for granted both by the institutions themselves and by the people, whose fortunes they so heavily influenced. The Enlightenment began to dismantle this edifice, however, and to replace faith and the power of the church with belief in science, reason, and progress. Science and reason then began to erode belief in the divine right of kings and the necessity of monarchical authority. And if kings were not divinely ordained to rule their lands, what was the basis of their authority? Kings and clergy quickly went from being viewed as divinely ordained to being interpreted as usurpers of power. As Denis Diderot concluded, “men will never be free until the last king is strangled with the entrails of the last priest” (De La Harpe 2001). In moving from a religious to a rational legitimation of political authority, it was found that there was still a need for people to identify with their political community in ways similar to how they had previously identified with a religiously mandated state and their coreligionists. The answer was nationalism, and, in the words of 19th-century French historian Jules Michelet, belief in the nation itself arose to fill the “immeasurable abyss” left by the extinction of the idea of God (Himmelfarb 1993, 57). The forms of nationalism that first emerged to fill this void were secular in nature and often anticlerical, if not outright antireligious. This was the case in France, where the revolution had wrested power away from the king and the church. Given the close connection between church and state in France under the ancien régime, however, it was difficult to find symbols for the new regime that did not hark back to either, which led to the use of the figure of Marianne, the tricolor flag, and the motto liberty, equality, and fraternity. Nationalism and World Religions Given the great diversity of religious traditions around the world, it is no surprise that nationalism’s relationship to religion is in many ways related to the theological, ecclesiastical, and historical dimensions of any particular religion. Whether a religion is monotheistic or polytheistic, whether its institutions are structured hierarchically or horizontally, and the context in which a religious tradition rose to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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prominence—or struggles to survive—can all affect the way a particular religion relates to nationalism. Perhaps the oldest connection between religion and national identity is what has existed for millennia among Jews. In Judaism, the connection between religion and national identity is a natural one. Hebrew scripture refers to the Jews as God’s “chosen people” and the land of Israel itself as being given by God to the Jews: “And the Lord said to Jacob . . . ‘Unto thy offspring will I give this land!’” (Genesis 35:11–12). It is important to distinguish between Jewish ethnic identity and Jewish nationalism proper. The former refers to the Jewish people as a distinct ethnic group, which incidentally can be broken down further into subgroups such as Sephardic and Ashkenazi, while the latter is a nationalist sentiment that conceives of a global community of Jews as sharing a common bond, whether they live in Israel or in the Diaspora. There are multiple expressions of Jewish nationalism, and not all Jews are Jewish nationalists. In most forms of Jewish nationalism, however, there is an importance placed upon the land of historical Israel, and for this reason it is an example par excellence of the sacralization of land. It is this expression of Jewish nationalism that has become important and that, over the past century and a quarter, has become closely connected with the Zionist movement, which sees the resurrection and maintenance of a Jewish state of Israel as the only safeguard against anti-Semitism and the only guarantor of the safety of Jews in the world. Another historical example that provides some interesting insight into the relationship between religion and nationalism is that of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. A great paradox exists among the Eastern churches of being one within the single, worldwide church, which is the body of Christ, and the tendency toward the ever-greater division of this body into national-territorial churches. This tendency, though having historical precedents, began to emerge in the late 19th century with the attainment of separate patriarchates for such states as Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Although setting up churches along territorial lines for administrative reasons is theologically permissible, the practice of placing greater attachment to one’s nation than to the church as a whole is not, as it borders on the heretical act of ethnophylitism. In fact, throughout the Orthodox world the ethnic attachment of most of the Orthodox churches is very strong. Even in some Orthodox churches in the United States, where the liturgy is performed in the language of the motherland as well as in English and where national holidays and ethnic festivals are often connected with church life—and often even celebrated at the church itself—the connection between the Orthodox faith and the various national identities of Orthodox nations becomes blurred and often fused. The relationship between Islam and nationalism is a very modern one. Historically, all members of the Muslim faith were conceived of as being united into one community of believers, the Ummah Wahida. In this ummah, one’s particular ethnicity and place of residence were irrelevant, for the common faith in the teachings of Muhammad was what united Muslims together. This overarching, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Jewish National Fund poster, ca. 1939. The rise of the Zionist movement in the late 19th century was influenced by nationalist currents in Europe, as well as by the secularization of Jewish life in eastern Europe, which led many assimilated Jewish intellectuals to seek a new basis for a Jewish national life. (Library of Congress)

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transnational identity lasted for centuries, and today the idea, though in a slightly altered form, remains a central goal of Islamists who seek to establish an Islamic state that will unite all Muslims in lands where they predominate and that were historically under the Islamic Caliphate. It was in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent development of nation-states throughout the Muslim world that nationalism began its association with Islam. With the development of separate states in which Muslims predominated, separate national identities began to emerge alongside the existing Muslim identity, leading to a hybrid religio-national identity, for example, Egyptian Muslims, Libyan Muslims, and Saudi Muslims. The agenda of political Islam to move beyond the boundaries of the nation-state is a response to this development. Although overall the relationship between Islam and nationalism is noteworthy for the weakness of the bond between the two, an exception may be in national liberation movements among Muslims who are seeking to secede from a non-Muslim state, such as in Chechnya, Kashmir, and Xinjiang. In such cases, Islam is often merged with nationalism in the articulation of a distinct national identity for the secessionist group.

Dimensions Although secular nationalism was originally meant to replace religious attachments and to engender loyalty to the nation and its political brother, the state, before long nationalism itself began to resemble religion and in many cases to become intertwined with it. For example, given Russia’s tradition of Christianity, which even predates Prince Vladimir’s conversion to the faith in 988, and its long history of wars with neighboring peoples of other faith traditions, it is no surprise that its national identity is inextricably linked with Orthodoxy, even among those who do not express any deep faith commitment. One reason that the link between Orthodox Christianity and national identity is so closely intertwined in Russia may be the longstanding tradition there of symphonia, or harmony in relations between church and state. According to this ideal, the czar ruled over the secular realm, whereas the church and its leadership ruled over otherworldly matters, both exercising their control in the name of God. This symphonia was changed under Peter the Great in 1721, however, when he replaced the patriarchate with a body known as the Holy Governing Synod, thus putting the church effectively under the control of the state. The group that perhaps did the most to strengthen the bond between Russian nationalism and Orthodoxy Christianity was the Slavophiles. A group of intellectuals writing in the 19th century, the Slavophiles emphasized the distinctiveness of Slavic culture and the centrality of Orthodoxy for Russia. It was largely at the pen of the Slavophiles such as Dostoyevsky that Orthodoxy became very closely connected with what it meant to be Russian. As he wrote, in Russia “the ideal N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of the people is Christ” (Dostoyevsky 1972). The church itself willingly grasped onto the idea and carried it even further. As Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg wrote, “if Russia isn’t your mother, God can’t be your father” (Boyle and Sheen 1997, 338). The interconnectedness of Orthodox Christianity and Russian nationalism was partly attributable to the ecclesiastical structure of Orthodoxy and the fact that Moscow was the seat of the patriarchate that had administrative control over the churches in Russian lands. This combination of territorial autonomy and coextensive church and state boundaries facilitated the formation of a Russian national identity that had Orthodoxy as one of its central components. It is perhaps this fact that led to the sharp attack against the church under the czar’s successors—the Bolsheviks. Shortly after wresting control from the provisional government in 1917, the Bolsheviks launched a systematic attack against religion with the purpose of eradicating it, and the methods used made it seem as though they were taking Diderot’s call almost literally. Despite their best efforts, however, even today Orthodoxy remains a central component of Russian national identity, so much so that more people in Russia identify themselves as Orthodox than profess a belief in God. Prior to the arrival of the Jesuits in the 16th century, there was not even a word in Japanese for religion. Indeed, when entering into treaties with the United States in the second half of the 19th century, the Japanese had to invent a word for religion, using the word shukyo. It is not that Japan was void of religious practice and belief at the time, however, but rather that religion was such a deep part of the culture that its distinctiveness had not been articulated. The “development” of Japanese religions then followed as Shinto and Buddhism came to be defined against Christianity as well as each other. In 1868, only months after the Meiji Restoration, the new government issued a decree “to unite the church and the state,” thus setting off a process that would meld the Shinto religion to Japanese nationalism. The result would only end with the horrific events of World War II and the emperor’s renunciation of his divinity under U.S. pressure immediately after the war. While Shinto was being elevated to the status of a state religion, efforts were simultaneously being made to separate Shinto from Buddhism, with which it had become largely interconnected over the centuries. Such a policy ran counter to the centuries-old practice of incorporating Buddhist deities into Shinto, but it was necessary if Shinto alone was to be elevated as the source of Japanese nationalism. By the early 20th century, Shinto and Japanese nationalism had become fused to a degree probably greater than in any other society in the world, and to catastrophic ends. In the hands of the Japanese imperial regime, Shinto not only provided a sense of superiority and invincibility to the nation but also provided a divine justification to the war and greatly contributed to soldiers’ willingness to die, particularly those who were chosen as kamikazes. The important role played by this religion in World War II was not lost on the Allied powers after the war. In N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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one of the first reports issues by the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP), Shinto was recognized as a major cause of Japanese nationalism, and recommendations were made on curtailing the negative effects of this relationship. The primary recommendation was to separate church and state as much as possible, and one of the first moves taken by the SCAP was to have the emperor renounce his divinity, thus bringing to an end a process that was 2,000 years in the making. Whereas in Japan religion acted as a source of unity for the Japanese, in India religion has been a major source of division and violence. In the early years of the 20th century, the power of the British empire in India declined as national self-consciousness began to emerge, and the two major new nations that were forming—India and Pakistan—were divided along the lines of religion. The distinct national identities that arose during this time were more than simply religious, ethnic, or regional identities, however, for Indian Hinduism and Pakistani Islam were central components of their respective national identities. Indian national identity, or Hindutva, had Hinduism as its core, albeit a “secular” form of Hinduism, as Ghandi and Nehru saw it. Hindutva was not intended to be a Hindu nationalism but rather to appeal to all citizens of the subcontinent by drawing upon a common set of values, including brotherly love, peace, and nonviolence. In this way, Hindutva was intended to be a broad civilizational identity. Perhaps ironically, Hindutva was also quite secular, with religion divorced from politics. For many people, however, to be Indian meant to be Hindu as well, and resentment began to develop among non-Hindus, particularly the Muslims and Sikhs. In the aftermath of World War II, as the United Kingdom began the process of decolonization, India and Pakistan gained their independence, although in a way in which the religious cleavages of the subcontinent were exacerbated, not ameliorated. Not only were two separate states created, with the rationale for the lines of demarcation being primarily the dividing line between the dominant Hindu and Muslim populations, but the actual boundaries between the two new nation-states were kept secret. This led to a mass exodus of population into and out of both states, as many Hindus in what was likely to be Pakistan headed south, while many Muslims in India headed north; on both sides these migrations were often accompanied by coercion and horrific violence.

Consequences Unity and Division Religion, as a component of nationalism can be both a force for unity as well as for division. Which way the pendulum will swing depends entirely upon the unique attributes and historical circumstances of each nation and potential N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nation. In a society plagued by economic disparities, ethnic diversity, and regional inequalities, for example, a common religious tradition may provide a sacred canopy of common meaning under which all citizens can live and prosper. That challenge can be quite formidable, however, for the forces of diversity are not easily overcome. When religious difference is combined with ethnic, linguistic, and cultural difference, however, the potential for conflict can quickly be triggered. Even among people who seemingly share myriad characteristics, including ethnic composition and language, religious difference can prove an insurmountable hurdle in the formation of a nation, and it can tear formed nations apart. Often ethnic entrepreneurs appeal to people’s religious sentiment or draw upon religious symbolism in their articulation of the nation. The result can, again, be either unity or diversity, regardless of the intent of those who seek to unleash this force. The attempt to draw upon India’s Hindu tradition in the formation of Hindutva was not meant to be an act of exclusion, for example, but in the end it alienated many of the millions of Muslims who called India home. Likewise, the development of the concept of Christo-Slavism in Serbia, or the belief that Serbs are a chosen people who are divinely ordained to be Orthodox Christians, degenerated into a view of non-Orthodox peoples as Christ-killers. In somewhat different fashion, the melding of Shinto and Japanese nationalism was intended to provide unity for the Japanese nation, but by elevating the Japanese nation above the rest of the world, the door was opened for an aggressive nationalism that legitimized the subjugation of other nations. Finally, because religion is such an effective means of providing cosmological significance, those societies that undergo dramatic religious transformations are prone to see their political authority undermined. The cases of Africa and Asia are illustrative here. The spread of Christianity in Africa has often resulted in the emergence of revolutionary groups with religious overtones—such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda—or in political transitions that result in Christians coming to power. This was also the case in China in the second half of the 19th century when the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion sought to tear down the imperial system and to establish a “heavenly kingdom” on Earth. It seems that dramatic religious transformations in a society have the potential to undermine political authority unless the regime is quickly able to identify itself with the new religion. Even if religion was not a component of nationalism under the ancien régime, this is no guarantee that those who have found a new religious conviction will not want leaders who share their beliefs. Religion and Nationalism in the Modern World Religion’s relationship with nationalism is a complicated one, and throughout history it has been put to use to both positive and negative effect. By facilitating the formation of an identity above that of traditional tribal and linguistic groups, religion has played a productive role in the formation of many multinational nations. Likewise, religion has also been to blame for many failed attempts to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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form nations from people who share common ethnic and linguistic traits, with Yugoslavia serving as a reminder of just how difficult religious differences can be to overcome. Although religion’s ability to strengthen in-group bonds can be used effectively to unite members of a society, its negative effects on relations with outside groups can be quite visible. The stronger the role that religion plays in the formation of an in-group identity, the more likely that the group will find it difficult to maintain peaceful relations with other groups who do not share the same religious tradition. In a very real sense, it is this phenomenon that is at the core of the “clash of civilizations” debate. For many, the end of World War II signaled a new age in international relations, one in which religion and parochial identities were to play a much less significant role than in previous periods in history. With the spread of communism and the initiation of the Cold War, ideologies and value-based identities seemed to be transforming the world around us. The collapse of those regimes and the failure of policies of forced secularization attest to the difficulty of eradicating religion and nationalism, and in today’s desecularizing world, it would be foolish to discount the continuing significance of the relationship between religion and nationalism. Selected Bibliography Baron, Salo Wittmayer. 1947. Modern Nationalism and Religion. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971. Bellah, Robert. 1967. “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 96, no. 1 (Winter): 1–21. Berger, Peter. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Berger, Peter, ed. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. Boyle, Kevin, and Juliet Sheen, eds. 1997. Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report. London and New York: Routledge. Colley, Linda. 1992. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Davis, R. H. C. 1958. A History of Medieval Europe. London: Longman’s. De La Harpe, Jean-François. 2001. Cours de Littérature Ancienne et Moderne. Boston: Adamant Media Corporation. (Orig. pub. 1840.) Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. 1972. The Dream of a Queer Fellow/The Pushkin Speech. London: Unwin. Durkheim, Émile. 1965. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Free Press. (Orig. pub. 1915.) Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Himmelfarb, Gertrude. 1993. “The Dark and Bloody Crossroads: Where Nationalism and Religion Meet.” The National Interest 32 (Summer): 53–62. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Sells, Michael. 1996. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Weber, Eugene. 1979. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. London: Chatto & Windus.

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National Symbols Michael E. Geisler Relevance Why Nations Need Symbols The German satirist Kurt Tucholsky once quipped that “every human being has a liver, a spleen, a lung, and a flag. All four organs are essential for life. One has heard of people without a liver, without a spleen, and with half a lung; but there are no human beings without a flag.” Why are national symbols so important to so many people? Why is it that politicians feel the need to “wrap themselves in the flag?” Why did New York firemen raise the Star-Spangled Banner on the ruins of the World Trade Center, imitating the Iwo Jima Monument? Why are American schoolchildren asked to pledge allegiance to the flag? Why do audiences break into tears while watching the famous scene in Casablanca in which the Czech resistance fighter Victor Laszlo induces the ragtag patrons of Rick’s Café to launch into a stirring rendition of “La Marseillaise,” the national anthem of France, with Nazi officers glowering in the background? Even though it often seems quite normal to us, there is nothing “natural” in our response to national symbols. There is no inherent reason why Americans should rise when their national anthem is played at the opening ceremony of a football game. Whether we believe that (some) nations, as social and political organizations, are thousands of years old and that nationalism responds to some kind of anthropological need, or whether we consider both as modernist forms that have come into existence only at the end of the supraregional empires marked by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (A. D. Smith 2000; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Anderson 2002), there are few scholars who would question the crucial role played by national symbols in the process of nation-building itself. Symbols, as catalysts and media of collective organization, hark back to prehistoric times. Émile Durkheim first directed our attention to the social organization of experience by symbols. In his study of Australian aborigines, Durkheim showed that the significance of totems for the survival of a clan extended well beyond religious matters; a most important function of these symbols was to maintain a stable experience of the world among collectives. Without such symbols, Durkheim said, “social feelings could have only an unstable existence.” As soon as the group loses physical contact with each other, cohesiveness begins to fade. The transference of emotions onto totemic emblems maintains the collective identity of the group. To Durkheim, it made no difference whether such feelings

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are “incarnated” in persons or in what he called “formulas”: “Some formulas are flags; some real or mythic personages are symbols” (Durkheim 1912, 233). A symbol reduces the enormous complexity of communication by using a concrete sign as a kind of shorthand for a web of interrelated concepts, ideals, and value systems. The larger the collective to be held together by the symbol, the more complex is the signification process, that is, the process of attaching meaning to a symbol to which all members or subsets of the group can subscribe. It is precisely at the intersection of small-scale social organizations (like the tribal village or the polis, the city-state in ancient Greece), defined by a shared regional identity, and that more amorphous collective, the nation, that the symbol comes into its own as a communicative device. The nation-state is a form of large-scale collective organization that evolved quite logically at a time when mass communication and mass transport were rapidly making older, more regional networks both economically and politically obsolete. However, by their very size, nationstates must contend with a significant amount of centrifugal pull—people identify first and foremost with their city or region and only secondarily with their nation and the state that claims to represent it. This is where national symbols take on a crucial role. The Greek origin of the word symbol, to symbolon, refers to the joining of two corresponding pieces, each of which is held by a person who is able to recognize the other individual (or, more importantly, his designate) by the missing piece. Presumably, the only reason somebody would have to pass this kind of identity check is because one of the pair has been traveling. Consequently, the symbol, from its very beginning, has been tied to forms of supraregional communication, whether in the form of commerce, exploration, political conquest, or any combination of these three. Over time, symbols evolved to become the communicative macros or metaphor clusters that we have come to understand. Yet underlying the narrative coral reefs that many symbols present (with layers and layers of cultural signification clustering around the original metaphor), there is always the basic function of shorthand communication, to be projected across the boundaries of time and space. Symbols thus are “present in political events whenever social conflict is expressed or solved and whenever social identity is confirmed. . . . Cultural values, although a fundamental component of the cultural system, do not exist in any material form outside symbolic texts” (Mach 1993, 37). National symbols fuse the nation, as a cultural, historical, and ideological construct, to the state, as an empirical reality; this is their single, most important function. They do so by giving “concrete meaning and visibility to the abstractions of nationalism” (A. D. Smith 1991, 73). The three vertical stripes of the flag of the Republic of Ireland, for example, show green as the color representing traditional Irish Catholic nationalism, orange as the color of Protestant loyalism (harking back to William of Orange who reestablished Protestantism in both England and Ireland), and white as the symbol of hope for peace between the two factions. The Irish tricolor thus seeks to overlay the ideological construction of a unified, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nonsectarian nation over the political reality of what was at least in its beginnings a Catholic state with an oppressed Protestant minority. Conversely, the state of Northern Ireland flies the British Union Jack, thus signaling not only its continued allegiance to Great Britain, but also the fact that the six counties making up Northern Ireland do not consider themselves a separate nation of any kind but derive their collective identity from what they perceive of as their loyalty to Britain. Yet the Irish Catholic Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland is rapidly approaching the 50 percent mark (at which point they could presumably join the Republic of Ireland by means of a simple majority vote). The ensuing tensions between Nationalists and Loyalists have not only led to more than 30 years of civil strife (the “Irish Troubles”) but they have also found an expression in territorial claims by both sides, claims expressed through national symbols. Protestant/ Loyalist boroughs use the Union Jack to demarcate their territory, down to painting curbstones and lampposts in the British national colors (Jarman 2005). Catholic/Nationalist neighborhoods have responded with the liberal use of the Irish tricolor. Given the tension between the two groups, the symbols used in both cases also serve a very practical purpose as guideposts: they signal to members of the respective communities where they “belong,” where they can feel safe, and where their sense of collective identity will be validated. The same goes for the colorful murals (of “King Billy” on his white horse at the Battle of the Boyne, for instance), which are, as it were, placeholders for national symbols in a state without its own separate national identity, whose citizens define themselves as either “Irish” or “British.” The case of Northern Ireland, precisely because of its somewhat exceptional nature, throws the importance of national symbols as key ingredients of collective identity formation into higher relief. There may be states that do not qualify as nations, and there have been many nations in history without a state, at least temporarily (the Jews, the Poles, the Palestinians), but there are no nations without national symbols. Especially in those cases where the territorial boundaries of the state do not correspond to the geographic outlines of the ancestral “homeland” claimed by a nation, or where a state is created without the ideological support structure of a nation, such as the United States of America (Connor 1994, 95), national symbols are charged with the difficult task of making a nation. What Is a National Symbol? Before we go on to discuss their uses and functions, we need to clarify what is and what is not a national symbol. Anthony D. Smith (1991) proposes a register of national symbols that would include not only “flags, anthems, parades, coinage, capital cities, oaths, folk costumes, museums of folklore, war memorials, ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead, passports, frontiers” but also “national recreations, the countryside, popular heroes and heroines, fairy tales, forms of etiquette, styles of architecture, arts and crafts, modes of town planning, legal procedures, educational practices and military codes—all those distinctive N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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customs, mores, styles and ways of acting and feeling that are shared by the members of a community of historical culture.” One might easily expand on Smith’s list even further to include, for instance, the writing system, national monuments in general (beyond war memorials), stamps (as a collective subsystem), allegorical figures representing alleged national characteristics (Uncle Sam, Marianne), animals, both real and mythical (the eagle, the Russian bear, or the Chinese dragon), and certain elements belonging to the sphere of high cultural production: literature, music, the fine arts, the cinema. In addition, David Marsland (2001, 220) adds maps, business advertising, and tourist materials. The Swiss flag is a particularly successful example of the fusion of a national symbol and the branding of an economic product (the white cross against a red background endorsing innumerable products from army knives to “swatches” to water bottles with the “Swiss quality” stamp of approval). Types of dance have been cited as national symbols: the tango for Argentina, the flamenco for Spain, and the merengue for the Dominican Republic. Some people even consider wine a national symbol of France. A particularly interesting subcategory are national leadership figures (William Tell, Jeanne d’Arc, Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill). Their significance as national symbols extends far beyond the pedagogical use made of their example by grade-school textbooks and similar “educational” materials. Whereas in the United States, for instance, the president is simultaneously the chief executive of the state, the commander-in-chief of the army, and the representative figurehead of the nation, these roles are distributed among different government positions in other countries. In Britain, the prime minister is the chief executive, and the queen is the titular leader of the nation; in Germany and Israel, the chancellor and prime minister, respectively, are the chief political executives, while in both cases the president represents the nation. These constitutional arrangements have a significant impact on the way people in these countries see their leaders. Whereas in England, Germany, and Israel, criticism of the prime minister’s or chancellor’s policies are treated primarily as a political dispute, political attacks on the American president as the proponent of a particular policy (i.e., as a political leader) are sometimes (mis)understood as attacks on the president as the symbolic figurehead of the American nation—and thus as an attack on the nation itself. This effect has, of course, not been lost on holders of that high office, many of whom knew how to turn such misunderstandings to their political advantage. The symbolic use of national landscapes connects older concepts of regionalism and regional identity (dialect, ethnic traditions) to the more abstract centralist notion of a national culture: the Alps as a symbol for Switzerland, and the Rhine as the classically contested symbol claimed by both Germany and France. Landscapes are the symbolic link between the region and the nation. For this reason, they are frequently evoked by cultural critics of the existing political or social N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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order in a nostalgic or sentimental way that—explicitly or implicitly—pits the “authentic” nature of a regional landscape and regional traditions against the allegedly more constructed nature of the nation-state. Yet it is debatable whether landscapes really qualify as national or regional symbols. A distinction needs to be made between national symbols, which are a phenomenon of relatively modern times, and ancient transnational symbols, which are shared by many different cultures, such as the Christian cross or the Islamic crescent. However, ancient transnational symbols have also been incorporated into some modern national symbols: the cross is prominently displayed on the flags of Switzerland, Greece, Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries (among others), and the crescent is featured on the flags of many countries with predominantly Islamic populations such as Turkey, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Algeria.

Origins The Religious Background of National Symbols As Émile Durkheim’s reference to totems and the afterlife of ancient transnational symbols in many national symbols demonstrates, collective symbols have been around since ancient times. Yet what endows national symbols, in particular flags and anthems and certain national monuments, with such an intense affective energy, an emotional force that causes us to break into tears when listening to our national anthem or feel a sense of elation when ascending the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, is not merely their importance as signifiers of our national heritage but also the historical vacuum they filled. In the wake of the terrible destruction wrought by Europe’s most devastating religious war (the Thirty Years’ War, which ended in 1648), religion as the most powerful ideological force was replaced, in some countries, by a secular competitor: the nation. In the more secular world created by the Enlightenment, science, and industrialization, a world in which religion had lost its central role as purveyor of collective identity, nationalism provided people with a new overarching sense of communion, belonging, identity, and collective purpose. In this context, nationalism has been referred to as a “civil religion” (Bellah, 1967). For the nationalist project to succeed, national symbols must be imbued with the same kind of spirituality that had hitherto been reserved for the cross or the crescent. Where this ideological cross-pollination does not succeed, the nation, as an ideological construct, will likely fail (unless the “secular religion” merges with its predecessor, as has happened in many Islamic nations), even though the state may survive without it for some time. Different nations have chosen different ways of accomplishing this ideological grafting. The most common recipe involves a kind of ideological plagiarism; for their national symbols, the intellectual elites that shaped the nation simply adopted elements of religious symbolism, recombining them with the symbolic N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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register of nationalism. We have already discussed the migration of the cross and the crescent onto national flags of various nations. In the Balkans, where people’s strong religious beliefs made the idea of simply replacing religious traditions with secular ones a risky proposition for nationalists, the ensuing compromises involved, among other ideological stratagems, the casting of religious leaders in the role of “founding fathers” of the nation (Bishop Germanos in Greece) and the “doubling” of religious holidays as national holidays—Annunciation Day for Greece (March 25) and St. Vitus’s Day for Serbia (June 28), which is also the day on which Serbians traditionally commemorate the Kosovo Battle of 1389. The Serb case is particularly interesting since the fusion of religious traditions and secular nationalism, as articulated in the June 28th commemoration, proved sturdy enough to survive four decades of Titoist suppression of Serb nationalism (Roudometof 2005, 52). The Israeli flag features the Star of David, while the menorah is the national emblem. Both are religious symbols (the menorah more overtly so than the Star of David), while more secular national symbols such as the Roaring Lion of Tel Hai, which commemorates the very secular struggles of the early settlers, have faded over time (Mayer 2005). Similarly, the strong formal affinities of many national anthems to religious hymns are a reminder of their musical origins. National Symbols as “Invented Traditions” Whether we think of nations as primordial or perennial phenomena or consider them modernist social constructions (Anderson 2002), the symbols representing them, although often perceived of as an ancient or organic part of a nation’s history, are actually “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) reaching back no further than the 18th century for the most part. The flag, for instance, dates back as a signal, that is, a medium of communication, to 1542 BC India and as an emblem of dynastic power to ancient China (Chou dynasty, 1122 BC). Yet the oldest flag used as a national symbol, the flag of Denmark, can be dated with certainty to late medieval times only, and even the Swiss flag, representing a nation that can trace its roots to 1291, did not replace the old cantonal coats of arms of the Swiss Federation until 1848. In contradistinction to many other national symbols such as the anthem and the holiday, the flag and the national emblem not only represent the nation-state to other nation-states, they also assert the state’s claim to represent the nation to the nation itself. In other words, each time we spot our national flag or our national emblem, we are reminded that the particular state we live in, with its specific political and economic system, claims to be the one and only legitimate articulation of the nation as a cultural, social, and historic collective. The state invests the flag and the emblem with the official imprimatur of its power over the lives and welfare of its citizens. This may be why the burning of the flag is seen as a symbolic attack on the country itself and why “desecration of the flag” is a much more serious offense against national etiquette than, for instance, a parody of the national anthem or N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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a critical essay on the conventions of a national holiday. While some nations feel that their anthems also ought to be protected against satirical attacks or disrespectful renditions, the public outrage following such an offense is usually relatively short-lived, as was the case when comedienne Roseanne Barr “murdered” the U.S. national anthem at a baseball game in 1990 by singing it off key and ending her performance with an obscene gesture. By contrast, the burning of the flag, especially in the United States, is taken so seriously that there may yet be a constitutional amendment restricting this freedom of expression. In the hierarchy of national symbols, the flag is (literally) at the top of the totem pole. The oldest national anthems we know are the Dutch “Wilhelmus van Nassouwe” (which can be traced back to the early 17th century but was not declared the Netherlands’s national anthem until 1932) and the English “God Save the King,” written in the 1740s (we don’t know exactly by whom) and first performed in London in 1745, probably in symbolic defiance of the Scottish (Jacobite) rebellion. One of the most interesting aspects of national anthems is their almost chronic intertextuality. Part of the reason we don’t know whether the English anthem was written by Henry Carey (as both Joseph Haydn, who heard the hymn in England in the 1790s, and John Philip Sousa thought) or by Henry Purcell or John Bull is that, in various ways, they each contributed something to the anthem, which nevertheless turned out to be such a success that Ludwig van Beethoven, Carl Maria von Weber, Johannes Brahms, Giacomo Meyerbeer, Charles Gounod, and scores of other composers all adopted the tune as part of various compositions (Eyck 1995). Joseph Haydn was so impressed with both the anthem and its acceptance by the people in England that he resolved to write a similar hymn for the Austrian empire (then technically still the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation). In turn, Haydn’s composition, the “Kaiserquartett” (Emperor’s Quartet), written as a hymn to the Austrian emperor and featuring a slow, folkloric tune in intentional contradistinction to the revolutionary clamor of the “Marseillaise,” eventually became associated with Hoffmann von Fallersleben’s “Lied der Deutschen,” the current national anthem of Germany. During Bismarck’s empire, the preferred anthem of the Prussian monarchy, however, was “Heil Dir im Siegerkranz” (Hail to You Wearing the Victor’s Wreath)—sung to the tune of “God Save the King.” The same composition is, of course, also the tune for an unofficial competitor for the American national anthem, “My Country, ’Tis of Thee.” The “Star-Spangled Banner” itself, on the other hand, written by Francis Scott Key while watching the terrible bombardment of Fort McHenry, presents the interesting case of a national symbol (the anthem) grafted onto another national symbol (the flag), not only confirming the ranking of symbols as outlined above but, more importantly, attesting to the crucial role of national symbols in articulating some of the collective myths that hold a nation together. Although public monuments usually lack the “official” state-endowed status accorded the flag, the currency, or even the national holiday, they may nevertheless N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Sheet music of the “Star-Spangled Banner,” printed in 1861. The lyrics of the song were written in the War of 1812 and the song gained popularity through the 19th century, until it was finally officially adopted as the anthem of the United States in 1931. (Library of Congress)

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exert significant influence over the collective self-image of a nation. In the United States of America, this is certainly true of the Lincoln Memorial, the White House, and, above all, the Statue of Liberty. The latter’s unusual genesis makes this particular monument a more genuine expression of the collective mythology of the American people than most other national symbols. While defacements of public monuments may be subject only to relatively minor legal penalties (more likely for the destruction of public property than for the offense against the national symbol), the actual destruction of an important national monument carries a very different, and often traumatic, emotional charge. The 1933 burning of the German parliament building, the Reichstag, by Marinus van der Lubbe, provided the National Socialists with an excuse for forcing passage of the infamous Enabling Law that gave Hitler dictatorial powers. More recently, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center turned what until then had been at most an unofficial or virtual national symbol into a real one. Moreover, the targets chosen by Mohammed Atta and his group—the Twin Towers and the Pentagon—highlight yet another facet of national symbolism: not all national symbols are created by the nation or state with which they are associated—some symbols are projected onto a nation by others. While many of these are ephemeral, emerging in the context of particular international political and cultural configurations and disappearing just as quickly, others may be more stable and exercise a significant degree of control over the imaginations of people living in other countries. Some Americans may have vaguely conceived of the Twin Towers as emblems of America’s economic prowess even before 9/11, but few U.S. citizens (but a great many members of other nations) would have assigned such a role to the Pentagon. However, there is little doubt that the Twin Towers, at least as apocalyptic-looking structures of molten steel, have since become a new national symbol for most Americans. The example of the Twin Towers reminds us that national symbols may crystallize around a nation’s traumatic events, often serving as a “permanent” reminder to the nation that events such as the one commemorated by the symbol “must never be allowed to happen again.” Other symbols in this category are the USS Arizona Memorial, the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, or the Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) in Japan. The difference between these and other war memorials is that there exists an indexical relationship between the symbol and the event commemorated by it. In other words, instead of simply being the result of an apt metaphor or an artistic creation, the symbol in these cases bear within them material traces of the very event they commemorate. They do not merely commemorate; they are also assigned an evidentiary function as part of their portfolio, that is, the task to preserve part of the historical evidence within the symbol itself. While most symbols are metaphorical in nature, in other words, one mental operation removed from the collective myth or value to which they refer, symbols like the USS Arizona Memorial and the Wailing Wall could be described as material trace symbols (or, in semiotic terms, indexical symbols). The purpose N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of such symbolic sites is to facilitate the work of mourning by displacing the trauma, as well as the widespread anxiety caused by the sudden and unexpected tear in the fabric of collective identity, into the imaginary realm of the national narrative.

Dimensions What makes national symbols, like the flag, powerful enough that people are willing to die for them? Again, Émile Durkheim’s early description of the process is amazingly astute: We cannot detect the source of the strong feelings we have in an abstract entity that we can imagine only with difficulty and in a jumbled way. We can comprehend those feelings only in connection with a concrete object whose reality we feel intensely. . . . The symbol thus takes the place of the thing, and the emotions aroused are transmitted to the symbol. It is the symbol that is loved, feared, and respected. . . . And it is to the symbol that one sacrifices oneself. The soldier, who dies for his flag, dies for his country, but the idea of the flag is actually in the foreground of his consciousness. . . . He forgets that the flag is only a symbol that has no value in itself but only brings to mind the reality it represents. The flag itself is treated as if it was that reality. (Durkheim 1912, 221)

The feelings of attachment, affinity, or solidarity we may harbor for a particular group or collective are projected onto the symbolic object. The problem with this process is that, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is to sustain the emotional energy needed to embrace the whole group. Even though people pay lip service to this ideal all the time, it is actually fairly difficult to “love” a nation, much less a state. The object of our affection, or love, is simply too diffuse. National symbols function as stand-ins for the nation (or the state) by giving us something that is tangible, concrete, and available for sensory experience. That is why we refer to symbols—including national symbols—as examples of objectified emotions. Unfortunately, Durkheim’s explanation for the modality by which national symbols accrue this emotional investment by millions of people is ultimately unsatisfying. He simply speaks of “spontaneous attachment”; however, there is absolutely nothing about a national symbol to which an emotion could “spontaneously attach” itself. Rather, this process occurs over a long period of time and as the result of what in cultural studies has been called “overdetermination.” This term is used to describe an invisible cultural web formed by all public institutions that implicates everybody in an all-encompassing network of signification maintained by the redundant and repetitious expression of the same ideas and values. What we learn in school is reinforced by what we see in movies, which is confirmed by what we read in the newspapers, which agrees with the stateN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ments made by politicians, which reflects what priests and ministers preach to us from the pulpit, and so on. Overdetermination works because each of these institutions echoes what all the others say, producing a cumulative effect (Althusser 1971). The term is an apt description of the way in which we are indoctrinated to accept natural symbols as “naturalized” expressions of our collective identity. On a typical day, I will spot the U.S. flag both virtually (on the morning news) and in reality, flying in front of numerous public buildings. I will see various national monuments and national leaders depicted on dollar bills (one type of national symbol grafted on top of another); I may be treated to a rendition of the U.S. national anthem on a Web site or as part of a live broadcast of a football game; and I will, of course, be exposed to innumerable variations of red-whiteand-blue on advertisements, television commercials, and product packaging. Most of these I will not even notice, at least not consciously, because I have been conditioned to expect them and to accept this as the natural order of things. Michael Billig refers to this ubiquity of (largely “unnoticed”) national symbols as “Banal Nationalism” (Billig 1995), pointing out that nationalist ideologies and behaviors are by no means limited to radical groups on the extreme right but are as pervasive in liberal democracies as they are overlooked, because we have been trained or “naturalized” to overlook them. As an “overdetermined” system, national symbols persuade us to accept the ideological, social, economic, and political realities of the state in which the “accident of birth” has placed us as the only possible order. Through constant exposure to these symbols, the particular historical context in which we grew up appears to most of us as the only “natural” way of life: “The historical nation aspires to achieve the inevitability of the status of natural law” (Berlant 1991, 25). A by-product of this process in which the nation as an ideological concept is connected to the state as an empirical reality is the teaching of “our national history.” Each generation of American schoolchildren has to be taught anew that the 50 stars on their flag represent the 50 states and that the 13 stripes stand for the original 13 states. Through this process of permanent recursive communication, the national symbol not only assures loyalty to the state but also serves as a historical “bookmark,” a link to actual or legendary events in the nation’s past that helped shape it. Each time this “bookmark” is actualized ( for example, a flag being saluted or a national anthem being played), it reminds us of our collective history as a nation, a shared past that makes us a nation, bestowing upon each of us a sense of collective identity. The monumental Lieux de mémoire movement, which originated in France under the guidance of the historian Pierre Nora, is essentially a vastly expanded version of this bookmarking function of national symbols. By seeking to preserve France’s most important “realms of memory” (the English translation of les lieux de mémoire), Nora and his fellow historians assembled what they considered the essential pieces of French historical identity in the hope of thus preserving this identity for future generations (Nora 1996). The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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similarities between the bookmarking function of national symbols and the Realms of Memory project become manifest in the third volume of the American edition, which explicitly focuses on national symbols. But many of the other realms of memory cited by Nora and his associates (such as the Tour de France or Gastronomy) could also be subsumed under the label of national symbols. Another important reason for the strong appeal of national symbols is that they shore up individual identity. Ironically, this happens by giving some of it up, suspending it within a larger, transcendent individuality—that of the nation. In doing so, national symbols, if only momentarily, allow us to overcome one of the horrors of modernity—individuation, the modernist anxiety that makes many people (especially those living in secular nations) feel disconnected from the society they live in. As Benedict Anderson (2002, 145) says about the feelings generated by listening to one’s national anthem, especially on ceremonial occasions: “There is in this singing an experience of simultaneity. At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses to the same melody. . . . How selfless this unisonance feels.” “Selfless” is the key to this experience. As the national anthem beckons us to lose our individual selves in the totality of the whole, comprised of all those who, through their simultaneous communication with the national symbol, become part of us as we become part of them, its attendant promise is to make us whole again. The feeling of suspending one’s individuality in the collective whole is one of the most powerful psychological elements of the semiotics of national symbols— and at the same time, one of the most dangerous. On the one hand, the transcendent affect of the anthem is what makes all those people singing the “Marseillaise” in Rick’s Café forget their everyday worries and concerns, the thousand little compromises that they, like all of us, make every day. Instead, they experience the rapture of being caught up in a community, of rising above one’s egotistical self and anxieties to support a common cause and being swept away by collective emotion. On the other hand, the threatening presence of the Nazi officers in the background reminds us of the abuse this affective power of national symbols can engender given extreme forms of nationalism. One way to understand the function and operation of national symbols is to think of them as a communications or mass media system (Geisler 2005). We have already seen that national symbols work in concert to establish a web of communication that “naturalizes” our experience of everyday reality by reassuring us of our collective identity, our “belonging” to a particular culture, with its particular language, history, and social conventions. In this they bear a strong resemblance to the operation of mass media. Like mass media, national symbols “implicate the individual members of the culture into its dominant value systems, . . . assure the culture at large of its practical adequacy in the world by affirming and confirming its ideologies/mythologies, . . . convince the audience that their status and identity as individuals is guaranteed by the culture as a whole . . . and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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transmit by these means a sense of cultural membership (security and involvement)” (Fiske and Hartley 1978, 88). Just as newspapers, television, the Internet, and other media construct our everyday lives by generating and maintaining a stable and seemingly immutable “background reality” (Luhmann 2000), that is, the kind of reality we take for granted when we leave our house to go to work in the morning, so national symbols, through the very redundancy of their communication, stabilize our sense of collective identity. In both cases the psychological gain for the individual is a reduction of the risk of a breakdown in the way we experience everyday reality on a psychological level. Precisely through their predictable (and therefore reliable) ubiquity, national symbols seem to confirm that the world as we know it will continue to exist without the threat of overly disruptive conflict and contradiction, no matter what disturbing stories the news media may tell us. That is one reason why, when such disruptions in the fabric of everyday reality do occur (as was the case with the attacks of September 11, 2001), people “rally around the flag” in the hope of being reassured that the “background reality” they have taken for granted still exists. Like mass media, national symbols may be used in ways for which they were not intended: to subvert the power structure they are meant to buttress. This may in fact happen in two entirely different ways, either by a direct attack on the symbols (burning the flag, spraying graffiti on monuments, and so on), or more subtly, by using national symbols to reclaim a part of their definition that is believed to be lost—think of the iconic use of the U.S. flag in Easy Rider or the pivotal role played by the Lincoln Memorial in Frank Capra’s Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (and many other movies). Finally, the role they play in promoting and sustaining a certain ideology may, at least in liberal democracies, be seized upon by underprivileged groups and redirected against the dominant (or “hegemonic”) culture, as an implicit promise made, but not fulfilled, by the ideology for which the national symbol stands. This “subversive” use of a national symbol is exemplified by Jimi Hendrix’s interpretation of the U.S. national anthem or, more recently, by the significance of the national holiday celebration featured in Oliver Stone’s 1989 film Born on the Fourth of July. Perhaps the most famous instance of a reappropriation of a national symbol by an oppressed minority group is Martin Luther King’s 1963 speech at the Lincoln Memorial, in which he used the impressive backdrop of the monument to remind the nation of the values celebrated by it.

Consequences Over time, national symbols are naturalized to the point where it is no longer feasible for many people to think of alternative representations. Yet alternatives to national symbols have existed as long as the symbols themselves, and there is N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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perhaps not a single one that has not been the subject of attacks, attempts to replace it with another symbol, or, at the very least, a renegotiation of its meaning and the specific values it represents. In the United States, the civil rights movement has changed the political landscape, creating in the process a new national symbol—Martin Luther King Day—as an additional bookmark in the American national narrative; and the veterans of the war in Vietnam have permanently “reminded” the nation of a war it desperately wished to forget, resulting in another new national symbol—the memorial wall. National symbols are a powerful expression of our collective imagination. Yet, although some symbols are more revered than others, they are far more fragile than they appear. They do have a shelf life and may change, lose some of their relevance, or even disappear over time. Selected Bibliography Althusser, Louis. 1971. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” In Lenin and Philosophy, translated by Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books. Anderson, Benedict. 2002. Imagined Communities. Rev. ed. London: Verso. Bellah, Robert N. 1967. “Civil Religion in America.” In The Robert Bellah Reader, edited by Robert N. Bellah and Steven M. Tipton, 225–245. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006. (Orig. pub. in Daedalus 96, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 1–21.) Berlant, Lauren. 1991. The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Cerulo, Karen A. 1995. Identity Designs: The Sights and Sounds of a Nation. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Durkheim, Émile. 1912. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated by Karen E. Fields. New York: The Free Press, 1995. Eyck, F. Gunther. 1995. The Voice of Nations: European National Anthems and Their Authors. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Fiske, John, and John Hartley. 1978. Reading Television. London: Methuen. Geisler, Michael E., ed. 2005. National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jarman, Neil. 2005. “Painting Landscapes: The Place of Murals in the Symbolic Construction of Urban Space.” In National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative, edited by Michael E. Geisler, 172–191. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Luhmann, Niklas. 2000. The Reality of the Mass Media. Translated by Kathleen Cross. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Mach, Zdzislaw. 1993. Symbols, Conflict, and Identity. Essays in Political Anthropology. Albany: State University of New York Press. Marsland, David. 2001. “National Symbols.” In Encyclopedia of Nationalism, edited by Athena S. Leoussi, 220–222. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

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Mayer, Tamar. 2005. “National Symbols in Jewish Israel: The Interplay of the Religious and the Secular.” In National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative, edited by Michael E. Geisler, 3–34. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Nora, Pierre, ed. 1996. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. English language edition edited by Lawrence D. Kritzmann, translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Columbia University Press. Roudometof, Victor. 2005. “National Commemorations in the Balkans.” In National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative, edited by Michael E. Geisler, 35–59. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Smith, Anthony D. 2000. The Nation in History. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Smith, Whitney. 2001. “National Symbols.” In Encyclopedia of Nationalism, vol. 1, edited by Alexander Motyl, 521–530. San Diego: Harcourt.

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Technology and Nationalism Joshua Barker and Sharon Kelly Relevance The birth and spread of nationalism and nation-states between the 18th and 20th centuries took place against a backdrop of tremendous social and technological upheaval. The last decades of the 18th century witnessed not just the American and French revolutions but the advent of a host of new technologies, including the power loom, the cotton gin, and the steamship. During the 19th century, as nationalism was spreading throughout Europe and the Americas, technological change continued apace, with such revolutionary inventions as the steam locomotive, the telegraph, the typewriter, the machine gun, and the telephone. During the first half of the 20th century, as independence movements emerged and gained strength in many parts of colonized Asia and Africa, societies across the globe were being transformed by the widespread adoption and use of cinema, radio communication, automobiles, and airplanes. Nations are typically conceived of as bounded territories inhabited by a group of people who lay claim to a common culture, language, history, and future. Over the past few centuries, the ideas that inform nationalism have provided the basis for political struggles leading to the establishment of hundreds of nation-states around the world. Although other forms of large-scale social organization and collective identity, such as monarchies and religious groups, continue to be important in many parts of the world, nation-states unquestionably have become the predominant political structure for containing and organizing human societies on a large scale. The fact that nationalism and nation-states emerged and spread during a period of rapid technological advancement has led numerous scholars to suggest that the two historical processes are interconnected. In this article we will describe two ways in which the history of technology and the history of nationalism may be understood to be causally intertwined: technological determinism and social determinism. We will also describe a way of understanding the relation between technology and nationalism that does not focus on their causal links but on the symbolic linkages and associations between the two. Impacts of Technology on Nationalism Technological determinism is the belief that technologies have the power to alter society and to shape peoples’ perceptions of the world they live in. When examining the relation between technology and nationalism, a focus on technological N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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determinism draws attention to the impacts technological changes have had on national societies and nationalist sentiments. For example, it can be shown that new communications and transport technologies break down the boundaries between social groups and unify people in new ways. Print technology, for instance, helped standardize languages through time and space, making it possible for a larger group of people to share both a common language and the awareness that they have a common language. Given the centrality of language to nationalist sentiments, it is easy to understand why the printing press might therefore be seen as having been a major cause for the rise of nationalism. The printing press was not alone in this regard. Various technologies have been shown to help unify people through the formation of a shared national public culture: the modern factory, the modern school, the railway, the automobile, and more. Technologies may be social unifiers, but they may also be dividers. The factory played an important role in the emergence of a mass culture, but it also precipitated the emergence of a society sharply divided along lines of economic class. The railway linked the American coasts together, helping create a relatively seamless national territory, but it also facilitated the devastation of American Indian communities with lasting consequences for the status of first nations groups within the American nation. When examining the effects of technology on nations and nationalism, it is important to recognize that new technologies can both enable and constrain nationalist sentiments, as well as unify and divide nations. Impacts of Nationalism on Technology Social determinism is the belief that social groups and social structures have the power to affect technological innovation and shape technological change. A focus on social determinism draws attention to the effects nationalist sentiments and nation-states have had on the invention and diffusion of technologies. Some of the most important means by which nation-states have affected technological change is through government planning, regulation, and investment. National governments themselves have been deeply involved in technological development, particularly in the construction of national infrastructures. The Canadian National Railway was exactly what its name suggested: a railway commissioned by the Canadian government and designed to serve the transport needs and to unify people across the large and disparate Canadian territory. The impact national governments had on material infrastructures was also evident in other large technological systems; telegraph and telephone networks, road networks, and electricity grids were all organized largely along national lines. Even when these networks were built by private businesses, they were heavily regulated to ensure they served national interests, or at least the interests of the national elite. Telegraphy is a particularly striking example of this tendency. Telegraph networks spread rapidly in the 19th century, wiring nations into systems that could N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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rapidly transmit messages. Such networks often allowed for global connections. By 1874, it took only four minutes to telegraph a message from London to Bombay and receive a reply. Twenty-five years earlier, without the benefit of new technologies, this process had taken 10 weeks. The chief motivation behind Britain’s telegraph network was not to link the metropole to its colony, however; it was to connect the nation. By the late 19th century, telegraph lines linked over 20,000 of Britain’s towns and villages, creating a dense net of domestic communication. Even when technological development is taking place outside the sphere of government authority, nationalist sentiment can have powerful impacts on the direction of technological change. For instance, many radio hobbyists in Java during the 1920s and 1930s viewed their pirate broadcast activities as playing a part in the Indonesian struggle for national independence. It was nationalism— rather than the prospect of personal fame or financial gain—that invested their hobby with historic significance and provided them with the motivation to continue innovating. In sum, whether in conjunction with the state or not, the nation has provided a fertile social and political ground for new technologies to flourish. Technologies as National Symbols The strong historical association between technological progress and nationbuilding has meant that technological achievements have often become viewed as symbols of national strength and power. Technological feats of human ingenuity, such as a tall tower, a big dam, a long bridge, or a fast car, have been used to suggest that the nation that produces them is a powerful, modern nation with a destiny for great things. The more remarkable human-made technologies, such as Paris’s Eiffel Tower or the Brooklyn Bridge, have become veritable icons of their respective nations. The Brooklyn Bridge, completed in 1883, was heralded as a feat of technological engineering and a symbol of collective American identity. On the day of its official opening, Brooklyn schools and businesses were closed, and 150,300 people crossed the bridge. The guest of honor was the president of the United States, highlighting the national significance of the event. The significance attached to the Brooklyn Bridge illustrates how technology entered into the broader repertoire of symbols that nations felt they ought to possess. It was not merely enough to have a language, flag, anthem, or common history; the nation needed a grand technology that would inspire awe in its beholders and confirm its legitimacy and status among nations worldwide. In examining the symbolic importance of technology to nationalism, it is not enough to focus on the meanings that leaders and engineers intended to give particular artifacts. History is replete with examples of technologies, such as the Titanic and the Hindenburg, that came to signify not a nation’s strength and modernity but its vulnerabilities and conceits. People give their own meanings to artifacts. In the case of technologies that serve as national icons, deciphering these meanings may reveal a great deal about how people feel about their nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Origins Modern nationalism could not exist without a shared and relatively uniform public culture. The “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) of the nation depends on each person being able to imagine him- or herself as being one individual among many similar individuals, all of whom share a culture and a set of rights. During the French Revolution, these rights were summed up as the famous triad of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. In the U.S. Constitution, they were summed up as Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. In explaining the origins of modern nationalism, it is first necessary to explain the emergence of a way of thinking about persons that made them directly comparable to one another and endowed them with the same inherent rights. Prior to the 18th century, large-scale communities took the form of monarchies and religious communities. Neither of these kinds of community endowed their members with inalienable rights. Whereas monarchies imagined persons to be subjects and religious communities imagined them to be believers, nationalism asserted that they were citizens possessed of certain inalienable rights. New technologies played an important part in helping to constitute the kinds of public culture that would ultimately form the basis for nationalist awakenings. The printing press was of central importance in this regard. As Anderson has argued, print technology standardized vernacular language and encouraged mass literacy, making possible the creation of large reading publics. Information could be extended to people across great distances, with the ease of mutual comprehension due to a uniform language that followed standardized rules of grammar and syntax. Newspapers, novels, and other mass-produced, mass-circulated materials thus created a unified field in which ideas could be exchanged and ideologies communicated. Print technology also encouraged people to see themselves as sharing a time and a space with others in the reading public. Newspapers were particularly important in this regard since they reinforced the idea that distant events were happening at the same time as local events, thereby generating a sense that everyone was living in the same place and time. A public that was united could be mobilized for political, social, or religious causes. This unification was essential in the nationalist cause; once people could imagine their fellows as sharing a public culture, it became possible to imagine that this public ought to share certain fundamental rights and freedoms. As the Canadian theorist and technological determinist Marshall McLuhan eloquently put it, print enabled people to see each other for the first time. Print technology was not alone in encouraging the development of a standardized public culture. The modern factory, whose emergence is dated to the mid-18th century, played an important role in creating an urban, industrial culture that differed radically from the culture of work that had come previously. The factory changed the organization of work by increasing regimentation to meet N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Early 20th-century painting by Charles E. Mills of Benjamin Franklin in his print shop. Benedict Anderson has suggested that the printing press allowed “imagined communities” to be established, which formed the basis for nationalist identities. (Library of Congress)

the standardized demands placed on production by new industrial machinery. Factory work was characterized by uniformity and repetition. The development of factories resulted in increasing levels of occupational specialization and a more highly segmented division of labor. From the standpoint of social organization, this resulted in the development of a new breed of worker and a new breed of manager. As Ernest Gellner (1983) has argued, industrial production requires the cultivation of specialists—people trained in a generic set of skills that are easily transferable to a variety of occupations. To support industry, states have historically taken responsibility for manufacturing a literate, numerate workforce. During the 19th and 20th centuries, this was generally accomplished by instituting mass education systems. These education systems in turn produced a homogeneous, competent citizenry fluent in the culture of the nation and “free” to sell its labor power on the open market. This modern, metropolitan, mass culture was the ground in which nationalist consciousness took root. In sum, modern technologies caused people to interact with one another in ways not previously possible and broke down many old divisions, both geographical and social. This in turn precipitated a shift in how people understood their role in society and the place of their society in the broader world. In some cases, the effect of these shifts was to generate and reinforce a standardized public culture that would enable nationalist sentiments to emerge. Beneath the apparent unity created by modern technologies, however, there were also many divisions. The printing press and mass education may have expanded the literate class, but higher education remained the privilege of an elite. Factories may have standardized wage labor and work culture, but they also led N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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to radical social and economic inequalities throughout the industrialized world. Such divisions draw attention to the importance of social factors in shaping technological change. While new technologies may have contributed to the emergence of nationalism, the ways in which they were used often reflected existing social hierarchies and patterns of exclusion.

Dimensions The development and application of new technologies often fall under the purview of political and economic elites, and technologies have often been consciously appropriated by elements of these elites to advance their social and political agendas. The social unification made possible by new technologies should not be considered all-inclusive. Even as it unites people, technology can create new divisions, and such divisions can be intentionally promoted by those in control of particular technological projects. The construction of a railroad in India in the 1850s was initiated by British colonial leaders in an attempt to assert dominance and increase the economic potential of the colony. The British believed that the caste system was a deterrent to economic success, and they intended the railway to act as an equalizer. Members of different castes would travel the rails together, and caste divisions would be temporarily suspended. However, the railroad succeeded only in substituting one form of social hierarchy for another. Although Indians of different castes did indeed travel together, the division that railways emphasized was that between the colonizers and the colonized. A racialized employment hierarchy was established, and the most desirable jobs on the railroad—such as supervisor, driver, and administrator—were held by the British. Despite comprising the majority of the workforce, Indians were excluded from these positions in favor of more menial tasks. The types of rail travel permitted to different groups also revealed the segregation in colonized India. The majority of Indian passengers were relegated to third-class travel, whereas Westerners enjoyed first-class conditions. Second class was where some mixture took place, as it was reserved for low-income Europeans and high-ranking Indians. Through the establishment of the railroad, the British embarked on a project of modernization, intending to alter the existing social structure through technological change. Though the railroad may have temporarily thwarted certain forms of social differentiation, it created new divisions, as race and class divisions replaced those of caste. However, the railway also proved vital to the Indian nationalist project. The extensive rail network stoked Indian nationalism by obliterating obstacles of distance and inspiring Indians to abandon regional particularism in favor of national unification. In addition, the discrimination practiced by colonial railway officials helped strengthen the resolve of Indian nationalists to bring an end to the injustices of colonial rule. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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While the intended aims of technology can be subverted or denied, the control of technology can also be used to political advantage. The use of technology to cultivate nationalist sentiment was often exploited by national rulers, who appropriated technology to promote their authority to an imagined public. In 1932, King George V asserted the legitimacy of the British empire through the first Christmas broadcast. Launched on radio, the holiday broadcast would become an annual event. The first such broadcast was transmitted to Britain, Canada, Australia, India, Kenya, and South Africa. In his speech, King George V explicitly recognized the unifying force of technology: “I speak now from my home and from my heart to you all; to men and women so cut off by the snows, the desert, or the sea, that only voices out of the air can reach them.” The broadcast solidified the notion of an imagined community, linking the British empire in a message of common interest, spoken by a shared head of state. The broadcast also served a symbolic function. E. J. Hobsbawm (1990) suggests that it helped constitute the royal family as a public icon of national identification, both domestically and abroad. It also reinvigorated the status of the British royal family, which had been experiencing decreased public support. By portraying the monarchy as a distinctive symbol of national identity, the holiday broadcast provided the British nation and empire with an emblem of nationhood around which they could coalesce. Technology can be used to galvanize national publics, and it can also be used to mold a public in the image desired by the nation-state. The mass media is a particularly effective tool in this regard; its capacity to reach large numbers of people within a given national territory makes it a popular means by which to spread nationalist ideals in hopes of creating a unified public. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Mexican government undertook a nationalist project through the airwaves by disseminating a national culture to the dispersed and culturally diverse Mexican population. In 1924, the Mexican Ministry of Public Education established radio station XFX (originally CZE). The station offered a variety of programming, but its most significant project was to build a nation based on the transmission of a national musical heritage. Officials were torn between a desire to celebrate indigenous Mexican culture and a desire to establish a more modern, bourgeois, European-style society. Joy Elizabeth Hayes (2000) describes how the tension between these contrary goals was reconciled by the practice of mapping traditional musical forms onto a distinctly European structure. For example, indigenous music was performed by orchestras rather than regional musicians, and the work of Mexican composers was presented alongside that of noted European composers, such as Beethoven or Mozart. These tactics allowed for the celebration of authentic music but assimilated it into a distinctly bourgeois form. Although XFX can be praised for integrating popular cultural forms—actively derided by the Mexican elite—into “high culture,” it is also clear that indigenous music was, for the most part, not accepted on its own terms. It was invested with a specifically European status, and this new hybrid musical form was transmitted to the masses via the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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airwaves in the hopes of shaping peoples’ perceptions of their national culture and heritage. The growing popularity of cinema in the early to mid-20th century made it another valuable medium through which to transmit nationalist ideals. Cinema has an advantage over radio in that it communicates through image and does so in an environment where people are directly aware of being part of a broader public. With cinema, the imagined community becomes tangible; the audience can recognize itself mirrored in the alternate reality of the screen. The use of technology to create a sense of community—defined in this case in racial terms—is illustrated by the Nazi regime’s use of mass media. Joseph Goebbels was appointed minister of public enlightenment and propaganda in 1933 and consequently wielded control over virtually all of Germany’s cultural production. He founded the Reich Chamber of Culture, whose seven divisions regulated cinema, literature, theater, music, fine arts, press, and radio. Such complete control allowed the state to disseminate political ideology through vehicles of mass entertainment. Some of the aims of this propaganda were to emphasize the necessity of war, to impress upon the public the existence of a German culture that needed to be protected, and to unite the German people in the task of protecting this culture. In essence, the Third Reich tried to unite Germans against those who were not welcome in Nazi Germany’s version of an imagined community. While most films produced under the Third Reich were not outright propaganda, most contained tenets of Nazi ideology. Die Degenhardts, produced in 1944 near the end of World War II, has been categorized as a “home front” film. Directed by Werner Klingler, the film espouses a nationalist message while trying to prepare the public for Germany’s looming defeat. The war is represented as vital for the continued existence of German culture. The film tells the story of an ordinary man, Karl Degenhardt, a retired Lübeck civil servant, whose task has been the maintenance of the city’s gardens and parks. Degenhardt spends his retirement enjoying traditional German music and strolling around Lübeck with his family, admiring German architecture and landscape. When the Allied forces begin a devastating bomb assault on the city, Degenhardt voluntarily returns to his post, stoically dedicating himself to the war effort and to his nation. Degenhardt’s children also join the cause to do their part for the “national family.” MaryElizabeth O’Brien (2004) has noted that Degenhardt’s actions affirm the existence of a national community, while providing assurance that this community will continue to exist. The overriding message of the film is that the individual has a responsibility to the nation. By depicting the everyday lives of a German family during the war and touching upon some of the harsh realities of the period, Die Degenhardts illustrated the collective suffering faced by the German people and demonstrated the need for unity and loyalty in the face of hardship. However, this unity was not inclusive—the type of German culture that Nazi-era films attempted to create depended on devastating forms of exclusion. Ultimately, such media N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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helped provide the ideological conditions in which the mass murder of Jews and other minorities could take place. The Symbolic Power of Spectacular Technologies In many instances, technology has functioned as a symbol of national identity. This is best exemplified by a nation’s symbols of pride and power, which commonly include skyscrapers, bridges, and other feats of engineering. The awe associated with new forms of technology at certain points in history has cemented its potential to serve as a key nationalist symbol. Noteworthy human-made achievements such as the Panama Canal, St. Petersburg’s Hermitage Winter Palace, the Eiffel Tower, and the Brooklyn Bridge capitalize on their considerable display value to impress upon the public the technological prowess of the nation. The power of the nation has also been reinforced by the technological embellishment of natural wonders. For example, the images of American presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Abraham Lincoln are carved into the southeast face of South Dakota’s Mount Rushmore, transforming it from a mountain into a national monument of impressive magnitude and scale. Electrical displays nightly illuminate Niagara Falls, often cited as one of the seven natural wonders of the world. These technological interventions highlight nature’s magnificence and demonstrate the capacity of humans to manipulate the natural world. In the interplay between humans and nature, technology establishes humans—usually represented as national subjects—as the privileged. The meanings conveyed by national symbols are sometimes contested. The visions of engineers and architects may conflict with those of the public who, as members of a nation, have a vested interest in the monuments chosen to represent them. Such was the case with the Eiffel Tower, an immediately recognizable landmark that has become synonymous with Paris and, by extension, France. Designed by Gustave Eiffel for the 1889 Exposition Universelle (which celebrated the centennial of the French Revolution), it was the tallest tower in the world at the time of its inauguration. The tower met with initial resistance from the French public, and influential citizens such as Guy de Maupassant, Emile Zola, and Charles Garnier circulated a petition protesting its construction, declaring it “useless and monstrous.” The Eiffel Tower was never intended to be a permanent fixture, and it was due to be torn down in 1909. However, its antenna proved useful for radiotelegraphic communication, and the tower was allowed to stand. During World War I, the Eiffel Tower was used to intercept enemy dispatches transmitted by wireless telegraph. The importance of the tower to the French war effort and its ubiquitous presence ingrained the tower in the public consciousness, securing its place on the Parisian landscape. The symbolism attached to technological achievements can shift over time, as the social or political program of a nation and its citizens may change. Hailed for its ornate architecture and impressive grandeur, the Moscow metro was built in the 1930s under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. The metro was conceived of as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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a state project that would bolster the notion of a socialist society and display the progressiveness of the socialist state. The ideology associated with the metro’s construction emphasized the importance of the citizen collective. The metro was promoted as a service for the proletariat, built by the people and for the people. It was not a project specific to Moscow. The construction of the metro required the resources of the entire Soviet Union, and this widespread financial, material, and human investment was rewarded by granting the public a sense of collective ownership. The complete inclusion of the Soviet public into the ideology of the metro symbolized its participation in the new socialist state and legitimated collective organization as the supreme social form. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, has gradually precipitated a change in how the Moscow metro is being conceptualized. Mikhail Ryklin (2003) notes that, since the fall of communism, the Moscow metro has been nationalized, or “Russified.” Formerly imagined as a Soviet-wide enterprise and the domain of the proletariat, the metro has been reimagined as a product of the Russian people. The role of the Soviet Union in its creation has been minimized, and the metro has been appropriated as a site of Russian history and an object of Russian pride.

Consequences Technologies of the past three centuries have allowed people to interact in new ways. They have abolished some social divisions while helping to generate others, they have been used by elites to shape public consciousness and to cement existing social hierarchies and systems of political domination, and they have been used to symbolize both national greatness and national shame. As a result, they have affected the ways in which people experience their nationality and their citizenship. Technology facilitates the restructuring of public consciousness, providing not just a way in which to imagine the nation but also the means to do so. The fluidity of technology permits the nation to be imagined, constructed, and experienced in numerous forms. As technology changes, so, too, does the character of nationalism. There is no reason why technology must always be wedded to nationalism. Technologies can also serve to undermine the primacy of the nation and to promote imagined communities on even larger scales. Between the 19th and the mid-20th centuries, the rapid proliferation of communication and broadcast technologies such as the telephone, telegraph, radio, and television aided communications among people living in different nations. By the time of World War II, audiences around the world were able to tune into European and American programming. The growing accessibility of broadcast technologies and the subsequent growth of the media industry increased the pace and scale of globalization by creating audiences that were not necessarily bounded by territory or restricted N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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by national borders. The permeability of borders was reinforced by the increased efficiency and relatively low cost of transport technologies such as trains and steamships, which also served to undermine the hegemony of the nation-state by facilitating travel, movement, and migration between countries. Arjun Appadurai (1996) notes that the nation seeks to monopolize loyalty and to legitimate only one identity. This is constraining in that it does not allow for the fluidity, complexity, or multiplicity of identity that becomes possible through increased international passages. The relationship between technology and nationalism unfolds in myriad ways. Technology is a force of unification and division. It may act as an agent or a tool of national change, and as a powerful symbol. At times, these relationships are enacted simultaneously. Over the past three centuries, technological change has played a critical role in the development of nations, facilitating their creation and the maintenance of their power. It has also helped to initiate forms of communication and contact that may ultimately lead to a more globalized understanding of the interconnections and entanglements among persons and nations. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. 1998. The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World. London/New York: Verso. Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Barker, Joshua. 2005. “Engineers and Political Dreams: Indonesia in the Satellite Age.” Current Anthropology 46: 703–727. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hayes, Joy Elizabeth. 2000. Radio Nation: Communication, Pop Culture and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920–1950. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Hobsbawm, E. J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1790. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth. 2004. Nazi Cinema as Enchantment: The Politics of Entertainment in the Third Reich. New York: Camden House. Ryklin, Mikhail. 2003. “‘The Best in the World’: The Discourse of the Moscow Metro in the 1930s.” In The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Socialist Space, edited by Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman, translated by Abigail Evans, 261–278. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

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Belgium Robert Kerr Chronology 1780 Joseph II becomes Holy Roman emperor. The stability and prosperity enjoyed in the Austrian Netherlands under the rule of Maria Theresa deteriorates as Joseph II institutes policies that are seen as oppressive and intrusive. 1787 Resentment toward Joseph II foments a seven-year revolt in the Austrian Netherlands led by two competing factions: traditionalists who want to retain powers and privileges enjoyed under Maria Theresa, and republicans who want to institute popular sovereignty in the region. 1789 Joseph II responds to the revolt by taking away the power of assembly in the Austrian Netherlands and permanently stationing troops in Brussels. Revolutionaries defeat Austrian troops and declare an independent Republic of the United States of Belgium. 1790 The Austrians retake Belgium and Joseph II dies. His brother Leopold II assumes the title of Holy Roman emperor. 1792 Leopold II launches an offensive against Brussels, and the republicans turn to France for military support. The French declare war on Austria and capture Brussels by year’s end. 1793 The Austrians regain control of Brussels. 1794 The French oust the Austrians from Belgium for good. 1795 The former Austrian Netherlands, along with the Bishopric of Liége, are officially annexed by France. 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte becomes emperor of France. Napoleon institutes policies to Frenchify the Southern Netherlands, effectively relegating the Dutch language dialects spoken in the northern region of Flanders and by the majority of people in Brussels to second-class status. This policy makes French the de facto language of the elite and Dutch the language of the working class and poor. 1814 Napoleon is defeated at the Battle of Leipzig, and Belgium is occupied by the British and the Prussians. After a brief period of 100 days, during which the French regained control of Belgium, Napoleon is defeated at Waterloo in June 1815. The Kingdom of the United Netherlands under William I of Orange is established. William I immediately establishes policies to make Dutch the de jure language of administration. 1830 After 15 years of rule by the Dutch, members of the Catholic clergy, the bourgeoisie, and the liberal, republican intelligentsia organize a revolt. Starting in Brussels and spreading to other Belgian towns, the revolutionaries inflict heavy casualties on the Dutch troops, and an independent Belgian state is declared. 1831 Belgium’s independence is recognized by all European powers but the Dutch, who don’t recognize the state until 1839. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is named King Leopold I of the Belgians on July 21. 1835 French is established as the language of higher education, administration, and jurisprudence. 1838 Hendrik Conscience publishes The Lion of Flanders, which is to become a major symbol of Flemish nationalism. 1848 The term “Wallonia” is used for the first time in print. Wallonia comes to be used to describe the French-speaking southern region of Belgium. Its use is largely in response to a growing recognition of Flanders as a distinct cultural-linguistic region.

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1856 An official committee is appointed to regulate the use of Dutch in Belgium’s public affairs. 1863 The oath of office for the Belgian Parliament is taken in Dutch for the first time. 1864 Fr. Guido Gezelle, father of the Flemish Nationalist Movement, releases the first volume of his weekly magazine Year 30. The magazine is used as a platform to promote Dutch as a language equal to French in Belgian affairs. He famously states, “Let him be Flemish whom God created Flemish.” 1873 A law stipulating that legal proceedings in Flemish areas are to be carried out in Dutch is enacted. 1878 A law decreeing that public notices are required to be translated into Dutch in Flemish areas is enacted. 1888 A speech is delivered in Parliament in Dutch for the first time.

Situating the Nation Belgium presents a fascinating case study of how national identity is a fluid and dynamic reality. As a country that encompasses two distinct cultural-linguistic regions—a Germanic, Dutch-speaking north and an Italic, Francophone south— many have said it is an experiment in government doomed to fail from the onset. For these people, to speak of Belgian national identity is a contradiction in terms. Yet to assume this attitude is to ignore the reality that a large-scale, collective sense of Belgian national consciousness fueled the push for the country’s independence from the Netherlands in 1830. There is no doubt, however, that Belgian national identity reached its apex in the years immediately preceding Belgium’s independence and weakened considerably over the course of the next 50 years. To understand the raison d’être, or essence of Belgian nationalism, and why Belgian unity wavered rather rapidly after independence, it is necessary to examine the historical context of the period leading up to, and immediately following, the creation of the independent kingdom of Belgium in 1830. From 1770 to the late 1880s, Belgian national identity evolved from its incipient state as a form of resistance against the imposition of exogenous imperialist rule (the Austro-Hungarian empire, France, and the Netherlands) to its climax with the successful revolt against William I of Orange in 1830. Almost immediately after its birth as a state, however, the nation-building process devolved into a project in mediation between the two major culture groups within the newly formed kingdom—the Dutch speakers in the northern region of Flanders, and the French speakers in Wallonia, located in the south of Belgium. In the 50 years after independence, the country’s capital city, Brussels, came to represent a microcosm of the country as French replaced Dutch as the preferred tongue and became the de facto language of court, commerce, and the privileged genteel life. Belgian national identity was born as a form of resistance against what were seen as restrictive policies instituted by the Austrian Emperor Joseph II. His mother, the Empress Maria Theresa, had warned him to take a more laissez faire approach to ruling the Belgians. Her hands-off approach in the region allowed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the Belgians to take great strides toward becoming the first industrialized economy in Europe, and a business-owning elite had proved their loyalty to the Holy Roman Empire. Belgian resistance against Joseph II took the form of an uneasy alliance between upper-class elites wanting to protect the rights and privileges they had come to know in the prosperous years of the early 18th century and a more existentially motivated group of republicans who wanted to open the door for popular sovereignty and a free market economy. The former group, led by a prominent lawyer named Henri Van der Noot called themselves the Vandernootists, and the latter group, the Vonkists, were named after another lawyer, Jean Francoise Vonk. Belgian identity represented a project-oriented movement that focused on achieving self-determination among a wide range of interest groups, each having its own motivation for wanting independence.

Instituting the Nation The push for Belgian independence originated with the clergy and an upper-class elite, which means that the nation-building process centered on Catholicism and rule by an elite oligarchy. Thus, Belgian identity formation came to be defined in fairly narrow terms; to be Belgian in the mid-19th century meant to be Catholic and French speaking. The only commonality that existed among Belgium’s cultural groups, the Flemings, Walloons, and a small German-speaking community in the region centered around the eastern town of Eupen, was religion. For this reason, the Catholic church came to play an influential role in the internal affairs of Belgium, and the clergy played an active role in defining national identity and promoting Belgian unity. In fact, it was the clergy who led the initial push for equal status among the Dutch and French languages, as it was the only influential group to represent the interests of the Dutch speakers in the Flemish lands. The project of ridding Belgium of foreign influence began in 1787. By 1789, in response to actions taken by the Vandernootists and the Vonkists, Joseph II successfully exiled the groups to the Netherlands and the Bishopric of Liége, respectively. While in exile, the traditionalist Vandernootists and the democratic-minded Vonkists formed an alliance and launched a successful offensive against the Austrians, establishing, for a brief period, the Republic of the United States of Belgium. The Vonkists quickly came to regret the partnership, however, as the Vandernootists promptly restored the institutions of privilege they had enjoyed in the Burgundian period. Bitter infighting between the two factions opened the door for the Austrians to regain control of Belgium a year later in 1790. By 1792, inspired by the revolutionary fervor of their southern neighbors, the Vonkists formed an alliance with France, who then declared war on Austria. In 1795, the Austrian Netherlands, along with the Bishopric of Liége, were officially annexed by France. The period of French rule set the stage for what would soon N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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become the dominant issue facing the Belgians: language use. Under Napoleon, a policy of Frenchification was instituted in the Southern Netherlands, and the Dutch language quickly lost favor among the educated and business-owning elite. Families that had traditionally spoken Dutch gave up their mother tongue in favor of the social standing that only the knowledge and use of French could bring under Bonaparte. This was true even in the Flemish cities of Antwerp, Bruges, and to a lesser degree, Ghent. This left a cultural and class division that would come to haunt Belgium and challenge Belgian national identity to this day. Napoleon’s war efforts had a profound impact on life in Belgium. As France found itself increasingly embroiled in military action, taxes were raised and less attention was paid to the needs of the Belgians; support for the French in Belgium quickly deteriorated. After Napoleon’s defeats at Leipzig and Waterloo, Belgium was annexed by the Netherlands. Under the rule of William I of Orange, it did not take long for the French-speaking Belgian elite to become disenchanted and disenfranchised as Dutch was made the official administrative language of the realm. Few educated people in Belgium could speak Dutch, so William appointed government officials from the Netherlands to take care of the day-to-day affairs of the Belgians. For the first time, Belgians were being ruled directly by foreigners who had little interest in preserving the preexisting social structure, and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Southern Netherlands was viewed by the Dutch as little more than a poorly advanced colony. Most of the appointed Dutch officials were Protestant, which immediately put them at odds with the influential Catholic church throughout Belgium, and none of them spoke French, thus isolating the Belgian elite and middle classes who suddenly found themselves powerless, and oftentimes unemployed. While one might speculate that the Dutch-speaking Flemings would have welcomed the elevated status of their language, the increasing role of Protestant Calvinism did not endear them to their Dutch rulers. Despite the differences between the French- and Dutch-speaking Belgians, they were united in their disdain for the rule of the House of Orange, albeit for different reasons. This unity for the sake of self-determination was thus based on the project of establishing independence, although the alliance quickly crumbled once this goal was achieved. Though William’s policies were hugely unpopular in the Southern Netherlands, his desire to promote industrialization and improve infrastructure paved the way for Belgian self-sufficiency. At this stage, the nascent Belgian nationbuilding project was focused on the potential for wealth that the oligarchs saw in freeing themselves from Dutch control. In August 1830 a coalition of Catholic religious leaders, business owners, and a republican intelligentsia defeated Dutch troops in a series of uprisings, beginning in Brussels and radiating throughout the country. As was the case 41 years earlier, the push for independence had more to do with freeing the Belgians from foreign rule than dreams of national destiny. Independence from the Netherlands meant different things for different factions. It is for this reason that almost immediately after independence and the installation of Leopold I as king of the Belgians that the notion of what it meant to be Belgian became contested. Because the Belgians did not have a royal lineage, a German prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gothe, was made king. Leopold was seen as a suitable symbol because he had fought against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814, then subsequently married the daughter of the French king, Louise of Orleans. Though Leopold’s mother tongue was German, French was instituted as the de jure language of governance, commerce, and jurisprudence under pressure from the Brussels Francophone elite. Also, Leopold’s favor among the English, Germans, and French was seen as advantageous for the new state.

Defining the Nation It was the educated elite among the clergy, the wealthy, and the intelligentsia that facilitated the successful push for independence from the Netherlands. Feeling that Belgians possessed the resources and skills to function independently of foreign rule, the revolutionaries sought to establish a country that would rival N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the other great powers of Europe. A key factor in the history of Belgian national identity is that it was not until Dutch rule that the Belgians felt completely subjugated by an imperial power. Before the Dutch, the Belgian oligarchs and business class was generally left to govern their own affairs. Even the issues that led to the disillusionment of French rule had more to do with the unmet needs and wants of the Belgian aristocracy than with strong nationalist fervor against an oppressor. The national idea of Belgium was thus born from the subjective argument of self-determination for the disenfranchised upper echelons of society who sought to assert their role as a legitimate European player. The Belgian elite embarked upon uniting under their ranks under the guise of national identity, but the nation-building project faced a serious hurdle. While the de facto (and after 1835, the de jure) language of the aristocracy and middle classes was French, the majority of people in the emerging country spoke various, disparate dialects of Dutch. To achieve any level of prominence or power in Belgian society, the ability to speak French was essential. After 1830, the focus of the new government shifted to the south toward France. This happened for two reasons. First, the Belgian oligarchs wanted to turn their attention back toward the French; they tended to see Flanders as nothing more than a buffer zone between Brussels and the Netherlands. Second, almost all of the new country’s economic

The Brussels landmark Palais de Justice, or Justitiepaleis, was built under King Leopold II between 1866 and 1883. It serves as a symbol of pride for French speakers and a symbol of oppression for the city’s Flemish inhabitants. (Bettmann/Corbis)

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resources were situated in the Sambre-Meuse Valley, in the heart of Francophone Wallonia. The Belgian Parliament had little reason to focus much attention on the largely agrarian and poor northern region of the country. This reality would come to challenge the notion of Belgian unity almost immediately after King Leopold I was coronated in 1831. The city of Brussels in the mid- to late 19th century exemplifies the Francophone desire to create a grand capital and the growing disillusionment of the Flemings toward the nation-building project they felt was increasingly ignoring them. Planners and builders set about the project of building a national capital that was to rival any of the great cities of Europe. Monumental architecture and grand street designs came to characterize the city as the infrastructure for the new kingdom was built outside the historical core of the city. The architectural style of post-1830 was heavily French in style and contrasted sharply with the Dutch style of the city’s core. The Palace of Justice, built between 1866 and 1883, is a good example of the grandeur of the royal architectural style. Brussels’s slowly shrinking Flemish population saw, and to a large extent still sees, this building as a symbol of the triumph of the Francophile elite in the city as well as in the country as a whole. In fact, between the years 1830 and 1860, the very symbols of Belgian national pride were being challenged with a counternarrative created by the Flemings, who increasingly defined themselves as an oppressed nation.

Narrating the Nation The Belgian fight for independence began in earnest August 25, 1830, at the National Theater in Brussels. The theater is thus an important site of memory in the Belgian national narrative. Inspired by a performance of Daniel Auber’s opera La Muette de Portici, which tells the story of an Italian uprising against the Spanish in Naples in the 1600s, crowds poured out of the theater and onto the streets, where they promptly stormed city hall and other buildings that symbolized the Dutch monarchy. In particular, it was a performance of the romantically nationalistic “Amour Sacre de la Patrie” (Sacred Love of the Fatherland), performed by Adolphe Nourrit and Auber himself, that is said to have sent throngs of riotous youth into the streets. This is a moment that plays a central role in the Belgian national consciousness. Belgium is unique in that the counternarrative of Belgian identity is stronger than the Belgian national narrative itself. Immediately after independence, the issue of language was thrust to the forefront of Belgium’s challenges as a country. In 1835, by order of a royal decree, French became the official language of higher education and government. The Belgian government saw this as a logical means of building unity in the country without having to forfeit their powers and privileges. The Flemings saw things differently. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Flemish writers such as Jans Frans Willems, Hendrik Conscience, and Fr. Guido Gezelle set out to elevate the status of Dutch within the kingdom. Although modern interpretations of substate Flemish nationalism identify these early champions of the Dutch language as symbols of the Flemish independence movement, the reality is that they were ardent Belgian nationalists. Conscience’s masterpiece, The Lion of Flanders, and Gezelle’s weekly journal, Year 30, were written to instill pride among Dutch speakers for their language and culture and to pressure the government to give Dutch equal status in Belgium’s internal affairs. Conscience played an active role in the 1830 revolts and envisioned Belgian independence as a way to restore the former glory of medieval Flanders under the support of the king. In short, these Flemish writers sought to enhance Flemish pride through representation in a legitimate kingdom, and when these expectations were not met, the Dutch speakers of Flanders became disenchanted with the Belgian project. The symbols of Belgium are unique in that they represent the ambiguity of Belgian nationalism itself. The national anthem, “La Brabanconne,” has no official lyrics. The author of the stanzas that are most often put to the music was an actor in the National Theater who took part in the 1830 revolution against the Netherlands. There are translations in Dutch and French, and any words critical of the Dutch were removed in the 1840s to appease Flemish nationalists. The flag, adopted in 1830, incorporates the colors of the incorporated territories of Flemish and Walloon Brabant: red, yellow, and black. At independence, the stripes were horizontal with red on top, a yellow center, and a black stripe on the bottom. In 1831 the government decreed that the stripes are to be displayed vertically, with black closest to the flagpole, yellow in the middle, and red at the other end. The switch made the flag appear closer in design to the French tricolor as opposed to the horizontally oriented Dutch flag.

Hendrik Conscience and The Lion of Flanders In 1838 Conscience wrote The Lion of Flanders. The story tells of the 1302 Battle of the Golden Spurs and the events leading up to it. In the battle, the townspeople of Groeninge are said to have driven out the more powerful (and corrupt) army of French knights. After three hours of bloody battle, the French soldiers were reported to have been so overwhelmed with the fight put up by the peasants that they hastily retreated. The next day, Flemish foot soldiers collected more than 500 pairs of golden spurs, thus giving the battle its modern name. Conscience’s version of the tale paints the soldiers of Groeninge, under the leadership of the legendary figure Robert of Bethune, as displaying the perfect virtues of selflessness, loyalty, bravery, and love for the fatherland—traits that Conscience felt every Fleming should possess in the context of the new nation of Belgium. Conscience is known as one of the founders of the Flemish Movement, and his efforts to elevate the status of Dutch within Belgium paved the way for Flemish nationalists to make the case for their own autonomy in the 20th century.

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Belgian national effort, mobilized primarily during the 15 years of Dutch rule under William I of Orange, reached its climax with the 1830 revolution. Once independence was achieved, the nation-building project of Belgian national identity met challenges from the country’s Dutch speakers in the Flemish lands. By the end of the 1830s, Flemish intellectuals and clergy members began to push for equal status of Dutch in national affairs. By 1856, these groups had successfully agitated the young monarchy and government to appoint a committee to incorporate Dutch into the country’s legal affairs, and by 1873, a law stipulating that Dutch was to be used in all legal proceedings in Flemish areas was enacted. In 1888 a speech was made to Parliament in Dutch for the first time, but despite these landmarks, Flemings became less and less supportive of the nation-building project of Belgium. Contrary to modern interpretations, the Flemish nationalists of the mid- to late 19th century were not agitating for an independent Flemish nation. Instead, they were challenging the notion that Belgian was synonymous with French language and culture. In the late 1880s, it seemed as though Flemings were content to build a national existence that they envisioned would safeguard the culture and traditions of all the citizens of Belgium. The period after the 1880s would prove otherwise, and further discontent among the Flemings with regard to their status within the kingdom would have serious consequences for Belgian unity in the 20th century. Selected Bibliography Cook, Barnard A. 2004. Belgium: A History. New York: Peter Lang Pub., Inc. de Meeus, Adrien. 1962. History of the Belgians. Translated by G. Gordon. New York: Praeger. Goris, Jan Albert. 1945. Belgium. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hermans, Theo, Louis Vos, and Lode Wils, eds. 1992. The Flemish Movement: A Documentary History, 1780–1990. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press. Kossmann, E. H. 1978. The Low Countries, 1780–1940. New York: Oxford University Press. Mokyr, Joel. 1976. Industrialization in the Low Countries, 1795–1850. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Murphy, Alexander B. 1988. The Regional Dynamics of Language Differentiation in Belgium. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Whitlock, Brand. 1919. Belgium: A Personal Narrative. New York: D. Appleton and Co. Witte, Els, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen. 2001. Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards. Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press.

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Denmark Marianne Rostgaard Chronology 1848–1851 The First Schleswigian War (a civil war) over the national allegiance of the dukedoms Holstein and Schleswig. 1849 Enactment of the first constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark, granting suffrage to all male inhabitants who live on their own property. 1864 The Second Schleswigian War, leading to the secession of the dukedoms to Prussia and Austria. 1866 Revision of the constitution, restricting eligibility for election to the upper house to a privileged class consisting mainly of landowners, and sparking a political struggle over the reinstatement of the 1849 constitution and parliamentary rule. 1901 End of the constitutional struggle, the terms of which are acknowledged in the constitution of 1915, granting universal suffrage. 1920 Referendum in Schleswig over national allegiance (to Denmark or Germany). 1940–1945 Denmark is occupied by the Third Reich. 1955 Signing of the Bonn-Copenhagen declarations on the rights of national minorities north and south of the Danish-German border.

Situating the Nation “Denmark” referred to two different geographical and juridical entities in the 1700s and 1800s. It referred first and foremost to the Kingdom of Denmark but also to the United Monarchy of Denmark. The latter was, until 1864, a princely state, or something of a miniature Habsburg empire. It consisted originally of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, and the two dukedoms, Schleswig and Holstein. Norway was ceded to Sweden in 1814 after the Napoleonic Wars, and in return Denmark received another German dukedom, Lauenburg. All three dukedoms were lost in the disastrous war of 1864, which also led to the dissolution of the United Monarchy. The long struggle over the national identity and territorial allegiance of the two dukedoms Schleswig and Holstein had a profound influence on the formation of Danish national identity. One way to differentiate Danishness from Germanness was to stress identification with Scandinavian peoples and countries. A Scandinavian identity reinforced and upheld the Danish nation in conflicts with the German states. Some voices in Danish public debate even called for a united Scandinavia in the crisis years around 1864. A Scandinavian currency union did, in fact, exist from 1875 to 1914. NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In the 1800s, Denmark was still basically an agricultural country. Exports of agricultural products grew significantly in the last decades of the 1800s, leading to growth in industry as well. Economic growth from the 1870s onward was based on new agricultural products and the export of butter and bacon to the British market, as well as the export of meat to the steadily growing market of a rapidly industrializing Germany. The long wave of growth peaked with the boom years of 1890–1914, during which industrial growth increased urbanization greatly. By 1900 the urban working class was already well organized and represented in Parliament. Nationalist movements working for political nationalism did not emerge until the 1840s and were led by the young members of the bourgeoisie, mainly civil servants, and a tiny intelligentsia in Copenhagen (a Bildungsbürgertum). A parallel movement in Kiel (in Holstein) worked for Schleswig-Holsteinianism, arguing for an independent state consisting of the dukedoms. In Denmark, the bourgeois nationalism of the 1840s was seen as a “for King and Country” nationalism, differentiating it from the type of nationalism that emerged after the 1870s. This “new” nationalism promoted peasants as the true bearers of the nation, perhaps justified by the vital role that agriculture continued to play in the national economy. The industrial workers and their party, the Social Democrats, entered national politics during the years between the two world wars. The crisis years in the early 1930s gave rise to a collaborative democracy, with the Social Democrats as one of the chief architects. A national welfare strategy was adopted by this party in 1935 under the slogan, “Danmark for folket” (Denmark for the people). Liberal movements in opposition to absolutist rule and with active campaigning for a reform of government existed in Kiel and Copenhagen (the two university cities in the United Monarchy) as early as the 1830s. These liberal movements were not nationalist from the outset, in the sense that they were focused upon issues such as a national language, but they became progressively more so. The liberals in Schleswig-Holstein were looking to Frankfurt, where liberals working for democratic reforms had gathered in February 1848 to write a constitution for the German Confederation. The liberals in Copenhagen took over power in March 1848. The irony was that the liberals in both the Kingdom of Denmark and the dukedoms might have agreed on a new joint, liberal constitution through the 1840s, and maybe even later. The question of national belonging, however, became increasingly more important in the process of transformation from subjects to citizens in both the kingdom and the dukedoms. The First Schleswigian War broke out in 1848 and lasted until 1851. The government in Copenhagen fought to keep the United Monarchy together, or at least to keep Schleswig within the United Monarchy. The German-speaking people in the dukedoms fought to form a state of their own, consisting of the two dukedoms as part of the German Confederation. The German Confederation, prominent

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among them Prussia, decided to send troops to help, which led to an intervention by the great powers of Europe—foremost, Britain and Russia. It had never been in the interest of these powers that Prussia rule the area; they preferred that Holstein and Kiel be ruled by the much weaker Danish king. The great powers of Europe became instrumental in the reinstatement of the United Monarchy of Denmark. In the peace treaty of 1851, the Danish government agreed never to incorporate the dukedoms in the Kingdom of Denmark and to consider the dukedoms as an entity. The peace treaty, however, did not solve the original problems of national affiliation and constitutional reform. Endless negotiations about the future fate of the dukedoms, interfered with by the great powers of Europe, led to the Second Schleswigian War of 1864. Much to the surprise of the Danish public, the war ended in a military disaster. In the collective memory of the Danes, the First Schleswigian War of 1848 to 1851 had been won by the bravery of Danish soldiers, not by diplomacy, and the public expected bravery to win the next war as well. Informed people in government knew the risk they ran. By 1864 Prussia had become much more powerful, and Bismarck had embarked upon his project of uniting Germany. The tiny Kingdom of Denmark was no match for the united Prussian and Austrian armies. However, national sentiments had grown in strength, and the majority of the government believed that the only way to solve the national question in the dukedoms once and for all was on the battlefield. They wanted to incorporate Schleswig into the Kingdom of Denmark (Holstein could do whatever it wanted) and cut the Gordian knot by breaking the old bonds between the two dukedoms. The loss in 1864, however, led to the incorporation of the dukedoms into the German empire (1871). The peace settlement, orchestrated by the great powers of Europe, agreed (in clause five) that a referendum to settle the national allegiance of Schleswig could be held sometime in the future. This so-called promissory clause came into use at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, and a referendum was held in Schleswig in 1920. After 1920, Schleswig was divided into two, the northern part integrated into the Kingdom of Denmark, the southern part into Germany, leaving national minorities living on both sides of the border.

Instituting the Nation After the loss of the dukedoms, the Kingdom of Denmark became more or less a one-nation state. Any remaining struggles were internal struggles among the Danes about who represented the nation. The revised constitution of 1866 restricted eligibility for election to the upper house (Landstinget) to a wealthy class of landowners, thus leading to the election of governments whose power base stemmed from the landed aristocracy. With the political right (Hoejre) representN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783–1872) Poet, minister, teacher, philologist, historian, and politician, Grundtvig was the son of a minister and studied theology at Copenhagen University. He became minister in the Danish State Church in 1811. As a young minister and publicist, he experienced several conflicts with the authorities and was subjected to lifelong censorship in 1826 by the then still absolutist Danish state. He was at the same time deprived of his office as minister. In the 1830s he became one of the leading spokesmen for the growing nonconformist movement that formed part of the opposition to king and government in the 1830s and 1840s. He was elected as one of the members of the constituent assembly in 1848, and as a member of Parliament, he voted against the revision of the constitution in 1866. Civic rights and the empowerment of the people, balanced by belonging to a national and Christian community, were at the center of Grundtvig’s political thinking. He was consistently skeptical about state involvement in society. He even argued against compulsory military service, written into the 1849 constitution. His argument was that Denmark would only be worth defending if people voluntarily rose to do so, not forced to do so by the state.

ing the landed aristocracy and the left (Venstre), the peasantry, the constitutional contest was cast as a class struggle between a wealthy elite and “the people,” wherein both parties claimed to speak for the nation. The right wing, in fact, called themselves “the national landowners,” which demonstrated the degree to which Danish politics became permeated by a nationalist discourse during the second half of the 1800s. Romanticized ideas about “the people” as a polity had gained currency among the educated elite prior to 1864, but it was not until after that point that the people —the peasantry—began to organize to represent themselves. The cooperative movement, including dairy cooperatives, folk high schools, nonconformist religious congregations, and numerous other forms of cooperation, constituted a new wave of civic involvement in Danish society. The ideologically most important part of the movement, the state-independent folk high schools, mushroomed after 1864. The founding father of the folk high schools, N. F. S. Grundtvig, was very influential in the development of Danish national identity after 1864. Grundtvig shared Herder’s idea that each nation had a specific character of its own. To be or become a cultural nation, he believed, this specific character should be developed or improved upon, and this was a central task of the folk high schools. The historical task Grundtvig saw before him was to create a new kind of society among freeborn and equal citizens bound together by the nation, which was thus to be understood as a cultural brotherhood. The core value in Danishness of equality, coupled with the idea of a freeborn people, had great appeal for the selfemployed peasantry, making Grundtvig’s teachings especially popular among this group. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation National identity, or what constituted Danishness, was first and foremost culturally defined. Identity centered on a common language and a common history. The rights of the pro-Danish minority in Schleswig were, after 1864, also argued in cultural terms. The issue of a just border was still sometimes argued in juridical terms, referring to coronation charters dating back to the Middle Ages and later peace treaties, which became mixed up with historical arguments about who originally had inhabited Schleswig. The national-conservative argument for Danevirke (Ejdergraensen in German) being the “true” border between Germany and Denmark was basically an historical argument, claiming that this was the “original” southern borderline of the Kingdom of Denmark. This argument carried the day in the 1863 and 1864 controversies, but in 1920 the nationalconservative party, still arguing for Danevirke as the true southern borderline, had clearly become a minority. The work of historian A. D. Joergensen was crucial in the formation of Danish national identity during the late 1800s. He dwelled just as much as any national-conservative historian on the heroic fights of kings back in the early Middle Ages against the evil Germans, but he never argued Danishness on the grounds of old territorial rights of the crown or other juridicalhistorical arguments. Joergensen argued instead for a new border that followed the linguistic borderline. The emphasis put on preservation of the Danish language and culture by the pro-Danish movement in Schleswig after 1864 prepared the ground for the argument of self-determination of national allegiance, which became instituted with the referendum in Schleswig in 1920. Since 1920, a German minority has lived in the southern border region, just as a Danish minority is still found in northern Germany. In the interwar years, people from the German minority demanded a revision of the 1920 borderline, which caused some worry for Danish governments given what was happening at the same time in Sudetenland and on Germany’s eastern border. It was thus not until after World War II that the national question about the border region was finally settled by the Copenhagen-Bonn declarations of 1955, granting the minorities the right to exist as cultural entities.

Narrating the Nation The most important events in the collective memory of the Danish nation were without doubt the First and Second Schleswigian wars. Their significance can be seen in the way Danevirke was symbolized. Danevirke (pronounced Danewerk) is an old fortification, located a few kilometers south of the town of Schleswig (now in Germany). The first fortifications were erected from AD 600 to 800, and over the next 500 years, Danish kings extended these fortifications, which played a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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role in the numerous border area conflicts among Danes, Saxons, and Slavs. In the 1200s and up to the beginning of the 1800s, the old fortifications played no role in border conflicts. After the 1200s, they were situated in what had become Schleswig, after a fiefdom under the Danish king and, from the time of King Christian the First (1460), a dukedom that belonged to the crown of Denmark. Danevirke was rediscovered in the 1830s and 1840s and became for Danish nationalists a cherished symbol of determined defense against the eternal enemy, the Germans. The kings and queens of old who had defended the southern border by building these fortifications also became very popular. Indeed, they were still depicted in historical paintings and in the history books of schoolchildren until the 1960s. Some of the popular stories, especially those of the good queen Thyra, who supposedly died in the 950s, are today known to be nothing more than myth. One such story, widely published in school history books from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, reports Thyra as having ordered the fortifications of Danevirke built to rescue the Danish people from becoming subjects of the German emperor. Myth or not, Thyra and other medieval kings and queens played a vital role as symbols of national resolve, and the parallel between resisting a German emperor in the 950s and in the 1890s was easy to draw. Danevirke played a minor role in the struggles of 1848–1851. In the Second Schleswigian War, the old fortifications were abandoned without a fight; the commanding general wisely judged them to be indefensible in February 1864, seeing that the parts of the fortification system formed by the estuary Silen and the Rivers Reide and Treene were frozen solid, making it easy to circumvent the old fortifications. The commanding general was, however, dismissed from his post for his unpopular decision. After the military disaster in 1864, Danevirke was no longer seen as a symbol of military resolve and strength but, rather, one of mental strength and resolve. For example, in 1875 Christian Berg, leader of the left wing (Venstre) in the Danish Parliament, invoked Danevirke in a debate about grants for military purposes. What was needed, according to Berg, was a strengthening of “Danevirke in our hearts,” or the mental Danevirke. To defend Denmark militarily had become impossible. The German empire was simply too big and powerful for tiny Denmark. The only way forward was thus “to build a Danevirke in the heart of every Dane,” including the pro-Danes in the lost province of Schleswig. Other figures popular to evoke during the nationalist movement of the 1800s, in addition to Queen Thyra, were Valdemar the Great and Niels Ebbesen. In the early 1300s, noblemen from Holstein had acquired control of large areas of Jutland in return for loans to the financially troubled crown of Denmark. Niels Ebbesen killed the leader of these Holstein noblemen, paving the way for King Valdemar Atterdag to again unify the kingdom and consolidate the king’s rule. Not much is known about the historic figure of Niels Ebbesen, but the story is the stuff myths are made of: the fatherland in dire crisis, a villain (a count from Holstein), and a hero who murders a tyrant and thus saves king and fatherland. Niels N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Ebbesen is normally depicted as a simple man (although he was actually a nobleman), thus symbolizing that it was the people—not the king or state power—that rescued Denmark in the difficult times of the early 1300s. The didactic parallel is once more obvious. The historic events (some of them mere historical myths) commemorated are those symbolic of the “eternal” national struggles on the southern border and the crucial role of the people. As an act of solidarity with the pro-Danish movement in Schleswig, brewer J. C. Jacobsen (the founder of Carlsberg breweries) commissioned historian A. D. Joergensen to write a popular history book. Joergensen’s Forty Tales about the History of the Fatherland gained wide circulation near the end of the 1800s, both in Schleswig and in the kingdom. Historic paintings also became a popular genre for nationalism in the second half of the 1800s. Some of the most well known (later appearing in both magazines and history books) were commissioned for display at the National Historic Museum at Frederiksborg, again by J. C. Jacobsen. He aimed to tell the history of Denmark through paintings, as a kind of picture book for the people. The most cherished symbols of Danishness include, besides historic figures, the language and the land. Here we are speaking not so much of the territory as we are of the landscape. The gentle hills, the green fields, and the open beach woods all contribute to making Danes a friendly, peace-loving people. This opinion fitted in nicely with the kind of Danishness propagated after 1864. The landscape was a cultural one created by the peasants, and its natural aspects were peaceful, with no wild mountains or rivers. Even the language was thought to be soft, a “language of the heart,” as opposed to German, depicted as a hard language (in caricature, mainly suited for military commands). The Danishness to be invoked, especially after 1864, was a country of and for the people. Songs, among them numerous pieces cherishing the landscape throughout the changing seasons and songs commemorating popular incidents in the history of Denmark, were one of the most popular ways to express national identity. They were sung at popular gatherings and in schools. Morgensang (to sing in the morning, at the beginning of the school day) was compulsory, and the songs sung were learned by heart as part of the school curriculum. For generations, until the 1960s, morgensang was practiced to create and express a common identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Ethnically speaking, the Danish nation-state after 1864 consisted almost exclusively of Danes. The 1849 constitution defined a Dane as a person born of at least one Danish parent; it was therefore not enough to have been born within the territory of Denmark. The latter stipulation would have been troublesome in the 1800s, a period in which the territorial definition of “Denmark” became the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Danish children participate in morgensang (to sing in the morning, at the beginning of the school day). The pupils are obviously very aware of the camera and some have nearly almost stopped singing. (Odense City Archives/Fyens Stiftstidende)

object of two wars. A law concerning citizenship (Indfoedsretsloven) had, in fact, been in existence since 1776, granting citizenship to all people born in the king’s countries, that is, all people born within the United Monarchy. These people and their children were legally the Danes in 1849. The constitution also gave the Danish Parliament the right to naturalize foreigners, the logic being that the Parliament represents the people, and only the people can grant citizenship to foreigners. Since 1849, it has thus been possible for foreigners to apply for Danish citizenship and for Parliament once a year to pass a law naturalizing them as Danish citizens. Immigration rules were very liberal until 1920. The state did not control immigration, and therefore we have no statistics. However, we do know that most immigrants before 1920 came from Sweden and from what are today the countries of Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania (among them relatively many Jews). We also know that their numbers were relatively small and that nearly all of them became Danish citizens. There were two criteria for granting citizenship: people had to stay out of the criminal records and be able to provide for themselves. Immigration and immigrants played next to no role in symbolizing the obligatory “other” in Danish identity formation, in contrast to the huge role played by the nationality question in Schleswig. The pro-Danes in Schleswig had from the outset mainly consisted of the peasantry, so Grundtvigianism fit the pro-Danish movement in Schleswig like a hand N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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H. P. Hansen H. P. Hansen represents the quintessence of the pro-Danish minority in Schleswig. The son of a small farmer, he expected to become a small farmer, too. He attended Askov Folk High School (one of the “ivy league” folk high schools) and was inspired to start a career as a journalist, later becoming editor of the influential newspaper, Hejmdal. He organized and represented the pro-Danish minority in the German Parliament in the 1890s, firmly defended the principle of national self-determination, and became a minister in the Danish government in 1920 with responsibility for deliberations concerning the 1920 referendum in Schleswig.

in a glove. As a national minority, however, the pro-Danes in Schleswig were much more directly confronted with the nationality question in their everyday lives and their political struggles. They wisely chose the Imperial German state as their opponent, not their German neighbors, so their struggle was first and foremost a political one. Sprogforeningen (the organization for the preservation of the Danish language) was an important organization in this context, just as newspapers for the Danish minority, such as Flensborg Avis and Hejmdal, and children’s magazines in Danish were instrumental in preserving Danish identity and cohesion. Another important movement in Schleswig was to organize a political party to speak for the Danish cause in the German Parliament and in local government. Whether or not the Danes should recognize the German state in this way was heatedly debated among the pro-Danish minority. Most, however, wanted to use Parliament as a platform to criticize Imperial Germany and its policy toward the Danish minority. This and other wise decisions, combined with their position as the weaker minority, allowed the pro-Danish group to adopt a generally constructive approach in their nationalist struggle. As an example, Sprogforeningen founded schools where children could be taught in Danish. Schleswig had long been a mixed area linguistically, but with its incorporation into Imperial Germany, it was no longer possible to learn Danish in the public school system. The songs sung at the folk high schools and talks or addresses such as those delivered at the folk high schools were also very popular when people met in the many proDanish associations. Apart from their ideological mobilization, the Danish minority also organized to ensure that farms and farmland in their communities remained in Danish hands. Again, they were opposing an Imperial Germany that, from the 1890s until 1914, subsidized the relocation of farmers from other parts of Germany to Schleswig to “Germanize” this outpost, exactly the same policy as pursued in Germany’s eastern border regions. The pro-Danes in Schleswig, the many Grundtvigian-inspired organizations, and Venstre formed a very strong alliance, in which a new type of national identity focusing on the people became the cement, explaining why that particular definition of the nation became so deeply embedded in Danish society. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Selected Bibliography Adriansen, Inge. 2003. Nationale symboler i det danske Rige, 1830–2000 [National Symbols in the Danish Realm, 1830–2000]. Vols. 1–2. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag. (Contains a 37-page English summary.) Bjørn, Claus. 1994. “A Poor Little Land? The Denmark of the Golden Age.” In The Golden Age in Denmark: Art and Culture, 1800–1850, edited by Bente Scavenius, 14–21. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Bjørn, Claus. 1995. Co-operation in Denmark. Copenhagen: Danske Andelsselskaber. Borish, Steven M. 1991. The Land of the Living: The Danish Folk High Schools and Denmark’s Non-Violent Path to Modernization. Nevada City, CA: Blue Dolphin. Christiansen, Niels Finn. 2001. “The Dynamics of Social Solidarity: The Danish Welfare State, 1900–2000.” Scandinavian Journal of History [Norway] 26, no. 3: 177–196. Jespersen, Knud J. V. 2004. A History of Denmark. Translated by Ivan Hill. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Østergaard, Uffe. 1996. “Peasants and Danes: The Danish National Identity and Political Culture.” In Becoming National: A Reader, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 179– 201. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Østergaard, Uffe. 1997. The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity: From Composite States to NationStates. Working paper 1997–14, DUPI (Danish Foreign Policy Institute). Rerup, Lorenz. 1993. “Grundtvig and 19th Century Nationalism.” Grundtvig studier [Grundtvig Studies]: 16–26. Rostgaard, Marianne. 2001. “Industrial Management and the Democratisation of Danish Society, 1880–1920.” In The Democratic Challenge to Capitalism. Management and Democracy in the Nordic Countries, edited by Haldor Byrkjeflot et al., 121–150. Bergen: Fakbokforlaget.

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England Ben Wellings Chronology 1775 Outbreak of the American War of Independence leads to the loss of the Thirteen Colonies in 1783. 1780 The “Gordon Riots”: 700 people die during 10 days of anti-Catholic rioting. 1788 Arrival of the “First Fleet” of convicts in New South Wales (Australia). 1789 Outbreak of the French Revolution. 1793 Declaration of war against revolutionary France. 1796 Abortive French invasion of Ireland. 1798 The United Irish rebellion for Irish independence is crushed at the Battle of Vinegar Hill. 1801 The Act of Union joins Ireland to Great Britain and creates the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 1805 Victory at Trafalgar establishes British command of the seas. 1807 Parliament outlaws the trade in slaves. 1814 The Cape Colony (South Africa) passes from Dutch into British control. 1815 Victory at Waterloo ends the Napoleonic Wars; postwar economic recession begins. 1819 Protestors calling for political reform are attacked by cavalry at the so-called Peterloo Massacre. 1820 The first steam railway opens between Stockton and Darlington. 1829 The Catholic Emancipation (Relief) Act allows Catholics to own property and serve in public office. 1832 The Great Reform Act widens the franchise and arguably averts revolution. 1833 Slavery is abolished within the British empire. 1834 The Tolpuddle Martyrs are convicted of forming a trade union and transported to Australia. 1837 German-born Victoria Sachen Coburg von Gotha crowned Queen Victoria of Great Britain and Ireland. 1839 Violent Chartist uprisings in England and Wales. 1839–1842 The Opium War against the Qing Dynasty forces China to trade with Britain. 1840 The Treaty of Waitangi shares Maori sovereignty over New Zealand/Aotearoa with the British government. 1843 SS Great Britain, the first oceangoing, screw-driven steamship, is launched. 1845 The Repeal of the Corn Laws, representing a great victory for the proponents of free trade. 1846–1848 Famine in Ireland exacerbated by ascendant free-trade ideology. 1848 Peaceful Chartist demonstration at Kennington, London. 1851 The Great Exhibition in the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park, London, showcases Britain’s industrial strength; census shows greater number of urban than rural dwellers in Great Britain for the first time. 1855 Florence Nightingale arrives in Constantinople to tend to British soldiers wounded during the Crimean War, 1853–1856.

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Indian, or Sepoy, Mutiny shakes East India Company rule; ultimate control of British India passes to Westminster. Albert, Queen Victoria’s husband, dies. Victoria enters into mourning for almost 10 years. Sterling is tied to the value of gold, producing currency stability. The Second Reform Act widens the franchise even further to male property owners. Fenian (Irish nationalists) attacks on London and Canada. Canada becomes a selfgoverning confederal Dominion of the British empire. The Education Act (England and Wales) establishes compulsory elementary education for all children in England and Wales. The first international football (soccer) match played between England and Scotland ends in a nil-nil draw. The Delhi Durbar celebrates Victoria’s elevation to empress of India, while famine kills an estimated 7 million Indians in the same year. The Second Afghan War, caused by Anglo-Russian tensions, heightens “jingoistic” atmosphere in England. British defeat in the (First) Boer War in South Africa stems British expansion in southern Africa for 15 years. The Defeat of Arabi Pasha’s revolt establishes effective British control over Egypt and the Suez Canal. The Third Reform Act widens the franchise further, but still only 20 percent of adults can participate in elections. The death of General Sir Charles Gordon in Khartoum checks British expansion along the Nile and creates an imperial martyr. The defeat of (First) Irish Home Rule Bill is a setback in attempting to solve the “Irish Question.” Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee is a pageant of British, imperial splendor.

Situating the Nation Between the 1770s and 1880s, British and English identity became merged, at least for the English. This merged identity was a product of one of the functions of nationalism and national identity, which is to legitimize the existence of the state in the name of the nation. However, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was a state that contained various different nationalities united by a common Crown and Parliament. Furthermore, this particular Crown and Parliament also ruled over a vast empire, comprised of various different nationalities and peoples. Thus, anyone attempting to articulate English national identity during the 19th century could not avoid the fact that England had expanded; the state that governed the English people was British and imperial, and many English people had emigrated overseas. English national identity was therefore increasingly bound up with being British and being the core nationality at the center of the largest global empire the world had yet seen. The period between the 1770s and 1880s was one of the most remarkable in human history and marked perhaps the most profound and rapid social transformation ever known. English people found themselves at the very forefront of this N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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transformation, namely, the Industrial Revolution. But if a link between nationalism and industrialization does exist, then its effect was not to produce an English nationalism, but to further merge English, British, and imperial identities. The Industrial Revolution was a truly British—as opposed to an English—phenomenon. Although the city of Manchester in northwest England became emblematic of the process of rapid industrialization, equally important centers of industry were located in central Scotland, southern Wales, and northern Ireland. In turn, Britain was the center of a global trade and manufacturing network that linked it both to the formal empire (such as India) and to areas under the sway of its economic power (such as the southern states of the United States). All of the above elements combined to generate a sense of national belonging at the very moment of the global transition to modernity. This transition did not lead to the creation of an English state, however. What it did help create was a sense of English nationality that became intimately bound up with notions of Britain and empire. The politics of nationalism in England were therefore not concerned with creating a new nation-state, as was the case in Germany and Italy, but were instead focused on reforming the existing one. Events such as the American and French Revolutions gave a great boost to supporters of “democracy” in England and Britain. National politics were profoundly affected by the increase in the voting public between 1832 and 1884 when the franchise was widened on three occasions: in 1832 (the Great Reform Act), in 1867 (the Second Reform Act), and in 1884 (the Third Reform Act), with male property holders being the main beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the disenfranchised found alternative outlets for their political opinions on a variety of issues. Church politics were particularly important, and the nonconformist and evangelical churches were prominent in antislavery campaigns before the 1830s. The 1830s also saw the creation of the first working-class movement in the world, named the Chartists (who took their name from the Magna Carta, which curbed royal power in the 13th century). During this period, English people called on the authorities to grant them their rights as “freeborn Englishmen” and to restore their “ancient liberties,” which they believed had existed in a bygone era.

Instituting the Nation The English state, the ultimate guarantor of these “ancient liberties,” had been expanding and contracting for almost a millennia by the time the Act of Union created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801. Danes, Normans, Welsh, French, Cornish, Scots, and American colonists had all been controlled or under the control of the English or British state at some point prior to the 19th century, hence the English, who were apt to venerate their state as the most perfect (or perfectible) form of government yet devised, had to somehow include other nationalities into their own national story. Often this was achieved by N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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simply ignoring them and making the terms “England” and “Britain” synonymous. But despite this tendency, Britishness did have to be articulated in different forms to Englishness, even though English narratives of state formation tended to dominate. Englishness also contained a cultural dimension, often linked to the landscape, which Britishness only started to acquire after the 19th century. For many English people, however, it was the state that reflected and produced a sense of English nationality, characterized, according to its exponents, by toleration and a tendency for compromise as opposed to extremism and ideology. This emphasis on the relationship between national character and the state’s institutions allowed the English to subsume other nationalities into their own historical narrative. Thus it was historians, rather than philosophers, who explained the English character. While early forms of socialism and modern republicanism were being articulated on continental Europe, the English by and large rejected grand theoretical constructs (except the theoretical construct of rejecting theory). This is not to say that there were no philosophical underpinnings to this Anglo-British worldview, which could variously encompass conservative, liberal, and radical understandings of the world. Radicals found a champion in Tom Paine, whose Common Sense (1776) and Rights of Man (1791) became manifestos for reform. Conservatives looked to Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irishman who set out a defense of the British system in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Burke argued that the “ancient liberties” enjoyed by Englishmen (and, by extension, Britons of both sexes) were the product of a gradual evolution of political institutions that should be protected from the type of ideologically driven changes being forced on France. The person who went furthest in attempting to theorize the “gradualism” of the British political system was the founder of The Economist, Walter Bagehot. In 1867, on the eve of the Second Reform Act, Bagehot published The English Constitution. Bagehot divided the operations of the British political system into two parts: the efficient and the dignified. The efficient part was the

The English Constitution This is not a single document outlining the functions of government as in the case of the American or French constitutions. Instead, the English constitution is the customary and accepted way of operating the political-legal system in Britain. It developed over many centuries, which its advocates claim gives it a suppleness and strength not enjoyed by newer, less time-honored political constitutions. Its detractors argued that it was corrupt. Nevertheless, the language of “constitutionalism” has been employed by conservatives and radicals alike. In the conservative view, the constitution was as near perfect a system of government as possible, guaranteeing the rights of “Free-born Englishmen.” For the radicals, the aristocracy had used the state to rob Englishmen of their inherent rights, and thus the constitution had to be reformed to be restored to its function of protecting English liberties. Whether conservative conceit or radical critique, the mixture of history, politics, and law that comprised the English constitution was a central component of English nationality.

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part of the system that actually ran Britain and the empire and was characterized by representative government. The dignified part referred to the monarchy, the means by which the common man and woman could relate to the Anglo-British system, which would otherwise escape the comprehension of the “vacant many.”

Defining the Nation One reason that English and British identities merged was that symbols of nationhood were often shared with other nations. For example, many other nationalities could claim English as “their own” language; Protestantism and even Anglicanism were not unique to England; and the monarch was not just king or queen of England but also ruled over Scots, Canadians, Bengalis and a host of other nationalities. In an era of unprecedented social and political upheaval, British institutions had to be justified by those in control of them as above mere nationality and as serving the best interests of the wider British community. The continuity and success of these institutions helped further merge British and English identities at both a popular and official level as the century progressed. However, the success of these institutions was never a foregone conclusion. In the 1780s, Britain was governed by an unpopular aristocracy, but by the 1880s, Britain was becoming a more recognizably modern democracy. During this period, Britons did not experience revolution in the same way that their American and European contemporaries did, despite the stresses of Britain’s precocious and appalling industrial transition. The conflicting groups in the early part of the period were, broadly, the conservative aristocracy, the liberal middle classes, and the radical working classes. Political contest was focused on reforming the British state to make the institutions of government more representative of Britain’s changing society. Until the 1850s, these contests usually pitted the middle and working classes against the more conservative aristocracy. Anti-Catholicism was also a notable feature of English and British identity for the early part of this period. In 1780, over 700 people were killed in London during the so-called “Gordon Riots.” But a subsequent campaign to allow Catholics to hold public office within the United Kingdom generated huge amounts of popular support and eventually Parliament passed a bill allowing for “Catholic Emancipation” in 1829. Another popular radical cause of the first third of the 19th century was antislavery. The antislavery campaigners won over Parliament, and slavery was abolished in Britain in 1807 and throughout the empire in 1833. Times of economic distress generally fueled radical movements. During the depression that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars, pressure for reform from the lower classes was great, and the British state enacted various repressive measures against its subjects. The most notorious of these was the so-called “Peterloo Massacre” of 1819, when a public meeting calling for reform was broken up by cavalry, leading to 11 deaths and 421 injuries. The push for reform was quelled N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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until 1832 when a reforming government attempted to widen the franchise in the face of opposition from the aristocratic House of Lords. The Lords eventually acquiesced, and threats of revolution were diverted. But the Great Reform Act of 1832 did not end tensions between the classes. During 1834, six laborers from Tolpuddle, Dorset, were harshly sentenced to transportation to Australia for forming a trade union. The case became a cause célèbre for radicals: here was an instance of the British state denying Englishmen their rights when it should be protecting their liberties. The so-called Chartists also employed the language of English liberties, even though their supporters came from all parts of the United Kingdom. The Chartists were working-class reformers who aimed to improve the British state by the implementation of the “Six Points” of their Charter: manhood suffrage; voting by secret ballot; payment of Members of Parliament (MPs); annual Parliaments; abolition of property qualifications for MPs; and equal electoral districts. Despite the authorities’ fears about the movement’s revolutionary potential, in 1848 the Chartists’ largest show of force petered out, thus confirming for many the notion that the English just weren’t the revolutionary type.

Narrating the Nation Accordingly, the dominant national narrative of this period was very much focused on England’s political development. National heroes were those who helped create or consolidate the Anglo-British state. There was no need to look too far into the past to find these heroes, as Britain was experiencing the pinnacle of its global power and influence at this time. Lord Horatio Nelson, whose spectacular naval victories against France secured British dominance of the seas for over a century, was perhaps the greatest and most lauded of all. During this high era of British sea power, it was not surprising that other maritime figures were also venerated. Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, and other “Sea Dogs” from the late Elizabethan era received a good deal of popular attention. Industrialization created its own heroes, too, none more so than Isambard Kingdom Brunel, the great English engineer. But the 19th-century English pantheon also included several figures that were regarded as “typically English” who were not English at all. The Duke of Wellington, victor of Waterloo in 1815, was Anglo-Irish (although he was quite uncomfortable with this fact), and David Livingston, the explorer of central Africa and another personality adopted by the English, was Scottish. Two women stand out as national figures in this period: Florence Nightingale, the “Lady with the Lamp,” who tended to the British wounded during the Crimean War, and Queen Victoria, who became the figurative “Mother of the Nation” as well as the literal grandmother of many of the crowned heads of Europe. Older heroes were not forgotten, however, and were drawn largely from the ranks of previous monarchs. Queen Elizabeth I (reigned 1558–1603) was lauded N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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for presiding over England’s “Golden Age” when the seeds of greatness were sown. King Richard the Lionheart (reigned 1189–1199) was portrayed as a paragon of good government and manly virtue in contrast to his tyrannical brother, King John (reigned 1199–1216). John’s powers were eventually reduced, in legend by Robin Hood and, in fact, by a coalition of powerful barons in 1215. This early curb on regal power was written down in the Magna Carta, the fount of “English liberties,” which became a central part of the national story. King Alfred the Great (reigned 871–899) was credited with laying the foundations of the English state, whereas the legendary King Arthur was re-mythologized by Victorian romantics. Queen Boudicca (d. 61), leader of the ancient Britons’ resistance to Roman imperialism, occupied an uneasy place in English mythology: Was she an early patriot or should the imperial English identify with the Romans against this barbarian? The notion of England as a Protestant elect saved by divine Providence from Catholic threats in 1588 (the Spanish Armada) and 1688 (the “Glorious Revolution”) increasingly gave way to narratives about Britain and England’s civilizing mission. Historians such as Thomas Babbington Macaulay provided the intellectual explanation-cum-justification of English and British political development and imperial power. The British empire was presented by its apologists as a force for good in the world, bringing the light of civilization and free trade (which were seen as more or less the same thing) to benighted parts of the world. Although there was some criticism of the empire from radicals for being too expensive, the period was characterized by the veneration of imperial heroes, many of whom were entombed in London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral, known to some as the “Parish Church of Empire.” Nothing better expressed English values, however, than England’s contribution to the spread of organized sport around the globe. The rules for cricket were codified in 1788, whereas the rules for football were written down in 1863. But by this time, football was already divided into two different codes—those playing to the Football Association’s rules (soccer) and those playing to the rules laid down at Rugby School (hence, rugby). The Lawn Tennis Association was established in 1888. These sports, adopted by the private schools (notably cricket and rugby) captured the ethos of Englishness best. This ethos emphasized sportsmanship, fair play, amateurism, and accepting victory or defeat graciously, and it taught endurance in the face of adversity, thereby preparing the players to take these attitudes into distant corners of the empire, far from the playing fields of Eton.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The main catalyst for the articulation of English national identity during the 19th century was the legitimization of the British state and empire. Ideas about the symbols of the British state, such as the monarchy and Parliament, as being above nationality but expressive of a wider British identification, were developed in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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response to the multinational nature of the British state and empire. Irish nationalism posed the greatest internal threat to the British state during the 19th century and generated both anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiment (although these were not necessarily the same thing). Anti-Catholic sentiment in England shifted during this period from a religious prejudice to one increasingly seen in cultural and, indeed, biological terms. Events such as the Famine, the Fenian attacks on London and Canada, and demands for land and self-government made nationalist Ireland an important “other” for the English. But unlike late-19th-century Germany or Hungary, there was little attempt to standardize the identities of the minority nationalities. Scotland retained its own religious, legal, and education systems, and Wales retained its own religion (and even its language ultimately survived). Only in England, the dominant partner in the United Kingdom, was it difficult to see where the cultural and political boundaries of Englishness ended and Britishness began because language, law, religion, and learning had been exported around the globe. Thus if one goal of nationalists is to attain “their own” state and to maximize its independence and influence within the international system, the English had achieved this by 1815, but via a mixture of state expansion and imperialism. The

Imperial Federation map of the world by Captain J. C. R. Colomb, showing the extent of the British empire in 1886. The illustration is taken from The Graphic, July 24, 1886. (Royal Geographical Society)

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Britishness Britishness was a term first coined in the 1870s but has been used more often in recent decades. It refers to qualities of being British and is used by politicians and academics when reflecting on, or asserting, attributes of British national identity. Historians have used the term more and more often when seeking to understand how a sense of British identity came about in the past and why it appears to be changing, or even under threat, in the present. Historically its main features were taken to be Protestantism, monarchy, empire, constitutionalism, and simply not being French or Catholic Irish. Its meaning varied over time, and ideas such as industriousness and race were also part of what it meant to be British during the long 19th century.

political goal of the people we might term “English nationalists” was certainly not the creation of an English state but, rather, the maintenance and perfection of the preexisting British and imperial institutions in the face of various political challenges, both domestic and external. This goal led to English national identity being increasingly expressed largely in the language of Britishness. The strategy was to convince various different social groups and nationalities within the United Kingdom and the empire that being English was a blessing and that being part of Britain and its empire was an enormous piece of good fortune. Many groups, from Indian princes to Lancashire cotton workers, did indeed acquiesce in this idea. By the 1870s, a sort of imperial patriotism, promoted through music hall songs and other forms of “jingoism,” was common, even if many working men and women knew little, and cared less, about the empire itself. Given all this, state and empire were rarely challenged in England after the demise of Chartism in the late 1840s. The outcome of this mobilization around state and empire was a sense of national identification in England that was significantly merged with, and often indistinguishable from, Britishness. Selected Bibliography Bagehot, Walter. 1867. The English Constitution. London: Oxford University Press, 1936. Burke, Edmund. 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the proceedings in certain societies in London relative to that event in a letter intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Paris. Dublin: W. Watson. Cobbett, William. 1830. Rural rides in the counties of Surrey, Kent, Sussex, (etc.) . . . with economical and political observations relative to matters applicable to, and illustrated by, the state of those counties respectively. London: W. Cobbett. Colley, Linda. 1992. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837. London: Pimlico. Dilke, Charles. 1869. Greater Britain. A Record of Travel in the English-Speaking Countries during 1867 and 1868. Vols. 1 and 2. London: Macmillan & Co. Engels, Freidrich. 1844. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Translated and edited by W. Henderson and W. Challoner. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971.

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Kumar, Krishan. 2003. The Making of English National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Macaulay, Thomas Babbington. 1849. The History of England from the Accession of James the Second. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. Paine, Thomas. 1791. Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution. London: J. S. Jordan. Seeley, John. 1883. The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures. London: Macmillan. Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell. Wellings, Ben. 2002. “Empire-Nation: National and Imperial Discourses in England.” Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 1: 95–110.

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France Elizabeth Rechniewski Chronology 1775–1790 A serious economic and financial crisis, compounded by agricultural failures. 1788–1789 Preparations for the meeting of the Estates-General. 1789 (June 17) The delegates of the Third Estate declare themselves the “National Assembly.” (August 26) The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen is passed. 1792 (September 21) Declaration of the Republic by the Convention. 1794 (July 28) Execution of Robespierre, who headed the Committee of Public Safety during the Terror. 1795–1799 France is governed by a “Directorate” of five men. 1799 (November 9) Coup d’état by General Napoleon Bonaparte, who is named first consul. 1804 (December 2) Coronation of Napoleon as “Emperor of the French.” 1815 (July) The monarchy (Louis XVIII) is restored after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. 1824 Succession of Charles X. 1830 (July 27–29) The “Three Glorious Days” of revolt in Paris drives out Charles X and installs the “citizen king” Louis-Philippe on the throne: the “July Monarchy.” 1847–1848 Opposition to Louis-Philippe culminates in the revolution of February 1848 and the declaration of the Second Republic. 1851 (December 2) Coup d’état of Louis-Napoleon. 1852–1870 The Second Empire. 1870 (September 4) Defeat of Napoleon III by the Prussians. 1875 Vote on the constitution of the Third Republic.

Situating the Nation In the 1770s France was still in theory an absolute monarchy. The king, Louis XVI, after 1774 exercised final authority over the state, administration, and law. Beneath him lay the hierarchy of the three orders or estates, derived from the medieval division between “those who worked, those who fought and those who prayed.” The first order was the church, whose doctrines provided the ideological basis of society and legitimated the divine right of the monarchy. The second, the nobles, included some who had, until the 17th century, rivaled the monarchy in territory and power. Finally, the third estate comprised perhaps 97 percent or more of the population. All the orders contained men of extremely diverse condition: the poor parish priests barely survived on their stipends, while the high churchmen might occupy positions of power and influence; many noble families NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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had fallen on hard times; and the third estate included the poorest day laborers and the richest proprietors. But the third estate was uniquely disadvantaged; however wealthy and even influential its members might become, all were subject to the various forms of taxation from which the other orders were exempt. In practice, absolute monarchy had always been subject to countervailing powers, including those of the traditional regional parliaments of nobles that were to prove such a problem to the monarchy during the pre-revolutionary period. The resistance of the parliaments to any encroachment on their rights and privileges led to the Maupeou crisis of 1771, when Louis XV’s chancellor sought to greatly reduce their power. The open warfare declared by the parliamentarians in pamphlets and speeches denouncing the “despotic” power of the king did much to undermine the ideological legitimacy of the ancien régime. Moreover, in this period the seeds of decay and transformation were at work on every level: ideological, political, economic, and financial. Enlightenment thought with its wide-ranging assault on injustice, intolerance, and irrationality culminated with the publication of the final volumes of plates of Diderot’s Encyclopédie in 1772. In this work and in a veritable torrent of publications, philosophers propagated ideas subversive of the authority of church and monarchy and of the social, political, and economic privileges of the first two orders, ideas that were discussed not only by the frustrated elites of the third estate but by liberal-minded members of the nobility and the clergy. Many commentators have argued—though the danger of hindsight is evident —that the closing decades of the 18th century saw the emergence of a new concept of citizenship. The breakdown of hierarchy could be witnessed in public places, whether at Montgolfier’s balloon ascent in 1783 or at the theater, where “high” and “low” drama lost their clear dividing lines (Schama 1989). The new citizenship idea was also visible in the “cult of great men” propagated in the extremely popular biographies and collective biographies that offered highly polished examples of citizenship modeled on the virile duty of the Roman republicans (Bell 2001). Such a model, as feminist historians have argued, tended to exclude women from active membership of the nation. There was an explosion in the use of the terms “nation” and “patrie” in the last decades before the revolution; the evolution in the meanings and use of this vocabulary has been widely studied. “Nation” was defined by various “objective” criteria, although there was little agreement on what those criteria might be. Was a nation a unique product of climate and environment, further defined by its forms of education and government, as Montesquieu had argued in L’Esprit des lois? His ideas were quoted approvingly in every context. Was a nation defined by the “national characteristics” of its people, a traditional idea that was accorded quasiscientific status in the 18th century? Or was the nation a political entity, the expression of the general will as Rousseau argued? The term was born in uncertainty and thrived, it could be argued, because of its ambiguity. But whether in Enlightenment or revolutionary discourse, the “nation” came to be increasingly N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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used as the motive for reform and the source of political legitimacy. Patrie carried an additional connotation: it referred to that ideal country where the citizen would find freedom and happiness. The French nation might not yet be the patrie dreamed of—but perhaps it could become so. The meaning of these terms was the subject of contestation as each interest group sought to legitimize its own claims. For example, the dissident parliamentarians tried to appropriate the vocabulary of patriotism, calling themselves the “parti des patriotes.” But certainly no writer used the new vocabulary with more effect than the Abbé Sieyès who, in January 1789, published his pamphlet Qu’estce que le tiers état? (What is the third estate?), to which his answer was, in a powerful rhetorical denunciation of power and privilege: the very nation itself. On the financial level, the Seven Years’ War in midcentury and the French intervention in the American War of Independence had dramatically undermined the state’s finances; in 1770 the French economy was in crisis, with a budget deficit of 50 million livres, forcing the king’s ministers to propose taxation that exacerbated tensions among the monarchy and the privileged orders. Agriculture, too, was in crisis in the years leading up to the revolution, with bitter weather and bad harvests precipitating many millions of peasants into hunger and despair and forcing up the price of bread for the townspeople. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Such was the context in which the king reluctantly summoned the EstatesGeneral to meet at Versailles in May 1789 to gain approval for tax reform. The Estates-General—the assembly of representatives of all three orders—had last met in 1614, and in its structure and custom, it was dominated by the first two orders. However, in the febrile atmosphere of the months leading up to the meeting, expectations were high that real change was possible. The process of electing delegates and the preparation of the cahiers de doléance—petitions setting out complaints and requests to be presented to the assembly—gave ideological and political expression to the disparate discontents of the three orders and crystallized the hopes of reform. Traditionally, each estate had an equal number of delegates, and each delegate had one vote, rendering inevitable the dominance of the third by the first and second who would unite to retain their privileges. Yet in 1789 the number of third estate delegates was doubled due to a powerful campaign orchestrated by the Committee of Thirty, which included members of the liberal aristocracy and clergy. Indeed, one of the most determined reformers of this period was a churchman, Abbé Grégoire, who campaigned for the rights of all citizens, as well as for equal rights for Jews and the liberation of slaves.

Instituting the Nation On June 17, 1789, the delegates of the third estate, frustrated by the king’s vacillation, declared themselves the “National Assembly” and three days later swore an oath not to part until they had given the nation a constitution. Their appropriation of the term “national” was the culmination of a century of contestation of privilege and an assertion of the equal rights of all to citizenship in the nation. These rights were defined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, passed after impassioned debate over many different versions on August 26, 1789. It is impossible to overemphasize the significance of this document, which laid the ideological and political foundations of the modern French nation. There were later declarations, but it is the declaration of 1789 that has stood the test of time. Proclaiming in its first article the Rousseauistic principle that men are born free, it enshrined the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and of expression, and of equality before the law. It abolished the legal basis of the three orders, declaring that social distinctions were to be based solely on utility. Most significantly, it declared that legitimate authority could derive only from the nation. It also enshrined the right to own property, a provision that, in the context of the sale of church property, created a climate in which the wealthy and entrepreneurial members of the third estate might make their way in the new nation rather more quickly than the rest. The declaration in practice left many excluded. Olympe de Gouges, recognizing that it did not address the issues crucial to the rights of women, wrote a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Tennis Court Oath (1791), by Jacques Louis David, depicts French delegates swearing to provide a new constitution. (The Gallery Collection/Corbis)

Declaration of the Rights of Women in 1791. She was subsequently executed, as were a number of women who, in campaigning for women’s rights or partaking in political activity, incurred the Jacobins’ displeasure. The Convention in fact formally excluded women from political participation by the decrees of 1793–1794, assigning them an inferior status within the nation, a status that was perpetuated throughout the 19th century by the patriarchal provisions of the Napoleonic Civil Code. Nor did the slaves—many hundreds of thousands of whom worked in the plantations of overseas possessions such as in Guadeloupe and Martinique— benefit from the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly or the declaration of 1789. Finally declared free by the Convention in 1794, they were returned to slavery by Napoleon. The only successful uprising was in Saint-Domingue (Haiti), where capable black generals led a 10-year-long campaign that finally overthrew French control in 1803. The revolution and the First Republic should not be understood as a single unit but as a period during which the assemblies were successively dominated by groups with increasingly radical definitions of what the rights and nature of citizenship should be. After 1792 the external menace of Prussia and Austria and internal threats such as the counter-revolutionary uprising in the Vendée heightened the importance attached to political unity. Rousseau’s theory that the general will permitted no division within the nation was the ideological justification of the Terror of 1793–1794, intended to eliminate internal dissent. ThouN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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sands were denounced as enemies of the Republic and were put to death by the guillotine at the instigation of the Jacobin Committee of Public Safety, increasingly under the control of Robespierre. The Jacobins, whose power was based on the Parisian patriots, the sans-culottes, adopted measures that were politically extreme, savagely repressive of real or imagined opposition, and yet socially advanced. Thus, the 1793 declaration adopted by the Jacobin-dominated Assembly (but never put into effect) proposed rights to education and public assistance. It was also the period of enhanced de-Christianization, with violent attacks on church property and belief, while the republican nation became the object of a quasi-religious cult, celebrated with imagery taken from nature and the ancient world. A new array of symbols to replace those of church and monarchy were developed during the revolutionary period: the tricolor, which officially became the national flag in 1794 and was worn on uniforms and cockades, the red bonnet or Phrygian cap, and the “Marseillaise.” These symbols, finally consecrated by the Third Republic, remain those of the modern French nation. On the administrative level also, the revolution and early years of the Republic laid the basis for the modern nation. The traditional provinces were replaced by a rigorously rational division of the country into 83 départements of similar size, designed to facilitate communication. This new structure might have accommodated some degree of continuing local governance, but the centralizing tendencies of the Jacobins and then Napoleon, who imposed at the head of each département a préfet answerable to Paris, created a powerful administrative structure that successive regimes, of whatever political hue, found too useful to abandon. Thus, the French nation acquired the tendency toward excessive centralization that continued to characterize it well into the 20th century. The early years of the revolution also saw the introduction of a single currency (the franc and centimes) and a standardized system of weights and measures (the metric system), reforms that imposed national uniformity on regional disparity and encouraged the trade and industry that were to lay the basis for France’s economic modernization.

Defining the Nation The myth of a common Gallic ancestry and the dictates of natural landforms and features supported the argument in 1792 for the incorporation of Savoy into the French Republic. Most republicans adhered to the belief that France’s “natural” boundaries were the Rhine in the east, the Atlantic Ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. This vision, temporarily realized under Napoleon, would persist in the 19th century and become the continuing basis of territorial demands. Upon the Restoration, republicans rejected France’s loss of the Rhine territories by the Treaty of 1815, while the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to the Prussians in 1871 rendered the recovery of the provinces occupées the very cornerstone of French nationalism until this goal was realized by the Treaty of Versailles in 1918. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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From the early days of the revolution, the Assembly understood that the new nation required not only the intellectual foundation provided by the declaration but the support of concrete and powerful images provided by spectacle, symbol, and ceremony. On July 14, 1790, the first anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, a massive celebration was organized on the Champ de Mars: the Fête de la Fédération. When the nation became the Republic in September 1792, the leaders, conscious that they were founding a new era for France and indeed for humanity, organized spectacular ceremonies. Apparent already was the confusion of the Republic with nation and nation with patrie, as well as the beginnings of modern forms of nationalism, a word that first came into use during this period. Although the era of the Directorate (1795–1799) saw a retreat from militant republicanism, Napoleon (1769–1821) exploited to the full the association of nation with revolutionary fervor to represent the conquest of Europe to his soldiers as both a patriotic duty and a fight to liberate oppressed peoples. First consul after the coup d’état of 1799, consul for life in 1802, and finally emperor in 1804, Napoleon is perhaps best known for his military genius, his whirlwind conquest of Europe, and his dramatic defeat; however, it could be argued that his legacy of nation-building was more significant and longer lasting. Renowned for his attention to detail and his interest in every aspect of administration and state policy, he pursued a raft of projects, some of which had been initiated by the republicans but not brought to fruition. This was the case with the Civil Code; under Napoleon’s guidance, a committee forged a single, coherent body of law from the many reforms passed after 1789. The code, passed on March 21, 1804, ratified certain basic gains of the revolution, including the abolition of social privilege and the right of equality before the law, but it also entrenched the relegation of women to the status of second-class citizens, subordinate to father or husband, and the power of employers over workers. Its provisions would remain almost unchanged throughout the period under discussion here. A new penal code was also issued in 1810. Under Napoleon’s control, the civil administration was organized along quasimilitary lines, staffed by public servants trained at the new secondary schools, the lycées (1802), and the Imperial University (1806). Religious tolerance survived under state supervision; the four principal faiths were organized into Consistories, with salaried personnel, though the Catholic faith was given a special status as the “religion of the majority of the French.” This situation would remain until the separation of church and state in 1905. Few details of national life escaped Napoleon’s attention, including overseeing the program of the Comédie-Française, for he understood very well the importance of the arts as propaganda. This was hardly a new discovery, of course. From the first years of the Republic, theater, painting, and the arts had been marshaled to instruct the public and instill devotion to the Republic, reaching a high point under the period of the Convention. In the summer of 1793, the government decreed that only suitably republican plays could be staged, and in March 1794, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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every municipality with a stage was ordered to perform “patriotic” productions every 10 days. The prominence of the artist Jacques-Louis David as participant (a member of the Convention), chronicler, and propagandist during the republican and Napoleonic eras is emblematic of the role art might be called on to play in instituting the nation.

Narrating the Nation Literature and art continued to celebrate French nationhood under the Restoration (1815–1848), although in more nuanced ways. Historical events were the subject of popular novels, poetry, and theater, as in the works of Victor Hugo (1802–1885), Alfred de Vigny (1797–1863), and Alfred de Musset (1810–1857). But the task of narrating the nation during this period belonged chiefly to the historian, an occupation that would over the century become increasingly professionalized. Many historians found employment in the new state institutions, the grandes écoles or libraries, or were commissioned by the king. Others such as François Guizot and Adolphe Thiers combined careers as historians and politicians. These liberal historians sought to defend the gains of the revolution against the danger of a return to the ancien régime. The historians were faced with a fundamental dilemma: Was the French nation an expression of a universal human aspiration toward civil and political rights, or was it an entity with particular, perhaps unique, qualities and characteristics? One means of bridging this dilemma was to present the French nation as unique in its devotion to the struggle for human enlightenment; more progressive than any other nation, it had a special mission to guide others toward freedom, nationhood, and self-determination. The works of Edgar Quinet (1803–1875), Henri Martin (1810–1883), and Jules Michelet (1798–1874) portrayed this mission as France’s historical destiny. The most lyrical and passionate of these historians, Michelet espoused the idealistic, messianic nationalism of the First Republic. Evoking figures such as Roland and Joan of Arc as incarnations of the spirit of the

Jules Michelet (1798–1874) Born in Paris in 1798 into a sans-culottes family, Michelet taught at the Ecole normale supérieure before being appointed to the National Archives, where he had access to many unpublished documents. He began his monumental Histoire de France in 1833 and was accorded a chair at the Collège de France in 1838. In the heady atmosphere of opposition to the July Monarchy in 1847–1848, he began his Histoire de la Révolution française (1847–1853), whose aim was to demonstrate the progressive victory of man over nature, of liberty over fatality. His work is a veritable hymn to the action of the people in their centuries-long struggle for the unity and greatness of France ( Le Peuple 1846).

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nation, he transformed the history of France into the narration of progress toward universal freedom. The persistence of this narrative throughout the 19th century is evident in Jules Ferry’s justification for French imperialism in the 1880s: that France had the civilizing mission to bring human rights and liberty to backward peoples.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Though theater and the press were both useful tools of civic instruction, and history was the handmaiden of national consciousness, primary education was quickly acknowledged as the key means of inculcating desirable political attitudes and national virtues in the mass of the people, and also of overcoming the considerable regional and linguistic diversity that characterized ancien régime France. The importance of a national language was debated, research carried out, and a report submitted to the Convention by the Abbe Grégoire in 1794, indicating the extent of the problem of linguistic diversity. Only a universal education system could overcome such diversity, and for the next century successive regimes put forward projects for such a system. While universal primary education remained little more than a vision under the Jacobins, the July Monarchy began to establish a nationwide system of public schools (the Guizot law of 1833). Under the Second Empire, in 1863, Minister of Public Instruction Victor Duruy introduced the teaching of history into public schools; four years later, he outlined an ambitious plan to implement universal elementary schooling. But it was the Third Republic (1875) that brought to fruition a century of projects for educational reform when in 1882 Jules Ferry, minister of public instruction, introduced free, obligatory, and secular primary schooling for children between 6 and 13 years. With its aim of forming patriotic citizens instructed in their rights and just as importantly in their duties, Ferry’s school was at the very core of the national project. In the century following the revolution of 1789, nationalism had undergone significant development and change. At first associated with the patriotic fervor of the defenders of the Republic and its legacy of universal human rights, over the course of the 19th century two main currents of nationalism emerged. The dominant liberal current approved the revolution and many of its gains, though within this group republicans were at odds with those supporting a constitutional monarchy. The nationalism of the liberal current was universalist, portraying France as forward-looking, predominantly secular, and inclusive. This outlook was opposed from the end of the 18th century by a counter-revolutionary and conservative current of thought first articulated by Bonald and de Maistre, which placed the monarchy and the church at the heart of French national identity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald The earliest theoreticians of conservative reaction to the revolution of 1789 were Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821) and Louis de Bonald (1754–1840). Echoing Edmund Burke’s fierce criticism of the French Revolution in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), de Maistre supported the restoration of what he saw as the divinely ordained hereditary monarchy. Denouncing the rationalist progressivism of the revolution, he called for the restoration of ultimate authority to the church. Louis de Bonald, who published his royalist Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux in 1796, also supported the supremacy of the church and hoped for the restoration of the pre-revolutionary harmony between the social and religious spheres.

For theoreticians who make a broad distinction between two ideal types of nationalism—one open, forward-looking, inclusive, and based on a political project, and the other particularist, exclusive, and emphasizing difference—it is tempting to see these types illustrated in the two strands of French nationalism of the late 19th century. The reality, however, is more complex: Both strains of nationalism generally shared the view that France had a special mission, whether to defend Catholicism or universal human rights. Both currents attached great importance to the army and military glory as constitutive of French identity. And nationalist thinkers from both tendencies were often tainted by the increasing climate of anti-Semitism in the late 19th century and by theories of racial difference. The defeat of 1870 in the Franco-Prussian War marked not only the end of the Second Empire and the eventual installation of the Third Republic (1875) but also crystallized and hardened the existing currents of nationalism. The conservative, counter-revolutionary tendency assumed a virulently nationalist and racist form, turned particularly against Germans and Jews—the army, the means of liberating the provinces perdues, became the symbol of patriotism and national unity; the Catholic church was seen as the only institution capable of holding at bay the moral anarchy glimpsed during the Paris Commune (1871); and the Third Republic was the enemy incarnate and the object of savage attack. Republican nationalism, while sharing some of these aims and characteristics, as we have seen, also included within its ranks those who subscribed to the emerging socialist ideologies that were anathema to the right. Thus by the 1880s, in spite of the centurylong attempts to unify the French nation and encourage patriotism, the country was still marked by deep political divisions as well as by marked regional differences. Paris and the provinces, city and country, north and south, retained distinct identities, whereas areas in the southwest, west, and center of the country, notably the Basque region, Brittany, and French Flanders, resisted attempts at integration. As Eugen Weber has shown, in the late 19th century, there continued to be widespread indifference to or ignorance of the national project among the rural populations. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Selected Bibliography Bell, David A. 2001. The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Cranston, Maurice. 1988. “The Sovereignty of the Nation.” In The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, vol. 2: The Political Culture of the French Revolution, edited by Colin Lucas, 97–104. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Crossley, Ceri. 1999. “History as a Principle of Legitimation in France (1820–1848).” In Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800, edited by Stefan Berger, 49–56. London and New York: Routledge. Furet, François. 1988. The French Revolution, 1770–1814. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Jenkins, Brian. 1990. Nationalism in France: Class and Nation since 1789. Savage, MD: Barnes & Noble. Nora, Pierre. 1997. Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer, edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman. New York: Columbia University Press. O’Brien, Conor Cruise. 1988. “Nationalism and the French Revolution.” In The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and Its Legacy, 1789–1989, edited by Geoffrey Best, 17–48. Chicago and London: Fontana Press. Schama, Simon. 1989. Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Weber, Eugen. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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Germany Celia Applegate Chronology 1792 French revolutionary armies under General Custine invade Germanic states, reaching across the Rhine as far as Frankfurt, inaugurating more than two decades of territorial and political transformation in central Europe. 1803 France undertakes major reorganization of the western half of the Holy Roman Empire, resulting in many fewer states overall in central Europe. 1806 End of the Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon establishes the Confederation of the Rhine and decisively defeats Prussia at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt. 1813 Prussia declares war on France, beginning the so-called Wars of Liberation from French hegemony. The French are defeated at the battle of Leipzig. 1815 Defeat of Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo. The Congress of Vienna establishes future shape of central European states, including the German Confederation. 1817 German student associations (Burschenschaften) hold nationalist festival at the Wartburg Castle in Thuringia. 1819 The Karlsbad Decrees of the German Confederation suppress political activity, especially agitation by nationalist groups. 1830 July Revolution in France, as well as various revolts and nationalist agitation in German states. 1832 Nationalist festival at Hambach in the Rhineland. 1834 Establishment of the German Customs Union (Zollverein). 1848 Revolutions in Europe, including Germany. German National Assembly meets in Frankfurt and begins to write a constitution for a united Germany. 1849 Frederick William IV of Prussia refuses the offer of a German crown from the deputies of the German National Assembly. The Assembly and other democratic associations are dispersed all over Germany by counter-revolutionary forces. 1851 German Confederation officially restored after the disruptions of the revolutionary years. Bismarck appointed Prussian ambassador to the Confederation Diet. 1859 German National Association (National Verein) established as an organization of liberals to agitate for political reform and national unification. 1862 Bismarck appointed minister-president of Prussia in the midst of a constitutional crisis over military reforms. 1864 Austria and Prussia go to war against Denmark over the territories of Schleswig and Holstein. 1866 Prussia (and Italy) go to war against Austria; the Austrians defeated at the battle of Königgrätz. The Treaty of Prague excludes Austria from German affairs. Establishment of the North German Confederation. 1870 Prussia and other German states war with France. 1871 The German Second Empire proclaimed at Versailles as a semi-constitutional monarchy with a modified 1849 constitution.

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Situating the Nation Because of long centuries of political fragmentation, the history of German nationhood has no clear starting point. Unlike France or England, the German lands straddled lines on either sides of which other European nations developed. The northern and eastern boundaries of the Roman empire ran through Germany, as did the eastern and southern boundaries of the Carolingian empire, and finally the roughly north-south division between the lands of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. All the distinctions marked by these lines—between traditions of law and autocracy, small-holder agriculture and serfdom, Protestantism and Catholicism—collided and failed to resolve in the German lands. This central position, which made German Europe a key point of cultural and economic transmission between east and west, north and south, contributed also to a history of constant tension, abrupt change, discontinuity, and attenuated collective identity. It made Germany an incoherent term or, for many a frustrated observer, a mere geographical expression. The ambiguity of German identity found expression in its only collective entity, the Holy Roman Empire, which was established in 962 by a German king who preferred the diffuse imperial grandeur of the Roman precedent to mundane monarchical centralism. Renamed the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in 1486, the German lands of central Europe saw the steady erosion of centralized authority. During centuries of religious and political conflict, German leaders (princes, bishops, nobles, city patriciates) refrained from reforming the empire’s political constitution, choosing to preserve their own authority, even at the cost of vulnerability to outside powers. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of the most destructive demonstration of German weakness, the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). It sealed German political fragmentation by ratifying the insignificance of imperial institutions and recognizing the authority of the individual states, large or tiny, as well as the right to oversight by powerful neighbors like France. The empire’s final dissolution in 1806 removed what had long been the mere appearance of German statehood. It made unavoidable a European confrontation with the question of how Germans should be politically organized.

Instituting the Nation But if unified statehood continued to elude the peoples of central Europe until 1871, national identity nevertheless developed. A sense of national identity was not evenly distributed across the population of 18th-century central Europe. Kings and nobility, town guildsmen and peasants, all had, for different reasons, no interest in German nationality or a national state. In social terms, the diffusion of national identity took place among the secular reading public. This group N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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consisted of educated people whose interests in reading and writing for publication created a social network of shared values and concerns that crossed the barriers dividing one locality from another and the privileged aristocracy from all. The German national movement had its origin among people living mainly in cities and with sufficient means to have obtained an education. Their national identity was grounded in the patriotism of language and culture, that is, a passionate interest in the commonalities of speech, history, and custom among the people of central Europe. Searching for a grounding for national consciousness, people began to write about it as something created and secured through language—the “invisible intercourse of spirits and hearts,” in the words of Johann Gottfried von Herder, the greatest 18th-century theorist of national cultures (cited in Giesen 1998, 75). The politics of such national identity were inchoate. People advocated devotion to some common good and expressed defensiveness vis-à-vis outside influences. This latter tendency reflected the actual historical experiences of Germans, expressing their fear of political powerlessness and loss of cultural identity. Literate people were certain that German culture existed but lacked confidence in its ability to survive political turmoil and the changing fortunes of princes. Even though, by the end of the 18th century, a more unified sense of national cultural identity had emerged among the literate public, its members still looked to literature, the visual arts, and (increasingly) music to measure the strength of the German nation. It took the French Revolution to bring focus to the political notions of nationally conscious Germans. The revolutionary wars, which began in 1792 and lasted for more than two decades, altered the political picture of central Europe profoundly and forced German patriots to experience firsthand the political impotence of the old empire—old lessons of history made new. French armies occupied

Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827) Probably the most admired composer in the history of Western music, Beethoven lived in the foundational period of German nationalism and was inevitably recruited to the national cause, mainly after his death. He was born in Bonn in the Rhineland but spent most of his years as a performer and composer in Vienna, where he developed the Viennese classicism of Mozart and Haydn with ever more daring, and individual, means of musical expression. By the end of his life, he was composing works that were scarcely comprehensible to his listeners but nevertheless increasingly received, in an era of romantic aesthetics, as being marks of genius, transcendent of everyday experience as great art was meant to be. While much of his music had immediate and lasting appeal among the growing middle-class audiences of music lovers, the mythic Beethoven stood for something beyond popularity or comprehensibility. His status as German hero derived above all from his symphonies, especially the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth, which German nationalists performed as the ultimate expression of German courage, resolve, profundity, and fate.

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the left bank of the Rhine before moving further into south Germany. In 1795, Prussia gave up lands in the west in the hope of securing new ones in the east; in 1797, the Habsburg emperor in Vienna traded away guarantees of the Holy Roman Empire’s future in return for the security of the Habsburgs’ own lands. Meanwhile, the hardships attendant on the presence of French armies in German lands, combined with the catastrophic collapse of Prussia in 1806, sharpened the edges of national discourse. If German national identity had long drawn coherence from a sense of its own vulnerability, the Napoleonic era saw the emergence of a fullblown and violent anti-French rhetoric in discussions of German nationality. National identity, then, crystallized into a national movement in the first decades of the 19th century, though still a national movement without a goal beyond that of strengthening the German people so that they could resist outside incursions. Still, the majority of soldiers in the armies that eventually defeated the French on German soil fought out of obedience to princely authority, not national resolve, and the princes who led them had no intention of laying the foundations for a national state. The national movement was not entirely absent from the struggle, however. Answering the king of Prussia’s appeal to “Prussians and Germans” to join his war against Napoleon, a small number of educated middleclass men, alongside artisans and apprentices, entered the Prussian Volunteer Units, believing them to represent the “nation-in-arms.” The princes themselves, especially the Prussian leadership, also used the rhetoric of national salvation to secure the loyalty of the non-noble classes in their efforts at state rationalization —the modernization of the old monarchies.

Defining the Nation In the course of confronting the challenge of French hegemony, Germans of many different ranks and regions became familiar with the idea of nationhood, and the vocabulary of national identity gained a new forcefulness. For outspoken nationalists, like the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte or the schoolteacher Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the German people had a special mission to secure the future of Europe on a higher moral plane. The Germans, they believed, were an original, unadulterated people, capable of much greater achievements than their enemies had so far allowed them. New organizations, like the Deutsche Bund (German League), dedicated to disseminating anti-French propaganda, the German gymnastic societies, and the German-wide student fraternities, attempted to mobilize a latent national identity, thereby preparing Germans for armed struggle. As a result of all this, and of victory over Napoleon, Germany’s existence as an idea was secured, without its future as a unified state becoming any more certain. The 1820s brought increasing recognition and encouragement of German cultural achievements, from the apotheosis of Ludwig van Beethoven as German N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Burschenschaften Many student fraternities or corporations, called Burschenschaften, that originated in the early 19th century became caught up in nationalist agitation during the period of Napoleonic domination of central Europe. After 1815, the governments of monarchical restoration did not welcome their continuing calls for national unity. In 1817, student fraternities, led by the fraternity Teutonia at the University of Jena, gathered at the historic Wartburg Castle outside of Eisenach in Thuringia to commemorate the 300th anniversary of Martin Luther’s 95 Theses, which had inaugurated the German Reformation. They used the occasion to call for German unity, denounce political repression, and create a bonfire of things they hated, including a corporal’s cane, symbolizing Napoleon, and so-called reactionary literary works, symbolizing the demoralizing effects of censorship. The Wartburg Festival led directly to the passage of the even more repressive Karlsbad Decrees, but it also served later nationalists as a demonstration of their courage and resolve.

hero, to major projects of history writing and artifact collecting, to the learned treatises of G. W. F. Hegel and his followers. The wartime moment of activism had passed, but the promotion of national identity through scholarship and cultural achievement remained, still imbued with the spirit of nationalist poet Ernst Moritz Arndt’s search for the German fatherland. Nor were the makers and consumers of this self-consciously German music, German history, German art, and German philosophy indifferent to its political shadow—the idea of a single national state. Nationally conscious people did not make neat distinctions between the cultural content of nationhood and its political implications; to believe that Germany existed as a cultural reality was also to believe in a set of political ideals —autonomy or self-government chief among them. As numerous writers said, Germans could only know their identity—and greatness—as a people through involvement in public life. People understood national identity not just as a set of character traits or a dream of brotherhood. To be a German was to participate in building a national community, made real through action and raised to a conscious level of experience. The most sustained collective effort to define what the German nation was, geographically, politically, and culturally, took place in 1848–1849 in Frankfurt among the deputies gathered in those revolutionary years in the hope of shaping a new future. Answering the question of German nationhood proved essential to writing a constitution for this incoherent geographical expression. The rough consensus the Frankfurt deputies endorsed represented agreement on several points. First, they believed that German nationhood could not be defined by a single criterion, whether of language, religion, geography, biology, law, or culture. Germanness was for them a flexible construct that reflected millennia of conflict and struggle, of regional diversity and confessional divergence. Acknowledging historical precedent, the deputies mainly agreed that the new German nation would have the same borders as the soon-to-be-superseded German Confederation N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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established in 1815. The mere existence of a substantial German-speaking population did not, in other words, mean that the new Germany’s borders must encompass it. And by the same token, neither non-German speakers (like the Poles in Prussian Poznan), Jews, nor Catholics forfeited a right to citizenship in this new nation, or a right to speak their language and practice their religion. True to their amalgamation of liberal-progressive and historicist thinking, the deputies of 1848 were sure that participation in the new public life of a German nation would bring about the full assimilation of non-Germans and Jews into this Christian, German-speaking Germany. The deputies believed that German culture represented the most progressive force in Europe, and most remained virulently anti-French. And in common with most Europeans—liberal, radical, or conservative—they had no respect for Judaism as such, considering it a relic of unenlightened times. Nor did they acknowledge the national claims of Poles or Czechs living in the territories of the German Confederation. At the same time, however, they held true to their belief in personal autonomy and self-development (Bildung) and rejected any policy of forceful “Germanization.”

Narrating the Nation Most of the national deputies of 1848–1849 were familiar with contemporaneous history writing, the main goal of which had long been to explain German disunity in the hope of soon overcoming it. The culminating moment in the national stories that historians and publicists of the mid-19th century recounted was the antiFrench campaigns of 1812–1815, refashioned as glorious Wars of Liberation, with their victories all the sweeter for reversing centuries of fragmentation and suffering. Midcentury nationalists developed a kind of obsession with the Thirty Years’ War. As the low point of German fortunes, it provided the perfect contrast to German recovery in the early 19th century and the hoped-for unification in the decades to come. Yet the story of the past and of the Thirty Years’ War in particular also revealed the lines dividing the nationalists, chiefly between Catholics and Protestants. Although the great poet and playwright Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) had characterized the war as a struggle for German liberty, later nationalists saw it in more sectarian terms. For Protestants, it illustrated the aggression and cruelty of international Roman Catholicism in arms. It thus demonstrated the importance of Protestant leadership, specifically from the Prussian kings, to any future German state. The greatest German national hero for such writers was Martin Luther, the leader of the first major revolt against the Roman Catholic oppression of German Europe. The boundaries of a future German nation, in such narrations, encompassed Germany north of the Main River, mainly a Protestant population close to the Protestant nations of Scandinavia and Great Britain and ruled by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Protestant princes. For Catholic nationalists, the 17th-century struggle was epochal in a different way. It had consisted of a noble effort on the part of the Habsburg monarchs to consolidate the fragmented states of central Europe. That effort’s failure could be blamed on many factors, French ambitions chief among them, and the effort to return to its high ideals in the 19th century must necessarily involve Austria and its monarchy as well. Thus, 19th-century efforts to tell the nation’s history were divided between images of a geographically smaller but overwhelming Protestant Germany (the so-called kleindeutsch or small German nation) and a more extensive Germany, evenly divided between Catholics and Protestants (the so-called gross-deutsch or large German nation).

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In 1815, the central European kings and princes, in concert with the great powers surrounding them, had reasserted the principle of monarchy and the geography of multi-statehood. In 1819, reacting to the nationalist agitation of the student fraternities and gymnastics associations, they issued the repressive Karlsbad Decrees, which established a highly circumscribed public sphere. The decrees destroyed the nationalist associations as effective means of popular mobilization and seemed to fulfill the German princes’ desire to depoliticize national identity. The European-wide shock of the July Revolution of 1830 in Paris briefly brought nationalist politics back out into the open again. It took the form of agitation aimed not against the French this time but against the outdated structure of the German Confederation of 1815—a loose association of 39 German states and cities that had inherited all the faults and none of the dignity of the Holy Roman Empire. This era was one of significant social and economic change in central Europe, of a revolutionary rise in literacy rates (reaching 40 percent of the German population by 1830), and of aggressive international posturing on the part of unified nations like England and France. Given all that, Germans expressed their indignation with leaders who seemed unable to understand the need for national strength through unity. Demonstrators in 1832 at Hambach Castle in the Rhineland called for “freedom, enlightenment, nationality, and popular sovereignty,” before being dispersed and arrested by government forces. More staid nationalists wrote articles in favor of monarchical constitutions and limited forms of representation. Both strands of nationalists saw themselves as part of a broader liberal stream in European political development and considered the national identity of Germans as requiring single statehood, sooner rather than later. Meanwhile, the need for real action, of the sort not experienced since 1815, suddenly presented itself in the summer of 1840 when a French international setback, unrelated to German Europe, led to an outbreak of aggressive speechmaking in Paris about the Frenchness of the Rhine frontier. In response, German nationalists found their voices again. Amateur poet Nikolas Becker composed a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Hambach Festival On May 27, 1832, 20,000–30,000 people, mostly from southwest German states but with visitors from as far afield as Paris and Warsaw, gathered in the ruins of an old castle in the Rhenish Palatinate, a part of the Rhineland that since 1816 had belonged to the kingdom of Bavaria, and hoisted the black-red-gold flag of German democracy for the first time. The demonstration reflected general dissatisfaction with Bavarian and German Confederation policies; the main demands of the demonstrators were for freedom of the press, civil rights, and German unification. Speeches from its leaders, Johann Georg August Wirth and Philipp Jakob Siebenpfeiffer, called for the overthrow of monarchies and the establishment of a single democratic Germany, which they predicted would be followed by a democratization of Europe as a whole. Siebenpfeiffer’s closing words were “Long live a free, united Germany! Long live the Poles, our German allies! Long live the Franks, our German brothers, who honor our nationality and our independence! Long live every people, who break their chains and swear fealty with us to the cause of Freedom! Fatherland—People’s Majesty—People’s Union—forever!” These and other sentiments resulted in the leaders’ arrests and a renewed crackdown on political activity in the German Confederation.

poem that stirred its readers with such sentiments as, “They shall not have it, our free German Rhine, though like greedy crows they hoarsely cry for it.” Within weeks, every German-language newspaper had reprinted the verses, and songwriters from Robert Schuman on down had composed melodies for it. Cultural organizations, like choral societies and historical associations, suddenly came into their own as channels for influencing public policy making. Under pressure from below, the German Confederation even drew up defense plans. The Rhine crisis of 1840 dissipated as quickly as it had arisen, but its lasting effect was to demonstrate to the mass audience of literate Germans that the cultural nation and the political nation were one and indivisible and could influence even kings. The 1840s thus intensified expressions of national identity among larger numbers of people than before. Cultural organizations pursued high-profile, Germanwide activities (national monument building, national choral festivals), and political liberals, infused with national consciousness, began to organize within and outside the state assemblies and to talk of the need for national statehood. At the same time, the German population exploded in size (from 22 to 35 million in a 30-year period), and the countryside filled up with landless laborers and the cities with underemployed casual workers. By 1847, the opposition groups had gathered a wide range of unhappy Germans under the guise of a single national movement. German national identity had become a potent force for mobilization. At the same time, however, its leadership had not yet developed any realistic assessment of the powers ranged against its goals. Nor did they show much awareness of the devil lurking in the details of national boundaries and ethnicnational definitions. For nationally conscious Germans, the rapid developments of 1848–1849 amounted to a lesson in power politics, that is, in the limitations of the idea of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nation without the power of state authority and military force behind it. The news in February 1848 of fighting in the streets of Paris and a king dethroned was welcomed by crowds of thousands, even tens of thousands, in towns and cities across Germany, who began calling for a free press, a free militia, and a national parliament. Liberal opposition leaders seized the moment and achieved wide-ranging concessions from governments in almost every German state, from those as large as Austria and as small as Oldenburg. The Prussian king Frederick William IV graciously acknowledged Prussia as part of Germany and appointed a liberal cabinet. The Austrian court, facing revolutionary nationalism in their non-German territories as well (Hungary chief among them), left Vienna altogether for the time being, holing up at the safe distance of Innsbruck. Liberal nationalists next moved, still without interference from the divided and dithering German princes, to create a parliament for their hoped-for new nation. They organized elections, and on May 18, the German National Parliament gathered in Frankfurt’s Paulskirche to begin deliberations on a new German constitution. Individual state elections to state assemblies also took place across German Europe, and many new associations, publications, and demonstrations made the public sphere of German Europe into a busy arena. The spring and summer of 1848 became the first extended episode of German-wide political activity, and despite its disappointing denouement, the experience of such politics still set a capstone on a hundred or more years of the nation’s existence, if only in the minds of its members. But such great questions of the time turned out not to be answerable through speeches and parliamentary debates. For the non-German powers—Great Britain, Russia, and France—German unity equaled European disorder, all the more so as it would have enthroned the disturbing forces of nationalism and liberalism at the head of the biggest nation-state of Europe. They began pressuring the German princes, who eventually got back their nerve and reasserted the old order, including the German Confederation. Starting in the fall of 1848, the royal leaders of the Confederation states began to counteract the revolution with armies, which quelled demonstrations and armed resistance from radical revolutionaries; eventually they presided over the dispersal of the National Parliament itself. The German revolution collapsed without bringing the legitimacy of statehood to ideas of national identity. It had clarified only that such ideas did not exist comfortably within the existing constellations of states. The spokesmen for German nationalism did not alter their views radically in the years after 1848, but they did alter their emphases. Economic activity had long been a means toward greater national integration, and not just by chance. Since the 1820s, forward-looking ministers of finance, like Prussia’s Friedrich Motz, liberal thinkers, like the economic theorist Friedrich List, and leaders of industrialization had actively promoted customs unions to mitigate the ill effects of multiple border crossings. A German Customs Union, including Prussia and many central and south German states, was established in 1834; by 1848 it N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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included nearly three-quarters of the German federal states. While justified in economic terms, unfettered economic activity within the customs union came to mean something more as well; just as cultural and political definitions of nationhood interacted with each other closely in 19th-century nation-making in Germany, so, too, did economic growth and economic policy form an inextricable part of people’s conception of what their nation was. Telegraph lines, modernized roadways, and above all railway lines, which grew rapidly after a late start in 1835, became the visible signs of the strong bonds that made the diverse German states into a common German home. List considered the railroad a “tonic for the national spirit” and a “tight belt around the loins of the German nation,” which had been “robbed of almost all attributes of nationality by earlier divisiveness” (Sheehan 1989, 468). By the end of the 1850s, Austria’s exclusion from this economic belt that bound the German nation was nearly irreversible, and the major question on the minds of many nationalists—a question discussed but never settled in 1848–1849 —became not whether Austria should be part of the nation but how to keep it out. Austria’s inability to defeat French-backed Italian nationalism in 1859, combined with the usual failure of the German Confederation to do anything, hardened the resolve of German nationalists to center their movement in Prussia. The boldly named German National Society, founded in 1859 by pro-Prussian liberals, hinted that the nation-state must first come from above, by show of strength against external enemies (France chief among them), and only then could the liberalization of a German nation follow. The National Society did not represent everyone’s view of what it meant to be German, but it represented the increasingly dominant view. In it, Germany, led by Prussia, was the land of Protestantism, the land of Prussian probity and resolve over southern dilly-dallying and division, the heirs to Alexandrian Hellenism and Roman virtue, destined to triumph over quarreling and chaos. The army crisis of 1861 in Prussia and its heavy-handed resolution in 1862 by the king’s new activist prime minister, Otto von Bismarck, gave pause to all the hopes invested in Prussian leadership. Anti-Prussian nationalist groups came into being; citizens of the “third states” (neither Prussian nor Austrian) found their voice; Catholics presented alternate views of German historical development; the National Society itself seemed to rethink its position, even on Austria. The remarkable effect, then, of Bismarck’s three successful wars between 1864 and 1871—the war against Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein, the war against Austria over the future of the German Confederation, and the war against France over, essentially, Prussian-led German unity—was to bring most nationalists, except those too far to the left or too firmly committed to Austrian inclusion, into the Prussian fold. Just as important, the wars bestowed an aura of historical inevitability on this answer to the question of what was Germany. After centuries of catching up and delays, most Germans were eager to embrace the so-called Second Reich of 1871 as the long-awaited embodiment of national identity. The N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Otto von Bismarck reads Prussian king Wilhelm I’s Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles on January 18, 1871, following Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

achievement was not just that of Bismarck and his armies. Left to his own devises, Bismarck would perhaps have been content to have established a bigger and stronger Prussia. But the power of public opinion, channeled through numerous associations, festivals, newspapers, elections, and parliamentary debates, had secured the identity of this latter-day empire as not just any nation, but the German nation. If the German identity of the Prusso-German state of 1871 was never in question, neither was its content clear. All the issues of German identity that had preoccupied the Frankfurt parliamentarians of 1848–1849 remained unresolved, including the place of Catholicism in the new reich, the possibility of Jewish integration into it, and the role of the smaller states, still in existence but now integrated into a federal council (Reichsrat). Bismarck’s solution had solved the centuries-long problem of outside interference in Germany’s development, without purging Germans of the habit of looking to outsider interference (from the French, the English, the Russians, the Jews) as the explanation for internal difficulties. More than a century of public activity had secured stable sources of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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collective identity in the form of cultural achievements, military victories, and political institutions. The new Germany had become more than a geographical expression but remained inevitably less than the ideal “intercourse of spirits and hearts” that many Germans had once expected it to be. Selected Bibliography Berger, Stefan. 1997. The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. Blackbourn, David. 1997. The Fontana History of Germany, 1780–1918: The Long Nineteenth Century. London: Fontana Press. Breuilly, John. 1996. The Formation of the First German Nation-State, 1800–1871. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Geiss, Imanuel. 1997. The Question of German Unification, 1806–1996. New York: Routledge. Giesen, Bernhard. 1998. Intellectuals and the German Nation: Collective Identity in a German Axial Age. New York: Cambridge University Press. Green, Abigail. 2001. Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press. Levinger, Matthew. 2000. Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806–1848. New York: Oxford University Press. Schulze, Hagen. 1990. The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763–1867. Translated by Sarah Hanbury-Tenison. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sheehan, James. 1989. German History, 1770–1866. New York: Oxford University Press. Vick, Brian E. 2002. Defining Germany: The 1848 Frankfurt Parliamentarians and National Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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The Netherlands Hans Knippenberg Chronology 1572 The “water-beggars” (gueux) capture Brill. Start of the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish king, Philip II. 1579 (January 23) Union of Utrecht among Holland, Zeeland, Groningen, Utrecht, and Gelderland; in the course of the year, this union is joined by Overijssel, Friesland, Drenthe, and the southern cities of Ghent, Ieper, Antwerp, Bruges, Lier, Breda, Venlo, and Mechelen. 1581 Act of Abjuration. Actual start of the Dutch Republic of the United Provinces. 1584 Balthasar Gerards murders William of Orange, the leader of the Dutch Revolt. 1584–1585 Ghent, Ieper, Bruges, and Antwerp are reconquered by Spanish troops. 1588–1590 Consolidation of the Republic by Johan Van Oldenbarnevelt, the Advocate of Holland. 1588–1702 The Golden Age; the source of national pride until the present day. 1590–1609 Recovery of territory from the Spanish troops; the Republic becomes a great power. 1609–1621 The Twelve Years Truce between the Dutch and Spanish troops. 1618–1619 The Synode of Dordrecht (Calvinist church); victory of the Counter-Remonstrants (orthodox Calvinists) under the leadership of Maurits van Nassau over the Remonstrants (liberal Calvinists) under the leadership of Van Oldenbarnevelt; execution of Van Oldenbarnevelt. 1629–1647 Recovery of territory from the Spanish Netherlands, including parts of Flanders, Brabant, and Limburg (the so-called Generality lands). 1648 Peace Treaty of Münster; formal start of the Dutch Republic. 1702–1795 The Age of Decline. 1795 Invasion of the French revolutionary army. 1795–1806 Creation of the Batavian Republic under control of revolutionary France. 1806–1810 Kingdom of Holland under Louis Napoleon. 1810–1813 Kingdom of Holland annexed to the French empire. 1813 Liberation from the French; William I (son of stadholder William V) becomes sovereign monarch. 1814–1815 The Vienna Congress reunites the former Dutch Republic with the Southern Netherlands. 1815–1830/39 United Kingdom of the Netherlands under William I. 1815–1840 Reign of King William I. 1830–1839 Belgian Revolt results in the creation of independent Belgium in the southern provinces of the Netherlands. 1834 First orthodox secession from the Dutch Reformed church (the Afscheiding). 1839–present Kingdom of the Netherlands. 1840–1849 Reign of King William II. 1848 Thorbecke’s Liberal Constitution; the start of the parliamentary system. 1849–1890 Reign of King William III. 1886 The Doleantie (second orthodox secession from the Dutch Reformed church). 1890–1898 Regency of Queen Emma.

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1898–1948 Reign of Queen Wilhelmina; invention of Queen’s Day. 1899–1902 Boer War (South Africa). 1917 New constitution, which ended the school dispute and made universal suffrage possible. Government decision to reclaim the Zuider Zee, the main inland sea. 1917–1960 The high days of Dutch verzuiling (“pillarization”), that is, the segmentation of society in blocs of Protestants, Roman Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals with their own institutions and subcultures. 1940–1945 German occupation during World War II.

Situating the Nation The cradle of Dutch statehood lies in the 16th century, when the Dutch revolted against their king, Philip II, who reigned over the Spanish part of the Habsburg empire, including the Netherlands. His father, Charles V, had centralized his authority in this part of his realm and unified the 17 provinces of the Netherlands (the territory of current Belgium and the Netherlands together). Philip II tended to rule the Netherlands as though they were annexed lands of the Spanish Crown and pursued a decidedly Catholic religious policy, thus implementing a principle of the Augsburg Peace Treaty (1555), cuius regio, eius religio (“who rules the territory decides on the religion of its population”). Since the Netherlands was one of the centers of early Protestantism, a confrontation could not be avoided. Religion, however, was not the only issue. The policies of Philip II reduced the power and autonomy of the local nobility and urban regents and augmented their fiscal burdens. Thus, the Dutch Revolt was also about autonomy—juridical and fiscal. The revolt started in 1572 when the Gueux (“Beggars”) seized the small port of Brill (Brielle) (Israel 1995, 169–178). The leader of the revolt was Prince William of Orange, who was an advocate of religious tolerance and who wanted political unity and autonomy for the Netherlands. After a short period of united action, the southern provinces were reconciled with Philip II, whereas the northern provinces joined together in the Union of Utrecht (1579). Two years later, the Northern Netherlands broke off from the Spanish Crown officially by signing the Act of Abjuration (Plakkaat van Verlatinge) and founded the Republic of the United Provinces with William of Orange as stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht. However, William was murdered in 1584, and after a short intermezzo, his son Maurits succeeded him as stadholder and leader of the revolt. In 1590, Maurits also became stadholder of Gelderland and Overijssel. While in general European state formation was a matter of “coercion and capital” (Tilly 1992), Dutch state formation was a clear example of state formation by capital. The claims of the Dutch Republic on the financiers of Amsterdam and other major trading cities allowed the new state to raise enormous sums rapidly for its armies and navies and to become the dominant European power for a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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time. The outcomes of the military battles with the Spanish troops shaped the territory of the new state, which eventually consisted of seven semi-independent ministates (Groningen, Friesland, Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, Holland, and Zeeland), the landschap Drenthe, and some Catholic territories in Flanders, Brabant, and Limburg, which were occupied in the last phase of the revolt and governed directly by the States General (Staten Generaal), the so-called Generality lands (Generaliteitslanden). The state structure of the Republic was a cross between federal state and confederacy, with “more of the confederacy in form and theory, and more of the federal state in substance and practice” (Israel 1995, 277). A large number of cities enjoyed a relatively autonomous position. The province of Holland and the city of Amsterdam dominated the Dutch Republic, which gained formal independence and international recognition with the Peace Treaty of Münster in 1648. During the Dutch Republic, a national Dutch identity or a consciousness of Dutchness was very limited. Most people were more oriented toward their own local or regional community. After its “golden” 17th century, the republic fell into decline and lost its position as a dominant world power. In 1795, the Batavian Revolution, a less bloody version of the French Revolution, ended the old republic with the assistance of French troops and established the French-inspired, unitary Batavian Republic (1795–1806), followed by the Kingdom of Holland (1806–1810) under the reign of Louis Napoleon, the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte. After a short period as part of the French empire (1810–1813), the Dutch were liberated from the French, and at the Vienna Congress (1814–1815), the great powers unified the former Dutch Republic and the Southern Netherlands into the United Kingdom of the Netherlands under the reign of the House of Orange. The political centralization and nationalization of the Batavian-French periods were continued. William I, the son of the last stadholder of the Dutch Republic, became the first king. His religious and educational policy stimulated much resistance in the southern part of his kingdom, particularly among the Catholic clergy and nobility, who lost much of their influence. Eventually the Southern Netherlands seceded and became the independent Kingdom of Belgium in 1839. From then on, the territory of the Netherlands did not change apart from some minor revisions. Only the German occupation in World War II (1940–1945) interrupted Dutch independence. Apart from the formation of the Dutch state, its colonial expansion is also of relevance. After the successful commercial activities of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), which is considered the world’s first multinational firm, the Dutch state expanded its power in the Dutch Indies (now Indonesia) in the last quarter of the 19th century and became the world’s second imperial power. It lost this position in World War II, and in 1949 Indonesia became independent. Also, in the Western Hemisphere were some colonial possessions: Suriname, which became independent in 1975, and the Dutch Antilles, a combination of six small Caribbean Islands that are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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VOC settlements were also established in South Africa. The British took over the Cape Colony in the Batavian-French periods. During the 19th century, descendents of the original Dutch farmers, the Boers, left the colony and founded the independent republics of Transvaal and Oranje Vrijstaat. As a consequence of the second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the Boers lost their independence, but they remained, as Afrikaners, part of South Africa.

Instituting the Nation The Batavian-French period was very important in the institution of the Dutch nation because it ended the federal and decentralized state structure of the Dutch Republic and introduced a centralized, national government (Van Sas 2004). (The term “Batavian” refers to the people who were living in the region [called Insula Batavorum by the Romans] when Caesar conquered this area in the first century BC.) Inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, the socalled “patriots” took power from the Orangists (Prinsgezinden) and formulated national programs for the Batavian nation, for instance, in the field of (primary) education, which was instrumental for building the nation. The Society for Public Welfare (Maatschappij tot Nut van ‘t Algemeen), founded in 1784 and the most important among the many (enlightened) societies that were established in the second half of the 18th century, took the lead in elaborating these ideas. The ultimate goal was to build a Dutch (Batavian) nation of equal citizens, linked by feelings of shared identification, loyal to the Dutch (Batavian) state, and legitimizing its authority. In the words of J. H. Swildens, one of the founders of the society: “In each Dutch child, love for his fatherland should be cultivated in such a way, that he always prefers his fatherland over all other countries” (cited in Van Sas 2004, 75). In 1798, the Preliminary Authority appointed an agent of national education, considered as the first minister of education in Europe. National school acts (1801–1806) ended the diversity of local and provincial arrangements, and a national school inspection supervised performances in the whole territory. There was no powerful conservative reaction. An important feudal landed nobility was missing; the Dutch Republic and its successors were foremost a society of urban citizens who made their living by commerce, traffic, and finance. Moreover, although initially many had experienced the Batavian Revolution as liberation, during this period, the growing French oppression encouraged the accommodation of internal Dutch differences and intensified patriotic feelings. Therefore, the liberation from the French was much welcomed, and the House of Orange with William I as its first king became a powerful symbol of the Dutch nation, even among the former “patriots.” In 1848, Prime Minister Thorbecke finished what the Batavian Revolution had started. Under the threat of revolutionary events in other parts of the continent, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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King William II agreed to a very liberal constitution. This constitution limited the power of the king considerably in favor of the Parliament, brought a stronger separation between public and private affairs and between state and church/religion, and provided more freedoms, including freedom of religion and freedom of education. Unity, equality, and rationality became the standard. Further democratization was encouraged, which gradually enlarged the electorate. Eventually, the 1917 constitution paved the way for universal suffrage and introduced an electoral system of proportional representation. In fact, the main elements of the 1848 and 1917 constitutions have been maintained until the present day.

Defining the Nation From an ethno-cultural viewpoint, the bounding of Dutch territory was rather arbitrary. Ethnically, the Dutch people descended from the Frisians, Saxons, and Franks, who also lived outside Dutch territory. Language borders also did not parallel state borders. Both in Germany and in Belgium, dialects were spoken that were cognate to the dialects used inside Dutch territory. Consequently, the “Dutch” language covered a much larger area than the Netherlands. Inside Dutch territory, only the Frisian language held a minority position. From a religious viewpoint, the reverse was the case: the Netherlands was situated on the “fault line Rome-Reformation” (De Kok 1964), and Dutch Protestantism included a rich variety representing the main streams of Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anabaptism. Moreover, the wealth and religious tolerance of the Dutch Republic had attracted many Jews from the Iberian Peninsula (Sephardim) and east-central Europe (Ashkenazim). Within Dutch Protestantism, Calvinism became dominant and was connected with the political elite of the new state very early. Roman Catholics, Protestant dissenters, and Jews had freedom of religious conscience but had not the same public rights as their Calvinist fellow citizens. The Batavian Republic redefined the Dutch nation by giving equal rights to all citizens irrespective of their religion. The dominant Calvinist church lost its privileged position. The new political elite, who predominantly adhered to a kind of liberal Protestantism, tried to compromise with the traditional idea of the Dutch as a Calvinist nation by banning religion from the public sphere. That became particularly apparent in the education policy of the new regime. All kinds of religious dogmatism was banned from the (partly) state-financed public schools. During the first half of the 19th century, this ban led to protests from orthodox Calvinists and Roman Catholics, who wanted more freedom of education. The liberal 1848 constitution brought freedom of education as well as religion. The opportunities for the founding of denominational schools were increased, and churches were no longer obliged to get state approval for their N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Geography of the Protestant-Catholic Divide The traditional divide between Protestants and Roman Catholics had a clear geographical dimension, which can be traced back to the military events during the Dutch Revolt. The military situation during the Twelve Years Truce (1609–1621) in particular has been responsible for the geographical distribution of Protestants and Roman Catholics. The frontline during that period determined most of the border between Protestants and Catholics. In the area south of this border, which was controlled by the Spanish troops, all Protestants were forced to become Catholic again or to leave the country. Many Protestants left the Southern Netherlands and moved to the area controlled by the States General. The city of Antwerp, which had become not only a major center of economic activities but also of the Reformation, serves as an illustration. After its conquest in 1585 by the Spanish troops, more than half of the population of around 100,000 inhabitants left the city for religious or economic reasons, and the remaining Protestants became Catholic again. Similar stories could be told of other Flemish cities. As a consequence, the area south of the demarcation line became homogeneously Catholic. Due to the freedom of religious conscience in the area of the States General north of the frontline, that part of the Netherlands never became entirely Protestant, although Calvinism dominated public life, including education. So, Catholic enclaves remained, and the population of parts of Brabant and Limburg, which were conquered by the Dutch troops after 1621, did not become Protestant. The essence of that geographical pattern has not been changed ever since.

church organizations. Freedom of religion paved the way for the restoration of the Episcopal hierarchy in the Roman Catholic church, which ended the status of the greater part of the country as a missionary territory and increased the opportunities for organizing, mobilizing, and disciplining the Catholic population. New church regulations in the Dutch Reformed church reinforced the impact of orthodox forces, which stimulated conflicts between more liberal and more dogmatic members and eventually resulted in the so-called Doleantie (1886), a secession under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper, and the founding of Gereformeerde (orthodox Calvinist) churches. The constitutional freedom of education paradoxically intensified the conflicts in that sector, which became known as the school dispute (schoolstrijd). The liberal state increased the educational requirements for all schools, which was not a problem for the state-funded public schools but was a great financial setback for the nonsubsidized denominational schools. Consequently, the initial school dispute about more freedom of education changed into a dispute about equal financial rights for public and denominational schools. Orthodox Calvinists and Roman Catholics not only fought against the liberal state but they also fought each other. Essentially, it was a struggle for the character of the Dutch nation between the former dominant group of Calvinists and the emancipating minority of Roman Catholics. That battle became most apparent N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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when the Catholic Episcopal hierarchy was restored in 1853. Orthodox Calvinists were furious. It was as if the bishop of Rome had planted its crosier in the heart of the Netherlands (the city of Utrecht, in the middle of the country, became the seat of the archbishop). In their view, the Dutch nation was still a Calvinist nation under the Calvinist House of Orange. They organized a petition for King William III asking him not to sign the act that settled the restoration of the Episcopal hierarchy (the so-called April Movement). Though William III personally stood at the side of his fellow Calvinists, he could not agree to their request for constitutional reasons. Prime Minister Thorbecke voiced the position of the liberal government: “It is time that in politics, we change the notion of a Protestant nation into the notion of a Dutch nation.” The same 1917 constitution that provided universal suffrage also pacified the school dispute and the struggle for the character of the Dutch nation by institutionalizing the religious differences in the political system. From then on, both N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Distribution of Roman Catholics in 1947 (by municipality). (Map by Hans Knippenberg)

(orthodox) Protestants and Roman Catholics were allowed to establish their own denominational schools, which were financed by the state in exactly the same way as the religiously neutral public schools. Moreover, this financial agreement became the main device for the allocation of government money in other sectors of society such as health care and housing. It was this legal system that would facilitate the founding of mosques and Muslim schools when the Dutch nation encountered a new challenge: the immigration of non-Christians, especially Muslims, from Turkey, Morocco, and the former colony of Suriname from the 1960s onward. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Narrating the Nation The struggle for freedom is a key element in narrating the Dutch nation. That struggle started with the Batavian myth—the struggle for freedom of the Batavians under the leadership of Gaius Julius Civilis against the Romans in the first century, suggesting a continuity in territory and population that never actually existed—and culminated in the struggle for freedom of the Dutch under the leadership of William of Orange, the “father of the fatherland,” against Philip II. The success of that revolt and the following “Golden Age,” when the Dutch Republic became a dominant world power, are still the most glorious periods of Dutch history and provide indispensable elements to Dutch national pride, such as the trading and colonial activities of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie; the paintings of Rembrandt, Vermeer, Frans Hals, and many others; the heroic actions of Dutch admirals such as Michiel de Ruyter, Maarten Tromp, and Piet Hein; the writings on international law of Hugo Grotius; or the philosophical ideas of Baruch Spinoza. After the Dutch Republic, there were only two short periods during which foreign powers occupied the Netherlands: the French occupation in 1795/1806–1813 and the German occupation in 1940–1945. In both cases, the Dutch regained their freedom, giving rise to strong nationalistic feelings. At the end of the 19th

People of Amsterdam in the Netherlands celebrate the unconditional surrender of the Germans in May 1945. (Corel)

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century, the South African Anglo-Boer wars also played a part in this strugglefor-freedom myth. The initial success of the Boers encouraged waves of enthusiasm and solidarity in the Netherlands. In a way, these Boers were seen as a pure, moral version of the Dutch nation, which was not yet contaminated by the materialism of modern society. Consequently, the defeat of the Boers in 1902 caused great disenchantment, as if the Dutch nation itself was defeated. The “pacification” of the Dutch Indies, which brought the East Indian archipelago under Dutch control, provided some compensation for the wounded national pride. In the same period, the House of Orange became a strong symbol of the Dutch nation. The accession of the 18-year-old Queen Wilhelmina in 1898 and the invention of Queen’s Day (Koninginnedag, i.e., the celebration of the queen’s birthday) encouraged a wave of nationalist fervor. Even the Catholic part of the population joined this enthusiasm. Until then, Catholics had had a somewhat difficult relationship to the House of Orange. For them the Dutch Revolt against their Catholic Spanish king under the leadership of William of Orange was a less obvious source of identification with the Dutch nation. Catholics preferred to emphasize the greatness of their fatherland in the Middle Ages, when the Netherlands was still Catholic, counterbalancing the three centuries of Protestant domination. Queen Wilhelmina again was a very strong symbol of the Dutch nation during World War II, when she was in exile in London and sent encouraging messages to the Dutch nation in occupied territory through Radio Oranje (Radio Orange). Her daughter Juliana and granddaughter Beatrix would perform the same symbolic function up to the present day. So would the color orange.

Hans Brinker and the Struggle against the Water The story of the legendary Hans Brinker, who put his finger in a hole in the dike to protect his village and its surroundings against inundation and written by the American author Mary Mapes Dodge in 1865, represents a key element in the narratives about the Dutch nation: the perpetual struggle against the water. This struggle was part of the myth of the Dutch nation as gradually organizing and unifying in its struggle against the common enemy, the water, from the Middle Ages, when the first dikes were built, onward. In reality, the Dutch nation has been shaped through interdependent processes of state formation, nation-building, territorial integration, and modernization. The myth originated during the 19th century and became a strong national symbol. The reclamation of the Zuider Zee (the current Lake IJssel) in particular has struck the imagination. This reclamation was a national happening. In the international context of World War I, in which the Dutch stayed neutral, the Dutch nation gave the world an example of how to expand national territory in a peaceful way. It became an object of national pride and a useful symbol of Dutch national identity. After World War II, the Delta Works in the southwestern part of the country, which gained momentum after the 1953 flood disaster, would perform the same symbolic function (Knippenberg 1997).

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Dutch society has never been characterized by a strong nationalism, which would not have been functional for this open economy and society of minorities. When its national culture has been narrated, it often has been described in terms of tolerance, willingness to compromise, and egalitarianism.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The political elite that came to power after the Batavian Revolt (1795) could not foresee that its nation-building activities would eventually contribute to the segmentation of Dutch society. Their attempts to marginalize the religious heterogeneity by banning religious dogmatism from the public to the private sphere had the opposite result: religion became the major political, social, and cultural cleavage of Dutch society. The conflict was focused on the school system, which is understandable since education was very important for transferring the religious subculture to the next generation and maintaining religious identity. The liberal 1848 constitution facilitated the mobilization of the orthodox Protestants and Roman Catholics, as did the expansion and integration of the infrastructure (railways, waterways, roads, telegraph, telephone) and, in general, the socioeconomic modernization in the second half of the 19th century. The orthodox Protestants were the first to organize their demands in a modern mass political party: the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party; 1878) under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper, who could make use of the organizational infrastructure of existing school organizations. The Roman Catholics were mobilized by the church itself, which had gained organizational power after the restoration of the Episcopal hierarchy in 1853. The Catholic leader Schaepman united the Catholic members of Parliament on the same political program in 1896, and it lasted until 1904 before a national Catholic political organization was founded: the Algemene Bond van RK Kiesverenigingen (General Union of RC Voting Associations), the forerunner of the RK Staatspartij (RC State Party) in 1926. Socialists entered the political arena as a third movement. Their main concern was not education or religion but the “social question,” the relationship between capital and labor, which became topical due to the industrialization of society. The laborers were first mobilized in the rather liberal Algemeen Nederlands Werklieden Verbond (General Dutch Workers Union), founded in 1871. In 1888, Domela Nieuwenhuis, the first socialist Member of Parliament, was elected as a representative of the Sociaal-Democratische Bond (Social-Democratic Union), which started six years earlier and was followed by the Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1894. The liberals were eventually concentrated in two liberal parties: the Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond (Liberal Democratic Union) and the more conservative Liberale Staatspartij (Liberal State Party). Those four political movements would N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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represent the four segments of society (later called zuilen, or “pillars”) in the political arena after the 1917 constitution, which settled the two main political conflicts of those days: the school dispute and the struggle for universal suffrage. The segments were characterized by their own subculture and organizations in all sectors of society, particularly for the orthodox Protestant and Roman Catholic “pillars,” to a lesser extent for the “red family” of socialists, and to the least extent for the liberals, which increasingly represented “the general interest” in this divided society. This “pillarized” (verzuilde) society did not fall apart, because the pillar elites were loyal to the Dutch state and nation, and they compromised in Parliament and in their coalition cabinets. No pillar was big enough to politically dominate the others, thus they needed each other. Later, the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart (1968) would call this system a consociational democracy. The mobilization of the pillars encouraged at the same time national integration and identification and built a nation with both a national and a “pillar” identity. After the 1960s, the traditional pillars crumbled as a consequence of mass secularization, as a result of which the Dutch nation became one of the most secularized nations in the world. In the same period, new religions (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and the charismatic Evangelical Christianity) encouraged a new multiculturalism that, especially after the 21st-century Muslim terrorist attacks, challenged the unity of the Dutch nation. These developments encouraged many debates on the character of the Dutch nation and the position of the immigrants and the Muslim religion within it. Religion seems to have become a major cleavage again. Selected Bibliography De Kok, J. A. 1964. Nederland op de breuklijn Rome-Reformatie. Assen: Van Gorcum. Israel, J. I. 1995. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Knippenberg, H. 1997. “Dutch Nation-Building: A Struggle against the Water?” GeoJournal 43:27–40. Lijphart, A. 1968. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press. Tilly, Ch. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992. Cambridge, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell. Van Sas, N. C. F. 2004. De Metamorfose van Nederland: Van oude orde naar moderniteit 1750–1900. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

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Poland Daniel Stone Chronology 1775 1791 1793 1794 1795 1807 1809 1813 1815 1830–1831 1846 1848 1859–1863 1863–1864 1867 1870s–1880s

First partition of Poland. Enactment of the May 3 constitution. Second partition of Poland. Unsuccessful insurrection. Third partition of Poland. Creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. War with Austria and expansion of the Duchy of Warsaw. Abolition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Congress of Vienna—creation of the Kingdom of Poland (Russia), Grand Duchy of Poznan´ (Prussia), and Free City of Cracow. Unsuccessful insurrection in Russian Poland. Autonomous institutions suspended. Unsuccessful insurrection in Austrian Poland. Free City of Cracow merged with Austrian Poland. Unsuccessful insurrection in Prussian Poland. Grand Duchy of Poznan´ abolished. Reform efforts in Russian Poland. Unsuccessful insurrection in Russian Poland. Congress Kingdom abolished. Home rule in Austrian Poland. “Culture War” in German Poland.

Situating the Nation The destruction of Polish statehood in the Polish Partitions (1772, 1793, 1795) by Russia, Prussia (the German empire after 1871), and Austria (Austria-Hungary after 1867) forced Poles to make extra efforts to survive as a nation. The national movement developed out of the pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian state’s institutions and customs, which were based on extensive noble participation in national and local government, including electing their Polish kings. Despite limiting active citizenship to nobles, Poland-Lithuania was surprisingly democratic, since the nobility comprised 10 percent of the population in the 18th century and perhaps 20–25 percent of all Polish speakers, as a result of policies that attracted and assimilated Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian nobles to the Polish identity. To keep the Polish nation alive, the challenge in 1770–1880 and beyond was to bind the rest of the population to the national movement. The first steps were taken in 1789–1794, when reformers extended active citizenship to burghers, acknowledged peasants as members of the nation, and discussed incorporating the large Jewish minority. NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Polish national sentiment was widespread across the educated and politically active Polish element. In the Russian partition, the ethnic core, covering much of contemporary Poland, was always important and stood out during the Napoleonic period and the 1830 and 1863 insurrections. Poles across the vast eastern borderlands (modern Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine) asserted their nationality forcefully. The Austrian partition in Galicia (southern Poland from Cracow to Lwów [Lviv, Ukraine]) received substantial political autonomy and cultural independence in the 1860s, enabling it to provide cultural leadership. Prussian/ German Poland was often an economic leader, where methods of nonpolitical resistance to the partitioners were explored. Polish nationalism developed against the backdrop of the agricultural and industrial revolutions. (“Nationalism” is used in the sense of patriotism open to all and not according to modern Polish usage, which equates nacjonalizm with nativist hostility to minority groups.) Polish industrialization began in the 1820s and accelerated in midcentury Russian Poland as the textile, railway, and mining industries grew. Prussian/German Poland developed agricultural processing industries and railways. Galicia changed more slowly. The growing Polish bourgeoisie was successfully absorbed by the national movement. In contrast, the peasantry mostly remained outside active nationalism until the end of the period. The abolition of serfdom by Prussia (1812), Austria (1848), and Russia (1861–1864) began the process by which Polish peasants came to think of themselves as Poles due to the oppressive nature of the partitioning states and their class-based economic policies, not to mention the ethnic and religious differences. Much of the Jewish business and professional elites became Polish in language, manners, and political allegiance without abandoning their religion, although some converted. The large majority of traditional Jews opted out of Christian disputes and remained politically aloof.

Instituting the Nation Because the Polish-Lithuanian state was divided among three different countries and each partition underwent changes between the 1770s and 1880s, the political history is extremely complex. From 1770 to 1795, the independent Polish-Lithuanian state was governed by a king, parliament, and regional assemblies. After the partitions, Poland was governed from St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin until Napoleon defeated the Prussians and created the Duchy of Warsaw (1807), adding part of Galicia after beating Austria (1809). The Duchy created a Polish-language parliament, administration, and courts. After Napoleon’s defeat, Czar Alexander I established the Kingdom of Poland (the Congress Kingdom) out of the Duchy of Warsaw and ruled it as a constitutional monarch, sharing power with the Polish parliament, administration, and courts. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Nicholas I abolished these autonomous institutions after the 1830 insurrection. Alexander II allowed limited autonomy in 1859–1863, but the outbreak and suppression of the 1863 insurrection led to the formal abolition of the kingdom and the institution of Russian-language institutions at all levels. The eastern sections of the Polish-Lithuanian state (now Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine) became part of Russia after the partitions. Polish nobles often served in the bureaucracy. Austria ruled Galicia directly from 1772 until 1867 (except for the Napoleonic interlude), when it gained the active support of Polish nobles by granting home rule. Poles dominated a Galician legislature (established in 1867), gained appointment to provincial executive offices, and enjoyed cultural self-determination through Polish-language universities in Cracow and Lwów (Lviv). The Free City of Cracow ruled itself under Austrian supervision from 1815 until a revolt in 1846 led to its incorporation into Galicia. The Prussian zone gained autonomy on paper as the Grand Duchy of Posen with little practical effect. Many leaders stand out during this time. King Stanisław August Poniatowski (1764–1795) orchestrated the modernization of Polish culture and stretched the boundaries of political action at a time when Poland-Lithuania was effectively a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Russian protectorate. Other, more forthright political leaders, such as Ignacy Potocki and Hugo Kołła˛taj, challenged Russian domination, creating (with the king’s help) the modernizing constitution of May 3, 1791; in fact, May 3 became a national holiday in independent Poland and throughout the diaspora. Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko led the 1794 insurrection and recruited non-noble soldiers; he is generally considered Poland’s greatest leader. The Polish legions and their generals who fought with Napoleon in Italy inspired the Polish national anthem. Leading 19th-century figures included Prince Józef Poniatowski, who fought in the 1792 war against Russia and became one of Napoleon’s marshals, symbolizing the French (or western) orientation in Polish politics. His cousin, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski became a personal friend and political advisor to Czar Alexander I, helping to create the Congress Kingdom. He participated in the 1830 insurrection

Tadeusz Kos´ ciuszko A noble of modest means, Tadeusz Kos´ ciuszko (1746–1817) studied at military colleges in Poland and France and served as an important military engineer during the American Revolution; he became a personal friend of Thomas Jefferson. Ko s´ ciuszko distinguished himself in the 1792 Russo-Polish War and commanded the 1794 insurrection, in which he won some significant battles. His Połaniecki Manifesto, reducing serfdom and recruiting peasant soldiers, and his mobilization of urban militia units provided a turning point in Polish social history. After defeat, Kos´ ciuszko spent two years in a Russian prison, visited the United States, and settled in France where he helped organize Polish legions to fight in Italy, but he became increasingly suspicious of foreign powers and rejected invitations to play a role in the Duchy of Warsaw and the Congress Kingdom. Kos´ ciuszko died in Switzerland and was buried in Cracow; his heart was reburied in independent Poland in 1927. Ko s´ ciuszko is generally seen as Poland’s greatest hero. A large memorial mound was Tadeusz Ko s´ ciuszko was the leader of the built outside Cracow in 1820–1823, and nuPolish national insurrection of 1794. (Na- merous literary and artistic portraits celebrate him (notably Jan Matejko’s painting of the 1794 tional Archives and Records Administration) Racławice battle). Poles often memorialized his death by illegal demonstrations, and Polish émigrés celebrated a Kos´ ciuszko cult. There are educational foundations and geographical features named after him around the world.

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and led an important faction afterward. Aleksander Wielopolski tried and failed to establish Polish autonomy within the Russian empire in 1859–1863. An émigré movement with close ties with the homeland was a distinctive feature of Polish nationalism. Life abroad permitted activists to develop political positions that could not be stated openly at home. Émigrés returned to fight in the 1794 insurrection, and the Polish legions fought for Napoleon in Italy in 1797 and Haiti in 1802 to gain support for Polish independence. After the 1830 insurrection, a “Great Emigration” of several thousand Poles dispersed throughout western Europe and North America, where they formed patriotic societies, published newspapers, and corresponded with home. Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, a leader of the 1830 insurrection, became the so-called uncrowned king of Poland at his Parisian residence, where he carried on an active foreign policy to restore Poland with British and French help. Czartoryski’s relative social conservatism was balanced by the Polish Democratic Society, which demanded immediate emancipation of the serfs, a position supported from Brussels by the émigré historian and politician Joachim Lelewel. Fewer Poles went into exile after the 1863–1864 insurrection, but those who did added to existing institutions and brought them up-to-date. Poles served among the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution (1848), the liberation of Italy (1860–1861), and the Paris Commune (1870–1871). Polish socialism emerged when émigrés joined Western socialist movements, forming Polish sections. Artists helped keep the national culture alive. Frédéric Chopin’s use of Polish folk elements in his piano compositions established Poland’s existence in Europe’s consciousness in the 1830s, 1840s, and beyond. A great trio of poets—Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, and Zygmunt Krasi´nski—wrote poetical epics depicting Polish national struggles against a backdrop of moral questions. Poles used all available arguments to maintain the existence of the nation after partition. Historians demonstrated that Poland had existed since the 900s and that destroying it violated international law. Some Poles stressed Poland’s long history of democratic practices to demand that western Europeans support Poland against the authoritarian Prussian, Austrian, and Russian monarchies. Others appealed to the conservative monarchs on the grounds that Polish landowners could keep liberals and revolutionaries under control more effectively than could Germanic or Russian officials. As ethnic arguments gained currency, it was easy to demonstrate through simple observation backed up with ethnographic scholarship that Poles were neither Russians nor Germans.

Defining the Nation The predominant definitions of the Polish nation were historical and ethnocultural. Historical definitions were based on the extensive historical borders of Poland-Lithuania. There was little objection from the large Ukrainian, Belarusian, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Adam Mickiewicz Generally considered Poland’s greatest poet, Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) was born in eastern Poland into a poor noble family. He studied at the University of Wilno (Vilnius, Lithuania) and taught school in Kowno (Kaunas). Association with a secret patriotic society led to his arrest in 1823 and exile to Russia, where he met leading Russian liberal intellectuals such as Alexandr Pushkin. Permitted to leave in 1829, Mickiewicz settled in Paris in 1832 where he initiated the teaching of Slavic literature at the College de France (1840–1844), revealing the riches of Polish, Russian, Czech, and Serbian literature to westerners. During the 1848 revolution, he edited a radical newspaper and recruited Poles to fight in Garibaldi’s Italian revolution. Mickiewicz died of cholera in Istanbul in 1855 while raising Polish troops to fight Russia in the Crimean War. He was buried in Paris and, in 1890, reburied in the royal castle in Cracow, Poland. Mickiewicz’s love poems and nature ballads helped establish Polish Romantic poetry. He is best known to foreigners for his verse-novel, Pan Tadeusz (1834), which sympathetically described Polish rural life and ended with the 1812 invasion of Russia; his portrait of a patriotic Jewish innkeeper epitomized Polish liberal attitudes. Sprawling poetical plays, Graz˙ yna, Konrad Wallenrod, and Forefather’s Eve, emphasized patriotic themes and portrayed a deep love for the eastern Polish borderlands. A romantic in politics as well as literature, Mickiewicz espoused mystical values of patriotism and heroic self-sacrifice. Nonfiction writings such as The Books of the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage (1832) called on Poles to participate in a revolution that would create social justice and freedom for all nations.

and Lithuanian minorities, which had not yet developed their own national consciousness. Ethnic arguments provided a straightforward definition of Poles as Polish speaking, mostly Roman Catholic, and conscious of their Polish heritage. Without abandoning their claims to eastern territories, Poles gladly welcomed the growth of national consciousness in midcentury among Polish speakers of Silesia and Mazuria, lands lost to the Polish state in earlier centuries. Because Polish nationalism was virtually universal among educated Poles, their opinions on social, economic, and political questions covered the spectrum from right to left, although the heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian state made even conservatives favor constitutional government. All patriots advocated regaining independence and restoring the pre-1772 boundaries. It should be kept in mind that only a minority worked actively for Polish independence, however. Polish Slavophilism, which antedated Russian Slavophilism, placed Poles at the head of their Slavic brethren in search of national independence and democracy. Slavophilism took the form of scholarly accounts indicating similarities with Poland’s Slavic neighbors as well as political action, such as Czartoryski’s efforts to bring the Slavic peoples of the Balkans under Polish influence in alliance with Britain and France. The myth of rural values was particularly strong as a result of the “Sarmatian” ideology, a 17th- and 18th-centuries concept that glorified the moral superiority N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of grassroots noble democracy. The 19th-century historian Joachim Lelewel went further and established Polish populism, claiming that prehistoric Poland practiced tribal democracy and that peasants still embodied that tradition. Populists developed peasant-based political parties at the end of the period. Unlike their Russian counterparts, Polish populists embraced European traditions and leaned on modern European progressive thought to suggest social and political reforms. Most nobles only slowly accepted the need to abolish serfdom, and it took the abolition of serfdom by the partitioning powers in the mid-19th century to wipe out barriers to attracting the peasantry to the cause of Polish nationalism. Ethnic minorities posed problems to growing Polish nationalism, although few were active before 1880. Progressive Poles generally thought that some, perhaps many, would become Poles in speech, culture, and nationality, and hoped to institute a tolerant multiethnic and multireligious nationality. Others considered this unlikely and often undesirable and expressed their views stridently.

Narrating the Nation Polish nationalism was intensely historical, and historical works informed Poles about their periods of greatness and the causes of decline. The partitioning powers limited coverage in schools, but censorship permitted the publication of patriotic historical works that were widely read. Professional historians led the public in debates over heroes and villains. The first archival-based history appeared in 1782–1785, written by Bishop Adam Naruszewicz and covering Polish history up to 1386 from a liberal monarchist perspective. Politician, playwright, novelist, and poet Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz popularized numerous figures in his 34 short didactic poems, Historical Songs (1816), for both children and adults. Many songs praised warrior kings and generals. Joachim Lelewel, a sophisticated academic scholar, expressed republican and democratic sentiments in studies written between 1825 and his death in 1861. Historians and the general public lionized Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko, the leader of the 1794 insurrection, for his selflessness. Acts of statesmanship were praised, such as the treaties of 1386 and 1569 unifying Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the 1466 treaty incorporating western Prussia. Kazimierz (Casimir) III retained his title “the Great” because the economic, social, and diplomatic results of his reign were positive. Cultural heroes received high praise, such as the Renaissance astronomer Mikołaj Kopernik (Nicholas Copernicus), whose statue was erected in 1810 in Warsaw. Renaissance poets, Jan Kochanowski and Mikołaj Rej, and the Enlightenment poets, Ignacy Krasicki and Adam Naruszewicz, were also recognized. Their 19th-century counterparts, the musician Frédéric Chopin and the poets Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, and Zygmunt Krasi´nski, joined the pantheon immediately. Periods of national wealth were also celebrated. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Historical figures who could be blamed for the partitions received merciless criticism, particularly the last king of Poland, Stanisław August Poniatowski, and magnates of the so-called Targowice Confederation, who secured Russian military help to overthrow the May 3, 1791, constitution and precipitated the second partition. Many historians condemned the nobility as a whole for blindness to national needs. Poles saw themselves as an exceptional nation. The pre-partition Golden Liberties such as the liberum veto and the elective kingship had been discredited, but the Polish historical commitment to constitutionalism and democracy was still seen as proof that Poles were modern, progressive, and worthy of west European support. In addition, Poles saw themselves as the historical defenders of Western civilization against Muslims and Orthodox Christians. The loss of independence in the partitions was seen by many 19th-century Poles as proof of Poland’s moral greatness as a suffering Christ-nation. Many expected the act of restoring Polish statehood to bring peace and harmony to all Europe. Polish nationalism was expressed in rich symbolism drawn from historical tradition. Living symbols existed in Polish revolutionaries who returned from Siberian exile or czarist prison after many years. National identity was celebrated by patriotic 18th-century composers such as Michał Ogi´nski who wrote patriotic

The Polish National Anthem The Polish national anthem was written in 1797 to celebrate General Jan Henryk Da˛browski and the Polish legions, who were leaving their camp in Italy to fight the Austrians under Napoleon Bonaparte. The author, Józef Wybicki, a prominent social reformer and playwright, set the words to a Polish folk dance, the mazurka. The song soon reached Poland and became immensely popular when the legions helped create the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807. Numerous variations in music and text appeared during the 1830 and 1863 insurrections, such as replacing Da˛browski’s name with contemporary commanders. Tsarist and Prussian authorities banned the song but failed to eliminate it, and it became the national anthem of independent Poland in 1926. Translation of the Polish text: Poland lives on As long as we live. We will win back with our sabres What foreign aggressors took from us. We will cross the Vistula and Warta rivers, To become Poles once again. Bonaparte has shown us How to win. (Chorus) March on Da˛browski From Italy to Poland. Under your command We will rejoin the Nation.

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pieces based on folk music including the “May 3 Oberek” and “Farewell to Poland.” In the 1830s and 1840s, Frédéric Chopin created a specifically Polish musical style and made Polish national identity renowned throughout the Western world with his brilliant outpouring of mazurkas and polonaises, mostly for the piano. He also used folk music in other compositions. The midcentury opera composer, Stanislaw Moniuszko, wrote Halka, the story of a peasant girl jilted by a young noble, and The Haunted Manor, a romantic comedy with patriotic overtones. Both operas are full of Polish melodies, speech, costumes, and dances. Throughout the period, ethnographers studied folk customs, including music and dance, most notably Oskar Kolberg who started publishing his encyclopedic 40-volume account in the 1860s. The mass public, both urban and rural, sang patriotic hymns in church and at public demonstrations. Artists depicted landscapes and cityscapes, but political art drew greater attention. Painters and sculptors produced portraits of nobles and peasants in distinctive Polish costume and painted historical battle scenes.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Politically active Poles were united in seeking statehood, even though other goals covered the spectrum from extreme left to the extreme right. Th e left built on the program of the French Revolution, calling for the creation of an egalitarian republic without serfdom and, by the 1880s, adopted socialist positions. The center and right built on late 18th-century Polish democratic reform, with limited concessions to the enserfed peasantry and poorer city dwellers. Monarchist political groups worked for Polish autonomy under the Austrian, Russian, or Prussian/ German emperors. Ethnic minorities were largely ignored, even in the eastern provinces where they outnumbered ethnic Poles, because most had not developed national self-consciousness at this time. Polish nationalists used all available forms of communication. Some produced works of high culture such as novels, poetry, academic scholarship, classical music, and painting. Others preferred works with broader appeal, such as pamphlets and mechanically reproduced art. Some nationalists mixed ethnicity with religion and talked of Poland as a suffering Christ-nation. They identified Polish ethnicity with the traditional rural customs practiced by peasants and the lesser nobility. Supporters of this idea varied from Adam Mickiewicz on the left, who favored armed insurrections against injustice, to Zygmunt Krasi´nski on the right, who opposed them because he thought they reflected atheistic and materialistic values. Poles began to stage the public commemoration of notable figures around 1880. The long career of patriotic historical novelist Józef Ignacy Kraszewski was celebrated in all three partitions in 1879; 11,000 visitors attended the Cracow N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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festivities, including groups of peasants conducted by patriotic and socially minded priests. Elaborate ceremonies also commemorated the bicentenary of Sobieski’s victory over the Turks at Vienna in 1683. Polish nationalism was an “historical nationalism,” to use a phrase by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, hence the Polish nation did not need to be built as much as expanded to embrace passive social groups, such as the peasants and urban poor. The successful development of nationalism in other countries acted as inspiration, but a greater influence was the assimilationist pressure put on Poles by the growing nationalism of the partitioners, which stirred Poles to resist. Active Poles supported the national cause in any way possible. Linguistic issues were foremost. Poles spoke and wrote Polish. When required to study and work in German or Russian, they became bilingual. Poles used state authority to build educational and economic institutions when they controlled the state, and when they did not, they undertook individual and communal action. Pushing the limits of the possible led to armed insurrections that were suppressed, and the cycle started over again. The archetypical figure was the young noblewoman dressed in widows’ weeds, bringing up her children to venerate their father, who had been lost in an insurrection, and the cause of Polish independence. In middle age, still dressed in black, she lived with her widowed daughter (or daughter-inlaw) who had lost her husband in the next insurrection, and the two women instructed the next generation in the cult of nationalism. Economic and social development also became a conscious strategy aimed at keeping Poland and Poles a modern nation. Adopted first in the late 18th century by Poles who found that Poland had fallen behind the West, the government of the Congress Kingdom used the state to develop banking and manufacturing in the 1820s. The phrase “organic work” was adopted by Karol Marcinkowski, a Pozna´n noble who opened a department store in 1846 to encourage Poles to move beyond land ownership. Similarly, the Warsaw Positivists responded to the failure of the 1863–1864 insurrection by telling Poles that their patriotic duty lay in developing economic and cultural modernity. During the “Culture War” of the 1870s and 1880s, Poles resisted an organized campaign to Germanize their territories by founding self-help groups, especially credit unions, so Polish farmers could keep their land and expand their holdings. Cultural and educational societies also helped keep the nation alive. The Ossoli´n ski Collection (Lwów, 1817), Raczy´n ski Library (Pozna´n, 1829), Polish Library (Paris, 1838), Polish National Museum (Raperswil, Switzerland, 1870), and especially the Czartoryski Collection, taken to Paris in 1831 and brought to Cracow in 1862, were only a few. Cultural societies sought mass support to resist the erosion of Polish language during the “Culture War” with imperial Germany in the 1870s and 1880s. The popular press emerged as a vital force at the same time, leading resistance against Germanization. The effort to maintain and expand Polish nationality between the 1770s and the 1880s was remarkably successful. A strong sense of nationhood survived the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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loss of independence and intermittent efforts by the partitioning powers to assimilate the Poles. Military struggle failed to regain independence in 1794, 1830–1831, 1846, and 1863–1864, but Poles, despite their disappointments, continued to devote themselves to the cause of Polish independence. Nationalists took advantage of any possibilities, legal or illegal, to demonstrate their devotion. They spoke, read, and wrote in Polish, joined legal and illegal organizations, and took part in legal and illegal festivities or parades. Selected Bibliography Goldberg, Halina, ed. 2004. The Age of Chopin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kukiel, Marian. 1955. Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770–1861. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Leslie, R. F. 1956. Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830. London: Athlone Press. Leslie, R. F. 1963. Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, 1856–1865. London: Athlone Press. Lukowski, Jerzy. 1991. Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697–1795. London: Routledge. Pienkos, Angela T. 1987. The Imperfect Autocrat: Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich and the Polish Congress Kingdom. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs. Skurnowicz, Joan S. 1981. Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Idea. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs. Trochimczyk, Maja. 2000. “Sacred versus Secular: The Convoluted History of Polish Anthems.” In Polish Music History Series, vol. 6: After Chopin: Essays in Polish Music, edited by Maja Trochimczyk, 246–268. Los Angeles: Friends of Polish Music at USC. Trzeciakowski, Lech. 1990. The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland. Translated by Katarzyna Krektowska. New York: East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1982. Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1989. Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kos´ciuszko. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Wandycz, Piotr S. 1974. The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Zawadzki, W. H. 1993. A Man of Honour: Adam Czartoryski as a Statesman of Russia and Poland, 1795–1831. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Scandinavia Byron Nordstrom Chronology 1730s New histories and extensive descriptive works on Scandinavia are written. 1750s The universities at Copenhagen and Uppsala and the academy at Åbo/ Turku are increasingly centers of research in national history, folk life, geography, topography, and flora and fauna. 1786 Lofthus Rebellion in Norway—in part a protest against Danish rule. 1788 Anjala Conspiracy involving Swedish-speaking officers in Finland opposed to Gustav III’s war with Russia. 1790s Haugean Movement in Norway—largely a religious movement but with some nationalist elements. Jens Svabo develops a Færoese dictionary. 1809 Finland becomes a Grand Duchy of Russia. Jørgen Jørgensen leads a bizarre attempt to establish an independent Iceland, which has virtually no popular support. 1811 The Gothic Society is established in Sweden. 1814 Norwegians draft a constitution at Eidsvoll, elect the Danish prince Christian Frederik as king, and declare their independence on May 17. After a brief war (“The Cats’ War”) with Sweden, the terms of a dynastic union are accepted in November. The Compulsory School Law is established in Denmark. 1816 Icelandic Literary Society is established. 1823 Anders Fryxell publishes his Tales from Swedish History (Berättelser ur svenska historien). 1830 Aftonbladet, Sweden’s first “modern” newspaper, is established. Similar papers appear throughout the area. 1830s Frederik VI moves to establish elected advisory assemblies in absolutist Denmark. 1832–1836 E. G. Geijer publishes his History of the Swedish People (Svenska folkets historia). 1835 Finland’s national epic, The Kalevala, is published. 1840 (Denmark’s) Historisk Tidsskrift is established. 1840s Heyday of Scandinavianism, especially among university students, who hold joint meetings in 1842, 1843, 1845, and 1848. 1841 Finnish Literary Society is founded. 1842 Compulsory Education Law is passed in Sweden. 1843 Iceland’s Althing is restored as an advisory body. 1844 First folk high school is established at Rødding in Denmark. 1848 Absolutism ends in Denmark. A German nationalist rebellion erupts in the Slesvig and Holstein that leads to the Three Years’ War (1848–1852) with the German states over the duchies. Compulsory School Law is enacted in Norway. 1852 The Færoese Lagting is restored as an advisory body. 1854 Venceslaus Hammershaimb’s Færoese orthography is published. 1863 Finnish Parliament meets for the first time since 1809. Language edict guarantees the parity of Finnish with Swedish within 20 years. 1864 Second Danish-German war over Slesvig and Holstein ends in the loss of both duchies. 1866 Swedish National Museum is established. Compulsory School Law is passed in Finland.

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1868 1871 1872 1874 1880 1881 1884 1885 1892 1892–1893 1893 1895 1897 1899 1905 1905–1906 1912 1916 1917 1918

The Norwegian Tourist Association is established. (Norway’s) Historisk Tidsskrift is established. Arthur Hazelius founds the Scandinavian Ethnographic Society in Sweden. A constitution for Iceland is adopted, and autonomy in internal affairs achieved. Sweden’s Nordic Museum is founded (followed by the outdoor museum at Skansen in 1891) by Hazelius. (Sweden’s) Historisk Tidskrift is established. A crisis with Sweden leads to the establishment of genuine parliamentary government in Norway. The Swedish Tourist Association is founded. Nynorsk is given equal status with bokmål in Norway. The Danish National Museum opens. A replica of the Norwegian Viking ship Gokstad sails to America and is on display at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago. (It attracted relatively little attention.) The first celebration in Sweden of June 6 as an (unofficial) national day. Norwegian-Swedish union war scare develops and passes. The Stockholm Exposition opens. The February Manifesto, a statement of the policy of Russification, reduces Finnish autonomy, and the Finns respond with largely passive resistance. The Norwegian-Swedish union is peacefully dissolved, embodied in the Karlstad Conventions. A new Finnish constitution is adopted, and the country enjoys greater autonomy from Russia (for a while). The Stockholm (Summer) Olympics. Finland’s National Museum opens. (Finland’s) Historisk Tidskrift is established. Finland declares its independence from Russia/the Soviet Union in December. Iceland is recognized as a sovereign state in union with Denmark.

Situating the Nations In the late 18th century, the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden were the only fully independent, politically defined states of Scandinavia. Iceland, Norway, the Færoe Islands, Greenland, and the duchies of Slesvig and Holstein were parts of the Danish kingdom; Finland was an integral part of Sweden. This picture changed dramatically between 1809 and 1814. In 1808–1809, Russia defeated Sweden and annexed Finland as a grand duchy of the empire. Five years later, Norway was handed over to Sweden in the Treaty of Kiel, a cynical diplomatic deal struck as part of efforts to build a new anti-Napoleon coalition. The only significant territorial change during the remainder of the 19th century was Denmark’s loss of both Slesvig and Holstein in 1864. Ultimately, Norway gained its independence in 1905, Finland followed in 1917, and Iceland in 1944. To this day, the Færoes remain part of Denmark but have enjoyed local autonomy since 1948. Clearly, the geopolitical simplicity of Scandinavia in this period was complicated by ethnic or nationality complexity. Denmark was a multinational state. Sweden was a binational state. In the years between about 1770 and 1918, Norwegian, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Icelandic, Færoese, German, and Finnish nationalism developed. Beginning as relatively small, mainly intellectual national identity movements in the late 18th century, they became increasingly political and popular during the 19th century and did much to shape the history of the region. In terms of natural resources, this region was relatively rich. Fish were important throughout the area. Denmark’s main economic strengths lay in agriculture and trade. Forest products including timber, charcoal, and pitch and tar were important to Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Iron and copper were particularly important to Sweden. Internal and international trade connections were relatively well developed. Manufacturing was limited; farming was the occupation of most of the area’s people. Although there were many towns, few were large. During the century under review, much of Scandinavia experienced the transformations involved in the process of modernization, including at least the beginnings of industrialization, urbanization, the growth of the middle class and the creation of an industrial working class, intense internal migration and mass emigration, and the beginnings of political democratization. Social class involvement in developing national ideals changed over time. In the 18th century, it was primarily the nobility, growing bourgeoisie, and tiny intellectual class that were most involved. The first two groups were most interested N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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in defining the nation around a hierarchic social structure in which they were predominant. Intellectuals were more interested in definitions based on history, geography, or culture. The social context broadened during the 19th century, when the nobilities of Denmark and Sweden lost influence while the landowning farmers and bourgeoisie gained. At the same time, the national ideals developed an interesting two-level focus. Part was on the peasantry and their folk cultures; the other was on modernity and the emerging industrial societies. All these developments took place in widely differing and dynamic historical contexts. In Sweden they occurred in relative safety and domestic calm. The country’s modern political independence dated to 1523, and, after 1815, it avoided participation in virtually all of Europe’s wars. Denmark was also an old and established state. However, it experienced a great deal of turmoil in the 19th century, much of which developed at the fringes of the kingdom—in Slesvig and Holstein, the Færoe Islands, and Iceland. Because Finland, Iceland, and Norway were not independent states, their nationalisms developed in much more intensely politicized settings.

Instituting the Nations The long period under review can be divided into at least three subperiods. During the first of these, 1770–1800, national identities and nationalism were generally cultivated by the Crown, small elites, and intellectuals acting in what they defined as national interests. Except in times of war, when nationalist rhetoric became more broadly aimed, there were only a few instances of wider, “popular” involvement. During a second period, 1800–1840, political activity aimed at national independence or autonomy based largely on small, politically articulate elites grew, especially in Finland and Norway; extensive and intensive research and publishing flourished in history, folklore, and language centering on (but not limited to) the universities in Copenhagen, Uppsala, and Oslo; and national Romantic schools of painting, characterized by grand landscapes and depictions of folk life, developed. All of this activity contributed to growing senses of national identity in the region, but the portion of the population in any of the Nordic countries actually engaged by these developments remained small. A third period, 1840–1880, was characterized by growing political activity organized by changing elites and aimed at the expanding popular bases generated by the increasingly representative nature of the region’s political systems. At the same time, ongoing intellectual and scholarly work, the development of compulsory elementary education systems that incorporated curricula with important national components, and the expansion of such media as newspapers that played important roles in engaging popular involvement in the nationalist agenda helped define the period. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Gothicism/Göticism Early historical events and institutions, such as representative assemblies as well as myths and sagas such as the Eddas, were incorporated into elaborate national histories written and rewritten during the Medieval and early modern periods. These “histories” resulted in complex national mythologies, such as gothicism/göticism, which had its origins in the 15th century in Sweden. This idea was advanced by Olaus Magnus in the 16th century and by the late 17th-century scholar Olof Rudbeck, who was also one of the discoverers of the lymphatic system. It remained part of Sweden’s historical canon well into the 19th century. Among its claims was that Sweden was the home of the Goths, whose migrations peopled the continent and contributed to the rise of virtually all of Europe’s nations. Equally fanciful was the idea that the lost city of Atlantis was located somewhere off Sweden’s eastern coast.

In all cases, the development of the personal, institutional, intellectual, and cultural foundations that made up national doctrines in the Scandinavian states was part of very long processes. Initially, they took their impetus from the political center. For example, Gustav II Adolf worked to foster a Swedish national consciousness in the early 17th century to bolster support for his wars, and his model was followed by virtually every monarch through the 18th century. The state Lutheran church played a leading part in this effort by carrying the national message to the common people. In the late 18th century, intellectuals played increasingly important roles in the development of national awareness, especially by defining the nation in terms of its people, history, geography, nature, resources, and cultures. This influence can be seen in the new histories, both natural and human, that were written in the period. Also important was the development of groups within the social elites, such as the Swedish-speaking military officers in Finland and the merchant elite of Norway, who adopted increasingly political national agendas. For example, in the summer of 1788, Sweden’s king, Gustav III, started a war with Russia, for which the country was ill prepared. In August of that year, a group of Swedish-speaking army officers stationed in and identifying with Finland joined together to oppose the war in what is called the Anjala Confederation or the Anjala Conspiracy. Declaring themselves to be acting in the interests of the Finnish nation, they took steps to reach a separate peace with the Russian empress, Catherine II. Although their efforts were unsuccessful, their actions indicated a growing sentiment among the noble-military elite in Finland that separation from Sweden was in the Finnish nation’s best interests. The national agenda of the Norwegian merchant elite came to the fore in 1814, one of the most important dates in all of Norwegian history. Separatist interests had been growing for at least a decade, fed by the miseries caused in Norway by the Napoleonic wars. In January 1814, the country’s situation changed entirely when it was transferred to Sweden under the terms of the Treaty of Kiel. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Ignoring this development, a group of upper-class merchants met in Eidsvoll with the Danish prince, Christian Frederik, in February 1814. Agreement was reached to pursue efforts to establish an independent Norway. Two months later, a more broadly representative assembly gathered at Eidsvoll. In a matter of weeks it had produced a constitution. On May 17, that constitution was accepted, and Christian Frederik was declared king. Sweden opposed these moves, tensions increased, and a brief “war” was conducted. In the late fall of 1814, the Norwegians

Gustav II Adolf, King of Sweden from 1611 to 1632. (Courtesy of the Swedish Institute)

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agreed to a union with Sweden. However, the terms of this settlement left Norway largely autonomous and with its own constitution. The union lasted until 1905.

Defining the Nations The Nordic nationalisms of this period were based more on ethno-cultural definitions, and/or on objective arguments (e.g., Norway and Iceland’s histories as independent states, or the threat to Finland that continued Swedish control presented), than on subjective arguments. There were, however, conflicts that complicated the process of national development. Strong regionalism existed throughout the region, determined in part by geography. The seas, fjords, rivers, lakes, marshes and bogs, mountains, and forests of Scandinavia divided the peoples of this region, and resolving differences and determining inclusiveness are themes that recur throughout this period. Finland was a bilingual state composed of Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking peoples. Both considered themselves Finns. The Germans in Denmark and the Danes in the duchies presented a different kind of problem. A central question was about where Denmark did or should end and Germany begin. The two Slesvig-Holstein wars (1848–1851 and 1864) were fought over this question, and even then it was not resolved. It was not until 1920, when a plebiscite was held in the border region of north Slesvig, that a stable border was determined. In northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland, the Sami had been a significant minority for centuries. In the period under review, these indigenous people were subject to laws and policies designed to force assimilation. Language was also a vital element in this defining process, especially in the Færoes, Finland, Iceland, and Norway. Faeroese had to be rescued from virtual extinction—largely through the work of Hans Christian Lyngbye and, especially, Venceslaus Hammershaimb. Language was a major divider of people in Finland. Although Finnish speakers made up about 80 percent of the country’s population, the official language of Finland was Swedish. Around 1860, an intense period of conflict began that did not really end when Finnish won legal parity with Swedish as an official language around 1880. Some people believed that only Finnish speakers were true Finns. In Norway, native dialects had been undermined by centuries of Danish being used as the official language of the church and the state. Norway’s language situation was confused and complex. Most people spoke a local dialect, while the language of officials and the clergy was generally Danish—with Norwegian pronunciation. The desire to have a common, national language became especially strong in the second half of the 19th century. Norway was a particularly interesting case since two languages competed for the designation as the national language of Norway. One was represented by Knud Knudsen, who worked to create a basic Norwegian out of the DanoNorwegian blended language through spelling and pronunciation standardization. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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This language came to be known as bokmål. The other option, advocated by Ivar Aasen, was a new language, nynorsk. It was based on the dialects of the fjord districts of western Norway and the mountain districts of the east. Knudsen’s option was the most popular, but Aasen’s was given legal equality in 1884.

Narrating the Nations National definitions were created through the history, literature, art, theater, music, language, and folk culture of the Scandinavian countries during what might be called a long 19th century that ran from about 1780 to 1918. A canon of great people and events, geographic and cultural traits, and material evidence was assembled in each country. For the Danes, the high points in this chronicle lay in the exploits of the Viking age, the primacy of Denmark in Scandinavia from the late 14th to the late 16th centuries, its great rulers, its ancient institutions, and its honest and hardworking people. Finns identified with an ancient folklore, their role in making Sweden a great power, the sufferings they endured because of the Swedes, the triumph of a long-repressed language, and, in the 19th century, the struggle to be Finns within the Russian empire. Icelanders treasured their history, their parliament (Althing), the sagas, and their struggle against the Danes. Norwegians looked to their Viking age and medieval achievements, to the richness of their folk culture, to the struggle against oppression at the hands first of the Danes and then the Swedes, and to the events of 1814 that became absolutely central in their national canon. Swedes, too, reveled in the mythical and real of their medieval past, highlighted their 16th- and 17th-century history when the country escaped the tyranny of Denmark and became the leading power in northern Europe, and celebrated the richness of their people and natural resources. Each of the Scandinavian countries had stories of mythical and historical individuals who were considered important institutors of the nation—some of whom lived long before the 18th century. For Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes they included Viking-age kings such as Harald Bluetooth (Denmark), Harald Fairhair and Olav II (Norway), and Olof Skötkonung and St. Erik (Sweden). Also important were monarchs from the Middle Ages whose achievements included law codes and more effective administrative structures, such as Valdemar IV (Denmark), Haakon IV and Magnus VI (Norway), and Birger Jarl, Magnus Ladulås, and Magnus Eriksson (Sweden). Early modern national heroes included Christian III, Christian IV, and Frederick II in Denmark, and Gustav I Vasa, Gustav II Adolf, and Charles XII in Sweden. Each country also had a catalog of important great nobles and religious leaders—first for the Catholic period and then for the Reformation. The Icelanders had in Landnámabók a record of the land claims of the island’s first settlers, dating to the ninth century. Also important were the many real and fictional medieval heroes, such as Egil Skalagrímsson from Egil’s Saga, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Detail of a manuscript containing the Icelandic sagas, written between the 12th and 14th centuries. The sagas described events that took place mainly in Iceland in the 10th and early 11th centuries. (Arctic-Images/Corbis)

whose lives were recounted in the Icelandic sagas, or the characters of orally transmitted folktales such as those that formed the bases for Finland’s national epic, The Kalevala. In addition, there were the legal institutions, such as the representative assemblies common to the entire region (thing or ting), early law codes, historic provinces, pagan religions, and a wealth of folk customs. All of the Nordic countries also defined themselves in terms of their people and their earliest histories. Again, this effort is evident in their use of pre-Christian myths, such as those contained in the Eddas or Ynglinga Saga or in the Icelandic family sagas that dealt with ordinary people and their struggles and achievements. During the 18th century and 19th centuries, ongoing efforts were made to define each of the Nordic countries through history, geography, folklore, biology, sociology, and so on. Enlightenment-era multivolume histories were authored by Ludwig Holberg (ca. 1730) and P. F. Suhm (ca. 1780) in Denmark, Gerhard Schöning in Norway, and Olof Dalin and Sven Lagerbring in Sweden. In the 19th century, the German historian Leopold von Ranke’s emphasis on the nation as the central element in historical studies prevailed throughout Scandinavia. This school was reflected in the works of Marcus Rubin, Kristian Erslev, and F. Troels-Lund in Denmark. The “Norwegian Historical School” developed around faculty at the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Viking Age A very interesting argument centers on how history has been used to define the Scandinavian nations. According to this theory, the whole notion of a “Viking age” was created, mainly in the 19th century. The past, in other words, was “colonized,” or taken possession of, and then exploited. Any evidence for the Viking age, much of it coming from the new discipline of archaeology, was selectively accumulated to support the idea of a period in which some kind of unified Viking culture existed when the peoples from Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in this case) were important in shaping a world that stretched from Newfoundland in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east. Particularly important for 19th-century Scandinavian nationalists was the connection made between the Vikings and their present. To them, the modern Scandinavian states and their people descended directly from the Vikings.

new university in Christiania/Oslo that included Rudolf Keyser, P. A. Munch, Christian Lange, and Carl Anger. In Sweden, the national perspective shaped the works of Erik Gustaf Geijer, Esias Tegnér, and Harald Hjärne. In each country, associations for historians and academic journals (Historisk tidsskrift) were founded as the discipline became increasingly professionalized. Folklore collections were as important and probably reached larger audiences than the histories. Here, the works of Elias Lönnrot in Finland, Jón Arason (whose 16th-century works became increasingly popular in the 19th century) and Magnus Grímsson in Iceland, and Peter C. Asbjørnsen and Jørgen Moe in Norway were particularly important. Lönnrot’s The Kalevala, first published in 1835, is Finland’s national epic. In addition, writers and intellectuals in various fields in each country contributed to the development of national literatures. Outstanding examples include Adam Oehlenschläger, Søren Kierkegaard, N. F. S. Grundtvig, and Hans Christian Andersen in Denmark; Johan L. Runeberg and Zacharias Topelius in Finland; Bjarni Thorarensen and Jónas Hallgrímsson in Iceland; Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, Henrik Ibsen, and Johan Welhaven in Norway; and Esias Tegnér, August Strindberg, and Verner von Heidenstam in Sweden. Similarly, composers like Edvard Grieg in Norway and Jean Sibelius in Finland drew upon folk tunes in their works, and national themes appeared repeatedly in paintings from the national Romantic period in the early half of the century and in the naturalistic works from the latter half. Landscapes, national heroes, and scenes from history or everyday life were the frequent themes of artists like C. J. Dahl, Adolph Tidemand, Gustaf Cederström, Carl Larsson, and Otto Bache.

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for short-term policies. They used the pulpit, the press, symbols, pageantry, and grand events as tools in these efforts. On the other hand, the small elites interested in national issues tended to speak to themselves, although their ideas were spread well beyond the group via early newspapers, the tavern, and so on. By the mid-19th century, political groups had been organized to articulate and spread national ideals, such as Denmark’s National Liberals. The growing popular press and greater educational opportunities dovetailed with these developments. By the closing years of the century, every social group was targeted, and nationalism crossed social and political lines. It was an important element in the growing middle-class ideology, and it was a favorite theme of the still large and influential agrarian class(es). Although internationalism was an element of both labor union and socialist movements, the new working classes were well aware of nationalism, were the subjects of barrages of indoctrination, and were attracted by it. Communicating these national identities was accomplished through many means. Already high levels of literacy in much of the region were increased through compulsory school systems that developed mostly in the second half of the 19th century. The curricula of these systems were specifically designed to teach national ideas and values. Concurrently, the number of books, magazines, and newspapers rose, and prices fell. Libraries, fixed and traveling, became more common. Interestingly, in Iceland there was only one printing press until relatively late in the 19th century. However, the number of books was surprising large. Many of them were handmade copies. Also, reading, privately and aloud to others, was part of the rural culture. Another medium for communicating the emerging national canon was the museum. Throughout the region local museums and, more important symbolically, national museums were established, generally around 1880, that were dedicated to collecting and displaying to a general public each country’s national treasures. Paralleling these were museums dedicated to the folk cultures of the region, such as Sweden’s Nordic Museum, founded by the ethnographer Arthur Hazelius in 1880. A very interesting and popular tool for educating the public about the nation and encouraging identification with it were trade expositions. The earliest of these to be held in Scandinavia dates from the 1820s. They were designed to display a country’s economic resources, technological achievements, and industrial products. Gradually, however, they became larger and more complex. By the close of the century, they were truly national (and sometimes international) expositions, designed by middle-class, capitalist organizers to show off the power and productivity potential of the country and to encourage all social groups to accept their definition of the nation, one that focused on modernity, industry, and progress. The Stockholm Exposition of 1897 clearly exemplified these developments. In addition, there was the adoption and popularization of symbols, including flags, currencies, national anthems, and holidays. Denmark’s red and white flag, the Danebrog, carried with it an ancient (and largely mythical) legend about its appearance at the Battle of Volmer in 1219. Norwegians used the issue of a “pure” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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flag rather than the oddly combined Norwegian and Swedish flags of the 19th century as a wedge issue in their struggle for autonomy and then independence. The acts of creating national flags in Finland and Iceland were important national moments. The national anthems gradually adopted included Denmark’s “Der er et yndigt land” (“There Is a Beautiful Land”), Finland’s “Maamme” (“Our Land”), Iceland’s “Lofsöngur” (“Song of Praise”), Norway’s “Ja, Vi elsker Dette Landet” (“Yes, We Love This Land”), and Sweden’s “Du Gamla, Du Fria” (“You Old, You Free”). Celebrated days included Denmark’s Constitution Day, June 5 (1849); Norway’s Constitution Day, May 17 (1814); and Sweden’s June 6—marking Gustav I Vasa’s recognition as king of an independent Sweden in 1523 and the date on which a new constitution was accepted in 1809.

Norway’s National Anthem Yes, we love with fond devotion This our land that looms Rugged, storms-carried o’er the ocean, With her thousand homes. Love her, in our love recalling Those who gave us birth. And old tales which night, in falling, Brings as dreams to earth Norseman, whatsoe’er thy station, Thank thy God, Whose power Willed and wrought the land’s salvation In her darkest hour. All our mothers sought with weeping And our sires in fight, God has fashioned, in His keeping, Till we gained our right. Yes, we love with fond devotion This our land that looms Rugged, storm-scarred o’er the ocean, With her thousand homes. And, as warrior sires have made her Wealth and fame increase, At the call we too will aid her, Armed to guard her peace. The lyrics were written by Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (1832–1910), one of Norway’s most prolific writers and intellectuals, between 1859 and 1863. The tune was composed by Rikard Nordraak (1842–1866). It was adopted as the national song in 1864 and sung at celebrations at Eidsvoll on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the events of 1814. About the song, Bjørnson wrote: “[T]his National Anthem of ours is free and open as the day, it soars upwards without a threat, it shows determination unmarred by boasting” (see http:// www.national-anthems.org/history.php).

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The years between 1880 and 1918 witnessed the culmination of many of these trends, and they form a crucial period in the development of Nordic nationalisms. The political agendas that were based on nationalism were largely fulfilled. Norway achieved full independence from Sweden in 1905. Finland secured its independence from (Soviet) Russia in 1917. Iceland was granted autonomy by Denmark in 1918 and declared its independence in 1944. The Færoes, probably too small to stand alone, remained part of Denmark but secured local autonomy after World War II. These developments and a kind of consensus regarding national definition in each of the Nordic countries removed national agendas from the politics of Scandinavia. To some degree, however, the situation has changed over the last several decades. The Sami, a people indigenous to northern Scandinavia, have been increasingly assertive in establishing their cultural uniqueness and political autonomy. Also, growing ethnic diversity is replacing the homogeneity of Scandinavian populations. The result of large-scale immigration, this change is opening a new chapter in the history of what it means, especially, to be a Dane, Norwegian, or Swede. Selected Bibliography Barton, H. Arnold. 2003. Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814–1905. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Derry, T. K. 1973. A History of Modern Norway. London: Oxford University Press. Ekström, Anders. 1994. Den utställda världen: Stockholmsutställningen 1897 och 1800-talets världutställningar. Stockholm: Nordisk museets Handlingar 119. (Includes an English summary.) Frängmyr, Tore. 2000. Svensk idéhistoria: Bildning och vetenskap under tusen år. 2 vols. Stockholm: Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur. Hamalainen, Pekka. 1979. In Time of Storm: Revolution, Civil War, and the Ethnolinguistic Issue in Finland. Albany: State University Press of New York. Jespersen, Knud. 2004. A History of Denmark. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Karlsson, Gunnar. 2000. The History of Iceland. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Lagerqvist, Lars O. 2003. A History of Sweden. Stockholm: The Swedish Institute. Lavery, Jason. 2006. The History of Finland. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Nordstrom, Byron. 2000. Scandinavia since 1500. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Nordstrom, Byron. 2002. A History of Sweden. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Singleton, Fred. 1998. A Short History of Finland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Svanberg, Frederik. 2004. Decolonizing the Viking Age. Vol. 1. Lund, Sweden: Acta Archaeologica Lundensia Series in 80 No. 43.

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Scotland Graeme Morton Chronology 1297 1305 1306 1314 1320 1603 1707 1715 1745 1746 1760s 1790s 1814 1832 1852 1856 1861 1869 1885 1886 1892 1894 1900 1913 1918 1919 1926 1928 1934

Battle of Stirling Bridge. William Wallace, Guardian of Scotland, executed. Robert I, the Bruce, accedes to the throne. Battle of Bannockburn. Declaration of Arbroath. Union of Crowns between Scotland and England. Union of parliaments between Scotland and England. First major Jacobite uprising. Second major Jacobite uprising. Battle of Culloden, defeat of the Jacobites. Improvements in the Scottish economy. Republican ideas circulate. William Wallace depicted in first modern statue. Electoral franchise opened to the middle classes in Scotland and England. National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR) formed. National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights dissolved. National Wallace Monument Movement formed. Foundation stone laid for National Wallace Monument, Stirling. National Wallace Monument opened. Scottish Office created. Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) formed. SHRA splits from Scottish Liberal Party. Scottish Grand Committee created. Scottish Home Rule Association disbanded. Young Scots Society formed. International Scots Home Rule League formed. Scottish Home Rule Association re-formed. Scottish National League formed. Scottish National Movement (SNM) formed. National Party of Scotland (NPS) formed. Scottish National Party formed from SNM and NPS.

Situating the Nation The modern age of nationalism has impressively long roots in Scotland, with key heroes and battles of the 13th and 14th centuries resonating throughout and structuring the political idea of nation. The patriot warrior William Wallace N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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(1270?–1305); the patriot king Robert I, the Bruce (1274–1329); and a key statement, the Declaration of Arbroath (1320), forged the nation for later generations. The declaration made clear that the nobles, barons, and freeholders, the “community of the realm,” entrusted Bruce as their king but vowed to remove him upon betrayal of that community. The divine right of kingship was broken in favor of accountability to the people, and the statement offered a rhetoric so strong and clear that it has inspired later generations (if not contemporaries): “It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom— for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself.” This period, known by later historians as the wars of independence, is credited with establishing Scotland’s independence from England, never again to be conquered militarily. In the 18th century, these medieval heroes enabled Scotland to enter political union with England in 1707 as a free nation. It was to be a union of equals, where Scotland and England each dispensed of their parliaments to create a new political structure, Great Britain. That union has framed Scottish nationalism thereafter. By the 1770s, once the political and monarchical threat of Jacobitism had truly receded, Scotland developed a sense of national identity and, at times, nationalism within the parameters of regal and political union with England. Political union meant that Scotland was brought into a new British state identity, but it did not result in the nation being undermined. Part of the strength of this British identity has been played out through its empire. Scots found the opportunities of empire to be attractive, more open than the prospects in England, and more lucrative than jobs at home. Access to Britain’s extensive overseas markets was advantageous throughout the 19th century—the market penetration of Scotland’s steel and ship-making industries at the end of the period, as well as the banking and finance sector, were especially notable. Despite this later success, the economic benefits of union were uneven and slow to materialize in Scotland. The anti-union riots that greeted its passage were indications of the political and monarchical instability of the time. The two major Jacobite uprisings in 1715 and 1745, plus the more minor skirmishes of 1708 and 1719, created a difficult environment for cross-border trade and technological transfer. By the 1760s, the Scottish economy was beginning to transform, although it brought with it much dislocation for the weakest land workers. The linen and cattle trades were bringing in valuable income, yet Scotland’s economy had to overcome its relative isolation from the richer markets in England and central Europe. In earlier periods, Scotland benefited from links to the east, to Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and to Poland. In the 1760s and 1770s, the focus was to the west, with the tobacco trade to and from the Americas at the fore. For the Glasgow merchants who dominated all but 2 percent of Britain’s trade in these two decades, and the banks that supported them, it was a “golden” prosperity, producing an elite and architecture to match. Here, geography gave Scotland an economic lead, with shorter sailing routes around the north of Ireland giving it an advantage over the southern ports of England. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Instituting the Nation The second half of the 18th century was one of great intellectual activity and did much to place Scotland in a British and European context. Coming out of a relatively small elite, although an urbanized one, a series of philosophical and historical giants, including Adam Smith (bap. 1723–1790), David Hume (1711–1776), Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), and William Robertson (1721–1793), as well as their acolytes, framed Scotland’s development within the progress of the age. Debating and self-improvement clubs and societies, linked to four ancient universities, produced a vigorous social and political analysis that was of international importance. It was an elite who celebrated the constitutional development of England and embraced the union of 1707 as a means of ensuring Scotland’s own evolution into modernity. It was a discourse that encouraged integration rather than separation from England, although it has been criticized by later nationalists for that stand. At a time when the concept of nationalism was taking on its modern form after the 1789 revolution in France, Scotland’s intellectual elites were taking on the clothes of others. Access to English markets and to those of the British empire, throughout the 19th century in particular, carried Scotland ever deeper into the political structure of Great Britain. But dual national identities were clear to be seen, and they structured who the Scots believed themselves to be. Along with additional legislation later that year, the negotiations that produced the union of parliaments in 1707 put into place a framework that has enabled the Scottish nation to remain distinct. Three key institutions were enshrined. Scotland maintained its own Roman-based legal system rather than being incorporated into the common-law origins of English law. As a result, the parliament of Great Britain legislates separately for Scotland. Sometimes this process has been relatively straightforward, as with the expansion of the electoral franchise in 1832 when the legislation was passed almost concurrently. Sometimes there has been a longer gap, as with the second reform of the franchise that occurred in 1867 in England but in 1868 in Scotland, and some legislation has bypassed Scotland altogether, such as the 1848 Public Health Act (England and Wales). Legislation accompanying the Act of 1707 ensured that the Presbyterian system of Protestantism was maintained in Scotland in contrast to Anglicanism in England. Each was an established religion, the official religion of the state, but they were kept distinct. The Church of Scotland and its governing assembly maintained a significant role in all aspects of Scottish life and welfare, and its centrality to the relief of poverty and pauperism only started to break down after the 1840s. Thirdly, Scotland’s educational system was maintained as institutionally distinct. Built up from a belief—a myth—of egalitarianism embodied in a range of different schools at the elementary level, its universities in the late 18th and 19th centuries gave emphasis to philosophical thought and intellectual breadth over specialization. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The disjunction between a British state and the institutions of the Scottish nation, institutions that the union of 1707 enshrined, has been fundamental. For governance in the 18th century, political managers were employed to oversee the running of Scotland, with local affairs kept local. This constitutional position was favored throughout Britain, with opposition raised to overcentralized government. Parish, county, and ultimately municipal governments were celebrated as the most flexible and responsive form of government; as taxation laws were extended, local government offered the closest tie between taxpayer and expenditure. The impact of this ideology was to encourage Scotland to keep its legislative difference, although it would still complain when it felt it lacked the legislation it needed. By the mid-19th century, the first organized nationalist group, the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR) could warn of the revolutions that had engulfed Europe. It was overcentralized government that had shattered the states of France, Hungary, Poland, and Italy, they argued. It warned that the nations of Britain could experience similar disruption if government were to centralize further. Although in existence for a short period, this group campaigned for more powers to be given to the localities to govern the nation from within. Importantly, these nationalists did not argue for a devolved or in any way separate parliament. Any such structure was regarded as another layer of bureaucracy and too distant from the people who, it was argued, were best served by local power centers in their own communities. Local government was to keep Scotland free within the British state structure. This philosophy, of unionist-nationalism, was the product of a separate nation forged during the medieval period and politically joined with England before the modern age of nationalism.

The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (1852–1856) This association was established to campaign for equal treatment of Scotland in matters ceremonial and heraldic, and it had a long list of practical complaints, from public spending on palaces and parks, lack of military spending in Scotland (compared to England), the loss of the Scottish Excise Office in 1843, and the loss of the Privy Council to deal with Scottish affairs. The danger of overcentralized government, undermining local issues and local solutions, was deemed a threat to Scotland’s nationhood. The association’s cosecretaries were the Romantic novelist James Grant and his brother John. The Tory peer Archibald William Montgomerie (1812–1861), Earl of Englinton and Winton, was president, and its political support came from the Free Church liberal Charles Cowan (1801–1889), Member of Parliament for Edinburgh. In all its campaigning for the continuing recognition of Scotland as a nation, it declared loyalty to the union with England and to Victoria as queen.

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Defining the Nation Scotland’s territorial borders have been remarkably consistent for a nation with such a long history of warfare with its more powerful land neighbor. The border town of Berwick-upon-Tweed changed hands almost constantly between the Scottish and the English in the medieval and early modern period, finally becoming a “Scottish” town in England after 1482, its English jurisdiction only confirmed in 1885. The border has a long history of skirmishes and raids between the two nations. It created a rich Borders identity that mixes local and national history with monarchical and religious symbolism, but the border has not otherwise framed the Scottish nation. Rather, the Scottish nation has been defined through its institutions and a number of associated identities. One of those identities has been racially constructed. Scotland, along with Ireland and the fringes of England and northern France, was defined at home and abroad as “Celtic” in contrast to

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Anglo-Saxon or “Germanic” England. The Celt fostered a fear of the unknown in the first half of the 18th century, projected as a mysterious and somewhat barbarous people. Following the defeat of the Jacobite forces on the battlefield of Culloden near Inverness in 1746, the Scots were then presented in official accounts and in art and travel writings as no longer a threat but instead were idealized as “noble savages,” a militaristic society of unsophisticated honesty and reliability. In both constructions, and in those that were to follow, the Celt was contrasted to the complexities of urbanizing and industrializing England. Scotland was represented as the land of the poet Ossian (Scotland’s Homer), where an oral culture had precedence over the written form and where the mystical beauty of its landscape inspired music as well as verse. By the 19th century, the Celt was increasingly feminized in distinction to the masculine Anglo-Saxon. Closer to nature, the Celt was melancholy rather than progressive and irrational compared to the conventions and rigid moralities to the south. The notion confirmed Scotland’s culture as being less sophisticated and therefore “inferior” or less advanced along the stages of cultural evolution identified by the Enlightenment philosophers. It was to be an ethnic label applied to all of Scotland, no matter how inappropriate, especially for Lowland and industrial Scotland. Indeed, many of the elites of Lowland Scotland were part of those who propagated this contrast. Aspects of Scotland’s distinctiveness were even absorbed into the wider British culture. Tartan and the kilt, for example, shifted from being the dress of Highland Scotland, crudely characterized as the Celts, to markers of the whole nation and Scotland’s ethnic contribution to Britain. The promotion of all things tartan by Queen Victoria (reigned 1837–1901), at her Aberdeenshire estate Balmoral, was the aristocratic epitome of this absorption.

Narrating the Nation The projection of ethnic differences constructed to fit contemporary mores in England and Lowland Scotland created markers of nationality that would contribute to the better integration of Scotland into Great Britain. The creation of the British Parliament in 1707 gave Scotland a series of state and constitutional structures to call upon in the 1770–1880 period. Its elites chose from England’s (older) constitutional history, made the most of access to the markets of empire, and, as we have seen, the nation retained its own institutional differences, most importantly in law and religion. Within this structure, Scotland produced and celebrated national narratives that commemorated its history. The last land battle fought on British soil, at Culloden moor in 1746, saw the defeat of the “Young Pretender” Charles Edward Stuart’s claim to the British throne. This event marked the political end of Jacobitism, yet the heroic failure of the Stuarts was transformed into a cultural critique of British constitutionalism. Charles Edward N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Jacobitism This is the term derived from the Latin Jacobus, meaning James, given to supporters of the Stuart line of James VII of Scotland, II of England, deposed in 1688. The removal of the Catholic Stuarts for the Protestant rule of William III (reigned 1689–1702) and Mary II (reigned 1689–1694) had mixed support in Presbyterian Scotland. Jacobite-involved uprisings against the British throne followed in 1708, 1719, and 1744 and most directly in 1715 and 1745 with French military support and the loyalty of some Highland chiefs. The failure of Charles Edward Stuart (1720–1788), the “Young Pretender,” to win back the throne of his grandfather, or fulfill the claim of his father, was to be the final act. The Jacobite army of the ‘45 marched to Derby outside London before retreating and being defeated against British forces at Culloden moor outside Inverness in 1746. This brutal rout, the suppression that befell the losers, and Charles’s flight to France disguised as “Betty Burke,” set the parameters for a powerful nationalist narrative. Once the political and military threat had receded in the 1770s, support for the movement was maintained in song, broadside, poem, and story. Often sentimentalized, Jacobitism continues to hold sway over Scotland’s national imagination.

himself was transformed into “Bonnie Prince Charlie,” a reflection of his early handsomeness and fondness for female company, but also gist for the romance of the story. His dramatic escape from the battlefield, then the flight from South Uist for Skye dressed as “Betty Burke,” the servant of Flora MacDonald, before heading for exile in France and Italy was celebrated in poetry and song. From the early 18th century, Jacobite pamphlets circulated throughout society along with songs, broadsides, and squibs. The famed Scottish poet Robert Burns (1759–1796) was a sympathizer who produced some of the most famous Jacobite songs such as “Ye Jacobites by Name” and “The Highland Widow’s Lament.” James Hogg’s Jacobite Relics of Scotland (1819–1821) kept up the elegiac tradition in print. The narrative was then taken over by Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832), who balanced a Romantic Jacobitism with a hard-headed support for English constitutionalism and union, first seen in his novel on the 1745 uprising, Waverley; or ’Tis Sixty Years Since (1814). The first print run of the book, 1,000 copies, was sold out in two days and showed the continued appetite for the Jacobite narrative, even when published by an unknown novelist (Scott kept his authorship secret until 1827). By 1888, the centenary of Charles Edward’s death was marked by a concert and a major exhibition the next year, with over 1,000 artifacts on display and noteworthy for a visit by Queen Victoria. In 1884 “The Skye Boat Song,” commemorating Bonnie Prince Charlie’s escape with Flora MacDonald, was published and remained one of the most popular Jacobite songs of the late 20th century. Matching this trope of loss and sorrow within the British constitutional structure was a renewed emphasis on the martyrdom of the medieval patriot William Wallace. Within what was to become a Victorian obsession with individualism and romantic valor, Wallace was used to celebrate the distinctiveness of the Scottish nation in a way that did not threaten loyalty to the Crown or the political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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arrangements of the age. Harry’s epic poem The Wallace (ca. 1480) had long popularized Wallace’s deeds, valor, and martyrdom, with sufficient historical truth, intertwined with error and embellishments, to sustain this patriot as the dominant folk hero. A version of his life written in modern Scots by Hamilton of Gilbertfield in 1722 reimagined the story for a new society, especially Burns, and a glossary was compiled by Dr. John Jamieson in 1820 to translate the less well-known Scots words into an anglicized form. The excessive (English) bloodletting, which was a prominent feature of Harry’s verse, was lessened for a Victorian audience. Wallace was depicted in a whole series of chapbooks as a self-made hero, an egalitarian who fought for his people against overwhelming odds and without the support of the aristocratic elite. It was the love of his country, or just for love, that was his motivation. A wildly popular romantic version of his life by Jane Porter (1776–1850), The Scottish Chiefs, first published in 1810, was reissued time and time again throughout the century. Wallace’s deeds against the English foe, his victory at the battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297, his outlaw existence in the early 1300s, his defiance of English rule through his guerrilla actions, all achieved from humble origins (in fact, he was the younger son of a minor knight), made him an inspiration. His betrayal, capture, and execution in 1305 made him a martyr. It was from 1814 that the fashion for commemorating Wallace in stone took grip. As befitted his republican sympathies in the 1790s, David Stuart Erskine (1742–1829), the 11th Earl of Buchan, commissioned the first likeness of Wallace in a 21½-foot-tall statue on his land in the Scottish Borders (despite there being no contemporary likeness to base it upon). Statues to Wallace littered southwestern and Lowland Scotland: in Falkirk (1810), Ayr (1819, 1831), Lanark (1820), Craigie in Ayrshire (1855), Stirling (1855, 1880s), Aberdeen (1888), Robroystone (1900), Elderslie (1912), and Edinburgh (1929). Inability to choose between Scotland’s two largest cities, Edinburgh and Glasgow, for situating a national memorial to Wallace allowed Abbey Craig in Stirling, which overlooked the site of the patriot’s greatest victory in 1297, to be chosen. All these monuments were financed with private money through subscriptions or bequests. The organizing committee for the National Wallace Monument was formed in 1856, struggled to meet the final cost, which doubled the original estimate to become £13,401, but achieved their goal with the inauguration of the monument in 1869. The inspirational story of Wallace affected not just Victorian society at home but also those abroad, with letters in support of the monument from the European nationalists Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872), Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882), Louis Blanc (1811–1882), and Louis Kossuth (1802–1884). Wallace monuments were built by the Scottish communities in Ballarat outside Melbourne in 1889 and in Baltimore in 1893. The Scottish-born American industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie funded a “crown” to set atop the newly completed national monument at Stirling and commissioned busts for a hall of heroes in its tower. Scotland had a national patriot of international importance, but still the union with England was to remain. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Statue of Scottish national hero William Wallace (ca.1274–1305) in Aberdeen, Scotland. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

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The nationalists were filling a gap where no political organization existed to mobilize Scotland’s patriotism. They kept up with the rhetoric of midcentury: Scotland was not a region but an independent nation in negotiated union with England. Without this union being balanced, the whole structure would be threatened. It was a curious position, with the nationalists warning against breaking the union but predicting its demise if the Scottish nation was ignored.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation There is a perception that because political nationalism pushing for a single unitary state bypassed Scotland in the century after the American Revolution that the idea of nation was somehow weakened. There was no deployment of violence or aggression to demand concessions from the state, and compared to Ireland, Scotland showed solid commitment to the constitution of Great Britain. Its first nationalist grouping, the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (1852–1856), was relatively powerless and comprised a disparate collection of interests. It came late, if the 1848 revolutions are deemed to be the correct time. Indeed, Scotland did not get a Young Scotland until 1900, well after the uprisings of its supposed counterparts Young Italy (1834, 1844) and Young Ireland (1848). The NAVSR was a product of its time, warning that centralization of government, to the detriment of the localities, would undermine the British constitution—that it would push Scotland toward independence. It lasted only four years before disbanding at the time of Britain’s continuing involvement in the Crimean War (1856), for fear of being disloyal. Thereafter there was an organizational gap in the politicization of the national cause. The Liberal Party, the predominant party in 19th-century Scottish towns, carried nationalist supporters within its ranks. Their four-time British prime minister, W. E. Gladstone (1809–1898), was considering Home Rule for Ireland from as early as 1871. When seeking election in 1880, he offered tepid encouragement to the voters of Midlothian that he would match this for Scotland within a policy called “home rule all round.” It was a commitment he was not keen to keep, fearing it would undermine the case for Ireland and contribute to regional devolution in England. He proposed the first Home Rule bill for Ireland in 1886, although it was defeated. The exclusion of Scotland from the bill led to the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA). For nationalists in both countries there was dissatisfaction with the lack of parliamentary time allotted to domestic affairs. Gladstone himself acknowledged that so much of what the “Imperial Parliament” had to attend to was taken up with foreign and colonial affairs. Only once, in 1890, did Gladstone support a bill for Scottish Home Rule in parliamentary debate, part of a federal structure for the whole of Britain. Initially the SHRA campaigned for prospective parliamentary N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Theodore Napier (1845–1924) Theodore Napier was one of the most colorful late Victorian nationalists. As well as penning many letters to the press on behalf of the Scottish Home Rule Association (1886–1900), Napier was a member of the Scottish Patriotic Association, onetime president of the Scottish National Association of Victoria, and campaigner for June 24—the day of the battle of Bannockburn in 1314—to be proclaimed Independence Day and a public holiday. On behalf of the SHRA, he was honorary secretary of the Scottish Petition to Victoria, highlighting the inappropriate use in official terminology of England, when Britain was meant. He claimed 104,647 signatures upon completion of the petition. Napier, who was born in Melbourne, took to wearing the dress of a Highland chieftain and to paying homage annually to Culloden and Fotheringhay Castle.

candidates of the Scottish Liberal Party to pledge in favor of “local national government” for Scotland. Limited in success and alienated by the insistence of Gladstone and the English members of the Liberal Party to reaffirm their efforts to secure Home Rule for Ireland, the SHRA split to go its own way. Between 1890 and 1914, the British Parliament was presented with 13 resolutions on Home Rule for Scotland. On 8 occasions, the bill past its first reading, and 11 times it was supported by the majority of Scottish (but not other) Members of Parliament (MPs), but not one of these proposals became law. Yet administrative changes were forthcoming. What became known as the Scottish Office was opened in 1885, which, along with the re-creation of the Scottish Grand Committee (1894)—a debating group comprising Scottish MPs in Parliament—gave Scotland a distinct administration within the state structure. Archibald Philip Primrose (1847–1929), fifth Earl of Rosebery, who would for a short time succeed Gladstone as prime minister in 1894 and was the first Scottish secretary in this new office, believed that this reform was enough to appease the nationalists. A supporter of constitutional change in the Dominions, Rosebery regarded gradual constitutional change as sufficient political reform at home. The SHRA did not agree and pushed for the creation of a Home Rule parliament in Scotland. But it lacked formal political power and had to rely on a letterwriting campaign in the newspapers and cultural celebrations to sustain its case. Only after a number of false starts and schisms at the start of the 20th century would political nationalism find a relatively stable platform in the Scottish National Party (1934). Selected Bibliography Broun, Dauvit, R. J. Finlay, and Michael Lynch, eds. 1998. Image and Identity: The Making and Re-making of Scotland through the Ages. Edinburgh: John Donald. Dickinson, H. T., and Michael Lynch, eds. 2000. The Challenge to Westminster: Sovereignty, Devolution and Independence. East Linton: Tuckwell Press.

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McCrone, David. 2001. Understanding Scotland. The Sociology of a Nation. 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge. Mitchell, James. 1996. Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaign for a Scottish Parliament. Edinburgh: Polygon. Mitchell, James. 2003. Governing Scotland: The Invention of Administrative Devolution. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Morton, Graeme. 1999. Unionist-Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–1860. East Linton: Tuckwell Press. Morton, Graeme. 2004. William Wallace: Man and Myth. Stroud: Sutton Publishing. Pittock, Murray G. 2001. Scottish Nationality. London: Palgrave.

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Switzerland Daniel Speich Chronology 1761 Founding of the Helvetic Society as a circle of Enlightenment thinkers. 1798 The Helvetic revolution. The Helvetic Republic is installed as a French sister republic until 1802. 1803 Act of Mediation by Napoleon. The cantons of Aargau, Grisons, St. Gallen, Thurgau, Ticino, and Vaud join the confederation as full members. 1814/1815 End of French period. Cantons of Geneva and Valais join the confederation. Congress of Vienna dismisses Swiss claim on Konstanz. Phase of conservative restoration starts. 1830–1831 Phase of liberal regeneration starts. Eleven cantons introduce liberal constitutions. 1839 Regime change (Straussenhandel) in Zurich leads to anti-liberal change in many cantons. 1847 Liberal forces defeat Catholic-conservative alliance in a civil war (Sonderbund War). 1848 Founding of modern Swiss nation-state. 1857 King Wilhelm IV of Prussia renounces claim on Neuchâtel. 1860 Savoy joins France. The option of joining Switzerland is seriously debated. 1861 Beginning of the democratic movement. Change from representative democracy to direct democratic system in many cantons until 1869. 1874 Revision of the federal constitution, change to semi-direct democratic system. 1882 Opening of the railway tunnel through St. Gotthard. 1883 First national fair held in Zurich. 1891 First national festival commemorates the alleged founding of the Swiss Confederation in 1291.

Situating the Nation During the early days of August 1891, tens of thousands of Swiss citizens attended a festival in the town of Schwyz commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Swiss Confederation. The national event was accompanied by festivities throughout the country, while intense press coverage emphasized the extraordinary historical continuity of the Swiss polity. However, the first national festival of 1891 marked the accomplishment of a rather improbable process of nation-building. To follow Oliver Zimmers phrase, Switzerland was—and to a certain extent still is—a highly “contested nation.” Recent scholarship has accentuated a structural inability of the Swiss case to conform to classic nationalism. In fact, the Swiss nation could not grow out of the political self-discovery of an ethnic people nor could it essentially build upon N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the denigration of other nations. Furthermore, it is not easy to discern any elites using the apparatus of nationalism to consolidate their domestic power, even though marginalized groups can be found. From the late 18th century onward, the formation of a Swiss national sentiment as well as the political process of national unification was exposed to politically, economically, and culturally separating forces. First and foremost, political power had evolved around regional entities, whereas the overarching ties remained weak. In 1836, the political observer Alexis de Tocqueville to his surprise remarked that there was no Switzerland—just cantons. As to the question as to whether a political unity was desirable, he concluded that the Swiss would do just as well without a proper nation-state. In the 1830s the then roughly 2 million inhabitants of the Swiss Confederation were organized into 25 sovereign states of very different size and structure. While 400,000 people lived in the canton of Berne, the state of Appenzell Inner Rhodes counted just less than 10,000. Grisons covered some 7,000 square kilometers of thinly populated alpine landscape, whereas the canton of Basle City was limited to an urban area of 37 square kilometers. Seventeen cantons were Germanspeaking, three, French, one, Italian, and the four remaining were multilingual. Similarly, religious denominations were heterogeneous. In the big midland cantons Protestants dominated, while the alpine area was predominantly Catholic. However, as in the case of Glarus, Catholic congregations could exist in Protestant regions and vice versa. Economic differences also abounded. Some of the alpine communities had gained considerable wealth in cattle trading with Lombardy or by supplying mercenary troops to the big European powers. However, the decline in these trades put their economic outlook in sharp contrast to the booming industrialization of textile production (Glarus, St. Gallen, Appenzell, Zurich, and Basle) and precision mechanics (Geneva, Neuchâtel, parts of Vaud and Berne). Within a still basically agrarian society, commercial enterprises existed whose trade connections reached as far as India, Russia, or the United States. Differences of this sort can be found in many nation-states. What is special about the Swiss case, however, is the fact that differing economic and cultural structures shaped the political culture and the constitutional procedures in the 25 sovereign states. The only way to mold this many-voiced choir into a single dominant interpretation of the Swiss nation was to imagine the community precisely as an alliance of diverse minorities, held together by its territory and its history. Thus, the exceptionality of the Swiss case itself could be used as a marker of national distinction. Such a construction successfully nurtured the first national festival of 1891.

Instituting the Nation Switzerland presents an excellent example for what can be found in most nations: the longing for an impressive pedigree. While the Swiss nation-state was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Halberdiers march through Villars-sur-Ollon on Switzerland’s National Day to commemorate the founding of the Swiss Confederation. (Corel)

founded only in 1848, national historiography went back in time as far as six centuries and linked the modern polity to the medieval defensive alliance of the Swiss Confederation. To unravel this idea of a continuing saga, it is essential to recount the institutional history of the nation-state as a counternarrative to national discourse. In a series of mostly bilateral treaties, the communities in the valleys of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden (1291), the imperial cities of Zurich (1351) and Berne (1353), the cities of Lucerne (1332) and Zug (1352), and the valley of Glarus (1352) formed an alliance to enhance domestic security and to aid each other against the Habsburg overlord. In contrast to other such confederacies of the 14th century, the Swiss Confederation proved to be surprisingly long-lasting. By the end of the 15th century, the league was enlarged by treaties with Fribourg and Solothurn (1481), Basle and Schaff hausen (1501), and Appenzell (1513) and was supplemented by further alliances of lesser status with such diverse partners as the little village of Gersau, the Prince-Bishop of St. Gallen, the city of Rottweil, or the republic of Geneva, to name just a few. Along with the acquisition of mandated territories, this process ended up in a highly elaborate system of relationships, which existed until 1798. In the course of the centuries, elements of state-building can be observed with all members of the alliance, but the confederation as such rather showed an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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opposite development. Its only body was a regular conference of cantonal delegates called the “diet” (“Tagsatzung”). The meeting was held up to 20 times a year in the early 16th century, but the rhythm slowed down to roughly one meeting a year in the late 18th century. Because of its extremely weak institutional form, the confederation did not qualify as an agent of political unification. Moreover, it symbolized the inequality of the medieval social order. By the end of the 18th century, wealthy inhabitants from the mandated territories and the subordinate countryside of the city states increasingly questioned the system. Uprisings in the Vaud, but also in places such as the Zurich hinterland, paved the way for revolution. When French revolutionary troops invaded the canton of Berne in 1798, these local movements quickly gained strength. Due to the French need for a reliable ally, the Helvetic Republic was instituted. This first central state on Swiss territory was a representative democracy. Under the symbol of William Tell and a tricolor in red, gold, and green, its executive directory instantly began to modernize the country. However, strong resistance from the alpine valley communities and the old urban aristocracies prevailed. Lack of finance and programmatic differences between liberal reformers and radical democrats ended the project. In 1803 Napoleon prevented the escalation of the domestic conflict by once again turning the cantons into sovereign states and reinstalling their joint conference (Tagsatzung). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Democracy National ideology considers democracy to be a Swiss invention. Indeed, direct democratic procedures had existed in the autonomous administration of the small alpine valley communities of the 13th and 14th centuries (Landsgemeinde, first documented for Uri in 1231). And in the larger city states like Zurich and Berne, representative democracies had evolved. But more often than not, the rural popular assemblies excluded a considerable number of people who did not hold the respective privileges. The indirect systems of the cities left the inhabitants of the hinterland without representation and showed strong tendencies toward aristocratic closure by the 18th century. The ideal interpretation of the Swiss democratic tradition generously ignored these facts and depicted the history of the confederation in the terms of political freedom based upon natural law. But the traditional Swiss procedures fundamentally differed from modern political thought by not considering freedom to be a fundamental right of every human being. The introduction of mainly French and American democratic theory into the Swiss context was one of the important sources of domestic conflict throughout the 19th century. However, the result of this difficult process was a political system that offered a degree of influence to the citizen unparalleled in the world. Cornerstones of Swiss direct democracy were the referendum (introduced in 1874) and the popular initiative (1891). While the first mechanism obliged the legislator to submit certain decisions to public vote, the second was more radical. The popular initiative enabled any group of citizens reaching a fixed quorum to demand a referendum on any matter, irrespective of parliamentary deliberation. Despite this level of participation, democratic rights for a long time remained restricted. The Jewish minority gained access to the national polity in 1874. Women suffrage, however, was introduced on the national level only as recently as 1971.

With this “Acte de médiation,” a new confederation was instituted as an alliance of equal partners. The former mandated territories were turned into the five new cantons of Vaud, Aargau, Thurgau, St. Gallen, and Ticino. Allies of lesser status became either full members (like Grisons) or were dismissed (e.g., the city of Mulhouse). All cantons were obliged to draw written constitutions, freedom of trade remained widely guaranteed, and all citizens kept the new freedom of movement and settlement within the territory. The General Staff was formed to coordinate the cantonal troops. These elements were basically confirmed by the confederate treaty of 1815 (Bundesvertrag). Geneva, Neuchâtel, and the Valais joined the league, giving it its modern territorial shape. Nevertheless, the end of Napoleonic rule had led to considerable turmoil. The restored aristocracies of Berne, Solothurn, Fribourg, and Lucerne demanded the liquidation of the new cantons. But their conservative aim was blocked by heavy pressure from Austria. Once again a leading European power interfered. Thus, after the collapse of the Helvetic Republic had made clear that forced centralization was not an option, now also the forced restoration of the old confederation proved to be impossible. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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As after 1803, a de-centered process of nation-building gained momentum, which was well under way when de Tocqueville visited the country in 1836. Advocates of a strong central state could be found with the elites of the new cantons, who embraced radical democratic ideas. The same thinking was prevalent in the formerly subordinate countryside of the city states. But moderate liberals from the old aristocracy of economically booming cantons like Zurich adhered to a quick national unification. Contemporaneously with the French July Revolution, these forces achieved constitutional changes in 11 cantons by 1830/1831. Some of the new constitutions (e.g., Thurgau’s in 1831) defined extremely modern democratic republics with a broad franchise. Public schools were introduced, and the cantons of Zurich and Berne founded universities. A series of multilateral treaties slowly homogenized administrative procedures. The concordat of 13 cantons concerning weights and measures in 1835/1836 is a case in point. In 1832, the liberal movement culminated in the formation of a special league of seven “regenerated” cantons (Siebnerkonkordat), with the aim of turning the treaty of 1815 into a unified state. However, by this time, the conservative opposition to such unification plans had also gained clear contours. The elites of the small alpine cantons as well as conservative aristocracies (e.g., of the city of Basle) put forward a specifically Swiss notion of democracy, which differed from the universalism of the French Revolution. The advocates of this position also referred to a national spirit, but they refused any attempt at building strong central state authorities. Their cause culminated in the formation of another special league of seven “conservative” cantons (Sarnerbund). A stalemate resulted among the sovereign cantons when it came to the question of building a nation. It could only be overcome by military means in a civil war in 1847, in which the liberal cantons enforced their project of a modern Swiss nation upon the conservative cantons. These political events were paralleled by a lively popular debate. Since the 1820s, some of the cantons (e.g., Appenzell) had conceded a level of freedom of the press that was exceptional in Europe at the time. It fostered the emergence of a domestic public sphere, in which the different stances toward national unification gained clear shape. Most importantly, the national project was divided into religious camps. Liberal thought and the will for quick unification of the cantons were increasingly identified with the Protestant denomination, while mistrust toward possessive individualism and the insistence upon local diversity more and more became Catholic positions. At the same time, two conflicting strands of liberalism developed. Put simply, one emphasized economic freedom, while the other stressed equality and called for direct democratic procedures. Thus, the constitution of 1848 initially lacked support in Catholic and alpine areas. Moreover, the emerging state marginalized radical democratic positions until major reforms were carried out in 1874. The consolidation of the unified nation took several decades and was accomplished only by 1891, when for the first time a Catholic conservative was elected a member of the national government and new instruments of democratic rule were established. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation The first attempts at defining a Swiss nation can be traced back to the center of Swiss enlightenment, namely to the Helvetic Society, which was founded in the early 1760s. Within this distinguished circle, members of the local elites from several cantons tried to strengthen the emotional ties among the different parts of the confederation. They did so by redefining the history of the medieval alliance in terms of political emancipation and freedom. Most renowned is Friedrich Schiller’s drama William Tell of 1804. Authors like Jean-Jacques Rousseau idealized Swiss republicanism and merged it with their new aesthetic interest for the alpine landscape. The territory of the confederation and its physical appearance were thus imbued with national significance. Within this frame of time and space, the enlightened patriots set out to document the diversity of Swiss folk culture. Johann Kaspar Lavater’s set of Swiss national songs (Schweizerlieder) of 1767 is a case in point. As a private association, however, the Helvetic Society was anxious not to postulate a need for political action, although several of its members held executive power in their cantons. The club fostered nationalism as an individual sentiment and did not shape itself as a political party. Therefore, its utopian discourse could be used as a reference point by all later national movements. In the course of the following decades, a whole range of elements were created to define Swiss national identity. Six main aspects can be discerned, which were instrumental in binding together the religious, ethnic, and economic separating forces. These were (1) the freedom from foreign dominance, leading to the notion of democracy and self-determination; (2) the high autonomy of communes and cantons,

Pastoral Ideal Swiss nationalism consists of a specific blend of historical and geographical imagination. In this, the idealization of simple rural life, as acclaimed in the pastoral ideal of the Baroque period, became a leitmotif. In the 18th century, intellectuals from all over Europe projected their vision of a pristine society upon the remote alpine valleys. Many visitors stopped at one of the villages on their tours to the classic Italian sites, enjoying the sublime landscape and marvelling at the customs of its inhabitants. Modern tourism heavily built upon these stereotypes. As was the case in Scotland or in Tyrol, the Swiss themselves took up the image of the free herdsman and made it a centerpiece of a national identity. With industrialization, the percentage of farmers within the Swiss workforce quickly dropped to a level that was comparable to England. At the same time, the farmer became the prototype of the democratic Swiss citizen. He should be upright in character, distrust fashionable modernity, and cherish a deep love for the land. Displays of rural villages were highlights at the national fairs of 1896, 1914, and 1938. In the 20th century, the ideology of the pastoral ideal ultimately led to substantial government subsidies for agriculture.

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leading to the notion of federalism; (3) the smallness and political marginality of the country, leading to the notion of neutrality; (4) the pastoral ideal of French Enlightenment, leading to a positive notion of agrarian society; (5) the hostility of the natural environment and its lack of resources, leading to notions of ingenuity and industriousness; and (6) the military tradition of mercenaries, making the confederation’s army a key agent of unity. These somewhat contradictory elements were combined in nationalistic interpretations of the confederation’s history and its territory. With regard to time, Swiss national unity was presented as an historic act of will. Concerning space, the naturally separating mountain range of the Alps was turned into a national landscape and perceived as a source of unity. This succeeded, for example, by defining Switzerland as Europe’s water tank.

Narrating the Nation Freedom from foreign rule has always been the most important strand of the national narratives. Indeed, the medieval defensive alliance had granted its members a certain degree of political autonomy. The intervention of the confederation in the Burgundian wars during the late 15th century provoked bitter reactions with Habsburg aristocrats. They were quick to term the new force in a derogatory way as “Swiss cows” (Kuhschweizer) or to compare them to “wild Turks.” Within the confederation’s elite, an analogous process of collective identification was under way, however, in positive terms of peasant liberation. The Chronicon Helveticum by Aegidius Tschudi, which was composed around 1535, offered an emancipative account of the confederation’s early history, including the legendary figure of William Tell, the destruction of Habsburg castles (Burgenbruch), and an alleged oath on the “Rütli” meadow on the shores of Lake Lucerne by representatives from Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden in 1307. The Chronicon saw a great revival in popularity in the 18th century. And from the 1870s onward, scientific historiography took up the theme. Liberal historians like Carl Hilty composed an account that made the constitution of 1848 appear as the culmination of all earlier treaties and alliances among the confederate states. It strengthened an already existing narrative that drew upon an alleged tradition of democratic self-rule. It not only dismissed the deep internal conflicts that had dominated the early decades of the 19th century but it also mystified the direct democratic procedures that had existed in the autonomous administration of the small alpine valley communities since the 13th and 14th centuries (Landsgemeinde, first documented for Uri in 1231). In fact, national historiography tried to merge two distinct concepts of freedom. One concept started from the positive freedom based upon natural law. It included the emancipation from traditional customs and aimed at introducing certain rights N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Swiss Army Switzerland does not have an army—it is an army. This popular dictum brings forward a strong identification of the nation-state with its military organization. It has some truth to it, despite the fact that the Swiss army has never been involved in major war activities. First, the old confederation knew a strong mercenary tradition. The Papal Swiss Guard, which goes back to the year 1506, is a case in point. Many articulations of nationalism in the 19th century, including the popular festivities of the Shooting Associations, drew upon this legacy and put the armed soldier at the core of national identity. When the Swiss National Museum in Zurich was opened in 1898, its centerpiece was a carefully displayed collection of arms. Second, the General Staff was of considerable importance in representing the national idea. It was founded in 1803 to coordinate the cantonal troops. In 1815 it introduced the white cross on red ground as a coat of arms, which later became the national flag. Until the foundation of the modern national state in 1848, the General Staff was practically the only federal administrative body, and its budget was an equivalent to a federal treasury. It tried to homogenize military standards in the cantons; however, this proved to be difficult until the constitution of 1874 considerably augmented its power. Third, the new military organization of 1874 successfully implemented the principle of general conscription. For young adult, male Swiss, the moment of military conscription soon became identical with an initiation ceremony into citizenship. Military training itself was repeatedly regarded as a “school of the nation.”

and institutional rules—such as freedom of speech, popular sovereignty, or the separation of powers. The other notion of freedom was defined in negative terms as freedom from external interference. The two concepts had been roughly associated with the main conflicting parties in the Sonderbund War. Their integration was, therefore, an act of national reconciliation. It is no wonder that this account strongly emphasized the role of national mediators like Niklaus von Flüe, who had successfully arbitrated an internal conflict in 1481 (Stanser Verkommnis). A comparable role was attributed to General Guillaume-Henri Dufour, who had led the liberal troops to victory in the Sonderbund War without humiliating the conservative party. In the course of the 19th century, a second narration arose that integrated national differences. It set out from the harsh conditions of alpine life and thus paid tribute to the mountain valley communities who were otherwise marginalized by the liberal project of nation-building. It did so, however, by emphasizing the moral duty of betterment, as put forward in enlightened philosophy, and it drew upon the notions of republican modesty, Protestant ethics, and technological excellence. Switzerland was depicted as a marginal country lacking natural resources, which could only be led to economic wealth by hard labor. In this narration, freedom basically meant freedom from natural constraints. Typically, in 1914, one author idealized the work of dynamite at the alpine road and railway construction sites as the gunshots of the modern Swiss liberation war. The heroes N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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in this account were engineers like Hans Konrad Escher, who completed a major irrigation scheme in 1816, or Louis Favre, who was responsible for the construction of the Gotthard railway tunnel in the 1870s.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Between 1803 and 1848, with the political perspectives blocked and a public sphere emerging, the main driving forces for instituting the nation were private associations. Many local associations joined forces in national federations, such as the Swiss Association for the Arts (Kunstverein, 1806). Some organizations, like the Confederate Shooting Association (Eidgenössischer Schützenverein, 1824) or the Confederate Gymnastic Society (Eidgenössischer Turnverein, 1832), were explicitly designed as instruments to strengthen the liberal unification project. Their annual festivities became bastions of republican nationalism. Other associations focused on the national heritage to overcome internal differences. They organized shows of traditional dresses, song contests, or sports events in rock throwing or wrestling. Most renowned is the “Unspunnen” festival, held for the first time in 1805 as an attempt at bridging the conflict between the formerly dominating cities and their hinterlands. The first national association of labor also took up the national symbolism. It was founded in 1838 in Geneva under the name Grütliverein, which referred to the alleged oath of 1307. In the absence of a central government, some of these national organizations even took over state functions. The Swiss Association for Public Good (Schweizerische Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft, 1815), for example, was a key actor in the modernization and homogenization of poor laws and welfare politics. And the Swiss Association for Natural History (Schweizerische Naturforschende Gesellschaft, 1815) took up the initiative in making a modern map of the territory. This project was then carried out by the General Staff and completed in the 1860s after three decades of work. Even after the foundation of the modern national state in 1848, central authorities remained extremely weak. Until a direct tax was introduced during World War I, federal income was restricted to a small number of tariffs and to import levies. Important domains such as monetary policy or the judiciary at first mainly remained cantonal concerns. Criminal law for example was homogenized only in 1898, while a national code of civil law followed in 1912. Public schooling still today is a matter of the cantons. The seats of the new federal institutions such as the Parliament (1848, Berne), the Polytechnic School (1854, Zurich), the Supreme Court (1874, Lausanne), or the Swiss National Bank (1905, Zurich) were carefully distributed among the most powerful cantons. Apart from the military organization, the federal state lacked political instruments to mobilize the nation. Major events, such as the first national fair of 1883, were organized by private initiative. However, the federal government did offer N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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financial support and used these exhibitions, which were held again in 1896, 1914, and 1938, to display its growing presence. The first official attempt at coordinated national propaganda by the federal authority took place in the second part of the 1930s. This program was called “spiritual national defence” and can be considered the climax of Swiss national discourse. To conclude, the Swiss development cannot be explained fully by internal forces. Instead, international trends have to be taken into account, most of all the rise of the modern nation-state as the dominant form of political organization. Especially after the German and the Italian unifications, the conservative project of carefully modernizing the Swiss Confederation completely lost its plausibility. As after 1848, national state structures slowly emerged out of an increasing interconnectedness of the sovereign cantons and converged with private national sentiment. Selected Bibliography Gugerli, David. 1998. “Politics on the Topographer’s Table: The Helvetic Triangulation of Cartography, Politics, and Representation.” In Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts and the Materiality of Communication, edited by Timothy Lenoir, 91–118. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Historical Dictionary of Switzerland. 1998–2007. www.hls-dhs-dss.ch (online version in German, French, and Italian). Im Hof, Ulrich. 1988. “Switzerland.” In Nationalism in the Age of the French Revoution, edited by Otto Dann and John Dinwiddy, 183–198. London, Ronceverte: Hambledon Press. Maissen, Thomas. 2000. “The 1848 Conflicts and Their Significance in Swiss Historiography.” In The Making of Modern Switzerland, 1848–1998, edited by M. Butler, Malcolm Pender, and Joy Charnley, 3–34. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Müller, Thomas Christian. 2001. “Switzerland 1847/49: A Provisional, Successful End of a ‘Democratic Revolution?’” In Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform, edited by Dieter Dowe, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, and Dieter Langewiesche, 210–241. New York, Oxford: Berg. Sablonier, Roger. 1998. “The Swiss Confederation.” In The New Cambridge Medieval History, edited by Christopher Allmand, 645–670. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Speich, Daniel. 2002. “Draining the Marshlands, Disciplining the Masses. The Linth Valley Hydro Engineering Scheme (1807–1823) and the Genesis of Swiss National Unity.” Environment and History 8, no. 4: 429–448. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1836. “Voyage En Suisse 1836.” In Alexis De Tocqueville Oeuvres Complètes. Tome V: Voyages En Angleterre, Irlande, Suisse Et Algérie, edited by J.-P. Mayer and André Jardin, 173–188. Paris: Gallimard, 1958. Zimmer, Oliver. 2003. A Contested Nation: History, Memory and Nationalism in Switzerland, 1761–1891. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zimmer, Oliver. 2005. “Nation, Nationalism and Power in Switzerland, c. 1760–1900.” In Power and the Nation in European History, edited by Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer, 333–353. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Egypt Mona Russell Chronology 1516–1517 Egypt becomes an Ottoman province. 1798 French invasion. 1801 Anglo-Ottoman forces arrive in Egypt. 1805–1848 Reign of Muhammad Ali. 1863–1879 Reign of Ismail. 1875 Egypt is bankrupt; Ismail sells Egyptian shares of the Suez Canal Company to the British. 1877 Abolition of the slave trade in the Ottoman Empire; British and French create Dual Financial Control over Egypt’s budget. 1879 Ismail ends Dual Financial Control and is deposed by the Ottoman sultan at the behest of European creditors. 1879–1882 Urabi Revolt. 1882–1914 British occupation and informal protectorate. 1906 Taba incident; Dinshaway incident. 1907 Lord Cromer retires as high commissioner; death of Mustafa Kamil. 1914 Outbreak of World War I; Abbas II deposed; Egypt becomes a formal protectorate of the British. 1919 A period of strikes and demonstrations commonly referred to as the 1919 Revolution. 1922 Egypt achieves partial independence from the British. 1922–1952 Egypt’s “liberal” era, ruled by a constitutional monarchy. 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty removes British points of control, allows a British presence in the canal zone, and liberalizes entrance requirements to the staff college allowing lower middle-class Egyptians to enter the officer corps. 1952 Egyptian Revolution.

Situating the Nation The existence of the Nile River and the surrounding desert planted the first seeds of Egyptian nationalism. The need to tame the waters of the Nile and to irrigate virtually all agricultural lands meant that Egyptians were bound to the land on either side of the Nile and in the delta, and they were accustomed to bowing down to the authority of a centralized state. Although some southern capitals existed, for much of Egypt’s recorded history the seat of government and significant locations for worship have been at or near the base of the delta. The power that northern-based governments imposed upon upper Egypt is still evident today in the term that native Egyptians use for the capital city. Rather than referring to it N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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as al-Qahira (Cairo), most Egyptians simply say Masr*, the same word they use for Egypt itself. Whether it was for a state emanating from Egyptian lands or as a province of another empire, Egypt’s peasants produced a lucrative agricultural surplus. Historically, wheat, sugar, and textiles were important sources of revenue, as was Egypt’s role as middleman for coffee and spices. By the 18th century, new trading patterns and European production based upon plantation slavery and factories undercut Egypt’s role in coffee, spices, sugar, and textiles. Wheat remained an important source of revenue, and France an important trading partner. While Egypt’s desert did not forestall foreign invaders, it did create a unity among the peoples settled around the Nile. The Arabs who arrived in the seventh century distinguished themselves from previous conquerors by mixing with the local population. Nevertheless, a minority of Egyptian Christians, Copts, maintained their separation from the Arab-Muslim population. By the mid-13th century, Egypt was controlled by yet another group of foreigners known as mamluks. * In this essay, symbols for long vowels have been eliminated and replaced with boldface type for emphatic letters. Since the Arabic language does not capitalize, Arabic words have not been capitalized, with the exception of names and places.

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They remained distinct from the rest of the population by their language, which was Turkish, and their self-imposed privilege of riding horseback. Mamluks were a self-perpetuating dynasty of slaves procured from places such as Georgia and Circassia. They were purchased as boys, trained for the army or the bureaucracy, and manumitted (freed from slavery) before receiving a post. Mamluks formed chains of households that were linked to one another based upon their house of origin. Although the Ottoman Turks toppled the mamluks in the early 16th century, within another 200 years they had become rewoven into the fabric of the ruling elite, serving as tax collectors and/or in military regiments. Although Egypt had a strong territorial basis for a common identity for virtually thousands of years, as was the case worldwide, Egyptian national identity is a modern phenomenon. The factors that fostered the growth of Egyptian nationalism were changes in political structure, bureaucratic reform, economic reorganization, opposition to foreign economic and political interests, changes in the function and composition of elite households, and the rise of a middle class with vested interests in the state. The growth of a middle class was not a slow-building evolutionary process but one in which a middle strata waxed and waned with the economic and political fortunes of the country. The rise of a new leader, changes in the form of government, and the abolition of slavery radically changed the nature and function of elite households, which had previously served as mini seats of government. Years of mamluk infighting, the French invasion, and the Anglo-Ottoman response caused damage to Egypt’s already troubled economy. Egypt’s local notables, long-distance traders, and the upper echelons of the religious establishment (culama’ ) desperately sought for leadership that would restore Egypt’s trade, rather than the multifaceted struggle for power among factions of mamluks, the central Ottoman administration, the British, and the French. Muhammad Ali, a member of an auxiliary force of the Ottoman navy, convinced them that he could do so. In 1805 the culama’ petitioned the Ottoman sultan to request him as the new viceroy of Egypt. Selim III (reign 1789–1806), in the midst of his own crises, ratified the candidate of the culama’. Most likely, Selim never thought that Muhammad Ali would rule until 1848 or that his family would continue to rule for more than 100 years—30 years after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Ali’s first six years of rule were spent consolidating his power. The viceroy did not consider himself an Egyptian, and while he desired greater autonomy for and hereditary control of Egypt, he recognized his position as a vassal of the Ottoman state. After 1811, Muhammad Ali set out on an aggressive program of economic and military expansion, buttressed by a growing central government of technology-savvy officials. This agenda required creating a modern educational system and a new army. His eldest son, Ibrahim, suggested using native Egyptians. Since the time of the expansion in the seventh century, Islamic empires had provided the military, which producers supported through taxation. Now Egyptians would be responsible for their own defense, albeit under the comN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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mand of a Turkish-speaking officer corps. The Ottoman sultan relied upon Egyptian troops for a number of campaigns, including those in the Hijaz and Greece. Muhammad Ali’s troops also undertook campaigns without permission, such as occupying a significant portion of greater Syria. The occupation of the Hijaz and coastal Syria would provide markets for Egypt’s goods. With respect to the economy, Muhammad Ali turned Egypt into a one-man monopoly whereby he was the single buyer and seller of all goods. He dismantled the tax-farming system in Egypt and created private property, distributing land to his family and to rural Egyptian notables, who cemented their loyalty by sending their sons to his new schools, the recruiting ground for the expanding bureaucracy. Much of the land that used to grow wheat was now turned over to growing long-staple cotton, which he put to use in Egypt’s first textile factories. The British saw an aggressive competitor in Muhammad Ali, and they encouraged the Ottoman sultan to ratify the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention in 1838, which dismantled Egypt’s monopolies. Within two years, the British forced Egypt out of the Hijaz and coastal Syria; however, Muhammad Ali was given hereditary control of Egypt following the Ottoman pattern of succession of primogeniture (eldest male). During the last years of his reign, many of his greatest accomplishments faded, and Egypt turned into a supplier of raw cotton for Britain. Nevertheless, some schools remained open, a generation of Egyptian students had graduated from his schools, and a rural landowning elite had been created.

Instituting the Nation Muhammad Ali set in motion a series of institutions that would gradually create an Egyptian national identity. His immediate successors did little to maintain those institutions. It was Ismail, a ruler remembered for his desire to turn Egypt into a European nation, who ended up cementing the processes that forged a national identity. Ismail began utilizing Arabic as a language for government, and he revitalized the educational system by restoring closed schools and opening new ones, including a primary school for girls. He built upon Egypt’s economic infrastructure by expanding railroad and telegraph lines, as well as by improving ports and roads. The Suez Canal opened during the reign of Ismail. His reforms were aimed at modernizing Cairo and key cities in the delta, as well as linking sites of production and consumption. Thus, the national identity that was emerging among his bureaucrats and in the educational system did not necessarily extend to the entire country. Another key event occurred during the reign of Ismail: the abolition of the slave trade in 1877. Over the course of the 19th century, sources for male slaves slowly diminished as the Russian empire expanded. Furthermore, with the rise to power of Muhammad Ali and the creation of a national army, the need for mamluks declined. Still prominent in government by midcentury, manumitted N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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mamluks eventually retired, died, or migrated. Their positions in the growing government bureaucracy were gradually filled by graduates from Egypt’s modernized schools. European advisors and government bureaucrats, who had visited or studied in Europe, created a curriculum that forged a national identity. The new school system helped bridge the gap between the old Turkish-speaking elite and the newer Arabophone Egyptian elite. The trade in female slaves continued, however. This practice allowed the male elites to retain their ethnic identity and language, which kept them distinct from ordinary Egyptians. Moreover, the new rural Egyptian elite could demonstrate its entrance into the ruling class by purchasing such women or even receiving them as gifts from the viceroy. While abolition of the slave trade did not entirely stop this practice, it certainly was curtailed. Meanwhile, the curriculum in the government schools encouraged an Egyptian national identity, and the old Turkishspeaking elite began to intermarry with the newer Arabophone Egyptian elite. Curriculum in government schools reflected these changes. During the reign of Ismail, new cultural institutions formed to create a more unified elite. Ismail sponsored a vibrant press culture that debated changes in Egyptian society. He opened museums, libraries, a national opera house, and a geographic society to promote Egyptian culture in Egypt and in colonized portions of East Africa. Although Ismail’s vision of Egyptian culture was extremely Western oriented, ultimately these institutions did promote an Egyptian identity that adopted Western technology but retained core values with respect to religion and morals. Ismail changed his title from viceroy to khedive, a Persian word meaning ruler or prince. Ismail’s support of a state-sponsored postal system helped disseminate emerging Egyptian national culture beyond the delta. Nevertheless, not all Egyptians received the benefits of these institutions.

Defining the Nation Ismail’s improvements came at a large cost to Egypt. He built extravagantly, lived lavishly, and borrowed heavily from European creditors, who engineered his deposition and replacement with his son Tawfiq (reign 1879–1892). Ismail’s program of reform, the increasing power of European creditors at the end of his reign, and Tawfiq’s European-protected reign brought to the fore a national movement sponsored by a party calling itself the Nationalist Party. This movement combined large landowners who wanted a greater say in government affairs, urban bureaucrats and professionals who wanted government accountability, and Egyptians in the army who wanted parity with the Turkish-speaking officer corps. It was the latter issue that created the impetus for the movement, whose rallying cry was “Egypt for the Egyptians!” (Scholch 1981). The outcome of the Urabi Revolt, named after the Egyptian officer who led the movement, was the British occupation in 1882. Although couched in the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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rhetoric of a temporary stay to restore order, the occupation’s aim was to restore Egypt’s financial solvency. The last British troops did not leave Egypt until 1956. The arrival of the British and their extended occupation helped advance the cause of nationalism beyond the upper classes. An incident in 1906 increased Egyptian anger over the occupation and augmented nationalist sentiment. A group of Britons had gone pigeon hunting in the Nile delta village of Dinshaway. After an altercation, one British officer died, and the Egyptians were blamed. The British set up a special tribunal and charged over 50 villagers with the death of the British officer. The penalties were particularly harsh, ranging from hangings and floggings to hard labor. Egyptians of all classes were outraged over the severity of the sentences. The ensuing hostility against British occupation even led to the resignation of Lord Cromer, who had been Egypt’s high commissioner since 1882. The early years of the British occupation brought forth a period of censorship to the lively press that existed during the reign of Ismail. The press was not fully restored until after the untimely death of Tawfiq and the ascension of his teenaged son Abbas II (reign 1892–1914). In his own memoirs, Abbas II identifies himself as an Egyptian ruler and his reign as a watershed moment in Egyptian nationalism. Under Abbas II, new newspapers and journals were founded, including ones targeting women and children. The vision presented by the political press was not unified. Many journalists in Egypt were Syrian Christians. They tended to speak in terms of an “Eastern” identity, which united Muslims, Christians, and Jews, as well as relocated Syrians and native Egyptians. These views were even present in advertising, encouraging Egyptians to patronize “Eastern” establishments rather than “foreign-owned” ones. Other secular Egyptians looked back toward Egypt’s ancient glory rather than its more recent Islamic past. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, an Islamic activist who traveled throughout the Middle East promoting pan-Islamism, arrived in Egypt in 1871. Afghani had numerous disciples who ranged from secular nationalists to Islamic reformers. The idea behind the latter was to update Islam in keeping with changes in the modern world. Afghani encouraged his followers to publish and disseminate their ideas. Although literacy rates in Egypt remained low, newspapers were often read aloud. Writers like Abdullah Nadim wrote in a mix of classical Arabic and Egyptian dialect to facilitate comprehension among barely literate readers and illiterate listeners. As was the case in many parts of the world, law students and lawyers espoused a nationalism rooted in expelling foreign powers, a notion supported by Egyptians (including Syrian immigrants) of all classes. The most famous of these individuals was Mustafa Kamil, the founder of the (re-created) Nationalist Party. Kamil’s death at the age of 33 in 1907 led to the splintering of his party into various nationalist groupings, some of which favored working with Abbas II, some that preferred to maintain ties with the Ottoman state, some that favored pan-Islamism, and some that even desired working either with the British or the French. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Such ambivalence is also revealed in attitudes about the geographic extent of the Egyptian nation. In 1906 the Ottoman government built a fort at Taba on the Sinai peninsula, which was west of the line that the British deemed the Egyptian border. The scant population of the Sinai was not particularly affected by the 19th-century changes that fostered national identity, and most Egyptian nationalists tended to support the Ottoman claim, since it would be Britain that would benefit from this border. However, there was a critical minority that pushed for the expanded frontier. Britain ultimately used the persuasive powers of its navy to impose what is known as the “international line” that gives Egypt most of the Sinai peninsula. A more coherent vision of nationalism was presented by mainstream newspapers, as well as the women’s press, which promoted the nuclear family as the building block of the nation. The abolition of slavery and intermarriage between the old and new elites supported this view of the family. Rather than power emanating from a single (or several) fortresslike homes, it was diffused among middle- and upper-class Egyptian homes with vested interests in the well-being of the state. Curriculum and textbooks in state-sponsored, missionary, private, and foreign community schools encouraged students to create homes and families that were worthy of self-rule. By the early 20th century, Egyptian nationalists advocated other changes in education, including improvement in schools and teachers (quantitatively and qualitatively), more instruction in and better teaching of Arabic, and a greater emphasis on national history, a subject that had been largely replaced by European history since the time of the occupation.

Narrating the Nation World War I changed the landscape of Egyptian nationalism. At the onset of the war, the British deposed the highly popular Khedive Abbas II and replaced him with his great uncle Husayn Kamil. The new title of “sultan” replaced that of khedive. Egypt’s status changed from unofficial to official protectorate, and more British soldiers and bureaucrats arrived in Egypt. Meanwhile, many Egyptians responded enthusiastically to the Ottoman sultan’s call for jihad against the British and the French. Furthermore, the war environment meant that Egyptians ran short of staple items that foreigners acquired more easily. The shortages cut across class lines, which again encouraged a nationalism calling for the expulsion of the British. Unlike most Egyptian historians who look back to 19th-century developments, many American historians mark this moment as the beginning of the nationalist movement. At the close of the war, a delegation (wafd) of Egyptian nationalists went to the residence of the British high commissioner to ask permission to attend the Versailles peace conference (January 1919). Saad Zaghlul, leader of the Wafd Party, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Saad and Safiyya Zaghlul Saad Zaghlul is best remembered as leader of the Wafd Party. He came from a wealthy peasant background and married into the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. His training in law in France and his presence at the salon of Princess Nazli afforded him the opportunity of meeting his future father-in-law, Mustafa Pasha Fahmy. In 1907 he became minister of education and worked toward reform of the educational system. During periods of exile and after his death, his wife, Safiyya, worked hard to preserve his efforts and memory as well as to maintain her own position of power. Saad never lost his ability to speak the language of the peasants, something that neither his opponents nor his successors could do. Saad and Safiyya had no children of their own; instead they promoted themselves as the parents of the Egyptian nation, with their home taking the appellation “home of the nation.” After Saad’s death, the government purchased his home and some nearby land to create a national museum and a memorial.

had been encouraged by Wilson’s 14 points. The British rejected Egypt’s request, and by March 1919, wide-scale rioting in Egypt occurred among all classes. Elite men and women supporting the Wafd Party wanted their protests to appear civilized, yet at the same time they portrayed themselves as speaking for all classes. Workers, peasants, and other ordinary Egyptians undertook spontaneous action in the streets and in the countryside. Demonstrations, the arrest and deportation of leaders, and celebrations marking the return of such leaders characterized the period between 1919 and 1922, when Egypt gained its partial independence. The British retained control of defense, communications, minority affairs, and the Sudan. In theory, Egypt would be a constitutional monarchy with Fuad, a brother of Husayn Kamil, as king. Egypt would now become a battleground between the British, the monarchy, and political parties. Both the Urabi Revolt and the 1919 Revolution have been highly romanticized and misrepresented. Urabi was made to be a villain or at best a well-meaning but

Sudan Sudan was occupied by the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali with the hope of providing men for his army and gold. Neither of these aims reached fruition; however, Egypt’s rule continued until the revolt of the Mahdi in 1881. A combined Anglo-Egyptian force finally defeated the mahdists and began a joint occupation of the country in 1898. Time and again, negotiations between the British and the Egyptians over the Sudan ended in an agreement to postpone an agreement. Much in the same way that Britain viewed Egypt as an errant child that needed proper upbringing, Egypt viewed Sudan as its own “special needs” child, justified by the same type of racism that the British applied to its colonies. Sudan did not achieve its independence from both Egypt and Britain until after the Revolution of 1952.

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incapable revolutionary, who was gradually rehabilitated after the Revolution of 1952. While politicians of the liberal era took great pride in the events of 1919, such accomplishments fell short when compared to the aggressive changes that took place after 1952. In her recent study of nationalism in Egypt, Beth Baron sheds light upon a frequently asked question in feminist circles: Why did male nationalists fail to incorporate feminist proposals in the 1923 constitution? Women were active participants in the 1919 Revolution, and they even took over the functions of their fathers, husbands, and brothers during periods of imprisonment or exile. Baron argues that the photographic record, often mislabeled, has served to obscure the collective memory of Egyptians. The women’s protests in 1919 lacked a feminist agenda that later ones in 1922/1923 embodied. Participants and researchers have consolidated a number of the events together and reshaped the public’s memory. Even during times when the male figures of the 1919 era lacked public respect, the female participants remained highly revered. From the turn of the 20th century, images of Egypt in sculpture, artwork, and political cartoons represented Egypt as a woman. Early on Egypt appeared in various forms of pharaonic garb, but after 1919 the New Woman became the model for Egypt, which for men represented an object of adoration and national honor. Simultaneously, men were urged to take on roles that women undertook in their homes to restore domestic order to the country. These lessons could be taught to the children of upper classes by means of civics classes (and home economics for girls), while children of the lower classes learned them in hygiene and morals lessons. The lines between personal hygiene, morals, home economics, and civics were blurred. Literally and metaphorically, clean individuals kept proper homes, which served as building blocks for the nation. With the spread of pictorial magazines, more Egyptians could follow political and social events in Egypt and around the world. Biographies and histories of the national movement and its key figures appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. The advent of radio and movies meant that Egyptians could listen to historical programs or watch footage of significant events or their re-creation in film.

Egypt’s Awakening Mahmud Mukhtar created this sculpture in 1928 to honor the memory of the 1919 Revolution. Egypt appears as a peasant woman, lifting her veil with one arm and resting her other arm on the head of a rising sphinx, connecting Egypt’s rebirth with its glorious past. The creation of an independent Egypt with a solid national identity meant bridging the gap between foreigners on horseback and peasants on donkeys. Mukhtar’s use of the Egyptian peasant in the sculpture represented the metamorphosis in the meaning of the word peasant (fallah). Historically the term was a derogatory slur utilized by the foreign elite; but by the early 20th century, it was turning into a source of pride and authenticity.

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Between 1882 and 1919, national identity spread among all Egyptians in response to the occupation. Nevertheless, there were class-based distinctions on what or who constituted the nation. The upper classes tended to have a more cosmopolitan outlook and a greater concern for uniting Egypt’s various religious communities. The opinions of the lower classes are not as well documented. Copts were present in the upper track of the educational system in larger numbers than their relative proportion in the population. Many elite Muslims were educated with or worked alongside Egyptian Christians. Egypt’s Jewish community was prominent in urban professions, such as banking, medicine, and commerce. While elite Muslims, Copts (and other Christians), and Jews had high levels of toleration, the same could not be said of the less fortunate among them. These differences would become apparent after the 1952 Revolution, whose leadership came almost exclusively from the lower-middle class. The flag chosen by elite nationalists was Nile green with a crescent and three stars, each representing one of Egypt’s religious communities. The only thing that truly united all Egyptians was their desire to get rid of the British. Even actions taken by nationalist women highlighted the segmentation of the population. Women’s groups organized boycotts of British goods and services in 1922 and 1931; however, only a small segment of the population purchased such goods or services. Egypt’s political parties represented the interests of a small minority. Two percent of Egypt’s population owned about half of its land. Large landowners had been highly critical of the British, particularly with respect to education, a topic that aroused interest across class lines. Once in power, elite nationalists continued to favor policies that improved production of cotton and facilitated its export, at the expense of social, educational, and welfare programs for the masses. The British recognized the power of the Wafd Party and courted its support in negotiating the 1936 treaty, which removed British points of control but allowed a presence in the canal zone. Thus, neither the monarchy (King Fuad and his son Faruq) nor the political parties addressed the fundamental struggles of the country, namely the inequitable distribution of land and the continued presence of British soldiers on Egyptian soil. In July 1952, a group of army officers overturned the nearly 150-year-old monarchy and brought down the parliamentary system. For the first time since the pharaonic period, Egypt would again be ruled by Egyptians. The Free Officers led by Gamal Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) instituted wide-ranging changes, including land redistribution, educational expansion, abolition of political parties, suspension of the 1923 constitution, and British withdrawal from the canal zone. These changes created great hope and stirred the aspirations of Egyptians. Nasser waged an aggressive foreign policy aimed at reducing Egypt’s dependence on foreign powers. He nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, which prompted N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Muhammad Naguib (second from right), Gamal Abd al-Nasir (third from right), and Anwar Sadat (fourth from left) meet with other Egyptian Free Officers in Cairo in 1952. The Free Officers forced King Farouk to abdicate his throne on July 23, 1952. (AFP/Getty Images)

a war waged by the British, French, and Israelis. Despite the fact that Egypt was the “loser” in the Suez War, Nasser became immensely popular throughout the entire Arab world, indeed throughout much of the Third World, for standing up to the British and the French. In other words, Nasser carried the victory of Egyptian nationalism to the entire Third World. His success in creating a supranationalism was demonstrated in Egypt’s short-lived federation with Syria as the United Arab Republic (1958–1961). Nevertheless, Nasser’s regime ushered in a brutal, authoritarian dictatorship. Arab socialism simply replaced the old bourgeoisie with the state. Although the Jews of Egypt survived the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, the Suez Crisis and the nationalizations that followed forcefully demonstrated that Egypt’s Jewry would not be part of the national family. Other minority groups, for example, Greeks and Italians, felt similarly constrained. Despite the many shortcomings of his regime, Nasser had advanced the cause of Egyptian nationalism above and beyond his predecessors. Selected Bibliography Abbas Hilmi II. 1998. The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II. Translated and edited by Amira Sonbol, introduction by Afaf Marsot. Reading, UK: Ithaca. Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Goldschmidt, Arthur. 1990. Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. Marsot, Afaf. 1985. A Short History of Modern Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mayer, Thomas. 1988. The Changing Past: The Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt, 1882–1983. Gainsville: University of Florida Press. Mitchell, Timothy. 1990. Colonising Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pollard, Lisa. 2005. Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923. Berkeley: University of California Press. Reid, Donald. 2002. Whose Pharoahs? Archeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I. Berkeley: University of California Press. Russell, Mona. 2004. Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity in Egypt, 1863–1922. New York: Palgrave. Scholch, Alexander. 1981. Egypt for the Egyptians: The Socio Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882. London: Ithaca Press. Sonbol, Amira. 2000. The New Mamluks. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

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Argentina Alberto Spektorowski Chronology 1810 (May 25) The cabildo (an especially influential autonomous municipal council and the lowest administrative unit in the Spanish government set up in the early 16th century in imitation of the Castilian ayuntamiento) of Buenos Aires deposes the viceroy and announces that it will govern on behalf of King Ferdinand VII (Fernando VII), who was captured by Bonaparte’s forces after invading Spain. The first Junta de Gobierno was created. 1811 José de San Martín declines his military career in Spain and embarks on the ship George Canning from England to Buenos Aires, where he arrives on March 9, 1812. 1812 The independent government of Buenos Aires accepts the services of San Martín and recognizes his rank of lieutenant colonel. He is commended to create a cavalry corps that soon becomes the glorious regiment known as the mounted grenadiers. San Martín also creates the Lautaro lodge, whose main goal is to liberate South America from the Spanish yoke. 1816 (March) The Tucuman Congress. Representatives of various provinces gather in Tucuman and on July 9 proclaim independence from Spanish rule with provisions for a national constitution, and declare the formation of the United Provinces of South America (later, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata). 1819–1820 Friction between the Unitarios and Federales culminates in a civil war that ends in 1820. Peace is restored, but the central issue, the formation of a stable government, is not resolved. 1829 General Juan Manuel de Rosas is elected governor of the province of Buenos Aires. 1833 Great Britain occupies the Malvinas Islands (Falkland Islands). 1852 The dictatorial regime of Rosas is defeated by a revolutionary group led by General Urquiza, a former governor of the province of Entre Ríos. 1853 A federal constitution is adopted, and Urquiza becomes first president of the Argentine Republic. The province of Buenos Aires, refusing to adhere to the new constitution, proclaims independence in 1854. The mutual hostility of the two states flares into war in 1859. The Argentine Republic prevails in the conflict. Finally, in October 1859, Buenos Aires agrees to join the federation. 1861 The province of Buenos Aires again rebels against the central government. Headed by General Bartolomé Mitre, the rebels defeat the national army in September. The president of the republic resigns on November 5, and in May of the next year a national convention elects Mitre to the presidency. The city of Buenos Aires is designated the national capital. In this sense, it can be claimed that the province of Buenos Aires, the wealthiest and most populous in the union, achieves temporary control over the remainder of the nation. 1865 Paraguay invades Argentine territory, beginning the bloody War of the Triple Alliance, which ends in complete victory for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in 1870. During the next decade, the conquest of the pampas as far as the Río Negro is completed, and the threat of Native Americans from that direction is eliminated.

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1879–1880 The War of the Desert led by General Julio A. Roca opens up vast new areas for farming. After his victory, the city of Buenos Aires is separated from the province and established as a federal district and national capital. In 1880 Roca is elected president of the republic. 1880 In the half century following 1880, Argentina makes remarkable economic and social progress. During the first decade of the 20th century, the country emerges as one of the economically wealthiest nations of South America. 1881 A long-standing boundary dispute with Chile is settled. Through this agreement, Argentina acquires the title to the eastern half of Tierra del Fuego.

Situating the Nation Argentina, or the Argentine Republic, borders Bolivia and Paraguay in the north, Brazil and Uruguay in the east, and Chile in the west. Argentina occupies an area of 766,889 square kilometers (sq km) (1,068,302 square miles), making it the second largest South American country behind Brazil. Its length from north to south is about 3,330 km, and at its widest it spans about 1,384 km. Argentina, however, claims a total of 2,808,602 sq km (1,084,120 square miles), including the Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas, and some other southern Atlantic islands, as well as part of Antarctica. Argentina’s capital is Buenos Aires with a population of approximately 12 million in its metropolitan area. That includes the autonomous capital city and its urban extensions. The country declared itself formally independent from Spain in 1816. However, it was not a united country for decades after its independence. The Argentinean rural northwest, for example, resisted Buenos Aires’s attempt to control power, setting the background for a delicate interplay of political identities, trade interests, and interventions from world powers in the process of national independence. In 1806 and 1807, the Buenos Aires estancieros (landlords) and comerciantes (merchants) had to repel a number of British invasions without any military aid from Spain. The porteños (the people of the port city) developed a certain sense of self-reliance and autonomy from Spain. After the Napoleonic invasions of the Iberian Peninsula and as a result of the changing status of Buenos Aires vis-à-vis the Spanish Crown, the porteños took advantage of the crisis in Spain and strove to emancipate from Spain. In 1809 the comerciantes and estancieros forced the kingless viceroy in Buenos Aires to grant free trade to the inhabitants of the region. New economic interests would thus have an open door to trade freely with England. This move amounted to a dismantling of mercantilism and a de facto economic, if not political, independence. Soon thereafter, the struggle for political independence began. It is not strange, therefore, that at the early period of the independence process the estanciero-comerciante alliance favored independence, for they wanted to expand their economic base and their trade with Europe. However, what must N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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be stressed is that this alliance between the rural and the bourgeois parts of society did not prevent clashes of interests among different regions of the country. The rural interior, for example, was protectionist, with no interest in free trade, for the interior of the country did not sell much to Europe and didn’t buy anything from it. Land was used basically as a means to economic and political power. Nonetheless, both the interior and the metropolitan bourgeois classes aspired to emancipate from Spain. While the porteños were free traders who used the language of liberalism to rationalize their own self-interest, the rural caudillos (local magnates) of the interior supported independence because they wanted more political autonomy. However, the war of independence was not even over before conflict broke out between the interior and the littoral regions. The reasons for this conflict were that, with independence, the estancieros and comerciantes controlling the government opened all of Argentina to free trade (with the support of the English government and foreign capitalists). Salted meat exports increased rapidly from 1810 to 1820, and British manufactured goods entered the country. When imported foreign goods entered the interior of the country, however, the manufacturing businesses concentrated there were devastated. Indeed, the handicrafts of the interior could not compete with the cheap European products. Overall, the interior of the country wanted to protect their internal market. Because the rural “interior” areas relied upon protectionism and self-sufficiency, therefore, their interests demanded the political creation of a federal nation-state. Two political/economic positions emerged: that of the Unitarios versus that of the Federales. The Unitarios wanted a unified nation-state without provincial autonomy. They supported central control from Buenos Aires and emphasized free trade. They presented themselves as political “liberals” and used the terminology of democracy and rationalism. The Federales, on the other hand, were for a federalized nation-state, without central control and with provincial autonomy. These two divisions based upon different economic interests would later expand their political and economic contest into one that encompassed culture as well.

Instituting the Nation After Napoleon seized power in Spain and the defeat of the Junta Suprema of Sevilla, a governing junta was formed in Buenos Aires on May 25, 1810, to replace the viceroy. An open town government (cabildo abierto) was formed whose political task was to appoint a political junta to rule in the name of Fernando VII (the deposed king of Spain in Madrid). These urban porteños were actually most interested in an emancipated process of nation-building. Indeed, Buenos Aires formed its own “junta” and invited the other provinces to join. The process of independence from Spain was enhanced by military campaigns led by General José de San Martín between 1814 and 1817, which made independence increasingly a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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José de San Martín (1778–1850) The least controversial national hero of Argentina, José de San Martín was sent at the age of eight to Spain, where he was educated in the college of the nobility. He entered the army in 1791 and served with honor during the French invasion. Attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel, he left the army to offer his services in the cause of South American independence and arrived in March 1812 in Buenos Aires. The government commissioned him to organize a regiment of mounted grenadiers, with whom he took part in the campaign against the Viceroy Vigodet, whom he defeated on January 13, 1813, at San Lorenzo. With the cooperation of Chilean emigrants, he organized the famous army of the Andes. Misleading the Spanish generals by false reports, he crossed the Andes under great difficulties and surprised the Spanish at Chacabuco. He was elected supreme chief of the republic, but he declined and proposed Bernardo O’Higgins, only reserving for himself the command of the auxiliary Argentine army. After a visit to Buenos Aires, he returned in October to Chile and soon began to organize, with O’Higgins, a fleet and army for the invasion of Peru. After a brilliant campaign, he entered Lima, which had been abandoned by the Spaniards on July 12, 1821. On July 27 he proclaimed the independence of Peru after being elected “protector” on August 3 by the municipality chief of the government. He sent the famous regiment of mounted grenadiers to assist Bolivar in his struggle for independence in Ecuador, and, seeing the importance of united action, he met him in Guayaquil on July 25, 1822. Nobody knows what was said in that interview, but upon his return to Lima, San Martín resigned on August 22. Leaving part of his army to assist Gem Sucre, he went to Europe, where he established himself in Brussels. In 1828 he returned to Buenos Aires shortly after the battle of Ituzaingo, only to find his country in the midst of internal discord. He thus returned to Brussels, for he had made a vow never to unsheathe his sword in civil war. In 1830 he settled in Paris.

reality. On July 9, 1816, a congress gathered at Tucuman and finally issued a formal declaration of independence from Spain. Although a so-called supreme director was appointed to head the new state, the congress was unable to reach agreement on a form of government. Many of the delegates, particularly those from the city and province of Buenos Aires, were in favor of a constitutional monarchy, a position that was later modified in favor of a highly centralized republican system. This position was met with vigorous opposition from the delegates of the other provinces, who favored a federal system of government. By 1820 provinces throughout the region centralized their power by replacing the cabildos with provincial governments. Buenos Aires, no longer serving the administrative role of the viceroyalty, started to implement liberal polices within its borders. Led by Bernardino Rivadavia, the province enacted legislation supporting liberal rights. Universal male suffrage, religious toleration, and freedom of press were assured. At the socioeconomic level, tax reform, floating interests, public education, and the policy of enticing immigrants from Europe to establish in Argentina characterized the new political tone. Many of the same acts were carried out in the interior, although to a lesser degree. Th e issue of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Congress of Tucuman In 1810 a town meeting of prominent citizens in Buenos Aires set up an autonomous government (or junta) to administer the viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (consisting of modern Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and southern Bolivia) in the name of Ferdinand VII, heir to the Spanish throne. In 1813 the viceroyalty was renamed the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, but the junta remained unable to solidify control over its vast territories in the face of internal anarchy and royalist attempts at reconquest. The 32 delegates to the Congress of Tucuman met in 1816 to devise a new political structure to cope with the disarray in the country. Having formally proclaimed Argentina’s independence from Spain, the delegates appointed Juan Martín de Pueyrredón as supreme dictator, while they conducted a fruitless search for a monarch. European royal candidates and even an Incan prince were considered. The congress moved to Buenos Aires in 1817, and two years later it framed a constitution providing for a strong central government. The breakaway of Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia from the United Provinces was accompanied by separatist movements among the provinces of Argentina itself, spearheaded by the caudillos, who finally forced the congress to disband in 1820. Confusion and disunity reigned in Argentina until the beginning of the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1829.

national unity was considered in a national congress assembled in 1824. Delegates passed a law that provinces would govern themselves until a national constitution could be signed. Declaring their union the United Provinces, the delegates elected Bernardino Rivadavia to the presidency of the republic. Rivadavia was an early advocate of independence. A convinced liberal ideologue, he joined the meeting of leading citizens that secured virtual independence from Spain. After assuming the presidency, he began implementing many of the liberal measures that shaped Argentina’s liberal identity, although many of those policies, particularly those against the church, turned provincial opinion against him. In 1827 Rivadavia resigned the presidency, effectively ending national and liberal governance for a generation. The political space was filled this time by a Federalist. Manuel Dorrego, the newly elected governor of Buenos Aires, provided a moderating influence upon the tensions between the two rival groups—the Federales and Unitarios. He maintained many of the liberal policies enacted by Rivadavia in Buenos Aires; however, the Unitarios were suspicious of any policies advanced by the Federales and attempted to remove him from office. One of the divisions of the Argentine army, which supported the Unitario cause, mutinied, captured Dorrego in battle, and summarily executed him without trial in 1828. Dorrego, however, had already signed a peace treaty with Brazil that ended the war over the future of the Banda Oriental (now Uruguay). The ensuing political crises thus lessened after the election of General Juan Manuel de Rosas as governor of the province of Buenos Aires. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Painting of Juan Manuel de Rosas, ca. 1890. His controversial legacy shaped the debate on Argentina’s cultural identity for years to come. (Stefano Bianchetti/Corbis)

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Rosas, one of the most important caudillos of Argentina’s political history, spent most of his youth in the cattle country, where he built a huge fortune. His political career was initiated as a gaucho leader in support of federalism. After Dorrego’s execution, Rosas became the Federalist leader. His rise to power was representative of the new power of the estancieros, the new landed oligarchy based on commercial ranching. In 1829 Rosas became governor of Buenos Aires with dictatorial powers and waged a bloody campaign against the Unitarios. Rosas was a manipulative and dictatorial character who defended national sovereignty and acted as a caretaker in foreign relations. As an ambitious caudillo, Rosas could not restrain from getting involved in a dispute with the United States and Britain over the Falkland Islands and interfering in Uruguayan politics, where he supported Manuel Oribe. His suspected designs to reduce Paraguay and Uruguay to dependent Argentine states led to two blockades by France and Great Britain (1838–1840, 1845–1850), greatly hurting Argentine commerce. He ensured support from other provinces and rapidly extended his authority over the United Provinces, which became known as the Argentine Confederation. During his rule, all opposition groups were crushed or driven underground. However, Rosas’s politics were, in practice, actually anti-Federalist, despite his formal allegiance. Indeed, Rosas came to represent the hegemony of Buenos Aires, and he established his dominance there, developing a paramilitary force of his own called La Mazorca (“the Corncob”), a secret political society that degenerated into a band of criminals. Rosas resigned in 1832, although he became governor again in 1835 after successfully manipulating support from other provincial chiefs. However, his manipulative skills did not impede political leaders from organizing successive attempts to revolt against his rule. Finally, Rosas was removed from power. Aided by Brazil and Uruguay, Justo José de Urquiza crushed the dictator’s army at Monte Caseros (1852). Rosas finally fled to England, where he lived in exile until his death. By 1859 the unity of Argentina was generally secured, although it would be two decades before the Unitarios completed their victory over the Federalists. The constitution of 1853, crafted by Alberdi, was Federalist and inspired by the model of the U.S. constitution. According to Alberdi, whose famous “Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina” (“Bases and points of departure for the political organization of the Argentine Republic”) provided a blueprint for the Argentine constitution of 1853, Argentina must first pass through what he called the “possible republic.” This was to be a period of government featured by limited suffrage and rule by an enlightened, authoritarian state. After Argentina could develop social and economic structures comparable to those of western Europe, it would then be possible for the republic to become a fully functioning democracy. The constitution created a president and a vice president, both with a six-year term, a senate, a house of representatives (Cámara de Diputados), and a supreme court. No property requirements existed for suffrage. Urquiza became Argentina’s first president. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation The struggle for defining Argentina’s national identity can be traced to the civil war between the Unitarios and Federales. These two contesting factions advocated two distinct models of national modernization, but, more than that, they embodied two different cultural and political styles. The Unitarios aspired to create a centralized modern state modeled after Europe. In their account, Argentina was a barbaric country that should become a modern democracy opened to immigrants, especially from Anglo-Saxon countries. Their type of civic nationalism emphasized the unity of the nation in its political institutions. They were forwardlooking; the nation could only be developed by adopting liberal forms of political and economic organization rather than by being imagined by references to a mythical, ethnic past. The Federalists, in contrast, represented by Juan Manuel de Rosas, enhanced the values of tradition and the power of charismatic leadership rather than that of an ordered, modern republic. As described by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the clearest representative of the forward-looking discourse portraying economic growth and progress as the culminating point of political legitimacy, this confrontation could be defined as a choice between “Civilization or Barbarism.” It is not strange, therefore, that the defeat of Rosas and the Federalists increased the determination of the Unitarios to erase the political memory of the dictator. This intellectual and political task was promoted by Sarmiento and the liberal elites, that is, those who set the path for Argentina’s transformation into a civilized country based on economic growth and immigration. They portray the image of the gaucho as a character unwilling to work and unable to survive under a rational political order. Prominent figures such as Bartolomé Mitre, Vicente Fidel Lopez, and Juan Bautista Alberdi even regarded Argentina’s backwardness as a result of Spanish colonialism. However, two processes ran counter to the elites’ model of a modern nation. The elites’ understanding of liberal values was far from what we conceive of today as political liberalism. They promoted economic liberalism without much emphasis on democratization. Alberdi, indeed, failed to understand that the liberal state was in reality an obstacle to democratization. Moreover, against the expectations of Argentinean elites, immigrants maintained their ethnic communities and identities and would not assimilate and become the cradle of a new nation. While the liberal Argentinean elites expected immigrants to merge into the nation, the immigrants’ desire to keep their distinctive identity sometimes led to xenophobic reactions. That is why Sarmiento, although a liberal himself and the main proponent of public education as a nation-making tool in 19th-century Argentina, strongly criticized the schools of the Italian community, for they allegedly provided an Italian education. Mass education was therefore initially regarded as the means for creating the republic and consolidating capitalism. Mass education would serve as an effective mechanism for social mobilization. Schools were instrumental in the “ArgenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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tinization” of children, and the results were most successful when education also became a tool for integrating them into a dynamic capitalism, a development particularly effective in coastal areas. For young immigrants or the children of newcomers, school provided not only the bare language but especially the “idiom” of the “high culture” necessary for upward mobility. In Sarmiento’s mind, there was a necessity to nationalize civic values to promote integration. This ideological and political process was determinant in changing the sociocultural and ethnic character of the nation. It was the culmination of a process of “nationalization” whose particular aspect was the slow and steady disappearance of the “other,” whether indigenous peoples or mulattos. Many indigenous groups disappeared because of harsh forced labor, compulsory resettlement, and diseases introduced by the Spanish conquerors. Those Indians who had maintained their autonomy well into the 19th century were almost exterminated during the military campaigns in the 1880s. Afterward the number of Indians diminished considerably, representing an estimated less than 1 percent of the total population (probably around 300,000 people) by the end of the 20th century. The number of blacks and mulattos of African origin decreased dramatically in the last decades of the 19th century. In 1887 only 8,005 Afro-Argentines lived in Buenos Aires out of a total population of 433,375. Epidemics, participation in civil wars, and intermarriage were the causes for the steady population decline of Afro-Argentines. Important factors in the diminishing presence of mestizo rural workers and Afro-Argentines were the European immigrants, who competed for scarce housing and sources of labor. The politics of labor and immigration enticed foreigners, especially from the Italian south and northern Spain, to arrive in Argentina and work in low-paying jobs formerly performed by Argentines. Immigrants quickly dominated the urban landscape as they outnumbered Argentine nationals and very soon transformed Argentina’s ethnic identity. The social outcome of these policies was that Argentina became the “most European” of Latin American countries, and its citizens felt proud of their European origin.

Narrating the Nation Argentine cultural symbols are mostly a 20th-century product of hybridization. Historical figures, sportsmen and sportswomen, politicians, and intellectuals contribute to the elaboration of a common feeling that Argentines identify with. However, the question of who best plays a role in defining who Argentines are and have been is a contested issue. Amid the historical icons who are decidedly noncontroversial is José de San Martín. He is perceived as liberator of the Americas and portrayed as a moral model to be emulated. For Argentines, San Martín sends a message of modernity and freedom, without personal or national ambitions of domination. Juan Manuel de Rosas, in contrast, is a good example of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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schisms in the process of nation-building. Hated by the liberal, modernizing, and urban-oriented sectors of society who regarded him as a tyrant who enjoyed the ignorance of the masses, he was an icon for the traditionalists who saw him as a tough defender of national sovereignty against imperial ambitions. While Rosas was at the center of the disputes around the fate of Argentina in the 19th century, Juan Domingo Perón was the focus of impassioned divisions among Argentines during the last half of the 20th century. Although some analysts draw parallels between Rosas and Perón, insisting that the two have defended the interests of the people against a foreign colonial order, the two are the products of very different societies. Rosas ruled an agrarian society; Perón ruled a predominantly urban society in which internal migrants to cities and the children of immigrants fought for greater participation as well as for recognition to be part of the nation. Another of the most controversial figures of Argentina’s politics is without any doubt María Eva Duarte de Perón, universally known as Evita. Undoubtedly she is the most famous Argentine woman, having played a determinant role in promoting the cause of underprivileged groups, mainly workers and women. Although political opponents dismissed her by stating that she was a bad actress with questionable morals, the popular sectors idolized her, seeing her as a saintly figure. After her death in 1952, people lit candles next to photographs of her, creating a national myth that has lasted to this day. During the 19th century, two authors and two books could be claimed to be the most representative narratives of Argentina’s cultural identity in the making. Both portrayed different visions of society and were to symbolize the conflictive characteristics of Argentina’s cultural identity. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s book Facundo is seen by some critics as the cathedral of Argentine culture. It describes a fragmented country torn between civilization and barbarism, with a rural, backward interior dominated by authoritarian, charismatic, populist caudillos who refuse to enter into an orderly, rational, and modern way of life. Sarmiento is held responsible for bringing the country into the modern, literate world; he is the teacher par excellence, the founding father of the Argentine school system, and a role model to be followed. Even today, attending school every day is equated with “being a Sarmiento.” Sarmiento is either glorified or vilified, but no Argentine is indifferent to him. Although Facundo was intended to attack the rural order and gaucho way of life, Sarmiento’s prose ironically continues to mystify the pampas. While Facundo was intended to highlight the backwardness of the mestizo population, another writer, José Hernández, exalted the values of gaucho culture. As a congressman in 1880, and as the leader of the Congress, Hernández defended the federation project, as a result of which Buenos Aires became the capital of the country. His book, El Gaucho Martín Fierro, was published in December 1872 and was an enormous success. In 1879, after the 11th edition, he published La Vuelta de Martín Fierro (The Return of Martín Fierro). Hernández was “painting” with N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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words the life of the gaucho. In El Gaucho Martín Fierro, the protagonist is an impoverished gaucho who is drafted to serve at a border fort, defending the Argentine frontier against the Indians. Hernández demonstrates great skill in narrating Martín Fierro’s life of poverty on the pampas and his military experiences. He pinpoints Fierro’s desertion and his attempt to return home. When he discovers that his house, farm, and family are gone, he enters into a state of tension. He deliberately provokes an affair of honor by injuring a black woman in a bar. That provokes a knife duel with her male companion, whom he finally kills. Fierro becomes an outlaw pursued by the police militia, soon joined by Sergeant Cruz who is inspired by Fierro’s bravery. The two set out to live among the Indians, hoping to find a better life there. However, in La Vuelta de Martín Fierro, Hernández describes a situation that shows that their hope of a better life is not real. When they are accused to be spies, only the cacique (“chief ”) saves their lives. Hernández presents us here with another view of rural life. The book narrates an epidemic, several attempts at a cure, and finally the fatal wrath upon those suspected of bringing the plague, including a young “Christian” boy.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During Justo José de Urquiza’s term as president, we can perceive the first attempts at national mobilization by way of technological and economic advancement. Transportation services were improved, and new communication and mail services between Buenos Aires and the provinces were encouraged. Free commerce and freedom to engage in economic activities enhanced Argentina’s dynamic economy. While land grants to railroads were centralized by the state, generally people were free to engage in any economic enterprise without governmental interference and get wealthy without limits. The government did impose income taxation, although indirect taxation was extremely small. At the same time, there was virtually no governmental welfare system. One of the most important measures to improve Argentina’s population was the initiative to promote immigration. During Bartolomé Mitre’s presidency (1862–1868), more improvements were made in finance and political order when schools were established, laws codified, and customs laws reformed. However, the clearest attempt to transform the nation into a modern democratic society was made by Sarmiento. His period in power from 1868 to 1874 was characterized by large investments in education and the encouragement of immigration. Teachers were hired (including foreigners in secondary and higher education), books were purchased, and new and modern equipment was introduced into the education system. By 1890 British investments in Argentina reached an estimated £157 million of investment capital. The great symbol of the new British connection was the construction of a burgeoning railroad system, most of it in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the hands of private British companies. The idea was to expand commerce overall with Great Britain. Over 10 million passengers and 5 million tons of cargo were transported. In 1861 total foreign trade, both imports and exports, was valued at 37 million gold pesos. By 1880 it increased to about 104 million, and by 1889 it had expanded to an estimated 250 million gold pesos. The nation’s population increased as well, from an estimated 1.1 million in 1857 to approximately 3.3 million by 1890. Immigrant arrivals increased especially during the last three decades of the century. Between 1871 and 1914, some 5.9 million newcomers arrived, of whom 3.1 million stayed and settled. It can be said that between 1830 and 1950 Argentina absorbed some 10 percent of the total number of immigrants from Europe to the Americas. Without a doubt, Argentina’s economic expansion offered immigrants the illusion of prosperity. That is why at the end of the 19th and early 20th century, belle époque, we can already perceive powerful middle- and working-class constituencies in Buenos Aires, which were among the largest in Latin America. The porteño middle class became an educated, professional middle class that depended on the state for employment. That dependence reflected, despite economic growth, the underdevelopment of manufacturing and the salience of commercial, professional, and bureaucratic occupations typical of peripheral societies. The working class, initially composed of migrants from southern Europe, was largely concentrated in transport and service sectors rather than industry. During Nicolas Avellaneda’s rule (1874–1880), Argentina acquired new land for settlement, expropriated from the Indians during the War of the Desert led by Julio Roca, who was to become president in the next term. By the 1880s, the majority of the indigenous populations had been dominated and pushed to marginal and inhospitable regions. The victory over the Indians of the pampas and Patagonia was described as the Conquest of the Desert by the generation of 1880. Vast tracts of land were distributed among the conquerors. The gauchos, who had roamed in open spaces and sometimes escaped into Indian lands to avoid the militia, gradually disappeared from the countryside as a social group. They competed with the immigrants for salaried work in the ranches that were demarcated with barbed wire fences. Many landowners believed that gauchos were ill suited for agricultural labor and favored the hiring of foreigners. Immigrants arrived by the thousands, to the point that in cities like Buenos Aires foreign-born residents outnumbered the Argentines. During Julio Roca’s presidency (1880–1886), Buenos Aires became the national capital, and La Plata became the state capital of the province of Buenos Aires. His presidency was marked by economic growth as the beef export business grew and by his total alignment with the Argentine oligarchy, especially the great landowners. Roca was followed by Miguel Juárez Celman, another representative of the oligarchy (1886–1890). In general terms it can be said that from 1880 to 1916 Argentina was ruled by the Autonomous National Party or PAN, a party that controlled elections through patronage, intimidation, and fraud and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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dedicated itself to the twin goals of “order and progress.” Argentina under the PAN sounds much like Alberdi’s “possible republic,” and, indeed, in Argentina the segue from mid-19th-century liberalism to fin de siècle positivism was unusually smooth. However, after the 1890s we begin to see a shift in Argentine politics that would lead to political protest and the demand for and process of democratization. In alliance with a dissident military faction, Leandro Alem and his nephew, Hipólito Yrigoyen, rose in revolt in 1890, 1892, and 1893, marking the beginning of the struggle for popular democracy. In September 1889, protest meetings in Buenos Aires saw the emergence of the Unión Cívica de la Juventud (Youth Civic Union). After some splits, it eventually became the Unión Cívica Radical. The Radicales fought for free suffrage and honest elections, finally gaining power in general elections in 1916. This electoral success represented a landmark of democratic mobilization that in the mid-20th century was to be characterized by the appearance of Peronist populism. Indeed, Yrigoyen initiated the period of national populism that was to be continued and radicalized by Perón. Selected Bibliography Botana, N. 1977. El orden conservador. La política Argentina entre 1810 y 1916. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana. Goodrich, D. S. 1996. Facundo and the Construction of Argentine Culture. Austin: University of Texas Press. Halperin, T. D. 1982. Una nación para el desierto argentino. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina. Halperin, T. D. 2000. De la Revolución de Independencia a la Confederación Rosista. Buenos Aires: Paidos. Luna, F. 1995. Historia integral de la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Planeta. Lynch J. 1981. Argentine Caudillo: Juan Manuel de Rosas. New York: Oxford University Press. Rock, D. 1975. Politics in Argentina, 1890–1930: The Rise and Fall of Radicalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rock, D. 2002. “Racking Argentina.” New Left Review 17 (September/October): 54–86. Romero, J. L. 1965. El desarrollo de las ideas en la sociedad argentina del siglo XX. Mexico/ Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Shumway, N. 1993. The Invention of Argentina. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Brazil Roderick Barman Chronology 1500 1532 1549 1788 1807 1808 1815 1817 1821 1822

1823 1824 1825 1831 1840 1864–1870 1889

Arrival of Pedro Alvares Cabral on the shores of what is now Brazil. First permanent settlement by the Portuguese at São Vicente. Creation of the Estado do Brasil (includes only part of what is now Brazil). The “Inconfidência Mineira,” an aborted plot for political independence in the captaincy of Minas Gerais. Invasion of Portugal by Napoleon I and the flight from Lisbon of the Portuguese government. Establishment of the royal government at Rio de Janeiro, creation of state institutions, and centralization of rule. Creation of the kingdom of Brazil, united with that of Portugal. Short-lived revolt in the province of Pernambuco and the creation of an independent republic there. Army revolt forces King John VI to return to Lisbon, leaving behind Prince Pedro, his elder son and heir, as regent of the kingdom of Brazil. Refusal of Prince Pedro to return to Portugal in January. In May, Prince Pedro assumes title of “Perpetual Defender of Brazil.” In September/October, declaration of Brazil’s independence as a monarchy (empire). Pedro I crowned emperor. Meeting of a constituent assembly, violently dissolved by Pedro I in November. Pedro I issues a constitution that includes a powerful monarch and a legislature. Recognition of Brazil’s independence by Portugal. Abdication of Pedro I in response to popular protests. Pedro II, aged 14, is declared of age and assumes the monarch’s constitutional powers. War with Paraguay. Overthrow of the empire by units of the Rio de Janeiro garrison. Proclamation of a republic.

Situating the Nation Brazil can be said to have begun in 1500 when its Atlantic coasts were “discovered” by Portugal. During the following 300 years, the Portuguese occupied most of the territories now contained within Brazil. They established a system of rule, an official culture, and an export economy. Emperor Napoleon I’s invasion of Portugal in 1807 forced the Portuguese royal family and government to flee across the Atlantic to Rio de Janeiro, where they remained until 1820. During these years, the colonies of Portuguese America for the first time consolidated into a single state, Brazil. In 1822 Brazil gained independence from Portugal. The new empire was a centralized state with a powerful monarch and a representative system N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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that survived until November 1889 when an army coup deposed the regime. By that time, a national identity and a national culture had fully developed. With the establishment of a republican regime, modeled on the United States, Brazil entered a new phase of its development. The traits that we now associate with Brazil as a nation began to emerge during the first three centuries of contact, when the future Brazil was no more than a collection of disparate Portuguese colonies. On April 22, 1500, the second expedition sent out by Portugal to India, following Vasco da Gama’s original voyage, encountered in the South Atlantic an unknown land and its inhabitants. The report sent back to the king of Portugal established three themes that continued to shape Brazilians’ sense of national identity. “The country is so well-favored that if it were rightly cultivated it would yield everything.” In other words, the material resources were rich, even infinite; all that was needed was their exploitation. As to the people, “any stamp we wish may be easily printed on them.” The indigenous people (and the Africans later brought in as slaves) were different, but they were human, capable of being transformed into “us.” Th e third theme simply emphasized that all was possible; the future was Brazil’s. In 1823, for example, a politician, Antônio Gonçalves Gomide, claimed that “the time will come, I am proud to predict, when . . . the south of Brazil alone will rival the United States” (Diário da Assembléa 1823, 726). “O Brasil é o país do futuro” (“Brazil is the country of the future”) resonates to the present day. For a generation after the first encounter, Portugal did not form settlements in the New World but instead exploited the available resources, above all, the stands of red dyewood, o pau brasil, from which the nation-state takes its name. Exploitation of other commodities, notably sugar, tropical produce, gold, diamonds, cotton, and coffee, motivated Portuguese expansion, first along the Atlantic coasts and then into the interior. The indigenous peoples were compelled to provide the labor needed for this resource exploitation. Disease, abuse, and armed resistance rapidly thinned their numbers, and a search for new sources of forced labor underlay both the Portuguese expansion into the interior and their importation, from the second half of the 16th century, of slaves from Africa. So large was this traffic that, when the trade was finally suppressed in the middle of the 19th century, some 3.5 million Africans had been brought to the Portuguese New World. By the late 18th century, Africans and their descendants formed the majority of the population. The Portuguese expansion westward in search of resources and labor continued until, in the late 18th century, it reached the lands to the east of the Andes and to the north of the Río de la Plata, areas already occupied by the Spanish (see map). The Spanish succeeded in preventing a Portuguese attempt to take control of what is now Uruguay, but they made no general attempt to roll back the Portuguese expansion. The only serious challenge to Portugal’s control of its New World colonies occurred between 1630 and 1652 when the Dutch conquered the sugar lands of northeast Brazil, from which they were eventually driven out by the local N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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inhabitants. The territorial extent of Brazil was thus established before it secured independence. The area encompassed seven or eight distinctive regions, stretching from the tropical forests of the Amazon basin in the far north to the rolling hill country with its pastures in the far south. The role played by the Portuguese state, or more precisely the Portuguese monarch, in the formation of Brazil was of considerable importance. On the one hand, the Portuguese monarch was God’s anointed, claiming absolute power over his vassals and their lives. But the revenues and the administrative machinery of the Portuguese state can only be termed scanty. The Portuguese king, lacking the means to take control of the New World territories he claimed, early on delegated the governing task to selected vassals, granting to each one or two “captaincies,” from which derive many of the existing states within Brazil. When that expedient failed to work, the king created in 1549 the “State of Brazil” under a governor-general. Administration in the Portuguese New World never became systematic and effective. The Atlantic was too broad, the territories too vast, the revenues too small, the personnel too limited. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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To retain control of its colonies, the Portuguese government sealed them off, as far as possible, from the outside world, and it prevented the emergence of alternative and therefore rival centers of power. Brazil could trade only with Portugal and Africa, using only Portuguese ships. No printing press, no university, and no professional schools (beyond a few seminaries) were permitted. Those who wished for a higher education had to cross the Atlantic to Europe. The entry of books and other printed matter was controlled as much as possible. Autonomous institutions (save for those of the Catholic church) were prohibited. These factors—resource exploitation, dependence on forced labor, royal claims to absolute authority, the monarch’s incapacity to control local affairs, and lack of cultural and institutional autonomy—combined to produce a deeply rooted and enduring social structure. A ruling minority, those who were Portuguese in culture and mainly so by descent, controlled the sources of wealth and profited from the labor of the subordinate majority, the African and indigenous peoples. While society lacked a network of institutions, there existed mechanisms, exercised mainly through personal ties and kept covert, by which the ruling minority ran local affairs as it pleased, unchecked by what the king might desire and command. It was a society that was hierarchical and oppressive yet also ill organized and sufficiently fluid to permit some individuals, outsiders by origin but talented and industrious, to gain entry, if not for themselves then for their children, into the ruling minority. The virtual absence of a school system created considerable opportunities for the self-instructed. After independence the paucity of educated men made the governing circles willing to accept those visibly not of “pure” Portuguese ancestry. By the end of the 18th century, when the societies that made up Portugal’s American colonies had existed for over two centuries, a sense of local identity was beginning to emerge, an identity manifested in two ways. The first was the image of the índio, the “Indian,” which came to symbolize what was unique and different about Portuguese America. The image was retrospective, focused on the distant past and detached from contemporary reality. It had nothing to do with the indigenous peoples as they actually existed. Linked to the índio was Tupí. This language—a lingua franca developed by the Jesuit order in the 16th century— provided words and phrases that were gradually incorporated into the Portuguese used in the New World, and individuals adopted Tupí words (often place names) as surnames. Tracing one’s descent from one of the original Portuguese settlers and their indigenous wives became proof of good standing in society. From the 1850s onward, with the establishment of weekly illustrated reviews, a Tupí Indian was often used in political cartoons as the image and personification of Brazil as a nation-state. The second focus of identity was loyalty to the pátria rather than to Portugal as such. The pátria was the physical area of the New World in which an individual existed and in which he or she made his life. Identification with the pátria was not incompatible with loyalty to the monarch—in fact, the two existed in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Banner of O Grito Nacional, a radical newspaper published in Rio de Janeiro during the 1850s. The illustration depicts a Tupí Indian, commonly used to personify Brazil and signaling its unique New World character, surrounded by other national symbols of Brazil. (Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro)

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tandem—nor did loyalty to the pátria mean loyalty to Brazil as now defined. The local identity manifested in the índio and the pátria was not nationalism, or even proto-nationalism. On the other hand, such identity was not incompatible with nationalism and eventually could and did transmute into loyalty to Brazil.

Instituting the Nation The establishment of the royal government in Rio de Janeiro in March 1808, following its flight from Lisbon in the face of Napoleon’s troops, necessarily reversed the established policies toward the New World colonies. Brazil was allowed to trade directly with the outside world, its ports thrown open to foreign shipping and foreign merchants and professionals permitted to settle there. Books and other literature from abroad circulated quite freely. A further consequence of the royal move to Rio de Janeiro was the establishment there of the institutions of government, including ministries, a treasury board, and a high court of justice. For the first time, printing was authorized, and one or two government newspapers began publication. A military college and two medical schools were founded. Just as importantly, all the colonies in the New World, now renamed provinces, were administered as a single entity from Rio de Janeiro, which became for the first time a capital city with such appropriate cultural institutions as a state library and an opera house. Upon the overthrow of Napoleon in 1814 and the end of warfare in Europe, the royal government did not return to Lisbon but continued in Rio de Janeiro, which had become the de facto center of the Portuguese empire. At the end of 1815, Brazil was raised to the status of a kingdom, equal in status and—on paper—united with Portugal in a single realm. In reality, of course, given the presence of the royal government at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was the dominant element, and Portugal, the subordinate. This new political order, established in 1808 and legitimized in 1815, lasted until 1820 when the army in Portugal revolted, demanding the return of the royal government to Lisbon and the establishment of a constitutional government. The king returned to Portugal in May 1821, leaving behind his elder son and heir as regent of the kingdom of Brazil. The Lisbon regime adopted policies that threatened to deprive Brazil of its autonomous institutions and its direct trade with the outside world. Brazilian opinion moved rapidly during 1821 and 1822 in favor of a break with Portugal. A radical minority desired immediate independence in the form of a republic. A conservative majority desired no more than the continuation of the existing status quo, although willing to accept independence as a nationstate if no other outcome was possible. When ordered to return to Europe by the Lisbon regime, the prince regent refused and thus identified himself with the cause of Brazil. As his senior minister, he named José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, born in Brazil but a longtime N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Pátria When Brazilians wish to express identity with and loyalty to their country, they refer to it as their pátria, not as their nação (“nation”). The concept pátria, with no direct equivalent in English and perhaps best translated as “native land,” possesses an emotional force for Brazilians that the word nação lacks. Pátria must be treated as a concept distinct from nação, although used as a synonym for it, and indeed it is both more diverse and more complex in meaning than nation. The dictionary published in 1789 by a native of Portuguese America defined pátria as a terra donde alguem é natural, the land or locality of which someone is a native. In terms of the 18th-century Portuguese world, in which most people were illiterate, the locality ( pátria) referred to a fairly small region, the area in which one was born, was brought up, made one’s living, and was married. It was a world that was familiar through direct personal acquaintance, not from abstract knowledge. The pátria could be a village, a town, or a region. It might but did not necessarily coincide with a political or administrative unit, such as a captaincy or a comarca ( judicial district). Individuals perceived the larger, outside world through the lens of their pátria. They could expand their concept of what their pátria was to encompass a larger area, but that larger area retained the characteristics of the original (and smaller) pátria. In sum, the meaning of pátria was and is malleable, depending a great deal on the context in which the word is used. The concept is not limited to a single, agreed-upon meaning. What relationship did the concept of pátria have, in the 18th century, to that of nação and to Brazil? Pátria and nação were quite distinct, and indeed incompatible in meaning because, as the word was then used, nação had no territorial basis. It referred to the totality of the people who owed allegiance to the Portuguese monarch, “a nação portuguesa espalhada nas quartas partes do mundo” (“the Portuguese nation scattered across the world”). References to a nação were accordingly not to Brazil as a potential nation-state but simply to the totality of the Portuguese subjects, regardless of where they resided throughout the world. The relation of pátria to Brazil is extremely complex. The Estado do Brasil was set up in 1549 under a governor-general, with his seat at the port of Salvador. But the State of Brazil only included the captaincies of the eastern Atlantic seaboard. From the 17th to the 18th centuries, there existed the Estado do Maranhão (State of Maranhão), which included the captaincies in the far north of what is now Brazil. In other words, Portuguese America never constituted a unit, a single colony, but rather a congeries of disparate colonies, which the British called “the Brazils.” The Portuguese termed their possessions in the New World sometimes as “o Brasil” (the name of one part serving to identify the whole), sometimes as “a América portugêsa,” and at times as simply “a América.” The important point to stress is that it was not o Brasil or a América portugêsa as such that formed the focus of identity and of loyalty, but the myriad local pátrias. However, individuals could and did use the term o Brasil to refer to their pátria, because it was perceived as a magnification of that pátria. No incompatibility, no contradiction existed. After the royal government settled in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil did become a single state, a potential nation. French political thought, in which the concept of la patrie was synonymous with nation, fostered among the politically conscious the equation of a pátria to nação, but the new usage coexisted with rather than replaced the old sense of the concept.

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government bureaucrat in Portugal, who possessed the political skills, the determination, and the ruthlessness that the task required. The new regime possessed considerable advantages. It could mobilize the resources to create a navy and to arm its supporters on land. It also received tacit support from Great Britain. In September 1822, the prince declared the independence of Brazil as an empire, being acclaimed as Emperor Pedro I. Portugal’s refusal to accept the new regime led to warfare that polarized opinion. Brazilians had no choice but to support either union with Rio de Janeiro or subordination to Lisbon. In March 1824, the emperor promulgated a constitution that gave Brazil a representative government under a strong monarch. In 1825, thanks to pressure from Great Britain, the king of Portugal, Pedro I’s father, recognized the independence of Brazil.

Defining the Nation Brazil began its life as a nation-state with considerable assets. It possessed an established central government, based in the city of Rio de Janeiro, which handled half the foreign trade of the new country. It also had an official language, used by everyone of standing, and a state religion (the Catholic church). The new emperor inherited the tradition of obedience and loyalty to the monarch that existed in colonial times. The new state rapidly established its authority throughout the territories it claimed. The governing circles identified with the new nation-state as the assurance of their continued security and prosperity. Recent graduates from Coimbra University in Portugal and other European universities existed in numbers sufficient to run the state apparatus. The external boundaries of Brazil’s territories were sufficiently well defined (if not actually demarcated) to avoid conflicts with other states, with the sole exception of the far south. There the lands lying to the east bank of the Río de la Plata recently conquered by the Portuguese had been incorporated into Brazil, but in 1825 a rebellion broke out, and three years later Brazil was forced to renounce its claims and recognize the new state of Uruguay. The war in the far south was far from the sole problem faced by the nation. Brazil was so large and communications among its separate parts (particularly with the far north) so difficult that effective government was almost impossible. The existence of slavery and the continued importation of slaves from Africa (despite an official prohibition of the trade enacted in 1831) meant that a large section of the population existed outside the nation. Brazil lacked a social and cultural infrastructure, above all an educational system, indispensable for functioning nationhood. Profound philosophical differences existed as to the nature of the new nation. Traditionalists, desiring a continuation of the status quo created after 1808, perceived the monarch as the legitimate source of authority within the nation and the guardian of its security and well-being. Radicals, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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unable to secure a republic, made the people the source of authority, electing a national assembly to which the monarch was subordinate. During the struggle for independence, compromise on this point prevailed, Pedro I being declared emperor by the Grace of God and the Unanimous Acclamation of the Peoples. However, in 1823, compromise ended when the emperor and José Bonifácio fell out and the fallen minister sided with the radicals in the assembly elected to write a constitution for the nation. The quarrel involved not just the emperor’s role but the question of the rights in the new nation of those born in Portugal (including the emperor himself). The radicals denounced the Portuguese-born as supporters of the colonial order and as potential supporters of renewed rule by Portugal. Since many radicals were in part of African descent, their espousal of the people as the source of authority sprang from their vision of Brazil as an egalitarian nation in which race played no role. The colonial heritage and the Portuguese-born they equated with racial discrimination. The outcome of the quarrel was the emperor’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in November 1823. The regime survived a resulting revolt in the northeast, and the constitution issued by Pedro I in March 1824 entrenched the traditionalist concept of the nation, making the monarch the controller of the political system and supreme representative of the nation. The constitution further recognized as citizens all Portuguese-born residing in Brazil at the time of independence. This success was achieved at high cost. Pedro I lost the confidence of a major section of the governing circles, and his impetuous style of rule and his refusal to share power intensified their hostility and caused them to advocate an extreme form of popular sovereignty. The “Confederation of the Equator,” proclaimed in 1823 by the rebels in the northeast, served as a model for this conception of Brazil: power was to devolve to the autonomous provinces (now equated with the pátria), leaving to the national government the tasks of guarding the pátrias against attack from abroad and preventing anarchy at home. Rather than share power with his opponents, the emperor abdicated in April 1831 and left for Europe, being succeeded on the throne by his son, Pedro II, then aged five. The regency that ruled Brazil in Pedro II’s name lacked both legitimacy and effectiveness. The country was wracked with conflicts, and in the hope of placating disaffected elements, a constitutional amendment was passed in 1834 devolving many powers to newly created legislative assemblies in the provinces. This amendment only intensified conflicts and, in fact, generated a separatist revolt in the far south. There followed a reaction in favor of the traditionalist vision of the nation, which culminated in Pedro II being declared of age in 1840 and made the central element in the nation. The young emperor developed into a capable ruler who, aided by other such developments as the introduction of the steamship, consolidated Brazil as a nation-state. Pedro II’s success as ruler also resided in his establishment of himself as the personification and thus as the definition of Brazil. For Brazilians, the nationN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Pedro II became the second emperor of Brazil after his father, Emperor Pedro I, abdicated, having established Brazil as an independent nation from Portugal. A moderate man with a modern outlook, Pedro II stabilized the new nation. (Library of Congress)

state as developed in revolutionary and Napoleonic France was both the most up-to-date and the most alluring form of political organization for their country. In dress, behavior, outlook, and speech, Pedro II turned himself into the model citizen, the exemplary bourgeois man of letters. He himself referred to his two countries, Brazil and France, the latter the country of his intellect and the former the country of his heart and birth. The emperor exemplified the modern and was accepted as such by literary and scientific circles in Europe. He thus became for Brazilians the definition of what their country was eventually destined to become as a nation-state.

Narrating the Nation In less than 20 years, Brazil was transformed from a collection of disparate colonies, isolated from the outside world, into an independent nation-state. The creation of Brazil was largely achieved through action from the top supported by those elements who equated independence with an end to subordination and discrimination. Among the leaders of the new state, the expectation seems to have been that the achievement of political independence would of itself generate a sense of national identity, a social infrastructure, and an autonomous culture that the colonial order had deliberately prohibited. Th e troubled years following Pedro I’s abdication in 1831 revealed how illusory this expectation was. A national culture, including a national past, would have to be brought into being. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The task of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute) founded at Rio de Janeiro in 1839 was to gather knowledge about Brazil and to promote research on all aspects of the nation. One of its first projects was a competition on the theme, Como se deve escrever a história do Brasil? (“How should the history of Brazil be written?”). The question implicitly admitted that no such history yet existed. The construction of a glorious past stretching back to the first appearance of the Portuguese gave legitimacy and longevity to the new nation-state. As Francisco Varnhagen, the pioneer historian of Brazil, commented to Pedro II in 1857, history would serve to form the public’s mind in a single mold, promoting an identical conception of and so loyalty to Brazil. From the writings of Varnhagen and others there emerged what is called in Brazil a história pátria, a body of writing that is the received orthodoxy regarding Brazil’s past. Recent writers of this school include Caio Prado Júnior, José Honório Rodrigues, and Emília Viotti da Costa. In North America, the leading exponent of this approach was the late E. Bradford Burns. The views of this historical school can be summarized as follows. Brazil began its existence from the moment the Portuguese arrived. A sense of separate identity began to emerge thereafter, being attested to by the local inhabitants battling to expel the Dutch in the 1640s. This sense of identity was essentially anticolonial, brasileiro (Brazilian) being opposed to português (Portuguese). It was also innately republican as opposed to monarchist. In the 18th century, the sense of identity became manifest in literary works, both poems and prose, and in the local literary societies, all of which glorified Brazil and its attributes. In the late 18th century, a number of conspiracies, above all the Inconfidência Mineira (Minas Subversion) of 1788, sought the end of Portuguese rule and the establishment of independence. The start of the 19th century marked, in the view of Caio Prado Júnior (1967), “the moment when the elements that make up Brazilian nationhood—the basic institutions and energies—organized and stored up from the outset of colonization, finally came to flower and reached maturity.” To writers of the história pátria, the movement for independence was the product of a mature Brazilian nationalism, an autonomous and triumphant achievement, of which the hero was José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, chief minister in 1822 and 1823. The empire (1822–1889) is treated as no more than a period of consolidation and preparation for the republic that Brazilians had always aspired to establish. The imperial regime rested upon slavery, so the achievement of abolition on May 13, 1888, necessarily followed the end of the empire. In fact, for many Brazilians, their country history only begins with the establishment of the republic on November 15, 1889. Writers of the história pátria began by focusing on the achievements of the ruling groups, but for the last 60 years, they have extolled the role of the ordinary people, the Portuguese and other foreigners being viewed as exploiters of the nation’s resources. Recently the emphasis has shifted from perceiving the past in economic terms (with the landowners as the ruling group and the working class N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Race and Nation The role that the concept of race has played in defining Brazil as a nation is complex and equivocal, mainly because the Brazilian attitude toward race is itself complex and equivocal. An explanation for the evolving attitudes toward race makes clear the connection between race and nation. The Portuguese came to the New World with long experience interacting (as superiors to inferiors) with non-European peoples. The Portuguese cohabited and accommodated at the same time they exploited and abused. In consequence, their colonies soon contained a population, much of it of mixed ancestry, that spoke Portuguese, was Catholic in religion, and looked Portuguese in dress and culture. Such groups were ancillaries, but not equals, in running the colonies. The Portuguese interacted in precisely this way with the indigenous peoples along the coasts of Brazil. The dividing line was not as much skin color as being “civilized.” In respect to the African slaves imported from the middle of the 16th century, the divide was much greater because they were slaves. Nonetheless, cohabitation with slave women produced a mulatto slave population. The practice of freeing slaves resulted in the appearance of a free population partly or wholly African in descent. By the late 18th century, a considerable section of the Brazilian population was of mixed descent (sometimes from all three races) and Portuguese in speech and culture. For such people, obtaining an education (even at the cost of going to Europe) was a key means of economic and social advancement. The French Revolution with its promise of liberty, equality, and fraternity powerfully attracted the free population of mixed descent. The concept of Brazil as an independent nation-state won enthusiastic support from this group, because in a nation-state the citizens were equal before the law. The 1824 constitution did in fact ordain that talent should be the sole basis for public office. The constitution guaranteed a range of other rights to the citizen, but it was totally silent on the question of slavery and the rights of slaves. The importation of slaves from Africa continued unchecked until 1851. Those born in Africa were foreigners and, even if freed, could not meet the documentary requirements for acquiring citizenship. Freed slaves born in Brazil did, under the provisions of the 1824 constitution, become citizens but with restricted rights. Racial discrimination had no legal basis during the empire, and people of mixed descent could and did play major roles in public affairs. At least two prime ministers during the empire were visibly of African descent, and one was of indigenous descent. However, since citizens in a nation-state were defined essentially as those with an education, owning property, and behaving in accord with European practice, the destiny of Brazil as a nation-state had to rest in the hands of the small minority who were “civilized.” The rest of the population stood outside of national affairs. The civilized minority contained a good many people of mixed ancestry. It was not they, however, but the Emperor Pedro II who epitomized what Brazil as a nation should be. Tall, fair-skinned, and blond-haired with blue eyes, he was fluent in French, knowledgeable about European culture, and the correspondent of many savants there. Physically and culturally he embodied what every member of the ruling circles, regardless of ancestry, wanted their country to become.

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as the eventual victors) to a perception based on social justice, wherein those of African descent constitute a central element in Brazilian nationhood. These changes have not altered the basic assumptions of the história pátria: Brazil is a natural unit, with unique qualities, and its history has unfolded steadily toward the achievement first of political independence and then (but not yet) the creation of the ideal society. The paradox of the história pátria school is that, while it lauds the ordinary people, its writings have been addressed to the literate, who have long formed a distinct and privileged minority among Brazilians. National past has been presented to the ordinary people, insofar as it has been presented at all, in the form of parades, statues, and names (usually those of great men) for streets and buildings, as well as the flag and anthems intrinsic to the nation-state. Unless the individual for whom a street or building is named possesses iconic standing, as does José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, for example, the practice does little to instill a sense of the national past in the ordinary population. Statues are more visible and more capable of arousing interest and pride in the heroes of the past, but

Flags and Anthems Of the emblems and icons that are integral to the existence of a nation-state, the flag and the anthem are the most visible and perhaps the most significant. In Brazil’s case, both flag and anthem(s) are indicative of the complexity of its national identity. No distinctive emblem or flag was associated with Portugal’s New World colonies. When the kingdom of Brazil was created in 1815, it was given as its official emblem an armillary sphere on a shield, surmounted by a royal crown. At the time of independence, the new imperial government adopted a national flag that, influenced by the design of the flags Napoleon I of France had given to his army units, placed the armillary sphere— encircled with 25 stars, flanked by branches of tobacco and coffee plants, and surmounted by an imperial crown—within a yellow lozenge on a green field. Green and gold, which had no long-standing connection with Brazil, rapidly became identified with the country’s luxuriant vegetation and bounteous resources. In November 1889, upon the overthrow of the empire, this flag was replaced by another that maintained the green field and gold lozenge but replaced the armillary sphere with a blue sphere showing the constellation of the Southern Cross, surmounted with a band reading “Ordem e Progresso” (“Order and Progress”). Brazil has no less than four accepted national anthems. Their tunes, all attractive, are widely known in Brazil, but not so the words. The music of the original national anthem, now called the “Hymn to Independence,” was composed by Emperor Pedro I, a competent amateur composer, with words by a leading journalist of the time. The music to the second anthem, known as the “National Hymn” and played on state occasions, was composed at the start of the 1830s, but the present words were not adopted until 1922. Upon the founding of the republic, a competition was held to select a new national anthem, but the winning entry, now termed “The Hymn to the Proclamation of the Republic,” with its theme echoing that of the “Marseillais,” failed to oust the “National Hymn.” The “Hymn to the National Flag” was composed early in the 20th century.

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here again it is the iconic standing of individual that determines whether the statue connects ordinary Brazilians to their history. More effective are the parades held on national holidays, of which Independence Day (September 7) and the Republic Day (November 15) are the most significant. The pomp and ceremony, with military contingents, bands, and speeches, give the parades a color and a vigor that holds attention, and they form an integral part of the cycle of life. National holidays were established by a law passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1823 and originally included the birthdays of the monarch, his spouse, and his heir. It is not that Brazilians have no sense of their nation’s history or no pride in what it has achieved, but the past does not approach futebol (“soccer”) as a defining element in the national identity. When Brazil plays a match in the World Soccer Cup (and Brazilians expect their team to win), the whole country literally closes down so that everyone can watch the game on television.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation If a sense of separate identity existed in Portuguese America of the 18th century, it was linked to the pátrias and to a widely held perception of the Portuguese New World as unique in terms of environment and people. None of the two or three attempts (which involved so few people that it is more accurate to term them “conspiracies” than “movements”) for independence in the late 18th century were concerned with Brazil in its modern sense. They sought freedom for the pátria. In the case of the one significant conspiracy, the Inconfidência Mineira of 1788, the pátria was the captaincy of Minas Gerais, which wanted to become an independent republic. The other captaincies in the New World might also wish to become republics, but that was their own responsibility. In sum, the evidence may show the emergence in the late colonial period of a sense of separateness, but it does not demonstrate the existence of national sentiment. This sense of separateness began to change into identification with Brazil as a nation following the arrival of the royal government at Rio de Janeiro in 1808, the opening of Brazil to foreign trade and cultural influences, and the creation of a central government at Rio de Janeiro. The decisive event was the creation in 1815 of the kingdom of Brazil, which gave legitimacy to the new status quo. Many groups—bureaucrats, merchants, and intellectuals—embraced the new order and depended upon it for their livelihood. The break with Portugal in 1822, therefore, represented not so much an innovation but the preservation of an existing order, especially since the idea of the nation-state, as exemplified by France, was familiar to educated Brazilians. Establishing a nation-state proved far more difficult than the exponents of the história pátria would allow. Several of the provinces (as the captaincies were known after 1808) were reluctant to abandon self-rule but, faced with the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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necessity of choosing, preferred Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon. The incorporation of the far north into the new nation-state was achieved by strong-arm tactics that boded ill for the future. Emperor Pedro I’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly late in 1823, the bloody suppression of the Confederation of the Equator revolt in the northeast, and his promulgation of a constitution in 1824 consolidated the new empire but deepened the existing divisions regarding the source of authority within the nation-state and undermined, over the long run, the regime’s legitimacy. The 1824 constitution established a legislature of two houses that first convened in 1826. The Chamber of Deputies, dominated by the emperor’s opponents, embarked on a legislative program designed to provide the new nation with institutions based on popular authority, mainly copied from France. It also sought to create a social infrastructure, starting with two law schools. The magnitude of the task, the legislators’ inexperience, and the deepening conflict with the emperor limited the success of these achievements. After Pedro I’s abdication in 1831, the discord and disorder facing the new government prevented new initiatives beyond the constitutional amendment passed in 1834. The amendment restricted the national government’s ability to engage in nation-building, and in particular it passed control of primary and secondary education to the provinces. In 1840 the legislature passed a law “interpreting” and in practice annulling the provisions of the 1834 constitutional amendment giving the provinces control of law and order. However, the new law did not restore to the national government the other powers it had lost in 1834. A number of developments, including the spread of coffee growing in the hinterland of Rio de Janeiro, the introduction of the steamship, Pedro II’s shrewdness as ruler, and the restoration of order throughout the country—exemplified by the suppression in 1851 of the illegal slave trade with Africa—consolidated the imperial regime. The simple passage of time made the Brazilian nation-state seem the norm, the necessary focus of identity. The government gave cautious support, mainly through the grant of subsidies, to the creation of a national culture—literature, arts, music, and theater. Finally, a long and ultimately victorious war with Paraguay (1864–1871) brought Brazilians from all parts of the country together on the battlefield and through bloodshed strengthened identity with the nation. The consolidation of Brazil as a nation-state, impressive as it was, could not disguise the existence of major problems. The country lacked the material and social infrastructure—railroads, highways, telegraph lines, schools, and universities —that the European nations, the United States, and even Argentina possessed in abundance. Brazil also displayed no economic dynamism, still depending on slavery for agricultural labor and failing to develop manufacturing industries. The imperial regime, which above all feared renewed threats to the country’s unity and disliked the emergence of autonomous centers of power in the provinces, refused to embark on a program of structural development for the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Further, the governing circles’ support for nation-building was restrained by the complex attitudes toward race existing in Brazil. Too vigorous a program of social integration would put at risk control of the nation by the civilized “white” population, with which the governing circles identified. By the 1870s, the incapacity of the regime to manage the country’s problems was patent, and it was this factor as much as any other that triggered the declaration of the republic on November 15, 1889. By 1889 Brazil possessed all the characteristics of a nation-state—a unified territory, a single language, a common culture, a shared past. Yet, as this entry has shown, there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of a single nationstate out of the diverse territories and peoples that existed in the Portuguese New World. Brazil is living proof that nation-states can be constructed. Selected Bibliography Barman, Roderick J. 1989. Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798–1852. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Burns, E. Bradford. 1968. Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey. New York: Praeger. Costa, Emília Viotti da. 2000. The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories. Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Diário da Assembléa Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil. 1823. Obra comemorativa do sesquicentenário da instituição parlamentar. 2 vols. Introduction by de Pedro Calmon. Facsimile edition (Brasília, 1973). Kraay, Hendrik. 1999. “Between Brazil and Bahia: Celebrating Dois de Julho in NineteenthCentury Salvador.” Journal of Latin American Studies 32, no. 2: 255–286. Prado Júnior, Caio. 1967. The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil. Translated by Suzette Macedo. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rodrigues, José Honório. 1965. Aspirações nacionais; interpretação histórico-política. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor. Schwartz, Stuart B. 1987. “The Formation of a Colonial Identity in Brazil.” In Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800, edited by Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, 15–50. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Canada Colin M. Coates Chronology 1608 Establishment of a French fort at Quebec. 1713 Treaty of Utrecht: Britain acquires title to peninsular Nova Scotia, and France cedes its claims to parts of Newfoundland and Rupert’s Land; the St. Lawrence Valley and interior of the continent as well as Ile Royale (Cape Breton) and Ile St. John (Prince Edward Island) are still claimed by France. 1759 Battle of the Plains of Abraham, British defeat of French army. 1763 Treaty of Paris, ceding New France to Britain. 1837–1838 Rebellions in Lower and Upper Canada (Quebec and Ontario) against British rule, defeated by British troops. 1840 Act of Union, combining Upper and Lower Canada into one province in the hope of establishing an English-speaking Protestant majority. 1864 Charlottetown meeting to discuss a proposed union of the Atlantic colonies; representatives of the United Canadas bring the issue of a larger British North American federation to the table. 1867 Passage of British North America Act, bringing the United Canadas, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia into a federation; Canada comes into being July 1. 1869–1870 First uprising led by Louis Riel; Manitoba is admitted into Confederation. 1885 Second Riel Rebellion; Execution of Riel; Honoré Mercier’s nationalist Parti national is elected the provincial government in Quebec one year later. 1917 Conscription crisis during World War I, a period of grave division between Englishand French-speaking Canadians. 1939–1945 World War II; the central government establishes key foundations of the Canadian welfare state; the issue of conscription again divides English and French Canadians, though to a lesser extent.

Situating the Nation The Canadian nation originated out of the remnants of two 18th-century European empires in North America. Arguably, no single coherent national identity defined the northern half of North America before 1945, but rather two main parallel and sometimes competing national identities evolved. It is only after the end of the period under study in this volume that two key events occurred in Canadian nationhood: the institution of a distinctive Canadian citizenship in 1947, and the completion of the present boundaries of the country through the integration of Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949. While much of present-day Canada (as well as present-day United States) was claimed by France, the defeat of French forces in 1759–1760 led to a brief political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Conquest (1759) The first 150 years of European settlement in the region now called eastern Canada was typified by strife between the French and the British. Although the French population in the New World remained much smaller than the British settlements, the strategic position of French forts along the St. Lawrence River helped them resist the various British attacks. The French surrendered significant territorial claims to the British in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, but the key turning point in the history of French Canada was General James Wolfe’s victory over General Louis de Montcalm at Quebec in 1759. Termed the “Conquest,” this battle left the city of Quebec in ruins. A deep scar on the mentality of French Canadians, the forced integration of Quebec into the British empire was nonetheless a key step in the creation of the Canadian nation. But the humiliation of the defeat still serves as a latent cause for some French Canadian antipathies to Canada’s constitutional framework.

unity under the British Crown for most of eastern North America. The regions that became Canada comprise essentially those parts of North America that chose not to join the United States. At the time of the American Revolution, rebel troops invaded the two most populous British colonies in the north, Quebec and Nova Scotia, but the efforts to entice these areas into rebellion were not successful. The majority French-speaking and Catholic inhabitants of Quebec had reason, perhaps, to distrust the Protestant fervor of American colonists. In Nova Scotia, much of the population had roots in New England, but the presence of the sizeable naval base at Halifax enhanced the lack of enthusiasm for rebellion against British authorities. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, many Loyalists fled to the remaining British colonies, their presence leading to considerable constitutional change: the creation of a separate Upper Canada (present-day southern Ontario), the short-lived colony of Cape Breton (1785–1820), and New Brunswick. St. John’s Island (renamed Prince Edward Island in 1799) also enjoyed a distinct colonial status after 1769. In the oldest British overseas colony, Newfoundland, imperial authorities continued to discourage permanent settlement until the 19th century. Despite their common British allegiance from 1760, the colonies did not share much sense of a common destiny. The main population centers were separated by considerable distances, and there were few trading links among the colonies. Moreover, each colony had its distinct history of European settlement. For some British political figures, including some of the appointed governors, the unification of the colonies seemed an entirely logical outcome. The logic was much less apparent to local political figures. At the same time, the British had to deal with an anomalous case: Quebec (Lower Canada after 1791) retained a French-speaking and Catholic majority. Although Catholics enjoyed more political freedoms in Quebec than they did in Britain, tensions festered over the degree of political control that local elected representatives could wield. These issues contributed to political unrest in the 1830s and ultimately to the armed rebellions of 1837–1838. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Ostensibly led by Louis-Joseph Papineau, the rebellions in Lower Canada quickly expanded beyond his control, and he fled to sanctity in the United States. The Scottish-born journalist and politician William Lyon Mackenzie, mistakenly hearing of widespread rebel victories in Lower Canada, led a short-lived uprising in Upper Canada, then he, too, fled south. Both leaders eventually returned to the colonies, assuming active but much less prominent political roles. The British solution was, in part, to unite Upper and Lower Canada in the hopes that the French Canadians would find themselves in a minority and assimilate. However, astute French Canadian leaders strategically allied with reformers from Upper Canada and quickly regained many of their lost political rights. Nonetheless, the United Provinces of Canada East and Canada West proved difficult to manage, and ultimately some politicians saw as a solution a wider federation of the British colonies in North America.

Instituting the Nation In 1864, representatives of the four Atlantic colonies planned to meet in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, to discuss a local union. Politicians from the United Canadas requested to join the meeting and quickly came to dominate discussions, proposing a larger union of the British colonies in the eastern half of the continent. Despite considerable opposition throughout the colonies, an agreement was later reached at Quebec City and then ratified in the form of the British North America Act, passed by the British Parliament in Westminster in 1867. Newfoundland, much more oriented to the Atlantic fisheries and European markets, withdrew from the discussions, and tiny Prince Edward Island declined to join, hoping for an improved financial settlement. One of the key goals of the leading advocates of the Confederation was westward expansion, and the

British North America Act (1867) Passed by the Westminster Parliament in London, England, in 1867, this act created the Dominion of Canada and is the basis of the Canadian constitution. The bill was the outcome of negotiations among political leaders in the three colonies (the United Canadas, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia) that together formed the new federation. The wording of the bill represented a delicate balancing of regional and local concerns, along with the desire to create a larger political entity on the northern half of North America. However, it was not the product of widespread enthusiasm, and it did not show that a new sense of nationality had emerged. French and British Canadian elites held different interpretations of the central logic of confederation, and these views would structure some of the key debates on whether Canada was at heart a federation of many provinces or a pact between two founding peoples, the British and the French.

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new Canadian government planned to purchase from the Hudson’s Bay Company its claim to Rupert’s Land, the vast watershed that drained into Hudson Bay. The local populations in the western prairies were not consulted, and in 1869, Louis Riel on behalf of the métis (people of mixed aboriginal and French or Scottish ancestry) of the Red River settlement declared a provisional government. A hasty negotiation led to the entry of Manitoba (only a tiny area at the time) as a full-fledged province. At the same time, Canada entered into discussion with distant British Columbia, separated from the rest of the continent by the formidable Rocky Mountains. Examining the various options British Columbia faced, local politicians forewent joining the United States or remaining a separate British colony and joined Canada in 1871. Having achieved its better terms (an increase in per capita subsidies and money for a railroad), Prince Edward Island joined in 1873. Much of Canada’s geographical area retained the political status of “territory,” without the full range of powers accorded to provinces. In 1888, Canada acquired title to the Arctic Islands from Britain, and in 1905, the two new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta were created. Despite negotiations over the years, Newfoundlanders declined to join Canada until 1949, and even at that point the referendum vote gave only a small margin to the Canadian option. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Therefore, one of the key foundations of Canadian nationhood was the process of expansion. Canada’s official motto of “From Sea to Sea” was implicit in the choice of “dominion” for the country when it still only stretched from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes. Unification involved a series of pragmatic political decisions with no definitive break in allegiance to Great Britain. Transcontinental railways created economic linkages in the nation, the investments benefiting some sectors of society while creating antipathies among other groups.

Defining the Nation It proved very difficult to define Canada in anything other than political terms. With the vast majority of the population of European origin divided between British and French before 1945, it was almost impossible to posit an ethno-cultural unity for the Canadian people. Nonetheless, in the late 19th century, some writers tried to propose a common Norman heritage for both French Canadians and English-speaking Canadians. More typically, Canada remained throughout this period a profoundly local society, and indeed its constitution defined the country in this way. A key feature of the Canadian constitution was the degree of power accorded to the provinces. The provincial governments had jurisdiction over education, health, local welfare, and natural resources, while the central government controlled currency, interprovincial trade and transportation, indirect taxation, and foreign affairs (this last power acquired after a slow evolution away from British control). In other words, the provincial governments had greater influence over many aspects of everyday life than did the central government, even if the latter maintained the right to disallow any provincial laws with which it did not agree. Tellingly, the central government has made only rare use of its veto power. The central government maintained considerable taxation powers, and so was permitted some latitude in developing programs of national scope. But throughout most of the period, the broad liberal consensus on the limited role of the state meant that the central government made few incursions into provincial jurisdictions. French Canadian national identity revolved around themes of a shared Catholic faith and French language, a distinct legal civil code, and a range of Church-run educational and welfare institutions. Within Quebec, where the vast majority of the population was French-speaking, these characteristics were firmly rooted. In French-speaking areas outside of Quebec, the antipathies of English-speakers threatened the minority groups’ schools. In the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s, which profoundly affected the prairie provinces in particular (as well as Newfoundland, which was bankrupted and lost its local control to a British-appointed commission government), and in the context of the exigencies of World War II, the central government expanded both its tax base and its political scope. The creation of the welfareN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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state policies of unemployment insurance (1940) and the family allowance (1945) led to an enhanced role for the Canadian government, and these developments would eventually create resentment in and competition from the government of Quebec.

Narrating the Nation It has proven extremely difficult to develop a national narrative to include the great majority of the Canadian population. In the first place, aboriginal peoples were categorically excluded from any national narrative, except perhaps in the early decades of settlement, for nonaboriginals perceived them to be hostile or irrelevant to Canadian growth. Aboriginal peoples were defined, in the context of Canadian law, as wards of the central government. Consequently, provincial governments did not have to serve this population, and incoming settlers often successfully lobbied governments to remove the aboriginal people from prime agricultural or resource-rich land. Until 1960, aboriginal people were denied the right to vote unless they gave up their official “Indian” status. For their part, French Canadian nationalists perceived that their people had a special status in North America, a staunchly Catholic island in a vast AngloSaxon, materialist sea. French Canadians (the term Québécois was not widely used, except to define people who lived in Quebec City, before the 1960s) argued that Canada was founded on a concept of duality, implying respect for the two “founding peoples” of the country. This respect was to be shown in the right to use both English and French in the national parliament and before federal courts and in constitutional protections for minority religious education (often flaunted by English-majority provinces). Some French Canadians hoped that, although clearly the political power of their people was centered in Quebec, their people could expand across the country and enjoy protection throughout. At the same time, there was a strong sense of the historic distinctiveness of French Canadians. The history of the French colonial period represented the “heroic age,” symbolized by individuals who defended the French colony against British and aboriginal (usually Iroquois) attacks. For French Canadians, the British conquest of 1759–1760 was a shameful event. Survival (“survivance”), often in the face of daunting odds, was the main theme explicating the French Canadian historical narrative, and the key heroes were people such as Dollard des Ormeaux, who gave his life defending the struggling colony, and 14-year-old Madeleine de Verchères, who thwarted a surprise Iroquois attack on her family’s fort. Conversely, for many English-speaking Canadians, the British conquest was the founding moment in the history of the country. English Canadian children learned the unofficial anthem, “The Maple Leaf Forever,” with its panegyric to General James Wolfe, the victor at Quebec. Moreover, for many English-speaking N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Canadians, their political identity was not merely as Canadians but also as British subjects. Unlike the history of all other immigrant groups, British immigrants arrived at fairly regular intervals after 1815, continually providing fresh links to the mother country. (In contrast, the majority of the French Canadian population traced its ancestry back to a small wave of immigrants in the late 17th century, and there was only insubstantial migration after this time.) British immigration was diverse, including Scots and Irish in the early and mid-19th century and large waves of English in the key period of immigration from 1896 to 1911. The reliance on immigration is one of the key defining features of English-speaking Canadian identity, and the roots of this identity can be seen in this period. With the largescale immigration of non-English speakers between 1896 and 1911, English Canadian elites mobilized to inculcate “British” values in the schools. For English Canadians, national narratives attempted to include French Canada by assimilating the history of New France as a romantic precursor to the peaceful political progress under British rule. The rebels of 1837–1838 were dismissed as well meaning but ill advised. The key heroes were those who defended Europeans against aboriginal or “American” attacks. The self-sacrificing generals James Wolfe and Sir Isaac Brock (of the War of 1812) occupied an important place

In this 1903 cartoon, the Canadian Mounted Policeman conducts male immigrants of many nationalities in singing, in English, a Canadian anthem. This image reveals the anxieties and hopes inspired by the massive wave of immigration to western Canada between 1896 and 1911. (Library and Archives Canada)

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in the Canadian pantheon. English Canadian nationalism was defensive, partly celebrating the slow but steady acquisition of political control away from British authorities (an argument that took the form Colony to Nation in Arthur Lower’s widely read history book written in 1946), and partly attributing greater moral weight to English Canadian political practices in contrast to the unbridled democracy of the United States. Furthermore, Canadians celebrated their harsh climate, even though the vast majority of nonaboriginal Canadians have always lived very close to the border with the United States. Canadians located their “manliness,” for the argument was often gendered, in their ability to withstand the cold winters. The rugged landscape of the Canadian Shield came to symbolize the country, even though only a small percentage of Canadians lived there. This imagery was best epitomized by the paintings of the nationalist “Group of Seven,” active in the 1920s and 1930s.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation It proved very difficult to mobilize the nation as a whole. Fortunately, Canada was given a geographical location that allowed it to avoid many of the tensions that other nations have to face. With only one significant neighbor, Canada has seldom had to defend its borders against attacks. The American rebel invasion of 1775 was met with some ambivalence and a certain degree of hostility, but it was essentially defeated by the harsh winter. The American attacks during the War of 1812 were repulsed by a combination of British troops, aboriginal allies, and some local militia. Small Fenian (Irish-nationalist) raids in the mid-19th century also revealed the difficulty of defending a very long border. But Canadians have always realized that they could not withstand a concerted American assault and instead have maintained generally good relations with their closest neighbor. The two uprisings led by Louis Riel in the prairie West revealed some of the fault lines in the country. In 1869, Riel was ostensibly defending the right of the métis to have some say over their political future. In 1885, although the issues were somewhat more complicated and Riel’s mental state was much less solid, he attempted to do the same again. A British Canadian force quickly suppressed Riel’s métis troops, Protestant English Canadians having joined in droves to fight this, the only large-scale, internal battle on Canadian soil. Riel was captured and charged with treason. During his trial, French Canadians rallied to Riel’s defense, whereas English Canadians desired vengeance for his execution of the prisoner Thomas Scott at the time of the 1869–1870 uprising. Riel’s hanging in 1885 led to one of the greatest rifts in Canadian political history since Confederation and contributed to the election of Honoré Mercier’s nationalist Parti national in Quebec. While in some countries, external wars serve as a means to enhance internal unity, the opposite was the case in Canada. The South African War (1899–1902) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Henri Bourassa (1868–1953) The grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau, leader of the Patriote Party and the most prominent rebel of 1837, Henri Bourassa emerged as one of the key intellectual leaders of French Canadians in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Elected first for the Liberal Party to the Canadian House of Commons in 1896, he differed with party officials over support for the South African War. He left the party and sat as an independent, fighting for the rights of French Canadians across the country. He proposed a thoroughly bilingual and bicultural country, where Catholics would be able to control their own institutions and thus maintain their faith. A brilliant orator and journalist, Bourassa had less success as a politician. His alliance with the Conservative Party led by Robert Borden helped the latter to victory in the 1911 election, but Borden then created a government with little French-Canadian influence as the country prepared for war and faced the wrenching issue of conscription. Bourassa again sat in the House of Commons as an Independent Member of Parliament from 1925 to 1935 but did not enjoy the same influence as he had previously.

provided the first key test of the different views on Canadian involvement in battles of the British empire. Many English Canadians rallied to the British attempt to suppress the Afrikaaners’ uprising in southern Africa, whereas French Canadians opposed financial and military support for the distant campaign and identified with the struggle of the Afrikaaners. Protests in the streets of Montreal presaged the broader division that developed during World War I. French Canadians were willing to defend Canadian interests but did not wish to be compelled to participate in overseas combats. When World War I broke out in 1914, as long as enlistment in the Canadian forces remained voluntary, deeper differences in opinion could be evaded. But in 1917, when conscription was introduced, riots erupted in Quebec City, and the Quebec legislature openly discussed for the first time the possibility of leaving the Canadian federation. The end of the war lessened tensions again, and in World War II, the government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (grandson of the rebel William Lyon Mackenzie) deftly, though confusingly, handled the issue. Initially, King promised that there would be no conscription. As the military commitment deepened, in 1942 King’s government held a plebiscite asking to be released from its promise; the result was strong English Canadian support for conscription in English Canada and strong French Canadian opposition. King delayed committing to conscription until late in 1944. At the same time, the Canadian government invested in more convincing propaganda to advance the national war effort, invoking figures of the country’s heroic past to encourage enlistment. The King government also introduced welfare-state policies, making the central government much more relevant to individual families. Until 1945, Canada remained a fairly regionalized country, with limited connections among the different provinces and territories, and particularly divided N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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by the two main language groups who had few relations outside of national politics. Given the constitutional division of responsibilities, there could be no national curriculum, and the French Canadian and English Canadian views of the nation’s history differed markedly. The 50th anniversary of Confederation, falling in the midst of World War I at a time when French and English speakers were clearly divided, was a muted affair, and even the 60th anniversary in 1927 failed to capture significant popular support. Canada had a limited degree of bilingualism, but the minority French language speakers were assisted by favorable demography and distance from major English-speaking populations. In Canada’s main city, Montreal, the two linguistic groups existed side by side but with little mixing, forming, in the words of author Hugh Maclennan’s important novel, Two Solitudes. Despite the initial reluctance of some of the colonies to join the confederation, there was little serious discussion of secession, and the instances of provincial threats of secession in the early decades can best be understood as bargaining positions. A deeper interest among some of the political elite in Quebec for forming a separate country was propelled in part by the divisions wrought by the two world wars, but no important politicians in the province supported secession in the 1940s. Key changes in state function that occurred in the 1940s led the central government to increase its fields of activities at the expense of provincial jurisdictions. Quebec politicians and intellectuals began to resent these incursions and increasingly saw an opportunity to develop the role of the provincial government along similar lines. In this way, Quebec nationalism, and ultimately secessionism, grew in response to the central government’s decision to modify the terms of the constitutional deal of 1867. In 1931, the Statute of Westminster defined Canada as a self-governing dominion. In the 1940s, the economic and military difficulties of Great Britain forced Canadian politicians to develop stronger links with the United States. Bilateral agreements increased the continental pull on Canadian affairs, to the dismay of many English Canadians who retained a strong emotional attachment to Great Britain. Canadian delegates played an important role in developing the new United Nations, as Canada increasingly saw itself as a key “middle power” on the international stage. Still, with the country’s main constitutional document an act of the British Parliament that could only be modified with the agreement of British politicians, some maintained that Canada still was not fully independent of the imperial power. Selected Bibliography Berger, Carl. 1970. The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867–1914. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Buckner, Phillip, ed. 2008. Canada and the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coates, Colin, and Cecilia Morgan. 2002. Heroines and History: Representations of Madeleine de Verchères and Laura Secord. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Granatstein, J. L., and J. M. Hitsman. 1977. Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Greer, Allan. 1995. “1837–38: Rebellions Reconsidered.” Canadian Historical Review 76, no. 1: 1–18. Martin, Ged. 1995. Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Nelles, H. V. 2005. A Little History of Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Silver, Arthur I. 1982. The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864–1900. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Trofimenkoff, Susan Mann. 1983. The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec. Toronto: Gage.

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Central America Jordana Dym Chronology 1517–1524

1534–1542 1542

1560s 1759–1808 1778 1784–1789

1793–1816 1808 1808–1814 1811–1812 1812 1820–1821 1821

1821–1823 1822 1824–1826 1824–1839 1825–1829 1829–1838 1831–1838 1838–1839

Conquest of Central American territories and peoples from what is now Chiapas, Mexico, to Panama by Spanish conquistador bands, and the foundation of important cities including San Salvador (El Salvador), León and Granada (Nicaragua), and Guatemala City (Guatemala). Establishment of bishoprics in Guatemala, Chiapas, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Captaincy General of Guatemala established, providing a single executive (captain general) and judicial court (audiencia) for the provinces stretching from Chiapas to Costa Rica; except for 1563–1568, this institution was the central authority until independence in 1821. Establishment of the first permanent Spanish settlements in Costa Rica; founding of Cartago. Bourbon reforms (fiscal, political, military, social). Spanish Crown allows free trade within the empire. Intendancies of Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chiapas are created, consolidating several smaller districts and approximating the territories of subsequently independent states. Publication of Gazeta de Guatemala, Central America’s first newspaper. Napoleon Bonaparte invades Spain and usurps the Spanish throne. Spanish “War of Independence”; Spain ruled by a junta and regency until the monarchy was restored. Uprisings in San Salvador, León and Granada (Nicaragua), and Tegucigalpa (Honduras). Political constitution of the Spanish monarchy (Constitution of Cádiz) (implemented in Central America from 1812 to 1814, 1820 to 1821). Publication of competing newspapers in Guatemala City, El Editor Constitucional and El Amigo de la Patria. Intendancy of Guatemala decreed (approximately the future republic of Guatemala). Cities and provinces of Central America declare independence from Spain and, in some cases, each other. After November 1821 referendum, Central American provinces join Mexican empire. El Salvador erects its own bishopric, recognized by the Vatican in 1842. Constitutions drafted for a federation (1824), formed by El Salvador (1824), Guatemala (1825), Honduras (1825), Costa Rica (1825), and Nicaragua (1826). Period of the Central American Federation, comprised of five states (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica). The federation president is conservative Manuel José Arce (Guatemala). The federation president is liberal Francisco Morazán (Honduras). The presidency of liberal Mariano Gálvez (Guatemala). Division of Guatemala into two separate states, adding a sixth state, Los Altos (Guatemalan highland area), to the federation; after 1839, Los Altos is reabsorbed into Guatemala.

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1838–1840 Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica secede from the federation; they establish sovereign and independent republics and write national constitutions. 1844–1865 The presidency or indirect rule of conservatives Rafael Carrera (1844–1865, Guatemala), Juan Rafael Mora (Costa Rica, 1849–1859), and Santos Guardiola (1856– 1862, Honduras). 1850 Bishopric of San José (Costa Rica) established. 1856–1857 Costa Rica leads Central American resistance to William Walker, U.S. adventurer who seeks to govern and annex a region from Nicaragua (the “National War”). 1870s–1880s The liberal governments of Tomás Guardia (1870–1882, Costa Rica), Justo Rufino Barrios (1871–1885, Guatemala), Rafael Zaldívar (1876–1885, El Salvador), Marco Aurelio Soto (1876–1883, Honduras) encourage positivist goals of “order and progress,” specifically foreign investment, exports, agricultural reform, reduced church influence, and railway and telegraph construction. 1874 U.S. businessman Minor Keith starts the United Fruit Company, growing bananas on land conceded to his railroad building company. 1885 Battle of Chalchuapa (Barrios’s failed attempt to forcibly re-create the Central American Federation). 1893–1909 The liberal presidency of José Santos Zelaya (Nicaragua) ends with U.S. intervention. 1895–1898 Brief period of the “Grand Republic of Central America” comprised of Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador.

Situating the Nation Central America is geographically an isthmus uniting North and South America. Politically, it comprises the five countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, which, from 1542 to 1821, were politically joined in the Captaincy General of Guatemala, an autonomous Spanish colony with its own political, judicial, military, religious, and economic authorities. These territories of the Captaincy General formed the basis for the Federal Republic of Central America (1824–1839) that emerged after the region became independent of Spain in 1821. Subsequently, the federation’s five states became sovereign republics, after 20 years of civil war. From the late 18th to late 19th centuries, Central America had a diverse regional economy. Colonial capital cities, which later became federal and national capitals, were financial and commercial centers supported by a vast hinterland producing foodstuffs and export goods ranging from cattle and sheep to cotton and wool cloth, fruits and vegetables, tobacco, coffee, silver, and indigo. Indigenous and mixed-race communities provided most of the labor that tilled fields, wove textiles, and built houses for the Spanish and later national elites. Similar relations repeated in smaller scale in every administrative district. Varied geography and climate meant that different regions specialized in different products, which led to an important trans-isthmian trade that continued after independence, despite endemic conflicts between the merchants in Guatemala City who N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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controlled access to export trade and the provincial elites who supplied the rest of the colony’s needs. In particular, the cattle industries of Nicaragua and Honduras supported mobility for the men who brought the beasts to market throughout the isthmus, and Pacific Coast coffee plantations and shipbuilding industries throughout the region attracted workers from as far as the Atlantic Coast’s Bay Islands (Honduras), retaining a “Central American” working-class identity at odds with the official national identities of the elites building the states. A complex geography, in which heavy rains might make roads impassable for many months and correspondence from Guatemala could take two months to reach Costa Rica, prompted development of distinct societies in the different regions that grew up in partial isolation, in a landscape that hindered regular and swift communication. About half of Central America’s population lived in what became the country of Guatemala, giving this one state disproportionate representation in federal institutions and contributing to tensions and instability among states. And, between the 1770s and 1880s, Central America’s residency pattern changed with substantial migration from rural settlements to the region’s principal cities. The region’s diverse population—of around 800,000 in 1778 and over 2 million by 1879—also influenced national development. Ethnically, the small number of Spaniards and their American-born descendants, Creoles, made up around 4 percent of the population, but this group dominated politics and the local economy, comprising the vast majority of regional and national leaders and officials, clerks, newspaper publishers, and landowners. The bulk of the population was 65 percent Indian, and the rest was of mixed Indian, European, and African origin (ladinos, castas, mestizos), who were largely small farmers and artisans, although a few climbed social ladders through marriage, education, or patronage networks to join the elite. This working class of indigenous or mixed-race heritage found few of their own leaders or values represented in the new nation-state, which took its cues from the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French and North American revolutions with which the elite national leaders were culturally as well as politically and economically comfortable. Although Guatemala’s predominantly Mayan, Nicaragua’s largely ladino, and El Salvador’s Indian and ladino populations could successfully petition the new national governments for specific and targeted policies, they did so more as communities using traditional identities than as individuals active in building national states or as soldiers whose choices about which leaders to follow toppled more than one government. Indigenous groups that had not accepted Spanish rule, like the Moskitu and Zambo in Honduras and Nicaragua and the Afro-Caribbean Garifuna, retained their political as well as linguistic and cultural autonomy well into the 20th century. The century leading to independence shaped Central America’s early national projects. In particular, reforms implemented by Spain’s Bourbon dynasty (1759–1808) created fractures in this small imperial colony, especially the relative decline of its long-time capital, Guatemala City, and the rise of feuding regional N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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capitals León and Granada (Nicaragua), San Salvador (El Salvador), Comayagua and Tegucigalpa (Honduras), and Cartago and San José (Costa Rica). Royal reforms known for Enlightenment rationality improved colonial defenses and control of mixed-race populations through increased urban policing, education, and militia; introduced new or improved collection of existing taxes and intermittent free trade; and reduced church fiscal and ideological power. Reforms also consolidated multiple districts into four intendancies established in the 1780s in Chiapas, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras and in 1820 in Guatemala, which dispersed political, economic, and religious power from Guatemala City and fortified provincial over colony-wide identities and allegiances. These reforms, as in Mexico and most of South America, undermined relations between the Iberian government and colonial societies, contributing to independence movements, while also driving wedges between the colony’s regions. In 1821, a declaration of independence severed three centuries of ties between the Captaincy General of Guatemala and Spain and also between the former and regional unity. The provinces of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica did not have to fight Spain for their independence, which meant they had no opportunity to find common cause by opposing a colonial power. After deciding separately to join Mexico (1821–1823), their subsequent federation of five states (1824–1839) was short-lived. Almost immediately, these states found themselves in constant and disruptive conflict over issues ranging from what taxes to pay to which bishoprics to establish to how much power to give the federation or its member states. By the 1840s, the federation’s states separated into independent and often-feuding republics. Although they united to repel U.S. filibuster William Walker from Nicaragua in the 1850s, Central America’s republics ultimately failed to form a nation. From 1839 to 1880, cooperative and reunifying efforts were less pronounced than internal civil wars, invasions, border disputes, imperialist meddling, and incursions by exiled military politicians from refuge in neighboring states. On the one hand, close—if often hostile—national relations meant that each Central American republic suffered if the country on its borders experienced instability, economic crisis, or civil war, offering opportunities to develop unique national identities tied to an individual country. On the other hand, a common past and continuing political, social, and economic connections allowed individuals to seek their destiny in multiple countries, thus giving meaning to a shared Central American identity despite the impossibility of re-creating a single republic.

Instituting the Nation Between 1770 and 1880, Central America experienced three political projects that each redefined the relation of individual to state and nation. From 1770 to 1821, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Depiction of the Battle of Rivas in 1856, where Costa Rican president Juan Rafael Mora gathered a Central American coalition army and defeated American Confederate William Walker, pushing him back into Nicaraguan territory. (Library of Congress)

as part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, residents were called upon first to be loyal to the Spanish king as individuals and as members of a broader political community that might be municipal or provincial in size. In addition, Spanish America’s caste system provided separate legal codes, and in theory separate towns, for Spaniards and their American-born descendants (Creoles) and the colony’s people of Indian, African, and mixed origin, dividing the colony’s population by race and ethnicity. Under the Spanish constitution of 1812 and after independence in 1821, as members first of the Mexican empire and then of the Central American Federation and its successor republics, individuals were recast from subjects to citizens, who as individuals were equal before the law and owed political allegiance to their state of residence and the federation regardless of race, ethnicity, or class. What bound individuals together was no longer loyalty to a monarch but loyalty to a system of governance whose motto was “God, Union, and Liberty.” Thus, the nation in early to mid-19th-century Central America was not based on race, ethnicity, or language—for the population was heterogeneous, descending from Spaniards, indigenous peoples, and Africans—but rather was based on a supposed sharing of common ideals, from the belief in a central government that would govern through democratically elected executive, legal, and judicial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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authorities to a shared Catholic identity. This national ideal, meant to bury remnants of a colonial system that had depended on loyalty to corporate entities such as guilds or family and patronage networks, was promulgated principally by the isthmus’s elite residents, such as José Cecilio del Valle (Honduras) and Pedro Molina (Guatemala). Although the populations of Central America quickly adapted to electoral politics, voting in many elections for local, regional, and national authorities in the first unstable decades following independence, they did not necessarily adopt these ideals. While Indian villagers and their scribes wrote petitions in the language of republican liberty, they behaved in traditional fashion, joining factions or insurrections based on local grievances and allegiances rather than in the name of unity among peoples of similar ethnic or state origin. Establishing federal and national capitals undermined rather than fostered identities, stability, and unity. Colonial capital Guatemala City was a controversial choice for the federal capital, as other states wanted to decrease the political and economic influence of the merchants who lived there and who had controlled much of the colonial export trade. Thus, the federal capital eventually moved to Sonsonate, San Vicente, and eventually San Salvador in El Salvador. Serving as federal capital meant that Guatemala and El Salvador had temporary state capitals in Antigua (1825–1826) and San Vicente (1834–1839), limiting the stability of state governments until Guatemala City and San Salvador resumed their traditional political roles in the 1840s. Equally disruptive were capital-rotating provisions in Costa Rica and Honduras, established to prevent civil war between competing cities, which is what happened when Nicaragua’s León and Granada became so competitive that, after unsuccessfully splitting government functions, the state eventually named Managua as state capital in 1857. After the federation failed, conservative presidents including Rafael Carrera (Guatemala), Santos Guardiola (Honduras), and Juan Rafael Mora (Costa Rica) kept constitutional order but favored more traditional and centralized relations among state, church, and society. They achieved the stability necessary for national roots to begin to develop. In the 1840s through 1860s, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador began to export coffee, Guatemala’s cochineal and El Salvador’s indigo dye markets grew slowly, Honduran silver mines lured in foreign speculators, regional cattle markets continued, and Nicaragua and Panama hosted North Americans headed toward the California gold rush. As the region’s economy recovered, institutions in the five Central American republics began to deliver a national education program, collect taxes with some regularity, establish national police and military forces, and enforce the provisions of whatever constitutions and legal codes endured more than a few months or years. By the 1870s and 1880s, as railroads and telegraphs connected isthmian plantations with Atlantic and Pacific ports and facilitated communication for governments and individual Central Americans traveling and working throughout the region, a sense of Central America as a pátria grande, a place of shared opportunities for individuals, had reemerged. Liberal governments returned, encouraging N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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positivist goals of “order and progress,” specifically foreign investment, exports, agricultural reform, reduced church influence, and railway and telegraph construction. Re-creating a Central American national polity, however, was the dream of only a few elites, whose efforts in 1852, 1896–1898, and 1921–1922 produced only ephemeral three-state federations. Since the early 20th century, such Central American connections continue with a Central American Court of Justice (1907) and, with the exception of Costa Rica, a Central American Common Market (1960) and Parliament (Parlacen, 1991). Parlacen serves as a forum for debate and for harmonizing policies for Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and, since 2004, the Dominican Republic.

Defining the Nation Defining the national territory of Central America principally meant incorporating former colonial districts into countries, with the exception of the province of Chiapas, which joined Mexico. Several provinces that had been autonomous annexed themselves to the new states, most notably Sonsonate joined El Salvador and Nicoya joined Costa Rica in 1824. Guatemala’s highlands briefly engineered the status of a sixth state for the largely Mayan area of 200,000 residents, joining the federation in 1838 only to be reabsorbed by force into Guatemala when the federation failed a year later. Constitutions listed the districts within countries, largely adopting colonial jurisdictions. Helping to consolidate the identification of people with specific territories, border disputes between most of the countries and their neighbors remained irritants in regional relations until the early 20th century, when many were settled in binding arbitration. Within the federation and later the independent states, people influenced politics in “factions” or early political parties that divided either along ideological, class, or community lines. At independence, liberales and serviles represented the “liberal” and “conservative” ideals of free trade versus protectionism, a reduced versus continued church role in politics and economy, individual versus communal rights, and, most importantly, decentralized governments versus a strong central state. Sometimes the split into factions happened within a single community, as in Guatemala City at independence, where Pedro Molina and José Cecilio del Valle’s competing newspapers, El Editor Constitucional and Amigo de la Pátria, presented the two philosophies to the men who later participated in drafting the federation’s 1824 constitution. Sometimes the split was between cities, as when Nicaragua’s conservative León and liberal Granada dragged the new state into civil war in 1824. Over the course of the 19th century, liberals emerged as the first leaders, but their ideals provoked such opposition from Creole elites and skeptical indigenous and mixed-race lower classes that the federation failed in a welter of bitter wars. Conservatives took power in the 1830s, governing the five indepenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Mariano Gálvez Mariano Gálvez (Guatemala), chief of state from 1831 to 1837, is perhaps the best exemplar of the liberal executive and his goals. He enacted and implemented a series of reforms, ranging from free trade, export development, freedom of religion, universal education, and development of a civil registry and state-controlled hospitals. He also introduced judicial reforms, including trial by jury, and welcomed European colonization projects on unexploited state lands. His program tried to reduce the influence of three basic aspects of colonial society: church political, ideological, and economic influence; the separation of indigenous and Hispanicized communities; and economic isolation. Indigenous communities, concerned about land reform and a new direct tax on individuals, and the Catholic church, concerned about its loss of influence, resisted such reforms, and Gálvez was ousted when a cholera outbreak in 1837 allowed his opponents, which included the church and conservative politicians, to orchestrate an uprising that brought conservatives to power for the next 30 years.

dent states as they built themselves into durable countries. The reins of power returned to liberals by the 1870s, when more industrialization and connection to international commerce produced a second major political shift.

Narrating the Nation Between the 1770s and 1880s, the number of events shaping the political future of what became five separate countries can seem infinite, particularly given the number of internal crises and conflicts that emerged. However, certain moments stand out as, if not decisive, then at least important. The crisis in the Spanish empire provoked by Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Spain in 1808 and the subsequent response of Peninsular and American Spaniards demonstrated both the fragility of American ties to Spain as well as to each other. Central America’s response of loyalty and insurrection included participating in the election of representatives to Spain’s interim governments, including deputies to the Spanish Parliament of 1810–1814, whose experience in helping to draft the Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy (1812) influenced Central America’s own constitution-writing a decade later. Men like Father Antonio Larrazábal (Guatemala), Father Florencio Castillo (Costa Rica), and Mariano Robles (Chiapas) are remembered in each country as founding fathers who fought for greater representation in the Cortes as well as for benefits for their own provinces—from recognition for putting down insurrections to new educational institutions and bishoprics. Similarly, others worked for autonomy, as when Mariano José Arce, Federation president from 1825 to 1829, led an 1811 insurrection to oust Spanish officials in San Salvador and set the precedent for local selection of governors, military N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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officials, and tax collectors by the principal men of the city, both European and African in origin. The 1824 Central American National Constituent Assembly (ANC), comprised of 34 delegates from throughout the isthmus, included these and other constitutional legislators as well as the region’s most erudite businessmen, clerics, and ranchers. The 1824 constitution of the Federal Republic of Central America became the model for most subsequent area constitutions, and its constituent body is remembered as the most distinguished legislative assembly of the era. Other events are remembered by individual states as part of their struggle for eventual sovereignty. Principal among these is the 1822 Salvadoran decision to erect a bishopric independent of the Guatemalan bishopric upon which they had depended throughout the colonial period. Although the Vatican did not recognize the bishopric until 1842, El Salvador’s first bishop, Matías Delgado, is a national hero for his role in establishing a separate identity for his fledgling country. Each country has its own national heroes and villains from among the early leaders. Honduras celebrates Francisco Morazán, federation president from 1829 until its dissolution, by naming districts after him. Costa Rica recalls the presidency of Juan Rafael Mora, attached to the “myth” of Costa Rica’s unique heritage of unity. Although this myth ignores evidence of internal strife prior to 1840, it does anchor 20th-century Costa Rica’s self-identification as a country of stable democracy, without the civil wars or foreign occupations that its northern neighbors experienced more frequently. Conservative leaders, including Guatemala’s Rafael Carrera, whose mixed race and humble origins proved problematic for celebrating his accomplishments and contributions to creating stability, have not been as fully adopted into the national pantheon of heroes. Even after the failure of union, Central American leaders and people came together in 1856 and 1857 to oust North American William Walker from his position as dictator of Nicaragua, a country whose government institutions he seized in 1855 with plans to establish and control the isthmus. Although the conservative heads of state who allied to expel the intruder did not see their effort as a precursor to restoring a Central American country, the successful effort provided residents with a rare moment of regional and national pride. It also provided a military opportunity for Central American leaders to express antiforeign sentiment that included rejection of liberal projects of secularization and individuality, which were perceived as foreign in origin, as well as British interference in or control of trade from bases such as Belize. Governments worked to weave these moments into national symbols and narratives. Federation leaders created a flag that put a white band, representing land, between two blue stripes, representing the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with the national seal in the center. From the dissolution of the federation until today, the emergent countries retained the federal colors, although Guatemala made the stripes vertical rather than horizontal, and Costa Rica added red stripes in honor of the French tricolor. Individual countries customized their flags to emphasize their own histories by placing different seals between the blue and white N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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bands. Guatemala adopted the quetzal bird as its national symbol in 1871, and Nicaragua’s flag now displays the federation’s volcanic seal. Thus, as in many other areas, unity within diversity and the retention of a regional identity as well as national affiliation remains. Similarly, all five countries have adopted September 15, the defunct federation’s date of independence, as their own. This national Independence Day recognizes the region’s separation from Spain, celebrating the day that Guatemala City’s royal officials, churchmen, and city council declared independence rather than the dates on which many of the current national capitals issued separate declarations. By retaining the common date, a regional identity continues. Although there was little in literary production to symbolize the national characters of the new states, by the 1830s governments did take care to build the tools of national governance through law, histories, and cartography. The accomplishments of and challenges faced by the federation were celebrated in the region’s first two histories meant to memorialize the “national” revolution and provide a unifying narrative to bind the competing states into a permanent unit: conservative Manuel Montúfar’s 1832 Memorias para la historia de la revolución de Centro-América and liberal Alejandro Marure’s 1837 Bosquejo histórico de las revoluciones de Centroamérica. After the federation dissolved, national histories such as Felipe Molina’s Bosquejo de la República de Costa Rica (New York, 1851) emerged. El Salvador published its first compilation of national laws in 1856, followed by Nicaragua (1867), Guatemala (1869), and Costa Rica (1886), while Honduras compiled its state constitutions in 1878. States also commissioned national maps starting in the 1830s. The maps’ emphasis on surveys of mountains and elevations bespoke the national and political interest in using cartography to encourage foreign investment in canals, railroads, and telegraphs. Sometimes

Declaration of Independence, September 15, 1821 All five nation-states of Central America celebrate their Independence Day on September 15, thus marking the date that royal and local authorities jointly declared independence in the colonial capital of Guatemala City. The independence process actually began, however, with declarations in the principal towns of Chiapas in August 1821. Provincial capitals and villages throughout Central America responded in multiple ways to Guatemala City’s declaration, which included an invitation to participate in a constituent assembly. Later in the fall, Comayagua (Honduras), Quetzaltenango (Guatemala), and León (Nicaragua) declared independence from both Spain and Guatemala, seeking separately to join Mexico. León also expressed a wish to “wait until the clouds pass” to determine its next steps. Tegucigalpa (Honduras) and Granada (Nicaragua) sought union with Guatemala and independence from Spain. Costa Rica’s principal cities issued a joint declaration of independence in late October. Thus, the date recognized by all Central American nation-states as that of their independence reflects the constant tension between unity and division that prevented Central America from remaining a single political territory.

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governments used local talent, like Miguel Rivera Maestre, the author of Guatemala’s first atlas. Most often, however, they drew upon the expertise of entrepreneurial foreigners like German surveyor Maximilian von Sonnenstern, author of the first national maps of Nicaragua (1858) and El Salvador (1858). Between the 1830s and 1870s, the history, geography, and laws of the five countries became important expressions of national identity for both citizens and foreigners.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Bourbon reforms of the late 18th century and Central America’s independence in 1821 mobilized the region’s elite to develop a political identity for Central America. The Gazeta de Guatemala (1793–1816), the colony’s first newspaper and first colony-wide publication, emphasized for its elite readership that a shared geography and a 250-year history bound all residents to a shared pátria, whose boundaries were neither local nor imperial but those of the Captaincy General. Although not claiming national status, the reliance on geography and history to provide identity would be picked up in Domingo Juarros’s Historia de la ciudad de Guatemala, Central America’s first complete history that incorporated pre-Columbian civilizations into its formula. The Gazeta further fomented a sense of homogeneity by proposing to bring Indian and mixed-race residents into a modern form of production and by recasting the divided ethnic and social groups of colonial Central America as a single “public” that, through adopting Spanish language education and accepting profit as a motive, would improve both individual prosperity and the regional economy. These ideals were adopted by the elites who wrote the state and federal constitutions and legal codes. These leaders, however, failed to anticipate the hostility that their vision of a modern future that sidelined the church and traditional communal values and landholding would generate. From the earliest days of an independent Central America, representatives of the fledgling federation sought to provide the tools to join the country and its people into a unified whole. Without disputing the ethnic, linguistic, economic, and regional distinctions of Mayan Indians in Guatemala and Afro-Caribbean residents of the Nicaraguan and Honduran Mosquito Coasts, early legislators shared an Enlightenment philosophy that it was not race or class that created a national community but acceptance of a shared government. Thus, in addition to making all adult men citizens with equal rights (regardless of race, literacy, or property) in the first federal and state constitutions, the ANC in 1825 adopted a state motto, “God, Union, and Liberty,” that reflected their republican ideals. The leaders also developed a national seal of five volcanoes, one for each state, under a Phrygian cap, the emblem of the French Revolution that symbolized breaking

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with the old monarchic and corporate order of Europe. The gains to be achieved by joining a Spanish-speaking, capitalist, individualist society were, in their eyes, so obvious that holding on to traditional religious, communal, and corporate values, as well as customs and languages, could only hurt the nation. The conservatives of this period, who were less prepared for a wholesale rejection of colonial institutions and social norms, shared values closer to those arguing for multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual forms of nationality today. At a time when the word “nation” was still associated more with birthplace than with a volitional political allegiance, Central American leaders used the language of a united “people,” or peoples. This language of unity probably reached the masses through legislation and broadsides addressed to “fellow citizens,” “Centroamericanos,” “Guatemaltecos,” and “Salvadoreños,” modified to fit the needs of the occasion, such as calls to support secessionist movements or national defense. The term thus encouraged individuals to see themselves as belonging to a national state rather than to a district, whether the unity was of Central Americans opposing Walker after the federation had failed or Guatemalans helping keep Salvadoran troops off “national” soil. The changing demands meant that individuals might continue to identify with multiple polities or ideals, even after the states originating them ceased to exist. Thus, for residents of Central America who lived between 1770 and 1880, a series of moments, policies, and institutions linked them as Spanish subjects, Central American citizens, and national citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Because of enduring cultural and economic divisions and ties, an individual might consider himself a “citizen” of a particular municipal community or of the entirety of Central America as opportunities and governments came and went. An individual’s identity could thus officially be at odds with legal political divisions, although perhaps this was perfectly acceptable in practice. By the time the liberal governments of the late 19th century took office, they led countries whose legal framework, geographical reach, national symbols, and principal institutions had been recently put in place. Although the institutions did not reach fully into the countryside or all urban neighborhoods, and though many residents continued to view all of Central America and not just their home country as the land of professional development and opportunity, the national states of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica were en route to consolidating national institutions and confirming distinct identities. These identities were based either on existing ethnicities—Guatemala’s substantial indigenous population—or on emerging efforts to “create” homogeneous populations by developing an ideal of a mixed-race nation, as El Salvador and Nicaragua increasingly claimed at the turn of the 20th century. Such national and homogenizing projects were unevenly implemented and achieved limited popular acceptance, offering new challenges to the leaders of the early 20th century.

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Selected Bibliography Bushnell, David, and Neill Macaulay. 1988. The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Dym, Jordana. 2006. From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759–1839. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Dym, Jordana, and Christophe Belaubre, eds. 2006. Politics, Economy and Society in Bourbon Central America, 1759–1808. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. Gudmundson, Lowell, and Hector Lindo-Fuentes. 1995. Central America, 1821–1871: Liberalism before Liberal Reform. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Hale, Charles R. 1994. Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894–1987. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hall, Carolyn, and Héctor Pérez-Brignoli. 2003. Historical Atlas of Central America. John V. Carter, Cartographer. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Holden, Robert H. 2004. Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821–1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Karnes, Thomas. 1961. Central America: The Failure of Union, 1824–1960. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Langley, Lester D. 2001. The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898–1934. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Perez-Brignoli, Hector. 1989. A Brief History of Central America. Translated by Ricardo B. Sawrey A. and Susana Stettri de Sawrey. Berkeley: University of California Press. Stansifer, Charles L. 1966. “E. George Squier, and the Honduras Inter-Oceanic Railroad Project.” Hispanic American Historical Review 46, no. 1: 1–27. Williams, Robert G. 1994. States and Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of National Governments in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Woodward, Ralph Lee Jr. 1999. Central America: A Nation Divided. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Chile Patrick Barr-Melej Chronology 1808 Napoleon Bonaparte, emperor of France, invades Spain, and Ferdinand VII renounces the Spanish throne, creating a political crisis in Chile and elsewhere in the Americas. 1810 Led by the city council of Santiago and revolutionaries like Bernardo O’Higgins, proindependence Chileans seek separation from Napoleonic Spain. September 18, 1810, is remembered as Independence Day. 1810–1814 The period of the Pátria Vieja (“Old Fatherland”) —the first attempt at self-rule in Chile — ended in 1814 when Ferdinand VII returns to the throne and seeks to squash independence movements throughout Spanish America. 1818 Chilean revolutionaries defeat Spanish loyalists and realize full independence. 1834 The government sets forth an official coat of arms and a national motto: “By Reason or by Force.” 1836–1839 War against Peru and Bolivia fan the flames of Chilean patriotism and reinforce national identity. 1879 Chile again battles Peru and Bolivia. The spoils of war for victorious Chile comprise all of what is today northern Chile, including the cities of Antofagasta, Iquique, and Arica. More importantly, Chile secures very lucrative nitrate and copper deposits.

Situating the Nation When conquistador Pedro de Valdivia first gazed upon central Chile in the early 1540s, he saw before him a fertile land with a rather agreeable climate—the ideal place where his seignorial vision of large feudal-like estates, paternalistic landowners, and subservient laborers could be realized. Thousands of miles from the seat of colonial authority in Spanish South America—Lima, Peru—a nascent colonial society took root, always in danger of destruction at the hands of Araucanian Indians and the violent convulsions that often shook the very earth under their feet. Chilean society during the colonial period evolved on the very fringe of Spanish administration in the New World, entering the 18th century with an economically powerful class of native-born whites (criollos, or Creoles), a politically powerful contingent of peninsulares (Spanish-born whites), and a large underclass of agricultural and pastoral laborers. Criollos and peninsulares were united in their loyalty to the Spanish monarchy, which based its rule on the notion of divine right and, more importantly, on an ornate and stable system of bureaucracy and administration. NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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However, all was not well in Chile and elsewhere in Spanish America at the beginning of the 18th century. Spain’s Habsburg monarchs had waged costly wars in Europe, mercantilist economic policy had restricted economic growth in a globalizing marketplace, and many Chilean criollos, in a region bereft of significant gold and silver deposits, complained that Chile’s economic interests were ignored by a colonial government interested in more profitable areas of Spanish America. Under the Bourbon Spanish monarchs of the mid- and late 18th century, criollos grumbled about their lack of political power, as those native-born whites were, by law, excluded from positions of colonial authority. Despite their secondclass political status, and regardless of the Bourbon’s more rigorous tax policy, Chilean criollos remained loyal to the monarchy, even when Spain’s Ferdinand VII was captured by the invading armies of Napoleon in 1808, which created a power vacuum in the Americas and forever altered the course of Spanish colonialism. Soon, though, many criollos in Chile chose to chart a new political path for their nation—their pátria, or fatherland—and the development of a Chilean national identity was a most important aspect in their journey.

Instituting the Nation As early as the 16th century, criollos in Chile and elsewhere in the Americas were conscious of their American roots in a hemisphere controlled by Europeans. Early conflicts between the monarchy and the heirs of the conquistadors and other early settlers produced the first signs of the development of an American identity in the New World, which, over time, fragmented into the many national identities that were prevalent by the 18th century, if not earlier. Thus began an intellectual tradition based on regionalist and localist tendencies that persisted and matured alongside colonial institutions and administration for nearly three centuries. A so-called “Creole patriotism” spread quickly during the latter half of the 18th century in Chile, as native-born whites claimed an American identity and began seeing themselves more and more as Chileans and less like Spaniards. Interestingly, while relations with Chile’s indigenous population remained combative well into the 19th century, Creole patriots of the colonial period seized on the image of the heroic Araucanian Indian as they sought to firmly define what was autochthonous and what was not. One example of the Creoles’ interest in nativist imagery as part of their growing focus on “national” themes in the 18th century was their attention to Alonso de Ercilla’s 16th-century epic poem “La Araucana.” Unlike other literature of the early conquest era, Ercilla’s poem focused on the native element of the great encounter and, specifically, the Araucanian Indians of the southern region who heroically defended their land and life ways against the Spaniards for much of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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colonial period. The poem, a result of Ercilla’s personal recollections of the events he witnessed in the 1540s, describes the Araucanians as freedom fighters who thrived on the valiant struggle against the Iberian invaders and Spanish colonial oppression of the indigenous population, which Governor Pedro de Valdivia was unable to curb. The execution of Caupolicán, a leading Araucanian war chief, is among many instances of Spanish excess decried in the poem. Ercilla’s poem was out of print for a century before Chilean criollos began reading it again in the 18th century, and those criollos found in the poem a strong sense of “American-ness” because, after all, criollo and Araucanian alike faced the same challenge: Spanish colonial rule. Criollo loyalty to the monarchy prevailed for only a short time after Napoleon’s overthrow of the Spanish monarchy in 1808, as criollos increasingly became concerned about the practicality of government. It was clear, too, that Creole patriotism, though tempered by a lingering loyalty to the monarchy, had taken firm root in Chile by 1810. Led by the cabildo, or city council, of Santiago—the only segment of government in which criollos enjoyed some political power—many liberal-minded criollos formulated a revolutionary solution to the crisis: independence. While still expressing loyalty to the monarchy, criollos like Bernardo O’Higgins (the son of a former governor) and José Miguel Carrera forged what became the Pátria Vieja (1810–1814), Chile’s first experiment in sovereign government. But when the monarchy sought to reestablish its authority after Ferdinand

Chilean and Argentine soldiers, led by Chilean General Bernardo O’Higgins and Argentine General José de San Martín, fight for their independence from Spain in 1817 at the Battle of Chacabuco. Their army of 5,000 men routed the Spanish in this decisive battle. (Library of Congress)

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VII returned to power in late 1813, liberal criollos fought to preserve their independence. Criollos eventually won their hard-fought independence from Spain in early 1818.

Defining the Nation From the time of independence to the 1880s, Chile was only about one-third the size it is today. The far north, or Norte Grande, belonged to Peru and Bolivia until the Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). The Treaty of Ancón (1884) officially ceded the region to Chile, along with its vast nitrate and copper resources. The far south, meanwhile, remained largely under the control of indigenous peoples who had resisted conquest since the 1540s. The Chilean population was concentrated largely in the Central Valley—a 300-mile valley with Santiago at its northern end. The geographical compression of Chile’s population, which was made even more real by the towering Andes mountains on its eastern frontier and the Pacific Ocean to the west, fostered intermarriage between powerful elite families (even between those with different political loyalties) and conditioned the development of a relatively tightly knit landowning class that remained powerful in both the economy and politics until the second half of the 20th century. Linked by a common language and living in a relatively small geographical region, where social and cultural idiosyncrasies developed, criollos sought to build a state at a time when the concept of “nation” was shared largely by only those of the highest social stratum. Also, criollos faced the challenge of creating a broader citizenry that would remain loyal to the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Clearly, by the 1870s the Chilean political and cultural elite—criollos and others of European ancestry—had forged the basic outline of a national identity that tied citizens to the state and, in general, championed the idea of Chilean exceptionalism. As a means of legitimizing hegemony immediately after independence, the emergent state made sure that pageantry was an important aspect of a developing Chilean national identity. Vibrant and colorful celebrations of the dieciocho, or Independence Day (September 18), drew large crowds from all social classes as early as 1811—only a year after the criollos declared independence. The Chilean flag was unveiled for the first time at the 1817 dieciocho celebration. In 1834 the country’s coat of arms and motto—“By Reason or by Force”—were introduced, underscoring the notion that Chile would be an active force in South America and would zealously defend its national interests. Soon, “By Reason or by Force” was applied geopolitically, as a victorious war against the Peru-Bolivia Confederation (1836–1839), which included the long-remembered Battle of Yungay ( January 20, 1839), fanned the flames of Chilean patriotism and national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Dieciocho What Chileans call the dieciocho, or the independence celebrations on and around September 18, commemorates the country’s first provisional junta’s declaration of separation from Spain in 1810. The declaration gave birth to so-called Pátria Vieja (1810–1814), which ended with Spain’s campaign to regain the colony. The dieciocho immediately became a central element of national identity. The government added the tradition of a military parade to the annual festivities in 1832.

identity. Out of the Battle of Yungay, moreover, there emerged in Chilean culture the image of the brave roto, or lower-class ruffian soldier, who was heralded by the state and by citizens as a heroic warrior. Strong anti-Peruvianism and anti-Bolivianism after the war also reinforced Chilean national identity, and, by the end of the century, there were signs that Chilean national identity was becoming more racialized in its depiction of its Andean and heavily indigenous neighbors. Despite such clear signs of a national identity, notions of nationality largely remained confined to the upper reaches of Chile’s social layers throughout the 19th century. To the elite, “Chile” simply meant the upper class, despite the more “popular” components like the image of the roto or popular participation in the annual dieciocho festivities. But even within elite circles the presence of a national identity did not necessarily mean that those Chileans seriously thought about what it meant to be Chilean; that is to say, chilenidad, or Chilean-ness, went largely unexplored in the 19th century. In fact, it is not entirely clear just how strong national identity was among the elite, who modeled their cosmopolitanism and cultural tastes on Europe and longingly gazed across the Atlantic to France and England for inspiration of every sort. Nevertheless, the Chilean elite of the 19th century extolled the virtues of their republic—a relatively stable and democratic constitutional system and a solid economy—on a continent that otherwise suffered from political instability and severe economic problems. By

Coat of Arms The coat of arms, designed in 1834, boasts one of the most memorable national mottos in the world: “By Reason or by Force.” It also depicts one of the rarest animals in Chile, the huemul—a small, deerlike animal—and the Andean condor. The animals are positioned on either side of the national colors: red, white, and blue. The coat of arms also is found on the official flag of the presidency and has made regular appearances on Chilean coinage since the 19th century, including the 100-peso coin currently in circulation. Interestingly, an English artist, Charles Wood Taylor, designed this most recognizable symbol of the Chilean nation.

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the middle of the 19th century, the Chilean elite routinely identified their country as “a model republic” and as the “England of South America.”

Narrating the Nation Although Ercilla’s “La Araucana” was a cornerstone of early nation-building literature in Chile, a well-developed and specifically Chilean national literature did not coalesce until well after the independence war. Led by such figures as José Victorino Lastarria and José Joaquín Vallejo, a circle of Chilean writers—the socalled Generation of 1842—crafted a Chilean romanticism that borrowed a European literary style but brought to bear Chilean subject matter, including but not limited to the struggle for independence from Spain. Along with the founding of the University of Chile in 1842, the 1840s were fecund years for intellectual and literary production, as the Chilean elite enjoyed a good economy and civil and regional peace. In this context, romanticist stories tended to focus on the early stages of nation-state formation, marking a fundamental shift away from European domination in matters of literary content. By the 1860s, Chilean national literature became more complex in style and in subject matter, as the celebrated Alberto Blest Gana—the best novelist of 19thcentury Chile—adopted the “realist” style of Balzac to create detailed stories about elite life in Santiago. His Martín Rivas (1862) captured the everyday life and cultural texture of Santiago’s well-to-do in a way that no other Chilean author had. The elite and, to some extent, an emergent middle class saw themselves in the novel—virtues and vices—as Blest Gana further developed what Lastarria and others started decades earlier: the formation of a Chilean national literary tradition. Still, chilenidad went without definition and inspection in the work of Blest Gana. But writers like Lastarria, Vallejo, and Blest Gana produced literature with Chilean themes and Chilean characters that certainly reinforced a national identity among their literate compatriots. As noted above, the “national” literature of the 19th century did not examine the lives of the common Chilean, nor did it pause to reflect on chilenidad. Indeed, despite the heroic image of the roto, the social underbelly was largely ignored by the leading writers of the era; the common Chilean stood outside what the elite considered to be the Chilean national community. “Nation” essentially meant “the elite” during the 19th century. It was not until the early 20th century that a new social layer—the urban middle class—sought to explore chilenidad and, in doing so, included lower-class peoples into a new and more democratized conception of “nation” through the novels, short stories, and essays of the genre known as criollismo, or Creole-ism. By that time, too, the very meaning of the term “Creole” had been transformed; it no longer meant “American-born Spaniard” and had become synonymous with all things native to Chile. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Chilean national identity from the late 18th century to the late 19th century was influenced by external events in no small way. The Napoleonic invasion of Spain and Chile’s conflicts with its Andean neighbors conditioned the development of the spirit of nationality. Geography, too, played an important role, as Chile’s colonial population developed on the edge of the Spanish empire, away from the most important centers of the colonial bureaucracy, and in the Central Valley, which fostered a relatively tight-knit criollo society. The creation of stable political and administrative institutions after independence was also a source of pride among the Chilean elite, as they were fully aware of the civil wars and other sociopolitical and economic strife that gripped much of the rest of Latin America. The power of that state was most evident during the War of the Pacific. The notion of Chilean exceptionalism ruled the day among national leaders of the 19th century, as the rhetoric of Chilean national identity championed the “model republic.” However, a clear and conspicuous national identity did not filter into the lower reaches of Chilean society—not before the 20th century, at least. The concept of “nation” remained restricted to the elite; the imagined community remained small until new voices emerged in the 1920s and 1930s that expanded the definition of what “Chile” was and who “Chileans” were. The Chilean elite of the 19th century deployed a national identity for the purposes of nation-building while, at the same time, they enjoyed the splendors of a relatively open economy and relished cultural cosmopolitanism. They enjoyed the finest of French perfumes, the latest continental literature, and regularly traveled to the Old World as they emulated Europeans in their patterns of consumption. This dualism was the subject of great criticism after the turn of the century, when patriotism and nationalism—fueled and sharpened around the globe by World War I—grew strong in Chile and non-elites who attacked the political and cultural sensibilities of the old aristocracy sought new political, social, and cultural formulae for their nation. Chilean national identity after the 1870s became more complex, mirroring the increasing complexity of Chilean society. The emergence of the middle class by the end of the 19th century, and the concurrent expansion of print culture, created new conditions that greatly affected the spirit of nationality. The elite no longer held a monopoly on defining the nation and its people, and strongly nationalistic critics of the elite, including Tancredo Pinochet Le-Brun and Alberto Cabero, argued that the elite had a rather weak sense of nationality, as evidenced by their cultural and economic cosmopolitanism, among other things. By the 1920s and 1930s, as economic problems gripped the country, what amounted to a national introspection took place, as a great many Chileans paused to assess the very nature of their imagined community. The common worker, for example, became a laudable example of chilenidad in the pages of criollista literature, creating a new image of the nation that included the lower N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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classes. This paved the way for later movements, including Salvador Allende’s “Chilean road to socialism,” which located the worker at the very heart of the nation and of Chilean national identity and nationalism. By the mid-1970s, Chilean national identity had taken another turn, as the military regime of General Augusto Pinochet sought to rally patriotic Chileans to the “national” cause: economic restructuring and the end of party politics. Above all, one thing was made clear during the Pinochet years: no longer was Chile a “model republic.” Selected Bibliography Barr-Melej, Patrick. 2001. Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the Middle Class. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Bethel, Leslie, ed. 1993. Chile since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brading, David. 1993. The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492–1867. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burr, Robert. 1974. By Reason or by Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Collier, Simon. 1967. Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808–1833. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collier, Simon. 2003. Chile: The Making of a Republic, 1830–1865: Politics and Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Halperin, Ernst. 1965. Nationalism and Communism in Chile. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Miller, Nicola. 1999. In the Shadow of the State: Intellectuals and the Quest for National Identity in Twentieth-Century Spanish America. London: Verso. Solberg, Carl. 1970. Immigration and Nationalism: Argentina and Chile, 1890–1914. Austin: University of Texas Press. Sommer, Doris. 1991. Foundational Fictions. Berkeley: University of California Press. Whitaker, Arthur Preston. 1962. Nationalism in Latin America: Past and Present. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

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Haiti Chris Dixon Chronology 1791 (August) Outbreak of slave rebellion, precipitating the revolution. 1804 Haiti declares independence, the world’s first independent black republic, under JeanJacques Dessalines. 1806 Assassination of Dessalines; Haiti divides into a mulatto-ruled south and a black-controlled north. 1820 Reunification of Haiti under President Jean-Pierre Boyer. 1821 Boyer invades Santo Domingo after it declares independence from Spain. Haiti controls the entire island until 1844. 1825 France recognizes Haitian independence. 1847 Faustin-Elie Soulouque becomes president. 1849 Soulouque proclaims himself “emperor for life.” 1859 Fabre Geffrard becomes president. 1860 A concordat is signed between Haiti and the Vatican.

Situating the Nation “Discovered” by Christopher Columbus in 1492, the Caribbean island of Espanola (Hispaniola) was a Spanish colony until 1697, when Spain ceded the western third of the island to France, which named its new colony Saint-Domingue. The boundaries of this territory, which later became the republic of Haiti, underwent significant changes from the 1770s to the 1880s. Under the terms of the 1795 Treaty of Basel, Spain ceded the rest of the island to France, but the formal transfer of possession did not proceed due to the continuing war in Europe. In late 1799, however, the Haitian revolutionary leader Toussaint-Louverture led a military expedition into Santo Domingo, ousting the Spanish forces and establishing Haitian control over the entire island of Espanola. Taking advantage of the power struggle between rival factions in Haiti, in 1809 Spain reestablished its rule in neighboring Santo Domingo. Spain’s colonial authority, however, remained tenuous, and in 1821 Santo Domingo declared its independence. The following year, Haitian forces conquered Santo Domingo. The Haitian presence in the eastern part of the island was welcomed by some Dominicans, but the majority regarded the Haitian presence as an occupation. During the 1830s, amid growing resentment toward the Haitian presence, an independence movement developed, particularly among the Spanish-speaking population. Perhaps emboldened by the demise of the long-serving Haitian leader N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Jean-Pierre Boyer, in 1844 military chiefs in Santo Domingo launched a coup and declared their nation’s independence. Haiti’s 19th-century military ventures into Santo Domingo contributed to the strains on the Haitian economy. Like many other postcolonial societies, 19thcentury Haiti experienced considerable economic privation. Colonial SaintDomingue, however, had commonly been regarded as the most lucrative jewel in the French colonial crown, and during the 18th century its economy and population grew apace. Based largely on the ruthless exploitation of slaves imported from Africa, a majority of whom toiled on sugar cane—and increasingly coffee— plantations, the island made a significant contribution to French prosperity. By the 1780s, it was estimated that two-thirds of France’s colonial foreign commercial interests were based on Saint-Domingue, earning the colony the label “the pearl of the Antilles.” It was not surprising, then, that even during the tumult of the French Revolution, successive French leaders endeavored to retain authority over their prized colony. From the inception of the republic in 1804, Haiti was beset by economic woes. Despite occasional attempts to develop the nation’s industrial base, economic life continued to revolve around the agricultural sector. But notwithstanding earnest attempts on the part of some Haitian leaders to improve agricultural outputs, the rural economy never achieved the same yields as during the colonial period. Haiti’s economic problems were compounded by the indemnity that France demanded—and received—in return for its recognition of the black republic. In 1825 Boyer’s government agreed to pay an indemnity of 150 million francs. Although the amount was subsequently renegotiated to 60 million francs, the price for recognition of Haitian independence and acknowledgment of the black nationalism that it embodied proved a serious impediment to the economic development of the black republic.

Instituting the Nation At the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, Saint-Domingue’s population consisted of 500,000 black slaves, 24,000 free mulattoes and blacks, and approximately 32,000 whites. Black slaves were situated firmly at the bottom of the prevailing racial hierarchy. A majority of these slaves were relatively recent arrivals from Africa; it has been speculated that their fresh memories of freedom in Africa made them more likely to rebel against colonial authority. Brutally mistreated, and subject to the indiscriminate cruelty of their owners, black slaves enjoyed scant protection under the law. Escape was a difficult proposition in SaintDomingue, but some slaves fled to the interior of the island, where they established Maroon colonies, some of which engaged in guerrilla warfare against the colonial authorities. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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As in other slave societies, free mulattoes and blacks in colonial SaintDomingue occupied an ambiguous position in the social and racial hierarchy. Some of these affranchise or gens de couleur (free mulattoes or, less commonly, free blacks) achieved financial independence and success; some, indeed, owned slaves. Yet commercial achievements did not translate into political or social equality with the white minority, and a range of legal prescriptions ensured the mulatto minority was constantly reminded that while its condition was superior to that of the slaves, its social and political status was far below that of the dominant white minority. That white minority enjoyed the most privileged position within colonial Saint-Domingue. But there were also deep divisions within the white community, between those born in the colony and those who lived and worked there temporarily, and among the elite, or grands blancs, whose ranks included landowners and wealthy merchants, the petits blancs, a group that included craftsmen and other members of what amounted to a white “middle class,” and the lower class, or blancs menants, whose ranks included peasants and laborers. The French Revolution had a direct and dramatic impact on Saint-Domingue. Discussions of “freedom” in the mother country, and the turmoil of the revolutionary era, inevitably encouraged the slaves in Saint-Domingue to demand their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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own freedom. In the short term, however, much of the criticism of the French colonial authority was manifested by the free mulattoes and blacks, who resented their second-class status. In May 1791, following an uprising against French colonial authority led by a gens de couleur, Vincent Oge, the French government sought to quell the growing restlessness in Saint-Domingue by granting rights of citizenship to prosperous free mulattoes and blacks. By July 1791, after the white colonists in SaintDomingue refused to comply with the revolutionary government’s law, fighting had broken out between the whites and the gens de couleur. The following month, the slaves rose in rebellion. Desperate to retain control, and apprehensive about a possible alliance between the slaves and the gens de couleur, the white colonists sought to appease the latter group. In April 1792, the rights of citizenship were extended to all gens de couleur. But this gesture was too little, too late, and the island was soon beset by conflict among rival factions. Exacerbating this confused situation were attempted interventions by Spanish colonists from neighboring Santo Domingo, and by British troops dispatched from nearby Jamaica. These proved to be merely the first occasions in which foreign powers intervened in Haiti. In 1793, realizing that the black majority could no longer be held in thralldom, the French authorities offered freedom to those slaves who agreed to join their army. They then took the dramatic step of abolishing slavery altogether. These concessions, however, did not mollify all the blacks and former slaves. From the confusion and turmoil, two powerful figures emerged: General Andre Riguad, a mulatto whose base of support rested on those who formerly comprised the gens de couleur; and the former slave, Toussaint-Louverture, who became the hero to

Toussaint-Louverture, leader of the Haitian Revolution. (Ridpath, John Clark, Ridpath’s History of the World, 1901)

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the black majority. By the late 1790s, Toussaint-Louverture had secured control of several areas of Saint-Domingue. Blessed with an astute military mind, and willing to concede at least a nominal allegiance to France, Toussaint-Louverture also negotiated with the British to advance his own political objectives. In May 1801 he designated himself “governor-general” for life. Napoleon, unwilling to yield control of France’s prized colony, dispatched his brother-in-law, General Charles Leclerc, to restore control in Saint-Domingue. By April 1802, Leclerc’s army had seized the initiative, and Leclerc had persuaded Toussaint-Louverture to put himself in French hands. A year later, after imprisonment and interrogation by the French, Toussaint-Louverture died of pneumonia. His death, widely regarded by Haitians as evidence of French perfidy, did not detract from his reputation as a formidable military leader and symbol of black revolution. That reputation extended well beyond Haiti, and Toussaint-Louverture’s achievements soon became a model and inspiration for black resistance to slavery and colonialism around the world. Yet the French presence in Saint-Domingue remained precarious. With Leclerc’s army beset by yellow fever and realizing that France could not afford the high price required to secure and maintain control in its former colony, Napoleon decided to relinquish the last vestiges of control. The leaders of the revolutionary forces in Saint-Domingue recognized Jean-Jacques Dessalines as their leader. On January 1, 1804, adopting the name originally used by the island’s native inhabitants, Dessalines proclaimed independence for the new nation. Haiti was the world’s first independent black republic. But the young nation faced vast problems. In a very real sense, the Haitians had nothing but freedom. Much of the infrastructure had been destroyed, the impoverished population was largely unskilled, and there were grave doubts about whether the experiment in black government would long survive. Postrevolutionary Haiti was plagued by political instability. There were three real sources of political power in 19th-century Haiti. The legislature, or Assemblee Constituante, was an often unruly and disorganized forum, characterized by conflicts between personal cliques rather than ideological differences expressed though formal political parties. Until 1843 the franchise was very narrowly restricted, with the vote largely restricted to army officers and the descendents of the prerevolutionary gens de couleur. Yet the assembly did provide a modicum of participatory democracy and served as a focus of political debate and opposition to presidential power. And successive Haitian leaders antagonized or alienated the army at their own peril. During the mid-1820s, when the Haitian population numbered fewer than 800,000, the regular army was comprised of 32,000 men. Although mulattoes occupied some important posts within the military, the army was largely dominated by black Haitians. Notwithstanding the importance of the legislature and the army, 19thcentury Haitian political life was largely dominated by its presidents. Having assumed the title of Emperor Jacques I, Dessalines died in 1806 while attempting to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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thwart a mulatto uprising. Henry Christophe then assumed control of Haiti, but his rule—centered in the northern part of the country—was soon challenged by Alexandre Sabes Petion from his base in the capital, Port-au-Prince, situated in the south. Lauded by some as an effective and dynamic leader, Christophe was a black, former slave who had established his military reputation, and honed his political skills, during the revolution. Petion, a light-skinned mulatto, was unable to overthrow Christophe’s reign in the north, and for the next decade, Haiti was divided between these two factions. Tensions between black and mulatto Haitians were an ongoing source of political conflict and disruption during the 19th century. After Petion’s death in 1818, the mulatto Jean-Pierre Boyer assumed control in the southern part of the country, where political and economic life was largely determined by the mulatto minority. Following Christophe’s suicide in 1820, Boyer established control over the entire nation. With a bloated civil service— whose senior ranks were dominated by mulattoes—and a large army—upon which much of Boyer’s authority rested, but which was dominated by blacks—his administration was characterized by inefficiency and corruption. His long tenure in office reflected both the absence of a coherent opposition and his ability to overcome prospective challenges to his authority rather than any significant achievements or measure of popularity. In 1843, however, Boyer was ousted by a coup d’état led by Charles Riviere-Herard. The overthrow of Boyer ushered in a period of political instability. For the next four years, Haiti was governed by a succession of short-lived regimes, led, in turn, by Riviere-Herard, Philipe Guerrier, Jean Louis Pierrot, and Jean Baptiste Riche. None of these governments enjoyed real legitimacy, and all proved incapable of either establishing themselves or addressing the nation’s profound economic and social challenges. In 1847 Faustin-Elie Soulouque became president; two years later, he was named “emperor for life.” That title proved less than prophetic, however, and after turning on his mulatto power base and engaging in repression that was brutal even by Haitian standards, in 1859 Soulouque was overthrown by General Fabre Geffrard, who governed until 1867. Endeavoring to reduce tensions between black and mulatto Haitians, Geffrard sought also to improve the nation’s economic situation by increasing production of cotton to capitalize on the rise in cotton prices resulting from the American Civil War. Yet Geffrard faced rebellion from the earliest stages of his presidency. A series of crop failures during the mid-1860s compounded public discontent, and following a mutiny among army troops in 1867, Geffrard fled to Jamaica. His departure ushered in a new era of political instability, characterized by a succession of shortlived regimes and by rivalry and tension between the largely black National Party and the Liberal Party, whose power base rested on the mulatto minority. Whereas Nationalist leaders appealed to the black majority with the slogan “the greatest good for the greatest number,” Liberal leaders advocated “government by the most competent.” Although the differences between them were not ideological, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Liberals and Nationalists vied vigorously for power and contributed to the continuing instability in political life. As had been the case after Boyer’s demise, Geffrard’s fall from power precipitated a renewed period of political instability: Sylvain Salnave ruled from 1867 until 1869; Nissage Saget then ruled until 1874, when he took the uncharacteristic step of retiring from political life; Michel Domingue ruled until 1876; and Boisrond Canal’s presidency, lasting from 1876 until 1879, was notable for the way in which he frequently deferred to the legislature. But the legislature—divided between the Liberals and Nationalists—was largely ineffectual. In 1879, at the conclusion of Canal’s presidential term, Louis Lysius Felicite Salomon was appointed president. He remained in power until 1888, after which two rival governments— one in the north led by General Florville Hyppolite, and the other in parts of the south led by Francois Legitime—vied for supremacy. Hyppolite triumphed in this struggle, but like those who had preceded—and succeeded—him, he was unable to establish a political system or culture that provided for orderly transitions of power. For the rest of the 19th century and well beyond, Haitian politics was characterized by instability and inefficiency. All too often, political life, and the culture that underpinned it, was an unruly and violent affair, marked by half-hearted attempts to instill democratic practices and culture.

Defining the Nation “Race” has always stood at the center of constructions of Haitian nationality, and transnational racial politics loomed large in Haiti during the 19th century. Notwithstanding the factionalized and contested nature of political life, there was wide consensus among Haitian leaders that the nation stood as an example of the capacities of the African race. Haitian nationality rested firmly on the abolition of slavery, and from the inception of the republic in 1804, the rights of citizenship were reserved for people of African descent. And although Haitian rulers acknowledged the importance of foreign trade, there were explicit attempts to control the foreign ownership of property. Dessalines decreed that whites could not own land in Haiti—a decree that remained in place until the early 20th century. The diplomatic isolation to which the nation was long subjected reinforced the notion that Haiti was a tangible, national expression of opposition to colonialism, racism, and slavery. Describing Haitians as “regenerators of Africa,” Noel Colombel—Petion supporter and a principal propagandist of the young republic—spoke for many Haitians when he stated that their efforts to secure and maintain independence and liberty constituted a struggle on behalf of two-thirds of the world’s people. Successive generations of Haitian writers denounced theories of racialism, repudiating both the conclusions of those who regarded darkN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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skinned people as inferior as well as the “science” upon which such conclusions were supposedly premised. Successive Haitian administrations remained vigilant about the prospect of foreign intervention. In 1861 Geffrard’s administration became embroiled in a diplomatic dispute with Spain, which—at the request of the president of the Dominican Republic—had recently re-annexed Haiti’s neighbor. Declaring that Haiti would never acknowledge the annexation and supporting an anti-Spanish insurgency in the Dominican Republic, Geffrard’s government incurred the wrath of the Spaniards, who demanded that the Haitians end their support for the Dominican rebels. With Spanish gunboats stationed off the coast of Port-au-Prince, Geffrard was compelled to back down. Haitians of all hues rejected notions of white superiority and agreed that their nation represented a tangible expression of the capacity of the African race. Yet an enduring theme in Haitian history—reflected in the turbulent nature of 19thcentury Haitian political life—was the tension between the largely rural, black majority, and the smaller, urban-based, and light-skinned mulatto population. These groups were also linguistically divided: the black majority generally spoke in Creole; the mulatto minority typically spoke French. These distinctions tended to correspond to the class divisions within Haitian society, with much of the nation’s wealth and economic power concentrated in the hands of the mulattoes. The language issue also proved to be an impediment to the incorporation of the Dominican Republic into Haiti; although Haitians appreciated their neighbors’ common experiences with European colonialism and racism, and although they viewed their own experiences in black government as an experiment on behalf of dark-skinned peoples everywhere, the fact that Spanish was the lingua franca in the Dominican Republic was a significant impediment to any long-term union between the two peoples. Dominican constructions of nationalism, moreover, were less explicitly racial than in Haiti, and attempts on the part of the latter group to foment a common, racially based sense of nationalism were met with little enthusiasm in the Dominican Republic. Despite their unequivocal rejection of colonialism and white racism, 19thcentury Haitians often understood “civilization” and “culture” in Eurocentric terms. This trait was reflected in the ambivalent attitudes toward Africa. Mulattoes valued their connections to Europe, and some regarded Africa in a negative light. Even among black Haitians there was a tendency to discuss Africa in condescending terms. Constructions of Haitian nationalism were also shaped by the nation’s particular religious values and culture. As a French colony, Catholicism was the dominant religion among the white minority. Among the slave community, too, Catholicism was a significant influence. In the wake of the revolution, although many of Haiti’s leaders were wary of the Roman Catholic Church, which many Haitians believed functioned as an expression of European colonial authority, Catholicism remained the dominant Christian denomination. It was not until N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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1860, however, when a concordat was signed between the Haitian government and the Vatican, that relations were officially restored. Apprehensive that the church might seek to exercise undue influence, not all Haitians welcomed the concordat. Those concerns notwithstanding, the Catholic church became an increasingly important and influential participant in the nation’s public life. At the same time that Catholicism was an important part of Haitians’ lives, however, popular religion in the country continued to revolve around Vodou (Voodoo). Derived largely from West African religious systems, Vodou was typically denigrated by Europeans as a form of superstition, which both perpetuated and symbolized the backward nature of the black republic’s rural populace. Such representations, however, understated the extent to which Vodou was a comprehensive system of religious beliefs and practices that played a part in encouraging the racial consciousness that underpinned the revolution and helped sustain the black republic. During the revolutionary era, the shared belief in Vodou and the meetings associated with Vodou worship functioned as unifying forces among the black majority. Early black leaders of Haiti—Toussaint-Louverture, Dessalines, and Christophe—understood, however, that Vodou was also potentially disruptive to the newly established black political order and could serve as a vehicle for political discontent. Their attempts to control Vodou worship and the Vodou priests were unsuccessful, however. Subsequent Haitian leaders, including the mulattoes Petion and Boyer, were less troubled by Vodou, which they probably regarded as further evidence of the black majority’s inferiority. Foreigner observers, including James Theodore Holly, an African American Episcopalian who in 1861 led a colony of black American emigrants to Haiti, interpreted Haitians’ attachment to Vodou as evidence of the black republic’s state of underdevelopment. Yet during the 19th century, many foreign observers— particularly white Southerners in the United States—realized that Haiti stood as a symbol of black power. Haiti was commonly viewed and represented in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, abolitionists on both sides of the Atlantic lauded Haiti as representative of the possibility of black emancipation and independence. Others, however, depicted the island republic’s political and social instability, and economic woes, as a foretaste of what would follow precipitous emancipation, or black rebellion, in other slave societies. Those fears underpinned international responses to the Haitian revolution. Apprehensive that the Haitian example might encourage slave rebellions elsewhere, European powers, and the United States, isolated the black republic. France did not recognize Haiti until 1825 (after the Haitians agreed to pay a sizeable indemnity); Britain granted recognition in 1833; and the United States eventually followed suit in 1862, following the secession of the southern slave states. It was only during the Civil War that the United States lifted the trade embargo on Haiti, which had been in place since 1806. The international reaction to the Haitian revolution compounded the young nation’s economic, political, and social difficulties. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Narrating the Nation Nineteenth-century Haiti was characterized by a vigorous, sometimes boisterous, cultural life. Haitians’ constructions of their history emphasized the significance of their successful break from colonial power and their ability to maintain their independence in the face of diplomatic and international hostility. At the same time as Haitians celebrated their nation’s status as tangible proof of the capacities of the black race and as an example of anticolonial rebellion, a Francophile tendency was evident within 19th-century Haitian culture. Much of Haitian culture, therefore, reflected this fusion of European and African civilizations. The fusion also reflected many educated Haitians’ distaste for, and sense of superiority over, Africa. Conscious of their nation’s role as an exemplar of antiracist and anticolonial sentiment, 19th-century Haitian historians self-consciously emphasized the significance of their nation’s achievements. Inevitably, however, there were competing narratives of that story of achievement—and of the nation’s often violent past. Historian David Nicholls has described the competing ideologies that emerged in 19th-century Haiti as the “black legend” and the “mulatto legend.” These mulatto and black versions of Haitian history were often at odds. Perhaps predictably, mulatto versions of the black republic’s past emphasized the roles played by mulattoes in establishing and maintaining Haitian independence and liberty and were sometimes critical of the excesses of black leaders such as ToussaintLouverture and Dessalines. And although mulatto writers shared black Haitians’ sense of racial pride, an undercurrent of color prejudice toward their more darkskinned compatriots was evident among many mulatto Haitians. Accordingly, while Toussaint-Louverture remained a hero to the nation and the focus of the black republic’s collective memory of its revolutionary past, Haitian history was always a contested field. The competing versions of Haitian history and culture were expressed in a range of ways. Beginning in 1836, Le Republicain (later succeeded by L’Union) served as both an avenue by which opponents of Boyer’s regime could articulate their political grievances as well as a forum for literary, economic, and cultural debate. Mulatto writers such as Beauvais Lespinasse (1811–1863) and Emile Nau (1812–1860) emphasized Haiti’s unique status, which they contended grew from its African and European origins. Most of the contributors to Le Republicain and L’Union were mulattoes, yet they regarded Haiti as the “cradle of African independence.” It was Haiti’s destiny, they contended, to serve as the pinnacle of African civilizations and to take the lead in advancing the black race. Students were taught, for example, that it was their duty to help develop Haiti, partly because such development was an essential ingredient of the process of modernization and partly because such development would play a part in overcoming prejudice against the black race. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Without demeaning the significance of those formal expressions of Haitian culture and nationality, much of the collective sense of national identity was constructed and reinforced outside schools or other formal institutions. Education, for example, was reserved for a tiny minority of Haitians. It is estimated that during the 1830s, only 1,000 children attended school. Fewer than 300 people subscribed to periodicals such as Le Republicain and L’Union. Yet despite their alienation from national politics, with its violence, corruption, and contempt for the well-being of the masses, the largely illiterate, uneducated, rural majority did understand and appreciate the significance of Haitian independence and nationality. Much of that nationalistic sentiment was expressed through folktales— passed down via a vibrant oral tradition—that emphasized the significance of their forefathers’ achievement of black independence and that provided a shared sense of history and national pride.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation With Haitian economic life centered on the rural sector, and with agricultural development impeded by political instability, the question of land ownership was a recurring theme in 19th-century Haiti. Prior to the revolution, land ownership was inevitably concentrated in the hands of the white minority. Following the bloodshed of the revolutionary era and the expulsion of the French, successive administrations in Haiti grappled with the issue of how to ensure that the agricultural lands were most efficiently—and, in some cases, fairly—distributed and exploited. Toussaint-Louverture, and then Dessalines, adopted a policy known as fermage, by which government-owned land was leased out to managers, who in turn used workers who were required to stay on the land. In return, the peasants received one-quarter of the crops that were produced. Haitian peasants remained unenthusiastic about fermage, which seemed little different from the serfdom under which millions of Europeans toiled. Building upon a policy initiated by Petion’s government, Boyer’s administration set about distributing small parcels of land, principally to members of the Haitian army and Haitians to whom the government owed a debt. Historians have questioned both the motives and the impact of this policy. Was this a means of pacifying the potentially unruly Haitian masses and protecting the elite’s access to the resources necessary to protect their own wealth, or did it reflect a genuine desire to ensure a more equitable distribution of resources? Did it stifle development of the vital agricultural sector and have a negative impact? What is clear is that a majority of 19th-century Haitians lived a subsistence or nearsubsistence existence, and that the nation’s development continued to be impeded by an underdeveloped agricultural sector. Concomitant with Boyer’s distribution of land was the 1826 “Code Rural.” This convoluted policy sought to redress the decline of the rural economy by compelling N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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peasants to remain on plantations. Rural workers were prohibited from leaving the land, moving to towns, or establishing farms or businesses of their own. To enforce these controversial measures, a rural constabulary was established. Ultimately, however, the Code Rural failed to arrest the decline in rural production. Nineteenth-century attempts to consolidate the agricultural sector in Haiti were compromised by the environmental degradation to which the land was subjected. This not only entailed the continuing destruction of natural vegetation— compounding problems of soil erosion—but also the ongoing degradation of agricultural lands. The declining fertility of the land, in conjunction with increased population pressures and an ongoing inability to manage land use in a sustainable manner that would benefit the rural majority, further exacerbated the nation’s economic difficulties. The malaise of the rural sector and the consequent state of almost perpetual economic crisis, in conjunction with endemic political instability, portended the continuing problems Haiti would confront during the 20th century. Selected Bibliography Dubois, Laurent. 2004. Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Fick, Carolyn E. 1990. The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Geggus, David Patrick. 2002. Haitian Revolutionary Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Girard, Philippe R. 2005. Paradise Lost: Haiti’s Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to Third World Hot Spot. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Heinl, Robert Debs, and Nancy Heinl. 1978. Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492–1971. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. James, C. L. R. 1980 (New Edition). The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution. London: Allison and Busby. Leyburn, James G. 1980. The Haitian People. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. (Orig. pub. 1941.) Nicholls, David. 1974. “A Work of Combat: Mulatto Historians and the Haitian Past, 1847–1867.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 16, no. 1: 15–38. Nicholls, David. 1996. From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan. Rotberg, Robert I. 1971. Haiti: The Politics of Squalor. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

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Mexico Will Fowler Chronology 1492 1519 1521 1521–1821 1524 1531 1648 1759–1788 1767 1780–1781 1788–1808 1792 1808 1810–1821 1812 1814 1821 1822 1823 1824 1824–1835 1829 1832 1835 1835–1836 1835–1846 1836 1838–1839 1841 1843 1845 1846 1846–1848 1847–1852 1848

Christopher Columbus “discovers” the New World. Hernán Cortés leads expedition to Mexico. Fall of Tenochtitlán, end of the Mexica empire. Colonial era (Mexico is a Spanish colony). Twelve Franciscan monks arrive in Mexico and allegedly baptize over 1 million Indians. Virgin of Guadalupe allegedly appears to an Indian convert, Juan Diego, on the hill of Tepeyac, near Mexico City. Miguel Sánchez publishes in Spanish his Image of the Virgin Mary, Mother of Guadalupe. Reign of Charles III, period of Bourbon reforms begins. Expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and its colonies. Francisco Xavier Clavigero composes his Ancient History of Mexico. Reign of Charles IV, king of Spain. Antonio de León y Gama publishes his Historical and Chronological Description of Two Stones. Napoleonic occupation of Spain. Mexican War of Independence. Spanish congress in Cádiz drafts first liberal constitution of Hispanic world. Rebel congress of Chilpancingo drafts first Mexican constitution of Apatzingán. Independence of Mexico and Central America. Mexican empire is forged. Mexican empire ends; Central American provinces (with the exception of Chiapas) secede from Mexico and become the United Provinces of Central America. First federal constitution. First federal republic. Spanish invasion of Tampico is repulsed; slavery is abolished in Mexico. Federalist civil war. Constitution of 1824 is abolished. Texan revolt (leads to secession of Texas and forging of the Lone Star Republic). First central republic. First central constitution (The Seven Laws). French Pastry War. Constitution of 1836 is abolished and replaced with Bases de Tacubaya. Second central constitution (Bases Orgánicas). U.S. annexation of Texas. Constitution of 1843 is abolished, and the 1824 constitution is reinstated. Mexican-American War. Caste war in Yucatán. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo brings Mexican-American War to an end, and Mexico loses half of its national territory to the United States.

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1849–1853 Lucas Alamán publishes his History of Mexico, five volumes. 1853 Gadsden Purchase (the United States buys the Valley of La Mesilla in present-day Arizona and New Mexico). 1854–1855 Revolution of Ayutla. 1857 Second federal constitution. 1858–1861 Civil War of the Reform. 1862–1867 French intervention in Mexico. 1864–1867 Reign of Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, emperor of Mexico. 1867 Liberal restoration. 1872 President Benito Juárez dies and is replaced by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada. 1876–1910 General Porfirio Díaz is president (with the exception of 1880–1884). 1887–1889 Vicente Riva Palacio edits his Mexico over the Centuries.

Situating the Nation Mexico was and remains a country of extraordinary contrasts. It is one of the 10 nations with the greatest biodiversity in the world. The territories that the Spanish Crown conquered between 1519 and 1542 included deserts, daunting mountain ranges, dry and moist forests, arid plains, volcanoes, and jungles. Mexico’s many varied political, economic, social, and historical contexts, characterized by their plurality and heterogeneity, would in a way mirror the country’s vast and contrasting landscapes. Its lands, extending from Central America to the south to as far north as Utah, were populated by a plethora of different and, in many cases, warring indigenous tribes. At the time of the European incursion, the Mexica, popularly described as the Aztecs, controlled this vast empire from their capital city Tenochtitlán (present-day Mexico City). However, their control had not resulted in the emergence of a uniform Mexica entity. The Mayas, the Tlaxcaltecs, the Mixtecs, and the Zapotecs, to name but a few, were communities with their own distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious identities. To this day, there are 56 different indigenous ethnic groups in Mexico, all of whom speak different languages. It is not surprising that Mexican national identity was, as first expressed in the latter half of the 18th century, a highly contested and controversial subject. The society that resulted from the conquest and 300 years of Spanish domination (1521–1821) was one that was profoundly hybrid and syncretic, the product of the uneasy (and not always peaceful or desired) mix of the indigenous and Spanish peoples and cultures of the 16th century. Slavery would add an African dimension to the question of Mexican ethnicity, in particular on the Caribbean coast of the nascent nation. According to the 20th-century intellectual and poet Octavio Paz (1914–1998), awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1990, much of Mexico’s tragic past could be blamed on the violent, mystical, and authoritarian temperaments of their Aztec and conquistador forebears. Modern Mexico N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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was perceived, in this sense, as a culture founded upon a particularly sanguinary and traumatic past: to coin Paz’s view, a culture bred from the figurative rape their Spanish father Hernán Cortés committed on their Indian mother La Malinche. In real terms, the Spanish conquest resulted in the end of Mexica domination, in a demographic collapse of the indigenous population (described by some as genocide), and a diverse population that was deeply heterogeneous. Conquistador Hernán Cortés led the ultimately successful military and political conquest of the Mexica empire. Disease, systematic killing, overwork, and ill treatment resulted in the Indian population of central Mexico falling from 20–25 million people in 1519, to 6 million in 1548, to 2 million in 1580, and to 750,000 in 1630. The painful legacy of the conquest, especially for the descendants of the indigenous population of Mexico, is one that continues to figure prominently in present-day indigenous political discourse. The Spanish incursion also resulted in a spiritual conquest whereby the religion of the Mexica and their contemporaries, with their notorious human sacrifices, was replaced with the Roman Catholic faith. With time most Mexicans would come to use Spanish as their first language and become practicing Roman Catholics. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Instituting the Nation The church was a key institution in establishing the foundations of what would become the Mexican nation. From the perspective of the 19th century, the Mexican church, with its autochthonous calendar and saints, was perceived by many as the sole and true representative of Mexican identity. This identification would be reflected in the way that the first four Mexican constitutions (1814, 1824, 1836, and 1843) officially described Mexico as a Roman Catholic country and forbade the toleration of any other religion. Following the traumatic Mexican-American War (1846–1848), a number of Mexican conservatives would go as far as to claim that Roman Catholicism was the only tie left that bound the Mexican people together vis-à-vis the increasing power and influence of the Protestant United States. For the anticlerical Mexican liberals of the mid-19th century, this association between the nation and the Catholic church would prove problematic. Existing similarities between Mesoamerican religion and Roman Catholicism certainly facilitated the conversion of the native population of Mexico. It also resulted in the emergence of a distinct and unique religious community with a very particular identity. Indian gods were equated with the saints. For example, Quetzalcóatl was equated with Saint Thomas; the Zapotec god, Cocijo, with Saint Peter. Catholic churches and shrines were erected on the sites of the old Indian cults. Where possible, the Catholic calendar was made to coincide with the preColumbian one. Probably the most evident example of this synthesis was the way in which the Mexicas’ ritual of the Day of the Dead was assimilated by the Mexican church

Our Lady of Guadalupe The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe ( guadalupanismo) was and remains the most powerful expression of Mexican national identity. Following the publication of Miguel Sánchez’s 1648 study on the apparition of the Virgin Mary on the hill of Tepeyac in 1531, the Creole clergy of New Spain propagated the belief that Our Lady of Guadalupe was the Queen of Mexico. She provided the Creole priesthood with an autonomous sacred foundation for their church and mother country. Her image, miraculously imprinted on the cape of a humble Indian, Juan Diego, preserved and venerated at the holy mount of Tepeyac, was a clear sign that the Virgin Mary would protect the Mexican people. Her mestizo features and her associations with the Indian goddess Tonantzin served to transform her into the object of devotion for Indians and Creoles, rich and poor alike. The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe became widespread over time as a result of the intertwining of religious fervor and patriotic enthusiasm. In a country divided by race, class, customs, and language, the inhabitants of Mexico had little to bind them together except for their shared identity as children and subjects of Our Lady of Guadalupe. Guadalupanismo and Mexican nationalism became one and the same thing.

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A huge banner displays the original image of the Virgin of Guadalupe in Mexico City on December 11, 2000. The Virgin is said to have appeared in 1531 on a blanket owned by the Indian Juan Diego. She is a key figure to the Catholic indigenous people of Mexico and has been venerated since her appearance. (Wesley Bocxe/Liaison/Getty Images)

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and incorporated into the festivity of All Saints. Similarly, the Indian goddess Tonantzin was equated with the Virgin of Guadalupe, whose apparition in 1531 was witnessed precisely on Tonantzin’s sacred hill of Tepeyac. The Virgin of Guadalupe even inherited from her pre-Columbian incarnation a mystical association with the cactus-based drink pulque. The fact that she presented herself to an Indian, Juan Diego, and that her complexion, miraculously imprinted on his cape, had indigenous traits, gave her an emblematic significance in the syncretic culture that developed in Mexico, one that no other figure or myth came to espouse. In a sense, she epitomized what would become one of the core aspects of mexicanidad, Mexican identity: mestizaje (the fusion of Spanish and Indian cultures). For those leading intellectuals who came to formulate a concept of Mexican nationhood in the late 19th and 20th centuries, mestizaje was an essential aspect of their identity, since the majority of Mexicans were, after all, mestizos (racially mixed Spanish Americans of Spanish-Indian descent). The Virgin of Guadalupe symbolized mestizaje beautifully. She embodied a Roman Catholic tradition that retained characteristics of a preceding Indian goddess. The fact that she had chosen to make her apparition to a poor Indian just outside Mexico City spiritually transformed Mexico’s indigenous-mestizo people into something akin to a chosen race. The Indian Juan Diego became a Mexican Moses, with the Virgin’s miraculous image representing the Mexican Ark of the Covenant. The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe, defined as guadalupanismo, would become a powerful expression of Mexican national identity after Miguel Sánchez (1596?–1674) published in Spanish in 1648, and in Náhuatl a year later, his Image of the Virgin Mary, Mother of Guadalupe. It is no coincidence that, when the Mexican War of Independence

Mestizaje Mestizaje is the term used in Spanish to describe crossbreeding or miscegenation. In the case of Mexico, it was specifically used to refer to the mix of the Spanish and Indian races. Mestizos were those Mexicans descended from Spanish-Indian parents. During the colonial period, a profoundly hierarchical (and racist) caste system was drawn up in which there were, in order of importance, a whole range of socio-ethnic categories, including, to name but two examples, castizos (the children of criollos and mestizos) and zambos (the children of Indians and blacks). Although Creole patriotism stressed that the origins of the emergent Mexican nation were to be found in preconquest America, its proponents could be deeply mistrustful of their contemporary Indians. By the end of the 19th century, however, mestizaje had become the cornerstone upon which subsequent interpretations of Mexican nationhood were hinged. Albeit contested, in the sense that European, Indian, and African Mexicans are excluded from the mestizo notion of mexicanidad, mestizaje has become the most enduring and hegemonic ethno-cultural interpretation of lo mexicano. To be Mexican is thus to be mestizo, hence cultural expressions of the Mexican nation tend to be hybrid and syncretic, with elements that can be traced to both a Spanish and an Aztec heritage.

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erupted on September 16, 1810, Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla’s rallying call to arms was: “Long live the Virgin of Guadalupe and death to the Spaniards!” One of the first Mexican-born intellectuals to develop the idea of a Mexican mother country that was at odds with, and different from, that of “mother Spain,” was Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora (1645–1700). Sigüenza championed the idea of a Mexican pátria by promoting the cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe and by arguing that Mexico’s Aztec past was where their antiquity originated from, rather than from Europe. Sigüenza’s writings would subsequently influence key 18th- and early 19th-century thinkers such as the Jesuit Francisco Xavier Clavigero (1731–1787), the revolutionary priest Servando Teresa de Mier (1763–1827), and the prolific diarist, journalist, and politician, Carlos María de Bustamante (1774–1848). However, the need to actually define the Mexican nation would not surface until the Bourbon reforms of the latter half of the 18th century challenged the social bases and political values that had characterized the Spanish empire for over two and a half centuries.

Defining the Nation Under the Habsburgs, Spain’s policy toward its colonies could almost be described as one of abandon. Centuries of inertia on the part of the monarchy had resulted in the colonies enjoying a high degree of autonomy. It was Charles III (1759–1788), a member of the Bourbon dynasty that had taken hold of Spain’s destiny, replacing the Habsburgs in the wake of the Spanish War of Succession (1702–1713), who changed all of that. Determined to impose his own brand of enlightened despotism, Charles III energetically set about reforming his domains, determined to encourage social and agricultural improvement while tightening his administration’s control over the empire. The changes he promoted, the so-called Bourbon reforms, resulted in acute discontent in the colonies and included a determined assault on church wealth and privileges. In a bid to wrest power away from priests who were deemed to be reactionary or who obeyed the Pope rather than the Crown, Charles III implemented a range of anticlerical legislation. One specific decree that had strong repercussions in the collective imagination of Spanish America was the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. Over 2,500 Jesuits, most of them criollos (white Spanish Americans of Spanish descent) were forced to abandon their homelands. These exiles were the individuals who began the intellectual process of defining the particularity of the oppressed nations they had been forced to leave. Ostracized in Europe, the criollo Jesuits pined for their homelands and, to start with, reminisced about their favorite dishes, craved for the fresh spring water of their province’s mountains, and begged the king to allow them to die in their homelands. However, it was not long before their writings N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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acquired a political dimension as they began to refute the views generally accepted in Europe that the New World was an inferior continent. European philosophers and scientists such as Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, William Robertson, and Corneille de Pauw were arguing that the animals, plants, and even the people of the Americas were inferior to their European equivalents. The exiled Jesuits’ response was to write works of outstanding scholarship that defended their homelands’ geography and history. It was the first and clearest expression of something that could be described as national pride. In the case of Mexico, Francisco Xavier Clavigero played a fundamental role in initiating a process of national reappraisal that soon caught the imagination of Europe as well as the Americas. Exiled in Italy, he wrote his Ancient History of Mexico (1780–1781), which he described as “a history of Mexico written by a Mexican.” It was not long before the exiled Jesuits’ works inspired other criollo intellectuals to challenge European prejudices. In Mexico City, Antonio de León y Gama (1735–1802), a criollo professor of scholastic theology, used the discovery of two pre-Hispanic monoliths to demonstrate that, contrary to the views espoused by European philosophers, the pre-Columbian Indian nation was a truly advanced society. One of these monoliths was the huge stone representing the monstrous goddess Coatlicue. The other was the great disc carved with the glyphs of a calendar, the piedra de sol (sun stone), which, partly thanks to León y Gama’s Historical and Chronological Description of Two Stones (1792), was to become an acclaimed monument, an enduring emblem of Mexico, and the most dramatic proof that the Indian peoples of pre-Cortesian Mexico had forged a civilization comparable to that of ancient Greece or Rome. With this emergent Creole (criollo) patriotism came a vigorous attempt to rescue the Indian past of the continent. In Mexico, home to the Aztecs and the Mayas, Creole patriotism acquired a particularly strong indigenista (Indianist) streak. At a political level, this orientation became a means to condemn everything Spain had brought to the Americas. Regardless of the fact that the main

Creole Patriotism The origins of Mexican nationalism are to be found in Creole patriotism. The Creoles (criollos) were the white descendants of the Spaniards who, having been born in Mexico, were discriminated against by the Spanish Crown, in particular during the latter half of the 18th century. Unable to rise in the colonial political hierarchy for the simple reason that they had been born in the Americas, it was the Creole intelligentsia who first formulated a proto-nationalist discourse. Intellectuals such as Francisco Xavier Clavigero, Antonio de León y Gama, and Servando Teresa de Mier developed a view of nationhood that distinguished the nascent Mexican nation from Spain by highlighting the Aztec past of “their” forebears, and the foundational myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Creole patriotism would become a powerful creed after the War of Independence erupted in 1810.

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proponents of Creole patriotism were Creoles of Spanish descent, political writers, such as Father Servando Teresa de Mier and later Carlos María de Bustamante, argued that the Spanish conquest of the Americas had resulted in 300 years of oppression and that it was their duty to renew the struggle of the Aztecs where it had been left off—with the execution of the last Aztec emperor, Cuauhtemoc, in 1521. They even found a way of refuting the view that the Spaniards were responsible for bringing Christianity to Mexico. They argued that the white-bearded god Quetzalcóatl was none other than the apostle Saint Thomas and that, therefore, the Aztecs were Christians before the Spaniards arrived. The Aztecs’ cannibalism was explained as a particularly literal interpretation of the Holy Communion, eating Christ’s body, drinking Christ’s blood. The Spaniards had corrected the Aztecs’ liturgy, but they had not evangelized the Americas. Needless to say, the Creoles’ indigenismo was strictly historical. They regarded their contemporary Indians with as much contempt as the Spaniards did. Nonetheless, however contradictory their emergent nationalism was, their condemnation of everything Spanish and their affirmation of an emergent national identity that had its roots in preconquest America became a very powerful creed after the Wars of Independence erupted. For many Mexican nationalists of the 19th and even 20th centuries, the Aztec inheritance became an integral and fundamental part of nationhood. It was what distinguished them from other Spanish American nations. It also distinguished Mexico from the United States. And the argument that Mexico had existed as a nation before the conquest in 1521 was critical in undermining the legitimacy of Spanish rule. Having said this, the contradictions that clearly figured in the writings of Creole patriots such as Carlos María de Bustamante would keep this version of Mexican national identity from becoming hegemonic. In fact, for the greater part of the 19th century, there was not one single national idea that might have been seen as dominant. Political writers and historians such as conservative ideologue Lucas Alamán (1792–1853) and liberal thinker José María Luis Mora (1794–1850) saw in Hernán Cortés the true father of the Mexican family and rejected the indigenista interpretation of Mexican identity. For them, the real foundations of their nation had been set during the colonial era. The conquest was what had led to this Roman Catholic, Spanish-speaking nation. Although Alamán played a key role in helping salvage and restore many of the Aztec antiquities that can be found today in the Anthropology Museum of Mexico City, he had little time for his contemporary Indians. The importance he gave to the Spanish legacy, moreover, would be shared by many of his contemporaries. Hispanophilia would become particularly prominent following the Mexican-American War (1846–1848), and again 50 years later, following the U.S. involvement in the Cuban War of Independence in 1898. Faced with the threat of U.S. expansionism, many Mexicans rejected their American affinities by emphasizing their Spanish and, by default, European heritage. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Mexicans’ real and imagined bonds with Spain and the United States were, and still are, recurrent themes in most definitions of Mexican identity. In both instances, there was always a certain ambivalence expressed, what could be described figuratively as a kind of schizophrenia. The Spanish Crown’s refusal to acknowledge Mexico’s independence until the late 1830s, paired with its attempt to reconquer its former colony in 1829, resulted in Hispanophobia becoming a common feature in most early expressions of mexicanidad. This attitude can be seen in literary works such as Xicoténcatl (1826), as well as in some of the legislation that was passed, such as the 1827–1829 laws that resulted in the expulsion of Spaniards from Mexico. There was a need for Mexicans to distinguish themselves from Spain as they consolidated their independence. To be Mexican entailed claiming the Aztec past as their own and condemning all things Spanish, even if they were white criollos. For the radical anticlerical, liberal Mexican politicians who filled the corridors of power following independence, the United States represented a role model. Their rejection of their Spanish heritage, interpreted as the cause of their backwardness and their reactionary traditions, entailed a desire to emulate their northern neighbor. One politician and thinker, Lorenzo de Zavala (1788–1836), N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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went as far as turning against Mexico during the 1835–1836 Texan revolution. However, with time, as the expansionism of the United States resulted in the loss of half of the national territory in 1848, most Mexicans found themselves developing a contradictory love-hate feeling toward the United States. As was noted by the 20th-century Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman, the Mexicans of the 19th century wanted the benefits of U.S. modernity, but they did not want modernity itself, preferring to retain their traditional Hispano-Indian Catholic customs. Thus, definitions of Mexican identity went from rejecting the Spanish heritage to embracing it, in tandem with periods of admiration and revulsion toward the American way of life.

Narrating the Nation Indicative of the failure of the elite to develop a coherent narrative of nationhood is that the majority of Mexicans were notoriously apathetic during the MexicanAmerican War (1846–1848). It could be argued that it was only after the defeat that Mexicans started to think seriously about who they were. Mexican politician and thinker Mariano Otero (1817–1850) was of the view that Mexico’s lack of a sense of national identity was the real cause of the 1847 defeat: “There has not been nor could there have been, a national spirit, for there is no nation.” The loss of half of their national territory did stir, however, an attempt to instill a sense of patriotism among the population. The intelligentsia resorted to writing histories of Mexico; the political class looked into other ways of achieving this goal. The 1853–1855 dictatorship of Antonio López de Santa Anna dedicated significant attention to organizing patriotic festivities, public holidays, and parades. The Mexican national anthem was commissioned by Santa Anna in 1854 as part of his drive to tackle the ostensible lack of patriotism in the Mexican people.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Nevertheless, despite the actions taken in the 1850s to mobilize the nation and develop a coherent set of myths that could provide the disparate communities of the republic with a unifying sense of nationhood, it was not until the late 19th century that something close to a hegemonic narrative emerged. Partly to blame, of course, was the size of Mexico and the poor communications that prevailed at the time. The sheer vastness of the country, paired with its geographical and climatic diversity, proved immensely difficult to overcome. Communications were poor, and even when news from the capital did reach the distant rural provinces, it did not necessarily mean much to the population. Behind vast mountain ranges, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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hidden in the depths of the jungle, or amid the desert, names of faraway presidents paired with abstract concepts such as “nationhood” bore little significance to the everyday lives of a majority whose allegiance was to their village, hacienda, or perhaps region. The burning issues that divided the political class in the congresses and Masonic gatherings of the main cities were just foreign words to the average campesinos and Indians of the countryside. In addition, the dramatic disparities of wealth between the few and the many, between the white minority and the colored majority, were not conducive to the establishment of a homogeneous sense of community, be that national or regional. The abysmal levels of literacy and education in 19th-century Mexico also meant that the majority did not participate in the intellectual debates that the intelligentsia became engaged in over what was lo mexicano, what it meant to be Mexican. In many regions, the Indian population quite simply did not speak Spanish and was not included in the criollos’ nation-building exercise. Federalism, centralism, republicanism, freedom of speech, free commerce, and liberalism meant so much in the big urban centers, but meant so little elsewhere. Why should an Indian in Yucatán care whether, in some distant place called Mexico City, an emperor by the name of Agustín I had abdicated and a constituent congress was to be formed? What could it matter whether in an even remoter place called Texas a large contingent of U.S. immigrants was being allowed to settle? It is worth remembering that the War of Independence was never a clear-cut conflict between nationals and Spaniards but a violent social revolution and civil war in which criollos, mestizos, and Indians fought for both sides. It would take the overthrow of Maximilian’s empire (1864–1867), the definitive triumph of the liberal reform laws of the 1860s, and the stability of the porfiriato (the 1876–1910 regime under Porfirio Díaz) for the Mexican intelligentsia and government to finally formulate and develop a more successful and long-lasting vision of Mexican identity. Once the regional and political factions established a relative status quo, the Porfirian political class saw the need to forge a comprehensive nationalistic history to consolidate the nation and to prove to the international community that Mexico was a stable country that belonged to the civilized world. Along with the so-called pax porfiriana, Mexico benefited from a technological revolution. The railway and the telegraph united the republic for the first time in ways that had been impossible before. Furthermore, Porfirio Díaz’s government took it upon itself to create an effective and far-reaching educational system that started to develop a unifying mestizo interpretation of nationhood. The nation, the government claimed, would be consolidated in the classrooms. The 1880s witnessed the publication of the first concise liberal histories of the nation. A fundamental work was Vicente Riva Palacio’s (1832–1896) five-volume compendium Mexico over the Centuries (1887–1889), which set the tone for subsequent Porfirian works such as historian Justo Sierra’s (1848–1912) textbook Patriotic History, widely used in schools at the beginning of the 20th century. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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most salient aspect of late 19th-century Mexican nationalism was its reconciliatory focus. Mexico had become a proud rather than a torn mestizo nation. The paradoxical paradigms of Mexican identity with the trauma of its conflicting Spanish-Mesoamerican origins appeared to be temporarily resolved in the Porfirian cultural landscape. Riva Palacio believed that with the conquest a mestizo nation had been born. Although he acknowledged the pain of the conquest, he stressed that the encounter of these two great cultures, the Spanish and the Aztec, had resulted in the birth of an even greater race and nation. The mestizos were, in his mind, set to become a chosen race that enjoyed the best features of its two constituents and the true representatives of the Mexican nation. Although Riva Palacio’s and his generation’s mestizo interpretation of mexicanidad continues to be contested, it would prove extremely resilient. In fact, it could be argued that the official 20th-century mestizo definition of Mexican nationhood originates from the popular works of the liberal historians of the porfiriato. Mexican nationalism would evolve and go through a number of substantial changes in the 20th century; nevertheless, many of the issues that concerned those Mexican thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries who attempted to define their national identity would remain the same, to a lesser or a greater degree. Whether conciliatory or divisive, the discussion of Mexican national identity would and continues to revolve around the importance of the Spanish and indigenous past, the importance of the Mexican church together with the emblematic role played by the Virgin of Guadalupe, the importance or meaning of mestizaje, and a need to either distinguish or find similarities between Mexican national identity and that of Spain and the United States. Selected Bibliography Anna, Timothy E. 1998. Forging Mexico, 1821–1835. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. Brading, D. A. 1984. Prophecy and Myth in Mexican History. Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies. Brading, D. A. 1985. The Origins of Mexican Nationalism. Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies. Brading, D. A. 1991. The First America. The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492–1867. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brading, D. A. 2001. Mexican Phoenix. Our Lady of Guadalupe: Image and Tradition across Five Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Florescano, Enrique. 1994. Memory, Myth, and Time in Mexico. From the Aztecs to Independence. Austin: University of Texas Press. Fowler, Will. 1998. Mexico in the Age of Proposals, 1821–1853. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Guardino, Peter F. 1996. Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico’s National State: Guerrero, 1800–1857. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hamnett, Brian. 1999. A Concise History of Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Knight, Alan. 2002. Mexico: The Colonial Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Santoni, Pedro. 1966. Mexicans at Arms. Puro Federalists and the Politics of War, 1845–1848. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press. Tenorio-Trillo, Mauricio. 1996. Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Thomson, Guy P. C., and David G. LaFrance. 1999. Patriotism, Politics, and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Van Young, Eric. 2001. The Other Rebellion. Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–1821. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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Paraguay Jerry Cooney Chronology 1811 (May) Overthrow of Spanish authority in Paraguay. 1813 (Winter) Proclamation of independence of the Republic of Paraguay. 1814–1840 Dictatorship of Dr. José Gaspar de Francia. Isolation of the republic. 1844–1862 Dictatorship of Don Carlos Antonio López. Economic modernization. 1862–1870 Dictatorship of Francisco Solano López. 1864–1870 War of the Triple Alliance or Paraguayan War. Near destruction of Paraguay. 1870–1936 The liberal era: reconstruction of Paraguay and the imitation of European liberalism in the economic, political, and social restructuring of the republic. 1932–1935 Chaco War. Paraguay gains great extent of territory west of the Paraguay River. Resurgence of Hispano-Guaraní nationalism.

Situating the Nation Paraguay’s origins are found in the Spanish conquest of the 1540s. The conquerors, finding no precious metals, turned to subsistence agriculture and pastoral pursuits, commanding the labor of the conquered Guaraní Indians. Very few Spanish women accompanied the conquest, and soon the offspring of Spanish males and Indian women outnumbered the original settlers. These hijos del país (“sons of the country”) accepted the material, social, and religious culture of their fathers but in daily life spoke Guaraní in preference to Spanish. By the 1590s, the children of the conquerors, regardless of their mixed origin, had acquired the full rights of Europeans. Spreading from the region of Asunción, the first area conquered by the Spanish, the hijos del país carried a unique Hispano-Guaraní culture into the fertile territory of what is now eastern Paraguay. Beset by nomadic Indians from the north and across the Paraguay River from the Gran Chaco, as well as by Brazilian slave raiders, Paraguayans from the 17th century on developed a self-reliant, frontier culture. Neglected by the Crown and forced to defend themselves, the hijos del país were often a troublesome folk, paying little attention to law or royal authority. Land was available to all classified as Spanish, and a population of small-to-middling independent peasants and small ranchers formed the backbone of the rural Paraguayan society and economy, the latter being mainly of a barter type. The small number of large landholders also gained wealth and prestige by grants of Indian labor for the extraction of yerba, the raw material for yerba maté, a popular tea in the Río de la Plata. And until the mid-18th century, yerba was Paraguay’s only important export to the outside N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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world. Only after 1760, as a result of important economic reforms, did Paraguay show moderate prosperity. At the same time, with the introduction of capable governors, the province secured its southern and eastern border at the Alto Paraná, established its northern border along a mountain range and a no-man’s land touching on the Brazilian Mato Grosso, and even exercised a shadowy authority over the eastern fringes of the Gran Chaco. Paraguay declared its independence in 1813 after three years of confusion, beginning with the rebellion against Spanish authority by the inhabitants of the vice regal capital of Buenos Aires. That event was followed by the Paraguayan militia fending off an attempt by the leaders of Buenos Aires to incorporate Paraguay into their new political system, a bloodless revolt by the militia against the last royal governor, and then the institution of a ruling junta. Essentially, from that declaration of independence until 1870, the new republic was ruled by three dictators. The first isolated his country almost completely to preserve its independence. The second opened Paraguay somewhat to the outside world and presided over economic progress and modernization (including the strengthening of the armed forces). The third led his nation into a disastrous war against the empire of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. By 1870 Paraguay was in shambles with a great loss in population, economic dislocation, and occupation by the

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Population Catastrophe, 1864–1870 The Paraguayan devotion to country is no better revealed than by the tragic population disaster resulting from the Paraguayan War. From available census records, Paraguay possessed a prewar population of about 470,000, and an immediate postwar figure of about 170,000. Battlefield and disease losses, particularly in the two-year struggle for Humaitá, so reduced available manpower by 1867 that the government ordered conscription of boys 14 years of age. Two years later, in an 1869 battle to effect the escape to the northeast of Marshal López’s army, the victorious Brazilians were shocked to discover that they had been fighting cork-mustached soldiers of 11 and 12 years old—the “children martyrs” of Acosta Ñu. This demographic disaster, of course, had great implications for the ability of postwar governments to fund their operations, as well as the near collapse of the rural economy and a Paraguay in which females greatly outnumbered males.

victors. Only the victors’ contention over the spoils saved the nation from disappearance. From the 1870s to the 1930s—the liberal era—leaders adopted European models for economic and political reconstruction of the republic. The old Paraguay of the three dictators was scorned as an evil, “uncivilized” period. The Guaraní portion of the Hispano-Guaraní heritage was looked upon as an impediment to progress, as Paraguay strived to be part of the “civilized” world. Most members of the formerly independent peasant class became no more than agricultural laborers. Only by the 1920s was there a greater appreciation of the unique historical inheritance of Paraguayans by various historians, politicians, and publicists. In 1932, Paraguay again found itself at war; this time against Bolivia for possession of the Chaco. Emerging victorious from that war (1932–1935), and wracked by the strife caused by a realization that the old liberal republic had ignored the economic and social plight of the majority of Paraguayans, political confusion ensued for the next 20 years. However, from that war did emerge a consensus of pride and acceptance of the Hispano-Guaraní culture and the Guaraní language as defining characteristics of being Paraguayan, and a conviction that the republic must find some path to social, political, and economic modernization.

Instituting the Nation Paraguayan independence was an offshoot of the Buenos Aires May 1810 revolt against Spanish authority. The port city then called upon all the viceroyalty to recognize its authority, a demand that the royalist-dominated cabildo (town council) of Asunción and Paraguay’s governor rejected. Twice in early 1811, Paraguay’s militia defeated an invading Buenos Aires army. However, the officer class N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of the militia, mainly important landowners, had no real loyalty to Spain but rather a distrust of the motives of Buenos Aires. Shortly after the Paraguayan victories, a bloodless militia coup d’état overthrew the governor, removed the royalist cabildo, and installed a civilian-militia junta to govern Paraguay. After the purge of the royalists, the junta entered into diplomacy with Buenos Aires. A member of the junta, Dr. José Gaspar de Francia successfully conducted that negotiation, by which Buenos Aires recognized the autonomy of Paraguay, if not its complete independence. At about the same time, a persecution of those elements that might contest the junta’s power ensued. Spanish-born merchants were cowed by fines and threats of imprisonment, partisans of Buenos Aires were expelled downriver, and the bishop of Asunción meekly accepted the junta’s assumption of the Crown’s power over the church. Internally, the junta experienced power struggles between 1811 and 1813, wherein Dr. Francia revealed an unexpected political skill. This university-educated, middle-aged lawyer had enjoyed minor cabildo positions since the 1790s but, as a native-born Paraguayan, was never associated with the favored Spanish-born royalists. Now he skillfully neutralized both civilian and militia opponents on the junta. In 1813 at a congress that declared Paraguayan independence, he became a co-ruler with a militia officer, and then the next year another congress named him president and dictator of Paraguay, an office he held until his death in 1840. Dr. Francia gained complete power by wooing the rural small and medium cultivators and ranchers, and with this class he gained power in the various congresses of the independence era and then utilized them in his governance of Paraguay. In reforming the provincial militia into a national army, he replaced many of the former officers of the landholding elite with his loyal adherents. In return for support, he gave those cultivators and ranchers security against the rapacity of the old landholding elite. He assured them that there would be no more military adventures outside of Paraguay such as the 1806–1807 disastrous expedition to Buenos Aires to repel a British invasion—an action that also created turmoil within the province. There was no interference with the traditional life of the countryside, and they understood that Dr. Francia would defend fanatically the sovereignty of the new republic. Only once in his generation-long rule was he threatened by a conspiracy—by discontented former militia officers in 1820. The plot was discovered and crushed without mercy. The dictator proclaimed a noninterference policy with regard to Paraguay’s neighbors, and when in 1818–1819 violent political difficulties to the south threatened to spill over into Paraguay, he isolated the republic diplomatically and politically. Paraguayans were barred from leaving their country, and very few foreigners were admitted. Only through two minor ports was commerce with neighbors permitted, and the dictator carefully monitored and controlled that trade. Paraguay was now a hermit nation, but one in which the belief in an independent republic became fully accepted. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation By the late colonial era, geography, culture, and language had all combined to create a common Paraguayan identity. Not only was the province, then the nation, far distant from other centers of power in the Río de la Plata, but it possessed well-defined natural boundaries. To the south and east, the Alto Paraná River served as the limit of Asunción’s authority, although until 1870 the Paraguayan Republic did claim a shadowy power over the old Jesuit province of Misiones between the Alto Paraná and Uruguay rivers. To the west of the Paraguay River, the forbidding territory of the Gran Chaco proved an effective guardian, and to the northwest and north, a mountain range and unsettled region protected Paraguay from Brazilian expansion. Internally, most Paraguayans lived within a 70-mile semicircle around Asunción. That compact area facilitated centralized government and forestalled regional rivalries that may have jeopardized political and cultural unity. Transportation was easy—both overland and by the many rivers draining west into the Paraguay River. By independence Paraguayans shared a common peasant culture based on many small rural villages. Large landowners did exist, but small- to medium-sized cultivators and ranchers were the economic and social backbones of society. Upon independence, no real ethnic differences troubled the new republic. Even those still legally classified as Indians shared the same culture, economic pursuits, and language as other Paraguayans. And the Indian classification, by a simple decree in 1848, was abolished. Nomadic Indians of the far north and the Gran Chaco were relatively few and had little impact upon the common HispanoGuaraní culture that had been forged through the centuries. In the last 30 years of the colonial era, a few Spanish-born merchants had made their way to Paraguay, but they were significant only in an economic sense, and then for just a short period. After the 1870s, some European agriculturalists did immigrate to Paraguay, although not enough to affect in any large manner the cultural and racial makeup of the republic. Descendants of those late 19thand early 20th-century immigrants often prospered but still melded easily into Paraguayan society.

Narrating the Nation Through oral transmission and political discourse in the 19th century, and then augmented by literary efforts and education in the 20th, Paraguayans were continually reminded of Dr. Francia and the independence of their nation, Carlos Antonio López’s modernization efforts (1844–1862), and then the era of Francisco Solano López and the “Great Epic” of the Paraguayan War (1864–1870). The N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Francisco Solano López, who became president of Paraguay upon the death of his father in 1862, is closely associated with the Paraguayan War, during which the army of his small country fought the forces of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay for more than five years. (Library of Congress)

grandsons of those who survived that war then experienced the bloody Chaco War against Bolivia (1932–1936). Carlos Antonio López’s “Golden Age” of peace and economic progress (1844–1862) is still celebrated, and even Francisco Solano López—for all his faults—became a controversial nationalist icon for devotees in the 20th century who honored his valiant defense of Paraguay against the combined forces of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Tragic as the Paraguayan War and Chaco War were, Paraguayans are proud that national sacrifices in these conflicts proved them, both men and women, courageous and patriotic. There are many “hallowed grounds” in Paraguayan memory: the fortress of Humaitá, where a generation of Paraguayans died in the 1860s; Cerro Corá, where President-Marshal Solano López in 1870 perished crying “I die with my country!”; the Asunción railroad station, emblematic of national progress under Carlos Antonio López; and the battlefields of the Chaco War, from which outnumbered Paraguayans emerged victorious. All of these have been celebrated in poetry, ballads, monuments, and holidays, their apotheosis being the Pantheon of Heroes in the center of Asunción, where the remains of honored heroes and leaders of Paraguay are interred. Poetry, both in Spanish and Guaraní, has played a large role in the literary narration of the nation, and some fine works were published soon after the Paraguayan War. The historical narration of Paraguay, however, had to await the rise of scholars and publicists in the first decade of the 20th century. For political reasons, Paraguayans produced very few accounts of their nation during the eras of Dr. Francia and the two Lópezes. Additionally, from 1870 to the 1890s, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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reconstruction of the nation and incessant political turmoil precluded such efforts. Given recovery by the 1890s, the appearance of some memoirs of war survivors, and then the availability of documentation from the National Archive, Paraguayan scholars began to reflect upon and reconstruct their nation’s past. While national biography was dominant, there were also studies of the independence movement and, because of contention with Bolivia over rights to the Gran Chaco, administrative and legal histories of the late colonial era. By 1942, with the publication of Julio César Chaves’s masterful biography of Dr. Francia, historical studies of Paraguay’s past had reached a respectable maturity. Ignored by many, however, has been the great contribution of the Guaraní tongue and folk memory to the narration of the nation. By songs and oral transmission, the common folk kept alive their vision of Paraguay. For instance, generations of Paraguayans respectfully referred to Dr. Francia as el difunto—“the one who has passed.” Balladeers composed songs in Guaraní celebrating leaders and great events in the nation’s past. Especially notable was the popular composer Emiliano R. Fernández, whose ballads of the Chaco War are still sung some 70 years after that conflict. For many Paraguayans, particularly in the countryside, folk narration of the national experience is as important as any literary or official account.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation From independence onward, the primary goal of Paraguayan leaders was to defend sovereignty and national territory. For Dr. Francia, this meant isolation of the republic; for Don Carlos, economic progress fueled by the state and military preparedness; for Francisco Solano López, recourse to war. During the regimes of these three leaders (1814–1870), Paraguayans received information from the government through written orders and proclamations to rural subordinates in the countryside, who then read the communications to villagers in Guaraní after mass. For two generations, the governments carefully controlled the dissemination of news, and in the official communications emphasized the duty of Paraguayans to defend their nation, the beneficence of the government, and dangers from outside. Weakened as they were and subject to the victors, the postwar Paraguayan governments still tenaciously defended Paraguay’s rights to the Chaco in the face of Argentine claims. The leaders of the liberal era of 1870–1930, however, in their imitation of European liberalism, found little value in the Guaraní portion of prewar Paraguayan culture. For them, the use of the native language was an impediment to educational, cultural, and economic progress. Furthermore, for many of the new elite, any recourse to Hispano-Guaraní populism reminded them uncomfortably of the “evil” days of the three great dictators. Nationalism came to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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mean Paraguay’s progress and integration into the Atlantic world of 19th-century liberalism. In contrast to the economic nationalism of Don Carlos, foreign investment was encouraged. And in the countryside, the many formerly independent peasants became laborers, subject to the great landowners who arose during the confusion of postwar Paraguay. Yet by the 1910s and 1920s, with a growing belief that liberalism was not working and had marginalized too many Paraguayans, a growing number of intellectuals and artists rediscovered the importance of leaders of the First Republic (1813–1870) and the “popular sectors” in Paraguay’s culture and past. Agustín Barrios, a great Paraguayan composer, celebrated Paraguay’s Guaraní inheritance in many of his works. Juan O’Leary glorified Francisco Solano López as a great patriotic defender of Paraguayan nationalism. Somewhat later, Juan Natalicio González furthered his semifascist political ambitions by both intellectual and polemical populist championing of Paraguay’s unique culture. By the 1920s as tensions with Bolivia grew over the ownership of the Chaco, so did HispanoGuaraní nationalism. In the Chaco War (1932–1935), Guaraní, as in the past, was the language of the Paraguayan Army. Officers, drawn from the educated class, became more appreciative of the worth of their soldiers from the lower classes, whom they led to victory. Out of the war emerged a populist movement to change Paraguay by integrating the “popular sectors” into Paraguayan society, economy, and politics. Land should be returned to the common rural Paraguayan. The Guaraní tongue must be respected as a common inheritance of all Paraguayans. The political and economic structure of the liberal state must be changed so as to benefit all Paraguayans, not just the liberal elite. Political turmoil from the late 1930s to the 1950s defeated most economic aspects of this populist and nationalistic movement. However, the realization that the Guaraní-speaking countryside was the true repository of Paraguayan identity became an article of faith among nationalists. The native tongue finally achieved official recognition as a national language, just as important as Spanish. And for

Agustín Barrios (“Mangoré”) (1885–1944) Agustín Barrios, born in a small village in southern Paraguay, has been recognized as one of the great guitarists and guitar composers of the 20th century. A musical prodigy, his earliest influences were the traditional rural music and dance of his homeland. Befitting the duality of Hispano-Guaraní culture, however, he quickly mastered the classical guitar of Europe and other Latin American nations. He never lost, though, his love for Paraguay and its culture. Indeed, at the height of his career in the 1930s, he adopted a second name of “Mangoré” after a Guaraní chieftain of the early 1500s. In many of his works, one also perceives a strong influence of Catholicism, but that religious theme is often influenced by a deep Guaraní mysticism. Few Paraguayans in the 20th century were as important as “Mangoré” in displaying to the outside world the culture of their country.

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political reasons or otherwise, the idea of the familia paraguaya (the “Paraguayan Family”)—the view that all Paraguayans were unified by their unique culture and identity—was widely promulgated and accepted. As this isolated republic became more integrated into the greater world in the 20th century, nationalism still found its justification through an acceptance of and appreciation for Paraguay’s Hispano-Guaraní culture, present and past. Selected Bibliography Centurión, Carlos R. 1961. Historia de la cultura paraguaya. 2 vols. Asunción: Biblioteca Ortiz Guerrero. Chaves, Julio César. 1964. El Supremo Dictador: Biografía de José Gaspar de Francia. 4th ed. Madrid: Atlas. Chaves, Julio César. 1968. El Presidente López: Vida y Gobierno de Don Carlos. 2nd ed. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Depalma. Cooney, Jerry W. 2004. “The Many Faces of El Supremo: Historians, History, and Dr. Francia.” History Compass (online publication) 2, LA 119: 1–18. Ganson, Barbara. 1990. “Following Their Children into Battle: Women at War in Paraguay, 1864–1870.” The Americas 46, no. 3: 335–371. Lustig, Wolf. 1999. “Chacore purahei–canciones de Guerra. Literatura popular en guaraní e identidad nacional en el Paraguay.” In El espacio interior de America del Sur: Geografía, historia, cultura, edited by Barbara Potthast, Karl Kohut, and Gerd Kohlhepp, 363–379. Frankfurt/Main: Vervuert. Potthast-Jutkeit, Barbara. 1996. “Paraíso de Mahoma” o “País de las mujeres”? El rol de la familia en la sociedad paraguaya del Siglo XIX. Asunción: Instituto Cultural Paraguayo-Alemán Editor. Rubin, Joan. 1968. National Bilingualism in Paraguay. Paris: Mouton. Warren, Harris Gaylord. 1949. Paraguay: An Informal History. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War, vol. 1: Causes and Early Conduct. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Whigham, Thomas L., and Barbara Potthast. 1999. “The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone: New Insights into the Demographics of the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870.” Latin American Research Review 34, no. 1: 174–186. Williams, John Hoyt. 1974. “Race, Threat and Geography: The Paraguayan Experience of Nationalism.” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 1, no. 2: 173–191. Williams, John Hoyt. 1979. The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1800–1870. Austin: University of Texas Press. Zook, David H. 1960. The Conduct of the Chaco War. New York: Bookman Associates.

N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Peru Nils Jacobsen Chronology 1759–1789 Reign of the reforming Bourbon king Charles III of Spain. 1780–1782 “Great Rebellion” (of Tupac Amaru II) postulates Andean autonomy. 1791–1796 Publication of enlightened, proto-nationalist Mercurio Peruano in Lima. 1808 Napoleon’s occupation of most of Spain; constitutional crisis in the Spanish empire. 1810 Governing juntas replace colonial authorities in major Spanish American cities, including Quito and Chuquisaca (Bolivia), but not in Peru. 1814 Anti-Spanish Pumacahua Rebellion in Cuzco under Creole leadership. 1820 General José de San Martín’s army of liberation invades Peru from the south. 1821 On July 28, San Martín declares the independence of Peru in Lima; the highlands are still controlled by strong Spanish armies. 1821–1845 Early republic: extreme political instability, with 24 regime changes and six constitutions. 1824 (December 9) The defeat of the Spanish troops at the battle of Ayacucho, Peru, terminates Spanish control over mainland America. 1836–1839 Peru-Bolivian Confederation under General Andrés de Santa Cruz. 1840s–1870s “Age of Guano”: Peruvian state reaps bonanza from bird dung sales for fertilizer; nearly 100,000 Chinese “coolies” (indentured servants) are brought to Peru. 1854 President Ramón Castilla abolishes slavery and the Indian head tax. 1866 Spanish navy bombards Lima’s port Callao in a brief war with Ecuador, Chile, and Peru. 1879–1883 The War of the Pacific ends in the loss of Peru’s southernmost territories to Chile and in a severe, decade-long domestic crisis. 1889 Publication of Peru’s first indigenista novel, Clorinda Matto de Turner’s Aves sin nido (Birds without a Nest). 1895–1919 “Aristocratic Republic”: period of rapid economic growth based on agricultural and mineral exports, relative political stability under exclusive oligarchic governments, rising nationalism, and labor organizing. 1900 “Generation of 1900”: group of young elite intellectuals calling for spiritual renewal of the nation. 1918–1919 Worker and student strikes lead to an eight-hour work day and university reform. 1919 “Generation of 1919,” lead by Marxist essayist José Carlos Mariátegui and populist politician Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, ushers in mass politics and progressive nationalism.

Situating the Nation What would become the Republic of Peru had previously been the center of two far-flung empires: the Inca empire, stretching for more than 4,000 kilometers NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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from the south of modern Colombia to northwest Argentina and central Chile; and Spain’s Viceroyalty of Peru, the formal juridical authority for all territories claimed by Spain in South America between the 16th and the early 18th centuries, from Panama to the River Plate and Chile. This legacy would leave two problems for Peruvian nationalisms. First, the bipolarity of the Inca capital at Cuzco high in the southern Andes and the Spanish colonial capital at Lima on the central coast exacerbated the distinct Hispanic and Andean visions of the nation in Peru. The differences between those visions owed much both to a colonial order hierarchically segmented along socio-ethnic lines and the unusually difficult conditions of communication and transportation posed by the exceptional geography of the Andes. Second, due to Peru’s “imperial avocation” and the gradual forging of shared socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural patterns throughout the central Andes between the countries of modern Ecuador and Bolivia by Incas and Spaniards, postindependence Peruvians would at times find it difficult to accept the nation’s southern and northern boundaries. More narrowly defined Peruvian nationalisms competed with projects to recompose the Incaic or colonial “Andean space.” With the rapid rise to dominance of foreign merchant communities (especially British, French, and North American) in Peru’s foreign trade during the 1820s, early economic nationalism was increasingly directed against foreigners. During the first quarter century after independence, Peru experienced economic stagnation and realignment of commercial circuits, fiscal penury, a weak state, and civil wars among military caudillos (strongmen). Fear of competition and the destruction of domestic manufacturing led a coalition of Creole merchants and craftsmen to successfully push for prohibitive tariffs on strategic imports and for severe restrictions on the distribution and retail activities of the foreigners in Peru. This coalition was able to slow the advance of economic liberalism until about 1850. With the strong rise of exports during the following quarter century (especially the guano bonanza but also the growth of sugar, cotton, and wool exports and the installation of associated rail lines and port facilities), the modernizing coastal elites opted for close association with foreign merchants, bankers, and engineers and embraced some of the tenets of economic liberalism. But this alignment prompted further protests by craftsmen and the rise of economic nationalist elite sectors, both among provincial elites and intellectuals in the capital. By the time the economic boom turned into a bust in 1876, numerous articles and pamphlets were blaming foreigners and Lima’s elite financiers for the debacle and calling for protectionism and the development of national industries (Klarén 2000). The period from 1895 to 1919 is known as the “Aristocratic Republic” in Peruvian history. The power of the social and economic elites was greater than it had ever been since independence. As a consequence of a sustained and diversified export boom, the social fabric, lifestyles, and consumption patterns of Peruvians were changing rapidly, in the city and in the countryside, on the coast and in the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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sierra; communications, associational activities, and literacy rates were increasing. These social, economic, and cultural changes would have a major impact on imagining the nation and on the strength of nationalist movements.

Instituting the Nation A cultural proto-nationalism gradually developed among Creoles (Americanborn Spaniards) between the 17th and late 18th centuries. Born out of a defense against European authors who dismissed America, its climate, flora, fauna, and native peoples as naturally inferior, Peruvian authors praised their environment for its bounty and promise; some authors portrayed the Andes as a providential land that re-created the biblical Eden. Late 18th-century, enlightened studies of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Andean geography and nature focused on economic and social improvement projects for their pátria. The editors of Lima’s Mercurio Peruano (1791–1796) proclaimed in its first issue, “We love Peru because it is right to do so, because of our natural inclinations, and because of its particular character” (Lynch 1986, 33). In spite of Spanish censorship, French and Anglo-American enlightened or revolutionary texts by authors like Voltaire, the Marquis de Condorcet, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine circulated among a small group of Peruvian elite Creoles. Peruvian Jesuit Juan Pablo Vizcardo y Guzmán, exiled in Europe after the expulsion of his order from the Spanish domains in 1767, published a Letter to the Spanish Americans in 1799, in which he called for independence, without imagining specific nations as Peru, Mexico, or Bolivia. Yet most Peruvian Creoles continued to imagine themselves as part of a Spanish nation right up to the achievement of independence, even while calling for more privileges, power, or autonomy for themselves. Few Creoles incorporated the indigenous majority into their concept of the nation. Creole nationalism surfaced broadly at the very moment of independence, and it immediately defined itself in juxtaposition to both the “Spanish tyrants” and the “foreign intruders” who dominated Peruvian politics between 1820 and 1826. The final campaigns liberating Peru from Spanish domination were led by generals and troop units from other parts of South America: José de San Martín and his Argentine and Chilean troops between 1820 and 1822, and Simón Bolivar and his Venezuelan and Colombian troops from 1823 through the decisive battle of Ayacucho on December 9, 1824, and beyond. These forces were accompanied by Peruvians officers, troops (many conscripted), and guerrilla groups, but at least as many Peruvians kept fighting for the royalists until the very end. The resulting notion of a “conceded independence” has been a problem for Peruvian nationalists and national identity ever since. Nationalists can justly point to a series of local and regional plots and rebellions, which fought for autonomy between 1809 and 1814. Their leaders expressed hatred of peninsular Spaniards and forged alliances between Creoles, indigenous caciques, and important sectors of the clergy, but not always under the leadership of Creoles. Some insurgents rallied indigenous peasants around the vision of reconstituting Inca rule.

Defining the Nation The Great Rebellion of 1780–1782, originally led by Tupac Amaru II, was the most serious challenge to Spanish rule in the Americas since conquest. Now seen as part of the revolutionary fervor sweeping the Atlantic world in the last quarter of the 18th century, the rebellion was also nourished by Inca nationalism, an 18thcentury cultural and intellectual movement in which native lords exalted their Inca ancestry, emphasized Inca dress, music, and oral traditions, and boasted of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the wise rule of the Inca emperors. Reacting both against the heavy-handed modernizing reforms of the Spanish Bourbon court and long-standing colonial abuses, rebels espoused social reforms such as the abolition of slavery, Indian tribute, and forced labor drafts (mita). While Tupac Amaru envisioned an autonomous Andean realm within a universal Spanish monarchy, more radical rebel leaders espoused complete independence from Spain. Tupac Amaru’s project foresaw the creation of a multi-ethnic nation made up of Indians, mestizos, people of African descent, and Creoles; but more radical rebel leaders envisioned nations of native Andean ethnic groups that excluded people of Spanish or African descent. The defeat of the rebellion owed much to the unwillingness of colonial Peruvian elites to accept a polity with native Andeans in leadership positions and a growing hysteria about “race wars” involving the extermination of the whites. This would remain a trope used against indigenous pretensions of inclusion throughout the first century of Peruvian independence. Many historians view the Great Rebellion of 1780 as the last serious chance for the construction of a multi-ethnic Peruvian nation before the mid-20th century. Before the arrival of San Martín’s liberating army in 1820, the colonial Creole elite of merchants, large landholders, and bureaucrats, especially in Lima and the coastal region, was unwilling to forge a national project that could bring unity to regional and social movements against the Spanish Crown. They remained royalists until the end—in spite of their cultural nationalism and growing resentment of their Spanish overlords—for fear of renewed Indian insurgencies and of rebellions among their Afro-Peruvian slaves and freedmen, who worked their lands and did much of the manual labor in the coastal cities. After independence, nationalists remained divided on the role of Spanish residents, on church-state relations, and on the social and ethnic dimensions of the nation. Nationalist discourse was intermingled with the debates and conflicts among conservatives and liberals and diverse regional elites. Within days of Peru’s declaration of independence on July 28, 1821, San Martín decreed the expulsion of the peninsular Spaniards and the confiscation of their property and that of Creole royalists. In all 19th-century Peruvian constitutions, place of birth defined native citizenship, and it became a political tool to denounce one’s adversaries as foreigners if they happened to be born in what became Bolivia, Ecuador, or Colombia. These constitutions also protected the Catholic church as the only legal religion in the land. The territorial dimensions of the Peruvian nation remained in dispute for decades. Peru fought border wars with its new republican neighbors Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia (conflicts with Brazil remained more diffuse due to lack of effective state control over the vast Amazon territories). Especially in southern Peru and the neighboring Bolivian altiplano, most elites envisioned a nation reintegrating the south Andean space (southern Peru and Bolivia) that had flourished during the prosperous silver cycle (in the 16th and 17th centuries). This vision briefly resulted in the formation of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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(1836–1839) under the leadership of Bolivian president Andrés de Santa Cruz, which reflected the shared culture, environment, commercial circuits, and crossborder family ties. The confederation was militarily defeated due to both opposition from within Peru (especially in northern Peru) and fear among neighboring republics of the formation of a neo-imperial state on the west coast of South America. But the idea of uniting Peru and Bolivia continued to play a role at least until the late 19th century. A less imperial vision of confederating the South American republics emerged under the presidencies of Ramón Castilla (1845–1849, 1855–1862). He promoted defensive alliances among them to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity both against cross-border caudillo wars and the increasing threat of U.S. imperialism. Reflecting on U.S. invasions in Mexico and Nicaragua, Castilla wrote in 1860 that “the relative weakness of the South American republics, divided and isolated among themselves, is . . . the deplorable cause of the fact that on many occasions we have been treated with grave lack of respect, as if for the great international potentates there did not exist a common law of nations” (Pike 1967, 111). Most Creoles portrayed Indians as degenerate and savage. Many writers soon regretted the “democratic” measures of the liberators in granting citizenship rights to Indians and viewed the Indians as the major obstacle to the nation’s achievement of its full potential (Mendez 1996; Flores Galindo 1986). Recently historians have stressed that it was precisely the enlightened, universalist principles and policies of Peru’s Creole founding fathers that impeded inclusive nationstate formation in Peru, for the republic undermined the autonomous political traditions of the indigenous communities (Thurner 1996). But indigenous farmers, their communities, and their leaders often embraced the republic from the beginning and saw themselves as legitimate citizens of the nation. Their idea of the nation built upon specific, locally varying notions of governance derived from both colonial and precolonial norms, practices, and customary law. Often this idea entailed the reciprocal exchange of taxes, labor, and military services for protection and localized privileges, ranging from autonomous community rule to guarantees for communal property and benevolent treatment by local and provincial authorities. Indigenous communities made extensive use of republican institutions, such as court cases, petitions, and complaints to authorities, to safeguard those privileges. Especially during the height of liberalism between the 1850s and 1870s, legislators and authorities were blind to these ethnic, multicultural forms of the nation-state and pressed the need for uniform, essentially European structures of governance. The foundation of the Sociedad Amiga de los Indios (Friends of the Indians Society) in 1867 by a handful of elite liberal politicians and intellectuals combined the call for the integration of the Indian into the nation along the lines of Western cultural norms (Spanish language, education, Western-style clothing, modern hygiene) with a paternalist call for the protection of their property and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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citizenship rights against abusive bosses and authorities (Thurner 1996, Jacobsen 1997). In February 1915, Victor Andrés Belaúnde (1883–1966) and José de la Riva Aguero y Osma (1884–1944) were among the founders of the Partido Nacional Democrático. The party attracted writers, educators, artists, and university students in Lima and the provinces who were deeply concerned about the “moral decadence” of the Peruvian nation. The party rejected materialism and advocated the integration of the Peruvian nation through common spiritual values. It considered the ruling parties and national elites in government, the military, the church, and business as corrupt, yet it was unwilling to embrace the mass politics around urban workers and rural peasants that began to preoccupy the ruling elites. The party thus proposed nationalism as a moralization campaign to uplift and perfect the “collective soul” of all Peruvians, and condemned itself to political insignificance. Before 1919, no nationalist political mass movement would emerge (McEvoy 1997; Pike 1967).

Narrating the Nation During the wars of independence, the young romantic poet Mariano Melgar wrote fervent revolutionary poems expressing notions of fraternity and liberty and paternalistic love for the Indians. His execution by colonial authorities in 1815 made him a martyr for the nationalist cause. In their search for the roots of the nation, early republican writers and politicians often put forward a romantic vision of the pre-Hispanic indigenous past of Peru. The victory over Spain was portrayed as Atahualpa’s (the last reigning Inca’s) revenge for 300 years of enslavement by the foreign invaders. Some Creoles were influenced by colonial native Andean myths about Inkarri, a beheaded Atahualpa and his host, slumbering under an eastern piedmont mountain, who would reemerge to rule the Andes again once his body was fully restored. Early republican heraldry widely utilized symbols for pre-Hispanic civilizations. Creoles delighted in intonations of yaravies and other mournful songs about the honor and glory of the Incas. Peru’s early republican Creoles found the origins of the nation both in Andean pre-Hispanic civilizations and in the bravery, honor, and religion of their conquistador ancestors, both subsequently subjected by the tyranny of imperial Spain. Yet early nationalist representations of the Incas remained abstract for the most part and never extended to the contemporary indigenous majority of the nation. Manuel González Prada, Peru’s most influential radical essayist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in sharp-tongued speeches and newspaper columns combined a chauvinist nationalism with a condemnation of the entire republican political class and a call for militant empowerment of Peru’s indigenous citizens. In Peru’s first important indigenista novel, Aves sin nido (Birds without a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Manuel González Prada (1844–1918) Poet, essayist, and sharp-tongued social critic, Manuel González Prada became Peru’s most influential progressive intellectual in the aftermath of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). Born into an impoverished family of the large landholding elite, González Prada sought to emancipate himself from the orthodox Catholicism of his upbringing, although never losing a moralist tone even in his most radical pronouncements. During the 1880s, he condemned Peru’s entire political elite for its factionalism, opportunism, and venality, and called for a militant nationalism to reclaim the territories lost to Chile during the War of the Pacific. “Old men to the grave, and young men to the task at hand!” he proclaimed in an 1888 speech. During a seven-year stay in Europe, González Prada turned from positivism to anarchism. Upon his return to Lima in 1898, he founded radical protest papers, helped organize anarchist labor unions, and called for the emancipation of the Indians through their own revolution. He became a major influence on a younger generation of Marxist and populist politicians and intellectuals who would carry on his attempts to combine nationalism with radical social thought.

Nest, 1889), Clorinda Matto de Turner focused the nation’s attention on the exploitation of the Indians in the highland by the “trinity” of the local priest, governor, and hacendado; redemption would come from Lima in the form of enlightened, humanitarian public and private elites. Influenced by the ideas of positivism, influential mainstream intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such as the sociologists Carlos Lisson and Mariano H. Cornejo, the social historian and diplomat Javier Prado, and the legal scholars and reformist legislators Manuel Vicente Villarán and Matias Manzanilla, rejected the colonial regime for its exploitation of the indigenous majority and called for increased popular education as a means for progress and national integration. While certain groups of elite intellectuals embraced hard-line versions of “scientific” racism, these men believed that the indigenous majority could become valuable citizens of the nation, albeit through relinquishing their Andean cultural traditions. The generation of Peruvian intellectuals that came of age around the turn of the 20th century reacted against the increasing preoccupation with material progress and science and looked to Peru’s past for sources of the nation’s moral regeneration. While their family backgrounds and the political cultural atmosphere in which they grew up imbued them with a certain elitism, these writers were the first to focus on the Indian and social issues as central for developing a strong Peruvian nation. José de la Riva Aguero y Osma, descendant of an aristocratic colonial family and of Peru’s first nationalist president, saw Peru as an ancient nation with roots in the pre-Hispanic civilizations. These ancient roots gave Peru the right to hegemony on South America’s west coast, and Riva Aguero y Osma envisioned reestablishing the Peru-Bolivian Confederation. He saw the Andean highlands with their indigenous population as the “true Peru,” “the cradle of nationhood,” whereas Lima and the coast where the elite resided was merely a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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place for easy life, gaiety, and pleasure. Though he wanted to base Peruvian nationalism on the “solidarity and confraternity between whites, mestizos and Indians,” Riva Aguero y Osma essentially portrayed the Indians as passive: they were good soldiers and agriculturalists but in need of rule by white intellectual elites. Victor Andrés Belaúnde (1883–1966), who had a brilliant career as essayist and scholar, educator, and diplomat—becoming president of the UN General Assembly in 1959—defined the nation as “a community of ideals and aspirations.” The Peruvian nation had its beginning with the Spanish conquest and colonization, as the Inca empire lacked the spiritual values that form a nation. The perfection of the Peruvian nation required the synthesis among the different cultures it contained, and this synthesis would be achieved through the “liturgy,” through which the spirit of Catholicism would be spread among all citizens. The Indians would be redeemed through the ethical-religious metaphysics that occidental culture had brought to the Andes. Belaúnde called this spiritual synthesis of the different cultures in Peru peruanidad. For Belaúnde, as for Riva Aguero y Osma, race in itself was not a central consideration in forging the Peruvian nation, since socio-ethnic and cultural differences would be overcome by solidarity and the spirit of peruanidad. But race was crucial in the definition of the nation for the third major writer of the generation of 1900, Francisco García Calderón (1883–1953). For García Calderón, the base of the Peruvian nation had to be the Latin race since, following Le Bon, he believed that Indians, blacks, mestizos, and mulattoes slowed down the nation’s transformation and modernization. Peru still had not become a full-fledged nation due to the formlessness of the colonial regime and the errors and inappropriate borrowings of the first republican century. National integration could be achieved through a policy of making the state stronger, through selective population policies— including the stimulation of European immigration—and by imbuing the citizens with the values characteristic of the Protestant nations—capitalist enterprise and hard work. For all of these authors, integrating Peru’s subaltern ethnic and social groups into the nation was not tied to a call for democratizing Peru. By the late 1920s and 1930s, Riva Aguero y Osma would flirt with Italian and Spanish fascism, Belaúnde would promote aspects of Catholic corporatism, and García Calderón would remain constant in his advocacy of a mixed authoritarian-democratic regime (Peña 1987; Pike 1967).

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During the 50 years after independence, Peruvian nationalism maintained an ambiguous relationship with Catholicism and the church. Many Peruvians perceived a strong anchor for their regional identity in their religion and in their devotion to a range of Peruvian-born saints and revered images; vernacular Andean N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Catholicism had been an important ingredient in regional pride and the rejection of Spain’s claims over Peru. But none of these devotions gained a status of national devotion comparable to the Virgin of Guadalupe in Mexico. During the festivities for the third centenary of her birth in 1886, Santa Rosa of Lima, “patron saint of America” and the first American to be canonized by the Vatican (1670), drew the largest crowds the city had ever seen. Yet most indigenous Peruvians in the highlands did not share this devotion. The diversity of Peruvian folk Catholicisms expressed the limits of a shared national imaginary. But liberal politicians and intellectuals deemed it necessary to restrict and regulate the functions of the church and sought to diminish ecclesiastic interferences in the civil sphere, which could undermine loyalty to the nation-state. During the 1820s and early 1830s, they closed many monasteries and some religious educational institutions, and after 1855 the state assumed control over payment of the church hierarchy. During the 19th century, there was a strong strain of Gallicanism (assertion of national control) in the Peruvian church, and—against Vatican opposition—the national state assumed the Spanish monarchs’ patronage over the church, for example, by intervening in the selection and appointment of bishops. The most radical of Peru’s numerous liberal Catholic priests, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Francisco de Paula González Vigil, in the 1850s rejected centralist authority of the pope and Roman curia as violations of the spirit and practices of pristine Christianity altogether (Pike 1967). Yet by midcentury the Peruvian church was turning more conservative. Bartolomé Herrera, a brilliant priest, politician, orator, and later bishop of Arequipa, railed against the moral and political decay of the republic and against the interference of the military in politics. He envisioned a hierarchical society that reflected his call for an ultramontane church to be led by an “aristocracy of intelligence.” As rector of the Colegio de San Carlos, he trained a generation of proclerical conservative nationalists who would exercise considerable influence during the late 19th century (Pike 1967). The debate over the role of Catholicism for Peru’s national identity would only become more contentious during the late 19th century. Coming soon after the collapse of the guano export economy, Peru’s bloody war against Chile and the subsequent defeat and occupation by the southern neighbor between 1879 and 1883 ushered in the most severe crisis of national identity prior to the late 20th century, fueled by 20 years of political, social, and economic turmoil. White officers killed in battle, such as army captain Francisco Bolognesi and Admiral Miguel Grau, together with the leader of the anti-Chilean highland guerrilla resistance, General Andrés A. Cáceres, have been consecrated as Peru’s supreme national heroes in official memory. Their statues today grace plazas in Peruvian towns from the Ecuadorian border to the Amazon and Lake Titicaca. The war prompted some soul-searching about the reasons for the defeat. Many in the elite blamed the indigenous majority for its supposed lack of modern skills and patriotism. Popular groups and critical intellectuals pointed to a self-serving, corrupt, and greedy elite, who had failed to prepare the nation for

Peru’s Crisis of 1876–1895 Between 1876 and 1895, Peru went through a multifaceted crisis of unprecedented dimensions. The collapse of the guano bonanza brought national bankruptcy. When three years later Peru was pulled into the War of the Pacific against Chile as an ally of Bolivia, the country was totally unprepared. After a series of battles on land and on sea in the south, Chilean forces landed close to Lima and defeated the Peruvian forces on the outskirts of the capital. The government withdrew into the Andes; the Chileans occupied the capital and many of the most important towns along the entire 2,000-kilometer coast, dismantling sugar refineries and other installations and looting Peru’s cultural patrimony (for example, the holdings of the National Library). Peru’s political system collapsed, with internecine factional fighting over resistance or acceptance of defeat. State revenues shriveled to one-third their peak level in the early 1870s, external trade was halved, and private fortunes vanished. The ensuing civil wars combined issues of power and fair elections with native Andeans’ struggles for autonomy and better conditions. The long crisis of 1876–1895 greatly heightened nationalist rhetoric and mobilization in Peru.

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the challenge from a confident Chile. There is little doubt that the war, and the subsequent social and economic crises, spread an awareness of a common national destiny among large segments of the Peruvian population. The intensification of communications, of civil society and the public sphere since the 1850s facilitated such outcomes. The war produced a shrill nationalism filled with anxieties about the future of Peru; papers and pamphlets often voiced the fear that the nation was in imminent danger of dismemberment through both the aggression of its neighbors and internal corruption and decay. The Sociedad Patriótica collected funds for the “rescue” of the southern territories occupied by Chile. During a brief war scare produced by border conflicts with Ecuador in early 1894, citizens in hundreds of towns and villages across Peru signed manifestos declaring their willingness to fight for the pátria “until the last drop of our blood.” Presidential administrations from 1886 to 1899 labeled their work as “national regeneration.” They emphasized institution building and strengthening the state. In sum, the War of the Pacific and the subsequent crises mobilized increasingly numerous middle- and lowerclass citizens around the concept of making the nation strong. During the following 40 years, until the end of the “Aristocratic Republic” (1895–1919), a gamut of popular diversions, arts, and food ways found widespread acceptance in Lima and other coastal cities. This cultural medley was dubbed criollo and constituted the core of an emerging Peruvian national culture. It selectively borrowed and reconfigured cultural traditions from Afro-Peruvians, native Andeans, and Europeans and began to be shared by people from different classes and ethnic backgrounds. The marinera (an Afro-Peruvian version of the Spanish zamacueca) and the vals (adapted from the Viennese Walzer) became identified as typically Peruvian dances, played at private parties and in public places from brothels to upscale cafés, accompanied by guitar and cajón (an AfroPeruvian percussion instrument). The sancochado, papa rellena, and olluquito con charqui at this time became widely consumed dishes identified with comida criolla and incorporated European, African, and Andean culinary traditions. Football (soccer) passed from being an elite pastime in Lima’s British country club to a popular sport promoted by bosses for the cohesion of their workers and to a daily practice on empty lots in popular urban barrios. Between the 17th and late 19th centuries, El Señor de los Milagros (“Our Lord of the Miracles”) had been a devotion exclusively of Lima’s population of African descent. But between the 1880s and 1920s, it became Lima’s most popular religious festivity, embraced by people from the middle and upper classes as well as Afro-Peruvians and mestizos. By the 1920s, the stage was set for the emergence of powerful nationalist popular movements and interventionist state policies exalting a strong, integrated nation.

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Devotees walk near an image of “Our Lord of the Miracles” during a procession along Lima’s streets in 2001. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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Selected Bibliography Flores Galindo, Alberto. 1986. Buscando un Inca. Havana: Casa de Las Américas. Jacobsen, Nils. 1997. “Liberalism and Indian Communities, 1821–1920.” In Liberals, the Church and Indian Peasants: Corporate Lands and the Challenge of Reform in Nineteenth Century Spanish America, edited by Robert H. Jackson, 123–170. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Klarén, Peter F. 2000. Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lynch, John. 1986. The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808–1826. 2nd ed. New York: Norton. McEvoy, Carmen. 1997. La utopia republicana: Ideales y realidades en la formación de la cultura política peruana (1871–1919). Lima: Pontifícia Universidad Católica del Perú. Mendez, Cecilia. 1996. “Incas Si, Indios No: Notes on Peruvian Creole Nationalism and Its Contemporary Crisis.” Journal of Latin American Studies 28, no. 1: 197–225. Peña, Antonio. 1987. “José de la Riva Aguero, Francisco García Calderón y Victor Andrés Belaúnde: Visión y propuesta conservadora.” In Pensamiento politico peruano, edited by Alberto Adrianzen, 135–150. Lima: DECO. Pike, Fredrick B. 1967. The Modern History of Peru. New York: Praeger. Thurner, Mark. 1996. From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial NationMaking in Andean Peru. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Walker, Charles F. 1999. Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780–1840. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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United States John M. McCardell Jr. Chronology 1774 First Continental Congress. As relations with Britain worsen, 13 American delegates convene in Philadelphia to discuss united action. 1776 Declaration of Independence. On July 4, 1776, 13 American colonies in “Congress Assembled” formally declare their independence from Great Britain. 1781 Articles of Confederation. After more than four years of debate, and while the Revolutionary War continues, the American states ratify the Articles of Confederation, thereby creating a new national entity, “The United States in Congress Assembled.” 1787 Federal Constitution. Meeting to revise the Articles of Confederation, delegates instead draft a new constitution, substantially strengthening the national government. The requisite 9 (of 13) states ratify the new constitution by June 1788. 1798–1799 Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. First articulation of doctrine of “state interposition,” based on the theory that the Constitution is a compact voluntarily created and joined by previously independent and sovereign states, thus the states are “duty bound” to interpose themselves to arrest any unconstitutional acts by the national government. 1814 Hartford Convention. Reiteration of the “state interposition” theory in response to alleged unconstitutionality of government policies during the War of 1812. 1820 Missouri Compromise. Congress sets the southern boundary of Missouri (36°30’), extended westward to the limit of the Louisiana Purchase, as territory into which slavery would be permitted to expand. Slavery is prohibited in all territory north of that line. 1828 “South Carolina Exposition and Protest.” In response to what is thought to be a discriminatory protective tariff, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina invokes “state interposition” and, ultimately, “nullification” as a remedy for unconstitutional acts committed by a majority against a minority. 1850 Compromise of 1850. Congress decides the question of slavery in territory acquired as a result of the Mexican War. California is admitted as a free state; the remaining territories are to determine the legality of slavery at the time of application for admission to the Union (“popular sovereignty”). 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act. Congress decides to apply the principle of “popular sovereignty” to the Kansas and Nebraska territories, from which slavery had been barred by terms of the Missouri Compromise, thus rendering that compromise “superseded.” 1857 Dred Scott decision. The Supreme Court determines that a slave is not free when transported by his master into a free territory, that slaves are the property of their masters, that any attempt to deny an owner his property is unconstitutional, and that therefore the Missouri Compromise, and any attempt by the national government to limit slavery, violates the Constitution. 1860–1861 Secession of the southern states, formation of the Confederacy. In response to the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency on a platform of prohibiting the extension of slavery, seven states (South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas) withdraw from the Union and create a separate southern nation. Four additional states (Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas) join

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the Confederacy after Lincoln calls for 75,000 volunteers to put down the “rebellion,” precipitated by the Confederacy’s firing on Fort Sumter. 1861–1865 Civil War. As a result of the war, the Union is restored, the presidency and the national government are strengthened, and slavery is formally ended by the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 1865–1877 Reconstruction. The southern states rejoin the Union. The last federal troops are withdrawn from the South as part of the settlement of the disputed 1876 presidential election.

Situating the Nation On November 19, 1863, at a ceremony dedicating the cemetery at Gettysburg, President Abraham Lincoln, in a mere two minutes, delivered an address that defined and fixed, perhaps for all time, the essence of American nationality. “Four score and seven years ago,” he began, “our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” “Now,” Lincoln continued, “we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure” (Adler 1976, 9:462–463). At the time Lincoln spoke, the outcome of the Civil War was far from certain. A southern Confederacy, formed in 1861, had declared its independence, had written a constitution, had established a government, and had managed, through three years of war, to maintain its separate national existence in the face of repeated attempts militarily to subdue it and restore it to the old Union from which it had seceded. These Southerners thought of themselves as Americans. Secession, they believed, represented a legitimate response to the threat of a hostile, sectional majority. They had voluntarily joined the Union and could just as voluntarily choose to withdraw from it. Indeed, those southern states that had been among the original 13 British colonies that had declared independence from the mother country in 1776 did not specifically vote to break up the Union. Rather, meeting in special conventions called for a particular purpose, they repealed their ratification of the federal constitution. And, when they later assembled to create a new nation, they adopted with only minor revisions that same constitution as their own, repeating the document’s purpose of establishing “a more perfect Union.” The Union from which Southerners claimed to be withdrawing dated, in their view, not from 1776 but rather from 1787. The Declaration of Independence established no nation. The nation as presently understood had been the creation of the founders who met in Philadelphia in 1787 and produced a wholly new charter of government. The Union, according to this interpretation, represented not a fragile “proposition” but rather a contract, or compact, among sovereign states. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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U.S. president Abraham Lincoln delivers the Gettysburg Address on November 20, 1863, commemorating the Battle of Gettysburg fought the previous July. (Library of Congress)

The story of American nationalism thus begins from multiple starting points, defined by multiple understandings. To some Americans, “nation” had an almost mystical meaning; it was an idea—or at least a proposition—that, in Lincoln’s words, stood as “the last best hope of earth” (Adler 1976, 5:518–537). To others, it was a rather more formal, almost legalistic arrangement involving checks, balances, and the division of sovereignty, based upon the novel idea of federalism between state and national government. To still others—enslaved Americans, for example—America, as either North or South defined it, appeared unsatisfying, even fraudulent; slavery seemed a denial of the idea, its perpetuation a requirement of constitutional unity. And for those Americans inclined, in whatever age, to dissent, the “test” of the proposition had much more to do with its tolerance of competing ideologies than with its insistence that it said all and spoke for all. One group found the essential source of American nationality in the lofty rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence. Another traced the beginning of true nationhood to the ratification of the Constitution. A “proposition” subject to testing? Or a contract incurring mutual obligation? Or something else entirely? Upon the answer to these questions rested fundamental understandings. Thus, the American nation, from the very beginning, found itself situated not in social or economic or ethnic or religious conflict; not in some contained or circumscribed geographical area; and not in the stream of a long, troubled, contentious history. The American nation, as its currency stated, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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was something altogether different and new. It was novus ordo saeclorum—a “new order of the ages.” It was also, wherein lay the tension that Americans must muster sufficient genius to withstand, e pluribus unum—“out of many, one.” Reconciling the one and the many would constitute the recurrent test of American nationalism and its durability.

Instituting the Nation Soon after declaring independence, the Continental Congress set to work preparing, according to a resolution introduced by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, “a plan of Confederation,” which would be “transmitted to the respective Colonies for their consideration and approbation” (Tansill 1927, House Document No. 308). Only after protracted debate, in November 1777, did the Congress agree on a draft document, which it referred to the states with a request to act on it by March 10, 1778. Not until March 1781, however, did the last state act. Until that time, the Continental Congress served as the national government. The debates over framing and then ratifying the Articles raised the most fundamental issues of power and authority, of representation and consent, and of territorial boundaries and jurisdiction. Suspicion of executive abuse, rooted in fears of monarchy, ensured that power would continue to reside in an elected legislature. The relationship of population to representation pitted large states, which sought proportional representation, against small states, which advocated giving each state a single vote in Congress. The unwillingness of states claiming vast landholdings based upon their colonial charters to divest themselves of “sea to sea” entitlements raised serious questions of how the territorial domain of the new nation was to be organized and administered. Only after Virginia agreed to cede to Congress its land north and west of the Ohio River did Maryland, the lone holdout, agree to ratify the Articles. Indeed, the most significant accomplishment by Congress under the Articles involved a series of territorial ordinances providing for the orderly admission of additional states to the Union. These enactments defined exactly how new states were to be incorporated: once the population of a territory reached 60,000, the inhabitants could create a government and apply for admission. Th e Northwest Ordinance of 1787 explicitly declared that the new states of the Northwest Territory (eventually the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin) would enter “on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatsoever” (Adler 1976, 3:191–196). Slavery, however, would not be permitted. These ordinances addressed one of the major causes of the revolution—the relationship between a national government and its territorial dependencies—and set a precedent for the admission, as full and equal members, of all future states. Otherwise, however, the Articles of Confederation proved unworkable. The new national entity bore the name “The United States of America in Congress N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Assembled,” fairly describing how the new government was meant to function. On the one hand, the Articles envisioned a “perpetual union,” but on the other, that union was to be “a firm league of friendship” among sovereign states rather than a consolidated, integrated nation-state (Adler 1976, 2:555–560). It was to be a confederation, and nothing more. And as a confederation, its weaknesses were immediately apparent. Legislative government (the first president of the United States—in Congress Assembled—was John Hanson of Maryland, who served as presiding officer in the Congress and lacked executive authority) proved no more effective, and no less potentially tyrannical, than executive government. Congress could make “requests” of states but had no authority to enforce them. Some states were fi scally responsible, others, reckless. Congress had little ability to deal with foreign affairs. Amendments to the Articles required unanimous consent, which meant that the smallest state, Rhode Island, could thwart the will of 12 other states. When, in the winter of 1786–1787, a group of debtor farmers in western Massachusetts under the leadership of Daniel Shays rose up in rebellion against the policies of the state’s legislature (known as the General Court), it became clear that the Articles of Confederation needed to be revised. With that purpose in mind, delegates from the states gathered in Philadelphia in May 1787. By this time a large number of influential Americans, most conspicuously Alexander Hamilton of New York and James Madison of Virginia, had discovered, in the words of a call to convention drafted by Hamilton himself, the need “to render the constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union” (Adler 1976, 3:68–70). Between May and September, in deliberations held entirely behind closed doors, an extraordinary group of men laid the groundwork for a new national government or, as the Preamble to the new Constitution put it, “a more perfect Union.” The Constitution represented a remarkable balancing of interests: a House based on population; a Senate, with each state having an equal presence; a Supreme Court along with “such inferior courts” as Congress might choose to establish; a strong chief executive. The powers of the national government were strengthened—to create a currency, to impose duties, to conduct foreign affairs— while limited and staggered terms of service and the principle of “advice and consent,” along with the system of “checks and balances,” reduced the chance that any one branch of government would become too powerful. Even so, to secure ratification of the new charter, its supporters promised to add a Bill of Rights once the new Congress assembled. The tenth article in that document expressly reserved to the states all powers not specifically enumerated in the Constitution itself. This new nation would be neither a democracy nor a monarchy, neither a unitary state nor a confederation. It would be something altogether different, and new, a federated republic that sought institutionally to balance the multiplicity of interests while holding in check humanity’s baser impulses. The Old World claimed it could never succeed. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Constitution attempted to codify what the Declaration of Independence had stated to be the essential principles of a nascent American nationality. The period 1776–1787 witnessed repeated, and ultimately successful, attempts to give a proper structural translation of the Declaration’s lofty ideals. Thus, the United States based its assertion of independence on a “proposition.” At the same time, it surrounded that proposition with a structure intended to preserve and protect it for all time, or, as the Preamble put it, to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

Defining the Nation As the new nation began its life, its leadership realized its incompleteness. Every ritual, every enactment, every word publicly uttered would set a precedent. As president, George Washington strove to balance his belief in the dignity of his office with a republican population’s expectation of accessibility and a common touch. Debates arose almost immediately about the proper role of government and the degree to which a transcendent national interest could be made harmonious with regional, state, or local concerns. The principals in this debate were Hamilton who, as secretary of the treasury, envisioned an energetic government actively involved in developing the nation’s economy, and Madison and Thomas Jefferson who, as congressman and secretary of state, respectively, feared a strong central government and the potential tyranny majorities might wield over minorities. These debates recurred over the next century. They involved the appropriateness of a national bank, the need for revenue, and the role of government in actively sponsoring internal improvements, as well as mechanisms for restraining the national government whenever it seemed to overreach. During the first decade of nationhood, though Hamilton’s continental vision largely triumphed, it aroused organized opposition in the form of a competing political party, which took the name “Republican.” Attacking the “Federalist” Washington administration, the Republicans advocated strict interpretation of the Constitution and states’ rights as the most effective antidote to governmental encroachment on individual liberty. By 1800 these disagreements had brought the country to a dangerous crossroads. War between England and France challenged America’s proclamation of neutrality. A widening rift over the country’s international role combined with continuing divisions over economic policy had produced a crisis. Equating dissent with disloyalty, and believing that organized opposition posed a factional threat to the government’s stability, the Federalist Congress enacted a Sedition Act in 1798, which severely curtailed free speech and led to the closing of opposition N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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newspapers and the imprisonment of dissenting editors. To the Republicans, the Sedition Act was unconstitutional, but how to arrest such behavior remained a matter of great uncertainty. Jefferson and Madison concluded that only the states could effectively halt the abuse of government power. They drafted, and the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky approved, resolutions that viewed the Constitution as a compact among the states, freely entered into. By this reasoning, a state or states, as parties to the constitutional contract, were “duty bound” to “interpose” themselves to thwart unconstitutional behavior by the national government (Adler 1976, 4:62–67). This doctrine of “state interposition” never moved beyond assertion in this particular crisis, but its concept of the weak nature of the federal Union would resurface in subsequent political debates and would represent the chief threat to the durability of that Union. Within another decade, by 1812, the European conflict engulfed America, and once again the country found itself at war with England. Opponents of the war, chiefly New England merchants, assembled in Hartford in 1814 and adopted the identical wording of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions to express their dissent. The coming of peace, however, halted any further action. And Americans everywhere hailed the victory over England as the harbinger of future glory. The Revolution had been secured. Still, in the several decades after 1815, the local and familiar were the national: trees, climate, animal life, history, economy, social organization, religious and educational institutions, food, manners, clothing. No matter how much these things may in fact have differed, in a federated republic seeking definition, nothing could be excluded from the category “American.” This included domestic institutions and, more especially, slavery. Slavery had vexed the nation from the start. The territorial ordinances of the 1780s had set boundaries to the institution. The Constitution had outlawed the international slave trade after 1808. Gradually most states north of Maryland and Kentucky had abolished slavery. But for those states to the south, whose agricultural economies required a large labor force to produce tobacco, cotton, rice, and sugar, slavery had become a necessary evil.

Narrating the Nation By 1815 partisan division had disappeared and a remarkable political consensus had emerged. The erstwhile Republican, now president, James Madison, called for the creation of a new national bank (Hamilton’s bank had dissolved in 1811 at the end of its 20-year charter and had not been renewed), the adoption of a tariff to support domestic manufacturing, and the development of the country’s transportation and communication network through a series of major internal improvements. A rising young nationalist, Congressman Henry Clay of Kentucky, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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would embrace this platform and, for the next generation, give it a simple, powerful name—the American System—which would be the defining blueprint for the nation’s economic development. The year 1815 marked a sharp dividing line in the nation’s history. Free for the first time from any serious possibility of foreign entanglements, Americans turned inward and began to consider those things that made them unique. The period 1815–1860 has aptly been called the “quest for nationality,” and the effort was intense. Wherever one turned, within politics and government but more especially outside them—in art, music, literature—the search for those things uniquely “American” had taken on a peculiar urgency. What, other than a constitution and the “proposition” that informed it, made America distinctive? In fact, there was little in this new nation that was not apparently derivative. Thus, Noah Webster advocated an American language and published, in 1828, his monumental American Dictionary of the English Language. Edward Tyrell Channing and, later, Ralph Waldo Emerson, declaring “literary independence,” urged the creation of an American literature. George Bancroft undertook the serious writing of American history, while Washington Irving, James Fenimore Cooper, and William Gilmore Simms chose American historical incidents and characters as the basis for imaginative fiction. Meanwhile the vast and varied continent became a subject worthy of great artists, from Thomas Cole’s and Asher Durand’s Hudson River landscapes to George Caleb Bingham’s depictions of frontier life, to Albert Bierstadt’s monumental western paintings, to Audubon’s remarkable birds. Immensely popular, these artists found in the natural environment surrounding them, and the tough, hardy human subjects usually dwarfed but never intimidated by that environment, themes quintessentially American. Add to this the simple, sentimental musical forms pioneered by Stephen Foster, the harmonious hymnody of Lowell Mason, and later the slavery-inspired compositions of Louis Gottschalk, and the outlines of an American culture begin to emerge. Public events also contributed to Americans’ sense of their distinctive national selves. Creating a sense of historical memory, especially for a people who had so little history, mattered. Independence Day was universally celebrated with speeches, picnics, parades, and fireworks. Politics was the great spectator sport of the time. Large crowds turned out for partisan gatherings, complete with indigenous barbecue and whiskey. States and communities held other annual observances to commemorate significant events from the colonial or revolutionary days.

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was mostly by water. Communication largely depended on newspapers, which in more remote areas paid more attention to immediate concerns than to national or international developments. Yet here, too, Americans set themselves to what they believed to be a national task. Canals—most notably the Erie Canal across New York, which opened in 1823—river and harbor improvements, railroads, and, in 1844, the invention of the telegraph bridged distances, bound the Union more tightly together, and made it easier for Americans to travel and thus get to know more of their country and their countrymen. By the late 1820s, slavery was coming to be, as Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina would put it in 1837, a “positive good” (Adler 1976, 6:346–350). Upset by what he believed to be a discriminatory tariff, which favored the manufacturing North over the agricultural South, Calhoun feared the long-term consequences of a hostile northern majority, not only in matters of economic policy but also concerning slavery. In 1828, attacking the so-called “Tariff of Abominations,” Calhoun once more employed the doctrine (and the exact language) of “state interposition” (Adler 1976, 5:282–283), which he called “Nullification,” to urge his state to resist the execution of the unconstitutional act. Before confrontation could occur, however, Congress voted to lower the tariff gradually. At almost the same time, however, an abolition movement began in the North, thus posing a new, if still small and marginal, threat to the South’s peculiar institution. Until 1803, slavery’s boundaries had been set. In that year, however, President Jefferson engineered the Louisiana Purchase, which added 838,000 square miles to the national domain and extended the nation’s boundaries west of the Mississippi River. In 1819 Missouri applied for admission to the Union as a slave state, and a new debate arose. Some Northerners, and their representatives in Congress, did not want slavery to expand beyond its current borders, even though the acquisition of Florida in 1819 had added more slave territory. Many Southerners argued that prohibiting slavery, against the will of Missourians, was unfair. For the first time slavery had become an “interest,” defended by the South, opposed (and occasionally attacked) by the North. The Missouri Compromise, by which the southern boundary of Missouri, 36°30', extended westward to the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase and became the northern boundary of slave territory, settled the question. That is, until the 1840s. The annexation of Texas, where slavery existed, by Congress in 1845 set off a new round of debate, which was aggravated by the acquisition of territory following victory in the Mexican-American War in 1846–1847. Once again, in 1850, a compromise allowed for the admission of California as a free state but left open for future “popular sovereignty” the decision about slavery in the rest of the Mexican Cession. The matter seemed settled until Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois in 1854 reopened the question and persuaded the Senate to pass the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which allowed the settlers in those territories, previously barred to slavery by the Missouri Compromise, to determine whether the institution was to be permitted. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The ensuing chaos made slavery a defining political issue and threatened the federal Union. Civil war broke out in Kansas in the mid-1850s. In 1857 the Supreme Court issued the Dred Scott decision, which ruled the Missouri Compromise, and any legislative enactment prohibiting Americans from taking their property in slaves wherever they chose, unconstitutional. This decision further roiled the political system and hastened the emergence of a sectional, antislavery, Republican Party. In 1860 that party, and its presidential nominee, Abraham Lincoln, won election. The threat of federal interference with slavery and the fact that a hostile northern majority now seemed to control the national government prompted South Carolina to repair to the old principle of state interposition. In December 1860, the state repealed its ratification of the Constitution, thereby taking itself out of the Union. Within six weeks, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas had followed suit. Meeting in Montgomery, Alabama, in February 1861, these states created a new, separate nation, the Confederate States of America. The nature of the Confederacy, and the impulses that led to its formation, could be immediately discerned in its constitution, which was a virtual duplicate of the U.S. Constitution. These states viewed secession as consistent with the actions of their forebears in 1776 and believed that the election of Lincoln, supported by a hostile majority (even though he had received only 40 percent of the vote), put the constitutional relationship at fatal risk. Secession, and separate nationhood, became a reluctant last resort to these Southerners, who continued to think of themselves as Americans. When the Confederate military fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor in the spring of 1861, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion. In response, four more states—Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas —withdrew from the Union. Four years of bloody civil war followed, which ended with the demise of slavery and the readmission of the defeated states to the Union. War had accelerated the trends toward consolidation that made the United States, by 1865, a much stronger nation. Under the pressure of war, the national government had assumed new powers, from the creation of a national currency to the setting of a standard rail gauge and the chartering of a transcontinental railroad, to the creation of a federal Department of Agriculture. The demands of war led to mass production of weapons and equipment, standard sizing of boots and uniforms, and a general growth of manufacturing and industry. The reintegration of the erstwhile Confederate states was remarkably swift and smooth, and in this respect, the outcome of the American Civil War was unique. There were no mass executions of rebel leaders, no confiscation of property, no obliteration of old boundaries, no wholesale destruction of symbols. At the same time, there was no genuine integration of the 3.5 million ex-slaves into American life. They were largely left on their own. Speedy reunion took precedence over massive reconstruction. Most white Americans understood that it could be one or the other, but not both. The modern American nation would be a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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racially segregated nation for another 100 years. The contours of that nation had in every way, by the mid-1870s, been fixed. “The American nation has not been determined by ‘natural’ factors of blood and soil,” wrote the great historian of nationalism, Hans Kohn, in 1944, “nor by common memories of a long history. It was formed by an idea, a universal idea” (p. 324). Whether based upon an “idea,” as Kohn would have it, or “dedicated to a proposition,” as Lincoln expressed it, America can indeed claim to be the first new nation. By the 1870s, the idea had prevailed, and the proposition had endured, against heavy odds. The “deed of gift,” Robert Frost wrote in The Gift Outright, “was many deeds of war,” including civil war (Lathem 1968, 348). The result became evident in the most ordinary of ways. Before 1861, it was customary, when speaking about the country, to say “the United States are . . . .” After 1865 the usage changed, and the now familiar formulation—“the United States is . . .”—spoke volumes. A modern, integrated nation-state had emerged, the offspring, as Lincoln had fervently anticipated in his address at Gettysburg, of “a new birth of freedom.” Selected Bibliography Adler, Mortimer J., ed. 1976. The Annals of America. 19 vols. London and Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. Basler, Roy P., ed. 1953. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 8 vols. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Dangerfield, George. 1965. The Awakening of American Nationalism, 1815–1828. New York: Harper and Row. Gruver, Rebecca Brooks. 1970. American Nationalism, 1783–1830: A Self-Portrait. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Hayes, Carleton J. H. 1926. Essays on Nationalism. New York: Macmillan Company. Kohn, Hans. 1944. The Idea of Nationalism. New York: Macmillan Company. Kohn, Hans. 1961. American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay. New York: Collier Books. Lathem, Edward C., ed. 1968. The Poetry of Robert Frost. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. McCardell, John. 1979. The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists and Southern Nationalism, 1830–1861. New York: W. W. Norton. Nagel, Paul C. 1971. This Sacred Trust: American Nationality, 1798–1898. New York: Oxford University Press. Potter, David M. 1968. “The Historian’s Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa.” The South and the Sectional Conflict, 39–83. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Spencer, Benjamin T. 1957. The Quest for Nationality: An American Literary Campaign. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Tansill, Charles C., ed. 1927. Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Waldstreicher, David. 1997. In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Wilson, Major L. 1974. Space, Time and Freedom: The Quest for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815–1861. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

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Uruguay Luis Roniger Chronology 1680 Colonia do Sacramento is founded by the Portuguese. 1726 Montevideo is founded by the Spanish governor of Buenos Aires. 1749 The governorship of Montevideo is set, to be ruled as part of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru. 1763 By the treaty of Paris, Colonia returns to Portuguese control after a short Spanish occupation. The Portuguese move the Brazilian capital from Salvador da Bahia southeast to Rio de Janeiro. 1776 Spain creates the new viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with Buenos Aires as its capital. The governorship of Montevideo is included in its jurisdiction. Portuguese bands move southward, regaining control of São Pedro. 1777 By the treaty of San Ildefonso, the Portuguese relinquish control of Colonia. 1801 The Portuguese take control of the Ibicuy area of the Eastern Missions in the northwestern Banda Oriental. 1806–1807 British forces attempt twice to take control of the port cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. 1808 Napoleon invades the Iberian Peninsula. King Charles IV of Spain abdicates, and his heir, Ferdinand VII, is taken prisoner by the French. Under British protection, the Portuguese Crown flees to Brazil, making the latter the center of its empire. 1810 An autonomous junta is established in Buenos Aires to rule in the name of the imprisoned king. Montevideo becomes the center of royalist rule in the South Atlantic. 1811–1820 Revolutionary wars in the Banda Oriental of the Uruguay River: Spanish, Portuguese, Uruguayan, and Buenos Aires forces clash with one another. Artigas structures a federal league that includes the littoral provinces of Argentina, suspicious of Buenos Aires’s centralism. 1814 With the fall of Montevideo comes an end to Spanish rule in the River Plate. 1816 The United Provinces of the River Plate declare their independence. Buenos Aires centralists begin clashing with the regional caudillos (power lords). The Portuguese move into Uruguay and by January 1817 occupy Montevideo. 1820 Artigas loses his hold in Uruguay and the neighboring littoral provinces. He moves to lifelong exile in Paraguay. 1820–1822 Portuguese control of Uruguay. 1821 The Uruguayan Congress votes for the incorporation of the country as the Cisplatine State into the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and Algarve. 1822 Brazil becomes an independent empire, separated from Portugal yet ruled by an heir of the same Bragança dynasty. 1825 A group of exiles, known as the “33 Orientals,” land in Uruguay and rekindle resistance against the Brazilians. Buenos Aires supports their struggle against Brazil. (August 25) Patriot representatives declare Uruguayan independence, joining the United Provinces of the River Plate. 1825–1827 Uruguay becomes a battleground for Brazilian, Platine, and Uruguayan forces.

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1828 (August) Brazilian-Argentine peace agreement leading to the final proclamation of Uruguayan independence. (October) Brazil and Argentina ratify the peace agreement and recognize Uruguayan independence. 1830 A republican constitution is promulgated (to prevail until 1919). 1831 First massive extermination of indigenous populations, former allies of the Patriot forces, in Salsipuedes. 1839 The so-called Great War of the South Atlantic begins. Uruguayan forces are backed either by Buenos Aires or by Brazil. 1843–1851 Siege of Montevideo by General Manuel Oribe, with the backing of the powerful governor of the Buenos Aires province, Juan Manuel de Rosas. 1850s After a short period of reconciliation, renewed party intrigues and continued rebellions in Uruguay. 1851 Rosas is defeated by the governor of Entre Ríos, General Urquiza, ending the Great War. 1865 The dictatorial rule of Venancio Flores marks the beginning of a long series of Colorado governments lasting for nearly a century. 1865–1870 War of the Triple Alliance, during which Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay defeat Paraguay. 1870–1872 Revolution of the Lances in Uruguay, an uprising led by rural Blanco caudillo Timoteo Aparicio. 1872 Reconciliation of the two parties, the Blancos and the Colorados, and the start of “coparticipation” or sharing of roles in the public administration. 1876 The end of the civil wars and the start of more stable centralized power. 1877 Law of education minimizing religious formation in state schools. 1879 Creation of a civil state register. 1885 Establishment of civil matrimony as obligatory and previous to religious marriage. Promulgation of a law of secondary and higher education. Law sanctioning the closure of monasteries.

Situating the Nation Uruguay crystallized as a separate country in the early 19th century, following the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, the ensuing crisis of authority in the Americas, and the subsequent disintegration of the Spanish empire. Its development as a separate nation-state was, in the words of historian Tulio Halperin Donghi, an awkward creation that few expected would last. From a systemic perspective, the emergence of the Uruguayan state and nation was due to the confluence of several macro-historical factors. First, the late colonial development of the region, shaped amid fragmented jurisdictions and conflicting authority claims, led to civil and transnational wars in the first half of the 19th century. Unlike many regions in Spanish America that were subject to the control of urban centers by the 16th century, the region was largely left to the control of the indigenous populations until the late 17th and 18th centuries. The native residents lived mostly from hunting and fishing and some agriculture and included groups as diverse as the fierce Charrúas and the more N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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peaceful Guaraníes. Only in 1680 did the Portuguese establish their first major settlement in Colonia do Sacramento, to be followed in 1726 by the founding of Montevideo by the Spanish authorities of Buenos Aires in an attempt to protect the South Atlantic basis of their empire against an Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Sparsely populated, the territories soon to become independent were divided among several jurisdictions. Buenos Aires held authority over the southern districts of the eastern bank of the Uruguay River; the military domain of the Missions ruled over the northern districts of the eastern bank, as well as over large areas of contemporary northeastern Argentina and southern Paraguay (including large tracks transferred in the 19th century to Brazil); and the navy governorship of Montevideo governed the port city and its rural hinterland. These internal boundaries were soon the object of struggle and became blurred in the wake of the imperial crisis. The second factor was the location of some of its major cities and ports on strategic trade routes, which prompted the early interest of the maritime hegemonic power, England, as well as of France, in the region. Connected with this strategic maritime location, especially the walled, fortress port city of Montevideo, was a growing antagonism with Buenos Aires. Although Buenos Aires was made the imperial capital of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate, which was carved out of the early Viceroyalty of Peru, Montevideo became increasingly aware of its

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Plaza Constitución in Montevideo, Uruguay, in the late 19th century. (Library of Congress)

own rival claims and endorsed ideas of prosperity through trade following the short-lived British occupation in 1807. Montevideo had supported Buenos Aires’s resistance against the British, and this commitment was advanced to argue claims of well-deserved autonomy, ending the “humiliating dependence” on Buenos Aires, as stated in a letter by the cabildo (city council) of Montevideo to the Spanish king following the British defeat. That letter asked the king to make Montevideo the headquarters of an intendancy, to give it a consulado (“commercial council”) of its own, and to extend the limits of its authority to include the whole Banda Oriental. The third factor was the fertility of the land, a land of moderate hills and an extended plateau covered by tall prairie grass, which supported large numbers of cattle and horses, thriving from those left by the early Spanish settlers. The cattle served as a basis for the export of salted beef to industrialized Britain, where it would sustain the poor working classes, and to Cuba and Brazil, where it would be the basis of the diet of a slave working class. Leather and wool were also exported, primarily to Britain. The fertility of the land also served to support the mobility of the armies wrangling for control of Uruguay in the early 19th century. Finally, the Banda Oriental or eastern bank of the Uruguay River was a territory in constant dispute and the target of mounting intervention by the Portuguese and Spanish crowns, and later on by the Brazilian empire and the United N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Provinces of the Río de la Plata, which replaced them, respectively. The Portuguese wanted to extend Brazilian control to its “natural” frontier in the River Plate, while the Spanish and later on the Buenos Aires authorities considered the region one more province in their disintegrating jurisdiction, to be kept or relinquished according to tactical considerations. These conflicting demands and the constant predation on local resources triggered the early emergence of local landed interests willing to master their own affairs and eventually attain self-determination. It was the combination of these factors rather than the mere willful role played by any of these multiple forces alone that led to Britain’s successful mediation, bringing Argentina and Brazil, both exhausted by the war, to renounce their claims to the Banda Oriental. British diplomats played a crucial role in creating a buffer state between Brazil and Argentina, relying on their country’s maritime hegemony in the South Atlantic Ocean and motivated by the interest to maintain some stability for the sake of British trade. In 1828 an independent state was established, officially known as the Republic to the East of the Uruguay River (República Oriental del Uruguay), a state soon recognized by its neighbors, the rival regional countries.

Instituting the Nation In the wake of Spanish imperial disintegration and as the region became the borderline arena of successive territorial conflicts, two main sets of actors emerged to play a protagonist role in creating the nation. One had its stronghold in the walled fortress city of Montevideo, where Spanish royalists, imperial Brazilian forces, and Uruguayan factions defended the city from recurring sieges by the other main force of local revolutionaries based in the countryside. Even before a nation existed in contemporary minds, these collective actors would dominate the public life of Uruguay—the patrician and learned circles of Montevideo, the landed and mercantile classes, the officers in the armed forces and the rural militia, as well as the lower classes. These groups learned to define themselves by reacting to one another and coalescing with one another as they faced the contrasting pressures put forward by the Spanish royalists (and then Buenos Aires) and by Portugal (and then Brazil). The major figure galvanizing the rural population into a collective actor was a native-born second commander of a rural gendarmerie founded by the authorities in Montevideo in the 1790s to keep order in the countryside. José Gervasio Artigas served under Spanish royalist authorities and later shifted his allegiance to the authorities in Buenos Aires. He soon became disappointed when Buenos Aires, under mounting pressure, negotiated a truce that returned the Banda Oriental to royalist control. Resenting the decision, Artigas led in November 1811 the retreat of over 4,000 Oriental militia and an equal number of fleeing civilians N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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on a month-long trek beyond the armistice lines, across the Uruguay River, to an eight-month encampment in the future Argentine province of Entre Ríos. Fearing Spanish reprisals and Portuguese depredations, the civilians had joined massively the withdrawing militias in what at that time people called a defeat (redota, a rustic transposition of the Spanish word derrota). Later generations identified it, however, as the “exodus of the Oriental people,” and many observers view it, with some justice, as the earliest visible sign of the birth of the Uruguayan nation, born out of defeat and expatriation. In fact, one can trace the earliest forms of the construction of the Uruguayan nation back to the declarations and statements of Artigas. The emerging leader was influenced by ideas on the resumption of popular sovereignty in cases of an acephalous royalty. These ideas can be traced back to a 16th-century Spanish school of thought. They were expressed in the pages of the Gazeta de Buenos Ayres by the radical autonomist Manuel Moreno, who also translated parts of Rousseau’s Contrat Social. In 1812 Artigas popularized these ideas in Uruguay and the neighboring provinces, as he stressed the “primitive [that is, original] rights” of sovereignty of the Orientales, who constituted themselves as a people by electing him as their jefe. A people left to fend for themselves had the right to organize themselves. As “Protector of the Free Peoples” in the region, however, his ideas evolved during the next several years. He first explicitly supported selfdetermination and federalist ideas, leading to a still undefined confederacy of peoples. That confederacy was to involve not only the Banda Oriental but also parts of contemporary Argentina, primarily the littoral provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes, and eventually was to include Santa Fe and even Córdoba (1813). He then moved to a more autocratic and paternalist attempt to keep control of the unruly population of his own native territory (by 1815). Ultimately he was defeated and spent a 30-year-long exile and isolation in Paraguay. It took a long time to define the “national” realm as distinguished from the “foreign” realms. At least until the end of the Great War in the Southern Cone of the Americas in 1851, the distinctions were largely irrelevant as the parties that waged civil war in Uruguay continued to mobilize the support of coalitions reaching to the radical autonomists of Rio Grande do Sul in southern Brazil, to the imperial house in Rio de Janeiro, or to the caudillos in Buenos Aires and other Argentine provinces. Yet, state independence implied an important shift by creating long-standing institutions that increasingly focused the rival energies of the Orientales on the shared public arena and, in this process, managed to constitute the nation. The promulgation of a constitution in 1830 was conceived as an anchor of stability, in the spirit of the Enlightenment. That constitution—which remained the institutional charter until 1919—made the legislature the dominant authority of the Oriental Republic, whose president it elected. The intention was to create a patrician, oligarchic rule led by a political class anchored in the patrician and learned circles of Montevideo. And yet, very early on, political parties crystalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Statue of José Gervasio Artigas, forefather of Uruguayan self-determination, in the Plaza Independencia, Montevideo, Uruguay. (Jon Hicks/Corbis)

lized, which were led by caudillos (military warlords), who had the necessary rural followings and political stature to impose presidential authority. A gap was thus created between the legal structure and the “real” structure of power, which prompted recurring rebellions, assaults on power, and civil wars. The Catholic church and the army, which were the institutional pillars of conservatism elsewhere in Spanish America, were weak in Uruguay. The foci of real power turned out to be the competing political factions or parties of the Blancos, headed by General Juan Antonio Lavalleja and soon by General Manuel Oribe, and the Colorados, initially headed by General Fructuoso Rivera. These parties, which in a simplistic way can be characterized as built around the conflicting interests of Montevideo versus the countryside districts, soon became the focal galvanizers of popular commitment and were instrumental in institution-building and nationbuilding—after they almost exhausted themselves and the country during the civil wars. By the mid-19th century, the parties were tired of waging war and had to recognize that they were almost undistinguishable in terms of their ideologies, blending classical republicanism and modern liberalism. Yet, an attempt to abolish them for the sake of national reconciliation in the 1850s proved ephemeral. As pointed out in the classic study by historian Juan E. Pivel Devoto, the political parties persisted, albeit under new physiognomy, as the most powerful defining institutions of public life in Uruguay, a trend unrivaled until recently in South America, with the exception of Colombia. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation Viewed in terms of its ethnic or socioeconomic composition, Uruguay closely resembled the structure of neighboring Río de la Plata or the Brazilian region of Rio Grande do Sul. In cultural terms, nothing distinguished the Orientals from the inhabitants of some of the future Argentine provinces. The notion of a “national” territory emerged only protractedly. Even as late as 1851 Uruguay renounced its claims over the Eastern Missions, an area equaling nearly 100,000 square kilometers or 37 percent of its territory, in favor of imperial Brazil. Uruguayan collective identities were structured as part of the process of consolidation of the state, without resemblance to any processes of ethnicities crystallizing into nationalities, as described by Anthony Smith and other scholars. Following the establishment of the “Oriental State” and in a progressive manner, collective identities were shaped in Uruguay along the lines of a code of civility and citizenship rather than along any primordial, ethno-cultural argument. The focal point for defining the nation turned out to be the republican virtues of citizenship and the principle of political order and rights guaranteed by the state. By the late 19th century and the 20th century these images were constructed in rather universal terms. The National (Blanco) Party leader Wilson Ferreira Aldunate expressed this view when emphasizing the role of the state and its principles on the definition of the nation, as he addressed the Chamber of Deputies of Ecuador in 1983, speaking from exile during military rule in his home country: This is why we are a most authentic country, . . . not due to the influence of a common race, in a genetic sense; neither as a result of geography, but rather by being a spiritual community. It consists in the cult of certain things: equality before the law, the representative character of the organs of government, the periodic election of the rulers, the subordination of any authority and power center to the civilian government, the strict obedience to the guarantees of freedom, of political freedom and individual freedom. . . . Among us, when there is an attack against the survival of these spiritual values the very existence of the country is put under risk, since the country is that and if [these elements are] absent, it is not a country. (cited in Demasi 1995, 29, 47–48)

Even though there are still open debates and controversies about the role played in the 19th century by individuals and institutions in the constitution of the Oriental nation, this view has become widely accepted. By the 20th century, it became “routinized” as part of the process of socialization and universal education carried out by the Uruguayan state and its leading political and cultural elites. It is important to remember, however, that the initial criteria of citizenship were rather restrictive, limiting representation according to several marks: personal status (slaves and dependent workers were not granted electoral rights), N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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gender ( females were excluded), age (minors until the age of 21 did not enjoy franchise), and education (analphabets were precluded from the electoral process after 1840). Moreover, even if formally abolished, slavery and indebted work continued into the second half of the 19th century.

Narrating the Nation It is perhaps not surprising that the turmoil and swift changes of political fate and shifting territorial boundaries of the early 19th century did not encourage the elaboration of any systematic project to “narrate” the nation at that time. And yet, already in the 1810s and 1820s, there were incipient signs of the construction of new collective identities as part of the political struggle. The first such signs are visible in the 1810s in the use of official papers, still carrying the signs of Spanish imperial rule, with the added inscription “4th and 5th years of The Liberty.” A similar token of the construction of a new collective identity in the Artigas camp was the use of playing cards with the written mottos, “Long live the Fatherland” (viva la Pátria) or “With persistence and fatigue, Artigas liberated his Fatherland” (con la constancia y fatigas, libertó su Pátria Artigas). These were part of a conscious attempt to strengthen the inner conviction of the rebellious camp. Equally illustrative was the January 1816 decision of the “Governing Cabildo” called by Artigas, which admonished against suspicious activities and forced support by demanding that “every Patriot citizen should use a ribbon [with the colors] of the Oriental Province.” A reading of the subsequent political developments indicates how fragile and unstable such popular support was. By the mid-1830s, shortly after independence, we witness popular expressions of nation-building, most significantly led by poets. Similarly to other Spanish American territories emerging into independent life, these expressions were shaped by the publication of anthologies of poetry. El Parnaso Oriental was the name of an anthology compiled by Luciano Lira in 1835. Following the neoclassical style of similar anthologies in Argentina (1824) and Brazil (1829), it attempted to create the nation by the word. It started with a song that would eventually be recognized as the national anthem: “Orientales, la Pátria o la tumba! Libertad o con Gloria morir! ” (“Orientals, the Fatherland or the Tomb! Freedom or a Glorious Death!”). The subject of its discourse was the citizen, envisaged as a universal and public category, from which most feminine voices and all black and indigenous voices were absent. The community was discursively constituted by the act of liberation, signaled by the autonomous subject singing the glory of the free people born in the territory of the Eastern Band of the Uruguay River. Thorny dissent and polemics were silenced, and an image of the unity and harmony of those belonging to the nation and struggling for its freedom was projected as mimicry to reality. A nation in the making seems already under way. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The role of Artigas, the jefe of the Orientales between 1811 and 1820, as founder of the nation was particularly open to controversy. Starting with denigration led by his enemies in Buenos Aires, a black legend was constructed of Artigas as a failing autocratic and even a despotic caudillo. In Uruguay, with few exceptions, the leader in exile was mostly ignored until his death in 1850. During the demands for the repatriation of his remains and the ceremonies surrounding his reburial on Uruguayan soil in 1856, his image was brought to apotheosis as “the founder of the Oriental independence,” the “patriarch of Liberty,” and finally “the founder of the Oriental nationality.” The latter term was of relatively recent coinage, having been used for the first time by the young intellectual Andrés Lamas in 1838, under the influence of new Romantic ideas. The black legend of Artigas was reinvigorated by the 1880s, especially with the publication of the work of Francisco Berra (1866–1895). It was paralleled by the defense and near beatification of Artigas in some official and academic circles. By September 1884, the Congress declared the day of his death a day of national mourning. By the early 1950s these early trends crystallized into a national cult of Artigas, soon to be critically evaluated by works of historical revisionism, which were drafted with renewed strength after the end of the military interregnum and the return to democracy in 1985.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation After independence, the ruling elites encouraged immigration. In the period 1835–1842 alone, an estimated 30,000 to 48,000 immigrants arrived to join a country that had only 74,000 inhabitants in 1830. The influx of immigrants contributed to population growth: the number of inhabitants grew to 132,000 by 1852 and to 438,000 by 1879. Immigrants constituted 48 percent of the population in 1860 and 68 percent in 1868. Large landed estates or latifundias still predominated in the countryside, and husbandry recovered after its decline in the civil wars. Yet society became more differentiated, especially in the urban centers. By 1853 there were in Montevideo 2,200 merchants and manufacturers, 80 percent of whom were “foreigners,” that is, had been born abroad. Worker unions and philanthropic and philosophical organizations proliferated, especially after 1870. In parallel, the city modernized: gas services were installed in 1853; the first bank opened its doors in 1857; sewage works were initiated in 1860; a telegraph was run in 1866; railroads to the interior were started in 1869; running water was available in 1871; an arts section was created in the National Museum in 1872; and a society for the promotion of science and the arts was founded in 1876. A new generation came of age in the 1860s and 1870s and combined new models of bourgeois privacy and public activism, replicating European upper-class claims and standards. Modernizing landowners established in 1871 a Rural Association charged with the task of improving livestock-raising techniques, and they soon gained considerable influN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ence on policy makers. A huge gap separated the upper classes from the lower classes, who lived in rented quarters and multiroom, crowded buildings (casas de inquilinos and conventillos). A similar gap persisted separating natives from immigrants and rural from urban sectors. The 1870s and 1880s witnessed a plethora of decisions aimed at the creation of some sort of “civil religion” to support an increasingly secularized state and society. Civic institutions were created to replace the role played by religious ones, and civic liturgies and rituals were launched. Sacredness was transferred from the religious to the secular public realm with, for example, legislation aimed at minimizing religious formation in state schools, creation of a civil state register, establishment of civil matrimony as obligatory and previous to religious marriage, the law of secondary and high education that established state control over educational institutions, and the decision to close monasteries. In parallel, the political class promoted a melting-pot vision through an expanding educational system that raised the standards of literacy. They aimed at instilling a sense of nationality and common destiny, constructed in terms that traced the notion of Oriental nationality back in history to Artigas and the founding fathers of the independent state. This project came to its completion under the rule of José Battle y Ordóñez in the early 20th century, which upheld civilian rule and instilled the values of citizenship, republicanism, and consensus across all segments of the population. Selected Bibliography Achugar, Hugo, ed. 1998. La fundación por la palabra: Letra y nación en América Latina en el siglo XIX. Montevideo, Uruguay: Universidad de la República, FHCE. Ardao, Arturo. 2001. ¿Desde cuando el culto artiguista? Montevideo, Uruguay: Biblioteca de Marcha. Barran, José Pedro, Gerardo Caetano, and Teresa Porzecanski, eds. 1996. Historias de la vida privada. Vols. 1 and 2. Montevideo, Uruguay: Santillana. Demasi, Carlos. 1995. “La dictadura militar: un tema pendiente.” In Uruguay: Cuentas pendientes, edited by Alvaro Rico, 29–55. Montevideo, Uruguay: Trilce. Halperin Donghi, Tulio. 2002. “Party and Nation-State in the Construction of Collective Identities: Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century.” In The Collective and the Public in Latin America, edited by Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog, 158–173. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press. McLean, David. 1995. War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire. Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836–1853. London: British Academic Press. Pivel Devoto, Juan E. 1994. Historia de los partidos políticos en el Uruguay. 2 vols. Montevideo, Uruguay: Ediciones de la Cámara de Representantes. Street, John. 1959. Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vázquez Franco, Guillermo. 1994. La historia y sus mitos. Montevideo, Uruguay: Cal y canto. Verdesio, Gustavo. 2001. Forgotten Conquests : Rereading New World History from the Margins. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

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Note: Page numbers in bold indicate a main entry for that subject, and numbers in italic refer to the sidebar text on that page. Aasen, Ivar, 226 Abacha, Sani, 1188 Abayomi, Kofo, 1180 Abbas, Ferhat, 1099 Abbas, Gulam, 1763 Abbas, Mahmoud, 1142 Abbas II (Egypt), 261 Abbas the Great, Shah, 1108, 1113 Abd-ul-Ilah, 1745 Abdallah, King (Transjordan), 728, 729 Abdelkader, Emir, 1098, 1099, 1102 Abduh, Muhammad, 731 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman Empire), 764, 765 Abdullah, Farooq, 1767, 1768, 1770 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 1142 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, 1761, 1761, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766–1767 Abiola, Moshood, 1188 Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 1847, 1851 Aborigines, Australian, 932. See also Pan-Aboriginalism Abrams, Lynn, 53 Abyssinia, 736–737, 739 Aceh, 954, 1468, 1734 Achebe, Chinua, 913, 914, 917, 920, 921, 925 Acton, Lord, 687 Adams, Abigail, 50 Adenauer, Konrad, 947, 973–974, 1549 Adivar, Halide Edib, 770 Afghanistan, 1683–1695, 1684 (map) and education, 1388–1389 Germany and terrorists in, 1554 invasion of, 1497 and music, 1440 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Soviet Union, 954 and terrorism, 1488 and women, 904, 1457 Aflaq, Michel, 731, 732, 733, 981, 1740 Africa and colonialism, 890 education in, 39–40, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 431 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence/separatist movements in, 1461, 1464, 1468–1469

literature/language in, 919–920, 925–927 and music, 1440 and religion, 108 and socialism, 980–981 supranational organizations and, 962, 965 See also specific African nations African Americans, 493–494 Afrikaner nationalism, 1144–1153 Afzelius, Arvid August, 73 Agathangelos, 1706 Aghulon, Maurice, 49 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 1245 Aguirre, José Antonio, 1515–1516 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar, 1741 Ahmad Shah, 1686, 1691 Ahmadinejad, Mahmmoud, 1117 Ahmed, Imam, 739, 743 Aho, Juhani, 605 Aidoo, Ama Ata, 927 Aizawa Seishisai, 810–811, 813–814, 814, 815 Akbar, 802 Akçura, Yusuf, 766, 770, 771, 773 Akhmatova, Anna, 1074 Akhmetov, Renat, 1625 Aksakov, K. S., 692 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 261 al-Alayili, Shaykh Abdallah, 732, 733 al-Azmah, Yusuf, 728 al-Azmeh, Aziz, 725 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hasan, 756 al-Banna, Hassan, 984, 985 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 731, 981 al-Bustani, Butrus, 731 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1139 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim, 1136 al-Husri, Sati, 730, 732–733, 751 al-Jawahiri, Mohammad Mahdi, 1740 al-Jazairi, Amir Abd al-Qadir, 727 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 753 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman, 727 al-Miqdadi, Darwish, 734 al-Nashshashibi, Raghib, 1136 Al Qaeda, 986–987, 1484, 1488, 1492 and Pakistan, 1232 al-Qaysi, Nuri Ali Hammudi, 1741 Al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, 1488–1489

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I-2 al-Said, Nuri, 753 al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Adb, 984 Alamán, Lucas, 352 Albéniz, Isaac, 1437 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 275, 276 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 840, 840 (illus.), 841, 844, 845, 846 Alem, Leandro, 281 Alevi, 1650–1651, 1653, 1654–1655 Alexander I, Czar (Russia), 20–21, 209, 211, 1576 Alexander I (Bulgaria), 578 Alexander II, Czar (Russia), 210, 598 Alexander III, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Alford, Kenneth J., 1442 Alfred the Great, King (England), 165 Algeria, 1094–1105, 1096 (map) and colonialism, 48 diaspora population of, 1371 and France, 1050–1051 and independence, 1464, 1490 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1496 and women, 903 Ali, Monica, 927 Ali, Muhammad, 258–259, 263 Aliyev, Heidar, 1715, 1720 Aliyev, Ilham, 1715 Allende, Salvador, 331 Almirall, Valentí, 703, 710 Alsace, 475, 1501–1510, 1503 (map) Althusser, Louis, 486, 1052 Amami Island, 1754 Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 1684, 1686, 1688, 1689 Amazon basin, 1827–1831, 1829 Ambedkar, B. R., 802, 1204–1205 Ambrose, Stephen, 905 American Revolution, 21 and Canada, 299 and education, 32 gender roles and, 45–46, 50 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 Americanization, and Puerto Rico, 841 Americas and language, 478 and music, 75–76, 1432 nationalism and gender in, 44 See also Central America; North America; South America Amharanization, 739, 741, 742 Amin, Hafizullah, 1687 Amir, Yigal, 1400, 1403 Amrane-Minne, Daniele Djamila, 903 Anatolian movement, 1646, 1646 Andersen, Hans Christian, 228 Anderson, Benedict, 25 and diaspora populations, 1368–1369, 1370

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and the “imagined political community,” 475, 481, 912, 1342 and Latin America, 826 and national symbols, 122, 900 on print technology, 129, 485, 1475 on the realistic novel, 923 on “young” and “youth,” 1859 Andic, Helmut, 545 Andrade, Mário de, 1662, 1662 Angell, Norman, 532 Anger, Carl, 228 Anglo-Boer Wars, 198, 204, 449, 490, 1146 and Canada, 305–306, 306 Anglo-Burmese wars, 776 Anglo-Chinese war, 27 Anglo-Nepal war, 1805 Angola, 968, 1657–1667, 1658 (map) and Cuba, 1285 and independence, 1464 Anjala Conspiracy, 223 Ankara, Turkey, 770–772 Anthem, national, 68, 116, 117, 1430, 1431, 1442–1444 and Basques, 1521 and Belgium, 145 and Brazil, 294 and Burma, 782 and Canada, 303 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and the EU, 1042 and France, 175, 1502 and Germany, 619 and Indonesia, 1732 and Japan, 1756, 1757 and Mexico, 354 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 1184, 1186–1187 and Poland, 211, 215 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 230, 230 and the United States, 1308 and Uruguay, 401 Anthias, Floya, 902 Anti-Catholicism, and England, 163, 166 Anti-free-trade movements, 1448 Anti-Semitism, 439, 447, 517, 520–521, 907 and Bulgaria, 582 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and France, 179 and Hungary, 639, 645 in Turkey, 1649 and Ukraine, 1078 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Zionism as reaction to, 1121, 1128 Antiabortion movement, 1446

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Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism, 912–928, 957–970 and Algeria, 1095, 1100 and Angola, 1658, 1664 and Burma, 777, 779, 780–781, 782, 783 and China, 1191, 1193, 1196, 1198–1199, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157–1158, 1163 and Gandhi, 1203 and India, 131, 796, 800–801 and Iran, 1110, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 753, 1739, 1740 and Malaysia, 1216 and nationalism, 26–27, 47–48, 486–487, 1461–1465 and Nigeria, 1178–1179 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 840 and Vietnam, 1269 and women’s rights, 457 Anticommunism, 520, 1310, 1394 Anticosmopolitanism, 415 Antinuclear-power movements, 1449 Antiracist movements, 1457 Antislavery, 161, 163 Antwerp, Belgium, 200 Apartheid, 1151–1153 Appadurai, Arjun, 136, 1374–1375 Aquino, Benigno, 1242, 1242 Aquino, Corazon (Cory), 1242, 1242, 1244 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 729, 1125, 1129, 1135, 1136, 1139–1140 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 1137, 1394–1395 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 1039 Arab League, 726 (map) Arab nationalism, 724–734, 726 (map), 965, 981 and Iraq, 751–752, 753, 754, 754, 757–758, 1739 Arabs, in Turkey, 1650–1651 Arafat, Yasir, 1136–1137, 1141, 1142, 1488–1489 Aral Sea, 882 Arana, Sabino de, 704, 709, 710, 1515 Arason, Jón, 228 Araucanian Indians, 323, 324–326 Arcand, Denys, 1294 Arce, Mariano José, 317–318 Architecture, 30, 37, 407–408, 409, 413, 414–415 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Brussels, 144 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1024 and Malaysia, 1224 and Russia, 692–693 and Turkey, 770–771 Arena y Goiri, Sabino, 1294 Argentina, 268–281, 270 (map) and film, 1335 immigration and national identity in, 492 and music, 1439, 1443 national identity and education in, 39 Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 755 Arif, Abd al-Salam, 754–755 Aristocracy, 5–9

Aristotle, 529 Armageddon, 1394 Armenia, 1696–1711, 1698 (map) and Azerbaijan, 1719 and diaspora populations, 1376 and the Soviet Union, 946 Armenian Apostolic Church, 1699–1700, 1701 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 1718–1719. See also Gharabagh conflict ethnic cleansing/genocide of, 438, 523 and the Ottoman Empire, 764, 765 and Turkey, 1648–1649 Arminius (Hermann), 618 Armstrong, John, 1368 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 187, 1504 Arne, Thomas, 1438 Arnim, Achim von, 73 Arnold, Matthew, 915 Árpád (chief), 643 Art, 16–17, 49, 405–409, 412–417 and Australia, 859–860 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1522 and Canada, 305, 1841 and Finland, 605 and France, 177 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569 historic paintings of Denmark, 154 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127 and the Maori, 1860 and Mongolia, 1794 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Poland, 212, 216, 682 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 402 and Wales, 1637 See also Culture; Landscape Artigas, José Gervasio, 397–398, 401, 402 Asbjørnsen, Peter C., 228 Ashoka, Emperor (India), 802, 1815–1816 Asia and education, 39–40, 428 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence movements in, 1461–1463, 1465–1468 and language, 478 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Asian countries Asquith, Herbert, 868 Assimilation, 29, 522, 931–932 and Australian Aborigines, 858 and China, 1196, 1199 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 and Ethiopia, 744–746

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Assimilation (continued ) and Hungary, 644 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 866 and Poland, 685 and the Sami, 1612–1613 and Turkey, 768, 1647, 1652 and Ukrainians, 716 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Education Asylum and the EU, 1042 and Germany, 1556, 1557, 1558–1559 See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Atahualpa, 373 Atatürk. See Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) Atlee, Clement, 1461 Atwood, Margaret, 1841 Auber, Daniel, 144 Audubon, John James, 389 Augustina of Aragon, 51 Aung San, 784, 785 (illus.) Aung San Suu Kyi, 784 Austin, John, 1372 Australia, 849–860, 851 (map) and Aborigines, 932, 1844–1853 communication in, 1473 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1375 and education, 1379, 1382 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigration, 883, 1420–1421 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 Macedonians in, 1415 and music, 1439 and new social movements, 1448 and New Zealand, 865 Austria, 539–554, 543 (map) education and, 33–34, 35, 36, 429 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 442 fascism in, 516 and German unification, 192 and Hungary, 638 and Poland, 210 politics and political philosophy in, 535, 1410 Austro-Hungarian empire. See Habsburg empire Autonomy, 899, 939–940 and Armenia, 1698 and Basques, 1516, 1517, 1522 and Catalonia, 1536, 1544–1547 and China, 1200 and the EU, 1041–1042 and Greenland, 1562–1563 and minorities, 1357–1358 and Nepal, 1805 and Pakistan, 1232 and Poland, 679 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 843, 845–847 and Spain, 707, 707–708, 708, 711, 1084–1085, 1088, 1090–1091

Avellaneda, Nicolas, 280 Awolowo, Obafemi, 1180, 1182, 1182, 1183 Ayala, Julio César Turbay, 833 Ayubi, Nazih, 734 Azaña, Manuel, 705 Azerbaijan, 469, 1713–1721, 1714 (map) and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1078–1079 and Turkey, 769 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 1180, 1180, 1183 Aznar, José María, 1544 Aznavour, Charles, 1707 Aztecs, 345–346, 351–352 Ba Maw, 779–780, 785 Ba’ath Party, 731, 981 and Iraq, 753, 754, 756, 1740–1741, 1743, 1745, 1746 Babangida, Ibrahim, 1188 Babenberg monarchy, 539–541 Babenco, Hector, 1334–1335 Babeuf, François-Noël, 1489 Bache, Otto, 228 Bachyns’kyi, Yulian, 722 Bacon, Sir Francis, 61 Bagehot, Walter, 162–163 Bahais, 1113, 1118 Bainimarama, Frank, 1324, 1325 Bakongo, 1660–1664, 1664 Bakshi, Gulam Mohammad, 1766 Baku, 1716 Bakunin, M., 38 Balakirev, Mili, 75, 79, 80, 82, 1437 Baldorioty de Castro, Román, 839 Balearic Islands, 1546 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 1183, 1185 Bali, 1440 Balkan nations, 435, 436 Balkan Wars, 437 and Bulgaria, 572, 580 and Turkey, 1645 Baltic states, 555–568, 559 (map), 1573 (map) independence, 503 and new social movements, 1449 racism in the, 518 and the Soviet Union, 946, 955, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1581–1582 Bancroft, George, 389 Bandaranaike, Nathan, 1467 Bandera, Stepan, 718, 1624 Bandung Conference (1955), 958–962, 964–965, 1206 Bangladesh, 1201, 1234, 1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1466 Bano, Shah, 1209 Bao Dai, 1264 Barassi, Ron, 857 Barbosa, José Celso, 839, 841 Barceló, Antonio, 840 Barcelona, 1539–1540

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Barker, Ernest, 531–532, 535 Baron, Beth, 264 Barons, Krišj¯anis, 564, 1577, 1577, 1578 Barrès, Maurice, 416 Barrios, Agustín (“Mangoré”), 365, 365 Barruel, Abbé, 45 Barry, Brian, 97 Barry, Sir Charles, 408 Barthes, Roland, 1052 Bartók, Béla, 1435 Basanáviˇcius, Father Jonas, 567 Basarab, 1592 Basedow, Johann, 34 B˘asescu, Traian, 1589 Basques, 1512–1524, 1514 (map) concessions to, 932 and cultural survival, 878 and the ETA, 1090, 1091–1092 and language, 477, 482 and the mixing of ethnic and civic nationalisms, 938–939 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1470, 1471 and Spain, 702–711, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1496 Batavian Republic, 197, 198 Batista, Fulgencio, 1276, 1277 Batman, John, 1845 Battle of Kosovo (1389), 100 Battle of Maysalun, 728 Battle of Yungay, 327–328 Battle y Ordóñez, José, 403 Bauer, Otto, 535, 1071 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1368 Baumer, Gertrude, 453 Bavaria, 621, 631 Beatrix, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Becker, Nikolas, 189–190 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 16, 117, 185, 186–187, 1431, 1432 Beg, Mirza, 1763 Begin, Menachem, 1488–1489 Bejarano, Jorge, 830 Belarusia, 1079 Belaúnde, Victor Andrés, 373, 375 Belgian Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Belgium, 137–146, 141 (map) colonialist policies of, 958, 968, 1464 and Congo/Zaïre, 437, 1156–1158, 1160 fascism in, 517 and language, 472 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1678 secession from the Netherlands, 197 Bello, Ahmadu, 1182, 1185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 1099, 1100 Ben Bouali, Hassiba, 1099 Ben-Gurion, David, 953, 1123, 1128 Bendjedid, Chadli, 1099 Beneš, Edvard, 587, 588, 588, 596, 596 (illus.), 1017 and World War II, 595, 1019

Bengalil, 1466 Benkheddda, Benyoucef, 1100 Bennett, Louise, 913, 921 Bennett, Robert Russell, 1433 Bentham, Jeremy, 19, 855 Berbers, 1101 Berg, Christian, 153 Berkl¯aus, Edvards, 1578 Berlin, Isaiah, 97 Berlioz, Hector, 1431, 1435 Bernstein, Leonard, 1439 Berra, Francisco, 402 Betances, Ramón Emeterio, 839–840, 841 Bethlen, Count István, 638 Bhabha, Homi, 914, 927 Bhanubhakta Acharya, 1807 Bhimsen Thapa, 1806–1807 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 1466 Bhutto, Benazir, 1231, 1398 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 1231, 1767 Biafra, 1469 Biblical texts, 473–474 Biculturalism, and the Maori, 1858–1859 Biehl, Janet, 882–883 Bierstadt, Albert, 65, 389 Billig, Michael, 121, 479 bin-Laden, Osama, 986–987, 1399, 1400 Bingham, George Caleb, 389 Biogenetics, 883 Bioregionalism, 879 Birendra, King (Nepal), 1808, 1809 Bismarck, Otto von, 24, 150, 192–193, 436, 611 and Alsace, 1505 monuments to, 410–411 and Poland, 678 Bjørnson, Bjørnstjerne, 78, 228, 230 Blake, Christopher, 1439 Blanc, Louis, 239 Blest Gana, Alberto, 329 Block, Alexander, 1602 Bluetooth, Harald, 226 Boer Wars. See Anglo-Boer Wars Boers. See Afrikaner nationalism Bohemia, 584, 1022 and Hussitism, 1023 and music, 1435–1436 Boland, Eavan, 926 Bolger, Dermot, 927 Bolivar, Simón, 16, 272, 370, 825, 831 Bolivia, 371–372, 1443 Bolognesi, Francisco, 377 Bolshevik Revolution, 436, 520, 593 Bolsheviks, and religion, 106 Bonald, Louis de, 178, 179 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 16, 26, 34, 175, 176–177, 474 as father figure, 51 and the French national anthem, 1443 and Haiti, 336 and Switzerland, 248

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Boniface, Pope, 100 Bonifacio, Andres, 1245–1246 Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José, 287–289, 290, 292 Borden, Robert, 306 Borders, 460–461, 966, 967, 968 and Afghanistan, 1684–1685, 1689 in Africa, 1464, 1469 and Algeria, 1096 and Armenia, 1697–1699, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 562–563, 1582 and Basque Country, 1513, 1514 (map) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 289, 1831 and Bulgaria, 574 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 298 in Central America, 316 and the collapse of communism, 1413 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Denmark, 152 and Egypt, 262 and Ethiopia, 740, 742 and the European Union, 1042 and Fiji, 1318 and Finland, 598 and France, 175 and Germany, 187–188 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 639–640 and Indonesia, 1729–1730 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1738–1739 and Ireland, 655 and Israel, 1124–1125, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1771 and Japan, 1753 and language, 471, 474–475, 477 Mexican, 353 (map) and Mongolia, 1792 and Nepal, 1805 and the Netherlands, 199 and Paraguay, 359, 362 and Peru, 368, 371 and Poland, 212–213, 685 and Romania, 1591 and Russia, 1599 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669 and Scandinavia, 225 and Scotland, 236 and South Africa, 1145 Spain/France, 1513 and Taiwan, 1255 and Turkey, 768, 769, 1647 and Ukraine, 713–714, 719, 1620 and the United States, 390, 1390 and Uruguay, 395 and Wales, 1636 and the War of the Pacific, 376 (map)

after World War I, 514, 524 See also Expansionism Borglum, Gutzon, 65, 411 Borneo, 1218–1220 Borodin, Aleksandr, 78–79, 82, 417, 1437 Bosanquet, Bernard, 534–535 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 806 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1358, 1409, 1525–1535, 1526 (map) Bosse, Abraham, 62 Botero, Fernando, 832 Botev, Hristo, 573, 576–577 Botha, Pieter Willem, 1152 Botswana, 1443 Bouchard, Lucien, 1292 Boudiaf, Mohammed, 1099 Boudicca, Queen (England), 165 Bouhired, Djamila, 1099 Boumaza, Djamila, 1099 Boumedienne, Houari, 890, 1099, 1100, 1100 Boundaries. See Borders Boupacha, Djamila, 1099 Bourassa, Henri, 306, 1289, 1293–1294, 1296 Bourassa, Robert, 1291 Bourbon reforms, 350, 371 Bourgeoisie, 12, 585, 626. See also Elites Bourguiba, Habib, 1464 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 1099, 1100 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 333, 337, 340, 342 Bracken, Thomas, 868 Bradley, F. H., 531 Bradman, Sir Donald, 857 Brahms, Johannes, 117 Brandt, Willy, 976 Brathwaite, Kamau, 917, 921 Brazil, 282–297, 284 (map), 1824–1832, 1826 (map) and the Amazon, 876 and the arts, 1334–1335, 1439 and colonialism, 889 and Uruguay, 396–397 Brazilian Portuguese, 478 Brentano, Clemens, 73 Bretagne, 1490 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1026, 1076–1077 Brinker, Hans, 204 Bristow, George, 76 British North America Act, 300, 300 Britishness, 159, 162, 167 and Scotland, 233 Britten, Benjamin, 1434 Brock, Sir Isaac, 304 Brooklyn Bridge, 128, 134 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom, 164 Brussels, 144 Buddhism and Asian political identity, 972 and Burma, 779, 780 and Japan, 106 and Mongolia, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1798

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and politics, 983, 988 and Tibet, 1815–1817, 1821, 1822 Buenos Aires, 395–396, 397 Buhari, Muhammadu, 1187 Bulgakov, M. A., 697 Bulgaria, 437, 570–582 Bull, John, 117 Burghers, Thomas, 1150 Buriats, 1784, 1785, 1788–1795, 1791 Burke, Edmund, 89, 162, 1489 Burlington, Lord, 62 Burma, 776–785, 1370 Burnley, I. H., 883 Burns, E. Bradford, 292 Burns, Robert, 73, 238 Burschenschaften, 187 Burundi. See Rwanda and Burundi Bush, George H. W., 1306, 1395 Bush, George W., 1306, 1347, 1395–1396, 1453 Bushnell, David, 834 Bustamante, Carlos María de, 350, 352 Byron, Lord, 631 Cabero, Alberto, 330 Cabinda, 1660 Cabral, Amílcar, 1661 Cáceres, Andrés A., 377 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth, 53, 57 Cakobau, King (Fiji), 1318 Calhoun, John C., 390 Caliphate, 760–761 Cambó, Francesc, 706, 710 Cambodia, 1463 Camden, William, 61 Camphausen, Wilhelm, 408 Canada, 298–307, 301 (map), 1289 (map), 1372, 1834–1842, 1836 (map) communication in, 1473 education and, 424, 428, 429, 1383–1384 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigrants/immigration, 1415, 1418–1419, 1420 and indigenous groups, 1566 and music, 1441 and national symbols, 1344, 1346, 1347–1348 and natural resources, 884 and Nunavut, 1562 and Québec, 1288–1297 railroad in, 127 and sports, 993, 1000–1001 and technology, 1477–1478 Canal, Boisrond, 338 Cannadine, David, 1009 Capitalism and Korea, 1778–1779 and Social Democrats, 976 See also Economy; Globalization Captaincy General of Guatemala, 310, 314 Carbó, Eduardo Posada, 834 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 1829

Carducci, Giousè, 671 Carey, Henry, 117 Caribbean, 838 (map), 1274 (map) Carmichel, Franklin, 1841 Carnegie, Andrew, 239 Carpathian Ukraine, 716 Carr, E. H., 23, 536–537 Carr, Emily, 1841 Carrera, José Miguel, 326 Carrera, Rafael, 315, 318 Carretero, Luis, 711 Carter, Jimmy, 1395 Cartier, Georges-Etienne, 1288 Cartography. See Maps Castile, 1083, 1537 Castilla, Ramón, 372 Castillo, Florencio, 317 Castro, Arturo, 830 Castro, Fidel, 834, 942, 952, 1276, 1278–1279, 1278 (illus.), 1279, 1286 Castro, Raúl, 1279, 1286 Catalonia, 1413, 1415, 1536–1547, 1538 (map) and language, 477 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1091 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and Spain, 702–711, 708, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1490 Catherine the Great, 19–20 Catholicism. See Eastern Orthodox Church; Roman Catholicism Caupolicán (chief), 326 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 669, 673 Ceau¸sescu, Nicolae, 952, 1585, 1589, 1591, 1594 Cederström, Gustaf, 228 ˇ Celakovský, František Ladislav, 73 Celis, Carlos Uribe, 832 Celman, Miguel Juárez, 280 Celtic languages, 471, 472, 477 Celts, 236–237 Central America, 309–321, 312 (map), 838 (map), 1274 (map) Central American Common Market, 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 896, 1746, 1821 Ceremonies, 1347–1348 and Burma, 782 and France, 176 and Iran, 1114–1115 and nationalistic art, 411, 417 See also Holidays/festivals Cervantes, Ignacio, 76 Césaire, Aimé, 488, 917, 919 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de, 1275, 1282 Chabrier, Emmanuel, 1437 Chaco War, 360, 363, 365 Chadwick, George, 76 Chamberlain, H. St., 41 Channing, Edward Tyrell, 389 Charents, Yeghishe, 1707 Charles III (Spain), 350

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Charles V (Habsburg), 196 Charles XII (Sweden), 226 Charrúas Indians, 394 Chartists, 161, 164 Chatterji, Bankimchandra, 800 Chaudhry, Mahendra, 1323, 1324 Chaves, Julio César, 364 Chávez, Carlos, 76, 1439 Che Guevara, Ernesto, 942, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1286 Chechens, ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 441 Chechnya and Russia, 897, 1080, 1597, 1605–1607 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 Chen Duxiu, 789, 793 Chen Shui-bian, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1259 Chenrezig (God of Compassion), 1816, 1817 Chernobyl disaster, 954, 1078, 1457 Cherono, Stephen (Saif Saeed Shaheen), 1001 Chiang K’ai-shek, 791, 792, 794, 1250, 1251, 1251 (illus.) Chibás, Eduardo, 1282 Chile, 39, 323–331, 325 (map) and Peru, 377 China, 787–795, 788 (map), 1190–1200, 1192 (map) and Angola, 1664 anticolonialism in, 27 and the Cold War, 942–943 and colonialism, 890 and communism/Maoism, 952, 977, 978 and diaspora populations, 1372–1373 education and, 426, 1386–1387 and film, 1339 and India, 1210 and Indonesia, 1729 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762 and Japan, 809, 815, 1749, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 and Korea, 1780, 1781 and language, 472, 478, 481 and Mongolia, 1784, 1785, 1786–1788, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1794, 1795–1796 and music, 1440 and population transfers, 876 and religion, 108 separatism within, 1468 and the Soviet Union, 948, 979 and Taiwan, 1251, 1252–1253, 1256, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1462 and Tibet, 1813, 1814–1815, 1818–1821, 1823 and the United States, 1395 and Vietnam, 1263, 1266 Chinese in Japan, 1753 in Malaysia, 1215, 1216, 1385, 1463 in New Zealand, 867 See also Singapore Chipenda, Daniel, 1662, 1662 Cho Man Sik, 1773

Choibalsang, Marshal (Mongolia), 1789, 1792, 1797, 1798 Choinom, R., 1794 Chopin, Frédéric, 74, 81, 212, 214, 216, 686, 1434–1435 Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 1078, 1626 Chou Wen-chung, 1440 Choueiri, Youssef, 730 Christian III (Denmark), 226 Christian IV (Denmark), 226 Christian Coalition, 1395 Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International, 973–975 Christianity and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1706 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and Fiji, 1318 and fundamentalism, 1392, 1393 and the Philippines, 1239 and South Africa, 1148–1149 See also specific Christian religions Christophe, Henry, 337, 340 Chrysanthemum Revolution, 638 Chubais, Anatoly, 1597 Church, Frederic Edwin, 65 Churchill, Winston, 950, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1034, 1461 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 1283 Cinema, 133, 417–418, 497, 1327–1340 and Algeria, 1102 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and France, 1053 and Mongolia, 1794 and Québec, 1294 related to World War II, 1434 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1675 and the Soviet Union, 1075–1076 and the United States, 951–952 See also Theater Cintrón, Rosendo Matienzo, 841, 845–846 Citizenship, 930, 934–936 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 1851 and the Baltic states, 568 and Brazil, 293 and Canada, 298, 1835 and Central America, 320 and Czech Republic, 1027 and Denmark, 154–155 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1366, 1371–1372, 1374, 1376 and the EU, 1041, 1042 and forms of nationalism, 488, 1354 and France, 171, 1050 and gender/sexuality, 444, 446, 909 and Germany, 188, 620, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559 and globalization, 1409

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and Haiti, 335, 338 and immigration, 1419–1420 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 669 and Japan, 1752, 1753 and Malaysia, 1216, 1217, 1223 and Mongolia, 1796, 1798 and Peru, 371, 372–373 and Poland, 207 and Puerto Rico, 836, 843 and Ukraine, 1624 and the United States, 1398, 1401 and Uruguay, 400–401 and Wales, 1639 ˇ Ciurlionis, Mikolajus Konstantinas, 565 Civil rights movement, U.S., 124, 944, 965, 1300–1303, 1304, 1305, 1310 Civil war and Angola, 968, 1658–1659, 1663, 1666 and China, 790 and collapse of communism, 895, 896 and Colombia, 829, 833, 834 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Iraq, 757 and newly independent states, 968 and Nigeria, 967, 1185, 1185 and Palestine, 1142–1143 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and Spain, 707, 711, 1088 and the United States, 382, 391 See also Conflict/violence Civilis, Gaius Julius, 203 Class, 1–12 and Afghanistan, 1692–1693 and Angola, 1661 and Argentina, 280 and Brazil, 285 and Bulgaria, 571 and Catalan nationalism, 1537–1538 and Central America, 311 and Chile, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330–331 and China, 1194–1195, 1195, 1196, 1197 education, nationalism, and, 423, 427, 431, 478–479, 481 and Egypt, 265 and ethnic conflict, 892–893, 895, 897–898 and Finland, 601 gender, nationalism, and, 55–56 and Germany, 611 and Great Britain, 163–164 and Greece, 625 and Haiti, 334, 339 and Hungary, 644–645 and India, 131, 1204–1205 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 755, 1739 and Italy, 669–670 and Mongolia, 1795 and Québec, 1292–1293 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222

and social movements, 1452, 1454, 1456 and Soviet ideology, 693–694 and Spain, 709 and the United States, 1305 and Uruguay, 397, 403 Clavigero, Francisco Xavier, 350, 351, 351 Clay, Henry, 388–389 Clientelism, Iraq and, 750, 750–751, 755, 755, 756 Clifford, James, 1368 Clinton, William, 1408 Cloots, Anacharsis, 86 Clos, Joan, 1541 Coates, Eric, 1433 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 516 Cohen, Leonard, 1296 Cohen, Robin, 1672 Cohn, Roy, 908 Cold War, 525, 942–956, 975–979 and Angola, 1658 and Austria, 550 and Canada, 1840 and Eritrea, 1174 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 442 Europe and the end of the, 1043–1044 and Great Britain, 1012 and Indonesia, 1733, 1734 and Italy, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750 and Korea, 1772, 1773 and the Philippines, 1241 and separatist movements, 1465 and sexuality, 907–908 and sports, 994 and Tibet, 1821 and the United States, 1039, 1303, 1310 See also Nonaligned movement Cole, Thomas, 389 Collins, Bob, 1849 Colombel, Noel, 338 Colombia, 39, 824–834, 827 (map) Colonialism/imperialism, 25, 26, 489, 530, 958, 1301, 1303 and Algeria, 1098 and Angola, 1659 and Arab nationalism, 728–729, 734 and Australia, 855 and Basques, 1513 and Brazil, 283–285 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 299 and Chile, 323–324 and China, 1190 and Congo/Zaïre, 1156–1158, 1160 and diaspora populations, 1364 education and, 419, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 430, 431 and England/Great Britain, 161, 165–167, 490–491, 1005–1007 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737–740

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Colonialism/imperialism (continued ) and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889, 893 and European nationalism, 513–514 and Fiji, 1314–1316 and France, 178, 1050–1051, 1056 and gender, 54–55, 447–448 and Germany, 621 and Greenland, 1566, 1568 and Haiti, 339 and indigenous cultures, 1337 and Indochina, 1264 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1730 and Iraq, 749 and Italy, 665, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 815, 821–822, 1749, 1751 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language/literature, 479–480, 912–913, 914–917 and the Maori, 1859 and the Netherlands, 197–198 and Nigeria, 1178 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 and sports, 992 and Taiwan, 1253 and technology, 1478–1480 and terrorism, 1490 and Third World nationalisms, 1776 and the United States, 1310 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Expansionism Comenius, Jan Amos, 1028 Commonwealth Games, 996–997 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1079, 1715 Communication, 1473–1476 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 279 and Australia, 852 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and Basques, 1521 and Central America, 311, 315 and Colombia, 833 and globalization, 1414, 1416–1417 and ideologies, 972 and immigrants/diaspora populations, 1370, 1427 and India, 800 and Iraq, 1738 and Mexico, 354, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and New Zealand, 865 and Paraguay, 364 and Peru, 368

and the Philippines, 1238, 1247 and Polish nationalism, 216 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavian nationalism, 229 symbols in, 112, 122–123 technological advances in, 127–128, 129, 132, 135–136 and the United States, 388–389, 390 and Wales, 1639 See also Media Communism, 468–469, 944 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1689, 1690, 1693 and Angola, 1663 and anticolonial nationalism, 964 and Armenia, 1706, 1707 and Burma, 780 and China, 789–790, 791, 792, 793, 1190–1200, 1191, 1197 and the Cold War, 947–948, 976, 977–979 collapse of, 1413 and Cuba, 1276–1277, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020, 1022–1026 and France, 1053 and Indonesia, 1727, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 and Iraq, 753, 754, 755–756, 1745 and Korea, 1773 and Malaysia, 1216, 1223 and Romania, 1587–1588, 1589 and Singapore, 1218 versus socialism, 975–976 and Ukraine, 718 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1266, 1267, 1269 Companys, Lluís, 708 Compromise Agreement of 1867, 638 Conder, Charles, 859 Condorcet, Jean Marquis de, 53, 86, 370, 1351, 1362 Conflict/violence, 14–28, 436, 888–898, 929 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Algeria, 1095 and Basque nationalism, 1518, 1521 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527 and Brazil, 1831 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and competition among nation-states, 1032–1033 and education, 1388–1389 and Eritrea, 1172–1173, 1174–1175 and Finland, 606–607 and gender roles, 50–52, 449–450 in Germany, 1555, 1556–1557, 1559 and Gharabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh), 897, 1706, 1707–1709, 1711, 1715, 1718–1719 and ideological differences, 943–944, 977, 988–989 and India and Pakistan, 804–806, 950, 987, 1201, 1203, 1228, 1234–1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1461–1462, 1762, 1769

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and Indonesia, 1734 and instability in postindependent nations, 1469 and Iraq, 1742, 1746–1747 and Ireland/Northern Ireland, 649, 651–652, 662, 1058, 1059, 1060–1062, 1068 in Italy, 665 and the loss of optimism, 935–936 and Malaysia, 1216, 1220–1221, 1223 and minority issues, 939–940, 1412 and Mongolia, 1795–1796, 1796–1797 and natural resources/territory, 523–524, 883–886 in New Zealand, 1856–1857 and Nigeria, 1185 and the Ottoman Empire, 763–764 Palestinian/Israeli, 1129–1130, 1141 and the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 985–986, 1403 and rituals of belonging, 499, 503 role of diaspora populations in, 1365, 1415 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1673–1674, 1676–1677, 1679, 1680–1681 and separatism, 1460, 1465–1470, 1470–1471. See also Separatism/secession and South Africa, 1152–1153 and the Soviet Union, 1075, 1078–1079 and sports, 995 and Taiwan, 1256, 1256 and Tibet, 1823 in Turkey, 1649, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 722 and Vietnam, 1463 See also Civil war; Genocide; specific conflicts and wars; Terrorism Confucianism, 1270 Congo and Zaïre, 962–963, 1155–1165, 1156 (map), 1667, 1671–1672 and Angola, 1662 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and music, 1440 and separatist movements, 1469 Congress of Berlin, 578 Congress of Tucuman, 272, 273 Connolly, James, 652, 654 Connor, Walker, 931, 933 Conrad, Joseph, 489 Conscience, Hendrik, 145, 145 Constantinescu, Emil, 1589 Constantino, Renato, 1245 Consumerism and education, 1380 and image technology, 1339 and Korea, 1778–1779 and sports, 1001–1003 “Contract of the Century,” 1720–1721 Cook, James, 1855 Cook, Ramsay, 1842 Cooke, John Esten, 494

Cooper, James Fenimore, 389 Cooper, William, 1851 Copland, Aaron, 1439 Copps, Sheila, 1839 Copts, 265 Corbin, Margaret, 50 Cornejo, Mariano H., 374 Corradini, Enrico, 515 Corruption and Angola, 1665, 1666–1667 and Armenia, 1710 and the collapse of socialism, 895–896 and Congo/Zaïre, 1160 and Cuba, 1275, 1277, 1283 and Iran, 1111 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1768 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Palestinians, 1140, 1142 and the Philippines, 1243, 1244, 1247 and Québec, 1290, 1292 and Russia, 955 and the Soviet Union, 1076, 1079 and Spain, 704, 705, 1088 and Turkey, 1645, 1651 and Ukraine, 1628 Corsica, 1490 Cortés, Hernán, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 86–88, 97, 1350–1362 and Alsace, 1510 challenging cultural, 416 and Chile, 330 and globalization, 1409 and immigration, 1427–1428 versus national identities, 1342 and Russia, 82 Cossacks, 1620–1621 Costa, Emília Viotti da, 292 Costa Rica, 318, 321 Costa y Martínez, Joaquín, 705, 705 Coubertin, Pierre de, 991 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1502 Council of Europe, 1715 Counterterrorism, 1496–1498, 1757 Cowan, Charles, 235 Cox, Oliver, 1301 Coyer, Abbé, 32 Creole patriotism and Chile, 324, 326, 329 and Mexico, 349, 351, 351–352 and Peru, 369–370 Crete, 1440 Crime and Brazil, 1831 and Colombia, 834 and Iraq, 757 and Mongolia, 1797 and Pakistan, 1232 and the Philippines, 1243 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675

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Crime (continued ) versus terrorism, 1485, 1486. See also Terrorism and women, 904–905 See also Corruption Crimea, 1078, 1625 Crispi, Francesco, 737 Croatia borders of, 1413 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440, 524 fascism in, 516, 518 and language, 481 and new social movements, 1449, 1453 Croats, in Bosnia, 1527–1535 Cromer, Lord, 261 Cross, James, 1291 Cuba, 1273–1286 and Angola, 1658, 1663, 1665 and film, 1335 and music, 1441 Cui, Cesar, 82, 1437 Cultural diversity, 877–879. See also Multiculturalism Cultural revivalism, 407 Culture, 88–90, 92–93, 405–418, 506 and Alsace, 1509 and Argentina, 276, 277–279 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 854–856 and the Baltic states, 558–560, 558–561, 1578 and Basques, 705 and Brazil, 291–295, 296, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 575–577 and Canada, 1837–1842, 1843 and Catalonia, 706, 1537, 1542, 1543–1544 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Danish folk high schools, 151 education and standardization of, 420. See also Education and Egypt, 260, 264 and Ethiopia, 741, 742 and Finland, 599, 600 and France, 1050, 1052–1053 geopolitics and national, 461 German versus Austrian, 542–543 and Germany, 184, 186–187, 617–620 globalization and world, 1407. See also Globalization and Greece, 628, 629 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1728 and Ireland, 657–659 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 671–673 and Korea, 1778 and Malaysia, 1223 and the Maori, 1858, 1860 and Mongolia, 1790, 1793–1794, 1797 music in establishing national, 72–73, 76–83

and nationalism, 31, 47, 53, 129–130, 485–487, 1355 and Nepal, 1801 and the Netherlands, 205 and Nigeria, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Paraguay, 358, 362, 365, 365 and Peru, 369–370, 373, 378 and Poland, 212, 214–216, 217 and Puerto Rico, 841–843, 846–847 and Scandinavia, 226–228 and Scotland, 237–239 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 692–696 and technology, 132–134, 1474–1475 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 400, 402 See also Art; Folk culture; Language; Literature; Music Currency and Austria, 552 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 1039 the euro, 1039, 1043, 1044, 1549, 1551 and Finland, 598 and globalization, 1392 and Tibet, 1818 Cuthbert, Betty, 857 Cygnaeus, Fredrik, 601 Cyprus, 1648 Cyrus the Great, 1107, 1113 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 211–212, 213 Czech Republic, 446, 584 and music, 82, 1435–1436, 1441 See also Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, 583–596, 1016–1028 breakup of, 1413 and communism, 977 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441, 442 and geopolitics, 465 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 215 Dahl, C. J., 228 Dahl, Jens Christian, 67 Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso), 988, 1816, 1816, 1819–1820, 1821–1823 Dalin, Olof, 227 Damas, Léon, 488 Dame Te Atairangikaahu, 1857 Dance, 81, 114 and Angola, 1665 and Catalonia, 1543 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Peru, 378 and Wales, 1637

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Danevirke, 152–153 Dangarembga, Tsitsi, 913, 926–927 Danilevski, Nikolai, 93, 94 D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 489, 670 Darcy, Les, 858 Darius the Great (Persia), 1107, 1113, 1697 Darwin, Charles, 40, 462, 532 Dashbalbar, O., 1794 Daud Khan, Mohammad, 1687, 1689, 1690 David, Jacques-Louis, 177 Davis, H. O., 1180 Davitt, Michael, 451 Dayananda, Swami, 798–800, 802 Dayton Peace Accords, 1527, 1530, 1533 D’Azeglio, Massimo, 665 de Gaulle, Charles, 949, 1038, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1053–1054 de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 1151, 1152–1153, 1489 de Maistre, Joseph, 178, 179 De-Stalinization, 1077 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 245 de Valera, Eamon, 655, 657, 660–661 Deakin, Alfred, 853, 859, 859 Deane, Seamus, 488, 925 Debray, Regis, 61–62 Declaration of Arbroath, 233 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 173 Decolonization and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Eritrea, 1168 and Fiji, 1316, 1320 and Great Britain, 1006–1007, 1012, 1012 and Malaysia, 1216–1217 and the United States, 1303 See also Colonialism/imperialism Decommissioning, 1063 Dehio, Georg, 415 Delacroix, Eugene, 49 Delgado, Matías, 318 Delors, Jacques, 1040 Demchugdongrub, Prince (Mongolia), 1789–1790 Demirchian, Karen, 1707 Democracy, 66, 1360–1361, 1362, 1399–1400, 1488 and Afghanistan, 1686, 1687, 1689–1690 and Angola, 1663 and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Argentina, 275, 276, 281 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 853, 854 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Brazil, 1831 and Canada, 1843 and Central America, 314–315, 318 and Chile, 328–329 and China, 789, 791, 794 and the Cold War, 944–945 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England/Great Britain, 163, 1008 and Eritrea, 1175 in Europe, 419

and Germany, 190, 613, 614, 620–621, 1556, 1559–1560 and India, 981, 1208, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Mongolia, 1784 and Nepal, 1809 and the Netherlands, 199, 206 and Nigeria, 1188 and the Philippines, 1248 and Poland, 214, 215 and Romania, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1594 and Russia, 1596 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1678–1679 and Spain, 1082, 1084, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 248, 249, 250 and Taiwan, 1253–2354, 1259 and Turkey, 1647 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 385, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1311 See also Voting franchise Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Demonstration effect, 1477–1478 Deng Xiaoping, 1200 Denmark, 147–156, 220–222, 226–228 education and, 429 and the European Union, 1038 flag, 229 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1566, 1572 language and, 225, 472 national anthem/music of, 68–69, 230, 1443 Derrida, Jacque, 1052 Desai, Anita, 923 DeSica, Vittorio, 1334 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 336–337, 340, 342 Determinism social, 127–128 technological, 126–127 Deutsch, Karl, 1474–1475 Devolution, and Great Britain, 1013–1015 Devoto, Juan E. Pivel, 399 Dewey, John, 422, 425 Dialectical materialism. See Marxism Diamonds, 968 and Angola, 1659–1660 and South Africa, 1145–1146 Diaspora populations, 1364–1377 and Algeria, 1097 and Armenians, 1698, 1699, 1700–1701, 1703, 1704, 1704, 1707, 1708–1709, 1710, 1711 and discrimination, 1426–1427 and homeland politics, 1414–1415 and India, 1211 and the Internet, 1482–1483 Jews, 1125–1126 and Latvians, 1581 and Nepal, 1807

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Diaspora populations (continued ) and new social movements, 1455 and Nigeria, 1179 and Russians, 698 and supporting terrorism, 1488 Díaz, Porfirio, 355 Diderot, Denis, 102, 171 Die Degenhardts, 133 Diefenbaker, John, 1838, 1839 Diego, José de, 839, 841, 846 Diego, Juan, 347, 349 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 1264, 1264–1265, 1271, 1463 Diffusion of innovations theory, 1477 Dion, Céline, 1296 Discrimination/prejudice and Afghanistan, 1690, 1692 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 858 and Czechoslovakia, 1022, 1027 and Ethiopia, 741 and Fiji, 1316 against immigrants, 1420, 1423–1427 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1729 and Iran, 1113, 1118 and New Zealand, 867 and Nigeria, 1179 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Turkey, 1653, 1655 and the United States, 1304 See also Racism Dixon, Thomas, 1328 Djaout, Tahar, 1100 Djebar, Assia, 1100 Dmowski, Roman, 436, 682, 685 Dobson, Andrew, 877, 880 Dodge, Mary Mapes, 204 Dodson, Mick, 1848 Dodson, Pat, 1848 Dollard des Ormeaux, Adam, 303, 1294 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 516, 546 Domingue, Michel, 338 Dominican Republic, 339. See also Santo Domingo Donskoi, Dmitrii, 696 Dontsov, Dmytro, 718 Dorrego, Manuel, 273 Dorzhiev, Agwang, 1793 Dostoyevski, Fedor, 93, 105–106 Dostoyevski, Mihailo, 93 Dostum, Rashid, 1695 Douglas, Stephen A., 390 Douglas, Tommy C., 1839–1840 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 718 Drake, Sir Francis, 164 Du Bois, W. E. B., 965, 1179, 1301, 1303 du Toit, Daniel, 1149 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 978, 1022, 1026, 1028 Duchy of Warsaw, 209

Dufour, Guillaume-Henri, 253 Dugin, Alexander, 1601 Duke, James, 1399 Duplessis, Maurice, 1290, 1294 Durand, Asher, 389 Dürer, Albrecht, 415 Dürich, Jaroslav, 588 Durkheim, Émile, 5, 99, 111–112, 120, 908–909, 1054 Duruy, Victor, 178 Dutch Antilles, 197 Dutch Reformed church, 1145, 1148, 1149 Duyvendak, Jan Willem, 1446 Dvoˇrák, Antonín, 75, 1436, 1438 Dyer, Reginald, 804 Eagleton, Terry, 922 East Germany, 1449. See also Germany East Slavic nationalism, 716 East Timor, 1381, 1468, 1729, 1731–1732, 1734 and Christianity, 1239 Easter rising of 1916 (Ireland), 651–652, 652 Eastern Europe and communism, 977 development of nationalism in, 26 ethnic conflict and, 888, 895–897 and new social movements, 1449, 1456 Eastern Orthodox Church, 946 and Eritrea, 1171 and Greek independence, 627 and national identity, 103 and politics, 983 and Russia, 105–106, 1080, 1602–1603, 1605 and Serbs, 1529 and Slavic peoples, 972 Ebbesen, Niels, 153–154 Ecologism versus environmentalism, 877, 880–881, 883 Economic liberalism, 19 and Argentina, 276 and Central America, 316 and India, 1211 and Peru, 368, 372 and Turkey, 1645 See also Liberalism Economy, 18–19, 433, 895–896, 1359, 1380, 1407, 1474, 1496, 1939 and Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1095–1096 and Alsace, 1502, 1510 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Arab nationalism, 729 and Argentina, 269–271, 279, 280 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 850–851 and Austria, 545, 553 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1719–1721 and Basques, 1513, 1522 and Brazil, 296, 1825, 1827, 1828–1832 and Burma, 777

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and Canada, 302, 1477–1478, 1837, 1842 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 310–311, 315 and Chile, 324, 330 and China, 1198, 1372–1373, 1387 and Colombia, 826 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Denmark, 149 and Egypt, 257, 258, 259 and the European Union, 1044 and Fiji, 1322–1323 and France, 172, 175, 1047, 1054 and Germany, 191–192, 611 and Greenland, 1563, 1568 and Haiti, 333, 337, 342–343 and India, 1206, 1211 and Indonesia, 1723, 1733 and Iraq, 756, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 653, 660–661 and Israel, 1130 and Italy, 665, 669, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755–1756, 1757 and Korea, 1778–1779, 1781 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 and Mongolia, 1784–1785, 1796 and Nepal, 1801, 1808, 1811 and the Netherlands, 205 and New Zealand, 863 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1059–1060 and Pakistan, 1227–1229 and Paraguay, 358–359 and Peru, 368, 377 and the Philippines, 1247–1248 and Poland, 217, 678, 679, 680 and Puerto Rico, 837, 847 and Romania, 1585 and Russia, 692, 1597, 1599, 1604 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670–1671 and the Sami, 1609–1610, 1613 and Scandinavia, 221 and Scotland, 233 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1077 and Spain, 706, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1644–1645, 1651, 1656 and the United States, 388–389, 1395 and Uruguay, 396 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Economic liberalism; Globalization Edelfelt, Albert, 605 Edgerton, Lynda, 903 Education, 9–10, 29–41, 81–82, 130, 419–433, 461, 464–465, 478–479, 482, 504–505, 1379–1390 and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Arab nationalism, 731

and Argentina, 276–277, 279 and Armenia, 1703 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 287, 289, 293, 296 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 303, 1477–1478, 1843 and Central America, 315 and China, 1193, 1198, 1199 and Colombia, 833 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 746 and Finland, 608 and France, 178, 409, 1049 and Greek independence, 627 and Greenland, 1566, 1571–1572 and Haiti, 342 and India, 796, 798 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 751–752, 755, 756, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1745 and Italy, 675, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 811, 816, 1749, 1757 and Korea, 1776–1777 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1785, 1796, 1797, 1798 and Nepal, 1808 and the Netherlands, 197, 198, 199–200, 205 and New Zealand, 865–866 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Paraguay, 362 and Poland, 217, 688 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and the Sami, 1613, 1615 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 and Scotland, 234 and Singapore, 1225 and Slovakia, 587 and South Africa, 1148–1149 and the Soviet Union, 696, 1073 and Spain, 708–709 and Switzerland, 250, 254 and Taiwan, 1254 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1646, 1652, 1656 and Ukraine, 714, 1621, 1625 and the United States, 1305–1306 and Uruguay, 400, 401, 403 and Vietnam, 1271 Eelam, 1467, 1491 Egypt, 256–266, 257 (map), 982 anticolonialism in, 26 and Arab nationalism, 725, 728, 729–730, 734

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Egypt (continued ) and gender, 446, 450 and new social movements, 1452 and religious fundamentalism, 984–986, 1396 and terrorism, 1490 Eicher, Carolyn, 56 Eiffel, Gustave, 134 Eiffel Tower, 134 Einstein, Albert, 1350, 1362 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 697, 700, 1330 El Salvador, 318, 321 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 1715 Elgar, Edward, 1438 Elias, Norbert, 1369 Elites and Afghanistan, 1689 and Angola, 1665 and Belgium independence, 142–143 and Colombia, 826–827, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 of Ethiopia, 739–741 and Finland, 598, 600, 601 in Hungary, 637–638 and Iraq, 749, 750–751 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 1751 and new social movements, 1453 and Peru, 368, 371 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Russia, 690, 692–697 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672, 1676 and Spain, 707 and sports, 999 technology and the authority of, 1480 in Turkey, 1651, 1653 and Vietnam, 1269 and Wales, 1633 See also Intellectuals Elizabeth I, Queen (England), 164–165 Elizabeth II (Great Britain), 870 Ellison, Ralph, 1303 Emecheta, Buchi, 927 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 59, 389 Emigration and Afghanistan, 1687 and Algeria, 1095, 1097, 1102 and Alsace, 1505, 1507 and Basques, 1513 and Cuba, 1277 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1365–1366, 1371 and Fiji, 1325 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Ireland, 649, 660–661 and Korea, 1781 and Mongolia, 1798 and Poland, 212 and Puerto Rico, 847

and Turkey, 1648 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Diaspora populations; Immigrants/ immigration Eminescu, Mihai, 1592 Emmet, Robert, 649 Enculturation. See Assimilation Engels, Friedrich, 217 England, 158–167 constitution of, 162 and counterterrorism, 1496 economic liberalism and nationalism in, 18–19 education and, 423 and Greek independence, 631 and music, 1432 nationalism in, 5–6, 502 nationalistic art in, 408, 410 and Uruguay, 395 See also Great Britain English language, 480, 483 Enlightenment, the and the American Revolution, 21 erosion of religious power in the, 102 and France, 171 and liberalism, 1350–1351 and organicism, 462 and origins of nationalism, 9–10 and romantic nationalism, 406 Enloe, Cynthia, 901, 904 Ensor, Robert, 425 Environment and Brazil, 1825, 1827–1831, 1832 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and Haiti, 343 and Latvia, 1575–1576, 1581 and the Sami, 1615 and Tibet, 1814 See also Environmentalism/environmental movements; Natural resources Environmentalism/environmental movements, 875–886, 1446–1458 Eötvös, Jószef, 96 Epicurus, 476 Erben, Karel Jaromír, 73 Ercilla, Alonso de, 324–326, 329 Eriksson, Magnus, 226 Eritrea, 1167–1175, 1168 (map), 1469 diaspora population of, 1370 and Ethiopia, 742 Erk, Ludwig Christian, 73 Erkel, Ferenc, 79 Erskine, David Stuart, 239 Erslev, Kristian, 227 Escher, Hans Konrad, 254 Eskimo. See Inuit Estonia, 1078, 1374. See also Baltic states Ethics. See Morality Ethiopia, 736–746, 738 (map) and Eritrea, 1171–1172, 1174, 1175, 1469

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Ethnic cleansing, 435–442, 522–523 and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1507 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530, 1531, 1532 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 596, 1020 and Germany, 617, 622 and Hungary, 645 and Jews in Iraq, 756 and Poland, 681 and Turkey, 1648–1649 in Ukraine, 722 See also Conflict/violence; Genocide Ethnic conflict. See Conflict/violence Ethnicity, 931, 1354 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688–1689, 1693, 1694–1695 and Angola, 1660, 1664 and Argentina, 276, 277 and Armenia, 1703, 1709 and Austria, 543–544 and Azerbaijan, 1716, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528–1530, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 580 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 1836 and Catalonia, 1542–1543 and Central America, 311, 314 and China, 1193–1197, 1196, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1020–1021 and education, 35, 36, 39, 40, 1379 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 741, 742–743 and Fiji, 1314 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1412–1413, 1415, 1416 and Greece, 633 and Greenland, 1570–1571 and Hungary, 644 and immigrants, 1424 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 672, 673 and Japan, 1753 and Latvia, 1574–1575 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1213–1215, 1225 and Mongolia, 1790–1791, 1797–1798, 1798–1799 and music, 1431–1432 and nationalist movements, 10, 11, 27, 46, 1460, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1469–1470 and Nepal, 1808, 1809–1810 and the Netherlands, 199 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 967, 1178, 1185, 1186

and Northern Ireland, 1063 and the Ottoman Empire, 101–102 and Pakistan, 1231–1232, 1236 and Paraguay, 362 and the Philippines, 1243–1244 and Poland, 209, 212, 213, 214, 216 in political philosophy, 88–90, 95, 461, 464 and Québec, 1296–1297 and religion, 103–105, 107–109 and Romania, 1592–1594 and Russia, 1079–1080, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669–1670 and Scotland, 236–237 and South Africa, 1144, 1145 and the Soviet Union, 1076 and Taiwan, 1254, 1257–1258 and Turkey, 1650 and Ukraine, 712–713, 1621 and the United States, 1309 See also Minorities; Religion Eto Shin’pei, 820 Eurasianism, 466 Europe borders after World War II, 581 (map), 591 (map), 616 (map), 668 (map), 684 (map), 1018 (map), 1550 (map), 1590 (map) borders from 1914 to 1938, 170 (map), 184 (map), 540 (map), 556 (map), 579 (map), 586 (map), 612 (map), 624 (map), 636 (map), 656 (map), 666 (map), 680 (map), 762 (map) borders in 1815, 139 (map), 148 (map), 182 (map), 208 (map), 246 (map), 610 (map), 664 (map) colonialism and, 420–421 and cultural identity in, 445 development of nationalism in, 26, 31 education and, 33–36, 38–39, 422, 427 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 437, 441–442 and gender/sexuality, 44, 908 and immigration, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1425 imperative and imaginary forms of nationalism in, 501–503 and landscape art, 64 and language, 472, 477 and music, 73–75, 1432 nationalism and class in, 4, 11 nationalism and conflict in, 16, 23–26 and new social movements, 1447 perversions of nationalism in, 512–525 revolutions of 1848 in, 24–25, 47, 52 supranational bodies in, 948–949, 974 systems of governance in, 419 and terrorism, 1494, 1495, 1497 and transnationalism, 1509–1510 women’s suffrage in, 453 and xenophobia, 1412 See also European institutions; specific European countries and organizations

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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1034–1035, 1037 European Convention on Human Rights, 908 European Court of Justice, 1035 European Economic Community (EEC), 1010, 1036, 1038, 1049, 1509–1510 European institutions, 1034–1036, 1039, 1040 and Great Britain, 1007, 1010 See also European Union (EU) European Parliament, 974, 1035, 1039 European Union (EU), 948–949, 1021 (map), 1030–1046, 1032 (map), 1532–1533, 1551 (map) and Algeria, 1095 and Alsace, 1510 and Armenia, 1704 and Basques, 1517, 1522 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528 Committee of the Regions, 1043, 1541 and Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1028 education and, 432 flag, 1410 (illus.) and France, 1048 and Germany, 1549–1551, 1555 and globalization, 1407, 1409, 1410–1411 and indigenous groups, 1610 and Ireland, 1060 and Latvia, 1582 and minorities, 1412–1413 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Spain, 1092 and Turkey, 1645, 1648, 1650, 1656 and Ukraine, 1623 Europeanization, 1406 Evans, Gwynfor, 1633, 1635 Evans, Robert, 1434 Evatt, H. V., 858 Evolutionary theory. See Social Darwinism Exhibitions, 412–414. See also Holidays/festivals Exile and diaspora populations, 1365, 1369, 1370 Expansionism affect on Hungary of, 639 and Brazil, 283–284 and Canada, 300–302, 1837 and geopolitics, 459 and Germany, 617, 621 Herder on, 88 and Italy, 665–667 and manipulation of ethnic autonomy claims, 940 nationalism as justifying, 40 and Nazi Germany, 518 and perversions of nationalism, 523–524 Soviet, 945 and the United States, 22, 37, 39, 465, 1308 See also Colonialism/imperialism Expedition of the Thousand, 672, 674 Expressionism, 491

Fabianism, 471 Factionalism and the Maori, 1857 and nationalist movements, 940–941 See also Conflict/violence Factory, 129–130 Faehlmann, Friedrich Robert, 561 Fairhair, Harald, 226 Faisal I, King (Iraq), 727, 728, 728, 749–750, 750, 1742, 1743, 1745 Falkland Islands, 275, 1009 Falla, Manuel de, 1437 Fallersleben, Hoffmann von, 117 Falwell, Jerry, 1395 Fanon, Frantz, 963, 1100 Færoe Islands, 220–222, 225, 231 Fascism, 515–517, 525, 973, 1301 and gender, 454–456 and Hungary, 638, 639 and imperative nationalism, 502 and Italy, 419, 667, 670–671, 674–675, 675–676 and Japan, 817 and nationalistic art, 413–415, 417 and the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 and race, 672 See also Nazism Fashoda Incident, 460 Fatah, 1137, 1142–1143 Faulkner, William, 495 Favre, Louis, 254 Federal Republic of Central America, 310, 313, 316 Federalism and Australia, 850, 852–853 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1171–1172 and India, 1205–1206, 1766 and Indonesia, 1723 and Malaysia, 1216, 1218 and Nigeria, 1183, 1185 as solution to minority demands, 933 and Ukraine, 721–722 and the United States, 383 Feminists, 451–453, 454 versus nationalists, 902, 907 See also Women’s rights Fennoman movement, 598–599, 600, 601, 601 Feraoun, Mouloud, 1100 Ferdinand, Franz, 1490 Ferdinand, King (Romania), 1586 Ferdinand of Aragon, 709 Ferdowsi, 1107, 1113–1114 Ferguson, Adam, 234 Ferguson, William, 1851 Fernández, Emiliano R., 364 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 400 Ferry, Jules, 178 Festival of Britain, 1011 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 17, 34, 90–92, 186, 475, 533

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Fidelis, Malgorzata, 53 Fiji, 1313–1325, 1315 (map), 1441 Film. See Cinema Film noir, 1333 Finland, 220–222, 597–608, 599 (map) education and, 429 and gender, 54, 450 and independence, 223, 231 language and, 225 and music, 1432, 1436, 1443 national identity and culture of, 226–228, 466 and national symbols, 230 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1614, 1616 Finno-Russian War, 607 Firley, Barker, 1841 (illus.) First Schleswigian War, 149, 152 Fischer, Joschka, 1555 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 489 Fitzpatrick, Brian, 857 Flag(s), 112–113, 116–117 Australian, 855 Basque, 1521 Belgium, 145 Brazilian, 294 and Burma, 781 Canadian, 1835 Catalonian, 1538–1539 and Central America, 318–319 Chilean, 327 Colombian, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 Egyptian, 265 and the European Union, 1042, 1410 (illus.) French, 175 German, 619 and Greenland, 1569, 1570 Indonesian, 1732 Irish, 659 Japanese, 1756, 1756 (illus.), 1757 Maori, 873 and New Zealand, 866 Nigerian, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 Polish, 686 Puerto Rican, 842 (illus.), 844 and Québec, 1294 Romanian, 1592 Russian, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 229–230 Swiss, 253 and Tibet, 1818 Turkish, 1646, 1647, 1653 and the United States, 1308 Flemings, 144–145, 146, 200, 413 Folk culture, 406, 462, 530 and Alsace, 1510 and the Baltic states, 561, 563–564 and Cuba, 1280

and Finland, 599, 604 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 Haiti and folktales, 342 and Hungary, 643 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1797 and music, 73, 76, 77, 80–82, 417, 1434–1435, 1436, 1437, 1444 and Paraguay, 364 and Poland, 212, 216 and Russia, 693 and the Sami, 1612, 1614–1615 and Scandinavia, 226, 228, 229 and Switzerland, 251 and Turkish folklore, 774 and Ukraine, 721 and Wales, 1634 See also Culture; Indigenous groups Food insecurity and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Peru, 378 Ford, John, 1337 Foreign intervention and Angola, 968, 1658 and China, 793 during the Cold War, 943–944, 945, 947–948, 977 and Cuba, 1275, 1277 and globalization, 1408–1409 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117 and Turkey, 1652 and the United States, 1305 See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign policy and Armenia, 1710–1711 and Brazil, 1831 and China, 1200 and Cuba, 1285–1286 and the European Union, 1040, 1042 and geopolitics, 458 and Germany, 1554, 1555 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1751, 1757–1758 and Latvia, 1576 and Mongolia, 1798 and New Zealand, 871 and post-World War II Europe, 974 and the Soviet Union, 979 and sports, 994–995 terrorism as, 1488 and Ukraine, 1622–1623 and the United States, 955–956 Forster, E. M., 490 Forster, Georg, 86 Fortuyn, Pim, 1453, 1486 Foster, Stephen, 389 Foucault, Michel, 1052 Four Freedoms, 972 Fourier, Charles, 423 Fowler, Robert, 1839

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France, 102, 169–179, 172 (map), 502, 1047–1057, 1048 (map) and Algeria, 1097, 1098 and Alsace, 1502–1504, 1505, 1507 and Arab nationalism, 727–728 aristocracy and nationalism in, 5–8 and Basques, 1513, 1513, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Belgium, 140–141 and Canada, 298 colonialism and, 424–425, 958, 1463–1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the Dreyfus affair, 520 education and, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 423 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1034, 1038 fascism in, 515 and film, 1336 and gender, 43, 48–49, 448 and geopolitics, 468 and Greek independence, 631 and Haiti, 333, 335–336, 340 and Indochina, 1263–1264 and Iraq, 1739 and language, 420, 480, 482 and the Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities/immigrants, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1424 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1437, 1441, 1443 and national identity, 461, 465 national symbols of, 134 nationalistic culture/art in, 407, 408, 409–410, 413, 415, 416 and new social movements, 1448, 1457 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and political philosophy, 14–17, 475 and the Rhine crisis of 1840, 189–190 and the Suez War, 266 and Syria, 728 and Uruguay, 395 See also French Revolution Francia, José Gaspar de, 361, 364 Franco, Francisco, 705–706, 707, 709, 973, 1088–1089, 1089 (illus.), 1471, 1515, 1519, 1536 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 409, 412, 465 Francophonie, 1056–1057 Franklin, Benjamin, 21 Franko, Ivan, 720 Franks, 1537 Fraser, Dawn, 857 Frederick I (Holy Roman Empire), 619 Frederick II (Denmark), 226 Frederick William IV (Prussia), 191 Frederik, Christian, 224 Freinet, Célestin, 425

French Canadians and the defeat at Québec, 299 and duality in Canada, 303, 306 identity and, 302 tensions over political control in, 299–300, 303 See also Québec French Revolution, 34, 174 and Alsace, 1502 and the aristocracy, 7 and Basques, 1513 gender and symbols in the, 45–46, 49, 50–51 and Germany, 185–186 impact on Haiti of the, 334–335 influence in Brazil of, 293 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 and popular sovereignty, 15–16 and terrorism, 1489 French West Africa, 424–425 Friedrich, Caspar David, 67, 463 Friel, Brian, 917, 925 Fröbel, F., 36 Frost, Robert, 392 Fry, William Henry, 76 Fuad, King (Egypt), 263 Fucik, Julius, 1441 Fugner, Jindrich, 594 Fukuyama, Francis, 988 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 9 Furnivall, J. S., 783 Furphy, Joseph, 857 Gagarin, Yuri, 951 Gaidar, Yegor, 1597 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 833 Gaitskell, Deborah, 904 Galicia, 209, 210, 1088 and Ukrainians, 715, 716, 718 Gallen-Kallela, Akseli, 605 Gálvez, Mariano, 317 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 1079 Gance, Abel, 1328 Gandhi, Indira, 1207, 1207–1208, 1466, 1766, 1767 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), 798, 801, 802–804, 803, 805 (illus.), 950, 963 and gender issues, 451 and India’s social structure, 1205, 1208 and nonviolent resistance, 976, 1203, 1822 Gandhi, Priyanka, 1207 Gandhi, Rahul, 1207 Gandhi, Rajiv, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1492, 1767, 1768 Gandhi, Sanjay, 1207 Gandhi, Sonia, 1207 García, Calixto, 1282 García Calderón, Francisco, 375 García Márquez, Gabriel, 832 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 502, 672, 673, 674, 674 (illus.) monuments to, 410 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Garnier, Charles, 134

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Garrigue, Charlotte, 585 Garvey, Marcus, 494, 1179, 1850 Gasperi, Alcide De, 973–974 Gaudí, Antoni, 706 Gay, Peter, 613 Gediminas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Geffrard, Fabre, 337, 339 Gégoire, Abbé, 34 Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 73, 228 Gellner, Ernest, 130, 461, 476, 479, 1475, 1835 Gender, 43–57, 444–457, 899–910 and colonialism, 926–927 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Uruguay, 401 Genocide, 435–442 and American indigenous groups, 893 and Armenians, 765, 1699, 1704, 1704, 1706, 1709, 1711, 1718 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Hungary, 645 and Kurds in Iraq, 756 and Nazi Germany, 517, 622 and perversions of nationalism, 522–523, 524, 525 and Rwanda and Burundi, 968, 1671, 1672, 1674, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679, 1680 and Tibet, 1820 See also Conflict/violence; Ethnic cleansing; Holocaust Geoffrin, Madame de, 7 (illus.) Geopolitics, 458–469 George, Lloyd, 468, 593 George, Terry, 1674 George V (Great Britain), 132, 870 Georgia, 897, 1071, 1079, 1080, 1710 German Confederation of 1815, 149–150, 189, 191 German Customs Union, 191–192 German National Society, 192 Germanization, 617 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 594–595, 595 Germany, 181–194, 525, 609–622, 1548–1560 and Alsace, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1508 anti-Semitism in, 520 and Austria, 544, 546–548 citizenship in, 1354 and colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and democracy, 946–947 education and, 34, 35, 36, 38, 419, 421, 422–423, 426, 429–430 and the environment, 882–883 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and the European Union, 949 and expansionism, 524 and film, 1330–1331 and France, 1051 and gender, 448, 453 and geopolitics, 458, 459, 462–464, 466–467, 468 and immigration, 1419, 1424

and language, 472 and minorities, 1374 and the Moroccan crises, 514 and music, 1431, 1432 and national identity, 465 National Socialism/Nazism in, 133–134, 517–519 nationalism and political philosophy in, 9–10, 17–18, 90–93, 474–475, 491, 502, 533–534 nationalistic art of, 408–409, 410–411, 413–414, 415–417, 418 and new social movements, 1450, 1453 and Poland, 678 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 and rituals of belonging, 507–508 Soviet advancement into, 950 symbols in, 49, 114, 117 unification of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 512 and World War II, 1309 See also East Germany; West Germany Gershwin, George, 1439 Geser, 1791 Gettino, Octavio, 1335 Gezelle, Guido, 145 Ghana (Gold Coast), 962, 964, 980 and independence, 1464 and music, 1443 Gharabagh conflict, 897, 1078–1079 and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1716, 1718–1719 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 1589, 1594 Gibbs, Pearl, 1851 Gilgamesh, 1738 Ginestera, Alberto, 1439 Gladstone, William E., 241–242, 651, 654 Glaize, Léon, 409 Glinka, Mikhail, 75, 78, 79, 694, 1437, 1602 Global institutions and globalization, 1412 for governance, 1359–1362, 1406, 1456 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 sports, 991 and transnationalism, 1407 and values, 1392 See also United Nations (UN) Globalization, 1405–1417 and Brazil, 1826, 1830, 1832 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1374, 1376 and education, 1380, 1389 and the environment, 877 and global governance, 1359 and image technology, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1427–1428 and India, 1211 and Japan, 1750 and the loss of optimism, 936 and minorities, 1547 versus nationalism, 1392

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Globalization (continued ) and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and religious fundamentalism, 1397–1404 and sports, 999, 1000, 1001–1003 technology as facilitating, 135–136 and Vietnam, 1271 Glyndwr, ˆ Owain, 1637 Gobineau, Arthur, 40 Gocar, Josef, 594 “God Save the King,” 117 Godard, Jean-Luc, 1336 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 1332 Goh Chok Tong, 1384 Gökalp, Mehmet Ziya, 766, 766, 770, 774 Gömbös, Gyula, 638 Gómez, Máximo, 1282 Gonçalves, Gomide, Antônio, 283 Gongaze, Georgiy, 1628 Gonne, Maud, 451 González, Juan Natalicio, 365 González Prada, Manuel, 373, 374 González Vigil, Francisco de Paula, 377 Good Friday Agreement, 1062, 1062, 1063 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 946, 979, 1039, 1079, 1581, 1582 and the Baltic states, 1078 Gordon, Andrew, 815 Gordon, Walter, 1842 Gorodetskii, S. M., 700 Görres, Joseph, 92 Gothicism, 223 Gottschalk, Louis Moreau, 76, 389, 1438 Gottwald, Klement, 1019, 1024 Gouges, Olympe de, 173–174 Gouldner, Alvin, 1473 Gounod, Charles, 117 Government(s) and Afghanistan, 1686, 1686–1687, 1692 and Algeria, 1099 and Angola, 1663 and Argentina, 272, 275 and Armenia, 1699 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 282–283, 284, 287, 289–290, 296 and Bulgaria, 578 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 302–303 and Catalonia, 1538–1539 and China, 795, 1192–1193 and Colombia, 828 and Czechoslovakia, 590 and England, 162, 163 and Ethiopia, 740, 741 European systems of, 419 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1317, 1317, 1321, 1323, 1323 and Finland, 598 and France, 169–171, 175, 176, 1048–1049, 1053–1054 German, Italian, Japanese postwar, 946–947

and Germany, 609, 611–613 and Great Britain, 1007–1008 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1565, 1567 Haiti and instability in, 336–338 and India, 1204 instability of postindependence, 1469 and Iran, 986 and Iraq, 750, 1747 and Ireland, 648 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1766 and Japan, 812 and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and Nigeria, 1183, 1186 and Northern Ireland, 1059, 1063 and the Ottoman millet system, 761 and Palestinians, 1142 and Romania, 1588, 1588–1589 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Scotland, 234–235 and Spain, 702–703, 1084–1085, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 247–250, 249, 254–255 Tibetan exile, 1821, 1822 and the United States, 383–387, 391 and Uruguay, 398–399 and Vietnam, 1270–1271 and Wales, 1632 See also Democracy; Federalism Govineau, Arthur, 415 Gowon, Yakubu, 1185, 1186 Goya, Francisco de, 1437 Grabski, Stanisław, 685 Gracia, Gilberto Concepción de, 845 Gramsci, Antonio, 486 Granados, Enrique, 1437 Granatstein, Jack, 1842 Grant, George Parkin, 1838 Grant, James, 235 Grant, John, 235 Grau, Miguel, 377 Grau San Martín, Ramón, 1276 Great Britain, 236 (map), 1005–1015, 1006 (map), 1061 (map) and Arab nationalism, 727–728, 729 and Argentina, 269, 275, 279–280 and Australia, 850–851 and Brazil, 289 and Burma, 776–777, 781, 783, 783 and Canada, 299–300, 300, 307 and Central America, 318 and colonial divestment, 1461, 1464 and colonialism, 27, 490–491, 889, 958 communication and technology in, 128, 132, 1473 and Denmark, 150 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 36, 38–39, 426, 429, 432, 1381–1382 and Egypt, 259, 260–261, 262–263, 265

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and Eritrea, 1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1036, 1038, 1040 fascism in, 516 and Fiji, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1317, 1319 and film, 1337 and gender, 447–448, 450 and geopolitics, 468 and Haiti, 335, 340 and immigration, 1419, 1420 and India, 55, 131, 797, 798, 804–806, 1203 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 749–750, 752–753, 1739, 1742, 1745 and Ireland, 915 Irish in, 654 and Israel/Palestine, 1123, 1125, 1129, 1133, 1134–1135, 1140, 1402 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762, 1763, 1764 and landscape art, 61, 62–64 and language, 472, 480, 482, 912 and Malaysia, 1213–1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and the Maori, 1856 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities, 1412 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1442, 1443 national anthem of, 117, 1431 and natural resources, 885 and Nepal, 1805 and New Zealand, 863, 868, 872 and Nigeria, 1178, 1181, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1058–1068 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and Pakistan, 1227, 1231 political philosophy in, 534–535 and Québec, 1288 and rituals of belonging, 507 and Scotland, 233–242 and South Africa, 1145–1146, 1150 and sports, 992, 996–998 symbols of, 114 and terrorism, 1488 and Tibet, 1818 and Uruguay, 396, 397 and Wales, 1631–1633, 1632 Great Depression and Burma, 777, 777 and Canada, 302 and Japan, 810, 821 Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 (Peru), 370–371 Greece, 623–633, 626 (map) and diaspora populations, 1374 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437–438 and the European Union, 1040 independence of, 46, 53, 464 and language, 477 and minorities, 1424 and Turkey, 1648

Greeks ethnic cleansing of, 438 Greek independence and diasporic, 627, 632 in Turkey, 1648 in the United States, 1427 Greenfeld, Liah, 938 Greenland, 220, 1561–1572 Greenpeace, 1361, 1362, 1448 Grégoire, Abbé, 173, 178 Gregory, Lady Augusta, 918, 922 Grenfell, Maria, 1439 Gretzky, Wayne “The Great One,” 1842 Grieg, Edvard, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 228, 417, 1436–1437 Griffith, David Wark, 1328 Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm, 67, 406 Grímsson, Magnus, 228 Grofé, Ferde, 1439 Grotius, Hugo, 203 Groulx, Abbé Lionel, 1290, 1293, 1294 Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap, 1637 Grundtvig, N. F. S., 151, 151, 228, 429 Guantánamo Bay, 1280 Guaraní Indians, 358, 395 Guardiola, Santos, 315 Guatemala, 318, 319, 321 Guernica, 1515, 1519–1521 Guerrier, Philipe, 337 Guindon, Hubert, 1293 Guiteras, Antonio, 1282, 1283 Guizot, François, 177 Gulf War (1990–1991), 756, 952, 1408–1409, 1746–1747 and Germany, 1554 Gumilev, Nikolai, 94, 1601 Gustav I Vasa (Sweden), 226, 230 Gustav II Adolf, King (Sweden), 223, 224 (illus.), 226, 565 Gustav III (Sweden), 223 Gyanendra, King (Nepal), 1809 Haakon IV (Norway), 226 Habermas, Jürgen, 97, 1481, 1556 Habibullah II, 1686, 1688, 1691 Habsburg empire, 512, 541 and Austria, 539, 541, 543–544 and Belgium, 138–139 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Czechoslovaks, 584, 587–588 and the formation of Austria-Hungary, 512 and Germany, 189, 191 and Hungary, 407, 637 and language, 472 and Mexico, 350 nationalistic philosophers from the, 96 and the Netherlands, 196 and Poland, 679–681 and Switzerland, 252 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 1677

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Hadj, Messali, 1097, 1099 Hadjiiski, Ivan, 577 Haegy, Xavier, 1508 Hagemann, Karen, 52 Haider, Jörg, 553 Haile Selassie, 740, 742, 743 Hailu, Kasa (Emperor Tewodros), 739, 743, 744 Haiti, 26, 174, 332–343, 334, 1414 Halbwachs, Maurice, 1343 Hallgrímsson, Jónas, 228 Halonen, Pekka, 605 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 394 Hals, Frans, 203 Hamas, 972, 978, 986 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1142–1143 Hambach Festival, 190 Hamilton, Alexander, 22, 386, 387 Hamilton of Gilbertfield, 239 Hamitic hypothesis, 1678 Hammershaimb, Venceslaus, 225 Hansen, H. P., 156 Hanson, John, 386 Haq, Abdul, 1690 Harb, Talat, 729 Harlem Renaissance, 494 Harris, Lawren, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Harris, Leonard, 1008 Harry (Scottish minstrel), 239 Hasan, Zoya, 902 Hashshashin, 1489 Hatta, Mohammad, 1463 Haushofer, Karl, 460, 466, 467 (illus.), 491 Havel, Václav, 1026, 1027, 1028 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 117, 1432 Hayes, Joy Elizabeth, 132 Hazaras, 1693 Hazelius, Arthur, 229 Head, Bessie, 927 Health, and the environment, 882 Health care and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Canada, 1840 and New Zealand, 871, 871 and Pakistan, 1228 Heaney, Seamus, 925 Hebrew, 477 Hecht, Abraham, 1400, 1403 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17, 92–93, 187, 534 Hegemony Anglo-American, 1393 and Baltic nationalism, 558, 562 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1534 of Buenos Aires in Argentina, 275 and Chilean identity, 327 and Ethiopia, 738, 741 and Finnish nationalism, 605, 608 and gender issues, 445, 906 of German music, 80, 82

and Germany, 611 Germany and French, 186 and Great Britain, 397, 490 Japan and U.S., 1754, 1757 and literature, 486 and Mexican identity, 349, 352 nationalism in maintaining, 898, 1481 nationalist music as reaction against, 79 and Nepali nationalism, 1809 and Peru, 374 of political ideologies, 512 Prussian, 544 and Spain, 702, 711 technology as undermining, 136 and Turkey, 1646 and the United States, 837, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1310, 1742-1743 and World War I, 713 Heidegger, Martin, 533–534, 534 (illus.) Heidenstam, Verner von, 228 Heimat, 611, 883, 1344 Heimatbund, 1508 Heimatkunst, 417 Hein, Piet, 203 Heine, Heinrich, 501 Helfferich, Karl, 613 Hellenism, 623 Helvetic Republic, 248–249 Henderson, Paul, 1842 Henlein, Konrad, 595, 595 Henry, Paul, 659 Heraclitus, 533 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 17, 30–31, 73, 88–90, 89 (illus.), 185, 406, 529, 533 and the Baltic states, 561 and organicism, 462 Hernández, José, 278–279 Herndon, Angelo, 1303 Heroes/heroines, 446, 504, 1345 and Afghanistan, 1690 and Algeria, 1098–1099, 1099, 1102 and Armenia, 1706 and Australia, 857, 857 of the Baltic states, 564–565 and Bulgaria, 576, 577 and Burma, 782, 784 and Canada, 304–305 and Central America, 318 and Colombia, 831, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164 and Cuba, 1282, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England, 164–165 and film, 1331, 1332, 1333 and Finland, 604–605 and Great Britain, 1012 and India, 1209 and Indonesia, 1725, 1727 and Iran, 1113–1114, 1115, 1116 and Ireland, 658, 659

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and Korea, 1779–1781 and Latvia, 1578–1579 and Mongolia, 1786, 1789–1790, 1791, 1797, 1798 and New Zealand, 870 and Nigeria, 1187 and Palestinians, 1137 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 377 and the Philippines, 1245–1246 and Poland, 211, 214 and Québec, 1294 Russian, 1074 Scandinavian, 226–227 and Scotland, 232–233 and the Soviet Union, 694, 695, 696, 700, 951 and sports, 995 and Switzerland, 253–254 and Syria, 728 and Turkey, 1643, 1646–1647, 1653 and Uruguay, 402 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637 See also Leaders; Symbols Herrera, Bartolomé, 377 Herrera, Enrique Olaya, 830 Herries, William, 869 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 1148 Hervé, Gustave, 515 Herzl, Theodor, 1121, 1123, 1127 Hezbollah, 986 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 350 Higgins, H. B., 859 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 1693 Hilden, Patricia, 56 Hilty, Carl, 252 Hindenburg, Paul von, 613 Hinduism and fundamentalism, 1393 and India, 107, 797, 803, 803, 987, 1204–1205, 1208–1210 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Nepal, 1806 Hindutva, 107, 108 Hirata Atsutane, 815 Hispanophilia versus hispanophobia in Mexico, 352–353 and Puerto Rico, 841 Historiography, 121, 406, 477, 880, 1343 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Algeria, 1098–1099 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 733–734 and Armenia, 1702, 1705–1708 and Australia, 855–858 and Austria, 551 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 564 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531 and Brazil, 292–295

and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 303–305, 1840 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 320 and China, 1195–1197, 1199–1200 and Colombia, 831–832 and colonialism, 917, 923–924 and Congo/Zaïre, 1162, 1163–1164 and Cuba, 1277–1278, 1281–1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1022–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Ethiopia, 742–744 and Fiji, 1318 and film, 1327–1328, 1336–1338 and Finland, 604 and France, 177–178, 1051–1052 and Germany, 188–189, 614, 617–619 and Great Britain, 1010–1011, 1011 and Greece, 629 and Greenland, 1568 and Haiti, 341 and India, 802–803, 1209 and Indonesia, 1727, 1728, 1730 and Iran, 1107, 1107, 1113–1116 and Iraq, 752–754, 757, 1741 and Ireland, 658–660 and Israel, 1125–1127 and Italy, 673–675 and Japan, 1750–1751 and Mexico, 354, 355–356 and Mongolia, 1788 and New Zealand, 864–865, 868–870 and Nigeria, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and Palestinians, 1139–1140 and Paraguay, 362–364 and the Philippines, 1244, 1245–1246 and Poland, 212, 214, 685–686 and Puerto Rico, 843–844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and Romania, 1592 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1677–1678, 1679 and the Sami, 1618 and Scandinavia, 223, 223, 226–228, 228 and Scotland, 234, 237–239 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 700, 1076 and Spain, 708–709, 1086 and Switzerland, 247, 251, 252–254 and Taiwan, 1252, 1255–1256 and Turkey, 771, 773–774, 1646 and Ukraine, 721, 721 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637–1638 Hitler, Adolf, 413, 611, 613 and anti-Semitism, 517 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and Austria, 545, 546, 547

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Hitler, Adolf (continued ) and Czechoslovakia, 1019 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438, 439 and gender, 450, 454 and Hungary, 638 and music, 1431 ties with Mussolini, 516 Hiwet, Addis, 737 Hjärne, Harald, 228 Hlinka, Andrej, 585, 590 Ho Chi Minh, 952, 962, 963–964, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1267 (illus.) Hoad, Lew, 857 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 (illus.) Hobsbawm, Eric, 19, 23, 132, 473, 476, 478, 481 Hobson, William, 863 Hodge, John R., 1773 Hofmeyr, Jan, 1149 Hogg, James, 238 Holberg, Ludwig, 227 Holidays/festivals, 116, 504, 1346 and Australia, 855–856 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 567 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 295 and Bulgaria, 575–576 and Burma, 782 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 319 and Chile, 327, 328 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1025 and France, 1053 and Germany, 620 and India, 800, 1204 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 754 and Israel, 1129 and Japan, 1752 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 and the Maori, 1857 and Mexico, 347–349, 354 and the Netherlands, 204 and New Zealand, 869, 873 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1067–1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 211, 216–217, 685–686, 688 and Romania, 1586 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 and South Africa, 1150 and the Soviet Union, 695 and Spain, 709 and Switzerland, 244, 254 and Taiwan, 1256 and Turkey, 1651, 1652–1653, 1653

and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637, 1638 Holly, James Theodore, 340 Holocaust, 439–440, 517–518, 523, 524 and Austria, 546 and Czechoslovak Jews, 1020 and German guilt, 1555–1556, 1557–1558 guilt and the foundation of Israel, 1402 and immigration to Israel, 1121 and legitimacy of Zionism, 1128 as reconstituting ethnic borders, 617 remembrances of the, 1345 See also Genocide Holst, Gustav, 1432 Holstein, 147, 149, 150, 220, 222 Holy Roman Empire, 183, 186, 543, 619, 1816 Homosexuality, 907–908, 909–910 Honduras, 318, 321 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1304 Horowitz, Donald, 989 Horthy, Miklós, 638 Hosokawa, Toshio, 1440 Hotel Rwanda, 1674, 1675 Hou Hsaio-hsien, 1338 Hoxa, Enver, 952 Hozumi Yatsuka, 816 Hrushev’skyi, Mykhailo, 721, 721 Hsaya San, 777, 782 Hu Shi, 789, 793 Hua Guofeng, 1200 Hueber, Charles, 1509 Huggins, Jackie, 1849 Hugo, Victor, 177 Humanism, 41, 86, 87 Humbert, Ferdinand, 409 Humboldt, Alexander von, 34, 64, 65, 423, 462 Hume, David, 18, 234 Hume, John, 1062 Hunedoara, Iancu de, 1592 Hungary, 635–645, 640 (map) anti-Semitism in, 520, 521 and the Austro-Hungarian empire, 24 autonomy and, 407 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441 and expansionism, 524 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and music, 1432, 1435 and nationalistic art, 412 and Slovakia, 587 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Huntington, Samuel, 929, 988, 1374 Hurston, Zora Neale, 494 Hurt, Jakob, 563–564, 567 Hus, Jan, 592, 1023 Husayn, Imam (Iran), 1115 Hussein, Saddam, 756–757, 758, 952, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Iran, 1115–1116 Hussein, Sharif, 727, 749, 750, 1739

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Hussitism, 1023 Hutton, C. M., 481 Hutus, 1669, 1675, 1677, 1678 Hyde, Douglas, 654–655, 657, 918 Hypernationalism, 1389–1390. See also Xenophobia Hyppolite, Florville, 338 Iancu, Avram, 1592 Ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 1113 Ibn Taymiyyah, 725 Ibsen, Henrik, 228 Iceland, 220–222, 226–228 and the environment/natural resources, 875–876, 885 independence and, 231 and national symbols, 230 reading and, 229 Icelandic Sagas, 227 (illus.) Idealism, 534–535 Identity, 27, 405, 528, 537, 930–932, 1351, 1418–1429 and Afghanistan, 1693–1695 and Algeria, 1100–1101, 1105 and Alsace, 1504 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 276–279 and Armenia, 1698, 1699–1700, 1701–1705, 1704, 1708 and Austria, 550, 551, 554 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1716–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 558, 561–562, 563, 563–565, 1576, 1577, 1577–1578, 1581 and Basques, 1519–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527, 1528–1530, 1531, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 283, 285–287, 288, 292–295, 294, 1826–1827 British versus English, 159–161, 162, 163, 167 and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 780–781 and Canada, 298, 302, 303–305, 1835–1843 and Catalonia, 1536–1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Central America, 313, 319–321 and Chile, 324–326, 327–329, 328 and China, 1198–1200 civic versus ethnic, 933–936 and Colombia, 832, 833, 834 and communications, 1474 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160–1165 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1282–1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1025 Dutch, 197, 198, 204 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 265 and the environment/landscape, 875–876, 879–880, 883, 884, 886 and Eritrea, 1174 and Ethiopia, 741–743, 744–746 European, 974, 1045–1046 and film, 1327, 1338–1340

and Finland, 598–605, 608 and France, 1056, 1057 and gender/sexuality, 43–45, 444–447, 909–910 and geopolitics, 458–459, 464–466 and Germany, 183–187, 190, 192–193, 611, 613–620, 621–622, 1549, 1552, 1555–1556, 1558 globalization and de-territorialization of, 1416 and Greece, 630, 633 and Greenland, 1565, 1567–1568, 1570 and Haiti, 341–342 and Hungary, 639–644, 645 after independence, 1465 and India, 797, 803 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726–1728, 1732, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 757, 758–759, 1740, 1743 and Israel, 1124, 1127–1130 and Italy, 665, 670–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and Japan, 809–810, 813, 815, 820, 822, 1750–1751, 1755–1756, 1757–1578 and Korea, 1773, 1775–1776, 1778–1781 and landscape art, 59, 60–71 and language/literature, 482, 486, 492–495, 922–923 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1225 Maori, and intertribal unity, 1856, 1858, 1859–1860, 1863 and Mexico, 345, 347, 347–350, 351–356 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788–1789, 1792, 1793–1794, 1797, 1798 and music, 78–83 and national symbols, 113, 122–123, 1342–1348 in nationalist political philosophy, 97, 473–476 and Nepal, 1803, 1804, 1805–1806, 1807, 1811 and New Zealand, 863, 864–870 and Northern Ireland, 1065–1066 and overdetermination, 121 and Palestinians, 1133, 1134, 1138–1139 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1849 and Paraguay, 360, 362, 365–366 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 209, 213, 682, 686–688 and Puerto Rico, 839, 841–843 and Québec, 1293–1294 and religion versus ideology, 972–973 religious, 99, 103, 109, 983, 988–989. See also Religion and rituals of belonging, 499, 509. See also Rituals of belonging role of education in, 29–41 and Romania, 1589–1591 and Russia/Soviet Union, 690–701, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672–1673, 1677, 1679 and the Sami, 1614, 1615, 1617 and Scandinavia, 222–225, 226–228 and Scotland, 233, 234

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Identity (continued ) and social class, 1, 3–4 and South Africa, 1149–1150 and Spain, 1083, 1085–1087, 1092 and sports, 995, 996, 997–998, 1002–1003 and Switzerland, 251, 251–252, 253 and Taiwan, 1253–1255, 1257–1260 and technology, 134–135, 1476, 1481 and Tibet, 1815, 1817–1818, 1821–1823 and Turkey, 761–763, 764–765, 766, 768–770, 1645–1647, 1650 and Ukraine, 718–721, 720, 1622–1623 and the United States, 389, 392, 1307, 1307–1308 and Uruguay, 400, 401–402, 403 and Vietnam, 1266–1269, 1271 and Wales, 1636, 1640 Ideology, 971–989 and China, 794–795, 1193, 1194–1197, 1195, 1197 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1280–1281 globalization, disillusionment, and, 936–941 and Iraq, 752 and Malaysia, 1223 and nationalist movements, 940–941 and Russia, 692–697 and the United States, 1307–1308 and Vietnam, 1269 See also Communism; Fascism; Nationalism; Philosophy, political Igbo, 1469 Iglesias, Santiago, 839 Ileto, Reynaldo, 1245 Iliescu, Ion, 1586, 1587, 1589 Iliolo, Ratu Josefa, 1325 Immigrants/immigration, 1418–1429 and Alsace, 1510 and Argentina, 276, 277, 279, 280, 492 and Australia, 850 and Basques, 1517 and Burma, 777, 783 and Canada, 304, 1837 and Catalonia, 1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Colombia, 833 and cosmopolitanism, 1362 and Cuba, 1275 and Denmark, 155 education and, 420, 423–424 and the European Union, 1042 and France, 1055–1056, 1056 and gender, 448 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1409, 1411–1412, 1415 and Great Britain, 1007, 1009, 1013 and Greenland, 1566 and homeland politics, 1414–1415, 1416 and Indonesia, 1729 and Israel, 1121, 1129, 1130 and Japan, 1749, 1753, 1753 and language, 482, 483–484

and Latvia, 1575 and Malaysia, 1215 and Mongolia, 1797 and nativism, 883 and the Netherlands, 202, 206 and New Zealand, 864, 867, 868, 1856 and Pakistan, 1237 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Québec, 1296–1297 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Scandinavia, 231 and sports, 1000 and Turkey, 1650 and the United States, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1311 and Uruguay, 402 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnicity; Minorities; Refugees Imoudu, Michael, 1181 Imperialism. See Colonialism/imperialism Incas, 367–368, 370–371, 373 Income distribution and Australia, 853 and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Iran, 1111 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 955 and the United States, 1307, 1308 Independence and Afghanistan, 1684 in Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1098, 1099, 1100 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 728 and Argentina, 269–273 and Armenia, 1709–1710 and Austria, 542, 548–550, 552–553 and the Baltic states, 556–557, 562, 568, 1575, 1577–1578 and Belgium, 140, 142–143 and Brazil, 282, 287, 289, 295 and Bulgaria, 573–574, 578–580 and Burma, 777, 782–785 and Central America, 313, 319 and Chile, 326–327, 328 during the Cold War era, 949–950, 960, 969 and Colombia, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1161 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1277 and developing countries, 980 and Eritrea, 1173, 1173–1175 and Fiji, 1316–1317, 1320 and Finland, 223, 231, 605, 606 and Greece, 46, 53, 623, 625–631 and Greenland, 1571 and Haiti, 336 and Hungary, 638 and Iceland, 231 and India, 804–806, 889–890, 1201–1203 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1725, 1727, 1733–1734

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and Iraq, 750, 752–753 Latin America and, 46, 272 and Mexico, 349–350 and Mongolia, 1790, 1795 and New Zealand, 872 and Nigeria, 1181–1183 and Norway, 223–225, 231 and Pakistan, 1229–1231 and Paraguay, 359, 360–361 and Peru, 370, 371 and the Philippines, 1240–1241 and Poland, 681, 687–688 and popular nationalist movements, 503 to protect national culture, 1355 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 841, 843, 844–847 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Santo Domingo, 332–333 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and Taiwan, 1256–1257 and technology, 1479 and Tibet, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 767–768 and Ukraine, 722, 1626, 1626–1627 and Uruguay, 397 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Separatism/secession; Sovereignty India, 796–806, 799 (map), 943, 949–950, 1201–1211, 1202 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and colonialism, 48 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1373 education and, 424, 429 and gender, 446, 451, 902 government in, 981 and Great Britain, 889–890 and independence, 963, 1006, 1461–1462 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1771, 1765 and the Khalifat Movement, 1763 language/literature in, 920, 922, 923, 927 and music, 1440, 1441, 1443 and Nepal, 1802 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 967–968, 1229–1231, 1234–1235, 1235 politics in, 976–977, 987 railroad in, 131 and religion, 107 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 and terrorism, 1495 and the Tibetan government-in-exile, 1821, 1822 and water, 885 Indians, in Malaysia, 1215, 1216 Indigenismo, 352 Indigenous groups and Argentina, 277, 280 and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 283, 285, 293, 1826, 1828

and Canada, 303, 1837, 1840 and Central America, 310, 311, 317 and Chile, 324–326, 327 and Colombia, 829, 830 colonialism and, 889, 893, 912–913, 914–917 and education, 1383, 1385 and the environment/natural resources, 879, 883–884 and Fiji, 1314–1325 influence on music of, 1438–1439 Inuit, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 and language, 472, 482 and Malaysia, 1213–1215 and Mexico, 345–346, 351 and new social movements, 1448, 1451–1452 and Peru, 370–371, 372–375 and Québec, 1297 and Taiwan, 1252 and the United States, 1309 and Uruguay, 394–395 See also Maori; Pan-Aboriginalism; Sami Indo-Fijians, 1314–1325, 1318 Indo-Pakistan War, 1767 Indonesia, 1722–1735, 1724 (map) aircraft industry in, 1476 diversity and government in, 953–954 and independence, 1462–1463 and Malaysia, 1220 and the Netherlands, 197, 204 political tensions in, 938 radio hobbyists in, 128 separatist movements in, 1468 and technology, 1479–1480 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and transmigration, 876 Industrial Revolution, 161 Industrialization and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Basques, 1514–1515, 1517 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 317 and class, 55–56 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and England, 161 and Eritrea, 1169 and the European revolutions of 1848, 47 and Finland, 598 and geopolitics, 461 and Germany, 611 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 648, 661 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 424, 1748–1749 and Korea, 1778 and Mongolia, 1785 and nationalism, 1475, 1480 and Pakistan, 1228 and Poland, 209, 679, 681 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Québec, 1293–1294

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Industrialization (continued ) and Romania, 1585, 1587 and Russia, 699 and Scandinavia, 221 socialism and, 205 and the Soviet Union, 1075 and Spain, 703–704, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Ukraine, 714–715 and the United States, 1309 See also Economy Inequality and education, 1382, 1385–1386 and gender, 901–902, 903–904 and globalization, 936 and oil revenues in the Middle East, 1396 See also Income distribution; Rights Infrastructure and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 296, 1829 and China, 1193, 1200 education, 1381 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1169 and Indonesia, 1723 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 205 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1680 and Spain, 706, 708 and technological advances, 127–128, 131–132 and Tibet, 1814 and the United States, 389–390 Ingrians (Ingers), 557 Ingush, 441 Injannashi, 1788, 1789 Innis, Harold Adams, 1474, 1475 ˙Inönü, ˙Ismet, 768 Inoue Nissho, 816–817 Intellectuals, 1707 and Algeria, 1100 and Arab nationalism, 725, 730–733, 734 and Armenia, 1706 and Bulgaria, 571–572, 573 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1842 and China, 789–790, 792, 793, 793 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and France, 1052 and Germany, 183–185 independence and Greek, 626–627, 629–630 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 1741, 1745 and Latvia, 1575, 1577 and Mongolia, 1785–1786 and Nigeria, 1180 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222, 223

the Soviet Union and disciplining, 1074–1076 and Ukraine, 718 Young Ottomans/Turks, 763, 763, 764–765, 767, 771, 774 See also Elites International institutions. See Global institutions International Labour Organization (ILO), 1610 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1229, 1829, 1829 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 1359–1361 Internationalism, 536 and Angola, 1663 and Germany, 1551, 1559–1560 and globalization, 1408–1410 issue-specific, 1361–1362 versus nationalism, 418, 1342 and sports, 991 See also Post-nationalism; Transnationalism Internet and Armenia, 1709 and diaspora populations, 1370 and national identity, 1476, 1481–1483 and transnationalism, 1339 Interpellation, 486, 489–490 Intervention. See Foreign intervention Intifada, 1141 Inuit, 879, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 Ioann, Metropolitan, 106 Iqbal Lahori, Muhammad, 1229–1230, 1230, 1233 Iran, 1106–1118, 1108 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714 and gender, 446 and Iraq, 758, 1743 and Islamic fundamentalism, 986 and new social movements, 1452 and Palestine, 1142 and religious fundamentalism, 1396–1397 and terrorism, 1488 and the United States, 952 See also Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 756, 757, 952, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1746 Iraq, 747–759, 748 (map), 1736–1747, 1738 (map) borders of, 966 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1389 and Iran, 1115–1116 U.S. invasion of, 954, 955, 1497 water, 884–885 See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ireland, 647–662 Celtic revival in, 407 and colonialism, 915 and diaspora populations, 1374, 1375–1376

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economy of, 1060, 1408 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 112–113 and gender/sexuality, 452, 908 and immigration, 1424 and independence, 166, 1006 language and literature in, 488, 913–914, 918, 919, 920, 922–925 and Northern Ireland, 1060–1062, 1062, 1068 and sports, 997–998, 999–1000 Irian Jaya, 1734 Irish National Land League, 653–654 Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, 1185 Irving, Washington, 389 Isabella of Castile, 709 Islam and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1694 and Arab nationalism, 731, 733 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and the caliphate, 760–761 and India, 797 and Indonesia, 1728, 1734 and Iraq, 755, 1737, 1743–1745 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and national identity, 103–105 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763, 764 and Pakistan, 1236 and the Philippines, 1239 and politics, 983–987 in Russia, 1605–1607 and Turkey, 768, 1653–1654 See also Islamic fundamentalists; Shiism/ Shiites; Sunnis Islamic fundamentalists, 984–987, 1392, 1393, 1396–1400 and Algeria, 1101, 1102–1103 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1769 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1141–1143 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 in Turkey, 1649 Islamization, 1397–1400 Ismail, King (Egypt), 259, 260 Israel, 953, 1120–1130, 1122 (map) and counterterrorism, 1496 and diaspora populations, 1367 and education, 1387–1388 and environmental nationalism, 880 and minorities, 1374 and music, 1443 and Palestinians, 1133–1143 and religious fundamentalism, 1394, 1398, 1401–1402 and the Suez War, 266 symbols of, 114, 116 and water, 885 Isto, Edvard (Eetu), 603 (illus.) István, King (Hungary), 643

Itagaki Taisuke, 820 Italy, 663–677 and democracy, 946–947 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 426, 429, 432 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737, 740, 740 fascism in, 419, 514–516, 518–519 and film, 1333–1334 form of nationalism in, 502 and gender, 448–449 and language, 472 and the Libyan war, 514 and minorities, 1374, 1412, 1424 and music, 1437–1438, 1441 and nationalistic art, 410, 413, 414–415, 418 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and terrorism, 1491 unification (Risorgimento) of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 468, 512 Ivan the Terrible, 700 Ives, Charles, 1439 Iwakura Mission, 818–820 Izetbegovi´c, Alija, 1527 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev (Vladimir), 1123 Jacini, Stefano, 669 Jackson, A. Y., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jacobitism, 175, 233, 238, 238 Jacobsen, J. C., 154 Jacobus, Stephanus, 1149 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 92, 186 Jakobson, Carl Robert, 562 Jamaica, 495 James, C. L. R., 992, 1301 James VI (Scotland)/James I (England), 61 Jamieson, John, 239 Jammu and Kashmir, 1462, 1759–1771, 1762 (map) conflict in, 1203–1204, 1234–1235, 1235, 1465–1466 Jang Bahadur, 1807 Jangghar, 1791 Jannsen, Johann Voldemar, 562 Japan, 808–822, 811 (map), 819 (map), 821 (map), 1748–1758, 1750 (map) and Burma, 777, 784–785 and China, 791, 792, 795, 1190 colonialism and, 1462 and democracy, 947 education and, 38, 40, 424, 426 and gender, 445, 450, 456 and India, 806 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language, 472, 478 and the Meiji Restoration, 27 and Mongolia, 1792, 1795, 1796 and music, 1439–1440, 1441 nationalism and literature in, 491–492 origins of nationalism in, 9

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Japan (continued ) and politics, 988 and religion, 106–107 and sports, 1001 and Taiwan, 1250, 1251 and terrorism, 1491 Jargalsaikhan, D., 1794 Jarl, Birger, 226 Järnefelt, Eero, 605 Jefferson, Thomas, 22, 32, 65, 211, 370, 387, 388 Jesuits, 350–351 Jews and Austria, 546 in the Baltic states, 563 in Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and the Diaspora, 1366, 1367 as discredited sexuality, 907 and Egypt, 265, 266 and establishment of Israel, 1402 ethnic cleansing and genocide in Russia, 438 and Germany, 188, 193, 430 and the Holocaust, 439–440, 523 and Hungary, 644, 645 in Iraq, 755–756 in Macedonia and Thrace during the Holocaust, 582 and the Netherlands, 199 and pogroms in Ukraine, 722 and Poland, 207, 209 in Romania, 1594 and Switzerland, 249 in Turkey, 1649 in the United States, 1398, 1400 See also Anti-Semitism; Israel; Judaism Jibzundamba Khutugtu, Eighth, 1788, 1792 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 804, 976, 1229, 1230, 1230–1231, 1233, 1461 Joergensen, A. D., 152, 154 Jogaila (Lithuanian prince), 564 John, King (England), 165 John Paul II, Pope, 948, 988 Johnson, Barry, 1399 Johnson, James, 73 Johnson, Lyndon, 944, 1310 Johnson, Samuel, 60 Johnston, Frank, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jones, Aneurin, 1637 Jones, Inigo, 61 Joseph II (Austria-Hungary), 138, 140 Jospin, Lionel, 1510 Joubert, Piet, 1146 Joyce, James, 489, 658, 914, 923, 924 Juan Carlos I, King (Spain), 1087 Judaism and fundamentalism (Ultra-Orthodoxy), 1124, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1400–1403 and national identity, 103 See also Jews Juliana, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Júnior, Caio Prado, 292

Kabila, Joseph, 1165 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 1165 Kagame, Paul, 1674 Kalaallit. See Greenland Kalevala, The, 227, 228, 406, 599, 602, 604 Kallay, Benjamin von, 1529 Kalmyks, 1784, 1790–1791, 1792, 1794–1795 Kamenev, Lev, 520 Kamil, Husayn, 262 Kamil, Mustafa, 261 Kangxi, Emperor, 1252 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 17, 86, 87–88, 533, 1352 Kaplan, Robert, 929 Karaites (Karaim), 557 Karamzin, Nikolai, 94 Karavelov, Luben, 573 Karel IV, king of Bohemia, 592 Karelia, 599, 600, 608 Karlsbad Decrees, 187, 189 Karmal, Babrak, 1687 Karnaviˇcus, Jurgis, 560 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 638 Karzai, Ahmed Wali, 1694 (illus.) Karzai, Hamid, 1686, 1695 Kasavubu, Joseph, 1158 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kasparov, Gary, 951 Katanga, 1158, 1469 Kaunitz, Chancellor (Austria), 33–34 Kayibanda, Gregoire, 1677 Kazakhs, 1798 Kazakhstan, 1079, 1798 Kazimierz (Casimir) III (Prussia), 214 Keane, John, 1446, 1456 Kedourie, Elie, 474, 533 Keller, Ferdinand, 413 Kellerman, François, 1504 Kelly, Edward “Ned,” 857, 857 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 451, 633, 767–770, 1643, 1646–1647, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653 and Turkish identity, 766 Kemal, Namik, 763, 763, 766, 770, 774 Kemboi, Ezekiel, 1001 Kennan, George C., 945 Kennedy, John F., 944 Kent, William, 62 Kenya education and, 429 and literature, 919–920, 925–926 and music, 1440, 1441 Kenyatta, Jomo, 965 Kerber, Linda, 50 Kerkorian, Kirk, 1707 Key, Francis Scott, 117, 1443 Keyser, Rudolf, 228 Khachaturian, Aram, 1707 Khalifat Movement, 1763 Khan, Abatai, 1791 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 1236 Khan, Altan, 1817

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Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 1786, 1786, 1791, 1798, 1816 Khan, Dayan, 1786 Khan, Ishaq, 1232 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1232 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 801 Khan, Yahya, 1232 Khan, Yaqub, 1690–1691 Khan Khattak, Khushal, 1690 Khatami, Mohammad, 1117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 952, 986, 1111, 1114, 1396, 1397, 1399, 1400 Khomiakov, A. S., 692 Khorenatsi, Movses, 1702, 1708 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 948, 952, 979, 1076, 1077, 1603 Khutugtu, Jibzundamba, 1790 Khyvliovyi, Mykola, 718 Kidd, Benjamin, 532 Kierkegaard, Søren, 228 Kim Dae Jung, 1779 Kim Il Sung, 952, 1773, 1779–1781, 1780 Kim Jong Il, 1780 Kincaid, Jamaica, 924 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 123, 938, 1203, 1304 King, Michael, 869 King, Rodney, 1339 King, Sir Frederic Truby, 871 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 306 Kireevskii, I. V., 692 Kiribati, 1443 Kissinger, Henry, 458 Kivi, Aleksis, 602 Kjellén, Rudolf, 460, 463, 491 Klaus, Václav, 1027, 1028 Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 1504 Klingler, Werner, 133 Knudsen, Knud, 225–226 Kochanowski, Jan, 214 Kodály, Zoltán, 81, 1432, 1435 Kohl, Helmut, 1549 Kohn, Hans, 23, 392, 474 Koidula, Lydia, 564 Koirala, B. P., 1803, 1807 Koizumi, Prime Minister (Japan), 1755 Kolberg, Oskar, 216 Köler, Johann, 564 Kolettis, Ioannis, 632 Kollár, Jan, 592 Kołła˛taj, Hugo, 211 Kollontai, Alexandra, 453, 454 Konovalets, Yevhen, 718 Kopernik, Mikołaj (Nicholas Copernicus), 214 Korais, Adamantios, 626, 628, 628 Korchynsky, Dmytro, 1628 Korea, 1467, 1772–1781, 1774 (map) education and, 424 and independence, 1462 and Japan, 809, 810, 815, 818, 1749 and sports, 1001

Koreans, in Japan, 1753 Körner, Theodor, 73 Korppi-Tommola, Aura, 54 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 96, 211, 211, 214, 686 Kosovo, 1409, 1554, 1555 Kossuth, Lajos, 638, 643 Kossuth, Louis, 239 Kostecki, Platon, 716 Koyama Eizo, 822 Kozyrev, Andrei, 1597 Kracauer, Siegfried, 1330–1331 Kramáˇr, Karel, 590 Krasicki, Ignacy, 214 Krasi´nski, Zygmunt, 212, 214, 216 Kraszewski, Józef Ignacy, 216–217, 685 Kravchuk, Leonid, 1078, 1597, 1621, 1622, 1626 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhard, 564, 567 Krieck, Wilhelm, 426 Kronvalds, Atis, 1577 Kruger, Paul, 1146, 1150–1151 Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 453, 454 Kuchma, Leonid, 1080, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1628 Kun, Béla, 520 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 1079 Kunchov, Vasil, 580 Kurds and European partition, 891–893 and Iraq, 752–753, 755, 756, 1737, 1741–1742, 1745 and terrorism, 1491 and Turkey, 769, 885, 1646, 1650, 1653, 1655 Kushner, Barak, 822 Kutuzov, Dmitrii, 696 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 1074 Kuwait, 1743 Kuyper, Abraham, 200, 1149 Kymlicka, Will, 97, 931 Kyoto treaty, 877, 1447, 1456, 1457 Kyrlylenko, Vyacheslav, 1626 Labor/employment and Australia, 852 and Burma, 777, 781 and England, 164 and Fiji, 1314–1315 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Iraq, 1746 and the knowledge worker, 1380 and migration, 1422, 1424 and Nigeria, 1181 shortages and ethnic cleansing/genocide, 441 slavery, 889. See also Slavery and South Africa, 1145–1146 specialization of, 130 and the United States, 1304, 1309 Ladulås, Magnus, 226 Lagarde, Pierre, 409 Lagerbring, Sven, 227 Lahiri, Jhumpa, 927 Laicism, 769

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Lal, Brij V., 1322 Lalli (Finnish hero), 604–605 Lamanskii, Vladimir, 1601 Lamas, Andrés, 402 Lamming, George, 913, 917, 924 Land ownership and Australia, 1851–1852 and Fiji, 1314, 1322 and Haiti, 338, 342 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Ireland, 648, 653 and Japan, 811–812 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1861–1863, 1862 and Paraguay, 358 and Puerto Rico, 845 and South Africa, 1151 Land rights/claims and Afghanistan, 1692 and the Baltic states, 568 and Burma, 783 and the Inuit, 1567 and new social movements, 1450, 1451–1452 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846 and the Sami, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1617 Land sacralization, 100, 103 Landes, Joan, 49 Landsbergis, Vytautus, 1078 Landscape, 59–71 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Canada, 1841 and Denmark, 154 and England, 162 and Finland, 599, 604 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127–1128, 1129 and music, 78–79 and national identity, 875–876, 1342, 1344–1345 and Russia, 698 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 228 and Switzerland, 251, 252 as symbols, 114–115 and Turkey, 770 and Ukraine, 1621 and Wales, 1633 See also Environment Lange, Christian, 228 Language, 471–484, 912–928 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1692 and Afrikaner nationalism, 1147 and Algeria, 1095, 1101 and Alsace, 1502–1503, 1509, 1510 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 733 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703 and Austria, 542 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 560, 561, 562, 563 and Basques, 704, 710–711, 1092, 1512, 1514 (map), 1516, 1522

and Belgium, 138, 141–142, 144–145, 146 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 289, 1825 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Canada, 303, 307, 1840 and Catalans, 706, 1537, 1542, 1544, 1546 and China, 1199 and cultural survival, 878–879 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1021 and Denmark, 154 dictionaries and standardizing, 477 education and, 420, 424–425, 427 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1170, 1172, 1173–1174 and Ethiopia, 741, 746 and Europe, 1031 and Fiji, 1320 and Finland, 598–599, 601, 601–602, 605–606 and France, 34, 178 and Germany, 185 and globalization, 1392 and Greece, 629–630 and Greenland, 1565, 1566, 1568, 1570–1571 and Haiti, 339 and Hungary, 641 and immigration, 1420, 1421 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723–1725, 1728 and Ireland, 657, 660 and Israel, 1124, 1127, 1129 and Italy, 665, 671 and Japan, 813 and Latvia, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1582 and Malaysia, 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 345, 346 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1796, 1798 and national boundaries, 461 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 16, 533, 1355–1356 and nationalistic music, 78, 80 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 199 and New Zealand, 1383 and Pakistan, 1233, 1235–1236 and Paraguay, 358, 364, 365 and the Philippines, 1247 and Poland, 217, 679, 688 and political philosophy, 88–89, 91 and print technology, 1475 and Puerto Rico, 841, 845 and Québec, 1291, 1293, 1296 and Romania, 1588, 1589–1591 and the Sami, 1613–1614 and Scandinavia, 225–226 and Singapore, 1224–1225 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Spain, 707

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and Switzerland, 245 and Taiwan, 1258 and Tibet, 1815, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 772–773, 1646, 1646, 1652, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 719, 719, 720, 721, 1621, 1623–1624, 1625, 1627 and the United States, 389 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 and Wales, 1632, 1634–1636, 1635, 1638 Laos, 1463 Lapage, Robert, 1294 Laporte, Pierre, 1291 Laqueur, Walter, 1489, 1498 Larrazábal, Antonio, 317 Larsson, Carl, 228 Laski, Harold, 981 Lassale, F., 38 Lastarria, José Victorino, 329 Latin America development of nationalism in, 8, 9, 16, 26, 46 and film, 1335 and language, 472 and nationalistic music, 76 and new social movements, 1450–1452 See also specific Latin American countries Latvia, 1573–1582, 1573 (map) fascism in, 517 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, 399 Lavater, Johann Kaspar, 251 Lavin, Mary, 925 Lawson, Henry, 854 Laxman, Adam, 810 Le Carre, John, 951 Le Corbusier, 1206 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1054, 1056, 1447, 1453, 1510 Le Republicain (L’Union), 341, 342 Leaders and Africa, 890 and Angola, 1661–1663, 1662 anticolonial nationalist, 962–964 and Arab nationalism, 730–731, 732, 732–733 and Argentina, 277–278 and Armenia, 1699 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532 and Canada, 306, 1837 and Central America, 317–318, 320–321 and China, 790, 794, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158, 1160 and Denmark, 153 and Egypt, 258–259 and France, 1051, 1052 and Germany, 189, 190 and Haiti, 336–337, 338 and India, 1206–1207, 1207, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1726, 1727 and Iraq, 758 Islamic attacks on Muslim, 1397–1398

and Islamic movements, 984–985 and Israel, 1121, 1123, 1123, 1128 and Japan, 818–820, 1751–1752, 1752 and Korea, 1775, 1780 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1857, 1858 and Mongolia, 1789–1790 monuments to, 410–411 and national identity, 1345 as national symbols, 114, 116 and Nepal, 1803, 1806 and new social movements, 1453 and Nigeria, 1180, 1180–1181, 1182, 1187 and Pakistan, 1230 and Palestinians, 1134, 1136–1137, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1848, 1848, 1851, 1853 and Paraguay, 364 and the Philippines, 1241–1242, 1242, 1244 and Poland, 210–212, 681–683, 682 and Puerto Rico, 839–840 qualities of, 982 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1597 and the Sami, 1616, 1616–1618 and separatist movements, 1464–1465 and Singapore, 1221 and South Africa, 1150–1151, 1152 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1075 and Taiwan, 1253 and Uruguay, 398 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Heroes/heroines League of Arab States, 729 League of Nations failure of the, 1402 and Iraq, 750, 1739 and Israel, 1123 Mandates, 728, 1461 and New Zealand, 872 Lebanon, 728 Lechner, Frank, 1392 Leclerc, Charles, 336 Leclerc de Buffon, Georges-Louis, 351 Lee, Richard Henry, 385 Lee Kuan Yew, 1220, 1221 Lee Teng-hui, 1253, 1253–1254, 1255, 1256, 1258, 1259 Legal system/institutions and Central America, 314, 315, 319 and France, 174, 176 and the Netherlands, 202 and Scandinavia, 227 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 254 Legitimacy and Angola, 1666 and Chinese communists, 1196, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1370–1371 and ideologies and religions, 972–973 and Iran, 1109

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Legitimacy (continued ) and modern nation-states, 930 and national sports, 998–999 and North versus South Korea, 1776, 1778–1779 and the Qing Dynasty in China, 788 Legitime, Francois, 338 Leino, Eino, 605 Lej Iyasu, 740, 740 Lelewel, Joachim, 212, 214, 692 Lemarchand, Rene, 1676 Lemieux, Mario “The Magnificent,” 1842 Lemkin, Raphael, 436 Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov), 436, 697, 978, 981, 1072 and ethnicities, 1599 and film, 1330 on nationalism, 1071 León y Gama, Antonio de, 351, 351 Leopold I (Belgium), 142 Leopold II (Belgium), 1156 Lepeletier, L. M., 34 Lerroux, Alejandro, 710 Lesage, Jean, 1290, 1290 Lespinasse, Beauvais, 341 Lester, Richard, 1337 Lévesque, René, 1290, 1290, 1291, 1291 (illus.), 1294 Levitt, Kari, 1842 Levski, Vasil, 573, 576, 576 Levsky, Vasil, 96 Levy, Andrea, 928 Lewis, C. S., 971 Lewis, Geoffrey, 773 Lewis, Saunders, 1635 Liberalism, 14–15, 23–28, 535–536, 537 and Australia, 854 and Brazil, 1830 as detached from democracy, 1306 and European nationalism, 512–513 and Finland, 598 German, 17 and Indonesia, 1732 and Italy, 669 versus nationalism, 1350–1351. See also Nationalism, liberal and Paraguay, 364–365 and Puerto Rico, 841 and Spain, 704 See also Economic liberalism Liberties. See Rights Liborio, 1283 Libyan war, 514 Liebermann, Max, 416 Liebknecht, Karl, 520 Liechtenstein, 1443 Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 Lijphart, Arend, 206 Lilburn, Douglas, 1439 Lincoln, Abraham, 382, 391

Lindeman, Ludvig Mathias, 73 Lindsay, A. D., 536 Linguistic internationalists, 471 Lippmann, Walter, 950 Lira, Luciano, 401 Lismer, Arthur, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Lisson, Carlos, 374 List, Friedrich, 18, 191, 192, 463 Liszt, Franz, 74, 81, 1432, 1435 Literacy rates, 495–497, 496 (map) and Pakistan, 1228 Literature, 465, 485–497, 912–928 and Argentina, 278–279 and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703 Austrian, 543 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Brazil, 285, 287 and Bulgaria, 576–577 and Canada, 1841 and Catalonia, 1543 and Chile, 329, 330 and Colombia, 832 and Finland, 602, 604, 605 and France, 177, 1052 and gender, 49 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and India, 800, 1209 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1740 and Ireland, 657, 658–659 and Mongolia, 1789, 1794 and Nepal, 1807, 1808 and the Philippines, 1244–1245 and Poland, 682, 685 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavia, 228 and Scotland, 238–239 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 1075–1076, 1077, 1077 and Spain, 708 and Turkey, 763, 770 and Ukraine, 720 and the United States, 389, 951 See also Poetry Lithuania, 561 and gender/sexuality, 908 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Livingston, David, 164 Livs, 557 Localism and globalization, 1411 nationalism as, 1415 and subsidiarity, 881 See also Regionalism Loggia, Enrico Galli della, 676 Lomonosov, M. V., 694 Lönnrot, Elias, 228, 406, 599, 602 López, Carlos Antonio, 362, 363, 364

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López, Narciso, 1282 Lopez, Vicente Fidel, 276 López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 830–831, 832 Louis-Philippe, 408 Louis XVI, King (France), 1489 Louis XVIII, King (France), 1443 Louisiana Purchase, 390 Lower, Arthur, 305 Loya jirga, 1686, 1687, 1690, 1691 Lu Xun, 793 Lubbe, Marinus van der, 119 Luce, Henry, 1309 Ludendorff, Erich, 613 Lumumba, Patrice, 962–963, 1158, 1158, 1159, 1159 (illus.), 1160–1162 heroicizing of, 1164 Luther, Martin, 188, 618, 983 Luxemburg, Rosa, 520 Lyngbye, Hans Christian, 225 Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 718 MacArthur, Douglas, 1751 Macartney, C. A., 1368 Macaulay, Hebert, 1179–1180, 1180 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 165, 912 MacCunn, Hamish, 1438 MacDonald, J. E. H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Macdonald, John A., 1837 MacDowell, Edward, 76, 1438 Macedonia and Bulgaria, 580, 582 and diasporic communities, 1415 Germany and peacekeeping in, 1554 Maceo, 1275, 1282 Machado, Gerardo, 1276 Maˇciulis, Jonas, 565 Mackenzie, Alexander, 300, 1438 Mackinder, Halford, 460, 468 Maclennan, Hugh, 307 Macpherson, James, 462 Mada, Gajah, 1727 Madison, James, 386, 387, 388 Magna Carta, 165 Magnus, Olaus, 223 Magnus VI (Norway), 226 Magsaysay, Ramon, 1241, 1242 Magyarization, 644 Magyars, 587 Maharaja (of Jammu and Kashmir), 1764–1765 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, 1803, 1807–1808 Maimonides, 1402, 1403 Maistre, Joseph de, 92 Majoritarian nationalist movements, 940 Makarenko, Anton, 425, 429 Malan, Daniel François, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1151 Malawi, 1440 Malay(s), 1213–1215, 1217, 1219, 1225 as dominant culture in Malaysia, 1220–1222 and education, 1384–1385 and the Philippines, 1243

Malaysia, 1213–1225 and education, 1385–1386 and independence, 1463 and Indonesia, 1729, 1733 and natural resources, 884 Malcolm X, 965 Mâle, Emile, 415 Malthusianism, 518 Mamluks, 257–258, 259–260 Mammeri, Mouloud, 1100 Manchester, England, 161 Manchuria and independence, 1462 and Japan, 810, 818 Manchurian Incident (1931), 810, 821 Manchus, 1818 Mandela, Nelson, 995, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1488–1489 Mandukhai, Empress, 1786 Manifest destiny. See Expansionism Mann, Horace, 37 Mann, Thomas, 617 Mansell, Michael, 1848 Manzanilla, Matias, 374 Manzoni, Alessandro, 671 Mao Zedong, 948, 952, 977, 1191, 1816, 1819, 1821 economic and political programs, 1198–1199 ideology of, 978, 1194–1197, 1197 influence of, 1192–1193 Maoism, 978–979 and Angola, 1664 and Nepal, 1810–1811 Maori, 866, 1855–1863 and education, 1383 and music, 1439 and New Zealand, 873 population, 864 and the Treaty of Waitangi, 863 and the world wars, 869–870 Maps, 465 and Central America, 319–320 and Finland, 602–604 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 640 and Japan, 810 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1320, 1324 Maragall i Mira, Pasqual, 1539, 1540, 1541 (illus.) Marcinkowski, Karol, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 1241–1242, 1244, 1246 Marcos, Imelda, 1242, 1244, 1245 Margalit, A., 97 Marginalization, 935–941 Maria Theresa (Austria-Hungary), 138 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 1469 Maritz, Gerrit, 1150 Markievicz, Countess, 654 “Marseillaise,” 175 Marshall, George C., 948 Marsland, David, 114

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Martí, José, 1275, 1276, 1282, 1283 Martin, Henri, 177 Martins, Wilfred, 975 Marure, Alejandro, 319 Marx, Karl, 1–3, 17–18, 217, 1195 and gender roles, 56 and religion, 1397 on socialism versus communism, 975 Marxism, 1–3, 12 and Angola, 1661, 1662 and Arab nationalism, 730–731 and culture, 485–486 and the environment, 881 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 471 See also Communism Mas, Artur, 1539 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 585, 585, 587–588, 589, 589 (illus.), 592, 593, 1017, 1028 Masculinity, 900–901. See also Gender Mashtots, Mesrop, 1701 Mason, Lowell, 389 Masood, Ahmad Shah, 1690, 1693 Massey, Vincent, 1838 Massey, William, 869 Masur, Gerhard, 834 Matejko, Jan, 682 Mathews, Robin, 1843 Matto de Turner, Clorinda, 374 Maude, Sir Stanley, 1742 Maupassant, Guy de, 134 Maura, Antonio, 707 Maurits of Orange (the Netherlands), 196 Maurras, Charles, 533 May, Glenn, 1246 May Fourth movement, 793, 793 Mayer, Gustav, 611 Maynard, Charles Frederick, 1848 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24, 90, 94–95, 468, 502, 673, 673 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Mbundu, 1660, 1664, 1665 McCarthy, Joseph, 907–908, 944 McCubbin, Frederick, 859 McDougall, William, 530, 535 McKay, Claude, 494 McLuhan, Marshall, 129 McVeigh, Timothy, 1492 Meˇciar, Vladimir, 1026–1027 Media and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Alsace, 1509 and Armenia, 1709 and Azerbaijan, 1719 and the Baltic states, 567 and Brazil, 287 and Bulgaria, 573 and Burma, 783 and Canada, 1839 and Central America, 316, 320

and China, 1193, 1199 culture and forms of, 1474–1475 education and, 422, 433 and Egypt, 261, 262 and Eritrea, 1172 and Ethiopia, 746 and globalization, 1412 in Haiti, 341 and immigration, 1427 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iraq, 1738, 1745 and Korea, 1781 as maintaining psychological stability, 123 manipulation of, 1480–1481 and national identity, 30, 31, 38, 464–465, 486, 1473 and Nepal, 1808 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1853 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 217 and Québec, 1296 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 technological advances and, 129, 132–134, 135–136 in Turkey, 1649 and the United States, 390, 1308 See also Cinema; Literature; Newspapers; Print technology; Radio; Television Megali Idea, 632–633 Mehmed V (Ottoman Empire), 765 Mehmed VI (Ottoman Empire), 767 Meiji Restoration, 818, 1748, 1751 Meiren, Gada, 1789 Mekhitarians, 1700 Melgar, Mariano, 373 Mella, Julio Antonio, 1282, 1283 Melnyk, Andrei, 718, 1624 Melucci, Albert, 1446 Men and gendered role in conflict, 449 nationalist imagery and, 445–446 See also Gender; Masculinity Mendelssohn, Felix, 1431 Mendes, Chico, 1829 Mendes-France, Pierre, 1054 Menelik II (Ethiopia), 737, 737–740, 744 Mercantalism, 18–19 Merchants. See Bourgeoisie Mercier, Honoré, 305, 1288–1289 Merse, 1789 Mesopotamia, 748, 757–758 Messiaen, Olivier, 1434 Mestiço, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1665 Mestizaje, 349, 349, 356 Mexican-American War, 347, 352, 354, 390 Mexico, 344–356, 346 (map), 353 (map) and communications, 1475 and music, 1439 national identity and education in, 39 national radio of, 132–133

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and politics, 1414 and terrorism, 1491 Zapatista movement in, 1412, 1451–1452 Meyer, John, 1392, 1397 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 117 Michael the Brave (Romania), 1585, 1592 Michelet, Jules, 102, 177, 177–178 Mickiewicz, Adam, 212, 213, 214, 216, 686, 692 Micombero, Michel, 1677 Middle East and education, 428, 1387–1388 and European colonization, 891 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Mier, Servando Teresa de, 350, 351, 352 Migration and consolidating sovereignty, 876 globalization and international, 1414–1415 and sports, 1001–1002 See also Emigration; Immigrants/immigration Mikhalkov, Sergei, 1602 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 722 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 683 Military and Algeria, 1100 and Angola, 1667 and Armenia, 1710 and Brazil, 1827, 1828–1829, 1830–1831, 1832 and Burma, 781 and China, 790 and Ethiopia, 740 and Fiji, 1314, 1324 and gender/sexuality, 903, 910 and Germany, 620, 621 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726 interventions and terrorism, 1497 and Iraq, 751, 753, 1743, 1745 and Ireland, 661 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1748–1749, 1752 music, 1430, 1431 and New Zealand, 868–869 and Nigeria, 1185, 1188 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Russia, 955 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1679, 1680 and Spain, 703, 705, 706 technology, 1473 and Turkey, 1646, 1647 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 57 Mill, John Stuart, 19, 57, 85, 95, 527 and cosmopolitanism, 1356 Miller, Ferdinand von, 416 Mindaugas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Minghetti, Marco, 669 Minin, Kuz’ma, 700, 1602 Minorities and Afghanistan, 1689–1690, 1692–1693, 1694 in the Baltic states, 557

and Basques, 1516–1517 and Bulgaria, 580–582 and Burma, 781 and China, 1193, 1199–1200 and citizenship, 1374 and Colombia, 833 and concerns about cultural survival, 878–879 cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and, 1356, 1357–1362 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and demands for rights, 932–933, 936–941. See also Rights and discrimination, 1420, 1425. See also Discrimination/prejudice education and, 419, 422, 427, 429–430, 431, 432 and the environment, 882 and Ethiopia, 741 and Germany, 617 globalization and mobilization of, 1412–1413, 1414 and Hungary, 639, 644 and India, 976, 1203 and Indonesia, 1728–1729 and Iran, 1112–1113, 1117–1118 and Iraq, 1741–1742 and Israel, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and Japan, 1753, 1756, 1758 and Latvia, 1575 and the legacies of colonialism, 894 and Malaysia, 1463 marginalization in modern states of, 931–932 and Mongolia, 1798 and nationalist ideologies, 513 and Nepal, 1804, 1809–1810 and new social movements, 1448, 1453, 1457, 1458 and New Zealand, 866–867 and Nigeria, 1182–1183 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and Poland, 683, 685, 687 and Romania, 1587, 1591, 1593–1594 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672 and state terrorism, 1488 and Turkey, 1648–1651, 1654–1655 and Ukraine, 1625 and the United States, 1307, 1308 and Vietnam, 1271 and Wales, 1636 See also Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Genocide; Language Missionary activity, 480 Mistral, Frédéric, 477 Mitre, Bartolomé, 276, 279 Mitterrand, François, 458, 1051–1052, 1054 Mixed race descent and Brazil, 293 and Central America, 311 and Paraguay, 358

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Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga), 1158–1159, 1160, 1161, 1162–1165 Modarres, Hassan, 1114 Modernization and Afghanistan, 1686, 1688 and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Australia, 853–854 and China, 792, 1191–1192, 1197, 1198–1199, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1372 and Ethiopia, 740–741 and film, 1337 and Greece, 625, 630 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Italy, 669–670 and Japan, 1753 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 as necessitating the nation-state, 930–932 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Spain, 705, 705, 706 and Turkey, 771 Moe, Jørgen, 228 Mohammad, Mahathir bin, 1223–1224 Mohammed, Murtala Ramat, 1186, 1187, 1187 Mohaqeq, Mohammad, 1695 Moldavia/Moldova, 469, 1414 Molina, Felipe, 319 Molina, Pedro, 315, 316 Molotov, Viacheslav, 1077 Moluccans, 1491 Monarchy and France, 169–171 and Great Britain, 1007–1008, 1008 Mondlane, Eduardo, 1661 Mongolia, 1783–1799 and independence, 1818, 1819 Mongols, and Tibet, 1816–1817 Moniuszko, Stanisław, 74, 216, 686 Monnet, Jean, 1034 Montcalm, Louis de, 299 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, 62–64, 171, 529 Montevideo, 395–396, 397, 402 Montgomerie, Archibald William, 235 Montilla Aguilera, José, 1539, 1541 Montúfar, Manuel, 319 Monuments, 117–120 and Algeria, 1102 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 294–295 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 594, 1024–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Germany, 618, 619 and Indonesia, 1732, 1733, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Ireland, 659 and Japan, 1754–1755

and Latvia, 1580 and Mongolia, 1798 and national identity, 1342, 1345–1347 and nationalism, 408, 409, 410–412, 414–415, 417 and Nigeria, 1187 and rituals of belonging, 502, 504 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1603 Scottish, 239 and Turkey, 774 Mora, José María Luis, 352 Mora, Juan Rafael, 315, 318 Moral Majority, 1395, 1446 Morality and cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, 1351–1353, 1356–1357 and Cuba, 1283 and gender and sexuality issues, 447, 899, 908–909 and national character, 531 U.S. idealistic, 944 See also Values Moravia, 584 Morazán, Francisco, 318 Moreno, Manuel, 398 Moro, Aldo, 676 Moroccan crises, 514 Morocco, 1096–1097, 1464 Moros, 1243 Moscow Declaration, 548 Moscow metro, 134 Mosley, Oswald, 516 Mossadegh, Muhammad, 1109, 1109, 1111, 1114 Mosse, George, 905 Motoori Norinaga, 815 Mott, Lucretia, 53, 57 Motz, Friedrich, 191 Mount Ararat, 1702 Mount Rushmore, 134 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 1765 Mourer, Jean-Pierre, 1509 Mozambique, 968, 1464 Mubarak, Hosni, 985 Muhammad V, 1464 Mujahideen, 1687, 1688, 1693 Mukhtar, Mahmud, 264 Mulgan, Alan, 868 Müller, Adam, 92, 463 Multiculturalism and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 1826 and Canada, 1838, 1840, 1843 and education, 1379, 1382–1384, 1386 and Fiji, 1325 as a form of nationalism, 934, 935 and globalization, 1411–1412 and Great Britain, 1011–1013 and immigration, 1367

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and India, 1765 and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 1784 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and the Netherlands, 206 and Poland, 685 and Romania, 1589 and Singapore, 1224 as solution to minority demands, 933, 939 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 1306 Multilateralism, 877, 881 Multinationality, 1358 Munch, P. A., 228 Munich Conference, 595 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 840, 841, 845, 846 Muñoz Rivera, Luis, 839, 841 Museums, 31 and the Baltic states, 560 and France, 1053 in Germany, 1558 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Latvia, 1578 and nationalistic art, 412–414 and Scandinavia, 229 Musharraf, Pervez, 1232 Music, 72–83, 1430–1445 and Angola, 1665 Baltic folk songs, 561, 567 and Basques, 1522 and Brazil, 1826 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Finland, 600, 605 folk songs and nationalistic, 417 and France, 1053 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569–1570 in Indonesia, 1479 and Israel, 1127, 1128 and Italy, 671 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and national identity, 31, 132–133, 407 and Paraguay, 364, 365 and Poland, 214, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 songs in Denmark, 154 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637 See also Anthem, national Musical instruments, 1440–1441, 1442 Muslim Brotherhood, 984–986, 1396

Muslim League, 801, 804, 806, 976, 1761 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171 and Pakistan, 1230, 1231 Muslims and Egypt, 265 and India, 801, 803, 804, 806, 1203, 1209 and the Netherlands, 202 See also Islam Musset, Alfred de, 177 Mussolini, Benito, 448–449, 514–516, 518, 667, 670, 676 and Roman history, 674 Mussolini, Vittorio, 1334 Mussorgsky, Modest, 75, 75 (illus.), 78, 82, 1437 Nadim, Abdullah, 261 Nadir Shah, Mohammed, 1686, 1688 Nagorno-Karabakh. See Gharabagh conflict Naguib, Muhammad, 266 (illus.) Nagy, Imre, 978 Naipaul, V. S., 924 Nairn, Tom, 933 Naji, Dr., 1740 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1687 Napier, Theodore, 242 Napoleon, Louis, 197 Napoleon III, 407, 1443 Napoleonic Civil Code, 174, 176 Napoleonic wars, 463 and Central America, 317 and Germany, 186, 618–619 music and resistance in the, 73 as stirring nationalism, 14, 16, 26, 46 Nariño, Antonio, 831 Naruszewicz, Adam, 214 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 687 Nassef, Malak Hifni, 450 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 265–266, 266 (illus.), 730, 890, 964, 1396 and the Bandung Conference, 962 and pan-Arabism, 965, 982 Nation-building, 929–941 National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), 235, 235, 241 National character, 527–537. See also Culture; Identity National Socialism, 419, 422, 513, 514, 517–519. See also Nazism Nationalism defining, 4–5, 85, 1351 ethnic-genealogical versus civic-territorial, 1353–1354 forms of, 5–12, 934–935 and geopolitics, 458–469 as an ideological political project, 875 imperative and imaginary forms of, 501–503 and language, 473, 482–484. See also Language as a legitimating ideology, 436 liberal, 488–490, 1355–1359, 1362

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Nationalism (continued ) and masculinity, 900–901 origins of, 473–474 particularistic, 90–94 versus patriotism, 45 perversions of, 512–525 religious, 100–101. See also Religion technological, 1478 transnational, 1407, 1414–1415 universalistic culture-based, 88–90 See also Identity; Philosophy, political; Politics Nativism, 883 Natsir, Mohammed, 965 Natsugdorji, D., 1794 Natural resources and Azerbaijan, 1714 and Brazil, 283, 1827–1828, 1832 and Canada, 1842 and conflict, 883–886 and India, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 877 and the Philippines, 1247 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1671 and Scandinavia, 221 and Wales, 1632 Nau, Emile, 341 Naumovych, Ivan, 716 Navarra, 1516, 1517, 1523 Nazism and Austria, 545, 546, 550, 552 and Czechoslovakia, 592 education and, 426 and the environment, 882 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438–440, 523, 622 and expansionism, 621 and film, 1331 and gender, 454–456 on German national character, 533 and Iran, 1110–1111 and language, 481 and music, 1431 nationalism of, 1353 propaganda of, 133–134 and rituals of belonging, 505, 507–508 and sexuality, 907 Ndadaye, Melchior, 1673, 1679 Negritude movement, 488, 918–919 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 981, 1207, 1461, 1761, 1764, 1765, 1766 and the Bandung Conference, 961, 962, 1206 and the Dalai Lama, 1820 economic policies of, 1206 and Indian federalism, 1205 and the nonaligned movement, 982 Nehru, Motilal, 1207 Nejedlý, Zdenˇek, 1023–1024 Nekrasov, N. A., 694

Nelson, Lord Horatio, 164 Neo-fascism, 525, 974 Neo-Nazis and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557, 1558 and the Soviet Union, 1078 Neo-Stalinism, 1077–1078 Neoliberalism, in education, 1381–1382 Neorealism, 1333–1335, 1336, 1337 Nepal, 1800–1811, 1802 (map) Netherlands, the, 195–206, 201 (map), 202 (illus.) and Belgium, 141–142 and Brazil, 283–284 and colonialism, 1479 education and, 34, 429 fascism in, 516 and immigration, 1420 and Indonesia, 1463, 1723, 1733, 1734 and Japan, 809, 810 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 and music, 1443 national anthem, 117 and Taiwan, 1252 and technology, 1480 and terrorism, 1486–1487, 1491 See also Afrikaner nationalism Neto, Agostinho, 1661–1662, 1662 Nevskii, Aleksandr, 696, 700 New France, 1288 New Guinea, 852 New Zealand, 862–873, 864 (map) and education, 1382, 1383 and the Maori, 1855–1863 and music, 1439, 1441 and sports, 993 Newspapers and Algeria, 1103 and Arab nationalism, 752 and Australia, 854 and Colombia, 833 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and Iraq, 1740, 1745 and Irish resistance, 918 and Japan, 816, 817 in Latvia, 1576 and nationalism, 1473, 1475–1476 and Nigeria, 1179, 1181 and Québec, 1296 and the Sami, 1613 and Wales, 1639 Ngata, Sir Apirana, 1858, 1859 Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, 1818 Ng˜ ug˜ı wa Thiong’o, 913, 915, 919–920, 925–926 Niagara Falls, 134 Nibelungenlied, 406 Nicaragua and national identity, 321 symbols of, 319 and William Walker, 318

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Niceforo, Alfredo, 672 Nicholas I, Czar (Russia), 210, 690–692 Nicholas II, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Nicholls, David, 341 Nichols, Terry, 1492 Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn, 214 Nietzsche, F., 10 Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 205 Nigeria, 1177–1189, 1178 (map) Biafran secessionist movement in, 967 education and, 424 and literature, 920 Nightingale, Florence, 164 Nitze, Paul, 950 Nixon, Richard, 1039, 1395 Nkrumah, Kwame, 962, 964, 965, 980, 1161 Noble, Paul, 734 Nolan, Sidney, 857 Nolte, Ernst, 515 Nonaligned movement, 961, 969, 982 and Algeria, 1095 and Cuba, 1285 and India, 1206 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 944, 1359–1361, 1412 and Brazil, 1830 and Fiji, 1322 and new social movements, 1453 Nora, Pierre, 121–122, 1343 Nordau, Max, 416 Nordraak, Rikard, 230 North America and immigration, 1421, 1425 and terrorism, 1494 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1294, 1407, 1412, 1451 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 943, 974, 1532–1533 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Germany, 1549, 1555 and international interventions, 1409 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Russia, 1604 and Turkey, 774 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 1303 North Borneo (Sabah), 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 North Korea, 977, 1757. See also Korea Northern Ireland, 1014–1015, 1058–1068 conflict in, 1470–1471 and counterterrorism, 1496 symbols in, 113 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1492 Norway, 220–222 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 229–230 and gender, 450 independence and, 223–225, 231 and language, 225–226, 472, 477

and music, 1432, 1436–1437 national anthem, 230, 230 national identity and culture of, 226–228 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1617 Notari, Elvira, 1327 Nourrit, Adolphe, 144 Novalis, 92 Nuclear weapons/energy and India, 1210, 1236 and Iran, 1117, 1117 and Pakistan, 1235, 1236 Nunavut, 1562 Núñez, Rafael, 828 Nussbaum, Martha, 97 Nyerere, Julius, 890, 962, 964, 980–981 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 1186, 1188 O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth, 133 Öcalan, Abdullah, 1655 Oceania, and language, 478 O’Connell, Daniel, 658, 920 O’Connor, T. P., 654 O’Donoghue, Lowitja, 1848 O’Dowd, Bernard, 853 Oehlenschläger, Adam, 67–69, 70, 228 O’Faolain, Sean, 925 Oge, Vincent, 335 Ogi´nski, Michał, 215–216 O’Gorman, Edmundo, 354 O’Higgins, Bernardo, 272, 326 Ohmae, Kenichi, 929 Oil/gas and Algeria, 1095 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Armenia, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1715, 1719–1721 and Canada, 1837 and Egypt, 729 and Iran, 1109, 1111 and Iraq, 755, 756, 1742, 1746 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 Oirat Mongols, 1797–1798 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 1185, 1185 Okinawa, 1757 Olav II (Norway), 226 O’Leary, Juan, 365 Olympic Games, 991, 994 O’Neill, Onora, 97 Onn, Hussein, 1223 Oommen, T. K., 1393 Opera, 79–80 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 Oral traditions, and the Sami, 1615. See also Folk culture Orange Free State, 1145 Organicism, 462–464 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1033, 1380, 1706 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 1095, 1742

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Oribe, Manuel, 275, 399 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 667 Ortega y Gasset, José, 704, 705, 707, 707 Orwell, George, 995 O’Shea, Katherine, 651 Oslo Accords, 1137, 1141 Ossian, 237 Otero, Mariano, 354 Otto of Wittelsbach, Prince, 631 Ottoman Empire, 760–767 and Algeria, 1097 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 734 and Armenia, 1704, 1704 and Armenian genocide, 522–523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Bulgaria, 571, 573, 577 collapse of the, 891 and Egypt, 258–259 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 436, 437–438 and Greece, 623–625 and India, 801 and Iraq, 748–749, 1737, 1739, 1742 and language, 472, 482 religion and the, 101–102 and Turkey, 1643, 1645 Ottomanism, 761–763, 764, 766, 768 Overdetermination, 120–121 Ovimbundu, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1664 Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 682, 682, 683, 683 (illus.) Padmore, George, 1179, 1301 Page, Thomas Nelson, 494–495 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 952, 986, 1109, 1111, 1114, 1396–1397 coronation ceremony of, 1114–1115 and minorities, 1113 Pahlavi, Reza, 986, 1110–1111, 1114 Paine, Thomas, 162, 370 Paisii, Father, 571 Paisley, Ian, 1065 Pakistan, 976–977, 1227–1237, 1228 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1689 creation of, 1201–1203, 1461–1462 and India, 950 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1767, 1768–1769, 1771 and religion, 107 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 and terrorism, 1488 and water, 885 Palach, Jan, 1026, 1028 Palacký, František, 96, 587, 594 Palais de Justice, Belgium, 143 (illus.), 144 Palestine, 1132–1143, 1134 (map) and Arab nationalism, 729 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1387

and Israel, 1120–1121 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1492 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 1137, 1140–1142 Palestinians and European partition, 891–893 and Israel, 1125, 1129–1130 Pamuk, Orhan, 1649 Pan-Aboriginalism, 1844–1853 Pan-Africanism, 965, 1161, 1179 Pan-Arabism, 965, 981, 982 and Iraq, 1740–1741, 1743 Pan-ethnic identities, 939 Pan-Germanism, and Austria, 544, 545 Pan-Islamism, 965 and Egypt, 261 and Turkey, 1645 Pan-Mongolian nationalism, 1790, 1792–1793 Pan-nationalist movements, 964–965, 980 Pan-Slavism, 93–94 and Russia, 20 and the Soviet Union, 946 Pan-Turkism, 764–765 Panama, and Colombia, 828, 829, 830 Pancasila, 953, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1731, 1732 Panchayat system, 1803, 1807–1808 Panchen Lama, 1821 Pandita, Zaya, 1791 Pankhurst, Christabel, 453 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 453 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 300, 306, 1288, 1292 Paraguay, 358–366, 359 (map) and Argentina, 275 Paraguayan War, 296, 359–360, 360, 362, 363 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 472, 1790 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and Hungary, 640 Parizeau, Jacques, 1201, 1297 Park Chung Hee, 1778, 1780 Parkes, Henry, 852 Parlacen, 316 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 649, 649 (illus.), 651, 651, 653–654 Parry, Hubert, 1438 Parry, Joseph, 1438 Parsons, T., 1399 Pashtuns, 1688–1689, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1693 Pasternak, Boris, 1074 Pastoral ideal, 251 Pat, Joe, 1853 Patel, A. D., 1318, 1319 Paterson, “Banjo,” 854 Pátria, and Brazil, 285–287, 288, 295 Patriarca, Silvana, 52 Patriotism and Austria, 553 and China, 1195 and France, 172 Iraq and local, 752

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and Mongolia, 1794 and national symbols, 1347 versus nationalism, 45 and Nigeria, 1186–1187 and political philosophy, 86, 91 and the Soviets, 945 and sports, 997 and the United States, 1308 Päts, Konstantin, 560, 565, 568 Patten, Jack, 1851 Paulin, Tom, 925 Pauw, Corneille de, 351 Paz, Octavio, 345–346 Peace movements, 1447–1448 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 183 Péan, Pierre, 1052 Pearse, Padraic, 449 Pearse, Patrick, 652, 918, 919, 922 Pearson, Karl, 532 Pearson, Lester B., 1838, 1839, 1840 Pearson, Noel, 1848 Peck, Raoul, 1674 Peckinpah, Sam, 1337 Pedro I, Emperor (Brazil), 289, 290, 294, 296 Pedro II, Emperor (Brazil), 290–291, 291 (illus.), 293, 296 Pelletier, Gerard, 1290 Penderecki, Krzysztof, 1434 Peres, Shimon, 1400, 1488–1489 Performance, and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 Perkins, Charles, 1846, 1848, 1851 Perlee, Kh., 1794 Perón, Juan Domingo, 278, 281, 942 Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita), 278 Perry, Matthew, 809 Persia, 1106–1107, 1700. See also Iran Peru, 367–379, 369 (map) and Colombia, 830 independence and, 272 and terrorism, 1491 Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 371–372 Pestalozzi, J. H., 34, 36 Pétain, Marshall, 1052 Peter the Great, 8, 20, 105, 696, 700 Peterloo Massacre, 163 Peters, Janis, 1575 Petion, Alexandre Sabes, 337, 340 Pham Van Dong, 963 Philip II (Netherlands), 196 Philippines, 1238–1248, 1240 (map) and gender, 450 and independence, 1462 separatist movements in, 1468 and terrorism, 1495 Philips, Caryl, 927 Phillips, Jock, 869 Philosophy, political, 85–97 and defining national identity, 474–476 and fascism, 514–517 and France, 171–172

and geopolitics, 460–464, 466–467 and Lenin, 1072 and national character, 527–537 and post-World War II France, 1052 postcolonial nationalist, 957–970 and Scotland, 234 See also Cosmopolitanism; Ideology Phuc Anh Gia Long, 1263 Picasso, Pablo, 1519 Pierrot, Jean Louis, 337 Pikul, Valentin, 1077 Piłsudski, Józef, 681, 682, 682, 683, 685, 687 Pinochet, Augusto, 331 Pinochet Le-Brun, Tancredo, 330 Pius IX, Pope, 665 Place names and Afghanistan, 1692 and Basque Country, 1513 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Turkey, 1652 Plato, 529 Platt Amendment, 1277, 1282 Poetry Chilean, 324–326 and Finland, 599 and forming national identities, 31, 32 and Greenland, 1570 and Japan, 491–492 and landscape, 67–69 and language, 78 and Latvia, 1577 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and Nepal, 1808 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 213, 214, 686 and Uruguay, 401 Pogge, Thomas, 97 Pogroms. See Genocide Poland, 207–218, 210 (map), 678–688, 679 (map) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and gender, 53 hostility toward German-speaking minority in, 522 Kingdom of, 209–210 and Lithuania, 558, 561, 562–563, 563 nationalism and literature in, 492–493 partition and, 21–22, 207, 209 and the Soviet Union, 948, 950 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716 uprisings against Russia in, 46 Poland-Lithuania, 207, 209, 212–213 Poles in the Baltic states, 563 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440 and Germany, 617, 1557 Political participation and Finland, 601 and France, 174

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Political participation (continued ) and gender, 46, 49–50, 53 and Germany, 620–621 and Japan, 812, 813 and Nigeria, 1188 and Northern Ireland, 1059 See also Voting franchise Political power and Afghanistan, 1685, 1686, 1686–1688 and Angola, 1666 and Armenia, 1710 and the Baltic states, 560 and Chile, 324 and China, 792 collapse of socialism and struggles for, 895–896 and Fiji, 1317 and Finland, 606 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iraq, 756–757, 1739, 1741, 1745. See also Clientelism, Iraq and and Malaysia, 1220–1223 and nationalist movements, 940 and newly independent states, 966, 967–968, 969 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Spain, 707 and the United States, 385 and Uruguay, 399 Political system. See Government(s) Politics and Afghanistan, 1686–1687, 1689–1690 and Algeria, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101 and Alsace, 1507–1509, 1508, 1509, 1510 and Angola, 1660, 1661, 1665–1666 and Arab nationalism, 728–731 and Argentina, 271, 275, 280–281 and Armenia, 1703, 1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711 and Austria, 544–546, 548–553 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1515, 1516, 1517–1519, 1521–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1535 and Brazil, 1827 and Burma, 777–780, 783–785 and Catalonia, 1539, 1539–1541 and Central America, 316–317 and China, 791–792, 793, 794 and Colombia, 827–828, 832, 833 and communications technology, 1480 and Cuba, 1275–1276, 1277, 1285–1286 and Czechoslovakia, 1017–1019 Danish, 150–151 and Egypt, 260, 261, 265 and England, 161, 162–163 and the environment, 876–877, 882–883 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171, 1172–1175 and Fiji, 1319, 1320–1322 and Finland, 605–606 and France, 178–179, 1054

geopolitics and legitimizing, 465 and Germany, 190–191, 611, 613, 620–621, 1552–1557, 1555, 1557, 1558 and Great Britain, 1011 and Greece, 628–629 and Haiti, 337–338 and Hungary, 638, 639, 641–644, 643 and hypernationalism, 1389 and the ideology of nationalism, 875 and immigration, 1427 and India, 798–802, 987, 1206–1207, 1207, 1208, 1209–1210, 1461–1462, 1763 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726, 1730 and international migration, 1414–1415 and Iran, 1109–1112, 1117 and Iraq, 754, 755, 1745–1746 and Ireland, 649–657 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 667–671, 676–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764–1765, 1768–1771 and Japan, 988, 1751, 1752, 1757 and Korea, 1780 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 and Malaysia, 1216–1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1857, 1858–1860, 1862 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1789 and Nepal, 1810–1811 and the Netherlands, 205–206 and new social movements, 1446, 1453, 1455–1456, 1458 and Nigeria, 1179–1183, 1185 and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1062–1063, 1064–1065, 1066, 1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, 1850–1853 and Peru, 372–373 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 213–214, 681–685, 687 post-World War II, 973–976 and Puerto Rico, 837, 839–840, 844–847 and Québec, 1288–1289, 1290–1292 and religion, 982–989, 1064, 1112, 1394, 1395–1396 and Romania, 1586–1587, 1587, 1589 and Russia, 1597, 1597–1599, 1604, 1605 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678–1679 and the Sami, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616 and Scandinavian nationalism, 228–231 and Scotland, 241–242, 1014 and South Africa, 1147–1149, 1148, 1152–1153 Soviet, 979 and Spain, 702–703, 709–711, 1086 and Switzerland, 250 and Turkey, 1645, 1654 and Ukraine, 718, 1621, 1622–1629, 1623, 1624, 1626, 1629 and the United States, 387–388, 389, 391, 1304, 1306

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and Uruguay, 398–399 and Wales, 1014, 1633, 1633–1635, 1639–1640 See also Government(s); Ideology; Leaders; Political power Pomare, Maui, 869 Ponce de Leon, Ernesto, 1375 Poniatowski, Józef, 211, 686 Poniatowski, Stanisław August, 210, 215 Popławski, Jan Ludwik, 681, 683 Popper, Karl, 534 Population and Algeria, 1096, 1098 and Argentina, 269, 277, 280 and Armenia, 1699 and Australia, 851–852, 1382 and Brazil, 1825, 1831 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 1836 and Central America, 311 and Colombia, 829 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Fiji, 1314 and France, 1054–1055 and Germany, 190 and Gharabagh, 1706 and Haiti, 333, 336 and Indonesia, 1723 and Israel, 1121 and Latvia, 1574 and Mexico, 346 and the Middle East, 885 and Native Americans, 893 and New Granada, 826 and New Zealand, 864, 865, 868 and Nigeria, 967 and Paraguay, 360 and the Philippines, 1247 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Russia, 1604 and the Sami, 1609 and Turkey, 1645 and Uruguay, 402 U.S., 1836 See also Ethnicity; Immigrants/immigration; Migration Population transfers. See Migration Populism, 281, 643 Porter, Jane, 239 Portugal and Angola, 1666 and Brazil, 282, 283–285, 287–289, 293 and colonialism, 889, 1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 and geopolitics, 465 and immigration, 1424 and language, 472 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397

Post-nationalism and Germany, 1555 and globalization, 1406, 1408–1410, 1411 See also Multilateralism; Transnationalism Poster, Mark, 1476 Potatau Te Wherowhero, 1856 Potocki, Ignacy, 211 Poujade, Pierre, 1054 Poverty and Brazil, 1831 and Fiji, 1322 and Pakistan, 1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 and the United States, 1308 See also Income distribution Powell, Adam Clayton, 962 Powell, Enoch, 1013 Power. See Political power Pozharsky, Dmitry, 700, 1602 Prague, 584–585 Prague Spring, 1025, 1026 Prat de la Riba, Enric, 706 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Premchad, 923 Press. See Media Pretorius, Marthinus, 1146 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 516, 705, 706, 709 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 516 Primrose, Archibald Philip, 242 Print technology, 127, 129 and Armenia, 1701 and diaspora populations, 1370 and India, 796 and Japan, 1749 and language, 479, 485 and national identity, 1474, 1475 See also Newspapers Prithvi Narayan Shah, 1803, 1803–1804, 1804, 1806 Pro-natalist policies, 878 Propaganda and Angola, 1665-1666 the arts and, 83, 176 and Australia, 1852-1853 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306 and China, 952, 1193, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 1020, 1025 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and ethnic cleansing, 441 and Germany, 186 and Greenland, 1571 and Indonesia, 1727, 1734 and Iran, 1115, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 758 and Italy, 667, 674 and Korea, 1781 and the Jacobins, 31 and Japan, 817, 818

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Propaganda (continued ) and Nazis, 133, 455 (illus.), 456, 614, 621, 1332 and Nigeria, 1181 and the Philippines, 1246 and Puerto Rico, 846 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and the Soviet Union, 508, 694, 696, 696 (illus.), 697, 699-701, 1074, 1708 and Switzerland, 255 and terrorism, 1490 and Yugoslavia, 896 Protectionism, 25, 316 and Amazonia, 1827–1828, 1831 and Argentina, 271 and Canada, 1837, 1839, 1842 and film, 1331–1332 and natural resources, 886 and new social movements, 1448 and Peru, 368 Protestantism and Czechoslovakia, 1023–1024 Dutch, 199, 200, 200–202 and fundamentalism, 1393, 1398 and Germany, 188–189 and politics, 982–983 Proust, Marcel, 489 Provençal, 471, 477 Prussia, 611, 617 and Denmark, 150 and education, 34 and German unification, 186, 191, 192 national anthem of, 117 and Poland, 210 resistance to Napoleon and women, 52 Puerto Rico, 836–847 colonialism and, 425 literacy rates in, 495 and terrorism, 1491 Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de, 273 Pujol, Jordi, 1539, 1539, 1541, 1542 Pumpurs, Andr¯ejs, 564 Punjabi Muslims, 1231, 1236, 1764–1765 Purcell, Henry, 117 Pushkin, Aleksandr, 78, 213, 694, 1437 Putin, Vladimir, 1080, 1597, 1601, 1602, 1604, 1605 Qanuni, Yunus, 1695 Qarase, Laisenia, 1324–1325 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 754, 754, 1742, 1746 Québec, 478, 1287–1297 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and separatism, 306, 307, 1470, 1471, 1836–1837, 1843 and terrorism, 1490–1491 Québec City, 299 Quezon, Manuel, 1241 Quinet, Edgar, 177 Rabin, Yitzhak, 1141, 1400–1401, 1488–1489 Rabuka, Sitiveni, 1321, 1321, 1323, 1323

Race and Afghanistan, 1688–1689 and Alsace, 1504 and Arab nationalism, 732 and Argentina, 277 and Australia, 850, 851 and the Bandung Conference, 961 and Basques, 710 and Brazil, 290, 293, 297, 1826 and Central America, 314 and Colombia, 826 and colonialism, 958 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1281 and Darwinism, 480 and Fiji, 1317, 1319, 1321, 1323, 1325 and France, 179 and gender, 47–48, 54–55, 447–448 and Haiti, 333–336, 337–339, 341 and India, 131 and Italy, 672 and Malaysia, 1222 and Mexico, 349 and Mongolia, 1792 and nationalist ideologies, 415–417, 513, 517 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 866–867, 869 and Peru, 373–375 and Puerto Rico, 837–839, 843–844 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and South Africa, 1151–1153 and the United States, 391–392, 894, 1300–1303, 1307 and Völkisch nationalism, 614, 614, 622 See also Ethnicity; Minorities Racism and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1510 and anticolonialism, 958 and Colombia, 829 education and, 429–430 and Egypt, 263 and film, 1328 and France, 1056, 1097 and gender, 447, 452–453 and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557 and Great Britain, 1013 and Hungary, 645 and immigration, 1424–1426 and imperative nationalism, 502, 510 and India, 798 and nationalism, 533–534 and Nazism, 426, 517–518 and new social movements, 1448 and Nigeria, 1179 and perversions of nationalism, 518–521 and Puerto Rico, 837 and the United States, 1310, 1339–1340 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnic cleansing; Genocide

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Radio and Canada, 1839 and Colombia, 833 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and Indonesia, 1727 in Indonesia, 1479 in nationalism, 132–133, 1474, 1475 and promoting nationalistic art, 418 and Puerto Rico, 846 Rahman, Abdul, 1218–1219, 1222 Rahman, Abdur, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1691, 1692 Rahman, Mujibur, 1466 Railroads and Argentina, 279–280 and Canada, 302, 1837 and Central America, 315 and Ethiopia, 740 and Germany, 192 in India, 131, 796 and Mexico, 355 and New Zealand, 865 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Rainis, J¯anis, 560, 564 Rakovski, Georgi, 573 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 164 Rangihau, John, 1860 Rao, Raja, 914, 921, 922 Rapp, Jean, 1504 Ras Tafari Mekonnen, 740 Rasputin, Valentin, 1077 Ratzel, Friedrich, 460, 461, 463, 488–489 Ravel, Maurice, 1437 Rawls, J., 97 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 351 Razak, Tun Abdul, 1222, 1223 Reagan, Ronald, 945, 946, 1039, 1244, 1310–1311, 1395, 1453 Rebet, Lev, 1624 Reddy, Jai Ram, 1323 Redmond, John, 651 Reeves, Sir Paul, 1322 Reformation, 618, 1502 Refugees and Europe, 1044 and the Gharbagh conflict, 1716, 1719 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Korea, 1781 and Pakistan-Indian violence, 1234 Palestinian, 1135, 1140 Sahrawi in Algeria, 1096–1097 and Taiwan, 1257 and Tibet, 1813, 1821–1822 See also Asylum; Immigrants/immigration Regionalism, 407 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 271 and Australia, 852 and Austrian provincialism, 551–552

and Basques, 1518–1519 and Canada, 306–307, 1837, 1843 and Central America, 311–313 and Chile, 324 and Colombia, 828–829, 834 education and, 432 and the European Union, 1043, 1044 and Finland, 608 and France, 1056 and Germany, 611 and globalization, 1413, 1415 and India, 1205 and Italy, 665, 672–673 and language movements, 482 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1808, 1811 and Nigeria, 1181–1183, 1185 and Romania, 1591 and Scandinavia, 225 and Spain, 1083, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 245 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 1623 and Vietnam, 1263 See also Separatism/secession Reich, Robert, 1407–1408 Reichsland, 1505 Rej, Mikołaj, 214 Religion, 971–989 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1692, 1693–1694 and Algeria, 1095, 1102–1103 and Arab nationalism, 725, 731–732, 733 and Armenia, 1700, 1701 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Basques, 710 and Belgium, 140, 142 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1525–1526, 1528–1530 and Brazil, 289, 1825–1826 and Bulgaria, 573, 580 and Burma, 781 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1280–1281 and Czechoslovakia, 1020 and discrimination against immigrants, 1423–1424 education and, 424, 428 and Egypt, 265 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 736, 741, 742, 746 and Europe, 1031–1032 and Fiji, 1314, 1315 and France, 176 and gender, 902 and Germany, 188–189, 618 and Greece, 627 and Haiti, 339–340 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1203, 1461–1462 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728

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Religion (continued ) and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 657–658, 1470–1471 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1768 and Japan, 813–814 and Malaysia, 1217, 1223 and Mexico, 346, 347, 347–350, 356 and Mongolia, 1785, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1792 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 99–109, 519–520 and Nepal, 1806 and the Netherlands, 196, 197, 199–202, 200, 202 (illus.), 205, 206 and Nigeria, 967 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233, 1236, 1461–1462 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1243 and Poland, 216, 686 and Québec, 1293 ritualism and nationalism as substitutes for, 500–501 and Russia, 1603, 1605 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 245, 250 and terrorism, 1487, 1494–1495, 1498 and Tibet, 1816–1817 and Turkey, 769–770, 1653–1654 and Ukraine, 720 and Uruguay, 403 and Vietnam, 1270 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 See also specific religions Religious fundamentalism, 1392–1404 and the United States, 1306 Rembrandt, 203 Renan, Ernest, 95–96, 415, 475–476, 477, 501, 528–529, 1504 Renner, Karl, 542, 542 Repression and Afghanistan, 1685, 1694 and Australia, 1845–1846 and Congo/Zaïre, 1165 and counterterrorism, 1496–1498 and Eritrea, 1172 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Korea, 1773, 1775 and Latvia, 1576, 1578, 1581 and the legacies of colonialism, 893–894 and Mongolia, 1784, 1794 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Russia, 690–692 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675, 1680 and the Sami, 1615

and the Soviet Union, 1074–1075, 1075 and Spain, 708, 709, 1089, 1092 and Tibet, 1820 and Turkey, 769 and Ukraine, 722 and the United States, 1310 and women, 904 Republic of the United Provinces, 196 Republicanism, French, 409 Resettlement, forced. See Ethnic cleansing Resnick, Philip, 1842 Retief, Piet, 1150 Reventós, Joan, 1539 Revueltas, Silvestre, 76 Reyntjens, Filip, 1675 Rezanov, Nikolai, 810 Rhee Syngman, 1780 Rhodes, Cecil John, 1151 Ricasoli, Bettino, 669 Richard, Maurice “Rocket,” 1842 Richard the Lionheart, King (England), 165 Riche, Jean Baptiste, 337 Richler, Mordecai, 1296 Riefenstahl, Leni, 1332 Riegl, Alois, 415 Riel, Louis, 301, 305, 1289 Rights, 14, 129, 444 Argentina and political, 272 and Armenia, 1703, 1708 and Australia, 852, 855 Brazil and political, 290 Central America and political, 316 Colombia and human, 834 demands for, 499–500 and diaspora populations, 1371 England and political, 161, 164 and the European Union, 1041 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1325 and forms of nationalism, 1352–1354 France and, 34, 173–174, 176, 179 free speech and the United States, 387–388 Greenland and civil, 1570 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 812 and the Maori, 1858 minority verus majority, 932–933 and Nepal, 1809 the Netherlands and political, 199 and New Zealand, 873 and Nigeria, 1183 Rwanda and Burundi and human, 1675, 1679, 1680–1681 and the Sami, 1612 Switzerland and political, 249, 252–253 and Turkey, 1648, 1650 Ukraine and human, 1626 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Liberalism; Minorities Riguad, Andre, 335 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 82, 417, 1437

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Rinchen, B., 1794 Rinchino, Elbek-Dorzhi, 1793 Risorgimento, 663–665, 669, 672, 673 culture and identity and the, 671, 673–674 Rituals of belonging, 499–511. See also Ceremonies; Symbols Riva Aguero y Osma, José de la, 373, 374–375 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 355 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 272, 273 Rivera, Fructuoso, 399 Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 320 Riviere-Herard, Charles, 337 Rizal, Jose, 1245 Robert I, the Bruce, 233 Roberto, Holden, 1662, 1662 Roberts, Hugh, 1101 Roberts, Tom, 859 Robertson, Roland, 1393, 1399 Robertson, William, 234, 351 Robespierre, 175, 1489 Robinson, Mary, 1375–1376 Robles, Mariano, 317 Roca, Julio A., 280 Rodgers, Richard, 1433 Rodrigo, Joaquín, 1437 Rodrigues, José Honório, 292 Roma. See Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies) Roman, Petre, 1587 Roman Catholicism and Alsace, 1507–1508, 1508 and Belgium, 140 and Brazil, 1825–1826 and Central America, 317 and Colombia, 827, 828, 829, 832, 833 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1023–1024 and France, 179 and Germany, 189, 192, 193, 618 and Haiti, 339–340 and Ireland, 654, 661 and Mexico, 346, 347–350 and the Netherlands, 199, 200, 200–202, 202 (illus.), 204, 205 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 686 and politics, 982–983, 987–988 and Québec, 1292 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Spain, 703, 705, 707 and Uruguay, 399 Romania, 1584–1594, 1586 (map) anti-Semitism in, 521 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Romantic nationalism, 31, 406, 463, 474–475, 476 German, 10, 92 Romanticism, 527, 882, 1352–1353 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 950, 1276, 1277 Roosevelt, Theodore, 448

Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 273–275, 274 (illus.), 276, 277–278 Rosenau, James, 1368 Rosenberg, Alfred, 416, 417 Rosewall, Ken, 857 Rossé, Joseph, 1509 Rossellini, Roberto, 1333–1334 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 15, 22, 30–31, 86–87, 171, 501 and the collective will, 1054 and organicism, 462 and sovereignty of the people, 530 and Switzerland, 251 and the Terror, 174 Rozent¯als, J¯anis, 565 Rubin, Marcus, 227 Rubinstein, Anton, 82 Rubriks, Alfr¯eds, 1582 Rudbeck, Olof, 223 Runeberg, Johan Ludvig, 228, 601, 605 Rusesabagina, Paul, 1674 Rushdie, Salman, 913, 920, 921, 927 Russell, Bertrand, 1676 Russia, 689–701, 691 (map), 1596–1607, 1598 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714–1715 and the Baltic states, 562, 567–568 and the Bolshevik Revolution, 436 and Bulgaria, 575 and Denmark, 150 education and, 423 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438 and Eurasianism, 466 and Finland, 598, 605 and Greek independence, 631 and Hungary, 638 and indigenous groups, 1566 intelligentsia and nationalism in, 8 and Iran, 1110 and Japan, 815 and language, 472 and Latvia, 1576, 1582 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790–1791, 1791–1792, 1796 and music, 82, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1441 national symbols, 134–135 and new social movements, 1449 and Orthodoxy, 105–106, 983 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and Poland, 209–210, 679 and political philosophy, 93–94 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1594 and Russian nationalism, 1079–1080 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 and Scandinavia, 220 Slavophilism versus Westernizers in, 19–21 and terrorism, 1489, 1495

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Russia (continued ) and Tibet, 1818 and Ukraine, 714, 1621 See also Soviet Union Russian nationalism, 1074, 1076–1078 Russians in Latvia, 1575, 1582 in Ukraine, 1627–1628 Russification, 946, 955 and Finland, 605 versus Germanization in the Baltic states, 561–562 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), 810, 816, 820 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 574, 763, 764 Rustaveli, Shota, 694 Rustow, Dankwart, 929 Ruthene-Americans, 589 Ruyter, Michiel de, 203 Rwagasore, Prince (Burundi), 1670 Rwanda and Burundi, 1668–1681, 1670 (map) genocide in, 968–969 Ryan, Claude, 1296 Ryckman, Pierre, 1157 Ryklin, Mikhail, 135 Ryukyu Island, 1754 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 1080 Saba, Isak, 1614 Sadat, Anwar, 266 (illus.), 985, 1398 Sadiq, G. M., 1763 Šafàrík, Pavol Jozef, 592 Safavid Dynasty, 1107–1109 Saget, Nissage, 338 Sahak, Catholicos, 1701 Said, Edward, 915, 924 Saigo Takamori, 820 Saint-Domingue. See Haiti Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 410 Sakharov, Andre, 951 Salanga, Alfredo Navarro, 1245 Salazar, Antonio, 516 Sale, Kirkpatrick, 879 Salisbury, Lord, 460 Salnave, Sylvain, 338 Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 338 Salvarrieta, Policarpa, 831 Samarin, Iu. F., 692 Sami, 225, 231, 1608–1618, 1610 (map) Samper, José María, 829 Sampson, Deborah, 50 San Martín, José de, 271, 272, 277 and Peru, 370, 371 San Stefano Peace Treaty, 575 Sánchez, Miguel, 347, 349 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 354 Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 372 Santander, Francisco de Paula, 826, 827, 831, 831 (illus.) Santo Domingo, 332–333

Santos, José Eduardo dos, 1662 São Tomé e Príncipe, 1667 Sarawak, 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 Sardà, Joan, 706 Sarmatian ideology, 213–214 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino, 276, 277, 278, 279 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1052 Saryan, Martiros, 1707 Saudi Arabia, 984, 1492 Saussure, F. de, 482 Savage, Michael Joseph, 871 Savimbi, Jonas, 1659, 1662, 1662–1663 Savoy, 175 Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1370, 1419 Sayeed, Mufti, 1769, 1770–1771 Scandinavia, 219–231, 221 (map) languages of, 471–472 Schaepman, Herman, 205 Schefferus, Johannes, 1615 Schelling, Friedrich, 67 Schieder, Theodor, 501–502 Schiller, Friedrich, 188, 251 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 7, 415 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 67, 92, 415, 1110 Schleswig, 147, 149, 152, 155–156 Schmid, Alex, 1484 Schoenberg, Arnold, 1434 Schoenfeld, Eugen, 1393 Schöning, Gerhard, 227 Schumacher, John, 1245 Schuman, Robert, 190, 1034, 1509 Scotland, 166, 232–242, 1413, 1415 and communication, 1639 and devolution, 1014 and music, 1442 Scott, James, 903 Scott, Robert, 1434 Scott, Sir Walter, 238 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 241–242, 242 Sculpture. See Monuments Sculthorpe, Peter, 1439 Second Schleswigian War, 150, 152, 153 Secularism and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Azerbaijan, 1713 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527 and France, 175, 409 and globalization, 1401–1402 and India, 1765 and Iraq, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1761, 1769 legitimacy and, 973 and Mongolia, 1796 and the Netherlands, 206 and Pakistan, 1233 and Palestinians, 1139, 1141–1142 and Québec, 1292, 1294 and religious fundamentalism, 1403

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role of symbols in, 115 and Turkey, 769, 1647, 1651–1652, 1653–1654 and Uruguay, 403 Seddon, Richard John, 868, 870 Sedition Act (U.S.), 387–388 Segregation and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1064 and South Africa, 1151–1152 Séguin, Maurice, 1294 Seipel, Ignaz, 551 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1662 Self-determination and Austria, 544–545 and the Baltic states, 558 ethnic conflict and denial of, 888 and ethnicity, 464 and Fiji, 1317 and forms of nationalism, 1354–1355 and Israel, 1402 and Mongolia, 1790 and the Napoleonic wars, 474 and nationalistic philosophy, 476, 524 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1845 in political philosophy, 536–537, 965–966, 969 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 as a precondition of rights, 972 See also Independence; Sovereignty Self-government. See Autonomy Selim III (Egypt), 258 Sella, Quintino, 669 Senegal, 963 Senghor, Léopold, 488, 919, 963, 980–981 Separatism/secession, 1460–1472 and Angola, 1660 and Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and Burma, 780–781 and Catalonia, 1540–1541 during the Cold War, 949 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and cultural distinctiveness, 461 and gender and sexuality issues, 899 and Georgia, 897 and global governance, 459 increases in, 929 and India, 800, 804, 806 in Iran, 1112 and Ireland, 649–657 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764, 1766, 1769 and Latvia, 1581–1582 linguistic, 477 and Malaysia, 1222 and minorities, 933, 1359 and Mongolia, 1784, 1798 and New Zealand, 866 and newly independent states, 966–967 and Nigeria, 1185 in the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 844

in Russia, 1600 and Swedish speakers in Finland, 606 and Taiwan, 1259 and terrorism, 1487, 1490–1492, 1494–1495, 1494 (table) in Turkey, 1655 and Ukraine, 716, 1625 See also Civil war; Independence Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 119, 955, 1399, 1410, 1457, 1488, 1492, 1493 (illus.), 1496 casualties, 1495 Serbia, 437, 481, 1413 Serbs in Bosnia, 1527–1535 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440, 524 Sergeev-Tsenskii, S., 697 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1368 Setus, 557 Sevak, Paruir, 1707 Sexuality, 446, 899–910 Sha, Mirwaiz Yusuf, 1764 Sha’arawi, Huda, 450 Shagari, Shehu, 1187 Shah, G. M., 1768 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 732, 733 Shakespeare, William, 474, 915–917 Sharif, Nawaz, 1232 Shatterbelts, 942 Shays, Daniel, 386 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1626 Sheng Bright, 1440 Shepstone, Theophilus, 1145–1146 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei, 718 Sheridan, Jim, 927 Sheridan, Richard, 915 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1080 Shevchenko Society, 718, 719 Shiism/Shiites differences from Sunnis, 983–984, 986 and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112, 1115–1116 and Iraq, 748, 752–753, 755, 755, 757, 1745, 1747 and Pakistan, 1236 Shinto, 106–107, 108 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 1074, 1432, 1433 Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 718 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 1597 Sibelius, Jean, 79, 228, 417, 600, 605, 1436 Sidgwick, Henry, 527, 531 Sidqi, Bakr, 752 Siebenpfeiffer, Philipp Jakob, 190 Siemiradzki, Henryk, 682 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 493, 682, 683, 685 Sierra, Justo, 355 Sieyès, Abbé, 172 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 350 Sikhs, 1466 Sikorski, Władysław, 683 Silesia, 584

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Sillars, Jim, 997 Silva, Lula da, 1829, 1830, 1831 Simeon I the Great, 574 Simms, William Gilmore, 389 Simon, Claude, 1052 Simpson, L. P., 494 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 1246 Sinai peninsula, 262 Sinclair, Keith, 870, 872 Sindici, Orestes, 828 Singapore, 1218–1219, 1220–1221, 1221, 1224–1225 and education, 1384–1385, 1386 and Indonesia, 1733 Singh, Gulab, 1763 Singh, Hari, 1465, 1764 Singh, Manmohan, 1207 Singh, V. P., 1769 Sinhalese, 1466–1467 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), 810, 820, 1774 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 795, 810, 817, 822 Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies), 440, 517, 521, 523, 1022, 1027 Skalagrímsson, Egil, 226 Skoropad’kyi, Pavlo, 716 Skötkonung, Olof, 226 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 718 Slanský, Rudolf, 1020 Slave rebellions, Haitian, 335–336, 340 Slavery, 1301 and Brazil, 283, 289, 292, 293 and colonialism, 889, 890, 893 and Cuba, 1275 and the development of nationalism, 47 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 262 and France, 174 and Haiti, 333, 334–336 and Mexico, 345 paternalistic justifications of, 54 and Peru, 371 and the United States, 383, 385, 388, 390–391 and Uruguay, 401 Slavophilism, 20, 213, 692 and religion, 105, 108 Slesvig, 220, 222, 225 Slovakia, 584, 1017, 1021–1022, 1026–1028 and separatism, 590, 594 See also Czechoslovakia Slovenia, 1450 Słowacki, Juliusz, 212, 214 Smart, Mary Ann, 671 Smetana, Bedˇrich, 74, 74 (illus.), 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 417, 593, 594, 1435–1436 Smetona, Antanas, 560, 565, 568 Smiles, Samuel, 531 Smith, Adam, 19, 234, 855 Smith, Anthony D., 113–114, 400, 473, 929, 931, 1368–1369

Smith, Dennis Mack, 674 Smith, Zadie, 927–928 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 1151 Smyrna, 633 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 601 Social Darwinism, 437, 439, 518, 532–533 and gender, 447, 452–453 and language, 480–481 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Social Democrats, 149, 975–976 Social mobility and ethnic minorities, 931 and nationalism, 5–6, 11 and technology, 1475 and the United States, 1305 See also Class Social movements and Finland, 600–601 new, 1446–1458 and the United States, 1303–1304, 1305 Social policy education reform as, 421–422, 428–429 and gender, 448–449 and women’s rights, 446–447 Social structure and Eritrea, 1170–1171 and France, 1050 and India, 1204–1205 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1676, 1680 See also Class Socialism and Alsace, 1508 and Arab nationalism, 732, 733 and Canada, 1839 and China, 789 versus communism, 975–976 and developing countries, 980, 981 disillusionment and discredit of, 936 and Egypt, 266 and France, 179, 1054 and gender, 453, 456 and Great Britain, 1011 and Iraq, 754 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and the Netherlands, 205 and Poland, 212 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Communism; Marxism Socialization and Finland, 600, 607–608 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 See also Assimilation Sokol, 594 Solanas, Fernando, 1335 Solano, Armando, 830 Solano López, Francisco, 362, 363, 363 (illus.), 364 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 951, 1077, 1601 Somalia, 949

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Somaliland, 459 Sonam Gyatso, 1817 Songtsen Gampo, King (Tibet), 1815, 1816, 1821 Sonnenstern, Maximilian von, 320 Sontsen Gyatso, 1816 Sorel, Georges, 514 Soulouque, Faustin-Elie, 337 Sousa, John Philip, 1441 South Africa, 1144–1153, 1146 (map) and Angola, 1664, 1665 and apartheid, 890 and education, 1386 and language, 478 and music, 1440, 1441 and the Netherlands, 198 and sports, 995 and terrorism, 1491 South America and language, 478 national identity and education in, 35, 37, 39 See also specific South American countries South Korea and Japan, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 See also Korea South Tyrol, 1490 South-West Africa, 437 Southeast Asia, 778 (map), 1214 (map), 1262 (map), 1724 (map) Southern Mindanao, 1468 Sovereignty and Australia, 855 and Brazil, 1830–1831 and the environment, 886 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1718, 1719 versus globalization, 1406, 1408 and Greenland, 1571 and Japan, 814–815 and the Maori, 1856 nationalism and popular, 5, 15 and Nepal, 1805 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 and Québec, 1291–1292 See also Independence; Self-determination Soviet Union, 699 (map), 714 (map), 1070–1080, 1072 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Angola, 1663 and Armenia, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709–1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714, 1716–1717, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 563 breakup of the, 888, 895–897, 972, 1413, 1596 and China, 1197 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Cuba, 1276 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 education and, 419, 426, 430 and the environment, 881–882 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440–441

and film, 1330, 1332 and gender, 449, 450, 454 and geopolitics, 459 and Japan, 822, 1754 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780 and language, 482 and Latvia, 1575, 1576, 1578, 1581–1582 and Mongolia, 1785, 1789, 1794–1795, 1795–1796 and national identity, 693–701, 880 nationalistic art of the, 411 nationalities policy, 468–469, 946, 1599 and new social movements, 1449 and Poland, 681 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1588, 1591 and Siberia, 876 and sports, 993 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716, 719, 722 See also Russia Soyinka, Wole, 925 Spain, 702–711, 703 (map), 1082–1092, 1085 (map), 1540 (map) and Argentina, 269 and authoritarianism, 973 and Basques, 1514, 1517, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Catalonia, 1536–1537, 1544–1547 and Central America, 311–313, 314, 317–318 and Chile, 323–327 and Colombia, 825 and colonialism, 889 education and, 36, 432 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 interventions in Haiti by, 335 and Mexico, 345–346, 350, 353 and minorities, 1412 and music, 1437 and the Philippines, 1239, 1243 resistance to Napoleon, 51–52 and Santo Domingo, 332–333. 339 separatist movements in, 1471 and sports, 997, 999 symbols in, 49 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397 Spanish-American War, 1086 Speight, George, 1323–1324 Spencer, Herbert, 532–533 Spengler, Oswald, 70 Spenser, Edmund, 915 Spinoza, Baruch, 203 Spivak, Gayatri, 926 Sports, 991–1003 and Australia, 852, 857 and Canada, 1841, 1842 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and England, 165

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Sports (continued ) and Ireland, 657 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 870 and Peru, 378 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 soccer and Brazil, 295 and Turkey, 1651 and Wales, 1637 and war, 901 Sri Lanka, 1466–1467 and terrorism, 1484, 1491, 1492 St. Erik (Sweden), 226 St. Gregory, 1700 St. Laurent, Louis, 1838 Stalin, Joseph (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), 945, 1075, 1603, 1603 (illus.) and China, 978 and the Cold War, 977–978 cult of personality, 952 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 440 and gender, 449 and nationalism, 1071, 1076 nationalities policy of, 469 and Russianness, 693, 694, 697, 700–701 and Yugoslavia, 948 Stambolov, Stefan, 578 Stanford, Charles Villiers, 1438 Stanley, Henry Morton, 1156, 1160 “Star-Spangled Banner,” 117, 118 (illus.) Starˇcevi´c, Ante, 96 Statue of Liberty, 119 Steele, James, 1843 Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 587, 588, 1017 Stefano, Alfredo Di, 1002 Steffens, Henrik, 66–68, 69–70 Stein, Freiherr von, 34 Stephen the Great (Moldavia), 1592 Sternberger, Dolf, 1556 Stetsko, Slava, 1624 Stoilov, Konstantin, 578 Strasbourg, France, 1510 Stratification. See Class Streeton, Arthur, 859 Strindberg, August, 228 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 237–238, 238 Stubbs, Paul, 1450 Štúr, L’udovit, 96, 592 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 589 Subsidiarity, 881, 1042, 1045 Sudan, 263, 1468–1469 Sudeten-Germans, 595 Sudetenland, 595, 1017–1019, 1025 Suez Canal, 259, 265–266 Suez Canal crisis, 1012 Suffrage, women’s, 446 and Australia, 853 and Germany, 620 and nationalist movements, 450

and New Zealand, 870–871 and transnational movements, 452–453 and Turkey, 770 See also Voting franchise; Women’s rights Suharto, President (Indonesia), 954, 1723, 1725, 1726, 1728, 1730–1731, 1733 Suhm, P. F., 227 Sukarno, Ahmad, 953–954, 964, 1463, 1725, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1734 and the Bandung Conference, 960–961, 962 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1734 Sükhebaatur, General (Mongolia), 1789, 1797, 1798 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala, 1318 Sullivan, A. M., 658–659 Sultan, Ibrahim, 1171 Sun Yat-sen, 789, 789 (illus.), 790, 791, 794 Sunnis differences from Shiites, 983–984 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 748, 751, 754, 755, 755, 757 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1764 Suriname, 197 Suvorov, Aleksandr, 696, 1074 Švec, Otakar, 1024 Svecoman movement, 599 Sweden, 220–222 communication in, 1473 and Finland, 598 and language, 472 national anthem and holidays, 230 national identity and, 223, 226–228 and Norway, 224–225 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 Swildens, J. H., 198 Swiss army, 253 Swiss Confederation, 245, 247–248 Switzerland, 244–255, 248 (map) education and, 429 flag of, 114 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 national identity and education in, 35 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 Symbols, 111–124, 1342–1348 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Armenia, 1702 and Australia, 856, 860 and the Baltic states, 565 and Basques, 1519–1521 and Belgium, 144, 145 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Brazil, 285, 286 (illus.), 294–295 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 305 and Catalonia, 1543–1544 and Central America, 318–319, 320–321 and Chile, 327–328, 328 and Colombia, 825, 831 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 and Cuba, 1283–1284

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and England, 163 and Ethiopia, 744 and the European Union, 1042 and Finland, 600, 602, 604 and France, 175 gender and familial, 43–45, 46, 48–50, 54, 445–446, 449, 904–905, 907 and Germany, 618, 619 and Greenland, 1568–1569, 1570 and Hungary, 641–644 and Indonesia, 1732–1733 and Iran, 1114–1115 and Iraq, 757 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 1752, 1757 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 in literature, 917, 926, 927 and Mongolia, 1786, 1793–1794, 1797 and national identity, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 465 and national self-invention, 900 and Nepal, 1803 and the Netherlands, 204, 204 and Nigeria, 1184 and Northern Ireland, 1066–1067 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847, 1850 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 215, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844, 846 and Québec, 1297 religious, 99, 102, 115–116 and rituals, 500. See also Rituals of belonging and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and Scandinavia, 229–230 and Singapore, 1225 and South Africa, 1150 and Spain, 709 and Taiwan, 1258 technologies as national, 128, 134–135 and Tibet, 1818 transnational, 115 and Turkey, 766, 770, 774, 1646–1647 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 1308 and Wales, 878, 1633, 1637–1638 Syncretism and Mexico, 347–350, 349 and Paraguay, 358 Synge, John Millington, 918, 920–921, 922 Syngman, Rhee, 1773 Syria and Battle of Maysalun, 728 and Egypt, 982 as French Mandate, 728 water, 884–885 Syrian Arab Kingdom, 727–728 Szálasi, Ferenc, 516, 638 Széchenyi, Count István, 637, 643

Tacitus, 64, 617 Tagore, Rabindranath, 918 Taine, Hippolyte, 415 Taiping Rebellion, 101, 108 Taiwan, 1249–1260, 1250 (map) and film, 1337–1338 and independence, 1462, 1468 and Japan, 810, 818, 1749 Tajiks, 1692–1693, 1694–1695 Takemitsu, T¯oru, 1439–1440 Taliban, 986–987 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1691, 1692, 1693–1694 and Pakistan, 1232, 1233 Tamils, 1385, 1466–1467, 1492 Tamir, Yael, 97 Tammsaare, Anton Hansen, 565 Tan Dun, 1440 Tanzania, 962 Tarai, 1801–1802, 1804, 1808, 1811 Taraki, Mohammad, 1687 Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 1290 Tarnowski, Count Stanislaw, 493 Tartars, 1621 Tatars, 441, 469 Tawfiq, King (Egypt), 260, 261 Taylor, Charles Wood, 328, 989 Taylor, T. Griffith, 851–852 Tchaikovsky, Piotr, 82, 1432, 1437 Technology, 126–136, 1473–1483 Cold war and weapon, 944 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1370, 1376 as enabling ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and the Holocaust, 524 and ideologies, 972 image, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1428 and Iraq, 1738 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and promoting nationalistic art, 417–418 See also Internet Tegnér, Esias, 228 Telegraphy, 127–128 and Central America, 315 and Germany, 192 and Mexico, 355 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Television and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Angola, 1666 and Canada, 1838 and Catalonia, 1546 education and, 422, 433 versus film, 1336, 1339

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Television (continued ) and India, 1209 and language in Italy, 671 and Québec, 1296 and Wales, 1635, 1639 Tenzin Gyatso. See Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso) Terre’Blanche, Eugène, 1148 Territory and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532, 1532 and Israel, 1125 See also Borders; Expansionism Terror, French (1793–1974), 174–175 Terrorism, 1484–1498 and Armenia, 1707 and the Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and hypernationalism, 1389, 1410–1411 and India, 801 and Indonesia, 1728, 1729 and Italy, 676 and Japan, 821 and Pakistan, 1232 and religious fundamentalism, 986–987, 1400 and Russia, 955, 1607 and the 1970s, 1939 and Turkey, 1651, 1655 in the United States, 955 and Wales, 1637 See also Conflict/violence Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), 1493 Thailand, separatism in, 938, 1468 Thakin Soe, 780 Than Tun, 780 Thatcher, Margaret, 1013, 1040, 1453 The Birth of a Nation, 1328, 1329 (illus.) Theater and the Baltic states, 559–560 and France, 176–177 and Ireland, 918 and Québec, 1294 See also Cinema Theweleit, Klaus, 904 Thibaw, King (Burma), 782 Thiers, Adolphe, 177 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 115, 183, 188, 592 Thomas, Harold, 1850 Thomas, W. I., 1403 Thompson, Tom, 1841 Thomson, James, 32, 1438 Thorarensen, Bjarni, 228 Thorbecke, Johan, 198, 201 Thrace, 580, 582 Thubden Gyatso, 1818, 1820 Thyra, Queen (Denmark), 153 Tibet, 988, 1468, 1813–1823, 1815 (map) Tidemand, Adolph, 228 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 800 Tiso, Jozef, 1019 Tito, Josip Broz, 948, 978, 982, 1530 Tokugawa Nariaki, 814, 815

Tokugawa Narinobu, 814 Tokutomi Soho, 813 Tolstoi, A. N., 697 Tone, John, 51 Topelius, Zacharias, 228, 604, 605 Toronto, Canada, 1837 Totalitarianism education and, 429–430 and Europe, 419 and gender, 454–456 and imperative forms of nationalism, 501, 502, 510 Touraine, Alain, 1446, 1456 Tourism, 1028 and Cuba, 1285 and Iran, 1115 and Tibet, 1823 Tours, Georges Moreau de, 409 Toussaint-Louverture, 332, 335–336, 335 (illus.), 340, 341, 342 Toynbee, Arnold, 1368 Trade Argentina and, 269–271, 280 and Brazil, 285, 287 expositions and Scandinavia, 229 and Peru, 368 Transjordan, 728 Transnationalism and diaspora populations, 1369 and globalization, 1407 and identity among immigrants, 1427–1429 and ideologies, 972 and image technology, 1339 and literature, 927–928 versus national identities, 1348 and new social movements, 1447, 1455 and sports, 1001–1003 and women’s rights, 451–453 See also Cosmopolitanism Transportation and Argentina, 279–280 and Colombia, 833 and immigration, 1427 and Iran, 1112 and Malaysia, 1224 and Nepal, 1807 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 technological advances in, 127, 131, 136 and the United States, 388–389, 389–390 See also Railroads Transvaal, 1145–1146 Transylvania, 472 Trautmann, Catherine, 1510 Trdat III, King (Armenia), 1700 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1549 Treaty of Kiel, 220, 223 Treaty of Lausanne, 437–438, 768, 1647, 1648 Treaty of Maastricht, 1549

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Treaty of Nice, 1549 Treaty of Rome, 669 Treaty of St. Germain, 542 Treaty of Trianon, 638–639, 645 Treaty of Utrecht, 299 Treaty of Versailles, 459, 468, 476, 513–514 and Bulgaria, 580 and Czechoslovakia, 595 and Germany, 613, 617, 621 Treaty of Waitangi, 863, 873 Tremaglia, Mirko, 1372 Tremblay, Michel, 1294 Trimble, David, 1062 Troels-Lund, F., 227 Trofimenkoff, S. M., 1294 Tromp, Maarten, 203 Troost, Paul Ludwig, 413 Trotsky, Leon, 520 Trubetskoy, Prince, 94 Trubetzkoy, N. S., 94 Trudeau, Pierre, 1291, 1835, 1836, 1837–1838, 1838, 1840 Truman, Henry, 950, 1309 Tsai Ming-liang, 1338 Tschudi, Aegidius, 252 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin, 1798 Tshombe, Moise, 1469 Tsongkhapa, 1817 Tubin, Eduard, 560 Tucholsky, Kurt, 111 Tucker, George, 494 Tuheitia, 1857 Tunisia, 1464 Tupac Amaru II, 370, 371 Turanism, 641, 773–774, 1645 Turgenev, I. S., 694 Turia, Tariana, 1862 Turina, Joaquín, 1437 Turkey, 760–775, 767 (map), 1642–1656, 1644 (map) and Armenia, 1704, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1714 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438, 442 and the European Union, 1411 and gender, 446 and new social movements, 1452 water, 884–885 Turkish-Greek war (1919–1922), 522 Tutsi, 1669, 1670, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1678 Tuvan Republic, 1792 Twa, 1669, 1672, 1678 Twelve Years Truce, 200, 201 (map) Ty-Casper, Linda, 1245 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 1629, 1629 Tyrs, Miroslav, 594 U Chit Hlaing, 779 U Nu, 783 U Ottama, 779 U Saw, 780, 782

Uhde, Fritz von, 416 Ukraine, 712–722, 715 (map), 1619–1629, 1620 (map) borders of, 1413 and new social movements, 1449 and the Orange Revolution, 1080 and the Soviet Union, 1071, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1079 Ulanfu, 1790, 1794 Ulmanis, K¯arlis, 560, 565, 568, 1576, 1578 Unifications, national, 464 Union of Utrecht, 196 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Monarchy of Denmark, 147 United Nations (UN) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1533 and Canada, 307 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171 and Fiji, 1322 and Germany, 1554 High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1535 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 and interventions, 1469 and Iraq, 756, 1743 and Israel, 1121, 1125, 1135 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1765, 1767 and Korea, 1780, 1781 membership, 957 and Mongolia, 1795 and new social movements, 1456 and the nonaligned movement, 961–962, 969 and peacekeeping, 1412 and the self-determination doctrine, 972 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 510 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 273 United States, 381–392, 384 (map), 1299–1311, 1302 (map) and Afghanistan, 1690 and African Americans, 493–494 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 275 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 850 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1533 and Canada, 305, 307, 1835–1836, 1842 and China, 1191 and the civil rights movement, 938 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Colombia, 829, 830 and colonialism/expansionism, 22, 1462 and counterterrorism, 1497–1498 and Cuba, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1280 Czechoslovaks in the, 588–589 and decolonization policy, 1320 and diaspora populations, 1372 economic policy and globalization, 1407–1408, 1409 education and, 32–33, 35–39, 420, 422–426, 429, 433, 1381–1382

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United States (continued ) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and European integration, 1033 and film, 1328–1330, 1332–1333, 1337, 1339–1340 and France, 1050 and gender and sexuality, 447, 448, 450, 452, 901, 902, 907–908 and Greenland, 1563 and Haiti, 340 and immigration, 1412, 1418–1419, 1420–1421, 1424, 1428 and indigenous groups, 1566, 1845 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117, 1117 and Iraq, 1742–1743, 1746–1747 Irish in the, 654–655 and Israel, 1398, 1401 and Japan, 810, 822, 1749–1754, 1756–1757 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780, 1781 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 and landscape art, 64–66, 70 and language, 472, 482 and the League of Nations, 1402 and Mexico, 353–354 and minorities, 894, 935 and Mongolia, 1796 and music, 76, 117, 118 (illus.), 1433, 1438–1439, 1441–1442, 1443 and national identity, 465, 930, 931 nationalistic art of the, 411 and new social movements, 1446, 1448 and New Zealand, 872 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Pakistan, 1229, 1235, 1236 and Palestine, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 372 and the Philippines, 1239, 1240–1242, 1243, 1248 and Puerto Rico, 836–837, 837, 845, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1394–1396, 1400 and rituals of belonging, 509 and Russia, 1604, 1607 and Southern identity, 494–495 and sports, 994, 1000–1001 symbols of the, 114, 119, 124, 128, 134, 1346, 1347 terrorism and xenophobia in the, 1410, 1488, 1490, 1492 and Vietnam, 954, 1264–1265, 1265 and Yugoslavia, 896 See also American Revolution Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 972 Unterhalter, Elaine, 904 Urabi, Ahmed, 263–264 Urabi Revolt, 260, 263–264 Urbanization and Argentina, 278 and Basques, 1515

and Central America, 311 and Denmark, 149 and France, 1055 and Iraq, 753, 755, 755, 1737 and Korea, 1778 and language, 479 and the Maori, 1860–1861 and Scandinavia, 221 and Turkey, 772 and Ukraine, 714–715 Urquiza, Justo José de, 275, 279 Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 829, 830 Uruguay, 393–403, 395 (map) and Argentina, 275 Argentine-Brazilian war over, 273 and Brazil, 289 and Garibaldi, 672 Utilitarianism, 531 Uvarov, S. S., 692 Uvin, Peter, 1680 Uygur, 1468 Uzbekistan, 1079 Uzbeks, 1693 Vaculík, Ludvík, 1026 Vagris, Janis, 1581 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 987, 1208 Vakatora, Tomasi, 1322 Valdemar IV (Denmark), 226 Valdemar the Great (Denmark), 153 Valdem¯ars, Krišj¯anis, 561, 562 Valdivia, Pedro de, 323, 326 Valencia, 1546 Valera, Eamon de, 1294 Valle, José Cecilio del, 315, 316 Valle-Riestra, José María, 76 Vallejo, José Joaquín, 329 Valois, Georges, 515 Values and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 1830 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1839 and Cuba, 1283 in education, 1381 exporting U.S., 944, 955–956 and Great Britain, 1008 and India, 797 and Iran, 1116 and Japan, 1754 and Latvia, 1576, 1580 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mongolia, 1793 and national character, 528–529, 530–531, 537 and nationalism, 901 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847–1848 and Poland, 686 post-materialist, 1454 and Puerto Rico, 844 and religion versus ideology, 971

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and religious fundamentalism, 1397, 1399 and rituals of belonging, 504–506 See also Morality; Religion Van der Noot, Henri, 140 van Gogh, Theo, 1486–1487 Van Thieu, Nguyen, 1265 Vanessa-Mae, 1440 Varikas, Eléni, 53 Varley, Fred H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Varnhagen, Francisco, 292 Vasnetsov, V. M., 694 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1180 Vazov, Ivan, 576–577 Velestinlis, Rigas, 626, 631, 631 Velvet Revolution, 1026, 1028 Verchères, Madeleine de, 303 Verdi, Giuseppe, 75, 77, 79, 80, 671, 1437–1438 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 197, 203 Vermeer, Johannes, 203 Vertov, Dziga, 1330 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch, 1152, 1152 Vian, Boris, 1052 Victoria, Queen (England), 164, 237 Vieira, Luandino, 1665 Vienna Congress of 1815, 46, 197 of 1819, 35 Vietnam, 963–964, 1261–1271 and France, 1050 and gender, 446 and independence, 1463 Vietnam War, 944, 952, 954, 1265, 1265, 1310 and the United States, 1304 Vigneault, Gilles, 1294 Vigny, Alfred de, 177 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 1579 Vikings, 228 Vilde, Eduard, 565 Villa-Lobos, Heitor, 76, 1439 Villarán, Manuel Vicente, 374 Vilnius, Lithuania, 563, 563 Vinnen, Carl, 416 Violence. See Conflict/violence Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 415 Virgin of Guadalupe, 347, 348 (illus.), 349–350, 356 in Peru, 376 Visconti, Luchino, 1334 Vivekananda, Swami, 802 Vizcardo y Guzmán, Juan Pablo, 370 Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), 1592 Vodou (Voodoo), 340 Vogel, Sir Julius, 865 Volhynia, 716 Völkisch nationalism, 613, 614, 614, 622 Voltaire, 14–15, 370 Voluntarism, 1196, 1197, 1198–1199 von Flüe, Niklaus, 253 von Metternich, Klemens, 671

von Ranke, Leopold, 41, 101, 227 Vonk, Jean Francoise, 140 Voting franchise and Argentina, 275 and Australia, 853 and diaspora populations, 1365, 1366, 1371–1372 and England, 161, 164 and Finland, 605 and Germany, 611 and Haiti, 336 and Italy, 669, 670 and the Netherlands, 199 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 250 and Uruguay, 401 See also Democracy; Suffrage, women’s Vramshapuh, King (Armenia), 1701 Vytautas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Wade, P., 1450 Wagner, Richard, 74, 77, 79, 406, 463, 1431 Wagner, Robert, 1508 Wais, Mir, 1690 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 863 Walcott, Derek, 914, 921 Waldheim, Kurt, 550 Walensa, Lech, 948 Wales, 166, 1631–1640, 1634 (map) and devolution, 1014 nationalism and environmentalism in, 878, 881 Walker, William, 313, 318 Wallace, Henry, 1303, 1309 Wallace, William, 232–233, 238–239, 240 (illus.) Wallot, Paul, 408 Walser, Martin, 1558 Walton, William, 1433, 1438 Walzer, M., 97 Wang Xilin, 1440 War of 1812, 388 War of the Pacific, 327, 330, 376 (map), 377, 377–378 Ward, Russel, 854 Warren, Robert Penn, 495 Warsaw Pact, 945 Wartburg Festival, 187 Washington, George, 387 Water, 884–885 Watkins, Melvin, 1842 Weber, Carl Maria von, 73, 74, 117, 1431 Weber, Eugen, 9, 102, 179 Weber, Max, 3–4, 40, 982, 1399, 1402 Webster, Noah, 32–33, 389 Weimar Republic, 613, 613, 620–621 and film, 1330–1331 See also Germany Weissman, Stephen, 1676 Weitz, Margaret, 905 Weizmann, Chaim, 1123, 1123

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Welfare state and Canada, 302–303, 306, 1290 and New Zealand, 870–871 and the United States, 944, 1300, 1309 See also Socialism Welhaven, Johan, 228 Wellington, Duke of, 164 Werner, Abraham, 67 Werner, Anton von, 409 West Germany, 976, 1448, 1490. See also Germany West Papua, 1468 Western, the ( film), 1332–1333, 1337 Western Sahara, 1468 Westernization and India, 1211 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Russia, 692 Wetterlé, Emile, 1508, 1508 Whitehead, Gillian, 1439 Whitlam, Gough, 1845 Wielopolski, Aleksander, 212 Wilhelm I (Germany), 619 Wilhelm II (Germany), 416, 621 Wilhelmina, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Willems, Jans Frans, 145 William I of Orange (the Netherlands), 141, 142, 196, 197, 203 William II (the Netherlands), 199 William III (the Netherlands), 201 Williams, Edward (Iolo Morgannwg), 1638 Williams, Kyffin, 1637 Williams, Ralph Vaughan, 1434 Wilson, A. T., 1742 Wilson, Woodrow, 464, 1328 Fourteen Points Speech, 436, 972 and Iraq, 749 principle of self-determination, 1790 Winter War, 607 Wirth, Johann Georg August, 190 Wislicenus, Hermann, 408 Wolfe, James, 299, 303, 304, 1840 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 416 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 53 Women and Afghanistan, 1457, 1690, 1694 and Algeria, 1105 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 264, 265 Eritrean, 1173 and fascism, 454–456 and France, 1047, 1050 and Germany, 620 and India, 1209, 1210 and Ireland, 661 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1065 and the Philippines, 1246 and postcolonial gender roles, 926–927 and social policies, 448–449 as symbols, 445–446, 926, 1345

and Turkey, 769, 770, 1653, 1654 and the United States, 901, 1304 and Wales, 1636 and war, 449–450 See also Gender; Women’s rights Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 453 Women’s movements, 1449, 1450, 1452–1453 Women’s rights, 53–54, 57, 446, 450–451 and France, 173–174, 176 and Germany, 620 and Greece, 53 revolution and, 46, 50–52 social policy and, 446–447 and socialism, 56–57 and Switzerland, 249 transnationalism and, 451–453 See also Suffrage, women’s Wood, Henry, 1438 World Bank, 1610 World divided. See Cold War World War I and Arab nationalism, 727–728 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and assassination of Habsburg heir, 1490 and Australia, 855–856 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529–1530 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306, 1835 colonialism and the causes of, 514 and the Czechoslovaks, 588–589, 593 education and, 426 and Ethiopia, 740 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 438 and fascism, 515 gender roles and, 449 and Germany, 613, 621–622 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 638 and India, 804 and Iraq, 1739, 1742 and Ireland, 651, 660 and Italy, 667, 670 and New Zealand, 868–869 and the Ottoman Empire, 765 and Poland, 682, 682–683 results of, 419, 436, 527 and South Africa, 1150 and statuary, 412 and Turkey, 1643, 1649 and Ukraine, 713 World War II and Alsace, 1507, 1508 and Australia, 857 and Austria, 547–548 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Bulgaria, 582 and Burma, 781, 784–785 and Canada, 302, 1835 and China, 1197

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Yassin, Ahmad, 1137, 1138 Yeats, William Butler, 487–488, 487 (illus.), 489, 654–655, 657, 659, 914, 918 Cathleen ni Houlihan, 922 Yeltsin, Boris, 946, 1079, 1080, 1597, 1597, 1605 Yohannes, Emperor (Tigray), 739 Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 281 Yrjö-Koskinen, Yrjö Sakari, 601 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 1725 Yugoslavia civil wars of, 525, 896, 1044, 1413–1414 common language versus religious difference in, 529 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and international interventions, 1408–1409 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Yushchenko, Viktor, 1080, 1622–1623, 1623, 1626, 1628 Yuson, Alfred A., 1245 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 902

and Czechoslovakia, 594–596 and Eritrea, 1170 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 435, 437–441. See also Holocaust and expansionism after World War I, 524 and Fiji, 1318–1319 and France, 1051–1052, 1052 and gender roles, 450 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 645 and India, 804–806 and Indonesia, 1733 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 667, 674–675 and Japan, 817–818, 822, 1749, 1751 and Malaysia, 1215–1216 music related to, 1433–1434 and nationalism, 509–510, 1490 and New Zealand, 869–870, 872 and Nigeria, 1181 and Palestinians, 1135 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1851 and Poland, 681, 683, 688 role of religion in, 106–107 and Russia, 1603 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and sexualized imagery, 905–907 and the Soviet Union, 1073, 1074, 1075 and Taiwan, 1250–1251 and terrorism, 1496 and Ukraine, 713, 722 Woronicz, J., 692 Worringer, Wilhelm, 415 Wright, Erik Olin, 2 Writing/alphabets, 481, 577, 1529 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703, 1706 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1798 and Romania, 1591 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Tibet, 1815 and Turkey, 773, 1652 Wybicki, Józef, 215 Wysłouch, Bolesław, 681, 685 Xenophobia, 1411–1412, 1415. See also Hypernationalism Xenophon, 1697 Xu¯ant˘ong, Emperor, 1818 Yacine, Kateb, 1100 Yamin, Muhammad, 1727, 1727–1728 Yanaev, Gennadii, 1582 Yang, Edward, 1338 Yanukovych, Viktor, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625

Zaghlul, Saad, 262–263, 263 Zaghlul, Safiyya, 263 Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 1687, 1689 Zaïre. See Congo and Zaïre Zanabazar, 1791 Zavala, Lorenzo de, 353–354 Zealots, 1489 Zeroual, Liamine, 1099 Zetkin, Clara, 453 Zhamtsarano, Tsyben, 1793 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1075–1076 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 1078, 1079–1080 Zhou Enlai, 962, 1816, 1821 Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 1232 Zimbabwe, 1441 Zimmers, Oliver, 244 Zinnermann, J. G., 41 Zinovief, Grigory, 520 Zionism, 103, 104 (illus.), 1120–1121, 1121, 1123–1125, 1126 and agricultural settlements, 1122 and Arab nationalism, 730 and the arts, 1127 and forming national identity, 1127–1130 and language, 477 and Palestinians, 1133 Žižka, Jan, 1023 Zografos, Panagiotis, 632 (illus.) Zola, Emile, 134 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1074 Zta-Halein, Kathinka, 52 Zulus, 27, 1150 Zurayq, Qustantin, 732, 732 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1079–1080, 1597

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About the Editors

Guntram H. Herb, Ph.D., is associate professor of geography at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. In addition to peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, his published works on nationalism include Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945 and the collection of essays co-edited with David H. Kaplan, Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. David H. Kaplan, Ph.D., is professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio. He is an editor of the journal National Identities. His six books include Boundaries and Place (with Jouni Häkli) and Nested Identities (with Guntram Herb). He has also published over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters, many of them in the field of nationalism.

N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

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volume 2 1880 to 1945

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 2 1880 to 1945

GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors

S A N TA B A R B A R A , C A L I F O R N I A

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Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nations and nationalism : a global historical overview / Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-907-8 (alk. paper) 1. History, Modern—18th century. 2. History, Modern—19th century. 3. History, Modern—20th century. 4. Nationalism—History. I. Herb, Guntram Henrik, 1959– II. Kaplan, David H., 1960– D299.N37 2008 320.54—dc22 2008004478

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

volume 2 1880 to 1945

Contents List of Contributors

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Preface xi Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii

Thematic Essays 405 Culture and Nationalism Neil McWilliam 419 Education and Nationalism Peter J. Weber 435 Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide Eagle Glassheim 444 Gender and Nationalism in the Age of Self-Determination Katherine O’Sullivan See

555 Baltic Nationalism Kevin C. O’Connor 570 Bulgaria Antonina Zhelyazkova 583 Czechoslovakia Maria Dowling 597 Finland Jouni Häkli 609 Germany Stefan Berger 623 Greece Gregory Jusdanis 635 Hungary Steve Jobbitt

458 Nationalism and Geopolitics Gertjan Dijkink

647 Ireland William Jenkins

471 Language and Nationalism John E. Joseph

663 Italy Nicola Pizzolato

485 Literature and Nationalism Jason Dittmer

678 Poland Patrice M. Dabrowski

499 National Rituals of Belonging Ulf Hedetoft

689 Russia David Brandenberger

512 Perversions of Nationalism Aristotle A. Kallis

702 Spain Frederic Barberà

527 Philosophy, National Character, and Nationalism Paul Gilbert

712 Ukraine Yaroslav Hrytsak

Europe 539 Austria Lonnie R. Johnson

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Middle East and Africa 724 Arab Nationalism Ralph Coury

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736 Ethiopia Mohammed Hassen Ali and Seyoum Hameso

808 Japan Neil Waters

747 Iraq Peter Wien

824 Colombia Jane M. Rausch

760 Turkey Kyle T. Evered

836 Puerto Rico Juan Manuel Carrión

Americas

Oceania

Asia 776 Burma Jörg Schendel

849 Australia Stephen Alomes

787 China Hong-Ming Liang

862 New Zealand Linda Bryder Index

796 India John McLane

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List of Contributors

Marco Adria University of Alberta

Linda Bryder University of Auckland

Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University

Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University

Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University

Roderick D. Bush St. John’s University

Stephen Alomes Deakin University

Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico

Celia Applegate University of Rochester

Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii

Christopher P. Atwood Indiana University

Colin M. Coates York University

Ghania Azzout University of Algiers

Saul B. Cohen Queens College CUNY

Alan Bairner Loughborough University

Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor)

Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Joshua Barker University of Toronto Roderick J. Barman University of British Columbia Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Stefan Berger Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Brett Bowden University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Stella Coram Independent Scholar Stéphane Corcuff University of Lyon Jeffrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Ralph Coury Fairfield University Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Ben Curtis Seattle College Patrice M. Dabrowski Harvard University

David Brandenberger University of Richmond

Dev Raj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal

David Brown Murdoch University

Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jason Dittmer University College London

Dennis Hart Kent State University

Chris Dixon University of Queensland

David Allen Harvey New College of Florida

Christine Doran Charles Darwin University

Stephen Heathorn McMaster University

Maria Dowling St. Mary’s College

Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University

Stéphane Dufoix Universite Paris X–Nanterre

Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol

Jordana Dym Skidmore College

Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands

Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University

Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University

Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University

Hugh Hudson Georgia State University

Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University

Bonny Ibhawoh McMaster University

Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen

Grigory Ioffe Radford University

Will Fowler University of St. Andrews

Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, The Behrend College

Michael E. Geisler Middlebury College Paul Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere

Tareq Y. Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto

Seyoum Hameso University of East London

Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna

Paul Hamilton Brock University

Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Samira Hanifi University of Algiers

Cynthia Joseph Monash University

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John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh

Christopher Marsh Baylor University

Gregory Jusdanis The Ohio State University

Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio

Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University

John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia

Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University

John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College

Martha Kaplan Vassar College

John McLane Northwestern University

Sharon Kelly University of Toronto

Kim McMullen Kenyon College

James Kennedy University of Edinburgh

Neil McWilliam Duke University

Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma

Nenad Miscevic Central European University

P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California

Graeme Morton University of Guelph

David B. Knight University of Guelph Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Taras Kuzio George Washington University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Orion Lewis University of Colorado, Boulder Hong-Ming Liang The College of St. Scholastica Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers

Joane Nagel University of Kansas Byron Nordstrom Gustavus Adolphus College Kevin C. O’Connor Gonzaga University Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Brian S. Osborne Queen’s University Cynthia Paces The College of New Jersey

Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee

Razmik Panossian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University

Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College

Fouad Makki Cornell University

Hooman Peimani Bradford University

Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London

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Linda Racioppi Michigan State University

Ray Taras University of Colorado

Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki

Jessica Teets University of Colorado, Boulder

Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst

Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University

Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney

Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion

Toon van Meijl University of Nijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber University of Applied Languages (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings The Australian National University George W. White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David N. Yaghoubian California State University, San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu

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Preface

What is a nation? What is nationalism? What does it mean to examine them in global perspective? We conceive of a nation or national identity as a form of loyalty. People have a multitude of loyalties: to family, friends, places, clubs, institutions, regions, countries, even to their place of work or brands of products. What distinguishes loyalty to a nation is the primacy it holds on people’s allegiance. It is so powerful that people are willing to give their lives to ensure the continued existence of the group members and territory that make up their nation. By extension, we call nationalism the process that defines, creates, and expresses this essential loyalty to the nation. We view the term nationalism in a neutral sense. While this process can take extreme forms and lead to violent aggression and the extermination of others, nationalism can also be benign and form the basis for peaceful coexistence. Nations and nationalism have found a bewildering range of expressions across the world and through time, and it is this geographic and temporal variation that we seek to address in a systematic fashion. Given the sheer number of nations that exist or have existed historically—some scholars argue that there are as many as 4,000–5,000 in just the contemporary era—our global perspective does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead we have chosen to follow cross-sections through time and space. We identify major historical eras in the development of nations and nationalism to examine characteristic themes and representative cases from all major regions of the world. Our emphasis is on depth rather than breadth. The 146 entries in this encyclopedia are full-length articles that go in depth to cover major debates and issues instead of brief descriptions of general features. They are authored by reputable scholars and try to provide accessible introductions to topics that are ambiguous, complex, and frequently misunderstood. Because literature on nations and nationalism arguably ranks among the most diverse and convoluted, our goal is to provide students, nonspecialists, and even junior scholars with concise information on this subject. In deciding what cases and themes to use, we take representative examples from each world region. These run the gamut from large powerful nations such as China and Russia to smaller nations that do not enjoy any form of sovereignty, like Tibet and Wales. We try to cover both prosperous nations of the developed world along with ex-colonial nations in the less-developed world. Similarly, some nations only appear during one time period, and others do not appear at all, because the most important consideration for us was that at least one representative example from all major regions of the world was included, even if scholarship has sorely neglected or sidelined that area, such as in Africa. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The selection of specific themes and cases that are treated intensively means that our coverage will have some unavoidable gaps. For example, there are no thematic chapters that treat race independently. This omission is not because we consider the issue to be of little significance, but because we feel that race is so elemental to discussions of nations and nationalism that it cannot be separated out. Similarly, it was not always possible to stick to the neat historical categorization into the four time periods. Some of our entries bridge several volumes to provide the most effective treatment of individual cases and themes. This encyclopedia is arranged chronologically in four volumes. The first volume traces the origins and formative processes of nations and nationalism from 1770 to 1880. The second volume covers the aggressive intensification of nationalism during the age of imperialism, from 1880 to 1945. The third volume deals with the decline of nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, from 1945 to 1989. The final volume outlines the transformations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War in 1989. All 104 country essays have the same format, and each is approximately 4,000 words. Each includes a chronology to position the reader in time; a discursive essay on main features; illustrations to help the reader visualize specific issues, situations, or persons; and a brief bibliography to guide additional inquiries. The case study essays also contain sidebars that highlight unique events, persons, or institutions. The main essays all contain five sections that help structure the inquiry and provide a universal key to access the information: (1) “Situating the Nation” places the national case in a historical, political, social, and geographic context; (2) “Instituting the Nation” examines key actors and institutions as well as philosophical foundations; (3) “Defining the Nation” discusses the role of ethno-cultural, civilizational, and geographic markers in creating the us–them distinction that is at the heart of national identity; (4) “Narrating the Nation” addresses particular events, stories, and myths that are used to create a community of belonging; and (5) “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” focuses on actions and strategies that help legitimize the national idea. Our 42 thematic essays address the interplay between national identity, politics, culture, and society and are generally 6,000 words long. They focus on geopolitical contexts and economic conditions, such as postcolonialism and globalization; social relations, such as gender and class; dominant philosophies and ideologies, such as fascism and fundamentalism; and nationalist cultural creations and expressions, such as art, literature, music, or sports. Though specific themes vary in each of the four volumes, each of the thematic essays include bibliographies and illustrations, and touch on the following questions: (1) How were the issues/phenomena under discussion important? (2) What is the background and what are the origins? (3) What are major dimensions and impacts on different groups, societal conditions, and ideas? (4) What are the consequences and ramifications of this issue for the character and future development of nations and nationalism? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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We feel that our encyclopedia makes an important addition to the current reference literature on nations and nationalism. Existing encyclopedias in the field generally contain only very brief entries (Spira 1999, 2002; Leoussi 2001); are dated (Snyder 1990); neglect such civic nations as the United States or Switzerland (Minahan 2002); or are uneven because they combine a few excessively long survey articles with several extremely short entries (Motyl 2001). A universal and significant shortcoming is the lack of maps and illustrations. Except for a limited number of general maps and select illustrations in Minahan, the other works do not have a single map, figure, or image. We believe that an encyclopedia on nationalism must contain visual information for it to effectively convey the contexts within which nationalist movements arose and to depict the important symbology that was used to galvanize national sentiment. Our encyclopedia also offers a unique and novel way to access information on nations and nationalisms. The thematic entries give insights into the larger contexts for the country essays and illustrate linkages among them in regard to general topics such as national education. The individual country entries allow readers to compare and contrast developments in different places and to examine trends in major regions of the world during different time periods. Finally, since some of the places and themes appear in all four volumes, it is possible to trace developments and identify linkages not only among places, but also through time. We hope that this encyclopedia helps to further an understanding of perhaps the most influential set of identities and ideologies in the world today. We also hope that this collection of cases and themes selected across space and time sheds some light on the different ways in which these loyalties are manifested. While this encyclopedia constitutes a very large body of work, it can only scratch the surface of all of the different varieties inherent in a study of nations and nationalism. We encourage the reader to follow up on some of the selected readings that are listed at the end of each entry and to further explore some of the various cases and themes that have not been explicitly addressed. References Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Minahan, James. 2002. Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. San Diego: Academic Press. Snyder, Louis. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House. Spira, Thomas. 1999 (vol. 1), 2002 (vol. 2). Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

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Acknowledgments

An enormous undertaking such as this four-volume work could not be accomplished without the help of several individuals. Of course we would like to thank all of our contributors, who were wonderful about following formatting guidelines, making revisions, and cheerfully supplying additional material as the need arose. We are very saddened that one of our contributors, Jeffrey Cormier, did not live to see the publication of this work. We would also like to pay special thanks to the people at ABC-CLIO, among them Ron Boehm, Wendy Roseth, Kristin Gibson, and especially Alex Mikaberidze. The efforts of ABC-CLIO’s publication team have allowed us to complete this project in a sustained and timely manner. Above all we wish to extend our gratitude to those people who have worked tirelessly in assisting us in this endeavor. Their efforts are reflected throughout these four volumes. Kathleen Woodhouse from Kent State University was instrumental in helping to conceive of this project, in identifying and lining up the contributors, and in evaluating and editing each and every entry in Volumes 3 and 4. She also played a major part in the development of three of the essays. She has been an enormous asset and has worked tirelessly to see this project from start to finish. Gruia Badescu, Zachary Hecht-Leavitt, Jonathan Hsu, and Conor Stinson provided invaluable assistance in Middlebury, Vermont. Their contributions would not have been possible without the generous support of Middlebury College, which is deeply appreciated. Zach and Gruia aided in identifying contributors, selecting illustrations, and managing numerous administrative tasks. Zach’s excellent writing and editorial skills ensured that many of the entries authored by non-native English speakers were transformed into stylistically polished pieces. Gruia’s remarkable linguistic skills and knowledge of the scholarship of nationalism allowed him to contribute deep insights to the review process as well as to the drafting of two introductory essays. Jonathan Hsu and Conor Stinson are to be credited for the beautiful cartographic design. Producing maps for these volumes proved to be a challenging and enormous project. The maps needed to vary greatly in scale—from small areas, such as Estonia, to giant regions, such as Russia—but at the same time needed to allow for easy comparisons. The historical maps were particularly difficult given the numerous border changes that took place and the lack of good reference sources, but Jonathan mastered this hurdle with ease. He is not only a gifted cartographer but an excellent researcher. Putting on the finishing touches to turn the massive manuscript and numerous images and maps into a coherent and beautiful set of volumes was also an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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enormous challenge, and we were fortunate to have the able assistance of Cami Cacciatore, Kristine Swift, and Kerry Jackson at ABC-CLIO and of Samuel Lazarus, Caitlin Sargent, and Mithra Harivandi at Middlebury College. Finally, we would like to thank our families for the unwavering support they gave us throughout this giant undertaking. We dedicate this work to the memory of David Woodward.

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Introduction Volume 2: 1880 to 1945

This second volume traces the development of nations and nationalism from the 1880s to the end of World War II in 1945. This is the period that witnessed the most intense applications of the national idea. It was used to strengthen the internal cohesion of existing nation-states, to justify their territorial expansion, and to expel or exterminate those who were deemed to be outsiders. It was also used by ethnic minorities who felt threatened by this new nationalism to demand selfdetermination in their own nation-states. While these activities continued trends that had started in the preceding period, they now took on an incredible urgency and fervor in a climate of increased power struggles among states; power struggles that culminated in two world wars and genocide. Three major changes were responsible for this accelerated competition and the increased importance of nationalism. First, there was the universal recognition at the end of the 19th century that the world was finite. The world had essentially been mapped. From now on, conflicts between states could no longer be diffused through the discovery of new lands, and competition over territories intensified. Second, the spread of industrialization to an increasing number of states brought in a powerful dynamic: not only was there a greater demand for resources and new markets overall, but some countries advanced more quickly and challenged the established order. Third, the influence of religion further declined and was replaced by new philosophies that were premised on competition, like evolutionary theory. In light of Darwin’s notion of survival of the fittest, struggle (and by extension war) was viewed as endemic to life. Conflict was deemed unavoidable. The first major change during this era was the general realization that the age of discovery and exploration had come to a close. The only blank spaces left on the world map were in the interior of Africa and in such forbidding climatic zones as the polar latitudes and the Australian central desert. Without new spaces to discover, competition for the last remaining portions of land became fierce. This is why the period is often identified as the climax of imperialism. Africa was the biggest price that was left, and in their “scramble for Africa,” European states arbitrarily divided up the continent during a conference in Berlin during 1884–1885. Only Ethiopia and later Liberia were to remain independent states on the African continent. Europeans either encouraged such ethnic divisions as the hierarchization of Hutus and Tutsis in what was to become Rwanda, or lumped together ethnic groups in territorial entities with no historical coherence, both actions creating important challenges for the independent African N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nation-states after the 1960s. Competition for territory also intensified in the Pacific where European states, the United States, and Japan tried to snatch up as many of the remaining islands as possible. These were important stopover points on transpacific trade routes. Increased competition over a finite amount of territory meant that each state had to ensure it maintained control over what it had. In nation-states, the government could simply call on the people, that is, the nation to defend the territory and even to support wars of expansion, regardless of whether they were civic nation-states, like the United States, or ethnic nation-states, like Germany and Italy. Multiethnic empires faced much greater challenges. Calls for the defense of the empire rang hollow with large parts of the population, either because they had little vested interest in supporting a system that treated them as subjects or because they were ethnic minorities that felt little connection with the other groups living in the same empire. Moreover, when the rulers tried to assert control through force, centralized educational policies, and the like, ethnic minorities became more aware of being the “other.” This engendered greater demands for self-determination and helps explain why we see the end of two major multiethnic empires during this period, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman. The second major change had to do with the uneven spread of industrialization. As more countries became industrialized, some of them, like Germany, the United States, and Japan, industrialized at an accelerated pace. Their later start gave them an edge because their modern factories were more efficient. In addition, there was heavy government involvement because the construction of transport systems, like railroads, canals, and steamships, or public works, like dams, were seen as effective ways to strengthen the cohesion of the nation and to project its power. Finally, these countries were also latecomers to the global imperial game—Germany and Japan only recently had become unified nationstates, and the United States initially had focused on expanding within its own continent—they vigorously started to push for overseas colonies in the late 19th century. This meant that not only was there an overall greater competition for markets and resources but that the balance of power was destabilized in a dynamic fashion. Germany was the most serious threat to the existing distribution of power because it directly challenged British supremacy on the seas. It pursued an aggressive naval buildup under its emperor, Wilhelm II, who had world power ambitions and wanted to give the new nation “a place in the sun.” Japan similarly started to flex its military might in the Far East and, after wars with China and Russia, expanded into the Asian mainland and the Pacific by taking control of Korea and Taiwan. The United States took advantage of the weakening imperial reach of Spain. After defeating Spain in a brief war in 1898, the United States occupied the Philippines and Puerto Rico and asserted more and more power in the Caribbean and the Americas. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The third major change comes from the increasing influence of new philosophies that replaced previously dominant religious world views. Evolutionary theories, such as Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), offered a convincing way to conceptualize the world of the late 19th century. Th ey postulated that life was based on competition, which was conveniently applied to human societies. Just as animals were engaged in a struggle for survival, so were nations. Rivalries among nations were endemic, which meant that war could not be avoided. Along the same lines, domination of some nations over others was considered a part of the natural order and helped explain and justify the need for imperialism and conquests. These views also inspired such geopolitical or geostrategic schemes as those by Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan, which outlined territories that had to be brought under control to ensure global dominance. Alternative philosophies, like communism, socialism, and anarchism, which argued for an egalitarian society, had less influence because they required a radical restructuring of society. These other world views were vigorously oppressed by those in power and only were adopted in a few places after violent revolutions, such as 1917 Russia. The influence of the new evolutionary world view can be seen in the aggressive arms buildup and naval race during this era as well as increasing military engagements. Apart from border wars in the Americas—the War of the Pacific of 1879–1884 (Bolivia and Peru versus Chile) or the Chaco War of 1932–1935 (Bolivia versus Paraguay)—there were numerous conflicts associated with the imperialist frenzy described above in which Western powers exploited their technological superiority to conquer territory. The development of more and more sophisticated weaponry and greater willingness to engage in wars came to a terrifying climax during the industrialized warfare of World War I with the senseless slaughter of millions of people. The world order that followed World War I was inspired by the principles outlined in U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech. It attempted to pacify the situation by granting self-determination to oppressed national groups in Europe since the trigger event had been the assassination of the archduke of Austria-Hungary by a Serb nationalist. As a result, new nation-states were created in Eastern Europe. However, the peace settlement also already contained the seeds for new conflicts. The principle of self-determination was not applied to the colonized peoples of Africa and Asia. For example, the Middle East was carved into French and British mandates, which remained very unpopular with the local population, who were eager supporters of the independence cause. Moreover, Germany, the main challenger, was humiliated, which created strong domestic support for revisionism and the most powerful nation, the United States, did not take a leadership role, but withdrew into isolationism. In the context of postwar economic hardships and a global recession, more extreme evolutionary philosophies emerged in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Survival N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of the fittest was interpreted in racial terms and the nation took precedence over the individual. These totalitarian philosophies were centered on the preeminence of their respective nations and used to justify aggressive policies of conquest and extermination. They culminated in World War II and crimes of genocide. Nationalism had been taken to its most perverse extreme and the concept of the nation tainted. Gun t ram H. Herb Gru i a B ad e s cu

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Culture and Nationalism Neil McWilliam Relevance Historians and theorists generally recognize the central role played by culture in forming and sustaining the modern nation-state. Whether they subscribe to a belief in the essentially artificial, constructed nature of the nation and national identity or, conversely, understand the nation as a primordial unit within which modern forms of collective consciousness have gradually evolved, scholars agree on the vital contribution of the cultural sphere in forging “imagined communities” or in promoting “the myth of nations.” In its broadest sense, in which it is understood to represent values, beliefs, customs, and practices that bind individuals into groups, culture provides a fundamental foundation upon which ethnic, religious, or territorial communities can emerge. Understood more narrowly as the range of artistic forms that have been developed for individual and collective expression, it is equally clear that culture represents one of the most important ways in which national consciousness has been forged and national interests have been asserted in the modern era. In making such a claim, however, it is necessary to recognize that, in many cases, nationalism is not an unambiguous, clearly recognizable ingredient in a work of art. Nationalism is not a generic category, and we cannot describe a painting or a musical composition as nationalist in the same way that we might identify it as a landscape or a sonata. Rather, in many instances, the nationalist connotations of a particular work are contingent, contextual, or conflicted: the situation in which a work is produced, performed, or displayed, and its reception and interpretation, can all help to shape the meanings attributed to it; these in turn can be challenged and transformed over time. As we recognize the dynamic character of culture’s role within nationalism, it is also important to understand that, through the various ways in which works of art are used, they can actively shape and advance ideological positions, rather than merely reflecting or illustrating beliefs understood to originate on a more authentically conceptual plane. Equally, the part played by cultural activities and forms differs significantly within politically distinct varieties of nationalism. This can range, for example, from the promotion of folk art and popular poetry within secessionist or anticolonial movements to the monumental celebration of established institutions by nation-states intent on solidifying popular allegiance and consent. In the decades roughly bounded by German and Italian unification in the late 19th century, and the crisis inflicted by extreme nationalism in the 1940s, the arts’ potential both as a mouthpiece for subaltern groups seeking a common voice and as an often overbearing spectacle N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of state power or ethnic integrity was widely exploited, even as modernist ideologies repudiated localized traditions, and emerging cultural markets transcended national boundaries.

Origins The conscription of art for the promotion of nationalist ideologies grew out of currents commonly described as “romantic nationalism,” which emerged in reaction to Enlightenment universalism at the end of the 18th century. Crucial to this process was Johann Gottfried Herder’s understanding of culture as a manifestation of identity, elaborated in his Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind (1774). For Herder, the character of a nation depended preeminently on a shared language and customs, rather than on common racial origins. Turning his back on assertions that the classical Mediterranean civilizations represented an unsurpassable paragon of achievement, Herder advanced a pluralist understanding of culture that rejected claims for the innate superiority or inferiority of particular peoples. His interest in folk culture (Volkskultur) pointed the way to a gradual decline in the status of classicism as a cultural language possessing the universal authority that occurred during the 19th century. What took its place was simultaneously more open and potentially more charged: challenges to the classical ideal gave apparently greater authority to the individual artist in varying the style, tone, and range of associations of particular works. In doing so, however, new and potentially controversial cultural references could come into play, prominent among which were those relating to ethnic identity and national history. The study of folklore and vernacular languages played a significant role in directing artists toward national cultural traditions previously overshadowed by interest in classical antiquity. Such figures as Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm in Germany or Elias Lönnrot in Finland recorded popular tales and legends that were later taken up by nationalists intent on asserting the cultural identity of particular peoples to advance political campaigns for autonomy or unification. Such epics as the Finnish Kalevala, edited by Lönnrot in 1835, and the Germanic Nibelungenlied, parts of which were first published in 1748 and, most famously, provided inspiration for Richard Wagner’s cycle of four operas Der Ring des Nibelungen (1848–1874), fueled nationalist sentiment and inspired new artistic interpretations in a variety of media, which themselves bolstered claims to self-determination. At the same time, the obsession with history during the 19th century had profound cultural implications for attitudes toward style and subject matter. As historians across Europe paid increasing attention to the alleged antiquity of individual nations or the transcendent identity of particular ethnic groupings, writers, artists, and musicians celebrated key moments from the past N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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that were often inspired by openly nationalist intent. Artistic forms, too, absorbed vernacular styles carrying national or regional overtones: music, painting, architecture, and the decorative arts all borrowed motifs that were seen to evoke a timeless popular tradition rooted in the shared experience of an organic, ethnically discrete community. Cultural revivalism often carried explicitly nostalgic, anticapitalist connotations. Regionalist styles in the decorative arts, for example, celebrated preindustrial traditions by bringing together a distinctive vocabulary of forms and motifs using handcraft techniques that were disappearing from the wider economy due to mechanization and production-line working methods. The political upheavals that shook the late 19th century were both a response to mounting nationalist pressures and a catalyst for increasingly assertive manifestations of popular nationalist sentiment. The unification of Germany under Prussian leadership in 1871, together with the triumph of the Risorgimento in Italy, had far-reaching consequences for Europe as a whole. The defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1866 heralded the Ausgleich (“compromise”), through which Hungary achieved greater autonomy from Habsburg control, while victory over France in 1871 forced the abdication of Napoleon III and led to the establishment of the Third Republic. From Ireland in the West to Russia in the East, the closing decades of the 19th century witnessed increased nationalist fervor, with varying and often far-reaching consequences for the arts. Nationalist themes in statesponsored projects, prominent in such countries as Germany and France, pointed to a shift away from dynastic conceptions of the state to a more broadly based concern with shaping popular assent rooted in a shared sense of interest and identity. In such cases as the Celtic revival in Ireland, however, where nationalist intellectuals fighting for political independence reasserted a repressed cultural tradition, the arts stirred up memories of former glories as a means of inspiring resistance to foreign domination. In every case, however, it is important to recognize that cultural nationalism was inflected by complex struggles over the meaning of nationhood and by often bitter disputes between countries over historical or symbolic markers of identity. In this way, nationalism was not simply invested in cultural artifacts, but was mediated by the contexts in which these artifacts were framed; educational systems, such institutions as museums or academies, civic rituals like the planning and inauguration of public monuments, and scholarly or popular debate on the history and contemporary state of the arts all set the boundaries for defining and disputing the identity of a nation and its culture.

Dimensions State Sponsorship Well established by the late 19th century, state sponsorship of architectural and pictorial programs was intended to heighten national self-consciousness. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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construction and decoration of such legislative buildings as the Capitol in Washington, D.C. (begun in 1793, with major additions during 1815–1830, 1856–1863, 1904, 1958–1962), or the Palace of Westminster in London (1840–1870), provided the opportunity for complex statements of cultural identity or dynastic genealogy, elaborated through historical illustration and stylistic allusion. In London, the combination of Sir Charles Barry’s Gothic Revival architecture and a program of fresco decorations dominated by chivalric themes favored a patrician version of national history in which monarchy retained a central role. This portrayal of a Christian nation guided by a traditional elite contrasts with the tactical recalibration of France’s past, undertaken by Louis-Philippe in the Historical Museum at Versailles, which was devised following the revolution that brought him to power in July 1830. In an immense suite of history paintings ranging from the era of Clovis to the present day, the Versailles museum represents the first, and most extensive, attempt to shape popular national consciousness through visual narrative. Its interconnected series of scenes, in which France’s emerging identity is closely identified with military prowess, works to legitimize Louis-Philippe’s succession to the throne as marking the resolution of tensions that had divided the nation since 1789. Although the traditional prestige of history painting was hotly contested in the late 19th century, governments continued to recognize its capacity to excite popular enthusiasm and to promote ideologically useful perceptions of the nation’s character and past. The unification of Germany, in particular, offered opportunities for artists to contribute to a new narrative of nationhood, in which the dispersed states brought together under Prussia in 1871 were enlisted in a myth of common origins and shared destiny. Building upon a vigorous tradition of fresco painting promoted by such 19th-century rulers as Maximilian II and Ludwig II of Bavaria, the new state prioritized a public art that at once glorified and helped to define the nation. Monuments to local and federal government, such as the Berlin Reichstag (designed by Paul Wallot between 1884 and 1894), government ministries, law courts, educational buildings, and town halls—more than 200 of which were completed between 1850 and 1914—provided extensive opportunities to elaborate officially sanctioned evocations of a people whose common history was traced back to the medieval era and beyond. Decorative schemes, such as the Hall of the Emperors in Frankfurt City Hall or Wilhelm Camphausen’s murals for the Gürzenich in Cologne—produced to commemorate the completion of the city’s cathedral in 1880—employed a historicist idiom and iconography to promote nationalist sentiment, typically evoking heroic moments from the nation’s past in fresco decorations within a Gothic architectural setting redolent of Germanic cultural achievement. Similarly, in the Romanesque palace at Goslar, restored between 1873 and 1879 to celebrate the new empire, Hermann Wislicenus’s frescoes in the Great Hall suggest associations between Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th-century German king and Holy Roman emperor revered as an early architect of national unity, and Kaiser Wilhelm I of Prussia, under N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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whom unification had been achieved. Unification itself was widely memorialized, most famously by Anton von Werner, a history painter whose fortunes were closely identified with the foundation of the new empire. Summoned to Versailles to witness the proclamation of the German Empire on January 18, 1871, Werner was charged with recording the event in no fewer than four monumental canvases. Completed between 1877 and 1913, these works gave pride of place to Wilhelm and his chancellor Otto von Bismarck as the architects of national renewal (Jefferies 2003, 44–53). The German empire’s use of history painting to foster popular devotion to the nation and its dynastic rulers contrasts with similarly concerted efforts in France to rally opinion behind the new republic after 1870. Following defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, which had allowed a united Germany to emerge, republican leaders were confronted by the urgent task of developing support for a new system of government within an established nation. Their task was complicated by the contested history of republicanism within France, a factor only partially resolved when conservatives sympathetic to the restoration of monarchy were forced into opposition in 1878. German annexation of territory in the eastern provinces of Alsace and Lorraine heightened nationalist sentiment in the decades leading up to 1914 and helped the radical right in militant campaigns intended to destabilize the liberal, secular regime that, despite such crises as the Dreyfus affair, prevailed until the invasion by the Third Reich in 1940. As their commitment to universal elementary education confirms, republicans in France understood that the state could play a crucial role in shaping popular values, not least of which was patriotic devotion to the nation. The secular ideology of civic humanism that formed the core of republican nationalism looms large in public art projects of the period: the new regime was lavish in constructing ministries, municipal buildings, and schools and universities, many of which incorporated extensive decorative programs extolling popular virtues and glorifying the beneficent power of the republic. City halls, in particular, served as secular temples of the republican creed. In Paris, the hôtel de ville (city hall), reconstructed following the Commune in 1871, formed the centerpiece of 20 neighborhood mairies (town or city halls), all of which housed imposing murals devoted to such themes as “The Triumph of the Republic” (Léon Glaize, mairie of the 20th arrondissement, 1891), “In Times of War” (Ferdinand Humbert and Pierre Lagarde, 15th arrondissement, 1886), and “Sacrifice to the Motherland” (Georges Moreau de Tours, 2nd arrondissement, 1882). These celebrations of family, work, and patriotic devotion were replicated across France, often in ambitious new monuments in a historicist style that drew upon indigenous architectural traditions associated with periods of regional or national glory. In the absence of a dynastic focus, such as the German kaiser or the British monarch, the republican cult exalted female personifications of tutelary virtues that were handed down from the 1789 revolution. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity serve as handmaidens to the imposing figure of the Republic herself, whose youthful features and classical N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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forms connote a quiet authority that apparently transcends the temporary passions of political factionalism. The extraordinary currency of the Republic as a national emblem—found on stamps and coinage, as well as in pictorial and sculptural form in civic buildings and public space—helped transform a remote abstraction into a more familiar focus of collective identification, whose popular nickname Marianne points to the internalization of national ideology into the fabric of everyday life. Public Sculptures Of central importance in this process was the proliferation of public sculpture throughout Europe and beyond, particularly in the half century before World War I. What exasperated contemporaries decried as “statuomania” represented perhaps the most conspicuous arena in which government, as well as municipal and private organizations, intervened to develop national consciousness. Emblematic representations, like the ubiquitous statues of the republic unveiled throughout France after 1880, or triumphalist expressions of German renewal such as the Niederwald monument (1877–1883) overlooking the Rhine at Rudesheim, employed colossal scale to impress the viewer with the moral and physical might of the nation. At the same time, memorials to exemplary citizens helped redefine national prestige in terms of the collective achievement of outstanding individuals, whose separate accomplishments cast reflected glory on the community as a whole and incited emulation among rising generations. By the late 19th century, achievement in a wide variety of political, cultural, scientific, and military fields was considered worthy of such recognition, although acts of public commemoration had previously been restricted to the monarchy and those who had served its interests. Military achievement, for example, determined the transformation in the late 1790s of London’s Saint Paul’s Cathedral into a necropolis that housed fallen commanders from the Napoleonic wars. It was also central to the cults of Wellington and Nelson, which spawned monumental tributes all over Britain in the mid-19th century. More expansively, nationalist considerations came into play with the designation of the Parisian church of Sainte-Geneviève as a revolutionary pantheon in 1791 and with Ludwig I’s construction of the Walhalla temple at Regensburg in Bavaria between 1816 and 1842. Beyond their very different ideological ambitions, both undertakings foreshadowed the glorification of the individual as a means of celebrating—or asserting the identity of—the nation. In newly unified Italy and Germany, this process centered around the figure of the monarch, as evidenced by the colossal monument to Victor-Emmanuel that was erected on the Capitoline Hill in Rome between 1895 and 1911 and by the many commemorations of Wilhelm I, such as the vast Kyff haüser monument in Thuringia that solicited dedication to the nation in the name of its founding father. The architects of national unification— Garibaldi in Italy and Bismarck in Germany—formed the focus of complementary cults of the nation, most fully expressed in the approximately 500 Bismarck towers N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Charles and Léopold Morice: Monument to the Republic, Place de la République, Paris, France, 1879–1883. Contemporary photograph. (Library of Congress)

constructed throughout Germany following the chancellor’s death in 1898 (Michalski 1998, 58–78). This colonizing process, in which a representation—or even the name—of a pivotal leader instilled physical space with national meaning, followed ideologically distinctive paths during the 20th century. In the Soviet Union, early internationalist impulses gave way to the glorification of Lenin and Stalin as personifications of a new social and political order, while in the United States, celebration of the nation as a leading capitalist democracy inspired temples to Lincoln (1915–1922) and Jefferson (1939–1943) in Washington, D.C., and Gutzon Borglum’s colossal carvings of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt on Mount Rushmore, South Dakota (1927–1941). The vogue for commemorative statuary represented an important moment in cultural nationalism, not merely through the vast quantity of works themselves but also through the elaborate array of rituals that surrounded their commissioning and inauguration. Local and national campaigns to win support and financing for memorials to favored sons (and, occasionally, daughters) of the nation often involved a concerted educational program that climaxed with the monument’s unveiling, an event habitually accompanied by speeches, parades, theatrical productions, and concerts. Yet this galvanizing process, in which the historical N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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personality served to embody and promote communal values, could also highlight ideological fault lines compromising national unity. Struggles over the symbolic meaning and identity of such figures from the past as Joan of Arc in France or Giordano Bruno in Italy, set progressive secularists at odds with conservative nationalists, giving rise to often violent disputes over the character and appropriate direction of the nation itself. In the early decades of the 20th century, potential for such disputes diminished as, in much of Europe, the focus of commemorative statuary turned to the memorialization of the numberless dead of World War I. Although memorials had been erected to commemorate combatants of both sides following the Franco-Prussian War, and had often been exploited for overtly nationalist ends (Hargrove and McWilliam 2005, 55–81), the sheer magnitude of the losses suffered on all sides between 1914 and 1918 generally tempered any triumphalist or revanchist sentiment. Exhibitions The blend of nationalist ideology and pedagogical zeal that favored “statuomania” also contributed to the astonishing expansion of museums and exhibitions in the 19th century. Universal exhibitions, which enjoyed worldwide success from London in 1851 to Paris in 1937, provided an opportunity for host nations to flaunt their industrial prowess and cultural heritage, while declaring allegiance to international peace and progress. These gargantuan events (the 1900 Paris exposition covered 277 acres and attracted almost 51 million visitors) became arenas in which participating nations fashioned identities that reconciled tradition and modernity. Pavilions frequently drew upon vernacular architectural styles and presented art works and artifacts that conjured up an essentialized image of a seamless national character. Particularly striking in this regard was the 1896 Budapest exhibition, organized to commemorate 1,000 years of Magyar history. The exhibition, centerpiece of a nationwide public works program designed to assert the Magyar identity of the newly autonomous, multiethnic nation, combined art, industry, and folk tradition to construct a history and culture for Hungary that was distinct from both Habsburg Austria, and the surrounding Slavic peoples. The prominence afforded to indigenous arts and crafts in this process echoed the vogue for displays of apparently authentic regional styles by the many nations participating in worlds fairs during this period (Facos and Hirsh 2003, 160–185). As popular tradition became an integral part of nations’ self-presentation in the international arena, so the universal exhibitions also incorporated primitivistic displays of non-European peoples to suggest the benefits extended by mature Western cultures to their alleged inferiors on other continents through the development of colonial rule. In such a way, culture served both to differentiate among advanced industrial nations and to draw them together in contrast to subaltern peoples who were defined as lacking a viable independent identity. National galleries of art developed across Europe following the opening of the Louvre in 1793 and became symbolically charged spaces in which individual citiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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zens implicitly recognized themselves as sharing in the cultural riches provided by the state. The pride of place that such institutions often accorded to indigenous schools of art—which, indeed, they frequently led the way in designating as such—further contributed to defining the nation as a cultural reality with a distinctive identity and tradition equal, if not superior, to neighboring states. Classical architecture, sculptural decoration, and imposing murals often lent such institutions overtly nationalist connotations (Facos and Hirsh 2003, 16–38). The Nationalgalerie inaugurated in Berlin in 1876, for example, presented the visitor with a decorative program that traced a distinctive cultural lineage extending back to the Germanic tribes. The museum displayed only German works of art, among which battle scenes and celebrations of national history, such as Ferdinand Keller’s Emperor Wilhelm the Victorious (1888), figured prominently. Housed in an imposing classical structure that evoked the Regensburg Walhalla, the inscription on the gallery’s façade—“To German Art 1871”—made no bones about the founding moment of the new state as the realization of an ostensibly transcendent cultural reality (Wright 1996, 79–99). Similar claims inspired museums and art historians to construct nationally based cultural genealogies, not only through the arrangement of permanent collections in major state galleries but also through temporary exhibitions that fashioned narratives of artistic achievement by identifying particular schools with decisive moments of stylistic innovation. In 1902, for example, a path-breaking exhibition of Flemish art in Bruges claimed that artists from the Low Countries, like Memling and Van Eyck, had been in the forefront of stylistic innovation in the 15th and 16th centuries. French scholars were not slow to respond. The 1904 exhibition of Primitifs français, held at the Louvre and the Bibliothèque nationale, assembled no fewer than 580 paintings, sculptures, enamels, and illuminated manuscripts to assert the precocious technical superiority of the French school and the unbroken tradition of cultural achievement to which France could lay claim. In both cases, openly anachronistic interpretations of nationhood and flagrant manipulation of stylistic attribution contributed to the higher imperative of advancing interests rooted in cultural nationalism (Hargrove and McWilliam 2005, 230–233). During the interwar period, Fascist regimes in Italy and Germany mounted exhibitions both at home and abroad to define—and police—the boundaries of an official national visual culture. In Germany, the opening in Munich of Paul Ludwig Troost’s monumental Haus der Deutschen Kunst (“House of German Art”) in 1937 was declared by Hitler as laying “the foundations for a new and genuine German art.” Its inauguration was accompanied by a pageant celebrating “2000 Years of German Culture” that brought together some 6,000 participants, and its first exhibition, devoted to “Great German Art,” provided the blueprint for an ethnically inspired aesthetic renewal, defined all the more trenchantly in contrast to modernist works held up for public ridicule in the celebrated exhibition of “Entartete Kunst” (“Degenerate Art”). The 3 million visitors who saw the proscribed works in Munich, and during a subsequent national tour, far surpassed the numbers N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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that were attracted to the official Great German Art shows, held annually until 1944. However, official backing for exhibitions with such themes as “Pictures of the Homeland” (Oberhausen, 1938), “German Farmer–German Land” (Gera, 1938), and “German Greatness” (Munich, 1940) indicated the state’s commitment to the cultural sphere as a weapon in promoting a nationalist ideology (Hinz 1979, 19). In Italy, too, the Fascist regime was equally alert to the arts’ potential for projecting a sense of italianità, and they exploited the unparalleled prestige of the classical and Renaissance traditions to reinforce unity at home and to win favor abroad. Two major shows were organized—one in London in 1930 and one in Paris five years later—in the expectation that, as the Corriere della Sera (Evening Courier) had commented on the earlier exhibition, the nation’s masterpieces “will be able to support the Italian cause in face of the most obstinate calumniators, the skeptics, and those who are indifferent, and to make it remembered that Italy was always the first to blaze the trail of civilization and of progress” (cited in Haskell 2000, 126). In Italy itself, such enterprises as the Museum of the Roman Empire (opened in 1927), the Augustan Exhibition of Romanness (1937–1938), and the projected Exhibition of Italian Civilization (slated to open in Rome in 1942) complemented initiatives to celebrate the modernity of the Fascist state and posited a transcendent Latin tradition of which Mussolini’s regime was the latest incarnation. Architectural Heritage Mussolini’s Italy also provides a striking instance of the state’s concerted exploitation of architectural heritage for nationalist ends. Dedicated to vitalizing collective consciousness through the exaltation of a national rather than a purely regional past, the regime worked to showcase monuments that embodied the dual spirit of italianità and romanità. Classical and Renaissance sites were conscripted to remind the citizen of an accumulated tradition of cultural and political greatness, and radical measures were taken to reburnish the sometimes faded glories of former days. The 1931 redevelopment plan for Rome led to extensive surgery of the urban fabric in which medieval buildings, deemed irrelevant to the city’s imperial past, were swept aside—the better to reveal the classical legacy to which Mussolini lay claim. Augustan Rome—and notably the famed altar of peace, the Ara Pacis, and the mausoleum of Augustus himself—reemerged as the symbolic heart of the city and of celebrations in 1937 to commemorate the bimillennium of the emperor’s birth (Lazzaro and Crum 2005, 53–65). Elsewhere, Renaissance monuments were extensively restored and often extended or rebuilt to enhance their apparently historic character. Such invasive restoration significantly modified such celebrated sites as San Gimignano and Ferrara, led to the wholesale rebuilding of the walls surrounding Monteriggioni, and transformed Renaissance town halls throughout Tuscany. As the regime refashioned architectural heritage and invented “medieval” festivals in such cities as Florence, Siena, and Arezzo, so it actively promoted domestic tourism to encourage popuN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lar identification of past glories with the path pursued by the fascist revolution (Lazzaro and Crum 2005, 97–131). Culture and Race The role scholars played in cultural initiatives was significant and, indeed, from the mid-19th century onward, academic debate was crucial in shaping understanding of the relationship between culture and race in general and in identifying different national traditions with a variety of characteristic traits. Philologists, ethnographers, historians, archaeologists, and art historians contributed to an essentialized cultural anthropology, which at times drew heavily on the overtly racist theories that Arthur Gobineau expounded in his Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, 1853–1855). Further indebted to often reductive readings of Ernest Renan’s philological investigations of Semitic peoples and Hippolyte Taine’s determinist theories of the impact of “race, milieu and moment” on cultural production, scholars increasingly sought to explain the history of art and literature according to fixed qualities, ostensibly rooted in, and expressive of, a shared ethnic or national character. In France, the architect and theorist Eugène Viollet-le-Duc adapted Gobineau’s theories to the cultural sphere, insisting that artistic greatness could be achieved only in societies that were racially homogeneous. Viollet contrasted a French nation in which the Franks had restored the ethnic vigor of the native Gauls following the defeat of Rome with an Italian civilization characterized by a decadent cosmopolitanism: the former he credited with evolving Gothic style as the material expression of the Gallic spirit, the latter with a superficial, insincere plundering of the classical past during the Renaissance (Michaud 2005, 60–68). This dichotomy between north and south inspired many nationalists to argue that the true nature of French culture had been fatally compromised by the Valois dynasty’s importation and emulation of Italianate art in the 16th century, though rightwing monarchists defended this classical tradition as marking France’s accession to a transcendent Mediterranean civilization with roots in ancient Greece (Hargrove and McWilliam 2005, 269–291). Debates over the true character of French culture fueled a burgeoning anticosmopolitanism in the early Third Republic. At the same time, claims that Gothic architecture had originated in 12th-century France buttressed critiques of Germany as an inferior and derivative culture advanced by such art historians as Emile Mâle in German Art and French Art in the Middle Ages (L’Art français et l’art allemand au moyen-âge, 1917). In Germany itself, historians had sought to explain the characteristics of particular cultures in racial terms since the Romantic period, and such figures as August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel championed Dürer and his contemporaries for resisting the encroachment of Renaissance classicism. Later, such art historians as Wilhelm Worringer, Alois Riegl, and Georg Dehio attempted to define German art in terms of transhistorical formal qualities that expressed the fundamental character of the German people. This tendency even colored the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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work of Heinrich Wölfflin, a figure best known for elaborating an art-historical method that apparently understood the phases in European artistic development in terms of a common period style based upon historically recurrent formal characteristics. Yet, in works ranging from The Art of Albrecht Dürer (1905) to Italy and the German Sense of Form (Italien und das deutsche Formgefühl, 1931), Wölfflin revisited well-established contrasts between northern and southern cultural traditions, aligning them with innate differences in national character rooted in race. Involvement in Alfred Rosenberg’s Nazi organization, the Combat League for German Culture (Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur), established in 1929, marked the height of this tendency that Wölfflin moderated in later publications. This scholarly endorsement of racial models coincided with tendencies among artists, critics, and politicians to challenge cultural cosmopolitanism and to call for strict controls to preserve indigenous cultural traditions from foreign contamination. In France, students at the Fine Arts Academy in Paris demonstrated against foreigners’ admission into the school, while Franco-German cultural exchange provoked regular protests around 1900. Nationalists spurned foreigninspired art nouveau design, decried challenges to France’s superiority in the decorative arts, and opposed the vogue for such foreign composers and dramatists as Wagner and Ibsen. On the eve of World War I, malcontents on the right promoted ideals of cultural enracinement (“rootedness”), popularized by the nationalist intellectual and politician Maurice Barrès, and expressed mounting hostility toward young immigré artists whose display of often experimental works in major Parisian exhibitions fueled claims that national culture was imperiled. Such cultural nationalism was not confined to France. In Germany, Wilhelm II led the assault on foreign art, describing Paris as “the great whorehouse of the world” (Forster-Hahn 1996, 95). His views were vigorously endorsed by such figures as the sculptor, politician, and director of the Bavarian Academy, Ferdinand von Miller, who warned the Bavarian Parliament in 1874: “French taste, formed by art, and the French sense of beauty have subjugated the whole world, including us Germans” (Lenman 1997, 51). The publication in 1892 of Max Nordau’s international bestseller Degeneration (Entartung) added to the belief that French art was the cultural expression of a deeper national pathology that had to be strenuously excluded from Germany itself. These views encouraged hostility toward such German painters as Max Liebermann or Fritz von Uhde whose modernist style bore the unpatriotic taint of French influence. Cultural chauvinists took further exception to the exhibition or purchase of works by modern French artists for German museums; following an initial skirmish in 1896 over the display of 36 modern canvases in the Berlin National Gallery, this resistance came to a head in 1911 over the Bremen Museum’s purchase of Van Gogh’s Poppy Field. The assault was led by a landscape painter, Carl Vinnen, whose Protest of German Artists (Ein Protest deutscher Künstler), bearing 140 signatures, decried “alien influences” and declared that “a people can be raised to the very heights only through artists of its own flesh and blood.” This desire for cultural autarchy was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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elaborated during the Third Reich by Alfred Rosenberg, whose Myth of the Twentieth Century (Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts, 1930) set out a racial aesthetic that announced a reaction against modernist internationalism and gave pride of place to German vernacular culture as the embodiment of the Volksgeist (“popular spirit”). Particularly partial to a folkish Heimatkunst (“homeland art”), ostensibly inspired by the values and cultural traditions of the peasantry and artisan classes, Rosenberg railed against Expressionism and the Bauhaus whose modern inspirations he dismissed as steeped in a baleful individualism at odds with the spontaneity and rootedness of popular forms.

Consequences The political appropriation of popular art as distinctively national in origin and wholesome in outlook united regimes of left and right in the mid-20th century, from Stalin’s Russia to the Vichy regime in France. It marked the crisis of a trend that, in the 19th century, had been identified with campaigns for national selfdetermination, in countries like Ireland, or with a politically progressive populism, as in Scandinavia, where Swedish and Finnish artists had embraced popular tradition in opposing academic conservatism (Facos and Hirsh 2003, 207–249). The interest in folktales and popular song among such composers as the Russians Alexandr Borodin and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, the Scandinavians Edvard Grieg and Jean Sibelius, or the Czech Bedˇrich Smetana stemmed from a romanticism that identified the essence of the nation with an imagined popular soul. Such nationalism tended to be nostalgic in tone and implicitly hostile to the social and political leveling generally associated with encroaching industrial modernity. However, for fascist advocates of a mythic, racially pure culture, such as Rosenberg, popular tradition worked in tandem with a commitment to industrial modernity, providing the mythic, foundational moral values upon which political and economic transformation could be accomplished. Whether articulated through popular folk songs, national epics, public monuments, or the showcasing of architectural heritage, the exploitation of cultural forms proved crucial in promoting nationalist ideologies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Such works as patriotic history paintings frequently enjoyed an impact that extended far beyond the exhibition hall through reproduction in school primers, encyclopedias, and illustrated periodicals. Ceremonies to inaugurate statues to national heroes, parades celebrating cultural achievement, and tourist visits to monumental sites all contributed to consolidating national identity, and often were explicitly directed toward inculcating assertively chauvinistic attitudes. Such popular forms as the panoramas that flourished in the 19th-century city, press caricatures, and jingoistic songs in music halls and cabarets all provided access to a mass public, which new technologies, like cinema N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and the radio, broadened even further. In such nations as Germany and Italy, whose roots extended back no further than the late 19th century, the exploitation of art for nationalist ends intensified during times of heightened international tension, particularly around the two world wars. At the same time, currents within the cultural marketplace provided points of resistance to such pressure. Modernism, though not reducible to a monolithic political or ideological perspective, frequently bred antipathy to more totalitarian nationalist regimes, as the departure of so many artists from Europe in the interwar years suggests. Artistic individualism, a conspicuous element in cultural life since the Romantic period, further insulated many from the lure of nationalist regimes or mass movements. Yet, perhaps one of the strongest counterweights to cultural nationalism, at least in advanced capitalist economies, has been the growing internationalization of the marketplace. If in more recent years, this has afforded the culture industry of the United States an overwhelming and, at times, overbearing international influence that has carried profound ideological implications, in the decades before the Cold War, the more egregious aspects of such domination still lay in the future. In the period bounded by the Franco-Prussian War and World War II, a growing international market in objects and ideas helped mitigate the detrimental impact of nationalism and foster openness and exchange, at the same time that artists all too often colluded with the more atavistic forces that shaped these fateful years. Selected Bibliography Facos, M., and S. L. Hirsh, eds. 2003. Art, Culture, and National Identity in Fin-de-Siècle Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Forster-Hahn, F., ed. 1996. Imagining Modern German Culture: 1889–1910. Washington DC: National Gallery of Art. Hargrove, J., and N. McWilliam, eds. 2005. Nationalism and French Visual Culture 1870–1914. Washington DC: National Gallery of Art. Haskell, F. 2000. The Ephemeral Museum. Old Master Paintings and the Rise of the Art Exhibition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hinz, B. 1979. Art in the Third Reich. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Jefferies, M. 2003. Imperial Culture in Germany, 1871–1918. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lazzaro, C., and R. Crum, eds. 2005. Donatello among the Blackshirts. History and Modernity in the Visual Culture of Fascist Italy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lenman, R. 1997. Artists and Society in Germany 1850–1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Löfgren, O. 1989. “The Nationalization of Culture.” Ethnologia Europaea 19, no. 1: 5–24. Michalski, S. 1998. Public Monuments. Art in Political Bondage 1870–1997. London: Reaktion Books. Michaud, E. 2005. Histoire de l’art. Une discipline à ses limites, 49–84. Paris: Editions Hazan. Taylor, B., and W. van der Will. 1990. The Nazification of Art: Art, Design, Music, Architecture and Film in the Third Reich. Winchester: The Winchester Press. Wright, G., ed. 1996. The Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology. Washington DC: National Gallery of Art.

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Education and Nationalism Peter J. Weber Relevance Nationalism can be understood as the demand for corresponding cultural and state borders. The question is how the state creates the cultural community and the historical traditions by which it legitimizes itself as a nation. This legitimization occurred in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century because of the social division of labor in industrialized societies, which caused the homogenization of culture in national standard languages. The period between 1880 and 1945 is paradigmatic of the interrelation between education and nationalism, because homogenization in the nation-states took place in particular by means of the then-new national educational systems. However, the expectations of the early national movements, which had predicted that the end of national wars would settle the disputes over national unity and independence and create peace between the states, were not fulfilled. Instead, old and new nation-states were drawn into national rivalry and economic competition in the last third of the 19th century. The aggravation of national rivalry found its peak in imperialism. Through imperialism, nation-states expanded their sphere of influence beyond their own borders by either colonial territorial rule or economic competition. After the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne in Sarajevo on June 14, 1914, World War I began, which put an end to the authority of the monarchy and to the age of the bourgeoisie. In the time between the two world wars, the nation-states experienced a rise in national feelings. The issue of national minorities and border disputes remained unresolved. Additional problems in Europe included the lack of economic growth and the search for a suitable system of government after World War II. The crash of the New York Stock Exchange on October 24, 1929 (“Black Thursday”), started the biggest crisis of the global economy because of the close interrelations among international economies and finances. After the United States, the German empire was the most affected by this crisis. It took until the 1930s to overcome the crisis internationally by different means. After 1933, the totalitarian regimes of Europe—national socialism in the German Reich, fascism in Italy, and Stalinism in the Soviet Union—standardized all educational institutions (Gleichschaltung). After World War II, West Germany and Italy overcame their totalitarian structures and experienced an opening to democratic structures, which increased the democratic orientation in the educational system. Throughout the years between 1880 and 1945, education and educational systems and their institutions played a major role in the achievement of national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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interests of linguistic and cultural standardization. The contention, therefore, is that during this period education was not independent and not future-oriented but, rather, a servant to the modern state, and in some ways it still is. Education for the Nation-State, 1889–1914 During the 18th century, the traditions of the federal system were still supported. In the course of the 19th century, however, the relationship between the individual and the state was reorganized, and the issue of a stable social order gained prominence—although it is still too often viewed as a reaction to the French Revolution rather than as being influenced by developments in Britain and America. For example, in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, American schools had to adapt to large numbers of immigrants. At that time, one important new use for schools was to socialize immigrant children to the American way of life (Americanization). In this context, a shared identity created through linguistic and cultural homogenization, especially by the educational system, played an important role. This homogenization served economic and political interests, which benefited from a single obligatory language. Since 1920, one-third of the mandatory time for instruction in the national school systems in Europe and abroad was spent on teaching the respective national language, one-sixth on mathematics, and about 10 percent each on social science, natural science, aesthetics, and physical education. For example, at the time of the French Revolution, more than one-third of the population of France did not speak French. Only after the introduction of primary education was it possible to achieve some intellectual and linguistic unity. After the language of Northern France, specifically of Paris (the langue d’oïl), was enforced as the standard, this model of unification was exported to the colonies, where the use of regional languages in state schools had been prohibited for a long time. Education for Colonialism, 1880–1914 In competition with other nations, many European nation-states expanded beyond their own borders in order to have access to more natural resources. With this expansion, the model of the Western educational system also expanded. Substantial influences of British and French colonial educational policy can be observed particularly in Africa. During the course of expansion, Western educational systems were forced upon other countries, because it was essential for the nation-states to be able to depend on a population that supported the state and spoke the respective European national languages. The transfer of the educational system accompanied a linguistic policy, to the disadvantage of local languages, in accordance with the linguistic standardization in Europe. The “acceptance” of the standard language could only be accomplished through pressure and force, especially in the area of education. This Eurocentric assimilation policy can best be observed in the French and Portuguese colonies in Africa. The goal was to use the educational system to achieve identification with the FrenchN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Immigrant children gather around the teacher in Boston, Massachusetts, ca. 1909. (Library of Congress)

or Portuguese-speaking cultures of Europe. This goal was reached mainly by implementing the language of the respective colonial power as the language of instruction and by introducing a curriculum focused on European themes. Cultural and political elites had to focus exclusively on this new system. Colonialism played a major part in the worldwide extension of a mass education system supporting the nation-state. Education as a Modern Force, 1918–1945 There can be little doubt that the movements of educational reform (Reformpädagogik) in Europe and of progressive education in the United States were of great importance in this period. The progressive education movement was part of a broader social and political reform, which developed in the last decades of the 19th and early decades of the 20th centuries. Through this educational approach, the nation-state succeeded in reducing illiteracy and in improving general living conditions by extending primary education. Reformpädagogik began in the 1890s but became more prominent as a reaction to new societal challenges after World War I. In the Weimar Republic, particularly, the most creative discussion about education took place. Despite the strong ties that existed between educators in the United States and Europe—due to the wide acceptance of the ideas of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Fröbel, and Herbart—these movements had been developing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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separately in accordance with national policies of state since 1930. In the United States, there were the efforts of Dewey, Kilpatrick, Rugg, and Count to turn the school system into an important part of social reform. In Europe, this idea was applied in a distorted manner when the rising totalitarian states tried to benefit from the student-oriented ideals of the Reformpädagogik. Thus, the progressive teaching concepts and a child-oriented style of National Socialism education found a fruitful symbiosis, as seen in the rural elementary school of Tiefensee, Germany. Because of the growing tension between nation-states, the common international trend of progressive education came to an end and lost its meaning as an experimental field of diversity in contrast to the public school system. After World War I, the concept of the early ethnic (völkisch) nationalism was questioned. This concept states that in an ideology of the nation-state, territory and language and/or culture have to be coterminous. On the basis of this concept, bi- and multilingual people had been excluded, thus creating the illusion of a monolingual society. According to the then-new concept of the internationally proclaimed right of self-determination of peoples, however, education policy had to deal with national minorities. In Europe, minority schools developed as a legitimate and independent form of minority schooling in addition to the regular state school system. State-Oriented Education, 1918–1945 In the 1930s, school systems developed independently because nation-states faced different challenges on each continent: Africa endured colonialism, Asia based itself on European models, Europe, in some of its countries, experienced nationalism in the extreme, and North America countered the fast evolution of mass media in the form of radio and television. In fact, in the United States, the debate about education was influenced by movies, radio, and television, and educators and major television stations discussed who should define national culture. In the German Weimar Republic, the relationship between education and nationalism can be called successful in the sense that they experimented with differentiated forms of schools, while school entry age and the duration of education were supposed to be standardized. Hitler’s new totalitarian state after 1933 did not implement any major changes concerning minorities in schools, and minorities were considered an obstacle that slowed down the reconstruction of German society. Refusing enlightenment and rational technical instruction, the Nazis looked for alternative forms of education, which they sometimes found in progressive education. Because of this, institutions of progressive education were not closed until the middle or the end of the 1930s. Many citizens of the United States observed this radical shift in the German and Russian schools while still applauding the use of the Pledge of Allegiance and the singing of nationalistic songs in U.S. schools. Especially in German Nazism, the educational selection became the counterpart to the “biological policy” of selection. The restriction of education was part of the creation of a special elite. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In order to achieve this, all educational institutions were interspersed with National Socialist ideology and infiltrated by Nazi personnel. These authoritarian structures were replaced by democratic ones in the reeducation program after World War II.

Origins Although it is true that in all nation-states education and its institutions played a major part in the development of nationalism between 1880 and 1945, the degree of the “nationalization of education” was different in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia. During the 19th century, there was a turning point in European education, and accordingly, a critical position developed that appeared in several ways and with varying degrees of success: in Germany, the school and educational criticism were liberal-progressive and associated with von Humboldt, Mager, Sack, and Dörpfeld; in England and in the United States, however, Owen’s ideas and criticism were very pragmatic and related to class struggle; in France, Fourier designed plans for a free organization of education; and in England, it was Godwin, the first classical author of the modern anarchic state and social criticism, who formulated a libertarian critique that influenced an anarchic pedagogy that is still found today in the Anglo-American context. Education for the Nation-State In western Europe, education in England was less nationalistic than in continental Europe; however, it was strongly influenced by class differences. In the German empire, on the other hand, the focus was on the systematization of education in the Prussian sense. With it, a very differentiated qualifying system was created in which the formal passing of an educational level authorized a student to move on to the next step. All stages had to be completed in a certain order and no changes were to be made—as opposed to the Anglo-American modular system. For many people, the focus of education was still not only literacy but also aimed at piety and morality, efficiency, and last but not least, obedience and discipline. During this time, France expanded its centralism, because the state administration intended to regulate every aspect of education, including curricula, syllabi, textbooks, and teacher education. Other western European countries followed these three models of education, while the eastern European countries followed the Russian communist system. At the very beginning, Russia was the place for the evolution of a progressive emancipative education that was converted under Stalin into an authoritarian school system. In North America, the situation was quite different. U.S. schools were less nationalistic because education was controlled at the state, not federal, level. However, this did not take into consideration the Americanization of immigrants N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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during that time, which the federal government had to regulate. Canada also followed a decentralized educational policy, according to which, the constitution gave no authority to the Canadian federal government in terms of educational issues. Therefore, European and North American educational principles cannot be compared with each other. In Asia, Japan stands out because nationalistic feelings increased between 1894 and 1905 due to their victory in the Russian-Japanese War (1904–1905). At the same time, Japan went through an impressive process of modernization and industrialization, which was carried into the education system in accordance with the new nationalism of the government. The renewal led to a Western orientation of the system, strongly influenced by the German system. The general ideological orientation, however, remained traditional, which was laid down in the “Imperial Rescript on Education” in 1890 (Kyoiku Chokugo). In southern Asia, India—in the course of its rising nationalism—became increasingly critical toward Western educational models, which were imposed by the British. The Indian National Congress and some Muslim organizations interceded against the colonial power in favor of their own language and culture in the educational system. Education for Colonialism After the Russian-Japanese War, a Japanese colonial government was established in Korea, which ended the Korean monarchy. In 1911, this government passed a law on education; Article 5 stated that in the new Korean schools, the “Japanese character” was to be taught and Japanese was to be used as the language of instruction. In Africa, colonialism was equally hard on schools, because before colonialism, it was common to prepare children to take on responsibility in the house, the village, and within the ethnic group. In many colonies, the main forces in the establishment of a European education system were religious missions like the “Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts,” the “Moravian Mission,” or the “Mission of Bremen.” In Nigeria, Protestant missions were founded between 1860 and 1899, and later, the Catholic Church founded its first church and “nonconfessional” primary and secondary schools. Because most schools were not well equipped, the colonial school system was insufficient for the majority of the population. After 1900, the French colonial educational policy started in “French West Africa” (Afrique occidentale française, AOF) and “French Equatorial Africa.” In 1903, the educational system in French West Africa was organized by decree in primary, upper primary, vocational, and common schools. The main function of the colonial educational system was to expand the influence of the French language to establish a common national culture based on the langue d’oïl—the standard of northern French from Paris. This was accomplished on the one hand by educating native teachers and by the special promotion of an elite, and on the other hand by introducing the entire population to French nationalism. The following quote by the governor general of French West Africa shows how important the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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schools were for the formation of a nation (AOF, mailing from June 22, 1897, about the schools in the protectorate territories). This quote also shows the degree of acceptance of the superiority of the European languages, especially of the French language: “School is, in fact, the most certain means that a civilized nation has at its disposal to accustom still primitive populations to its ideas and to bring them gradually up to its level. School is, in one word, the ideal element of progress. It is also the most solid means for the propagation of French ideas and of the French language which the government could have at its disposal” (Turcotte 1983, 11; author’s translation). When the U.S. government subdued the Native American tribes in the 19th century and acquired Puerto Rico (1898), processes similar to those of African colonization occurred. The government used education as a “de-culturalization” process, that is, as a means to eliminate these cultures. This misuse of education as part of the colonization of Puerto Rico could be observed in the annual report of the second commissioner of education, Lindsay (1902): “Colonization carried forward by the armies of war is vastly more costly than that carried forward by the armies of peace, whose outpost and garrisons are the public schools of the advancing nation” (quoted in Spring 1994, 148). Education as a Progressive Force After World War I, the progressive education movement reached its peak. In 1921, the “New Education Fellowship” was founded by Ensor and his colleagues in England. This international organization’s mission was to spread the ideas of progressive education, and they became famous as the “World Education Fellowship.” Its main argument was that schools needed to adapt to the needs of children and not vice versa. Not long before that, the “Progressive Education Association” (PEA) was founded in the United States on the same principle. Worldwide, many individuals who corresponded with one another supported the progressive education movement. One of them, Reddie, combined the English boarding school tradition with the German “educating lessons” (erziehender Unterricht) in the “New School of Abbotsholme.” Other representatives were Decroly and his éducation pour la vie (“education for life”) in Belgium, Morris and his “community education” in England, Dewey and his “learning by doing” in the United States, Freinet and his éducation du travail (“education for work”) in France, Makarenko and his “pedagogy of the collective” in the Soviet Union, Kerschensteiner and his Arbeitsschulbewegung, Steiner and his “Waldorf ” schools and Petersen and his Jena Plan schools in Germany, and Key and her “Century of the Child,” the leitmotif for the entire progressive education movement, in Sweden. However, the influence of progressive education on the public school system at the beginning of the 20th century was rather small compared to developments after World War II. While only a few individual schools were founded, a European dimension as a modern aspect of education was established, for example, during the Weimar Republic in Germany. The educational reform with the greatest (controversial) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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potential was the “child-centered education” in which Rugg and Schoemaker in the United States gave up curricula and oriented education toward the child’s interest. The reformers were able to implement this progressive education with public consent, although this was an exception in state-dominated education. State-Oriented Education The most prominent characteristic of the time after 1930 is the fact that in some European states the connection between education and nationalism was reduced to the formula of the “education state” (Erziehungsstaat). In this type of state, the Gleichschaltung (“coordination”) of the state’s interests with processes of socialization and education by various means is much more efficient and effective than in democratic societies. It is therefore contrary to progressive education. State education connected to the education state obliges the citizen to follow the interests of the state, suppresses tolerance and protection of minorities, and at the same time institutionalizes a ban on plurality and the rule of indoctrination. Education states can be considered the final product of nationalism, reaching its goal of optimal homogeneity or even coordination of education and its institutions. Forms of education states can be found worldwide during this period in states with demagogic leaders; for example, Stalinist Soviet society’s indoctrination of the masses by political officials, Japan’s imperial educational system, Italy’s fascist education in schools, China’s educational system for national regeneration, and the German Third Reich’s racial theory of the Nazis. Interestingly, the biologically focused education state of the Third Reich did not create its own pedagogy, although its educational policy was structurally determined by new organizations like the Hitlerjugend for boys and the Bund Deutscher Mädel for girls, and by new concepts of socialization. Educators conformed with Nazi educational politicians like von Schirach, Stellrecht, and Decker, who wanted to expand Hitler’s vague idea of education to an education of the “national revolution” in which Gleichschaltung and suppression played a central role. Wilhelm Krieck was instrumental in legitimizing Nazi ideology through his publications on “national socialist education.” Krieck, who was a member of the Nazi Storm Troopers (the SA), assumed a fascist societal model in which education was based on racism. Clearly such a case of overt biological racism is rare; however, even in liberal forms of state there are tendencies to promote national unity through questionable means. The racial policy in the United States or the introduction of a common English school system in the United Kingdom with its suppression of the Celtic language community happened on a different level, although these are examples of a negative connotation of nationalism. The quality of a nation’s educational system was also seen as a factor of its success or failure in World War I. In dictatorial regimes or socialist societies, education was central to the legitimization of these systems, which did not happen through educational specialists, but rather through the governing party and its administration. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Dimensions The pattern of building nation-states spread worldwide, either through independent decision or because of colonialism. The use of education in the development of nationalism can best be described by referring to four periods. The first two periods fall between 1880 and 1914, when education played a major part in the development and implementation of the nation-state, the key elements of which are nationalism, for a homogeneous nation-state, and colonialism, for a competitive nation-state. The second two periods were between 1918 and 1945, when education played an ambivalent role. On the one hand, it was combined with social reform movements as a modernizing force in the Reformpädagogik (“progressive education”) movement, where ethnic minorities were dealt with on an educational level for the first time. On the other hand, state-related obligations, such as the education of citizens loyal to the state, were fulfilled, which was the basis for the totalitarian state systems of Europe. These state-related obligations, which were supported by education and its institutions, changed some national groups and made them “unequal” citizens. It led to a systematic exclusion of individual groups in the nation-states, mostly affecting communities of regional ethnic languages, religious groups, workers, and women. Educational systems deepened class barriers and tried to equalize diversity, which was not always successful. Education for the Nation-State Following the idea of liberalism, European nation-states of the 20th century wanted to provide all citizens with social mobility—regardless of social class and creed. The means to achieve this was to be provided by the educational system, and therefore compulsory education was introduced. The new system did not lead to much social unrest: in theory, anybody could move up, but in reality, the financially strong strata of the bourgeoisie and the nobility had the advantage of being able to give their children a head start in the national educational system. The children of workers, on the other hand, had to leave school early to do their share in supporting the family. Another dividing line was ethnicity. The marginalization of minority languages started with the development and consolidation of the “modern” state, which used educational policy to promote the state language at the expense of other languages, linking educational policy to linguistic policy then and now. This link has a deep impact on minority languages and languages without a state, since languages mark borders, not only between states, but also between societies. In the heated climate of nationalistic agitation in Europe, the question of the language of instruction became a matter of belief, which could not be solved by pragmatic means. The selection of a language of instruction was generally perceived as a symbolic definition of the national identity of a community or region, and many teachers were involved in national policy matters. The situation was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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different in North America; in Canada, for example, the historic principle of maintaining minority languages led to a pluralistic cultural concept, in which differences in schools were accepted to a certain degree. Furthermore, provinces developed independently with a centralized educational policy within each province —comparable to the autonomous provinces of Italy. Nevertheless, education had to refer to the Canadian understanding of a developing multicultural society, as the use of English and French was laid down in Section 133 of the British North America Act in 1867. In 1982, this was changed to the Constitution Act and included the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protected linguistic and cultural diversity. Multiculturalism and multilingualism had the greatest impact on the educational system and the process of nation-building in Canada. Education for Colonialism In the process of the development of colonial school systems, diversity was suppressed because autochthonous forms of nonformal education (e.g., initiation courses, secret societies) were suppressed and existing indigenous institutions of formal education (e.g., Koranic schools, temple schools) were dominated by the colonial powers. In the Middle East, Asia, and southern Asia, the imposition of the Western school system led to the following consequences: the credibility of teaching material was no longer derived from religion and subjects were no longer taught using religious texts. In this model, religion was perceived as a “new historic subject” that was based on personal experience and practiced during leisure time. Moreover, the colonial educational policy kept local groups from controlling educational developments. The colonial powers only engaged themselves directly in schools that educated second-rate administrative and lower-paid staff who served under European control. Support for secondary education in Africa did not start until the 1930s on the Gold Coast. In spite of the bad results of colonial education, the new “European” model of schooling was accepted in the colonies, since no formal school system had existed before colonialism. The demand for formal education increased in the colonies and the “colonized” used the European schools for their anticolonial resistance, because they could attract a lot more people into the regular school system than in everyday life. After independence, the formal European school system expanded and the now politically independent countries adopted it for use in several attempted reforms. Because of the replication of colonial structures, which were oriented toward nationalism, there was social, regional, ethnic, and sexual discrimination. Education as a Progressive Force Because progressive education was obliged to protect individual diversity, it was a colorful parallel to state schools, even if the reform movement exerted little influence on the state school system. Nevertheless, besides its positive influence on specific student cohorts, progressive education influenced nation building in such institutions of nonformal education as people’s education and the educaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tion of women. The social pedagogy in Germany with its differentiation between education, upbringing, and care belongs in this context. Another important pioneering feat was the reform of juvenile jurisdiction, when juvenile courts were founded in Chicago in 1899, in the early years of the progressive education movement. When Makarenko founded his educational collective for criminal minors in 1920 in the Gorkij Colony in the Soviet Union, he tried to realize the principles of self-determination and self-discipline, which derived from liberalism. Thus, he added a new touch to the authoritarian education state, although he still aimed at developing the socialist personality. Progressive education and workers’ education were interrelated, and in the German Weimar Republic, it was necessary to enable citizens to fulfill their rights and duties in the new republic. Due to internal difficulties, churches and workers’ movements were not able to reach that goal; therefore, the state and communities played a specific role in this process. Meanwhile, the Danish model of the folkeskole by Grundtvig was being accepted worldwide—its core principles being the moral and intellectual development and understanding of local and national traditions. At the beginning, they were independent institutions, which were later supported by community boards of education that could be used by state institutions. This influenced existing forms of adult education in Canada, Kenya, India, and the Netherlands, while independent institutions related to people’s education were established in Finland as workers’ academies, in Germany and Austria as Volkshochschulen (“adult evening schools”), in Great Britain as “adult education centers,” and in the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland as “people’s universities.” Adult education as vocational education became the main instrument of the state to influence not just education but also the national values of its citizens. State-Oriented Education The question of minorities was not addressed when the nation-states were founded, and the situation became even more critical during the worldwide economic crisis and the growing totalitarian structures of the nation-state. At the turn of the century in the United States, a distinct racial policy was aimed at Asians, African Americans, and Mexican Americans, and the children of these groups were separated from European American children in schools. The separation of African Americans, especially, shows the connection between economic exploitation and schools as a means of producing cheap labor in this context. Also the de-culturalization of Native Americans in the American school system shows the questionable attitude toward minorities on its own state territory. In the German empire, schools were used for ethnic homogenization between 1871 and 1918. Not until the Weimar Republic did discrimination of minorities end, while at the same time the United States was dominated by a strong racial policy toward African Americans. This policy of the German empire was copied by the Third Reich for a short time after 1933 by reintroducing a law on civil servants (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums of April 7, 1933), which N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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made it impossible for Jews to work as teachers or professors. Therefore, a German school system was created in which education was implemented in the interest of the German Reich. In addition, a few schools existed for German children who had a limited knowledge of the German language, in which different languages of instruction were used. For the entire school system, the acceptance of new “foreign” (especially Jewish) students to public schools and institutions of higher education was limited to 1.5 percent. After the Kristallnacht (“Pogrom Night”) on November 9, 1938, public schools and universities were entirely closed to “foreigners.” The end of this process was reached in 1942 when all Jewish schools closed. The policy of Gleichschaltung of citizens by the educational system during this time not only affected the school system of the Nazi regime but also, since 1928, the educational policy in the USSR under Stalin. While the school system in the USSR was not much affected by the regime until 1931, the leading majority implemented a restrictive policy after 1932. The educational system corresponded to the political, social, and technological structures of the system in all respects. Stalin’s authoritarian school system was part of an educational concept that was based on emancipative education. He established a number of mechanisms of manipulation to ensure his control of the totalitarian state by means of the school system. Therefore, schools now had little relation to reality, students were committed to Stalin’s leadership, and images of enemies were created. All social groups that could possibly rival the leaders were declared as enemies: religion, church, political opponents, and competing socialist movements. What Hitler’s and Stalin’s totalitarian systems had in common was the misuse of the educational system for the interests of the nation-state, whereas in the biological racism of the Third Reich, the suppression and the elimination of the “other” created a new level of extremism.

Consequences The consequences of education for nationalism between 1880 and 1945 can still be observed today. Without claiming a clear causality and linearity, one can observe the following typical developments characterizing the four periods of education. Between 1880 and 1914, the educational system became a primary domain of the nation-state, and because of colonialism schools worldwide followed the same principles, even in remote areas of the world. In the period between 1918 and 1945, private educational movements frequently made an effort to run alternative forms of schools, often referring directly to progressive education, and maintained educational self-determination of (regional) minorities. The worldwide consensus on state education, how to organize it, and how to improve human capital as a means of economic growth, led to a state-oriented effort of standardization and homogenization, which primarily benefited global economic powers. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Education for the Nation The Stanford research group showed that since 1870, the location of a state and its position in the world has affected its entry into the process of modern education, rather than such factors as urbanization, the cultural and religious composition of the population, the political status of independence, and even the existence of proclaimed compulsory education. The political liberalism of the 19th century led to freedom of choice and the right to education, which has been part of many state constitutions and, since 2005, has been in the draft of the European Constitution. Education is therefore an element supporting the state, although the traditional nation-state transfers certain functions to superior institutions of the global community, without becoming obsolete, as has been predicted many times. In the former Soviet countries, for example, a sense of national identity, which had remained hidden by a unifying socialism and educational system after World War II, is rising again. Education for the Colonies The colonial powers favored specific groups of the population through their educational systems. As a consequence, a class system developed between 1880 and 1914. Parts of the population of some African states were not allowed to participate in Christian education, but some groups were favored in order to support the economy and administration of the colony. Biased preferential treatment of a minority promoted the formation of social classes and increased differences between different groups within the peoples of many African countries. As African nations were gaining independence, they ended racial segregation; however, the educational structures from colonial times remained unchanged. There are two consequences of historic colonialism. On the one hand, a global model of schools has been established worldwide so that schools in formerly remote areas can follow the same principles: state-run, relatively homogeneous classes taught by more or less educated teachers using codified curricula in graded and selective school systems, with grades and evaluations, which can— according to Bourdieu—be used as “cultural capital” on the world market. This development was caused by the fact that before the European invasion hardly any formal educational systems had existed in the colonies, and the continuous use of the European model after independence filled this gap. On the other hand, the result of this period is that the African continent still depends on European nation-states and that European-style nationalism and education prove to be a separating rather than a unifying force. Education as a Progressive Force During the entire 19th century, progressive sectors of established education regularly criticized the existing relationship between state and school. However, no major alternative movement came into existence. Therefore, the dispute about the state controlling schools remained on a purely academic level until the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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beginning of the 20th century, and had hardly any political consequences. While the ideas of the progressive movements were mainly ignored by the state before World War I, many of these ideas became relevant after 1945. Spain, for example, legitimized the former illegal progressive education movements of the Franco dictatorship in the educational reform in 1990 by implementing progressive elements in its national curriculum for primary education. Private movements based on alternative funding were also established; for example, the “progressive reform movement” exemplified in Montessori kindergartens and elementary schools and in Waldorf schools. The motives were similar to the historic ones: international student assessments like PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), conducted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), suggested that even today, economic competition between nation-states lead the best human resources to top positions in the world economy. At the same time, the state takes less and less responsibility for the funding of education; therefore, the gap between the (educated) rich and the poor is widening as was the case at the beginning of the last century. The historic progressive education movement that developed around 1900 is, in fact, a rather ambivalent phenomenon in nationalism, since it led to diversity during its successful times, but was never really politically influential. The consideration of ethnic minorities after World War I, however, was modern. It was supported by political elites, and minority school systems, which were legally grounded and independent of the regular school system, played a major role. These minority school systems were the beginning of a multilingual and regionally differentiated school system of modern times, which would not have been possible before democratization. In the European Union before 2005, education was discussed on a regional level, especially in Italy and Spain, but also in Great Britain. Here, nationalistic elements were found in regional identity: in the strong position of the autonomous region of Catalonia in Spain, in the autonomous region of South Tyrol in Italy, and in the regional assemblies in Wales and Scotland in the United Kingdom. These developments were mainly supported by new schools, which were established in addition to the main school system. In this respect, the model of a combination of school and regional nationalism is very current. However, there is a qualitative difference between now and the beginning of the 20th century: due to colonialism and globalization, the development of schools has become international. Not only do nation-states and “national regions” take an active part in education, but so do supranational and international institutions like the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the OECD, and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). The attempt to homogenize the population in order to strengthen the nation-state in Europe works like a pendulum, swinging from total suppression, as with Stalinism, to an increasingly heterogeneous population, as in the regionalized EU of today. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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State-Oriented Education A worldwide consensus has been reached on implementing a state-oriented education in which children learn similar contents in similar contexts. This leads to state-oriented standardization and homogenization, which primarily benefits global economic powers. Therefore, the worldwide measurement of pupil assessment in schools is very important, because economic growth is believed to be based on the human capital of nations. After 1945, nationalism and national education formed an alliance, considering the fact that a majority of the population was provided with an education oriented on democratic principles. In the United States, this had already been debated in the 1930s, which led to the use of mass media as a vehicle of education. Some educational shows like Sesame Street have been copied worldwide. In conclusion, between 1880 and 1945, education and its institutions were assistants to the nation-state, to varying degrees. Decentralized states were not as easily affected in a negative political manner, because it was more difficult to reach a consensus for the nation-state. Nowadays, the nation-state is redefining itself because of the increasing importance of global society, while education remains one of its central tasks. Today education is guaranteeing a reproduction of a national identity, which is driven by democratic values and oriented economically, the bases of which were laid between 1880 and 1945. Selected Bibliography Adick, C. 1995. “Formation of a World Educational System.” In Pluralism and Education. Current World Trends in Policy, Law, and Administration, edited by P. M. Roeder, I. Richter, and H.-P. Füssel, 41–60. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Government Studies Pr. Benner, D., J. Schriewer, and H. E. Tenorth, eds. 1998. Erziehungsstaaten. Historisch-vergleichende Analyse ihrer Denktraditionen und nationaler Gestalten [Education states. A historical and comparative analysis of their thinking traditions and national models]. Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag. Bousquet, P., R. Drago, and P. Gerbod. 1983. Histoire de l’administration de l’enseignement en France 1789–1981 [History of French Education 1789–1981]. Geneva: Droz. Digby, A., and P. Searby. 1981. Children, School and Society in Nineteenth-Century England. London: The Macmillan Press. European Manual of Continuing Education. Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1994. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalisms. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Helmert, G. 1994. Schule unter Stalin [School under Stalin]. Berlin: Harrassowitz. Keim, W. 2005. Erziehung unter der Nazi-Diktatur [Education under the Nazi regime]. 2 vols. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Knabe, F. 2000. Sprachliche Minderheiten und nationale Schule in Preußen zwischen 1871 und 1933: eine bildungspolitische Analyse [Linguistic minorities and national school in Prussia between 1871 and 1993: an analysis of educational politics]. Münster: Waxmann. Levinson, M. 1999. The Demands of Liberal Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meyer, J. W., W. Ramirez, and Y. Soysal. 1992. “World Expansion of Mass Education.” Sociology of Education 65, no. 2: 128–149.

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Röhrs, H. 1985. Die Reformpädagogik. Ursprung und Verlauf unter internationalem Aspekt [The Reformpädagogik Origins and process in an international perspective]. Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag. Schleicher, K., and T. Kozma, eds. 1992. Ethnocentrism in Education. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Schleicher, K., and P. J. Weber. 2000. National Profiles, vol. 2: Contemporary History of Education. Münster: Waxmann. Spring, J. 1994. The American School 1642–1993. New York: McGraw-Hill. Turcotte, D. Lois, 1983. Règlements et textes administratifs sur l’usage des langues en Afrique occidentale française (1826–1959) [Laws, regulations and administrative texts about the use of langues in French Western Africa]. Québec: Éditions Presses de ‘Université Laval.

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Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide Eagle Glassheim Relevance In the first half of the 20th century, ethnic cleansing and genocide displaced millions of people and led, directly or indirectly, to the deaths of millions more. Inspired by modern forms of ethnic and racial nationalism, ethnic cleansing and genocide began in the late 19th century as southeastern European states and Ottoman Turkey sought to build homogeneous national states in place of the faltering Ottoman Empire. By the 1930s, the idea of ethnic and racial purity had spread widely in Europe, exploding into vicious ethnic civil wars and the genocide of European Jews during World War II. At the conclusion of the war, east central European countries expelled over 12 million ethnic Germans from their newly reconstituted countries. By 1947, ethnic cleansing and genocide had in fact produced several homogeneous nation-states, including Poland and Germany, where ethnic diversity had long been the norm. Though there was a brief flare-up of renewed ethnic violence in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, ethnic cleansing and genocide largely ended in Europe after 1947 and moved on to new or emerging states in postcolonial Africa and Asia.

Origins Forced migration and mass murder have a long history, but ethnic cleansing and genocide were particularly virulent modern variants that emerged in Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Ethnic cleansing is the forced migration of a group defined primarily by ethnicity or race. The term “ethnic cleansing” emerged only in the 1980s, initially used by Serbs in Yugoslavia to describe perceived persecution by ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region. During the Yugoslav civil war of the 1990s, the term was widely adopted to describe efforts by Serbs and Croats to expand their ethnic territory in Bosnia at the expense of Bosnian Muslims. “Ethnic cleansing” has since evolved into both a legal and analytical term, defined by the United Nations in 1994 as actions “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.” Though “ethnic cleansing” is a recent formulation, the idea dates to the late 19th century, when Balkan countries struggled to construct homogeneous national states as the Ottoman Empire declined. In an age of eugenics and racial N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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hygiene, Germans and others commonly used the term “cleansing” in the 1930s and 1940s to refer to the process of creating an ethnically pure nation-state. Frequently extremely violent, ethnic cleansing qualifies as genocide when the goal or outcome of cleansing becomes the physical annihilation of a particular ethnic or racial group. Coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer and refugee from Poland, the term genocide was defined by the United Nations in 1948 as acts “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.” Nationalism, the sanctification of the nation-state that reached its height in the 19th and early 20th centuries, was the underlying cause of the modern forms of violent purification referred to as ethnic cleansing and genocide. Nationalism had its origins during the French Revolution in the late 18th century, when middleclass Frenchmen (the Third Estate) claimed sovereignty as representatives of the people, known collectively as the nation. With the rise of mass politics in the second half of the 19th century, nationalism became particularly popular in Europe as a legitimating ideology for centralizing states or movements seeking such states. Political elites, ranging from Otto von Bismarck in the German empire to Roman Dmowski in partitioned Poland, sought popular legitimacy for their statebuilding projects. The nation-state, a state by and for a particular national group, proved a promising replacement for faltering empires, whose divine-right ideologies were losing legitimacy in secularizing and democratizing Europe. Under tremendous strain during World War I, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires collapsed during 1917–1918. Waves of sporadic ethnic conflict ensued, as most postimperial European states anchored their legitimacy in the principle of (ethno-linguistic) national sovereignty. The leader of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Vladimir Lenin, embraced national selfdetermination in an effort to win Russia’s many national groups over to the Bolshevik side. Arguing that the anti-Bolshevik Whites would restore a Russiandominated empire, Lenin claimed that a communist federation would give nonRussians freedom to enact their own social revolutions. American president Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, issued at the height of the war in early 1918, also advanced self-determination as a fundamental goal of the forces arrayed against the Central powers. With the Fourteen Points, Wilson sought domestic and international support for the Entente cause by casting the war as a struggle between freedom and authoritarianism. The effect was explosive, not only undermining the multinational Austro-Hungarian and German empires, but also elevating ethno-linguistic nationhood as the fundamental source of legitimacy for postwar states. In a region with multiple intermixed ethnic groups, this was a recipe for conflict. Already in the years before and during the war, Balkan states and Ottoman Turkey began using ethnic cleansing as a means of consolidating their national sovereignty. The violent pursuit of the nation-state ideal continued into the 1920s in the Balkans and then spread to central and eastern Europe during and immeN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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diately after World War II. Thus, ethnic cleansing and genocide were the culmination of a struggle for a particular kind of sovereignty, that of the homogeneous national state. While ethnic cleansing and genocide were products of the modern ideology of the nation-state, they also tended to involve modern technologies, such as trains, machine guns, radios, and powerful bureaucracies. These technologies enabled not only the rapid spread of nationalist messages, but also the quick removal of large numbers of people. Many of the worst cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide have come during or soon after large-scale wars, when the power and reach of states have attained their highest point. Cleansing occurs, therefore, when a combination of ideology (will) and power (ability) reach a critical threshold.

Dimensions Though the history of ethnic cleansing and genocide in colonial empires is a story of its own, many historians have argued that European and American colonialists honed both ethno-racial ideology and techniques of modern cleansing in their respective empires in the latter half of the 19th century. In the expanding United States, the government invoked the “manifest destiny” of white Americans to justify the forced removal of native peoples to reservations in often inhospitable territory. In the Congo, Belgian representatives tortured and killed (directly or indirectly) millions of natives in order to perpetuate a lucrative system of forced labor in rubber plantations. In South-West Africa in the early 1900s, German forces systematically murdered the majority of the Herero tribe in an attempt to eliminate resistance to colonial rule. In all these cases, colonial rulers looked upon their victims as subhuman, lower life forms in a racial hierarchy inspired by the flourishing ideology of Social Darwinism. In the early 20th century, Europeans and Ottoman Turks applied this same ideology to internal “enemies,” projecting racial qualities onto preexisting social, ethnic, and religious conflicts and prejudices. Opportunistic leaders now turned Social Darwinism and cleansing to the task of constructing or consolidating national states. As the declining Ottoman Empire continued to hemorrhage territory in Europe, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece went to war with Ottoman Turkey and each other in an attempt to expand their national territory. During the so-called Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, hundreds of thousands of Muslim Turks were forced out of Europe in the first large-scale case of modern ethnic cleansing. The battle for southeastern European nation-states continued into the 1920s, as war between Greece and Turkey led to the systematic expulsion of close to 2 million Orthodox and Muslim residents from conquered territory. In the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek and Turkish governments agreed to ratify the previous forced migrations and to exchange all remaining Christian Orthodox and Muslim minorities N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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within the new borders of Greece and Turkey. Arranged and overseen by the newly created League of Nations, the Lausanne exchange became a precedent for later population “transfers” during and after World War II. The prototypical genocide of the 20th century also emerged from the context of Ottoman decline, as the revolutionary Young Turk regime sought to remodel the faltering empire on a Turkish national basis. With much of the Ottomans’ European empire gone by 1913, the Young Turk leaders sought to consolidate their rule in Anatolia by isolating and then eliminating their largest remaining minorities, the Greeks and the Armenians. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 was both a trigger and an opportunity for violent deportations of unwanted minorities in Ottoman Turkey. The Turkish state deported a few hundred thousand Greeks and then turned its attention to the Armenians, who were suspected of sympathizing with the Russian enemy. In 1915, Turkish forces began deporting Armenians across Anatolia into the deserts beyond the Euphrates River. The terror, forced marches, crowded boxcars, and frequent violence had all the marks of ethnic cleansing. But the Armenian deportations qualify as genocide as well, as the Turkish government’s intent was to kill off a substantial proportion of the empire’s Armenians. Upwards of 800,000 Armenians died, over 60 percent of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. The unsettled aftermath of World War I also proved deadly for vulnerable minorities in the Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish borderlands in the region that is now western Ukraine. During the Russian Civil War of 1917–1921, waves of pogroms took the lives of between 50,000 and 200,000 Jews (Lieberman 2006, 140). Though pogroms are by definition spontaneous and unsystematic, they do share many of the hallmarks of ethnic cleansing and genocide, most notably the violent targeting of an ethnic or racial group as such. The stereotype of the Judeo-Bolshevik that took root among many Poles and Ukrainians during the Russian Civil War had genocidal consequences under the influence of the Nazis during World War II. As Hitler prepared to invade Poland in 1939, he invoked the Armenian precedent for his policy of “physical destruction of the enemy.” After all, he told his generals, who “speaks today about the annihilation of the Armenians?” (Naimark 2001, 57). Noting little international response to the genocide, Hitler drew some important lessons from the case of the Armenians. First, it was possible and desirable to move and/or destroy populations in the name of creating a homogeneous national state. With the elimination of much of its Greek and Armenian population, Turkey had achieved its goal of reinventing itself as a nation-state (the problem of Turkey’s Kurdish minority emerged later). Second, war provided cover and infrastructure for genocidal policies, as both domestic and international attention turned to the exigencies of mobilization for combat. On other occasions, Hitler also cited the forced removal of American Indians as a model for his population policies in Germany and the occupied East. With the defeat of Poland and the subsequent invasion and occupation of significant territories of the Soviet Union in 1941, the Nazis undertook a large-scale N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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reengineering of populations in eastern Europe. With the intent of carving out “living space” (Lebensraum) for Germans in the East, Nazi planners started to create bands of settlements that reflected their Social Darwinist racial hierarchy. Germans would move into what had been western Poland; Poles from those regions would move east into mixed Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish borderlands; and the millions of Jews of eastern Poland and the Russian Pale of Settlement would be deported to a newly created colony in Madagascar. When the Madagascar plan became impracticable, the Nazis started moving Jews in the direction of a socalled Lublin Reservation in the General Gouvernement of occupied Poland. At the same time, Nazi officials developed a series of concentration camps for Jews and other prisoners in the German-controlled east. These camps, including Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, and Belzec, became death factories in late 1941 and 1942, and turned to the task of systematically annihilating European Jews. There is a great deal of scholarly debate surrounding the evolution of Nazi Jewish policy from ethnic cleansing to genocide, from deportation to ghettos and reservations in the east to mass murder. From the day Hitler and the Nazis took power in Germany in 1933, they began to isolate and discriminate against Jews. Nazi ideology was explicitly Social Darwinist and anti-Semitic, identifying Jews with both communist materialism and capitalist exploitation. Nazi leaders looked on Jews, a small, though prominent minority in Germany, as an alien and even subhuman race that was undermining German racial and national purity. In another common Nazi formulation, Jews were a kind of disease that sapped German society of its strength and competitiveness vis-à-vis other nations. Indeed, Hitler used metaphors of cleansing and extermination well before the Holocaust began in 1941. Until at least 1939, though, the Nazis promoted Jewish emigration, not mass murder, as the solution to the so-called Jewish Question. After the onset of war closed off the possibilities for emigration, the German regime turned to a policy of deportation, at first hoping to ship Jews to Madagascar and then turning more realistically to occupied Poland. The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, created new opportunities and plans for deportations, but it also brought millions more Jews under German control. Already in the summer of 1941, special Nazi SS battalions known as Einsatzgruppen followed the German Army to the east, murdering hundreds of thousands of Jews, communists, and alleged partisans (often equated indiscriminately). In late 1941, the SS began employing gassing techniques from the discontinued T4 euthanasia program in Germany. From 1939 to 1941, the doctors and medical technicians of the T4 program had used lethal injections and poison gas to kill thousands of Germans considered mentally or physically handicapped. First at Chelmno and later at Birkenau, Treblinka, and other camps, the SS drew on T4 experts and experience in constructing gas chambers and crematoria for the rapid murder and disposal of large numbers of deported Jews. Though undergirded by virulent anti-Semitism and a crude Social Darwinism, the deportation of the Jews became genocidal as a technical solution to a perceived population problem. The Holocaust is the most N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Jewish families wait on a Warsaw street for deportation to a concentration camp, Poland, ca. 1944. (Imagno/Getty Images)

prominent of several cases where policies of ethnic cleansing have shaded into genocide. In all, close to 6 million European Jews died during the Holocaust. Nor were the Jews the only targets of Nazi genocidal policies. Over 200,000 Roma (Gypsies) died in Nazi camps, as well as thousands of homosexuals and other persecuted minorities. The Germans also killed close to 3 million Poles, including thousands of priests and other members of the Polish elite. In addition, Soviet forces executed more than 15,000 captured Polish army officers at Katyn in 1940. With the creation of a Croatian fascist state in 1941, Croats began to massacre Serbs and Jews living within their territory. In all, there were over 300,000 victims of the Croatian genocide, the majority of whom were Serbs. World War II also unleashed several other waves of ethnic cleansing, including waves of Soviet deportations of suspect minorities and the postwar expulsion of ethnic Germans from reconstituted Czechoslovakia and Poland. Already in the 1930s, Stalin had deported millions of “class enemies” to Siberia and allowed millions more to starve to death during forced collectivization. Up to 1937, the victims of the Stalinist system were defined more by class than by ethnic criteria, though some ethnic groups, most notably the Ukrainians, suffered disproportionately. But after 1937, and particularly during World War II, Stalin targeted particular ethnic groups considered unreliable, including Poles, Finns, Chinese, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ethnic Germans. In 1944, the Soviets deported almost 500,000 Chechens and Ingush from the militarily sensitive Caucus region. Over 100,000 died in transit or in the inhospitable landscapes of Soviet Central Asia. During the same year, a similar deportation of around 190,000 Tatars of Crimea led to tens of thousands of deaths and the destruction of long-standing Tatar cultural monuments. In the waning months of World War II in early 1945, the Soviet Red Army and returning Czechoslovak and Polish forces targeted ethnic Germans for looting, reprisals, and ethnic cleansing. The subsequent postwar flight and expulsion of close to 12 million Germans from their eastern homelands was the single largest case of ethnic cleansing in history. This exodus came in three waves. First, over 3 million Germans fled to the west as the Soviet Red Army swept into East Prussia in early 1945. Then in the months after the German capitulation in May 1945, Poles and Czechs forced close to 2 million ethnic Germans across the border into occupied Germany. During this period of indiscriminate violence, hundreds of thousands were killed, and tens of thousands of German women were raped. In August 1945, the Potsdam Agreement called for a stop to violent expulsions and prepared for a so-called Organized Transfer of over 4 million Germans remaining in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Yugoslavia also took this opportunity to deport hundreds of thousands of Germans from their territories. As in other cases of ethnic cleansing, the expulsion of Germans from east central Europe had long-lasting effects on the societies and politics of the expelling countries and the destination countries alike. Cleansed regions of Poland and Czechoslovakia suffered labor shortages for decades, as German workers and experts abandoned the highly developed industrial borderlands of those countries. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia used patriotic propaganda and financial incentives to lure settlers from their interiors, with Poland also relocating around 2 million ethnic Poles forced out of the Lwow/L’viv region, which had been ceded to the Soviet Union. New settlers came from a variety of circumstances and regions and had little connection to the formerly German regions, making them particularly vulnerable to Communist organizational efforts. In the meantime, defeated and occupied Germany struggled to accommodate over 12 million refugees from the East. Expellees lived miserably for years after the war, often met with scorn by native Germans. Though conditions improved in the early 1950s, expellees (particularly those from the Sudetenland) remained a bitter and often revisionist political force in West German politics into the early 21st century.

Consequences Ethnic cleansing and genocide sharply simplified the ethnic map of Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Beyond counting bodies, we can only speculate on N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the cultural and economic potential lost to genocide and ethnic cleansing. Poland and Czechoslovakia lost thriving German and Jewish minority communities, which had long been vital contributors to economic and cultural development. Germany and Austria, once great centers of world Jewish life, lost their storied diversity, not to mention their empires. Turkey, a largely homogeneous nation-state after 1924, lost its most prosperous trading groups with the removal of Greeks and Armenians. In the second half of the 20th century, the Cold War standoff in central and southeastern Europe had the effect of ratifying the ethnic transformation of central Europe. Only in Yugoslavia, which retained much of its ethnic diversity after World War II, would ethnic cleansing return in the 1990s. With most European countries largely rid of minorities and bound by Cold War alliances, ethnic cleansing and genocide moved on to Africa and Asia, where newly emerging postcolonial states adopted national ideologies from their former European masters. Selected Bibliography Browning, C. 1992. The Path to Genocide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dadrian, V. 1995. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. De Zayas, A. 1989. Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of the Germans from the East. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Friedlander, H. 1995. The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Glassheim, E. 2000. “National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945.” Central European History 33, no. 4: 463–486. Glassheim, E. 2006. “Ethnic Cleansing, Communism, and Environmental Devastation in Czechoslovakia’s Borderlands, 1945–1989.” Journal of Modern History 78, no. 1: 65–92. Gross, J. T. 2001. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hayden, R. 1996. “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers.” Slavic Review 55, no. 4: 727–748. Hilberg, R. 1985. The Destruction of the European Jews: Student Edition. New York: Holmes & Meier. Lieberman, B. D. 2006. Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. Mann, M. 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marrus, M. 1985. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Mazower, M. 1999. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. McCarthy, J. 1995. Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press. Naimark, N. M. 2001. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rieber, Alfred, ed. 2000. Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass.

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Suny, R. G. 1993. Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ther, P. 1996. “The Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after World War II: A Historical Reassessment.” Slavic Review 55, no. 4: 779–805. Ther, P., and A. Siljak, eds. 2001. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948. Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield. Wistrich, R. 2001. Hitler and the Holocaust. New York: Modern Library.

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Gender and Nationalism in the Age of Self-Determination Katherine O’Sullivan See Relevance In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, nationalism was shaped by two interlocking ideas: the nation was a self-determining populace with a right to statehood, and the nation was a community of belonging in which common identity would transcend social difference. Constructing the nation, then, had several key tasks, especially to define the citizens of the sovereign state (even if that state had not yet been established) and to articulate a vision of group identity and solidarity in the face of social difference (e.g., class, gender, language, region, religion). Gender was deeply implicated in these two tasks: it served as a marker for defining citizens’ rights, as a means for differentiating social roles within the nation, and as a basis for developing national solidarity. Defining national citizenship and building national identity entailed distinguishing between “us” and “them,” “self ” and “other.” National self-determination necessitated a template for determining who belonged to the nation, who could be a citizen, and how political rights should be constituted and distributed. Building national solidarity also required constructing a sense that national identity would always be implicated in one’s selfhood, that national security and survival would be the responsibility of the nation’s members, and that membership would generate a willingness to adhere to the dominant societal norms. Embedded in each of these tasks were practices of inclusion and exclusion, of dominance and subordination. Would national citizenship be defined by territory? By blood? By language? Would all citizens have the same rights and duties? What would be the relationship between national identity and other communal attachments? For nationalists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the nation constituted a political community to which all other forms of identity should be subordinated. Both the state-building and community-defining aspects of nationalism were deeply gendered. Nations were often represented in familial terms that made both the nation and its gender relations seem natural and transhistorical. Men were mobilized as fathers and brothers to assert their right to sovereignty and to defend the nation in its wars. Borders were protected and imperialism was legitimated on the grounds of a “natural” hierarchy of nations. Citizens’ political and civil rights and social roles were gendered. At the same time that nationalists made naturalist claims about nations and their gendered practices, however, they intervened in even the most intimate social practices so as to shape political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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boundaries, ensure national loyalty, and advance their goals. And as the principles of self-determination spread, activists mobilized to challenge gendered national hierarchies and to build transnational movements for women’s rights.

Origins The ideology of the nation-state reached its epitome during this time, legitimating both imperialist hegemonies and national liberation struggles. In claiming the right to sovereignty, nationalists tied notions of a historic populace to visions of a modern state in ways that both naturalized the nation as a timeless entity and envisioned it as an agent of history. Within Europe, the older states sought to mobilize the populace around a standard cultural identity, asserting historical continuity and modern destiny. On Europe’s periphery and colonized empire, aspiring nations sought to overcome domination by stressing their immemorial traditions and language. And outside of Europe and its empire, independent states sought to expand their boundaries in the name of the nation. Nationalists, in this period, constructed images of the nation as a family writ large, deploying metaphors of kinship to emphasize primordial and transcendental connections to place and to one’s national “brothers” and “sisters.” Evoking the nation as natural and timeless fostered national identities and political solidarity at the same time that it legitimated gendered hierarchies. The images of Mother Ireland, Mother India, Broederbond, Uncle Sam, and Vaterland all attest to the power of gendered familial images to define the national homeland and its people. Such images signaled membership in the national family, but they also suggested the appropriate gendered roles within it. Indeed, the nation was seen as both a repository of tradition (linking the people to its history) and a force of progress (leading the people to modernity). This dual purpose was gendered: in most nationalisms, women were seen as the carriers of tradition and men as the agents of history. Thus, women were often depicted as mothers of the nation, not only reproducing the national family but also nurturing its children, embodying its culture, and preserving its traditions. If women were most closely associated with domestic and private domains, men were more often associated with the public realm, responsible for heading the national household, governing and defending its interests. National and regional symbols in late 19th-century Europe, for example, emphasized women as mothers nurturing tradition even as men engaged in activities of transformation and change. Women wore national costumes, thus functioning as symbols of the traditional culture, while men abandoned traditional dress, signaling their move into modernity. In Japan, for example, during the Meiji reform era (1868–1912), the government encouraged Western hairstyles among men, whereas short hair was banned for women. Both within and beyond Europe, as men’s fashions became N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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more uniform, women’s clothing often became the embodiment of the nation, signaling the contest over women as carriers of tradition or as signals of modernity. Although familial images and women as tradition were predominant in nationalist iconography during this period, some nationalists invoked a past in which women were national heroines; for example, Czech nationalists retold the stories of mythic heroines, Libuse and Vlasta, to signify the gender harmony and equality in their national struggle. Similarly, modernizing nationalists outside of Europe constructed mythic pasts where women were heroic and envisioned futures with women as the bearers of modernity: nationalist reformers in Turkey, Iran, India, and Egypt argued for extending women’s rights in order to resist imperialism and strengthen the national family. Greater equality of women was to be part of creating a modern nation. From this perspective, women should be freed from those traditional constraints (from veiling to foot binding to purdah to polygamy). But even in anti-imperial, modernizing nationalisms, the association of women with the family remained paramount. In Vietnam, for example, nationalists opposing French colonialism mythologized the Trung sisters who had led an uprising against Chinese rule. But this call to Vietnamese women was to defend the nation as if they were mothers defending their child. Such calls were particularly compelling in places where the household was the center of production and where colonial policies undermined that economy and thus weakened family structures. Indeed, the image of the nation as a naturally gendered, unchanging family was at its strongest in this period, even as modernizing states were intruding into and absorbing traditional familial and household functions from production to social welfare to reproductive planning. Even though the nation was presented as a natural entity, nationalists sought to regulate its members, ensuring that they would conform to normative expectations in public life, civil society, social intercourse, and intimate relations. Attachments, interests, and allegiances that might have been disruptive of these normative expectations required vigilant monitoring. The policies of nation as nuclear family reinforced normative endogamous heterosexuality (almost always within the confines of marriage) and discouraged exogamy. Although men’s energy could be channeled into fraternal groups, it needed also to be contained within hetero-normative sexuality. In Western and anti-imperial nationalisms alike, the family was increasingly represented as a bourgeois, male-dominated nuclear household where women were, above all, mothers and custodians of culture. The family was not merely a metaphor. As the foundation of the nation, the household and the family became targets of social policy, and women were generally defined in terms of their “natural” roles within the family. At the beginning of this period, women were denied full citizenship rights and were socially and economically subordinated to men in every nation-state. Denied the franchise, the right to hold property, or to marry freely, limited in access to education and to occupations, women’s nationality and political status were identified with that of their fathers or husbands, so that their very political being was circumscribed by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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their social position vis-à-vis men. Not surprisingly, social reformers sought to expand women’s rights, taking advantage of the proliferating discourse about political sovereignty and independence. Feminists and nationalist and anticolonial leaders sometimes questioned the ways in which gender had been organized, generating new ideas of manhood and womanhood. Women’s rights were sometimes embraced as part of efforts at nationalist modernization rather than merely as agents for the preservation of culture traditions. The diversity in the genderings of nationalism in this period suggest the many ways in which gender could be manipulated or mobilized to serve the nationalist cause.

Dimensions Imperialism and Race The emerging racial “sciences” of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were entangled with the imperialist practices and policies, and helped to undermine the egalitarian claims in liberal nationalist traditions. The presentation of social evolution as a scientific finding legitimated claims about the natural hierarchy of the “family of man” and provided an ideological basis for imperial control of European colonies and exclusionary and restrictive immigration regulation. Social Darwinists advocated the need for strong social boundaries and for the regulation of female sexuality to retain the integrity of the nation. A typology of moral attributes was connected to this hierarchy, associating social respectability and moral virtue with those more “evolved” nations and lack of control and social degeneration with groups at the bottom of the “family of man.” Imperialism, racism, and nationalism often defined the outsider or the colonized in blood terms, linking history to nature in claims about the timeless and immutable “other,” who was seen alternately as a child in need of guidance and socialization or as dangerous and sexually threatening. These concepts were highly gendered, associating race with a range in sexual proclivity and selfcontrol. In the United States during this period, racial nationalists legitimated social control over men of color to protect “white womanhood,” by depicting African American men as rapacious and criminally prone and white women as vulnerable and in need of protection. African American women were imagined as either domesticated and maternal or as licentious and loose, thereby rationalizing economic and sexual exploitation. Gendered contradictions in racist stereotypes were evident as well in anti-Semitic images of Jewish men as either inherently effeminate or as lecherous. “Scientific” racists often depicted colonized nations as children governed under the authority of benevolent and paternalist white fathers, guiding the primitive races toward maturity and civilization. These images were inevitably gendered: British imperialists, for example, asserted their own more manly, civilized, and superior racial family, contrasting it to the purportedly more feminine, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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uncivilized, and inferior colonized India. The feminine was naturally subordinate to the masculine; but not all women to all men. Thus, Victorian womanhood, in the British imperialist scheme, represented the ideal; and the ways in which colonies treated their women were taken to constitute their lesser civilization and need for imperial guidance. As advocates of imperial control, British women embraced the ideal of “imperial motherhood,” established female emigration societies to rectify the gender imbalance in the colonies, and ensured a permanent imperial populace. Female emigrants to South Africa were recruited as British mothers who would be dedicated to care for both the national family and the inferior races. In this context, the civilized nations were thought to be especially vulnerable to degeneration, especially if their women reproduced with men from lesser nations. Although its expressions differed among the imperial powers and their colonies, the racialized legitimation of colonial domination was everywhere deeply gendered. Such racialized imagery not only undergirded imperialism and nationalist claims for a “white man’s republic” in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, but it also fueled such social policies as harsh restrictive immigration legislation to keep out the “inferior” races. Marriage laws were crafted to outlaw miscegenation and discourage liaisons across “racial boundaries.” Th e infamous “one drop” rule in the United States proscribed interracial sexuality by defining the progeny and all descendants of such unions as “nonwhite.” Such rules about racial identity reflected efforts to police sexual behavior amid concerns about national “degeneration.” Sexuality and Reproduction By the end of the 19th century, pro-natalism was a key part of nationalism, tying women to their roles as mothers and reproducers of the nation, particularly in Europe and the United States where declining birth rates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries fostered nationalist fears. Pressures on women to have children for the nation were often conflated with eugenic anxieties about the quality of the nation’s bloodlines and hence about class and racial origins and patterns of reproduction. Political leaders like American president Teddy Roosevelt (1858–1919) argued that efforts should be taken to promote reproduction among native-born white American women, lest demographic shifts foster “race suicide.” Over the first decades of the 20th century, contraception was restricted and made illegal in response to nationalist demographic concerns (France, 1920; Soviet Union, 1936; Germany, 1933). And states adopted legislation to promote motherhood and protective legislation limiting the hours and venues for working women. Fertility was encouraged through honorifics that linked heroic mothers to courageous warriors because both sustained national interests: the Medals of the French Family honored women for producing more than 5 children (1920); the Honor Cross of the German Mother was granted to women with more than 4 children (1939); Mussolini (1883–1945) led a campaign in Italy to “win the Battle of MothN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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erhood” (1933); Stalin (1879–1953) instituted a Medal of Honor for mothers of 7 and the title of Heroine Mother for those bearing more than 10 children (1944). No similar honorifics were tied to fatherhood. Rather, reproduction was women’s soldierly duty. Thus, women were reinforced as mothers of the nation and childbearing linked to national responsibility. Militarism and War Nationalism was closely associated with war and militarism, as established states strove to impose their will on foreign territories, and as colonized and stateless peoples mobilized to gain political autonomy. War intensified national consciousness, igniting the belief that the nation and its mission were in danger from threatening and sometimes barbaric national “others.” Building from traditional gender roles, nationalist leaders in many lands called men to fight and die for the nation and women to sacrifice their sons and brothers. These calls often came through invocation of the nation’s historic myths and memories and these too were gendered: “The sacrifices of our forefathers must not be forgotten”; “Our motherland must be returned.” The struggles of the national collective thus became the gendered duty of each man and woman. War is always entwined with gendered norms, and mobilization for the great nationalist wars that dominated this period contributed to the deep reinforcement of the connection between nationalism and the image of the warrior man. Dying for one’s nation could be depicted as the ultimate sacrifice, the quintessential proof of manhood. The Irish nationalist poet Padraic Pearse (1879–1916) thus romanticized the Irish Republican Brotherhood, calling on bloodshed as sanctifying and cleansing and as the route to preserve national manhood. But over the course of this period, women also became more engaged in warfare both directly and indirectly, complicating the dichotomy often made between the citizen soldier and the vulnerable women and children. During the 1899–1902 Boer War, for example, propagandists sought to recruit men as broeder Afrikaners to fight the British in order to protect their vulnerable women. Unsuccessful in this effort, however, Boer women mobilized to shame men for their failure to defend the state, threatened an Amazonian Corps of Afrikander Women, advocated the centrality of mothers for the survival of the volk, and entered politics. The development of the fraternal Broederbond was a partial reassertion of this challenge to masculine hegemony, as the nationalist organization reasserted male authority over Afrikaner nationalism and white women in a male-controlled state. A different pattern emerged in continental Europe during World War I, where popular images of the selfless brotherhood in the trenches mythologized the heroic sacrifice of the citizen soldiers and the natural fraternal bond. At the same time, the war had generated greater opportunities for women to assume nontraditional social roles and to experience more autonomy, even as they contributed to the war efforts. In the interwar period, increasing political rights and educational opportunities for women, sexual freedoms, and changes in fashion N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and mores led to the emergence of the “new woman” that signaled dramatic changes in gendered practices. Political conservatives argued that these changes would undermine national respectability and moral standards, that women should be guardians of the home. Thus, postwar nationalists sought to reinstate the traditional gender order. World War II similarly challenged the ideology that equated women with domesticity, as wartime mobilization and appeals of national interest fostered the recruitment of women into war-related work. In the United States, “Rosie the Riveter” signaled women’s active contribution to the war industries. In Japan, women were recruited to work in factories, and protective legislation laws were relaxed. In the USSR, women replaced men in heavy industry. And in Britain, birthplace of the ideal of Victorian domesticity, close to two-thirds of women worked outside the home during the war. In sharp contrast, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) held fast to his gendered vision, claiming that national biological (volksiologisch) interests in reproduction were more important than recruiting women to work in industry. Despite crippling labor shortages, only one-third of German women left their homes for the labor market, and some have argued that this short-circuited Germany’s mobilization. Women’s Rights Because they are tied to claims about sovereignty and self-governance, nationalist movements helped to spawn the assertion of women’s political rights, providing both ideological bases for women’s claims to equality and political opportunities for organizing. In some cases, political leaders accepted women’s rights and national rights as coterminous and adopted universal suffrage (e.g., Norway and Finland in their struggles against Sweden and Russia). In others, nationalists explicitly rejected suffrage as undermining the nationalist cause. Both Japanese and Filipino nationalist politicians, for example, argued that women’s suffragists were imitating Western women and thus undermining national culture. In some places, women active in anticolonial and nationalist organizations pressed for equal rights and asserted that their part in the national struggle legitimated their claim to political rights. In Egypt, for example, as part of the struggle against British control, Huda Sha’arawi (1882–1947) established the Wafdist Women’s Central Committee; in 1923, she formed the Egyptian Feminist Union to press the Wafd for female suffrage. Similarly, Malak Hifni Nassef (1866–1918) challenged the exclusive rights of Egyptian men in marriage. But even feminists often disagreed about strategies for gender equality: in response to the rejection of female suffrage, Sha’arawi dramatically cast off her veil, viewing it as a symbol of women’s oppression; in contrast, Nassef opposed the unveiling of women as a Western imposition. Women, then, were nowhere in accord about the contours of nationalism and women’s emancipation, nor were male nationalists. Male nationalists also reflected a variety of views on nationalism and women’s emancipation. In some cases, male leaders of nationalist movements N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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encouraged women’s mobilization and then disregarded their contributions. For example, Irish political leader Michael Davitt (1846–1906) exhorted the anticolonial Ladies’ Land League to mobilize Irish peasants against British landlords but later discounted this defiant group as merely engaged in charity. In other cases, nationalists saw women’s rights as a key part of national development and modernization, as did Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, the “father of the Turks,” 1881–1938) in his rejection of sharia (Islamic Holy Law) and association of secularism with national progress. Others recruited women to the nationalist cause but argued for the priority of national independence over women’s emancipation. Sinn Fein, for example, absorbed Maud Gonne’s (1866–1953) Daughters of Erin (Tion Inghinidhe na hEireann) while arguing that women’s political rights must await national autonomy. Indian nationalism in the early 20th century embodied these complex dynamics of gendered nationalist politics. Militant nationalists had to refute British views that Indians were not fit to rule, lacking the courage and “manly” virtues to face external challenges. Countering this imperialist masculinist view, Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) emphasized the Hindu virtues of internal self-reliance and self-control and invoked a nationalist view of manhood that would embrace nonviolence and service as key to self-rule. He also insisted on equal rights and mobilized women as crucial to the success of the nationalist movement. Gandhi recruited women for particular campaigns, including those that rejected traditional Hindu practices of untouchability, child marriage, and purdah. At the same time that Gandhi subverted imperialist gendered claims about Indian men and advocated women’s rights, however, he also embraced essentialist views of men and women, claiming that the sexes differed in their capacity for nonviolence and self-sacrifice, arguing for a clearly gendered division of labor, and asserting that women should focus on domesticity and child rearing. He opposed women’s participation in work outside the home or in important events like the Dandi Salt March because it would take them away from home. And, he insisted that women conform to ascribed roles, appealing to Indian women to support his swadeshi (homespun) movement as part of maternal duty, to picket foreign clothiers and liquor dealers as part of their moral virtue, and to oppose purdah and untouchability as part of their feminine responsibility to purify and reconstruct Hindu traditions. Thus, like many nationalist leaders, Gandhi mobilized women for the nationalist campaign and exhibited a readiness to transform gendered practices, only insofar as these served the nationalist purpose. And like many nationalist campaigns, India’s spawned and spurred greater activism on the part of women, seeking to reframe the nation in more egalitarian directions. Transnationalism and Feminism In public life, nationalists sought to repress or control those movements that could mobilize interests, solidarities, and identities across national boundaries. Among the most important of these were women’s movements. Feminism’s N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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conceptualization of the universal secondary status of women and its recognition of the keen interplay between public and private politics had the potential to undermine nationalist ideologies that relied on a politics of communal exclusivity and gender differentiation. The emergence of feminist movements that explicitly challenged traditional gender roles, promoted transnational ties among women’s groups, and asserted women’s shared interests had the potential to weaken or even sabotage the primacy of national loyalties and the myth of the eternal national family. If women were oppressed worldwide, they might mobilize across state borders and build transnational solidarities and loyalties. Indeed, women’s rights activism reached across national boundaries. Th e International Council of Women, founded in 1888, worked to develop women’s rights organizations throughout the world, establishing committees that would address suffrage, work, public health, child welfare, and issues of sexual exploitation. By 1939, women’s rights activists in 36 countries had organized affiliated councils. Women’s rights activists who focused on suffrage also worked transnationally to push for women’s political rights, establishing the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance (IWSA, later the International Alliance of Women) in 1904. IWSA activists traveled in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to advocate women’s rights, and by 1929, they had established national suffrage auxiliaries in 51 nations. Suffrage movements simultaneously sought women’s full inclusion in the nation-state and moved beyond the nation, building international advocacy networks and making global comparisons. Nationalism and racism often undermined women’s transnational solidarity in building movements for equal political rights, and suffrage groups sometimes split over the primacy of political goals and the legitimacy of nationalist claims. In Ireland, for example, the suffragist movement was divided over Home Rule, and when propertied women were enfranchised in local elections in 1898, women supporting the Union participated in anti–Home Rule petition drives, in protests, and in political canvassing for male candidates. Thus, perceived national interests were seen as having priority over universal suffrage for women. In the United States, divisions among suffrage activists over women’s exclusion from the Reconstruction Amendments generated a legacy of racialized friction that was felt throughout this period. Many white suffragists argued that the nation needed the votes of educated white women to counter immigrant and black male voters; and the National American Women’s Suffrage Association was structured to attract southern support by allowing individual chapters to exclude African American women from membership. Moreover, suffrage movements, especially those affiliated with nationalists, often had a conservative thrust, aligning women’s rights to social purity movements, blaming social vices (prostitution, alcoholism, truancy) on familial degeneration, and asserting that these ills would be better addressed through women’s suffrage. Intertwined with nationalism and imperialism, these assertions often assumed a racialist cast, especially as doctrines of Social Darwinism were invoked to legitimate colonial domination or immigration restricN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tions. Feminists often presented the colonized women as helpless victims and themselves as “mothers of the race” who could help to advance the imperial project. But colonized women responded, rejecting the patronizing stances of racialized maternalists. For example, in 1920, black women in the United States and Africa formed the International Council of Women of the Darker Races to build an international feminism centered on anti-imperialism and antiracism. Socialist feminism posed a greater set of challenges to nationalism than liberal feminism, for it invoked international solidarity of working women at the same time that it denounced nationalism and imperialism. Such socialist feminist activists as Clara Zetkin (1857–1933), Alexandra Kollontai (1872–1952), and Nadezhda Krupskaya (1869–1939) were at the forefront of efforts to build an international socialist women’s movement. Zetkin, who helped found the Socialist Women’s International, spearheaded the successful effort to designate March 8 as International Women’s Day, and opposed Germany’s entry into World War I as a nationalist and imperialist action. Although women leaders of the Socialist Internationale and the International Women’s Congress called on women to oppose the war and urge its end, these were a distinct minority, and both liberal suffragists and some socialist feminists supported the war and were willing to transform the suffrage organizations into service associations. The militant British suffragists Emmeline (1858–1928) and Christabel (1880–1958) Pankhurst suspended their campaign so as to support the war effort, encouraging British women to work in hospitals, in munitions factories, and in nursing near the front. In Germany, women’s rights leader Gertrude Baumer (1873–1954) organized the National Women’s Services (Nationaler Frauendienst [NFD]) to support the war effort. Its anthem exhorted women to adhere to their roles as domesticators for the nation: “Women’s hands work busily in service to our dear Fatherland. . . . We knit socks for soldiers; we are here for a labor of love.” If the war itself stalled suffrage efforts and undermined transnational feminism, its impact on the gender order was more unsettling, as women were recruited to fill strategically vital jobs when men moved to the front. Indeed, for many, women’s contributions to the war effort were seen as earning their political rights and helped to erode opposition to suffrage throughout Europe (Russian women won the vote in 1915, women in Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Luxemburg, and Germany in 1918 and 1919, English women over 30 in 1918, and American women in 1920). At the same time, international feminism expanded. The effects of World War I, as other wars, generated crises over the social meanings of gender and especially the social roles of men and women, at the same time that national and international feminism expanded. During World War I, an International Congress of Women was held at The Hague in 1915. The participants sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict and asserted support for women’s suffrage. By 1921, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, which was spawned by this conference, had sections in 22 countries and played a key role in advocating international over national loyalty. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Totalitarianism and Fascism The rise of totalitarian militarized states in the 1930s weakened transnational women’s movements, fostered conservative nationalism, and led to the repression of social reform movements and feminism. During the early years of the Soviet Union, feminist Bolshevik leaders Natialia Krupskaya and Alexandra Kollontai had pushed the party to address the “woman question.” As the leader of the Women’s Office (Zhenotdel), Kollontai pressed for greater sexual freedom, legalized abortion, communal housekeeping, and easier divorce as a way to wed socialism and feminism. However, after Stalin’s accession to power in 1927, feminism was quashed in the USSR and the “woman question” was declared to be resolved. Men and women were to devote all of their energies to the collectivization of agriculture and heavy industrial development. Domestic labor was devalued at the same time that explicit efforts were adopted to promote reproduction and “heroic worker mothers,” who combined excellence as workers and mothers. In contrast to Soviet claims about women’s equality, fascists explicitly embraced the ideology of male superiority and the woman’s domain as exclusively maternal. If the Soviets claimed that women’s rights had been fully realized under communism, the Nazis opposed women’s rights as a “product of the Jewish intellect” and called for “emancipation from emancipation.” In the wake of the losses of World War I and the economic uncertainties of the Great Depression, the myth of racial superiority provided solace to many Germans and both Jews and the “New Woman” were encoded as threats to the German nation. The Nazis argued that the state was a masculine sphere and women should return to their true maternal roles. The paradigmatic virtues of National Socialism—toughness, obedience, loyalty to the brotherhood—were associated with men, and qualities assumed to be feminine—emotional expressiveness, vulnerability—were to be expunged from the state. There was no place for women in the Nazi hierarchy, and women’s rights were secured only through marriage. Indeed, Hitler depicted women as belonging to the state and marriage as the route to citizenship for women. Abortion was opposed as a form of race suicide, birth control was made illegal, and motherhood medals were instituted to honor women for bearing children for the nation. Misogyny and National Socialism were of a piece, yet one out of five German women belonged to the Nazi Party, inspired in part by its conflation of family and nation. Crusaders for Hitler and motherhood developed networks of mothers to spread Nazi ideas and established associations like the Fighting Women’s League, which opposed women’s work outside the home and argued that the “female soul” was essential for German national development. At the same time that the state was to constitute the sheltering national family, Nazis demolished the underpinnings of German family life: programs such as Hitler Youth and schools that emphasized the primacy of state interests over family privacy and parental rights undermined the authority and influence of parents, and revisions in divorce laws allowed for the dissolution of marriage on grounds of racial incompatibility, failure N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nazi propaganda poster from 1940 illustrates one of the key concepts of National Socialist and neo-Nazi thought in Germany, describing and transfiguring the desired cohesive, classless, and racially pure society of the Nazi utopia. (Library of Congress)

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to procreate, or eugenic weakness. Thus, even as Nazi propaganda depicted the family as a realm of protection and safety, its practices weakened families and subordinated them to the state. Although feminists had been active in Japan after World War I, developing contacts with European and American suffragists, this work was sharply suppressed as Japanese imperialist militarism increased. The regime adopted very conservative policies, urging women to reproduce for the emperor and to deliver their sons to be soldiers for the glory of the empire. The Women’s Suffrage Conference embraced this patriotic militarism, and nationalism took precedence over women’s rights. Here, too, race, nation, and gender were intertwined as imperial expansion led to full-scale war by 1937. The notorious rape of Nanking and the jugun ianfu system of sexual slavery (“comfort houses”) were examples of the racialized gender dimension of wartime imperialism. To reduce civilian concerns and to regulate soldiers’ behavior in the wake of the rape of Nanking, the Japanese government established “comfort houses” in China and throughout the Asian Pacific region. More than 200,000 women, largely from colonized Korea (but also from China, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies) were abducted or coerced into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers. The army established regulations with priorities given to officers and fees established in accord with the rank of the soldier and the ethnicity of the sex slave. This jugun ianfu system reflected both the general subordination of women and the racialized hierarchy that were part of nationalist imperialism.

Consequences Nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries covered a broad spectrum of political aspirations and social relations. If always gendered, there was no single framework on which gendered purposes and practices could be hung. Sometimes, as in fascism, masculinity and femininity were dichotomized and naturalized and men and women were reduced to social roles in service to the state and its nationalism. More generally, location within the emerging world system and relationship to metropolitan imperial and capitalist powers shaped the context for nationalism and race, religion, and class dynamics infused the processes by which it was organized. And even within any particular locale, there was a contingency to how nationalism was gendered, dependent in part on the intellectual and political leadership and influences. Although socialists in Europe took the “woman question” seriously, for example, and were more open to demands for equal rights for women, they often opposed suffrage, even as nationalists supported it, on the grounds that women would vote more conservatively. Outside the European continent, nationalists embraced European ideas in selective ways, sometimes building a nationalism that emulated aspects of bourgeois life N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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in Europe and adapting this creatively and necessarily to local circumstances, sometimes opposing Westernization and embracing the superiority of indigenous “traditions.” Similarly, anticolonial movements were neither necessarily supportive of nor unequivocally opposed to women’s rights. They sometimes invoked new understandings of men and women, and generated support for women’s rights. But they might also draw from existing gendered roles and expectations claiming that these were more authentic. Hence, there is no simple template for the relationship between nationalism and gendered equity. Rather, nationalist leaders used gendered politics as they strategized about how to best mobilize the populace and address countervailing social forces. Regardless of stance, nationalists sought power and dignity and sovereignty in ways that were deeply gendered, co-opting gendered traditions and images to give legitimacy to their own movements and to mobilize support. The malleability of gendered ideology and practices were thus constrained by the strategic understandings of nationalist leaders. What persisted throughout the world in this age of self-determination—despite changing state systems—were male-dominated polities and nations. But they did not persist unchanged or unchallenged. Selected Bibliography Ahmed, L. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Blom, I., K. Hagemann, and C. Hall, eds. 2000. Gendered Nations: Nationalism and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Berg. Buckley, M. 1989. Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Edwards, L., and M. Roces. 2004. Women’s Suffrage in Asia: Gender, Nationalism and Democracy. London: Routledge Curzon. Gilmore, G. E. 1995. Gender and Jim Crow. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Hicks, G. L. 1995. The Comfort Women. New York: Allen & Unwin. Jayawardena, K. 1986. Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Zed Books. Koontz, C. 1987. Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Mosse, G. 1985. Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe. New York: Howard Fertig. Ranchod-Nilsson, S., and M. A. Tetreault, eds. 2000. Women, States and Nationalism: At Home in the Nation? New York: Routledge. Rupp, L. J. 1997. Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. West, L. A., ed. 1997. Feminist Nationalism. New York: Routledge.

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Nationalism and Geopolitics Gertjan Dijkink Relevance Over the course of the 19th century, geopolitics and nationalism have made similar claims about the “natural” foundations of a (vital) state. While early nationalists denounced the “artificial” culture of European empires and their ruling elites with arguments about a pure national identity defined by linguistics, ancient folk songs, and poetry, geopoliticians wanted to exchange the customary juridical discourse about the state for a theory about the “life processes” of the state. Both visions entailed the excitement of a quest for “the truth,” but they suffered equally from a light-hearted handling of facts. Classic nationalism and geopolitics pivot on a typical central principle or normative theory about the necessary boundaries of a nation-state. Nationalism claimed that “the political and national unit should be congruent.” Geopolitics suggested that a specific mode of production and protection requires a specific political territory. These general theories do not likely offer the same solution in a national “emergency.” Nationalism and geopolitics, however, also comprise less disciplined local “narratives” about the national identity of a specific group (national myths), on the one hand, and specific threats or opportunities in the outside world (geopolitical visions), on the other. Such local narratives run more smoothly from the framework of geography/ geopolitics to ethnicity/nationalism and back. Geopolitics as an academic practice in prewar Germany and the racist views of German National Socialism were theoretically hardly compatible, but they met each other in a worldview that fit German feelings of deprivation and resentment. Differently from nationalism, the word geopolitics can indicate an (unofficial) academic discipline but also a way to conduct foreign politics. Statesmen acting geopolitically are supposed to see the material needs of a state and focus on the security problems that are given with a state’s geography. Shocking events in the world around us regularly revive geopolitical awareness. During the course of the Vietnam War, Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger lamented the “lack of geopolitics” in the American foreign policy tradition. French president Mitterrand expressed the idea that “the politics of a state follows its geography.” The latter was a remarkable statement made by a president who recognized the inevitable reunification of Germany in 1989. Whether such conclusions mean that speakers deny a role to national “identity” as a guiding principle in foreign politics is difficult to say. One might assume that statesmen adhering to geopolitics believe that national identity also follows geography. Nevertheless, in the current academic field of “Critical N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Geopolitics” the construction of geopolitical ideas or visions in a state is usually seen as inseparable from the construction of national identity. In the early 20th century, both geopolitics and nationalism proclaimed selfdetermination but on different theoretical grounds. Because intellectuals behind these movements often had the same political goal in mind, the incompatibility between them remained hidden. Both German geopolitics and National Socialism interpreted self-determination as German expansion. In the emerging Soviet Union, national self-determination was “designed” to fit the geopolitical vision of the Soviet Union as a stable communist universe. The incompatibility between geopolitical and national conceptions of self-determination became embarrassingly clear in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved. A similar thing underlay the negotiations for the Versailles Treaty (1919). The victorious allies of World War I officially endorsed the ideal of self-determination along ethnic lines, but the actual boundary decisions always went through a strategic and economic sieve that denied self-determination to ethnic groups related to one of the losers of the war (Hungarians in Romania’s Transylvania, Germans in Poland’s Upper Silesia or in the Czech Sudetenland). By the end of the 20th century, ethnic turmoil in central and eastern Europe was a lagged result of the mixing of geopolitics and nationalism during the early 20th century. No wonder today’s global governance does not favor the redrawing of boundaries along ethnic lines. Conflict management and reconciliation are the preferred strategy, while secession in the name of self-determination often is withheld international recognition. An example is the secession of Somaliland, a country that rose from the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. When the leaders of Somaliland applied for help to UNESCO, the UN high representative for Africa made financial aid conditional on the removal of maps in geography and history schoolbooks that indicated the distinctiveness of Somaliland. The presence of maps or maplike qualities of a discourse on international movements, conflicts, or power balances is often subsumed under geopolitics. Because maps can be “deconstructed” as nationally self-serving visions, the term nationalism often pops up as well. Here, we are obviously talking about nationalism as national identity construction or national self-aggrandizing rather than merely a call for political independence of an ethnic group. The diverging practices of both nationalism and geopolitics make this theme sometimes confusing, but during 1880–1945, (classic) geopolitics and nationalism were grand theories about national strength and self-determination that claimed universal validity. Geopolitics

Nationalism

Classic “theory” Organicism Global power balance

≠ Congruence of political and national unit

Local narratives

= Nation(al identity)-building

Geopolitical visions Popular geopolitics

≠ incompatible; = compatible

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Origins Classic Geopolitics Geopolitics as theory about the political significance of geographical arrangements was born from a shock. Its advance toward a distinct academic outlook started only in the last decade of the 19th century. European states, more or less reconciled with the post–Vienna Congress fixed world, were now encountering each other in unchartered territory outside Europe. The landmark event was the Fashoda Incident (1898) at the headwaters of the Nile, where a small French and British army expedition hit upon each other, and the two states found themselves for a short time on the brink of war. The message was that no place on Earth could do without boundaries agreed upon in treaties (the polar areas are the last places to escape this rule), but also that such boundaries were still volatile and that new theaters of war were opening. During the same year in a speech in the British parliament, Lord Salisbury divided the nations of the world into “the living and the dying, the former gobbling up the latter.” A new conception about a struggle for life and space on the earth had become quickly fashionable. Halford Mackinder was the first Briton to frame such ideas in an academic essay about the “geographical pivot of history” (1904), in which he offered the view that the world was in the embrace of a struggle between land power (Eurasia) and sea power (Britain and its colonies, Japan, the United States, South America), and that a new means of transport (railway) was dangerously shifting the balance in favor of land power. Mackinder did not use the term geopolitics, but it was already invented by the Swedish political thinker Kjellén in an obscure publication from 1899. Geopolitics as a distinct academic perspective was born from the awareness of the nearing end to European colonial expansion. In 1897, the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) published his book Politische Geographie. It dealt with the need for space in modern states, suggesting that a higher level of development requires larger states. Although it did not deal with global confrontations between states, Ratzel’s work was certainly inspired by the colonial race between Britain and France and by emerging new world powers like the United States and Japan. The word “geopolitics” finally became well known and very soon became suspect as a result of the interwar German Geopolitik school of Haushofer that merged its ideas so easily with the worldview of the Nazi’s. Classic Nationalism If we conceive of geopolitics as any idea about political territoriality, then geopolitics started much earlier than the 1890s. According to some interpretations, the emergence of the European (Westphalian) state system already implied geopolitics, meaning that there was a collection of assumptions about territorial security and rules of international behavior. If geopolitics historically started with N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the acceptance of international boundaries (“civilized geopolitics”), then nationalism should be characterized as the second stage in its development. Nationalism sprang from an industrial revolution that tore people away from their rural background and made them painfully aware of cultural differences within the same state, particularly the difference between the “high” culture of those having access to power and the “popular” culture of ordinary people. Nationalism did two things: it demanded general education in order to make everyone a participant in the “high” culture, and it sanctified popular culture as a natural and perpetual territorial marker of the state. According to thinkers like Ernest Gellner, nationalism was a necessary response to industrialization because this social revolution required people that could easily communicate with each other, and it constituted flexible workers in a swiftly changing labor market. General education better satisfied the demands of this labor market than the traditional on-the-job training that farmers and craftsmen underwent for a lifelong occupation. To such a “functional” explanation, one might add that a common culture generates the feeling of solidarity that is essential to modern states. According to Gellner’s well-known definition, nationalism is the principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, or more simply phrased: political and ethnic boundaries should coincide. While this principle suggests a “natural” logic that should determine state boundaries, it ignores the fact that ethnic or cultural boundaries are far from unequivocal. There are three problems with regard to this principle: (1) differences in culture are not clear-cut (e.g., the gradual transition between dialects, if we consider language as the crucial cultural feature), (2) ethnic groups are not distributed in a spatially contiguous way, and (3) there are simply too many ethnic groups in the world to consider ethnicity as a useful guiding principle in the creation of states. These problems moved state formation in the direction of creating a common culture rather than creating states on the basis of a common culture (whatever that may be). The classic example is France existing for a long time as a strong state before it seriously started (incited by the 1870–1871 war with Germany) to turn its peasant population into Frenchmen. But in the same century, we also see the amalgamation of small states into larger unions (Germany, Italy) and the secession of states from large empires (Ottoman, Austrian), all with a similar appeal to the cultural distinctiveness of the newly emerging political units. In view of the three problems mentioned above we can only conclude that these decisions involved a lot of imagination (and manipulation) to satisfy the requirement of “political and national congruence.” Ratzel developed his political geography (here subsumed under geopolitics) to escape such doubtful ethnic rationalizations and to equate the state with a geographic system of people and land-tied productive activities. Such spatial systems would be coupled with a spirit and culture, according to Ratzel. Although proposed as a “science,” Ratzel’s political geography did not develop a theoretically consistent approach to the origin of such spatial systems. Were they in the end naturally or culturally determined? N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Organicism German geopolitics became particularly associated with the “organicist” approach: the conception of the state as a living organism. This is often attributed to the influence of evolution theory (Darwin, Spencer), but in Germany the term “organic” has much older roots. Like German nationalism, it had roots in the Enlightenment, on the one hand, and the political and mental response in Germany to the events in France at the turn of the 19th century, on the other. Political thinkers of the Enlightenment born in the 18th century, like Rousseau in France and Herder in Germany, saw the world as a natural order of identities and places. Th e discovery (and fraudulent creation) of ancient poetry and songs legitimated the distinctiveness of national territories as different from the dynastic logic of political territories and their “artificial” higher cultures. It soon became an intellectual challenge to discover the “natural” origins of nations, particularly among new elites that distinguished themselves by education rather than descent. James Macpherson’s publication of songs attributed to the ancient bard “Ossian” (1765) caused excitement everywhere in Europe and elicited the “finding” of other ancient evidence of nations. Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) was the genius that continued the Enlightenment perspective into the 19th century with a singular geographic enterprise: his four volumes of Kosmos. While this enterprise covered mainly what we call “physical geography” today, it was couched in typical Enlightenment discourse. Humboldt elaborated the natural distinctiveness of any region in the world; a condition that would give each local society a specific character but also a degree of “incompleteness.” Human travel and exchange (trade) would create a new organic unity out of these differences. Humboldt developed the first truly global view in a definitely positive spirit. He pictured variety in nature and in human culture as a promise, a condition leading to ever increasing harmony in the future rather than conflict. The publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) symbolized the end of evolution as a harmonious concept and the start of a view on nature as conflictridden. Evolutionary changes in Darwin’s theory did not obey a predestined harmonious force but emphasize the advantage of local adaptation. This idea would singularly fit the geopolitics that rose at the end of the century and also the type of nationalism that had developed in Germany at the beginning of the century. German nationalism broke away from Enlightenment positivism as a reaction to the French Revolution and the authoritarian backlash in post-Vienna Germany. While German philosophers initially hailed the French Revolution as the triumph of the age of reason over the ancien régime, the emergence of the revolutionary terror regime in France and the Napoleonic expeditions in Germany soon changed the mood. The humiliation of Germany unleashed the “othering” process that is so characteristic of resentful nationalism. This means that national identity is constructed as antipode of and superior to that of another nation. The mechanism involves an inversion in which weak or shameful aspects of a nation (for example the political weakness of Germany) are presented as strength (Germany N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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does not need a central government like France because it is a distinct and strong Volk)—“making a virtue of necessity,” as the proverb runs. A second disappointment followed in Germany when the restoration of the old order after the Vienna Congress did not yield an open society in which the new educated class (Bildungsbürger) could play a political role. Censorship and downright suppression compelled intellectuals to “internal emigration” and sublimation of their longing for a legitimate and uncorrupted German state in art and literature. Artists from the painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840) to the composer Richard Wagner (1813–1883) were obsessed with the idea of falseness in official culture and society and equated going back to nature (or religion) with recovering the true German identity. With artistic creations that were a smack in the face of established authorities, they had to account for reprisals, but they held their ground because they were driven by an almost religious inner vision. This denial of the established order is generally called romantic nationalism, an outlook that hovered between the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment philosophers and worship of a utopian (German) nation. The emphasis on the natural foundations of a society was echoed in the “organicism” of Ratzel and Kjellén, who imagined the state as a living being requiring Lebensraum (“space for living”). These ideas, however, were already present in German reactions to “wars of liberation” (1813–1815). During the stirring years of the Napoleonic wars, Adam Müller (1779–1829) attacked the rigid universalism that seemed to underlie the French idea of the state. According to Müller, a state cannot be based on a system of fixed rules or a concept; it rather is the concretization of an idea. The difference is that the latter fits the model of a living phenomenon that will perish if it is not treated and understood according to its own spirit. Life needs struggle (war) and adversity to develop its typical resilience. Friedrich List (1789–1846), the spiritual father of the German customs union, strikes a similar note. In his unfinished treatise titled “The National System of the Political Economy” (1841), he wears himself out criticizing the Adam Smith School of economic liberalism, which identifies the creation of economic value primarily with individual action and considers nations only as an idea, a “grammatical construction.” The current condition of nations, according to List, is a result of the accumulation of discoveries and creations by many generations. Without acknowledging the “cultural capital” of states, one cannot produce a sound economic theory. While Müller’s discourse still echoed the clang of arms of an ongoing war, List represented the practical turn that German politics would take after the failures of nationalist ideals in the previous decades. Yet the idea of an organic supra-individual quality is preserved in the shape of cultural capital, implying an important task for the state in such interindividual affairs as economic exchange. These German ideas about the state, so much influenced by the nationalist mindset of the early 19th century, obviously prefigured the more elaborate geopolitics of the later 19th century. Darwin and the evolutionists may have contributed N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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to the hardening of organicist thinking, but the idea of a struggle between identities had already been firmly planted in the German experience of the world during the “wars of liberation.” It should also be noted that in the nationalist imagination, this struggle was not so much a matter of life and death as a lifebringing experience, a catharsis that would bring to light true national identity. The mixture of these nationalist influences that partly reflected idealistic elements from the Enlightenment philosophers and post-1859 natural science is what makes the interpretation of Friedrich Ratzel’s work so difficult.

Dimensions The 19th-century nationalist revolution did two things that had an impact on territorial politics: it incorporated ethnic or racial criteria in international politics, and it involved ordinary people in state affairs. Territorial features, however, may be more or less prominent in the myths, narratives, and symbols that we call national identity. This reveals something about the history and type of external relations of a country. The most explicit mix of territorial assumptions and myths developed in Germany after World War I (Geopolitik). “Ethnicization” of International Politics The implementation of ethnic criteria in redrawing the map became for the first time a concrete option with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek struggle for independence (1821–1832) supported by European and American philhellenes, who attributed the identity of classic Greece to this people, unleashed a series of other secessions and struggles (Poland) that were territorially legitimated by a dominant ethnic group (Poles, Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians). The principle of self-determination is almost exclusively associated with ethnically distinctive groups, although an earlier and sensational example of selfdetermination, American independence, can hardly have been legitimated by ethnic criteria. The next wave of reterritorialization involved national unifications: Italy (1860) and Germany (1871). The third wave occurred in the aftermath of World War I and the break up of the Austrian monarchy and Russia. Th e principle of self-determination was now an explicit guideline of the victorious powers (and particularly of American president Woodrow Wilson) in redrawing the map of Europe. The last wave of important territorial change—decolonization after 1945—on the contrary, put nationalism to the fore as a creator of new postcolonial nations rather than as a determinant of state boundaries. Politicization of the People Education, military conscription, art, and media information moved the vicissitudes of the state to the reality of daily life. History and geography lessons at N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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school propagated the idea of national identity and destiny. Politicians learned how to stir up the masses, and the prospect of war raised hysterical and enthusiastic masses in Berlin and Paris in 1914. Geographical images and visions played an important role. Images and maps were not any longer merely an instrument for military strategists and statesmen, but they were used as a means to raise public support. A novel like Volk ohne Raum (People without Space, 1926) imbued Germans with the idea that the Versailles Treaty had virtually eliminated all life chances for the average young German, both at home and in the world. In the same period, Portuguese citizens looked at maps of Portugal that included the overseas colonies projected on the map of Europe, learning that Portugal was not a small country at all. It is this constructive quality of “popular geopolitics” that has drawn much interest in the academic study of geopolitics since 1990. Apart from representing theories of self-determination that are intellectual weapons on the international political scene, both nationalism and geopolitics create the typical domestic legitimation of politics that appeals to national identities and popular ideas about the mission of a state in the world. In this popular and practical sphere, nationalism and geopolitics are hard to disentangle. The vision of a westward shift of human civilization that gives the United States an advantage over other countries (“Manifest Destiny”) in the world, and justifies its exceptional position in the world of states, is a basic idea that has deeply influenced U.S. identity, and that goes along with a “geopolitical culture” that easily sees the world as a struggle between good and evil. Territorial and Nonterritorial Identities We might distinguish between national identities that adopt a more and a less “territorialized” mode, which means a nationalist discourse can either pivot on pride in national principles like the sovereignty of a people, cosmopolitanism, or social equality (Britain with its Magna Carta, France with the Revolution during a major part of the 19th century, the United States today) or focus on territorial unity and the relations with other states. The change from the first to the second mode of national identity occurs in the wake of shocking or euphoric territorial events. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 changed the face of French classrooms with the introduction of maps of the entirety of France, and it eventually brought a more thorough nationalization of the people than had happened in the decades before. National identity became defined in terms of contrasts with Germany rather than in terms of the French people as inheritor of the Revolution. Germany’s unification in the course of the same war inevitably implied an obsession with territory, also because part of the German-speaking world was left outside the new state. Secession or independence likely elicits an engagement with territory in the nationalist imagination. But weakness may also incite attempts to dig up more cosmopolitan and humanitarian visions and traditions. The visions that intellectuals had of Czechoslovakia and its place in the world have been characterized as the alternation of geopolitical (territorialized) and nongeopolitical visions. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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aftermath of World War I and the revolutionary events in Russia changed the map of Russia and called up the specter of a territorial breakdown. While the Bolsheviks subsequently suppressed Soviet Union–wide nationalism in favor of socialist internationalism, Russian émigrés found comfort with Eurasianism that imagined Russia as a political unit that covers Europe and Asia but that, in terms of national identity, was distinguishable from both. Eurasianism relied on geographic and anthropological theories. No wonder the demise of the Soviet Union again revived Eurasianism among some nationalists in Russia. Another example of territorial nationalism is Finland. The Finnish experience of different political masters (Sweden, Russia) in the 19th century generated a strongly territorial dimension in the construction of Finland’s national identity. German Geopolitik It is not surprising that Germany, a (powerful) European state that underwent the most significant territorial changes and pressures after 1870, turned out to be the most ambitious in producing geopolitical ideas and in promoting geopolitics into an academic subject. The latter could take advantage of a political discourse on space (Raum) that already existed in popular writings and among intellectuals of statecraft (military, journalists). In 1925, the retired general Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) started the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik ( Journal of Geopolitics), which subsequently became the main medium for launching geopolitical theories. Haushofer was the central figure in propagating the concept of geopolitics, but he ultimately was also responsible for the later taboo on geopolitics that overshadowed academic writing during the first decades after World War II. Geopolitik was primarily a way to overcome the human fixation on the current world map and reveal the great movement of history. This in itself is not very different from other and more recent “respectable” academic enterprises like Braudel’s analysis of the Mediterranean world or Diamond’s discussion on the fate of human civilizations. The difference is that in Geopolitik, the role of German wishful thinking was only too obvious. At first sight, Geopolitik was a kind of geographical craft. It used maps, and its analysts mapped “directions” corresponding to the main interests and external streams of traffic of a state. These they called “lines of force” or “collision lines.” A collection of such lines on a map was a “geopolitical field of force.” When extending overseas, such lines of force were (in a striking similarity with later economic geography concepts) called “growth poles.” The method was thought to provide insight into future military conflicts and boundary changes. War was generally discussed in a neutral way. Certain wars had to be prevented because they were caused by human misconceptions, but other wars were simply an expression of profound forces tending toward equilibrium or their destiny. When German geopoliticians talked of self-determination, they meant respect for such developments rather than the democratic decision of a nation. It is the embedding of such ideas in a wider nationalist (and National Socialist) framework that makes them understandable rather than their inherent logic. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Dr. Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) on his way through Frankfurt Airport to Nuremberg for possible trial on war crime charges, 1945. Haushofer’s geopolitical ideas influenced Nazi leadership. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In discourses around Geopolitik, the idea was aired that the German people were unique in having a special intuition for the spatial requirements of the state or the needs of the state as a living organism. National Socialism was seen as a political breakthrough that for the first time would give this intuition free reign. Although nationalism can be also associated with conservatism in the 20th century, German geopoliticians saw themselves as futuristic and hostile to conservative streams in German politics that also supported the Nazi’s. Geopoliticians did not resist the nationalist slogan “one nation, one state,” which aimed at the unification of Austria and Germany, but preferred to incorporate this ideal in a geopolitical discourse on Mitteleuropa (“Central Europe”). Ethnic criteria were never a leading principle among Geopolitik writers in the period between both world wars.

Consequences The impact of nationalism on historical events in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is more conspicuous than that of geopolitics, which after all involved theories that were only appealing to elites and leaders of strong states bent on N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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enhancing their power. Nationalist leaders, however, also entertained geopolitical narratives or visions from which they gained courage in the struggle for independence. The Italian nationalist Mazzini (1805–1872) expected that the imminent ignition of the national spirit among the Slav nations, particularly Poland, would be the most significant event in bringing the Habsburg empire down. It did not work out like that, but Italian nationalism at least succeeded in unification “at home.” Geopolitik studies helped to underpin the German feeling of paranoia after 1918 and may consequently have contributed to German war plans. Mackinder’s geopolitical analysis of the perils of the British empire, however, did not ring an alarm in the British capital in 1904. The main reason was the strength of the British geopolitical “reflex,” which distinguished sharply between balance of power strategies for continental Europe and liberal politics for the world at large. In France, no clear academic tradition of geopolitics was started before 1976. This does not mean that French statesmen were not guided by geopolitical visions. After 1870, Germany loomed large in these visions and this reverberated in French national identity formation. In the early 20th century, geopolitics was more fatefully present in the shape of strategies for the manipulation of groups, negotiations in peace treaties, and the exercising of international pressure. The consequences of the Versailles Treaty resulted from the impossibility of creating viable mono-ethnic states and from the incompatible strategic (geopolitical) visions of delegates in the conference. The treaty was hardly concluded when British prime minister Lloyd George observed, “We liberated the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, the Yugoslavs and today we have all the trouble in the world preventing them from oppressing other races.” The most curious type of geopolitical strategy in the guise of nationalism was practiced by the new communist rulers in the Soviet Union, who created an entire administrative system based on different degrees of “autonomy” for national groups: Union Republics (Socialist Soviet Republics [SSRs]), Autonomous Republics (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics [ASSRs]), and other areas. A Union Republic was to be the home of a comparatively advanced (i.e., industrialized) nation that might still cherish memories of former independence (Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania, etc.). Within their territories, smaller ethnic minorities were given Autonomous Republics (Chechnya, Tatar Republic, Tuva, etc.). It seemed an honest way to do justice to the complexities of ethnic geography. There is much speculation about the motives of Soviet leaders (particularly Stalin) to engage in such practices, because nationalism and communism are ideologically incompatible. However, one should bear in mind that in the early 20th century, nationalism and communism struggled against the same enemy: multiethnic empires and imperialism. The Soviets could not resist the spirit of the times and undoubtedly considered nationalism a transitory stage in the inevitable development to world socialism. A geopolitical interpretation of Soviet nationalities policy is that it was simply a way to wield power by means of divide and rule. This is suggested by certain N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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anomalies in the way boundaries were drawn. The Tatars, faithful allies of the Bolsheviks in the struggle against the old regime and its defenders, were promised a separate Tatar-Bashkir state after the war was over. But Stalin and his fellow rulers seemed to have immediately forgotten this promise, and the Tatars were presented with a very odd national house. The envisaged Tatar-Bashkir Republic was split into two ASSRs. In the one that would bear the name of the “titular” nationality, the Tatar ASSR, Tatars made up actually less than 50 percent of the population. In the other one, the Bashkir ASSR, Tatars were the largest ethnic group but only 24.3 percent of the total population. These administrative creations still accommodated only one-third of the total number of Volga Tatars. In view of the Tatar ethno-geography, such practice can hardly be explained as other than “divide and rule.” Similar goals, but directed at neighboring countries, may have been the rationale for the creation and naming of national republics like Moldavia, Azerbaijan, and others. As conspicuous acts honoring the selfdetermination of Azeri and Moldavian ethnic groups, they may have been a tool in a hidden policy to spread discord in neighboring states (Iran, Romania). The hidden dangers of the Soviet nationalities policy became obvious in the years after 1991 when one after another SSR appealed to the federal constitutional principles to leave the Union. The early 20th-century rhetoric of selfdetermination had born unplanned children that moreover were not ethnically homogeneous at all. The presence of autonomous groups with a lower degree of political competence caused and causes continuous conflicts in the former Soviet areas echoing Lloyd George’s complaint from the early 1920s. Classic geopolitics was right in stressing other principles that integrate states, but ultimately, it never transcended the “ethno-nationalist” and Machiavellian preoccupation of its practitioners. Selected Bibliography Agnew, J. 2003. Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics. London: Routledge. Bassin, M. 1991. “Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space.” Slavic Review 50:1–17. Cairo, H. 2006. “ ‘Portugal is not a Small Country’: Maps and Propaganda in the Salazar Regime.” Geopolitics 11, no. 3: 367–395. Dijkink, G. 1996. National Identity and Geopolitical Visions. London: Routledge. Drulak, P. 2006. “Between Geopolitics and Anti-Geopolitics: Czech Political Thought.” Geopolitics 11, no. 3: 420–438. Gould, S. J., ed. 2004. “Art Meets Science in ‘The Heart of the Andes’: Church Paints, Humboldt Dies and Darwin Writes, and Nature Blinks in the Fateful Year of 1859.” In I Have Landed: The End of a Beginning in Natural History, 90–109. London: Jonathan Cape. Herb, G. H. 1997. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918–1945. London: Routledge. Hooson, D., ed. 1994. Geography and National Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. Kaiser, R. 1994. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Murphy, D. T. 1999. “ ‘A Sum of the Most Wonderful Things’: Raum, Geopolitics and the German Tradition of Environmental Determinism, 1900–1933.” History of European Ideas 25:121–134. Ó’Tuathail, G. 1996. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. London: Routledge. Paasi, A. 1996. Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border. Chichester: Wiley. Parker, G. 1985. Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century. London: Croom Helm. Rorlich, A.-A. 1986. The Volga Tatars: A Profile of National Resilience. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Roshwald, A. 2001. Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923. London: Routledge. Valota, B. 2003. “Giuseppe Mazzini’s ‘Geopolitics of Liberty’ and Italian Foreign Policy toward ‘Slavic Europe.’ ” East European Quarterly 37:151–166.

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Language and Nationalism John E. Joseph Relevance Over the last four decades, a consistent theme within studies of nations and nationalism has been the central importance of language in their formation, in determining where the boundaries of a nation lie in terms of both population and territory, and in whether a given individual belongs to a particular nation or not. The matter of what language is spoken has long seemed to offer the surest and most objective criterion. Yet no nation has ever been linguistically homogeneous— bilingualism and multilingualism have always been the norm for most societies— and the way in which languages spread is a cultural matter disconnected from genetic ethnicity. There is, then, a gap between the reliance on language to define the nation, on the one hand, and the heterogeneous nature of language itself, on the other. The gap has always been filled by ideology and myth, and it is precisely here that we can locate the real historical importance of language (or rather, what people believe about language) for nationalism. A number of prominent historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have argued that the existence of a national language is the primary foundation upon which nationalist ideology is constructed. Others have paid more serious attention to the evidence compiled by linguistic historians, who have shown that national languages are not actually a given, but are themselves constructed as part of the ideological work of nationalism-building. This is not, however, to deny languages their place right at the center of how the “people” is conceived of—from the beginnings of recorded history, with a certain intensification toward the start of the 19th century, to the present day. The period from 1880 to 1945 was also one of growing hostility toward nationalism among certain segments of the population—most spectacularly in the working classes, where Marxism was crowding out other versions of international socialist doctrine. Among the bourgeoisie—the class that included Marx and Engels—plenty of “champagne socialists” were to be found, if not adherents of Marx, then of Fabianism or other idealistic doctrines. But even they were far outnumbered by linguistic internationalists, people who believed that the future peace and stability of the human race depended upon the existence and use of the artificial languages Volapük or Esperanto. On a more local level, resistance to particular national identities was being manifested through movements for a return to subnational and pre-national languages, notably Celtic languages in the British Isles, Provençal in the south of France, and newly standardized Scandinavian N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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languages within a vast region where Danish had previously been the “national” tongue. We can divide the nation-states of 1880 into four basic types where language is concerned, remembering, however, that certain countries defy easy categorization. First, there were nations with a well-established standard language (or languages) and no serious threat from rivals. China is perhaps the best example, along with Japan, despite a government proposal in 1872 to make English the national language. The United States and the British Commonwealth nations were linguistically stable, as were the nations of Latin America (despite the fact that most of the populations spoke indigenous languages and knew nothing of the excolonial standard language). In Europe, there were few such stable examples because of movements for the revival of peripheral languages; but Portugal can be put into this category, as well as Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and multilingual Belgium and Switzerland. Second, there were nations with a well-established standard language (or languages) but with significant rivals in certain (often peripheral) areas. This was the usual situation with such multinational states as the United Kingdom, where English was under increasing pressure from the Celtic fringes; the Russian empire, with the twist that French functioned as a suprastandard language in Greater Russia; and Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, though they had always been inherently multilingual. Third, there were new nations where the use of the standard language was not yet widespread. Italy became a nation only in the 1860s, and though a standard form of Italian had been established for centuries, it was not spoken among the middle class, where it competed with the older regional dialects of the working class and peasantry. Norway’s situation was different: their standard language had been modeled closely on the ex-imperial language, Danish; then a new standard Norwegian was created based on local dialects and with an effort to deDanicize it as much as possible. The two standards remained in competition into the second half of the 20th century. Fourth, there were imperial “possessions”—where the imperial language functioned as standard but was not well established among the indigenous population. In 1880, the great age of imperialism—when the entire globe could be color-coded by imperial possession—was still getting under way, and by the end of the decade, it would be nearly complete. When the maps of Europe, Asia, and Africa were redrawn at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, linguistic considerations figured prominently, even if they were often secondary to political ones and sometimes to economic ones (such as which of two neighboring countries would get an area rich in natural resources or that was well developed industrially). Countries that had been on the losing side in World War I and that possessed areas populated by a significant linguistic minority had little chance of holding on to them—a spectacular example being the reassignment of Transylvania from Hungary to Romania. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The period from 1880 onward also saw the apogee of what we can term “language nationalism”—the view that a people and its language are not only coterminous, but that the language embodies the soul of the people, whose cultural responsibility it is to keep the language pure, probe its history, and ensure that its “correct” form is spread throughout the population as much as possible. In fact, a little historical evidence could be stretched a long way; Smith (1998, chap. 8) emphasized how much of the effort of nationalism-construction was aimed at reaching back to the past in the interest of “ethno-symbolism.” As Hobsbawm has pointed out, the national standard language is, like the nation itself, a discursive construction: National languages . . . are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national mind. They are usually attempts to devise a standardized idiom out of a multiplicity of actually spoken idioms, which are downgraded to dialects. (Hobsbawm 1990, 51)

Hobsbawm defines the standard language as “a sort of platonic idea of the language, existing behind and above all its variants and imperfect versions” (1990, 57). This is in line with what linguists have maintained for decades (for a survey of their views see Joseph 1987), but no one has ever put it quite so succinctly. Hobsbawm argues further that a “mystical identification of nationality” then occurs with this idea of the language, an identification he believes to be “much more characteristic of the ideological construction of nationalist intellectuals, of whom Herder is the prophet, than of the actual grassroots users of the idiom” (1990, 57). But, pace Hobsbawm, while this may be true historically of the period when the national/standard language is initially being constructed, it ceases to be the case once it enters the educational sphere, and once education is widespread. The linguistic ideology then becomes common national property, as least as likely to find firm belief among the working classes who do not control it as among the upper classes who do.

Origins Modern nationalism exhibits continuities with national identities that extend all the way back to the beginning of recorded history. The Old Testament records the oral traditions of the Hebrew nation, not merely as a historical chronicle but as a way to manifest and ensure the nation’s ongoing existence. Developments in nationalism during the 18th to 20th centuries were interpreted via their refraction through the biblical texts, the common base of European culture across national and social divides. Nations make their first appearance in Genesis 10, which lists the sons of Shem, Ham, and Japheth together with the places where they dwelt, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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sometimes with precise specification of borders. Each of the three sets concludes with a passage like the following: “By these [seven sons and seven grandsons of Japheth] were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands, every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations” (Genesis 10:5). In more modern times, English national sentiments were obviously present in Shakespeare’s history plays from the end of the 16th and start of the 17th centuries—but to call them “nationalist” is, arguably, anachronistic, when the whole concept of nationalism as a general doctrinal position does not appear until two centuries later. The American and French revolutions were cardinal events in establishing the modern concept of nation as a political reality. Kohn argued that nations are a concept dating back not earlier than the mid-18th century, and that “nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has been more and more common to mankind” (1944, 10–11). Kohn’s argument was grounded in an essentialist dualism between a “voluntaristic nationalism,” characteristic of England and France, versus the “organic nationalism” of Germany and central European nations—tied to the empiricist philosophical tradition of the former and the rationalist one of the latter. Kedourie (1960) identified the crucial change as having taken place at the start of the 19th century, triggered by the Napoleonic aftermath of the French Revolution. His book begins with an intentionally provocative opening sentence: Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. . . . Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government. (Kedourie 1960, 9)

Kedourie presented a less essentialist view than Kohn’s, replacing nationalism as an “act of consciousness” with nationalism as doctrine. Between 1804 and 1810, Napoleon was expanding his empire to include most of Europe. Those German Romantic thinkers who had hero-worshiped Napoleon as the embodiment of the possibilities of the human will, now had to come to grips with having their country defeated by him and themselves becoming his imperial subjects. From this experience arose the argument that such imperial rule was unjust, because it is natural for each nation to rule itself. But what were the “natural” boundaries of a nation? The obvious answer was geographical obstacles—seacoasts, mountain ranges, great rivers cutting the nation off from its neighbors. But by that answer, there was nothing in principle to prevent “Europe” being conceived of as a “nation” rather than an empire composed of nations. Internally, only the Alps and the English Channel constituted serious barriers, and neither of these mattered for what concerned the German Romantics, which was to define their nation as distinctive from their neighbors to the west and east. If the German right to autonomy was to be maintained by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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something more fundamental than mere historical difference, something nongeographical yet plausible as a primordial, “natural” boundary had to be identified. The answer was formulated in 1808 by Fichte, who argued that what defines a nation most clearly is its language: The primary, the original, the truly natural borders of states are unquestionably their spiritual borders. Whoever speaks the same language are already linked to one another by a number of invisible bonds through their sheer nature, before any human art; they understand one another, and are capable of reaching ever clearer understanding, they belong together, and are naturally one, and an inseparable whole. (Fichte 1808, Address 13; my translation)

Fichte’s writings are given the principal credit for rousing Germans to rise up against Napoleonic rule. The view he espoused was not just a political one, though. It resonated so loudly because it accorded well with the idea system of German Romanticism in general. Events later in the 19th century put France in a position very like the one that the Germans had been in. The Franco-Prussian War culminated with the siege of Paris in 1870–1871 and ended with the proclamation of the German empire— modern Germany as we know it—and the empire’s annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, territories that had repeatedly shuttled between French and German rule. Here, the local dialects were Germanic, but the political allegiance of the populace was strongly to France. These events had an impact on the French psyche comparable to what the Germans had felt with Napoleon’s victories at the start of the century. Romantic thought had so shaped the modern European conception of nationalism that even Frenchmen who believed wholeheartedly that Alsace-Lorraine must be French could not find an obvious way to counter the argument that, since the territories were German speaking, they belonged naturally to Germany. It was finally a linguist, Renan, who produced a new conception of nationalism in response, and it was this conception that became the basis for the Wilsonian principles by which the world map was redrawn at Versailles in 1919. Renan starts from the Romantic idea of a shared national “soul,” but breaks it down into its component parts, one of which involves the national “will”: A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things that are actually one make up this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common ownership of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the presentday agreement, the desire to live together, the will to continue validating the heritage that has been inherited jointly. (Renan 1882, 26; my translation)

The nation, in other words, exists in the minds—the memories and the will— of the people who make it up. This is the conception that Anderson (1991, 6) returned to in defining the nation as “an imagined political community.” The “legacy of memories” Renan pointed to would dominate future philosophical and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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academic attempts to analyze national identity. The other element, the collective will of the people, would however have the deepest political impact, starting at Versailles. It has continued to be the assumed basis for the legitimacy of the political nation to the present day. For Hobsbawm, the events of 1870–1871, which Gellner had already acknowledged to be transformative, were the truly cardinal moments for modern nationalism. For the first time, ideological notions about nation and language, heretofore restricted to intellectuals and the government elite, spread down through the general populace, eventually even reaching the working class. Hobsbawm points to one further development in this period that would have dramatic consequences. Prior to about 1880, the claims of a group of people to constitute a “nation” would have been taken seriously only if their population met a certain unstated threshold. But from that time onward, any body of people considering themselves a “nation” claimed the right to selfdetermination. . . . [I]n consequence of this multiplication of potential “unhistorical” nations, ethnicity and language became the central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criterion of potential nationhood. (Hobsbawm 1990, 102)

This was the ideology that predominated at Versailles, but it was not actually the case that the older, Romantic belief in a deep, causal link between language and national identity died there. On the contrary, its most powerful realization was yet to come, in a Germany that saw itself as having to overcome unduly harsh treatment in the decisions made in 1919.

Dimensions One Nation, One Language The idea that language and nation reciprocally define one another has ancient roots, including the biblical ones discussed previously, but also classical ones. Epicurus held that a language arises from the exhalation of breath peculiar to each nation from the configuration of their bodies. Starting in the 15th century, momentum spread through western Europe for change in the traditional division of linguistic labor between Latin, used for all prestigious (or as sociolinguists call them, “high”) functions, and local vernaculars, used merely for “low” communication in the family and among the lower classes. Each nation, in the emerging modern sense of the term, required its own national language—which, however, had to be created from among a plethora of very divergent dialects, guided by a myth that somewhere in the past all the members of the nation had shared some unified version of the national tongue. The “one nation, one language” doctrine remained the implicit operating principle of those creating and enforcing the standard version of the national N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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language until the start of the 19th century, when events led to the doctrine becoming politicized. The previous section discussed how Napoleon’s conquests of German lands led Romantic thinkers to theorize that language defined the “natural” boundaries of nations. This theory solidified the doctrine of “one language, one nation” to such an extent that even those like Renan, whom the events of 1870–1871 would lead to discard Fichtean naturalness, nevertheless did not question the implicit assumption that each nation should have one and only one language. All that changed was the basis on which that unique language should be determined. Language Standardization In the second half of the 19th century, those eastern European and Scandinavian nations that had lacked a well-defined standard language of their own acquired one (or two, in the case of Norway, mentioned earlier, and Greece, where one form of the modern standard language was more classical in orientation and the other more demotic). Meanwhile, the older European standard languages, formed during the Renaissance, were subjected to a new wave of nationalistically motivated attempts to eliminate variation by establishing a single “correct” usage, based on scientific study of the language’s history. This was the age of the great modern dictionaries, such as the Oxford English Dictionary, the French Larousse, and their counterparts in every other major language. These same years witnessed the rise of the “history of the language” as a genre, following the plot of national histories, where the modern standard language is treated as the perfect expression of the national soul and its rise as an inevitable historical good. Those who contributed to its rise are portrayed as heroes, while anyone who tried to hold it back, either by sticking conservatively to Latin or by promoting a rival dialect as the vernacular standard, is shown up as a knave or a fool. However, this new wave of standardization also saw the resuscitation of attempts to promote other regional dialects that had lost out in the initial race to emerge as the national tongue. The Félibrège movement in the south of France was a particularly successful example. A new, standardized form of Provençal was promoted through the production of grammars and creative literature, notably by the poet Frédéric Mistral. Many others followed this example, in the Celticspeaking areas of the British Isles and France, the Basque and Catalan areas of France and Spain, and in other regions throughout western Europe. This new linguistic separatism continued to flourish through the 20th century, although states differed in the extent to which they tolerated regional vernaculars or tried to restrict them to private contexts. This was also the period in which the revival of Hebrew was being discussed and planned by European Zionists—though by no means were all of them agreed that Hebrew should be the national language of the eventual Jewish homeland. Attempts at standardizing Yiddish, JudeoSpanish, and Jewish dialects of Slavic and other Semitic languages were also under way. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Outside Europe, in the Americas, Oceania, and South Africa, the period saw growing recognition of national varieties of Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish that could legitimately follow norms of their own, independent of those of the European homeland. National language academies sprang up throughout South America in the last two decades of the 19th century. In most cases, what appeared objectively to be very minor differences took on great significance as markers of national identity within the standard written language— which continued to be 99 percent identical with its European counterpart—even when, as in the case of Quebec French or Brazilian Portuguese, the spoken form of the language (except as used by the educated middle and upper classes) had become largely incomprehensible to people in France or Portugal. In Asia, calls were heard for the traditional written languages, with their centuries or even millennia of venerable tradition, to be replaced with an alphabetic system, as modernizers looked generally to Western technological methods. Though these calls met with success in Indonesia and Malaysia, for Chinese there was a particular obstacle to alphabetization. The system of characters transcended differences among the Chinese dialects, which are as linguistically different from one another as are English, German, and Swedish. Alphabetization would have required the choice of one dialect as standard—a political and practical impossibility in China until the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. In Japan, the modernizers who had proposed the use of English in 1872 had by 1880 shifted their cultural allegiance toward Germany, from which educational models were imported. Universal Education Starting in the 1860s, and running to near completion by the 1890s, universal education spread through Europe and the Americas, and eventually to their colonies. This transformed the very nature of education, from being reserved for a select few to something everyone underwent, to differing degrees—ensuring that the aims of social equality that motivated universal education were partly but never wholly achieved, a fact that class differences in language have continued to reflect. Focusing on this same period, Hobsbawm notes that one social class in particular benefited from universal education: the lower middle class. The children of small tradesmen and artisans could, by passing examinations, enter into civil and colonial service and white-collar professions. As they moved up, the lower middle class was replenished by children of the working class making their ascent by the same process. “The classes which stood or fell by the official use of the written vernacular were the socially modest but educated middle strata, which included those who acquired lower middle-class status precisely by virtue of occupying non-manual jobs that required schooling” (Hobsbawm 1990, 117). These are also the people who become the mainstay of nationalism—not just by active flag-waving on symbolic occasions, but daily in the banal ways pointed to by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Billig (1995), including their use of “proper language” and their insistence on its norms. The education system provided the mechanism through which a general shift from dialects to the national language could be effected. Children were in the hands of the institution at least five days a week, and there were few legal constraints on what the institution could do with them, stick-wise. Carrot-wise, their local communities were generally in step with the “nationalizing” agenda, proud of the nation and its overseas empire, if it had one (or was part of one), and certain that prosperity and progress lay with national language and identity, and poverty and backwardness with the local. Economics and Modernization Gellner (1964, chap. 7) argued that nationalism was best understood as the result of the uneven way in which modernization had spread, causing massive economic and social changes, disrupting traditional lifestyles, and motivating people to move from the countryside into the cities. Traditional village and tribal structures no longer functioned, and what was available to replace them in the urban context was language and language-based culture, especially print culture. Modern education, funded by the state, grew up around the printed word, and functioned as an institution for creating new social hierarchies based upon literacy and standards of language. But the new hierarchies engendered new tensions, as people struggled to retain old privileges under the new regime. Ethnic alliances took on a new importance in this struggle, and from the new ethnic awareness, nationalist movements developed, “inventing” nations where, in reality, they did not exist. In later work, Gellner (1973, 1983) reformulated this theory to take into account certain facts it could not explain. One of these facts had to do with the central role he had assigned to language: it would predict that nationalisms would not arise in the absence of a recognized national language, yet there were plenty of examples of that happening, for instance, in the Arabic-speaking world and Hispanophone Latin America (as well as the English-speaking world, where separate American, Canadian, and the like subvarieties are recognized, but not as distinct languages). Moreover, relatively stable nations had formed around a multiplicity of languages, as in Switzerland. Gellner therefore shifted the focus away from language, and ever more onto the institutional structure of the public education system and its role in defining and maintaining a culture within which nationalism as a political principle is embedded and enacted in a wide range of ways. Imperialism In this climactic period of European imperialism (and American after 1898, when the United States took over Spain’s possessions), the language of the imperial power was the principal official language, though indigenous languages always N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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had a role, particularly at regional and local levels. Among the powers, France was most firm in its policy of “assimilationism”: government-provided education was in French, and any imperial subject who mastered spoken and written French was, in principle at least, treated like any other French citizen when it came to access to civil employment and the like. Britain was at the other extreme, favoring the development of indigenous languages for use in education, often in the face of strong opposition from the indigenous population, who preferred for their children to be educated in English on account of the opportunities for advancement that it offered. In most places and periods, the British administration ended up providing English-language education to meet the popular demand, even though this then meant opening up civil posts to colonial subjects when one of the empire’s main functions was to provide such well-paying posts for middleclass young men back home. Resistance to British rule in India and South Africa led not just to warfare but to linguistic resistance, through the promotion of languages such as Hindi and Afrikaans for use in high functions. In the main, however, the growing perception from the last decades of the 19th century onward that the United Kingdom and the United States were the dominant world powers fueled the view that English was becoming the dominant world language and would soon become the de facto international language unless something were done to stop it. This gave rise to both nationalist and internationalist reactions. Missionary activity spread as imperial conquest opened the way for it, and often had more direct and profound effects on education at the grassroots level than the official administration did. Missionaries taught the imperial language as part of Christianization; but protestant missionaries especially were also intensely interested in learning the languages of those they lived among, writing them down, composing lexicons and grammars, and ultimately translating the Bible into these languages and training others to preach in them. Evolutionary Theory and Racial Ideology From the mid-19th century, interpretations of Darwin emerged that held that the various human races represent distinct points on the evolutionary scale—in other words, that some races are more evolved than others, with the white race at the top and the black at the bottom, and with any racial mixture seen as bringing out the worst qualities of both. Linguistic evidence was adduced, though almost inevitably the features of the Indo-European languages were taken to be superior to other types. (Not that linguists generally held this view, but the promoters of racial inequality did, and they picked and chose their facts to support their claims.) Within linguistics itself, the assumption at the start of the 19th century had been that the Indo-European languages were descended from a highly complex ancestor tongue that had decayed over the centuries; this gave way to a newer, evolutionary view in which a simple original structure had complexified and progressed over time. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The goal of mainstream linguistics in this period was to reconstruct this original protolanguage, and such reconstruction was always open to interpretation and hence to ideology. By the 1920s, the notion of an original “Aryan” mother tongue, spoken by a race whose most pure descendants were to be found in the northern Germanic lands, had found many adherents and developed a literature that would grow substantially in the Nazi era. Hutton (1999) has shown how, after Nazi anthropologists admitted that no Jewish racial type could be determined on a physical basis, it was linguists who, adducing their own evidence and interpretations, gave the scientific backing to the policies that would produce the Holocaust. Impact on Different Groups It is not so much their language itself as beliefs about their language that serve to identify groups of people relative to one another, whether inter- or intranationally. Within Chinese culture there was and is absolute belief in the existence of a single unified Chinese language, despite the huge variation among dialects. On the other hand, Croatian and Serbian, each comprehensible in its spoken form to speakers of the other, have been maintained culturally as separate languages, in part through the use of the Roman alphabet for the one and the Cyrillic for the other. The cultural mandate for separation is underlain by religious difference, Serbia being predominantly Orthodox and Croatia Roman Catholic. So long as people believe that their way of speaking constitutes a language in its own right, there is a real sense in which it is a distinct language. They will probably find ways to “perform” their distinctive linguistic identity for the benefit of others, but ultimately this does not matter so much as does the existence of the “imagined community” of their language, to adapt the term created by Anderson (1991) to describe the nation. For Hobsbawm, national identity in the sense we usually think of it really goes back to Victorian shopkeepers and clerks who envied the sort of class-belonging enjoyed by the upper classes, with their clubs and aristocratic titles, and the workers, who could locate their identity in socialism. Neither the aristocrats nor the workers needed education to maintain their position; neither worried about their language in the way that the middle class had to do, at least that very substantial portion of the middle class whose standing rested on their command of standard written and spoken usage. “One might suggest that the self-definition of the lower middle classes . . . was not so much as a class, but as the body of the most zealous and loyal, as well as the most ‘respectable’ sons and daughters of the fatherland” (Hobsbawm 1990, 122). In other words, although their real identity was that of a social class, they masked it for themselves and others in a nationalistic guise. And the mask was double-sided: in their obsession with “speaking properly” as a mark of respectability, they were contributing to the linguistic construction of their nation. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Consequences Saussure (1916) discussed the tension in language between its unifying and fragmenting tendencies. A shared language is what makes intercourse possible among all the members of a nation, and without which it is difficult to suspend disbelief in their existence as an imagined community. Features of one’s language that mark regional or local identity—or ethnic, religious, sectarian, generational, or class identity—will serve to fragment the national identity, though not necessarily to weaken it. If, however, other fragmenting tendencies are present, the linguistic tendencies become extremely salient, as every time one opens one’s mouth, one manifests one’s position relative to the split. From 1880 to 1945, the position taken by states was, with few exceptions, to promote the standard form of the national language to the exclusion of any minority languages or nonstandard dialects. In countries undergoing a high level of immigration during this period, such as the United States and Australia, the education of the immigrants’ children in English was assumed to be crucial to the desired “melting pot” effect whereby all of them would take on the shared identity of their adopted homeland. The same policy was applied to aboriginals—their languages would be tolerated, in the assurance that educating their children in English would lead soon enough to their linguistic assimilation. In the event, some of the larger indigenous languages have proved more resilient than anyone might have imagined. Exceptions to the toleration of immigrant languages occurred in parts of the United States during World War I, when the use of German was banned in the Midwestern states with large German-speaking populations, and in World War II, when the use of Japanese was banned in California. In both cases, the rationale was that this was the only way to prevent espionage by “the enemy within.” Backlashes against language nationalism manifested themselves through movements for the promotion of regional languages and artificial international languages. Both were aimed at undermining the growing force of national identity, though only the regional language movements were ever seen as a serious threat to the cohesion of the state. Within the United Kingdom, Welsh- and Gaelic-speaking children were punished for using their mother tongue at school, even in the playground, as, too, were Norman French–speaking children in the Channel Islands and children in Brittany, the Basque country, and other minority language areas. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics portrayed itself as unusually tolerant of its linguistic minorities, particularly in the Caucasus—but in fact, a thorough competence in Russian was necessary for anyone who aspired to be part of the nomenklatura. Much the same was true with regard to Turkish in the multilingual Ottoman Empire. Like every manifestation of nationalism, language nationalism is a doubleedged sword. It gives meaning to people’s lives by marking and manifesting their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Signposts giving original Irish (Gaelic) place names alongside English ones created in the 1820s and 1830s for the British government’s general survey of the island. In 2007 Irish became the 23rd official language of the European Union. (Corel)

identity and allowing them to bond with those who share that identity. But it does so at the price of making it impossible to ignore differences vis-à-vis other groups, thus helping to keep opposition and hostility alive. The “one nation, one language” doctrine, romantic and oversimplified as it was, allowed many oppressed peoples to gain their independence in 1919, in some cases after centuries of foreign domination. Yet it was inseparable from the doctrines that fed into “scientific racism” and Aryan superiority and that were ultimately used to justify genocide. Language nationalism remains no less central an issue today than it was a century ago. In every country of the world, tensions continue between official language and vernaculars, and among groups who do not share a vernacular or who use different dialects of one. Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989–1991, the perception that English is becoming the de facto international language has once again become as strong as it was in the late 19th century, spawning no less strong reactions against it. The concept of minority language rights, which has emerged in recent years, has made significant legal inroads into the “one nation, one language” doctrine—but has also met with fierce popular resistance, not only from majority language speakers but from within the minority groups themselves, where there are inevitably schisms between those whose primary concern is for their children to assimilate and those more worried about them losing their heritage. Increases in immigration, particularly from eastern to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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western Europe and from the southern hemisphere to the northern, have led many developed countries to resuscitate policies in support of the national language not unlike those of the period covered in this article, policies that had long been thought consigned to the dustbin of history. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. New York: Verso. (1st ed., 1983.) Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Fichte, J. G. 1808. Reden an die deutsche Nation. Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung. Gellner, E. 1964. Thought and Change. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson. Gellner, E. 1973. “Scale and Nation.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3:1–17. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hobsbawm, E. J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programmes, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hutton, C. M. 1999. Linguistics and the Third Reich: Mother-tongue Fascism, Race and the Science of Language. New York: Routledge. Jespersen, O. 1925. Mankind, Nation, and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Joseph, J. E. 1987. Eloquence and Power: The Rise of Language Standards and Standard Languages. New York: Blackwell. Joseph, J. E. 2004. Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kedourie, E. 1960. Nationalism. London: Hutchinson. (4th ed. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993.) Kohn, H. 1944. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Macmillan. Renan, E. 1882. Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars. Paris: Calmann Lévy. Saussure, F. de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale, edited by C. Bally and A. Sechehaye with the collaboration of A. Riedlinger. Paris and Lausanne: Payot. [English translations by Wade Baskin. 1959. Course in General Linguistics. New York: Philosophical Library; Roy Harris. 1983. La Salle, IL: Open Court.] Smith, A. D. 1998. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism. New York: Routledge.

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Literature and Nationalism Jason Dittmer Relevance By the dawn of the 21st century, the lands of the globe had been divided up into mutually exclusive territories, each marked with a different color on the world political map as a way of visually distinguishing among them. The map makes a particular statement about these territories; the colors of each country neither overlap nor blend together, signifying a fundamental difference between the people on one side of the border and the other. That perception of a fundamental cultural difference is visible in a variety of ways in real, lived space—such as the belief that there are “national” schools of literature that incorporate many authors who are linked together via mutual interaction and influence more than they are interconnected with other “foreign” authors. These authors are seen as ineluctably linked together by their common experience as national subjects, regardless of the other contextual factors that may divide them (such as social class, race, or religion). Indeed, Anderson (1991) pointed to the creation of the printing press and the linguistic standardization it inspired as a turning point in the formation of national communities. This division of Goethe’s Weltliteratur, or literature at the grandest geographical scale, into national schools was but one effect of the processes that have nationalized us all, or rendered us into willing subjects of the nation-state. If the Age of Self-Determination can be defined as the shift from land-based multinational empires to nation-states (at least in some parts of the world, like eastern Europe), then special attention must be paid to this idea of the nationstate itself, and the novel fusion of culture and polity represented by the term. Indeed, much has been made of the formal political processes that take nations and fuse them with political systems (such as the American Revolution), while relatively little attention has been paid to the equally political process of forging the nation and its unifying culture through differentiation from the “other,” or those who should be isolated, literally, beyond the pale. This is an oversight, however, as the formal processes would never have proceeded as they did without the cultural claim required by nationalism being satisfied. Would the American colonies have been able to band together against the British if there had not been a sense of commonality at least partially in place before the conflict? A Marxist explanation for historical events, such as the American Revolution, which are rooted in pure economic determinism, fails to pass muster, as was demonstrated by the failure of the international proletariat to emerge as predicted despite the workers’ alleged common economic interest and 80 years of opportunity. Perhaps this N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was because of Marxism’s ideological blindness to culture in the face of its economic determinism. However, this ideological blindness to culture compelled some of the best analysis of culture and its role in perpetuating a status quo of inequality and national identity. When other intellectuals ignored popular culture for being too low to consider, Italian communist Antonio Gramsci (1971) argued that everyday life is shaped by cultural and political elites in such a way that subjects believe in the state’s legitimate hegemony over them. It is through this top-down establishment of hegemony that literature can be seen as a force in identity formation. Louis Althusser took Gramsci’s idea of hegemony and theorized it more explicitly with his concept of interpellation, which can be directly applied to literature. Althusser (1977) argued that Gramsci’s cultural elites disseminate a discourse of national unity and exclusion of outsiders (in this case, through books or other forms of literature) that incorporates a wide variety of cultural markers found among the people that the elites are hoping to unite. Readers of these books then self-identify with portions of this discourse, and discard the parts that they feel do not apply to them. Nevertheless, the nation is unified through its acceptance of the discourse, even if individuals disagree about which parts are accurate depictions of their way of life. Thus, national identity is constructed by the interpellation of people through various overlapping and contradictory national narratives that all emphasize unique aspects of the peoples’ lived experiences. Once national communities are created, they are sustained through the same interpellation that constructed them in the first place. Articulated through such various literary media as newspapers, novels, and comic books, national identity can vary in meaning, as it is contested by various actors in society, and can vary in intensity, as attitudes become cosmopolitan in response to a faraway disaster or more nationalistic in response to military saber rattling. It is important to remember that interpellation is not an oppressive top-down formulation by which nationality is force-fed to the consuming public. Rather, it is a theorization in which the ability of cultural elites to produce texts (and the power of political elites to co-opt those cultural elites) is counterbalanced by the general population’s ability to reject the various discourses being offered to them, or at least to accept parts of it selectively. Thus, the Marxist idea that citizens are duped into believing in their national identity must be set aside; rather, we must see citizens as participants in the ongoing processes of nation-making and nation-shaping. Theoretically, the processes of nation-making and nation-shaping are similar, as described above; however, during the Age of Self-Determination (and today) they were often set in opposition to each other. That is, the discourses of unity espoused by those aspiring for statehood attempted to differentiate their “nation” from the state in which they were presently situated. The political tension resulting from this anticolonial, nationalist discourse resulted in an imperial, nationalist counterdiscourse in which either the essential cultural unity of metropole and colony were emphasized or the exceptionalism of the metropole (or backwardN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ness of the colony) was such that the status quo had to be preserved. This chapter will focus on both types of nationalism, but mostly on groups seeking to legitimate a new political identity. In either case, cultural claims remained at the heart of the debate over independence and empire. Thus, literature was a battlefield on which cultural claims were contested and substantiated.

Origins Nationalist literature during the colonial period had as its goal the creation of separate categories for colonizers and colonized. While certainly this was already the case in other ways (legal, economic, etc.), the tendency among colonizers was to elide those differences in order to maintain a territorial claim on the land of the colonized and thus justify the modification of that selfsame land. The desire of the colonized to maintain their own specific link to their territory alongside the everyday violation of that territory spurred authors to create a new landscape, even if only in the realm of literature. “The search for authenticity, for a more congenial national origin than that provided by colonial history, for a new pantheon of heroes, myths, and religions, these too are enabled by the land” (Said 1990, 79). Perhaps the earliest of the iconic writers from this time period who can help us understand the principles involved in the broader realm of nationalist literature is William Butler Yeats. Born in 1865, Yeats lived on both coasts of Ireland before moving to London with his family. He returned to Ireland at the age of 15, and shortly thereafter began to write poetry. By 1889, he had begun to move into

Irish poet and playwright William Butler Yeats is one of the earliest examples of a nationalist writer from this era. (Library of Congress)

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themes that could later be looked back upon as nationalist, such as pre-Christian Irish mythology (as in “The Wanderings of Oisin”). This attempt to construct a pre-English Irish landscape dominated his early work, when he argued that writers should play a serious role in the struggle for independence: “Creative work has always a fatherland; . . . there is no fine nationality without literature, and . . . the converse also, . . . there is no fine literature without nationality” (quoted in Tracy 1972, 39). Later, Yeats was to become consumed with the inability of Ireland to liberate itself, largely because of the opening of a significant divide between the workers and the bourgeoisie. The unwillingness of the middle class to assist the revolutionary nationalist workers led Yeats to move away from his earlier, romanticized Ireland. Seamus Deane has argued that Yeats’s emphasis on primordial Ireland was “amenable to his imagination . . . [whereas] he ended by finding an Ireland recalcitrant to it” (quoted in Said 1990, 80). Still, with the Easter Uprising in 1916, Yeats felt that a cycle of continual Irish defeat had been broken and that the requirement of a mythologized origin for the Irish nation was removed, leaving instead an essentialized Irish character rooted in a fundamentally metaphysical consciousness. This acceptance of a fundamental and essentialized national character, such as the “spiritual Irish,” is characteristic of nationalist literature during the Age of Self-Determination. The need to differentiate a group of people from the colonizer requires a rallying point, a set of cultural traits that all in the nation can reasonably have claim to (this is also true of the postcolonial world; see Fanon 1965, for example). Unfortunately, this is the mirror image of the modern colonial process through which groups are identified, classified, and inscribed as part of the hierarchy of peoples within the empire. In this sense, nationalist literature can be seen as co-opting and inverting the systems of knowledge that the colonizer produces. This is visible elsewhere within the empires of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The term “negritude,” as used in the work of Léopold Senghor (Senegal), Aimé Césaire (Martinique), and Léon Damas (French Guiana), engages in the same type of binary identity formation. Négritude refers to a type of African solidarity in the face of French colonialism that included a rejection of assimilation into the French body politic and a reclamation of “blackness” as a positive attribute. Thus, negritude affirmed racial boundaries as being significant, but simply inverted the generally negative normative values associated with them. To return to the Irish prototype, Yeats’s conception of a primordial Irish race dovetailed with an overarching shift in the conception of the nation-state across Europe from a politically liberal one (generally dateable to the beginning of the French Revolution) to an organic form, most clearly enunciated in Friedrich Ratzel’s Politische Geography in 1897. Ratzel’s belief was that the state was but a symbol of the strength of the nation, which was in turn rooted in the spiritual connection between the people and their land. Strong nations, like organisms, would expand at the expense of their weaker neighbors. The idea of the organic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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state was largely adopted by the imperial powers, and later was taken from the metropolitan center to the outposts of the empire where it began to take root in an anticolonial context. In this way, the claim of organic states was essentially apolitical, as Yeats’s primordial fantasy of an essentialized, ethnic Ireland was used to fight against British imperial domination, and Ratzel’s concept of Lebensraum was infamously used to bring the liberatory Age of Self-Determination to an end with the Nazi invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Liberal and organic nationalism differ in the relationship of citizen to state. In liberal nationalism, every citizen is entitled to the same treatment under the law, and citizenship is based on (largely) voluntary association. However, in organic nationalism, treatment by the state is linked to cultural or ethnic traits, which are also the basis for citizenship. The primary unit of analysis under the liberal model of the state is the individual; under the organic model of the state, the nation becomes that primary unit of analysis. This difference is paralleled by a shift in narrative style from the impersonal narrator (representing the universality of the liberal state) in the late 1800s to a more subjective, personal style after 1900. This could be “either a projection of the consciousness of an individual protagonist (as in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, À la recherche du temps perdu, or Heart of Darkness) or a more generalized projection of a collective consciousness (as in Ulysses or the last novels of Henry James)” (Lewis 2000, 10). Authors writing in this vein helped to explore the question of identity and subjectivity: To what degree are individuals capable of stepping outside of their nationality? Authors such as Conrad, Joyce, Proust, and d’Annunzio had varying answers to that question, but each “focused attention on the shaping of the individual by the nation and on the potential for the individual in turn to redeem the nation in time of war or crisis” (Lewis 2000, 11). The process of interpellation outlined at the beginning of this chapter can be seen to have some flesh on its bones; that is, we can see that even as authors were reacting and contributing to the changing political philosophies around them, through the incorporation of primordial national essences (e.g., Yeats’s Celtic romanticism) or subjective narration (e.g., Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus from A Portrait of a Writer as a Young Man), readers were exposed to a variety of frameworks for the nation, either liberal or organic, appealing to either Enlightenment principles or the new emerging modernity of classifiable differences among peoples. Therefore, whatever type of Ireland, Australia, Finland, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Albania was recognized by readers as ideologically acceptable, there was literature available. Readers with completely opposed visions of the nationstate would nevertheless agree on the existence of that nation-state. Indeed, as F. Scott Fitzgerald pointed out, the truly great thinker is identifiable by his or her “ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function” (1945, 69). Interpellated nationalism can be viewed in this same way—as a mishmash of mutually contradictory ideas that the subject can pull from selectively to make sense of their everyday experience. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Through this process of interpellation, identities formed, solidified, and manifested themselves politically through anticolonial movements, imperial parades, and particular regimes of power and wealth accumulation. The world of literature reified a particular European vision of how the world should be divided up, both territorially and culturally. In other words, the nation-state—this peculiar claim about how the world should be divided into those differently colored boxes on the world map—began to move from the world of ideas into the material world, imaginary yet real at the same time. Of course, the specific ways in which this took place around the world vary greatly, as does the impact of literature on that process. In some places the belief in national organic uniqueness is firmly believed to this day; in others the idea is still found, but only among fringe groups or as an artifact in historical literature. It is to a sampling of these stories that this chapter turns to next.

Dimensions British Nationalism and the Call to Empire British nationalism was of supreme importance during the Age of Self-Determination because it was the British will to power, inspired in part through particular representations in literature, that necessitated anticolonial representations of other places and groups of people, such as those made by Yeats and the Irish. At the beginning of the 20th century, much of British literature was concerned with the twin pulls of traditional insularity and global power. In particular, the work of E. M. Forster reflected this split in British identity: “His narratives, like the protagonists within them, require the symbolic crunch and frisson of cultural difference provided by metropolitan perception as well as the lingering allure of insular landscapes. They require, in other words, the coexistence of British hegemony and Anglocentric idealism” (Esty 2004, 25). For instance, in Howard’s End, the Schlegels are cosmopolitan and modern while the Wilcoxes are more aristocratic and traditional. Similarly, in The Other Side of the Hedge, Forster creates a spatial imaginary in which each side of the hedgerow represents a very different aspect of English identity, either insular or imperial, separated by the material landscape but tangential nonetheless. The British literature of the Age of Self-Determination was often extremely nostalgic for the seemingly lost insular England yet unable to ignore the increasing dominance of their global commercial and imperial relations over everyday life on that island. Between 1880 and 1945, the British imperial project lost steam with opposition forming in southwest Asia from the Russians and in the Caribbean from the Americans. Further, the Boer War at the beginning of the 20th century left the national will to power shaken. Still, this did not necessitate a loss of national identity and superiority. For instance, with the outbreak of war in SepN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tember 1939, Virginia Woolf wrote, “Civilization has shrunk” (1984, 237). Thus, even as the cracks in empire were showing, British identity was able to shift from a process of othering their imperial subjects to another process that identified the Nazis as uncivilized and everything that was not English. German Nationalism and the Rise of Nazism The relatively new country of Germany, in contrast to the British during this period, can be seen as growing in its will to power, particularly as viewed through the lens of literature. No country had embraced the principle of organic nationstates with the depth of the Germans. Following an intellectual lineage from Friedrich Ratzel to his Swedish student Rudolf Kjellén to German nationalist Karl Haushofer, the German school of thought of Geopolitik argued for a Social Darwinist–inspired form of policy formation. Haushofer himself wrote that small states had no right to exist, as their cultures were weak and therefore vulnerable to takeover by the superior German Kultur. This was mirrored in the German press, which not only viewed Germans as superior to those they colonized, but also ethically superior to the other colonial powers: One cartoon [ found in a left-liberal satirical magazine], entitled “Colonial Powers,” compared regimes in four separate pictures: a Belgian administrator is shown roasting an African on a spit; French legionnaires play childish sexual games with heavy-limbed and apparently primitive African women; and a British soldier puts an African through a press in order to squeeze out money from his intestine. German officers, in contrast, are depicted with a line of giraffes, not Africans, which they are teaching to goose-step. (Hewitson 2000, 37)

This sense of superiority rose to a fever pitch in World War I Germany, as it did in other wartime nations. However, as the war ground on, a more humanist perspective began to take root, culminating in the ascendancy of Expressionism after the war (Rose 1964). This Expressionism was tied to the disappointment of the younger generations of Germans with the postwar revolution to enact truly radical change. Over time, however, the intellectuals behind this movement steadily lost ground as tougher censorship laws were enacted in the Weimar twilight. The rise of Nazism cannot be adequately seen through the lens of literature because of the heavy hand of government on the pens of the writers. Japanese Nationalism after the Meiji Restoration Japanese nationalist literature is worthy of study for the same reasons as German literature; it provides insight into the cultural prerequisites of an era of imperial outreach. Japanese nationalist literature at the dawn of the 20th century was inextricably linked to poetry, which was a traditional stronghold of nationalism following the Meiji Restoration of the late 1860s. In the 1890s, there was a concerted effort among cultural elites to create a new nationalist form of poetry that was independent of roots in the archaic form of the Japanese language and stripped of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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loan words from China. This new poetry, known as Shintaishi, would be in the colloquial, everyday language of the people and be explicitly patriotic (Bourdaghs 2003). What is unique about this new form of nationalist literature compared with already-described forms is its absolute disavowal of the past, its rejection of the primordial Japan. Similarly, the traditional forms of poetry, such as haiku and tanka, were transformed by the assertion of more masculine and patriotic themes. Thus, the national identity was sculpted into a masculine, modern form, explicitly rejecting the traditional, more feminine image of the pre-Meiji court in Kyoto. This clearly parallels the rise of Japanese imperialism throughout east Asia and the Pacific. Argentinian Nationalism amid Ethnic Transition The influx of Europeans into Argentina in the late 1800s swamped the ethnic Spanish (criollos), creating an immigrant nation that often despised the uneducated criollos who worked as gaucho cowboys throughout the Pampas. Therefore, the creation of a coherent national identity faced some of the same problems as in Japan: disdain for the ancient (and even recent) past left the primordial Argentina undesirable as the source of identity. Nevertheless, with time, the gaucho culture, which was virtually extinguished under President Sarmiento’s rule (“Fertilizing the soil with their blood is the only thing gauchos are good for”) in the 1870s, was rehabilitated into a mythic source of local identity to differentiate the Buenos Aires intellectual from his peers across the Atlantic. The creation of this idealized synthesis, however, often ignored the realities of native Indian and gaucho culture, which were seen as not being useful in constructing the desired identity: In his [Ricardo Rojas, the “dean of Argentine letters”] collections of essays, The Nationalist Restitution (1909), Argentinidad (1916), and Eurindia (1924), [Rojas] looked for an easy synthesis of what he called “exotismo” and “indianismo,” meaning a European and American heritage. What he failed to investigate was the nature of his “indianismo”—Argentina had no Toltec, Maya, or Quechua civilizations to draw from and the regional culture patterns were European. (Lewald 1972, 306)

Therefore, Argentinian identity came to focus on the land itself as a transformative factor that took European influences and rendered them Argentinian in a way that was similar to the Turner Frontier Hypothesis in the United States. Polish Nationalism during Partition The division of the Polish state in successive partitions culminated in the destruction of the Napoleonic Polish state in the Congress of Vienna. From 1880 on, then, the Polish nation was strongly in need of a literature with which it could maintain identity in the face of political repression, such as the Russification and Germanization of Polish education systems by their occupiers. As would be expected of a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nation with an independent past within its recent history, the Poles intentionally turned to historical models, specifically adventure stories of Polish exploits against the Ukrainians, Turks, and Swedes. The leading author of these novels was Henryk Sienkiewicz, who consciously sought to provide encouragement for Poles in the face of domination. Often compared to Alexander Dumas’s tales of derring-do, Sienkiewicz’s stories (most notably The Trilogy) were simple in narrative form and produced for a general audience, which approved heartily. The impact of his writing was long lasting in the Polish consciousness; during World War II, the names of characters were used as code words by the Polish resistance (Eile 2000). One contemporary reviewer, an aristocrat professor (Count Stanislaw Tarnowski), emphasized the importance of Sienkiewicz’s contrast between Poland and less civilized groups to the east (such as the Cossacks), and indeed, his contrast with any group that was not Catholic: His sympathetic appreciation concerned Sienkiewicz’s emphasis on Polish cultural mission in the East and his religiousness, blended with patriotism. Tarnowski concluded that in the age of materialism and skepticism [Sienkiewicz’s book] promoted the faith and love of fatherland, and at times when understanding of history was becoming smaller, and Polish customs gradually decreasing, it turned attention to the past and its noble greatness. (Eile 2000, 113)

Needless to say, Ukrainian authorities complained about the revisionist history often incorporated into Sienkiewicz’s fiction, but that only made the books more popular in Poland. The construction of a narrative in which Polish individualists unite into a cohesive unit for a collective holy war against outsiders opposed to the Virgin Mary was not only profitable for Sienkiewicz but also helped to create a simplistic national myth understandable by the entire nation as they struggled to retain a sense of collective identity under harsh assimilatory policies by their occupiers. African American Nationalism in the Harlem Renaissance It is important to remember that not all nationalism is tied to success—the examples given thus far all come from successful national movements that either resulted in the creation of a state or the amplification of a particular type of national identity. For African Americans after the Civil War, there was no need to construct a coherent identity; they had had an identity thrust upon them. Despite their legal equality, their perceived racial differences led them to be separated out as a “minority race” within the dominant discourse of white America. This was nothing new for African Americans, as that racial difference had been the basis, both legally and philosophically, of slavery. What was lacking was the ability to invert racial categories so that “blackness” (negritude) could be seen as a normative good rather than a stigma. Thus, discourses of African American liberation dovetailed with the discourses of the Age of Self-Determination around the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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world, often literally. The arrival of Marcus Garvey from Jamaica is just such an example of the transnational nature of the African American nationalist movement. Garvey, although not a literary author, did publish several newspapers that advocated for a return to Africa by motivated and capable African Americans. The inspiration of his movement led many African American authors like Claude McKay and Zora Neale Hurston to focus on the everyday, folk identity of life in the ghetto; in combination with other art forms, this came to be known as the Harlem Renaissance (Emerson 1972). However, these authors were not politically unified: some sought a release from prejudice through Soviet-inspired socialism in the United States, some advocated assimilation under the current regime, and Garvey’s hopes for an independent Africa called to yet others. Nevertheless, despite their different goals, they all harnessed a sense of difference through realism, both in the colloquial form of English that their characters spoke (as in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man) and in the types of issues on which they focused (as in Richard Wright’s Native Son). Nationalist Literature in the American South Another form of nationalist literature that never quite achieved its stated goal is that of the American South. Although the Civil War had created a very strong sense of Southern identity among the unreconstructed population—ironically in a way similar to the process that constructed African American identity—a common sense of persecution left no doubt as to who was a (white) Southerner. The question remained, however, as to what that identity meant. Antebellum Southern literature had been very concerned with the representation of the slave-based plantation system as redemptive, that is, the plantation system represented “the static image of a community of chosen people existing in a pastoral dispensation which it is America’s destiny to fulfill” (Simpson 1972, 201). This can be seen in various novels like George Tucker’s The Valley of Shenandoah (1824) and John Esten Cooke’s The Virginia Comedians (1854). The Civil War created a new nation where, arguably, there was not one before, with a new mythology and sense of self that was purged of its need to justify the actual practice of plantation slavery and instead stood for antimodern traditionalism in the face of the spiritual corruption of the American North. In particular, Southern literature incorporated a fusion of Confederate mythology with Christian imagery of purity and a forthcoming resurrection. Simpson (1972, 204) quotes Thomas Nelson Page’s essay published in 1892: “The South was dead, and buried, and yet she rose again. The voice of God called her forth; she came clad in her grave-clothes, but living, and with her face uplifted to the heavens from which had sounded the call of her resurrection.” Interestingly, Page goes on to specifically lament the lack of antebellum writing of the South, which not only makes the antebellum South unrecoverable as anything but an imaginary space but also because this lack of place promotion had material consequences in the lack of support from outsiders. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Page’s call to action remained largely unanswered until after World War I, when writers like William Faulkner and Robert Penn Warren emerged. These authors wrote about the American South in a very depoliticized way, ignoring the Lost Cause imagery that had motivated their predecessors. Instead, they substituted a humanist perspective for the collectivist, nationalist perspective that Page presumably would have preferred. This was enabled by changing geopolitical circumstances, as the United States as a whole began to focus outside its borders in its search of an “other” to construct its identity against. Thus, the Lost Cause narratives began to lose their role as the primary source of identity in the American South. However, that imagery is clearly still resonant, as is the idea of Southern spirituality redeeming the entire nation.

Consequences As we have seen, literature consistently plays a role in the creation and perpetuation of national difference and exceptionalism, even if this sense of national difference and exceptionalism does not always come through identical formulations and does not always result in an independent nation-state of the type described at the beginning of this chapter. However, it should be noted that literature (and literacy itself), in most times and places, has been largely the province of the elite, with very little immediate impact on the vast majority of the population. This is not to deny the efficacy of literature as an agent of social cohesion and identity formation, as literature can shape the discourses that elites then transmit through speeches and other media to the masses. I am arguing, though, that literacy rates provide an outline of the times and places in which nationalist literature has had (or will have) the most impact. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, literacy rates in all parts of the world were very low in comparison to our contemporary situation, and following the Industrial Revolution the literacy rate grew in a very spatially uneven way. In 1970 (the first year UNESCO statistics are available), the world literacy rate was 64.4 percent; it can be safely assumed that during the Age of Self-Determination it was lower and more spatially uneven. Ironically, during the Age of Self-Determination literature was most widely available in the economically privileged societies that were most likely to be independent nation-states already. For example, according to their censuses, Puerto Rico’s literacy rate in 1899 was 18.3 percent and Jamaica’s literacy rate in 1901 was 45.4 percent (Núñez 2005). This bias toward the developed world has already been demonstrated, in a way, through the selection of the nationalist literatures in the preceding section, which come generally from developed countries. Until recently, literacy rates have been low throughout most of the world, and even now, they are highly spatially uneven in ways reminiscent of the past. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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UNESCO map of world adult (15 years +) literacy rates by country, 1995–2005. (UNESCO Institute for Statistics)

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Ironically, as literacy rates have been improving around the world, the reading of literature in the developed world has declined as technological innovations in printing, broadcasting, and film have come to define the new, more visual media of the post-1945 era: comic books, television, and movies. Thus, the ability of writers to disseminate nationalist messages appears to be in relative decline as the reading of literature becomes less prevalent (NEA 2004). Comic book characters like Captain America, besides bringing a highly visual way of framing World War II as a morality tale of conflict between good (the United States) and evil (Germany, the Japanese), also brought the ability to provide nationalist imagery and text to younger audiences who might not have the reading skills or patience to read a novel. Similarly, World War II saw the collaboration of Hollywood with the U.S. government to produce war movies that featured the same simple, moral form of nationalism found in wartime comics. That cooperation has continued, with cinematic representations of the nation proving critical in interpellating an audience into a nation and constructing geopolitical realities (Sharp 1998). Thus, while literature is critical to understanding the birth of the many nationstates created during this period and to the growth of this era’s anticolonial movements, which would flower in the period immediately following 1945, the power of literature to shape national consciousnesses would become circumscribed by changes in the technologies associated with cultural production and with the habits associated with cultural consumption. Selected Bibliography Althusser, L. 1977. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. London: New Left Books. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Bhabha, H. 1990. “Introduction.” In Nation and Narration, 1–8. London: Routledge. Bourdaghs, M. 2003. The Dawn that Never Comes: Shimazaki To¯son and Japanese Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Eile, S. 2000. Literature and Nationalism in Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Emerson, O. B. 1972. “Cultural Nationalism in Afro-American Literature.” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 211–244. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Esty, J. 2004. A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fanon, F. 1965. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Fitzgerald, F. S. 1945. The Crack Up. New York: New Directions. Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Hewitson, M. 2000. “Nation and Nationalismus: Representational and national identity in Imperial Germany.” In Representing the German Nation: History and Identity in TwentiethCentury Germany, 19–62. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Lewald, H. Et. 1972. “Argentine Literature: National or European?” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 303–319. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

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Lewis, P. 2000. Modernism, Nationalism, and the Novel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). 2004. Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in America. Research Division Report 46. Núñez, J. 2005. “Signed with an X: Methodology and Data Sources for Analyzing the Evolution of Literacy in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1900–1950.” Latin American Research Review 40:117–135. Rose, W. 1964. Men, Myths, and Movements in German Literature. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press. Said, E. 1990. “Yeats and Decolonization.” In Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature, 69–95. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Sharp, J. 1998. “Reel Geographies of the New World Order: Staging Post-Cold War Geopolitics in American Movies.” In Rethinking Geopolitics, 152–169. New York: Routledge. Simpson, L. P. 1972. “Southern Spiritual Nationalism: Notes on the Background of Modern Southern Fiction.” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 189–210. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Tracy, R. 1972. “Ireland: The Patriot Game.” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 39–57. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. UNESCO. 2002. “Regional Adult Illiteracy Rate and Population by Gender–July 2002.” (Retrieved March 19, 2006), http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/UIS_Literacy_ Regional2002.xls. Woolf, V. 1984. The Diary of Virginia Woolf. San Diego: Harcourt Press.

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National Rituals of Belonging Ulf Hedetoft Relevance Rituals of belonging are a normal part of the formation and maintenance of national identities; they are particularly crucial in the period from ca. 1880 to the end of World War II. This is a historical era containing important developments involving imperialism and nationalism, fascism and democracy, colonialism and incipient decolonization. It holds within it two world wars. And it is the historical phase encompassing what is often referred to as the nationalization of the masses (Mosse 1975), the cultural process through which national identities are shaped and ordinary people learn to think of their primary site of identification as the state and territory where they were born—rather than, for instance, their familial, local, or occupational ties. In this process, perceptions of the national “other” —nation-states and peoples existing outside of the state border—are formed and deployed in different situations. To both of these mutually dependent processes— creating self-identity and forming images of alterity—rituals of belonging are integral and indispensable. Belonging and feelings of emotional attachment to nation-states become increasingly important as the period progresses and the geopolitical map transforms into one composed of formally symmetrical units, in which the general aspiration is congruity between state and nation (Gellner 1983), and where the units interact with each other in the framework of the international order. The interests in constructing national “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983/1991) were many, varying from one locality and context to the next, and having multiple historical backgrounds. Generally, however, by the end of the 19th century, interstate competition in Europe—the breeding ground of nationalism—had reached a point where the mobilization of the masses in the name of the nation and across internal divides like class, ethnicity, or region was invested with evergreater significance by political and cultural elites. The driving force behind these developments was directly linked to the formation of political regimes competing for the same European and global resources (territory, raw materials, trading outlets, cultural domination, and so forth). Year by year, this competition among European colonial powers pulled them into a political game with inevitable military consequences. This build-up toward confrontation and war called for clear self/other demarcations and popular support of elite objectives on an unprecedented scale. Simultaneously, but for different reasons, people were beginning to demand (and to some extent achieve) social and political rights, that is, to be recognized as citizenries and electorates. State N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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demands for a mentality of sacrifice thus dovetailed with popular demands for influence, rights, and recognition. The result in many cases was powerful forms of identity and belonging, feeding off hostile images of the “other,” and inculcated by means of a combination of materialism (prospects for improved livelihoods) and idealism (identification with national mythologies and “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Rituals and ritualism—public displays of attachment between rulers and ruled in a stylized form—constituted an indispensable part of this political process of mobilizing communities by forging overlapping “vertical” and “horizontal” solidarities, that is, deep-seated sentiments of belonging between state and nation and among different sections of the population. Such forms of repetitive public spectacle assumed extraordinary significance during turbulent periods, in which state confrontations were the order of the day and public mobilization around state objectives could not, like today, rely on the power of the mass media. This core function in turn is related to the nature of rituals as well as the formative process they were being asked to serve. Rituals are symbols in collective practice, social enactments of belonging, faith, and identity, and repeated narratives of communality. They are simple, iterative, and formal displays of “us-ness,” spun into webs of cultural meaning (Geertz 1973). They cannot be decoded without a cultural key, and therefore refuse to give away their secret at first glance. Their meaning can only be grasped by knowing about their historical, cultural, and sociopolitical context. In particular, their core meaning and role are intimately connected with the temporal dimension of the national community, with the present enactment of the past, and with creating an imaginary bridge between past, present, and future. Some scholars argue that in this way, rituals create a suspension of time through the (repeated) enactment of the past in the present and the dramatization of collective memory. It is just as important, however, that rituals—like state funerals, commemorating dead soldiers and heroic deeds, royal parades, or the singing of national anthems—have the capacity to override reason while appealing directly to emotional responses of a sentimental, nostalgic, pitiful, proud, or jubilant nature. Finally, rituals are able to combine the realm of the profane with that of sacrality and faith, and thus the imaginaries of life and death, fatality and eternity. This is partly because humans seem to be generally disposed toward magic, myth-making, and ritualism in order to imbue earthly problems and processes with a higher inscrutable purpose—and partly because ritualism by its very form orchestrates and enacts the elements of self-abnegation, lack of free will, subjection under a collective order, and affective attachment, which national allegiance and religious conviction have in common (Hayes 1960). All of this is significant for understanding the appeal and effectiveness of national rituals in the transformative phase under review. Not only was it shot through with numerous smaller and larger wars demanding extreme sacrifices of ordinary people, but it was also characterized by the decline of collective religiosN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ity, the separation of church and state, the pursuit of market-oriented goals, the belief in science and rationality, and especially the forging of strong, militaristic, and totalitarian states and political cultures in Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the USSR—in other words, by all the stark ideological and cultural contradictions of historical modernity. In this context, nationalism and its rituals offered an alluring substitute for traditional religion and the relativism of modern life as well as a haven of imagined security, order, and existential meaning. Much of this is unquestionably universal and valid across national boundaries. Nevertheless, the specific shape and societal import of ritualism varies relative to the history and political culture of a country: the extent to which countries are culturally and politically unitary or plural; have leaderships that are perceived as indigenous or alien; have been shaped through top-down or bottom-up processes; possess political and cultural elites that mutually support each other or are at loggerheads; can tap into traditions of religious or cultural ritualism to a larger or smaller degree; and can more or less easily mobilize a readiness for collective sacrifice on the part of subjects and citizens. In turn, this relates to the sources, diffusion, and forms of rituals of belonging in this period.

Origins Nationalism in the late 19th century in Europe oscillated between two very different forms, which can be called imperative and imaginary, respectively (Hedetoft 1995). On the one hand, it was a top-down, state-induced, and territorially motivated political and cultural organizing principle—figuratively speaking, an edict by the powers-that-be to “the people” to fall emotionally in line with its ruling cadres. This is the conservative version of nationalism, which ultimately produced European racism and fascism. On the other hand, we find the national imaginary, the push from below toward national-ethnic homogeneity and independence, toward fulfilling both Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideal of direct popular representation (Rousseau 1762/1950), Ernest Renan’s image of nationalism as a daily plebiscite (Renan 1882/1990), and the poet Heinrich Heine’s dream of a future unified Germany (Heine 1844/1906). This is nationalism in the imaginary mode: if only it were so, things would be perfect. Importantly, neither of the two forms can confidently take the existence of nation-states and national identities for granted. Nationalism is filled with tension between imperially or aristocratically inspired imperatives from above, and popular-nationalist ardour to create “one’s own” institutions of power by putting pressure on states and rulers for cultural and linguistic concessions from below. The specific blends of imperative and imaginary forms and the different rituals of belonging that follow from them depend on the avenue taken to construct national modernity in particular countries or regions. The German historian Theodor N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Schieder has usefully suggested distinctions between an incorporative, a unifying, and a secessionist path (Schieder 1992). In the first category we find, for instance, England and France, with state structures, institutions, and territorial boundaries reasonably in place before this phase of nationalism. These structures, institutions, and boundaries undergo a politically and socially transformative process in the nation-building phase, violent and fragmentary in France, smoother and more “continuous” in England; in both cases, however, there exists an established state framework that can be tapped into, reformed, or revolutionized. By the turn of the 19th century, political establishments of both countries were engaged with similar problems: how to nationalize the masses of colonial metropoles and win over the hearts and minds of people(s) within their territories. In this context, rituals of belonging tended to consist mainly of highly formalized public displays of stately pomp and circumstance to forge unitary points of reference and a sense of historical continuity for different groups and a variety of social movements—for instance, in the form of celebrating royalty (e.g., the socalled Durbar on the occasion of Queen Victoria becoming empress of India in 1877), imperial successes (e.g., the Empire of India Exhibition in London in 1895), national progress and pride (e.g., celebrations surrounding the completion and opening of the Eiffel Tower in 1889, on the centenary of the Revolution), and the inauguration, in both countries around the turn of the century, of countless public monuments dedicated to the commemoration of long traditions of sacrifice and heroism for the good of the nation. The second type, unifying nationalism, is what we find primarily in Germany and Italy. This is a nationalism marked by violent showdowns between political representatives of institutional modernism and cultural representatives of the national imaginary, as witnessed by the German conflict between a Gross- and a Kleindeutschland, or between the national visions of Mazzini and Garibaldi in Italy. Here, nationalism is imperative and imaginary at the same time, with representatives of the two strands constantly engaged in a struggle to define “rightful” territory, proper institutions, criteria for national citizenship and belonging, and popular influence on state and government. Toward the end of the century, the champions of the raison d’état are at the helm of state in both countries, but both countries are also losing out in the wider intra-European competition for global resources, influence, and colonial control, notably in Africa. These processes point ahead to post–World War I fascist developments in both Germany and Italy, which due to their revanchist and expansionist ideological foundations relied extensively on constructing rituals, myths, and official narratives of racist superiority and unbreakable unity of state and people. The secessionist type, characteristic of most central and east European national paths (and later of independence movements in the colonized part of the world), is different. Here nationalism was predominantly imaginary, represented by ambitious social and regional groups excluded from the opportunity structures offered to the ethno-national core, and therefore locked in a fight against N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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absolutist and agrarian-based “multicultural” empires like those of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. This third type contains a rupture: the foundations and interests of the state run counter to any modern vision of nationalism, and hence, imaginary nationalism feeds on a combination of powerlessness, marginalization, and cultural resentment. Rituals of belonging and symbolic resistance are here largely based on communal narratives and cultural practices of, for instance, singing, celebrating the changing of the seasons, oral traditions of storytelling, or commemorating local heroes. In combination with the external intervention of World War I, the dissolution of the three great landed empires in Europe, and the adoption of national self-determination as an international norm, these popular nationalist movements in central and eastern Europe managed to achieve independence and statehood, for instance, in the three Baltic nations. Not all nationalist processes ran in parallel. In general, however, the most significant crucible for the creation of European nationalism as an all-societal and all-encompassing phenomenon of political, cultural, and existential identity was the fundamentally imperial processes of international competition and mutual grievances in Europe between ca. 1880 and 1914, the concomitant political discourses of national history, memory, glory, and future goals, and the acceptance by the peoples of the soldiery virtues they were asked to internalize and demonstrate. War and rituals related to war proved to be an invaluable nationalist mobilizer, and the image of particular national self-identities became virtually inseparable from the mental construction and cultural representations of negative “otherness.” Thus, the pacific, nonexclusivist images of national character and culture propounded by Herder, Kant, Locke, Paine, Scott, and other intellectuals in the age of Enlightenment and Romanticism fell prey to the more ferocious “models” put forward or inspired by people like Arndt, Chamberlain, Hobbes, Hegel, Treitschke, and Wagner—and their political incarnations, Bismarck, Disraeli, Franco, Hitler, Kaiser Wilhelm, Stalin, and so forth. Together with the economic promise of modernity, these developments imparted to nationalism and national identity a historically unprecedented legitimacy and paved the way for the effectiveness of state-orchestrated ritualism. Types of Ritualism It emerges from what has been said already that rituals associated more or less directly with states and state interests in the international system were predominant during the period. This applies whether or not we are thinking of liberaldemocratic, fascist, or socialist regimes. The first of these were still in the making, and many were simultaneously colonial powers. The second had a built-in propensity for rituals of power, race, and manliness. And the third, particularly in its Stalinist version, cultivated other forms of authority, sacrifice, and antimaterial discipline. In a context of ruthless international competition, all three forms of rule—empires of different hue—came to rely for popular support and legitimacy on heavily stylized public demonstrations of power and identity, on ritualized N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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cults of personality, and on cultural representations of unity. Only smaller and less powerful states in the developed world (like Denmark or Norway) or countries in the Third World aspiring to emancipation from colonial rule (like India or Senegal) represented more pacific forms of national ritualism, rooted in cultural history and traditions. It is possible to identify five types of rituals of belonging in this period. The first consists of rituals of state proper, that is, rituals directly orchestrating the cult of the ruler, affirming the exceptional virtues of the regime, symbolizing transitions and continuities from one ruler or government to another, or displaying the grandeur and mission of the state in relation to past successes and future goals in the context of international competition. This area would encompass British celebrations of imperial monarchy (for instance, Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897); the personality cult erected around dictators like Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin; military parades and other public displays of power and authority; and regime changes like Norwegian celebrations of new-found statehood in 1905 or the ritual formality of the transition from Weimar to Nazi rule in 1933 (Voigt 1989). These are all examples of the state celebrating and commemorating itself, of projecting and presenting itself to its titular people—or peoples, in the case of colonizing states—and, to some degree, of the people responding and participating of their own accord. The second type encompasses rituals of heroic sacrifice and death in the national cause, such as those related to the cult of the Unknown Soldier, the inauguration of public monuments in honor of heroic acts carried out in wartime and “beyond the call of duty,” the award of medals for bravery, the initiation of national holidays or museums commemorating the wartime dead, and the political use, in demagoguery and inflammatory practices of various kinds, of such extreme idealism to extol the incomparable racial virtues of the nation and highlight the evil nature of the enemy. During this period, this type of ritual practice is no doubt the most significant in a majority of national settings; it squares both with the inclement state of international relations and the objective of shaping an imagined unity of state and nation. Rituals of war, death, and suffering constituted the litmus test of national identity, since they orchestrate this unity as frictionless and popular allegiance to state objectives as absolute. The third type contains rituals of national sportsmanship in international competitive environments. These rituals share certain features with rituals of war: both display national identity in concrete practice, both rely on giving one’s utmost to the national cause, and both can take the form of events where medals are bestowed, the national anthem is played, and the national flag is waved in honor of specific persons or groups and the nation-states they vicariously represent. The difference between the two kinds of national exploit is just as clear, however. In an important sense, the ritualism of sports is not limited to “extraneous” circumstances like spectator behavior, pre-match flag-waving, and postmatch award-winning ceremonies, but centrally consists of the rules and practices N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of the games themselves, which are ritual confrontations between international rivals. Furthermore, the virtues of sacrifice, exertion, and asceticism are, in the case of the sportsperson, intended only to lead to an honorable representation of the nation-state internationally, not physically to the destruction of the opponent. Sports events symbolize and celebrate the successful physical incarnation of national particularities, but within an ideal framework dedicated to friendly relations and peaceful competition—whereas soldiers are expected to apply comparable physical skills and mental courage to a “game” that is deadly serious. In addition, the ritualism of sport could be engineered in such a way that it helped support political goals by cross-fertilizing with political rituals. The Nazi regime’s use of the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936 is only the most blatant deployment of sport for political ends during this period, where sport was often unashamedly subordinated to political interests, as regards preparations for war, the inculcation of masculine virtues (“muscular Christianity”) in young people, and the demonstration of the racial qualities and superiority of the national “stock” (Pearson 1901). The fourth type concerns precisely such ritualism of moral value and national allegiance, notably in institutions of education and socialization. The discipline required of loyal subjects and citizens, the moral virtues of selfless dedication to higher goals, the necessary knowledge of national history, and the balanced

Adolf Hitler, flanked by fellow Nazis, opens the 1936 Summer Games in Berlin, Germany. (Austrian Archives/CORBIS)

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combination of moral and physical skills (“mens sana in corpore sano”) were imparted to young people by means of curricula and learning methods in which ritualism—symbolic and repeated enactments of loyalty, devotion, asceticism, and discipline—played a dominant role. From bodily rigor in physical education, through mechanical repetition of Latin declensions and German prepositions, to oaths of allegiance and displays of admiration for the nation’s founders in history, rituals of belonging were pervasive as a necessary instrument in the formation of national character, political identity, and useful skills—even though the specific combination of these requirements varied from one country to the next. But given such variations and different emphases, inculcation of rituals of belonging applied to all states and all classes within them, and increasingly so as primary education became a common public good during this period. The fifth and last type embraces everyday rituals of cultural symbolism. It intertwines with some of the other areas, for instance, sports and socialization, but also lives an autonomous life of its own in social movements, professional associations, political events (like elections), private gatherings, family circles, and so forth. At stake here are more or less formalized practices like celebrating the nation in song (e.g., the Welsh choir tradition), saluting the flag or using the flag for a variety of everyday purposes, commemorating the local/family dead, observing national red-letter days (Constitution Days, Memorial Days, religious holidays), participating in cultural events (e.g., Hindus collectively bathing in the Ganges river to cleanse themselves spiritually), helping needy people, celebrating personal rites of passage in a national spirit, dressing in a particular “national” way, participating in national movements and associations (e.g., in defense of the national language), or even little things like going about one’s daily routines in a ritualistic way informed by national traditions and cultural habits. Some of these practices originated in the elite cultures of a particular nation-state, others in contemporary national symbols or events, and yet others in folk traditions, which now became attributed with national meaning, sometimes by way of the intermediary of religious allegiance or events—Christmas rituals in Europe during this period providing an illustrative example. Whereas the other four types are indicative of the imperative form of ritualism, this one contains the popular appropriation and practice of belonging and identity in everyday form.

Dimensions So far the discussion has focused on the forms, backgrounds, and intentions of ritualism of belonging. We now turn to the impacts and consequences of these forms of socialization. Were they successful? Did they have differential impacts on diverse groups? And did they entail significant consequences, whether intended or unintended? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The most general assessment to be made is that they were surprisingly successful and rather uniformly imperative across the board. In fact, nationalism as a political project of modernity largely owes its global success to the acceptance and performance of rituals of belonging by ordinary people, as a significant instrument in the forging of imagined communities and state loyalties. Leadership calls for national mobilization, obedience, discipline, devotion, and sacrifice were heeded to a surprising degree and were accepted, indeed often internalized, by ordinary people as moral yardsticks of sound character and loyal behavior. This is true both in liberal, fascist, and socialist regimes, in states formed through incorporation, unification, and secession, and in polities that are ethnically pluralist, homogeneous, or “colonial.” Nevertheless, the specific combination of these different features in each case, coupled with varying political contexts and cultural backgrounds, made for some interesting and meaningful variations of impact. A few examples will have to suffice. In regimes typified by being liberal, colonial, and incorporative, like Britain, common rituals of belonging tended to be unevenly accepted by all subjects and to be unevenly applied within the British geopolitical space. This is to be expected, given the expanse of the British empire and the haphazard and informal types of administrative rule in different parts. However, it was also true for the British Isles. Here, the cultural and to some extent identity-related differences between the English, Irish, Welsh, and Scots presented an obstacle to the creation of one, homogeneous, full-fledged British identity based on the whole range of common rituals. This meant that ritualism of this nature was either connected to overarching symbols of imperial but apolitical rule, like the monarchy, and/or to situations of real or trumped-up national emergency, like war or immigration, where images of the enemy (e.g., “the Jew”; see, for instance, White 1899) could be deployed to galvanize internal unity. Rituals of belonging were in that sense imperfectly integrative, if the measure is one unifying identity and form of allegiance to the British Crown. Conversely, imperative rituals of emergency were surprisingly effective and successful. Many colonial subjects responded positively to the British call to arms both in World War I and World War II. Nazi Germany presents a different case. Fascist and ethnically homogeneous (at least as regards self-projection), historically acting on a basis of very uneven conceptions of what constituted Germanness and the German territory, and intent on vindicating the defeat and humiliation of World War I, rituals of belonging were excessively state-directed (imperative), targeting the genuine “Aryan” elements of the German population. Benefiting from the militaristic culture of the Wilhelmine era and its historical roots, Nazi Germany employed the entire range of ritual types to the full, in the process successfully mobilizing the larger part of the population behind its program of ethnic purification and vindication of German greatness. This had the intended consequence of excluding, ostracizing, and killing millions of Jews and other supposedly “alien elements” in the body politic, who thus became the immediate victims of a German ritualism they were N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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not permitted to embrace. But it had the unintended consequence of creating and exacerbating new internal and external divisions. The demand for a total subjection of the economy, civil society, and the individual will of the citizen under the objectives of the strong state was a cultural project of consolidation and was successful for a time due to the integrative force of the war economy. Eventually, however, it broke down in its efforts to make the unified state into a new multiethnic empire through territorial conquest, in other words, because of its political project of international revenge and domination. Finally, the Russian/Soviet case exemplifies a third pattern. It is strikingly different from the other two by virtue of the fact that the first part of the period (until 1917) represents the gradual disintegration of the landlocked Romanov empire due to internal divisions. Strategies of belonging in this multiethnic and classdivided empire failed, and World War I became a catalyst for the Bolshevik Revolution. The Soviet part of the period is characterized by incorporative and pluralist strategies at the same time, rituals of belonging being focused on the construction of “socialism in one country” and the defense of the fatherland against foreign intervention, but also on the socialist ideal of the “Soviet person” and his or her obligations and allegiance to the system and its leader. Like the other two regimes, ritualism as a means to orchestrate attachment and forge identity was both pervasive and predominantly imperative, since the ethnically plural nature of the USSR precluded it from tapping into a common cultural repository. In addition, state ritualism and propaganda became increasingly militaristic the more we approach the Stalinist purges and deportations of dissidents between the mid-1930s and the end of World War II. The three cases represent the most important patterns, developments, and impacts of national ritualism during this period. All three are predominantly imperative, giving priority to rituals engineered by elites and aimed at forging popular identification with political objectives in situations of national emergency. To the extent that they existed, common cultural traditions and popular imaginaries were here made to serve as sources to be tapped and shaped according to specific goals. Otherwise, traditions and shared cultural origins were “invented” or “rediscovered,” frequently by reference to their opposite, the ominous and threatening outsider (whether “Jew,” “German,” “Irishman,” or “Boer”), and sometimes by harnessing scholarly disciplines like ethnography, geography, history, linguistics, and archaeology to political and military goals, for instance, to justify territorial claims. Clearly, however, the three cases do not exhaust the whole spectrum of different ritual forms. The nationalization of the masses, and the ritualism employed, assumed a somewhat different shape in smaller and less agenda-setting state contexts (e.g., Sweden, Switzerland), in “imaginary states” where nations still dreamt of independence and sovereign statehood (e.g., Finland before World War I, Ireland before 1922), and in states under colonial rule (e.g., Iran, Jamaica). In all three variants, feelings and rituals of belonging derive more immediately from N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the cultural imaginary of popular identifications, collective memories, and common histories. Even in these contexts, however, more official and imperative rituals of belonging had an important role to play. First, because they lent credence to claims for recognition in the context of international comparison and formal symmetry among states after World War I. And second, because few of these nations had been spared the ordeals and sufferings of conflict, war, occupation, and civil unrest, and hence had their own reasons for commemorating their dead, celebrating heroism, or erecting public memorials in honor of past sacrifice. This all implies that rituals of belonging in this turbulent phase of modern history were either (and mostly) highly formalized, orchestrated, and statedirected, very imaginary and culturally informed, or some combination of the two forms, but very rarely just normal, taken for granted, and tacit practices of national identity (the closest approximation being identity formation in the United States, but even there the normality of melting-pot practices and loyalties was punctured by military ritualism, the continuous absorption or rejection of immigrants, the Great Depression, and the divisive question of race). They represent a period where identity processes undergo radical change in a climate of domestic, national homogenization, but also of international anarchy and ferocious political and military competition. Hence, despite the success of the national model of identification that this period symbolizes in a general sense—and in which rituals of belonging played a significant role—the way the model and its identity components were geared to state goals and interstate competition proved to have long-term consequences for the role of nationalism.

Consequences World War II marked the end of the formative years of nationalism and very nearly killed off the idea of nationalism at the same time. This is, of course, a paradoxical statement. The first half implies that nationalism as a template of identity formation between people and state provided a benchmark of legitimate political and cultural organization for the future. The second half says the opposite, namely that nationalism had proved itself to be a destructive principle, and that by the end of World War II, its political legitimacy and usefulness had been eroded and nearly exhausted. What is interesting about the postwar phase is that in a very real sense both propositions are true. There is a direct link between the negative, dysfunctional, and ultimately destructive components of European nationalism and the imperative, directive, and militarized forms of ritualism characteristic of the period between 1880 and 1945. The nationalization of the masses was preponderantly a political, top-down project, simultaneously undertaken in a number of different sovereign entities, for very similar reasons, and in roughly comparable forms. To N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a large extent it was exclusive, building on clear-cut territorial, political, and cultural demarcations against the “other” and, historically, on mentalities of imperial rule and racially justified hierarchies of superiority and inferiority. On the other hand, its success would not have been possible had it not been able to tap into cultural and historical sources of kinship ties and local belonging. It is little wonder, therefore, that the nationalization of the masses, propped up by stylized rituals of belonging and legitimated by ideologies of race and blood, had chauvinist and revanchist implications like fascism, ethnic cleansing, and all-out international war, but also involved more pacific, imaginary, and seemingly innocuous forms of patriotic attachment to kith and kin, landscapes, traditions, and symbols. Nationalism, after all, is both a political program and a cultural identity, and its global success is largely due to this dual nature. The immediate impact of World War II was to decouple the negative from the positive elements. By virtue of the defeat of Nazism—which was simultaneously the political embodiment of the most imperative forms of national ritualism— it managed to delegitimate, particularly in Europe, the identity of the strong, authoritarian state and the unabashed forms of ritualism connected with the semireligious cult of the dictator, with honorable death in the national cause and explicit racism as an ideology underpinning national identities. On the other hand also, the victors were nation-states proud of their national identities. In addition, a new international order based on national independence and decolonization, formalized in a number of international institutions and underpinned by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), saw the light of day— adding new moral impetus to nationalism and fueling new symbols and rituals of belonging, eventually in the defeated European states, too. The ideological tenor of this more moderate, open, and democratic form of national identity was less hostile and chauvinist and more egalitarian and cooperative than in the formative phase of national modernity. It did away with the all-dominant militaristic and imperative nature of ritualism in that phase, leading to a significant reshuffle in the order of priority of the different types of rituals of belonging, while embedding these more solidly in the everyday imaginary and practices of people as well as in institutions of democratic governance and civil society (Billig 1995). In many ways, this has implied a normalization of rituals of belonging. Nevertheless, imperative and highly formalized rituals have survived in the form, for instance, of official celebrations and commemorative events; royal pomp and circumstance; births, weddings, and funerals; swearing-in ceremonies for incoming political leaders or oaths of allegiance pledged by immigrants and schoolchildren; national election procedures; the award of medals and distinctions to soldiers, sportspeople, and dignitaries; flagging, singing, marching, and mourning together in one or the other national cause; cults of charismatic personalities; and of course, in reliving and reconstructing the national past and the “collective memory” in innumerable ways. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In this sense, nearly all the older forms have survived, in some national contexts more than others, but the relationship of dominance and importance among them has shifted, and new forms have been added. What this means is not that national belonging today is perceived as less important than between 1880 and 1945, nor that it no longer depends on ritual acts, but that both the normative and political context has changed significantly. The prime lesson learned from recent history is that rituals are most effective if people are encouraged to shape and execute them in their own interest—rather than merely obeying the powersthat-be or applauding the spectacles they orchestrate in their own honor. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1983/1991. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Hayes, C. 1960. Nationalism: A Religion. New York: Macmillan. Hedetoft, U. 1995. Signs of Nations. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Heine, H. 1844/1906. Germany (The Works of Heinrich Heine). Translated by Charles Godfrey Leland. London: W. Heinemann. Hobsbawm, E., and T. Ranger, eds. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mosse, G. E. 1975. The Nationalization of the Masses. New York: H. Fertig. Pearson, K. 1901. National Life from the Standpoint of Science. London: Adam and Charles Black. Renan, J. E. 1882/1990. “What Is a Nation?” [original title “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?”]. In Nation and Narration, edited by H. Bhabha. London: Routledge. Rousseau, J.-J. 1762/1950. The Social Contract and Discourses. New York: Dutton. Schieder, T. 1992. “Typologie und Erscheinungsformen des Nationalstaats in Europa.” In Nationalismus und Nationalstaat, edited by O. Dann and H.-U. Wehler, 65–86. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Voigt, R. ed. 1989. Symbole der Politik. Politik der Symbole. Opladen: Leske and Budrich. White, A. 1899. The Modern Jew. London: W. Heinemann.

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Perversions of Nationalism Aristotle A. Kallis Relevance During the 19th century, nationalism was diffused across Europe, motivating revolutionary movements, effecting fundamental boundary changes, and altering the dynamics of state power. In 1848, the continent was seized by revolutionary fever that shook (though did not dismantle) the foundations of the old imperial system, bringing to the fore new nationalist movements and objectives. In the following three decades, the national unification of Italy (1859–1870) and Germany (1866–1871), along with the transformation of the Habsburg empire into a “dual monarchy” in recognition of Hungarian self-determination (Ausgleich, 1866), strengthened the dynamics of nation-statism and added to the overall significance of nationalism. In the years leading to World War I, Europe witnessed the transformation of nationalism into a radical and often aggressive ideology with numerous permutations, revisions, and fatal perversions.

Origins Already in the second half of the 19th century, nationalism had undergone one crucial transformation: while initially it had been deployed by movements against the excesses of state power with a view to attaining self-determination and freedom, it had also become a tool of political legitimacy for the ruling elites. The way in which the Italian and German unifications took place fulfilled very few of the revolutionary aspirations that had been invested in 1848: they were engineered from above, defusing more radical claims for social change and manipulating nationalism for the benefit of the state itself. While stateless national movements continued to invoke nationalism as a platform for liberation from the yoke of an alien ruler, states, too, adapted it to serve their own purposes, not in a revolutionary direction but as a basis for popular mobilization against perceived external or internal “threats.” All this was taking place in a rapidly changing context, in which ideologies battled for political hegemony over the continent. On the one hand, liberalism continued to defend the right of individual and collective (therefore, national) self-determination against repressive imperial rule or state excesses. The ongoing legal emancipation of the Jews across Europe provided a path for a more inclusive, tolerant nationalism that would defend the rights of minorities and promote N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a culture of peaceful, egalitarian coexistence. On the other hand, socialism gathered momentum in the last decades of the century, offering a new basis for collective identity that not only antagonized state authority but also transcended boundaries of ethnicity, religion, and culture. The internationalist basis of socialist ideology—in itself the product of the radicalism that had been generated in the first half of the century in tandem with revolutionary nationalism claims— now found itself at odds with both nationalism and the interests of the political order. At the same time, the drive toward imperialism—and its escalation during the second half of the century—revived a wider interest in the differences between “white” and “nonwhite” peoples, in social and anthropological terms alike. Increasing contact with colonial populations fueled an “us–them” mentality. The idea of “white superiority” had always been inherent in the history of European colonialism, but it had been primarily articulated in moral, cultural, and civilizational terms, not in racial-biological ones. Now, a growing stress on genetic difference gave rise to fears about miscegenation and, thus, promoted discourses of exclusion/segregation. In this respect, the new colonial experience proved instrumental in engendering discourses of biological (racial) superiority, rooted in heredity, and discourses containing similar “threats” to the biological health of the “white” peoples. Until the 19th century, this sort of discourse had operated on a loose distinction between European (white) and non-European (nonwhite) groups, projecting a universal hierarchy of racial value based on large, loose groupings of the world population. Increasingly, however, in the second half of the century, some racial theories suggested that even within the allegedly superior white bloc there were distinctions of biological value to be made. This shift coincided with a strengthening of nationalist tendencies across the continent and an intensification of antagonisms among European states/nations. The escalation of nationalist feelings and ideas produced centrifugal tendencies within the white/European imperialist bloc, fueling competition for colonial resources and, eventually, for the domination of the continent. Race then gradually provided a new norm for the expression of nationalist ideologies, adding a new (allegedly objective and immutable) element of group identity and a powerful alibi for the violent exclusion of “the other(s).” As nationalism was becoming more and more closely associated with the acquisition of a national state for the whole community, the ideology of “nationstatism” gained currency as the major organizing principle of citizenship and group membership. National minorities in the new states became more visible, more divergent, more isolated. Integration was still possible, but its requirements were becoming increasingly rigid—as were the expectations of the majority group for conformity. At the same time, the idea of unifying the whole community under the aegis of the nation-state provided the pretext for territorial expansionist claims and a more aggressive foreign policy. At the peace negotiations in Versailles in 1919–1920, competing nationalist claims over territories and populations made N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the task of drawing new boundaries along ethnic lines practically impossible. In the end, the compromise solution allowed for the creation of a plethora of new aspiring nation-states, but this was seen by nationalists as the first step toward the realization of their goal of a pure nation-state. Neither complete nor secure, new and old states used a rigid form of nationalism to exclude others, to promote homogeneity (if need be, aggressively), and to demand (again, often with force) the completion of the process that led to a uniform nation-state. Finally, the radicalization of nationalism had an impact on the way in which states related to each other. The last wave of colonial expansion (second half of the 19th century until 1914) coincided with a period of heightened nationalist mobilization. Increasingly vocal and aggressive popular constituencies could successfully force their governments into action in the colonial field purely on the basis of “national prestige.” This is what happened in Germany during the two Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, as well as in Italy during the Libyan war (1911–1912). The European colonial powers soon found themselves in a vicious circle of competition against each other in the colonial field, forced into further action by their public opinion at home, and inevitably sinking deeper into a hostile web of international relations. A pan-European war was averted in the 11th hour during the second Moroccan crisis of 1911, but cumulative colonial antagonisms were one of the major factors contributing to the atmosphere that led to conflict in the summer of 1914.

Dimensions The New “Radical Nationalism” The growing capacity of nationalism for popular mobilization was missed by neither political activists nor thinkers or state authorities. This produced a number of variations and revisions of nationalism, the significance of which would be witnessed during the 20th century. One of the variations, ironically, emerged out of a fusion between nationalism and socialism. A group of dissident leftist thinkers in France (e.g., Georges Sorel) in the last decades of the 19th century grew impatient with the slow progress that socialism made in terms of winning over the masses and paving the way for a social revolution, and so they turned to the myth of the “nation” as the primary mobilizing theme. This new form of revolutionary nationalism vehemently rejected socialist internationalism in favor of “nationalizing” all revolutionary potential of socialism. The attraction of this new formula of a “national socialism” found willing adherents across the continent. In Italy, a new breed of avant-garde intellectuals, radical socialists (such as Benito Mussolini), revolutionary syndicalists, and other dissident leftists inspired by Sorel joined forces to articulate a different paradigm of nationally based revolutionary nationalism. They were successful in using a broadly Marxian methodology of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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analysis of inequality, which, however, they transplanted into a national (and not a class-based) context. Thus, Enrico Corradini spoke of Italy as a “proletarian nation,” exploited by the old “plutocratic powers” of the West but capable of spearheading a revolutionary redistribution of power starting from internal “rebirth” and then claiming its allegedly rightful place among the world’s leading nations. To leftists like Mussolini in Italy or Gustave Hervé and Georges Valois in France, this formula paved the way for a spectacular ideological transformation from the fringes of the revolutionary left to a new branch of radical, mass-mobilizing nationalism. In 1911, the Italian Nationalist Association (Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, ANI) was founded, giving expression to this new idiom of nationalism against both the internationalism of the left and the moderation of the liberal establishment. A similar political movement had already been formed in France with the name Action Française. Taken together, the intellectual synthesis of radical nationalism and dissident socialism that took place in France and Italy in the decades before World War I opened up an ideological and political space that would usher in the “era of fascism”—a term pioneered by the German historian Ernst Nolte in the 1960s. The fact that the ANI was totally fused into the Fascist Party (Partito Nazionale Fascista, PNF) by the early 1920s and that the Action Française nurtured a new generation of fascist-leaning movements after 1918 give credence to the idea that fascism was intellectually and politically connected to this earlier form of nationalism. But it was interwar fascism’s diffusion across Europe, its acquisition of power in Italy and Germany, and its influence on right-wing political thought in the 1920s and 1930s that made it the most destructive perversion of nationalism that the continent has ever witnessed. Interwar Fascism Officially, the “fascist” chapter in European history started in October 1922, when Mussolini was appointed prime minister in Italy. From January 1925 until July 1943, he headed a one-party state, with clear totalitarian aspirations and a determination to render the new doctrine, as Benito Mussolini himself declared in the manifesto titled Doctrine of Fascism, “the dominant ideology of the 20th century” (Mussolini 1932, 2). However, the origins of the Fascist movement in Italy lay in the profound impact of World War I that had allowed Mussolini to jump on the bandwagon of nationalism and eventually turn decisively against both socialism and liberalism. It was in the tense atmosphere of 1914–1915 that (the then rogue socialist) Mussolini decided to ally himself with those campaigning for Italy’s intervention in the conflict (the so-called intervento movement), and thus hijack the banner of radical nationalism for his own political ambitions. The eventual decision of the liberal Italian establishment to enter World War I in May 1915 was a triumph for the intervento campaign and marked the beginning of Mussolini’s political ascendancy in the ranks of the Italian radical, ultranationalist right. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Thus, fascism emerged as a revolutionary movement in search of a “third way,” placing the “nation” at the very heart of its ideology and subjugating all other considerations to national interest. Obsessed with the idea of national regeneration and greatness, fascism was inspired by the universal influence of the Roman past and committed itself to creating the new civilization of the “third Rome” that would set once again the foundations for a new European rebirth. This was meant to be a project of revolutionary reconfiguration, where violence, confrontation, and war were seen as natural forces of history. Therefore, fascism embarked upon “remaking the Italians” into a nation of citizen-soldiers whose primary allegiance would be to the whole nation and the national community. In fact, fascism was instrumental in transforming nationalism into a secular religion, based on faith, loyalty, and sacrifice to the collective cause; this is why it was vehemently antiliberal and antibourgeois, in the sense that these ideologies had bred individualism and material egoism. Instead, fascism focused attention on the collective body of the nation, held together in perfect unity by an integral nationalism. The influence of Italian fascist ideology and of the Fascist regime after 1922, in particular, cannot be exaggerated. In the mid-1920s, the Spanish general-cumdictator Miguel Primo de Rivera acknowledged his intellectual and political debts to Mussolini. Oswald Mosley, the former Conservative Member of Parliament that had made an unprecedented switch to the Labour Party, was converted to fascist ideology after a visit to Italy; upon his return to Britain, he founded the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and became the most important representative of this new creed in his country for the whole of the 1930s. At the same time, Mussolini himself was busy cultivating political links with other kindred movements across Europe. His links with (and financial support for) German nationalists— including Hitler’s Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterspartei (National Socialist German Workers Part), or NSDAP—have been documented, as were his contacts with Croat, Macedonian, Hungarian, and other radical nationalist movements, particularly in the Balkans and central Europe. Within a few years from the establishment of the Fascist dictatorship in Italy, fascist-like movements (whether they called themselves as such or not) emerged in Spain (Spanish Falange, headed by the son of General Primo de Rivera, Jose Antonio), in Croatia (the notorious Ustasha, who were outlawed by the Yugoslav government and were given refuge in Italy), in Romania (the Iron Guard under Corneliu Zelea Codreanu), and in Hungary (the Arrow Cross under Ferenc Szálasi). Even right-wing authoritarian regimes emulated many of its practices: Antonio Salazar in Portugal paid lip service to the “regeneration” of the Portuguese nation through his “new state” and devised a clearly corporatist constitution along the lines of the Italian Fascist experiments; corporatism was also implemented by the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who was blatantly sponsored by Mussolini against the threat of the German-oriented Austrian NSDAP. Even more importantly, the myth of the nation was taken up by new movements in the Netherlands (FlemN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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mish Bloc), in Belgium (Verdinaso), and Latvia (Perkonkrusts), where the slogan “Latvia for the Latvians” echoed fascism’s vision of ethnic homogeneity. Even if gradually after 1933 Italian Fascism was somewhat eclipsed by the dynamism of German National Socialism, it continued to inspire and guide nationalists across the continent in search of a revolutionary “third way.” German National Socialism The National Socialist regime in Germany (1933–1945) has been associated with the most lethal, destructive, and shocking perversion of nationalism. By the time of its shattering collapse amidst the ruins of Berlin, it had left behind around 55 million casualties, including 6 million Jews, up to 500,000 Sinti/Roma, and millions of other nationalities that perished in the death and labor camps. Many have questioned whether the National Socialist regime’s horrifying emphasis on race justifies its categorization as “fascist,” when the Italian Fascist regime displayed an inconsistently—and in any case never strongly—racist orientation. However, the National Socialist regime’s emphasis on “race” was in itself a product of its perverted approach to nationalism, to national homogeneity, and to total rebirth and “health” of the community. Perhaps the uniqueness of National Socialism lies in the way in which it combined the most aggressive form of nationalism with the modern pseudoscientific theories of biological racism. No other interwar ideology or movement accomplished this lethal synthesis, though many subsequently endorsed it for their own purposes (including the initially hesitant Mussolini). Of course, Hitler was not breaking new ground when he invoked an aggressive form of anti-Semitism; the latter had a long autonomous history in most European countries that predated the rise of nationalism. Equally, racism had been an ideology that had gathered momentum since the Enlightenment, fueled by the belief in an alleged European superiority. But Hitler’s movement combined an uncompromising belief in the rebirth of a “pure” national community with a rigid notion of biological “health” and an element of “mission” on behalf of Europe and the whole world. More than any other nationalist/fascist movement, National Socialism saw itself as a revolutionary history-making force that would redo not just Germany but the whole world. In the network of their camps, the National Socialist authorities erected a veritable “industry of death,” a “production line of corpses.” After 1939—and mainly in the 1941–1944 period—Nazi authorities constructed an elaborate network of death camps in the newly occupied eastern territories. These camps soon became the sorting houses of a genocidal campaign against Jews, Sinti/Roma, Slavs, and other groups considered as “unworthy of life” (lebensunwert). This was the moment when ethno-exclusive nationalism, biological racism, and the National Socialist “missionary” tendency came to a horrifying paroxysm. National Socialist racialism may be seen as a projection of internal “cleansing” outwards, on a massive European or worldwide scale. Its roots lay in an obsessive concern N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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with the “health” of the national community (Volksgemeinschaft) and the perceived necessity of eradicating all detrimental racial influences. At this point, science and traditional prejudices came together, feeding off each other. This was also the culmination of a strange atavistic utopia of homogeneity, conceived of and pursued in extreme modern terms. Biological racism provided pseudoscientific legitimacy to cliché prejudices by articulating stereotypes in new terms, by seeking to prove preexisting hypotheses rather than serving an allegedly pure science. When anthropologists, biologists, and medical practitioners engaged with the racialist discourse, they did so overwhelmingly from the viewpoint of a “national” science, partly or fully serving the interests of the state. When German biomedical experts talked of the alleged superiority of the “Aryan race,” they mostly did so in order to give scientific credence to the belief in national superiority; and when they sought to found such claims against the ostensible inferiority of “others,” they turned to traditional stereotypes (e.g., Jews, Sinti/Roma, black peoples, Slavs) in order to draw arbitrary comparisons. The path that led from evolutionary theories, such as Darwinism, or socioeconomic paradigms, such as Malthusianism, to the biological racialism of the 1930s and 1940s passed through aggressive nationalism. Social Darwinism adapted the notion of “survival of the fittest” to the requirements of nationalist antagonisms, first in the colonies and then in Europe. Social Darwinism perceived conflict, war, and violence as natural necessities of each nation’s struggle for survival, while also stipulating pro-natalist measures for the strengthening of the numerical basis of the nation. The Malthusian warning about the emerging disequilibrium between population and resources pointed to two different solutions: either birth-control measures (including restrictions on marriage and procreation as well as sterilization [voluntary or compulsory] in the case of “racially undesirable” or “alien” elements) or acquisition of “living space” (Lebensraum) ideology, whereby the pressure for more resources resulting from pro-natalism would be solved by the appropriation of more usable territory, if need be through war. While Mussolini’s formula “strength in numbers” (il numero come forza) placed almost exclusive emphasis on procreation in order to prepare the nation for its (natural) confrontation with others about resources, National Socialist policy combined pro-natalism (involving “racially valuable” Germans) and anti-natalism (targeting both “aliens”—such as Jews, Slavs, and Sinti/Roma—and “racially unworthy” Germans—such as disabled, “asocials,” and other nonconformist groups) with large-scale Lebensraum expansion, particularly toward the east. Equally, the spreading of the “Aryan” racialist gospel across interwar Europe articulated a sense of national elitism. In Fascist Italy, for example, the previous agnosticism of Mussolini’s regime vis-à-vis biological racism was replaced by a political-scientific agenda that—among other agendas—attempted to prove the “Aryan” origins of the Italian population. Similarly, in Croatia and the Baltic states, a racialist discourse sought to juxtapose a “European” (or even “Aryan”) racial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nazi racial experts use calipers to measure a man’s facial features in order to determine his “race.” (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

derivation of the indigenous groups against the alleged “eastern” or “Asiatic” characteristics of their opponents (Serbs in Croatia, Russians in the Baltic states). Nationalism underpinned this new discourse in a decisive manner, expressing the most radical and aggressive claims for homogeneity, ethno-exclusivity and nationstatism. And while it is obvious that National Socialist Germany facilitated the expression of such extreme views and policies, their indigenous origins and modality was also evident. Backlash The popularity of nationalism in 19th- and 20th-century Europe was largely dependent on its ability to amalgamate old prejudices and divisions into a new, uniform ideology of inclusion/exclusion. In fact, nationalism attributed historical value and significance to a number of differences and divisions that predated it. Some of them had traditionally been perceived as fundamental and had generated numerous conflicts. Religious clashes among not only Christians and Muslims and Christians and Jews but also among Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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had punctuated the Middle Ages and survived into the modern period. Other differences, however, such as language, culture, or even physical appearance, were given new meaning and importance in the age of nationalism, generating a new awareness of alleged incompatibility where there was coexistence before. Thus, nationalism provided a new basis for inclusion into the community while at the same time more aggressively fostering difference, detecting alleged threats, and building the in-group largely in opposition to other, contestant identities. It also offered a new, powerful “filter” through which to perceive the world, whereby belonging and exclusion, similarity and difference became effectively “nationalized.” From the 19th century onward, nationalism became a mass-mobilizing ideology, seizing the imagination of previously unpoliticized sectors of the population and offering them the opportunity for history-making collective action.

“Nationalized” Prejudice and Stereotypes Anti-Semitism provides one example where old prejudices became “nationalized” and entered the nationalist imagery. For centuries, Jewish communities across Europe had lived under the constant threat of persecution or even pogroms, as second-class subjects or citizens. They had suffered limitations, expulsions, or even random murder. Although liberalism had ushered in a period of legal emancipation, as well as the uncertain promise of a future full integration into European civic societies, nationalism drew new lines of exclusion by presenting the Jews as “nationless” and “stateless,” internationalist and therefore dangerous to their host nation-state. In 1894, France was shaken by the so-called Dreyfus affair, when a Jewish army officer was wrongly accused of stealing national secrets and handing them over to the enemy. Although the accusations proved to be mistaken and Dreyfus was eventually reinstated, the incident divided French society and revealed the extent to which aggressive nationalism and anti-Semitism could mobilize large sections of the population. After the Bolshevik Revolution, nationalist movements seized with anticommunist paranoia openly accused Jews of masterminding the October Revolution as part of a wider international plot to seize control over the world—an idea that had already been articulated since the 1890s with the forged publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. During 1918–1919, Hungary and Germany experienced short-lived communist revolutions that fed the prevalent anticommunist hysteria after the Bolshevik seizure of power. The disproportionate participation of Jewish politicians in the movements (Béla Kun in Hungary; Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Germany; as well as figures such as Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinovief in the ranks of the Bolsheviks) was used to justify the arbitrary link between Jews and Bolshevism/communist revolution. Therefore, protection of the nation dovetailed with the persecution of internationalist socialism in a way that implicated the Jews and revived traditional notions of anti-Semitism. Laws to restrict Jewish influence on socioeconomic life N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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were implemented immediately after World War I, such as the numerus clausus legislation in Romania and Hungary (legislating a ceiling for Jewish presence in various economic and social activities, such as university enrollment, professional membership, and so forth). These laws became even more aggressive and widespread, however, in the 1930s. Although National Socialist Germany set a powerful precedent by introducing the most wholesale regulation of “Aryan”-Jewish relations, other countries followed a similar path without any Nazi pressure whatsoever. Indigenous anti-Semitic traditions and tendencies—thinly veiled until then —came to the fore, partly emulating the Nazi formula (e.g., restrictions of citizenship, bans on mixed marriages, exclusion from economic and social activities) but giving expression to native political agendas. A similar tendency was observed with regard to Sinti and Roma peoples, scattered for centuries around the continent but still largely committed to a nonsedentary lifestyle. Unlike other ethnic/national minorities, but like the Jews, Sinti/ Roma were regarded as “stateless” communities; but they were unique in both their unconventional approach to life and their lack of interest in acquiring a “national home” (e.g., as in the case of Zionism). Long-standing cultural and racial stereotypes about them had partly been mitigated in the past due to the selfmarginalization of Sinti/Roma communities, whose members usually chose to inhabit the societal fringes and seek minimal contact with the majorities. However, the emergence of a biological racist discourse in the first decades of the 20th century, in conjunction with nationalism’s hostility to any form of internationalism, brought the “Gypsy question” to the fore in many countries. Again, Germany pioneered in the domain of legal persecution: from the turn of the 19th century, there was a powerful movement across the German states to introduce legislation against the so-called Gypsy nuisance, with Bavaria leading the way in 1926 with a special law against the “Gypsy plague.” Other states were more than willing to follow this precedent due to the strength of indigenous prejudices: in the 1920s, Switzerland planned the removal of all “Gypsy” kids from their families and their placement in sedentary foster homes; while in the 1930s and during World War II, a series of states introduced legislation requiring either the expulsion or the confinement of Sinti/Roma communities within their borders. The influence of the German National Socialist precedent should not be discounted, especially since many of these measures were instituted after 1939, under Nazi occupation or in the context of a wartime alliance with Germany. The chronicle, however, of persecution, exclusion, and even pogroms from the medieval times until the 20th century points to a continuity of powerful prejudice that was radicalized under the influence of both aggressive nationalism and biological racism.

Persecution, “Elimination,” Genocide Nationalism developed into an ideology that fetishized inclusion through conformity and overstated the significance of difference. The emergence of the modern N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nation-state derived its legitimacy from the claim over particular groups (bound together by collective cultural, historic, or even allegedly biological ties) and their territories. With the collapse of multiethnic empires in Europe throughout the 19th century, and particularly after World War I, nation-statism became the main form of political, social, and economic organization. The radicalization of both nationalism and ideas of nation-statism resulted in renewed pressure over minorities to either relinquish their difference voluntarily or accept the gospel of uniformity against their will. Thus, nationalism turned its heterophobia (fear of “the other”) into a systematic policy that oscillated between cultural integration, forced assimilation, and, increasingly, persecution. States “nationalized” their citizens through institutions of socialization (such as education) and through symbolic, collective rituals aimed at instilling a sense of collective (imagined) identity. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the expectation was that everyone residing within the jurisdiction of the (nation-)state would respond by adhering voluntarily to the new identity. When this did not happen, voluntarism gave way to systematic, forced assimilationist policies that demanded evidence of compliance and uniformity at the expense of individual or group self-determination. Ironically, it was many new nation-states, created through the post-1918 peace treaties, that proved least amenable to extending protection to their minorities. Post-Versailles Poland subscribed to the League of Nations’ minority treaty only very grudgingly and proved hostile to the cultural rights of its German-speaking minority, withdrawing instruction in the mother tongue. Utopias of national homogeneity (what we may call “ethno-exclusive nationalism”) could not accommodate groups that resisted the gospel of uniformity. The more ethno-exclusive nationalism was becoming in the 19th and 20th centuries, the more the range of solutions to minority problems became restricted and aggressive. In the aftermath of the Turkish-Greek war of 1919–1922, the two states chose the difficult path of population exchange in order to strengthen their individual claim to national homogeneity and forestall future conflicts. Elsewhere, minorities were forced to accept a second-class-citizen status, through discriminatory legislation and/or active persecution. Pogroms were sporadic but violent —instigated, aided, or simply tolerated by state authorities. The utopia of homogeneity passed through the elimination of “the other,” and it was this prospect of elimination that proved horrifyingly open-ended, going far beyond legality or any notion of common morality. The systematic elimination of “the other” had a long history that went back to colonial pursuits and the treatment of indigenous peoples. From the first Spanish conquistador to the German administrators of southeast Africa, colonizers excelled in using violence and murder against whole groups of people who they perceived as dangerous or simply expendable. These instances made a type of violence against groups conceivable in the colonial field and thus opened the way for its deployment in the European context. Arguably the first modern case of physical elimination was the campaign of the Ottoman authorities against the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Armenian communities of Anatolia during 1915–1916. It was World War I that provided the perfect pretext to the new Ottoman government (by then seized by an exclusive form of “Turkish” nationalism) for a radical “solution” to the “Armenian question.” As a result, the authorities organized and executed a systematic campaign of eradicating the Armenian communities from Anatolia. Either directly through murder or indirectly through forced expulsion (during the marches across the inhospitable Anatolian plateau to the “resettlement” camps of Syria, more than half of the people perished before reaching their final destination) a large number of Armenians died (estimates vary from 400,000 to more than a million). It has been alleged that Adolf Hitler mentioned the Armenian genocide in a 1939 conversation (“Who, after all, speaks today of the extermination of the Armenians?”). Whether the quote is accurately reported or not, it was the Nazi regime that embarked on the most “total” genocidal program in history a little over two decades after the plight of the Armenians. A lethal combination of radical nationalist utopias of ethnic homogeneity and biological racialism turned certain minority groups (Jews, Sinti/Roma, Slavs) from unwanted “others” to “threats” to the “health” of the national community (Volk). As a result, Nazi authorities implemented a step-by-step program aimed at banning interactions between “Aryans” and Jews (citizenship and marriage restrictions), removing Jewish influence from the Reich (“Aryanization” of economy and professions; societal marginalization of the Jews), and then removing Jewish physical presence through forced expulsion and “resettlement” eastwards. During the war, the regime embarked upon the expulsion, resettlement, and eventually annihilation of the above groups. From the autumn of 1941, death camps benefiting from modern technology became the sorting houses for the devastatingly effective extermination process. The total figure reached around 5.5 million Jews, 300,000–500,000 Sinti/Roma, 3 million Soviet POWs, and a large number of victims from various categories of “life unworthy of living.” Nationalism and War The Nazi war against the Jews and other alleged forms of “life unworthy of living” was conducted in the context of another campaign, this time about territorial resources and political control. Nation-statism always had an explicit territorial dimension, whether for reasons of acquiring resources, “living space” (Lebensraum), redeeming lands and people that ought to belong to the nation-state (irredentism), geopolitical security, or simply prestige. The escalation of nationalist feeling during the late 19th and early 20th centuries intensified the territorial conflict and caused a series of disputes for control over land. New states were carved out of existing boundaries of larger states or empires, either through diplomatic means (Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania) or through war (Greece). Germany and Italy pursued their national unifications through a combination of negotiations and military force. But it was World War I—and the vacuum that was created in 1918 N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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by the collapse of multinational empires—that whetted the appetite of nationstates for territory. The peace treaties tried unsuccessfully to redraw the map of Europe on the basis of national self-determination, leaving a number of disputes unresolved and creating a plethora of new ones. Defeated nation-states (particularly Germany and Hungary) continued to agitate for “revision” of the borders and for more ample “living space.” When World War II erupted in 1939— predictably using the protection of a minority (German-speaking group in Poland) and the revision of the Versailles border (the Polish Corridor)—nationalist aspirations came to the fore across the continent, causing the most violent and destructive military campaign in history.

Consequences In the aftermath of World War II, people have tried to come to terms with the unprecedented violence and brutality unleashed by the Nazi regime. While some argued that this was the result of an “exceptional” parenthesis in the history of Western (and, indeed, human) civilization, others insisted that the Holocaust was in fact an integral part of the modern world, rooted in the extreme fringes of nationalism and made possible through the spirit of technological innovation. It was in the context of modernity that the possibility of eliminating “the other” became intelligible and desirable, and it was modernity that supplied the necessary infrastructure (communications, planning, effective execution) for the execution of such programs of “total” elimination. This does not mean that nationalism directly causes genocide, but it suggests a path that starts from perceptions of “otherness,” demonization and dehumanization of “the other,” and an impression of deadly “threat” as necessary preconditions for genocide. For all these intermediary steps, nationalism has historically played a crucial, negative role. Its reliance on a “negative” definition of the in-group (us-versus-them), its tendency to place the nation at the heart of every consideration and exclude out-groups, its perpetuation of stereotypes about alien groups, and its populist mobilizing powers proved essential for the execution of every recorded (disputed or not) case of genocide. It is not coincidental that local populations in some European countries eagerly helped the Nazi occupying authorities in exterminating Jews and Sinti/Roma; and it is not a coincidence that the Nazi “death factory” provided the alibi to other state authorities to exterminate their own “others” (e.g., the genocidal campaign of the Independent Croatian State against the Serb minority during 1941–1944). All in all, a perverted, extreme, ethno-exclusive form of nationalism has always been a necessary condition for genocide; necessary but not sufficient per se. This implication of nationalism in the Nazi Holocaust provoked a profound soul-searching in Europe and elsewhere in the postwar period. The refounded N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 was predicated on a “constitutional,” civic form of nationalism, thus burying the ethnic component that had been largely deemed responsible for the atrocities of the 1939–1945 period. This “constitutional nationalism” was intended to be an inclusive, tolerant, and plural basis for the creation of a new German collective identity. At the same time, nationalism was relegated in favor of other considerations in both Western and Eastern Europe: in the former, it gave way to a transnational spirit of cooperation, leading to the establishment of the European Economic Community and later the European Union; in the latter, nationalism was castigated as an evil inherent in the capitalist system and antithetical to the internationalist spirit of socialist solidarity. For four decades after the end of World War II, the world was absorbed in a different kind of confrontation with potentially devastating consequences (Cold War). Extreme bipolarity between East and West nurtured closer ties among the memberstates of each coalition and relegated (perhaps superficially) internal differences, including nationalist tensions. It took the collapse of Eastern communism during 1989–1991 to bring to the fore old divisions—and, with them, the potential for new genocides. The wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s reminded the world that genocide could not be confined in the same historical box as National Socialism. The “era of fascism,” however, did end in 1945. Fascist-like movements did survive the end of World War II (Franco in Spain; Salazar in Portugal), but even in those cases the transition to democracy in the 1970s proved irreversible and remarkably stable. “Neo-fascism”—be that in the form of nostalgic Nazi/Fascist groups or as more respectable, but ideologically hypernationalist and divisive movements/parties in many countries—has remained a fringe phenomenon with unspectacular electoral effects. Nationalism’s capacity, however, for erecting lines of exclusion and constructing “otherness” has not abated, even if the targets of this tendency have changed. Selected Bibliography Bauman, Z. 1993. Modernity and the Holocaust. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. Burleigh, M., and W. Wippermann. 1991. The Racial State. Germany, 1933–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chalk, F., and K. Jonassohn. 1990. History and Sociology of Genocide. Analyses and Case-Studies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Griffin, R. 1993. The Nature of Fascism. New York: Routledge. Hobsbawm, E. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewy, G. 2001. The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies. New York: Oxford University Press. Macmaster, N. 2001. Racism in Europe, 1870–2000. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Mussolini, B. 1932. “Doctrine of Fascism.” In The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe, edited and authored by Michael J. Oakeshott, 164–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939.

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Nolte, E. 1965. The Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Passmore, K. 2002. Fascism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Payne, S. 1997. A History of Fascism, 1914–1945. London: UCL Press. Smith, A. D. 2001. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge: Polity Press. Weindling, P. 1993. Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Philosophy, National Character, and Nationalism Paul Gilbert Relevance The period from 1880 to 1950 may justly be regarded as the heyday of nationalism. The dissatisfaction of stateless nations and the nationalist fervor of established states led directly to World War I. One of the results was the creation of many new supposed nation-states. Another was a deep wound to the national pride of Germany, which motivated the actions that precipitated World War II. In this it was joined by Italy and, later, Japan, again for nationalist reasons. What, we may ask, created the mindset that could make such horrors seem natural and justified? Its origins lie a century or so before the beginning of our period in the thinking of German Romantic philosophers. They developed the idea that people are naturally divided up into separate nations and that the boundaries of states should reflect this fact. Throughout the 19th century, this idea spread and became the accepted wisdom. Even liberal philosophers like John Stuart Mill embraced it, assuming that, given the freedom to choose, people would naturally prefer political association with fellow members of the same nation. Yet, as the period progressed, nationalism took on an increasingly authoritarian slant, as what people are—as decided by their leaders—assumed a greater importance than what they want. But what is it about what people are that makes them members of a particular nation? On the face of it, the nationalists of different nations suggest different answers to suit their political purposes. For some, nations are supposedly founded on a common language, some on a shared religion, others on attachment to a homeland or to a history, and so forth. As we shall see, however, one of the achievements of philosophical defenders of nationalism in our period was to bring apparent unity to this diversity by returning a single answer. And on this answer, they sought to ground nationalist claims to separate statehood. Toward the end of the period, this answer became discredited, as did the whole nationalist project of making states coincide with nations. What, then, is the answer that nationalists gave to the question, what makes people members of a nation? “An actual nation consists,” writes the philosopher Henry Sidgwick in 1891, “of persons of whom the predominant number have . . . a certain vaguely defined complex of particular characteristics which we call the ‘national character’ of Englishmen, Frenchmen, etc.” (Sidgwick 1891, 11). It is this notion of national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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character that is such a pervasive feature of nationalism in the latter part of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. It is shared national character that distinguishes one nation from another, although, as we shall see, this apparently uniform criterion of nationhood is deceptive. Yet the notion plays a number of key roles in nationalist ideologies of the period, as they apply both to established states and to peoples seeking national secession or reunification. Nationalism may be taken to be the belief that there are groups of people— “nations”—united in such a way that they possess a right of shared statehood, other things being equal. The problem for nationalists is to specify what this uniting feature is and why it generates this right. Notoriously, a wide range of answers have been given to this question, leading to difficulties for theorists in providing a single account of what a nation is. The French thinker Ernest Renan’s celebrated paper “What Is a Nation?” which was written at the beginning of the period, runs through a range of suggested criteria. Race, language, religion, common interests, and geography are all considered as what distinguishes one nation from another. Renan dismisses them all as either unnecessary or insufficient for nationhood. His own account is, famously, that “the existence of a nation is . . . a daily plebiscite,” expressing a people’s continued common will to live together. On the face of it, this represents a different movement of thought from that which postulates a shared national character. But this is potentially misleading. For, although Renan explains the common will that generates a right to statehood as deriving from the recognition of a shared history, he glosses it thus: “The Spartan song ‘We are what ye were, and we should be what ye are,’ is, in its simplicity, the abridged version of every national anthem” (Renan 1939, 203). One way of making this identification with past members of the nation is through the invocation of a shared national character, as manifest, for example, in the heroic figures of national history. This, then, is the first role of national character: to persuade those for whom a common national identity is claimed to identify with other members of the nation, past and present. They recognize themselves in the glowing descriptions of the character or aspire to so recognize themselves. Conversely, however, members of the nation distance themselves from the character traits that they ascribe to members of other nations, which are commonly represented in uncomplimentary terms. Recognition of a common character thus binds people into a nation and separates them from the members of other nations. The second role of national character is to provide a ground for loyalty and partiality toward other members of the nation. A possible ground for national partiality is that one’s fellow members possess valuable character traits, and particularly, that they are pursuing values one shares with oneself; therefore, by giving them support, one is furthering those values and expressing the associated character traits of oneself. By contrast, members of other nations lacking these traits and values are relatively undeserving. While this line of argument is of dubious cogency, it does account for much nationalist thinking, especially if comN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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bined with a view of a nation’s mission and of the particular fittingness of its members to fulfill it in virtue of their national character. This is a combination of the views that were common during the period and that we shall explore shortly. The third role of national character is to provide a justification for the right to statehood. This may be because those who are loyal to each other will more readily undertake the obligations of shared citizenship. Or more directly, it may be that those with a common character are apt for shared government in a way that those with divergent temperaments are not. The kind of laws that suit people who want a quiet life, for example, would be different from those that are appropriate for people of a more noisy and excitable disposition. Or, again, it may be because, if character is seen to involve the pursuit of particular values, and one has a right to live one’s life in accordance with one’s own values, then this may only be possible if one can utilize the political organization of a state to advance those values. Yet an appeal to national character offers a justification of the right to statehood that is preferable to the grounds for it—race, language, religion, and so on— which Renan considers and rejects. For the difficulty with these is that they generate different and conflicting claims. The common language criterion that shaped Yugoslavia, for example, was always under challenge by the mainly religious criteria that separate Croats and Serbs. But if a claim to statehood is to carry conviction, it must employ the same criterion as is used by others. Shared national character purports to provide a common yardstick for identifying nations and acknowledging their political rights.

Origins The idea that different peoples have different characters was a commonplace among the Greeks. Plato notes that people are influenced by the climatic conditions in which they live, and Aristotle follows this explanation of their differences by crediting European nations that live in cold regions with spirit but a relative lack of skill and intellect, whereas the reverse is true of Asian nations. This leads to the former being free but lacking political cohesion, while the latter live under tyrants. And there are differences in the relative intellect and courage of the different Greek nations. Assumptions such as these passed naturally into modern thought through philosophers like Montesquieu, who accounts for the English love of liberty by the vicissitudes of the English climate—a style of explanation that recurs in the founder of nationalist thought, Johann Gottfried von Herder, who uses it to show that what distinguishes peoples is what relates them to their particular territories. But why, we may ask, should the idea that the people of different places have different characters lead to the notion that there are distinct national characters —lead, that is, to the view that these differences of character follow national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lines? A sociohistorical explanation can no doubt be offered in terms of the need, from the latter part of the 19th century onward, to mobilize mass support for nation-states or for national movements, and we have seen how an appeal to national character might achieve this. But a justification for the appeal will require us to consider, in the next section, what accounts of the formation of national character might be offered. Meanwhile, we need to look at two more general philosophical considerations affecting the invocation of character as individuating nations. The first is, of course, the doctrine, enunciated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that a state is legitimate if and only if its people are sovereign (i.e., the supreme authority) within it. This leads immediately to the question, “Who are the people?” If our interest in asking it is to arrive at a system of legitimate states, then there are two rather different ways of addressing it. One is to see, with Renan, what groups of people share a common will to live together. This yields what we can call the subjectivist answer, which exploits the current of modern thought in which human beings are represented as essentially rational calculators, able to determine how to achieve happiness individually and collectively. The other way exploits a different current, which is to see peoples as sharing certain human needs but who differ naturally or culturally. This objectivist approach identifies the peoples whose sovereignty would legitimize states as categories picked out by differences that make them apt for separate statehood. Here, the anthropological observations that accompanied late 19th-century colonialism, as well as the study of European folk cultures, which differ more than the cultures of elites, exercised an influence. Indeed, in the subjectivist approach, such observations were used to justify imperialism on the grounds that colonized peoples lacked the psychological attributes required for exercising sovereignty, whereas in the objectivist approach, they served to challenge existing empires by discerning cultural differences between ordinary people who were then recruited to independence movements. In the earlier 19th century, the subjectivist approach was dominant, in the latter part, the objectivist takes over. But the notion of national character is able, to some extent, to span the two. The reason for this is that, in the philosophical psychology of the time, character is seen as the seat of the will. Character, claims the psychologist William McDougall in 1913, can be defined as that from which the will proceeds. Thus, from an objectivist view, national character can be seen as that which gives rise to a common will, particularly if, according to McDougall, an attraction of like to like is postulated as underlying ethical and political groupings. Conversely, from a subjectivist view, a common national character can be attributed to a coincidence of wills, since this must indicate a sharing of the values that are the determinants of character. The emphasis on character, therefore, allows apparent theoretical differences about who a sovereign people might be to be obscured by postulating a correspondence between national will and national character traits. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The second philosophical consideration that explains the invocation of character is its importance in the ethics of the period. The popular influence of the notion of character, not only in Victorian Britain, may be gauged by the fact that Samuel Smiles’s Character, published in 1871, was reprinted no less than 27 times before the turn of the century and continued in circulation well into the middle of the next. “The same qualities which determine the character of individuals,” he remarks, “also determine the character of nations” (Smiles 1939, 32), so character building evidently has a national benefit. However, there are at least two distinct philosophical reasons why one might emphasize the importance of character. Throughout the late 19th and earlier 20th centuries, utilitarianism remained an important theory of ethics. Utilitarianism is the doctrine that something’s moral worth is measured by the amount of happiness it brings. But utilitarianism seems to run counter to common sense and to render the making of moral judgments inordinately difficult. The 19th-century resolution of these problems by philosophers like Henry Sidgwick was to regard the character traits commonly seen as valuable as those that generally lead to the actions that produce the greatest happiness; therefore, those who display them simply follow their virtuous dispositions in deciding how to act. There was, however, another distinct but influential theory of philosophical ethics that measured the goodness of an act by its virtuous motives, and thus its displaying an admirable character, not by its consequences. F. H. Bradley, for example, was an idealist, in the sense that he held reality to be ultimately spiritual rather than material. Bradley’s idealist ethics hold that man’s ultimate end is selfrealization, but that the self to be realized is principally that of the social organism to which someone belongs, since “he is what he is, in brief, so far as he is what others also are” (Bradley 1927, 167). Thus, insofar as he acts in accordance with his community’s moral self, he tends to act well, since this will express the sort of unity that constitutes a man’s character, rather than acting from disorganized instincts. Bradley admits that one may have to look beyond one’s own community, which may be to some extent corrupt; yet it is evident how this view of ethics naturally allies itself with the doctrine of national character as that to which one should aspire to conform.

Dimensions Different nationalisms, we noticed earlier, depend on different criteria for what they take to be their nation—race, religion, language, and so forth. The way these different criteria connect with an apparently uniform conception of national character is by providing different accounts of its formation. One is not, of course, obliged to refer to only one causal factor. Reflecting on national character in his book in 1927, the political philosopher and historian Ernest Barker lists three N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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“material factors”—race, geography, and economy—and four “spiritual factors”— politics, religion, language, and education—seeing all of them as contributing to shaping it. But Barker does not appreciate the political point of seizing upon a single criterion, or a small set of them, namely, that it is this and this only that applies to the group for whom a right to statehood is claimed. For example, the Belgians largely share a religion, Catholicism, while speaking two languages. The Germans, by contrast, share a language but differ in religion. In these circumstances, only one criterion will form a country’s national character, which will be forced upon the group’s nationalists, as will the appropriate philosophical underpinnings. It would be an oversimplification to regard the late 19th and earlier 20th centuries as a battleground between materialist and idealist metaphysics, and even more so to see Barker’s material and spiritual factors captured by the former and the latter, respectively. Nonetheless, it is worth bearing this crude picture in mind when considering what follows. For we shall go on to look at various philosophical frameworks to see what accounts they can offer for national character, and we shall notice to what nationalisms, and hence to what purportedly national groups, they are congenial or not, as the case may be. It is impossible here to do more, however, than to provide a few examples of the philosophical lines of thought that influenced the way particular nationalists conceptualized their national groups in terms of the formation of their national characters. During this period, one influential strand of materialist philosophy was Social Darwinism, though the English thinker Herbert Spencer, who may be considered its most influential exponent, had set out his principle of evolution, by which only the fittest survive, prior to Charles Darwin and with none of Darwin’s scientific method. But Spencer also believed that people came together in a social organism that is grown rather than made and, thus, needs to be left to its own devices to flourish or to perish. Spencer’s ideas were carried forward in Benjamin Kidd’s Social Evolution of 1894, which explicitly presents rivalry between individuals, societies, nations, and races as the mechanism whereby the fittest in each category come to the fore. This sort of thinking sees character—individual, national, or racial—as operative, with the impulsiveness of “Bushmen,” according to Spencer, unfitting them for the social union through which progress is possible. Karl Pearson’s National Life and Character, appearing in the same year as Kidd’s book, advocates war with “inferior races” and competition with “equal” ones for economic advantage. Social Darwinism regards national character as largely an inherited characteristic, shaped in a rivalrous struggle for existence. Its maintenance and improvement therefore depends principally upon eugenic methods and the vanquishing of opponents. The latter militarist conclusion was exposed by Norman Angell’s 1909 volume The Great Illusion, since, he argues, it is the fittest who go to war and they perish rather than survive. The former strategy was generally seen as one of preserving racial purity, although Spencer himself believed that mixing similar N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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stocks will derive the evolved advantages of both. While this sort of eugenic thinking affected most Western countries during the period, each advertising their own national characters as best fitted for survival, it was notoriously in German nationalism and Nazi supranational racism that its most baneful effects were encountered. Germany had long had a racist tradition of thinking about its national character, originating in the 15th-century discovery of the Roman writer Tacitus’s Germania and its portrayal of Germans as morally admirable because they are racially pure. Despite his insistence that the will shaped individual character, the 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant had a physiological view of temperament as manifest in inherited national and racial characters. Kant compares these characters on an evaluative scale, the Germans coming out best, unlike Herder who sees the Germans simply as best fitted to their different conditions. Kant’s successor Fichte, however, also sees the Germans as a superior people, though there is a crucial twist in his argument as to why they are. Certainly they are a racially pure people, but what accounts for their moral superiority is that, unlike other Teutonic peoples, they continue to speak their original uncontaminated language, which becomes the criterion of German national identity. This enables them to understand the thoughts it expresses in a way that speakers of languages that are introduced or have introduced elements cannot. Yet, as Elie Kedourie observes, “there is no clear-cut distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism . . . a nation’s language was peculiar to that nation only because such a nation constituted a racial stock distinct from other nations” (Kedourie 1960, 71), and he goes on to cite the French Fascist Charles Maurras as holding that Jews were unable to understand French as Frenchmen proper can. One cannot, therefore, become a member of a nation by learning its language. It was in this racialized form that linguistic nationalism percolated through Europe and could thus be combined with elements of Social Darwinism. The most notorious example, in our period, of a philosopher embracing racist nationalism is Martin Heidegger, whose inaugural address as rector of Freiburg University in 1933 borrows themes from Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation a century and a quarter earlier. Like Fichte, Heidegger sees himself as speaking at a moment of crisis in which the German people are under threat, while at the same time their position as an original people at the center of Europe gives them a special mission. It is a mission they are uniquely able to discharge because of the peculiar properties of their language. For the German language is, Heidegger claims, especially fitted for the original metaphysical thinking required to resolve the crisis by providing a ground for the new German political order. This grounding is achieved through a fundamental questioning of received assumptions, rather than by a restatement of established values. As a starting point, Heidegger urges a return to the pre-Socratics, particularly Heraclitus, whose dark saying that everything comes about through conflict provides a justification for similar attitudes to Social Darwinism (which, as a philosophical system, Heidegger would N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Martin Heidegger, like Fichte, saw the Germans as a people of a special kind with a special mission. This, notoriously, led him to support Hitler. (Bettmann/Corbis)

have rejected). Although Heidegger’s political ideas had little influence on nationalism, the difficulty is to divine whether features of his more general philosophical system might conduce to acceptance of it or of other objectionable forms of identity politics. The same question can be raised about the idealism that originates in the work of Hegel, another of Kant’s successors, and which continued to exercise an influence in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In fact, in 1945, Karl Popper credits Hegel—probably unfairly—with fathering the “new tribalism” that German nationalism expressed. Yet certainly a Hegelian philosophy of history sees world events as the unfolding of Spirit, and individual nations, through their members’ national characters, as playing a part in this development. This leads directly to a conception of national mission that is potentially dangerous, particularly when allied to Hegel’s doctrine that war preserves the ethical health of a nation. Ideas like these were taken up during our period, and they present a picture of the formation of national character little different from, though even more mysterious than, that of Social Darwinism. But are there not more benign forms of idealism that dispense with the worst of these ideas? Bernard Bosanquet’s idealist work, The Philosophical Theory of the State, exerted considerable influence in Britain. In his introduction to a third edition in 1919 he writes: “‘England’ has always meant the cause of humanity; so has every nation, so far as it saw and fought for a true good. All saw the good differently . . . but all saw some of it . . . and knew darkly that they were there to see it and to champion it” (Bosanquet 2001, 44). Here, a more benevolent construction is put upon the idea of a national mission, a word Bosanquet hesitates to use because it N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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is “too narrow and too aggressive” (Bosanquet 2001, 283). The differences of national character implied in the different missions arise, he thinks, from different experiences and rule out cosmopolitan government (i.e., covering the whole world) for the immediate future. Yet these differences of character are seen, in idealist terms, as reflecting the distinctive Sittlichkeit, or social ethics, of each nation. This is to accord national character a significance it would lack were it to be formed by mere imitation. Bosanquet, therefore, takes issue with this reductive theory, which, we might notice, was taken up by both McDougall and Barker— the latter mentioning the imitation of great men (like Cromwell for the English!) as a feature of national character formation. Bosanquet’s stress on national experiences, however, finds its best expression in the Austrian social philosopher Otto Bauer. Heavily influenced by Marxism, he is not an idealist, but he also rejects an economic materialist view of history, seeing individual consciousness as the unit of social explanation. Bauer was writing in the context of nationalist struggles within the Austrian empire, and he immediately grants significant differences between nations, readily detectable in terms of their national characters, with different ways of thinking and feeling. However, he regards national character not as a causal factor but as marking a type of regularity in acting. Its explanation is neither metaphysical, as an expression of Volksgeist, or national spirit, nor racial. Rather, it reflects the common direction of people’s wills, resulting from their shared historical experiences, so that “a nation can thus be defined as a community of character that grows out of a community of destiny” (Bauer 1996, 52). It is easy to see the greater appeal of this account for subject peoples conducting campaigns of national secession or reunification than of confident stories of national missions. It concedes the possibility of changes in character and places emphasis on the role of the will, though Bauer opposes his basically cultural criterion of nationhood to Renan’s, which, unlike Bauer’s account, requires a national consciousness. National consciousness, Bauer believes, is a secondary phenomenon that develops only when a national group is brought into contact, possibly confrontationally, with other groups. Prior to that, its unity is unreflective. However, Bauer is not, even in our nonpejorative sense, a nationalist, believing that each person’s national identity can be accommodated by the granting of cultural rights within a multinational state, and not justifying separate statehood.

Consequences Up until World War I, most English liberals had been, in our sense, nationalists, conceding nations a right to statehood from the value of freedom, and thus deriving their right to a state from a general right of freedom of association. They assumed that national independence is what groups with distinct national characters N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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would prefer—although practical problems in implementing this liberal program were acknowledged. After the war, however, disillusion set in as a result of the difficulties of redrawing the map of Europe and the widespread unrest and imposition of authoritarian regimes that this occasioned. The attempt to marry a shared political will to cultural distinctiveness in the way that the theory of national character presupposed, and to draw organizational conclusions from it, began to seem unworkable. One casualty was the theory of national character itself. Despite defenses like Barker’s, it came increasingly under attack as a usable criterion of national identity, and it is interesting to see how some political theorists of the day, now largely forgotten, criticized the idea and its political application. One line of criticism was that differences in national character are no more marked than the differences between members of subnational groups, and they are, at best, typical, not a criterion of membership of the nation. They are, furthermore, stereotypes that can be politically manipulated, according to the state of international relations. This last point concerning the malleability of national stereotypes is rather different from another criticism, which sees national character itself changing quite suddenly in response to circumstances. Here, the replacement of German respect for science and learning by the irrationality of Nazism was cited. Such changeable characters could not be the bases of political organization. One influential thinker, A. D. Lindsay, adopted a quite different criterion of what he terms nationality in the political sense: “It is a sentiment, a readiness to act together, a feeling that the organization of government of this area is the common job, something that matters to all” (Lindsay 1943, 163). There is more than a hint of the idea of a national mission here, but it is deliberately separated from any idea of a distinctive national culture and its effect on national character, as these are linked by Bosanquet. Lindsay identifies a nonpolitical sense of nationality as the consciousness of a common culture, which, by contrast with the position in western Europe, preceded shared political institutions in central and eastern Europe. But, he maintains, these nonpolitical nationalities do not have boundaries appropriate to those of modern states, and they look to the past in deciding upon their political associations, not to “the common job” that needs to be done in the future. Nationalism on this basis is unacceptably emotional. Other thinkers went further than Lindsay, denying any principle of a national right to statehood as ethically unacceptable and looking forward to the development of an international community. Yet, even as they wrote, this sort of liberal internationalism itself came under attack as World War II loomed. The quasi-Marxist political thinker E. H. Carr branded it “utopianism” and advocated a more clear-sighted “realism” about power relations and conflicts of interest. He too, though, condemns “the nineteenth century supposition that nation and state should normally coincide” (Carr 1942, 62) and its concomitant equation between the principle of self-determination and the principle of nationality. The right of self-determination, he suggests, is a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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right of individuals to determine their units of political organization in accordance with their socioeconomic interests so that these units change and attract shifting loyalties as conditions change. Carr would no doubt have regarded talk of national character, which seems to stand in the way of this, as a fiction serving the interests of those who benefit from national states. In educated circles, talk of national character did not survive World War II, though it continues to fuel popular fantasies and antagonisms. The reasons for its decline are multifarious. The observed volatility of national characteristics and allegiances and their susceptibility to political manipulation played a part, as did a greater awareness of regional and supranational affiliations. In modern conditions, the kind of cultural homogeneity on which talk of national character was predicated could no longer be assured and individual variations of lifestyle were seen to reflect divergent values. This last point reflected a growing liberal belief that the ethical role of the state, even the nation-state, was limited, allowing maximum scope for the personal choice of values. A philosophical reaction to this position set in, however, which corresponded to a resurgence in nationalism following the end of the Cold War. So-called communitarian thinkers emphasized once more the embeddedness of the individual in a social setting from whose communal practices his or her values derive. This led to a concern about, what came to be known as, cultural identity and the need, sometimes, for separate states to protect it. But national character and cultural identity may be less different than meets the eye, with many of the same questions about what constitutes the former recurring about the latter. Indeed, the notion that nations are culturally shaped has led to a revival of liberal nationalism. Selected Bibliography Barker, E. 1927. National Character and the Factors in its Formation. London: Methuen. Bauer, O. 1996. “The Nation.” In Mapping the Nation, edited by G. Balakrishnan, 39–77. London: Verso. Bosanquet, B. 2001. The Philosophical Theory of the State and Related Essays. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press. Bradley, F. H. 1927. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carr, E. H. 1942. Conditions of Peace. London: Macmillan. Heidegger, M. 1990. “The Self-Assertion of the German University.” In Martin Heidegger and National Socialism, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering, 5–13. New York: Paragon House. Kedourie, E. 1960. Nationalism. London: Hutchinson. Lindsay, A. D. 1943. The Modern Democratic State. London: Oxford University Press. McDougall, W. 1913. An Introduction to Social Psychology. London: Methuen. Popper, K. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Renan, E. 1939. “What Is a Nation?” In Modern Political Doctrines, edited by A. Zimmern, 186–205. London: Oxford University Press. Sidgwick, H. 1891. The Elements of Politics. London: Macmillan. Smiles, S. 1939. Character. London: John Murray.

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Austria Lonnie R. Johnson Chronology 1918 (January) U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” state that the “peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development” to pave the way for the subsequent dismemberment of Austria-Hungary at the end of World War I. (November 12) A provisional government for the “Republic of German-Austria” is proclaimed in Vienna, which expressly states its intention to enter a union (Anschluss) with a democratic German state. 1919 Victorious Entente powers forbid the Anschluss of Austria with Germany in the Treaty of Versailles with Germany (June) and reiterate it in the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria (September). 1920 (October) The Constitution of the Republic of Austria (“First Republic”) is enacted. 1934 (February) A three-day “civil war” between the conservative and right-wing forces and social democrats leads to the final demise of democracy in Austria and the consolidation of an authoritarian, one-party regime: the “Fatherland Front.” (July) An unsuccessful putsch is attempted by Austrian Nazis; conservative leader Engelbert Dollfuss is assassinated. 1938 (March) The occupation of Austria by Nazi Germany goes militarily unopposed; Austria is incorporated into the Third Reich. 1943 (November) The Allied “Moscow Declaration” declares the Anschluss “null and void” and formulates the “reestablishment of a free and independent Austria” as a war objective. 1945 (April 27) The provisional government in Vienna declares Austrian independence; the “Second Republic” is established. 1955 (May 15) Allies conclude the Austrian State Treaty in Vienna, which paves the way for the Allied evacuation of Austria and Austria’s declaration of permanent neutrality (October 26). 1989 (July) The Austrian government solicits negotiations with European Economic Community authorities in Brussels that conclude with Austrian accession to the European Union on January 1, 1995.

Situating the Nation Before 1918, “Austria” was not a territorial or political reference to an entity coextensive with the small state established after World War I, but a malleable political, territorial, and dynastic concept that has referred to a wide variety of polities in the past millennium. The first documented use of the term Austria (in Old German, Ostarrichi, in contemporary German, Österreich) dates back to 996 and was a territorial reference to part of the contemporary Austrian province of Lower Austria. The history of the concept of Austria is associated with two dynasties: the Babenbergs, who were appointed margraves of Austria in 976 and ruled until 1246, and the Habsburgs, who ruled from 1278 until 1918. Under the Babenbergs, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Austria was roughly coextensive with the contemporary provinces of Upper Austria and Lower Austria in the Danube Valley. After 1278, the term “Austria” became associated with the Habsburg dynasty (“House of Austria”). By the late Middle Ages, the Habsburgs’ holdings included the medieval forerunners of seven of Austria’s nine contemporary provinces. Although Habsburg Austria was more or less coextensive with contemporary Austria, it also included considerable territories in contemporary Slovenia, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland, too. After 1477, dynastic intermarriage and Habsburg diplomacy provided the basis for the evolution of an Austrian empire. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Habsburg’s dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was a far-flung, ethnically diverse, religiously heterodox domain of some 52 million inhabitants and included territories of the contemporary Czech Republic, southern Poland, Slovakia, western Ukraine, Hungary, Transylvania in Romania, northern Serbia, BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and provinces of northern Italy. Although Austria is an age-old name and refers to an age-old polity, it is important to recognize that at no point in its long history did “Austria” as a political or constitutional unit correspond to the frontiers of the Austrian state established in 1918. Furthermore, Austria was not a national concept before 1918. Due to its association with the Habsburg dynasty, it had imperial and multinational connotations. Finally, there was no “national program” for Austria in the 19th century: no widespread sentiment among German-speaking Austrians in the Habsburg empire that there was an autochthonous Austrian nation or that German-speaking Austrians should express their political self-determination by establishing a small, independent state. Therefore, although many of the component parts of the contemporary Austrian national narrative are age-old, the Austrian nation is a recent phenomenon.

Instituting the Nation The Republic of Austria emerged from empires in the wakes of world wars twice in the 20th century. When the Habsburg’s dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary began to deteriorate at the end of World War I, German-speaking representatives of the Austrian imperial parliament (Reichsrat) proclaimed a republic, initially called German-Austria, in Vienna on November 12, 1918. However, Austria effectively ceased to exist as an independent state in March 1938 when it was occupied by Nazi Germany and incorporated into the Third Reich. Representatives of Austria’s interwar political parties proclaimed the so-called Second Republic in Vienna on April 27, 1945, during the closing days of World War II and harkened back to the territorial and constitutional precedent of the independent First Republic. During the postwar period, reestablished Austria was divided into four zones and occupied by the Allies until the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955 provided for their evacuation and full Austrian sovereignty. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Karl Renner (1870–1950) Karl Renner was one of the leading representatives of the pragmatic wing of the Austrian Social Democratic Labor Party for over five decades. He served as a member of the Imperial Parliament before World War I, where he promoted the idea of a federal reorganization of the Habsburg’s holdings. He was instrumental in the political and constitutional establishment of a provisional Austrian government in 1918. He led the Austrian delegation responsible for negotiating the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919 and advocated an Anschluss, which was orthodox social democratic policy at the time. He served subsequently as a social democratic member of Parliament in the 1930s, was briefly interned in 1934, and stated his support for the Anschluss in principle in 1938 (as a justification of the historical record) without otherwise advocating Nazi policies. In 1945, he was once again instrumental in establishing a provisional Austrian government and served as its first chancellor. He was elected president of Austria, a predominantly symbolic position, in 1945 and died in office in 1950.

There are a striking number of parallels between the establishment of the Republic of Austria in 1918 and the reestablishment thereof in 1945. In both cases, Austrian independence was preceded by war and the collapse of empires, and achieving independence entailed the dissociation of a small state from an empire under circumstances that were characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Representatives of political parties from antecedent Austrian states proclaimed Austrian independence, and Dr. Karl Renner (1870–1950), a social democratic politician, was instrumental in the establishment of both provisional governments. Finally, the victorious powers substantially dictated the scope and conditions for Austrian sovereignty after 1918 and after 1945.

Defining the Nation The issues of Austrian national autonomy, the relationship of an Austrian nation to the German nation, and the relationships of Austrian states to German states have been recurrent core-identity issues laden with problems for Austrians. This task of defining the Austrian nation is exacerbated by the fact that the assumption that Austrians were part of one German nation was widespread in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, in the Habsburg empire as well as in the First Republic. Although German is a pluricentric language, a linguistic justification for a distinct Austrian nation is exceptionally difficult insofar as Austrians speak German. In terms of 19th-century linguistic and cultural nationalism, Germanspeaking Austrians considered themselves “Germans,” and educated Austrians and Germans shared an educational and cultural canon to a great extent that was circumscribed as “German science and culture” (deutsche Wissenschaft und Kultur). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Although Austrian culture was characterized by its own set of autochthonous developments, styles, and sensibilities, including the emergence of a specifically Austrian literature, the widespread tendency in the 19th century was to view Austrian culture as a regional manifestation of one German culture instead of an autonomous expression of a distinct Austrian nation. Within the context of the Habsburg’s multinational empire, German-speaking Austrians defined themselves linguistically and culturally as “Germans.” Furthermore, they also identified themselves ideally with a larger German-speaking “linguistic and cultural community” (Sprach- und Kulturgemeinschaft) that was associated in historical and political terms with the “German nation”: the Holy Roman Nation of the German empire that existed as a loose confederation of German states from the early Middle Ages until its dissolution in 1806, with the Habsburgs almost continuously serving as emperors from 1493 onward. Austrians also ethnically identified themselves as part of the German people (Volk)— one people that was subdivided into subgroups anachronistically called “tribes” (Stämme). There were a number of different sets of “national problems” in central Europe during the 19th century. The rise of liberalism and nationalism—or the propagation of the concepts of popular sovereignty and national self-determination— created the “German problem” of how to create one large unified national state N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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out of a series of disaggregate smaller ones. These trends simultaneously aggravated the “nationalities problem” within the Habsburg empire of how to accommodate the increasing demands of various subject peoples for more national autonomy and political equality. The position of German-speaking Austria must be seen in terms of this national double bind. Historically, the Austrian political spectrum has been divided into three “camps”—social democratic, Catholic conservative, and German national-liberal —and pan-Germanism was present to varying degrees in all three political traditions. The premises of 19th- and 20th-century pan-German nationalism and liberalism prescribed that all Germans should be unified in one democratic state. Viewed in these terms, German-speaking Austria was an anomaly both before the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and thereafter. Before 1918, “Germans” in Austria lived in a multinational state that could not (or did not) participate in the process of German national unification. As subjects of the Habsburgs, German-Austrians were excluded from participating in the process of the unification of Germany as a national state under Prussian hegemony in 1871, when Germany became an empire in its own right. After 1918, the predominantly German-speaking inhabitants of the Republic of Austria were not enthused about the prospects of independence and felt that their national interests would be best served by some form of union (Anschluss) with Germany. If the desires of the Habsburgs’ individual subject peoples to exercise national self-determination were the centrifugal forces that ultimately tore Austria-Hungary apart at the end of World War I, German-Austrians represented an exception because they had literally no tradition of seeking national independence for the German-speaking territories of the Habsburg empire. On November 12, 1918, the day after the signing of the armistice that ended World War I, the representatives of the provisional national assembly of German-Austria proclaimed the establishment of the democratic republic of German-Austria (Deutsch-Österreich) and declared an Anschluss with Germany. German-Austria was to be a component of the democratic German state that also was in the process of constituting itself. Two points are particularly noteworthy here. The founders of modern Austria initially called it German-Austria to distinguish it from “old” Austria, which had imperial and multinational connotations, and they saw their political mandate in the same terms as the representatives of the other so-called successor states, such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, that were in the process of carving themselves out of the Habsburg realms. German-Austrians also justified their political agenda by appealing to the omnipresent postwar principle of national selfdetermination. The assumption of German-Austrian democrats of all political persuasions at that time was that the unification of all Germans into one state, which had been prevented by the dynastic competition of the Habsburgs with the Hohenzollerns in the 19th century under the conditions of imperial politics, would be possible under the conditions of post–World War I democracy and the “deimperialization” or “decolonization” of the Habsburg empire. The GermanN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Austrians saw the end of the war and the collapse of the empire as a political opportunity to exercise the same kind of national self-determination the other subject peoples of the Habsburg were realizing, too: the unification of all Germans in one democratic state. However, in the course of the postwar treaties concluded in Paris, the victorious powers forbade the unification of Austria with Germany in the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. Furthermore, they informed the German-Austrian delegation present that the name of the state they represented was to be “Austria,” with no hyphenated national reference to being “German.” The Republic of Austria retained its national sovereignty against the expressed will of its political elites. It was—to use a phrase coined by the Austrian journalist Helmut Andic— “a state no one wanted.” Psychologically, the idea of a postwar Austro-German Anschluss was ultimately an asymmetrical concern: an issue of more importance for those Austrians who felt that they were being excluded from participating in a democratic union they considered absolutely vital, than for most Germans, who had grown accustomed to living in one state without Austrians and did not experience the victorious powers’ fiat prohibiting an Anschluss as a loss to the same extent. However, the Anschluss was an obsession of Adolf Hitler, and it became an integral part of Nazi imperial pan-Germanism: ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. The so-called First Republic of Austria got off to a bad start, faltered, and failed. There was no tradition of its populace striving for “national independence.” It was not a coherent economic unit, and there were widespread doubts about its economic viability, initially aggravated by postwar inflation and later by the economic downturn that accompanied the Depression. Furthermore, its domestic political culture was characterized by a high degree of polarization and confrontation between Austro-Marxists and social democrats on the left and Roman Catholic conservatives and corporatists on the right, augmented by communists, Austro-fascists, and National Socialists at the respective extremes of the political spectrum. There was no overriding commitment of all political parties in interwar Austria to the idea of a democratic and sovereign Austrian state, the kind of which could have contained domestic political confrontation. On the contrary, various brands of ideological fervor treated Austrian democracy, Austrian independence, or both as expendable items. The tenor of political rhetoric was militant. Armed paramilitary organizations of the major political parties postured antagonistically and clashed periodically. Austrian democracy failed in 1934 when Roman Catholic conservatives, corporatists, and Austro-fascists collaborated to ban the communist and Nazi parties in Austria and then, after instigating a three-day “civil war” in February, suspended the Social Democratic Party and all of its suborganizations. This coalition of conservative and right-wing forces—designated as “authoritarian” by some historians but deemed to be “fascist” or “Austro-fascist” by others—created a oneparty regime (the “Fatherland Front”) and an authoritarian state (which defined N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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itself as “Christian Corporate”). However, neither this party nor this state was as popular or as successful as the Italian fascist or German national socialist models they emulated. Nonetheless, this regime was noteworthy in terms of its “national ideology.” It vigorously affirmed the unity of Christian and German (read “Austrian” here) culture and posited the idea of Austrian political independence from Germany based on a distinct Austrian historical mission and a distinct Austrian nation. These ideas were in conscious opposition to the atheism and pan-Germanism of Nazi ideology. However, they met with little popular support not only because of the strength of pan-German traditions in Austria, but also because they were being propagated by a regime that had eliminated political pluralism. This authoritarian regime operated on a very narrow domestic basis in Austria. It was caught between the passive resistance of the social democratic left and the increasingly aggressive agitation of an illegal but growing Nazi movement on the right. In July 1934, the illegal Nazis unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the regime with an armed putsch: a second brief “civil war” that included the murder of the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. Austria also was isolated internationally. As an authoritarian regime, it had alienated western European democracies at a time when these states began pursuing an increasingly accommodating policy of appeasement toward Nazi Germany. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Nazi occupation of Austria in March 1938—Hitler’s first big step toward bringing all Germans “home into the Reich”—provoked neither Austrian resistance nor international protest. The majority of Austrians had lost faith in their own state, and the rest of the world was prepared to acquiesce to the territorial expansion of Nazi Germany in order to appease Hitler. Austria literally disappeared from the map. In April 1938, the Nazis held a plebiscite in Austria to legitimize their occupation of the country after the fact, and those Austrians who were allowed to vote overwhelmingly affirmed the Anschluss. The Nazis turned the individual provinces of Austria into provinces (Gaue) of the Greater German Reich and forbade the usage of the word “Austria.” Austrians who fulfilled Nazi racial criteria became German citizens. The German occupation of Austria also was accompanied by widespread pogroms that soon were followed by the systematic discrimination against Austria’s Jews: some 180,000 of which were registered as Jews with Jewish communities of worship and some 30,000 who were either atheists, agnostics, or baptized Christians but designated to be Jews based on Nazi racial criteria. Approximately two-thirds of Austria’s Jews were expropriated in the process of emigration and flight in the years following the Anschluss. Some 65,000 Jews ultimately were “relocated” and killed in the concentration and extermination camps of the Third Reich. Although the idea of an Anschluss with a democratic German state previously had attracted a large number of proponents in interwar Austria, the execution thereof under the auspices of the Third Reich and Nazi policies gave it a specific ideological twist. As in Germany, there were enthusiastic supporters of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In violation of World War I peace treaties, armed forces of Nazi Germany occupied Austria in March 1938 and executed an Anschluss, or unification. Many Austrians were initially enthusiastic about the union of the two states. (National Archives and Records Administration)

regime as well as a fair number of opportunists and fellow travelers. Austrian Nazi party membership peaked at over 600,000. Some 1.2 million Austrians served in the German armed forces with 250,000 killed or missing in action. Approximately 35,000 Austrians were executed by the Nazis or died in prisons or concentration camps. Some 24,000 Austrian civilians were killed in Allied air raids. The dynamics of public opinion in Austria during the war were complicated. Hitler promised Austrians peace and prosperity in March 1938, but he gave them war and austerity after September 1939. After the Anschluss, the Nazis also apprehended thousands of Austrians as real or potential opponents of the regime. Representatives of the political parties who had opposed each other so bitterly in interwar Austria—social democrats and Catholic conservatives—suddenly found themselves together in the prisons and concentration camps of the Third Reich where they learned to reconcile their differences. Disillusionment with the Anschluss, Nazi policies, and the war became more and more widespread as the war drew on, and they contributed to a retrospective appreciation of those things that many Austrians had lost after 1934 and after 1938 and hoped to achieve or re-achieve thereafter: democracy and domestic peace in the former case and national sovereignty in the latter. The failure of the First Republic and the Anschluss taught Austrians a number of valuable political N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lessons. The experience of being German in the Third Reich instilled a genuine desire among many Austrians to be Austrian in a small, independent state. Austrian patriotism became the foundation of an unprecedented political program that explicitly broke with pan-German traditions and sentiments. Until late 1943, the conditions under which Austrians might achieve national independence were unclear. Most countries in the world had acknowledged the Anschluss. There was no Austrian government in exile nor was any one group of the Austrian exiles abroad acknowledged by the Allied powers as legitimate representatives of Austria. Resistance in Austria itself was not widespread. However, after a meeting in Moscow, the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics issued a brief declaration on November 1, 1943, that represented a new and coherent Allied policy toward Austria. The so-called Moscow Declaration referred to Austria as “the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression,” noted that the “annexation” of Austria by Germany was “null and void,” and stated the reestablishment of a “free and independent Austria” as an Allied war objective. Although there was no Austrian state or Austrian government at the time, the declaration also admonished Austria “that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war” and noted that Austria was responsible for making “her own contribution to her liberation.” It was a fortunate coincidence that the Allied tactical planning for postwar Europe corresponded to the national aspirations of many Austrians. The Allies did not conceive the Moscow Declaration as explicit support for the Austrian national idea nor were Austrians in exile abroad or in resistance at home involved in its articulation. It was inspired partially by the tactics of psychological warfare and reflected broader Allied strategic intentions related to weakening postwar Germany. However, it laid the foundations for the reestablishment of Austria at the end of World War II. It also simultaneously provided Austrians with a framework for articulating their own independence and retrospectively interpreting their relationship to the Third Reich. After the liberation of Vienna by the Soviet Red Army in April 1945, representatives of Austria’s social democratic left and Roman Catholic and conservative right constituted two new political parties: the Socialist Party of Austria and the Austrian People’s Party. Along with representatives of the Austrian Communist Party, these two new parties issued a “proclamation of independence” and established a provisional government on April 27, 1945, that referred to the individual clauses of the Moscow Declaration and established the so-called Second Republic. The Allies had designated Austria a victim of Nazi Germany—a status that corresponded to the disillusionment and psychological disposition of many Austrians at the end of the war—and Austrian politicians of the first hour, many of whom had been active in resistance or interned by the Nazis during the war, understandably wished to take as much advantage as possible of the fortuitous status Allied policy provided. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Austrian diplomats and politicians pursued a strategy of emphasizing the legal continuity of Austria as a state in terms of international law, despite the Anschluss, and the factual or institutional discontinuity of Austria as a state in terms of constitutional law as a result of the Anschluss. The logic of their argumentation was as follows: The Anschluss was an occupation, not an annexation. Therefore, Austria was never legally part of Nazi Germany and subsequently could not be considered a belligerent power or a successor state of Nazi Germany. In 1938, the Republic of Austria had been a victim of German aggression (as had Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, in 1940). As such, it was an occupied state that factually had been deprived of its legitimate organs of government, representation, and volition. Austria was liberated from Nazi Germany and reestablished its sovereignty based on the democratic constitution of the First Republic (which had been abrogated by the Austrian authoritarian regime in 1934). Although the Allied planning for the quadripartite occupation and administration of Austria and Vienna was modeled on the agreements that the four major Allied powers had concluded for Germany and Berlin, Austria’s reentry into the community of sovereign states after the war was not to be regulated by a peace treaty, because Austria had not been an ally of Nazi Germany or a belligerent power. It was to be facilitated instead by a “state treaty” outlining the conditions for ending the Allied occupation and administration of Austria and regulating the reentry of Austria into the community of nations as a sovereign state. The political stakes in occupied postwar Austria were exceptionally high and contributed in their own right to consolidating an Austrian national consensus and a domestic political consensus. Austria had been liberated from Nazi Germany in 1945, but it was occupied by the Allies thereafter: liberated but not yet free. There had been massive collaboration with Nazi Germany in Austria during the war, but according to the occupation-victim theory of the Anschluss, this was an issue of the responsibility of individual Austrians for their actions, not an Austrian state, because Austria had not participated in the war as a state. One of the dilemmas Austrian politicians confronted in the postwar period was to deny Austrian state responsibility for National Socialism in Austria as a principle of foreign policy and, at the same time, to assume domestic responsibility for the prosecution of a considerable number of former Nazis without jeopardizing, in the eyes of the Allies, Austria’s status as a victim or incurring massive reparation obligations in the course of the negotiation of a treaty that would end Allied occupation. The Allied policy of dissociating Austria from Germany based on granting Austria the status of a victim; the Austrian experience during World War II and the psychology of the immediate postwar period; and the genuine desire of Austria’s postwar politicians not only to make the best of Allied policy but also to reestablish a democratic state each contributed in its own way to establishing one of the foundational myths of the Second Republic: Austria (or Austrians) as a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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victim of National Socialism. Although this myth was dismantled substantially as a result of the so-called Waldheim affair in 1986 (when in the course of his campaign for the Austrian presidency, an enormous controversy arose over the wartime past of the former secretary general of the United Nations and the oblique and apologetic manner in which he dealt with it), it initially played a role in the formation of Austria’s new national identity. As long as the conditions of the Austrian State Treaty were negotiable, the pragmatic incentives for Austrian diplomats to downplay Austrian involvement in National Socialism were obvious. Furthermore, the normalization of domestic politics in postwar Austria entailed not only the prosecution of former Austrian Nazis but also the reintegration of the former party rank-and-file into political life. Given the competitive nature of electoral and party politics, former Austrian Nazis represented a considerable reservoir of voter potential that Social Democrats and Conservatives both wished to attract. The deterioration of East-West relations at the beginning of the Cold War also put the negotiation of the Austrian state treaty into a larger and more precarious ideological context, and the occupational regimes of the Western allies in Austria began to focus their attention less on issues related to de-Nazification and more on anticommunism. Within this context, Austrian political parties (with the obvious exception of the Communists) clearly posited Austria’s identity as a “Western” state. A brief “thaw” in the Cold War after the death of Stalin created a window of opportunity for the successful negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty, and neutrality based on a model similar to that of Switzerland was the idea that the Austrians proposed to help break the diplomatic gridlock. The negotiation of the State Treaty entailed important diplomatic trade-offs, and the conclusion thereof on May 15, 1955, paved the way for the end of the Allied occupation of Austria. The Soviet Union and the Western allies were prepared to reestablish full Austrian sovereignty only if neither East nor West would derive tactical advantages from Austrian independence, and they were prepared to accept a permanently neutral Austrian state, if Austria freely chose this status, because Austria would not be allowed to formally ally itself with either side. Austria agreed to unilaterally declare its permanent neutrality after the complete Allied evacuation of Austria and did so on October 26, 1955. The negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty got the allies out of Austria, and the Austrian proclamation of permanent neutrality effectively got Austria out of the Cold War by disallowing Austrian participation in either of the military blocs. It also provided Austria as a small state with a new national role to play: a mediator between East and West and a nonpartisan broker in international affairs. Austrian neutrality initially was conceived as a pragmatic diplomatic trade-off. However, the subsequent Austrian practice of “active neutrality” gradually made it a permanent diplomatic fixture in international affairs as well as a new core component of Austrian national identity. In 1965, the Austrian parliament desigN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nated October 26 as the Second Republic’s national holiday (Nationalfeiertag) to commemorate annually the Austrian declaration of permanent neutrality in 1955.

Narrating the Nation The dissociation of Austria from Germany after 1945 was radical not only in political terms but also in cultural and historical ones. The small republic Austria needed to adopt a new matrix for Austrian national identity, and this required the articulation of “Austrianist” perspectives on Austrian history and culture that countered previously prevalent pan-German and imperial assumptions. In terms of their history and their temperament before 1945, Austrians were —to use a phrase coined by Ignaz Seipel, one of the conservative federal chancellors of the interwar period—Großstaatmenschen: people accustomed to living in large states or, loosely translated, “imperial animals.” After 1945, Austrians articulated a new Austrian national narrative that was not imperial in the Habsburg or the German sense of the word and not German-national. This new national identity was based on affirming the cultural distinctness of Austrians from Germans (or abandoning the traditional pan-German emphasis on commonalities) and combined with an affirmation of smallness and independence (as opposed to largeness, “empire,” or some form of union with Germany). The completely new dimension of neutrality then successfully augmented these ideas of national autonomy and independence. Given the length of Austrian history and the wealth of Austrian culture, there was no shortage of material for a fundamentally new Austrian national narrative. The natural beauty of the country and its cultural heritage became prominent focal points of national identification, and Austrians consistently demonstrated great pride in them. Members of the Austrian academic community increasingly abandoned traditional pan-German perspectives on Austrian history and culture and began to propagate “Austrianist” perspectives more commensurate and compatible with the autonomy of the Austrian nation and the independence of the Austrian state. Historians, for example, noted that the federal provinces of Austria formed the core holdings of the Habsburgs in the late Middle Ages, and they wed the age-old histories of the Austrian provinces with the comparatively new idea of Austrian federalism in a manner that gave the young state and young nation venerable national traditions. Indeed, the relationship between provincialism and federalism is one of the keys to understanding Austria as a political nation. Th e provinces are one of the great continuities in Austrian history, and provincial identities—unlike Austrian national identity—have traditions of strength and stability. However, before 1945 the political identification of the Austrian provinces with the Republic of Austria was weak, the cultural identification of Austrians as “Germans” was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Oaths, Currencies, and Regime Transitions The stability of political and economic institutions enhances the development of national identities. The problems of political commitment and concomitant identity issues that Austrians confronted in the first half of the 20th century is well illustrated by the fact that there were civil servants who took oaths to serve five different political regimes, each of which represented different national ideologies, in the course of less than two decades. They swore to serve the Austrian emperor before 1918, the First Austrian Republic in 1920, the Christian Corporate State in 1934, Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich in 1938, and the Second Austrian Republic in 1945. During the same time span, Austrians also had four different currencies. The imperial crown devaluated dramatically after World War I and was replaced by the Austrian schilling in 1925. The Nazi’s introduced the German reichsmark to Austria in 1938, which, in turn, was replaced by a “new” Austrian schilling in 1945.

strong, and the political desire of Austrians to see Austria unified with Germany was widespread. Since 1945, Austrian provincial identities have been culturally and politically brought into line with the idea of an autonomous Austrian nation and the premises of Austrian federalism and independence in an unprecedented manner. Indeed, the creation of the Austrian nation was not so much a question of inventing new traditions; it was mainly an exercise in the selective reinterpretation and political realignment of preexisting older ones. In this manner, the small state of Austria could disassociate itself from undesirable imperial political traditions but at the same time appropriate equally imperial artistic and cultural ones.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Initially, the concept of the Austrian nation was articulated as a response to the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The realization of the Austrian nation ultimately was a response to 7 years of totalitarian occupation by Nazi Germany from 1938 to 1945 and 10 years of democratic occupation by the Allies from 1945 to 1955 that led to Austrian independence. If the Nazi occupation of Austria helped create the Austrian nation, Allied occupation helped to consolidate and institutionalize it. The political program of Austrian elites in 1945 was relatively straightforward: They wished to establish the continuity between the First Republic and the Second Republic and to treat the Anschluss as an occupation, in order to use these premises to negotiate the Allied evacuation of Austria and to achieve full Austrian sovereignty. They based their strategy on previously unthinkable degrees of domestic political collaboration to strengthen their position over and against the Allies, and they institutionalized cooperation as the feature of postwar political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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culture in Austria. Coalition governments ruled uninterrupted in Austria until 1966, and this formal power sharing was augmented by the development of a specifically Austrian form of mediating conflicts of interests outside of parliament called social partnership. Occupation created an unprecedented sense of national community in Austria, and reconstruction assumed the role of a national mission. The economic recovery of Austria was just as dramatic as Germany’s “economic miracle,” and it contributed stable postwar growth that lead to genuine national prosperity. Although the social democrats and the Catholic conservatives may have disagreed about some of the ideological details of the Austrian national idea, they agreed on the overriding importance of Austrian independence, and they both propagated the importance of allegiance to the republic and the concept of Austrian patriotism as the means of achieving it. The concept of the Austrian nation was based on patriotism—an explicit commitment to the Republic of Austria. It made no explicit reference to the concept of nationalism because nationalism in Austria historically had been pan-German or German-national (deutsch-national). These terminological distinctions are exceptionally important because not all Austrians readily accepted the idea of an Austrian nation. After 1945, the social democrats and Catholic conservatives embraced the idea of an independent Austrian nation whereas representatives of the national-liberal tradition, including a substantial number of former Nazis, continued to entertain traditional “national” and pan-German views about Austria. They organized themselves in a political party established in 1949 called the Union of Independents, which laid the foundations for the Austrian Freedom Party. These “nationalists” accepted the fact of Austrian state independence but continued to propagate traditional ideas about Austria as part of a German “ethnic and cultural community” (Volks- und Kulturgemeinschaft). Although this form of nationalism was still widespread in postwar Austria, support for it diminished as Austrian national consciousness developed. It is important to recognize that the concept of nationalism in Austria historically has referred to this Germannational tradition and has negative connotations for most Austrians. “Nationalists” in postwar Austria wanted to continue to be included in the German nation, whereas Austrian patriots argued for the existence of an independent Austrian nation. Representatives of this German-nationalist tradition in Austria also were prepared to openly appeal to exclusionary and xenophobic sentiments. One of the most ambivalent manifestations of the success of Austrian nation-building has been that the populist politician Jörg Haider, who originally was a classic second-generation representative of the postwar German-national tradition in Austria, abandoned traditional pan-German references to the German nature of Austria in the early 1990s, and reformulated the contents of the German-national agenda in exclusively Austrian national terms. The first openly nationalistic appeal to Austrian sentiment was an explicitly xenophobic plebiscite that Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party organized in 1993 based on the slogan “Austria first!” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The broad popular affirmation of Austria as a distinct national unit coupled with a wide-ranging popular commitment to the Republic of Austria as a small, independent, and neutral state has been well documented by over 15 national public-opinion surveys since the mid-1950s. In 1956, 49 percent of the Austrians surveyed affirmed the existence of an Austrian nation, 46 percent considered Austrians to be part of the German people, and 5 percent did not know or answer. By 1994, the share of Austrians who believed Austria was a nation had increased to 79 percent (Frölich-Steffen 2003, 106). Eurobarometer surveys conducted in Austria by the European Union’s director general for Education and Culture since 1990 also document that Austrians demonstrate a comparatively high degree of national pride by European standards. This mode of contemporary self-perception provides a strong contrast to the psychological insecurities of interwar Austria just as the political and economic success of the Second Republic provide strong contrasts to the manifold failures of the First Republic. The First Republic of Austria was a state without a nation; the Second Republic is a state that has succeeded in creating an Austrian nation. Selected Bibliography Beller, S. 2006. A Concise History of Austria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bischof G., and A. Pelinka, eds. 1997. Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, vol. 5: Contemporary Austrian Studies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications. Bruckmüller, E. 2004. The Austrian Nation: Cultural Consciousness and Socio-Political Processes. Translated by Lowell A. Bangerter. Riverside, CA: Ariadne Press. Frölich-Steffen, S. 2003. Die österreichische Identität im Wandel. Vienna: Braumüller. Johnson, L. R. 1995. “Interpreting the Anschluss.” In Austria, 1938–1988: Anschluss and Fifty Years, edited by W. E. Wright, 265–294. Riverside, CA: Ariadne Press. Pelinka, A. 1998. Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Plaschka, R. G., G. Stourzh, and J. P. Niederkorn, eds. 1996. Was heisst Österrreich: Inhalt und Umfang des Österreichbegriffes vom 10. Jahrhundert bis heute. Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenscahften. Pohl, W. 1996. “Ostarrichi Revisited: The 1946 Anniversary, the Millenium, and the Medieval Roots of Austrian Identity.” Austrian History Yearbook, 27:21–40. Steininger, R., G. Bischof, and M. Gehler, eds. 2002. Austria in the Twentieth Century. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Stourzh, G. 1990. Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum Österreichbewußtsein im 20. Jahrhundert. Vienna: Edition Atelier. Thaler, P. 2001. The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building in a Modern Society. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.

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Baltic Nationalism Kevin C. O’Connor Chronology 13th century Latvia and Estonia are conquered by German knights. 1236–1263 Reign of Mindaugas, who unifies the Lithuanian tribes. 1386 The marriage of Grand Duke Jogaila to Queen Jadwiga of Poland inaugurates a nominal union between Lithuania and Poland and begins the Christianization of Lithuania. 1525 A Lutheran prayer book is published in Estonian, Livonian, and Latvian. 1547 The first Lithuanian-language book is printed. 1569 The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczspospolita) is created. 1710 Russia seizes the Baltic provinces of Estland and Livland from Sweden. 1772–1795 The Commonwealth is partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and Austria; Russia acquires most of Lithuania and the Latvian provinces of Courland and Latgale. 1816–1819 Serfdom is formally abolished in Estland and Livland. 1857–1861 The Kalevipoeg epic is published in Estonia. 1860s The Young Latvia movement is formed. 1862–1865 Pe¯ terburgas av ı¯zes, a weekly Latvian-language newspaper, is published. 1863 Lithuanian peasants participate in a Polish insurrection. 1864–1904 Russian imperial authorities ban the publication and dissemination of Lithuanianlanguage materials. 1869 First Estonian song festival. 1873 First Latvian song festival. 1880s–1990s Russification policies are implemented in the Baltic provinces. 1888 The La¯ cˇ ple¯ sis epic is published in Latvia. 1891 The first Estonian daily newspaper, Postimees, is published. 1905–1907 The revolution in the Russian empire is followed by insurrections in the Baltic provinces. 1918 Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia proclaim independence. 1918–1920 Wars of Independence in the Baltic countries. 1939 Secret protocols to the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact awards the Baltic states to the Soviet sphere of influence. 1940 The Baltic states are annexed to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1941 (June) A massive deportation of the Baltic peoples to the Soviet interior takes place one week before the German invasion. 1941–1944 Nazi occupation and the extermination of the region’s Jews. 1944–1956 Partisans known as the “forest brothers” resist Soviet occupation. 1949 Mass deportation of Baltic rural dwellers.

Situating the Nations Subject to foreign control for most of their histories, the Baltic peoples, in modern times, have experienced only two periods of complete independence: first in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the interwar era (1918–1940), when Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia formed three of the smallest and most vulnerable successor states that were carved from the Russian empire’s western borderlands; and since 1991, as post-Soviet republics struggling to balance their requirements for both security and cultural development. Because of their shared history of sustained foreign domination, the Baltic peoples have always regarded themselves as threatened nations. Indeed, concern for their very survival has been central to the national identities of the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians from the last decades of czarist rule through the Soviet period, and it underpinned their recent rush to join European and international institutions. “The Baltic states” as a category that encompasses the three tiny countries of northeastern Europe dates to the establishment of political independence after World War I; this designation originally included not only Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, but Finland as well. As a geographical descriptor, the appellation is problematic, for Sweden and Denmark surely have an equally legitimate claim (one that has not been exercised) to being “Baltic states.” Moreover, from the first use of the term, “Baltic states” was understood as an outsiders’ construct that blurred the distinctions between these unique countries. In the narrower linguistic sense, only the Latvians and Lithuanians are true “Balts,” as Estonians speak a FinnoUgric language that is similar to Finnish but is entirely unintelligible to the closely related Indo-European languages spoken by Latvians and Lithuanians. (In fact, long before the Latvians and Lithuanians were regarded as “Balts,” the word balten was used as an ethnonym for the Baltic Germans.) Despite the confusion, the term “Baltic states” stuck and was cemented during the era of Soviet rule, during which Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (but not Finland) were welded together into a region that the Russians called Sovetskaia Pribaltika. Although it is common to speak of these three neighboring countries as a unit on the basis of their location and shared political history, Estonia, Latvia,

Baltic Minorities The present-day Baltic countries have historically been home to several other smaller national groups. The population of interwar Estonia included thousands of Finnish-speaking Ingrians (or Ingers) and Setus, the Estonians’ Finno-Ugric cousins. Latvia once had a substantial population of Livs, but their population is nearly extinct. A Finno-Ugric people who once lived in settlements along the Latvian coast, the Livs assimilated into the surrounding Latvian population. Lithuania was (and remains) the home of several hundred Karaites (or Karaim), a Turkic people who practice an ancient, pre-Talmudic form of Judaism. Among the other “foreign” minorities in the Baltic countries were the several thousand Swedes who lived in Estonia, Poles who lived in Lithuania, Germans who arrived in Latvia and Estonia in the Middle Ages and dominated the region until the achievement of independence, and Russians who settled in Baltic cities during the era of czarist rule.

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and Lithuania possess very different cultural backgrounds that have reinforced their sense of national uniqueness. While the Estonians are culturally oriented toward Scandinavia and northern Germany, the Lithuanians, because of a long shared history with Poland within the old Commonwealth (Rzeczspospolita), are culturally oriented toward their larger western neighbor. Latvians share both associations. While sharing the centuries of German rule endured by the Estonians, Latvia’s Kurzeme (Courland) and Latgale regions came under Polish control in the 16th and 17th centuries. All three Baltic countries were ruled by Russia from the 18th century until the end of World War I, and thus were subject to Russian cultural influence. Only the Lithuanians had a prior history of statehood, before the grand duchy’s union with the Polish crown in 1569. The religious diversity of the Baltic states is also significant: while Catholicism has been central to Lithuanian identity for more than 300 years, Estonians and Latvians, like their German overlords, were predominantly Lutherans in a Russian empire whose dominant religion was Russian Orthodoxy. Later, all three Baltic countries were subject to the ideological requirements of the atheistic Soviet state.

Instituting the Nations While the sprawling Grand Duchy of Lithuania existed as an independent state in the Middle Ages, Estonia and Latvia (as well as a considerably diminished Lithuanian state) became political entities as a result of World War I and the Russian revolutions of 1917. Created on the basis of the national self-determination principle, each of the Baltic governments worked to consolidate the young nationstate by (1) striking at the political and economic hegemony of the old German, Russian, and Polish (in Lithuania) elites; (2) encouraging the cultural development of the dominant nationality; and (3) promoting a generally tolerant but culturally exclusive sense of nationhood. While Estonia was the most ethnically homogenous of the Baltic states, Latvia had a significant Russian minority and a smaller Jewish one. Despite the loss of the Vilnius region to Poland during the interwar era, Lithuania had substantial Jewish and Polish minorities. Although minorities were allowed to publish their own newspapers and educate their children in their own minority-language schools, it was clear that only speakers of the native language possessed full membership in the national community. The key attributes of national identity in the Baltic nations, from the era of the national awakenings in the second half of the 19th century through the postSoviet era, are language and culture. Indeed, during the period of national formation, writers and other cultural figures did more to inculcate a sense of national consciousness and patriotism than did political elites. Their poems, plays, stories, and operas often told the story of the origins, struggles, and destiny of their nations. Thus, it is hardly surprising that one of the principal ways that the Baltic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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governments of the interwar era attempted to foster a sense of national feeling was through the creation of various cultural institutions, including museums, theaters, and creative unions. Before 1919 most cultural institutions in the Latvian and Estonian provinces were run by and catered to the German-speaking elite. However, the cultural environment was quickly transformed following the establishment of independence, as new institutions enjoying generous state subsidies were established in each of the Baltic states in an attempt to raise the cultural level—and the national awareness—of the citizenry. In R¯ıga, the Latvian National Theater and the Daile (Art) Theater were established in 1919 and 1920, while Tallinn added the Drama Studio to the existing Vanemuine (originally established in 1906) and Estonia (1913) theaters. In Lithuania, which lost Vilnius to Poland after the war, the main cultural center was Kaunas, where the Lithuanian State Theater was established in 1920. Cultural figures with strong nationalist credentials, such as the poet and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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playwright Ja¯nis Rainis (1865–1929), who directed the Latvian National Theater in its early years, typically played leading roles in these new institutions. Performances often featured national themes: national operas, such as Gražina (1933), by the Lithuanian composer Jurgis Karnavicˇus (1884–1941), and The Vikings (1928), by the Estonian composer Eduard Tubin (1905–1982), were first performed at these new national institutions. Likewise, the new art museums established in the interwar era highlighted the achievement of native artists, who in turn frequently offered their talents in service of the nation, especially as nationalist feelings intensified throughout Europe during the 1930s. The governments of the interwar era were themselves national institutions, and most of the parties that were represented in the parliaments claimed to defend national, rather than class or regional, values and concerns. After a short period of untidy democracy, each of the Baltic countries, beginning with Lithuania in the late 1920s, experienced a political shift to the right that was accompanied by the official lauding of native, rural values. Increasingly isolated from Western Europe, from Soviet Russia, and from each other, the Baltic nations—like other countries in east central Europe—embraced the politics of nationalism while lapsing into a certain cultural narrow-mindedness. While organizations like Iron Wolf (Lithuania), Thundercross (Latvia), and the League of Independence War Veterans (Estonia) promoted extremist nationalism and had some popular appeal, power was seized by the authoritarian governments of Antanas Smetona (1926–1940), Konstantin Päts (1934–1940), and K¯arlis Ulmanis (1934–1940). Each of these leaders saw himself as embodying the values of his country’s dominant ethnic group and partly on that basis justified his seizure of power.

Defining the Nations Language and culture are the core components of national identity for the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Although their numbers are small today, the Baltic peoples are descendents of some of Europe’s most ancient inhabitants. The ancestors of the Finno-Ugric–speaking Estonians settled in the region as far back as 3000 BC, while the linguistic ancestors of the Latvians and Lithuanians arrived from the Eurasian steppe somewhere around 2200 BC. Once inhabiting a large swath of the east European plain, during the first millennium AD, the proto-Balts and proto-Estonians were pushed into the geographical areas they inhabit today. Lake Peipsi demarcated the natural border between Estonians and Slavs, while the Väina River formed the divide between the Estonians and peoples who spoke Baltic languages. Of course, the peoples living along the Baltic Sea hardly existed as “nations” a millennium ago. The ancestors of modern Latvians, for example, included tribes such as Sels, Latgals, Zemgals, and Kurs. The fact that the Baltic peoples played a unique role in the history of modern national formation in Europe is sometimes overlooked. Living in R¯ıga in the late N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1760s, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), a minister from East Prussia and a theorist of German Romanticism, became particularly interested in the nonGerman people who populated the surrounding countryside. As he wrote down the stories and folk songs of the Latvian and Estonian peasants, Herder discovered that beneath the “high culture” of the German overlords there existed a variety of local cultures with their own rich oral traditions. All Völker, or national groupings, he concluded, possessed their own spirit and distinctive characteristics; all were unique expressions of the beauty of God’s creations. Herder’s belief that language was the essence of nationhood is significant, for it is this criterion for nationality, rather than “blood” or ethnicity, which is at the core of national identity in the Baltics today. Herder’s inclusion of several Estonian and Latvian folk songs in The Peoples’ Voice in Song (1787) helped stimulate the scholarly interest of other Baltic Germans who later formed such study groups as the Society of Friends of Latvians (1824) and the Estonian Learned Society (1839). By the middle of the 19th century these friendly scholarly efforts to understand the Baltic peasantry were superseded by the efforts of native but German-educated Estonian and Latvian intellectuals, such as Friedrich Robert Faehlmann (1798–1850) and Krišj¯anis Valdem¯ars (1825–1891), who helped inaugurate the national awakenings of their peoples. Unlike the case in Germany or Poland, where native cultural elites led their respective national revivals, one of the distinguishing factors in the national awakenings of the Baltic peoples was the lack at this early stage of such indigenous political and cultural elites. For the Latvians and Estonians, who never possessed their own aristocracy, the nation had to be created from scratch on the basis of language and peasant traditions. Lithuanian elites, on the other hand, had been largely Polonized and only belatedly began to identify with the language and culture of the Lithuanian peasantry. Indeed, the Lithuanian situation was different in several ways. Unlike Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania had existed as an independent entity for several hundred years. For a time, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the largest country in Europe before it was adjoined to Poland in 1569 and shared the latter’s sad fate in the 18th century. Split for more than a century between Russian-ruled Lithuania proper (the provinces of Kovno, Vilna, and Suwalki) and Lithuania Minor (in East Prussia), Lithuanians faced serious political obstacles that delayed their national formation. Most significantly, because of their role in the Polish-Lithuanian rebellions of 1830 and 1863, the Lithuanians of Russia had to endure a press ban from 1864 to 1904. Thus, Lithuanian-language materials had to be published abroad in Lithuania Minor and smuggled across the border. The national awakenings of the Estonian and Latvian peoples occurred in the context of their rising concerns about Germanization—the somewhat voluntary fate of many upwardly mobile Estonians and Latvians—and Russification, which was St. Petersburg’s response to the sprawling empire’s need for centralization and uniformity. Convinced that their cultural development had been inhibited by N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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centuries of servitude to foreign masters, Estonian and Latvian intellectuals sought to bring their peoples up to the cultural level of the Germans and thereby initiated a discussion about their national pasts and destinies. Sometimes they disagreed. For example, while the Russophile Carl Robert Jakobson (1841–1882) was convinced that a new era of happiness would arise for Estonians only when the Baltic Germans lost their power, Johann Voldemar Jannsen (1819–1890), publisher of the newspaper Eesti Postimees, took the more moderate position that Estonian culture could best be developed under the tutelage of the Baltic German elite. In Latvia, the development of a national consciousness was hindered by the fact that Latvians were spread across three different provinces. Further complicating the situation, there was the anomalous position of the inhabitants of the Latgale region, who practiced Catholicism (most Latvians were Lutherans) and whose dialect was arguably so distinctive as to constitute a separate language. Widespread acceptance of the idea that all Latvians were one people (tauta) would require the education of the peasantry in their own language—a burden that fell largely on the shoulders of the editors of the Latvian newspaper P¯eterburgas av¯ızes. The arguments of Krišj¯anis Valdem¯ars (1825–1891), one of the newspaper’s editors, echoed those of Estonia’s Carl Robert Jakobson: that Latvian culture could best be developed under Russian protection. It is worthwhile to note that whereas Latvian and Estonian nationalists of a later era protested against the Soviet regime’s policies of linguistic and demographic Russification in the late 1980s, many Estonian and Latvian “awakeners” of the previous century actually welcomed the Russification measures of Czar Aleksandr III (reigned 1881–1894) in the belief that these would arrest and reverse the hegemonic role of the Baltic Germans. While the Estonians and the Latvians got more than they bargained for, it was in Lithuania that the Russification decrees were most resented, for it was not until 1904 that Lithuanians were permitted even to publish materials using the Latin alphabet. Despite the lack of clearly delineated national boundaries before 1918, establishing the border between Estonia and Latvia posed little problem once the Latvians and Estonians declared their independence from Russia. The independent Latvian republic that was proclaimed in January 1918 included southern Livland, Courland, and Latgale (western Vitebsk). The following month an Estonian Committee of Elders declared the independence of an Estonia state that included northern Livland and Estland. Although the arrival of German armies and a struggle with the Bolsheviks delayed the full realization of independent Latvian and Estonian states for more than a year, it was along these strictly ethnic lines that the new boundaries were established. Only the small town of Valga/Valka was disputed; it remains divided between Latvia and Estonia even today. Determining the frontiers of the new Lithuanian state was far more problematic, as Lithuania’s claims to independence were compromised by Germany’s creation of a puppet Lithuanian state in 1917. Moreover, Polish leaders, who tended N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Multinational Vilnius The fluidity and impermanent nature of national identity is well-illustrated by the history of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. Once the capital of the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilnius became a culturally Polish city as a result of Lithuania’s close political association with Poland and the latter’s cultural dominance. By 1914, more than a century after Vilnius and most of the rest of Lithuania were swallowed up by the Russian empire (where it was called “Vilna”), Jews and Poles each formed about 40 percent of the city’s population. The Poles called their city “Wilno,” to the Yiddish-speaking Jews it was “Vilne,” and to the Belarusian peasants who populated the surrounding countryside it was “Vil’nia.” Under Polish administration from 1921 to 1939, the contested city retained its Polish cultural identity, which was also attractive to most of the city’s Jewish population. A Lithuanian identity developed in Vilnius only during the Soviet era, following the extermination of its Jews between 1941 and 1944 and the repatriation of most of its Polish population at the end of World War II. Although Vilnius is now the capital of a Lithuanian nationstate, this outcome would have seemed most unlikely only a century ago.

to regard Lithuania as a backward Polish province, had every intention of including territory inhabited by Lithuanians in a reconstituted greater Poland. Lithuanian leaders, who took over administration from the Germans only one month before the armistice of November 1918, rejected Polish claims and proceeded to make their own, including the former Russian provinces Kovno (Kaunas), Vilna (Vilnius), Suvalki, and Klaipe˙da ( formerly Memel), a German port city that was also claimed by the Poles. Although both sides made their claims in Paris, the realities on the ground determined the borders of the Lithuanian state. While Lithuania, with German help, was able to hold onto the Kaunas region, Polish forces seized Vilnius, a largely Polish and Jewish city whose surrounding territories included hundreds of thousands of Lithuanian peasants. The Vilnius region came under Lithuanian administration only in October 1939, following the German and Soviet attacks on Poland, and in 1945 it was established as the capital of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania. Kaunas, the interwar capital, meanwhile became a neglected provincial town.

Narrating the Nations Almost everywhere in central and eastern Europe the formation of national consciousness was facilitated by a combination of one or more of the following factors: religion or religious institutions (as in Bulgaria), a shared sense of suffering due to a perceived historical injustice (Serbia), nostalgia for a glorious past (Poland), and language (Germany). For the Baltic peoples, the keys to national identity were their languages and their folk songs and folklore. Jakob Hurt (1839–1907) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and Krišj¯anis Barons (1835–1923) began the systematic collection of (respectively) Estonian and Latvian folk songs and folklore in the middle of the century, while others shaped these tales into grand epics that told the troubled and sometimes glorious stories of their nations. The Estonian epic, published in 1857–1861 by Friedrich Reinhard Kreutzwald (1803–1882), was titled Kalevipoeg (Son of Kalev). While its inspiration came partly from the Finnish epic Kalevala (1835–1836), Kalevipoeg’s heroes and themes were derived mainly from the Estonian folk tradition: heroic deeds, honesty, and peaceful labor are depicted as supreme virtues, while the German conquerors are portrayed as devils bringing ruin to a once free and prosperous people. Although its importance has diminished over time, Kalevipoeg was the first truly Estonian book—one that profoundly influenced a generation of Estonian intellectuals and became a symbol of the Estonian national awakening. Of more enduring value has been the Latvian national epic, La¯ cˇpl¯esis (The Bear Slayer), published by Andre¯js Pumpurs (1841–1902) in 1888. Set in pagan Latvia in the 13th century, L¯acˇpl¯esis recounts the exploits of a bear-eared giant—the son of a man and a female bear—who defends his homeland from invaders. In the end, the Bear Slayer is defeated and the Latvians are subjected to 700 years of misery. Whatever their literary merits, each of these epics shared the political goal of showing that the oppressed peoples had a history and culture no less grand than those of their German masters. Lacking a true literati and subject to the press ban, Lithuania never created its own national epic. However, Lithuanian nationalists, like their Polish counterparts, could and did revive memories of Lithuania’s glorious past. Lithuanians commemorate the great princes Mindaugas (1230–1263), who fended off the Germans and unified a series of scattered tribes under his leadership; Gediminas (1316–1341), who expanded the grand duchy’s borders deep into Slavic territory; Jogaila (1377–1392), who converted to Christianity and in 1386 became ruler of a partially unified Polish-Lithuanian state; and Vytautas (1392–1430), who along with Jogaila defeated the Teutonic Knights in the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410 and dramatically expanded the territory of the grand duchy. With the formal conclusion of a dynastic union with Poland in 1569, however, the heroic times had passed and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania became the junior partner in the commonwealth until it was dismembered by its neighbors in three stages between 1772 and 1795. During the century that followed, when the bulk of Lithuania and Poland were under Russian rule, Lithuanian nationalists appropriated the traditional Polish portrayal of their country as a crucified nation, thereby cementing the bonds between nationhood and religion (Catholicism) in a way that was alien to the Estonian and Latvian national traditions. With no memory of great kings or warriors, the Estonians and Latvians have focused on their favorite cultural figures. Among the most beloved cultural heroes of Latvia are the writer J¯anis Rainis and the artist Johann Köler (1855–1929); their Estonian counterparts are the poet Lydia Koidula (1843–1886), the prose N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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writers Eduard Vilde (1865–1933) and Anton Hansen Tammsaare (1878–1940), and the artist J¯anis Rozent¯als (1866–1916). Lithuania, too, celebrates cultural heroes ˇ iurlionis (1875–1911) such as the composer and painter Mikolajus Konstantinas C and the romantic writer Jonas Maˇciulis (1862–1932), better known as Maironis. Many of these cultural figures are associated either with the national awakenings of the 19th century or the first era of independence in the 1920s and 1930s. The political figures of the latter period occupy a more uncertain position. Although Antanas Smetona, Konstantin Päts, and K¯arlis Ulmanis are praised for their efforts in helping to create the independent states of (respectively) Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, their roles as authoritarian dictators leave them with somewhat ambiguous political legacies. While their critics hold them responsible for extinguishing liberal democracy in their countries, their defenders point out that these were “soft” dictatorships that may have prevented true extremists (fascists or communists) from taking power. The period of independence between 1918 and 1940 was very important for building national identities in the Baltic countries. This was symbolized through the donning of traditional peasant costumes during festivals and holidays, the celebration of an idyllic, agrarian past, and the rural ideal of the prosperous family farm. Storks, windmills, and oak trees were commonly featured in the rural imagery of interwar Lithuania, and they remain symbols of Lithuanian identity today. A staunchly Catholic country, the cross is a ubiquitous symbol in the Lithuanian countryside. Among Latvia’s most important national symbols are the R¯ıga skyline, L¯acˇpl¯esis (whose name and image has been appropriated by marketers of goods ranging from chocolate to beer), and the Freedom Monument, while Estonia’s most significant national symbol is Tartu University. Founded by the Swedish King Gustav II Adolf (1594–1632), the university was the intellectual center of the Estonian national awakening and is a living connection with the country’s enlightened Scandinavian past. For all three Baltic countries, the wars of independence during 1918–1920, like the “singing revolution” of the late 1980s, were also important symbols and shapers of national identity, for it is believed that the nation coalesced as it liberated itself from foreign rule.

Mobilizing and Building the Nations The first attempts to mobilize the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples on behalf of national goals occurred during the era of the national awakenings. In Latvia this role was first assumed by the Young Latvians ( Jaunlatviesi), a group that was inspired by the Young Italy and Young Germany movements of the 1830s and 1840s. Although most of these intellectuals were entirely comfortable in a culturally German milieu, the Young Latvians of the 1860s and 1870s occupied an intermediate space between the Baltic Germans and the Latvian peasantry as N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The spire of Saint Peter’s Cathedral is visible above a square in R¯ıga, Latvia, with the Latvian flag displayed in the foreground. (iStockPhoto.com)

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they worked to gain recognition of limited Latvian rights and popular acceptance of Latvian nationhood. In an era when literacy was rapidly spreading among the Latvian peasantry, the Young Latvians “rediscovered” the Latvian language and Latvian traditions and folklore. Meanwhile, the Estonian Society of Literati, which originated in the mid-1860s and was led initially by F. R. Kreutzwald and then by the journalist Jakob Hurt (it was closed by the czarist government in 1893), spearheaded the Estonian national birth. Its efforts were accompanied by the establishment in the early 1860s of the Estonian Alexander School, whose main purpose was to produce well-educated Estonian-speaking teachers for the growing elementary school network. Later, in the period just before World War I, the intellectuals who formed the Young-Estonia (Noor-Eesti) continued the work of raising the level of Estonian culture while at the same time orienting Estonian national culture toward western Europe: “Let us remain Estonians,” the movement’s founder Gustav Suits (1883–1956) declared, “but let us also become Europeans!” Among the most visible and successful efforts to mobilize the Latvian and Estonian nations was the song festival. While the first all-Estonian song festival was held in 1869, it was repeated, on a growing scale, five times in the last three decades of the 19th century. The first Latvian song festival was held in 1873; although purely a cultural event, as in Estonia, its deep nationalist overtones heralded the emergence of Latvia as an “awakened nation.” Featuring thousands of choir singers and dancers dressed in native costumes, the song festivals were—and remain—a tribute to national pride and cultural distinctiveness. Indeed, it was through the national song festivals that the Baltic nations could, during the years of Soviet rule, give expression to national uniqueness under a regime where any autonomous expression of national distinctiveness was considered suspicious. Under the unique conditions prevailing in Lithuania, there could be no Lithuanian analogue to Young Latvians or the Estonian Society of Literati. There the task of mobilizing the nation fell primarily to Catholic clerics such as Father Jonas Basanáviˇcius (1851–1927), whom many Lithuanians consider the patriarch of the nation. In the mid-1880s, his newspaper Aušra (The Dawn), published abroad and smuggled into Russian-ruled Lithuania, acted as the intellectual center of the Lithuanian movement. While Latvian and Estonian natives grew more literate and began to assume a more prominent position in the larger Baltic cities like R¯ıga and Tallinn, “Lithuanian” cities (such as they are today) like Vilnius (Wilno) and Kaunas (Kovno) remained heavily populated by non-Lithuanians— especially Jews. Indeed, Lithuanians were more economically backward, less literate, and less nationally conscious than their northern neighbors until well into the 20th century. The first opportunity for national mobilization on behalf of explicitly political goals occurred when Russia was rocked by a revolution in 1905, which occurred on the heels of two decades of intensive industrial development and urbanization. While social and class concerns were more important to the Latvian and Estonian rebels (which they expressed by burning down the estates of 184 manor N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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houses), the concerns of the Lithuanians, whose working class was smaller and less radical, were more national. Indeed, unrest in the Lithuanian provinces was directed less at Russo-Polish landlords than at the Russian state, which was forced to make such cultural and political concessions as the use of native languages in the classroom and the legalization of political organizations. While radical newspapers were shut down in the Baltic and Lithuanian provinces, Balts could now voice their concerns in the newly created State Duma. This initial experience with parliamentary politics provided Baltic leaders with the leadership skills and experience necessary to cope with the challenges posed by the Great War, the Russian revolutions of 1917, and the quest for independence. Yet the achievement of independence for the Baltic countries was less the product of intensive national mobilization than it was the fruit of the German government’s wartime efforts to promote “national self-determination” (in an effort to detach Russia’s western borderlands) at a time when the Russian empire was most vulnerable. The latter’s collapse in 1917, followed by the defeat of the Reich in November 1918 and the heroic efforts of the soldiers who fought in the Balts’ wars of independence, made that independence a reality. Once independence was established, it then fell to the new governments to define citizenship. In none of the Baltic countries did citizenship depend on ethnicity; while it was clear that these were Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national states, all inhabitants regardless of nationality were granted citizenship and cultural rights. However, the fact that the wealthier landowners—primarily Germans in Latvia and Estonia and Poles and Russians in Lithuania—were forced to surrender much of their land in what amounted to perhaps the most sweeping land reforms ever undertaken by democratic governments, may be interpreted as an attempt by the new governments to strike at the political and economic power of the former elites. While members of national minorities were still allowed to publish their own newspapers, organize their own political parties, and participate in public life, these rights were narrowed in the 1930s under the dictatorships of Smetona, Ulmanis, and Päts. Likewise, just as the monuments that were erected in Baltic cities during the interwar era (most notably, the towering Freedom Monument that stands in the heart of R¯ıga) highlighted the cultural and political achievements of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples, almost to the exclusion of the national minorities, so was education increasingly patriotic in content, emphasizing the rural values of the native peoples. Selected Bibliography Eglitis, D. S. 2002. Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity, and Revolution in Latvia. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Krickus, R. J. 1997. Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion and the Breakup of the Soviet Empire. Washington, DC: Brassey’s. Lane, T. 2002. Lithuania: Stepping Westward. New York: Routledge. Lieven, A. 1993. The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Misiunas, R., and R. Taagepera. 1993. The Baltic States: Years of Dependence. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. O’Connor, K. 2003. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Pabriks, A., and A. Purs. 2002. Latvia: The Challenges of Change. New York: Routledge. Page, S. 1959. The Formation of the Baltic States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Plakans, A. 1995. The Latvians: A Short History. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Raun, T. U. 1987. Estonia and the Estonians. 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Senn, A. E. 1990. Lithuania Awakening. Berkeley: University of California Press. Smith, D. J. 2002. Estonia: Independence and European Integration. New York: Routledge. Vardys, S., and J. Sedaitis. 1997. Lithuania: The Rebel Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Bulgaria Antonina Zhelyazkova Chronology 632–665 Old Great Bulgaria, situated in the lands north of the Caucasus, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov. 681–1018 First Bulgarian Khanate/Kingdom on the Balkan Peninsula. 855 Cyril and Methodius invented the Slavonic Script (Church Slavonic Alphabet). 864 Bulgarians accepted Eastern Orthodox Christianity. 918 The Bulgarian archbishopric is promoted to patriarchate; Simeon the Great is crowned as king. 1018–1185 Byzantine rule. 1185 The Petar and Asen uprising; the restoration of the Bulgarian state. 1185–1396 Second Bulgarian Kingdom. 1204 Bulgaria and the Roman Catholic Church unite. 1205 The western knights of the Fourth Crusade are defeated near Adrianople (Edirne) by King Kaloyan’s army. 1396–1878/1912 Ottoman rule. 1406–1409 Uprising against the Ottomans led by Konstantin and Fruzhin. 1443–1444 Crusades led by Vladislaus III of Varna (Władysław Warnen´ czyk). 1651 The first printed Bulgarian-language book Abagar, edited by Philip Stanislavov, is published in Rome. 1688 Chiprovtsi uprising in the northwestern Bulgarian territories as part of the Holy League war against the Ottoman Empire. 18th–19th centuries The beginning of modern Bulgarian history; Bulgarian national revival. 1762 The book Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya (Slavic-Bulgarian History) is written by Father Paisii. 1860 The Bulgarian church separates from the Constanstinople Patriarchate. 1873 (February 19) Vasil Levski is hanged in Sofia. 1877–1878 Russian-Turkish liberation war. 1878 (March 3) Russia and the Ottoman Empire sign the San Stefano Peace Treaty. 1878–1944 Modern Bulgarian history. 1879 (April 16) Founding Assembly in Tarnovo; the Tarnovo Constitution of the Principality of Bulgaria is adopted. 1885 (September 6) Unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia. 1908 (September 22) The government of Aleksandar Malinov declares the independence of Bulgaria. 1912 (October 5) Beginning of the First Balkan War. 1913 (June 16) Beginning of the Second Balkan War. 1919 (November 27) Bulgaria and the Allied Powers sign the Peace Treaty of Neuilly. 1940 (September 7) Bulgaria and Romania sign the Craiova Treaty under which Bulgaria regains Southern Dobrudzha. 1941 (March 1) Bulgaria joins the Axis. 1944 (September 9) A coup d’état in Sofia brings a Fatherland Front Government to power.

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1944–1989 1946 1947 1971 1989

1990 1991 2004 2007

Socialist system under Soviet influence. (September 8) The monarchy is abolished through referendum. (December 4) The constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria is adopted. (May 16) A new, third Bulgarian constitution is adopted. (November 10) The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party removes Todor Zhivkov from the position of secretary general. Democratic changes are seen after 1989. (June 10–17) First democratic elections take place in contemporary Bulgaria. (July 12) The constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria is adopted by the Grand National Assembly. (March 29) Bulgaria joins NATO. (January 1) Bulgaria accedes to the European Union.

Situating the Nation The Ottoman Turks conquered the Second Bulgarian Kingdom in 1396, making it a Balkan province of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. The Bulgarian nation was formed in southeastern Europe, in the regions of Moesia, Thrace, and Macedonia, and populated predominantly by ethnic Bulgarians. The Bulgarian national revival and the consolidation of the Bulgarian nation occurred approximately three centuries after the European Renaissance, being delayed by the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Balkan Peninsula. The book Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya (Slavic-Bulgarian History), written by Father Paisii in 1762, is considered the starting point of the Bulgarian revival. The Bulgarian revival had its unique features, but there were also similarities with the processes and phenomena among the other nations of central and southeastern Europe, which each had similarly subordinated status under the rule of the Austrian-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the traditional Ottoman feudal economic system began to disintegrate. Bulgarians and other subjugated peoples in the Balkans, encouraged by influences from western Europe, used these new conditions for their own economic development. As a consequence, social and political changes occurred in the Bulgarian territories and society. Over the early period of the Ottoman rule, there were no specific social or class differences within the Bulgarian society. Regardless of their residence (city, town, and village) and economic status (rich or poor), all Bulgarians had the basic social characteristic of reaya (“conquered subjects”). As a result of economic development, differentiation and stratification began and a bourgeois structure developed. A civil society was born, which started to set up its own educational, cultural, and religious institutions (i.e., schools, cultural centers, and church boards). The newly formed bourgeoisie and intelligentsia understood the desire and need of the Bulgarian nation for, in the first place, education and religious services in the Bulgarian language and, in the long run, for national emancipation (not all were N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Father Paisii Father Paisii was born in the town of Bansko in 1722. In 1745, he became a monk in the Holy Monastery of Hilendarion in Mount Athos. In the libraries of Athos monasteries and during his travels across the Ottoman Empire, he found many documents related to Bulgarian history. As a result of his research, Paisii wrote the book Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya (Slavic-Bulgarian History) in 1762. He started to distribute it among Bulgarians. The book represents an idealized history of Bulgarians. At the time it was written, the book made an enormous contribution to the revival of Bulgarian self-confidence, hope, and patriotism. The book is considered the starting point of the Bulgarian revival.

convinced that independence from the Ottomans was the best solution for Bulgarians). The bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, becoming the main driving force of the Bulgarian nation, entered into conflict with the Ottoman authorities and the Greek Patriarchate, seated in Istanbul. The Bulgarian state was reestablished after the war between Russia and Turkey (1877–1878). A number of wars and armed conflicts among the various actors in the Balkans followed during the subsequent decades. After the end of World War I, Austria-Hungary disintegrated and the territory of the peninsula was divided among Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Turkey (only a small part of its former territorial possessions). This relative status quo was not considered as final by any of the Balkan states. All of them were dissatisfied with the outcome and had territorial claims against their neighbors.

Instituting the Nation The modern Bulgarian nation was built on the following foundations: the Bulgarian language, the Eastern Orthodox religion, historical and cultural traditions, a common national consciousness, and a unified national market. These developments occurred while Bulgarians were still under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. After much debate about the future of the Bulgarian nation and the course it should take, the idea that it is essential for Bulgarians to form their own free and independent state was accepted by the Bulgarian intelligentsia. The struggle for education in Bulgarian language and a separate Bulgarian church, independent from the Greek Patriarchate, became a nationwide project and marked the start of the Bulgarian National and Cultural Revival. Bulgarians thus started to fight for national self-definition and separation from the other communities in the Ottoman Empire. For most of the Ottoman period, the only education in Bulgarian language was done in unofficial village schools, known as “chamber schools” due to their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Bulgarians perform in traditional costume during Trifon Zarezan (Vine Grower’s Day) in the village of Ilindenci. This festival celebrates wine and includes rituals for an abundant grape harvest. (EPA Photo/Mladen Antonov)

small size. The first important success in the struggle for Bulgarian education was the establishment of a network of Bulgarian secular schools, starting in the 1820s. Printed media in the Bulgarian language appeared as well. This educational development strengthened the Bulgarian intellectual elite, the nucleus of which became the school teachers. In an attempt to arrest the Bulgarian revival, the Turkish authorities tried to merge Turkish and Bulgarian schools into a unified system of Ottoman schools during the 1860s. The attempt failed because of the resistance of the entire Bulgarian community. The second important step for instituting the Bulgarian nation was the establishment of the independent Bulgarian church. The fight for religious independence was fought against the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul. Creation of a separate Bulgarian church was seen as a necessary step for the recognition of Bulgarians as a separate community in the Ottoman Empire. The third step in the development was the Bulgarian movement for national liberation, which reached its climax in the period after the Crimean War (1853–1856) due to the activity of its four most prominent leaders: Georgi Rakovski, Luben Karavelov, Vasil Levski, and Hristo Botev. In the two decades preceding the national liberation, Bulgarians carried out their most extensive attempts to overthrow the foreign rule. They organized revolutionary committees and armed groups. After the Stara Zagora (1875) and the April (1876) uprisings, numerous N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Bulgarians participated in the war between Russia and Turkey (1877–1878). The result of the war was the restoration of the Bulgarian state. The political representatives of the Bulgarian nation (monarch, government, political parties, other organizations) reached a consensus that the main political objective after the liberation was the restoration of the San Stefano Bulgaria (see below). Gradually, this new national project transformed into a chauvinistic idea of “United” (in fact, Greater) Bulgaria. The idea reached its climax in the 1930s and 1940s. According to liberal-thinking Bulgarians (experts, intellectuals, and common people), the idea of Greater Bulgaria was a manifestation of “Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism.” The historical myth of Greater Bulgaria went even beyond the boundaries of the San Stefano Bulgaria, as it was underlain by the idea to achieve possession of the national territories reigned by Simeon I the Great (893–927). During the reign of Simeon, Bulgaria possessed the largest territories in its history, spreading out to the Mediterranean, Black, and Adriatic seas. The favorite nationalistic and especially extreme chauvinistic slogan during the 1930s and 1940s was “Bulgaria bordering on three seas!” Today this idea does not include aggression or territorial claims against the other Balkan states. It supports the Bulgarian national selfconfidence, especially in periods of crisis, carrying in itself memories of Bulgaria being, even for a short time, the third-largest and strongest state in Europe.

Defining the Nation The San Stefano Bulgaria became a key issue for Bulgarian history, nation, and nationalism, and represented the essence of the so-called Bulgarian National Question. The only time Bulgarian state borders coincided with its real ethnic borders was the period immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. According to the treaty, the Bulgarian state was reestablished as an autonomous and tributary principality with a Christian government and its own army. The newly liberated state included Northern Bulgaria with the exception of Northern Dobrudja, which became part of Romania; the entire region of Thrace, without the regions of Gümülcine and Edirne; and the entire region of Macedonia, without the regions of Thessaloniki and the Halkidiki Peninsula. On July 1, 1878, the Berlin Peace Treaty was signed. The newly liberated Bulgaria was divided into five parts. The autonomous Principality of Bulgaria included only Northern Bulgaria and the region of Sofia. Southern Bulgaria became an autonomous province within the borders of the Ottoman Empire under the name of Eastern Rumelia. The regions of Thrace and Macedonia remained Turkish territories. The lands in the regions of Niš, Pirot, and Vranje became a part of Serbia. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Before the restoration of the Bulgarian state, the phrase “the Bulgarian National Question” generally stood for the issue of the national unification of all territories that were historically populated by Bulgarians. The main ethno-cultural features, shared by people belonging to the Bulgarian ethnos, were common language (Bulgarian), common religion (Orthodox Christianity), and common historical traditions. During the first decades after the liberation of Bulgaria (1878–1912), the Bulgarian National Question transformed into a struggle for cultural and political emancipation of the Bulgarian nation. The newly liberated state had three objectives: First, the restoration of the Bulgarian monarchy as continuation of the political tradition of the medieval Bulgarian state. Second, the establishment of Bulgarian state institutions to defend national interests and sovereignty. And third, the consolidation of the Bulgarian nation and preservation of its national character based on cultural traditions, historical memory, and self-confidence, all stemming from the tradition of statehood, dating back to the year 681. The San Stefano Peace Treaty came about as a result of Russian efforts. Thus, the majority of Bulgarians viewed Russia not just as a Great Power but also as a liberator to whom respect and gratitude should be paid. In the following decades, Bulgarians and their political leaders started gradually to divide into “Russophile” and “Russophobe” factions. The Russophiles defended the idea that Bulgarians should be forever grateful to Russians for the liberation. The Russophobes were of the opinion that Russia had been pursuing nothing but its own imperial interests and accused it of unwillingness to protect the Bulgarian interests against the other Great Powers. However, both factions supported the idea that the San Stefano Bulgaria had to be restored.

Narrating the Nation The official holidays in Bulgaria can serve as an excellent example of the national ideals of Bulgarians. March 3, 1878, the date on which the San Stefano Peace Treaty was signed, became fundamental to the historical mythology of Bulgarians. The day continued to be commemorated during the Communist rule, but the official state holiday became September 9, 1944 (the date when the Communists took power). After the fall of Communist rule, a debate began on the significance of the date of March 3. Some right-wing politicians considered that on this day, Bulgaria permanently entered the orbit of Russian imperial interests. For them, this date was humiliating because the liberation from Turkish rule had been part of the Russian imperial strategy and had not been achieved through the efforts of Bulgarians themselves. On the other hand, the larger part of the nation had pro-Russian feelings, being grateful to Russia for its war against the Ottoman Empire. Most of the population did not want to forget the date when N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the Bulgarian national project had been accomplished at least for a short period of time. During the democratic changes after 1989, two more dates were introduced as official national holidays: September 6, 1885 (Unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia), and September 22, 1908 (Declaration of Independence of Bulgaria). A holiday accepted and loved by the entire Bulgarian nation is May 24, the day dedicated to the Holy Brothers Constantine—Cyril and Methodius. Since the 1850s, May 24 has been officially celebrated as the Day of Bulgarian Education and Culture and of Slavonic Script (initially only as a church holiday and after the liberation as an official state holiday). From the very beginning, the celebration dedicated to St. Cyril and St. Methodius has been the most important holiday in Bulgaria, equally respected and approved by all segments of Bulgarian society. The greatest national hero of the Bulgarian nation is Vasil Levski. His death is commemorated on February 14, when his monument in the center of the capital Sofia—the place where Levski was hanged by the Ottoman authorities in 1873— is covered with flowers. Vasil Levski is the symbol of the national ideal for freedom, chastity, honesty, honor, and loyalty to national interests. The Bulgarian minorities respect Vasil Levski as well, because he was the first to formulate the idea that the future free Bulgaria had to be a republic where all ethnic and religious communities should live in equality and freedom. Two most emblematic and important poets, writers, and journalists from the Revival period are Hristo Botev and Ivan Vazov. Botev is commonly referred to as “the poet and revolutionary” and Vazov as “the patriarch of the Bulgarian litera-

Vasil Levski Considered by many to be the greatest Bulgarian national hero, Vasil Levski, was born on July 6, 1837, in the town of Karlovo. He left school and became a monk. In 1862, he left monasticism and went to Belgrade to join the Revolutionary Legion of Georgi Rakovski. Later, Levski returned to Bulgaria and worked as a teacher, but in 1867, he departed for Bucharest to reestablish relations with Rakovski. Selected to be a standard-bearer of an armed unit that was to be sent to fight for the liberation of Bulgaria, Levski realized that the failures of the liberation movement were caused mainly by the apathy within Bulgaria. He started to travel throughout the country trying to organize the population. Within a period of less than two years, Levski managed to create a network of revolutionary committees (the so-called Internal Revolutionary Organization). According to Levski, the objective of the organization was to start a revolution and to transform the existing tyranny to establish a democratic republic. Levski planned to create a “Chapel of Truth and Freedom,” which would mean an end to the Turkish, economically backward despotism, and the creation of a society where all people would live in agreement, freedom, and fraternity. Levski’s ideas actually introduced the values of the European bourgeois-democratic school in the National Liberation Movement and that made him a political leader of the Bulgarian revival. In 1873, Levski was arrested and sentenced to death by the Ottoman authorities.

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ture.” Botev’s poems glorify, mainly, the heroic efforts of Bulgarians to overthrow the Ottoman rule. As a journalist, he criticized Turkish authorities, on the one hand, and the weakness of the Bulgarian nation, unable to abolish foreign rule, on the other. In his verses, Vazov also praised the heroic resistance of Bulgarians against Turks. In addition, he wrote a novel (Under the Yoke), which is considered a cornerstone of Bulgarian literature. The novel is studied in elementary schools, high schools, and universities. Under the Yoke describes in detail the sufferings of Bulgarians under Ottoman rule, the gradual creation of educational, church, and revolutionary networks, and the enthusiasm and hope of the nation during the April Uprising of 1876 (one of the most important in Bulgarian history), which ended in a bloody defeat. The works of Botev and Vazov mirror general negative stereotypes regarding the period of Ottoman rule. The centuries of Ottoman rule are usually described as “the Five Dark Centuries of Bulgarian history,” and these perceptions played an important role in the formation of the Bulgarian national identity and consolidation of the nation. Their works established a number of national stereotypes that continue to exist in present times. According to these stereotypes, Bulgarians were forcibly prevented from developing their economy and culture; they were for centuries separated from the European, Christian civilization; and they developed a tendency to subordinate to the will of stronger nations. To counter this negative self-evaluation, Bulgarians created a mythical presentation of heroic freedom fighters (haidouks), who personified the Bulgarian resistance against Ottomans. The Bulgarian historiography has rarely made attempts to analyze objectively this period of Bulgarian history. The Ottoman rule over Bulgaria has always been viewed by literature and history from a romantic-sentimental perspective, with a significant degree of distortion of the historical facts of economic, social, and cultural life. Bulgarians have a whole spectrum of stereotypical self-evaluations, most of which are inaccurate. Bulgarians consider themselves to be extremely hardworking and highlight that as their main feature. The official social etiquette requires the individual to complain of poverty and hard life in order not to attract envy. In addition, Bulgarians consider themselves the “Prussians of the Balkans,” which is to say that they are disciplined, diligent, and temperate in emotions, that they strictly follow rules and orders, and that they are good soldiers. They also have pride as the creators of the Slavonic alphabet and view their culture as of one of the most ancient in Europe. The main works of the best Bulgarian social anthropologist, Ivan Hadjiiski (1907–1944), rebut these self-evaluations and describe Bulgarians as rather mediocre and envious, and as having a national inferiority complex. On the other hand, a number of positive qualities of Bulgarians are described: democratic potential, optimism and will for survival, discipline, constructive individualism, will for education and development, and capability of economic management. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation The initial period of building the state-political structure of the Third Bulgarian state was between 1878 and 1885. The period started and finished with remarkable events: the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule (1878) and the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia (1885). This dynamic and important phase of the Bulgarian nation was marked by the adoption of the Tarnovo Constitution (April 16, 1879), by legislative and administrative activities, which created the foundations of state administration, economy, culture, education, and governance in the Principality of Bulgaria and in Eastern Rumelia, and also by active resistance against the decisions of the Berlin Congress. The Congress of Berlin established two states, both of them Bulgarian by national identity. Activists in Eastern Rumelia established relations with the government of the Principality, and a program for joint action in both formations and in Macedonia was created. A Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee (BSCRC) was founded in Plovdiv (capital of Eastern Rumelia) in February 1885. The BSCRC followed the doctrine for joint actions in Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia in order for both territories to become part of the Principality of Bulgaria. On September 6, 1885, the units of the Rumelian militia arrested the governor of the region and disbanded the cabinet. An interim government was created, which declared general mobilization. The prince of Bulgaria, Alexander I (1879–1886), pronounced the unification and arrived in Eastern Rumelia. The 1885–1908 period also started and finished with two very important events for the Bulgarian nation. First, the nation defended the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in a short war with Serbia, which convinced the Great Powers to recognize the unification. Second, in 1908, Bulgaria declared its state and political independence. During this period, the Bulgarian national ideology was finally shaped. The evolutionary line followed by prime ministers like Konstantin Stoilov (1887, 1894–1899) and Stefan Stambolov (1887–1894) laid the foundations for constructive foreign policy, systematic diplomatic efforts, and cultural integration of Bulgarians who had remained outside the borders of the Bulgarian state. The state policy for integration of the Bulgarian diaspora was actively supported by the Bulgarian church. Stambolov became one of the first Bulgarian politicians to try to separate Bulgaria from Russian influence and direct it toward Europe, through the implementation of liberal economic policy. In 1908, using the revolution of the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire, Bulgarians effectively violated the despised Treaty of Berlin and proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria. This act (September 22, 1908) had a great influence over the national history. It was a continuation of the unification and a new step toward the completion of the project for full consolidation of the nation. A period of diplomatic activity preceding the Balkan wars followed. The dynamics of the historical events and the existing attitudes in society encouraged the Bulgarian N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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politicians to try to achieve the national and state project with the help of armed force, triggering the First Balkan War. The First Balkan War resulted in the liberation of a significant part of the peninsula from Ottoman rule and finalized the process of the restoration of the Balkan states. Bulgaria was on the verge of achieving national unification. Then the Second Balkan War started among the former allies. It dealt a heavy blow to Bulgarians, with thousands of victims (over 60,000) and great material damages. The heavy losses determined the foreign policy orientation of the country until the end of World War II. Governments, politicians, and people believed that with the support of foreign allies they could compensate for the defeat and continued to hope that the project of restoring the San Stefano Bulgaria could still be achieved. Along with the attempts to unite the Bulgarian nation—which at times bordered on irredentism—the state (and the Bulgarian nation as well) had to resolve numerous complex issues related to the fact that after their liberation, the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia were inhabited by different ethnic and religious communities. Apart from ethnic Bulgarians, Bulgarian-Muslims (Pomaks), Turks, Jews, Armenians, and Gypsies were recognized as indigenous peoples. The first Bulgarian Tarnovo Constitution included provisions envisaging protection of the interests of the minority members. Until 1989, despite the constitutional guarantees and the ideas of national leaders, such as Levski, the Bulgarian majority had not accepted the minorities, especially the Turkish one, as part of the nation. The minorities themselves felt insecure and marginalized, but they shared the Bulgarian political objectives and had taken part in all wars carried out for the achievement of these objectives. The ethnic and confessional issues were especially important for the Bulgarian nation in Thrace and Macedonia. The complex ethnic and religious relations were further influenced politically by the ambitions of the Balkan states and their intensive ethno-confessional propaganda. The Bulgarian historian Vasil Kunchov stated that religions were trying to substitute for nations. This was the political and ethnic situation in Bulgaria on the eve of World War I. After the outbreak of the war, the Bulgarian government declared neutrality. At the same time, the hope for a restoration of San Stefano Bulgaria was still alive, and the government was driven ever more closely to the Central Powers, which provided guarantees that in the case of military victory, Bulgaria would acquire the entirety of Macedonia. The wrong choice that Bulgaria made had heavy consequences, and the country was punished in the Peace Treaty of Neuilly after the war. This was the worst national disaster for Bulgarians: approximately 100,000 casualties and additional loss of territories. The peace system of Versailles, introduced by the victorious states, changed the very essence of the Bulgarian National Question. The aspirations for the unification of territories were replaced by the necessity for protection of Bulgarians abroad and the preservation of their national identity. For this reason, in the period between the two world wars, the Bulgarian state used diplomatic means to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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try to protect the rights of Bulgarian communities in other states, and it actively supported the international system of minority protection. Hoping to revise the Versailles system, Bulgaria joined the Axis and took the wrong side in World War II. With the support of Germany, Southern Dobrudja (being lost to Romania after the Second Balkan War) was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. On March 1, 1941, the Bulgarian prime minister officially signed the agreement for inclusion of Bulgaria in the war on the side of the Axis. The motivation of the Bulgarian political leaders was the possibility for them to again put on the agenda the resolution of Bulgarian national problems. This was the period when the “Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism” reached its climax. Despite that, there was no extreme anti-Semitism in Bulgaria, which became the only country to prevent the extradition of its 50,000 citizens of Jewish origin to the Nazi concentration camps. During the war, Bulgaria had administrative rule over Macedonia and Western Thrace, but they were not officially included within the borders of the Bulgarian state: 11,343 Jews from these territories were deported to the German concentration camps. As a result of its participation in World War II, Bulgaria managed to achieve only one goal of its utopian national program—it regained Southern Dobrudja. This final attempt for national unification therefore failed as well. Selected Bibliography Crampton, R. J. 1997. A Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Daskalov, R. 2004. The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the Bulgarian Revival. Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press. Genchev, N. 1977. The Bulgarian National Revival Period. Sofia, Bulgaria: Sofia Press. Istoriya na Bulgaria. 1999. 3 vols. Sofia, Bulgaria: Izdatelska Kashta Anubis. Jelavich, B. 1983. History of the Balkans: 18th and 19th Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jelavich, B. 1993. History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jelavich, C., and B. Jelavich. 1977. The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Rothschild, J. 1974. East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Roumiyana, Andreeva. 1998. Nacia I Nacionalism v Bulgarskata Istoriya. Sofia, Bulgaria: Paradigma. Stoicho, Grancharov. 2001. Balkanskiyat Sviyat. Iidei za Darzhavnost, Nacionalizmi I Razvitiya ot Nachaloto na XIX vek do Kraiya na Parvata Svetovna Voina. Sofia, Bulgaria: Izdatelstvo Damiyan Yakov. Todorova, M. 1995. “The Course and Discourse of Bulgarian Nationalism.” In Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, edited by P. Sugar, 55–102. Washington DC: American University Press.

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Czechoslovakia Maria Dowling Chronology 1880 Milan Rastislav Štefánik, the Slovak “founding father” of Czechoslovakia, is born. 1881 (June) Opening night of the Czech National Theatre in Prague. 1884 Edvard Beneš, the second Czech “founding father” of Czechoslovakia and its second president, is born. 1896 The Czechoslovak Union is formed. 1897 The Badeni language laws are enacted. 1905 The Slovak National Party is refounded. 1907 The Slovak League is founded in Pittsburgh. 1914 (August) World War I starts. (August 27) The Czecho-American Committee for Independence and the Support for the Czech Nation are formed in New York. (September 2) The Czech National Alliance is founded in Chicago; the Autumn Czech military unit is formed on Russian soil. (December) Masaryk, the founding father of Czechoslovakia, leaves Austria. 1915 (February) The first meetings of the “Mafia” (the home resistance) are held in Czech lands. (April 3) The 28th regiment surrenders to the Russians at Dukla. (November 14) The Czech Foreign Committee is formed in Paris. 1916 (February) The Czech Foreign Committee becomes the National Council of the Czech Lands. 1917 (July) The Battle of Zborov takes place. 1918 (February) Masaryk’s treaty with the Bolsheviks is signed. (May 1) The Slovaks declare at Liptovsky Sväty Mikulas in favor of the union with the Czechs. (May 24) Hlinka declares at Turciansky Sväty Martin in favor of the union with the Czechs. (June 19) Masaryk is received by President Woodrow Wilson. (June 30) The Pittsburgh convention takes place. (July 13) The French recognize the National Council. (August 9) The British recognize the National Council. (September 3) The United States recognizes the National Council. (October 28) The first Czechoslovak Republic is founded. (October 30) The Slovak National Council votes to join the new Republic. (November 5) Kramar proclaims the Republic in Prague. (November 14) The Provisional National Assembly formally deposes the Habsburgs and elects Masaryk as president by acclamation. (December) The eight-hour workday becomes law. (December 19) Scranton convention by Ruthene-Americans. (December 20) Masaryk comes home to the new Czechoslovak state. 1918–1920 Anabasis of the Czechoslovak legion in Russia. 1919 (January) The Paris Peace Conference opens. (April 9) The land expropriation law passed. (May) Štefánik dies. (September 10) Treaty of St. Germain with Austria is signed. 1920 (February) The new constitution of the Czechoslovak state. (February 29) The constitution is approved by the Provisional National Assembly. (April) The land compensation law is passed. (June 4) Treaty of Trianon with Hungary. (July) The child labor law is passed.

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1920–1921 (August to June) The Little Entente is created. 1921 (December) The Treaty of Austro-Czechoslovak friendship is signed. 1924 (January) Treaty of alliance with France is signed. (June) Sickness and accident insurance laws are passed. 1925 (October) Treaty of Locarno is signed. 1934 (September) German Nazis begin to subsidize Konrad Henlein. 1935 (May 16) Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty is signed. (May) Masaryk resigns; Beneš becomes president. 1937 (September) Masaryk dies. 1938 (March) Anschluss of Austria and Nazi Germany. (April 29) Henlein puts forth his Karlsbad Program. “May scare”—Czechoslovak mobilization. (August to September) Runciman mission to Prague. (September 15) Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and Chamberlain. (September 2) Godesberg meeting. (September 29–30) Munich conference and pact. (October) Beneš resigns as president, then goes abroad; the “Second Republic” (Czecho-slovakia) is proclaimed. (November 2) First Vienna award. 1939 (March 14–15) The Nazis invade Czech lands and establish the Protectorate of BohemiaMoravia. Slovakia declares independence. (October 28) Celebrations for Czechoslovak national day are broken up by Nazis—Jan Opletal, a student demonstrator, dies. (November 17) Peaceful student protests provide the pretext for Nazi reprisals and for closing Czech universities. 1940 Provisional British recognition of Czechoslovak government-in-exile. 1941 (June) The Nazis invade the Soviet Union. (July) Full British and Soviet recognition of Czechoslovak government-in-exile. (September) Reinhard Heydrich becomes the deputy Reichsprotektor (“imperial protector”). 1943 Heydrich is assassinated; Lidice and Lezahcekasarkaky are destroyed in the reprisal. 1945 (April) Beneš returns home in triumph; (May) World War II ends.

Situating the Nation Most unusually, the Czechoslovak nation was formed out of two close but distinct branches of the Slav family, which had experienced quite different histories. Both Slovakia and the Czech crown lands belonged to the Habsburg empire, which in 1867, transformed itself into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Even before the formal Ausgleich or Compromise, Slovakia formed part of Hungary whereas the Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia were deemed to lie in the Austrian part of the empire. The economic circumstances of the two components of the nation were quite different. Slovakia was a mountainous, mainly agricultural country, while Bohemia had most of the industrial enterprise of the old empire. Indeed, Bohemia and Moravia held between 70 and 90 percent of the empire’s brewing, sugar refining, glass, ceramics, textile, leather, chemical, and paper industries, besides most of the coal-mining and construction industries. For the Czechs, Prague was the key place for the development of the nation; after all, it was the ancient capital of the historic Czech kingdom. Slovaks, too, recognized the importance of Prague. It was here that the Czechoslovak Union N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was founded in 1896, following the inclusion of Slovak displays in the Ethnographic Exhibition in Prague in 1895. The Union did its best to foster contacts between Czechs and Slovaks, encouraging Czech investment in Slovakia and supporting Slovak students in Prague, for example. It also sent books to Slovakia and published a review, Naše slovesnko (Our Slovakia), between 1907 and 1910. Similarly, a journal called Hlas (Voice) was founded by Slovak student followers of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. For the Slovaks, Liptovsky Sväty Mikulas and Turciansky Sväty Martin came to play key roles in the development of the Czechoslovak nation. The former was the place where a declaration was read out by Vavro Šrobár on May 1, 1918, in which the Slovaks declared themselves in favor of a union with the Czechs. Indeed, this declaration demanded self-determination for all subject peoples of Austria-Hungary, including “the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak family.” It preceded by more than a month the Pittsburgh Convention between AmericanSlovaks and Czechs. On May 24, 1918, the Slovak National Party met at Turciansky Sväty Martin. Its leader, Andrej Hlinka, declared that the thousand-year marriage with the Magyars had failed, and he urged his followers to seek the Czechoslovak orientation. The Slovak National Council meeting in the same place declared on October 30, 1918, that Slovakia should join the Czechs in the new independent Czechoslovak Republic. It must be said that the social context of the birth of the nation varied between Czechs and Slovaks. With the former, the nationalists were solidly bourgeois; with the latter, whose bourgeoisie was tiny, nationalists were equally to be found among the peasantry. There were strong historic reasons for both sociopolitical developments. In Slovakia, where conditions were not conducive to the formation of a large bourgeoisie, the native aristocracy had long been either Magyar or Magyarone (that is, Slovaks who hoped to pass for Hungarians). In the Czech lands, defeat at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 had resulted in

Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937) Masaryk was born in 1850 in Moravia to a Czech mother and a Slovak father. His father was a coachman, his mother had been a domestic servant. Accordingly, he was apprenticed in turn to a locksmith and a blacksmith, although his unusual intellectual gifts came to be recognized. He was a pupil-teacher in a high school and spent four years as a student in the grammar school in Brno before going to Vienna. His lowly background meant that he was rejected for a career in diplomacy and politics, so he became a professor, going in 1883 to Prague to teach in the Czech branch of Charles University. He sat in the Austrian parliament from 1891 to 1893 as a delegate for the Young Czech Party, and in 1907, after the introduction of universal manhood suffrage into Austria (though not Hungary), he sat again as a deputy for his own Realist Party. He married a Danish-American, Charlotte Garrigue, and adopted her surname as his middle name. Masaryk was above all a democrat, seeing democracy as the only political system consonant with the dignity of humankind.

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the execution, exile, and dispossession of the native, Protestant nobility and their replacement with foreign Catholics, most of them German-speaking. The historic context of the birth of the Czechoslovak nation is a complex one. On the one hand, the Czechs had a recorded history as an independent entity, with their own king and unique branch of Christianity, Hussitism. Czech independence had ended with White Mountain, when the rebellious kingdom was declared to be a hereditary possession of the ruling Habsburg. With the “national awakening” of the late 18th and early 19th centuries came the desire for Czech independence, or at least autonomy within the Habsburg empire. There arose, too, a desire for union with the Slovaks. On the other hand, the Slovaks had no recorded independent history. Their country had been overrun by the Magyars ca. 1000, when the empire of Great Moravia was destroyed. Thereafter, Slovakia was designated as “Upper Hungary.” During the 19th century, the Slovaks were subject to a particularly brutal program of Magyarization, prompted by fear of pan-Slavism and of increased Russian influence in the region. As a result, from 1867 until the foundation of Czechoslovakia there were no state secondary schools for Slovaks in Slovakia. The Elisabeth University in Bratislava was only for Magyars and magyarized Slovaks. In 1874, the three Slovak gymnasia were dissolved, as was the Matica Slovenska, the national cultural institution. The Slovaks were so poorly represented in the parliament in Budapest that in 1916 Edvard Beneš was able to claim that there was only one parliamentary deputy for 3 million Slovaks.

Instituting the Nation There were three founding fathers of Czechoslovakia, two Czechs and one Slovak. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937) was the senior member of the triumvirate. In 1918, he became the first president of the new state, and was known as the “president liberator.” In his work of foundation and liberation, he was helped by two younger men, the Czech Edvard Beneš and the Slovak Milan Rastislav Štefánik. Broadly speaking, it might be said that Štefánik helped Masaryk in a military and Beneš in a political and propagandist capacity. Originally, Masaryk was a proponent of Palacký’s theory of Austro-Slavism, which saw the empire as the shelter of small nations caught between the twin giants of czarist Russia and a Germany that seemed to be on the point of unification. As Palacký observed in 1848, if Austria had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it. Masaryk, however, realized the shortcomings of Austrian and Hungarian justice toward the Slavonic peoples of the empire when he intervened in the 1909 Zagreb “treason trial” of South Slavs, who had allegedly plotted against the empire, to show that evidence against the accused had been fabricated. It can have come as little surprise to Masaryk to learn in December 1914 that the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Edvard Beneš (1884 –1948) Edvard Beneš was a Czech and was born to a peasant family in 1884. He gained two doctorates in law, one in Czech and the other in French, and while studying in Paris wrote for the Czech press. In September 1915, he joined Masaryk in Switzerland after a dramatic escape from Austrian territory. He succeeded Masaryk as second president of Czechoslovakia upon the former’s resignation in 1935, having spent the previous two decades being concerned with Czechoslovakia’s foreign-policy orientation. Although he had a dry temperament very different from Masaryk’s, eventually he won the people’s respect, if not affection, and was accorded the title of “president constructor.” It was Beneš’s fate to preside over the Munich agreement, which in effect sold Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and over the February coup by Czechoslovak Communists in 1948.

war would make no difference to the Habsburg policies toward the Slavonic peoples; he immediately left Austrian soil, never to return. The task facing the Czechoslovaks in building their state during World War I was a daunting one. Technically, both the leadership abroad and any common soldier who defected to the Allied side were considered traitors to Austria-Hungary. Moreover, though their actions might win praise from the Allies, they had at best a nuisance value, and there was a very lively fear that the Allies would make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary in which the rights of the subject nations would be ignored. Consequently, it was essential to earn some form of official recognition for leadership from the Allies. Accordingly, the Czech Foreign Committee was formed in Paris on November 14, 1915. During February 1916, this committee became the National Council of the Czech Lands, with Masaryk as president, Štefánik and Jaroslav Dürich as vice presidents, and Beneš as general secretary. Later that year, however, Dürich set up a rival puppet Czech committee in Petrograd under the auspices of the czarist authorities, though this body was repudiated by the revolutionary Russian provisional government in February 1917. A month earlier, the Allied war aims had included for the first time the liberation of the “Czechoslovaks.” Full recognition of the Paris Council as the legitimate representative of the home populations only came quite late, however. France recognized it as such on July 13, 1918; Great Britain followed suit on August 9. U.S. recognition did not come until September 3, 1918. The final component that instituted the nation was the Czech and Slovak emigration, particularly in North America. Almost 3,000 Czech- and Slovak-Americans joined the Czechoslovak legion in France, with others serving in Italy and Russia. After the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917, about 40,000 Americans of Slovak and Czech origin served in the American armed forces. Even more important than this military contribution was the political role of the emigration. On August 27, 1914, a Czecho-American Committee for Independence and Support of the Czech Nation was formed in New York, and on N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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September 2, the Czech National Alliance was founded in Chicago, its first congress was held in Cleveland, Ohio, on January 15, 1915. The Slovak League had been founded in Pittsburgh as early as 1907. Originally, it had aimed at autonomy for Slovaks within Hungary; but in October 1914, its chairman wrote a newspaper article proclaiming that a “United States” of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia would be best for the Slovaks. American-Czechs and -Slovaks were influential in determining the shape of the new country. On June 30, 1915, Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh Convention with Czech- and Slovak-Americans. This agreed on the union of Czechs and Slovaks, with an autonomous administration, representative assembly, and judicial system for Slovakia. Similarly, the Ruthene-Americans were determined to free their homeland from Magyar rule. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (sub-Carpathian Russia, Carpatho-Ukraine) was a poor and backward region of Hungary inhabited by Slavs who were ethnically close to the Ukrainians. On December 19, 1918, the Ruthene-Americans decided at Scranton, Pennsylvania, to join the new state of Czechoslovakia on a federative basis. The leaders of the home Ruthenes decided to bring their land into the Czechoslovak Republic on May 8, 1919.

Tomas Masaryk signs the freedom declaration from Austria-Hungary at the close of World War I, thus creating the new nation of Czechoslovakia. He would lead the country as its first president from 1918 through 1935. (National Archives and Records Administration)

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Defining the Nation On October 28, 1918, a bloodless revolution took place in Prague. The Austrian authorities bowed to the inevitability of defeat and handed over power to representatives of the new nation. But what was the nation in 1918? The inhabitants of Czechoslovakia in 1918 were about 3 million Czechs, 2 million Slovaks, over 3 million Bohemian Germans, 750,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ruthenes, and about 80,000 Poles. The provisional constitution of November 13, 1918, defined the nation as the Czechoslovaks, the language as Czechoslovak, with all other ethnicities being defined as national minorities. The national idea was connected with both objective, ethno-cultural arguments and with subjective, voluntaristic arguments, such as the will of the people. There was a fundamental debate in 1918 about the form of government the Czechoslovaks would adopt. Some statesmen, such as Karel Kramáˇr, were in favor of making the new state a principality under a Romanov. In the end, however, Masaryk’s republicanism prevailed, and Kramáˇr himself announced the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic on November 5, 1918. There was, however, conflict between different cultural orientations in the development of the national idea; in particular, between Czechs and Slovaks. Naturally enough, the Czechs saw themselves as the “elder brother” of the nation, who would give the benefit of their long experience of self-rule and of parliamentary opposition to the Habsburgs to the “younger brothers,” the Slovaks and Ruthenes. Naturally, too, the Slovaks resented this assumption of superiority and the colonization of Slovakia by well-meaning doctors, nurses, teachers, entrepreneurs, and engineers. The incomers were meant to bring the Slovak economy and standards of living, health care, and education up to Czech levels after the long neglect of all these areas by the dominant Hungarians. Nonetheless, the Slovak People’s Party under Andrej Hlinka continued to campaign vociferously for Slovak autonomy. A Catholic priest and a passionate patriot, Hlinka had spent time in Hungarian jails for his opposition to Magyarization and espousal of Slovak autonomy. Under the Czechoslovak Republic, he felt increasingly bitter that the provisions of the Pittsburgh Convention, which had outlined plans for Slovak autonomy, were not implemented. In August 1919, he tried to raise the question of Slovak autonomy at the Paris Peace Conference, and was jailed briefly for his pains on his return to Czechoslovakia. His relations with the Prague government remained stormy until his death in 1938. His political testament of August 1938, however, stated unequivocally that the Czechoslovak Republic was the natural homeland of the Slovaks. This was at a time when the Republic was under attack, not just from German and Hungarian, but also from Slovak separatists. In spatial terms, Czechoslovakia was composed of the historic Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, with Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Thus, the Czechs utilized both historic-right arguments and romantic nationalism when staking their claim to a homeland with the Slovaks at Paris in 1919.

Narrating the Nation The Czech national myth played a huge part in the narrative of the nation. This posited a “golden age” under the emperor and king of Bohemia, Karel IV, in the far-off 14th century. This happy, prosperous time had been followed by the tempestuous period of the Hussite revolution, when all the forces of Catholic Europe tried unsuccessfully to subjugate the heroic, dissenting Czechs. Indeed, Jan Hus himself was something of a rallying point for Czechoslovaks, or at least for Czechs. July 6, 1915, marked the 500th anniversary of his martyrdom at the Council of Constance; Masaryk took the opportunity to give a public lecture on Hus in Geneva, which would raise the flag of revolt for Slovaks as well as Czechs. The great Hus monument, on Old Town Square in Prague, had been commissioned for this anniversary, but when the Austrians refused permission for an official unveiling ceremony, Czech patriots protested by covering the statue in flowers. The importance of Hus as a national hero to the Czechs was not lost on the Habsburgs nor on the Nazi Germans, who during World War II covered the statue in swastika flags in a particularly insulting gesture. The next major event in the Czech national myth is the Thirty Years’ War, which began in 1618 with the revolt of the Czech Protestant nobility against the Habsburgs. The war ended for the Czechs in 1620, with defeat in the Battle of White Mountain just outside Prague. This defeat was followed by “three hundred years of darkness,” during which (according to the myth) the Austrians tried systematically to wipe out the Czech language and to deprive the Czechs of all national and religious rights. This darkness was only pierced by two things: the national awakening of the late 18th and early 19th centuries and the revolutions of 1848. These were the only two historical memories the Slovaks could share. The national awakening saw the revival of both languages—Czech and Slovak—and the birth of Czechoslovakism. It was the Slovak poet Jan Kollár and the Slovak scholar Pavol Jozef Šafàrík who first outlined the close relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. Ironically, though, the Slovak hero of 1848, L’udvit Štúr, was against the idea of union with the Czechs. Between the wars, Czechoslovakia was presented as the “bridge between East and West”; this accorded well with its foreign policy, which strove for accommodation with Stalin’s Soviet Union as well as with the Western democracies. It was stressed, however, that historically and culturally the country lay in the democratic camp, and it was also presented as a bulwark against Nazi barbarism. By the time of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the sense of identity as Czechoslovaks was expressed by the double national anthem. The first part was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the haunting Czech air, “Where Is My Home?”; the second part was formed of the stirring “Hymn of the Slovaks.” For Czechs, there was also other music, such as Smetana’s symphonic poem “Ma Vlast” (“My Country”).

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The catalyst for the creation of the nation was the collapse of Austria-Hungary in World War I; in World War II the catalyst was the need to preserve the nation from extinction. During World War I, a key component in mobilizing and building the nation was the behavior of the troops on the Eastern Front, culminating in the celebrated “anabasis” of the Czechoslovak Legion through Russia in 1918–1920. This epic journey, when Czechs fought their way across Russia to Vladivostok, was used as a national symbol of the indomitable nature of the Czechs. A Czech military unit was first formed on Russian soil in the autumn of 1914. These Russians of Czech origin were soon joined by volunteer prisoners of war. Men were surrendering wholesale to the Russians, the most spectacular incident being the desertion of the entire 28th Regiment (“the children of Prague”) at Dukla in Slovakia on April 3, 1915. The czarist authorities were determined that the Czech and Slovak troops in Russia should take Russian nationality and be under the command of Russian officers. All this changed with the February Revolution of 1917. What really established the Czechoslovaks’ right to exist as a separate military force was their performance at the Battle of Zborov in July 1917, which resulted in indisputable victory. The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 naturally complicated matters for the legion, which now called itself the “First Czechoslovak Infantry Division of Hussites.” Masaryk, however, was determined that his troops should pass from Russia to the Western Front, and accordingly in February 1918 an agreement was signed with the Bolsheviks. This agreement recognized the legion’s existence as an independent army and guaranteed its armed neutrality and its right to leave for France. Thus began the famous anabasis, later described by Lloyd George as one of the greatest epics of history. The troops journeyed from western Russia and Ukraine to Vladivostok in the far east. The Russian civil war had started, and both Whites and Reds were anxious to make use of Czechoslovak military expertise, though the Czechoslovaks wished to remain above Russian affairs and simply to regain their homeland. Thus, the legion fought its way along the trans-Siberian railway, alternately engaging with Reds and Whites. The first troop transport left Vladivostok on December 9, 1919, and the whole operation was completed by November 30, 1920. Czechoslovaks were seen as the nation; all other ethnic groups, especially the Germans and Hungarians, were merely “national minorities.” The rights of minorities were safeguarded in a minority treaty that every state was bound to sign as part of the settlement of the Paris Peace Conference. It seems that Czechoslovakia N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was more scrupulous than most nations in adhering to this treaty; even so, there were many complaints to the League of Nations at Geneva about infringements of minority rights, largely in terms of language and the land reform. Besides the national minorities, Slovak separatists continued to campaign for independence, or at least autonomy, from the Czechs. Much use was made of national holidays, especially the anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia, October 28. A particular focus of patriotism was the Sokol (“falcon”), a gymnastic movement founded in 1862 by Miroslav Tyrs (1832–1884) and Jindˇrich Fugner (1822–1864). The aim of Sokol, according to its statutes, was the revival of the homeland through the education of spirit as well as body, through physical energy, art, and science. The annual slet, or mass display of gymnasts, held every September, was often an occasion of nationalist and democratic demonstration. This was particularly the case in 1938, and would be again in 1948. Small wonder, then, that it was one of the first national organizations to be banned by the invading Nazis. Most Czech national monuments date from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For reasons of Magyarization, there are no corresponding Slovak national monuments of the same era. The National Theatre (Narodni Divadlo) in Prague demonstrates well the cultural aspect of the Czech national struggle. The building was financed by voluntary subscriptions from all towns and villages throughout the Czech lands, as the Habsburgs declined to fund it. Thus, the motto on the proscenium arch, which states that the theater is a gift from the nation to itself. The foundation stones were gathered from places of historic importance and were laid in 1868 by František Palacký and Bedˇrich Smetana. The latter’s patriotic opera Libu˘se was performed on the opening night in June 1881. Two months later the theater burned down, but the Czechs merely collected more money, and started to rebuild. ˚ m) in Prague was designed as a cultural cenThe municipal house (Obecní du ter for the Czech population (as opposed to the German). Completed in 1911, it is a jewel of art nouveau. The Czechoslovak declaration of independence was signed here on October 28, 1918. Cubism also flourished in Prague on the eve of independence. One of the more notable architectural examples is the House of the Black Madonna on Celetna in the Old Town. Designed as a department store by Josef Gocar, one of the foremost Czech Cubists, it was completed in 1911–1912. The Germans were, of course, a large national minority within Czechoslovakia. Even more than the Austrians proper, the Bohemian-Germans found it hard to accept the reality of defeat in World War I. They refused to participate in the establishment of the new Czechoslovak state, and instead tried to link their fortunes with those of Austria. When this met with opposition from the Allies as well as the Czechoslovaks, the Bohemian-Germans’ attitude was one of reticence, from which they only emerged briefly in the mid-1920s. This period of “activism” saw Germans participating in government, but the economic depression of the 1930s, coinciding as it did with the rise of the Nazis in neighboring Germany, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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made a more extreme reaction to Czechoslovakia much more attractive. Thus, when Konrad Henlein and the Sudeten-German Party, backed politically and financially by Hitler, made increasingly impossible demands for autonomy on the Prague government, the majority of Bohemian-Germans applauded. These demands and Allied diplomatic activity culminated in the infamous Munich Conference of September 29–30, 1938. By the pact of Munich, 11,000 square miles of Czechoslovak territory were ceded to the Third Reich by the French and British. The Czechoslovaks were not consulted, nor even present. From the Munich Pact to 1945, the political goal of the Czechoslovaks was quite simply the survival of the nation. Czechoslovak democracy would be maintained by a government-in-exile led by President Edvard Beneš, even in the face of foreign occupation and dismemberment of the country. The Czech lands were occupied and became, in name and fact, a German protectorate; Slovakia was persuaded to declare independence and became, in fact though not in name, a German protectorate. To this end, Beneš and the government used a variety of propaganda themes: the call to history; the juridical continuity of the First Republic; Czechoslovakia’s standing as a cobelligerent; and its historic role as a bridge between East and West. All of the themes were informed by the lively fear that Czechoslovakia would either be reduced in territory at the end of the war, or worse still, not reconstituted at all. The outcome of all this propaganda activity, along with German atrocities in the homeland that were used to good propaganda effect (such as the wholesale destruction of the villages of Lidice and Lezahcekasarkaky in revenge for the killing of the deputy Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich), was that Czechoslovakia

Sudetenland and Sudeten-Germans Both these names are contentious. The Sudetenland proper was in Silesia and northern Moravia, on the borders with Germany. It was in fact one of four “German provinces” created after World War I in a bid to have the German parts of the Czech lands incorporated into Austria. In fact, these four provinces could not communicate well with each other and were dependent on the Czech areas for food. The resistance of the German population to occupation by the Czechoslovaks was minimal, however, and as the Allies were keen to prevent the aggrandizement of Austria and Germany after the war, the German areas were incorporated into Czechoslovakia in the Treaty of Versailles. It was not until the rise of Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten-German party that the adjective “Sudeten” came to be applied to all ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia. The name gave a misleading impression of homogeneity, and helped to bolster the claims of Hitler to the “Sudetenland.” During World War II, the “Sudeten-Germans” benefited greatly from the occupation by Nazi Germany. They were counted as Reich citizens, with full legal and civil rights, while the Czechs were merely “subjects.” After the war, the Czechs took their revenge, first in a series of “wild,” often violent, expulsions, then in a series of officially sanctioned and organized transfers of the population to Germany proper.

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Edvard Beneš was founder and president of modern Czechoslovakia (1935–1938, 1945–1948). (Library of Congress)

survived the war, and Beneš returned in triumph. He also achieved his aim of making the nation truly homogenous, by getting Allied agreement to the expulsion of the vast majority of the German population. Selected Bibliography Beneš, E. 2004. Fall and Rise of a Nation. Edited by Milan Hauner. New York: Columbia University Press. Dowling, M. 2003. Czechoslovakia. New York: Oxford University Press. Lukes, I. 1996. Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s. New York: Oxford University Press. Mamatey, V. S., and R. Luza, eds. 1973. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Masaryk, T. G. 1927. The Making of a State, Memories and Observations. London: George Allen & Unwin. Pynsent, R. B. 1998. Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality. New York: Central European University Press. Rothschild, J. 1977. East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. Seattle, WA: Columbia University Press. Seton-Watson, R. W. 1943. History of the Czechs and Slovaks. New York: Hutchinson. Taborsky, E. 1981. President Edvard Beneš between East and West, 1938–1948. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Zacek, J. F. 1969. “Nationalism in Czechoslovakia.” In Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by F. P. Sugar and I. J. Lederer, 182–198. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

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Finland Jouni Häkli Chronology 1809 Finland is annexed to Russia as an autonomous grand duchy after Sweden’s defeat to Russia in the Finnish War. The Diet of Porvoo establishes Finland as a separate political entity for the first time; Finland retains the Swedish system of law and government. 1835 The Finnish national epic Kalevala is first published. 1860 Due to economic liberalization, the paper industry starts to develop. Finland acquires its own currency, the markka. 1863 Finland’s diet convenes and active legislative work begins. The language decree states that Finnish is to have equal status with Swedish as an official language within 20 years. 1870 The first novel is published in Finnish: The Seven Brothers by Aleksis Kivi. 1881 The first youth association is founded in Kauhava. 1883 The Workers’ Association is founded in Helsinki. 1899 The era of oppression begins as Czar Nicholas II issues the February Manifesto, narrowing the legislative power of the diet. The Workers’ Party is founded (later Social Democratic Party). 1900 The Finnish arts gain international attention at the Paris World Fair. The Language Manifesto establishes Russian as the language to be used in certain offices; the Post Manifesto abolishes Finnish stamps. 1905 Revolutionary disorder in Russia brings relaxation to the Russification policies in Finland. 1906 National parliament reform in Finland, equal and universal suffrage. 1909 Oppression resumes, and Czar Nicholas II dissolves the parliament several times. 1917 The revolution begins in Russia. Finland declares independence on December 6. 1918 The conflict between Reds and Whites turns into a civil war. 1919 Finland adopts the republican constitution; Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg is the first president. 1920 Peace of Tartu between Finland and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The Petsamo area is annexed to Finland. 1921 The League of Nations decrees that the Åland Islands belong to Finland; parliament grants autonomy to Åland. 1932 Finland and the Soviet Union sign a nonaggression pact. 1939 (August) The Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement is signed between the Soviet Union and Germany. The secret protocol states that Finland belongs to the Soviet sphere of interest. (November) The Red Army attacks Finland. The Winter War is fought until March 1940. Finland cedes a large part of Karelia in the peace of Moscow. 1941 Fighting resumes in the Continuation War that lasts until 1944. 1944 (September) Finland signs an interim peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Finland cedes the Petsamo area and pays great war reparations. 1947 The terms of the 1944 armistice are confirmed in the Paris Peace Treaty.

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Situating the Nation The Finnish polity was formed in 1809 when Finland, thus far a collection of provinces under Swedish rule, became an autonomous grand duchy in the Russian empire. This was the direct consequence of Sweden’s defeat in the Finnish War fought between Sweden and Russia from February 1808 to September 1809. The ensuing annexation of Finland to Russia was an important geopolitical change because it established Finland for the first time as a politically viable territorial entity. The province of Viborg was attached to the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1812, and the demarcations of boundaries with Norway and Russia were completed in 1833. After that, Finland’s territorial shape remained virtually intact until World War II. An exception is the annexation of the Petsamo area to Finland in the 1920 Tartu peace treaty. By the end of the 19th century, a vocation had emerged among the mostly Swedish-speaking educated elites to create a sense of common national identity among the Finns, who were linguistically a distinct group in the Russian empire. The years of consolidation until the early 1860s stabilized the autonomous position of Finland in the Russian empire. Finland was ruled by a governor general as the head of senate and a cabinet that also functioned as Supreme Court. From the 1860s onwards, political and economic liberalization invigorated the grand duchy’s societal life. Significant reforms were carried out to give the country a new impetus. Freedom of trade set forth industrialization, and in 1860, Finland was granted a currency unit of its own, the markka (mark). Moreover, in 1863, Czar Alexander II assembled the four representative estates (nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants) at a diet for the first time in more than five decades, and four years later he made the diet a regularly convening body. With the diet meeting regularly, active legislative work in Finland began. The language decree issued in 1863 by Alexander II stated that Finnish should become an official administrative language alongside Swedish in 20 years. The Primary School Act was issued in 1866, and the Conscription Act of 1878 gave Finland its own army. Consequently, by the early 1880s, Finland had emerged as a state within a state. It was separated from the empire by an official border, and it had its own senate and diet, its own local officials, legislation, army, money, and even postage stamps. The vigorous atmosphere of social, political, and economic reforms strengthened Finnish nationalism that was gaining ground among the Swedish-speaking educated elites during the last decades of the 19th century. While the ultimate goal was broadly accepted, a dispute about the proper language to be used in nationbuilding grew into a conflict between the advocates of Finnish versus Swedish. The Fennoman movement was supported by Swedish-speaking upper classes who cherished the Hegelian nation-state idea and thus chose to promote Finnish culture and language. By Finnicizing their family names, learning Finnish, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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using it extensively, the Fennoman enthusiasts aspired to bridge the gap between the upper class and the people. The Svecomans, again, were a faction of the Swedish-speaking elite who pursued liberalism and felt that only the Swedish language and culture would guarantee Finland’s place among the Western nations. The “language strife” between Fennoman and Svecoman movements was transcended by consensus about the role of Karelian song lands as the geographical core of the Finnish national identity. The origins of Karelianism were in the rise to prominence throughout the region of the Kalevala, the Finnish national epic collected by Elias Lönnrot from folk poetry and song tradition in northeastern Karelia. The expanded version of Kalevala was published in 1849, and by the 1890s, Karelianism had become a leading romantic movement that celebrated the landscape and people of Karelia. The region was seen to be an undiscovered reserve of poetry where earlier Finnish life ways and culture were preserved. This romantic affair between nationalist elites and Karelian peasantry lasted until the 1920s when the border between Finland and Russia was closed. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Instituting the Nation The Finnish nation was formed under unique circumstances. It can be said that Finland was first a state and only after that a nation. Territorial continuity and juridico-political institutions inherited from Swedish rule, together with strong and extensive political autonomy, made the Grand Duchy of Finland a quasi-state with almost all the attributes of a sovereign state apart from independence. Therefore, the central task that the elites aspiring for national self-determination faced was the production of national consciousness into the population of Finland. It was clear that the goal of the independent Finnish nation-state could only be achieved with the institutionalization of the Finnish nation. Efforts to produce the Finnish nation were led by Fennoman elites whose status was not based on aristocratic land possessions but rather on the professional system and high offices provided by the state apparatus. Simply put, the upper classes were attached to and dependent on the state’s continuing autonomy. However, the area of cultural production was not led by the senate because it could not have been. The Karelianism of prominent painters, authors, poets, and composers was inspired by the broader national romantic movement that could not be reduced to institutional incentives or purposes. Yet, awareness among the Finns concerning the products of Finnish high culture—the much loved songs, books, paintings, and poems—was effectively disseminated through the statecontrolled media of socialization, such as the school system, the military, and mass communication. Moreover, outside the immediate state apparatus, yet in connection with the state, new kinds of social movements emerged that were instrumental in the rise of national consciousness among the broader population. With the breakthrough of mass organization after 1870, various voluntary associations and movements

Jean Sibelius’s Finlandia Composer Jean Sibelius became a national figure during his long life (1865–1957). His career in music took off in the context of the Finnish national awakening. He was recognized as a distinctively original composer with a sound world that was widely seen to reflect the Finnish natural landscape and culture. Sibelius wrote some of his music with a deliberately nationalist sentiment. The symphonic poem Finlandia is a case in point. It was composed at a time when Russia was beginning to tighten its grip on Finnish autonomy by pursuing new Russification policies. With parts titled in a patriotic fashion and haunting music ranging from melancholic to stormy, Finlandia captured the minds and hearts of Finns. Sibelius wrote the music as his image of Finland’s sufferings under Russian oppression, unyielding resistance, and eventual awakening toward statehood. Culminating in a patriotic finale titled “Finland Awakes,” the music became enormously important for the emerging national self-awareness of Finns. Finlandia is one of the unquestioned symbols of Finnish nationalism.

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established themselves as part of the rising Finnish civil society. Ranging from the workers movement to voluntary fire brigades to youth societies to the temperance movement, these new associations disseminated the consciousness of Finland as a political community. Leaders of the Fennoman movement founded the Society of Popular Education (Kansanvalistusseura) and made it into a house organ for the movement’s ideals and organizational activities. The Finnish movement thus gained an organization whose network of representatives extended into all areas of the country. Soon after, a temperance movement followed with an even more effective means of encouraging local organization. For most members, these movements represented the first possibility of political participation. They introduced modern principles of public life to cities and countryside alike. This rapidly gave rise to a modern political field in Finland. The state together with numerous voluntary associations formed the institutional basis for the creation of the Finnish nation. The elites remained dependent on the state apparatus, but in the egalitarian spirit of the time, they wished to come closer to the masses. This was possible through membership and activity in voluntary associations and popular movements that brought together people from different social strata. Finnish nationalism of the late 19th century had both a political and an existential aspect. The dissemination of national consciousness among the population was essential for attempts to secure the continuity of the emerging state and eventually reach the goal of national self-determination. Yet also, the very existence of Finns as a nation among Western nations was at stake. Great efforts were made by protagonists of the Fennoman movement to establish Finnish as a language of poetry, literature, and statecraft. They realized that as long as Swedish

Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881), a Philosopher and Statesman One of the most influential figures in Finnish nation-building was Johan Vilhelm Snellman. He was a philosopher following Hegel’s thought on the modern nation-state as the end or goal of history and the most comprehensive level of the realization of freedom. Snellman stressed the importance of national awakening by means of raising the Finnish language and culture from peasant status to internationally recognized language and culture. Extending the use of the Finnish language was also part of the resistance to subordination by Sweden and assimilation by Russia. Snellman was appointed professor at the Alexander University of Helsinki, but his chief achievement was a cabinet post in the Senate of Finland. As a senator he worked effectively to achieve the language decree from the czar, eventually giving Finnish the status of an official language along with Swedish. Snellman was one of the leaders of the Fennoman movement, along with Fredrik Cygnaeus, Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, Johan Ludvig Runeberg, and others. He was also the editor of two newspapers and a strong proponent of Finnish-speaking literature. The Fennoman movement changed the face of the 19th-century Grand Duchy of Finland.

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was the dominant language of culture and politics—when the great majority of the population (some 85 percent in 1880) spoke Finnish only—the nation would remain decisively disunited. The purpose of creating an institutional ground for the Finnish language in education, cultural life, and official use was twofold. First, it would attach the masses to the emerging national polity, and second, it would show the Western world that Finns had an original culture that stands in comparison with that of old European nations. Activities that centered on the Finnish Literature Society (SKS) were key in cultivating the use of the Finnish language. The society funded the excursions to eastern Finland and Karelia made by its first secretary, Elias Lönnrot, and published Kalevala based on these trips. Also, the first novel written in Finnish, Aleksis Kivi’s The Seven Brothers (Seitsemän veljestä), was published by the society.

Defining the Nation The idea of Finns and Finnishness was mainly connected with ethno-cultural distinctiveness from both Swedes and Russians. Aspirations toward national selfdetermination were based on this awareness, well captured by the Fennoman slogan “Swedes we are no longer, Russians we can never become, so let us be Finns” (Engman 1995). Because the territorial setting of Finnish nation-building was fairly stable and clear for more than a century, the challenge for the elite was to foster consciousness of nationhood and territory in the popular realm, rather than to determine the homeland’s territorial extent. For creating popular awareness of Finland and Finnishness, it was necessary to represent the country and nation as a unity. Reference to the territorially defined Finnish space could be made through maps and other representations of the national territory and landscape. These representations made the Finnish lands visible in a manner that had wide popular appeal. For example, the cartographic image of the Finnish territory portrays the contours of the “Maiden of Finland,” which personified and embodied the idea of a unified nation and Finns’ belonging to the Finnish lands. Apart from the rhetorical power of this anthropomorphic image, maps provided a media that was increasingly available to the masses. Various atlases became common items both in home and at school by the early 20th century. Cartographic images, produced mostly by the educated elite for governmental, academic, and educational purposes, were disseminated throughout the country via books, newspapers, education, and such institutions as museums and public offices. In consequence, the sense of Finnishness as rooted in a particular soil gradually emerged as an image of the Finnish territory and cultural sphere. In territorial terms, maps were significant not only in that they portrayed a land that the ordinary people could identify with but also in the sense that they N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Attack, by Finnish painter Edvard (Eetu) Isto, features a depiction of the Finnish Maiden defending the law against an attacking Russian two-headed eagle. (Eetu Istos / The National Board of Antiquities / The National Museum of Finland)

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helped in disseminating the idea of an original link between people and land. Maps with Finnish place names point directly at a historical interlinkage of a people with a particular territory, concrete places, and everyday practices. Place names are a concrete historical testimony to the cultural presence of Finns on the Finnish peninsula and thus help fortify the idea of a territorially confined culture. An important literary work that highlighted national unity by addressing its regional diversity was The Book of Our Land (Maamme kirja), authored by Zacharias Topelius. The book describes Finland and its different landscapes in an idealistic, stereotypical, and easily accessible way. Published in 1875, it quickly became popular reading and a standard bookshelf item both in schools and at home. In territorial terms, the book is significant because it described a land and a landscape that the ordinary people could identify with. It also promoted unity over regional cultural differences and sought to straddle the linguistic barrier between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking populations. Moreover, it was The Book of Our Land that eventually popularized the poetic representation of the Finnish territory as a person, the “Maiden of Finland” as portrayed against the “landscape of the thousand lakes.”

Narrating the Nation Finland was part of the Swedish realm for more than 600 years and the Russian empire for over a century. Reflecting its status as a historical borderland between Western and Eastern Great Powers, the narratives of Finnishness have come to rest on defensive ethos more than anything else. Threats to the country have constituted Finland and Finnishness. The negative definition of the Finnish identity (“we are neither Swedes nor Russians, let us be Finns”) shows that in the turn of the 20th century, Finland had no historical narrative of itself. Liminal borderland identity gave rise to narratives that told what Finns are distinct from, how Finland has been defended, and against what enemy. The collection of Finnish folklore, with the national epic Kalevala as the beacon, was important for building the sense that Finns also have a history. However, in the absence of a “grand narrative” of Finnishness, the oral tradition and folk poetry could not be tied into a preexisting historical storyline. Instead of a glorious narrative of the nation’s path toward a sovereign state, the folklore has been represented in terms of the myth of origins. Here, inspiration has been sought from stories of the Finnish tribe’s early settlement in Finland, as well as the endurance of the original Finnish folk culture in the Karelian song lands. Due to the defensive ethos of the narratives of Finnishness, most national heroes are characters fighting against external threat and oppression (by foreign or domestic lords). The first known Finnish hero is Lalli, a peasant from the region of Ostrobothnia who, according to legend, killed the Catholic bishop Henrik, of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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English origin, on the ice of lake Köyliö in the winter of 1156. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the legend of Lalli became meaningful as the beginning of Protestant Finland and nationally significant heroics. Lalli came to represent the national character of Finns and the will and readiness to protect property, family, country, and own community. Parallel characterizations of Finns were made by national poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg in his description of the peasant Paavo of Saarijärvi (Saarijärven Paavo), and by Zacharias Topelius in his depiction of farmhand Matti in The Book of Our Land. Both characters came to represent the heroic inhabitants of the backwoods. Both also became the enduring icons of hardworking, gutsy, and persistent Finns. Finnish identity was expressed in all forms of art. The years from 1880 to 1910 are known as the golden era of Finnish art. Artists began to depict ordinary people, historic motifs, and the Finnish nature in a realistic way. The Kalevala especially inspired painters, composers, and poets. For example, Akseli Gallen-Kallela made the illustration of Kalevala and used the motifs in several of his paintings. He was part of a group of artists with nationalist ideas, along with composer Jean Sibelius, novelist Juhani Aho, poet Eino Leino, and painters Albert Edelfelt, Pekka Halonen, and Eero Järnefelt, among others. Through the works of these artists, Finns learned to appreciate the particularity of the landscapes of their homeland, the character of its inhabitants, and the soul of its music. The golden era of Finnish art had a constitutive effect on the national consciousness of Finns.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Consciousness of Finnishness had reached all social strata by the early 20th century. The Finnish identity was negotiated in the context of romantic nationalism and defensive ethos, but from 1890 onwards as a response to the direct policies of Russification. During the reigns of Czar Alexander III (1881–1894) and particularly of Nicholas II (1894–1917), the extensive privileges enjoyed by the Grand Duchy of Finland fell under increasing pressure from nationalist circles in Russia. The growing displeasure in Russia with the “Finnish separatism” grew into two eras of Russification policy, first from 1899 to 1905 and second from 1909 to 1917. The 1905 revolution in Russia relaxed the atmosphere in the intervening years and gave Finland some political maneuvering space. The senate carried out a radical parliamentary reform in 1906, moving from a four-estate diet to a unicameral parliament and universal suffrage. This sealed the integration of the masses to the emerging polity and set modern party politics in motion. In 1917, Finland gained independence, and Finnish identity assumed a hegemonic position in the country. This provoked resistance from a section of the Swedish-speaking elite who claimed that the Swedish language and culture were N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a vital part of the Swedish heritage in Finland and should not be dismissed in favor of the “rustic” Finnish culture. Furthermore, it was held that the Swedishspeaking elite and common people, who were heavily concentrated in the country’s western and southern coasts and in the Åland Islands, formed a separate nation that should not be betrayed by forsaking the Swedish language. The idea of a “Swedish nation” was used in arguments for territorially based Swedishspeaking self-government, even autonomy. Further demands included cultural autonomy in church and education, and a separate military unit. The Swedish movement gained political support through mass organization and the founding of the Swedish People’s Party (Svenska Folkpartiet). However, it failed to realize plans for territorial autonomy, mainly because the Swedishspeakers’ opinions remained divided on the issue. Moreover, guarantees for Swedish cultural autonomy were already being prepared through institutional arrangements and legislation. For example, a Swedish diocese was established, including all Swedish congregations in the country, and a separate Swedish department was instituted at the government board of education. Furthermore, the 1919 constitution decreed that both Finnish and Swedish were the national languages of the republic and that the needs of both language groups were to be satisfied on the same basis. In addition to this, the Language Law of 1922 secured the rights of citizens to use their mother tongue, whether Finnish or Swedish, in their business with the authorities. After the most vital interests of the Swedish-speaking group had become protected, their separatism gradually waned. The Swedish-speaking elite experienced no linguistic difficulties in school any more than in public life. Also, a degree of cultural autonomy had been granted for Swedish-speakers in the form of their own educational and cultural institutions. Hence, the language question did not eventually compromise the goal of forming an independent nation-state accepted by both language groups. War and Nation-Building in Finland The first half of the 20th century was tumultuous for Finland, just as it was for the rest of Europe. The declaration of Finland’s independence from Russia took place in December 1917. For a period of time before and after the declaration, the country lacked a clear political power structure. The revolution in Russia a month earlier had spurred the Finnish workers to begin a general strike on November 14. Local strike committees took the most actual power in the country. Usually there were two competing organizations: white middle class and red working class, both armed with their own forces (the White Civil Guard and the Red Guard). The breakdown of the normal administration and order, especially the police, and their replacement by local strike committees and militias, unsettled the society and led to a growing restlessness. Armed clashes between the White Guards and the Red Guards escalated into a bloody civil war that was waged from January to May 1918. The war ended with N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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victory for the White Guards; more than 24,000 people were killed in the battles and aftermath. The bloody civil war was a traumatic experience to the Finnish society at large, and despite such conciliatory measures as including the Social Democrats in the government, it was only after World War II that the wounds would really start to heal. The “White” and “Red” factions of the population were brought together by common war efforts. First was the Winter War waged by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Finland (1939–1940), with over 23,000 killed in action, and after that the Finno-Russian War (the Continuation War), waged from 1941 to 1945 with over 60,000 killed in action. Experiences of the hardships of war and a common enemy made the legacy of hatred give way to a more unified political culture. The hard-won national unity of Finns survived the dramatic changes and turns of the young republic’s (geo)political life. Numerous important social (and socializing) practices continued to produce the image of Finland as a unified whole. Finns had become aware of their distinct history, culture, and nationality largely N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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through school education and mass mobilization. They had consistently built the idea of national unity rising above, but not suppressing, regional identities. Thus, from the point of view of the increasingly hegemonic Finnish-speaking national identity, the Swedish-speakers were just as rightful Finns as were the Finnishspeakers themselves. By the end of World War II, the formative years of the Finnish national identity were over. This is not to say that the national identity and its reflections in the narratives of Finnishness had reached an end point by 1945. Quite the contrary, the postindependence time has been characterized as a continuous “search for national identity” (Paasi 1996). For instance, the dramatic changes in the Finnish territory after World War II necessarily affected the Finnish self-image, as the mythic lands of Karelia, which only recently had figured in the aspirations toward “Greater Finland,” had to be ceded to the Soviet Union. However, the foundation of Finnish nationalism created and canonized by the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries has continued to guide the “search” as one of its fundamental layers. It is here that the comfortable and secure images of the Finnish nature, lands, tradition, and territory have been cherished and preserved as part of the continually evolving narrative of the Finnish nation. Selected Bibliography Alapuro, R. 1988. State and Revolution in Finland. Berkeley: University of California Press. Alapuro, R., and H. Stenius. 1987. “Kansanliikkeet loivat kansakunnan” [“Mass Movements Created the Nation”]. In Kansa liikkeessä [Nation on the Move], edited by R. Alapuro, I. Liikanen, K. Smeds, and H. Stenius, 7–52. Helsinki, Finland: Kirjayhtymä. Anttonen, P. J. 2005. Tradition through Modernity: Postmodernism and the Nation-State in Folklore Scholarship. Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Literature Society. Engman, M. 1995. “Finns and Swedes in Finland.” In Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, edited by S. Tägil, 179–217. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. Häkli, J. 1999. “Cultures of Demarcation: Territory and National Identity in Finland.” In Nested Identities: Identity, Territory, and Scale, edited by G. H. Herb and D. H. Kaplan, 123–149. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Häkli, J. 2002. “Mapping the Historical Sense of Finland.” Fennia 180:75–81. Jutikkala, E., and K. Pirinen. 1996. A History of Finland, vol. 5. Rev. ed. Translated by Paul Sjöblom. Porvoo, Finland: WSOY. Lönnqvist, B. 1991. “What Does It Mean to Be a Swedish-Speaking Finn?” Life and Education in Finland 3:25–27. Paasi, A. 1996. Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness. Chichester, England: John Wiley.

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Germany Stefan Berger Chronology 1871 (January) The German nation-state is founded at the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles. The assembled heads of the German lands declare the king of Prussia the new German emperor, Wilhelm I. (July) Kulturkampf begins in Prussia. 1878–1890 (October to October) Antisocialist Laws are in force. 1888 (June) Wilhelm II becomes emperor, after his father, Frederick III, ruled for only “100 days.” 1890 (March) Otto von Bismarck resigns as chancellor of the German Reich. 1898 (April) First Naval Law is passed. 1905 (March) Wilhelm II lands at Tangiers. 1914–1918 World War I. 1918–1923 The revolution in Germany leads to a prolonged period of civil war. 1919 (January) Elections for the National Assembly are held. (June) The Versailles Peace Treaty is signed. 1923 The Ruhr is occupied. 1933 (January) Adolf Hitler is appointed chancellor; the National Socialist dictatorship begins. 1934 (August) Hitler proclaims himself Führer and Reich chancellor. 1935 (September) Nuremberg laws are passed. 1938 (March) Law for the Reunification of Austria with the German Reich. (November) Reichskristallnacht. 1939 (October) Heinrich Himmler is appointed Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germandom. 1939–1945 World War II. 1941 (June) The Soviet Union is invaded. 1942 (January) Wannsee conference. 1943 (February) Joseph Goebbels gives his “Total War” speech in Berlin. 1945 (May) The last Reich government is dissolved by the Allies.

Situating the Nation During the 70 years of its existence between 1871 and 1945, the German nationstate underwent three important political transformations. Imperial Germany, between 1871 and 1918 was a constitutional monarchy incorporating aspects of semi-absolutist rule. The Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1933 was a parliamentary democracy. And National Socialist Germany between 1933 and 1945 was the worst fascist dictatorship in the 20th century. In this relatively short time span of 70 years, Germany underwent massive socioeconomic change and its N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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geographical shape altered significantly. Such lack of a stable national framework produced highly contested and diverse constructions of national identity. For a start, predominantly Protestant north Germans produced different ideas of the nation than predominantly Catholic south Germans. The diversity of the German lands before 1871 meant that strong local and regional identities had to be reconciled with the ethos of the nation-state. Notions of Heimat were crucial in mediating between the region and the nation. Imperial Germany remained a highly federated nation-state that gave a great deal of autonomy to its constituent parts. Strong regional divides were accompanied by major social divisions. The national movement of the 1860s had been a predominantly middle-class movement, actively attempting to keep workers before the gates. Thereby, the national question played an important role in the comparatively early division between what Gustav Mayer called “bourgeois” and “proletarian” democracy in the 1860s. Protestant, urban workers formed the bulwark of support for the German Social Democratic movement, which was vilified in Imperial Germany as antinational. The Social Democratic Party was banned between 1878 and 1890, and its followers were routinely described as “fellows without a fatherland.” Persecution of Social Democrats was particularly nasty in Prussia, the state that had taken the lead in unifying Germany. Its strong economic performance just as much as its military muscle made Prussia an obvious candidate and gave it the edge over its closest competitor in the German Federation, Austria-Hungary. Between 1871 and 1914, Germany pushed Britain into second place as the leading industrial nation of Europe. World War I was only a temporary setback, as Germany remained an economic powerhouse. “Made in Germany” soon became a hallmark of high-quality industrial products on the international markets. German national identity had strong economic overtones. Economic instability in the interwar period contributed significantly to the rise of National Socialism. Hitler’s mirage of a united German people standing behind one Führer in a united German Reich (ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer) appealed to a growing number of Germans from all social classes, including workers. The promotion of social welfare and the beginnings of a consumer revolution in the racial state of the Nazis was, however, stopped in its tracks by the second consecutive attempt of Germany to gain hegemony in Europe and the wider world.

Instituting the Nation The shape of the first German nation-state was devised by its founding father, the “iron chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck. The dualism, enshrined in its constitution, between a strong monarchy and a parliamentary system based on adult male suffrage produced significant tensions and was at the heart of Imperial Germany’s N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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political instability. A strong civil society, of which agile mass parties were an important part, produced considerable synergies but also conflicted with the semiabsolutist aspirations of the emperor. The democratic revolution of 1918 instituted a republic and a parliamentary democracy. The most fervent republicans were those who had been politically isolated in Imperial Germany, the Social Democrats. The “outsiders” of Imperial Germany now became the “insiders” of the Weimar Republic, as Peter Gay put it. But Weimar has often been described as a “republic without republicans.” The republican parties had command over a majority in the Reichstag only during 1919–1920. They faced powerful antirepublican forces to the left and right. The German Communist Party was the largest and most successful Communist Party outside of the Soviet Union in the interwar period, and they celebrated the Soviet Union as the true fatherland of the proletariat. On the political right, monarchist parties, such as the German People’s Party and the German National People’s Party, were soon challenged by a variety of Völkisch groups, among them the National Socialist Workers’ Party of Adolf Hitler. As the republic was rocked by political and economic crises, the right attacked republican politicians for signing the Versailles peace treaty and “stabbing the German army in the back” in 1918 by supporting the revolution. A complex amalgam of factors—among which the antirepublicanism of the social elites, the legacy of the long civil war between 1918 and 1923, and the massive economic crises are the most important—allowed Adolf Hitler to come into power in 1933. His fascist dictatorship produced a racial state that culminated in war and genocide. Radical Völkisch nationalism formed an important part of the National Socialists’ Weltanschauung (“world view”). If nationalism had been relatively weak in Germany before 1871, it flourished after the creation of the nation-state and was actively promoted by the institutions of that state, especially schools, universities, and the army. But civil society

Stab-in-the-Back Myth The “stab-in-the-back” myth was one of the most powerful weapons of the political right in its fight against the Weimar Republic. It argued that the German army had never been defeated militarily, but that it was stabbed in the back by the socialists who were responsible for the revolution of 1918. It was the revolution that had led to Germany’s defeat in the war. This myth was put into circulation by Paul von Hindenburg, the former head of the Imperial German armies, in November 1919. But the text of his speech was written by his former assistant, Erich Ludendorff, and a prominent politician of the German National People’s Party (DNVP), Karl Helfferich. In reality, Ludendorff had urged the German government in October 1918 to sign an unconditional armistice as soon as possible, as he could no longer guarantee that the Allies would not be able to overrun German lines at the Western front at any moment. The stab-in-the-back myth cleared the army leadership of all responsibility for the lost war and shifted it to the republican politicians.

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Völkisch Nationalism Völkisch groups emerged in Germany during the last decade of the 19th century. The Deutschbund, formed in 1894, and the journal Heimdall, founded in 1896, were among the most influential institutions of the Völkisch movement. Language, race, and religion were the three key concepts in the Völkisch Weltanschauung (“world view”). A crude Social Darwinism posited that racial characteristics decided between success or failure in the inevitable struggle for the “survival of the fittest.” Concern over the purity of racial stock led Völkisch groups to propagate selective breeding and euthanasia. They perceived the German people, above all, as a manly and courageous warrior people superior to all other peoples in Europe. After 1918, Völkisch paramilitary organizations gave anti-Semitism a militancy that had been largely absent before 1918. Calls to kill Jews like one would kill vermin were now being heard regularly in Völkisch propaganda. National Socialism built on Völkisch ideas and can be seen as the most successful of Völkisch groups, putting into practice many of their ideals and ideas.

was also thoroughly nationalized and contributed much to the “making of Germans” after 1871. If there was a strong identification with the nation among all sections of society by 1914, different groups in society tended to identify with different things. Dynastic, authoritarian, and militaristic allegiances intermingled with democratic, liberal, and participatory identities. On the political left, the “citizens’ nation” was a popular concept and Social Democratic ideas of the nation stressed social progress and democratic rights. On the political right, the Völkisch movement developed ideas of racial belonging to the nation. The majority of the German middle classes stressed cultural definitions of Germandom. Overall, notions of Germany were built on a baffling variety of ethno-cultural, religious, and voluntary-political ideas that often formed curious alliances and hybrids. The republican Germany after 1918 found it very difficult to create powerful national symbols and narratives of its own. The revolution of 1848 was one of the few events in 19th-century German history that could be mobilized on behalf of the republic. By contrast, Nazi Germany after 1933 fell back on and developed Völkisch ideas. The National Socialists portrayed themselves as the logical successors to 1,000 years of German history. They loved to point out the alleged continuities between their own ambitions and those of Frederick the Great, Otto von Bismarck, and Wilhelm II—something that was also picked up and mocked outside the borders of Germany.

Defining the Nation Nationalists everywhere had a tendency of declaring their particular nation “exceptional.” German exceptionalism took shape in the form of the German Sonderweg. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Cover of Le Rire satirical magazine from September 1939, depicting Joseph Goebbels as Frederick the Great, Hermann Goering as Otto von Bismarck, and Adolf Hitler as Kaiser Wilhelm II. (Mary Evans Picture Library)

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Germany’s path in history was postulated as different from that of its Western neighbors, in that its idea of freedom was one of inner freedom, which allowed the individual to develop its full potential. Politics was left to a strong executive. This, in Thomas Mann’s unforgettable phrase, machtgeschützte Innerlichkeit (“inner freedom protected by power”), formed a marked contrast to “Western civilization” with it revolutionary (French) and parliamentary (British) traditions. Political pluralism was vilified as “un-German,” as cultural superiority became the rallying cry of German nationalists. Germany as a country of culture was juxtaposed in particular to Slavic, eastern European “barbarity.” German nationalism identified strongly with an alleged German colonizing mission in eastern Europe. Prussia incorporated millions of Polish speakers in its territory who were subjected to stark Germanization policies, as were other ethnic minorities in the German Reich. At the same time, millions of ethnic Germans lived outside the borders of the German Reich, provoking calls to extend the German borders as far as German “culture” had reached. The problem of what to do with ethnic German minorities in eastern Europe was exacerbated by the Versailles Treaty, which left millions of Germans belonging to new-found states in east central Europe, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. Attempts to justify incorporation of particular territories into the German state produced veritable map wars: many maps were produced to demonstrate that particular territories belonged to particular nations. National Socialist expansionism in the 1930s was built on the notion of bringing ethnic Germans back to the Reich (heim ins Reich). In World War II, the National Socialists attempted to solve the problem through ethnic cleansing. Germans in eastern Europe were moved into the Reich. The borders of the Reich were extended as far as possible eastwards. Those populations, in particular, Poles, that were in the way were either killed or transported eastwards. The Holocaust was part and parcel of such reconstitution of ethnic borders in eastern Europe. Territorial instability characterized the German nation not only in the east. Austria to the south, Alsace and Lorraine to the west, and Schleswig to the north all produced considerable tension and conflict, as the question of Germany’s borderlands was crucial to German national identity throughout the period under discussion here.

Narrating the Nation Tracing the nation back in history as far as possible was an important means of legitimating the nation. Constructions of Germanness thus frequently harked back to the ancient Roman writer Tacitus who had described the Germanic tribes in AD 98 as a natural warrior people characterized by honesty, openness, decency, love of liberty, and purity of morality. In AD 9, German tribes under the leadership N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of Arminius, also known by his Germanic name Hermann, defeated the Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest. The forest itself, and the oak, as holy tree of the Germanic tribes, became powerful symbols of Germanness. Hiking (preferably through dark forests) became a national obsession (next to gymnastics), as young Germans made it the first mass sport in the 19th century. In 1875, a monument to Hermann was opened near the town of Detmold. The memorial featured a 26-meter-high Germanic warrior figure. Just four years after the Franco-Prussian war, which had culminated in the foundation of the German empire, this warrior symbolized German unity in battle: against the Romans in ancient times and against the French, both in the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the 19th century and during 1870–1871. Yet Hermann’s sword was also directed against Rome. At the height of the Kulturkampf of Prussia against the Catholic Church, Hermann symbolized the Protestant German nation. The close identification of Germany with Protestantism was particularly obvious in the cult surrounding Martin Luther and his seminal role in the German Reformation. The 400th birthday of Martin Luther in 1883 was the high point of a public symbiosis of Protestantism and nationalism. Innumerable historical paintings and illustrations showed Luther burning the papal bull. He was celebrated as liberator from Rome (i.e., foreign domination), as founder of Germany’s national religion, and as incarnation of middle-class virtues. The Reformation was Germany’s revolution and, as such, it was frequently juxtaposed against the French ideas of 1789. The German nation was not only constructed as opposing the ideals of liberté, egalité, fraternité, but it was also celebrated as having been reborn in the struggle against Napoleon. Th e Wars of

Kulturkampf Liberal and Protestant nationalists saw Catholicism as backward, reactionary, and antinational. Their struggle to curb the powers and independence of the Catholic Church became known as Kulturkampf. This literally means “cultural struggle,” and it was very much perceived as a fight of the forces of culture against the forces of superstition and ignorance. It saw the banning of the Jesuit order from Germany and various attempts by the state to control the church and abolish as much autonomy over its internal affairs as possible. The freedom of movement of Catholic priests was severely restricted; many were forcibly expatriated and imprisoned, including, at one point, 5 of the 11 Prussian bishops. The Catholic press and associations were placed under permanent police supervision. Civil marriages became obligatory, but the attempt to freeze the Catholic Church completely out of school education was eventually unsuccessful. Catholics reacted by withdrawing into a Catholic milieu that ranged from educational associations to women’s and youth groups, from a political party (the Centre Party) to trade unions, and from leisure-time organizations to associations for specific occupations. The attitude of Catholics toward the foundation of the German nation-state remained an issue for debate throughout much of Imperial Germany’s existence.

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Liberation were a crucial foundational moment for Germany’s national consciousness. On the centenary of the Battle of the Nations (Völkerschlacht) in 1813, Kaiser Wilhelm opened the megalomaniac Völkerschlacht monument in Leipzig. The biggest memorial in Europe at the time, its symbolic language emphasized sacrifice, courage, manliness, and all the values of the German warrior people. Those values, the monument alleged, had contributed directly to the foundation of Imperial Germany in 1871. The empire was also referred to as the “Second German Reich.” The first German Reich was the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and opinion on that first empire was divided. Whereas nationalists widely criticized its extreme federalism and its unwieldy political and administrative structures for being responsible for the divisions and weaknesses of the fatherland, the same nationalists were content in locating periods of glorious strength and greatness in that first empire. None was greater and more glorious than the reign of Frederick I, also nicknamed Barbarossa (Red Beard). One of the most potent national myths was that the spirit of Barbarossa was haunting one of his castles, the Kyff häuser. He himself was supposed to be sitting inside the rock on which the castle had been built, seated at a stone table with his red beard growing through the table, awaiting the completion of the German Reich. German nationalists depicted 1871 as the moment when the Reich had indeed been completed by Wilhelm I, duly nicknamed Barbablanca (White Beard). Dynastic nationalism in Imperial Germany found expression in a number of monuments, such as the huge Kyffhäuser memorial built between 1892 and 1896, or the bombastic avenue of marble statues of Hohenzollern monarchs in the Avenue of Victory (Siegesallee), dedicated by Wilhelm II in 1901. The glories of the medieval past of the Holy Roman Empire could be set side by side with the triumphs of the present. But the 400 memorials built in Imperial Germany to celebrate Barbablanca were dwarfed by the over 700 memorials built to the founder of the Reich, Bismarck. While narrations of the nation in scholarly tomes, novels, monuments, the fine arts, and, last but not least, the most German of all the arts, music, successfully linked the state of 1871 to a long, continuous, and proud national past, the new state nevertheless had its difficulties with national symbols. Thus, Imperial Germany never had a national anthem. One of the most popular national songs, the “Deutschlandlied,” was widely associated with the 1848 revolution and thus deemed unsuitable. It became the national anthem in 1919 and the National Socialists combined its first stanza, celebrating German greatness, with the “HorstWessel-Lied.” The national flag was a similarly tortured story: the black, red, and gold of the 1848 revolution could not be adopted in 1871. Instead a red stripe was added to the black and white of Prussia. In 1919, red, black, and gold became the colors of the republic, but in March 1933, President Hindenburg decreed that both the old imperial black, white, and red and the National Socialist swastika flag should serve together as national flags. However, in 1935, Hitler made the swastika flag the sole national flag in the Third Reich. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation The German nation came into existence through three wars, or at least that was one of the stories that nationalists liked to tell. Prussia, in order to fulfill its German mission, first had to defeat Denmark in 1864, then Austria-Hungary in 1866, and finally France in 1871. Only then could the German nation-state be founded at Versailles. Given the strong link between nation-building and war, the military was to have a special place in the pantheon of German nationalism. Military service became a mark of distinction and German civilian society became heavily militarized. The Sedan celebrations, commemorating the defeat of the French army at the Battle of Sedan on September 2, 1870, were an annual national festival with a strongly Protestant flavor. During national festivals, weapons, military uniforms, insignia, and flags were everywhere. The War Associations (Kriegervereine) were the focus of national festivities in each and every city, town, and village. The army as creator of the nation also became the school of the nation. Military service was the precondition not only to full manhood, but also to full citizenship. Only by serving in the army did one earn the right to become a citizen, which is also the reason why women remained excluded from citizenship until 1919, when the republic granted them the vote. But the nation and the national movement gave women a broad field of potential activities. National women’s associations flourished. One of the biggest, the Patriotic Women’s Association (Vaterländischer Frauenverein), had 600,000 members in 1914. Many of the associations focused on social work and social welfare issues. Motherhood was often glorified as duty to the nation. Family and domesticity played major roles in the construction of Germanness. In wartime, women acted as nurses in hospitals and generally performed jobs in factories and public life that were reserved for men in peacetime. After 1918, the Weimar Republic witnessed ferocious debates surrounding the politics of the body, which included the question of whether motherhood should be redefined as a more voluntary concept. On the political right, Völkisch women’s groups fought not for women’s rights, but idealized an alleged female vocation to serve their Volk. The Nazis tapped into that and promoted womanhood as “motherhood to the Volk” (Volksmütter). Mother’s day was made into a national holiday and a “cross of honor” was given to women who had been particularly fertile. The Weimar Republic had given 19 million women the right to vote. The republic was widely seen as one of the most democratic political systems in Europe at the time. Democratic politics undoubtedly had a mobilizing function already in Imperial Germany. The first national elections in the German Empire demonstrated only lukewarm support for the nation. For a start, only half of those eligible to vote actually turned out, and of those, 50 percent voted for parties that were skeptical of the newly unified state. However, over the next decades, enthusiasm for national politics grew. The democratic male franchise for national elections N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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mobilized voters and contributed to the emergence of a dynamic political culture based on a vibrant interest in politics. Germans rightly gained a reputation for joining associations (Vereinsmensch). A vibrant civil society underpinned the further mobilization of the populace. However, it also increased a perception among Germans that they were hopelessly divided. Such divisions were not accepted as part and parcel of a pluralist society and produced longings for organic harmony and greater unity. Hence, party politics was frequently denounced as divisive and antinational. The party political system in the Weimar Republic suffered under such antipluralism that contributed to the unpopularity of “system politics” among the Weimar electorate—a fact skillfully exploited by National Socialist propaganda. From the 1890s onward, the Imperial German elites, led by Kaiser Wilhelm II, mobilized the nation around the issue of Weltpolitik (world policy). Germany had become a nation-state to fulfill a world political mission. To this end, it had to acquire colonies. Germany’s “search for a place under the sun” did not result in an impressive empire, but it led to considerable tension with other colonial powers in Europe, notably Britain. The decision to build a navy that would rival the British one and challenge British domination of the seas led to the rising Anglo-German antagonism before 1914. Navalism was popular in Germany; little boys were dressed in naval uniforms and the Navy League was a powerful and popular pressure group, as was the Colonial Association. Yet the German overseas empire remained an episode. The Versailles Treaty took all colonial possessions off Germany, and although the many voices who clamored for a revision of that “treaty of shame” in the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany also included those who wanted Germany reinstated as a colonial power, this issue was hardly at the forefront of debate in the Weimar Republic. The Nazis searched for Lebensraum in eastern Europe and concentrated on the European map—with little interest in colonialism. Imperial Germany was highly successful in making Germans between 1871 and 1914. The state in conjunction with civil society produced powerful myths of the nation and a strong national culture, which blended the local and regional allegiances into a greater federal whole. Even those areas of Germany that had the potential of developing into separate national entities (especially Bavaria and Austria) did not. But Germans constructed multiple and highly contested national identities in the empire. The divisions within the German nation were painfully recognized and produced a longing for greater unity. World War I was widely welcomed as providing the focus for such unity. Germans of all creeds, beliefs, and political orientations were supposed to rally to the cause of an allegedly beleaguered nation. “The ideas of 1914” were celebrated by an entire generation of intellectuals and juxtaposed against the double betrayal of the nation during 1918–1919: the political right argued that the revolution and the Versailles Treaty had brought the nation to its knees. It contrasted the squabbling of the political parties with the unity of the German population in wartime. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The idea of the Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community) gained a wide currency during World War I and influenced constructions of national identity in the interwar period. It also contributed to the success of the National Socialists in 1933. They built their entire state on the idea of a Volksgemeinschaft based on criteria of race. Their radical racial nationalism, however, was not so much the end point of German nationalism per se. It was the end point of one of several 19thcentury traditions. The Völkisch idea of the nation was a distinct minority position in Imperial Germany. In the interwar period, it served as a focal point for those who felt that the more mainstream concepts of cultural nationalism and statism were no longer sufficient. World War I and its aftermath radicalized German nationalism. The Weimar Republic and its version of modernity, symbolized by the urbanity of the city of Berlin, stood for everything that Völkisch groups, including the National Socialists, hated. Yet the Nazis were not simply reactionaries. Their idea of the nation endorsed notions of a highly modern, industrial nation at the cutting edge of technology. But their modernism was “reactionary” (Herf 1984) in that the ultimate aim of the National Socialist “revolution” was the realization of a racial utopia. Europeans glimpsed the horrendous implications of that utopia during World War II, which saw ethnic cleansing on a hitherto unprecedented scale, the systematic murder of European Jewry, and unspeakable atrocities. Selected Bibliography Applegate, C., and P. Potter, eds. 2002. Music and German National Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Berger, S. 2004. Inventing the Nation: Germany. London: Edward Arnold. Frevert, U. 2004. A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society. Oxford: Berg. Fritzsche, P. 1998. Germans into Nazis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herb, G. H. 1997. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945. London: Routledge. Herf, J. 1984. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. James, H. 1990. A German Identity 1770–1990. Rev. ed. London: Routledge. Jarausch, K., and M. Geyer. 2003. Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Koshar, R. 1998. Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century: Germany’s Transient Past. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Smith, H. W. 1995. German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870– 1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Umbach, M., ed. 2002. German Federalism: Past, Present and Future. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan. Verhey, J. 2000. The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilisation in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wildenthal, L. 2001. German Women for Empire, 1884–1945. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Greece Gregory Jusdanis Chronology 1453 1806 1814 1821 1822 1827 1833 1866 1881 1912 1913 1919 1922 1923

Constantinople falls to the Ottoman Turks. Elliniki Nomarchia, an influential revolutionary tract, is published. Formation of “Philiki Etairia,” secret “society of friends” that lays program for independence. The War of Independence erupts. The first constitution is proclaimed. British, French, and Russian ships sink the Ottoman fleet in Navarino. King Otto arrives in Nafplion, the provisional capital. There is an outbreak of rebellion on Crete. Greece acquires Thessaly and the Arta region of Epirus. First Balkan War. Second Balkan War; Greece acquires southern Macedonia. Greek troops arrive in Smyrna (Izmir). Greek forces are routed from Asia Minor. Treaty of Lausanne, compulsory exchange of populations.

Situating the Nation Modern Greece offers a paradigmatic case of nationalism. The War of Independence against Ottoman rule (1821–1832) was an event whose meaning reached beyond Greece itself. It was the first nationalist struggle against the Ottoman Empire, becoming a model for subsequent insurrections in the Balkans and the Near East that ultimately led to the dissolution of the empire. Beyond this, the war constituted an early case of nationalism and the first victorious struggle for sovereignty since the American Revolution 50 years earlier. Why were the Greeks the first people in the Ottoman Empire to launch a war of independence? Why did the significance of this confrontation transcend the limits of Greek history itself ? The answer to these questions has to do with the special position of the Greeks within the Ottoman Empire and the particular place of Hellenism within Western culture. The Greeks were able to take advantage of their privileged situation within the empire and then to exploit the favorable image of Hellenism in the imaginings of the West. They thus converted their individual conflict to a struggle between West and East, between Christianity and Islam, between freedom and despotism, between modernization and backwardness. In the minds of philhellenes around the world, the Greek War of Independence was a modern version of the conflict between the ancient Greek city-states and the Persian empire. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Greeks had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire since 1453 with the downfall of Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine empire, to Ottoman forces, the last piece of Byzantine territory to succumb to the Turks. The mass of the population was peasants, which the Ottomans grouped administratively into the Orthodox (or Rum) millet, an ethno-religious but not territorial mode of social organization. (There was a Muslim millet and a Jewish millet.) In short, all Orthodox subjects belonged to this millet no matter where they lived in the empire. Headed by the patriarch of Constantinople, the millet enjoyed considerable autonomy in religious, cultural, and social matters. During the 17th century, two clusters within the Orthodox millet began to differentiate themselves from the bulk of the population: (a) an upper class of government officials known as Phanariots, as well as rich merchants and landowners, and (b) a middle class of merchants, tradesmen, and manufacturers. These two classes were instrumental in the War of Independence ever since they had become aware of economic, technological, and political developments in Europe. The government officials, for instance, often represented the Ottoman state to outside powers. The merchants had formed extensive trading contacts throughout Europe. Both groups had come into contact with Western modernity and realized that they had to reform Greek society and make it part of Europe. Specifically, they sent their sons to study in European cities, where they were introduced to Western progress. This confrontation with the West, as in so many cases of nationalism in the last two centuries, was momentous, for in Europe, these Greeks encountered the advance of the host countries and the belatedness of their own society. The comparisons they made between Greek and Western polities were so devastating that they undertook a complete transformation of Greece along Western prototypes. The establishment of an independent nation-state became one of their highest priorities. As is often the case, nationalism became a way of modernizing society, of making it able to compete with the West economically, militarily, and culturally. Rather than dragging society into darkness and backwardness—the manner in which nationalism is often portrayed—it represented a way of pushing society forward.

Instituting the Nation By the 18th century, a series of internal and external changes led to the dissolution of traditional social networks, creating much instability. The centralized state grew weaker, unable to control the provinces. Ever more powerful landlords exploited this lack of authority and took advantage of the peasants by appropriating their land. A large number of peasants felt tossed aside by social and economic

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changes. Many resorted to banditry. Although originally their brigandage was a response to arbitrary taxation and impoverishment rather than an expression of a nationalized fervor, these bandits, or klephts, became receptive to revolutionary messages coming to them from political and intellectual elites. As a result, they joined the independence movement in great numbers. At the same time, Greek merchants themselves became dissatisfied with the volatility and uncertainty within the empire. They feared that the general absence of law was undermining their business pursuits. They also became anxious about the extent to which capitalist states of the West penetrated Ottoman markets, destroying traditional craft industries. They felt, in other words, a double insecurity. It was in such a climate that such diasporic intellectuals as Adamantios Korais (1748–1833) and such revolutionaries as Rigas Velestinlis (1757–1798) began to draft a program for revolution against Ottoman rule. Residing in the cosmopolitan centers of Europe and having become aware of liberal political institutions, Enlightenment ideals, and Western progress in general, they undertook a grand project to seek national independence for the Greeks from the Ottoman N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Empire. In this effort, they found the merchants as allies for they too saw the nation-state as a legitimate area to exercise their interests. To be sure, this diaspora of intellectuals, revolutionaries, and merchants played a decisive role in the nationalist enterprise. Crucial to this effort in 1814 was the formation of the Philiki Etairia (The Society of Friends), a clandestine revolutionary organization in Odessa, by three members of the mercantile diaspora. Its aim was the overthrow of Ottoman rule through armed revolt. It recruited members, disseminated revolutionary and nationalist ideas, and laid out a program of rebellion. This society provides an example of the active role played by the diaspora, in its mercantile and intellectual dimensions, in the period prior and during the revolution. Many diasporic Greeks who were not involved in seditious activities made their contributions in other ways. Wealthy individuals and entire families subsidized the foreign study of deserving pupils, sponsored the publication of books and journals, and set up schools and other cultural institutions in Greece, all with the aim of disseminating ideas on Greek culture, nationalism, and Enlightenment. The aim that seemed to bind them together was education—the enlightenment of the Greek nation. To be sure, the investments made by the diaspora in education were vast, even after the establishment of the state. It should be added that these intellectuals had a double-pronged strategy, to arouse the passions of Greeks for revolution and to stir the philhellenic sympathies of Europeans. Exploiting the place of ancient Greece as a fountainhead of Western civilization, they argued that it was the duty of Europeans now to aid their fellow Christians in their struggle against Ottoman despotism. As the original Europeans, they claimed, the Greeks were now deserving of help from Europe. These intellectuals, often militantly anticlerical, came into conflict with the upper ecclesiastic authorities, who had been suspicious of the Catholic West ever since the Crusaders sacked Constantinople in 1204, rendering it ultimately vulnerable to Ottoman conquest. Many thus saw the Catholic West as a greater threat to Orthodoxy than Islam because it sought to absorb Orthodoxy or compel it to recognize the ultimate authority of the pope as the leader of all the Christians. These Orthodox authorities regarded Orthodoxy’s opposition to Catholicism as one of the great repudiations of history, that is, a supreme example of how one culture resisted assimilation into another. They also recognized that the multiethnic, multilingual, and multiracial Ottoman Empire ultimately ensured the universality of the patriarchate and of Orthodoxy in general. Th ey rightly feared the prospect of independence movements each forming their separate nations with their own national churches. To be sure, nationalism among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire undermined the universality of the patriarchate as it led to the establishment of independent churches. The modernizers, in contrast, developed a different conception of the West, as something to be emulated, rather than be rejected, to be embraced rather than be feared. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Defining the Nation The Greek War of Independence was a nationalist event. Unlike the French Revolution, which was conducted against internal despotism, it was launched against a foreign foe, different in terms of religion, language, and ethnicity. The Greeks, therefore, defined themselves against an external, rather than a domestic, “other.” Although it is impossible to distinguish cultural from political factors in any nationalist movement, we can say that issues of language, tradition, history, ethnicity, and race loomed large in discussions leading to and after the War of Independence. Enlightenment intellectuals, such as Adamantios Korais, and the anonymous author of the political tract known as Elliniki Nomarchia (the Greek Constitution, 1806) stressed the ideas of freedom and sovereignty that are due any peoples. Korais repeatedly argued in his speeches and writings that all oppressed peoples have the right to break away from the yoke of tyranny. He and others foresaw the creation of an independent Greek state governed by liberal, democratic institutions. At the same time, they stressed the features shared by the Greeks on the basis of which they sought their independence—their language, history, religion, traditions, and customs. The Greek case illuminates the interplay between culture and politics in the formation of nation-states. Culture becomes the foundation of the states because cultural uniqueness becomes a way of justifying the creation of a new polity. Th e Greeks claimed that, insofar as they constituted a separate people, they deserved to have their own state. But it is wrong to see this nationalism as a completely cultural phenomenon, devoid of political dimensions. Nationalist movements, such as the Greek, German, and many cases of postcolonial struggles, are often dismissed as merely cultural. The Greek situation demonstrates that this is not the case. The Greeks argued for freedom not just because they were Greeks but

Adamantios Korais (1748–1833) Adamantios Korais was one of the primary figures in the cultural revival that led to the War of Independence in 1821. Born in Smyrna (Izmir) to a merchant from the island of Chios, he was sent to Montpellier in France to study medicine. As his true interests lay in classical studies, he turned his attention to editing classical texts and writing commentaries on them. His greatest passion, however, was the enlightenment of his homeland to which he dedicated all his life. He tried to convince his fellow Greeks that they were descendants of classical Greece and to rouse in them a revolutionary spirit. At the same time, he attempted to persuade Europeans that the Greeks, as descendants of this glorious tradition, were the original Europeans and thus deserving of Europe’s attention and aid. Distrustful of the church’s influence in Greek life, he became a fierce critic of what he saw as its subservience to Ottoman rule.

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also because they were humans. They wanted to break away from the Ottoman Empire both in the name of liberty and Greekness. The two went together. The fact that the peasants may have had a vague sense of parliamentary democracy does not diminish the political aspect of their struggle. They saw their uprising as a conflict between self and other, between Christian and Muslim, between Greek and Turk, but also between light and darkness and between freedom and tyranny. Greek nationalism, like so many other cases of nationalism, emphasized cultural models not because of some obsession with the self but because of the discovery of Greece’s belatedness vis-à-vis Western powers. Culture was a way of making sense of this belatedness. It encouraged the population to enter the frightening world of modernity by ensuring the preservation of indigenous ways of life. National culture—the domain of identities, religion, language, traditions, and the arts—served as a space that protected valuable symbols of traditional life from modernity. The aim of the elites, therefore, was as much cultural as political. Not only did they have to rouse the Greeks to rebellion but they also had to ensure that they saw themselves as a separate people. This was a daunting task as the Greeks were dispersed in the multinational empire in which faith, rather than nationality, was the dominant mode of distinction. Moreover, these Greeks had intense regional loyalties and a vague notion of national identification. What the intellectuals created was a common sense of destiny. They had to make Greek-speaking, Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire into Greeks, a long complex process that continued well into the 20th century. Although the intellectuals themselves may not have been directly involved in the armed struggle, they had bequeathed upon the nation a shared sense of identity, history, and culture. One of the first topics of their concern was the classical patrimony. They had to do this for two reasons: to grant the nation an illustrious history, far more distinguished than any other European nation, and to solicit aid from the Europeans. They therefore gave much energy to publishing classical texts, learning about the classics, and disseminating knowledge about classical antiquity. It should be kept in mind that ordinary Greeks knew little of this antiquity, the evidence of which they could see in the countryside. At the same time, Greek schools were in the grips of neo-Aristotelian philosophy that discouraged new ways of thinking. Intellectuals thus had to rethink the link with classical Greece, instill pride in the ancients as ancestors, but also demonstrate that the moderns were equally capable of wisdom. They also devoted considerable attention to language, one of the most hotly contested attributes of Greek nationalism. As heirs to one of the longest linguistic traditions in the world, Greek intellectuals had to consider the language of the new nation. This was not a straightforward task as a number of registers were available: the ancient language known to scholars; ecclesiastical Greek, based on the Koine of the Christian Bible; and demotic, the language of everyday speech N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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used in a myriad of dialects by Greeks throughout the empire. After much debate, they settled on a compromise, the katharevousa, a puristic form of Greek. Based on the vernacular, it was “purified” of Turkish words and expressions and “embellished” on the model of the ancient language. This compromise may have temporarily settled the debates, but language continued to be the apple of discord in Greek life, often dividing intellectuals as well as ordinary people into opposing camps. For instance, riots broke out in the streets of Athens in 1901 with the appearance of a demotic translation of the New Testament and again in 1903 when the National Theater performed Aeschylus’s Oresteia in modern Greek. These examples once again highlight the interplay of culture and politics in nationalism.

Narrating the Nation The intellectuals created a sense of collective destiny, which they politicized. In other words, they fashioned a shared identity that they then made an object of political struggle. Identity, along with liberty, became one of the motivations for revolutionary struggle. The national story they fashioned went like this: Oppressed, humiliated, and denied enlightenment, Greeks should realize that rather than toiling subjects of a decaying and unjust Ottoman Empire, they should strive to become citizens of an independent Greek state, itself an integral part of Europe. Greeks should modernize and catch up with Europe. Intellectuals began to endow Greeks with a sense of cultural, linguistic, historical, geographical, ethnic, and political integrity. They did this by publishing works of criticism, geography, and history; by collecting folk songs and tales from around the country, such as the song “The Bridge of Arta” and the tale Ours Once More; by establishing newspapers and magazines, such as O Ermis o Logios; by sponsoring poetry contests; and by printing pamphlets. The identity they created is still valid today. Greeks are still trying to catch up with Europe. Opposition by the church, aristocrats, and local notables frustrated the realization of their plans. Therefore, the grand dream of reconstruction did not succeed in the forms originally imagined. To be sure, the introduction of European institutions and ideologies in a stratified, traditional society largely incapable of integrating them was long and the process imperfect and incomplete. But the project of modernization did not fail either. Even though the Enlightenment intellectuals were far removed from the fighters on the plains and in the mountains, most of whom did not share with them the same belief in progress and constitutional government, they bequeathed on the nation a common sense of purpose. They had set the terms for debates for the next two centuries. Of course, the War of Independence was hardly a unified movement. Different parties sought different ends. Some intellectuals strived for an independent N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Rigas Velestinlis (1757–1798) Considered one of the heroes of the Greek War of Independence, Rigas Velestinlis served first as secretary to Alexander Ipsilantis, a Greek general in the service of Czar Alexander of Russia, and then worked for the Greek princes of Wallachia. A passionate revolutionary, he wrote his Declaration of the Rights of Man, “Thourios” (a war song), and a constitution for a state that was to be built on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. In all three texts, he had been influenced by French republican and revolutionary ideas. Not a nationalist strictly speaking, he had envisioned a multinational state, comprising the various peoples of the Balkans, but with Greek as the official language. With 3,000 copies of his revolutionary tract in hand, he intended to travel in 1797 to the Balkans to preach the overthrow of Ottoman rule. Captured by Austrian forces in Trieste, he was surrendered to the Ottoman authorities in Belgrade who executed him in 1798. He died a martyr for the Greek cause.

state with liberal institutions. Others, like Rigas Velestinlis, wanted the resurrection of the Byzantine empire but united by Greek culture. The brigands, highly factional and local, did not have a homeland beyond their own regional identification nor a strong sense of national identity. The landowners, who profited from the absence of state authority, were ambivalent about independence, rightly fearing the peasants demand for land reform and justice after the departure of the Turks. The peasants, the largest bloc, joined the effort as much to ameliorate their deteriorating economic lot as to seek freedom from the Turks. The revolution was thus marked by ideological differences among the participants and lacked a true central authority. Crucial to its ultimate success was the involvement of the then superpowers, England, France, and Russia. Because of Greece’s position in the eastern Mediterranean, the revolution became a major diplomatic conflict. Sensing the imminent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the European powers strived to gain as much advantage as possible. They finally intervened in 1827 by entering the conflict and sinking the Ottoman fleet in Navarino. The powers may not have been motivated by the same philhellenic intentions that had brought the likes of Lord Byron to fight and die for Greece, but they did ensure victory for Greece. Paradoxically, they then imposed a “hereditary” monarch on the Greeks, Prince Otto of Wittelsbach, the 17-year-old, second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria. It is perhaps ironic that the recently independent Greeks did not participate in the treaty signed by Britain, France, Russia, and Bavaria in 1832 that established the terms of Otto’s ascendancy to the throne and guaranteed Greece’s sovereignty. The imposition of a foreign ruler underlined the limited sense of sovereignty that the powers had intended for Greece. The British minister in Athens, in 1841, emphasized this very point when he claimed that an independent Greece was an absurdity. While independent from the Ottoman Empire, Greece became an appendage to western Europe to which it continued to compare itself. Moreover, the lasting internal divisions, the clientelistic networks, and resistance to change N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Artist Panagiotis Zografos’s depiction of the Battle of Navarino, ca. 1827, during the Greek War of Independence. (Stapleton Collection/Corbis)

made it difficult to incorporate foreign political and cultural institutions in a traditional, stratified society. The most damaging division was that between culture and state—the fact that the majority of the Greek population resided outside the borders of the unstable Greek kingdom and that Greeks had been scattered throughout the Balkans and Anatolia.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation If one of the tenets of nationalist doctrine is that there must be an overlap between nation and state, between territory and nation, this did not apply to Greece until 1922. When the state was established in 1832, it comprised only a fraction of its current size and about a third of the then Greek population. To redress this imbalance, the country embarked on an aggressive irredentist campaign to “redeem” the land that was historically Greek. The ideology motivating this crusade was called the “Megali Idea” or Great Idea. Proclaimed by Ioannis Kolettis in 1844, it stated that a native of the Greek kingdom is not just someone who lives within its borders but also in any land “associated with Greek history or the Greek race.” This meant that it was the duty of the state to bring these Greeks within its bosom N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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by expanding its borders. The ultimate aim was the capture of Constantinople, which for Greeks remained their spiritual capital. Despite the fractional divisions among political parties and the population, Greeks in general were united in the support of this policy throughout the 19th century. The country’s foreign relations were determined in part by this dream and its identity was solidified by it. Thus, the country launched a series of campaigns to obtain more territory. As a result, it acquired the Ionian Islands in 1864, Thessaly in 1881, Crete in 1913, Macedonia in 1913, Thrace in 1923, and finally the Dodecanese Islands in 1947. The Megali Idea continued to inspire the country until it was burned in the flames of Smyrna in 1922. As a reward for joining the allies in World War I, the Greeks were allowed in 1919 by Britain, France, and the United States to land Greek troops in Smyrna to protect the Greek population in the region. Rather than remaining in the area, as the foreign powers had agreed, the troops pushed further inland in pursuit of additional territory, committing atrocities along the way. There they confronted a nascent Turkish nationalism, led by Mustafa Kemal, which sprung out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek forces were routed, leaving the Greek population defenseless. A fire destroyed most of the city, and about 30,000 Greeks and Armenians were killed. For the Greeks, this was the Asia Minor Catastrophe, the end of the mission for a Greater Greece, and, more important, the end of the 2,000-year-old Greek presence in Asia Minor. A peace conference was organized in Lausanne in 1923 by the superpowers that enforced an exchange of populations. As a result, about 1.1 million Greeks had to leave their homes and move to Greece, and 380,000 Turks had to make the opposite journey. The influx of such a large number of Greeks changed the ethnic makeup of the country, making Greeks, for instance, the majority in Macedonia. Greece became one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the Balkans, if not the world, with small minorities of Macedonians, Muslims, Vlachs, and Albanians. The coming of this huge number of refugees, many of whom did not know Greek, posed tremendous problems of assimilation. But they arrived into a state that was 100 years old. During that time, the country had achieved a relatively cohesive nation-state. This is remarkable when one considers that the bulk of the population did not have a strong sense of national consciousness by the War of Independence. Greek identity served as a foundation of the state, a fusion of Orthodoxy, ancient Greek elements, and modern forms: the Greeks are Europeans, Orthodox by faith, and heirs of an illustrious, ancient tradition. This identity was for the most part a product of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Although the edifice of this national identity has not really changed, it is increasingly challenged today by waves of migrants from eastern Europe, the Near East, and Africa. As a country that until the recent past was a net exporter of labor, Greece has to come to terms with a large number of residents that are of a different race and nationality. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Selected Bibliography Clogg, R. 1973. The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence. London: Macmillan. Gallant, T. W. 2001. Modern Greece. London: Arnold. Gourgouris, S. 1996. Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Herzfeld, M. 1982. Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece. Austin: Texas University Press. Jusdanis, G. 1991. Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture: Inventing National Literature. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. Jusdanis, G. 2001. The Necessary Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lambropoulos, V. 1988. Literature as National Institution: Studies in the Politics of Modern Greek Criticism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. St. Clair, W. 1972. That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Woodhouse, C. M. 1952. The Greek War of Independence: Its Historical Setting. London: Hutchinson’s University Library.

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Hungary Steve Jobbitt Chronology 1825–1847 Hungary’s Reform Period; characterized by modest social and economic reforms and hopes for the gradual as well as peaceful acquisition of national independence from Austria. 1848–1849 (March–August) The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence; defeated by a combined Austrian and Russian invasion and followed by two decades of Habsburg absolutism. 1867 The Ausgleich, or Austro-Hungarian Compromise; the Habsburg empire officially becomes a Dual Monarchy. 1881 A group of opposition politicians run on an anti-Semitic platform in the national election, reflecting a general shift in Hungarian politics toward a more chauvinist definition of national identity. 1896 The Hungarian Millennium; Hungary celebrates 1,000 years of conquest and settlement in the Carpathian Basin. 1918 (November) Count Mihály Károlyi assumes power as the head of the short-lived Chrysanthemum Revolution, a coalition of moderate leftists and liberals. 1919 (March) The Communist Party comes to power under the leadership of Béla Kun. (November) Counter-revolutionary forces under the command of Miklós Horthy, a former rear admiral in the Austro-Hungarian navy, march into Budapest and assume power; Horthy goes on to serve as regent from 1920 to 1944. 1920 (June) the Treaty of Trianon is ratified; Hungary loses two-thirds of its former territory and roughly one-third of its prewar population. 1921–1931 Count István Bethlen serves as prime minister of a relatively moderate conservativenationalist government. 1932–1936 Under Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, leader of the so-called Szeged fascists, Hungarian politics moves further to the right. 1938 First Vienna Award restores southern Slovakia to Hungary. 1940 Second Vienna Award; Hungary reoccupies parts of Transylvania. 1941 (April) Hungary enters the war as an ally of Germany and Italy, joining in the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia. 1944 (March) Germany occupies Hungary, meeting no resistance. (October) Horthy is arrested and the national socialist Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi is named prime minister by the Nazis. 1945 (April) The war ends with the Soviet occupation of the country.

Situating the Nation Hungarian nationalism and nation-building in the 19th and 20th centuries was shaped by a combination of factors common to east-central Europe as a whole. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Situated between aggressive imperial powers in the West and East, Hungary was very much constrained by the Great Power politics that shaped the region. Though Hungarians enjoyed much more autonomy than other east-central European nations in domestic affairs in the decades leading up to World War I and, as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, even engaged in imperialist projects of their own, the nation itself was saddled with the burden of political and economic backwardness, and with the influx of foreign ideologies and cultural movements that often resulted in radical social and political upheaval. Of all east-central European nations, however, the Hungarian experience was most similar to that of the Poles. Much like Poland, which had been a sovereign state prior to its partition in the late 18th century, Hungary had been an independent kingdom until the early 16th century and, like its northern neighbor, even had a limited tradition of representational government. This memory of former territorial and political unity provided an important basis for Hungarian and Polish nationalism, and even helped to fuel collective fantasies of “the martyred nation” in both countries. Moreover, as in Poland, where nation-building was effectively a top-down process guided by the szlachta (Poland’s aristocratic class), Hungarian nationalism owed much to the combined efforts of the nation’s aristocrats and lesser nobles, an admittedly heterogeneous grouping of individuals who, in the absence of a true middle class, were largely responsible for outlining the social, political, and symbolic parameters of Hungarian nationalism in the modern period.

Instituting the Nation In the decades leading up to World War I, Hungarian nationalism was influenced by two divergent and often conflicting tendencies. The first was one of conservative pragmatism. Generally associated with the reform program initiated by Count István Széchenyi in the mid-1820s, and later institutionalized under the terms of the Ausgleich or Compromise Agreement signed with the Austrians in 1867, conservative pragmatists argued that Hungary’s future lay within the Habsburg monarchy, and thus promoted compromise and cooperation rather than revolution as the best way to ensure Hungarian development and prosperity. Though essentially liberal in its economic outlook, the conservative reforms articulated by Széchenyi and implemented by the pro-Compromise liberal governments of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were intended to enhance, rather than undermine, the privileged social, cultural, and political position of the nation’s ruling political and economic elite. The second tendency was revolutionary rather than cautiously pragmatic and was initially led by members of Hungary’s lesser nobility or gentry, a subclass whose ranks were augmented throughout the 19th century by the inclusion of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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assimilated Swabians (Germans), Croats, Slovaks, and others. Often associated with the name and image of Lajos Kossuth, the charismatic leader of the successful but short-lived insurrection of 1848–1849, Hungary’s liberal revolutionaries pressed for more radical social and economic reforms and ultimately called for full independence from Austria. Though crushed by the combined imperial forces of Austria and Russia in 1849, and further undermined by the terms of the Compromise Agreement of 1867, the demand for greater Hungarian autonomy experienced a resurgence at the end of the 19th century. Frustrated with their peripheral socioeconomic status, a growing number of the nation’s gentry and educated professionals began appropriating the legacy of Kossuth and the liberal revolution of midcentury in their call for a more equitable Hungary free from Austrian control. Intersecting as it did with a more aggressive form of integral nationalism, the renewed independence movement quickly acquired culturally and ethnically chauvinist overtones, and was subsequently denounced by an emergent group of bourgeois radicals and avant-garde intellectuals who, at the turn of the century, were only beginning their ultimately abortive struggle for a truly liberal reform of Hungarian society and politics. World War I and its immediate aftermath marked a definite watershed in Hungarian history. With the empire’s ethnic minorities in open revolt, and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy threatened by imminent military, economic, and social collapse, the stage was set for revolution. In the autumn of 1918, Count Mihály Károlyi led a coalition of moderate leftists and liberals in what came to be known as the Chrysanthemum Revolution. Lasting only four and a half months, Károlyi’s leftist revolution gave way in March 1919 to a full-fledged communist revolution that, with its monumental social and economic reforms marred by violence and terror, collapsed after only 133 days. The dramatic failure of both revolutions paved the way for Admiral Miklós Horthy’s march into Budapest in November 1919 and for the subsequent consolidation of his counter-revolutionary regime, which remained in power until 1944. During the 1920s, Hungarian politics was dominated by the government of Count István Bethlen, a moderate conservative-nationalist politician who served as prime minister from 1921 to 1931. Bethlen’s work to consolidate the nation politically and economically, however, along with his desire to revise the Treaty of Trianon diplomatically rather than militarily, was ultimately challenged by the rising popularity of such right-wing politicians as Gyula Gömbös, an ex-army officer of Swabian descent who served as prime minister from 1932 until his death in 1936. Yet, although the right wing tended to dominate Hungarian politics throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the more moderate conservative nationalists still exerted a great deal of social and political influence, and it was not until Hitler deposed Horthy in October 1944, and then appointed the Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi as head of the government, that Hungary finally succumbed to fascism. The defining event of the Horthy era was beyond a doubt the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, an especially punitive treaty that uprooted a large N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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number of Hungarians, and that created the uncertain social, economic, and geopolitical conditions that haunted Hungary between the wars. Humiliated by the harsh terms of the treaty, and deprived of both human and natural resources, the attempted revision of Trianon served not only as the focal point of Hungarian foreign policy until 1945 but also as a symbolic pretext for defining and narrating the nation between the wars, a process of identity formation that became progressively more fascistic and anti-Semitic by the outbreak of World War II.

Defining the Nation With the exception of the brief revolutionary period during 1918–1919, Hungarian politicians and nationalists tended to define the nation in cultural rather than political terms between 1880 and 1945. Reflecting in part a growing Europeanwide trend toward exclusivist definitions of the nation, the rise of essentialist and ultimately racialist definitions of Hungarian identity was also a response to an existential paranoia felt by Hungarians at large, one which was amplified by the prevailing ethnic tensions in the region and, after World War I, by the threat not only of German and Soviet expansion but also of Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Yugoslav aggression. More than anything, however, the tendency to define the nation in cultural and later racial terms was a reflection of the influence that right-wing political factions were able to exert in Hungarian politics. Between 1880 and 1918, for example, the largely optimistic and conciliatory attitude that had existed toward the nation’s ethnic and religious minorities at the time of the Compromise was effectively undermined by right-wing elements at work within both the ruling Liberal Party (1875–1905) and the neo-liberal National Party of Work (1910–1917), and also by the growing momentum and political consolidation of the nation’s parliamentary opposition, a loose coalition of conservatives and radicals who eventually succeeded in forming a brief government between 1906 and 1910. Though the liberal parties may have dominated the country politically in the decades leading up to World War I, their cultural, educational, and assimilationist policies reflected the spirit and aspirations of Hungary’s conservative right-wing factions. Between 1880 and 1945, the idea of the nation as an historically and territorially integrated geographical body was central to every project of identity formation in Hungary. Though a territorial awareness of the historic Kingdom of Hungary had persisted in one form or another for nearly 1,000 years, it was not until the end of the 19th century that the image of the nation as an integral geographic unit began to take shape in the nationalist imagination. Overlapping with an earlier belief that the Kingdom of Hungary was a historic reality guaranteed by God and blessed and protected by the Virgin Mary, the work of cultural, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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historical, and economic geographers suggested to Hungarians that their country was an ideal natural unit as well. Drawing on often sophisticated geographical and hydrological arguments, geographers amassed an impressive, if heavily biased, body of scientific evidence to suggest that Hungary was an integrated organic entity whose historical boundaries corresponded perfectly to the natural geographical contours of the Carpathian Basin. This territorial conceptualization of Hungary as an unbreakable organic unit served as one of the chief defenses employed by the Hungarian government at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, and later became the basis for the more passionately articulated revisionist arguments of the interwar period. Maps stressing the naturalness as well as the territorial integrity of pre-Trianon Hungary proliferated in the 1920s and 1930s, and were often accompanied by the irredentist slogans “No! No! Never!” “We’ll Never Forget!” and “Justice for Hungary!” Clinging to the conviction that the dismemberment of the country broke the very laws of nature itself, Hungarians were virtually unanimous in their belief that the continued survival of the nation depended on the revision of the Treaty of Trianon and the return of all or at least most of the nation’s former territory. Hungary, however, was not defined by mere geography alone, and though Hungarian nationalists and nation-builders both before and after Trianon largely agreed on the territorial extent and geopolitical importance of historic Hungary, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Turanism Turanism originated in Germany as a linguistic hypothesis in the early 19th century. In the narrowest sense of the term, the Turanian idea included speakers of Magyar, Finnic, and Turkic languages. In its broadest sense, however, the Turanian hypothesis came to embrace cultural-linguistic groups as far-flung as the Japanese and the Dravidians of the Indian subcontinent. German scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries tended to describe Turanians in negative terms, seeing them as barbaric warlike peoples who were, at best, merely half-developed Aryans. In Hungary, however, the idea of the nation’s supposed Turanian roots became a source of pride for many nationalists, and eventually evolved into a central nation-building myth, especially among conservative and right-wing thinkers and ideologues. Though Turanism had been largely discredited by serious scholars as a linguistic theory by the 1880s, it nevertheless continued to have great cultural, political, and ideological appeal. In the interwar period, Turanism fed essentialist fantasies of Hungarian uniqueness and racial strength, and quickly became the basis of an increasingly aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans.

they by no means agreed on the political, or even cultural, definition of the nation itself. In fact, the construction of Hungarian identity was a hotly contested political project, one that tended to play itself out on the symbolic level as a polarized struggle between Western and Eastern conceptualizations of the nation. On the Western side of the ledger was a vision of Hungary as a modern, or rather modernizing, multiethnic nation-state with a long history of defending Christian Europe against Asiatic barbarism and tyranny. Insisting that the nation embodied the progressive Western principles of rationalism, cosmopolitanism, and humanism, proponents of this vision suggested that Hungary had earned its rightful place in Europe. On the Eastern side of the ledger, however, was a more essentialist, and ultimately chauvinist, conceptualization of the nation, one that was diametrically opposed to Hungary’s Western self-image. Thus, where the Western vision promoted values such as Christian civilization and material progress, the Eastern vision stressed not only Hungary’s pagan roots and its nomadic warrior traditions, but also its cultural and linguistic affinity with other so-called Turanian peoples of the Near and Far East.

Narrating the Nation The conceptual distinction between West and East that dominated the politics of identity formation in Hungary from the late 19th century to the end of World War II found expression in the various myths, symbols, and historical figures and events that different groups of nationalists utilized to express their particular political or ideological vision of the nation. Liberals and conservative nationalists, for instance, largely adhered to a Western vision of the nation (in part because N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Statue of Saint Stephen (István), the first King of Hungary, standing in Heroes’ Square in Budapest. (iStockPhoto.com)

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they sought political, diplomatic, and economic support from western European governments), and thus tended to rely on images and narratives that stressed Christian monarchy, Habsburg loyalty, and European integration. The opposition and radical-right factions that promoted an Eastern vision of the nation, however, often countered with symbolic references to pre-Christian tribalism, ancient blood ties, and a fierce tradition of conquest and independence. Thus, it was that the memory of Széchenyi and the Compromise of 1867 was countered by that of Kossuth and the Revolution of 1848, or that the reign of King István (997–1038), Hungary’s first Christian monarch, was offset by that of Árpád, chieftain of the pagan Magyar tribes that conquered Hungary in the late ninth century AD. Despite the heavily polarized positions expressed by the binary representations of West and East, compromise and independence, and royal legitimacy and tribal history, Hungary’s various political factions, and especially the ruling government parties, often found it politically expedient to include opposing images and symbols into their narrative of the nation. At the end of the 19th century, for example, the ruling Liberal Party incorporated Árpád into the official celebration of the nation’s millennium, commemorating his pagan state-building legacy alongside the civilizing efforts of King István. Though in part perhaps a sincere reflection of the complex and even contradictory nature of identity formation, the inclusion of Árpád was undoubtedly a carefully calculated political strategy on the part of the ruling liberal elite. Interwar conservative nationalists, in turn, though they idealized conservative nation-building personalities like Széchenyi and enlightened Westernizing figures like King István, could not resist drawing upon the rich nationalist heritage provided by the liberal revolution of the mid-19th century, nor could they ignore the essentialist fantasies being spun by the radical right, or the Völkisch narratives being produced by emergent groups of agrarian populists. Much like the discourse and imagery that characterized Hungarian

Populism In the 1920s and 1930s, various forms of agrarian populism rose to challenge the dualistic character of national consciousness that had dominated Hungarian political thinking for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Building on the work of nation-building ethnographers from the fin de siècle, and promoting themselves as harbingers of a “third way” in Hungarian politics and culture, groups of sociologists and disillusioned poets and artists ventured out of Hungary’s major cities to engage in so-called village research. Driven by the belief that Hungary’s peasants were living incarnations of an authentic Hungarian spirit, representatives of the growing populist movement sought to offer what they felt was a much more accurate definition of Hungarian history and identity. Though populism gained momentum as an aesthetic and even moral alternative in the interwar period, its political base was undermined by conservative nationalists and right-wing radicals alike, two competing factions that were able to appropriate the moderate and more extreme forms of populism, respectively.

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nation-building at the turn of the century, the nationalist narratives that emerged in the interwar period often represented a synthesis, or at least a compromise, between otherwise divergent symbolic regimes.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Throughout most of the 19th century, many Hungarian nationalists clung to the notion of Hungary as a multiethnic entity and sought to develop nation-building strategies that would not only rally ethnic Hungarians to the national cause but would also accommodate the country’s ethnic minorities. By the 1880s, however, the more moderate federalist solutions to Hungary’s ethnic question fell by the wayside, with the government committing itself to an aggressive languageoriented policy of assimilation. With ethnic Hungarians comprising little more than 50 percent of the total population, and with nationalist agitators gaining momentum among the nation’s minorities, this appeared to many as the only sensible course of action. Hungary’s policy of aggressive assimilation, or Magyarization, produced mixed results. The assimilation of large numbers of Hungary’s Jewish population, for example, was very much a success, albeit a tragically limited one. Though assimilation had little to offer the Hasidic Jews who lived primarily in outlying rural areas of eastern Hungary, a vast majority of Hungary’s “Western” and predominantly German-speaking Jews jumped at the opportunity to assimilate. Living primarily in Budapest and other urban centers, these newly integrated Hungarian Jews quickly rose in social, political, and economic status, and tended to become passionate advocates of Hungarian nationalism and assimilation. This success, however, was tempered by the general failure to assimilate the large numbers of Slovaks, Ruthenians, Romanians, Serbs, Croats, and others who lived within the historic boundaries of the Kingdom of Hungary. Though some of the educated elite among the nation’s ethnic minorities were successfully integrated into Hungarian society, the assimilationist efforts of Hungarian nationalists quite often met with either indifference or resistance. Aggravating existing tensions between Magyars and non-Magyars, Hungary’s assimilationist programs ultimately fanned the flames of ethnic nationalism within the Kingdom of Hungary and the surrounding region at large. The overt failure of the government’s assimilationist policies to unify the nation was amplified by a growing rift within Hungarian society and politics itself. The self-interested, short-sighted, and often insincere socioeconomic policies of the ruling liberal elite served to alienate, rather than mobilize, certain elements of Hungarian society. Hungarian workers, for example, were largely ignored by the government, while the peasant class, though it assumed an increasingly central symbolic role in nationalist discourse and imagery, continued to suffer from N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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poverty and exploitation, with large numbers of them emigrating to the West prior to World War I. Hungary’s aristocratic class of conservative landowners, in turn, openly rebelled against the materialism and secularism of the age. With their traditional agrarian power base threatened by Hungary’s rapid modernization and urbanization, this group began to develop and embrace a form of reactionary nationalism that would become dominant in the interwar period. Despite the growing influence of right-wing elements at the turn of the century, the question of Hungarian identity did not officially acquire an overtly racialist character until after World War I. Though Trianon had more or less created a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation-state in which ethnic Hungarians comprised roughly 95 percent of the total population, the conservativenationalist and later openly right-wing governments of the Horthy regime pursued comprehensive cultural and educational programs that stressed not only the territorial integrity of the historic Kingdom of Hungary but also the unique racial character of the Hungarian people. Driven by the perception that Hungary had been abandoned by the West, betrayed by its national minorities, and undermined by the Communists, counter-revolutionary nationalists and nation-builders sought to mobilize ethnic Hungarians as a means of furthering their irredentist ambitions, and of steeling the nation’s resolve against a host of perceived enemies, both internal and external. The resulting desire to purge the nation of its undesirable foreign elements ultimately targeted Hungary’s Jewish population, a highly visible social group that was denounced both for its ties to Western capitalism and its overrepresentation in socialist and communist circles. In 1921, the government moved quickly to pass the Numerus Clausus, Europe’s first explicitly anti-Jewish law. Intended in part to make room for the influx of educated middle-class Hungarians from the dismembered regions of the country, the legislation limited Jewish participation in the professions and universities. Though the law was regarded by Bethlen and many other conservative nationalists merely as a symbolic gesture, one that was tacitly ignored on many levels during the 1920s, its intolerant and ultimately destructive spirit was revived in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Pressured in part by Nazi Germany, the Hungarian government passed a series of three Anti-Jewish Laws between 1938 and 1941. Though historians may not agree on the extent to which this anti-Jewish legislation accurately reflected a widespread anti-Semitism in Hungary, there can be no doubt that the open articulation of racist attitudes legitimated an already-present anti-Jewish sentiment in Hungary, and ultimately contributed to the rapid deportation and murder of over 500,000 Hungarian Jews during the German occupation of Hungary at the end of World War II. Selected Bibliography Freifeld, A. 2001. “The Cult of March 15: Sustaining the Hungarian Myth of Revolution, 1849–1999.” In Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present, edited by M. Bucur and N. M. Wingfield, 255–285. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.

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Frey, D. S. 2002. “Aristocrats, Gypsies, and Cowboys All: Film Stereotypes and Hungarian National Identity in the 1930s.” Nationalities Papers 30, no. 3: 383–401. Ger˝o, A. 1995. Modern Hungarian Society in the Making: The Unfinished Experience. Translated by James Patterson and Enik˝o Koncz. Budapest, Hungary: Central European Press. Hanebrink, P. 2006. In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890–1944. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Hofer, T., ed. 1994. Hungarians between “East” and “West”: Three Essays on National Myths and Symbols. Budapest, Hungary: Museum of Ethnography. Janos, A. 1982. The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lampland, M. 1994. “Family Portraits: Gendered Images of the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Hungary.” East European Politics and Societies 8, no. 2 (Spring): 287–316. Nagy-Talavera, N. M. 2001. The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Romania. Oxford: The Centre for Romanian Studies. Romsics, I. 1999. Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Budapest, Hungary: Corvina. White, G. W. 2000. Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. (See in particular Chapter 4.) Winternitz, J. 1983. “The ‘Turanian’ Hypothesis and Magyar Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century.” In Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe, edited by R. Sussex and J. C. Eade, 143–158. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers.

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Ireland William Jenkins Chronology 1879–1882 The economic pressures that instigate the Land War promote political activity among the rural population through the Land League and its clubs; a new Land Act is instituted and the League is eventually outlawed. 1882 Political energy is now channeled into the campaign for Irish self-government (Home Rule) at the local level through National League clubs and at the parliamentary level through the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). 1884 The Gaelic Athletic Association is established to promote and organize Gaelic sports. 1885 Electoral reform gives the vote to many small farmers and agricultural laborers, more than trebling the Irish electorate from about 226,000 to about 738,000; the IPP wins four-fifths of Irish representation in the general election. 1886 The first Home Rule Bill is introduced in the House of Commons; a group of “Liberal Unionists” break from Gladstone’s party, ensuring its failure. 1890–1891 The political downfall of Irish Party chairman Charles Stewart Parnell divides the IPP; less than a year later, he is dead. A Land Purchase Act in 1891 creates the Congested Districts Board to rehabilitate the economies of the poorest regions. 1893 The Gaelic League is founded to preserve and promote the ailing Irish language; the second Home Rule Bill passes the Commons but is rejected by the Lords. 1900 The IPP reunite under the leadership of the Parnellite John Redmond. 1905 The Ulster Unionist Council is organized. 1909 The Land Commission is empowered to acquire land compulsorily for the relief of population congestion, further accelerating the decline of landlordism in rural Ireland. 1910 The IPP gain the balance of power in Westminster in both general elections. 1911 The Parliament Act removes the absolute veto of the House of Lords. 1912–1913 The third Home Rule Bill is introduced in the Commons; the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant is signed by more than 200,000 Ulster Protestants to resist any imposition of Home Rule; the Ulster Volunteer Force and Irish Volunteers are formed as armed paramilitary groups representing unionist and nationalist interests, respectively. 1914 The Home Rule Bill passes the Commons in May and is enacted in September, though the issue of Ulster exclusion remains unresolved; the Ulster volunteers are channeled into the 36th Ulster Division for World War I; Irish volunteers also enlist under the name National Volunteers with those opposing enlistment retaining the name Irish Volunteers. 1916 The Easter Rebellion in Dublin is followed by the swift execution of 15 of its leaders; the 36th Ulster Division is decimated at the Battle of the Somme on July 1. 1918 John Redmond dies in March; the general election at the end of the year reflects the dramatic rise in support for the Sinn Féin party (who win 73 seats) outside of Ulster and the disintegration of the IPP (who win 6 seats). 1919–1921 The Anglo-Irish War is fought initially between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the police (Royal Irish Constabulary); the latter are subsequently reinforced by the notorious “Black and Tans,” escalating the conflict.

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1920 The Government of Ireland Act, also known as the “Partition Act,” provides for two parliaments: one for a 6-county “Northern Ireland” based in Belfast, the other for the remaining 26 counties based in Dublin; the Unionists agree, but Sinn Féin disregard the act; sectarian riots follow in Belfast. 1921 Following a truce between the IRA and British, the Anglo-Irish Treaty provides for the creation of a 26-county Irish Free State (IFS) as a dominion within the British empire. 1922–1923 A civil war is fought between pro- and anti-treaty forces; the pro-treaty forces prevail and the Irish Free State settles into a period of relative peace. 1926 The anti-treaty Sinn Féin, led by Eamon de Valera, enter the political scene in the IFS through the Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) party; Sinn Féin are now a marginal political force. 1937 The Irish Constitution includes a territorial claim to the whole island and recognizes the “special place” of the Roman Catholic Church in the Irish nation. 1938 The IRA, now declared unlawful by the IFS, begins a bombing campaign in Britain; World War II breaks out; Ireland declares neutrality, while Northern Ireland enters as a member of the United Kingdom. 1941 Bombing raids by German aircraft kill approximately 1,000 people in Belfast.

Situating the Nation By the early 1880s, Ireland remained an integral part of the United Kingdom through the Act of Union (1801). Divided into 4 provinces and 32 counties, the island’s 103 elected representatives sat in the House of Commons in London. With such appointed figures as the chief secretary and lord lieutenant in place in Dublin, the administrative apparatus in Ireland was not typical within the United Kingdom; Wales and Scotland, for example, had no such figures. Ireland’s religious geography, a product of centuries of migration, land confiscation, and plantations, remained distinctive in the late 19th century: the population was more than 80 percent Roman Catholic with the remainder adhering to various Protestant denominations. The social and political force of the Protestant minority was especially evident in the northeastern province of Ulster. Ireland remained a largely agrarian society whose economy was tied closely to the urban and industrial British market. Agricultural modernization was limited. On the land, social relations revolved around a mostly Protestant landlord class and a tenant farming population. The agricultural laboring class, hit hard by the potato famine of the late 1840s, continued its decline as crops gave way to increased cattle production. By 1870, less than 800 landlords owned half the country and more than 13 percent of landowners resided elsewhere, mostly in England. Industry was confined to the northeastern region around Belfast where the engineering, shipbuilding, and textile industries were closely linked to Britain’s imperial markets. This economic particularity, coupled with the region’s intense Protestantism, contributed to the latter population’s self-conception as hardworking and thrifty in contrast to the population of the nonindustrial south, whom many Protestants considered to be unduly influenced by the “backward” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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doctrines of Roman Catholicism. These religious sensibilities ultimately informed disagreements regarding Ireland’s “national” status as Protestant “unionists” organized to retain the Act of Union with Britain. Emigration to Britain and North America, having peaked during the midcentury famine, remained significant. Irish-born passengers left United Kingdom ports for destinations beyond Europe and the Mediterranean at rates ranging between 60,000 and 100,000 per annum during the 1880s. The United States remained the key destination. Although emigration affected all parts of the island, out-migration was most prominent in western and southwestern regions, areas scarred badly by the potato famine where small-scale agriculture and the Irish language remained features of everyday life. Since economic realities now discouraged farm subdivision, most rural families could not hope to retain all their offspring in Ireland. Political subversion against British rule in Ireland had been low for most of the 1870s. The last years of the 1860s heightened the public’s awareness of the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) or “Fenian” organization. Though gaining notoriety with their risings, raids, and other public disruptions in Ireland, Britain, and Canada between 1866 and 1870, their activities did not reflect popular sentiment in Ireland. In striving to achieve an Irish republic, the IRB upheld the “physicalforce” tradition pursued in earlier rebellions by the United Irishmen (1798), Robert Emmet (1803), and Young Ireland (1848). During the period 1870–1916, however, the idea of Irish self-government or “Home Rule” emerged as a credible alternative for realizing Irish “nationhood.” This “constitutional nationalism” was promoted through the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) in the House of Commons, with Charles Stewart Parnell as its formidable leader throughout the 1880s.

Charles Stewart Parnell, Irish nationalist and leader of the struggle for Irish Home Rule in the late 19th century. (Library of Congress)

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A banner of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (Fenian) organization ca. 1866 with a swordwielding Erin at the center with green flag and shamrock-ringed skirt, and surrounded by earlier generations of national heroes such as politicians O’Connell and Grattan, poet Moore, and rebellion leader Emmet. (Library of Congress)

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Charles Stewart Parnell (1846 –1891) Charles Stewart Parnell was an Irish landlord and politician born into the Church of Ireland (Anglican) faith. In 1875, he was elected to Westminster as a supporter of Irish Home Rule where his long speeches contributed to the strategy of “obstruction” pursued by the Irish members to ensure discussion of Irish issues. Active in the land agitation, Parnell became the first Land League president in 1879 and was elected chairman of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) the following year. In 1881, he was jailed for treasonable offenses for more than six months. Through the subsequent decade, Parnell was roundly hailed as the “uncrowned king of Ireland” at home and abroad. He modernized the Irish Party, incorporated the physical-force nationalists of the Irish Republican Brotherhood into his constitutional strategy, and in 1885, he “converted” Liberal leader William Gladstone to the idea of Home Rule for Ireland. In 1887, a letter in the Times linking Parnell with the 1882 political murders in Dublin’s Phoenix Park was found to be a forgery, and he won an outof-court settlement that further enhanced his political standing. In late 1890, however, the citing of Parnell as co-respondent in the divorce papers of Mrs. Katherine O’Shea heralded the beginning of his political downfall. Repudiating Gladstone and the Liberals for withdrawing their support of his chairmanship, Parnell then lost the support of the majority within the IPP. His marriage to O’Shea in 1891 brought condemnation from the Catholic Church. He died in the south of England in October of that year. Home Rule, meanwhile, remained in place as the key imagined reference point of Irish nationhood until the aftermath of the 1916 rising.

Despite the harnessing of popular support for Home Rule in most of Ireland by the mid-1880s, these constitutional initiatives failed. Parnell’s political downfall in 1890–1891 split the IPP, and despite reunion in 1900, it was not until 1910 that their grip on the balance of power in the Commons once again forced the Liberals into action. The House of Lords veto, which had short-circuited the second Home Rule Bill of 1893, was removed in 1911. This was significant in stirring Protestant Ulster to act in unison against incorporation into a self-governing Ireland. In 1912, more than 200,000 Protestants signed a covenant pledging their determination to resist Home Rule, while an armed Ulster Volunteer Force was formed early in 1913. The Catholic south responded later that year with the Irish Volunteers. World War I intervened to prevent what seemed a likely civil war in Ireland. With the outbreak of war, IPP leader John Redmond encouraged the enlistment of the Irish Volunteers as a gesture of loyalty to Britain that would not only copper-fasten Home Rule but also bring an end to sectarian tensions within Ireland. The majority, renamed the National Volunteers, supported him while the minority, now infiltrated by the IRB, remained at home. Though Home Rule passed into law in the autumn of 1914, it had effectively been postponed until the cessation of hostilities while the issue of Ulster exclusion was still to be resolved. As the war dragged on, disillusion set in and the radical minds among the Irish Volunteers and IRB who felt that “England’s difficulty was Ireland’s opportunity” took a decisive step. On Easter 1916, a rebellion took place in central Dublin where N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Easter Rising of 1916 With Britain at war in Europe, those advocating a physical-force solution to Ireland’s long search for nationhood seized their opportunity, though with little in the way of public support. Their numbers held variously overlapping memberships in the anti-enlistment Sinn Féin Party, the Gaelic League, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Irish Volunteers, and the Citizen Army, the latter grouping formed by the socialist James Connolly. Although failing to secure adequate German weaponry, and with imperfect communication between its leaders about whether to press for rebellion or not, a “minority of a minority” took to the streets of central Dublin on April 24, seizing key buildings and factories and declaring themselves to be the “provisional government” of an Irish Republic. About 1,600 insurrectionists, women as well as men, participated. Doomed from the beginning, British firepower brought the rebels to surrender unconditionally after six days. Most of the 450 deaths and 2,600 casualties were civilian. Martial law was imposed by the British and by mid-May, 15 of the rebel leaders had been executed, elevating them to the ranks of political martyrdom. The belief in “blood sacrifice” by the executed proclamation reader, Patrick Pearse, has added emotional force to interpretations of the rising by subsequent generations of Irish nationalists and republicans.

a proclamation was read declaring an Irish Republic. The rebellion was suppressed within a week and the swift execution of 15 of its leaders inspired antiEnglish revulsion across the island. The search for the “Irish nation” was not now to be found in the scheme of political devolution within the empire that Home Rule promised. The massive resistance to conscription in nationalist Ireland in the spring of 1918 was one indicator that the tide had turned, but more concrete proof came in the general election later that year that gave a decisive mandate to the Sinn Féin (Ourselves) party, who had opposed enlistment and now supported the republican ideal. They won 73 seats compared with the IPP’s 6 and the Unionists’ 26. The Sinn Féin members abstained from Westminster and set up an independent Irish government (the Dáil), which was subsequently declared illegal by the British. The scene was set for a return to physical-force nationalism. In the aftermath of World War I, a guerilla war pitted the Royal Irish Constabulary and British military forces in Ireland against the reorganized Irish Volunteers, now known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In the midst of this, the Government of Ireland Act (1920) provided for two separate administrations, one in Belfast for the 6 northeastern counties and the other in Dublin for the remaining 26. Following protracted negotiations, the northern Unionists accepted this partition of the island; the Sinn Féin Dáil did not. With the introduction of the “Black and Tan” reinforcements from Britain inspiring new levels of brutality from both sides in the AngloIrish War, it was not until July 1921 that a truce was reached. The resulting treaty, signed in December 1921, confirmed the partition of the island, establishing the 26 counties of the Irish Free State as a dominion within the British empire with a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Dublin parliament. Not all were satisfied with this proposed “national design.” During the acrimonious Dáil debates of January 1922, dissenters in Sinn Féin famously objected to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarch before sitting in the new Irish parliament. With the IRA also divided by the treaty, a bitter civil war followed that lasted until May 1923. The years between 1923 and 1940 thus witnessed the building of two separate states in Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the Unionists were now in effective control of a state that remained within the United Kingdom in which one-third of the population was Catholic in religion and nationalist in political outlook. The latter would remain a stranded minority. In the south, the emphasis turned toward the building of a state where an exclusive interpretation of Irishness, rooted in Gaelic and Catholic culture, would predominate. With minorities comprising scarcely more than 10 percent of the population, such a project met with little opposition. In 1937, the new Constitution of the Irish Free State renamed it as “Eire” in Irish and “Ireland” in English. With cross-border relations characterized by mutual suspicion rather than cordiality during the interwar period, partition seemed assured for the long term.

Instituting the Nation The key actors in late 19th-century Irish nationalism were politicians, tenant farmers, Catholic clergymen, and urban middle-class intellectuals. In 1879, the Irish Land War commenced as cheap beef and grain imports from the Americas flooded the British market and potato fungus reappeared on farms in the west and southwest. With declining incomes, over 14,000 tenants were evicted between 1879 and 1883, more than had been evicted over the previous 30 years. Tenant interests were defended by the Irish National Land League, whose first president, Parnell, was, ironically, a landlord himself. The Land League brought together a broad coalition of small and large farmers as well as town and village shopkeepers. IRB elements were also brought on board by Parnell. The upper Catholic hierarchy remained opposed to the IRB presence, but given the League’s overall popularity, the response of priests varied at parish level. The League agitated for fair rents, provisions for land purchase by tenants, and an improvement to the latter’s security of tenure. Large tenant farmers, though less pressed economically, also sought ultimate ownership of the land, and their social and kin ties to the town merchant class brought the latter into the movement. Clubs were set up in towns and villages, aided in no small part by the national reach of road and rail systems. While the Land Acts of 1881, 1885, 1903, and 1909 were to ultimately facilitate the transfer to “peasant proprietorship” in Ireland, the rural unrest of the early 1880s served to firmly mobilize the nationalist consciousness of rural Catholic Ireland behind Parnell and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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IPP in their mission to obtain Home Rule. Given their economic and demographic importance, it was the tenant farmers in particular who came to see themselves as the backbone of the Irish nation. But politicians and parties in both Ireland and Britain were also critical power brokers. With Land League clubs reconstituted as branches of the “National League” in the autumn of 1882 and thereafter, the IPP’s Home Rule campaign won the support of the Catholic Church with pledges to support Catholic education. Despite Parnell’s own Protestant background, the latter move did not attract Ireland’s Protestants to constitutional nationalism. Although Home Rule did not involve the separation of Ireland from the imperial realm, Protestants feared the social and economic effects of the Catholic majority in a Dublin parliament and were furthermore convinced that Home Rule was merely a “stepping-stone” to an Irish republic. The countermovement of unionism thus gathered strength, finding its natural home in Ulster where such slogans as “Home Rule will be Rome rule” struck a popular chord. In 1885, an expanded franchise helped the IPP to win four-fifths of Irish representation in the Commons and hold the balance of power. Requiring their support, William Gladstone endorsed Parnell’s Home Rule initiative to bring his Liberal Party into government. Unionists in turn formed a wing in the Conservative Party. Despite the failure of Home Rule bills in 1886 and 1893, these political alignments remained in place until the aftermath of the 1916 rebellion. In the Irish Free State, the rural farming population would continue to be envisioned as the critical building block of the new nation. Other political collectives became established in urban Ireland over the period 1900–1914 whose ideas of political reform ranged from socialism and feminism to republican separatism, yet these continued to live in the shadow of the IPP until the aftermath of the 1916 rising. Though socialists like James Connolly and women’s rights campaigners such as Countess Markievicz participated in the rising, the endurance of the Catholic Church’s institutional power in the postrevolutionary era would severely constrain the political possibilities of those advancing modern or liberal ideas. With the structure of another key institution, the civil service, remaining largely intact as the Free State era began, the new dispensation followed a strongly conservative line. Institutions promoting Irish nationalism were not confined to Ireland itself. Financial support for representatives of the Irish Party in London was critical, and Irish communities in Britain and the United States were an important source of this. A key figure in rallying support among the Irish in Britain, T. P. O’Connor, became the only Irish Party candidate to win a seat in an English constituency, Liverpool’s Scotland division, which he held for more than 40 years. Branches of the Land and National leagues were instituted in American and Canadian centers of Irish settlement in the 1880s for fundraising and agitational purposes. In the period before World War I, the United Irish League of the United States performed a similar function. Cultural revivalists such as the Gaelic League’s Douglas Hyde and the poet William Butler Yeats, among others, also undertook wellN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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publicized North American tours. With continued in-migration from Ireland, Irish identities remained prominent in cities such as New York, Boston, and Chicago, and not all the American-born Irish were unresponsive to events in the homeland. At the same time, institutionalized opposition to Irish nationalism within Ireland strengthened itself. In 1905, the Ulster Unionist Council was formed, adding depth to that group’s alignment with the British Conservatives. Ulster’s Protestants were not necessarily denying their Irishness; sports such as rugby continued to be organized at the all-Ireland level after partition, for example. Their sympathies with unionism, however, revealed a preference for the “big nationalism” of Britishness and the security of British citizenship. They repudiated the idea of a distinctive “Irish nation” and predicted economic disaster should it become a reality. At the local level, the fraternal Orange Order lodges, open only to Protestants, mobilized against nationalist interests from the 1880s onward and were a key outlet of recruitment for the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913. Their annual rituals and processions reaffirmed the spirit of “loyalty” to the British monarchy and its Protestant legacy. With the advent of the Northern Ireland state, these unionist and loyalist institutions remained pervasive, while Catholic nationalism lived on in the guise of the church-aligned Nationalist party. Faced with a future of permanent opposition, however, the options for Catholic nationalists remained limited. They pursued a haphazard pattern of parliamentary abstention, agreeing only in 1965 to become the official opposition to the Unionists.

Defining the Nation For Irish nationalists, the island of Ireland was the ideal national unit. It had the ultimate natural boundary. Even with the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 and the treaty of 1921, nationalists on both sides of the border remained convinced to various degrees that political reintegration would eventually occur. This has so far failed to materialize. Although unionists were clearly strongest in Ulster, both they and the nationalists in the IPP operated on an island-wide basis up until World War I. While partition made Unionism anachronistic in the southern state, Catholic nationalism retained its presence north of the new border. The nonacceptance of partition by anti-treaty Sinn Féin, led by Eamon de Valera, ultimately resulted in a bloody civil war. In its aftermath, a Boundary Commission investigated minority populations in border areas and recommended territorial transfers between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. However, the premature leaking of its findings to the newspapers in 1925 resulted in its collapse. The two Irish governments along with the British formally agreed to keep the border in place. In official quarters within the Irish Free State, however, the reality of partition was supplanted by an imagined future of reintegration. The first series of Irish N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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stamps circulated in 1922 depicted a borderless island. With the election of the archnationalist de Valera in 1932, Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 constitution defined the entire island as the “national territory,” specifying that the laws of the Irish Free State would apply only to the 26 counties “pending the reintegration” of the two states. These articles only added to the sense of distrust felt by the Belfast government toward Dublin, and the articles remained unamended until 1999. The geographical divisions of province and county also added to popular conceptions of the Irish nation, with the four ancient provinces comprising the “four green fields” of the mythical figure of Mother Ireland. Northern Irish Protestants for their part resented nationalist labelings of their state as the “six counties” or the “fourth green field,” and their own politically risky attempts to rename their state as “Ulster” did not succeed. Cultural imaginings of Ireland and Irishness connected to those of territory. In the 1880s and 1890s, various middle-class groups promoted initiatives geared toward Irish cultural recovery as the political idea of nationhood via Home Rule gained popularity. In 1884, the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) was established island-wide to promote Gaelic field sports such as football and hurling at the local, intercounty, and provincial level. In 1893, the Gaelic League was formed as a nonpolitical organization to revive the flagging Irish language. Though cognizant of the status of English as the language of commercial life and social mobility in Ireland, “de-Anglicization” through cultural revival was identified as a primary goal of the organization’s leaders. For them, Ireland had become excessively saturated by a materialistic and shallow English culture whose followers they denounced as shoneens (a diminutive of Seán that described those who mimicked the airs of the English ascendancy) and/or “West Britons,” terms that spoke to the apparent crisis of identity embodied in the “non-Irish Irishman.” Almost 60 branches of the League were set up within five years, while a weekly newspaper appeared in 1899. With the GAA actively discouraging the playing of such “foreign” (English) sports as rugby, cricket, and association football, these institutions sought to police the boundaries between authentically “Irish” and “(West) British” cultural practices. Cultural nationalism was advanced in other contexts. Playwrights and poets sought to bring the mysteries of Ireland’s Celtic past into the literary and artistic sphere. In 1899, Yeats and his associates established the Irish Literary Theatre in Dublin. The “Gael” or “Celt” had by this time emerged as a racial category in popular discourse in opposition to the “Anglo-Saxon”; in the Irish context, this added to popular notions of an ancient Irish race that justified the political arguments of nationalists. Though Protestants such as Yeats and Hyde were to the fore in many of these revivalist movements, it was all too easy for many Catholics to deny them an equivalent sense of “Irish” belonging. The hyphenated labeling of the Protestant “Anglo-Irish” spoke to this idea of being less than fully “Irish”; their privileged class position, particularly in the south, also fed such perceptions, while northern unionists were denounced by some as little more than “Saxon invaders.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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With priests now at the center of social life in rural Irish communities, equations of an “Irish Ireland” with a “Catholic Ireland” became prevalent though such narrow views of Irish nationality were also notably challenged in works such as James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922). Successive Free State governments reinforced the cultural ethos of the Irish nation as “Gaelic” and “Catholic” during its first two decades. Though it remained a language spoken fluently by an ever-declining minority of the population, Irish was designated the “first official language” of the nation in the 1937 constitution, with the “special position” of the Catholic Church as the majority church also acknowledged. In Northern Ireland, Catholics remained hostile to partition and continued to see themselves as legitimate members of the Irish nation despite their now-impotent political situation. Fearing future attempts at forced reunification from either Dublin or Westminster, Unionists in turn emphatically proclaimed their Britishness. Royal visitors such as the Prince of Wales and King George VI were predictably given rousing receptions, while displays of the Irish “tricolour” flag were banned from public display.

Narrating the Nation Ideas of a distinctive Irish nationhood were communicated to audiences throughout the period not simply through speeches, but also through literature, art, and public performance. By the late 19th century, a relatively coherent “story” of the historical evolution of the “Irish nation” was successfully advanced by nationalist writers to galvanize a popular patriotism. Here, the “golden age” of an ancient Irish nation was typically rooted in the island’s Celtic past prior to contact with English-speaking peoples. The revival of the myths and legends of heroic chieftains and other warriors lent credibility to this image of an earlier Irish nation with its own sophisticated government, laws, and language. English involvements in later centuries were thus depicted as negative disruptions to the island’s cultural life that served only to frustrate all subsequent attempts at Irish unity. The confiscations of Catholic lands in the 17th century, the anti-Catholic Penal Laws of the 18th century, and the famine of the late 1840s were identified as “dark moments” that demanded ultimate redress. Rebellions such as those of 1798, 1803, and 1848 were presented as courageous failures with the agitation for Catholic emancipation (1829) by Daniel O’Connell (“the Great Liberator”) constituting a rare political triumph. The realization of a separate Irish nationhood was thus conceived as the inevitable and morally just outcome of the story. Works such as the journalist A. M. Sullivan’s The Story of Ireland illustrated this narrative tradition. First published in 1867, the 25th edition was released in 1888, by which time at least 50,000 copies were sold. While Sullivan was by no means the last to publish a book with this title, he and his brothers were also responsible for publishN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ing the popular Speeches from the Dock, or Protests of Irish Patriotism in 1868. More than 20 editions of this were published within 10 years, along with a version for the increasingly important American market. Images and symbols of Irish nationhood accompanied the written words of nationalists. The allegorical representation of Ireland as a woman became widespread. Political cartoonists commonly featured “Hibernia” as the innocent virginal figure vulnerable to corruption and trickery from all sides, while the legendary figure of “Mother Ireland,” also known as “Kathleen Ni Houlihan” or the “Poor Old Woman,” was the subject of a play by Yeats and appeared on the first set of Free State currency notes in 1928, among other places. Other key symbols such as harps, shamrocks, and wolfhounds that had been resuscitated by early 19th-century revivalists appeared variously on IRB flags and Irish Party campaign posters, as well as in nationalist songbooks, newspapers, and other publications. Green was recognized as the color of Irish nationalism. The everyday landscape provided opportunities for further national narration. Streets and squares became host to a variety of statues commemorating Irish heroes, especially once nationalists gained control of town and city councils after local government reform in 1898. While Dublin’s central thoroughfare Sackville Street (later renamed O’Connell Street) had statues to Parnell and O’Connell located in its central median prior to World War I, those towns and villages in eastern Ireland affected by the 1798 rebellion also erected monuments to their local heroes. A symbolic landscape was now in place to challenge the prevailing pattern of statues to British royalty and war heroes, and it was one that would receive further embellishment in the decades following 1923. Landscapes could also summon the national imagination through art. In the pre- and postrevolutionary period, the paintings of Paul Henry, depicting the “mountain and cottage” landscape of the west of Ireland, connected with arguments about that region as the location of an ancient, noble, and unadulterated Gaelic-speaking culture. This ordered and simple peasant world contrasted sharply with the reality of the west as a region of endemic poverty and high outmigration, but it was nevertheless a critical part of the Free State’s efforts to set the antimaterialistic Catholic virtues of the national population against the soullessness and vulgar excess of metropolitan England. The “cottage landscape” became a staple of Free State handbooks and tourist posters in the 1930s and in many ways continues to inform popular visions of Ireland. In the north, the narration of “loyal” identities to crown, monarch, and empire had been the business of the Orange Order since the late 18th century. These narrations centered on the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 when the last Catholic king of England, James II, was defeated by his son-in-law, the Protestant Dutchman, William III. While the July 12 parades by the Order had been banned for a time, they were back and larger than ever from the late 19th century onward, first in the mobilization against Home Rule and then in the efforts to solidify the dominant British-Unionist culture in Northern Ireland. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The events of 1914–1918 were remembered differently in the Free State and Northern Ireland. In the former, the memory of World War I fitted awkwardly into the “foundation story” of the new state; the returning Catholic veterans were not easily viewed as heroes to the Irish nation. The 1916 Rising thus served as the principal moment to commemorate the “birth” of the new Ireland with its 15 executed leaders entering the hallowed halls of political martyrdom. Those who believed that their surviving the horrors of the trenches would be rewarded with a peaceful transition to Home Rule were marginalized. The 25th anniversary of the rising was commemorated on Irish stamps, and the 50th anniversary in 1966 was the high point of 20th-century Irish nationalist remembrance. In Northern Ireland, 1916 commemorated the tragedy of the Ulster division at the Somme and the sacrifices of Protestant Ulster for the British nation and empire. Exservicemen were given preferential treatment in the labor market of the new northern state, something that did not happen south of the border.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Once emerged from the ravages of civil war, the Free State government set about the task of building a nation that would distinguish itself from its English neighbor. Recalling the “Irish Ireland” initiatives of the prerevolutionary era, this process emphasized Gaelic and Catholic values and traditions. Foremost among the Gaelic traditions was the issue of language. Though the majority of the population now spoke only English, compulsory programs were introduced to restore pride and proficiency in the language through the education system; it also became a prerequisite for employment in the civil service. This linguistic shift was also observable in official documents and on stamps, currency, and street signs, while de Valera’s 1937 constitution named the head of government as the taoiseach (chief). These various efforts, however, added up to tokenism at best and delusion at worst. English could not now be dislodged as the predominant language of communication and conversation in Ireland, and with England becoming favored as a migrant destination over the depression-ridden United States in the 1930s, few could afford not to know how to speak the language of the “old enemy.” Ireland’s farming population, key players in the nationalist mobilization of the Home Rule era, was once again central to the national vision in the postrevolutionary decades. Drawing sustenance from the traditional images of a “cottage landscape” and a noble peasantry, de Valera’s vision remained especially fixated on a landscape of self-sufficient farming families whose contented home lives would faithfully reproduce the Gaelic-Catholic ethos. This romantic vision was at odds with the persistence of emigration from rural Ireland, a fact that sharply indicated the limits to which independence could deliver economic prosperity. More than 350,000 people left the 26 counties between 1926 and 1946, and Britain N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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also remained Ireland’s main trading partner throughout the period. Such realities did not deter de Valera from launching import-substitution initiatives as well as an “economic war” with Britain in the 1930s, however, but such gestures were a clear attempt to mask the economic problems of the fledgling Irish state. These acts of “economic nationalism” had their political and cultural equivalents. In 1923, the Irish Free State joined the League of Nations. A 1929 censorship act limited the circulation of British newspapers and literature in Ireland, while in the countryside, the GAA continued to channel youngsters into Gaelic sports and repudiate “foreign” influences. A 1935 citizenship act removed the words “British subject” from Free State passports. By the 1930s, the powers of the governor-general had been reduced, the Oath of Allegiance to the king abolished, and all constitutional references to “the Crown” removed. The return of the “treaty ports” in 1938 enabled de Valera to declare Irish neutrality during World War II, though this did not prevent tens of thousands of his fellow citizens serving on the British side. Subsequent Irish history books would term this the era of “the Emergency.” The Catholic dimension to building up the new state was not simply reflected in its control of most of the education system. The church’s moral teachings also heavily influenced social legislation. The Free State courts did not grant divorces, the sale of contraceptives was prohibited, and the “traditional” role of women as homemakers was articulated in the 1937 constitution. The fact that women had played a role during the revolutionary era, including the pivotal rising of 1916, was conveniently forgotten. Even “immoral” forms of dancing, such as jazz, were cleansed from Irish dance halls. Opposition to these measures was on the whole marginal and poorly organized. Preserving law and order was also an important challenge in the aftermath of a civil war. In the Irish Free State, lingering animosities and distrust led to drastic reductions in the size and influence of the national army by the late 1920s. Following the abolition of the Royal Irish Constabulary, an unarmed police force of Gardaí Síochána (Guardians of the Peace), commonly known as “the guards,” was in place by 1923. Northern Ireland faced its own economic challenges. Its key industries of shipbuilding, engineering, and textiles all declined during the 1920s and 1930s, their revival coming only (and temporarily) with the onset of war in 1939. The northern munitions factories thus became key targets for German bombers, notably during the “Belfast blitz” raids of 1941. Unlike the Free State, Northern Ireland had no military but rather two armed layers of policing, the full-time Royal Ulster Constabulary (1922) and the part-time “B” Specials. Many of the latter were recruited from the old Ulster Volunteer Force. Given the sectarian violence of 1920–1922 (reprised in 1935) and persistent accusations of “disloyalty,” northern Catholics had little incentive to represent themselves in these bodies at a level that reflected their share of the population. Their response to such everyday experiences of political exclusion and alienation would remain muted until the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1960s. In the meantime, the IRA, largely underground since 1923, reappeared on the scene with their bombing campaign in British cities in 1939. If Eamon de Valera’s gestures toward a united Ireland had now become merely symbolic and aspirational, the IRA retained the old belief in physical force as a more immediate route toward its attainment. Selected Bibliography Boyce, D. G. 1995. Nationalism in Ireland. 3rd. ed. New York: Routledge. Clark, S. 1979. Social Origins of the Irish Land War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cusack, T. 2001. “A ‘Countryside Bright with Cosy Homesteads’: Irish Nationalism and the Cottage Landscape.” National Identities 3, no. 1: 221–238. Duffy, S., ed. 1997. Atlas of Irish History. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Edwards, R. D., with B. Hourican. 2006. An Atlas of Irish History. 3rd. ed. New York: Routledge. Fitzpatrick, D. 1984. Irish Emigration 1801–1921. Studies in Irish Economic and Social History. Pamphlet no. 1. Dundalk, Ireland: Dundalgan Press. Fitzpatrick, D. 1998. The Two Irelands, 1912–1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foster, R. F. 1989. Modern Ireland 1600–1972. London: Penguin. Foster, R. F. 2002. The Irish Story. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hennessey, T. 1997. A History of Northern Ireland 1920–1996. London: Macmillan. Hoppen, K. T. 1984. Elections, Politics, and Society in Ireland 1832–1885. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hutchinson, J. 1987. The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State. Boston: Allen and Unwin. Jackson, A. 2003. Home Rule: An Irish History 1800–2000. London: Phoenix. Johnson, N. C. 2003. Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kennedy, B. P. 1994. “The Irish Free State 1922–49: A Visual Perspective.” In Ireland: Art into History, edited by R. Gillespie and B. P. Kennedy. Dublin: Town House. Laffan, M. 1983. The Partition of Ireland, 1911–1925. Dundalk, Ireland: Dundalgan Press. Loughlin, J. 1995. Ulster Unionism and British National Identity since 1885. New York: Pinter. O’Day, A. 1998. Irish Home Rule 1867–1921. New York: Manchester University Press. Sheehy, J. 1980. The Rediscovery of Ireland’s Past: The Celtic Revival 1830–1930. London: Thames and Hudson. Whelan, Y. 2003. Reinventing Modern Dublin: Streetscape, Iconography and the Politics of Identity. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.

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Italy Nicola Pizzolato Chronology 1870 The capture of Rome: when French troops defending Rome are called back home, the Italian army enters through the breach of Porta Pia and conquers the city. 1871 Rome is made the capital of the Kingdom of Italy. This is the final event of the process of unification. 1896 Battle of Adowa—a disastrous defeat for the Italians that halts their colonial ambitions for 20 years. 1915 Italy joins the Triple Entente in World War I against the Central powers. Italy aims at acquiring Italian territory under foreign control. 1922 Following the March on Rome, King Victor Emmanuel III hands the government to Mussolini, who goes on to install a dictatorship. 1936 The Italian invasion of Ethiopia boosts Mussolini’s colonial ambitions; however, the Italian empire will be short-lived. 1938 Anti-Semitic laws exclude Jews from the military, the administration, and the Fascist Party and open the way to a hate campaign against them. 1940 Italy’s intervention in World War II undermines what support remained to the fascist regime. 1943 (September 8) Collapse of the Italian state after the Allies’ invasion. Italian generals surrender, but the country remains occupied by both the Germans and the Allies. 1946 Italy becomes a republic after a popular referendum. The House of Savoy is banned from the country. 1948 After being approved by the Constituent Assembly, the republican constitution—democratic and anti-fascist—is enacted. 1950 Italy enters NATO and will support the Western coalition throughout the Cold War. 1963 Emergence of the first center-left government, which includes the Socialists alongside the Christian Democrats. 1969 Bombing of Piazza Fontana opens a period of instability in the Italian state, threatened by neo-fascist plots and extreme-left terrorism. 1978 Kidnapping and murder of former prime minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades brings to an end the experiment of national solidarity between the Christian Democrats and the Communists. 1992 The judicial enquiry Tangentopoli (Bribesville) brings to an end the party system dominated by the Christian Democrats. 2003 In the bombing of Nassirya (Iraq), 19 Italian soldiers lose their lives.

Situating the Nation In 1861, Italy became a nation after centuries of political fragmentation dur ing which the peninsula was under foreign domination and divided into states N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of different importance and size. Th e House of Savoy, whose realm originally included only Piedmont and Sardinia, led a process of unification by conquest— Risorgimento (“resurgence”)—that came to an end in 1870 with the entry of Italian troops into Rome. On that occasion, Pope Pius IX declared himself a prisoner of the new state and refused to recognize it until the Lateran Pacts of 1929. The Risorgimento had created, out of seven states, a single political entity that had never existed before. In fact, although the Roman empire was centered in the peninsula, it was universal in its scope rather than national. Therefore, the construction of a national identity was a primary concern for Italian leadership at the end of the Risorgimento. They saw it as the necessary requirement for Italy to grow as a powerful nation and compete with France or Britain. Since the onset of the unification process, in the early 19th century, the way Italy compared to the advanced countries of Europe was an incessant concern of the patriotic elites. Patriot Massimo D’Azeglio’s dictum “We have made Italy, now we must make Italians” summarized the widespread opinion that Italians lacked a sense of belonging to the newborn nation and had a local, rather than a national, identity—a phenomenon often referred to as campanilismo, or belonging to one’s own bell tower. Italians had lived under different political and judicial institutions and did not share a single language. Standard Italian was a language that the elites slowly adopted only after unification, while the rest of the population identified mainly with regional dialects well into the second half of the 20th century. Th ere were no habits and customs that could be said to be typically Italian; instead, they differed markedly throughout the peninsula according to local, not even regional, variance. After unification, this issue was further complicated by a profound division between north and south, one wealthy, and the other impoverished, one represented as a land of civilization, and the other as a land of barbarism that needed reform, with military intervention if necessary. As we will see, the cleavage between the north and south of Italy continued to play an important role in national politics and the economy, as well as in Italians’ own self-representation, during the 20th century. During the liberal era—the first 60 years of the Italian nation—the state faced a number of important problems: a low rate of industrialization, an uneven tax structure and legislation, high rates of poverty and illiteracy, and social and political protest against the new state that often took the form of banditry and peasant revolt. Notwithstanding these internal problems, the country aimed at acquiring an international role. It did so by joining Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance in 1882 and by initiating its own colonial expansion. A first attempt to conquer Ethiopia ended up in the disastrous defeat of Adowa (1892), which curtailed Italy's aspirations to great-power status and halted her colonial ambitions until 1911, when it waged war against the remnants of the Ottoman Empire to appropriate Libya. Another area of possible expansion concerned the so-called Italia irrendenta, “non-emancipated” Italy. The irrendenta comprised all those territories, such as Trentino, Trieste, Dalmatia, Istria, Gorizia, Ticino, Nice, and Malta, where the Italian language was at least partially spoken. The possibility of annexing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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some of these territories lay behind Italy’s entrance into World War I on the side of the Triple Entente (the United Kingdom, France, and Russia). Due to its lack of preparation for a major war, however, Italy suffered disproportionate human losses and a huge budget deficit. At the Paris Peace Conference, Italian diplomats led by Vittorio Emanuele Orlando could secure only a part of the promised territories. In the aftermath, the disappointment over a “mutilated victory” caused a wave of nationalist sentiment against the Allies and the liberal political class. At the same time, the postwar economic crisis increased the influence of the Socialist Party among northern workers, and of the Catholic Italian Popular Party among southern peasants. Both movements were critical of Italy as a nation. Th e Socialists believed that the propaganda of a national myth served the rule of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. Eventually, they argued, with the coming of international socialism, the nation would be transcended. On the other hand, because of the strong anti-ecclesiastical outlook of the Risorgimento, Catholics, too, opposed the liberal government and the lay cult of the fatherland. They insisted that only the Catholic tradition could be the basis for a national identity and could lead the nation’s development and mission. Against this background, Mussolini could claim that the rise of fascism (1922) would restore the primacy and importance of the nation among the populace against the “Internal enemies”— Catholics and, in particular, Socialists and Communists. The identification of fascism with the nation was all encompassing, and the myth of the Grande Italia, the Great Italy, imbued every aspect of its policy. Fascist ideology maintained that only within the fascist state could Italy become a complete nation. As a result, all the opponents of fascism were treated as enemies of the country. In the 1930s, as fascism consolidated itself into a totalitarian regime, the idea of the nation became instrumental, and subordinate, to the accomplishment of the fascist state. Paradoxically, the nation was also central to the creation, through warfare, of a new European political order. This order, under the rule of fascism and Nazism, was to overcome the principle of nationalism. By the time the regime fell, fascism had erased any common notion of belonging to one country among Italians with different political ideas. On September 8, 1943, the withdrawal from the war and the flight of the king from Rome left the country occupied by the Germans and the Allies and divided between fascists and anti-fascists, both convinced of the need to save a nation to which the other did not belong. Although most Italians joined neither the fascists (after 1943 under the rule of the Republic of Salò) nor the Partisans, they were utterly disenchanted with the regime, and, to get rid of fascism, they preferred the nation’s defeat. As the Allies were advancing through the country, they were welcomed as “liberators.” They reached the northern cities only in April 1945, almost two years after their landing in Sicily. In May 1946, Italy became a republic, and the royal house, considered too complicit with fascism, was forced to leave the country. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In 1948, the Christian Democrats, with the strong backing of the United States and the Catholic Church, won the general elections and led the country toward American influence by joining NATO (1949). Subsequently, with the Treaty of Rome (1950), Italy became one of the protagonists of European integration. Therefore, for the first time, Italy’s development as a nation was both constrained and supported by international institutions and alliances. Although the war cost Italy all its colonies and some territories, such as Istria, Trieste (regained in 1954), and the Dodecanese islands, its economic development greatly benefited from the Marshall Plan and from the increase of free trade in Western Europe. The “economic miracle” of the late 1960s finally put Italy on a par with the other major European nations, although not in the way that the leaders of unification had expected.

Instituting the Nation Although the myth of national origins propagated in the 19th century described the Risorgimento as a grassroots political movement, its protagonists were actually a group of moderate politicians from the center and north of Italy who identified themselves with the policies of Camillo Benso di Cavour, the architect of Italian unification. This political leadership, known as the Destra storica (“historical right”), embraced liberalism in its most conservative form. Cavour, Quintino Sella, Bettino Ricasoli, Stefano Jacini, and Marco Minghetti were the leaders of this ruling class made up of large estate owners, many of whom were of aristocratic descent. Central to their interests was the defense of the right of property and the principle of free bargaining between workers and employers, unhindered by any kind of social legislation, trade unions, or the right to strike. Consequently, a main feature of the first decades of unity, those crucial for the consolidation of the nation-state and the formation of a homogenous national identity, was government protection of bourgeois prerogatives, a repressive and illiberal attitude vis-à-vis the popular classes. After the fall of the Destra storica (1876), the progressive liberal opposition, the Sinistra storica (“historical left”), became the dominant coalition in Parliament. Progressive liberals achieved an extension of the suffrage (1882) by giving the ballot to all males older than 21 with two years of primary school education. In practice, however, this still excluded from the benefits of full citizenship the 75 percent of the population made up of peasants and workers who could not read or write. The liberal elite that unified the country saw the birth of the nation as the first step toward achieving the goal of modernity for a country that they considered to be socially and economically backward. In their view, political unification must produce an overall development that, eventually, would allow Italy to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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impress its mark of civilization on the modern world. However, at a political level, the practice of trasformismo—the formation of a changeable centrist coalition in Parliament that reshuffled members of opposite parties into the majority and was often associated with corruption—hindered this modernization by cementing the alliance of traditional power groups, the rich bourgeois of the north and the large landowners of the south. Trasformismo has been a constant and distinguishing feature of Italian politics both in the liberal and republican eras. In 1911, 50 years after unification, the country was still divided and lacked a shared national identity. There was a gap between the paese legale (“the legal country”)—the segment of the population whose interests were represented by the institutions—and the paese reale (“the real country”)—the Italian masses, by then increasingly organized within the Socialist and Catholic movements. Socialists and Catholics did not join the celebration for the 50-year anniversary of unification because—for different reasons—they did not identify with the monarchic and liberal Italy. World War I was a collective experience that—although ending with disastrous consequences—merged Italians of different classes and regions who, for the first time, were regimented by a state until then considered distant. In the aftermath of the conflict, nationalist movements greatly increased their sway among the population. At the same time, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, the liberal state was no longer able to control the upsurge in social conflict driven by the Socialist movement. In the postwar period, the masses finally entered politics when universal male suffrage was first granted (1919), and they made the Socialist Party and the Catholic Italian Popular Party the two main political forces in Parliament. In the same year, Gabriele D’Annunzio, with an irregular army of 2,000 nationalists, occupied the city of Fiume in Dalmatia, inhabited by a majority of Italians but excluded from the war reparations to Italy, and proclaimed an independent state. This political experiment, which lasted until 1920, prefigured many ideological and choreographic elements later incorporated by Benito Mussolini into his regime. The Fiume episode acted as a catalyst for a further growth in the nationalist movement—the necessary background for the rise of fascism in the following years. Fascists presented themselves as the genuine continuators of the Risorgimento. The liberal ruling class had left unification unaccomplished by failing both to integrate the masses, workers, and peasants into national politics and to infuse them with patriotic sentiments. At the time of the March on Rome (1922), many mistrusted the ability of the parliamentary regime to modernize the country and believed the myth of the coming of a “saviour of the country” that Mussolini built around himself. However, fascism’s nationalism expunged the Risorgimento of its stress on individual liberty and on peaceful cohabitation among nations and instead used it to legitimate its claim against parliamentary democracy and to argue for Italy’s primacy in the international context. Although it claimed to assimilate the masses into national politics, fascism excluded them by suppressing N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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democratic political representation and by concentrating every decision in the government headed by the duce. After World War II, the Socialist, Communist, and Catholic parties returned to the center of political life and remained key protagonists in the development of the nation until 1992, when the entire party system was shaken by the scandal of widespread corruption. In the face of quickly changing governments (the average length was 11 months), political parties were the only institutions that offered continuity in political life and that incorporated the issues that arose from society. However, because of the ideological cleavage of the Cold War, the governing coalition, led by Christian Democrats, and the opposition, led by the Communist Party, did not acknowledge each other as legitimate actors in the political arena. Therefore, even during the republic, there was no common view of what it meant to be Italian. Each Italian’s predominant allegiance was to a party or political faith rather than to the nation. Italy was two Italies: one Communist, one antiCommunist. At the same time, during the 1950s and 1960s, economic development integrated the national labor market and spurred an intense internal migration that brought millions of southerners to the industrial north within a decade. Internal mobility transformed the century-long isolation of the population of the south and, together with the spread of television, increased the usage of Italian— as opposed to dialects—as a shared language, thereby promoting a general national integration.

Defining the Nation In 1847, the Austrian statesman Klemens von Metternich described Italy as a “geographic expression” to characterize its lack of common institutions, language, and customs and to undermine the patriots’ claim to unification. The nationalist Italian poet Giousè Carducci responded that Italy was rather a “literary expression,” meaning that, although never a political entity, Italy had existed in the minds of scholars and writers at least since Dante. Culture in fact was one of the key ideas deployed during the Risorgimento, and afterward, to define the new nation. The nation-builders of the Risorgimento strived to emphasize that Italian high culture gave continuity and consistency to the national identity, in spite of the cultural and linguistic diversity of the peninsula’s population. Nationalists turned writers such as Alessandro Manzoni and Carducci and musicians such as Giuseppe Verdi into icons of the Risorgimento and used their work to establish a common notion of pátria, the fatherland, for which to fight. For instance, the famous “Va, pensiero” chorus sung in the third act of Verdi’s Nabucco—the Hebrew slaves’ hymn to their homeland—was long considered a national anthem for the Risorgimento. Historians such as Mary Ann Smart (2001) have lately demystified the equation of Verdi with the Risorgimento and shown that his patriotic commitment was constructed after unification. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882) Garibaldi was a leading military figure and popular hero of the Risorgimento. He participated in the revolution of 1848 and led the defense of the short-lived Republic of Rome in 1849. He was originally a republican and a follower of Mazzini, but in 1859 he agreed to lead a military unit for the Piedmontese monarchy in the Second Italian War of Independence, assuming that only the House of Savoy could achieve unification. His most famous endeavor was the Expedition of the Thousand (1860) in Sicily, where he led about 1,000 volunteers, joined by the local population, in a conquest of the main cities of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, then under the absolutist rule of the Bourbon. In 1862, a similar attempt against the Papal states was halted by the newborn Italian state. On that occasion, Garibaldi was shot and wounded in the foot by Italian soldiers. Garibaldi enjoyed a worldwide reputation as a sympathizer of the nationalist cause. He fought for independence in Uruguay and was dubbed the “Hero of the Two Worlds.”

On the one hand, the stress on the importance of culture as a basis for national identity was used throughout Italian history (until 1954, when the city of Trieste finally returned to Italy) to legitimize claims to territories where populations spoke Italian or its dialects. On the other hand, neither race nor ethnicity could be used to define who belonged to the nation. In fact, it was widely recognized that, because of the several foreign invasions that had occurred throughout the centuries, Italians were a blend of different ethnic groups. Only for a brief period, during fascism, did race become a crucial component of Italianness. Then, the enactment of the racial laws (1938) defined certain races, Jews in particular, as foreign to the nation. This ideology was in stark contrast to the approach that had been dominant in the liberal era and the early fascist period, one that regarded the nation in voluntaristic terms, that is, it emphasized the will to be part of a nation among people who for centuries had inhabited the same territory. The division between the north and south of Italy has been, since unification, an important component of national identity, making it difficult to define national features that would apply to the whole peninsula. The incorporation of the south took on racialized and colonial overtones. The ruling elite deemed southern Italy a wound on the nation and a region inhabited by a different race. They mistrusted the local elite and used military occupation to consolidate the new Italian state. They responded to the challenge of widespread banditry, which emerged as a reaction both to the failed social revolution promised by Garibaldi and to the enactment of military conscription. At the turn of the century, the discourse on the “otherness” of the south was reinforced by anthropologists such as Alfredo Niceforo, who characterized southerners as “barbarians” and stressed their moral depravity and incapacity for self-government, together with physical and racial features that made them inferior. The existence of “Two Italies,” one “European” and the other “African,” cast serious doubt upon the solidity of Italy as a nation, although nationalists claimed that the two Italies would merge into one single, national conscience. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The identification of the south with backwardness, barbarism, and violence persisted into the postwar period, when the influx of southerners into the northern industrial cities raised issues of social difference that were perceived as ethnic. For instance, municipal census data and sociological surveys in many northern cities kept track of “mixed marriages” between northerners and southerners. In the late 1980s, the emergence and electoral success of the Northern League, a coalition of parties that aimed ultimately at separating the Padanian region from the center and south, showed the persistent relevance of this issue and its capacity to pose a challenge to national unity.

Narrating the Nation As has been demonstrated so far, the Italian case reinforces the theory of the constructed nature of modern nations. At the time of unification, national identity did not exist. It had to be invented. During the Risorgimento, the nation-builders gave prominence to events in the past that proved the existence of an Italian “national character” and that could serve as a source of inspiration for the revolt against the “oppressor,” the foreign powers or dynasties ruling in the peninsula. Medieval episodes such as the Lombard League (1162) and the Sicilian Vespers (1282), interpreted out of their historical contexts, provided inspiring evidence of cooperation and rebellion against foreign enemies (the Lombard League against Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Sicilian Vespers against the Angevin Charles I) and were heralded as precursors of a national sentiment. After 1870, the Risorgimento—despite having occurred in recent history— became an essential part of a mythical national narrative that downplayed the stark contrasts among the different protagonists (for instance, Cavour, Mazzini, Garibaldi), called “heroes” and “fathers of the country,” and obscured the fact that

Giuseppe Mazzini (1805 –1872) Born in Genoa, then part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Mazzini was a patriot who argued for Italian unification under a republic. At the age of 25, he joined the Carbornari, a revolutionary society sympathetic to the nationalist movement. In 1831, while in exile in Marseille, he founded Young Italy (La Giovine Italia), a society that aimed at the political unification of the peninsula. From abroad, where he had to live almost all his life, Mazzini organized several insurrections against the House of Savoy, and other Italian states, in attempts to establish a republic. They failed but established him as a leader and inspirator of the Risorgimento. Mazzini advocated unification through popular revolt rather than through military conquest; his actions were crucial in advancing the idea of Italy as a nation. He was the founder of the Italian Republican Party, which was active until the 1990s and, for a period, part of the government coalition.

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The military hero behind the unification of Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi became one of the icons of Risorgimento and an internationally known figure. (Perry-Castaneda Library)

unification had been achieved by chance rather than by design. In particular, the Expedition of the Thousand (1860), the campaign that started with Garibaldi’s landing in Sicily and ended with the annexation of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, has traditionally been considered a founding event of the nation. The traditional interpretation of this event, centered on the heroism of Garibaldi and his followers, who were joined by local volunteers, against the Bourbon regular army, stressed popular participation to counteract the claim that Italian unification was a façade for Piedmontese expansion. In the past decades, historians such as Dennis Mack Smith (1990) have reconsidered the episode by revealing the important roles of Sicily’s great landowners and of British diplomacy in explaining the Bourbons’ defeat. As we have seen, the fascists elaborated an image of historical continuity with the Risorgimento and absorbed the cult of national heroes such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and his wife, Anita, into the cult of the regime. Next to the Risorgimento, another recurrent theme in fascist propaganda was the myth of Roman history and grandeur, which was especially suited to justifying Italy’s imperial ambitions. Worthy of its past as the capital of the Roman empire and, with the Pope, of Christianity, Rome, Mussolini claimed, would be at the center of the world for the third time as the capital of the fascist empire. After World War II, the anti-fascist parties that dominated the political scene could not draw on the national myth of the Risorgimento; it had been compromised by its “fascistization,” and Catholics, Socialists, and Communists had never associated themselves with that movement anyway. The decade following the debacle of September 8, 1943, when the collapse of the nation and its leadership N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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left Italians at the mercy of former allies (the Germans) and occupiers, was one of profound division in which no attempt was made to create a unifying national narrative. Only in the 1960s did the official political rhetoric, both from the government and the opposition, propose a mythic narrative of the resistance to the Germans as a moment of popular revolt against the invader. Some even called this the “Secondo Risorgimento,” thereby concealing the civil war between fascist and anti-fascist Italians and precluding a national awareness of the motives that had allowed the fascist regime to persist for 20 years.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The process of nation-building presented the challenge of “constructing” a national past that could be shared by a very diverse population, a national past that could instill the idea that Italy was destined to be united since the Roman empire or, at least, the Middle Ages. The political leadership sought to legitimize the new state after unification by affirming that only as a nation could Italy progress toward modernization and gain its place among countries such as Britain or France. A negative comparison to these advanced European countries was a constant of the liberal era, although it coexisted with the constructed image of Italy as a “cradle of civilization,” reborn through acquired independence, whose universal “mission” was to civilize the world. This myth was used in official rhetoric to mobilize the country during its colonial enterprises in Ethiopia and Libya. Precisely to offset Italy’s former division, the constitutional order achieved in 1870 introduced a highly centralized state that did not grant former states a territorial representation in the Parliament. Because the political elite believed that decentralization would undermine the newfound unity of the state, they also adopted the French administrative model of prefects—state representatives nominated by the central government in Rome. Only with the advent of the republic in 1946 did the constitution distinguish between “ordinary” and “special” regions (Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino Alto-Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, and Valle d’Aosta) that, for historical and geographical reasons, were granted a level of autonomy. Finally, in 1970, regional governments were created throughout Italy with a degree of fiscal and legislative autonomy. As in other newly formed nation-states, education was seen as a crucial field of intervention for the construction of a national identity. The education system, from primary school to university, was rigidly centralized. Government bodies controlled teaching methods and the appointment of teachers and professors, while the minister determined the national curricula for schools at every level. Centralization increased during fascism, when it was seen as the best possible method to modernize the country and to inculcate fascist ideals in the population. Fascism aspired to regiment the population beyond the school and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB) A fascist youth organization founded in 1926, the Opera Nazionale Balilla enrolled boys and girls between the ages of 8 and 18, divided—according to age—among Balilla and Avanguardisti (for the girls, Piccole Italiane and Giovani Italiane) aimed at providing military and political education to the youth. This institution was an essential part of the fascist project to create a “new Italian” and the “fascists of tomorrow.” Boys wore a uniform with a black shirt, gray trousers, a fez, and an azure handkerchief, and were armed (either with toys or real weapons, according to their age). Girls wore white shirts and black skirts, and their education was focused on domestic economy. However, for both boys and girls, physical exercise was the foremost activity. Meetings of the ONB took place during “fascist Saturdays” and in summer camps. Enrollment in the ONB was not mandatory until 1937, when it was absorbed into the Gioventù Italiana del Littorio, the youth branch of the Fascist Party.

military service. For instance, workers and employees were encouraged to belong to a dopolavoro, a leisure and recreational organization that the Fascist Party attempted to use for indoctrination. Children and teenagers were organized into the Opera Nazionale Balilla, which used practical training to inculcate the values of Italianness, fascism, and the cult of Mussolini. Mussolini succeeded in associating the idea of nation with fascism. As a consequence, the fall of the regime and the chaotic period following September 8, 1943, left Italians uncertain about what the nation was and whether there could be a national identity dissociated from one’s own ideology. According to Enrico Galli della Loggia (1996), September 8, 1943, represented “the death of fatherland.” Postwar patriotic discourse was inevitably tainted with fascist overtones and could not be used to mobilize a country in which the main political parties offered a universal ideology, such as Catholicism or communism. The 1960s offered a generation raised without a common national sentiment, while the aggregation of party politics favored local rather than national interests. In 1969, the neo-fascist bombing of Piazza Fontana and the increased use of terrorism by both the extreme right and left showed that Italians shared neither a collective memory of the national past nor a vision of its future. In 1978, the kidnapping of Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades coincided with an attempt to create a government of national solidarity supported by the Communists, the so-called “Historic Compromise,” which could have been the first step toward rebuilding a national identity. The assassination of Moro put an end to this experiment. In the 1980s and 1990s, widespread consumerism and the further secularization of society have reduced the appeal of opposing ideologies. However, Italy still lacks a common sense of national cohesion. Since the birth of the so-called “Second Republic” (1992), which followed the crisis of the party system brought on by a scandal of political corruption, Italian parties have been split on a left/right N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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axis that discourages the practice of trasformismo. In this new system, right-wing parties such as Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale have tried to appeal to patriotic sentiments in their rhetoric and outlook, for instance, by incorporating the flag colors into their symbols. Lately, right-wing parties have used the bombing of Nassirya (2003), when 19 Italian soldiers lost their lives in Iraq, to reinvigorate nationalism and the cult of the fatherland, but with mixed results. Today, 150 years after unification, the question of a unitary national identity is still unsolved. Selected Bibliography Bosworth, R. J. B., and P. Dogliani, eds. 1999. Italian Fascism: History, Memory and Representation. London and New York: MacMillan and St. Martin’s Press. Galli Della Loggia, Ernesto. 1996. La morte della patria: La crisi della idea di nazione tra Resistenza. Antifascismo e Repubblica, Italy: Bari-Roma, Laterza. Gentile, Emilio. 2000. La Grande Italia: Il mito della nazione nel XX secolo. Roma, Italy: Laterza. Lanaro, Silvio. 1988. L’Italia Nuova: Identità e sviluppo 1861–1988. Torino, Italy: Einaudi. Levy, Carl. 1996. Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics. New York: Berg. Mack Smith, Denis. 1990. Italy and Its Monarchy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Moe, Nelson. 2002. The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the Southern Question. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Romanelli, Raffaele. 1979. L’Italia liberale (1861–1900). Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino. Smart, Mary Ann. 2001. “Liberty On (and Off ) the Barricades: Verdi’s Risorgimento Fantasies.” In Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of National Identity around the Risorgimento, edited by Albert Russell Ascoli and Krystyna von Henneberg. New York: Berg.

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Poland Patrice M. Dabrowski Chronology 1905–1907 1918

1920–1921 1926 1939 1940 1944

1945

Revolution in Russian Poland, sparked by the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and discontent with czarist rule. (January) Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech, in which the U.S. president advocates national self-determination and supports the creation of an independent Polish state. (November) The establishment of the Second Polish Republic. Polish-Soviet war. The Polish victory serves to keep the Bolsheviks at bay and prevent the spread of communism westward. (May) Józef Piłsudski’s coup d’état. Piłsudski rules Poland until his death in 1935. (September) Outbreak of World War II. Poland is invaded first by Germany (September 1), then by the Soviet Union (September 17). (Spring) Massacres of Polish prisoners of war by the Soviet NKVD in the Katyn´ forest; designed to decimate the ranks of the Polish intelligentsia. (August–October) Warsaw Uprising. The defeat of the Polish underground army results in the death of over 200,000 Polish civilians and soldiers. (July) Establishment of communist rule in Poland. (February) Yalta agreement confirms new borders (westward shift) for the postwar Polish state. Poland is transformed into a homogeneous, ethnically Polish state.

Situating the Nation As in the period prior to the 1880s, the Polish nation persisted in a state of partition. The lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the premodern multiethnic and multidenominational Polish state, remained under the control of the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian empires. Imperial rule, thus, was the reality for the Poles, even as this reality varied in each partitioned zone. The situation of Poles deteriorated in the German lands after German unification in 1871; it became increasingly difficult to be a loyal “Prussian” Pole (Prussia being the kingdom where most Poles resided) when the new state was aiming to turn its citizens into Germans. However, economically the Poles were fairly well off, with, for example, a solid agricultural base in the area around Pozna´n, the center of Polishness under German rule; and the Poles of Silesia were employed in mining and industry. For the most part lacking a native Polish nobility, the Poles in German Poland cooperated across the social divide, making this partitioned region unique. This cooperation was facilitated by Bismarck’s Kulturkampf of the 1870s, which affected all Catholic Poles regardless of social status. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Under Russian rule, the memory of the last Polish insurrection (of 1863) was too fresh for any concessions to be made there, either in the central Polish lands (the former Kingdom of Poland, 1815–1830) or in the multiethnic eastern borderlands, always a bone of contention between Poles and Russians. Within the former, industry was developing apace, especially in the centers of Warsaw and Łód´z, leading to the rise of a Polish working class, which absorbed déclassé (or former) gentry in addition to peasants and townsfolk. Within the latter region, Wilno remained the most important political and cultural center. Only under Habsburg rule—that is, in Austria-Hungary, after the compromise of 1867 that resulted in the establishment of the Dual Monarchy—did Poles find a more congenial existence. In the years following the compromise, the Poles of Galicia—the Austrian province in which Poles resided—gained a degree of autonomy; the Polish language replaced German in the administration, schools, and public life. Although Galicia was the province most advantaged politically and culturally—witness the blossoming of the cities of Lwów and Cracow—it nonetheless remained economically behind the regions under German and Russian rule. “Galician misery” was proverbial, especially as regarded the situation of the peasantry. The nobility and intelligentsia fared relatively better; they dominated

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in the bureaucracy and government of the province. Still, not until World War I saw the undoing of empire was there a “Poland” on the map; it existed only in the minds of Polish activists, which explains why there arose such a wealth of conceptions as to what the nation should be. In the wake of World War I, a Polish state was reestablished, after 123 years of foreign rule. This meant that Poles could rule themselves at last, although not all Poles were enamored of the fact that there was a significant minority population within the new interwar state. Rather than social differences, thus, ethnic ones became paramount. In the Second Republic, the Polish state established after World War I, Warsaw became the capital and the true seat of power. Economically, Poland faced tremendous challenges, given the devastation of the war, the fact that it was a new state created out of lands formerly under the control of three different empires (with three different systems), not to mention the advent of the Great Depression. During World War II, the Polish state was once again obliterated. It was occupied by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union until the Germans’ invasion of the latter in July 1941. Poles experienced many hardships under occupation: some were expelled from their homes or deported to Siberia, and others were shot or imprisoned. All experienced the privations of war as a people low on the Nazi scale of humanity—or seen as undesirable inhabitants of Soviet-occupied lands. The social fabric of the country was changed drastically by World War II, not the least because Poland’s numerous Jewish population was decimated in the Holocaust. Repercussions extended to the state as well as to the nation. The Soviet occupation (“liberation”) at the end of the war and the agreement of the Big Three at Yalta resulted in Poland coming under the Soviet sphere of influence as well as its territory being changed: Poland lost its eastern borderlands to the Soviet Union while gaining other territories at Germany’s expense. The ethnic cleansing and population exchanges that took place during and after the war rendered the citizenry of the new Polish Peoples Republic more homogeneous, comprised almost entirely of ethnic Poles.

Instituting the Nation The 1880s witnessed the beginnings of new thinking about the role of peasants in the Polish nation, in which Jan Ludwik Popławski and Bolesław Wysłouch figured prominently. In the following decade, increasing industrialization and the passage of time since the emancipation of the peasantry facilitated the advent of mass politics; the key actors and institutions for the Poles tended to be politicians and political parties. They ranged across the entire political spectrum, with two parties worthy of particular notice. On the left, the most important party was the Polish Socialist Party, under the leadership of Józef Piłsudski, founded in 1892. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860–1941) Paderewski was a Polish pianist, composer, and politician. He made a career for himself as a dynamic concert pianist, touring Europe and America, but he did not forget the Polish community back home. His most famous gift to the nation was the bronze Grunwald monument unveiled during the 500th anniversary of the famous battle in 1910. During World War I, the pianist actively campaigned for the Polish cause abroad, thus gaining it allies in the White House and elsewhere. Paderewski was a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles that re-created a Polish state; he was also premier and foreign minister of the new interwar state in 1919. His story is but one example of how men of the pen, the paintbrush, or even the keyboard became leading national figures when there was no Polish state.

On the right, the National League (later to become National Democracy) of Roman Dmowski was established the following year. There were already conservative and liberal democratic parties operating in Galicia prior to the 1880s; peasant parties emerged there in the mid-1890s as well. Other national activists were not immediately associated with concrete parties. Artists, musicians, and writers likewise could be considered key actors, given their influence. Consider, for example, the painters Jan Matejko and Henryk Siemiradzki, whose donations of important canvases came to grace the National Museum in Cracow; the pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski, who served as an unofficial Polish diplomat abroad prior to independence and later became Poland’s premier for a spell; and the Nobel Prize–winning writer Henryk Sienkiewicz, whose historical novels provided a historical education for many Poles during the age of imperial rule. National institutions such as the Peoples School Society, Sokół gymnastic club, and scouting and paramilitary organizations also helped foster a sense of national identity among the broader public. During World War I, key actors were Dmowski and Paderewski in the west, both of whom agitated for an independent Poland and ultimately signed the Treaty of Versailles in the name of the new Polish state. Piłsudski could be found on the battlefields closer to home, demonstrating with his forces that Poles were willing and able to fight for their independence. Not to be underestimated, however, was the “General Committee of Assistance for the Victims of War in Poland,” founded by

The First Brigade Piłsudski’s first fighting force to see battle, the First Brigade of the Polish Legions was created out of the paramilitary organizations that had been forming in the last years before World War I. It invaded Russia—the first Austro-Hungarian force to do so—on August 6, 1914. The First Brigade became a potent symbol of Poles fighting for an independent Poland, completing the work of the unsuccessful insurrections. Its soldiers became the political and military elite in interwar Poland during and after Piłsudski’s rule.

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Polish pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski served as prime minister of Poland in 1919. (Library of Congress)

Paderewski and Sienkiewicz in Switzerland after the war broke out; it gained funds and support for Poles and the Polish cause in western Europe and America. In the interwar period, one witnesses a true proliferation of parties across the political spectrum involving not only ethnic Poles but Poland’s minority populations: Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Lithuanians, and the like. The ethnic Polish parties of the right and center essentially ruled Poland until 1926. After his coup d’état, Józef Piłsudski established a new umbrella organization, the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR), to dominate the political field. The country again shifted right after Piłsudski’s death, with the rule of the “colonels,” a group of officers that had close ties to Piłsudski. During World War II, the key institutions were the Polish government-inexile and the Polish underground army, the so-called “Home Army.” The most famous Poles included heads of state Władysław Sikorski (d. 1943) and Stanisław Mikołajczyk. That said, there were other underground groups, most notably the Soviet-inspired “People’s Army.”

Defining the Nation Already in the 1880s, Jan Ludwik Popławski drew a sharp distinction between the former gentry nation and what he considered the new foundation of a modern Polish nation, the peasant nation. With the beginnings of mass politics in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1890s, the national idea was increasingly identified with the masses. This resulted in the new mass parties of the right and left (the National Democrats and social democrats/socialists) gaining the upper hand. As mentioned above, the most influential parties were identified with the politicians Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski. Dmowski took Popławski’s idea that the ethnic Polish peasantry was the foundation of the modern nation and augmented it with other productive members of society; he rejected the heritage of the old commonwealth, which he saw as disastrous for the modern Polish nation. In contrast, Piłsudski’s vision of the Polish nation took its cue from the old commonwealth; in particular, he valued its rich multiethnic heritage and chivalric traditions. The way the Polish nation was mapped or imagined in space—insofar as it was so imagined—varied according to political views. For example, the populist Bolesław Wysłouch saw a sharp discontinuity with the past Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: for him, each peasant nation—whether Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Lithuanian—was to have its own state. Most of the political orientations, however, built their vision of the nation on a variation of the territory associated with the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Piłsudski saw a federation of people within the boundaries of the former state, which would make room for the other ethnic groups who had always lived there. In contrast, National Democrats combined historic and ethno-linguistic criteria: they thought Poland should be a nation-state for ethnic Poles but that a modern Poland must be a great power with access to the sea. As regards the full extent of its territory, it should encompass territories inhabited by Poles whether or not they had been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (for example, Silesia) while extending only as far to the east as was feasible for assimilating the ethnic minorities living there. The National Democrats were consequently ready to give up some of the eastern territories—which they did when National Democrat Stanisław Grabski negotiated the border with Bolshevik Russia in the Treaty of Riga in March 1921. Still, interwar Poland struggled to cope with these borders and populations, a struggle that did not foster unity among the citizenry. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that ethnic Poles were favored within the state. Germans and Jews found themselves singled out as essentially unassimilable, while the assimilationist policies directed toward the Slavic ethnic minorities in the east generally served to alienate them from the Poles, thus sharpening ethnic conflict in that region.

Narrating the Nation The historical novels of writers like Józef Ignacy Kraszewski and Henryk Sienkiewicz helped teach the Poles their own history at a time when it was not being taught in the schools. The latter in particular painted a heroic picture of the Polish past. Such images were also furthered by a spate of anniversary celebrations N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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feting historic events and illustrious Poles, which also helped to reinforce various myths or stereotypes of the Poles. These commemorations included the 200th anniversary of the Relief of Vienna of 1683, which depicted Polish knights as defenders of Western Christendom. Poland’s greatest poets—important sources of inspiration for a stateless nation—were celebrated, especially Adam Mickiewicz, whose remains were reburied in the crypt of Wawel Cathedral, much like the kings and military leaders who preceded him. The centennials of the constitution of May 3, 1791, and the Ko´sciuszko Insurrection of 1794 served to remind Poles that they had engaged in serious reform and fought valiantly for their independence. Commemorations of military leaders like Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko and Prince Józef Poniatowski as well as the 19th-century insurrections underscored the Poles’ history of fighting for their freedom. These events and individuals continued to be celebrated after the Poles regained their independence. In the process of commemoration, various symbols traditionally came to the fore: the red-andwhite flag and the crowned Polish eagle (and, for those of a Piłsudskiite leaning, the Lithuanian Chase and Ruthenian archangel); insurrectionary songs and religious hymns; and the musical compositions of Chopin and Moniuszko. Important aspects of Polish national consciousness were framed in religious terms, Catholicism being a crucial component of Polish national identity. This heritage was particularly visible in Marian devotions, as seen in the traditional cults of and pilgrimages to the Marian icons of Our Lady of Cze˛stochowa and Our Lady of Ostra Brama (and lesser madonnas) throughout the entire period. For the Poles, Mary was queen of Poland, and they saw themselves (for the most part) as faithful children of the Catholic Church. This conviction was particularly important as a means of gaining the devout but nationally unconscious peasantry for the nation. In regard to other characteristics identified as “Polish,” most were still connected to Poland’s noble and chivalric heritage. According to stereotype, the aristocratic Poles were individualistic to the point of anarchy, they valued honor more than industry, they were ultrapatriotic, and they raised freedom to a supreme virtue and demonstrated the courage to fight for it, at least in spurts (particularly on the battlefield). Such stereotypes prevailed in Europe; in the Americas, Poles were more closely identified with the peasant masses—illiterate and uneducated—that emigrated there.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During the period of partition, the ultimate aim of the Poles was political independence. The last third of the 19th century saw a move away from insurrections to more peaceful means of creating a Polish constituency from the broad swaths of nationally unconscious masses. It was imperative for the Poles, historically a nation of the nobility, to win over townspeople and especially peasants (and later workers) N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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to the cause. For the most part, those targeted were ethnic Poles, although other groups considered assimilable were also targeted, especially in the period before World War I. These included Ruthenians (today’s Ukrainians) and even Jews, albeit the latter—referred to as Poles of the Mosaic persuasion—were targeted to a lesser and limited extent. Noteworthy is the fact that, under Habsburg rule, sons of Austrian bureaucrats sometimes grew up to become patriotic Poles. What led such individuals and others to identify with the Polish nation? Here the attractiveness of being Polish, of belonging to a nation that valued freedom and justice and was ready to fight, as the slogan went, “for our freedom and yours,” was key. Also attractive was the messianic romantic nationalism that saw a mission for the Poles in the east. As regarded the lower classes, a shared religious faith could cement the nation, as both nobles and peasants were Catholic. Others were won over by the Poland they saw represented in Polish commemorations. With the attainment of political independence and the popularization of the doctrine of national self-determination, many Poles assumed that the new Poland should be the country of ethnic Poles. This attitude left over a third of the population—Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Lithuanians—relegated to minority status. Although on paper they were equal under the law, reality was rather less comfortable. These populations, one could argue, were for the most part demobilized by the new Polish state; if they were to become mobilized, it was to be as members of different nations. The modern nation had been in the process of construction, some scholars would warrant, since the period of the partitions. Indeed, Lord Acton maintained that the partitions of Poland had “awakened the theory of nationality in Europe” (Acton [1956], 146). Many aspects of nation-building—seen in how the nation was narrated, institutionalized, and mobilized—have already been mentioned. Were Poles to regain their independence—the desired outcome—that national cause would need to be supported by the masses, something that these various activities fostered. Once statehood was achieved, Polish activists pressed to consolidate these gains, that is, to strengthen the Polish element within the newly formed state.

Assassination of Gabriel Narutowicz A close friend of Józef Piłsudski, the scientist Gabriel Narutowicz was selected to become the first president of interwar Poland on December 9, 1922. It took five ballots and the help of minority parties in the Parliament to get him elected. This election proved to be a death sentence for the president, for a fanatical right-wing nationalist who objected to his socialist convictions, his friendship with Piłsudski, and the fact that Jews and others had supported him assassinated Narutowicz on December 16. This act widened the gulf between Piłsudski and the National Democrats; it also helped to marginalize minority parties within the new Polish state, keeping them from playing any significant role in the ruling of the country.

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This proved quite a challenging proposition for a state in which over 30 percent of the population was not ethnically Polish but, rather, Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, Jewish, Lithuanian, and the like. The attainment of independence was also no small shock for the masses of ethnic Poles, many of whom had grown used to empire. The task awaiting Polish activists—as in the preceding period— was to make ethnic Poles identify with the Polish nation and not just with their village/town, their caste, or their region. The enforcement of Polish as the national language and the establishment of Polish schools (and bilingual schools) helped with this identification, as did the fact that eastern Europe was now the home to a multitude of “nation-states.” Polish state holidays were established and celebrated annually. It should be added that opposition to this new view of the nation-state—whether political or ethnic—was for the most part ill countenanced; those who could be considered “enemies of Poland” (however defined) felt the hand of the government and/or of the nationally conscious masses, most notably, nationalistic students. This process of nation-building was interrupted by World War II, devastating for both state and society. The war brought the Poles back under foreign rule, resulting in a situation where Poles once again had to fight for their freedom—a situation that, some would argue, persisted through the next period, that of communist rule. Selected Bibliography Acton, Baron John Emerich Edward Dalberg. 1956. Essays on Freedom and Power. London: Thames and Hudson. Brock, Peter. 1969. “Polish Nationalism.” In Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, 310–372. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press. Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. “Nationalizing States in the Old ‘New Europe’ and the New.” In Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, edited by Rogers Brubaker, 79–106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dabrowski, Patrice M. 2004. Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Davies, Norman. 1982. God’s Playground. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press. Porter, Brian. 2000. When Nationalism Learned to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in NineteenthCentury Poland. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Prizel, Ilya. 1998. National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomaszewski, Jerzy. 1993. “The National Question in Poland in the Twentieth Century.” In The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, edited by Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, 293–316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1994. Poland between East and West: The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland. The August Zaleski Lectures, Harvard University, April 18–22, 1994. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Walicki, Andrzej. 1999. “Intellectual Elites and the Vicissitudes of ‘Imagined Nation’ in Poland.” In Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy, 259–287. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

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Russia David Brandenberger Chronology 1682–1725 Peter the Great presides over the Europeanization of Russia. 1762–1796 Catherine the Great inaugurates the Russian Enlightenment (until 1789). 1772, 1793, 1795 Three partitions of Poland, incorporating Polish and Jewish minorities into the Russian empire. 1812 The Patriotic War against the invasion of the Napoleonic Grande Armée leads to Russia’s participation in campaigns against Napoleonic France in 1813–1815. 1825 Decembrist Rebellion of Westernized officers. 1825–1855 Reign of Nicholas I. 1826 Imposition of strict censorship. 1830–1831 A Polish rebellion is inspired by French unrest. 1849 Suppression of Hungarian Kossuth revolt. 1853–1856 Crimean War. 1855–1881 Reign of Alexander II, “the Liberator.” 1861 Emancipation of the serfs. 1863–1864 Polish rebellion is suppressed. 1865 Abolition of censorship. 1881 Assassination of Alexander II. 1881–1894 Reign of Alexander III. 1894–1917 Reign of Nicholas II. 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war. 1905 First Russian Revolution (forces Nicholas to allow the Duma, a pseudo-constitutional system, and the relaxation of censorship). 1913 The 300th anniversary of Romanov rule. 1914–1918 World War I. 1917 February Revolution (Nicholas II’s abdication results in an unstable Provisional Government under Alexandr Kerenskii); the October Revolution (the Bolshevik overthrow of Provisional Government, and the formation of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). 1918–1921 Civil War and War Communism. 1920 Soviet-Polish war. 1922 Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1924 Death of Lenin. 1927 War scare with Great Britain. 1928 Onset of the first Five Year Plan. 1936 “Stalin” constitution. 1936–1938 The Great Terror. 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty with Nazi Germany. Partition of Poland with Nazi Germany. 1939–1940 Soviet-Finnish Winter War. 1941–1945 Great Patriotic War with Nazi Germany. 1953 Death of Stalin.

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Scholars have traditionally contended that educated Russian elites experienced the dawn of national consciousness as early as the 18th century. The same cannot be said for the rest of the society, whose transition to modernity was complicated by poverty, illiteracy, autocratic governance, late industrialization, war, and revolution. These factors conspired to delay the emergence of a mass sense of national identity in Russian society until midway into the 20th century.

Situating the Nation Although the idea of a “noble nation” circulated within the Russian elite as early as the 18th century, this sense of identity was as much a product of caste and imperial patriotism as it was evidence of true national consciousness. Elsewhere in Europe, such “noble nations” frequently gave rise to a broader, more modern sense of national identity during the 19th century under the influence of the Industrial Revolution, print capitalism, mass politics, and the advent of the mobilizational state. In Russia, however, a variety of factors stymied this catalytic reaction. Russia was a multiethnic imperial state long before the age of nationalism, and its domain straddled the eastern European and Eurasian steppe in a way that made it impossible to disentangle nation from empire. What’s more, the autocratic rulers of this vast realm—whether Romanov czars or Soviet commissars —had nothing but distrust for nationalist mass politics. An ideology grounded in ideals of self-determination and popular sovereignty, nationalism threatened the dynastic legitimacy of the Romanov autocracy and, subsequently, the MarxistLeninist authority of the Soviet Communist Party. As a result, neither proved willing to lend state resources to the task of Russian nation-building. These factors, along with mass illiteracy, underdevelopment, and war, account for the striking lateness of Russian national identity’s formation within society at large.

Instituting the Nation Although 18th- and early-19th-century Russian rulers were willing to entertain limited discussion of elite identity in Russian society, events such as the 1789 French Revolution and the more local 1825 Decembrist Revolt suggested to them that such talk posed a direct threat to the autocracy. Coming to power amid the latter rebellion, Nicholas I (1825–1855) declared war against all manifestations of nationalist sentiment. Abroad, he earned himself the moniker “Gendarme of Europe” for his eagerness to suppress popular rebellions during eastern Europe’s period of national awakening (Poland, 1831; Hungary, 1849). At home, he countered elite interest in European Romanticism and national identity with police repression, censorship, and “official nationalism,” a monarchist ideology that linked N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Romanov legitimacy to national and religious principles that were summarized in S. S. Uvarov’s formula: “orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality.” Although such tactics preserved the Nicholaevan regime at the same time as national movements were destabilizing the old order in countries to the west, they were probably not as necessary as Nicholas I believed. Widespread domestic poverty, serfdom, and an unprofitable agrarian economy had limited the growth of trade and the Russian middle class, retarding the expansion of print culture, transportation, and mass communication. This left a massive divide between the empire’s educated elite and the isolated, illiterate peasantry that precluded the formation of national movements like those found elsewhere in eastern and central Europe. Underdevelopment, heavy-handed autocratic governance, and censorship drove Russian elites to look to the West for a sense of identity, whether during the Decembrist era, the 1830s (P. Ia. Chadaaev), or the 1840s and 1850s (V. G. Belinskii, T. N. Granovskii, K. D. Kavelin, B. N. Chicherin). In time, these Westernizers’ frustration with native Russianness precipitated a countervailing Slavophile tendency that idealized Russian orthodoxy, the traditional family, and the peasant commune. Originating among Polish thinkers such as J. Lelewel, J. Woronicz, and A. Mickiewicz, Slavophilism in its Russian variant counted I. V. Kireevskii, A. S. Khomiakov, K. S. Aksakov, and Iu. F. Samarin among its adherents. During the second half of the 19th century, the Westernizers fragmented under the influence of a variety of European ideologies, gravitating first to positivism and utopian socialism (the Petrashevites, A. I. Herzen) and then following their Polish contemporaries to populism (N. G. Chernyshevskii, N. A. Dobroliubov, M. A. Bakunin, P. L. Lavrov, N. K. Mikhailovskii) and Marxism (G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Lenin). The Slavophiles, too, collapsed into a variety of nativist pan-Slavic factions during the latter half of the 19th century (K. N. Leont’ev, M. N. Katkov, N. Ia. Danilevskii). Important to note in discussions of such intellectual currents is the unofficial nature of this search for identity and the degree to which it was often at odds with the autocracy’s view of proper imperial subjecthood. Equally important to note is the relatively small scale of the groups involved, which grew from a few dozen active members in the 1820s and 1830s to a few hundred during the 1860s and 1870s. Within the realm of elite opinion, salon culture and literary journals probably played at least as significant a role in defining a sense of Russianness during these years as either “official nationalism” or the philosophical writings of the Westernizers and Slavophiles. This is because in the wake of the Nicholaevan censor’s crackdown on political and philosophical self-expression, Russian elites were obliged to conduct their discussions and debates about identity in Aesopian terms within the context of nominally apolitical literary works and criticism. In time, expansion of these forums and the relaxation of censorship in the 1860s transmitted such ideas to a significant portion of the urban reading public. Soon, the subject of national identity came to rival other vital topics of the day, from positivism to socialism, and encouraged critics to identify a national literary canon, a national style of artistic representation, and a national “gingerbread” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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form of architectural design. By 1900, public interest in folk culture had even led to the commercialization of village handicraft and the co-option of folk motifs into the symbolic vocabulary of the Russian art nouveau. That said, the importance of urban trends in what was still a largely agrarian society should not be exaggerated. Although notions of group identity were passionately contested within the elite and reading public during these years, these ideas’ unofficial status and their dependence on the printed word for publicity limited their impact within the society as a whole. As a result, enormous stretches of the empire’s ill-educated rural population were simply never challenged to imagine a larger political community than those defined by traditional regional, confessional, and kinship ties. Far from all Russians were content with this state of affairs, of course. Elites yearned to contribute to a truly national government similar to that of their Western contemporaries. State officials in non-Russian regions of the empire tried to Russify their jurisdictions to standardize law, education, and commerce under a single imperial lingua franca. Czars Alexander III (1881–1894) and Nicholas II (1894–1917) even augmented the reigning imperial aesthetic of neoclassicism with aspects of a pseudo-Muscovite style of design and architecture. But these initiatives were never implemented broadly or consistently enough to have a truly nationalizing effect for two fundamental reasons. First, the formulation of a Russian “national idea” was such a contentious issue that it proved to be more divisive than unifying. Second, even late in the 19th century, the czarist autocracy refused to do more than flirt with the developing national canon or lend its support (and its educational system) to the task of whole-hearted nation-building due to its abiding mistrust of populist nationalism. Even the army was forced to settle for a banal and simplistic form of jingoistic sloganeering (referred to in Russian as shapkozakidatel’stvo) to maintain morale within the ranks. Change on these fronts came only in 1914 at the start of World War I, but even then, too little effort was invested too late to make a real difference before the fall of the old regime. Revolution, class war, and internecine strife between 1917 and 1921 further confused the situation, scattering the elites, officials, and armies that might have ultimately succeeded in rallying the society together. As a result, when ethnographers associated with the first Soviet census went out into the provinces during the mid-1920s to look for evidence of an articulate mass sense of Russian national identity, they found ethnic self-awareness among Russians to be vague and defined more by negative characterizations of other ethnic groups than by a positive understanding of what it meant to be Russian. Such a weak and inconsistently felt sense of national identity was aided and abetted by the early Soviet regime, which focused on fostering a mass sense of class consciousness rather than national consciousness, even after the inauguration of I. V. Stalin’s famous “Socialism in One Country” thesis (1924). Marx and Engels, after all, had denounced nationalist and patriotic loyalties in the Communist Manifesto, declaring that “the workers do not have a fatherland”—class conflict, rather than nationhood, lay at the core of their materialist vision of the world. Exceptions N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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were made for underdeveloped non-Russian cultures, but even as Soviet ideologists invested in various sorts of compensatory “indigenization” (korenizatsiia) programs, they remained distrustful of national sentiments that threatened to distract the society from more fundamental class identities. Russian nationalism was seen as particularly divisive, leading the party hierarchy to condemn positive appraisals of Russianness as “Great Power chauvinism” and exclude Russians from korenizatsiia programs. A shift away from this heavy focus on materialism and class occurred late in the 1920s. Turbulence and social unrest—particularly in the aftermath of the 1927 war scare—led Soviet ideologists to look with increasing urgency for a way to complement the party’s arcane, abstract Marxist-Leninist propaganda with slogans that would be more understandable and compelling to the Soviet Union’s poorly educated citizenry. This need for accessible, easy-to-relate-to propaganda led to the revival of practices that were rather questionably Marxist involving the celebration of individual hero cults and a newfound sense of loyalty to the socialist motherland known as “Soviet patriotism.” A major ideological turnabout, this new set of emphases—augmented by official endorsement of socialist realism in literature and the arts—led to the rise of what was essentially a new genre of agitational propaganda oriented around Soviet heroes, socialist myths, and modernday fables during the early 1930s. This “search for a usable past” focused not only on shock workers in industry and agriculture but on prominent old Bolshevik revolutionaries, Komsomol officials, Comintern activists, Red Army heroes, and even famous members of the secret police. Virtually silent on the issue of Russianness, this propaganda promoted an official line that might anachronistically be called “multiculturalist,” insofar as it popularized a diverse array of heroes from the center and periphery who worked together harmoniously under the official “Friendship of the Peoples” ethic. Interest in individual heroes, patriotism, and the “usable past” led some propagandists to expand this line in the mid-1930s in the direction of folklore and the selective use of prerevolutionary imagery. New attention to popular literacy and the precursors to socialist realism led to the rehabilitation of folkloric epics by the 12th-century Georgian bard Shota Rustaveli as well as renewed attention to the 19th-century classics in literature, the arts, and science—a largely Russian pantheon dominated by A. S. Pushkin, N. A. Nekrasov, I. S. Turgenev, M. I. Glinka, V. M. Vasnetsov, M. V. Lomonosov, and others. By late 1936, Soviet mass culture resembled a colorful and complex pageantry revolving around the multiethnic Soviet people’s past, present, and future—a patriotic rallying call with greater social appeal than the previous decade’s narrow and impersonal focus on materialism and class. The revival in 1936 of prerevolutionary Russian literary, artistic, and scientific reputations was in large part facilitated by Stalin’s announcement in December 1935 that 18 years of socialism and the “Friendship of the Peoples” had rendered the Soviet Union’s longstanding distrust of Russianness unnecessary. Although N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Stalinist Olympus Pantheon of Russian National Heroes Aivazovskii, I. K. (1817–1900), painter Aleksandr Nevskii (1220–1263), prince Antokol’skii, M. M. (1843–1902), sculptor Bakunin, M. A. (1814–1876), anarchist, populist Belinskii, V. G. (1811–1848), social critic Bolotnikov, I. I. (d. 1608), peasant rebel Borodin, A. P. (1833–1887), composer Chekhov, A. P. (1860–1904), playwright Chernyshevskii, N. G. (1828–1889), social critic Davydov, D. V., peasant partisan (1784–1839) Decembrists, noble-born mutineers (1825) Dmitrii Donskoi (1350–1389), grand prince Dobroliubov, N. A. (1836–1861), social critic Glinka, M. I. (1804–1857), composer Gogol’, N. V. (1809–1852), writer Herzen, A. I. (1812–1870), social critic Igor’ Sviatoslavich (1151–1202), prince Iurii Dolgorukii (d. 1157), prince Ivan I, “Kalita” (d. 1340), grand prince Ivan III, “the Great” (1440–1505), grand prince Ivan IV, “the Terrible” (1530–1584), czar Kotsebu, A. E. (1815–1889), painter Krylov, I. A. (1768–1844), writer Kutuzov, M. I. (1745–1813), marshal Lermontov, Iu. M. (1814–1841), writer Lomonosov, M. V. (1711–1765), scientist Mendeleev, D. I. (1834–1907), chemist Michurin, I. V. (1855–1935), geneticist Minin, Kuz’ma (d. 1616), merchant, militia commander

Musorgskii, M. P. (1839–1881), composer Nakhimov, P. S. (1802–1855), admiral Nekrasov, N. A. (1821–1878), writer Novikov, N. I. (1744–1818), social critic Ostrovskii, A. N. (1823–1886), playwright Pavlov, I. P. (1849–1936), scientist Perov, V. G. (1834–1882), painter Peter the Great, (1672–1725), czar Polzunov, I. I. (1728–1766), scientist Popov, A. S. (1859–1906), scientist Pozharskii, Dmitrii (1578–1642), prince, militia commander Pugachev, Emelian (1742–1775), peasant rebel Pushkin, A. S. (1799–1837), writer Radishchev, A. N. (1749–1802), social critic Razin, Stepan (1630–1671), peasant rebel Repin, I. E. (1844–1930), painter Rimskii-Korsakov, N. A. (1844–1908), composer Saltykov-Shchedrin, M. E. (1826–1889), satirist Surikov, V. I. (1848–1916), painter Susanin, Ivan (d. 1612), peasant partisan Suvorov, A. V. (1729–1800), generalissimo Tchaikovsky, P. I. (1840–1893), composer Timiriazev, K. A. (1843–1920), scientist Tolstoi, L. N. (1828–1910), writer Tsiolkovskii, K. E. (1857–1935), scientist Turgenev, I. S. (1818–1883), writer Ushakov, F. F. (1744–1817), admiral Vasnetsov, V. M. (1848–1926), painter Vereshchagin, V. V. (1842–1904), painter Zhukovskii, V. A. (1783–1852), poet

Epic Events Christening of Rus’, 988 Tale of Igor’s Host, purported 1202 account of Igor’ Sviatoslavich’s campaign Battle on the River Kalka, clash with Tatar-Mongol forces, 1223 Battle on the Ice, defeat of Teutonic Knights, 1242 Battle of Kulikovo Field, clash with Tatars, 1380 Time of Troubles, 1605–1613 interregnum Battle of Poltava, defeat of Swedes and Ottoman forces, 1709 Battle of Chesme, Russo-Ottoman naval clash, 1770 Battle of Borodino, engagement with Napoleon, 1812 Patriotic War of 1812, versus Napoleonic Grande Armée

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this rehabilitation of prerevolutionary Russian creative genius was obscured by a series of celebrations of non-Russian cultures during 1936, it became more visible after the centennial commemoration of Pushkin’s death in February 1937. This expansion, in turn, was trumped later that year with the introduction of an exclusively Russian pantheon of political and military patriots—Aleksandr Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Peter the Great, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Dmitrii Kutuzov—a development that appears to have been predicated in part by the destruction of more conventional Soviet heroes during the Great Terror. By 1938, this celebration of Russianness was even designating the Russian people as primus inter pares—the most historic and revolutionary of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In marked contrast to the confused and disorganized identity politics of the old regime, this newly Russocentric line and its emphasis on Russian national heroes, myths, and iconography was instituted “from above” to play a central role in Soviet mobilizational propaganda. Complementing a long-standing stress on Marxism-Leninism, it scripted educational efforts in the public schools, party study circles, and Red Army ranks, as well as broader discussions of patriotic identity throughout Soviet mass culture (for example, popular literature, the press, theater, film). Ubiquitous, this Russocentric line was consistent as well, thanks to

A World War II–era Soviet propaganda poster serves to remind Red Army soldiers of the military successes of the past. Leading the battle charge are images of, from left, Aleksandr Nevskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Vasilii Chapaev. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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tight state control and the censor. Members of the creative intelligentsia like A. N. Tolstoi and S. Sergeev-Tsenskii were rewarded for writing about prerevolutionary themes in an ideologically correct manner at the same time that M. A. Bulgakov, S. M. Eisenstein, and others were prevented from publicizing nonconformist views, even concerning such controversial figures as Ivan the Terrible. Few countries in the world can rival the coordination and consistency that the Stalinist Soviet Union brought to its promotion of Russianness.

Defining the Nation Under the old regime, unofficial opinion concerning the nature of Russian national identity ranged widely from liberal, civic models to conservative, chauvinistic interpretations based on ethnicity and Russian orthodoxy. In the end, this diversity of views (and their lack of official endorsement) precluded the catalysing of a coherent sense of mass identity. When Soviet ideologists revived public interest in the subject in the mid- to late 1930s, they formulated their propaganda in a more narrow and consistent fashion to guarantee results and ensure its compatibility with overarching Soviet values. Obviously, this meant that Russianness would have to conform to the “national in form, socialist in content” principle that governed all Soviet ethnic self-expression. Less obviously, it also meant that Russian national identity would have to embrace other Soviet priorities revolving around working-class populism, personality cults, and political, economic, and cultural autarchy. But how could something that had been labeled “Great Power chauvinism” during the 1920s become so central to Soviet propaganda less than 10 years later? Stalin’s 1935 call for an end to Russophobia certainly played a role. Equally important was the revival of a long-forgotten thesis of Lenin’s in which he argued that, within every nation, there are progressive elements as well as reactionary ones. This idea allowed Stalinist ideologists to selectively rehabilitate examples of native Russian genius in the arts and sciences from the prerevolutionary period without legitimating the old regime itself. Ultimately, even czars like Ivan the Terrible managed to qualify for “progressive” status. Lenin’s thesis also allowed for a celebration of primordial traits that Russians had supposedly acquired over a millennia: modesty, bravery, loyalty, resourcefulness, generosity, hospitality, and stubborn determination. Russians were singled out as a heroic people capable of great things, possessing enormous endurance, and willing to undergo agonizing trials and sacrifices in the name of the national community. Not accidentally, Stalin incorporated many of these characteristics into his famous toast to the Russian people in 1945: “I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people not just because they are the leading people [in the Soviet Union], but because they have a clear mind, hardy character, and patience.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Narrating the Nation If popular Russian historical myths during the prerevolutionary period tended to vary widely from region to region, the Stalinist canon was necessarily more consistent. Historical narratives celebrated the service of a dozen “great men of history” as well as the sacrifices that common Russians had made while valiantly shielding European civilization from invading juggernauts such as the TatarMongol horde, Napoleon’s Grande Armée, and the German Wehrmacht. Aside from this martial prowess and staying power, the Russian people were also mythologized for their genius and ingenuity, apparently having been responsible for the invention of the steam engine, the radio, the airplane, and the lightbulb, only to have these advances squandered by the old regime. The national canon in literature and the arts, while somewhat better defined than other aspects of popular Russian culture during the 19th century, was also revised by Soviet ideologists during the 1930s to strip it of its religious messianism (F. M. Dostoyevskii), its Silver Age symbolism (A. Belyi), and its bourgeois obsession with love, sex, and social status (A. Verbitskaia). Sanitized in this way, it still focused on political, social, and martial themes but drew particular attention to the superfluousness of the elite during the 1830s and 1840s (I. A. Goncharov) and the social criticism of the 1860s (Turgenev, V. G. Perov). The latter subject, which included graphic depictions of humble rural life, backbreaking labor, and dignified poverty, set within a bleak landscape of endless flat steppe, wheat fields, birch forests, and wooden huts, served as an effective complement to the sterile industrial modernism of Soviet culture. Paradoxically, although the landscape of the steppe was romanticized as being uniquely Russian, little effort was made to further characterize the Russian nation in geographical terms. Before 1917, the empire was described in inclusive nonethnic terms (Rossiiskaia imperiia, or “all-Russian empire”) rather than in particularistic terms (Russkaia imperiia, or “ethnic Russian empire”). Moreover, as a contiguous land empire, it proved impossible to distinguish where the ethnically Russian heartland ended and the non-Russian periphery began. This situation remained ambiguous after 1917, even after the demarcation of national republics. Russians were encouraged to call the All-Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) home, but they were not granted special status within this federal structure like the Ukrainians were within Ukraine or the Georgians were within Georgia. What’s more, Russians were encouraged to serve as a mentor and “elder brother” to the other Soviet nations throughout the non-Russian republics, leading to the formation of a significant Russian-speaking diaspora from the Baltics to central Asia. This had the effect of creating considerable confusion over the Russians’ proper place in the Soviet Union, as they were encouraged to feel at home throughout the country at the same time that they were the sole Soviet nation to be denied a geographically bounded national territory. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Why was Russian nation-building so idiosyncratic? Because wherever Russocentrism won official endorsement, whether during World War I or during the middle to late 1930s, the resulting propaganda attempted to instrumentally mobilize Russian speakers for industrialization and national defense without engaging in truly nationalistic sloganeering. Czarist efforts advanced a message that was more successful at vilifying the Germans than it was at formulating a positive sense of a Russian national community. Soviet efforts, while considerably more successful in constructing a compelling case for what it meant to be Russian, attempted to fuse Russian national consciousness to a greater sense of Soviet identity. In theory, this allowed for popular participation in national culture without giving rise to nationalist sentiments that might pose a threat to the Soviet Union. In reality, it meant that the Soviets were engaging in a high-stakes gamble to tame and bureaucratize the revolutionary process of nation formation. Although many scholars contend that the Stalinist regime’s embrace of Russocentrism stemmed from nationalist sentiments within the party hierarchy, it is better understood as part of a new ideological line that aimed to mobilize Soviet society for industrialization and war by any means necessary. This is clear from N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the fact that massive investment in Russocentric propaganda did not result in official support for Russian state-building within the Soviet Union, inasmuch as this would have required a degree of institutional, political, and cultural autonomy that the Bolsheviks never had any intention of extending to the Russian people. This stance on Russian state-building signaled similar reservations on the subject of Russian nation-building. Although the party hierarchy revived a vast array of heroes, legends, and myths associated with the Russian national past after 1937, its efforts were selective and cautious, subordinating Russocentrism to the cause of Soviet state-building and national defense. Leaders like Peter the Great were revived to legitimate the party’s preference for charismatic one-man rule, while Ivan the Terrible came to stand for the state’s right to suppress its internal enemies. Ivan I “Kalita” symbolized the importance of the centralization of power, while the medieval warlords Aleksandr Nevskii, Kuz’ma Minin, and Dmitry Pozharsky illustrated Russia’s eternal struggle with Polish and German irredentism. Other traditional priorities with no relevance to the communist future were deemphasized, like popular religiosity and monarchism. Thus, Eisenstein rehabilitated Aleksandr Nevskii as a military commander but not as a saint, and S. M. Gorodetskii revived Glinka’s A Life for the Tsar as Ivan Susanin, but only after recasting the opera around the defense of the Russian motherland instead of the Romanov dynasty. Little more than a mobilizational ploy, this instrumental relationship is best understood as a function of Stalin’s peculiar regard for the Russian people as a whole. Although famous for his valorization of Russianness and the Russians, Stalin was not a Russian nationalist and historically opposed all efforts to promote Russian self-determination. Stalin instead viewed the Russian nation as a “state-bearing people,” the backbone of the Soviet Union’s multiethnic society. The Russians, in Stalin’s mind, were the vanguard people of the Soviet Union just as the workers were its vanguard class, and he aspired to harness their culture, history, and demographic strength to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the Soviet Union. Russian state- and nation-building never figured into his agenda at all. Ultimately, it must be conceded that Stalin’s attempt to co-opt the Russian national past without encouraging Russian nation- and state-building did not translate particularly well from theory into practice. Analysis of the resonance that the regime’s official line evoked among Russian speakers during these years indicates that they assimilated Russocentric propaganda idiosyncratically, internalizing the most familiar, epic dimensions of the propaganda (Pushkin, Peter the Great) while ignoring the arcane and less compelling “Soviet” elements of this line (historical materialism, socialism, etc.). This selectivity should come as no surprise—after all, audiences rarely accept ideological pronouncements wholesale, tending instead to simplify, essentialize, and misunderstand them in ways that are difficult to anticipate. In this case, however, the specific nature of the Russians’ assimilation of national imagery and iconography during the Stalin N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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era allowed them to acquire a much more coherent and articulate sense of who they were in ethnic terms than they had ever enjoyed before. Indeed, the party’s attempt to reinforce popular loyalty to the Soviet Union through the selective cooption of Russianness resulted in something Stalin never seems to have anticipated: the formation of an independent sense of Russian national identity. As such, although the emergence of a mass sense of Russian national consciousness can be tied to one of the greatest Soviet propaganda campaigns of the mid-20th century, it should also be regarded as an unintentional and even accidental by-product of Stalin’s flirtation with the mobilizational potential of the Russian national past. Selected Bibliography Brandenberger, David. 2002. National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ely, Christopher. 2002. This Meager Nature: Landscape and National Identity in Imperial Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Hosking, Geoffrey. 1996. Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hosking, Geoffrey. 1998. “Empire and Nation-Building in Late Imperial Russia.” In Russian Nationalism, Past and Present, edited by Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service, 19–34. New York: Palgrave. Hosking, Geoffrey. 2006. Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jahn, Hubertus. 1995. Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lohr, Eric, 2003. Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Raeff, Marc. 1994. “At the Origins of a Russian National Consciousness: Eighteenth Century Roots and Napoleonic Wars.” In Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia, edited by Marc Raeff, 65–75. Boulder, CO: Westview. Rogger, Hans. 1962. “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma.” Comparative Studies in History and Society 4, no. 3: 253–264. Tolz, Vera. 2001. Russia: Inventing the Nation. New York: Oxford University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1975. The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in NineteenthCentury Russian Thought. Translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. New York: Oxford University Press. Weeks, Theodore R. 1996. Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

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Spain Frederic Barberà Chronology 1875 Establishment of a parliamentary monarchy through the restoration settlement. 1895 Sabino de Arana creates the political bureau of the Basque Nationalist Party. 1898 Spanish-American War, which results in Spain’s loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and some minor Pacific islands. 1901 First victory in the local elections of the Lliga Regionalista, which breaks the electoral monopoly of Spanish political parties in Catalonia. 1914 Creation of the Mancomunitat of Catalonia, an institution with limited autonomy formed through the union of the four Catalan diputacions, or provincial councils. In 1925 it is dismantled by the dictator Primo de Rivera. 1923 (September) The coup d’état carried out by General Primo de Rivera installs a dictatorship that lasts until 1930. Repression of Basque and Catalan nationalism. 1931 (April) Establishment of the Second Spanish Republic. The coup d’état attempt by General Sanjurjo (1932) paradoxically speeds the process of approval for the Catalan statute of autonomy (1932). The Basque statute of autonomy is passed in 1935. 1933 Creation of Falange Española, the Spanish fascist party, by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the dictator. 1936 (July) Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. 1939 (April) General Franco’s victory. He installs a military dictatorship that lasts until 1975. Catalan and Basque autonomy are suppressed, and Spanish is imposed as the only official language in a new National-Catholic Spain conceived as a greater Castile.

Situating the Nation From the 1880s onward, Spain underwent a crisis as a nation-state that was related to the political emergence of two main peripheral nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country. Following the failure of the First Spanish Republic (1873–1874) and its short-lived monarchic sequel, the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875 was modeled on the British bicameral system, with liberals and conservatives as political parties. Its goal was to provide Spain with political stability, thus putting an end to civil war in 1876 and favoring industrial growth. However, political corruption based on the intervention of local bosses or caciques, and political centralism (which ignored demands for autonomy within Spain and overseas) soon proved the state to be dysfunctional. The political system also frustrated the ambitions of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie, who wanted to modernize Spain and become her hegemonic political actor. In addition, this parliamentary monarchy offered no room for two important politiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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cal options that had gathered strength after the fall of the monarchy (1868): republican federalism and anarchism. Instead, the official policies of the restoration were based on three pillars: the Crown, which experienced a vacuum of power following the death of Alfonso XII (1885), the army, used to intervene in politics throughout the 19th century, and the Catholic Church, which had an active influence on state affairs and great control over elite education. This tight structure was supported by an agricultural oligarchy from central and southern Spain opposed to social change, decentralization, and genuine democracy. Possibly the greatest paradox in this traditional Castilian-centered Spain lay in that the only two industrial areas were far removed from the center. These culturally and politically distinct territories had lost their political liberties and institutions, the Catalans in 1714, and the Basques only in 1876. The Catalan industrial bourgeoisie proved incapable of influencing state politics and acquiring the political predominance required by their economic might. This frustrated the ambitions of a class that in the 1860s had already demanded protectionist measures for their textile manufactures. In 1898, with the loss of the main Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in the Spanish-American War, it became clear that the state could not even defend the Catalan colonial markets. A section of that same disenchanted bourgeoisie was behind the emerging Catalan regionalism, which drew on the federalist ideas of Valentí Almirall’s Lo Catalanisme (1886). The first electoral success of their political formation, the

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Lliga Regionalista (1901), led to a new period of consolidation of Catalan nationalism. In the Basque country, the liberalizing economic measures passed after 1876 by the restored monarchy allowed the export of mineral resources, but this meant that the traditional small industries were replaced by a large steel industry, which was tied to the establishment of the major Spanish banks. For the children of the alienated petite bourgeoisie, like Sabino de Arana, the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), economic liberalization brought political corruption and persistent centralism while leading to the loss of Basque traditional culture and values. In 1921 the Spanish liberal-conservative José Ortega y Gasset interpreted the formation of Basque and Catalan nationalism as a result of the weakness of the common Spanish project. For Ortega, Basque and Catalan culture had been subjugated by Castile in an early process of incorporation. Yet in Catalonia, the development of a cultural Renaixença (“revival”) had preceded the formation of nationalism. Indeed some historians point to that revival as an immediate cause leading to Catalan nationalism, although other scholars argue that the mid-19thcentury patriarchs of the Renaixença not only did not challenge the Spanish status quo but endorsed it by limiting their cultural production in Catalan to specific disciplines. The Catalanization of all spheres of cultural and scientific life proved, instead, to be a task for the following generation. In the Basque country, Arana himself acknowledged the precarious state of the Basque language. The early

A statue of Basque Nationalist Party founder Sabino de Arana is erected in November 2003, 100 years after his death, in the northern Spanish Basque city of Bilbao. (Rafa Rivas/AFP/Getty Images)

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Joaquín Costa y Martínez (1846–1911) Joaquín Costa y Martínez was the main voice behind Spanish regeneracionismo. His works pinpoint the problems that affected Spain before and after the colonial disaster of 1898, from political corruption to illiteracy and poverty. Promotion of education, public investment in infrastructures, and the creation of agricultural cooperatives were the main pillars of his ambitious program of modernization, through which he hoped to transform Spain into a country that once again attracted international respect. He had favored the granting of autonomy to Cuba, and later advised abandoning Morocco. His idea of an “iron surgeon” to resolve the problems of Spain, which he retracted in his later years, was adopted with enthusiasm by some of his conservative followers. However, his republican leanings and active political life on this front granted him great popular support. Historians have demonstrated that his burial in Madrid was discouraged by the central government to avoid a republican demonstration.

revival of Basque culture was mostly circumscribed to poetical contests like the Floral Games, with their more popular sequels including traditional sports, oral poetry, and singing. The colonial disaster of 1898 highlighted the complaints from Catalonia and the Basque country of an inefficient, corrupt, and centralized state and prompted the setup of new administrative and economic frameworks that would accommodate non-Castilian aspirations. The 1898 disaster also demonstrated, however, the willingness to reconstruct a Castilian-centered Spain that had once held together a large empire and had now been humiliated in the international arena. A trend of thought, regeneracionismo, intended to modernize the country through education, the improvement of infrastructures, and the creation of wealth, but without challenging the concept of Spain as a greater Castile. This set of goals was mostly incarnated in the far-reaching program of Joaquín Costa. In the decades to come, his reformist agenda found followers within both the right and the left, from republicans in the moderate left like Manuel Azaña to antidemocrats like José Antonio Primo de Rivera and liberals like Ortega y Gasset. Given its modernizing project, some scholars also consider Catalan nationalism as belonging to a broader stream of regeneracionismo.

Instituting the Nation The three institutions on which the parliamentary monarchy relied—the Crown, the army, and the Catholic Church—dated back to imperial times. This traditional framework could hardly be overturned by the weak and short-lived federal republic of 1873. Instead, it continued to exist under General Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923–1930) and peaked under Franco (1939–1975). Franco’s military rebellion N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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overthrew the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939), thus frustrating an attempt to modernize, decentralize, and socially transform Spain. These two military dictatorships appropriated the traditional idea of a unified Spain as a greater Castile, with its language, institutions, myths, and heroic past. Yet those dictatorships also embodied in their programs the legacy of regeneracionismo, if only in part. For some historians, Primo de Rivera’s economic program coincided to a great extent with that of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista. It was no coincidence that the dictator, an admirer of the Lliga’s economic agenda, was captain general of Catalonia at the time of his coup in 1923. Indeed the Lliga was present in the amalgamation government formed in 1917 after the general strike, alongside the Crown, the old institutional parties (liberals and conservatives), and the army. After 1917, the Lliga’s presence in Spain’s national government and its hesitant attitude concerning class issues (that is, the protection of their factories with the help of state police) had halted their demand for further autonomy. Facing a similar dilemma, several years later the Lliga’s leader, Francesc Cambó, contributed to financing Franco’s war effort during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). In the late 1950s, Joan Sardà, a reputed economist from the Lliga, became a key figure in the economic modernization of Franco’s Spain. Yet the institutionalization of Catalan culture launched in the early 20th century by Enric Prat de la Riba had a deep social impact and remained a constant feature of political life until the 1930s. Thus, first from Barcelona’s diputació since 1906 and then from Catalonia’s Mancomunitat after 1914, Prat de la Riba’s conservative Lliga Regionalista launched an ambitious program of cultural development that endorsed the creation of a network of cultural infrastructures. These included the Institut d’Estudis Catalans (1907) and the Biblioteca de Catalunya (1914). The standardization of the Catalan language played a central role through the publication of Pompeu Fabra’s Normes Ortogràfiques (1913) and Gramàtica Catalana (1918). This process, which aimed at the full public presence of a language that was a suitable vehicle for culture, shows the crucial importance of language in Catalan nationalism. A new intellectual movement, Noucentisme ( from Nou-cents, meaning “NineHundred”), emerged based on a rationalist cult of the urban world and a new aesthetic neoclassicism. This movement further enhanced cultural life and national pride in a territory whose capital city, Barcelona, was already culturally thriving. Noucentisme replaced Modernisme, which in turn had completely rejected the literary amateurism and historicist nostalgia of the Renaixença and had attained the professionalization of a new generation of writers. Artists and architects later branded by critics as modernistes also thrived, taking advantage of a new wave of urban expansion. Some of them like Antoni Gaudí succeeded in marrying Catalan tradition with universal innovation. Although the Mancomunitat was suspended by Primo de Rivera in 1925, Catalan cultural life continued to expand. Paradoxically, the repression of Basque and Catalan national identity further ignited political activism. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Defining the Nation Basque and Catalan nationalism appeared at the turn of the century as complex projects trying to balance modernization and tradition while providing political power to these two industrial territories. Indeed, various governments had failed to provide the country with a secular state structure capable of dealing with the emergence of a new society and granting autonomy to its emerging nations and overseas colonies. This multiple confrontation was still alive when civil war broke out in 1936 as a reaction by the ruling elites against social reform and decentralization designed to recognize national plurality. Those elites, consisting of a promonarchic oligarchy, the army, and the Catholic Church, considered Catalan and Basque national assertion as a further blow to traditional Spain. In this context we must understand the common interests shared by the defenders of the Spanish Republic, keen on modernization and social change, and the peripheral nationalisms, which saw the republic as a framework that could grant their autonomy. An anti-republican reaction suddenly broke out in 1936, with the key contribution of the Falange Española, the Spanish fascist party founded in 1933, siding with those traditional elites. This union represented the bulk of Spanish nationalism, which won the war in 1939. Even many liberals shared with those elites the concept of Spain as an indivisible, greater Castile, with Spanish as the only common official language. The adaptation of some of Ortega y Gasset’s ideas and slogans under Franco became a dramatic example of how those common denominators were used, particularly since he had favored the proclamation of the republic, accepted Catalan autonomy, and was one of the few Spanish intellectuals known abroad. Back from exile, his postwar agenda of re-nationalization was appropriated by the regime within its National-Catholic parameters to justify the cultural and political cleansing of elements of non-Castilian identities.

Antonio Maura’s Plan: A Precedent for Autonomy The “plan for reform of local administration” proposed by Antonio Maura as secretary of the interior (December 1902 through July 1903) and as prime minister (January 1907 through October 1909) was presented as a legal platform to grant autonomy. Though never approved by Parliament, this plan was favored by the Lliga in Catalonia, despite the rejection of the Catalan republicans, but was considered insufficient in the Basque country. The spirit of this plan, potentially granting administrative autonomy to all Spanish territories, was resurrected by Ortega y Gasset in the republican constitution of 1931. Experts in constitutional law have pointed out that the spirit of strictly administrative autonomy present in Maura’s plan, which disregards national rights, is also present in the 1978 Spanish constitution and was put into practice in the 1980s to water down a state model that had initially respected what this constitutional text calls “historic nationalities.”

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Catalonia and the “Revolution of October 1934” On October 6, 1934, Lluís Companys, president of the Catalan autonomous government, proclaimed in Barcelona the “Catalan Republic within the Spanish Federation” as an act of rebellion against the conservative government of Madrid. It was a common view among the forces of the left that the conservative government formed in 1933 was dismantling the republic from within with antidemocratic measures, particularly by means of abolishing any progressive laws with a social or autonomic content passed prior to 1933. As a part of this “Revolution,” the miners of Asturias also rebelled. Both rebellions were militarily suffocated, and Catalan autonomy was suspended. Autonomy was reestablished after the victory of the left-wing Popular Front coalition in February 1936.

Thus, the same brutal political repression carried out against left-wing activists across Spain, resulting in execution, torture, imprisonment, and exile, also affected Catalan and Basque nationalists. Moreover, all institutions through which political autonomy was being exerted were dismantled, as were all infrastructures, from education to newspapers, which allowed the normal development of an identity and culture that differed from the new norm. The public presence of Catalan and Basque, beyond what was accepted as innocuously picturesque remnants, was also forbidden. These radical measures condemned these divergent national identities and their cultures to clandestine life and exile. The concept of the political and cultural “normality” lost after Franco’s victory, still in currency to this day, was forged in those circumstances.

Narrating the Nation Scholars explained the origin and expansion of the medieval myth of the Spanish nation as being forged on the blood link between the Visigoth monarchs, which held control over a unified Spain prior to the Moorish invasion (711), and the rulers of the new Christian territories of Asturias. Unlike the fickle motivation lying behind the crusades in the rest of Christian Europe, this plausible invention would have efficiently served the political purpose of ousting the Moors. Not only were they disloyal, but they had also invaded and segmented the Spain of its ancestors, hence the re-conquest. This myth of a united Christian Spain was spread throughout the medieval Castilian chronicles and was further reinforced in literature, particularly through the epic poem on the life of El Cid. Thus the gothic myth, fueled through historiography and literature, reached the 20th century in good health and was diligently used to shape the sense of belonging for millions of young children in post-1939 National-Catholic Spain. In their compulsory class of Formación del Espíritu Nacional, students learned a long string of Gothic kings N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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as historical backing to a Spain that was a unidad de destino (“united destiny”), above “local separatisms.” This united destiny found a symbol in the 15th-century union of the crowns of Catalonia-Aragon and Castile with the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, the Catholic Monarchs, referred to as “national unity” in the official National-Catholic historiography. The yoke and arrows in the coat of arms of these monarchs, also allegedly descendant from the Gothic kings, became the symbol of the Falange, and Franco adopted it to represent Spanish unity. In the regime’s narrative in reconstructing the Spanish “united destiny,” which for José Antonio Primo de Rivera was threatened by political parties and “local separatisms,” the humiliation of 1898 in the Spanish-American War was considered the concluding tragedy that did away with the glory of imperial Spain. Not surprisingly, October 12, the day Columbus set foot on American soil, was declared a national holiday and branded “Day of the Race.” The celebration coincided with the day of Our Virgin del Pilar, made patron saint of the Hispanics. The implementation of these official celebrations and symbols were detrimental to the cultural traditions of Spain’s non-Castilian nations, which were prohibited. Thus, in Catalonia, in addition to the banning of the public use of the Catalan language, the Catalan flag and anthem were prohibited, as was the celebration of September 11, the Catalan national day in remembrance of the fall of Barcelona to the Franco-Castilian troops in 1714. In the Basque country, the ikurriña, or Basque flag, the Basque anthem, and the new name for the Basque nation, Euskadi, all invented by Arana, as well as the aberri eguna, the day of the Basque fatherland, were all banned. What proved more harmful for Catalan and Basque national cohesion under Franco, though, was the dismantling of their cultural and political institutions and infrastructures, which had been put in place between the late 19th century and the 1930s.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Socially, the birth of Catalan and Basque nationalism is clearly linked to a section of the bourgeoisie that initially failed to attract the working classes to their political positions. At the turn of the century, these workers were mostly under the influence of socialism in the Basque country and of anarchism and republicanism in Catalonia. Although it took longer for Basque nationalism than for its Catalan counterpart to become dominant in the polls, in both cases bridging the gap between nationalism and the lower classes was a complex and long process. Some historians place the evolution from Catalan regionalism to nationalism in the early 20th century. Yet the decisive incorporation of the popular classes into Catalan nationalism did not materialize until 1931, with the creation of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC; Republican Left of Catalonia) and its N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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subsequent electoral successes under the republic, which benefited from the anti-republicanism of Cambó, from the Lliga, and from Cambó’s support of the dictatorship. The ERC had finally incorporated secular republicanism, whose electoral monopoly had been held by Alejandro Lerroux’s republican parties, which were opposed to Catalan nationalism. In a way, this new predicament brought Catalan nationalism back to its roots, as even Catalan regionalism had originated in the secular federal republicanism of Valentí Almirall. Here lies a crucial difference with Basque nationalism, which kept intact the religious component of the carlista cause defeated in 1876, with “God, king and fueros [Basque liberties]” as its logo. Indeed, religion is closely linked to the birth of the Basque Nationalist Party, created single-handedly in a messianic way by Sabino de Arana, himself the son of a carlista activist. After his own nationalist revelation on Easter Day 1882, he designed a political agenda with a missionary goal and a Christian logo. Moreover, his early death following imprisonment (1903) was interpreted as martyrdom by his followers. Not surprisingly, the original Basque Nationalist Party, for which Arana founded the political bureau in 1895, was later renamed Basque Nationalist Communion (1910). In the background of Basque nationalism is foralismo, or the defense of the Basque liberties suppressed in 1876. In that same year, the Euskara Association was founded in Pamplona, with the purpose of studying the Basque language, history, and institutions. The rural nature of Navarrese society and the monarchic leanings of many of its members might explain why this association never evolved beyond regionalism. The divergent background of another association, Euskalerria, founded in 1878 in Bilbao, the capital of industrial Biscay, with a considerable liberal input from its members, may also explain why most of them joined the Basque Nationalist Party shortly after Arana founded its political bureau in 1895. Arana’s early background as a Basque activist was in the field of culture as a philologist. His efforts in this field, from his grammar of Biscayan Basque (1888) to his amateurish attempt at linguistic purification, proved fruitless, however, as he acknowledged the irreparable recession of Basque and the impossibility of assimilating Castilian immigrants. Paradoxically, he considered the Basque language a barrier to protecting his race and culture from the invasion of industrial workers. Indeed, for Arana race was central. His racialism, rather than racism, however, must be understood in its context, a time when European scientists often linked race with language; and at any rate, he did not proclaim the Basque race to be biologically superior. In the tenth issue of Bizkaitarra, a paper he founded in 1893, Arana launched a plan to create Euskaldun Batzoki, or Basque centers. At the time of Arana’s death (1903), the Basque nationalists were the second political force in Biscay. Their political dominance, however, was only attained after Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship. As happened in Catalonia, in the years that followed the general strikes of 1917 and 1919, social conflict overshadowed Basque national claims, and the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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number of nationalist seats in Madrid decreased. In 1918, the creation of the Society of Basque Studies and the Academy of the Basque Language launched the scientific study of the past and the normalization of the language, opposing the earlier amateurish purification. With the political hegemony attained under the Second Republic, the Basque nationalists enjoyed a harmonious relationship with other political forces, and when the Spanish Civil War broke out, they provided committed fighters to defend the republic as a means to protect their statute of autonomy, which had only been approved in October 1936. The governments of the Spanish Republic, the Basque country, and Catalonia went into exile and gradually lost hope when their members realized after 1945 that the Allies did not intend to overthrow Franco’s regime. Thus, the triumph of Franco’s National-Catholic Spain in 1939 truncated the consolidation of Basque and Catalan nationalism, but also interrupted the development of a secular multinational Spain. In 1947, from his Mexican exile, the Castilian federalist Luis Carretero reminded his readers that, during the Spanish Civil War, the autonomous Basque and Catalan nations did not choose to become independent but defended the Spanish Republic instead. Selected Bibliography Agranoff, R. 1996. “Federal Evolution in Spain.” International Political Science Review 17, no. 4: 385–401. Alvarez-Junco, J. 1996. “The Nation-Building Process in Nineteenth-Century Spain.” In Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula, edited by C. Mar-Molinero and A. Smith, 89–106. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Balcells, A. 1995. Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. London: Macmillan. Carr, Raymond. 1980. Modern Spain, 1875–1980. London: Oxford University Press. Conversi, Daniele. 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company. Dobson, Andrew. 1989. An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marfany, Joan-Lluís. 2004. “ ‘Minority’ Languages and Literary Revivals.” In Past & Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Past and Present Society, no. 184 (August): 137–167. McRoberts, Kenneth. 2001. Catalonia: Nation Building without a State. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Núñez, Xosé-Manoel. 1993. Historiographical Approaches to Nationalism in Spain. Fort Lauderdale, FL: Breitenbach. Núñez, Xosé-Manoel. 1996. “Region-Building in Spain during the 19th and 20th Centuries.” In Region und Regionsbildung in Europa. Konzeptionen der Forschung und empirische Befunde, edited by Gerhard Brunn, 175–210. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.

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Ukraine Yaroslav Hrytsak Chronology 1905 1917–1918 1918 1918–1919 1918–1920

1919 1922 1923

1923–1933 1929 1932–1933

1938–1939 1939 1941–1944 1942–1943 1943–1944 1945

During the Russian Revolution of 1905, the ban on Ukrainian language publications is lifted. (June–April) Leftist Ukrainian People’s Republic claims control over Ukrainian provinces of the Russian empire. (April–December) Conservative Ukrainian State (Hetmanate) is under the control of the German and Austro-Hungarian occupational army. (December–December) Leftist Ukrainian People’s Republic reclaims control over Ukrainian provinces of the Russian empire. (December to December) Ukrainian territory becomes a major military theater in the conflict among the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Russian Red and White armies, the Polish republic, French occupational forces, and local peasant guerrillas. (January) Leftist Ukrainian People’s Republic is joined by Ukrainian provinces of the Austro-Hungarian empire. (December) Creation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, with the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic as the largest non-Russian republic. (March) The Paris Peace Conference hands the former Austrian Galicia to Poland; other parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy integrates into Romania and the Czechoslovak Republic. Policy of Ukrainization in the Soviet Ukraine. (January–February) Founding congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Vienna. Stalin-engineered famine causes 2–7 million deaths in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic; the famine is part of large-scale repressions in the 1930s heavily affecting all strata of society, including ethnic minorities. (October–March) Carpathian Ukraine, a Ukrainian state proclaimed in Transcarpathia is crushed and annexed by Hungary. (September) Soviet annexation of western Ukraine. (June–October) The Ukraine is under Nazi occupation. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is created under the auspices of the OUN. (August–October) Soviet Army reoccupies Ukrainian territory. (February) Yalta agreement confirms the new borders of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. (August) At a San Francisco conference, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic is granted the status of a founding member of the United Nations.

Situating the Nation The territory Ukrainian nationalism was claiming as its own was marked by strong ethnic diversity. Besides Ukrainians who made up 70–80 percent of the population, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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it included one of the largest Jewish communities in the world; Poles formed a large share of the population in the western and central parts; Russians, in the south and the east; southern Ukraine had Christian migrants (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Gagauzes) from the Ottoman Empire; Crimea was the homeland of Crimean Tatars; in the west and south there were large pockets of German colonizers; and in the southwest borderlands Ukrainians lived mixed with Hungarians and Romanians. Ethnic diversity was a legacy from previous states that had ruled different parts of Ukrainian ethnic territory: Rzeczpospolita, the Crimean Khanate, and the autonomous Cossack state. Each of these states had ceased to exist by the end of the 18th century. From then until 1914, this territory was divided between the Romanov and Habsburg monarchies: the Russian empire had 85 percent of the area, and the Austro-Hungarian empire held the remaining 15 percent in the west. By the late 19th century, the local population had undergone a demographic transformation. The change was characterized by a decline in death rates, especially among children. As a result, all ethnic groups—and Ukrainians above all—were steadily becoming more numerous, younger, and prone to ideologies that promised radical change. Ukrainian nationalism was one those ideologies. The significance of the Ukrainian position increased during World War I. Both the Entente and the Central powers considered control over rich local human and natural resources to be a key factor in their hegemony over central and eastern Europe. War led to the collapse of both empires and to the emergence of several national states in 1917–1920: the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Ukrainian Statehood (Hetmanate), and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. These were, however, Bolsheviks who managed to get control over the major part of Ukrainian territory. They proclaimed the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, and in 1922 it was integrated into the Soviet Union (1922–1991). It comprised most of the former Russian provinces of Ukraine except for Volhynia in the west, which fell under the rule of the reborn Polish state. Poland also annexed the largest former Austrian province (Galicia), while two other Habsburg parts—Transcarpathia and Bukovyna—were incorporated, respectively, into the Czechoslovak Republic and Romania. World War II led to the unification of the territory through Soviet annexation of Polish and Romanian-controlled parts in 1939–1940. This territorial integration was interrupted by the Nazi occupational regime (1941–1944). It reinstated the pre-1918 divisions: the former Russian imperial provinces were reintegrated into Reichskommisariat Ukraine, while the former Austrian part was revived as General Gouvernement (other smaller parts were given to the Nazi satellites, Hungary and Romania). The Soviet victory led to a final unification of all ethnic territory in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Transcarpathia was the last territory to be “reunited” in 1945. Only small strips of ethnic territory were left outside, within the borders of communist Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Belarus. The frequent shifts of political borders reflected the status of Ukrainian territory as highly contested borderlands between European superpowers. For the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Russian empire, possession of the Ukrainian provinces also had an important symbolic meaning: Ukrainians (“Little Russians”), Belarusians (“White Russians”), and Russians (“Great Russians”) were each considered a tribal group of the “greater Russian” ruling nation. Without the Ukrainians, the Russians could barely form a majority inside the Russian empire. Small wonder that the Russian imperial authorities in 1863, and then again in 1876, outlawed the Ukrainian language to prevent the development of a separate Ukrainian identity. The ban was lifted during the Russian Revolution of 1905, but until the very end of the Russian empire in 1917, Ukrainian nationalism was systematically repressed. The geopolitical vulnerability of the Ukrainian territories is reflected, among other things, by the high level of casualties: between 1914 and 1945, every second male and every fourth female there perished violently. This level of violence had consequences for nation-building; its prospects would have been more propitious under peaceful circumstances. Nation-building was further undermined by the feeble penetration of education, railroads, and national markets from the cities to the countryside. Pre-1914 Russian sections and pre-1939 non-Soviet sections were among the least literate on the European continent. This factor hindered the transformation of “peasants into nation.” Ukrainian nationalism was also losing ground to rapid industrialization and urbanization in southern and eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian peasants were less inclined to enter local factories and cities. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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As a result, the highly industrialized and urbanized regions were within Ukraine but not of Ukraine. Competition over Ukrainian territory had, however, one positive effect: it prevented the Ukrainian national project from being fully absorbed by either side. Ukrainian nationalism made full use of this opportunity in Galicia, the largest Austrian province controlled by the Polish ruling elite with a predominately Ukrainian (Ruthenian) population. Because the Habsburg regime was more liberal than the Russian one, in the 1880s–1910s, Galicia and its capital Lviv were chosen by Ukrainian leaders as their “national Piedmont,” that is, the territory from which cultural and political influence could emanate to their fellow Ukrainians in the Russian empire. Of the three interwar states that annexed formerly Habsburg parts of Ukrainian territory, the Czechoslovak Republic maintained a liberal policy on ethnic minorities, whereas Poland and Rumania embraced assimilation policies. Ukrainian nation-building gained a large success in the Soviet Union during the 1920s with the Soviet affirmative action policy of Ukrainizatsia (Ukrainization). This coincided with a large-scale industrialization that brought many peasants to the city and exposed them to modern culture. The Soviet regime tried to foster Ukrainian irredentism for exporting the revolutionary mood to Poland. This elicited a positive response from many Ukrainian patriots there; many of them regarded N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic in the 1920s as the Ukrainian national state; some went so far as to immigrate into the Soviet Union to contribute to the Ukrainian nation-building. The 1930s brought a dramatic change in Soviet policies: Ukrainization was curtailed, Ukrainian elites were harshly repressed, and Ukrainian peasants’ resistance against collectivization was broken by the large-scale, Stalin-engineered famine of 1932–1933. Under these circumstances, Galicia renewed its Piedmont mission. Ukrainian nationalists managed to expand their influence to the neighboring western Ukrainian territories of Transcarpathia and Volhynia. In the former, there emerged an ephemeral state of Carpathian Ukraine (November 1938–1939); the latter became, during World War II, the main base of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In the long run, the Soviet incorporation of western Ukraine contributed to the collapse of the Soviet regime. Between 1940 and the 1980s, the region served as a base of anti-Soviet dissent, and in 1989–1991, together with Baltic Soviet republics, it took the lead in the secessionist movement of non-Russians away from the Soviet Union.

Instituting the Nation Given the political fragmentation, the ethnic diversity, and the contested character of the Ukrainian lands, local populations faced several possible scenarios of national identification: they could form a unified East Slavic nation with Byelorussians and Russians (the so-called “greater Russian nation”); be assimilated into the modern Polish, Russian, Hungarian, and Rumanian nations; assert their separate national identity as Ukrainians; or coin smaller-scale (e.g., Ruthenian in the Ukrainian-Hungarian-Slovak borderland) identities. By late 19th century, not all of these options had equal chances of success. With the advent of mass politics, some were losing their relevance. At the dawn of the 20th century, the idea of voluntary assimilation into the Polish nation was fading away along with the death of its last propagator, the poet Platon Kostecki (1832–1908). The East Slavic project was relatively strong; it was represented by the Russophile orientation inside the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Little Russian orientation in the Russian empire. It combined local patriotism with loyalty to the ruling monarchies and displayed strong conservatism. In Austrian Galicia, Russophiles relied on their network of cultural institutions (such as the Kachkovs’kyi society established in 1874 under the leadership of Ivan Naumovych [1826–1891]). The Little Russian orientation never built institutions of its own under the Russian empire, but it dominated the Ukrainian State (Hetmanate) (1918) under Pavlo Skoropad’kyi (1873–1945). With the collapse of the ancien régime, both Russophile and Little Russian trends lost their legitimacy, and in 1920s–1930s, they seemed anachronistic. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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World War I–era film poster showing a ring closing around Ukraine. Despite progress by leaders like Pavlo Skoropadsky toward Ukrainian independence, the country was under constant threat of invasion by Poland and Russia. (Library of Congress)

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The strength of the Ukrainian national movement lay in its strong populist and leftist orientation. Within the Russian empire, the Ukrainian national movement was represented by hromady (“communes”), semi-legal or illegal institutions formed by national intelligentsia. By the beginning of the 20th century, they had been transformed into political parties (like the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party in 1900). Their attempts to create an exile center in Geneva under the auspices of Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895) expired in the mid-1880s. The Ukrainian national movement flourished in Austrian Galicia, where it relied on a dense network of cultural, economic, and political institutions, such as Prosvita (Society for Enlightenment, 1868–1939), the Shevchenko Society (1873–1940), peasant cooperatives (beginning in the 1880s), and modern parties (like the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, 1899). Gradually, Ukrainian nationalism prevailed there over rival Russophile organizations and challenged Polish political domination. “The Ukrainian conquest of Galicia” was manifested by, among others, the shift of the local Greek Catholic Church under metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi (1865–1944) from a Russophile to an Ukrainophile orientation. The failure of Ukrainian nationalism to maintain a national state during the turmoil of 1914–1923 led to a critical reconsideration of ideological tenets. In Soviet Ukraine, there emerged a trend of Ukrainian national communism that was opposed both to the “bourgeois” values of older Ukrainian patriots and to the imperial policies of Russian Bolsheviks. Some of them, such as Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933) and Oleksander Shums’kyi (1890–1946), held high positions in the Soviet Republic’s apparatus; others, such as writer Mykola Khyvliovyi (1893–1933), were vociferous on the cultural scene. Ukrainian national communism was wiped out by the Stalinist repressions of the 1930s. Its defeat also undermined the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (1919–1938), which had enjoyed relatively strong support among the Ukrainian minority in interwar Poland. The local political scene was increasingly dominated by a new rightist and xenophobic Ukrainian nationalism that emerged in the 1920s. Its main ideologist was Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973), and its major institution was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) founded in 1929 under Yevhen Konovalets (1891–1938). From 1930 to the 1940s, the OUN split into antagonistic camps led by Andrei Melnyk (1890–1964) and Stepan Bandera (1909–1959). In 1942 the Bandera faction was instrumental in creating the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) that conducted guerrilla warfare in western and in some areas of central Ukraine against Nazis, Soviets, and Poles. From 1920 to the 1930s, there emerged a conservative-liberal trend within Ukrainian nationalism that criticized both the radical left and the radical right. This trend was limited to several dozen émigré intellectuals and politicians, the most prominent among them, Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi (1882–1931). Despite their political insignificance, they made an important contribution to Ukrainian political thought: they restored liberal and democratic traditions in the Ukrainian national movement. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Shevchenko Society The Shevchenko Society was established in Lviv in 1873 on the initiative of Ukrainian patriots from the Russian empire to foster modern cultural production in the Ukrainian language. In 1892, it was reformed into the Shevchenko Scientific Society as an all-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The society was instrumental in establishing the national paradigms of history, philology, geography, and economics, and coined Ukrainian academic terminology in natural sciences. It was disbanded in 1940 in the aftermath of Soviet annexation but was revived in 1947 in Western Europe.

Ironically, the Soviet regime—the chief enemy of all Ukrainian nationalists since the 1930s—made the largest contribution to the institutionalization of Ukrainian identity. It integrated ethnic Ukrainian territories within unified political borders, established the Ukrainian capital (until 1934, Kharkiv, then Kyiv), introduced Ukrainian language into school curricula, and, finally, raised the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the status of a founding member of the United Nations (1945). It stripped Ukrainian identity, however, of all vestiges that could possibly hint of Ukraine as an independent nation. Before Stalin’s death (1953), no ethnic Ukrainian was allowed to head the Communist Party of Soviet Ukraine; collective memory and literary language were purged to minimize the distance between Ukrainians and Russians. The ambivalent character of this nationbuilding was probably best summarized in a book published outside Ukraine in 1953: Ukraine was a “subjugated, but state nation.”

Defining the Nation The boundaries of Ukrainian territory were outlined through ethnographic studies conducted by the Kyiv hromada. The studies were a detailed elaboration of the lapidary formulation of Ukraine “from San do Don” in the Ukrainian national anthem “Shche ne vmerla Ukraïna” (“Ukraine Has Not Perished,” 1862); that is, the Ukrainian homeland stretched from the river San on the Polish-Ukrainian ethnic border in the west to the river Don on the Ukrainian-Russian border in the east. The “natural” character of the ethnic borders was further reinforced by overlapping ethnic and social lines: Ukrainians were thought to be a “plebeian nation” (Mykhailo Drahomanov) composed only of peasants. The depiction of Ukraine as a “peasant” nation led to numerous problems, despite its alleged simplicity and persuasiveness. Politically, its populist thrust alienated many educated classes. Socially, Ukrainian nationalism relied on a group that displayed a low level of national awareness and whose loyalties fluctuated. Even though the term “Ukraine” was popular among peasants, they rarely thought of themselves as Ukrainians. They identified themselves as tuteishi (“local”), N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Rus’-Ukraine There are, probably, no terms other than Rus’ and Rus’ki (Ruthenian/s) that reflect as vividly the complexity of nation-building in eastern Europe. Originally, the name Rus’ was used for a small region around Kyiv; later, it developed a broader meaning as a term for the entire East Slavic territory or Eastern Christian world. Depending on the circumstances, the term could both include and exclude Russians. At the end of the 19th century, Ukrainian patriots replaced Rus’ki with Ukraïns’kyi/Ukraïntsi (Ukrainian/s) as an exclusive selfdefinition. The choice of Ukrainian as an ethnic description was accepted by the Soviet regime (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Many ordinary people, peasants above all, did not have a clear idea about their nationality and did not distinguish it from religious orientation. Rus’ki as a self-description persisted in Ukraine until World War II, and even later in the Ukrainian-Slovak-Hungarian borderlands.

muzhyky (“peasants”), khokhly (nickname for Ukrainians), or Little Russians or “Rus’ki”/ “Rusyny” (Ruthenians). The latter usually signified not ethnic but religious affiliation with Eastern Christianity and, in that sense, included other East Slavic groups. Religion presented another problem; what was thought to be the Ukrainian nation belonged to two different churches—Orthodox in the Russian empire and Greek Catholic (Uniate) in the Austro-Hungarian empire. This religious and cultural split between two parts of their imagined nation was of extreme concern to Ukrainian leaders; they were afraid that, if allowed to develop unhampered, it might lead to a Serbo-Croatian scenario.

Narrating the Nation Ukrainian nationalism evoked the image of Ukraine as a peasant utopia, as it was reflected in the local folklore of both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires —a Cossack land free of any oppression. This vision was popularized in and by Ukrainian belles lettres. Late 19th- to early 20th-century generations of Ukrainian writers broadened the repertoire of Ukrainian literature by introducing new topics and genres, making it more modern and sophisticated. This trend was epitomized by Ivan Franko (1856–1916), a prolific writer, versatile scholar, and public activist. Still, attempts to create a literature outside the national paradigm, “art for art’s sake,” were not tolerated. Ukrainian nationalists worked hard to bridge numerous differences between Austro-Hungarian “Ruthenians” and Russian “Little Russians” by making necessary compromises. This was especially evident in forging the modern Ukrainian language; it was developed from peasant vernaculars spoken in the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian empire and supplemented by grammars and academic terminology developed in Austrian Galicia. Simultaneously, Ukrainian nationalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi (1866–1934) Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi is considered the dean of modern Ukrainian historiography. He graduated from Kyiv University and in the 1890s moved to Lviv, where he occupied the chair of East European History at the local university and headed the Shevchenko Scientific Society. At the outbreak of World War I, Hrushevs’kyi was arrested by Russian authorities and sent to Siberia. In 1917–1918, he headed the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. After that government was defeated by Bolsheviks and disbanded by Germans, he emigrated to Prague. In 1924 he returned to Ukraine, attracted by the Soviet policy of Ukrainization. He died in 1934 as a celebrated Soviet Ukrainian academician. After his death, his name and works were banned by the Soviet regime.

ists insisted on crucial differences between Ukrainian and Russian peasant cultures; the former was purportedly exceptionally rich and fundamentally different, especially given the popularity of the Ukrainian Cossack heroic epos, and Ukrainian villagers were believed to display a greater degree of “individualism” (manifested in the absence of land communes in Ukraine). The peasant-Cossack character of the Ukrainian identity was reflected in national symbols: the peasants’ embroidered shirt, woolen hats for males and head scarves for females, and Cossack wide trousers (sharovary) became central elements of the national costume; peasant and Cossack folklore were integrated into modern Ukrainian music; and, above all, modern Ukrainian language, based on peasant vernaculars, was considered the epitome of modern Ukrainian identity. Of all efforts to forge a unified national identity, the most important was a new scheme of east European history launched by Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi. In his History of Rus’-Ukraine (10 vols., 1899–1936), Illustrated History of Ukraine (1911), and other works, he integrated major historical phenomena that took place on Ukrainian ethnic territories since the early medieval state of Kievan Rus (the 9th–13th centuries) until the 20th century into a single narrative of a national past. Though he was criticized for his political activity by both the far left and the far right, his historical scheme was unanimously adopted by all factions of the Ukrainian national movement. It is now considered the foundation myth of modern Ukrainian identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Ukrainian nationalism addressed above all ethnic Ukrainians. Regarding neighboring nations externally and ethnic minorities internally, relations had to be regulated within the framework of a federation: Ukrainians and other nations of the (reformed) Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires were to form a federated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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union based on mutual recognition of the right to national self-determination. The implementation of this concept in 1917–1920 by the Ukrainian People’s Republic led to starkly contradictory results: on the one hand, Ukrainian leaders granted the fullest possible national autonomy to Russian, Polish, and Jewish minorities; on the other hand, the short historical record of that republic was marked by eruptions of xenophobic violence, above all by large-scale Jewish pogroms in 1919. An alternative concept of full political independence did not progress much before the end of World War I. It was launched relatively late (1895 by Yulian Bachyns’kyi in the Austro-Hungarian empire and 1900 by Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi in the Russian empire) and was regarded by many Ukrainian activists as a necessary but transitory step toward future federation. The defeat of Ukrainian national strivings in 1917–1920 begot a xenophobic nationalism. It proclaimed a full political independence of the Ukrainian nation as an absolute must. On the one hand, this was a response to assimilation politics of interwar states and Soviet repression. On the other hand, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists drew its inspiration from programs and activities of the Italian Fascists and German Nazis. The situation was extremely tense in western Ukraine, where in 1943 the UPA initiated Polish ethnic cleansing (known as the Volhynian massacre). The ethnic concept of the Ukrainian nation was challenged by the conservativeliberal trend in Ukrainian nationalism of the 1920s–1930s. It gave birth to the idea of a Ukrainian political nation that was to comprise all social and ethnic groups on Ukrainian territory provided they were loyal to the idea of a Ukrainian state. During World War II, the shift from an ethnic to a territorial model of the Ukrainian nation was also evident among some factions of the OUN. This resulted from nationalist encounters with former Soviet Ukrainians who were overtly hostile to xenophobic nationalism. The Soviet and Nazi repressions led to the elimination of large ethnic groups long present on Ukrainian territories. Jews were exterminated by Nazis; Poles, Germans, and Crimean Tatars were driven away by Soviets. These ethnic changes both alleviated and aggravated Ukrainian nation-building. They undermined non-Ukrainian domination in strategically important sectors of political and economic life. At the same time, the Ukrainian question became an internal issue of solely the Soviet Union. The final success of Ukrainian nationalism was dependant on whether its claims were to be recognized as legitimate by the major superpowers. Before World War II, an intrinsic weakness of the Ukrainian national project was that too often it failed to find a wider recognition. During World War II, the Soviets proved the most skillful in playing the Ukrainian card: they not only integrated Ukrainian ethnic lands but legitimized this integration on the international arena. However, their victory, as shown by subsequent events, proved to be problematic. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Selected Bibliography Abramson, Henry. 1999. A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times. Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute and Centre for Jewish Studies. Berkhoff, Karel C. 2004. Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule. Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Graziosi, Andrea. 1996. The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Kappeler, Andreas, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen, eds. 2003. Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945). Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. Magocsi, Paul R. 1996. A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Miller, Alexei. 2003. The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press. Rudnytsky, Ivan L. 1987. Essays on Modern Ukrainian History. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. Szporluk, Roman. 2000. Russia, Ukraine and the Breakup of the Soviet Union. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.

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Arab Nationalism Ralph Coury Chronology 1860 Butrus al-Bustani publishes Nafir Suriyyah (The Syrian Clarion), promoting the idea of the unity of Greater Syria on the basis of language. 1868 Ibrahim al-Yaziji publishes the first Arab nationalist poem, “Arise, O Arabs and Awake!” 1875 Christian, Muslim, and Druze Arabs establish a secret society at the Syrian Protestant College demanding an Arab national state. 1877 A group of notables from Greater Syria approaches the Amir Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, hero of the Algerian resistance living in Damascus, to see if he would lead an independent Syrian Arab state should the Ottoman Empire collapse. 1911 Arab nationalists from Greater Syria and Iraq establish the Society of the Young Arab Nation in pursuit of a secret Arab nationalist program. 1912 A group of Syrian émigrés in Egypt establish the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization (OPAD). 1913 OPAD convenes an Arab congress in Paris. 1916 Sharif Hussein launches the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. The secret Sykes-Picot agreement divides the Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent into spheres of British and French influence. 1917 The Balfour Declaration promises British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. 1918 Prince Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein, establishes an Arab government in Syria. 1920 Britain and France establish themselves as mandatory powers in the Fertile Crescent, and France occupies Syria. 1931 Arab delegates to the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem meet separately and proclaim a new pan-Arab covenant. 1933 Middle-class professionals from Greater Syria and Iraq establish the League of National Action. 1934 A Syro-Lebanese group of Arab nationalists and Marxist intellectuals meet in Lebanon and issue a program for progressive nationalists. 1937 In Syria, 524 Arab delegates attend the Bludan Conference to discuss the Palestinian issue. 1941 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden expresses British support for greater Arab unity. 1945 The League of Arab States is founded. 1948 The Arabs lose the Arab-Israeli War, Israel is established, and the remains of Palestine are occupied (Gaza by Egypt and the West Bank/East Jerusalem by Transjordan).

Situating the Nation The idea that all Arabic speakers belong to an ethnic national group that constitutes a nation had its roots in the 18th century when breakaway movements

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among Arabic speakers under Ottoman rule assumed an anti-Turkish dimension. Such revolts occurred as the term Arab was extended to all Arabic speakers, in contrast to the medieval usage in which the term was used largely for the bedouin and the phrase abna or awlad al-arab (the children of the Arabs) was applied to the settled populations. A consolidated sense of cultural and ethnic Arab identity, and then of political nationalism, became manifest in the late 19th century in areas that were still under Ottoman rule (present-day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/ Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and western Saudi Arabia) or that had fallen under direct European control. Cultural and ethnic Arabism was promoted by three social groups: religious scholars and leaders who claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad and who represented their communities to foreign dynasties and non-Arab ruling families; new, middle-class intellectuals (teachers, bureaucrats, journalists, doctors, and translators), including a high percentage of Christians in Lebanon and Syria, who established literary associations, newspapers, and European-style schools; and urban leaders from large landowning and merchant families who represented their communities to the reformed Ottoman state and/or who served as its civil servants. These groups focused upon the celebration of Arab historical achievements, the promotion of the idea that a purified Arab culture was fully compatible with modernity, and the forging of a new Arabic literary language. The social groups who promoted cultural and ethnic Arabism later promoted political Arabism, as champions of Arab autonomy or actual independence in the waning years of Ottoman rule, and then as champions of Arab independence and unity vis-à-vis European colonialism after the Ottomans’ collapse in 1918. Although leaders from great landowning and merchant families remained dominant until the late 1940s and beyond, significant socioeconomic changes affected the nature of Arabism in the interwar period. First, the expansion of the professional and intellectual middle classes contributed to a revolutionary Arabism that would mount a formidable challenge to the conservative-liberal Arabism of the upper classes in the post–World War II period. Second, the leaders of Egyptian industrial and commercial capital appeared as new actors in the promotion of Arabism in the middle and late 1920s as they began to realize the value of opening Arab markets to Egyptian capital, products, and labor. Arab nationalism was constructed on the basis of shared language, traditions, and customs that cut across religious and class boundaries. As Aziz al-Azmeh notes, Arab nationalism was the expression of growing Arab social and cultural coherence and of the need for collective defense, and it was able to draw upon a sense of unity that already existed. A sense of Arabness extended back into the medieval period, as is reflected in Ibn Taymiyyah’s assertion in the 13th century that the Arabs of his time could be classified as such linguistically or biologically or territorially (that is, as speakers of Arabic, or descendants of the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, or as inhabitants of the peninsula).

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Instituting the Nation Secret Arab nationalist societies calling for an independent Arab state developed in the 1870s among Lebanese students (predominantly Christian) in the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut) and missionary schools. Although this political Arabism had little immediate influence among Arab Muslims, who were then more attracted to Ottoman/Islamic nationalism, the appearance of such groups reflected growing hostility to the Turks in the Fertile Crescent and the wider Arab East. In 1877 a group of Muslim notables from Greater Syria went so far as to approach the Amir Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, the hero of Algerian resistance against the French who was then living in Damascus, to see if he would agree to lead an independent Syrian state should the Ottoman Empire collapse (he accepted on condition that he would be elected by the Syrian people and that the Sultan would retain the spiritual leadership of Muslims). Arab nationalist organizations with broader impact appeared after the Young Turk coup d’état of 1908, which transferred power from the Sultan Abdul Hamid to the Committee of Union and Progress. The Turkification of schools and official proceedings, Ottoman defeats in the Balkans, the lifting of publishing restrictions, and revival of the parliament that had been suspended by the Sultan, stimulated, and provided for the venting of, Arab discontent. Developments in political practice had their parallels in political ideology as intellectuals and activists such as the Syrian civil servant Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849–1902) publicly embraced the idea that the Arabs as a national entity deserved their own separate and democratic political institutions. Most organizations established before World War I sought equal rights for Arabs, the establishment of local Arab assemblies, and the use of Arabic as the legal, administrative, and educational language of Arab areas. Such were the demands of the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization, which was founded in 1912 and which sponsored an Arab congress of Christian and Muslim delegates in Paris in 1913. Although more radical secret societies (demanding an Arab-Turkish dual monarchy or Arab independence) appeared in the first decade of the 20th century, an actual break did not occur until the Ottomans joined the side of Germany and Austria in World War I. Sharif Hussein, spiritual leader of western Arabia and ruler of Mecca, who had allied with the British and Arab nationalists of the Fertile Crescent, proclaimed a revolt in 1916 that was able to drive the Ottomans from Syria and establish Arab rule. Hussein’s son Faisal was proclaimed king of a united Syrian Arab Kingdom by a Syrian General Congress in March 1920, and Arab nationalism, which now enjoyed the support of most Syrians, became the new government’s official ideology. Faisal’s government was destroyed by the French, with British acquiescence, inasmuch as the Allies had no intention of honoring the promises of independence N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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that they had made to obtain Arab cooperation. The Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent were divided between Britain and France as League of Nations mandates. Iraq and Transjordan were placed under British mandate, with Faisal and his brother Abdallah as their respective monarchs; Palestine was ruled directly as a British mandate and was opened to Jewish immigration in keeping with Britain’s declaration of support for a Jewish national home in the Balfour Declaration of 1917; and Syria and Lebanon became republics under French mandate. These arrangements contributed to the further politicization of pan-Arab sentiment, as feelings of unity were drawn upon in a political struggle against Zionism and the division and colonialism effected by the Europeans. A series of strikes, demonstrations, riots, and revolts (Iraq in 1920, Morocco in 1921–1926, Syria in 1925–1927, Palestine in 1936–1939, and Iraq in 1941) were directly or partly inspired by the Arab nationalism of the Arab East. Resistance to the Europeans was enhanced through the establishment of many political organizations: the Arab Independence Party of Palestine in 1932; the League of Nationalist Action of Greater Syria and Iraq in 1933; the Arab Liberation Society of Greater Syria and Iraq in the early 1930s; the Muthanna Club, centered in Iraq, in 1935; and the clandestine Red Book Group of Arab Asia and North Africa in 1934. The formation of such groups was complemented by numerous formal and informal meetings, such as the pan-Arab gathering (the first to bring representatives of North Africa and the Arab East together) that met within the context of the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem in 1931, or the conference in Bludan, Syria, in 1937, which was attended by 524 delegates from all over the Arab world. The limited political independence gained by certain Arab countries (Egypt in 1922, Iraq in 1932) inspired programs that addressed the Arab world as a whole. The meeting in Jerusalem in 1931 was typical in its assertion that the Arab countries constituted an integral whole and that the Arab nation should resist colonialism with all the means at its disposal. Centrifugal movements, such as the

The Battle of Maysalun The Battle of Maysalun was fought at the Maysalun Pass near Damascus between French and Syrian troops on July 23, 1920. The battle took place as France moved to claim the League of Nations mandate over Syria that had been promised to her in the Sykes-Picot agreement with Great Britain in 1916. Although King Faisal, whose father had rebelled against the Ottomans as an ally of the British, and who had become king of Syria after the war, submitted to French demands and went into exile, General Yusuf al-Azmah, his minister of defense, refused to surrender. Al-Azmah was killed in battle, and the French took Damascus later in the day. The general is a major hero in Syria and throughout the Arab world. Many Syrian streets bear his name, and his statue dominates a major square in central Damascus. He died at the age of 36.

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Lebanese nationalism of Maronite Christians, mounted challenges, but the idea of Arab unity became paramount and was to be embodied in a range of liberal, socialist, and communist ideological options. As the enthusiasm for greater Arab unity grew stronger, the British sought to strengthen conservative and reactionary elements that would accept a weak form of unity under British domination. This policy culminated in the creation of the League of Arab States in 1945, which included Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Egypt, the Arab countries that had obtained legal independence by that time. Although the League played a positive role in the realms of culture, economics, and administration, it had great difficulty effecting common political policies. States were at variance with one another on a number of critical issues, including, as the Arabs’ defeat in the war against Israel in 1948 so tragically illustrated, the question of Palestine. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were drawn into this war, at least in part, to resist the ambitions of King Abdallah, the ruler of Transjordan, to incorporate the West Bank into his territory. Although the regular Arab armies had long-range plans of attack, they were unable to occupy all of the territory allotted to the Palestinian Arab state by the UN partition plan. By July 1948, 40,000 Arab soldiers, with little military experience and fewer weapons and munitions than their opponent, faced 60,000 Jewish soldiers. The failure of the League of Arab States in Palestine was compounded by the shadow of British influence. Evident from the first and widely opposed at a popular level, this influence remained strong into the 1950s. In spite of the inadequacies of the League and of Arab unitary movements more generally, this overview of the political history of Arab nationalism up to 1948 should not end on a negative note. Two developments—growing Egyptian attraction to Arabism and the radicalization of young, middle-class activists and thinkers—broadened and strengthened Arabist perspectives. Egyptians manifested interest in Arabist possibilities as early as the mid1920s. As has already been mentioned, there was the perception that the Arab world was a potential market for Egyptian industry and labor and a field for other economic activities. Bank Misr (Bank Egypt) established banks in Syria and Lebanon in 1927, and the Misr industrial group was active in countries of the Arab East, especially Saudi Arabia. In the late 1930s, Talat Harb, the head of Bank Misr and its group, even began to plan the exploration and distribution of petroleum products, an endeavor that he kept secret from the imperialists and that was in any case aborted by the outbreak of World War II. Noneconomic influences were also at work. Arab political movements increasingly sought Egypt’s political, financial, and moral support in their struggle against colonialism. Non-Egyptian pan-Arab nationalists argued that Egypt was destined to lead the Arabs and that this would benefit Egyptian interests. Egyptians of varying orientations began in turn to perceive the possibilities of a larger ensemble within which Egypt would be paramount. The issue of Palestine, more particularly, forced Egyptians to think within an Arab context, and for a number N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Council of the League of Arab States meets in Bludan, Syria, on July 11, 1946, to discuss the migration of Jews to Palestine. The Arab League, formed in 1945, is considered the equivalent of the United Nations for the Arab world. (Bettmann/Corbis)

of interrelated reasons: sympathy with the Palestinians and fear of Zionism as part of a broader strategy of imperial control; fear that a Zionist state might threaten Egypt’s position as the Arab world’s potential industrial, technological, and financial center; and fear of a Palestinian popular revolution that might inspire disturbances in Egypt or elsewhere in the Arab East. The eminent Syrian Arab nationalist theorist Sati al-Husri said that the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s conversion to Arabism in the early 1950s was the happiest moment of his life. Egypt’s full embrace of Arabism came relatively late, but the seeds of Nasser’s Arabism, the Arabism of the greatest Arab leader of modern times, were nevertheless sown in the interwar period. As for the radical Arabism that drew upon an expanding audience, it emerged in the 1930s as the product of an encounter between Marxist and Arab nationalist intellectuals contemptuous of traditional nationalism. As Youssef Choueiri writes, a meeting of Syro-Lebanese Arab nationalists and Marxist writers, jourN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nalists, and schoolteachers in the spring of 1934 in the Lebanese town of Zahle can be taken as a turning point. Attendees included the Syrians Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (the future founders of the Ba ’ ath Party) and a number of Lebanese communists who had become dissatisfied with their party’s subservience to the Soviet Union. At the end of the meeting, the delegates issued a statement that called for the unity of the Arab nation, the establishment of a unified party, and a journal to serve as a platform for all progressive pan-Arabists. Many who gathered in Zahle were men of courage, a courage born of anger but also of hope and love, and this was also true of a large number of the activists in the unified Arabist party that came into existence a decade later. In the first years of the Syrian Ba ’ ath, members who were physicians traveled on foot to provide free medical treatment to peasants in remote and neglected villages, and party activists sent the promising sons of peasant families to secondary schools in the cities at their personal expense or tutored them without charge.

Defining the Nation During the period under consideration, Arabism was predominantly liberal and dedicated to parliamentary democracy. Such liberalism had its origins in two strains of thought—the reformism of 19th-century Christian and Muslim secular intellectuals, and that of 19th-century Islamic ulema or clerics. Butrus al-Bustani and Muhammad Abduh can be taken as examples. The Syro-Lebanese al-Bustani (1819–1883) was the first well-known Christian intellectual of his day to embrace Arab nationalist perspectives. Disturbed by the religious strife in Mount Lebanon between 1840 and 1860, he promoted Arab identity and the revival of Arab culture in Greater Syria as a vehicle for unity and a bullwark against European cultural domination. He published Nafir Suriyyah (Syrian Clarion), the first Arab nationalist journal, in 1860, and established al-Madrasah al-Wataniyyah (the National School), which taught in Arabic and was open to students of all faiths. Although al-Bustani believed that the Ottoman state should remain intact, he regarded Greater Syria as Arab, basing this identity on its use of the Arabic language. The second example, the Egyptian Sunni cleric Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), the most famous of Islamic modernists, contributed to an Arabist version of Islam that was incorporated into the secular Arab nationalism of a later period. Abduh argued that there was no contradiction between Islam and reason, that the early Islamic community had acted according to this assumption, and that it had therefore laid the basis for Islam’s Golden Age (in contrast to the Turks who had presided over Islam’s decline). This proto-political Arabism was related to the development of patriotic loyalties to particular territories—Tunisia, Greater Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. A largely secular loyalty to particular Arab places and peoples, a shift from religion and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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dynasty, was later incorporated into a broader loyalty to the Arab peoples in their entirety. The “intellectual father” of this liberal nationalist tradition as it reached its maturity in the interwar period was the Syrian Christian Qustantin Zurayq (1909–2000) who, as political activist, professor of history, and university administrator, served as mentor to an entire generation of Arab nationalist youth. Zurayq argued that religion could not be set apart from Arab culture but that the state must be absolutely separated from religious institutions. Social reform had to be based on the promotion of individual initiative, scientific knowledge and culture, and political, social, and intellectual liberties. Although the commitment to liberal democracy persisted until the mid1950s, the 1930s witnessed efforts to develop more coherent theories of nationalism, which set the stage for socialism and the idea of the nation as a social entity in need of radical transformation. Here, again, certain prominent thinkers —Sati al-Husri, Shaykh Abdallah al-Alayili, Michel Aflaq, and Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar—can be regarded as representative. The Syrian Sati al-Husri (1879–1968) had been one of the Ottoman Empire’s foremost liberal educators, and he remained an educator as a theorist of Arabism after the empire’s demise (he was minister of education in Faisal’s government from 1918 to 1920, director general of education in Iraq from 1923 to 1927, and head of the League of Arab States’ Institute of Higher Arab Studies from 1953 to 1957). According to al-Husri, national identity was based on the unity of language and history. He rejected religion and race as foundations and argued that there were no pure races in any case. A common will was the result of nationhood

Qustantin Zurayq The Syrian Christian Qustantin Zurayq (1909–2000) was the most eminent liberal theoretician of Arab nationalism in the interwar period. Born in Damascus, he received his PhD (at the age of 21) from Princeton University. Apart from a short time as Syrian ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, he devoted his professional life to education, serving as an administrator (rector of the University of Damascus, vice president and acting president of the American University of Beirut) and professor of history (also at the American University). Zurayq argued that the Arabs had possessed a sense of national identity in medieval times and that it had been established by the Prophet Muhammad. Nevertheless, nationalism as a cultural and political bond, superior to all others and capable of shaping a nation of equal citizens irrespective of religion, is a modern phenomenon. Independence and unity based on Arab spiritual development are not enough. The Arab nation must incorporate the science, philosophy, and industrial systems developed in the modern West. Zurayq’s works (beginning with National Consciousness in 1939) had broad influence, but his role was not limited to the promotion of Arabism through scholarly and theoretical efforts. He participated in the formation of a clandestine Arab nationalist organization (the Red Book) in 1934, and served as mentor to an entire generation of Arab nationalist students.

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and not its source. Although he began with a rather romantic understanding of language, he ultimately came to view it as a mode of communication necessary to carry out the practical tasks of a modern nation-state in the service of all its citizens. The Lebanese Sunni Muslim cleric Shaykh Abdallah al-Alayili (1914–1996) promoted social democracy based on a new concept of individual immortality (he believed the old concept was selfi sh, whereas the new hoped for the survival and prosperity of society). National identity—he spoke of an “imagined community”—is derived from the unity of language, territory, common interests, and ideals. True nationalists must reject imperialism, dictatorship, and a racism that stems from the desire for power and domination or the need for a substitute faith in an age of religious decline. Although religion can play a secondary role, it does not qualify as a primary factor. Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) believed that nationality is acquired as a destiny, just as one acquires a name, but that the regeneration of the nation depends on a radical break from the past. Conservatives—capitalists, feudalists, politicians opposed to unity, and rigid religious leaders—are arrayed against the rest of the nation and its revolutionary youth. Nationalism is democratic and a form of love, but it does not flinch from confronting the enemies of the people. Islam as a universal faith is an expression of Arab humanism. It represented the renewal of Arab life in the seventh century, but Arab nationalism, the ideal of the present age, represents the renewal of Arab life today. The Syrian Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar (1879–1940) provided a bridge between the old and new generations. A medical doctor by profession, he was minister of foreign affairs in Faisal’s government and founder of the Syrian People’s Party during the mandate. According to Shahbandar, political activity proceeds from the interaction of cultural, social, and economic realities. The Arab revolt was dominated by medieval notions and crippled by weak political organization. Religion represents a universal moral code, and all religions are united by a common core. Although communism is not in accord with the Eastern heritage, a moderate socialism could be established.

Narrating the Nation As in the case of other nationalisms, an idealized understanding of the nation developed during this period at a popular level. The great deeds of the Arab people were exalted, while decline was attributed to foreign corruptions. Modern values were projected into the Arab past, and history was conceived as tending, inevitably, toward the rebirth of a unified Arab nation that had allegedly once existed or that had fallen into decline. Such popular idealizations coexisted with the sophisticated and nuanced understanding provided by scholars and intellectuals who N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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recognized and did not flinch from considering provincial differences and subdivisions, the plurality of coexisting identities, and Arab responsibility for Arab failures. In History of the Arab Nation (1939), for example, the Iraqi Darwish al-Miqdadi assumes that historical developments are reactions to the particular needs of the moment, and that this is as true of Islam (seen as a response to the collapse of Arab states and a loss of trade) as of everything else. Even if left to their own devices, the Arabs are no more immune to shortcomings than others. The great Arab revolt of 1916 was itself superficial; true nationalism at that time was limited to a few organizations of young people, and the Arab masses remained loyal to the Ottoman caliph as a religious duty.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Paul Noble likens the contemporary Arab world to a vast sound chamber in which ideas resonate with little consideration for state borders. This sound chamber, which is linked to a sense of common identity and interests, began to take shape during the period under consideration. It owes its existence, at least in part, to two phenomena: intellectuals and activists who promoted cultural and political Arabism within the context of Arab civil societies, and the acculturation effected by the Ottoman state and its Arab successors. Even the local patriotisms of individual Arab areas (and later states) drew upon a common pan-Arab heritage that could be associated with the national territory by various state institutions, and in particular by the new secular educational systems. In spite of all this, no significant institutional unity at the state level, other than the weakly constituted League of Arab States, was achieved during the period under consideration. Although the interwar generation developed a common Arab nationalist discourse, by 1948 movements for Arab unity implied the self-assertion of individual states. How is this to be explained? The answer lies in two primary factors: the hostility of European imperial powers that pursued a policy of divide and rule within and between Arab states, and, as Nazih Ayubi argues, the weakness or indifference of the Arab ruling classes who were unable and/or not interested in bringing about greater institutional unity. Arab nationalism had great resonance among the urban merchants (and their professional offspring) who resented the artificial separation of their traditional markets when the British and the French divided up the Arab East after World War I; such nationalism also had resonance for the Egyptian capitalists who discovered the wider Arab world in the 1920s. Yet the Arabist commercial/intellectual elite of the Fertile Crescent was too weak to penetrate the new borders, and Egyptian capital was soon subordinated to foreign capital in Egypt itself. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Selected Bibliography al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1993. Islams and Modernities. London: Verso. Ayubi, Nazih. 1997. Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London: I. B. Taurus. Batatu, Hanna. 1999. Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Choueiri, Youssef. 2000. Arab Nationalism: A History. Oxford: Blackwell. Coury, Ralph M. 1998. The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist: The Early Years of Azzam Pasha, 1893–1936. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. Nafi, Basheer M. 1998. Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908–1941. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. Noble, Paul. 1991. “The Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities.” In The Foreign Policies of Arab States, edited by Bahgat Korany et al., 47–48. Boulder: University of Colorado Press. Rodinson, Maxime. 1981. The Arabs. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Salem, Paul. 1994. Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

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Ethiopia Mohammed Hassen Ali and Seyoum Hameso Chronology 1855–1867 1865–1888 1872–1889 1880s–1890s 1889 1889–1913 1890 1896 1906 1916 1930 1931 1936–1941 1941

Reign of Emperor Tewodros II of Begemeder. Reign of Menelik II, king of Shawa. Reign of Emperor Yohannes of Tigray. Menelik II’s colonial expansion to the southern regions. The Treaty of Wuchale is signed by Menelik and Italy. Reign of Emperor Menelik II of Abyssinia. The creation of the Italian colony of Eritrea. The battle of Adwa, in which Menelik II defeats Italian forces. Menelik II is incapacitated and dies in 1913. Tafari Makonnen is appointed regent with the title of Ras. Ras Tafari is crowned as Emperor Haile Selassie. Ethiopia has its first modern written constitution. Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Haile Selassie returns to power.

Situating the Nation The name Ethiopia is of Greek origin. It first applied to the region of Nubia, which was mentioned by classical writers and in biblical references to Ethiopia. Arabs referred to Habashat, which was closer to Habasha, Abasha, and Abyssinia. The name Ethiopia was linked with Abyssinia in Kebra Negast, an Abyssinian politicoreligious epic compiled during the last quarter of the 13th century. Despite the strong link the epic established, Abyssinian leaders rarely referred to the country as Ethiopia. Internationally known as Abyssinia, it became a member of the League of Nations in 1923 as such. It was the 1931 constitution that made Ethiopia the official name of the country and defined the people as Ethiopians. And yet, until 1942, the British Foreign Office records continued to refer to Ethiopia as Abyssinia. Historic Abyssinia constituted only one-third of modern Ethiopia. The nationhood of historic Abyssinia had been based on Christianity, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the monarchy, and the solidarity of the Abyssinians in their common opposition to the expansion of Islam in the region. As such, it excluded not only Muslims but also believers in traditional African religions who lived in Abyssinia. More importantly, entire peoples of the south were not part of historic Abyssinia. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Contemporary Ethiopia achieved its current geographical configuration and political expression in the last two decades of the 19th century. Prior to this period the Abyssinian state was situated in the northern and central highlands. It was Menelik II (reigned 1889–1913) who created the modern Ethiopian state. Menelik saw himself as a conscious participant in the scramble for colonies. Menelik expressed his imperial intentions as early as 1891. In his letter of April 10, 1891, to the heads of states of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, he stated that “I have no intention of being an indifferent looker-on if the distant powers have the idea of dividing up Africa” (quoted in Packenham 1991, 470). These were also times when he signed different border treaties with European states. One example is the Treaty of Wuchale (also Ucciali, Wechale, and Wichale) with Italy on May 2, 1889. Italy then claimed a protectorate over Ethiopia in October 1889 on the basis of Article 17 of the treaty. The Italian version of Article 17 bound Emperor Menelik to use the Italian foreign office as an intermediary for Ethiopia’s foreign relations. The Amharic version of the same article, however, “contained no obligation but permitted the possibility of requesting Italian assistance” (Marcus 1994, 89). Menelik rejected this interpretation of the treaty, and the dispute developed into war and eventually the defeat of Italian forces in Adwa (also spelled Aduwa and Adowa) in 1896. In the wake of the defeat, the government of Francesco Crispi collapsed, and Italian forces retreated to Eritrea. The moral and material boost of this victory encouraged Menelik to complete the Abyssinian expansion to the south by conquering the Borana Oromo in 1896 and the kingdom of Kafficho in 1897. In other words, although Menelik’s representatives did not participate in the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, Ethiopia embarked on its own scramble for colonies and greatly expanded its territory between 1882 and 1906 (Keller 1991, 36). According to Addis Hiwet (1975, 1), “Ethiopia’s existence as a ‘modern state’ does not extend beyond the 1900s and into the limitless and ever-remote millennia. The same historical forces that created the ‘Gold Coast,’ the ‘Ivory Coast,’ the Sudan and Kenya, were the very ones that created modern Ethiopia too.”

Emperor Menelik II (1844 –1913) The son of King Haile Melekot, who died in 1855, Menelik was born in 1844 and named Negus Sahle Maryam at the age of 11. He was soon captured and put under house arrest by Tewodros of Gondar in the fortress of Magdalla, but in 1865 he escaped and became the king of Shawa (1865–1888). When Yohannes II of Tigray died following the battle with the Dervishes in Sudan in 1889, he proclaimed himself Emperor Menelik II. In 1896, he led the war against the Italian army and successfully defeated the latter. In the subsequent years, he signed treaties with European powers and created the basic configuration of contemporary Ethiopia. He was incapacitated by illness in 1906 and died in 1913.

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The colonial expansion took shape with the religious zeal of a “civilizing mission.” Emperor Menelik pursued this mission to conquer the peoples of the south, transforming Abyssinia into what became Ethiopia and the historic Abyssinians (namely Amhara and Tigray people) into what is described as “the true Ethiopians” (Levine 1974, 8). In effect, Ethiopian nationalism, which is governmental nationalism, became a metaphor for the political and cultural hegemony of the Amhara elites in Ethiopia. Thus, Ethiopian nationalism was the product of Abyssinian cultural heritage rather than being based on the collective achievements and pride of all the peoples of Ethiopia. The political structures constraining Ethiopia included but were not limited to factors such as the prohibitive, rugged, and mountainous terrain, semidesert areas, lack of modern transport facilities, inequality of power between the northern and southern peoples, a political culture based on tyranny, the desire of European colonial empires for expansion and influence, and the existing ethnonational structures in Oromia, Sidama, Ogaden, and other areas. The factors enabling Abyssinia included the earlier adoption of Christianity, the alliance of the Abyssinian rulers with Portugal in the 1520s, and similar alliances with European powers during the 1870s and 1880s. It was just such an alliance that provided N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Emperor Menelik with the arsenals of modern weaponry that made imperial expansion to the south possible. Menelik used the same weapons to defeat Italian imperialism at the battle of Adwa in 1896. The core regions for launching imperial expansion were in historic Abyssinia, which included the regions of Tigray, Begemeder, Gojam, Wollo, and Northern Shawa. Tigray was the birthplace of the Axumite civilization that flourished from the 1st to the 10th centuries, which had since seen perpetual decline. Between the 12th and 13th centuries, the Abyssinian state had slowly expanded from Tigray to the region of Wollo and Northern Shawa, until it was curtailed by the jihadic war of Imam Ahmed (1529–1543), civil wars, and the feudal anarchy that led to the decentralization of power within the core Abyssinian region. For over two centuries, the core regions of Abyssinia were divided into four autonomous regions that were engaged in endless wars with each other. The social context that gave birth to the national idea of uniting the core Abyssinian regions included the fear of external invasion, the spread of Islam, and the rise of Oromo power in the region of Wollo, which was part of the core region of Abyssinia. The leader who articulated Christian nationalism and mobilized the Abyssinian society on an anti-Islam and anti-Oromo platform was Kasa Hailu of Begemeder, who defeated various Abyssinian warlords and crowned himself Emperor Tewodros (1855–1867). Though Tewodros united the core Abyssinian region, his vision had been limited to historic Abyssinia, as he considered the vast region of the south to be populated by different nations. After Tewodros’s force was destroyed by the British in 1868, Emperor Yohannes of Tigray (1872–1889) held Abyssinia together. Emperor Menelik (1889–1913) expanded the territorial conception of the nation by conquering and incorporating the vast and rich regions of the south into Abyssinia. In the process, Menelik shifted Shawa (also referred to as Shoa) from the periphery of Abyssinian politics into the center of the Ethiopian colonial empire. Menelik and the Abyssinian ruling class—mainly the Shawan Amhara elite—believed they had a historic mission “to civilize” the peoples of the south. It was in the name of the civilizing mission that hundreds of thousands of southern people were killed and their property plundered. It was in the name of the same mission that the conquerors expropriated the southern peasants, turning them into their tenants (Markakis 1994, 231). Menelik gave two-thirds of all the conquered land to his armed settlers known as Naftanya and to the Orthodox church. In the land of their birth, the conquered people of the south lost their land, their rights, and their human dignity, becoming landless serfs (gabars) without legal protection against armed settlers, who became governors, soldiers, policemen, tax collectors, and judges and jury at the same time. It was also in the name of the “civilizing mission” that Amharanization—the policy of spreading the Amharic language as well as the Amhara culture, way of life, and beliefs—was imposed on the conquered people of the south. In short, Menelik and his successors developed and propagated the imperial idea, and Ethiopia was officially N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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known as an empire until 1974. From the time of Menelik’s conquest until 1991, the Amhara elite dominated the Ethiopian political landscape.

Instituting the Nation After defeating and thwarting the Italian colonial ambition at Adwa in March 1896, Menelik completed the conquest of the south. He negotiated boundary treaties with Italy (October 26, 1896) and France (March 20, 1897) in the north and east, and then with Britain (May 14, 1897) in the south and west (Hameso and Hassen 2006). Created by conquest, Menelik’s empire was maintained by soldiers; thus by 1900, there were around half a million armed settlers in the south. When Menelik suffered a stroke in 1906, he appointed a cabinet, the first modern governmental institution to be established in Ethiopia. In 1908, the first modern school was set up in Finfinne (renamed Addis Ababa when Menelik moved his seat from Ankober), followed by the establishment of the first financial institution, the Bank of Abyssinia, and the building of the Franco-Abyssinian railway, which reached Addis Ababa in 1917. After the death of Menelik in 1913, his grandson Lej Iyasu succeeded at the age of 15. In 1916, he was removed from power by a coup instigated by the Shawan Amhara elite, which favored Ras Tafari Mekonnen. Menelik’s daughter Zawditu was named empress, with Ras Tafari as regent and successor to the throne. Taking on the mantle of power, Ras Tafari saw the need for basic infrastructure, the expansion of primary schooling (Ethiopia did not have a single university until 1950), police and security services, military training, centralized

Lej Iyasu Born in 1898, Lej Iyasu was an offspring of a political marriage that the invading elite entered into with some of the indigenous Oromo elites of Wollo. His father was an Oromo leader, and his mother was the daughter of Emperor Menelik. He succeeded Menelik in 1913, but his government was overthrown in 1916 mainly due to the opposition of the Abyssinian nobility and clergy. The overthrow caused internal displacement of a significant number of people, mainly Oromos. The coup was supported by the British, the French, and the Italians, who accused Iyasu of allying with the Germans and the Ottomans in World War I. Fearing that Iyasu’s cooperation with the Muslim populations of their colonies in Africa would prove subversive, these countries cooperated with the Amhara elite, providing them assistance to bring him down. He was hunted down and unable to seek asylum in the neighboring colonial territories ruled by the British, the French, and the Italians. He roamed the inhospitable Afar lowlands for five years until he was captured in 1921. He was kept in prison until 1935, and at the onset of the Ethiopian-Italian War, he was killed by the order of Emperor Haile Selassie who was fleeing into exile in 1936.

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governmental bureaucracy, and municipal administrations. These and other programs of modernization focused on centralizing and consolidating power. Throughout the period under consideration, the philosophical guiding principle of the Ethiopian ruling elite was the policy of Amharanization through the system of education, governmental bureaucracy, the military, police, and security services. The Amhara ruling elite considered the Amhara culture superior to all other cultures and instituted it as the national culture of Ethiopia. The national project was first and foremost motivated by economic domination and politically guided by the imposition of Amhara language, culture, religion, and way of life on the peoples of the south. There was no distinction between Amhara and Ethiopian nationalism since Amhara national characteristics were rendered synonymous with pan-Ethiopian traits. The goal of the national project was to consolidate the power of the Amhara elite “through the establishment of the hegemony of the Amhara culture masked as ‘Ethiopian culture’” (Keller 1998, 121). The project of nation-building failed to produce a cohesive Ethiopian nation. Instead, it produced Amharanized non-Amhara individuals who were despised because of their different ethnic background, ridiculed because of their Amharic language accent, and looked down upon with contempt by the members of the Amhara ruling class. Non-Amhara individuals were assimilated without being accorded equality of status with members of the Amhara ruling elite. Their predicament is complex. On the one hand, they were Ethiopian nationalists and they believed in the Ethiopian nation, identity, the state, and its institution. On the other hand, they felt a humiliating sense of exclusion from important decisionmaking processes within the Ethiopian political establishment. Because of its cultural and historical foundations, the contemporary Ethiopian state is a multinational state. State here is defined as “a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens” (Seton-Watson 1977). The main ethno-linguistic groups in post-1890s Ethiopia were Cushitic, Semitic, Nilotic, and Omotic. The Cushitic groups constituted the majority, but they remained a political minority. They include, among others, Oromo, Sidama, Afar, Somali, and Hadiya, and they live in the southern, western, eastern, and central areas of Ethiopia. Semitic groups, who form the other major group, include Amhara, Tigre, Gurage, and Adere. With the exception of the last two, most Semitic groups live in the northern and north-central parts of Ethiopia. The Nilotic and Omotic groups live in the western and southwestern regions.

Defining the Nation From the 1890s to 1945, the national idea of Ethiopia did not find expression in a common understanding of social groups belonging “together by birth and/or through familially inherited language and culture” (Kellas 1991, 2), but rather N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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through the policy of assimilation and homogenization known as Amharanization. This policy produced Amharized educated individuals who sought recognition of their ethnic groups’ identity as an integral part of the national idea. The failure to accord respect for such individuals hastened their politicization, thus giving birth to rival nationalisms. There were also internal rifts in regard to culture and religion. The hierarchical, largely authoritarian culture of northern Ethiopia was in opposition to the egalitarian Gada- and Luwa-based practices in the southern regions, especially Oromia and Sidama. Religious differences were pronounced between Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (with its unique ritual and a calendar that differed from the rest of the world and other Christian denominations), Islam, and followers of traditional religious beliefs. These conflicts put the stability and logic of Ethiopian nationhood into question and hence challenged its legitimacy—at least in the eyes of the conquered peoples. The contemporary proliferation of national popular liberation fronts is a poignant reminder that these tensions have not yet been overcome. The type of boundaries advocated and implemented in Ethiopia between the 1890s and 1945 ranged from natural to political. The Amhara regions of Abyssinia were divided into four: Begemeder, Gojam, Wollo, and Northern Shawa. The boundaries among the four regions were marked by mountains and rivers. Following the conquest and incorporation, the south was divided into several regions and controlled mainly by Amhara governors. Prior to World War II, Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie was divided into 13 provinces: Tigray, Begemeder, Gojam, Wollo, Shawa, Arsi, Bale, Hararge, Sidamo, Gamo Gofa, Kafa, Illubabor, and Wallaga. None of these territorial entities reflect the ethnic composition of Ethiopian societies. Only the provinces of Tigray and Arsi refer to the Tigrayans and Arsi Oromo national groups. Often natural terrain, especially rivers such as the Awash, Wabishebelle, Ganale, and Abay, divided provinces. Political boundaries also divided the Somalis in Somalia and Ethiopia, the Borana Oromo in northern Kenya and south Ethiopia, and several Nilotic groups in eastern Sudan and western Ethiopia. Eritrea, which was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, came under British military administration from 1941 to 1951. The United Nations federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952, and a decade later Ethiopia annexed Eritrea as its 14th province. Mapping exercises in Ethiopia started during the Italian occupation and expanded during and after the 1940s. Apart from geography, social perceptions divided the Abyssinian peoples. For example, there were differences among the Amhara of the four regions. The Amhara of Begemeder felt that they were superior to the Amhara of Northern Shawa. The Tigrayans in the north believed that Tigray was the seat of Abyssinian civilization, while the Amhara to the south, especially the Shawan Amhara, believed that they had created modern Ethiopia. Yet, both groups believed in their superiority to the conquered people of the south. Christianity, the institution of the monarchy, and a common culture united the Amhara and connected them, albeit N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Haile Selassie Born in 1892 as a Tafari to Ras Makonnen, a relative of Emperor Menelik and the first governor of Harar, the young Tafari grew up in the palace of Menelik. In 1916, he engineered a coup against Lej Iyasu and effectively became a de facto ruler. In 1923, he made Abyssinia a member of the League of Nations; in 1928, he declared himself king, and in 1930, emperor. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941), Haile Selassie fled to Jerusalem, then to Bath in England where he stayed until 1941. In 1936, he made impassioned pleas to the League of Nations in Switzerland for intervention on behalf of Ethiopia. He returned to Ethiopia after the Italian forces were defeated and expelled from Ethiopia in 1941. He ruled until 1974, when he was overthrown by a military committee known as the Derg; he was detained and died in September 1975. For more than a half century, Haile Selassie dominated the Ethiopian political landscape. His reign was characterized by consolidation of imperial rule, intensification of the policy of Amharanization, and unsuccessful attempts at modernizing a feudal empire.

loosely, with the Tigrayans. The Abyssinian elites also shared the historical myth that their nation had existed for 3,000 years, a claim that would make Ethiopia one of the oldest nations on Earth. The irony of this myth is that Ethiopia still lacks national consensus on the nature of the state and nation. The conquered peoples of the south viewed the supposed superiority of the Abyssinians as a perverted colonial invention. This is because, on the eve of Menelik’s conquest and colonization, the Abyssinian society and the people of the south such as the Oromo states of the Gibe region, the kingdom of Kafficho, and the city state of Harar were at similar stages of material culture.

Narrating the Nation The history of the Amhara and Tigrayan people has been taught as the history of Ethiopia throughout the Ethiopian educational system. In school and government propaganda, the capital of the ancient Axumite kingdom is presented as the birthplace of Ethiopian civilization. Ethiopian Orthodox Christians believe that Axum is the holiest place where the true Ark of the Covenant is kept. The city of Axum, the churches of Lalibela, the palaces of Gondar, and the monasteries, which are all located in Abyssinia, are presented as the centers of Ethiopian civilization. The 16th-century jihadic war of Imam Ahmed is recalled as a tragic event that nearly destroyed Christianity in Ethiopia. The era of the princes (1769–1855) is remembered as a time of chaos and anarchy. The reign of Emperor Tewodros (1855–1868) is regarded as the time of the rebirth of the nation. The wars against the Egyptians in 1875 and 1876 and against the Sudanese in 1889 are presented as saving Ethiopia from external aggression. The memory of the famous battle of Adwa in 1896 is replayed extensively in the nationalist discourse as an example N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of Ethiopian unity, greatness, and Emperor Menelik’s extraordinary leadership. The great Ethiopian famine of 1888–1892 and the Italian occupation of Ethiopia are recalled as times of national hardship and great suffering. The war of conquest that incorporated the southern regions into Ethiopia is celebrated as the reunion of the Ethiopian nation. The myth of descent from the so-called Solomonic dynasty (1270–1974) is perpetuated to create images of national continuity and of a unique and godly nation. Kebra Negast graphically depicts the Ethiopians as the chosen people and provides legitimacy for the same dynasty. Ethiopian Christians usually attributed their victories to God’s kindness toward them and explained their defeat as his lesson for their repentance. In Emperor Tewodros’s letter of 1863 to Queen Victoria of Great Britain, and in Emperor Menelik’s letter to European heads of states in 1891, Ethiopia is depicted as a “Christian Island” surrounded by a sea of “pagans.” Successive governments’ propaganda cited Ethiopia as a symbol of African independence and characterized its people as beautiful, hospitable, God-fearing, patriotic, proud, and brave, who have humiliated their enemies from far and near. Ethiopian identity is expressed through historic landmarks in Abyssinia, through the Ethiopian Orthodox Church paintings of Christ and his disciples, Mary, angels, saints, and martyrs, through prayers, through Amharic literature, theater, proverbs, war and love songs, music, and hymns, through the Ethiopian flag, national anthem, the 1931 constitution, the symbol of the cross, lion, and rare animals and birds that are found only in Ethiopia, the coffee tree, and the calendar of 13 months of sunshine.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The catalysts for the mobilization of the Ethiopian nation include Abyssinian solidarity and Christian nationalism. The people were mobilized against invading enemies, while external support was deployed toward the same end. Victory against foreign invaders is depicted as a true expression of Ethiopian unity, the foundation of its nationalism and nationhood. Patriotism and militarism are often exalted as the means of attainment and maintenance of autonomy and independence from some foreign authorities, while at the same time the state system depends on other forms of foreign advice and support to help build the historic Abyssinians’ ideological cohesion as a social group. The key characteristic of Ethiopian identity has been the extent to which it has been recognized or identified with the core elements of cultural homogeneity, traditional heritage, and beliefs and value systems of the Abyssinians. The groups targeted for assimilation and marginalization were the Oromo (who, until 1974, were officially called by the derogatory name Galla), Sidama, and many other southern peoples. Ethnic homogenization in a physical sense has rarely taken N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Obelisk of Axum, hewn from one entire granite stone to mark the reign of the Kings, Queens, and Emperors of Abyssinia. (UNESCO Photobank/Maureen Dunne)

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place, but there have been concerted and widespread efforts to assimilate and suppress non-Amhara identities. There were also peoples who resisted domination. In areas such as Sidama and parts of Oromo, people resisted forced baptisms and conversions and were receptive to non-Orthodox Christian missionaries and even to Italian intervention as it relieved the burden of exploitation and suffering. Conversions to Islam were also seen as a way of resisting Abyssinian domination. The emerging Ethiopian identity is the outcome of conquest and concomitant migration, cultural assimilation, and religious conversions, all of which account for the creation and promotion of an Ethiopian identity. Language, as one of the markers of national identity, was exploited to the fullest, and the Amharic language was made the official national language as well as the language of education. From 1917 onward, Amharic was promoted in schools, through the mass media, and within the bureaucracy. This process was only briefly interrupted by the Italian occupation of the 1930s. Both the education system and feudalistic marital arrangements enabled the adoption and co-option of a limited number of elites from conquered nations to legitimize the national idea. The print media, radio, imperial tours, and selective adoption of children orphaned through wars were also used in this process. While this enabled social mobility for a very few, large segments of constituent societies from the south were left out. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Hameso, Seyoum, and Mohammed Hassen, eds. 2006. Arrested Development in Ethiopia: Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-Determination. Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press. Hiwet, Addis. 1975. “Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution.” Review of African Political Economy 2, no. 4: 1–115. Hobsbawm, J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Program, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kellas, J. 1991. Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: Macmillan Press. Keller, Edmond. 1991. Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Keller, Edmond. 1998. “Regime Change and Ethno-Regionalism: The Case of the Oromo.” In Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse: The Search for Freedom and Democracy, edited by Asafa Jalata, 109–124. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press. Levine, Donald. 1974. Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society. Chicago: The University Press of Chicago. Marcus, Harold G. 1994. A History of Ethiopia. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Markakis, John. 1994. “Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa.” In Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, edited by Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, 217–237. Athens: Ohio University Press. Pakenham, Thomas. 1991. The Scramble for Africa. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson. Seton-Watson, Hugh. 1977. Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. London: Methuen.

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Iraq Peter Wien Chronology 1914–1918 British troops occupy the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. 1920 The San Remo Conference assigns the mandate over Iraq to Great Britain. A countrywide revolt against British occupation forces the mandate power to rethink its position in Iraq. 1921 Under the auspices of Winston Churchill, the Cairo conference decides to create a monarchy in Iraq. Prince Faisal Ibn Hussein becomes first king of Iraq. 1924 A constituent assembly passes the Organic Law as the first constitution of Iraq. 1930 An Anglo-Iraqi treaty prepares the release of Iraq into independence. 1932 Iraq joins the League of Nations and becomes officially independent. 1933 Death of King Faisal. His son Ghazi succeeds him on the throne. 1936 First in a series of military coups, initiating a period of instability and indirect military rule. 1939 Ghazi I dies in a car accident; his minor son is crowned as Faisal II. 1941 A British-Iraqi war breaks out in May after a “Government of National Defense” has ousted the pro-British regime in a further military coup. 1951 Most Iraqi Jews leave the country for Israel. 1958 Iraqi Revolution: the monarchy falls, Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim becomes Iraq’s first dictator. 1963 Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif and the Ba’ath Party remove Qasim in another military coup. 1966 President Arif dies in a helicopter crash; his brother Abd al-Rahman succeeds him as military dictator. 1968 The second Ba’athist coup makes party leader Hasan al-Bakr president, backed by his associate Saddam Hussein. 1973 World oil crisis. Iraq’s oil revenues multiply. 1979 Al-Bakr steps down, giving way to Saddam Hussein. 1980 President Hussein declares war on Iran.

Situating the Nation Iraq is not an obvious nation. It has neither long established nor clear natural boundaries, and it has never had a homogeneous population. Since the foundation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, its citizens have always referred to different national, ethnic, or religious groups as important, if not crucial, for the formation of their identity. Iraqis could be Sunni Muslims and at the same time either Arab or Kurdish nationalists, or Shiite Muslim clerics with strong ties to the religious establishment of Iran. To different degrees, this phenomenon has dominated the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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formation of Iraqi society since the creation of the Iraqi state in the wake of World War I, and this still holds true today. The geographical core of Iraq is ancient Mesopotamia, the land between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates. From 749 to 1258, Baghdad was the residence of the Abbasid caliphs. The modern state of Iraq was formed out of three former Ottoman provinces, with Basra as a capital in the south, Baghdad in the center, and Mosul in the north. The provinces were first placed under Ottoman rule in the 16th century but remained a frontier land between the Ottomans and the Iranian Safavid empire. Mesopotamia was of strategic and symbolic importance for both. The rivers were important waterways, and Basra, controlling the access to the Persian Gulf, was an important hub of Indian Ocean trade. Moreover, the country hosts the most important shrines of Shia Islam in the towns of Najaf, Kerbala, and others. The struggle between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shiite Safavids over Mesopotamia lasted until 1639 when the provinces fell finally into Ottoman hands. The complex Ottoman system of central control and local autonomy was bound to eventually give way to local forces. In the 18th century, the Ottoman provinces of Iraq became virtually independent under the rule of local dynasties, but in the early 19th century, the growing threat of European imperialism prompted reform efforts in the Ottoman Empire to strengthen the state apparaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tus. Starting from 1831, the Ottomans made efforts to integrate Iraq into a more centralized state system, but they were only partially successful against local resistance. The elite Ottoman bureaucrats had to enter arrangements with urban notable families and the tribal leaders. Nevertheless, the Ottoman reforms introduced the concept of modern statehood for the first time in Iraq, just like in the other Arab provinces of the empire. Increasing numbers of influential people started to accept a state-centered system of power sharing, not yet a national society but ways of running political and economic affairs within a patronage system overviewed by state authorities. A majority of the population of the three Mesopotamian provinces, however, remained largely untouched by these developments, especially those who lived far from the provincial capitals in the countryside or provincial towns. As a state, Iraq was initially a colonial construct. For Great Britain, Mesopotamia had already been a region of vital interest in the 19th century because it provided a land bridge from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and thus British India, and it was close to the Iranian oilfields. After the Ottoman Empire entered World War I as an ally of Germany in 1914, British troops occupied the three provinces step by step until 1918. After the war, both U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s plans and the secretly negotiated Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between Great Britain and France envisaged a partition of the Ottoman Empire into smaller nation-states. The mandate system designed at the Paris Peace Conferences was, however, a means to reconcile colonial interest with the Wilsonian idea of self-determination. Iraq was already under British military rule when Great Britain was assigned the mandate over Iraq. Now it was responsible for preparing the country to become independent, with viable institutions. After a large countrywide revolt in 1920 absorbed a large number of British troops and financial resources until it was suppressed, London decided that indirect rule of the country through a dependent national government should meet a dual interest: to uphold British control of the country to secure vital communication lines, and to fulfill the tasks of a mandate power.

Instituting the Nation The groups that had been involved in the first stage of the state formation under Ottoman rule formed a part of the elite of the newly founded state as well. Even though there was no dynastic tradition in Iraq, in 1921 London put Prince Faisal on the throne of a constitutional monarchy. He was the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca and had been the military leader of the British-sponsored Arab revolt of World War I. London believed that Faisal’s family origin as a descendant of the Prophet would give him authority among the diverse groups of the country. Faisal, however, was aware that he was entirely dependent on British support, and while the urban N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Faisal I (1883–1933) Faisal I was the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Faisal was the military commander of the British-sponsored Arab revolt that his father had initiated during World War I. From 1918 to 1920, he headed an Arab government in Syria and was crowned king of the country in 1920. Shortly afterward, a French occupying force ousted him. The British considered their wartime ally a suitable choice for the foundation of a dynasty in the new kingdom of Iraq in 1921. Being an alien to the country, his reign was a continuous struggle for full recognition by its diverse groups. By the time of his early death in 1933, he had become a unifying symbol of the new state, a position that none of his successors could ever achieve. Nevertheless, Faisal’s policy of putting the former officers of his World War I Arab army into influential government positions contributed to the lack of transparency and the clientelism that have shaped Iraqi governments ever since.

notability soon acquiesced to the new state structures, the tribal realm of Iraq did not comply. Despite the constitutional structures imposed on the state, the new government needed British military force to coerce the tribes into obedience. During the first years after the foundation of the state, the majority of the population outside the larger cities remained indifferent if not hostile toward the government. The traditional power elites—tribes, notables, former Ottoman administrative elites—however, chose mostly to acquiesce to the government structures, which were dominated by a foreign king together with a military elite that had no stake in the traditional patronage networks of the country. These so-called Sherifian officers of Iraqi origin had fought under Faisal’s command during the Arab revolt and formed his entourage when he came to Iraq. Consequently, they entered high government posts. Until the end of the 1920s, the old and new elites of the country joined interests as one landholding class. The Organic Law of 1924 gave the overwhelming power to the executive, and in a society that lacked a developed public sphere, elections to the Parliament could be easily manipulated. An abstract institutional power of constitutional structures therefore never emerged. A treaty of independence between Iraq and Great Britain was signed in 1930 and became effective with Iraq’s entry to the League of Nations in 1932. The treaty remained contentious, though, because it maintained a strong British position in the country. The British ambassador remained highly influential, and Britain virtually controlled the Iraqi military and economic development.

Defining the Nation During the 1920s, the new state elite of the Sherifian officers did not deem it contradictory at all to work for the formation of a state according to their Arab nationalist ideals while, at the same time, they created a patronage system. In N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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this system, the elite safeguarded its control over state and state resources by making it easy for those who were influential in the tribal and urban spheres to acquire land. Thus, the Sherifians contributed to the emergence of a landholding class with common interests. This policy, however, prevented the emergence of abstract state power in the form of reliable and functioning institutions. The resulting paradox between constitutionally guaranteed state structures and parallel networks of informal power virtually continued to dominate Iraqi politics until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. During the 1920s, there was only a very small group of people who actually accepted and identified with the state. Those in power were mostly of Sunni background, and many had gone through military education at Ottoman officer and staff academies, where they took on the panArab nationalist ideas rampant among Arab officers in Istanbul and Baghdad during World War I. Faisal’s comrades, now ministers and high-ranking army functionaries, had turned this inclination into a myth during the Arab revolt. There were other returning soldiers of Iraqi provincial origin who after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had nowhere else to go but home. Many of them were of Kurdish or Turkmen origin and therefore very critical of the pan-Arab tendencies that dominated the upper echelons of the state. Yet, this state needed trained and experienced officers of all kinds because the newly founded army was supposed to be the backbone of the state. The Sherifian idea of the Iraqi military as the “school of the nation” has often been ascribed to the influence of German nationalist philosophy. The growing self-esteem of the Iraqi officer corps as an avant-garde of the Arab nation that had to build a national core in Iraq to become the cradle of the pan-Arab nation-state —a “Prussia of the Arabs”—seems to confirm this view, as do the writings of the Arab nationalist theoretician Sati al-Husri. Husri was the long-term director general for education in Iraq and therefore responsible for the nationalist orientation of the schooling system, which he helped build in the 1920s. He referred to German nationalist thinkers such as Fichte in his works. The fact that the Sherifian officers had been trained by German teachers in Ottoman military academies during their earlier careers arguably exposed them to these lines of thought, too. This line of thought should, however, not be overexaggerated. The nationalist tendencies in the newly founded Iraqi officer corps corresponded equally to the centralized and coercion-oriented ideas that the former Ottoman officers had internalized during their education under the rule of the Turko-Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in Istanbul. For the officers, the relation of the subject to the state was one of obedience and discipline, with the army as the most formidable institution, state education as a carrier of nationalist ideas, and the youth as the harbinger of a new age. State education had to be Arab nationalist, although the majority of the population (Shiite Arabs, Sunni Kurds) rejected this ideology. The state was thus a chimera during the 1920s and much of the 1930s in confrontation with a tribal majority, a paradox that did not apparently concern the carriers of the state institutions. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nationalist doctrine, however, took deep root among those who adhered to the state and were produced by the new state: the graduates of state schools, universities, and military academies, that is, the new generation that emerged in the late 1920s and early 1930s. When those who belonged to this generation discovered the public sphere of the young state as their domain and became publicists, teachers, and parliamentarians, they pointed out the deficits of the state leadership and started to criticize the oligarchic, authoritarian state structures that served the interests of a few and secured their grip on power and their economic benefits. The opposition of the younger generation found expression in a desire for change in the inherited structures and paradigms, based on the realization that the elders would not give way to their sons. Their desire was first of all to be liberated from the inherited power structures and to create a “modern” society, falling somewhere between individual freedoms and desires and the authoritarian formation of a “strong and determined society.” The nationalist discourse in Iraq of the later 1930s thus took recourse to models of society formation as promoted by Turkey under Atatürk, and sometimes came close to emulating fascist principles of a charismatic leadership that would unite and guide the nation. The nation was strongly identified with the youth, and the idea that a strong nation had to be authoritarian was widespread among politicians and publicists of the time. The mainstream of Iraqi politicians and those who were visible in the public sphere were pan-Arab nationalists. Publicists had close ties with colleagues in neighboring Arab states and published in Egyptian or Syrian newspapers. An alternative strain of national identity became popular among younger urban Iraqis, who were mostly of non-Sunni origin and social-liberal oriented. During the 1930s, this position implied opposition to the dominant Arab nationalist and Sunni narrative of the state and therefore produced an inclination toward “Iraqism,” in the sense of local patriotism as opposed to Arab nationalism. In 1936, this group found support from the popular Iraqi army general Bakr Sidqi, who was of Kurdish origin. He staged the first military coup of Iraqi history, but his government soon fell in 1937 when the Arab nationalist and Sunni-dominated wing of the officer corps removed him in another coup.

Narrating the Nation The 1920 revolt against the British presence in the country turned into the founding myth of the Iraqi nation in the course of time. It was no national effort, however. First, Shiite tribes rose after clerics of the shrine cities Najaf and Karbala called for resistance against the infidels. They were also worried about the prospect that new national boundaries could exacerbate the traffic of pilgrims and financial support that they traditionally received from Iran. Only later did Kurdish N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tribes from the north join the effort, as well as some units led by former Ottoman officers. Baghdad and the core areas of British control remained quiet, in spite of large, peaceful demonstrations in the city that called for Iraqi independence. What had been primarily a Shiite tribal uprising was later reinterpreted in Iraqi nationalist history as the “Great Iraqi Revolt.” The failure of the revolt resulted in the temporary withdrawal of the Shiite clerics from the forefront of politics, but it remained an initiating moment for a relatively small group of Shiite youth who had participated and therefore experienced it as their first opportunity to take part in collective action. Arab nationalist state education turned this group into a core of Shiite supporters of the state, who reached maturity in the 1930s, while the majority of their coreligionists remained outside the national paradigm. During World War II, the Arab nationalist trend in Iraq once more took a different turn. The so-called Rashid Ali Movement of 1941 became a key element of the nationalist narrative of the state in the following decades. Rashid Ali al-Kailani was a member of an old Baghdad notable family and had held key positions in Iraqi politics in the 1920s and 1930s. During the war years, he became the figurehead of a group of nationalists rejecting the continuing British presence in the country. In April 1941, a military coup removed the pro-British regent of Iraq and installed a “Government of National Defense” under Kailani, with a considerable number of extreme nationalists among its members. The government established contacts with Nazi Germany, but in early May, British troops landed in southern Iraq and subdued Iraqi resistance within one month. Hitler had pledged support, but it arrived too late and was insufficient. What happened in 1941 was in fact not a movement but a rather loose federation of political extremists, ambitious officers, and representatives of the old guard of politicians. The time of restoration that followed turned the events into a national myth. The British reinstalled the regent and supported the pro-British politician Nuri al-Said as the strong man of Iraq. Until the demise of the monarchy in 1958, he controlled politics and headed several governments. His pro-British course turned the members of the Kailani group into martyrs of anticolonial resistance. After World War II, a growing trend of urbanization and industrialization, as well as national education, created a broader basis for the integration of a national society. The old nationalists, Iraqi or Arab, were not able to attract a lot of followers. The future seemed to belong to the communist movement and the nascent Ba ’ ath Party. The communists were less internationalist than their support by Moscow would have suggested but, rather, adhered to an Iraqi perspective. The strongly pan-Arab Ba ’ ath was founded in Syria in the 1940s, with a branch in Iraq soon after. The nationalist parties of the 1930s were too attached to the bourgeois and elite state circles to be attractive within the emerging mass society. The Egyptian revolution under Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 left a deep impression on the officer corps, which was, however, ethnically quite heterogeneous and therefore internally split. The pro-British monarchy came to be seen as the main obstacle to true national independence. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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When the monarchy fell in 1958, the entire pattern of Iraqi politics changed. Like under many other Arab revolutionary regimes, the day of the revolution became a national holiday to be appropriated by all successive rulers, although under different pretexts that mirrored once more the rifts in Iraqi society.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation A wide popular movement supported the revolution, which had been preceded by several instances of public protests. The Iraqi Communist Party had the greatest capacities for mass mobilization. The coup itself, however, was a military putsch under the command of a Free Officers cell, including pan-Arab Nasserites, Ba’ath Party sympathizers, and Iraq-first promoters. Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, the most senior officer of the group, managed to gain the upper hand in a power struggle inside the officer corps and successfully claimed the presidency for himself. For this purpose, he managed to rally the support of the communists. His dictatorial tendencies, together with his anti-Arab nationalist, Iraq-first policy— his father was Sunni Arab and his mother, a Shiite Faili Kurd—alienated important factions among the officers. Consequently, he was removed in another military coup in 1963 and replaced with his former ally, Abd al-Salam Arif. The latter had managed to gain the backing of the Ba ’ ath Party, which had gained a strong foothold among important sections of the Iraqi population through its combined appeal of a moderate socialism and Arab nationalism. This political philosophy, however, could not conceal the Sunni dominance in the party and among its group of supporters in the officer corps. Arif was not willing, though, to share power with a political movement and therefore removed Ba ’ ath representatives from government to establish one more personal rule in Iraq. In fact, the forma-

Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914–1963) Abd al-Karim Qasim, first president of the Iraqi Republic, represents two contradictory trends of Iraqi society in the post–World War II period. He was the senior soldier in a group of conspiring army officers that staged the military coup leading to the 1958 revolution. The “Free Officer” conspiracy of Iraq used the Arab nationalist example of Nasser’s revolution in Egypt in 1952 as a model to organize opposition to the monarchy. A strong faction of the Iraqi “Free Officers,” mainly of Sunni Muslim background, were Nasserites and considered the revolution a pretext to the foundation of a larger Arab nation state. Qasim, however, took on an Iraq-first policy after the revolution and gained the support of the Communist Party. He thus represented a faction in the Iraqi public and the military that considered Arab nationalism a threat to the position of non-Arabs and non-Sunni Muslims in the country. This stance, however, alienated the greater part of the officer corps and led to his downfall and assassination in 1963.

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Sunni-Shiite Divide The Sunni-Shiite divide has always been a determining factor of social and political interaction in Iraq. In the 19th century, the religious differences reflected a divide between urban space and countryside. While not the majority, Sunni Arabs dominated politics in the Ottoman provincial capitals, whereas the majority of the population in the tribally organized countryside was mostly Shiite. After the foundation of the state, a class divide began to supersede the religious one because the urbanization of the rural Shiite population led to the growth of impoverished shanty towns with a strong Shiite component. Sunnis were largely able to profit better from the clientele networks that dominated politics. Nevertheless, the increased importance of state education and the growth of the public sector in the economy after the oil boom in the 1970s led to a leveling of social differences and a better integration of the population.

tion of an integrated society identifying with the state as a forum for shared political activity had not made much progress because the dictatorial nature of the military regimes rested on very personalized networks and closed client circles. Politics remained the affair of a clique. The unwillingness to broaden the basis of politics contradicted Arif ’s public appeal to enter into unity talks with the Arab brother state of Egypt, which served to placate the Nasserite tendencies of Arif ’s supporters in the officer corps. Continuing struggles with the Kurds in northern Iraq reflected the lack of national unity in Iraqi society and weighed heavily on all Iraqi governments from the 1920s until the downfall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Qasim’s reputation in the armed forces had suffered from his inability to quell Kurdish unrest, and when Abd al-Rahman Arif became Iraqi president after his brother’s death in a helicopter crash in 1966, he was once more confronted with the growing disenchantment of the officer corps due to setbacks in Kurdistan. Kurdish nationalism contradicted the Arab nationalist doctrine of the limited Sunni elite circles. The Arif brothers emphasized Sunni dominance when they mobilized the bonds of clan solidarity to strengthen their networks in the armed forces. While Iraqi Kurds had a clear pattern of identity to adhere to, Iraqi Shiites became an integral part of the new Iraqi mass society that emerged after World War II, albeit in an uneasy position. Nationalist state education emphasized their Arab nature, and urbanization intensified their contacts with Iraqis of other denominations. However, their experience was that sectarian background determined one’s possibilities to participate in the game of clientelism. Activities in the emerging revolutionary parties provided an alternative, especially the Communist Party that was explicitly antisectarian. In the 1950s, Islamic political associations emerged, such as the Daawa Party. Its radical activist approach was popular among young and disillusioned Shiites, while traditional clerics perceived it with suspicion. For similar reasons, the Communist Party was attractive for young Iraqi Jews as well. The origins of the Iraqi Jewish community date back to antiquity, and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Zionism remained weak in the community even until the forced mass exodus that started in the early 1950s. Under the British mandate as well as in the young Iraqi administration, Jews gained influential positions relatively easily due to their superior skills, which they had gained through modern education at reformed denominational schools that first opened in the 1860s. The state therefore seemed a favorable institution, and many middle-class Jews developed a strong sense of Iraqi patriotism. With the growing strength of Arab nationalist trends among the young non-Jewish intelligentsia, Iraqi Jews became more and more a target of hostility, however. The outbreak of the anti-British and antiZionist revolt in Palestine in 1936 reverberated in nationalist circles of Iraq. They distinguished less and less between Zionists in Palestine and Iraqi Jews. The climax of this growing hostility was a pogrom, the so-called “Farhud,” in Baghdad in early June 1941, immediately after the British-Iraqi war. Approximately 150 Jews of the poorer quarters of the city fell victim to a mob of looters and soldiers as well as roaming youth bands that took advantage of the power vacuum after the Iraqi defeat. Nevertheless, when the Iraqi Jews were finally forced to leave Iraq in large numbers in 1951, most of them were still strongly attached to Iraq, and only a few left out of a Zionist commitment. Until the 1960s, identification with the state and a national society in Iraq remained limited due to continuing sectarian differences and the elitist nature of the Iraqi political system. In spite of the fact that the coups of 1958 and 1963 had been backed by more or less popular movements such as the Communist Party and the Ba ’ ath Party, the shifts in government had only served to modify existing clientele networks and redirect patronage loyalties. Even though the Ba ’ ath Party, assuming power under Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein after a further coup in 1968, followed essentially the same patterns, the 1970s brought drastic changes. The oil crisis of 1973 and the dramatic rise of oil prices multiplied state revenues within a few months. All of a sudden, the rulers could extend the patronage system to an unprecedented extent. This resulted in a huge expansion in the public sector. State education and the growth of towns due to expanded employment opportunities brought people closer together and made them identify more with the state, regardless of its authoritarian nature. Eight years of war against Iran from 1980 to 1988 under the presidency of Saddam Hussein added to the shared experiences of the different religious groups of the country. Even though Iraq was fighting a Shia country, there were only insignificant numbers of defectors among Iraqi Shiites. But the war also triggered the darkest episode in the history of the Iraqi Kurdish community. In 1988, Saddam Hussein’s war machinery turned against Kurdish villages in the north and took revenge for Kurdish collaboration with Iran. The use of poisonous gas against the town of Halabja will long be a symbol of unbridgeable hostility between Iraqi Kurds and the state. After the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi state largely ceased to exist. Northern Iraq became virtually autonomous, and the UN sanctions made normal conduct in administration and economy impossible. Power remained inside the circles around N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Saddam Hussein and turned more and more into a regime of organized crime dominated by the president’s family. Hussein used real or revived tribal structures to control the Iraqi population and uphold his patronage system, which turned into an even more effective means of control in a time of dire shortage. The 1970s middle class of civil servants and employees in the large public sector lost its economic basis. Yet, even after the U.S. occupation of the second Gulf War, it still made up a large part of the population as a group that no longer defined its identity through religious or ethnic adherence only, but through Iraqi nationality. The fact that, beside the old Ba ’ athist networks, diverse opposition groups of Shiite and Sunni Islamist nature have gained decisive power in state and society since 2003 suggests, however, that identities and contradictions are forcibly being imposed again on the population in a civil war situation, even after ethnic and sectarian rifts had been considered overcome. From the outset, the precarious nature of the Iraqi state made it difficult for rulers and elites to form a single national narrative that would enter school curricula and textbooks. Politics determined how tradition had to be invented and the community to be imagined. While Hashemite rule over Iraq favored a clear panArab orientation due to the imposed nature of the dynasty, postrevolutionary regimes put emphasis on an Iraqi national identity linked back to the Mesopotamian heritage, because pan-Arab nationalism had been challenged as the exclusive basis of political designs. The fact that Baghdad had been the center of Islamic culture before the Mongol conquest in 1258 remained very important for the self-perception of the modern Iraqi state. When Muslim armies first conquered Mesopotamia, an important battle took place near Qadisiyya in 636, close to today’s Kufa, which resulted in the defeat and submission of the Persian empire. Arab nationalists referred to the battle in the early 1940s as an example of the spirit of manhood in Arab Muslim warriors to provide a model for the youth of the state. During the war against Iran in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein took up this topos again. In 1986, he commissioned two huge Qadisiyya triumphant arches to be erected in Baghdad. They each consist of two forearms with crossing swords in their hands. Thus, the struggle between Iraq and Iran was symbolically presented as the continuation of an ancient confrontation between the Arabs and the Persians. Only from the 1930s onward did Iraqi political circles start to develop a sense for the usefulness of the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian past to construct a national identity, a trend that reached its climax under Ba ’ ath Party rule. It remained a problem, though, to reconcile the Arab nationalist claim of Ba ’ ath ideology with the Iraqi past of great civilizations, including non-Semitic ones such as the Sumerians. Iraqi academics argued that all Mesopotamian civilizations together were in fact forefathers of the Arabs, a somewhat distorted version of the Semitic Wave theory, which lacked credibility. The emphasis on the Iraqiness of all ancient civilizations contradicted the Arabness of modern Iraqis (the rebellious Kurds aside) that went without question. A possible bridge between the two poles was to refer N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Ceremonial Arches, in the form of hands holding swords, stand at either end of the Baghdad Parade Grounds. This site was built to honor Iraq’s victory over Iran in the eight-year war. The hands are said to be molded after Saddam Hussein’s forearms. (U.S. Department of Defense)

to a shared Iraqi civilization rather than to a blood link among the different peoples that represented it. The linkage between modern Iraq and ancient Mesopotamia made it possible to create a continuity from such ancient rulers as Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar to the leadership cult of Saddam Hussein. Moreover, the claim that in ancient times the peoples of Iraq had been in a position of world leadership justified Iraq’s claim to a leading role in the Arab world. The Babylonian exile of the ancient Israelites was portrayed as an example of Iraq’s responsibility to defend Arab Palestine. Iraqi uniqueness in the framework of the Arab world had to brace all Iraqis, a primordial cultural unity preceding the split between Sunna and Shia after the rise of Islam. This latter claim became increasingly important after the Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 that could potentially weaken Saddam Hussein’s authority in Iraq. The above reference to the battle of Qadisiyya is a proof for the wide array of stories that had to be blended into one single national narrative. During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein started to refer to Islamic images of holy war and destiny as propagandistic means of mobilization, too. In spite of all, this discourse remained only a component of state propaganda. Even though it entered school and university curricula, it is hard to say to what extent it appeared legitimate enough to become an integral part of individual N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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identities among the vast majority of Iraqi citizens living under a dictatorial regime with totalitarian aspirations. By the time the regime fell apart in 2003, the hardships of the post-1991 period had probably jeopardized much of the efforts toward state-society integration of the 1970s and 1980s. Selected Bibliography Baram, Amatzia. 1994. “A Case of Imported Identity: The Modernizing Secular Ruling Elites of Iraq and the Concept of Mesopotamian-Inspired Territorial Nationalism, 1922–1992.” Poetics Today 15, no. 2: 279–319. Batatu, Hanna. 1978. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba ’ thists, and Free Officers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cleveland, William L. 1971. The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati’ al-Husri. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Davis, Eric. 2005. Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dodge, Toby. 2003. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied. London: Hurst. Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. 2001. Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London, New York: I. B. Tauris. Haj, Samira. 1997. The Making of Iraq, 1900–1963: Capital, Power and Ideology. Albany: SUNY Press. Luizard, Pierre-Jean. 1991. La formation de l’Irak contemporain: Le rôle politique des ulémas chiites à la fin de la domination ottomane et au moment de la construction de l’Etat irakien. Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Nakash, Yitzhak. 1994. The Shi’is of Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Simon, Reeva S. 2004. Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny. New York: Columbia University Press. Sluglett, Peter. 2007. Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914–1932. New York: Columbia University Press. Tarbush, Mohammad A. 1982. The Role of the Military in Politics. A Case Study of Iraq to 1941. London: Kegan Paul. Tripp, Charles. 2007. A History of Iraq. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wien, Peter. 2006. Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941. London, New York: Routledge.

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Turkey Kyle T. Evered Chronology 1839–1871 1877–1878 1914–1918 1915 1916 1918–1923 1919 1919–1923 1920 1922 1923 1924 1927 1928 1933 1934 1938 1952

Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat reform era. Russo-Turkish War results in an Ottoman defeat. World War I. Battle of Gallipoli. Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France. British and Triple Entente occupations of Istanbul. Amasya Agreement; Erzurum Congress; Sivas Congress. Turkish War of Independence. National Pact declared; Grand National Assembly formed in Ankara; Treaty of Sèvres. Sultanate is abolished. Treaty of Lausanne. Also, a recently re-seated assembly proclaims a new Turkish Republic and declares Atatürk as its president and I˙nönü as its prime minister. The caliphate is abolished. Atatürk delivers his famous 36-hour “Speech” (or Nutuk) to a Republican Peoples Party congress. Introduction of a new Turkish alphabet. Universal suffrage is declared. Turkish assembly confers surname/title “Atatürk” (or “father of the Turks”) upon Mustafa Kemal. Death of Atatürk. Turkey joins NATO.

Situating the Nation Today linked inextricably to the modern Republic of Turkey, variations of Turkish nationalism actually arose in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire (1290s–1922). This political precursor to the Turkish nation-state was not, however, an entity that could be defined essentially as just “Turkish.” Though led primarily by a ruling Ottoman Turkish dynasty, the Ottoman state was a vast land-based empire that was notable for a populace of diverse ethnicities, languages, and religions. It was also an Islamic state that had claimed control of the caliphate since as early as the 15th century. As an institution, the caliphate originated in the seventh century following the death of the Prophet Muhammad (ca. 570–632). It was the only institution in history that authorized a unified religious and political leadership over the Islamic world, as recognized at least by most Sunni Muslims, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and it thus became a major prize for empires of the Middle East to control since the time of the Umayyad dynasty in the later seventh century. For the Ottomans, reliance on the authority and symbolisms of the sultanate and the caliphate were not the only means to rule an empire that included many non-Turks and non-Muslims. Practical governance of this pluralistic society functioned through the establishment of the millet system. Initially, a millet was defined roughly as a religious community, but concepts of ethnicity became integrated over time, as well. This system implied a centralized, imperial order within which local communities existed in a semi-autonomous state that both allowed them to express their own religious, cultural, and linguistic identities at a local scale and empowered them to manage related institutions (especially for religion and education). In this manner, the millet system was a safeguard against the empire’s potentially disruptive heterogeneity; rather than immediately assuming that unfavorable policies resulted from ethnic or religious discrimination, individuals were limited to making less politically volatile assumptions focused on their own communities, its leaders, and its representatives and liaisons in the imperial system. In depicting periods prior to the late Ottoman era, many historians have represented the millet system as a successful means of governing an extremely diverse society. Already in a sustained period of decline since the 17th-century economic crisis, the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century experienced serious challenges to its legitimacy and its very existence. Problems faced by the Sublime Porte (i.e., the Ottoman state) included the particularization of ethnic and religious groups into nationalisms that would seek total autonomy, competition with other global empires (such as the expanding Russian empire), economic and technological marginalization, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Identifying many of these problems as stemming from failures to modernize, the Ottomans initiated the Tanzimat reforms in 1839. The reform era that followed (1839–1871) witnessed an emphasis on modernizing—and further centralizing and empowering—the empire’s bureaucratic institutions and the ways that state and society were managed. It was also a period marked by state efforts to enhance loyalty to the troubled empire by moving beyond requiring simply allegiance from its subjects and millets to actually promoting identification with the empire. This state-fostered identity construct known as “Ottomanism” thus evolved in a context of reform that was both inspired by connections—and competition—with Europe, on the one hand, and devised to prevent internal ethno-nationalist fragmentation by substituting an imperial identity, on the other. In dealing specifically with its Muslim populace, the empire also emphasized “Islamism” as an identity subject to the Ottomanheld caliphate. Lacking anything approaching a robust economy, many of the ambitious Tanzimat reforms were instituted piecemeal and partially, at best. Moreover, Ottomanism, interpreted by many non-Turkish citizens as an assertion of Turkish identity over other ethnic identities, often contributed more to ethno-national development among the empire’s ethnic minorities, and Islamism N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was viewed both as divisive by many non-Muslims and as illegitimate by many Arab Muslims who had long doubted the appropriateness of a non-Arab caliphate ruling over the umma (the collective Islamic community). This era also gave rise to the Young Ottomans, a disparate group of intellectuals who were comprised mostly of educated sons of the elite and lesser officials. Media savvy, they were the first in Turkey to employ a press for their own ends. Though their interests were diverse, they generally regarded the Tanzimat reforms as hollow approximations of European ideals that were applied autocratically and were essentially disloyal to Ottoman traditions and Islamic sensibilities. Advocating an alternative Ottomanism that was not just articulated from above, they were staunch critics of the state, committed to promoting alternative paths of modernization that would be true to their Ottoman heritage, to Islam, and to their desire to learn from Europe without being subordinate to it politically, culturally, or intellectually. Historically, the most prominent from this loose grouping of early nationalists was Namik Kemal. His contemporaries likely appreciated his powerful emphasis on the supreme importance of vatan (“fatherland”), a concern due to the ongoing territorial dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Having already lost much of what would become Greece in the preceding decades, the Ottoman state was confronted throughout the 19th century both by other global empires and by rebellious ethno-nationalisms and religious groups. The most notable of these international conflicts was the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, which resulted in large losses of lives on both sides. Russia’s immediate geopolitical gains from the war were largely reversed later by other European powers at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, while the Ottoman Empire lost most of its territories in the Balkans and a great deal of prestige and legitimacy. Additional events that would contribute to the eventual decline and collapse of the empire included the following: Austria

Namik Kemal (1840–1888) Namik Kemal was among the first foundational figures contributing to an emergent Turkish national identity. He was a writer of plays, poems, and prose, a newspaper columnist, and a publisher. Heavily associated with—directly or otherwise through the influence of his words—the Young Ottomans and later the Young Turks, he was also distinguished from many as he never sought to thoroughly renounce Islam, even being associated especially with Sufism in his later years. As such, he is sometimes identified as an early model thinker for representing the compatibility between maintaining the Islamic faith alongside secular politics, as well as for advancing the ideas and agendas of a nascent Turkish nationalism. He is most credited with embedding the territorial idea of vatan in the collective Turkish nationalist consciousness. His early 1870s dramatic play Vatan yahnut Sillistre is associated most often with Kemal’s popularization of this term and the sentiments of territoriality.

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seizing Bosnia-Herzegovina; a French occupation of Tunisia; a British occupation of Egypt; Bulgaria’s annexation of East Rumelia; the rise of Armenian nationalism amid Russian intervention; the Greco-Turkish War; and the Macedonian question. Prior to—and especially after—such conflicts, the Ottoman Empire was regarded by Western powers as the so-called “Sick Man of Europe.” Such losses also contributed to the further actualization of Turkish national identification. The outcome of both the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the other losses that preceded it, plus the ascension of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842–1918, reigned 1876–1909) to the throne, marked the end to the brief five-year period of constitutional experimentation, when the Young Ottomans exercised varying degrees of influence over Ottoman policies. In the subsequent decades, Abdülhamid II reverted to autocratic rule, although he sought to realize many of the reformist promises of the Tanzimat, applying his own versions of Ottomanism among the empire’s citizenry and Islamism among its Muslims. Accordingly, education became an important state tool in promoting these ideals—though fiscal limitations often inhibited opening and expanding schools. Schooling was also a sphere of foreign penetration, with other empires and Christian missionaries opening schools throughout the empire— especially in territories of ethnic and religious minorities. As a leader, Abdülhamid II was not at all averse to employing severe—even violent—repression to perceived resistance, as was particularly true in policies toward the empire’s increasingly nationalistic and pro-Russian Armenian minority. In reaction to Abdülhamid II’s rule, as well as from a desire to revive the constitutionalism that was considered briefly in the Young Ottoman period prior to his ascension, the so-called Young Turks (also known as the Committee of Union and Progress, or CUP, and by similar names) articulated many alternative expressions of Ottomanism. As with manifestations of Ottomanism that were voiced by the Young Ottomans, the visions of Ottomanism expressed by the Young Turks expressed evocatively and appreciably a nascent Turkish nationalism. Almost without exception, historians of this period have depicted the rise of the Young Turks as influenced—at least partly—by liberal ideologies in the West, as were many Young Ottomans. With respect to Islamism, some were quite devoted to its adoption and application, others were less enthusiastic, and some were even opposed to its emphasis. Many also manipulated ethnic and religious differences within Ottoman society to acquire support against Abdülhamid II—sometimes creating enduring intergroup animosities. Others attempted to define variously distinct Turkish nationalisms; some expressions had profoundly racial overtones, others were based more on ethnicity, and others integrated both approaches in defining “Turkish-ness.” Additionally, some Young Turks’ views went far beyond the realms of the Ottoman Empire and promoted pan-Turkism—seeking to unify all Turkic peoples from eastern Europe to eastern Turkestan (today, China’s Xinjiang province). Thus, while notions of an Ottoman or Turkish territory might have been a growing N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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concern, specific expressions of its location ranged from the European and Anatolian territories of the modern Turkish nation-state to the various territories claimed by the Ottoman Empire throughout its long histories, and even to the central southern core of Eurasia. Given such variabilities, it is difficult to make appropriate generalizations about the Young Turks collectively. Indeed, it would be more appropriate to distinguish between the political program followed by those who would later rise to power, on the one hand, and the individual works of this broad movement’s main luminaries, on the other. In sum, their profound diversity has sometimes been overshadowed by their unity of opposition to Abdülhamid II and their stated desires to restore a constitutional system. Disenchantment in the empire with Abdülhamid II and his tight control of the state was widespread. In 1908, a Young Turk leadership asserted control by gaining the support of troops stationed in Macedonia. They reinstated the 1876, pre-Abdülhamid II constitution and marched toward Istanbul. Despite a counterrevolution led by Abdülhamid II in April 1909, the Young Turks established themselves, deposed Abdülhamid II, and set up a constitutional monarchy that they led. The sultanate, under Mehmed V (1844–1918, reigned 1909–1918), would be little more than a figurehead for the state throughout the remainder of the empire’s history. Focused on acquiring internal control, the Young Turks made the Ottoman state extremely vulnerable to external powers—even promoting cooperation among them (especially Britain and France). In recalling the territorial losses and insecurity that the empire endured during the previous century, this focus was both foolhardy and dangerous. This characterization was especially true of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in World War I. Seeking to alleviate their most immediate concerns over Ottoman territories with the British and the French and reflecting the sympathies of many with the plight of Turkic Muslims in the Russian empire, the Young Turk political leadership entered eagerly into an alliance with Germany. The overzealous application of their political leadership’s policies within the empire was also counterproductive. Despite the hardships that instability and friction with external powers caused, the Young Turks attempted to achieve internal control by any means possible. When not preoccupied with foreign challenges along their borders, the Young Turks attempted to quell any dissension within them. For instance, shortly before Erzurum was captured by Russia in 1916, many Armenians were massacred or died amid deportations from Eastern Anatolia, making the massacres of Armenians under Abdülhamid II seem little more than a prelude in scale. Despite the deaths of many Turks in the interethnic violence that ensued, Armenian claims of “genocide” persist to the present day and still frustrate the Turkish nation-state internationally in its conduct of foreign affairs and domestically as various parties seek to address the matter publicly. Though the Ottoman Empire’s demise is often associated with World War I in prosaic general histories, this banal view only accounts for the last scenes of a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mehmet Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) Ziya Gökalp, as he is more commonly known, is widely regarded as the most significant voice of an emergent Turkish nation prior to the rise of Atatürk. Born in Diyarbakir—most likely of Kurdish ancestry—educated in veterinary science in Istanbul, and a self-taught philosopher and sociologist, he was influenced strongly by the works of Durkheim and other European notables. Advocating a centralized system of education, he viewed it as a chief vehicle for integrating Western ideas with Turkish national culture, and both with Islam. He held only minor political offices during the Young Turk era and served in the new republic’s assembly for only a short time until his death. Gökalp’s major accomplishment was the construction of an ideological foundation that facilitated both the transition from the Young Turks’ version of the Ottoman state to the modern Turkish republic and the creation of a national image that functioned as the theoretical counterpart to what would be Atatürk’s national policies.

rather long drama involving many internal dynamics. The internal histories of identity construction—not only of Ottomanism, Islamism, pan-Turkism, and Turkish nationalisms but also of many ethnic and religious minorities’ nationalisms— and of conflicting views of governance and the proper paths to modernization were at least as decisive in bringing about the empire’s eventual collapse. In both the histories of the final days of the empire and of the republic that would follow, the works of writers and philosophers from the Young Ottoman era, like Namik Kemal, and from the Young Turk era, like Mehmet Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, would prove decisive in articulating the lexicon and imageries that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) would draw upon in defining the Turkish nation-state.

Instituting the Nation While debates over the eventual division of Ottoman territories—and especially the Bosporus—had been ongoing among European powers for almost a century, the eventual demise of the so-called “Sick Man of Europe” was especially a matter of concern amid the hostilities of World War I. Britain and France’s attempt to gain a foothold in Anatolia that could be used as a base for a push toward Istanbul and the Bosporus—the prolonged Battle of Gallipoli that took place throughout much of 1915—was thoroughly unsuccessful. This battle did, however, enable the meteoric rise of a mid-level officer named Mustafa Kemal. Later known as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, he distinguished himself as one of the heroes of the fatherland in leading troops against this considerable invasion force. In the following year, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 formally divided the Ottoman lands. The plan effectively carved up not only much of the remaining Arab lands of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Ottoman Empire between Britain and France, it also partitioned considerable lands in what would emerge—despite this plan—as the modern Turkish republic. Earlier agreements also made territorial offerings within Anatolia to Italy and even offered the Bosphorus and Istanbul to Russia. With the Ottoman defeat in World War I, Sultan Mehmed VI (1861–1926, reigned 1918–1922) was briefly in a position of symbolic leadership over what remained of the empire, while the British and then the Triple Entente began an occupation of Istanbul that would last from 1918 to 1923. At this time, the sultan had the remaining members of the top CUP/Young Turk leadership arrested— some had already fled—and they were then convicted of various crimes, several of them in absentia. In May 1919, Atatürk and others began the Turkish War of Independence—recognizing the failed Ottoman state for the European puppet state it was beginning to become. The presence of foreign forces in Istanbul and Anatolia helped Atatürk acquire support with the call to arms that came in the form of the June 1919 Amasya Agreement. This movement for an independent nation-state was further galvanized by the subsequent 1919 congresses held in both Erzurum and Sivas. At these congresses, among many other issues, the territorial shape of an eventual Turkish nation-state was envisioned. This idealized Turkish national homeland was officially declared in January 1920 the Misak-ı Millî (National Pact). The operative capital for this new homeland was designated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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in the small, central Anatolian city of Ankara in April 1920 when a national assembly was established there. The earlier proposed Sykes-Picot partition would seem minor, however, in contrast with the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and its division of Anatolia. Though accepted by the marginalized Ottoman sultanate, this treaty was rejected by—and also contributed to further support for—Atatürk’s alternative government, which also abolished the sultanate in November 1922. Atatürk’s rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres and his leadership during the ongoing Turkish War of Independence forced an eventual replacement of the original treaty with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This agreement roughly fixed international recognition of the boundaries largely associated with the modern Turkish republic. In October 1923, already possessing a state structure from the War of Independence, the new state’s assembly proclaimed the new Republic of Turkey, appointed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as its new president, and declared that the military leader—and Atatürk’s key representative at the Lausanne peace talks— ˙Ismet ˙Inönü (1884–1973) would be prime minister. Upon this history of national struggle, the nation-state of Turkey would be established—as would a vision of its membership and the singular national narrative that was directed largely by Atatürk. In this manner, Kemalism—named for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—became the singular definition of Turkish nationalism, the ideological basis of the nationstate, and the doctrine of the republic. In this context, too, we see why Mustafa Kemal would later acquire “Atatürk” (or “father of the Turks”) as his surname/title from a 1934 act of Turkey’s assembly.

Defining the Nation As noted above, there was a rich and diverse tradition of defining “Turkish-ness” —and, recalling pan-Turkism, even “Turkic-ness”—since as early as the Tanzimat era (if we include early, state-led Ottomanism) and the Young Ottomans. The new republic under Atatürk’s leadership sought to define itself as a modern nationstate, and it thus circumscribed a Turkish nationalism that purged notions of Ottomanism and Islamism. Alternative Anatolian identities, such as those of the Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Laz, and others, were also not included in visions of the new nation’s membership. While some of these groups had been previously expelled—or would be shortly amid population exchanges with Greece, for example—others were expected to assimilate ethnically and linguistically. In this sense, the vision of a Turkish nation that was being employed was one of an elective identity; through education and personal choice, people could become Turkish. Indeed, racial views of identity—especially when they were associated with pan-Turkish ideals and agendas—were characterized as fundamentally racist and even fascist, and advocates of such perspectives were later targets of proseN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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cution in the Anatolian republic. While this view of a national identity was fine for everyone who was inclined to comply with it, it created particular problems for those who were not. Indeed, Atatürk’s euphemistic characterization of Kurds as simply “mountain Turks” reflected not only intolerance for alternative inclinations of ethnic identification (not to mention either ignorance or ambivalence toward a people who are Irani, and not Turkic) but also a pejorative view of alternative ethnic identities within the republic as primitive and ignorant. Given such perspectives, it is also understandable why the relatively poor republic that emerged from the Ottoman state’s collapse and World War I pursued policies of nation-building and education with such rigor. Meanwhile, Kurdish identity and political agendas were suppressed by the state, thus beginning the basis for the Kurdish question—and the associated problem of insurgency—that persists to this day in southeastern Anatolia. The geographic definition of the Turkish nation also remained consistent with the vision articulated in the so-called National Pact of 1920, though with some exceptions; the former Ottoman vilayet (or province) of Mosul was relinquished to the British as part of Mandate Iraq, and there were some other less significant changes as well. This geopolitical organization of the state was viewed as critical to the Turkish state in a number of ways. Initially, with the exception of claims by Kurds and other minority ethnic groups and by Armenians and Greeks who had been expelled or were being “exchanged,” it was not a territory that could be viewed as particularly threatening to others or as irredentist. Indeed, it is often noted in Turkish national histories that Atatürk sought to safeguard Turkey by avoiding such territorial ambitions and opportunities, as in the case of his reported rejection of Azerbaijani invitations for him to annex Azerbaijan so that it would be under fellow Turkic peoples and not under Russo-Soviet control. Later, this geographic decisiveness created what many Turks viewed as an ideal Anatolian core upon which the national narrative could be established. The matter of religion was also a great concern. While Turkey is often characterized as supporting “secularism,” some scholars of the early republic prefer to describe it as endorsing “laicism.” As a concept, laicism was borrowed from constitutional developments in 19th-century France and had little to do with thoroughly suppressing any particular religion. Rather, it was a more explicit statement affirming that the state would not support—or even simply favor—any particular religion. The removal of Islam from the political sphere began at least as early as Atatürk’s 1924 abolishment of the caliphate and the abolishment of Islamic courts, and it continued politically with the 1937 incorporation of “secularism” in the republic’s constitution and with related social reforms, such as the prohibition of veiling or covering by women and girls who worked for the state or attended its schools. Still, characterizations of the Turkish republic as “secular” or “laicist” are overstatements. Indeed, though Atatürk tried to keep the politicization of Islam and the Islamicization of politics in check, the state also neither aspired to eliminate religion entirely nor entrust it to nonstate entities. In keeping with the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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corporatist Kemalist state, religion was to be managed by state institutions that would control theological education, staffing of clergy, mosques and other infrastructure, and so forth. This arrangement would endure until changes in the administration of religion in Turkey came about due to manifestations of political Islam that emerged over the past two decades. As with state repression of political expressions of ethno-linguistic identities, suppression of religion and dealing with its resurgence became an enduring challenge for the state. In addition to ethno-linguistic, geographic, and religious aspects of national identity, defining the Turkish nation and the Kemalist state in a way that was inclusive for women was also a major concern. Though Atatürk made women’s rights and opportunities a priority, the issue was not entirely new. During the later period of imperial decline, the roles of women both in the family and within a wider society were topics that were commonly discussed by supporters of the Ottoman state and by its array of critics, alike. Thus, even prior to the creation of a secular Turkish republic, symbolisms of the place of women in Ottoman society constituted powerful discursive weapons in struggles against both tradition and conservative Islam. For Ziya Gökalp, the woman was employed symbolically in consonance with imagery from idyllic Turkic communities of ages past. In such contexts, women and men were idealized as having equal rights and privileges in both the home and society. Therefore, notions of parity between the sexes were quite integral in the fusions of Turkic mythologies and political ideals that would emerge in most manifestations of Turkish nationalism. Among the key proponents of women’s roles in the emergent Turkish nation and nation-state was the prominent woman writer Halide Edib Adivar (1884–1964). In 1933, universal suffrage was declared in Turkey—ahead of similar declarations in some Western states.

Narrating the Nation While an abundance of “Turkish” literature—novels, short stories, plays, songs, poetry, histories, essays, and so forth—emerged after the time of the Young Ottomans by writers such as Namik Kemal, Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, and Halide Edib Adivar, among others, perhaps the most profound statement of the new nation-state was written on the Anatolian landscape rather than on paper. The designation of Ankara as the nation’s capital was a profound statement about what the Turkish nation was—or at least what it should be—and what it was not. Rejecting Istanbul, the centuries-long seat of both the Ottoman sultanate and the caliphate, Ankara would remain the center of the new Anatolian and secularist Turkish nation-state. As with many forward capitals, the planning for Ankara was ambitious and involved an international competition to select the ideal design for the modernist republic. Incorporating the usual state buildings and monuments— ones that were grandiose in scale and ultramodern and masculine in style—the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) Of both Volga and Crimean Tatar heritage, Akçura was one of the few figures associated with the Young Turk movement who was not only influenced by European thought but who actually studied for a number of years in France. A prodigious writer, his pan-Turkish influence on the Young Turks is often explained by his parentage, his sustained connections with and sympathies for the Tatars of Kazan, and family connections to the distinguished Tatar Jadidist Ismail Bey Gaspirali. With the emergence of the Turkish state, he was a member of the Turkish assembly, but was perhaps most noted for being tapped by Atatürk to head the republic’s historical society—what would emerge to be the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Foundation).

chosen plans also included significant green spaces and elements like an urban farm for research. Such designs revealed how the Kemalist state intended to instruct its citizenry on how their lives should be lived, not only in work but in recreation, and how the state intended to reach out and modernize what was still an essentially agrarian, rural society. The selection of Ankara was also telling about how the nation would define its membership. Abandoning the cosmopolitan, world city of Istanbul, Ankara was reinvented as a quintessentially Anatolian hearth for an Anatolian Turkish nation. The ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of Ottoman society was thus rejected, as was any identification with ambitions beyond the borders roughly identified by the National Pact of 1920—with some subsequent modifications. The seat of the new nation-state thus spoke to its intentions of neutrality—as would be demonstrated in the subsequent World War II era—and its introspective orientation. Indeed, rather than looking to other Turkic societies to define the nation, the Kemalist state incorporated pre-Turkic symbols of Anatolia—such as those of the Hittites and other early Anatolian-based civilizations. As a matter of state historiography, the Ottoman past was thus relegated to a far lesser status than the evolving histories of the republic would be. While Ankara as a tableau for the presentation of this idealized Anatolian Turkish state was a sound choice, the presentation’s mythic appropriations of past civilizations and its exclusions of contemporary identities still present in Anatolia (like those of the Kurds, Laz, remaining Armenians and Greeks, Alevis, and other ethnic and religious constituencies) would create profound obstacles for future generations. Though such excluded ethno-linguistic and religious “others” would confront the state in later years of the republic, other types of alternative narratives did emerge in the early period. In such cases, too, the urban landscape provides us with an ideal view of such discordant narrations of the nation. Although the Kemalist state was ambitious, populist, and corporatist—not only out of a desire to control but also out of sincere convictions of inclusivity in the program of modernization—its resources were seriously limited. This became immediately N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Major intersection in Ankara with the city’s former Hittite-derived symbol prominently displayed. Since the rise of Islamism in contemporary Turkey, this symbol was replaced by a symbol incorporating a mosque. (Courtesy of Kyle T. Evered)

apparent in the dynamics of rural-to-urban population shifts. Despite its remarkable planning, Ankara—and other large cities—simply could not foresee or effectively absorb the numbers of people arriving from the countryside. Thus, encircling and interspersed with the ornately planned landscape of the capital emerged gecekondu (Turkish squatter settlements) that would endure in various forms up to the present day. These neighborhoods of the disenfranchised in the capital and in other key cities would form the basis of a sort of Islamic populism that would manifest itself in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In addition to the populism and corporatism that the state employed—and its written and unwritten policies of inclusion/exclusion, as indicated above—the Kemalist state also found particular nation-building institutions to be of paramount importance. Beyond just a centralized system of education that largely excluded private schools and universities—at least until recent decades—the state would also craft a distinct notion of “Turkishness.” This goal would depend upon controlling language, history, and notions of tradition, among other things. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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At the time of the empire’s collapse, the common written language was Ottoman Turkish. It was a hybrid of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian and was written in variations of the Arabic script. For the vast majority of peoples in Anatolia, this language was not only inaccessible on account of their mass rates of illiteracy, but much of its vocabulary was also foreign. To foster nation-building projects, one of the immediate priorities involved both standardizing a Turkish language and the promotion of literacy. In 1928, Turkey adopted a modern Turkish alphabet—a move that also implied severing connections with its Ottoman and Islamic past and more closely approximating a European/Western future. In 1932, Turkey established what would eventually become the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Foundation). Initially guided by the so-called “Sun-Language Theory,” language reforms began that would endure and continue long beyond the immediate interests generated by this bizarre view on the Turkish language and its derivation. In scope, the reforms generally entailed the replacement of Arabic and Persian words with Turkish words and/or neologisms. Words that were unique inventions for this particular Anatolian Turkish replaced words common throughout most Turkic languages. Geoffrey Lewis’s book, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success, provides a wonderful account of how the actions and results of the project far exceeded the original expectations of its mandate. As indicated in the previous section, the formative Kemalist state sought to further solidify the legitimacy of the republic in the minds of its citizens—while sharply differentiating itself from its not-so-distant Ottoman and Islamic pasts. It thus created and fostered its own academic institutions that were devoted to the history of the Turkish nation. In this exercise, an unlikely mixing of the Anatolianbound Kemalism with a revamped pan-Turanian notion of ethno-genesis could be witnessed. As it became institutionalized, however, it was entirely apparent that the alluring pan-Turanian myths of Turkic origins would only be employed to the extent that they would reify the exclusively Anatolian imagery of the Turkish nation-state. While appeasing some citizens’ fantasies of the pan-Turanian, they would refocus attention back toward Anatolia. In short, a co-optation of Turkists was sought through the deployment of mythic histories of the nation. Yusuf Akçura was appointed to lead this movement and establish what would become the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Foundation). At its 1932 gathering— and with the enthusiastic support of Atatürk—the so-called “Turkish historical thesis” was advanced as the singular paradigm of the nation’s history. Blending aspects of the mythic, the historic, and the fantastic, this thesis purported that the origins of all Turkic peoples could be traced to central Asia. The “Turkish historical thesis” was based on notions concerning the Turkic cultural hearth in central Asia, from which Turkic peoples diffused in successive waves outward to Europe, the Middle East, east Asia, and even to the Americas. According to this thesis, the civilizations that would later emerge were all culturally and biologically derivative, at least in part, of an early Turkic people of one ethnic type or another. This insinuation of a Turkic contribution to, or at least a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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presence within, the major civilizations of the world was an idea that was not promoted outside Turkey, but it was further developed and taught from early childhood on within the republic. The Anatolian Turkish nationalism of the Kemalist period thus depicted earlier peoples of the region as ancestral brethren— sometimes in a rather extreme fashion. The earliest of Anatolia’s prehistoric agriculturalists and pastoralists, the Hittites, the Phrygians, the Lydians, the Galatians, the Sumerians, the Byzantines, and the Seljuk and Osmanlı/Ottoman Turks were thus all rooted in the soil of Anatolia and were alive in the present day in the Turkish nation and its political manifestation, the Kemalist state. Monuments of a romantic Anatolia would be erected subsequently, even in prominent locations within the nation’s capital. Indeed, images from Hittite art have been common motifs in government publications and textbooks throughout the nation-state era. Their contemporary usage has been in decline, however, as they have been increasingly replaced—sometimes even amid contestations regarding claims as to their authenticity/legitimacy. The earlier, Kemalist-era icon for Ankara featured one such Hittite statue, and its departure is but one example of the declining symbolic relevance of Anatolian icons. Finally, within the Turkish republic, the question as to whether or not to employ folk culture as a medium for nation-building was never an issue. Indeed, that question seems to have been resolved by Young Ottoman and Young Turk theorists, like Namik Kemal and Ziya Gökalp, respectively. Moreover, the message was not at issue either; the state would promote the Anatolian ideal of Turkish nationalism as fostered by the Kemalist state. The main questions concerning folk culture, therefore, tended to center around the forms to be promoted and how they might complement—or how they might require modification in order to complement—the historical and linguistic projects of the new nation-state. Of the varieties of folk culture that the Turkish state actively promoted, folklore could easily be identified as having been among the most prominent. Indeed, as a crucial component of nation-building, folklore studies in Turkey enjoyed the status of a discipline unto itself for many years. In 1927, the Halk Bilgisi Derne˘gi (Folklore Association) was established. Publications, such as the association’s journal Halk Bilgisi Mecmuası, soon followed. Building upon some of the earlier works of figures like Gökalp, many initial works were devoted to the epics of heroic figures or popular tales. Under the Kemalist leadership and institutions of the early republic, the Turkish nation developed along a largely singular trajectory within Turkey until the final days of World War II and Turkey’s increased contacts with the West through programs like the Truman Doctrine and its entry into NATO in the early 1950s. While divergence from this trajectory did occur—as was the case with panTurkish or Kurdish activists—it was policed and repressed by the state. In this isolated and controlled context, histories of Turkish national identity and the Kemalist state traveled roughly the same path until the republic increased oppor-

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tunities for political dissent within its borders—as with the adoption of a multiparty system—and allowed increased contacts beyond them. Selected Bibliography Ahmad, Feroz. 2001. The Making of Modern Turkey. London: Routledge. Berkes, Niyazi. 1998. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Introduction by Feroz Ahmad. New York: Routledge. Bozdo˘gan, Sibel. 2001. Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Bozdo˘gan, Sibel, and Re¸sat Kasaba, eds. 2003. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Evered, Emine Ö. 2007. “An Educational Prescription for the Sultan: Hüseyin Hilmi Pa¸sa’s Advice for the Maladies of Empire.” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3: 439–459. Evered, Kyle T. 2005. “Regionalism in the Middle East and the Case of Turkey.” Geographical Review 95, no. 3: 463–477. Gökalp, Ziya. 1968. The Principles of Turkism. Translated and annotated by Robert Devereux. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill. Kandiyoti, Deniz, and Ay¸se Saktanbar, eds. 2002. Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Karpat, Kemal H. 2001. The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Landau, Jacob B. 1995. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Lewis, Bernard. 2001. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, Geoffrey L. 1999. The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mardin, ¸Serif. 2006. Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. White, Jenny B. 2003. Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Zürcher, Erik J. 2005. Turkey: A Modern History. 3rd ed. London: I. B. Tauris.

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Burma Jörg Schendel Chronology 1824–1826; 1852–1853; 1885 Three Anglo-Burmese wars: gradual British conquest and administrative integration into British India. 1906 Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) is founded; develops from initial cultural and religious concerns into a political organization. 1920 General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) emerges from the YMBA; promotes noncooperation with the British but suffers many organizational splits. 1923 So-called dyarchy constitution is in force; the departments of education and forestry are headed by Burmese ministers and are responsible to the legislative council. 1930 Foundation of Dobama Asiayoun, a nationalist organization promoting independence. 1930–1932 Hsaya San Rebellion, built on earlier noncooperation campaigns in the Burmese countryside. 1937 Separation of Burma from British India; Burmese prime minister and ministers are responsible to the legislative assembly, British governor with special powers. 1942–1945 Japanese occupation of Burma. 1943 Formal independence under the wing of the Japanese. 1944 Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO, later AFPFL) is formed—parts of the Burmese army, communists, and socialists combine in resistance against the Japanese. 1945 British recapture Burma. 1947 Aung San–Attlee Agreement; Great Britain agrees to independence. 1948 Independence from Great Britain; subsequent civil war.

Situating the Nation Burma has been host to a succession of large-scale political formations since the 11th century. The area’s most powerful rulers controlled the full length of the Irrawaddy basin, establishing varying degrees of supremacy over adjacent territories—namely, Arakan in the west, Tenasserim in the southeast, the Chin and Kachin hills in the north and northwest, and the Shan hills and northern Thailand in the east—and repelling Thai and Chinese armies. Repeated defeats by the British Indian army in three Anglo-Burmese wars (1824–1826, 1852–1853, 1885), subsequent annexation, and a decade of “pacification” campaigns, incorporation into British India, and British governance resulted in a sharp break with the past. The dismantling of political and administrative institutions in the lowlands was followed by direct British administration. Successive constitutional changes, directed from British India, led to the introduction of a lieutenant governor of Burma (1897), an enlarged legislative council (1909), and two ministerial posts N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Hsaya San Rebellion (1930–1932) This movement of rural violence and resistance was inspired and partly led by the eponymous former activist of the GCBA. Amid plummeting rice prices, widespread land foreclosures, and pressing tax demands in the early stages of the Great Depression, the rebellion was directed against landlords, moneylenders, tax collectors, and other institutions of the colonial state and economy. The rebellion was a culmination of pre-nationalist rural resistance, elements of Buddhist millennialism, and the grassroots resistance tactics of the GCBA and the wunthanu athin, where Hsaya San as well as many of his lieutenants and supporters had been active earlier. The British military defeated the rebels, thus demonstrating the limits of rural resistance, and Hsaya San was tried and hanged. Along with U Ottama and others, the nationalist movement held him up as a paragon of national spirit.

for the Burmese, responsible to a partially elected legislative council (1923). By 1937, Burma had separated from British India, had a Burmese prime minister elected by a legislative assembly, and had a cabinet deciding most issues. Foreign affairs, defense, monetary policy, and the administration of border areas remained the prerogative of the British governor. From 1942 to 1945, Burma was under Japanese control, even though it had a Burmese administration and was nominally independent from 1943 onward. After the British recaptured Burma, it attained independence on January 4, 1948. Socioeconomic change under colonial rule was massive. Rice agriculture, particularly in the Irrawaddy delta of Lower Burma, became largely export-oriented and was driven by the swift extension of cultivated land and rapid population growth. Under British laissez-faire economic and immigration policies, a rigid ethnic division of labor emerged. The Burmese largely focused on agriculture and left most positions in trade, the learned professions, and the civil service to Indian and Chinese immigrants. The British occupied the commanding heights of politics and economics. As Burmese cultivators were exposed to fluctuating rice prices in the world market, the pressures of taxes, debts, and interest payments mounted. The Great Depression of the 1930s triggered a wave of debt recall and foreclosures, exacerbating Burmese discontent with the colonial political and socioeconomic system. Meanwhile, Western education helped a Burmese middle class emerge and shift into new urban professions, including civil service jobs—a prerequisite for organizing and articulating Burmese national interests.

Instituting the Nation The emergence of Burmese nationalism and an independent nation-state was reflected in institutional and conceptual shifts, from religious and cultural associations operating within the confines of British colonialism, to political parties and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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student unions, and finally to a broad-based independence movement. The Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA), patterned after the YMCA, was founded in 1906 by Rangoon students and soon included high-ranking Burmese civil servants. Initially loyal to the British and mainly promoting cultural and religious institutions, they soon championed the cause of Burmese rights and liberties, such as more and higher-ranking civil service posts and a dyarchy constitution. In 1920, a younger, more expressly anticolonial group carved a mass organization, the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA), out of the YMBA. Soon, however, the GCBA split, due to personal rivalries and different approaches toward key issues such as participation in elections. The leading nationalist figure of the 1920s was U Chit Hlaing (1879–1952), the son of a successful merchant, trained as a barrister in England, who spent most of his wealth on the GCBA. In the 1930s, he became dependent on Indian financial support and lost his influence. The Buddhist monkhood (sangha) resented Christian proselytizing, missionary and secular education, and the new ways of life, considering them threats to Burmese moral and religious values. Monks (pongyis) had led anti-British uprisings in the 19th century, and in the 1920s, politically active monks (dhammakatikas, a term including nonpolitical Buddhist teachers) sought to link Western-educated and urban-based nationalists with the rural masses. The dhammakatikas supported rural protest organizations (wunthanu athins) at the village, circle, and district levels, which were, in turn, affiliated with the GCBA. The monks themselves formed unions (sangha sammeggis, later subsumed within general councils for Upper and Lower Burma, respectively) and at times controlled the GCBA. The most prominent figure was U Ottama (1897–1939), who had previously been active in the Indian National Congress. He spoke out for self-rule and nonviolent noncooperation, which earned him and many other dhammakatikas several spells in prison as part of a British campaign against the wunthanu athins. University students and their unions, especially at Rangoon University, came to play important roles in nationalist organizations, and the university strikes of 1920 and 1936—both directed against British academic control and educational policies that sought to produce pliable civil servants—were important catalysts of the nationalist movement. By 1930, young intellectuals had founded the Dobama Asiayoun (“We Burmese Association”), a secular organization addressing a wider audience, including workers and peasants. Although very anti-Indian, the Dobama was strongly influenced by the concepts of the Indian National Congress and favored an independent Burma. The Dobama turned into a movement with a broad ideological spectrum, reflecting the influences of the teachings of Marx, Nietzsche, Sinn Féin, Fabianism, and Burmese Buddhism. A number of political parties split from the GCBA or developed independently in the 1920s and 1930s to contest elections to the legislative assembly. Several organizations had their own paramilitary corps (tats). In this period, two party politicians stand out. First, Dr. Ba Maw (1893–1977), trained as a barrister in London, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was at the helm of the Hsinyetha Wunthanu Ahpwegyi (Poor Man’s Nationalist Party), which promoted tax reductions, the protection of farmers from moneylenders, and depended heavily on pongyi support. Ba Maw served as minister of education (1934–1937) and as prime minister (1937–1939). He joined the student leaders of the Dobama Asiayoun and founded the antiwar Burma Freedom Bloc— an activity that led to his arrest by the British. He led the Burmese government while the country was under Japanese occupation. U Saw (1900–1948), another significant party politician, founded the rightwing Myochit (Patriotic) Party. Japanese funding and his share in the Thuriya newspaper helped his self-promotion and rise to power. During his spell as prime minister (1940–1942), he furthered the interests of the Burmese landowners and businessmen supporting him and pressed for full self-government. The British arrested him because of his Japanese contacts. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) was founded in 1939 by a few intellectuals, including Thakin Soe, Burma’s foremost Marxist theoretician. Than Tun (1911–1968) later became the party’s long-time leader. The CPB fought the Japanese occupation and supported the British. It split in early 1946, and its radical wing, the Red Flag, under the leadership of Thakin Soe, went underground. The majority White Flag CPB under Than Tun was expelled from the multiparty nationalist movement, the AFPFL, in October 1946. They began a civil war in March 1948.

Defining the Nation In its early stages, Burmese nationalism was largely defined in terms of a “fixed” cultural, religious, and ethnic Burmese identity, as shared by all indigenous inhabitants of Burma. Besides the central role of Theravada Buddhism, Burmese identity was conceptualized around references to country, language, and literature. In the context of a multiracial colonial society, the younger and more radical nationalist movement of the 1930s included voluntarism in their concept of nationalism, encouraging people of mixed ethnic heritage to identify with Burma and to become part of “Dobama” or “our Burma,” instead of belonging to “ThudoBama” or “their Burma,” the Burma of the collaborators and the enemy. Patriotism was thus viewed as the crucial element for “true” members of the emerging Burmese nation. Burma and Burmese identity were partly defined in contradistinction to the Indians in the country and to British India, of which Burma was a province. The topic of separation dominated the nationalist discourse for decades. This discussion touched upon the question of Burmese identity as well as on tactical issues of how best to continue the anticolonial struggle, a subject complicated by the wealth of Indian businessmen financing Burmese politicians. Further, South Indian N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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migrant laborers depressed land rents and rural wages and competed with indigenous Burmese workers seeking new sources of urban employment. The resulting Burmo-Indian riots in 1930 and 1938 sharpened the ethnic basis of Burmese nationalism, as did the loss of land to Indian moneylenders; the role of Indians diminished with mass emigration in 1938 and 1942. One conundrum of the nationalist movement was the relationship between the Burman majority—Burman being the term for the ethnicity dominant in Burma—and the indigenous minorities distinct in ethnicity, language, and religion. Whereas the Shans, Mons, and most Arakanese were Theravada Buddhist like the Burmans, others were animist, and many had been converted to Christianity by European and American missionaries. The minority areas at the periphery of the Irrawaddy basin also experienced much slower socioeconomic change, and Chins, Kachins, Karennis, and Shans were administered by established indigenous elites and not by the British colonial bureaucracy—an arrangement that left open to discussion the borders of an independent Burma. Even where minority settlements were interspersed with those of the Burmans, such as in the case of the Karen community in the delta, the British gave them (and immigrant Indians and Chinese) special political representation. Finally, military recruitment focused on Chins, Kachins, and Karens and virtually excluded all Burmans. During the war, the anti-Japanese resistance of several ethnic minorities widened the gap between them and the Burman cooperators. Hence, the ethnicities of Burma experienced colonialism and war very differently, and the Karens in particular developed a separate nationalist ideology. The difficulty of defining Burmese nationalism is reflected in the terminology used to describe the concept. Thus, the term Dobama Asiayoun (“We Burmese Association”), which drew upon the example of the Irish nationalist organization Sinn Féin (“We Ourselves”), sought to avoid the more rigorously ethnically fixed “Myanma” (“Burman”) and instead used the older term “Bama,” which was then meant to include all “Burmese” ethnicities. Even though nationalist organizations made token efforts to appeal to all ethnicities and claimed all their territories as part of an independent Burma, the nationalist movement remained largely a Burman affair. An agreement at Panglong in February 1947 on the self-administration of the Shans, Kachins, and Chins did not prevent the rebellion of the Karens in early 1949 and of other groups thereafter.

Narrating the Nation Burma’s glorious precolonial past was central to its nationalist narrative. Often, strength, pride, and valor of the Burmese people were held up as national traits. Thus, in the newly created tricolor, based on the Irish flag, yellow represented the (Buddhist) religion, green, the peasants, and red, Burmese valor. The Dobama N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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song, created in 1930 and adopted as the national anthem in 1948, valorized the heroic moments of the former Burmese kingdoms, such as victories over Thailand, and contrasted Burma’s past with the lamentable present under British rule in an effort to point toward a better future. Performances of the Dobama song and the hoisting of the flag played important roles in most rallies. Finally, the Dobama Asiayoun assumed the title thakin (“master”) for its members, referring to the independent precolonial past, rejecting British claims of superiority, and promoting the revival of a Burmese-Buddhist cultural tradition. The Burmese, it was implied, were masters of Burma and, consequently, “a race of masters.” In a more specific reference to the past, the annual conferences of the GCBA adopted elements reminiscent of the precolonial royal court protocol. The promotion of the Burmese language, history, and patriotism was also one of the objectives of the national school movement of the 1920s. The new textbooks emphasized the achievements of the former kings, and popular histories, historical novels, and royal biographies picked up these themes. For example, the picture of a 19th-century Burmese general was used at a nationalist meeting; U Saw laid the foundation stone for a new mausoleum of King Alaungpaya (1752–1760), founder of the last Burmese dynasty; and the last king, Thibaw (1878–1885), formerly dismissed by many as an inept ruler, came to be seen as a victim of British cunning. In 1937, the anniversary of King Thibaw’s exile was commemorated. Significantly, in 1941 Premier U Saw performed the annual plowing ceremony, a task hitherto preserved for the British governors and, before them, the kings. Over time, the anticolonial struggle itself became part of the nationalist narrative. Individual resistance fighters achieved fame and were held up as examples of the national spirit. In particular, those who died in the wave of strikes and agitation in 1938–1939 were venerated as heroes. U Saw adopted the Galon, a mythical bird, as the primary symbol of his organization, drawing a link with Hsaya San. Finally, the anniversary of the first strike at Rangoon University in 1920 was celebrated as the National Day, just as other important events of the national movement were given importance—often as a front for public mass meetings that would otherwise have been illegal.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The process of creating the Burmese nation was largely synonymous with the struggle against British colonial rule. Burmese demands developed from very specific and limited issues in the early decades of the 20th century. Only later did they encompass self-rule, separation from India, and finally, by the 1930s, the call for full independence. World War II and the Japanese occupation became key catalysts on the road to independence and constituted the primary historical watershed for Burmese nationalism. This period also saw a variety of means N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Shoe Question This question flared up in 1916 and epitomized the cultural side of the conflict between British rulers and Burmese subjects. Burmese religion and custom require everyone to remove his shoes inside a monastery or on the grounds of a temple as a token of respect. European visitors frequently disregarded this rule, much to the outrage of Burmese monks and laymen. Many of them vented their anger in books and pamphlets, and the YMBA sent several memorials to the British authorities. Monks attacked shoed Europeans and were arrested. In 1919, the British administration confirmed the right of abbots and pagoda trustees to define the proper attire for visitors—except for soldiers. The shoe question galvanized early nationalist sentiment and led to the first concession to Burmese sentiment, even if it was largely symbolic. Europeans, however, virtually stopped visiting Burmese pagodas.

deployed by Burmese nationalists: from outright military confrontation with the British in World War II over mass protests after the British return in 1945, to participation in the administration and negotiating the political transition to independence in 1946–1947. All of the major nationalist institutions sought to educate and raise the consciousness of their activists and potential supporters. Lectures, discussions, and instructions, both in closed circles and before a wider audience, in the towns and in the countryside, addressed religious, philosophical, cultural, and political issues. The YMBA, for example, organized lessons in Buddhist scriptures, publishing both an English-language weekly and, from 1911, the Burmese-language Thuriya (The Sun). Other nationalist periodicals and publications followed thereafter. The Burma Book Club, initiated by scholar J. S. Furnivall and nationalist U Nu, and the Nagani (Red Dragon) Book Club provided translations of socialist, Fabianist, and Marxist writings. In addition, major institutions sought to mobilize their troops in rallies and large-scale national conferences. Cooperative activities, such as those of the YMBA, included petitions to and negotiations with the British administration to protect religious and cultural institutions, to promote Burmese participation in the administration and government, and to further constitutional reform. The parties contesting the elections for the legislative bodies of the 1920s and 1930s hoped to attain control of the colonial administration. Most parties promoted some variant of land reform and opposed Indian immigration. The British governor, however, often obstructed such measures by using his reserve powers and by enlisting ethnic minorities against the Burmese parliamentarians. Some rural reforms were instituted after 1937, but they came too late to improve the lot of the cultivators before World War II. Legislative work was widely regarded as ineffective, if not corrupting, and even the Dobama’s platform of entering the assembly to “wreck it from within” failed to garner much electoral support. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Aung San (1915–1947) Aung San dominated the nationalist movement from the late 1930s until his death. Descended from the rural gentry of Upper Burma, he attended Rangoon University, where he was editor of the student newspaper and president of the Rangoon University Student Union and of the All-Burma Students Union, and where he organized a nationwide student strike in 1936. In 1938, he became general secretary of the Dobama Asiayoun. One of the founders of the CPB in 1939, he led the Thirty Comrades into Japanese military training and the BIA into Burma and took a major role in the wartime administration of the country. He then helped found the AFO/AFPFL. As its key non-communist leader, he became deputy chairman of the executive council and led the delegation that negotiated independence in London. Before he could become the first prime minister of independent Burma, an assassin’s bullet ended his life on July 19, 1947 (“Martyrs’ Day”) and made him a national hero. He was seen by many as the one man who could have prevented decades of civil war. In popular historiography, he is considered the fourth “unifier” of Burma, after kings Anawrahta (1044–1077), Bayinnaung (1551–1581), and Alaungpaya (1752–1760). His daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), has earned a Nobel Peace Prize (1991) and years of house arrest for her efforts to replace the present military regime of Burma with an elected government.

Many of the localized or nationwide confrontations were legitimized by Buddhist political theory and leaned on Gandhi’s concept of nonviolent noncooperation, or ahimsa. In the 1920s, the wunthanu athins opposed British taxes and the wholesale punishment of villages for withholding revenue. They also turned against local officials and elections, opposed the auctioning of fisheries, and objected to the Indian moneylenders’ rates of interest, thus challenging the colonial socioeconomic structure. However, even such confrontational tactics lacked a clear agenda and remained disconnected from the objective of independence. In the towns, the All-Burma Youth League, affiliated with the Dobama, encouraged a boycott of British goods and a return to homemade textiles in the wake of Gandhi’s swadeshi (self-sufficiency) movement. In this context, they called for a more austere and less Anglicized style of life and for Burmese entrepreneurship. The Dobama sought to appeal to intellectuals, workers, and peasants alike and promoted aggressive agitation that, in 1938, led to labor and race riots and a wave of labor strikes in oilfields, transport facilities, rice processing, and offices. By 1939, the Dobama joined the Burma Freedom Bloc to campaign against cooperation with the British war effort. The nucleus of the Burmese nationalist army and active rebellion lay in the “Thirty Comrades.” This group of mostly student nationalists was trained abroad by the Japanese in 1941 and formed the core of the Burma Independence Army (BIA), later the Burma National Army (BNA), which supported the Japanese invasion and boosted nationalist morale as the first largely Burman force since 1885. Disillusioned by Japanese rule in Burma, the leaders of the BNA, together with the communists and one socialist group, formed the Anti-Fascist Organization N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Aung San (1915–1947). (Library of Congress)

(AFO) in August 1944, which was later renamed the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). Open revolt, coordinated with the British advance, broke out on March 27, 1945. After the war, parts of the BNA were integrated in the British army, and other parts, such as the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO), remained connected with the AFPFL. After participating in British colonial governance, the Burmese set up local administrations in the wake of the BIA’s advance, in concert with the Japanese. Ba Maw formed a government in August 1942. Within one year, Burma became formally independent, without gaining true sovereignty, however. When the Japanese withdrew in May 1945, Burmese forces, dominated by members of the AFPFL, filled the power vacuum. The AFPFL used mass mobilization, protests, and strikes to buttress their demand for independence. By September 1946, strong pressure on the British administration had earned the AFPFL the majority of seats in the Council of Ministers. The elections in April 1947 gave the AFPFL a majority in the Constituent Assembly and, consequently, control over the government of independent Burma in 1948. Selected Bibliography Aye Kyaw. 1993. The Voice of Young Burma. Southeast Asia Program Monographs, no. 12. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program. Beˇcka, Jan. 1983. The National Liberation Movement in Burma during the Japanese Occupation Period (1941–1945). Dissertationes Orientales, no. 42. Prague, Czech Republic: Academia Praha.

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˘ sîj A ˘ yôum: A Study of the Evolution of BurBeˇcka, Jan. 1986. “The Ideology of the Dou B˘amá A · mese Nationalism (1930–1940).” Archív Orientální 54: 336–358. Khin Yi. 1988. The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930–1938). 2 vols. Southeast Asia Program Monographs, nos. 2–2A. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program. Maung Maung. 1980. From Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movements of Burma, 1920–1940. Australian National University Monographs on South Asia, no. 4. Delhi: Manohar. Maung Maung. 1989. Burmese Nationalist Movements 1940–1948. Edinburgh, Scotland: Kiscadale. Moscotti, Albert D. 1974. British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma, 1917–1937. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Nemoto, Kei. 1987. “The Doubama-Asiayon and the Shweibou Bye-Election (1933).” In Burma and Japan: Basic Studies on Their Cultural and Social Structure, edited by Burma Research Group, 247–256. Tokyo: Burma Studies Group. Nemoto, Kei. 2000. “The Concepts of Dobama (‘Our Burma’) and Thudo-Bama (‘Their Burma’) in Burmese Nationalism, 1930–1948.” Journal of Burma Studies 5: 1–16. Smith, Martin. 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. 2nd ed. London: Zed. Taylor, Robert H. 1987. The State in Burma. London: Hurst. Zöllner, Hans-Bernd. 2000. Birma zwischen ‘Unabhängigkeit zuerst—Unabhängigkeit zuletzt.’ Die birmanischen Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen und ihre Sicht der zeitgenössischen Welt am Beispiel der birmanisch-deutschen Beziehungen zwischen 1920 und 1948. Demokratie und Entwicklung, no. 38. Münster, Hamburg, and London: LIT.

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China Hong-Ming Liang Chronology 1879 Japan annexes Ryukyu, formerly a tributary state to China. 1880 Prior to 1880, foreign and domestic challenges include unequal trade agreements, the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the Nian Rebellion (1853–1868), the Panthay Uprising (1855–1873), and the Muslim Rebellion in northwest China (1862–1873). 1885 China makes a concession to Japan over its former tribute state of Korea. 1894–1895 China is defeated in the Sino-Japanese war. 1898 An attempt at thorough reforms by the Qing government during the One Hundred Days’ Reform is aborted after a palace coup by court conservatives. 1898–1900 Boxer uprising. 1905 Qing dynasty abolishes the examination system. Revolutionary Alliance is formed by Sun Yat-sen and other anti-Qing revolutionaries in Japan. 1910 Japan annexes Korea. 1911 The 1911 Revolution successfully overthrows the Qing dynasty and establishes the Republic of China. 1915 Japan presents 21 demands of privilege and dominion over China. 1915–1919 The New Culture and the May Fourth movements. 1920 Founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 1924 Sun Yat-sen reorganizes the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, or GMD), with aid and advice from the Soviet Union. 1925 Death of Sun Yat-sen. 1926–1927 Northern Expedition and the purge of CCP members from the GMD. 1928 Unification of China under the GMD’s Nationalist government. 1931 Manchurian Incident and the fall of the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) to Japanese occupation. 1934 Chiang K’ai-shek’s attempt to pursue regulated mass mobilization with the largely unsuccessful New Life movement. 1934–1935 The Chinese Communist Party, in spite of the GMD forces’ pursuits, survives the Long March. 1936 Chiang K’ai-shek is arrested by General Zhang Xueliang during the Xi’an Incident and pressured to halt his campaigns against the CCP and focus instead on the Japanese. 1937–1945 War of resistance against Japanese aggression.

Situating the Nation The Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, ruled from 1644 to 1911. During its reign, China underwent unprecedented prosperity and geographical N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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expansion. Yet, by the 1800s, the traditional dynastic order began to encounter social, economic, and demographic pressures from within. It also faced an increasing number of foreign encroachments from without. Each of the challenges from within and without severely depleted the national government’s treasury and, hence, degraded its ability to effect substantial changes. The Manchu rulers, an ethnic minority reigning over the Han majority of the empire, also faced the unenviable task of maintaining their legitimacy in the face of these challenges while an entirely new world order evolved around them. From 1880 to 1945, a consensus within China developed concerning the severity of domestic and foreign challenges facing the country. Rhetorical descriptions of China’s position in the world and its existence as a nation frequently bordered on the hysterical, with cries that China was teetering on the edge of national extinction. Yet despite the consensus on the severity of China’s plight, there was no uniformity in proposed solutions. The Manchu ruling elite could not agree on the feasibility of efforts to restore China’s former world order or, as the Japanese had with their Meiji reforms, accept the premise of a new European world order. Nor did the leadership agree on whether reforms should lead to Westernization or a preservation of traditional Chinese national identity. Likewise, forces outside Manchu leadership disagreed on the ideal pathway toward change; some favored a slower, reformist constitutional monarchy, while others favored more radical changes, ranging from anarchism to liberal democracy. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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This pattern of deep pessimism over China’s status and a general desire for rapid and comprehensive national change, coupled with a lack of consensus over concrete methods and objectives, persisted throughout this period. The 1911 Revolution overthrew China’s last imperial dynasty, yet the new republican government quickly sank into an abysmal paralysis. China did not attain the unity and rapid transformations revolutionary leaders envisioned. Instead it fragmented into semi-autonomous fiefdoms ruled by regional military authorities. In response to this perceived failure of parliamentary democracy, different groups and leaders sought to save the nation through radically different strategies. Sun Yat-sen sought aid and advice from the Soviet Union and reorganized his Nationalist Party along Leninist lines. Sun also retooled this party into a vanguard organization capable of leading mass movements. Others such as New Culture intellectuals Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi sought a thorough cultural revolution. Reasoning that the “quality” of the common people in China had stagnated, Hu, Chen, and others called for a radical departure from Confucian social order and an embrace of the perceived universal values of science and democracy. Still others began to seek radical options, such as following the model of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. By the end of the 1920s, three main forces existed in China: Sun’s modified socialism, the New

Portrait of Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). (UPI/Bettmann/Corbis)

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Culture intellectuals, and the newly founded Chinese Communist Party. In essence, efforts to create a unifying modern Chinese nationalism had returned to square one.

Instituting the Nation From 1800 to the 1890s, the key actors were the Qing government and Western and Japanese powers. Within China the important actors could be further disaggregated to include leading government and intellectual leaders who advocated preserving the status quo and officials and leaders who advocated various levels of reforms and changes. By the late 1800s, a near consensus was reached on the fact that both domestic and international forces made change necessary, yet methods and objectives were still very much contested. Some, such as leaders of the Self-Strengthening movement, advocated importing Western technology while steadfastly maintaining the essence of Chinese culture. Others advocated modifications to cultural and political institutions as well as the use of Western technology. Still others began to look toward Meiji Japan and Western powers as models to emulate and called for even more thorough changes to China. During the early 1900s, Chinese revolutionary groups were formed abroad and at home, while the Qing government began to contemplate more thorough changes. Chinese anarchists were organized by overseas students in Tokyo and Paris. By 1905, Sun Yat-sen had formed the Revolutionary Alliance, an umbrella group of anti-Qing revolutionaries. These groups utilized racialist anti-Manchu rhetoric coupled with Social Darwinian worldviews and called for the embrace of constitutional republicanism and the creation of modern citizens. Within China as well, local provincial elites, provincial governors, and leaders of the Chinese military began to fill in the power vacuum left by an atrophying national government. The period from 1911, when the Qing dynasty was overthrown and the republic established, to 1928 was one of great opportunity and chaos. A national government was established in Beijing after the revolution, yet China was in fact still paralyzed by fragmentation and perpetual civil war. The parliamentary government in Beijing was rife with corruption and intrigue. Notorious assassinations of prominent political figures ensued. China itself was effectively controlled by powerful regional military leaders known otherwise as warlords. Essentially, the “national” government in Beijing was national in name only. The political chaos created by the 1911 Revolution was a profound disappointment to the revolution’s leaders, yet ironically the relative ineffectiveness and ineptitude of the new republican order also enabled a great variety of experimentation and debate at local and regional levels. Other forces also emerged during this period of fragmentation. For example, Western-educated and -inspired N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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students and intellectuals called for even more radical cultural changes. Sun Yatsen’s party, exiled from the Beijing republican government that they had helped to establish, eventually ended up in a southern enclave in the Guangdong province. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1920 and added another militant voice to the national debate over the fate of the nation. During his years of internal exile, Sun Yat-sen concluded that a multiparty parliamentary democracy, as evidenced by experiences since 1911, was unworkable in the Chinese context. Therefore, in 1924 Sun reorganized his Nationalist Party (Guomindang, or GMD, also known as the Kuomintang, or KMT) along Leninist lines. With Soviet advisors and aid, Sun revised his revolutionary ideology with the Three Principles of the People (Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood) and the concept of an orderly, three-staged national revolution. An alliance was also formed between the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party. Sun posited that the remedy to China’s chaotic transition from dynastic to republican rule was an armed, disciplined, revolutionary party that would lead China through the stages necessary for a new national order. As a direct reaction to the perceived failure of the 1911 Revolution, Sun devised a plan for a national revolution wherein China would proceed from a period of military rule, through a period of political tutelage, to a final period of constitutional rule. The period of political tutelage, Sun envisaged, would remedy the chaos and distortions encountered by the 1911 order. During this period, the GMD would rule as a benevolent one-party dictatorship and “teach” the Chinese people to become modern, suitable citizens. Sun’s sudden death in 1925 left the Guomindang in disarray. The reorganization of 1924, particularly the alliance with the CCP and the plans for radical social and economic changes, was controversial within the GMD. Sun also died without designating a successor or providing an orderly institutional mechanism to produce one. Chiang K’ai-shek, head of the party’s military academy, eventually emerged as the paramount leader of the GMD, but his claim was never truly satisfactory to many senior members of his party. Between 1927 and 1928 Chiang sought to consolidate his leadership over the GMD. Chiang also embarked on the Northern Expedition, wherein the GMD swept north from its enclave and sought to reunify China under GMD rule. He also formed an alliance with the conservative wings of the party and purged the Chinese Communists in what some considered a bloody coup. By 1929, the communists had been driven underground, local warlords had either been defeated or co-opted by the GMD, and the Chinese Nationalists announced the formation of the Chinese Nationalist government in the city of Nanjing. The Nanjing Nationalist government faced external and internal threats in the 1930s similar to those faced by the Qing dynasty in the 1880s. Japan’s ambitions as a regional and world power soon encroached upon Chinese territories, culminating in the loss of the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) in 1931. Domestically, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the GMD faced intraparty disunity, rising disenchantment over incessant civil wars and the lack of human rights, and student protests. The most serious concern, as perceived by the GMD leadership, was that the Chinese Communist Party had been driven underground and become a militarized and rural opponent. China was nominally unified under the leadership of the Nationalist government from 1928 to 1949. The GMD declared the commencement of the period of political tutelage, which represented a transitory period of one-party dictatorship with an eventual transfer to a democratic constitutional republic. During this period, the party proposed the inculcation of Sun Yat-sen’s ideological principles in every citizen, the mobilization of the masses, and the creation of a unified, modernized, and strengthened new China. The Guomindang, however, was composed of a motley collection of party elders, regional leaders, and co-opted former warlords. Although the party planned and promulgated ambitious national policies of political and economic modernization, the party and government remained fragmented. Chiang’s leadership was questioned at every turn, and significant portions of China effectively remained under the rule of local power brokers. From 1928 to 1931, significant political and military struggles were waged between Chiang and his opponents north and south of Nanjing. Beyond the struggles among GMD leaders, the GMD’s plan for an orderly, party-led mobilization of the masses toward building a new, unified China came under severe criticism from leading Chinese intellectuals almost from the very beginning of its inception. Leaders within the GMD questioned Chiang’s claim to be Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary disciple. Critics outside the party questioned the GMD’s right to assert a period of party dictatorship. Moreover, GMD leaders proved indecisive over the extent to which the national revolution would be truly revolutionary. The seesaw battles at the top over direction undercut the morale of the local party cadres. The perception that the Guomindang was a revolutionary alternative to the corrupt and selfish northern warlords quickly dissipated. Chiang K’ai-shek’s meek reactions against increasing Japanese encroachments and the establishment of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) in 1932, plus his preference for pursuing the CCP at all costs, led to a series of escalating student protests, protests that belied his government’s attempt to position itself as the sole and leading arbiter of modern Chinese nationalism.

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changes that much more difficult. By the 1880s, China had successfully existed as a leading empire in the world for over 2,000 years. Dynasties rose and fell, changes came about, but the fundamental supposition that China’s existential reality was fundamentally sound gained great credence because of the empire’s longevity and its history of adaptability. Such adaptability appeared evidenced by China’s ability to essentially maintain much of its political, cultural, social, and emotional unity even while being ruled by foreign invading forces, such as during the period of Mongol rule during the Yuan dynasty. Surges in pressures from Western powers and Japan were coupled with a series of increasingly successful domestic rebellions and posed a greater challenge to China’s sense of nationalism and identity. The Qing government attempted tactical maneuvers around foreign and domestic challenges in hopes of returning to the status quo ante. However, by the 1880s it became clear to many inside and outside the government that such a return was difficult at best, and that China might require more thorough changes to respond adequately to domestic and foreign crises. The goal of defining China’s modern nationhood became more and more contingent on the ability of the nation to survive and thrive in a world whose terms were set by wealthy and powerful foreign nations. By the 1920s, the mantle of national renewal and national identity had been taken up by the intellectuals of the New Culture movement and the student protesters of the May Fourth movement. The New Culture leaders called for a radical departure from China’s traditional cultural/social order. The May Fourth students introduced an important new element of student activism and patriotism, which served as a model for students through ensuing decades. By the late 1920s and 1930s, however, disciplined vanguard political parties with armed forces emerged, in the form of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as the leading forces in the articulation of Chinese nationalism. Significantly, these two Leninist parties possessed the forces necessary to push their agenda beyond the realm of ideas and into policies enforceable through coercion.

New Culture / May Fourth Movements Western-educated intellectuals such as Hu Shi, writers such as Lu Xun, as well as future CCP cofounder Chen Duxiu led the calls for an iconoclastic new culture that included a total critique of Confucianism, questioning the existing socioeconomic order, criticism of gender inequalities, and promoting vernacular rather than the florid, inaccessible classical Chinese. The New Culture movement started around 1915 and was composed of a loosely collected series of magazines and writers. These intellectuals sought cultural revolutionary answers to problems that political entities appeared powerless to resolve. By 1919, when students and faculty from major Chinese universities poured onto the streets to protest China’s meek acceptance of its loss of rights at the end of World War I, the intellectual/ student movements had taken a decidedly more militant, organized, and political turn.

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Narrating the Nation Throughout the period of the GMD rule, the party-state made concerted efforts to portray the interests of all sectors of the nation as one and the same and as those of the party, as demonstrated by its efforts to recast Sun Yat-sen, founder and leader of the GMD, as “Founder of the Republic.” This conflation of the interests of the party with the interests of the nation can also be illustrated by the efforts to teach party ideology in China’s education system on all levels. However, the Guomindang’s attempt to create China’s nationalism and identity was at best incomplete and uneven. The GMD had less than three years, from 1928 to 1931, to formulate and carry out national policies before foreign (Japanese) and domestic (intra-GMD and CCP) challenges came to the fore. In ideological terms, the GMD’s assertion that it was a mass party representing all interests of all segments of China was belied by the fact that it had turned its back on earlier policies of social revolution and mass mobilization. Even the party’s own leadership could not agree on the direction or leadership of the national revolution. As the period of GMD rule continued, the assertion that the party represented the interests of the nation became more adamant and shrill, in direct opposition to the party’s popularity nationwide. Moreover, challenging critiques of the GMD’s policies on Chinese nationalism came from intellectual leaders, alternate parties (ranging from socialists to liberals to nationalists), as well as from the CCP.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Guomindang used two strategies to mobilize and build the nation. From the 1900s to 1924, the GMD believed modern Chinese nationalism would be best served by emulating the leading Western powers as models of liberal parliamentary democracy. When the GMD was driven from the republic that it had participated in creating, Sun turned away from the multiparty democratic model and considered the vanguard revolutionary party of the newly founded Soviet Union to be the latest and best path for weaker, “backward” nations such as China to emulate. Although Sun’s successor, Chiang K’ai-shek, broke off both the policy of radical socioeconomic revolution and the alliance with the CCP, the overarching goal of one-party dictatorship and rapid national transformation via mass mobilizations and a strong national state was maintained. Throughout the 1930s, the GMD did manage, despite its problems, to reconstitute the national government. This process was greatly hampered by disunity within the GMD party as well as by foreign and domestic challenges. A great impediment to the GMD’s ability to mobilize the masses was its inability to communicate and understand the socioeconomic forces at work in a vast and populous N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nationalist Government This Guomindang-led government, established in 1928, adopted the institutional model provided by the Soviet Union wherein the GMD party had parallel institutions along all levels of the government. Sun Yat-sen’s model of three stages of transition, from a period of military rule, to a period of political tutelage, and toward a period of constitutional rule, provided the ideological basis to justify this period of one-party dictatorship. The Nationalist government was the most organized and unified governing authority of this period.

nation. Hence, instead of activating and leading genuine mass movements, the GMD hampered its relationships with localities (and hence, its role as the guardian and leader of Chinese nationalism and new national identity), because its policies were designed as much to stifle dissent and perpetuate one-party dictatorship as to truly create and nurture new, active Chinese citizens. The Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945 accomplished for the GMD what it was unable to do by itself. Although the Japanese invasion devastated the nation and over half of China fell into occupation, this severe threat to China momentarily unified the nation under Nationalist leadership and temporarily halted the conflict between the two Chinese Leninist parties. The mass mobilization and national unity caused by the invading Japanese, however, did not resolve the GMD’s own ideological and institutional limitations. Instead, the war only postponed problems, and soon after China’s victory over Japan in 1945, the GMD’s problematic role in the articulation and leadership of China returned to the fore. Selected Bibliography Bergere, Marie-Claire. 1998. Sun Yat-sen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Boorman, Howard L., ed. 1967. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. 4 vols. New York: Columbia University Press. Coble, Parks M., Jr. 1986. The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dirlik, Arif. 1989. The Origins of Chinese Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eastman, Lloyd E. 1974. The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eastman, Lloyd E. 1984. Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–1949. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fairbanks, John K., ed. 1983/1986. The Cambridge History of China, vols. 12 and 13: Republican China 1912–1949. London: Cambridge University Press. Fitzgerald, John. 1996. Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Schoppa, R. Keith. 2000. The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History. New York: Columbia University Press. Twitchett, Denis, and John K. Fairbank, eds. 1978. The Cambridge History of China, vols. 10 and 11: Late Ch’ing 1800–1911. London: Cambridge University Press.

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India John McLane Chronology 1526–1707 Rise, consolidation, and early decline of the Mughal empire. 1757 English East India Company defeats the Nawab of Bengal and establishes its headquarters at Fort William, later called Calcutta. 1857 The Indian Revolt of 1857–1858 spreads across north India. 1885 The Indian National Congress is founded to represent Indian grievances. 1905–1908 Extremist nationalists experiment with new forms of protest, including the boycott of foreign goods and assassination of British officials. 1920 Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi is elected leader of the Congress Party, starts civil disobedience campaign, and reaches out to Muslims and non-elite Hindus. 1930 Gandhi leads the march to the sea to manufacture salt illegally to demonstrate the Congress Party’s concern for the poor and resistance to oppressive British practices. 1937–1939 Congress Party wins provincial elections and forms governments; Muhammad Ali Jinnah accuses the Hindu Congress leaders of persecuting Muslims. 1940 Jinnah and Muslim League demand separate, autonomous states for the Muslimmajority areas. 1947 Britain partitions India and transfers power to the independent states of India and Pakistan.

Situating the Nation Under British colonial rule (1757–1947), a nationalist movement grew that aimed to create a sense of unity and pride in being Indian, as well as loosen the hold of colonial rule so that India would be governed in the interest of Indians. British dominance gradually provoked anticolonial sentiments that produced a sense of shared identity where it had been weak. British rule also brought some of the institutional and technological means that contributed to the integration of communities, including the printing press, English-language schools and colleges, the railway and telegraph, and a strong government and army. It is conventional to say that South Asia contains as much cultural variation as Europe. The peoples of colonial India did not make an automatic nation. The regions of India possessed their own separate identities or characteristics, with distinct languages, literatures, cuisines, and dress. For centuries prior to the Mughal empire, each region was governed by its own state or states, not by an imperial government. Nevertheless, India was a geographic and cultural unit of sorts, hemmed in on the north by the Himalayas and on the sides by the Indian Ocean.

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Early British scholar-administrators who studied Indian history, law, and languages discovered that early Indian civilization had been highly developed. Indians educated in colonial-era schools learned to take pride in the major precolonial achievements in ethics and religion, in mathematics and astronomy, and in many other fields. Many confidently assumed that a country that produced the Upanishads, Buddhism, the decimal system, and an international market for its handicraft textiles, for example, could be great once again. From the British perspective, India’s poverty, slow economic development, and civil wars in the 18th century led them to see the country in “Orientalist” terms as essentially backward, static, and autocratic. The multiplicity of languages, castes, and religious affiliations raised doubts that India could ever be a single nation. But that was a self-interested view. Pan-Indian consciousness was widespread as a result of shared cultures and such common experiences as pilgrimages, long-distant trade, and living under imperial governments. North India had been the seat of many political powers with imperial ambitions, including the Maurya dynasty in the third century BC, the Gupta dynasty (AD 320–550), and the Mughal empire (AD 1526–1707). Multiregional languages such as Sanskrit (the classical language of the Brahmans), Persian (used by both the Mughal and early British states as an administrative language), and Hindi allowed for communication and some sharing of values between regions. The pan-Indian spread of Hinduism, Islam, and their numerous hybrid offshoots had a similar effect. The devotional forms of Islam (Sufi) and Hinduism (Bhakti), with personal attachment to a sheikh or guru, resembled each other. Hindus in the far reaches of India typically worshipped the same gods (Shiva, Krishna, Rama, Kali, etc.); they went on pilgrimages to the same sacred temple towns where one or more of those gods and goddesses were worshipped; they read or listened to the same epic stories, such as the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, about India’s mythical kings; and they used the same Sanskrit vocabulary to express moral and ritual ideas. The Muslim population, mostly descended from converts from indigenous Buddhism and Hinduism and maybe a fifth of the whole population by the 19th century, also had strong ties across regional boundaries. They often were exposed to the Hindu epics at the same time they were linked to fellow Muslims by the Qu’ran, by a sacred history centered on the Prophet’s life and the duty of pilgrimage to Mecca, by membership in a Sufi (Islamic mystic) brotherhood, and in some cases by a memory of Muslim expansion and conquest of India. Both Hindus and Muslims were recruited into the same armies and civil services and typically shared the same regional languages and some festivals. Indians, in other words, came under British rule already in possession of complex, multiple identities that bridged many boundaries created by religion, class, language, and region. Those overlapping identities qualified but rarely eliminated a sense that India was home to a distinctive if plural civilization.

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Instituting the Nation British rule enlisted the cooperation of numerous Indians. As the British penetrated into the interior after 1757 from their original trading stations at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, they employed thousands of Indians in government service, including the army. While some Hindu and Muslim ruling elites and their followers violently resisted British usurpation of their ruling privileges, many Indians joined the British colonial army and civil services where they greatly outnumbered Europeans in the middle and lower ranks. Even the bloody Indian Revolt of 1857–1858 was put down with the help of Indian soldiers, including recently conquered Punjabis. The willingness of Indians to work and fight for the British led Gandhi to write ruefully in 1909 that the British had not conquered India as much as Indians had delivered it to them. After the British replaced Persian with English as the pan-Indian administrative language in the 1830s, more Indians sought education in English-language schools. Over many decades, the English-language schools produced a small, influential minority of high-caste or high-status intellectuals and professionals who often simultaneously admired British democratic practices and modern technology while criticizing colonial racism and what increasingly seemed to be economic exploitation. Working in British colonial institutions and being educated in the language of the rulers led to an ambivalence common among colonial elites. In the last three decades of the 19th century, Indians literate in English began to form numerous voluntary associations to discuss how Indians might reform their cultures and politics. A civil society developed outside of governmental control, with voluntary societies with formal meetings and written rules and competitive elections. In 1885, English-speaking, high-caste college graduates founded the Indian National Congress, the political party that led India to independence. They traveled on the railways and steamships built by their colonial masters; they spoke to each other in English, now the pan-Indian language for elites; and they addressed complaints to their rulers in the same language of rights they had learned in colonial schools. Many early Congress members regarded British rule as beneficial because of its orderliness and modernity. But they also increasingly saw their rulers as autocratic, racist, and impoverishing as Britain used India as a producer of raw materials rather than manufactured goods, drained wealth overseas, and restricted Indian access to higher posts in the civil and armed services. Many more Indians were literate in their vernacular languages than in English. Regionally based vernacular politics also bloomed in the late 19th century. Less concerned with constitutions and questions of political rights, these politics drew on culture, often mixing religion with politics in provocative ways that the secular Congress leaders resisted. One example of these regional groups was the Arya Samaj, a movement to reconstruct Hindu society. Swami Dayananda started the Arya Samaj in 1875, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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it attracted widespread support in north India among upper castes, with its modern-sounding attacks on Brahman authority and caste inequalities. The Arya Samaj explicitly competed with Christian missions and Muslims for converts, and its Hindu-oriented school system, aid to famine victims, and protection of cows attracted Hindu support and increased religious tensions. In Bengal, vernacular politics produced Bengali-language plays, novels, and newspapers that were openly or covertly anti-British. Bankimchandra Chatterji wrote a popular Bengali novel, Ananda Math, about a community of Hindu ascetics who rebelled against an oppressive Muslim government, which readers often understood to stand for the English government, after taking vows to the goddess Kali. Bengali-vernacular newspapers and theaters represented Europeans as an “Occidentalized other,” materialistic, greedy, sex-crazed, and arrogant. In a third region, Maharashtra, vernacular nationalism was particularly strong. Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), the most popular Congress leader in its preGandhian years, started a public, patriotic festival to honor the Hindu deity Ganesh, hoping to draw illiterate Marathi-speakers into nationalist politics. With his Marathi-language newspaper and another public festival, he celebrated the heroism of the 17th-century warrior Shivaji who rebelled against the Mughal empire. This was controversial in part because it glorified a Hindu killing Muslims. Tilak’s justification of Shivaji’s murder of a Mughal officer also led the British to convict and imprison him for seeming to encourage anticolonial violence. This increased the popularity of the extremist Tilak.

Defining the Nation For nationalists, showing how colonialism impoverished India and robbed Indians of self-respect was easier than identifying what elements of culture made Indians a nation. With over a dozen separate linguistic regions and distinct literary traditions, language often impeded communication. Religions increasingly worked against feelings of shared citizenship, as suggested by the examples of the Arya Samaj, Bankimchandra Chatterji’s novel, Tilak’s Shivaji festival, and emerging Muslim separatist sentiment. Without one shared language, religion, or historical narrative, what besides the experience of colonialism might provide a common patriotism, a national identity? This problem dogged the Indian National Congress, the major nationalist party, from its beginning in 1885. The founders tried to focus on a core set of political grievances, such as complaints about the economic drain, the absence of representative institutions, and the exclusion of Indians from high office. But the early Congress proceedings, largely in the English language, loyalist in tone, and deliberately secular, were inaccessible and unappealing to many Indians who might have sympathized with the basic project of loosening the foreign hold. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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After 1900, a chorus of extremist critics expressed discontent with both the moderateness and the English or foreign tone of the Congress movement. Th ey called for a politics of self-sacrifice and direct action to replace the politics of polite petitions and collaboration. In 1905, nationalists in Bengal and elsewhere adopted a boycott of foreign imports and swore preference for swadeshi or India-made goods and indigenous cultures. The Congress movement began to fragment. Moderate leaders feared that mixing religion with politics might drive Hindus and Muslims apart. But Hindu extremist critics were pessimistic about attracting Muslims as allies in the anticolonial movement, and some openly asserted their preference for a national identity defined in Hindu cultural idioms. Outside the Congress, starting in 1908 in the provinces of Bengal, Maharashtra, and the Punjab, small terrorist groups began to assassinate British colonialists and their Indian supporters. Often they did so in the name of Kali, a Hindu goddess of destruction. These developments increased Muslim anxieties about the Congress and the Hindu majority. Soon after the Congress was founded in 1885, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), an aristocratic Muslim who had started a college for Muslims so that they would not ignore the study of English and modern science, openly attacked the Hindu-led Congress as dangerous to Muslim minority interests and declared that India contained two nations, not one. In 1906, elite Muslims organized their first all-Indian party, the Muslim League, and demanded special electoral protections for Muslim minority voters. When Mohandas (Mahatma) Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) returned to India in 1915 after years in South Africa as a lawyer and activist, he faced HinduMuslim, moderate-extremist, and elite-popular polarizations. He tried to unite and expand the political classes. He set out to make the nationalist movement more inclusive, militant, and indigenous. He persuaded the Congress to use the vernacular languages locally and to adopt Hindi eventually as the pan-India language in place of English, which was spoken by less than 2 percent of the population. He reached out to peasant groups as previous Congress leaders had failed to do. His boldest move was toward Muslims. During World War I, Muslims in India learned of European imperialist threats to the Ottoman Empire’s hold on the sacred cities of Islam. Indian Muslims joined a pan-Islamic movement to preserve the Ottoman ruler’s control of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Gandhi seized upon Muslim anxiety about European encroachment on the Ottoman Empire as an opportunity to enlist them in a multiethnic alliance with the Congress. Congress and Muslim leaders in the early 1920s worked together briefly in a noncooperation movement against the British to seek more self-rule for India and to protect the authority of the Ottoman caliph in Istanbul. These friendly relations faltered after Turkey abolished the office of caliph and adopted a secular constitution in 1924. After Congress-Muslim cooperation unraveled, the only nationalist narrative shared generally was one of colonial autocracy and exploitation. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Other groups raised their voices against the Congress and the dominance of its high-caste Hindu leaders. In the southern province of Madras, non-Brahmans formed the Justice Party to resist Gandhi’s insistence on Hindi as the national language and to undermine the traditional dominance of Brahmans who led the Congress. The Justice Party evolved into an anti-northern regional movement promoting Tamil culture and non-Brahman empowerment. It defeated the Congress in elections during the 1920s and formed an anti-Congress government in the province of Madras under the 1919 constitution. Another example of countermobilization was the untouchable movement led by B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956). In 1932 discussions about India’s future constitution, Ambedkar agitated to obtain separate electorates for untouchables, but Gandhi fasted in protest, saying that it would separate untouchables from the rest of Hindu society, and thereby forced Ambedkar to abandon this demand. Ambedkar was deeply bitter about the failure of India to end discrimination as Gandhi promised, and after independence, he and thousands of other untouchables converted to Buddhism.

Narrating the Nation Few events or periods in India’s precolonial history offered the potential to excite either unambiguous pan-Indian pride or a narrative of common victimhood. Details about the admirable and humane emperor Ashoka (269–232 BC) were hazy. The history of the great Mughals was far better known, but the fact that the Mughal rulers were Muslim conquerors from central Asia limited their appeal to many non-Muslim nationalists. The Mughal ruler Akbar (1555–1605) was championed by some Hindus as a tolerant and broadminded ruler, but Akbar failed to attract popularity. The search for historical figures to represent a unified nation was elusive. By the time Gandhi assumed leadership of the Congress movement in 1920, religious thinkers such as Swami Dayananda (1824–1883), Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), and others had persuaded a broad swath of political India that what was distinctive about Indian, or at least Hindu/Buddhist, culture was its spirituality. Ironically, European scholars were the first to spread the notion that India was otherworldly and spiritual, compared to the practical and scientific West. Indian spirituality, Gandhi and others taught, was modern in its universalism and tolerance, while it was also a humane cure or antidote for self-centered competitiveness, which Gandhi considered the curse of Western modernity. Gandhian nationalists commonly took pride in claims of superiority for Indian spirituality and village solidarity over Western materialism and individualism. However, this view was by no means universal. Some Indian politicians and businessmen disagreed with Gandhi and argued that India needed more materialism and industry, that is, more modernity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Tactically and ideologically, Gandhi dominated the diverse Congress movement from 1920 to independence in 1947. In his efforts to persuade Muslims, untouchables, and peasants that they belonged to one nation, he relied selectively on Hindu moral-philosophical traditions of tolerance and nonviolence. His universalistic, inclusive teaching embraced the idea that variations among religions in rituals, as well as among castes, were superficial differences. He said all human beings embodied god within them, regardless of the name they used for the deity, and thus society as a whole deserved our respect and selfless service. To demonstrate the inclusion of untouchables in the Indian nation, he personally and repeatedly performed the conventionally polluting work of untouchables such as removing excrement. He gave the untouchable castes a new name—Harijans, or children of god. Gandhi also perfected a new form of nonviolent political resistance or disobedience called satyagraha (“holding firmly to truth”), which was based on the Hindu concept of ahimsa, or nonviolence, and which asked its practitioners, in an effort to win over their opponents, to neither harm nor hate them during acts of resistance. His anti-urban vision of the future Indian nation was one of self-dependent villages producing food and handicrafts. Under his leadership, Congress members spun their own cotton thread. Nationalist India changed visibly as Congress members wore the distinctive, rough, hand-woven white cloth. Among the problems Gandhi faced was that the idiom of satyagraha and his other activities had a specifically Hindu character that appealed less to Muslims. Ahimsa attracted few Muslims who understood the Islamic notion of jihad (the struggle to become a better Muslim) to imply violence; reverence for the cow meant less to meat-eating Muslims than to Hindus. The challenge for Gandhi and the Congress in building a single nation was deeper than that the Hindus themselves were split and that Hindus and Muslims often did not share a national narrative.

A Hindu Nation? Gandhi’s political vocabulary was often Hindu, which aroused suspicions among some Muslims. Ahimsa, cow protection and vegetarianism, and glorification of Lord Rama—the warrior/king deity of the epic Ramayana—were all exclusively embedded in Hindu life. Moreover, an influential body of Hindus did not share Gandhi’s inclusive Indian nationalism or his interest in mobilizing Muslims and/or untouchables. Hindu extremists saw nonviolence as a Hindu weakness rather than a strength. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Society, or RSS), founded in 1925, promoted an ethnic nationalism focused on the history of Hindu resistance to Muslim conquest and temple destruction centuries earlier. The RSS was a Hindu self-strengthening movement focused on patriotic cultural, paramilitary, body-building, and self-defense activity. Thus, while Gandhi preached that India offered humane tolerance, nonviolence, and antimaterialism to a violent, competitive world, Hindu extremists were constructing a history of Hindu victimhood, internal division, and martial bravery in the examples of Shivaji and Lord Rama.

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Despite these divisions, the Congress movement after 1920 gained broad popularity. Over a million Indians served in World War I. This service and international discussion of the rights of self-determination raised nationalist hopes for more self-government. But the 1919 legislative council reforms failed to meet nationalist expectations. Public opinion was inflamed in 1919 when General Reginald Dyer ordered soldiers to fire on an unarmed nationalist demonstration in Amritsar in the Punjab, killing 369 people. The Congress also attracted support from its concern for the welfare of overtaxed peasants and depressed untouchables and from Gandhi’s reputation as a self-sacrificing spiritual leader of great purity and moral standing. Neither Hindu extremists nor the Muslim League matched the ability of Gandhi and the Congress to mobilize mass agitations or organize election campaigns. Gandhi’s flair for dramatizing colonial injustice to a largely illiterate population was remarkable. For example, his 1930 civil disobedience march to the sea to break the government monopoly over the manufacture of salt, a necessary ingredient in the diet, captured popular imagination around the world. Gandhi and his 78 followers trained in nonviolent techniques marched 241 miles in 24 days with the widely publicized intention of breaking British-Indian law. The police brutally clubbed his followers to the ground, igniting massive protests. By the end of the year, Gandhi and over 60,000 Indians had been imprisoned. Nevertheless, Muslim leaders remained wary of the Hindu majority as independence approached, as self-government was conceded to the provinces, and as the Congress Party in some regions became not merely an opposition movement but also the governing party. After the first elections under the new 1935 constitution, Congress won such a large part of the Hindu vote that it formed governments in 7 of India’s 11 provinces. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) and the Muslim League claimed that schools and police under the Congress provincial ministries, largely composed of Hindus, discriminated against members of the Muslim minority and that Islam was in danger. Fear of Hindu majority rule in a free India led the Muslim League to adopt the “Pakistan Resolution” in 1940, calling for the creation of separate and autonomous states for Muslims. World War II raised nationalist anger to new levels. But it also provoked separatist passions. The British government in 1940 committed India to fighting in the war without consulting Indian leaders. The Congress regional ministries resigned in protest, leaving the Muslim League a clear field during the war to mobilize Muslims in favor of one or more autonomous Muslim states. The Congress focused on obtaining immediate independence instead of winning Muslims over to the idea of a united India. The Congress defiantly declared the “Quit India” movement in 1942 after Winston Churchill’s government refused to promise independence. The movement and its repression led to much violence and over 90,000 arrests. In the administrative confusion caused by the war and civil unrest, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mahatma Gandhi, leader of the Indian civil disobedience revolt, marches to the shore at Dandi to collect salt in violation of the law in 1930. (Bettmann/Corbis)

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over 2 million died in the 1943 Bengal famine. A clearer sign of the erosion of British colonial authority occurred in the Indian army, which since 1857–1858 had been mostly free of anti-British political activity. When the Japanese army defeated the Indian army defending Singapore in its advance toward the borders of India in February 1942, they recruited many of the 60,000 imprisoned Indian soldiers into the Indian National Army (INA) and placed it under the command of Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), a popular, former president of the Congress movement. The INA achieved minimal military success against the British-led Indian army, but its formation and the 1945 sedition trials of its members created a sensation in India. Most importantly, by 1945 most Muslims who participated in Indian elections were voting for Muslim League politicians who advocated a separate state of Pakistan. Two nations, not one, were about to be born. Selected Bibliography Akbar, M. J. 1988. Nehru: The Making of India. New York: Viking. Arnold, David. 2001. Gandhi. London: Longman. Brown, Judith M. 1985. Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chatterjee, Partha. 1994. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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Embree, Ainslee T. 1972. India’s Search for National Identity. New York: Knopf. Hardy, Peter. 1972. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hay, Stephen, ed. 1988. Sources of Indian Tradition, vol. 2: Modern India and Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press. Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed. 2005. The Sangh Parivar: A Reader. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. McLane, John R. 1977. Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mukherjee, Rudrangshu, ed. 1996. The Penguin Gandhi Reader. New York: Penguin. Sarkar, Sumit. 1989. Modern India, 1885–1947. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Japan Neil Waters Chronology 1825 Expulsion edicts issued, ordering that foreign ships be driven away from Japanese waters. Aizawa Seishisai writes New Theses. 1854 Commodore Matthew Perry secures Treaty of Peace and Amity. 1858 Townsend Harris negotiates Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the United States. It is the first of a series of unequal treaties. 1868 Tokugawa regime is overthrown; Meiji era begins. 1871–1873 The Iwakura Mission, which includes key government leaders, travels to the United States and Europe to assess conditions in the West and evaluate the prospects for renegotiating unequal treaties. 1889 The emperor grants a constitution. 1890 National Diet is convened. 1895 Sino-Japanese war ends. 1905 Russo-Japanese war ends. 1918 First party cabinet marks transition from political control by Meiji oligarchy to political party rule. 1920–1930 “Imperial Democracy,” characterized by growing political liberalization at home, clinging to empire abroad. 1931 Manchurian Incident: an explosion on Japan’s South Manchurian Railroad, secretly set off by Japanese army officers but blamed on the Chinese, leads to the Japanese takeover of Manchuria (renamed Manchukuo in 1932) and Japan’s withdrawal in 1933 from the League of Nations. 1937 All-out war with China. 1941–1945 Japan participates in World War II, fighting the United States in the Pacific. The war ends with the Japanese surrender and occupation by the United States in 1945.

Situating the Nation In 1825 Japan would seem to have had most of the geographical ingredients associated with a nation-state. Its island boundaries were stable, although the northern island of Hokkaido was regarded as the land of the barbarian Ezo, under the loose control of the lord (daimyo) of the Matsumae domain in Northern Honshu, who in turn owed his allegiance to the Tokugawa government in Edo (modern Tokyo). Nevertheless, Japan was not the primary, nor even the secondary, unit of identity for most Japanese. The Japanese islands during the Tokugawa period (1603–1868) were politically and socially fragmented. The samurai class, consisting of about 7 percent of the population, included all who were armed, from the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lowliest spear-carrier to the shogun in Edo. Most lived in castle-towns in one of about 250 domains, or han, comprising most of the land of Japan. Peasants lived in villages on those domains, physically separated from their samurai superiors in the castle-towns. Each domain, in turn, was headed by a daimyo, who for most purposes was absolute lord of his domain, commanding the personal allegiance of all samurai of lesser rank. He in turn owed a combination of feudal and bureaucratic allegiance to the Tokugawa house, and through it to what passed as a central government—the shogun’s administrative apparatus, or bakufu (literally, “tent government”) in Edo. Foreign relations, which did imply a “national” level, were restricted to the port of Nagasaki, where limited trade under careful bakufu scrutiny was allowed solely with the Dutch, who were permitted to live on a quarteracre artificial island called Dejima in Nagasaki harbor, and with Chinese traders, who had a few warehouses on shore. In addition, 12 official missions from Korea were permitted to land in Nagasaki and proceed on foot to Edo during the 265-year Edo period. Other “foreign relations” were handled at the domain level: Satsuma han in southern Kyushu claimed suzerainty over the Ryukyu Islands (which also labored under similar and simultaneous claims by Ming and then Qing, China). Hokkaido, under the daimyo of Matsumae, was regarded as not quite foreign, not quite integral to Japan, but somewhere in between. Most samurai saw themselves as housemen attached to a particular daimyo; the highest allegiance they normally encountered was the han level, although some would accompany the daimyo on his alternate-year sojourns in Edo. Most peasants, constituting approximately 85 percent of the population in the 19th century, parked the lion’s share of their identity in their home villages, which in all but a few domains contained no samurai. For them, even the han level seldom mattered, except as a collector of taxes, and the national level was at best an abstraction. For samurai attached directly to the Tokugawa house, and for merchants and peasants who lived in and around Edo or Osaka, life was more cosmopolitan (Edo was the largest city in the world by 1720). Classes mixed more freely than on the domains, but allegiances were still personal for samurai (to a houseman of the Tokugawa clan, for example) and tied to the local sphere of everyday life. All that changed, repeatedly, over the next 125 years. In 1840 the Japanese learned that British fleets had defeated China in the Opium War, and when Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Uraga Bay in 1853 and returned in 1854, the Tokugawa bakufu was powerless to drive him away. National identity, such as it was, had been primarily antiforeign and reflexively pro-Tokugawa; now it became for many samurai detached from loyalty to the Tokugawa regime and grounded instead in loyalty to the Japanese emperor. After the Tokugawa regime was overthrown in the Meiji Restoration in 1868, it became quickly apparent that the new state, centered on the symbol of the emperor, was no more capable of driving out foreigners than the Tokugawa bakufu had been. If Japan was to survive, it would need a national identity that was not simply antiforeign and not only the concern of the samurai class. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Efforts to craft such an identity were primarily top-down and in response to continually changing conditions. The most important events that altered and expanded the idea of the Japanese nation included the following: 1. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895. Japan won and emerged from the conflict with a foreign possession, Taiwan. 2. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905. Also won by Japan (albeit barely), it gave Japan holdings on the Asian continent, augmented five years later by the annexation of Korea. 3. The Great Depression in 1929 and the London Naval Conference of 1930. These convinced many ordinary Japanese that elected politicians were incompetent and only military leaders could be trusted to act in Japan’s best interests. 4. The Manchurian Incident of 1931. This event led to the takeover of all Manchuria and the inculcation of the idea that Manchuria was indispensable to Japan’s survival. 5. War with China in 1937. This war led to disputes with the United States and to efforts to define Japan as the natural “liberator” of an empire large enough to be autonomous.

Instituting the Nation What we might call national identity began to emerge almost exclusively among members of the samurai class in the face of contact with foreigners outside the official channels in Nagasaki. A series of “incursions” by Russian explorers and merchants (Adam Laxman in 1792, Nikolai Rezanov in 1804) into, respectively, the Nemuro region in Hokkaido and Japanese settlements in Sakhalin and the Kuriles prompted the bakufu to commission a map of Japan that, for the first time, included Hokkaido, as well as Kunashiri. A shocking incident occurred during the Napoleonic wars in 1806 when the British ship Phaeton, seeking Dutch enemies, sailed into Nagasaki harbor and abducted Dutch officials on Dejima. Mortified, the Nagasaki bugyo (the bakufu-appointed commissioner of the port of Nagasaki) committed hara-kiri. In 1824 shipwrecked British sailors appeared in Mito han, an event that helped prompt the Tokugawa bakufu to issue the following year an exclusion edict ordering daimyo in coastal areas other than Nagasaki to attack and drive away all Western ships. These events did not yet evoke even a proto-nationalist consciousness. But they did prompt Japanese scholars to lay the intellectual foundations for such a development. Aizawa Seishisai, a scholar from Mito han, is the best-known example. He envisioned a national polity grounded in the Japanese emperor, whose direct descent from Amaterasu, the son goddess, assured a spiritual unity of all N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Japanese with him. The result would be a moral community capable of resisting the West and assuring that Japan was morally superior to all other nations. Moral superiority was one thing, national survival was quite another. Japan’s leaders after the Meiji Restoration concluded very early that Japan would have to learn to adhere to Western international norms if it was to avoid the sort of domination by Western nations that had befallen China and other Asian countries. That effort in turn would require wholesale transformation of Japanese society. A spate of reforms followed the Meiji Restoration and bracketed the return of the Iwakura Mission in 1873. Some of these were implemented before the return of the mission: abolition of the domains and establishment of prefectures headed by governors appointed by the central government in Tokyo (haihan chiken) was completed in 1871; an elementary education system, mandatory for four years (on paper) to all children, was enacted in 1872; and a “universal” conscription ordinance was promulgated early in 1873. Others, notably those restricting the privileges of samurai, awaited the return of the mission. Samurai stipends were commuted to single payments, and the right to bear swords was revoked in 1876. In 1873 peasants were converted to farmers; their taxes were based on the assessed N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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A group of ex-samurai pose for a photograph in late 19th-century Japan. Samurai warriors were the driving force behind the Meiji Restoration of 1868, but they disappeared as a legally recognized class after 1876, when they lost their stipends and their right to carry swords. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

value of the land they worked rather than the value of the harvest, and they were given the right to buy and sell land. Finally, and more slowly and carefully, venues of political participation and legal rights were established. Prefectural assemblies with limited powers were inaugurated in 1878 throughout Japan; delegates could be elected by males over 25 years old who paid at least 5 yen per year in taxes, a wealthy minority of the population. The government promised in 1881 that a National Diet would be established by 1890; it was, although the electorate was confined to males over 25 years old who paid at least 15 yen in taxes. In 1889 the emperor “granted” a constitution. In 1898 a new civil code was promulgated, in general, conformity with Western legal standards. There is no doubt that these far-reaching reforms were enacted in an atmosphere of fear, but it was not mindless fear. Japan’s new leaders were determined to forge a centralized nation-state from the remains of the Tokugawa order that was physically capable of resisting foreign incursions and capable of dealing as an equal in an international world order defined by the legal and economic norms of the West. The underlying goal of the Iwakura Mission—to revise the unequal treaties—remained perhaps the top priority of the Meiji government long after the mission returned, until it was largely realized in 1899. But achieving that N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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goal would require a transformation of Japanese society and of its economic, educational, legal, and status-based foundations. A transformation on that scale would in turn require the inculcation of a sense of national identity involving the whole of Japan’s population. The Meiji oligarchs needed a population not just compelled but willing to serve in a national army and navy, to pay taxes in good times and bad, to send their sons and even daughters to school long enough to become minimally literate, and to work in textile mills and steel mills for the good of the nation as well as for their own benefit. The result was by no means a full democracy, but it did involve a degree of participation by very gradually increasing percentages of the male population in elections to prefectural assemblies and, after 1890, to a national assembly. National identity in the early Meiji period (1870s) was what many would term proto-nationalism; in 1908 the journalist and intellectual Tokutomi Soho said of the 1870s, “The concept ‘foreign nations’ brought forth the concept ‘Japanese nation’ ” (quoted in Maruyama 1974, 342). But Tokutomi was speaking of the past; in 1908 there was a participatory element to Japanese nationalism, and it might be more properly regarded as a form of modern nationalism.

Defining the Nation Despite local variants, the Japanese spoke a common language that was, for the most part, mutually intelligible from Kyushu to Northern Honshu. A common writing system, history, literature, culture, and religious mind-set bound the inhabitants of Japan’s three main islands (Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu) even more tightly, and the degree of genetic variation was so small (with the exception of the Ainu on Hokkaido) that no real distinction was made between being ethnically and culturally Japanese. Early efforts during the Tokugawa period to articulate what it meant to be Japanese were motivated in large part by a desire to explain why Japan was more important than its inferior position in the Chinese view of the world order implied. But such efforts took on a new note of urgency in the early 19th century in response to Western incursions. The Mito scholar Aizawa Seishisai congratulated the bakufu on its exclusion edict but insisted in his New Theses, written in 1825 in response to the edict, that the English, the Russians, and other Western seafarers represented a deep spiritual threat to all of Japan. His greatest fear was that Japan’s non-samurai, the “stupid commoners” (gumin), would fall prey to Christianity, the religion of the Western barbarians, and thus pave the way for the downfall of Japan’s spiritual polity and, thence, of Japan itself. To counter such developments, Aizawa sought a variety of reforms, and he used the efforts of the Mito school of scholarship to construct a rearticulated version of the “national polity” (kokutai) that could, he hoped, serve as a counterweight to the seductions of Christianity. He was not the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Aizawa Seishisai (1782–1863) Aizawa Seishisai was born in the Mito domain, a major center of Confucian learning and Japanese historical studies. He is best known for writing his New Theses in 1825, two months after the Tokugawa bakufu issued its expulsion decree ordering Japan’s daimyo to drive away all foreign vessels approaching Japanese territory at any location other than Nagasaki. The tract, written in reaction to the expulsion decree, was addressed to Tokugawa Narinobu, the daimyo of Mito, in the hope that it would be sent on to bakufu officials in Edo. Instead, Narinobu prohibited its dissemination, fearing that its far-reaching recommendations would elicit retribution from Edo. There was reason for Narinobu’s concern. New Theses was a prescription to save and enhance the power of the Tokugawa regime in the face of the increasing appearances of ships from Western nations. It was virulently antiforeign, yet advocated the study and adoption of Western military equipment, techniques, and coastal fortifications. Aizawa called for stronger control over the daimyo so that they could be forced to contribute to the common defense. Above all, he saw a growing spiritual threat from the West, manifested in Christianity, which he viewed as the major source of Western strength. He sought a counterweight to the potential seductive appeal of Christianity among the “stupid commoners” of Japan. He recommended the vigorous establishment of a “national polity” (kokutai ) focused on the Japanese emperor, whose blood connection to Amaterasu, the sun goddess, made him the source of moral superiority in which all Japanese could partake. That moral community, in turn, made Japan the true “middle kingdom,” superior to all other nations. In 1829 there was a new daimyo in Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, whose views on national defense were very close to those expressed in New Theses. He promoted Aizawa and ordered the dissemination of his work. Decades later, when the Western threat was far more serious, Aizawa’s views, originally presented to strengthen the Tokugawa regime, were used as a rationale for toppling it and “restoring” the emperor to power.

first Tokugawa thinker to use old texts dating to the eighth century to establish a case for Japan’s superiority over all other places in the world, but he did so with a particular sense of urgency. Aizawa denounced Buddhism as a foreign import and forcefully reminded his readers that Japan’s native roots were Shinto. He reemphasized the old creation stories in the eighth-century works Kojiki and Nihon shoki, noting especially that the first Japanese emperor, unlike his Chinese counterpart, was the direct blood descendant of Amaterasu, the sun goddess, and that all subsequent Japanese emperors shared her divine bloodline. He retained the Confucian idea that international relations were a hierarchical analogue to familial relationships, but he strongly maintained that the fact that Japanese emperors had never been overthrown proved Japan’s superiority to China, as well as to all other countries; hence Japan, not China, was the true “middle kingdom,” regardless of its diminutive physical size. After the Meiji Restoration, and particularly after half of Japan’s new leaders studied Western international law in preparation for the Iwakura Mission, JapaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nese leaders were convinced that they must adopt Western concepts of national sovereignty and that they must master Western international law to make sure that Japan’s sovereignty was recognized. The first priority was territorial. Almost immediately after the Restoration, the new government promoted Japanese migration to Hokkaido to lay the framework to a legal claim, in Western terms, over the northernmost of Japan’s main islands. Similarly, an expedition to Taiwan was mounted in 1874 to chastise native tribes who had killed some shipwrecked Japanese fishermen and, in the process, won international recognition of Japanese claims to the Ryukyus, the “tradition” of Chinese suzerainty notwithstanding. Concerns about sovereignty partially, but not totally, explain Japan’s gradual acquisition of an empire. In 1876 the Japanese government insisted on redefining its relationship to Korea by means of a classic, Western-style unequal treaty. In 1894 Japan went to war with China partly because of fears that Chinese Confucianbased relations with Korea could lead to a Western power taking over the Korean peninsula, thereby threatening Japan’s security. When it appeared like Russia might actually do so, Japan attacked Port Arthur, precipitating the Russo-Japanese war. These conflicts left Japan in possession of Taiwan, of Korea itself in 1910, of concessions in China and Manchuria, and of southern Sakhalin. How did the existence of an empire influence national identity in Japan? By the end of the Meiji period in 1912, Japan’s place at the head of an empire dovetailed nicely into the carefully fostered view that Japan, alone among Asian nations, was a successful, modern nation and a natural model for the rest of Asia. For “liberals” fighting hard for political rights at home, the annexation of Korea in particular demonstrated Japan’s suitability to undertake a mission civilisatrice, redounding, eventually, to the benefit of the Koreans. Others looked to the empire less altruistically as a source of national prestige and/or of potential economic benefits. Across the political spectrum, there were very few Japanese voices raised against colonial possessions and spheres of influence, even during the relatively liberal 1920s, an era that historian Andrew Gordon calls “imperial democracy.”

Narrating the Nation The tumultuous period from 1853 to 1868 was vital to the formation of Japanese national identity. Aizawa’s treatise, which was supported by Tokugawa Nariaki, the daimyo of Mito from 1829, was dusted off, made available in a more accessible, less scholarly form of Japanese, and applied to paradoxical circumstances: Aizawa’s views (and those of other scholars associated with “national learning,” such as the philologist Motoori Norinaga and the reactionary/romantic Hirata Atsutane) served to remind his readers that the primary mission of the shogun, and the reason the emperor appointed a shogun at all, was to suppress barbarians, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and yet this set of barbarians could not in the end be driven away. For many samurai, the logical conclusion was that the shogun had failed and should be removed from power, and in his place the emperor, whose actual political role since the time of Emperor Go-Daigo in the 1330s was confined to figurehead legitimizer of a series of shoguns, should be “restored” to power. That development, many samurai fervently hoped, would lead to the sort of kokutai (“national polity”) envisioned by Aizawa or the national learning scholars: drawn from Japan’s distant past, grounded in Shinto, and led by an emperor descended from Amaterasu who would perform rites and ceremonies to cement the loyalty of the people. The Meiji version of this national narrative did not derive exclusively or even primarily from Aizawa, yet elements of his thought persisted. The virulent antiforeignism was stripped away, but the idea that Japan’s natural place was high in the hierarchy of nations remained and was used to explain the need to sacrifice, through taxes and military service, so Japan could assume its proper place. The Meiji emperor was no longer hidden away to perform rites; he was put on a fine white horse in a splendid military uniform, and his portrait was placed in every school in the country. In the 1890s, Hozumi Yatsuka, a law professor at Tokyo University, seemed to echo Aizawa and even Hirata by explaining that, through the emperor’s connection to the sun goddess and the Japanese people’s descent from lesser deities, the Japanese were not like a family, they were a family. Japan, he maintained, was a family-state (kokka kazoku Nihon). By the time of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–1905, several “generations” of Japanese schoolchildren had passed through the elementary education system and had listened to a reading of the emperor/subject-centered Imperial Rescript on Education every Monday morning of their schooldays. Most could read newspapers, and most of those newspapers enthusiastically supported the war effort. “Official nationalism” would henceforth be augmented, and occasionally contradicted, by popular nationalism. Popular nationalistic views sometimes escaped government control. In the wake of the Russo-Japanese war, for example, the “failure” of Japanese negotiators at Portsmouth to secure an indemnity from Russia (an unrealistic expectation stoked by a popular press unable to forget the indemnity collected from China in 1895) to pay for the war meant that high wartime taxes would continue. Riots erupted in Tokyo and other major cities, fueled by the conviction that inept negotiators had sold out Japanese interests. More ominously, the public reaction to the 1933–1934 trials of the army, navy, and civilian defendants in the assassinations on February 9, March 5, and November 15, 1932, of former finance minister Inoue Junnosuke, the director-general of Mitsui, Dan Takuma, and Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, respectively, demonstrated that popular nationalism could far outstrip the official variety. The conspirators were rightists determined to attack Japan’s business and political elites and thus shock the Japanese into ridding the emperor of bad advisors and establishing a more egalitarian order, based on, as the leader of the conspiracy Inoue N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nissho stated, “all these things that made us Japanese, things that have been washed aside in the mad fascination for modern ways” (quoted in Large 2003, 63). By the time the intensely reported trials were over, much of the public came to see the assassins as patriots acting in the interests of ordinary Japanese, and the beleaguered prosecutors and judges imposed much lighter sentences than were initially proposed. During the next few years, an increasingly militaristic government seized tighter control of the national narrative. By the mid-1930s, Japan was a far more authoritarian place than it had been in the 1920s or even in the Meiji period. The emperor cult was revived and intensified, and domestic opponents to militarization, especially Japanese communists, were imprisoned. Mobilization of industry and labor followed the outbreak of all-out war with China in 1937. The Special Higher Police took pains to monitor public opinion for any signs of wavering in popular support for the war effort. Government propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s portrayed Japanese soldiers down to the lowest-ranking private as heirs to the spirit of the samurai. Newspaper and magazine cartoons depicted the Pacific war as a purification ritual, cleansing the rest of Asia of Anglo-American infestation. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang

Fascism An unresolved debate still continues among historians over whether Japan from about 1936 to 1945 can be considered fascist. Despite mobilization of the economy and the populace, intolerance of dissent, brutal disregard for rights, and other signposts of fascism, Japan differed in some ways from its Axis allies. There certainly was no Führerprinzip (“leadership principle”), and Japan’s political parties continued to exert some influence even after their official dissolution in 1940. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, initiated in 1940, was never the totalitarian mass party it was envisioned to become because its constituent elements refused to dissolve. The Way of Subjects (Shin’min no michi ), assigned by the Ministry of Education in August 1941 as required reading in secondary schools and universities, took approving note of fascist dictatorships in Germany and Italy, but took pains to distinguish Japan from its Axis allies: Germany . . . has succeeded in achieving thoroughgoing popular confidence in, and obedience to, the dictatorship of the Nazis, and is adopting totalitarianism. Italy’s ideals are the restoration of the great Roman Empire, and her policy for realizing that is not different from Germany. The country stands on the dictatorial totalitarianism of the Fascists. In contrast to these, Japan, since the founding of the Empire, has been basking under a benign rule of a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal, and has been growing and developing in an atmosphere of great harmony as a nation, consisting of one large family, . . . united under the Emperor, the center. . . . Japan is the fountain source of the Yamato race, Manchukuo is its reservoir, and East Asia is its paddy field. (Japanese Ministry of Education, Shin’min no michi [The Way of Subjects], reprinted in Lu 1997, 435–440)

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K’ai-shek were portrayed as demons. At the same time, the nobility and necessity of Japan’s mission was constantly emphasized: Japan had to fight to survive; Japan was Asia’s most advanced country, its natural leader, and its potential liberator; Japan’s new order in Asia would set the stage for world peace. Yet it is clear that wartime propaganda was not broadcast to an unreceptive public. In 1941 Japan had controlled Taiwan for 46 years, had held interests in Manchuria for 36 years, and had maintained total control over Korea for 31 years. The Japanese had become used to regarding their country as the natural head of an Asian empire, an advanced, modern nation that had earned its special place because it had avoided colonization and Western domination. It was not a great leap of faith to believe that Japan had a special mission to extend its own blessings—a product of its unique history—to its more benighted neighbors by freeing them from the yoke of Western imperialism and materialistic communism. It was also easy to believe that Western nations, in alliance with the Chinese Guomindang, sought to strip Japan of its empire and seize it for themselves, destroying Japan in the process, and that therefore Japan had to vastly expand its empire to construct an entity capable of self-sufficiency and of resisting its enemies. The execution of that vision was horribly flawed, and most of Japan’s Asian neighbors suffered far more under Japanese overlords than they had under Japan’s Western predecessors, a fact that continues to elude Japanese rightists who prefer to remember a noble cause over its hideous consequences.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Most samurai who backed the Meiji Restoration were looking for just that—a restoration of the past, not a nation in pursuit of Western-style modernity. In the final years of the Tokugawa bakufu, however, it was apparent that no one, not even under orders from the emperor, could actually drive the foreigners away. In 1825 foreign vessels under attack actually left; after 1853 they did not. The Meiji Restoration leaders who actually came to power in 1868 realized almost immediately that the Western nations would hold Japan in its entirety responsible for the implementation of treaties, so the autonomy of the han could not be sustained. The only way to keep foreigners at bay and someday roll back the concessions made in a series of unequal treaties was to learn and adapt to the Western international order and change Japan enough for the country to be accepted within it. Incredibly, almost half of the new Meiji government ministers left Japan in 1871 and went on a two-year fact-finding tour of Europe, Russia, and the United States, returning to Japan in 1873 (the Iwakura Mission). Accompanying the mission were about 60 students who were left in Europe and the United States to study. The other purpose of the mission was to renegotiate the unequal treaties, but those efforts were dropped in 1872 when it became apparent that N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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they could not succeed. Of far more lasting value to Japan was that the time members spent preparing for the negotiations gave them a crash course in Western diplomacy and international law (Mayo 1967, 389–410). The trip was undertaken just as the Industrial Revolution was in full swing, and the members of the Iwakura Mission realized that the economic, technological, and military gap between the nations of the West and Japan was far greater than they had imagined, although they also took heart at the realization that the industrial wonders they saw were of recent vintage. Two other realizations were key prerequisites in determining the shape of the Meiji state: (1) that wealth and power in the West were based on the labor and loyalty of the population as a whole, not just that of an elite class; and (2) Western dominance was based not only on technology but also on the institutions and beliefs that supported the technology. A few of the Meiji leaders who had remained in Japan during the Iwakura Mission, most notably Saigo Takamori, hoped to launch a war with Korea as a means to preserve and even enhance the supremacy of the samurai class. When their returning peers refused to allow this, Saigo, Itagaki Taisuke, and Eto Shin’pei left the government, effectively leaving the field to those most impressed with the need to reform Japan. When a rebellion, led reluctantly by Saigo, was put down in 1877, many samurai who retained hopes of a reactionary outcome to the Meiji Restoration were either killed or profoundly discouraged. Most of the rank and file in the pro-Meiji forces involved in the 1877 uprising were commoner-draftees, not samurai, and from then on Japan’s wars would be fought primarily by commoners. Accordingly, the effects on national identity of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894–1895 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–1905 among ordinary Japanese were enormous. The armies were manned by draftees— perhaps 250,000 in the Sino-Japanese war and over a million in the Russo-Japanese war. Organized “home-front activities,” from packing care packages, rolling bandages, and seeing off departing soldiers to taking care of bereaved families, gave new life and new, nation-oriented purposes to village-based youth groups and women’s associations. The enormous casualty rates in the Russo-Japanese war assured that almost every family was directly affected or knew somebody who was. With the end of the Russo-Japanese war, most of the raw ingredients in Japan’s changing pre-1945 national identity already existed, although they would be blended in various ways over the next 40 years. Japan had succeeded in identifying itself, and seeing itself recognized, as one of the “powers,” not as one of the colonizable nations. The sacrifices of millions of ordinary Japanese had led to demands for more rights, leaving the financially strapped government looking for ways to keep the spirit of sacrifice alive. Above all, Japan had an empire, which would mean different things to different people, but almost no one was inclined to give it up. Japan by most objective measurements was a success story by the end of the Meiji period in 1912, but the same forces that had made it a success turned it into N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a mass society, alive with new groups—workers, students, women’s associations, tenant’s associations—holding aspirations that went far beyond survival in a hostile world. The success of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the victory of the “democratic” forces in World War I, the rice riots in 1918, and the rise of party government and the end of the domination of the Meiji oligarchs all contributed to a greater diversity and intensity of domestic expectations. Japan did not become a democracy in the broadest sense of that term, but during the 1920s most popular attention was on the politics of the Diet and its constituent parties, not on the authoritarian aspects of the Meiji constitution. All that changed in the 1930s. The quadruple impact of the Great Depression; the 1930 London Naval Conference agreement, which was attacked in the press as a demonstration of the venality of civilian politicians and the rapacity of Western powers; resurgent Chinese nationalism, countered by the Manchurian Incident; and right-wing terrorist incidents in 1932 and 1936 led to a consensus, of sorts, that Japan could no longer put its faith in a Western-dominated world order. Instead, it would essentially have to defend its empire against Chinese nationalists (portrayed as puppets of the West), Western imperialists, and Soviet communists. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Defense, it was argued, required expansion, because the only way that tiny Japan could defend an empire was to make it large enough to be self-sufficient in all the materials needed in wartime and in peace. Whether one interprets subsequent events as the unfolding of the logic of regional autonomy or as evidence of an irrational element in Japanese government decision making, the events themselves are well known. In 1937 a nighttime shooting incident near Beijing led to an all-out war with China. Two years later at Nomonhan, Japan’s Kwantung Army was sharply repulsed by the Soviet Union. In 1940, reassured by the recent nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and then turned its attention, and its search for autonomy, southward, moving troops into northern Indochina. In April 1941, Japan signed a five-year neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, only to be shocked when its ally Germany attacked the Soviet Union two months later. In July the United States imposed an oil embargo, and Japanese troops entered southern Indochina. In December Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and followed immediately with attacks on the Philippines and Malaya. Rationally or not, Japan was at war simultaneously with the United States, Britain, and Holland, while its war in China continued to drag on. In 1945 Japan lost the war, and with it every shred of its empire, even including, until 1972, Okinawa. Militarism and emperor-worship in the minds of most Japanese were thoroughly discredited by the fact of Japan’s defeat. A new national identify had to be crafted almost from scratch, in the presence of American occupiers. Yet a study by Barak Kushner suggests at least one element of continuity. Concerned above all with social stability, Japan’s American occupiers hired some of Japan’s best professional wartime propagandists, notably Koyama Eizo, to help smooth the transition. He and others reinforced the wartime message that Japan was the leading example of Asian modernity, worthy of pride and of emulation by others, by proclaiming that it must become so again. Despite the trauma of defeat, the physical devastation of Japanese cities, the deaths of 1.7 million soldiers and approximately 400,000 civilians, the millions of returning deactivated, unemployed soldiers, and the food shortages, the message was clear: Japan could and must recover, and the way to do so was to work with, rather than against, the American occupation forces. Selected Bibliography Dudden, Alexis. 2005. Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Fujitani, Takashi. 1996. Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Gordon, Andrew. 1991. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

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Kushner, Barak. 2006. The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Large, Stephen. 2003. “Substantiating the Nation.” In Nation and Nationalism in Japan, edited by Sandra Wilson, 55–68. London: RoutledgeCurzon. Large, Stephen. 2007. “Oligarchy, Democracy and Fascism.” In A Companion to Japanese History, edited by William M. Tsutsui, 156–171. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Lu, David, ed. 1997. Japan: A Documentary History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Maruyama, Masao. 1974. Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Mayo, Marlene J. 1967. “A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: The Japanese and Hamilton Fish, 1872.” Journal of Asian Studies 26, no. 2: 389–410. Steele, M. William. 2003. Alternative Narratives in Modern Japanese History. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. 1986. Anti-foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies. Wilson, Sandra, ed. 2002. Nation and Nationalism in Japan. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

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Colombia Jane M. Rausch Chronology 1830 Venezuela and Ecuador withdraw from the supra state (known as Gran Colombia) created by Bolívar, which included Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia), and Ecuador. 1832 Constitution of 1832 establishes the Republic of New Granada. Francisco de Paula Santander becomes president. 1843 The constitution of 1843 is adopted. 1853 The constitution of 1853 is adopted, which provides for separation of church and state. 1858 The constitution of 1858 establishes the Grenadine Confederation. 1861 Adoption of Colombian flag. 1863 The Convention of Rionegro adopts the constitution of 1863, creating the United States of Colombia. 1886 The constitution of 1886 is adopted, creating the Republic of Colombia. The Catholic Church regains its former influence. 1887 President Rafael Núñez writes the national hymn of Colombia. 1899–1902 Colombia is immersed in a bloody conflict known as the War of the Thousand Days. 1903 Panama declares its independence. 1920 The national hymn is officially adopted. 1921 The United States recognizes Panama and by the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty agrees to pay Colombia for the loss of Panama. 1930 Enrique Olaya Herrera, a Liberal, is elected president, ending five decades of Conservative rule. 1932–1934 Peru invades the Colombian Amazon outpost of Leticia. After two years of fighting, Colombia is victorious. 1934 Alfonso López Pumarejo, a Liberal, becomes president and begins the “Revolution on March,” an effort to promote radical economic and social reform. 1936 Codification of 1936 modifies the constitution of 1886 to ensure that labor enjoys the protection of the state and is entitled to the right to strike, that public assistance is a function of the state, that possession of property carries social obligations, and that the state might intervene in the conduct of private and public businesses where the general social welfare is concerned. Other provisions restrict the role of the Catholic Church in public affairs. 1944 López Pumarero resigns from the presidency; Alberto Lleras Camargo becomes interim president. 1946 Mariano Ospina Pérez, a Conservative, is elected president. 1948 Assassination of Liberal populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán sets off the bloody civil war known as La Violencia (1948–1964).

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Situating the Nation The modern nation of Colombia can trace its beginnings to the Spanish colonial viceroyalty of New Granada, but it achieved its present territorial boundaries as the result of the Wars of Independence (1810–1824) and the disintegration of Simón Bolívar’s confederation known as Gran Colombia. In 1739, with the goal of rationalizing political control, Charles III removed from Lima’s jurisdiction the northern portion of the Viceroyalty of Peru to create the Viceroyalty of New Granada, which, with its capital in Bogotá, encompassed present-day Ecuador, New Granada (Colombia), and Venezuela. In 1810 patriot resistance to imperial rule and the outbreak of the War of Independence forced the viceroy of New Granada to flee, but the royalists reinstalled his regime in Bogotá after defeating the rebels in 1816. This reprieve was short-lived, for the patriot victory at the Battle of Boyacá on August 7, 1819, ended Spanish control over the region once and for all. In that year Simón Bolívar proclaimed the entire former viceroyalty an independent republic to be known as Colombia but generally referred to by historians as Gran Colombia. To his despair, it was soon clear that geographic, political, and economic tensions made this unwieldy state unworkable. When Venezuela and Ecuador withdrew from Bogotá’s control in 1830, Bolívar accepted that he had failed. Determined to go into exile, he succumbed to tuberculosis at the port of Santa Marta while waiting for a ship to take him to Europe. In 1832 a constitution was adopted creating the Republic of New Granada. This new state, which occupied approximately 440,000 square miles, was a conglomeration of regions, isolated from each other by three branches of the formidable Andean Cordillera. Surrounding the highland core were five peripheral

The Colombian Flag Colombia’s flag is similar to those of Ecuador and Venezuela because all three countries, between 1819 and 1830, formed part of the confederation known as Gran Colombia. The Gran Colombian flag had yellow-blue-red stripes horizontally arranged at a 3:2:1 ratio —that is to say, yellow was larger than blue, and blue was larger than red. After the federation was dissolved, Colombia adopted a new flag in 1834, keeping the same three colors but with vertical stripes, all of the same width. The present flag, adopted on November 26, 1861, restored the horizontal stripes, yellow-blue-red, but at a 2:1:1 ratio. There are three explanations about the meaning of the flag’s colors. The first states that yellow symbolizes sovereignty and justice; blue stands for nobility, loyalty, and vigilance; while red represents valor, honor, generosity, and victory through bloodshed. The second states that yellow stands for universal liberty, blue for the equality of all races and social classes before God and the law, and red means fraternity. The third, coming from a children’s song, states that yellow represents Colombia’s gold, blue is the vast sea, and red is the blood that brought freedom.

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lowland regions including the Pacific coast, the Isthmus of Panama, the Caribbean coast, the eastern tropical plains or Llanos Orientales, and a large portion of the Amazon basin. During Spanish rule, gold and silver mined in Antioquia represented New Granada’s principal economic value, but livestock and commercial agriculture—cacao, sugar, tobacco, salt, and flour—flourished in other regions. Thanks to the variations in altitude, most regions were self-sufficient in food production, and until the development of tobacco, followed by coffee, as export crops in the mid-19th century, internal trade was more important than transatlantic trade. According to the census of 1778, New Granada had a population of 826,550. There were 277,068 whites and 368,093 mestizos who together comprised 80 percent of the whole. Indians numbered 136,753, or 15 percent, and African slaves, 44,636, or 5 percent. By 1830 it is estimated that the population had increased to 1.5 million, with the racial proportions remaining more or less the same. With regard to spatial arrangement, approximately 60 percent of the people lived in or around Bogotá, Tunja, and Socorro in the Eastern Cordillera at altitudes of more than 7,000 feet. Another 15 percent, including most of the slaves, resided in the agricultural and pastoral areas of Popayán and the Cauca Valley. The northern coastal regions, including Panama, and the seaports of Cartagena, Santa Marta, and Barranquilla accounted for 15 percent of the people, while 9 percent were living in mineral-rich Antioquia. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out in Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, the national consciousness that sprang from the ruins of the Spanish empire in Latin America was a “Liberal nationalism” influenced by the French Revolution and limited to the Creole elite. The lat-

Francisco de Paula Santander (1792–1840) Santander was born in Cúcuta on the eastern border of New Granada to a family of upperclass provincial landowners. The outbreak of the independence movement interrupted his formal education, and he subsequently saw active service both in the civil conflicts between New Granadan patriots and against Spain. After the royalists reconquered most of the colony in 1815–1816, Santander helped organized patriot resistance in the eastern plains. Eventually joining forces with Simón Bolívar, he took part in the campaign of 1819 that culminated in the decisive victory of Boyacá. In 1821 Santander was elected vice president of Gran Colombia (which included Venezuela, Ecuador, and New Granada) and governed effectively from Bogotá while Bolívar was defeating the Spanish in Peru. After Bolívar’s death and the breakup of this confederation in 1830, Santander became the first constitutional president of the separate Republic of New Granada in 1832. Known as the “Man of Laws,” he was a firm and capable administrator. In 1836 he turned the presidency over to his successor, but he continued to serve in Congress until his death in 1840. His supporters later formed the nucleus of the Liberal Party that has conventionally claimed Santander as its founder.

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ter, who sought to displace their Spanish oppressors, were equally determined to prevent “lower-class” political mobilizations: to wit, Indian or Negro-slave uprisings. As in the other newly formed states, in New Granada Francisco de Paula Santander and other independence leaders were rallying points for what may be described as nationalism, but for many years, the collective memory of their deeds inspired patriotism rather than nationalism. New Granada was spared the emergence of caudillos (dictators) such as Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina or José Antonio Páez in Venezuela. Instead, the division of the elites into two competing parties after 1840—the Liberals and the Conservatives—proved to be the primary way of mobilizing the masses. These parties were unique in Latin America in the sense that they went beyond being solely elite creations. Members of the so-called lower classes also developed deeply partisan identities. In addition, the Roman Catholic Church continued to wield enormous influence at all social levels. With some notable exceptions, the Liberals were anticlerical and supported federalism and free trade, while Conservatives were pro-clerical and favored unitary government and protectionism. Numerous civil wars were fought to promote these ideological goals, and the promulgation of five different constitutions (and subsequent changes of the name N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of the state) in 1843 (New Granada), 1853 (New Granada), 1858 (Granadine Confederation), 1863 (United States of Colombia), and 1886 (Republic of Colombia) reflected the temporary dominance of one party over the other. Each constitution reconfigured regional divisions so that, for example, in 1853 the country was divided into 36 provinces, whereas in 1863 it was consolidated into 9 states and the Federal District of Bogotá. In short, despite the fact that a national flag was adopted in 1861, during most of the 19th century, regional and party loyalties far outstripped any sense of Colombian national identity. To cite an extreme case, Panama, geographically isolated by the impenetrable Darien forests that make up the eastern part of the isthmus, remained free from Bogotá’s control, in spite of the fact that it was officially declared a state in 1863. This isolation contributed to the Panamanians’ sense of abandonment and was undoubtedly a factor in their separation from Colombia (with help from the United States) in 1903.

Instituting the Nation There is general agreement among historians that President Rafael Núñez was the key figure in establishing the basis for a centralized state in Colombia. Although he began his career as a Liberal who believed in federalism, he gradually became convinced that only a centralized government based on an alliance with the Catholic Church could hold the country together. The constitution of 1886, which he endorsed, provided for a powerful president elected for a six-year term and reduced the regions, which had been classified as “states” under the previous charter, to the status of departments. The constitution declared Roman Catholicism the religion of the nation, and a concordat signed with Pope Leo XIII in 1887 specified that Roman Catholicism was indispensable to the social order. Núñez also wrote the national hymn, “¡Oh Gloria inmarcesible! ” (“O Unfading Glory!”), a poetic recollection of the wars for independence consisting of 11 verses and a chorus. The hymn, set to music composed by Orestes Sindici, an Italian music teacher living in Bogotá, was first performed in 1887 (though not adopted as the official national anthem until October 18, 1920). It is significant that in the first verse, Núñez included the lines, “And all humanity, which groans in chains, understand the words of Him who died on the cross,” thus associating Colombian independence with an orthodox version of Roman Catholic Christianity. The nationalism that Núñez championed was cultural and aristocratic. It emphasized that Colombia was a nation because it was Spanish, in language and religion, a definition that embraced the “white” population while rejecting the mestizo, African, and Native American elements. By strengthening control of the central government and cementing an alliance with the Catholic Church, Núñez hoped to weaken the ideological divide between the two political parties and to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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overcome regional allegiances that for most Colombians remained far stronger than their commitment to the “nation” as a whole. This effort, however, seems only to have exacerbated regional and political divisions, for the 19th-century cycle of civil wars continued, reaching a horrific climax with the War of the Thousand Days (1899–1902) that ended in a Liberal defeat, cost an estimated 100,000 lives, and set the stage for the first major loss of Colombian territory, the secession of Panama in 1903.

Defining the Nation Until the early 20th century, the “nation” in terms of effective territory included the Colombian highlands and the Caribbean coastal regions, inhabited by 97 percent of a population that had grown to nearly 8 million people. The lowland peripheral regions still contained less than 3 percent of the population, although they accounted for over half of Colombian territory. The loss of Panama alerted the Conservatives, who dominated the central government from 1910 to 1930, to the critical need to extend more effective control over these neglected areas. To achieve this end, they designated these territories either as intendencias or comisarías especiales, depending on the size of their populations, and they created a special bureaucracy to administer them until their populations grew large enough to justify their elevation to departmental status. Since their inhabitants were primarily Native Americans, the government regarded these regions as mission territories. In 1902 it signed with the Vatican a Convention on Missions that gave the Catholic Church absolute authority to govern, police, educate, and control the Indians, including jurisdiction over primary education for all people in these territories—white and Indians—as well as unlimited access to public lands to promote colonization. Although the government also assigned civil officials to administer the territories, the missionary orders easily superseded their authority. In the 19th century, writers such as José María Samper celebrated Colombia’s regional differences by describing the mixed racial and cultural characteristics of the people who lived in the different parts of the country and creating vivid regional stereotypes. By the beginning of the 20th century, however, the ruling upper class rejected these “romantic” idealizations. Undeterred by the fact that the vast majority of the population was mestizo, they condemned mestizaje (racial mixture) as a sign of racial degeneration. Viewing themselves in the mirror of North American materialism and racism, they stressed that the only true Colombians were whites. The 1920s saw the emergence of a more militant nationalism in reaction to the threat of U.S. economic imperialism and U.S. approval of the unpopular UrrutiaThompson Treaty (originally signed in 1914) by which the United States paid Colombia an indemnity of $25 million as compensation for the loss of Panama. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Urrutia-Thompson Treaty of 1914 In August 1903, during the aftermath of the War of the Thousand Days, the Colombian Senate refused to approve the Hay-Herrán Treaty, by which the United States would have received permanent control over a narrow strip of the Isthmus of Panama to build a canal, because they regarded the terms of the agreement as a breach of Colombian sovereignty. Panama’s subsequent revolt in November 1903, aided and abetted by the United States, has been the only territory lost by Colombia in its 200-year history. Although Colombians felt no deep cultural ties to Panama, its separation was an ignominious defeat difficult to accept. Nevertheless, in 1914 Colombia signed the UrrutiaThompson Treaty in which the United States expressed regret for its actions in Panama and agreed to pay Colombia a $25 million indemnity. Opposition to the treaty came not from Colombians but from U.S. senators, who, influenced by Theodore Roosevelt, objected to the inclusion of the “regret” clause in the treaty. It was not until the Colombians agreed to exclude this clause that the U.S. Senate approved the treaty in 1921. At that time, Colombia recognized Panamanian independence and received its $25 million indemnity from the United States.

During this decade, some intellectuals such as Jorge Bejarano, Arturo Castro, and Armando Solano strongly defended Colombian mestizaje. Without abandoning racial stereotypes completely, they argued that Africans, Indians, as well as mestizos had made unique contributions to the country, and that through education they could be redeemed. Nevertheless, the indianismo, or championing of native culture as the bedrock of nationalism, embraced by Peruvian and Mexican intellectuals found no resonance among Colombian scholars. In 1932 an invasion by a group of Peruvians into the Colombian Amazon territory of Leticia provoked a Colombian declaration of war and an outpouring of patriotic fervor. Perhaps for the first time, Liberals and Conservatives set aside their ideological differences to defend the fatherland. As President Enrique Olaya Herrera mobilized the army to confront the Peruvians, Bogotanos belonging to both parties held an enormous demonstration on September 18 to support the war effort. In one day, the government, strapped to find funds for basic economic reforms, received pledges of 10 million pesos from individuals to buy war bonds. The Colombians were able to defeat the Peruvians by 1934, but the war underscored the fragility of Bogotá’s control over the eastern half of the country. To correct this deficiency, the government recognized the need to incorporate more fully under its rule Colombia’s Orinoco and Amazonian frontiers. In 1934 the Liberal president, Alfonso López Pumarejo, made clear that his commitment was to the entire nation. Adopting the slogan, “Rediscovering Colombia,” he stated: “We have neglected Colombian territory which remains unknown to us, and we have left its people in a miserable and anguished condition. . . . In my view, it is not necessary to regenerate the country but to discover it. . . . It is necessary to awaken all the human energies that have been abandoned. . . . It is necessary N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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to make an economic conquest of national territory. And especially to liberate captive minds that have never been stimulated” (López Pumarejo 1937, 1:9–12). López Pumarejo’s policies of instituting tax reforms, labor laws, church restrictions, and land partitioning are collectively known as “the Revolution on March.” His goal was to broaden Colombian nationalism beyond the upper class and the highland regions to encompass the middle and laboring classes as well as the peripheral territories that previous regimes had largely ignored. López Pumarejo embraced economic nationalism by taking a strong stand against foreign investment and by legalizing the seizure of large landholdings for the public good. Finally, his energetic support of territorial reforms represented an important step in consolidating government control over all Colombian territory.

Narrating the Nation Without doubt, the heroes of the wars for independence provide the bedrock of Colombian national memory. Antonio Nariño, “The Great Precursor,” who the Spanish exiled in 1794 for publishing the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, Policarpa Salvarrieta, the first woman executed by the Spanish in New Granada for her work with the patriot underground, Francisco de Paula Santander, the “Man of Laws” who helped defeat the Spanish and gave New Granada its first constitution, and, of course, Venezuelan-born Simón Bolívar, whose genius made independence possible but whose enmity with Santander delayed his apotheosis until the mid-19th century, are just a few of the patriots enshrined in the Colombian pantheon. The national flag, emblem, and hymn all recall this glorious era.

Hailed as the true founder of Colombia, Francisco de Paula Santander was a soldier and statesman who fought beside Simón Bolívar in the Spanish-American Independence War. (Library of Congress)

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Because of the absence of a prolonged 19th-century dictatorship and the weakness of the military, early on the Colombian elites emphasized the country’s record of civilian and constitutional rule. Likewise, they embraced the title of the “Athens of South America.” With great political skill, they stressed what Carlos Uribe Celis has called a “fantasy of high culture” to maintain their political domination, disregarding the fact that the vast majority of the population remained destitute and illiterate. The elites pointed out that Colombian presidents were not just politicians but also humanists, grammarians, and writers, all characteristics that helped neutralize the military. Even in the 20th century, Colombian cultural prowess continued to be internationally acclaimed thanks to novelist and Nobel laureate Gabriel García Márquez and artist Fernando Botero, not to mention fine universities and thriving publishing houses. Another manifestation of the “Athens of South America” image is the importance of ideology. Historians commonly refer to Colombia’s frequent 19th-century wars as struggles over ideas, in which attitudes regarding the importance of the Catholic Church played a more important role than did individual caudillos striving for personal power. Underscoring this point is the fact that in no other Latin American country have the two traditional parties, founded in the 19th century, continued to dominate politics in the 21st century. At the popular level, Colombian identity was and is most clearly expressed in regional and national beauty contests and in folk music and dance, reflecting the country’s mixture of ethnic and regional influences. Perhaps most characteristic is the black-influenced cumbias, begun by African slaves in Cartagena and Barranquilla, that at different times have been all the rage elsewhere in Latin America. Equally familiar are the vallenato, salsa, bambuco, and the joropo. While each of these musical types is native to a specific region, they are widely known throughout Colombia. With regard to sports, only in bicycle racing and soccer have Colombians gained world attention, and in recent years these activities have been vitiated by infusions of money from illegal drug trafficking cartels.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Colombia emerged from the breakup of “Gran Colombia” in 1830 as a product of the liberal idealism born of the French Revolution. Fragmented by ethnic and regional differences, it was first held together by loyalties to the heroes that emerged from the war with Spain. By the late 19th century, the adoption of the constitution of 1886 imposed a centralizing framework on its territory, half of which was still largely unpopulated. The loss of Panama in 1903 awakened the leadership to the threat of U.S. imperialism, and the Peruvian invasion of 1932 provided the impetus for the radical reforms undertaken by President López Pumarejo to bind the disparate classes together and reclaim abandoned regions. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Unlike Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, Colombia has never attracted large-scale European immigration and thus was spared the challenge of transforming huge numbers of Italians and Germans into Colombian citizens. Individual immigrant families from northern Europe, however, have achieved prominence in various fields. The other substantial immigrant group is from the Middle East, known collectively in Colombia as turcos. Often discriminated against, they are found everywhere, and a few such as Julio César Turbay Ayala, who was president from 1978 to 1982, have managed to infiltrate the closed political system. The elite largely ignored the sizable minorities of Afro-Colombians and Native Americans even after protests by these groups began in the 1920s and 1930s. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the mestizo Liberal populist, was the first to directly appeal to these marginalized people, and his assassination on April 9, 1948, initiated the bloody civil war known as La Violencia that lasted until 1964. By the 1980s, formerly neglected ethnic groups were better organized, and the new constitution of 1991 recognized their existence by giving them special representation in the Congress. From the 19th century onward, campaigns by political parties and leaders of the Catholic Church were the principal methods of rallying the middle and working classes. In addition, newspapers, based in the capital and principal cities, were a key source of information for the small percentage of literate Colombians. By the 1930s, the development of a national airline and radio communication began to breech geographic barriers that for so long had blocked the development of a sense of national unity. The availability of airplanes cut travel time between Bogotá and the most distant regions from weeks to a few hours. The first commercial radio, La Voz de Barranquilla, began transmission on December 8, 1929, and by 1935 there were 5,000 radios receiving signals. Not only were radios important in popularizing the music of different regions and developing a huge following for the radionovelas or soap operas, but the technology also provided a way for officials in Bogotá to communicate their programs to every corner of the country. The accelerated modernization of these decades encouraged the growth of the middle class and the expansion of public schools that, even though they reached only 30–40 percent of the population, began to inculcate patriotism by teaching the history of the independence movement, observing national holidays, and acquainting children with the national hymn and other symbols of collective identity. Gradually the division between the European culture of the elite and the traditional, folkloric culture of the people became blurred, giving way to a mass-based cultural consumption. Outlook As noted earlier, the political centralization imposed by Nuñez and the constitution of 1886 ultimately proved insufficient to override regional and political ideologies. After 30 years of uneasy peace under the Conservatives (1900–1930) and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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15 years of uneasy change under the Liberals, uncompromising political ideologies, barely held in check during World War II, broke out again after the assassination of Gaitán. The ensuing civil war, known as La Violencia, touched nearly all Colombians, regardless of their class, race, or region. Although the initial violence abated in the early 1960s, it sprang up again at the end of the decade as guerrilla groups such as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), inspired by Fidel Castro, began their 40-year militant struggle to refashion Colombia in a way similar to Castro’s Cuba. In the 1980s, the emergence of competing drug cartels intensified the ensuing mayhem, and in recent years, efforts by the army and paramilitary groups to eliminate narco-trafficking and the guerrillas have only increased the plethora of kidnappings, massacres, and violations of human rights. In 1968, historian Gerhard Masur examined Colombia’s lack of a strong sense of nationalism and concluded that the country offered a unique case where national identity had failed to overcome the centrifugal pull of regional loyalties. Thirty years later, upon surveying the decades of civil warfare that have afflicted Colombia since 1945, other scholars have concluded that a culture of violence defines Colombian national identity. In 1999 Eduardo Posada Carbó observed that a common trend among Colombian intellectuals has been to systematically deconstruct the nation. He added that, having scrutinized every aspect of Colombian identity, these scholars have ended up by denying the very existence of the nation and the value of its democratic and civil advances. Rejecting this gloomy assessment, David Bushnell, the dean of Colombian studies in the United States, has argued that, while it is commonplace to say that Colombians lack a proper spirit of nationalism, for better or worse, the country does exist as a nation. He asserts that time and time again, Colombians have exhibited the ability to recover from terrible catastrophes and continue their daily activities under circumstances that others might regard as hopeless. Since it is clear that even without developing a strong sense of nationalism the Colombian state has endured for nearly 200 years, maintaining a constitutional government and creating a unique history and a rich culture, it is difficult not to agree with Bushnell that Colombia is indeed “a nation in spite of itself.” Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. ed. New York and London: Verso. Bushnell, David. 1993. The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Earle, Rebecca. 2005. “Sobre Héroes y Tumbas: National Symbols in Nineteenth-Century Spanish America.” Hispanic American Historical Review 85, no. 3: 375–416. Herring, Hubert. 1968. A History of Latin America. 3rd ed. New York: Knopf. Jaramillo Uribe, Jaime. 1998. “Perfil Histórico de Bogotá.” In Travesías por la Historia, 323–349. Bogotá, Colombia: Imprenta Nacional.

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López Pumarejo, Alfonso. 1937. La política official: Mensajes, cartas y discursos del presidente López. 4 vols. Bogotá, Colombia: Imprenta Nacional. Lynch, John. 1986. The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826. 2nd ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Masur, Gerhard. 1966. Nationalism in Latin America: Diversity and Unity. New York: Macmillan. Melo, Jorge O. 1992. “Etnia, región y nación: El fluctuante discurso de la identidad.” In Predecir el pasado: Ensayos de historia de Colombia, 81–107. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Lealon. Posada Carbó, Eduardo. 2003. “El regionalismo político en el Caribe colombiano.” In El desafío de las ideas: Ensayos de historia intellectual y política en Colombia, 139–165. Medellín, Colombia: Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT. Samper, José María. 1861. Ensayo sobre las revoluciones políticos y la condición de los repúblicas colombianas (hispano-americanas). Paris: Imprenta de E. Thunot Y ca, Calle Racine. Uribe Celis, Carlos. 1992. Mentalidad del Colombiano: Cultura y sociedad en el siglo XX. Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Alborada. West, Robert C. 1962. “The Geography of Colombia.” In The Caribbean: Contemporary Colombia, edited by A. Curtis Wilgus, 3–21. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

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Puerto Rico Juan Manuel Carrión Chronology 1887 The Autonomist Party is founded. The Spanish colonial government carries out a campaign of massive repression (“Los Compontes”). 1895 Puerto Rican section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party is founded, and the Puerto Rican flag is created. 1897 Spain grants autonomy to Puerto Rico. 1898 Puerto Rico is invaded during the Spanish-American War. 1900 The Foraker Act establishes a civilian colonial government, and Puerto Rico becomes a “non-incorporated territory.” 1901–1922 “Insular Cases” decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. 1904 The Unionist Party is formed. 1915 The Socialist Party is formed. 1917 With the Jones Act, Puerto Ricans become U.S. citizens while remaining “foreign in a domestic sense.” 1922 The Nationalist Party is formed. 1930 Pedro Albizu Campos is elected president of the Nationalist Party. 1937 Ponce Massacre. 1938 The Popular Democratic Party is formed. 1946 The Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) is formed. 1947 Albizu Campos returns to Puerto Rico from federal jail, and special political repressive laws are passed (“la ley de la mordaza”). 1948 Luis Muñoz Marín is elected governor in the context of new political reforms. 1950 The Nationalist Party carries out a last-ditch armed rebellion. 1952 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is established.

Situating the Nation Puerto Rico is a nation with a long history of colonial subjection. For four centuries it was a colony of Spain, and since 1898, as a consequence of the SpanishAmerican War, it has been a possession of the United States. After the American invasion, a limited form of colonial self-government was established and justified by defining the island as an unincorporated territory, “domestic in a foreign sense.” The U.S. Supreme Court sustained the political definition that Puerto Rico “belongs to but does not form part of the U.S.” in a series of important constitutional decisions known as the “Insular Cases.” These decisions remained unmodified even after Puerto Ricans were made U.S. citizens in 1917. After World War II, several important political reforms were carried out that led to the creation of a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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new political structure in 1952, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, “Estado Libre Asociado” in Spanish. Under this new regime, Puerto Rico was granted internal self-government. Given the colonial status, politics in Puerto Rico have for more than a century revolved around what is locally called the “Status Question,” defined in terms of three traditional options to solve it: independence, autonomy, and annexation (U.S. statehood). In the last decades of the 19th century, Puerto Rico experienced some economic growth, but only to a limited degree given the backwardness of the Spanish metropolis. After the American invasion, the island went through a rapid economic transformation. Puerto Rico was integrated into the U.S. economy through American-owned sugar corporations. Puerto Rico became an American outpost in the early stages of U.S. ascent to world hegemony. This was a time when ideologies of “White Supremacy” and visions of a “White Man’s Burden” were common in the United States. The racially mixed population of Puerto Rico was seen with condescending eyes, that is, as clearly inferior, but at the same time there was some optimism concerning the positive effects that Americanization could have on the local population. The perception of the United States as the epitome of democracy and modernity cast a spell among wide sectors of the population and generated support for American rule. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, many people welcomed the new rulers, hoping they would bring modernization of the economy and society. But by the 1930s, many of these hopes had been dashed, and some critics were calling Puerto Rico the “Poor House of the Americas.” At that time, some of the New Deal programs started in the United States by President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to be applied to Puerto Rico, and in the late 1940s the local government, controlled by a new political party, carried out a program of industrialization with the help of U.S. authorities. This program, called Operation Bootstrap, was a success, and by the 1950s Puerto Rico was in official government parlance the “Showcase of Democracy” in the Caribbean. Puerto Rico is a small island in the Caribbean, but by 1900 it had a population close to a million. As in other parts of the region, a significant part of the population was black or racially mixed, but it also had a large number of whites. The typical social-racial stratification found throughout the Caribbean, with whites at

Insular Cases The U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of decisions from 1901 to 1922 known as the Insular Cases. They provide the basic legal framework that defines the political relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. These rulings have characterized Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory that “belongs to but does not form part” of the United States. Puerto Rico was also defined as “foreign in a domestic sense” in spite of the U.S. citizenship given to Puerto Ricans in 1917.

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the top, was also typical of Puerto Rico, but whites were also significantly present among the poor, and some blacks like José Celso Barbosa, founder of the U.S. statehood movement, were able to achieve the highest status in society. The large demographic increase that was experienced in the 19th century was mostly due to natural growth. Some important immigration flows also took place during this period, but immigrants in general were a small total of the population in Puerto Rico when the Americans arrived.

Instituting the Nation In the 19th century, national consciousness started to emerge among the socioeconomic elite in Puerto Rico. The name and definition of that group is subject to debate. The precapitalist elements present in its makeup have led some authors to talk about an “Hacendado” class. This group, which perhaps could better be called a proto-bourgeoisie, expressed elements of a new national identity through different cultural manifestations and through its political aspirations for autonomy. In 1887 an Autonomist Party was formed under the leadership of Román Baldorioty de Castro. The idea of autonomy was expressed in different ways. For some, autonomy just meant a different administrative arrangement. But for others, the idea of autonomy entailed an emotional attachment to Puerto Rico as a unique community that demanded political loyalty. Important contradictions and fissures within the Puerto Rican socioeconomic elite affected these autonomist aspirations. The ideas of “country” (pátria) that had developed within the elite had limited resonance among the illiterate masses. Under the leadership of Santiago Iglesias, a Spanish-born carpenter, a Socialist Party was founded in 1915 that developed antinational and pro-American political postures. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, became divided into two sectors, the antinational bourgeoisie linked more closely to the sugar industry, and the autonomist bourgeoisie that on some occasions would flirt with independence. For José Celso Barbosa, leader of the pro-American Republican Party, the separate Puerto Rican nation or culture did not exist. The Unionist Party, which was formed in 1904, had independence as its long-range goal and autonomy as its immediate goal. For some leaders of the Unionist Party such as José de Diego, independence took precedence, but for the main leader of the party, Luis Muñoz Rivera, independence, although beautiful, was impossible due to weaknesses he attributed to the Puerto Rican people. There’s a long history of links between independence and autonomy advocates that goes all the way back to the early 19th century. Separatists and autonomists came from the same socioeconomic sector and shared similar liberal political ideals. The big difference laid in their understanding of the relationship between reform and revolution. For separatist leaders like Ramón Emeterio Betances, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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reforms were impossible under Spanish colonialism. He advocated a revolutionary overthrow of Spanish power not only in Puerto Rico but in Cuba as well. Betances died in 1898, the year of the invasion, extremely worried that, without an armed rebellion against the Spanish, Puerto Rico would become an American colony for all eternity. After the great setback of 1898, a radical anticolonial nationalism emerged again in Puerto Rico in the 1930s under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos. This Harvard-educated mulatto transformed the Nationalist Party, which had been founded in 1922, into a militant organization that preached resistance to foreign domination. This radical nationalism was mostly supported by a heterogeneous petty bourgeoisie with some links to the lower strata of society. The upper-class members abandoned the Nationalist Party when Albizu Campos was elected president, alarmed by his militant rhetoric. In the 1930s, the Liberal Party, which was also in favor of independence, became the largest political organization under the leadership of Antonio Barceló. But in the 1940s, Luis Muñoz Marín, scion of the late patrician leader of the Unionist Party, founded the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) and thwarted the growing push for independence. Initially, this new party, which had grown out of the Liberal Party, was identified by many as being in sympathy with independence, but after 1945 it quickly changed its orientation. Under the leadership of Muñoz Marín, the PPD rejected political dimensions of Puerto Rican nationalism and instead advocated a separate Puerto Rican culture, albeit one that legitimated the continued colonial relationship with the United States.

Puerto Rican nationalist Pedro Albizu Campos waves from his prison cell after talking to reporters, November 1950. (Bettmann/Corbis)

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Defining the Nation In the 19th century, liberalism was the dominant ideology both among revolutionaries like Betances and reformists like Muñoz Rivera. In the next century, Hispanophilia also was a common feature of leaders in favor of autonomy and independence. This was in contrast to the Hispanophobia that prevailed among annexationists and socialists. Before the invasion, the nation that was forming was defined in territorial and political terms and not in terms of ethnicity. But after the invasion and in opposition to the campaigns of cultural Americanization, the nation started to affirm ethnic elements through Hispanophilia. This cultural orientation had conservative and radical expressions. In its conservative version, the imagined Puerto Rican nation emphasized the lost links to the Spanish “Mother Country.” In the radical nationalism of Pedro Albizu Campos, Hispanophilia meant claiming cultural superiority vis-à-vis the invaders and belonging to a widespread community of nations that were mainly Latin American. Albizu Campos proposed a “voluntarist” break with the colonial status quo and an end to the policy of “good manners” toward the “colonial oppressors.” By contrast, Muñoz Marín argued that there was disjuncture between the “abstract nation” cherished by nationalists and the “really existing people” (pátria-pueblo), which made it impossible to achieve independence. The officially sponsored process of Americanization and informal influence of American culture have been decisive factors in the making of Puerto Rican collective identities. Until the late 1940s, the official policy sponsored by colonial authorities was the substitution of the Spanish language with English. This was reflected in the public school system where instruction was carried out in the new language. Resistance to this policy led to early manifestation of cultural nationalism. José de Diego distinguished himself in the defense of the vernacular. For José Celso Barbosa, on the contrary, Americanization was openly accepted, including the linguistic change it encompassed. Early pro-independence leader Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón proposed a conditioned acceptance of Americanization and welcomed the influence of American civic and republican values while rejecting cultural impositions. Albizu Campos, on the other hand, presented a radical critique of the whole Americanization process, arguing that a fully formed Puerto Rican nation existed that did not require the condescending mentoring process defended by Americanization advocates. National identity has been a contested issue in Puerto Rico. For Albizu Campos it was clear that a choice had to be made: “Yankee or Puerto Rican.” But this has been a difficult choice, because cultural identity has not always been congruent with national identity. A Puerto Rican ethnic identity grew in strength during the first half of the 20th century, but the Americanization process also had a deep impact on the political loyalties of Puerto Ricans. The U.S. statehood movement in Puerto Rico can be seen in some of its aspects as a Creole version of American N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The flag of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico flies alongside the U.S. banner atop a building in San Juan following the official observance of Puerto Rico’s Constitution Day in 1952. (Bettmann/Corbis)

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nationalism. Its advocates may feel ethnically Puerto Rican but consider their nation to be the United States. Autonomists, on the other hand, have given support or have made use of cultural nationalism but limit the political demands that could possibly be drawn from it. Sharing many aspects of the cultural nationalism that is present in the autonomist movement, pro-independence advocates defend a political nationalism that seeks the creation of a Puerto Rican national state. In spite of the strength of ethnic identities, the independence movement has been relatively weak. Factors that help explain the divergence between a strong ethnic identity and a weak national identity include the interplay between ethnic and racial distinctions, the effects of economic conditions, and the influence of political measures, such as educational policies and repression of political dissidents.

Narrating the Nation The interpretation of past events is used as a political tool in contemporary struggles to define present-day power arrangements. The interpretation of this “social past” (as opposed to what “actually happened”) in Puerto Rico is refracted in the prism of the colonial legacy of the country. For political nationalists, the past that is emphasized deals with the 1868 rebellion in the town of Lares and the numerous conspiracies and acts of defiance that have taken place first against Spain and then against the United States. For autonomists, the past represents the sufferings and achievements of the 19th-century struggle for autonomy and the struggles for self-government in the 20th century. Of special significance to them is the year 1897 when Spain granted autonomy to Puerto Rico. For U.S. statehood advocates, the “true” history begins in 1898. The other significant date is 1917 when U.S. citizenship was “obtained.” Autonomists and pro-independence advocates evaluate the Spanish past with mixed sentiments. Spanish political abuses are denounced, but at the same time Spanish cultural heritage is valued as a very important element in the cultural (“national”) definition of what it means to be Puerto Rican. By contrast, advocates of U.S. statehood view the Spanish past in overwhelmingly negative terms and correspondingly praise the American influence in Puerto Rico. Different myths are articulated in narrating the nation. One of the most common myths is that of the three roots. According to this myth, the Puerto Rican people are the result of the cultural and racial blending of three main groups: Taino Indians, Spaniards, and Africans. It is similar to other Latin American myths of “racial democracy,” which seek to hide the reality of racial inequality and to sponsor a desire for racial harmony. Another major Puerto Rican myth is the notion of the “Jibaro” or Puerto Rican peasant as the predominant national icon. It has been pointed out that Jibaros were mostly racially mixed whereas the iconic Jibaro has N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Pedro Albizu Campos (1891–1965) Albizu Campos was the most important exponent of Puerto Rican nationalism in the 20th century. Born as the illegitimate son of a white landowner and a black domestic servant, he became an orphan very early in his life. In spite of the shortcomings of his social origins, he was able to acquire a law degree from Harvard University. From 1930 until his death he was the main leader of the Nationalist Party, an organization that practiced a very militant anti-imperial form of nationalism. After spending many years in jail, he was pardoned by the government shortly before his death in 1965.

been presented in most cases as white. This clearly points to the limitations and contradictions of the racial democracy myth. But at the same time, one should not overlook the use of this myth as a tool of nationalist resistance. Just like in other countries, the peasant has been considered a depository of authentic national values in Puerto Rico. A Puerto Rican national identity has shown itself through many different cultural expressions. A great variety of symbols are associated with the nation, some in a more nonconformist fashion than others. Besides the iconic Jibaro, the Puerto Rican flag, originally designed by Puerto Rican separatists in 1895, has wide currency. Like the flag, the Puerto Rican national anthem originates in 19thcentury anticolonial struggles. In contrast to more traditional national anthems, “La Borinqueña,” as this anthem is called, is set to music that invites one to dance. It is based on a type of music called la danza that originated among the higher strata of 19th-century society but whose rhythms and compositions incorporate many elements of popular culture. Significantly, the nationalist-inspired flag was declared the official flag in 1952 when the Commonwealth was established. “La Borinqueña” was also adopted as the anthem of the new self-governing regime but was modified to purge its separatist connotations. The original revolutionary lyrics of “La Borinqueña” were changed to an innocuous rendition of the country’s beauty.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Nineteenth-century Puerto Rican separatism was ideologically related to Cuban separatism, and in more than one way, there were instances of collaboration. But in Puerto Rico, separatism was not able to obtain deep-rooted popular support. In some respects, Puerto Rico was still a nation in the making when it became an American colony. This youth is reflected in the contradictory features of the first manifestations of national affirmation that took place early in the 20th century. In its beginnings, the Unionist Party included independence in its political platform, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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although together with what were considered other options for self-government: autonomy and U.S. statehood. Later on, the Unionist Party dropped U.S. statehood as a possible option and declared independence its maximum goal but still without giving emphasis to that objective. The Unionist Party had in the beginning some success in appealing to wide sectors of the population with its message of unity, addressed to the “Puerto Rican Family.” But early success was followed by a prolonged failure in achieving a cohesive popular bloc capable of negotiating with a strong hand with U.S. authorities. The “country” (pátria) that Unionist Party leaders were trying to achieve met opposition from the emerging labor leadership and from the local bourgeois sectors that prospered under U.S. rule. The imagined political community expounded by Unionist Party leaders was seen as socially conservative and in conflict with the desires for social improvement of the impoverished masses. On the other hand, the policy of U.S. governments was to convince Puerto Ricans of the need of the American connection for their well-being. In its moderate version, nationalism was hesitant. Pro-independence and autonomist variants coexisted but in a tense relationship that eventually had to be resolved against independence. In its radical version, the one introduced by Pedro Albizu Campos, nationalism was daring and defiant. Its message had its greatest resonance among individuals belonging to what could be described as a petty bourgeoisie, which attempted to confront the strong impact of proletarian processes. Besides the demands for self-government there were attempts to mobilize the nation around economic and cultural demands. Economic demands dealt mostly with defending local land ownership and denouncing the power of the sugar corporations. Cultural demands had as their main concern the defense of the Spanish language. The economic demands were planned to appeal to small Puerto Rican proprietors and to the proletarian sectors of society, but this objective in many occasions conflicted with the interests of the Creole bourgeoisie and their connections with the sugar corporations, interests that had to be satisfied in the Unionist and Liberal parties. This compromise limited the more radical demands necessary to appeal to wider social sectors. Luis Muñoz Marín and his Popular Democratic Party were able in the 1940s to momentarily connect successfully the nationalist surge of the previous years with demands for social reforms. But this conjoining of forces broke apart in the process that led to the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952. In 1946 Muñoz Marín’s party abandoned independence as a goal, and shortly afterward a breakaway group under the leadership of Gilberto Concepción de Gracia formed the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP). The final goal of Puerto Rican nationalism has always been the creation of a national state, defined in republican terms and “spiritually” linked to the “Brother Republics” of Latin America. These links had been proclaimed in Betances’s idea of an “Antillean Confederation,” and in other ways they were expressed by nationalist leaders in the first half of the 20th century, such as Rosendo Matienzo N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Cintrón, José de Diego, Pedro Albizu Campos, and others. The goal of the autonomist movement, on the other hand, has always had a “fuzzy” quality to it. For some of its leaders, autonomy has been defined as something close to independence, but for many others it could be interpreted as a possible stepping-stone to full annexation. The evolution of Luis Muñoz Marín’s political position is a case in point. He started in the 1930s as, in his own words, a “radical nationalist.” In the 1940s he started to attenuate his political position and emphasized social reforms that could be carried out within the existing colonial regime. By the late 1940s, in the context of the early years of the Cold War, Muñoz Marín reached a deal with U.S. authorities that allowed an expansion of self-government with the creation of the Commonwealth. At that time, nationalism was denounced as demonic, and measures of political repression were inaugurated that coincided with McCarthyist political repression in the United States. Nationalists in Puerto Rico have used a variety of means to propagate their goals, such as political rallies, newspapers, and public protests. In the 1930s Albizu Campos gave weekly radio addresses, and in the last years of that decade, Muñoz Marín introduced American-style “grassroots” political campaigning in Puerto Rico. Under the leadership of Albizu Campos, the Nationalist Party carried out a propaganda campaign in the 1930s that advocated resistance to colonial rule. Although the Nationalist Party participated in the elections of 1932, its relationship with U.S. colonial authorities grew increasingly volatile and resulted in violent confrontations until the arrest of its political leadership resulted in the practical destruction of the organization. The most notorious case of political repression in this period was the Ponce Massacre of 1937 where 19 people were killed and more than a hundred wounded when police stopped a Nationalist Party march with machine-gun fire. After the ideological change in the Popular Democratic Party pushed by Muñoz Marín, nationalism was on the one hand coopted and on the other hand strongly repressed. Nationalism was co-opted through the incorporation of many traditional nationalist symbols such as the flag and the adoption of state-sponsored forms of cultural nationalism, such as the establishment of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture as a state agency. This went together with an unprecedented campaign of political repression that included special laws against dissidents and an intense and prolonged campaign of fear that preached that independence meant hunger and starvation. The Commonwealth established in 1952 is the closest that Puerto Rico has been to complete the process of nation-building. With this change, local elites were able to achieve local self-government, but it left Puerto Rico’s final relationship with the United States unresolved: annexation as a U.S. state or an independent republic? In spite of the many contradictions, a nation was built—culturally and politically—during the first half of the 20th century. Since the 19th century the nation started to take shape culturally through diverse learned and popular cultural expressions that were increasingly defined and presented as national. Artists, writers, and cultural workers from several fields, as well as political leadN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ers, contributed to a growing feeling of national identity through activities such as the defense of the vernacular language and the celebration of symbols and rituals of national affirmation. Politically the nation has been built through the demands of autonomy and independence, demands that in diverse and often contradictory fashion defined the local political space as Puerto Rican. Politically the nation has been built through diverse practices of active resistance, including armed struggle. In October 1950, a much smaller Nationalist Party made a last-ditch effort to stop the process that led to the establishment of the Commonwealth, which for them meant an attempt to legitimize colonialism. They carried out an armed rebellion that forced the mobilization of the U.S. National Guard and that included an attempt to kill U.S. president Harry Truman. While culturally the nation was an established fact in 1952, politically many unresolved issues remained. Building the nation politically has been a difficult struggle against the pressures and tendencies that want to define the political space as American. The political status of Puerto Rico is still an unresolved issue at the beginning of the 21st century. Puerto Rico is today one of the few remaining colonies in the world. There’s much irony in being a colony of the world’s paramount democracy. In the last decades of the 20th century, the Puerto Rican model of economic development lost the luster it once had. Since the 1970s, the Puerto Rican economy has experienced very low levels of economic growth and is no longer a success story. The territorial coordinates of the Puerto Rican nation is today a much more complicated question because, after more than 50 years of emigration, there are almost as many Puerto Ricans in the United States as in Puerto Rico. The strength of ethnic Puerto Rican identities is now stronger than ever, and it is much more common presently to speak of Puerto Rico as a nation. At the same time, however, the pro-U.S. statehood movement has become the strongest political force, and the pro-independence movement has been unable to overcome its minority status. Selected Bibliography Acosta, Ivonne. 1987. La mordaza. San Juan, PR: Editorial Edil. Burnett, Cristina, and Burke Marshall, eds. 2001. Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Cabán, Pedro. 1999. Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898–1932. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Carrión, Juan Manuel. 1996. Voluntad de Nación: Ensayos sobre el nacionalismo puertorriqueño. San Juan, PR: Ediciones Nueva Aurora. Carrión, Juan Manuel. 2005. “Two Variants of Caribbean Nationalism: Marcus Garvey and Pedro Albizu Campos.” Centro: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 17, no. 1: 26–45. Fernandez, Ronald. 1992. The Disenchanted Islands: Puerto Rico and the United States in the Twentieth Century. New York: Praeger.

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Ojeda Reyes, Félix. 2001. El desterrado de Paris: Biografía del doctor Ramón Emeterio Betances (1827–1898). San Juan, PR: Ediciones Puerto. Quintero Rivera, Angel G. 1977. Conflictos de clase y política en Puerto Rico. San Juan, PR: Ediciones Huracán. Rivera Ramos, Efrén. 2001. The Legal Construction of Identity: The Judicial and Social Legacy of American Colonialism in Puerto Rico. Washington DC: American Psychological Association. Rosado, María. 1998. Las llamas de la Aurora: Acercamiento a una biografía de Pedro Albizu Campos. San Juan, PR: Editora Corripio. Trías Monge, José. 1997. Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Australia Stephen Alomes Chronology 50,000 BCE Aboriginal occupation of the continent. Australia’s first nations. 1642 European explorers “discover” Australia—Abel Tasman in 1642, William Dampier in 1688, and James Cook in 1770. 1788 British invasion/settlement begins: Sydney, New South Wales, convict colony. 1788–1836 British invasion/settlement in port cities: Moreton Bay (later Brisbane) colony, which later becomes Queensland in 1824; Perth, Western Australia, in 1829; Melbourne, Victoria, in 1834; Adelaide, South Australia, in 1836. 1803–1804 Napoleonic wars: fear of French invasion. Hobart, Van Diemen’s Land (later Tasmania), is settled. 1850s Responsible government is granted to colonies, for example, to New South Wales in 1855. 1854 Eureka Stockade miners’ rebellion in Ballarat, Victoria, during the gold rushes. 1899–1902 Colonial and federal contingents fight in Britain’s South African War. 1901 A federation of six colonies forms the Commonwealth of Australia. White Australia policy is enacted through federal Immigration Restriction Act. 1908 New protections are instituted for labor and industry; tariff walls are linked to regulated wages. 1914–1918 World War I — 331,000 volunteer troops, 62,000 dead. 1915 Australian troops land at Gallipoli in Turkey; the event is later commemorated as Anzac Day, which becomes a national day. 1916–1917 Conscription for war service is rejected at two referendums. 1927 The federal parliament is established in Canberra, the new national capital. 1931 Statute of Westminster passed in the United Kingdom, adopted by Australia in 1942. 1939–1945 World War II—Australian troops are in Greece, North Africa, New Guinea, and the Pacific. 1940s Labor government institutes social nationalism and national projects. Labor government supports the United Nations. 1941 Labor prime minister John Curtin looks to the United States for defense. 1942 Singapore, a bastion of British naval defense, falls to Japan. 1949–1972 Cold War: the Liberal Party (conservative) governments stress the U.S. alliance; Australian troops are engaged in four regional conflicts—Korea, the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation (Borneo), and Vietnam. 1972–1975 Labor government of Gough Whitlam formulates a “new nationalism” regarding the Asia-Pacific region, Aboriginal rights, and Australian culture and national symbols. 1975–2006 Globalization weakens official nationalism and fosters popular nationalism, particularly sporting nationalism. 1990s–2000s Australian forces are engaged in three regional conflicts—the Gulf War, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq.

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Situating the Nation In 1788, Aboriginal Australia was invaded and settled by the British, founding the convict colony of Botany Bay, later renamed Sydney. Consequently, Australian nationalism was a product of imperial time, Pacific place, and contemporary ideologies. The hopes and fears of an imperializing era, ranging from a dominant British empire to fears of racial conflict, shaped Australia. They influenced the national policies and the nationalism of the settler colonies created by the invasion of Aboriginal land. By the late 19th century, the colonies exported wool, wheat, agricultural products, and minerals to Britain. Australia entered into the excitement of “New Imperialism” from the 1880s. A few “Australian Britons” dreamed of an imperial federation. More middling opinion aspired to the political, demographic, economic, and defense advantages of a federation. A smaller number of radicals, as well as Social Darwinians who believed in the centrality of race, had varying dreams of “A Nation for a Continent.” The six colonies federated as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, but Australia remained within the orbit of British empire foreign policy, defense, and trade. The racial conception of the nation and national defense was manifested in racial immigration restrictions after 1901, known as the “White Australia Policy,” which included the exclusion of the Aboriginal race from the census. Radical and republican nationalist sentiment diminished due to imperial sentiment and invasion scares in the 1900s and during World War I. The Royal Navy was the basis of defense. Australia saw itself as a “dominion” within the British empire, complemented in the 1920s by links between “Men, Money, Markets” (British immigrants and capital and markets for primary products). During the Great Depression, imperial trade preference was strengthened by the 1932 Ottawa Agreement, aiding British manufacturers and helping primary produce exporters such as Australia and Canada gain access to the British market. During the 1930s, as international tension grew, a minority of foreign policy commentators argued for a realistic Asian-Pacific defense reorientation, a change that only occurred after Japan entered the war in December 1941 and Singapore fell in February 1942. Now Australia looked to the United States as the primary “great power” supporting its defense. Economically, before 1788 Australia was a hunter-gatherer society. Despite the prison foundation, the settler/invader colony became a small capitalist urban and rural society, never having had a peasant or serf economy. Commercial cities and population concentrations characterized Australia even though its major exports came from the land. Economic prosperity, among the highest in the world, was challenged by the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s and by recurring droughts. Twentiethcentury nation-building included industrial development behind tariff walls and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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within the British sphere. Post–World War II diversification came through American and European capital investment and Asian trade. Port cities and inland movement by rivers and later railways shaped Australian development. Paradoxically, given the frontier national image, urban capital was central in the development and export of wool, wheat, and minerals. A littoral pattern of settlement in capital cities and hinterlands encouraged varying responses, including a national myth based on the “Bush” image that contradicted the urban reality. Pioneering nurtured a rural or frontier myth of the Australian character. In contrast, a related consciousness of trade, the empire, and a wider world emerged in the six small capitals separated by hundreds of miles, or more in the case of Perth. Geographical isolation and the geopolitical reality of European empires ruling Asia ( from the Dutch East Indies to French Indochina) encouraged a Eurocentric racial orientation and fear of China, Japan, and, later, independent Asian nations. Fear of the “North” shaped defense and foreign policy nationalism. From the 1880s, racial ideology, formed by dominant pseudoscience, encouraged ideas of “survival of the fittest” regarding racial difference and of superior or inferior races. Populationism argued that to survive as a nation Australia must “Populate or Perish,” peopling the “Vast Empty Spaces.” If not, it would be invaded by the “teeming races of Asia.” Populationism, though illogical, was reinforced by fear of the “Yellow Peril” and later the “Red Peril” (communism). In the 1920s, the geographer T. Griffith Taylor challenged popular ideology regarding how large a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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population an arid land with thin soil could productively carry and was pilloried as a traitor and an out-of-touch “expert.”

Instituting the Nation A political federation was appealing in the 1850s when the colonies were granted self-government and convict transportation ended, except to Western Australia. However, rights were won regionally without the need for rebellion, and regional loyalty remained strong, as did the barrier of distance. The ease with which “responsible government” was achieved and Britain’s provision of external defense also diluted interest in unity. By the 1880s, confidence engendered by greater national wealth and the anxieties aroused by international insecurity revived the idea. International events, improved communications (including the 1872 telegraph cable to London and the 1880s train services linking Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane), and increased intercolonial trade reinvigorated debates about national unity. The tyranny of distance was being conquered. Intercolonial conferences, in spheres from science and communications to trade unions, suggested national possibilities. So did several problems. New imperialism created imaginary fears and a more dangerous world as Britain, France, and Germany scrambled for Pacific colonies and Japan, China, and Russia strengthened their forces. Queensland attempted to annex New Guinea in 1883 after German activity in the island. An 1889 report argued that Australian defense demanded a federation of the colonies. The economic crash of the 1890s reinforced the urgency of national union. The six colonies had varying fears about the economic implications of federation, however, and protectionists (especially in Victoria) and free traders (especially in New South Wales) were anxious about a future nation’s economic policies. Bitter strikes, reflecting deep divisions between capital and labor, also made Labor Party and trade union principals anxious about the future polity. Sports enhanced the national spirit through shared enthusiasm for the Australian cricket team’s victories over England. While radicals, a very small republican minority, and progressive labor supporters opposed imperialism and the values of class society, most Australians appreciated Australia’s British and English traditions, from Shakespeare to the British empire. Political nationalism resulted in the creation of the Commonwealth of Australia on January 1, 1901. A Federal Council to deal with larger national matters, proposed in 1880 by New South Wales premier Henry Parkes, was established by an imperial act in 1885. In an 1889 speech, later called the “Tenterfield Oration,” Parkes argued that a strong central and federal parliament to control national matters should replace the Federal Council. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Federation, either a great national idea or a national market, took time. The proposal progressed through federal conventions, conferences, and colonial premiers’ meetings in 1891, 1893, 1895, 1897–1898, and 1899. It gained impetus from the 1893 Australian Natives Association (ANA) conference and from the campaigning of Alfred Deakin. Despite a poor voter turnout in 1898, particularly in New South Wales, five colonies passed the 1899 referendum. Western Australia finally said “yes” in July 1900. Federation’s vicissitudes confirmed that, in a difficult continent in a country “founded” as a convict colony, the people did not see the state and the nation as one. They did not invest meaning or authority in the political nation nor venerate its founding fathers or revere “sacred documents” as did more tradition-oriented countries. Cynicism about politicians and politics in a country with 14 houses of parliament coexisted with formal respect for authority. Radicals and writers dreamed romantically of a young, pure, unsullied Australia separate from “Old World” evils of caste, class, and social hierarchy and the European evil of war. However, for most people federation was a political project to strengthen defense and the troubled economy. Philosophical or romantic conceptions of Australian nationalism had continuities with everyday social nationalism. Central was the archetype of the “coming Australian man,” later the male image of the frontier sheep drover or shearer, Digger (soldier), or sportsman or surfer. Amid the national hopes of the 1900s, visionaries recognized that Australia was leading the world in democracy—the secret ballot, male and female suffrage (the last in South Australia in 1894, and throughout the Commonwealth in 1902) —and as a “social laboratory” in social reform—from the first eight-hour workday (achieved by Victorian building workers in 1857) to welfare benefits and pensions, and to one of the first Labor governments in the world (1904). Australia also had one of the most egalitarian distributions of income in the developed world. Working-class progressives and middle-class social liberals supported reform, acknowledging that city and bush (country) Australia was not without poverty, inequality, or disease. Some radical populist journalists expressed another view opposite to patriotic jingoism. Their popular antidote to imperial hyperbole was cynicism about politicians’ aspirations for an imperial knighthood or for personal gain. Many Australians asked, echoing Bernard O’Dowd’s 1900 poetic imagery, if the nation’s future would bring “millennial Eden” or “a new demesne [domain] for Mammon to infest” (Alomes and Jones 1991, 104).

Defining the Nation Australia is a paradoxical society. Settler/invader Australia was even more a product of the era of modernization than of the parallel era of nationalism. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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transmission of institutions created a derivative society, a variant on a Western model. An urban, immigrant, materialist, and increasingly secular society, with a liberal capitalist democracy on the Westminster model, Australia resembles other modern Western societies. Perhaps social and cultural variations, isolation, a small population, distinctive continent and fauna and flora, an evolving social democracy of manners (supplanting Victorian-era class distinctions and “respectability”) made Australia socially and culturally different. However, the ideal of an “egalitarian” society has often been a popular social myth rather than a socioeconomic reality. Political federation was only one evolving national idea during late-19thcentury nation-building. A second idea was that of the Australian Legend (known also, through the Australian term for the inland country as “the bush,” as the “Bush myth”). This radical social ideal of the Australian “type” as a bushman, the egalitarian bush (or country) worker who supported his mates (later termed mateship) appealed to bush trade unionists, Labor Party progressives, and literary nationalists. Both ideas gained from an increased native-born population. In this modern society, the national idea was not the product of traditional blood and soil nationalism. A thin soil and deracinated immigrant people, who took too little account of the indigenous people and nature, had no such confidence in nationhood, in spite of their contemporary race fantasies. The national idea’s reform dimensions had their roots in two different, but related, traditions: the Australian Legend frontier idea of social egalitarianism and urban, middleclass liberal ideas of justice and social progress that had British origins. These radical and reform ideals contrasted with contemporary British imperial ideas and monarchical rhetoric. The radical idea of an Australian egalitarian democracy, free of English and European class hierarchies, was influenced by English radical and Whig traditions of parliamentarism and civil rights and popular Chartism. Australian ideals merged with English liberalism and progressivism in the nation-building and social reforms of the 1890s–1900s. The national-type idea, “the coming Australian man,” from the 1870s also reflected the literary imagination and contemporary rudimentary science. The male archetype’s social attributes and even physiognomy differed from perceived English characteristics. Russel Ward (1958) discerned the origins of what became by the 1890s the “Australian Legend” about the difficult frontier and the bush workers’ traditions of mateship and solidarity. A national tradition arising from the oral culture of the bush workers found literary expression in radical newspapers, including the national Bulletin weekly. The Bulletin also published the new Australian short-story writers and ballad poets, including Henry Lawson and “Banjo” Paterson, known for “The Man from Snowy River.” Stronger British traditions also shaped the new nation into the new century: new imperialist romance, Social Darwinian ideas of racial conflict, and even the

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laissez-faire or individualist economic ideologies of the economics of Adam Smith, modified by the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. The “crimson thread of kinship” (shared British blood), became central to contemporary jingoism. Social and cultural nationalism were less powerful than the bond of empire, nation, and colonies—federation occurred as Australian troops fought in Britain’s war in South Africa (1899–1902). In another paradox, because Australians won democratic political rights early, the idea of the sovereignty of the people was weak. A pioneering society valued roads and bridges more than philosophical social thought. Textbooks inculcated the duties of the citizen posited on loyalty: colonies loyal to the “Mother Country” and citizens loyal to the monarch. The war memorials of the 1900s and 1920s in every town and suburb were sacred monuments to “our glorious dead.” Sovereignty, vested in the throne, was manifested through loyalty rather than emanating from the will of the Australian people. Colonial nationalism was an element of imperial nationalism, even when ideas of “Independent Australian Britons” (Hancock 1930) suggested difference. In reaction, an Australophile intellectual tradition, enlarging the Australian Legend, found significance in Australian culture. Progressive and left intellectuals and cultural nationalists pursued a social conception of Australianism. Politically conservative elitists preferred the idea of “British civilization” (or by the mid-20th century, “Australian civilization”), looking to derivative culture to “civilize” the rough and ready colonials. Such tensions underlie continual agonizing over national identity. Its continuing expression has a related color confusion: history’s red, white, and blue flag contrasting with nature’s legacy, the green and gold sporting colors. The fusion of official, imperial Britannic and popular folk nationalism occurred after the Gallipoli invasion of World War I. The ANZAC myth, named after the acronym for the Australian and New Zealand troops, became the dominant national ideology, a secular religion that drew on Australian Legend ideas of the resourceful Australian soldier animated by feelings of mateship for his comrades. The myth had its storied beginnings in the soldiers’ bravery in the monumentally unsuccessful landing on Turkey’s Dardanelles peninsula on April 25, 1915. Australia redefined its national tradition as expeditionary nationalism after the World War I force of over 400,000 was sent to Europe and the Middle East, resulting in over 60,000 dead, the ultimate sacrifice for “King and Country.” The immediate cause of this changed view of nationalism was the expeditionary force loyally serving a larger power, also seen as Australia’s down payment on a national defense policy. The underlying cause was a settler colony conception that significance came from elsewhere, reinforced by a search for the sacred in a modern society. Anzac Day became the national day, seen as the “birth of Australian nationhood” and “national manhood” and “Australia’s coming of age” national myth, as well as a commemoration of this baptism of fire on the “world

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Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) dig in at Gallipoli in 1915 during World War I. The Allies ultimately failed in their ambitious plan to conquer Turkey by sea. (Bettmann/Corbis)

stage.” Far more important than Anzac Day in New Zealand, it supplanted Australia Day (January 26) and Empire Day (May 24), which lacked resonance. ANZAC began the erasure of the idea of an inferior national character due to the convict stain, although Australians maintained a “colonial cultural cringe” due to the assumption that their culture was lacking compared to metropolitan nations. ANZAC also made expeditionary nationalism the servant of imperial nationalism. As in other gestures of independence (the anger in the 1930s over English bad sportsmanship in cricket and the celebration over the defeat of the Americans in the 1950s Davis Cup tennis tournaments and the 1983 America’s Cup yachting race), symbolic statements of difference became a substitute for independent national policies. The ANZAC legend’s fusion of imperial and popular nationalism benefited conservative political forces. In a related 1920s transition, the small farmer as pioneer became an exemplar of the bush legend. A noble spirit, he was a successor to early inland explorers. Both were memorialized in cairns and monuments, in pioneers’ memorials, and in women pioneers’ gardens. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Narrating the Nation The historian Brian Fitzpatrick argued that “the Australian people made heroes of none and raised no idols, except perhaps an outlaw, Ned Kelly, and Carbine, a horse” (Fitzpatrick 1956, 209). Ned Kelly, the 1870s bushranger, became a hero of Australian myth in a way never achieved by explorers or politicians, governors, scientists, or businessmen or -women. Another popular story, the 1854 Eureka Stockade, combined the drama of a rebellious gold miners’ fight against high license fees, their oaths of solidarity, their adoption of the Southern Cross flag as a symbol of rebellion, and their defense of a fort. In both stories, failed rebellion against authority is an inversion that acknowledges an authoritarian society: a coded recognition of unequal power in a class society despite the myth of egalitarianism. Heroic figures connoting Australian success have been few. They include a World War I general, General Monash, and a rare specific myth of bravery—the small force of new soldiers who stopped the Japanese advance over the Kokoda Track in New Guinea in World War II. Most Australian heroes have come from sports, including the great cricketer Sir Donald Bradman, the tennis champions Lew Hoad and Ken Rosewall, Olympic swimmers and runners such as Dawn Fraser and Betty Cuthbert, stars of the original Australian sport, Australian football, such as Ron Barassi, and the heroes of Rugby Union and Rugby League. Australians prefer such heroes despite the earnest efforts of curriculum planners and historians. Relative economic success and social harmony characterized one of the oldest continuous democracies, despite the fatal impact and ongoing legacy of the invasion. However, the Australian national story emphasizes defeat and difficulty more than success. Stories of defeat permeate Australian history: the first settlers/ invaders facing starvation; the violence of the convict era; explorers lost in the

Ned Kelly (1855–1880) Edward “Ned” Kelly, son of an Irish convict, grew up among small land selectors. Brushes with the law and a sense of injustice led him to become a bushranger, the Kelly gang robbing banks in Victoria and New South Wales from 1878 to 1880. Captured after a hotel siege, despite metal armor, he was tried, and then executed on November 11, the same fateful day as Armistice Day (1918) and the Whitlam government dismissal (1975). The Kelly gang symbolized the “battling” little man’s resistance against big farmers and the banks. The bushranger, whose gang also killed a policeman, became an iconic national hero, the subject of seven films (including the first feature film, The Story of the Kelly Gang, 1906), plays and songs, stories and biographies. “Game as Ned Kelly” is a popular phrase for courage, while Kelly’s last words, “Such is life,” became the title of Joseph Furphy’s great novel (1903). Kelly’s iron mask, captured in Sidney Nolan’s iconic 1940s paintings, symbolizes the dramatic folk hero of national myth.

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desert, some perishing or naming landmarks “Mt. Disappointment”; the Gallipoli defeat; unemployment and poverty; the 1917 death of the Australian boxer Les Darcy and the 1932 alleged poisoning of the champion racehorse Phar Lap in the United States; and the 1942 Japanese defeat of the Allied forces at Singapore and the prisoner of war experience of Changi prison and the Burma railway. Belatedly, Australians have recognized the survival of indigenous Australians and the violence, discrimination, and deprivation they have faced. Aboriginals experienced the physical, social, and cultural degeneration resultant from invasion, imported disease, policies of “Protection,” and confinement in special areas, as well as assimilationist schemes that “removed” light-skinned children from their communities.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In 1901, the monarch was at the apex of the symbolic pyramid, the governor general was titular commander of the armed forces, the state governors and Government House were the peaks of polite society, and knighthoods were marks of honor. The Privy Council was above the High Court of Australia, while Westminster parliamentary forms reflected Australia’s closeness to Britain. Royal tours, from the Duke of Cornwall (1901) to the reigning monarch, Queen Elizabeth II (1954), vied in importance with Australian national events. After federation, assumed racial homogeneity led to the political and social exclusion of Aboriginals, continued prejudice against the Chinese, and the sending back of Pacific islanders (Kanakas). Official assimilationist ideals strengthened in the 1950s and were applied to light-skinned Aboriginals and immigrants. These policies were officially abandoned when the nation embraced multiculturalism in the 1970s. Language services and multicultural policies turned national traditions on their head, despite continuing peer group social pressures. Citizenship and loyalty, qualified by popular indifference or cynicism, became the Australian norm after federation. Imperial popular culture was soon diluted by Australian films and radio, by Hollywood and American popular songs. By the 1950s, Empire Day had become “Cracker Night”; bonfires and fireworks had exploded imperial patriotism. Homogeneity and isolation (the lack of borders with foreign countries) encouraged complacent nationalism. The only major qualifications were bitter Irish Australian opposition to conscription proposed for World War I, class conflict in the 1930s depression, and regional patriotism, whipped up by state premiers over economic development and in sports. Political nationalism has been associated with Labor governments’ independent policies and regional awareness. External Affairs Minister H. V. Evatt supported the United Nations in the 1940s, and the Whitlam and Keating govN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ernments (1970s and 1990s) brought Australia closer to Asia. However, conservatives asserted national interests within an imperial framework: Prime Minister Deakin opposed French colonial aspirations in the New Hebrides (1906), and W. M. Hughes, speaking for the 60,000 dead Australians at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, argued for Australian control of the German southwest Pacific territories. While both major parties claimed loyalty to the great power, conservatives effectively used such themes in the “fear” elections of the 1920s and 1950s–1960s when loyalty was associated with preventing invasion by the “Yellow” or “Red” peril, even though the continent had only experienced one invasion, the one that began in 1788. In the early 1900s, practical nation-building established the institutions of the new Commonwealth, including the Parliament, the High Court, the currency, the postal system, taxation, and the defense forces. Over time federal taxing powers saw the Commonwealth grow at the expense of the states, especially from World War II. The shared social vision of the Deakinite Liberals and Labor was also expressed in the Harvester Judgment (1907), which established a “basic wage” minimum for Australian workers. Justice H. B. Higgins created “A New Province for Law and Order”—a “fair and reasonable” wage for the average employee “living in a civilized community.” This “New Protection,” linking fair wages and industrial tariffs, became the settled national policy for the next seven decades (Alomes and Jones 1991, 152–154). Nation-building’s symbolic culmination, the new Parliament House in Canberra (1927), was delayed by years of war, bitter division, and postwar economic difficulties. During the next decade, the 1930s Great Depression, the Western Australia electorate voted to secede (1933), but this required larger support beyond the state, which it would never obtain. Despite social nationalism and the cultural nationalism of writers and the 1880s Heidelberg school of impressionist painters such as Arthur Streeton, Tom Roberts, Frederick McCubbin, and Charles Conder, who discovered the light of

Alfred Deakin Alfred Deakin, premier of Victoria (1883–1890) and prime minister of Australia (1903–1904, 1905–1908, 1909–1910), was both typical and unique. The son of British immigrants, a middle-class nationalist, lawyer, and silver-tongued orator, and an important 1890s advocate of federation, he was also a spiritualist and an author. Deakin’s social vision of a better Australia was manifested in the New Protection policy. A supporter of the British empire, he argued for the Australian Monroe Doctrine regarding the South Pacific, challenging French domination of the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), and, without approval from London, invited the American Great White Fleet to visit Australia in 1908.

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Australian grasslands, coasts, and beaches, nationalism was predominantly shaped in a British and imperial context. The culture of public display symbolically expressed the imperial relationship in Union Jacks and Australian flags, bunting, crowns, ceremonial and welcoming triumphal arches, illuminations, slide and lantern shows, and advertising. School history books and adventure stories romanticized the heroes of empire—“Wolfe of Canada,” “Clive of India,” “Gordon of Khartoum”—stories more colorful than those of Australian explorers such as Burke and Wills who perished in the desert. Young Australians learned less about their own history than about other peoples’, a situation that has never changed. The paradox of being English-speaking was that, as the imperial and world systems of the great English-speaking powers—Britain and the United States— facilitated the distribution of books, film, and then television, language opened up Australia to overseas influence. A colonial underdevelopment of cultural institutions was thus stronger than a differentiated national culture. Contemporary Australian Nationalism The Whitlam Labor government’s new nationalism of the 1970s supported Australian cultural industries, introduced a new national anthem, withdrew Australia from the Vietnam War, recognized China, and legislated for the first Aboriginal land rights and for multiculturalism and nondiscriminatory immigration. The changes illuminated the contrasting character of Australian nationalism from the 1880s to the 1940s and 1950s: the older Australia with a worldview that was imperial and British, Eurocentric, and racially based, fearful, and protectionist. There was also continuity. After the three Whitlam government years, traditional policies returned: loyal colonial reliance on a great power for defense (the United States), anxiety about the region, invasion fears, and fear of foreigners. In addition, however, traditional national policies linking protection for wages and industries and the major government role in utilities and services were abandoned, and neoliberal economics (termed “economic rationalism”) reduced government and deregulated capitalism. Paradoxes continued in the globalizing era. A symbolic form of national independence in the form of a republic rather than the monarchy was rejected at a 1999 referendum because the proposed model specified a president chosen by Parliament rather than elected. Social nationalism grew, as national sovereignty in policy and culture diminished. Recent immigrants expressed a more emotional nationalism, once seen as not the Australian way. Indigenous nationalism—Aboriginal movements for land rights, equity, and recognition—also redefined nationalism. Both tendencies were paralleled by banal nationalism, popular sporting nationalism, and a rediscovery of the continent. The journey to the Red Centre (to Uluru, or “Ayers Rock”) challenged the odyssey across the waters as a national rite of significance.

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Selected Bibliography Alomes, Stephen. 1988. A Nation at Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism 1880–1988. North Ryde, Australia: Angus & Robertson. Alomes, Stephen, and Catherine Jones, eds. 1991. Australian Nationalism: A Documentary History. North Ryde, Australia: Angus & Robertson. Birrell, Bob. 2001. Federation. Potts Point, Australia: Duffy & Snellgrove. Day, David. 2001. Claiming a Continent. Pymble, Australia: HarperCollins. Dunn, Michael. 1984. Australia and the Empire: From 1788 to the Present. Sydney, Australia: Fontana. Fitzpatrick, Brian. 1956. The Australian Commonwealth. Melbourne, Australia: F. W. Cheshire. Hancock, W. K. 1930. Australia. London: Ernest Benn. Irving, Helen, ed. 1999. The Centenary Companion to Australian Federation. Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. McLachlan, Noel. 1988. Waiting for the Revolution: A History of Australian Nationalism. Ringwood, Australia: Penguin. Powell, J. M. 1991. An Historical Geography of Australia: The Restive Fringe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seal, Graham. 2004. Inventing Anzac: The Digger and National Mythology. St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press. Trainor, Luke. 1994. British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century. Cambridge/Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. Ward, Russel. 1958. The Australian Legend. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press.

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New Zealand Linda Bryder Chronology 1642 Dutch voyager, Abel Tasman, sites New Zealand. 1769 British Captain James Cook “rediscovers” New Zealand. 1840 Treaty of Waitangi signed between British Crown and chiefs of New Zealand. First planned settlement, Port Nicholson (Wellington), is founded. 1848 Otago Settlement (Dunedin) is founded. 1850 Canterbury Settlement (Christchurch) is founded. 1852 Constitution is written. 1860 European population size surpasses Maori population. 1866 Telegraph cable is laid between North and South islands. 1870s Sir Julius Vogel improves communications through public works schemes. 1876 Abolition of provinces established under the 1852 constitution. “God Defend New Zealand” first performed publicly. 1877 Compulsory primary education is introduced. 1880s National sports teams are formed. 1881 A series of anti-Chinese immigration is introduced. 1882 Refrigerated shipping is introduced. 1886 Census shows for first time more New Zealand–born Europeans in New Zealand than immigrants. 1890s Kotahitanga movement establishes Great Council or Kauhanganui. 1891–1912 Liberal government in office. 1892 New Zealand Rugby Union formed. 1892–1906 Richard John Seddon becomes premier (“prime minister” from early 20th century). 1893 Women are granted the vote. 1898 Old-age pensions are introduced. 1899–1902 New Zealand sends troops to support Britain in its South African war. 1900s Maori population shows first increase since early contact (1769). 1901 Australian Federation is formed, but New Zealand refuses to join. The Duke and Duchess of York, future King George V and Queen Mary, tour New Zealand. 1902 New Zealand flag is officially adopted. 1905 The All Blacks rugby team tours Britain; an overwhelming win to All Blacks. 1907 Royal New Zealand Plunket Society is founded. 1914–1918 New Zealand sends troops to support Britain in World War I. 1915 Gallipoli defeat of ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps). 1916 Conscription is introduced. Gallipoli Day, April 25, becomes a national holiday, now called Anzac Day. 1935–1941 Michael Joseph Savage becomes prime minister. 1935–1949 First Labour government in office. 1936 New Zealand is elected to the League of Nations. 1938 Social Security Act. 1939 New Zealand declares war on Germany. 1939–1945 New Zealand supports the Allies in World War II.

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1941 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into the war changes New Zealand foreign policy. 1947 Statute of Westminster is signed by New Zealand, granting independence from Britain. 1951 ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, U.S. defense agreement) is signed. 1972 Britain joins the European Economic Community. 1977 “God Defend New Zealand” becomes the national anthem. 1985 New Zealand refuses to allow U.S. nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships into ports. 1986 The United States abrogates ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand. 2004 Supreme Court is established in New Zealand, ending appeal to the United Kingdom Privy Council.

Situating the Nation New Zealand became a British colony on February 6, 1840, when the British government’s representative, William Hobson, and a group of 50 Maori chiefs gathered at Waitangi to sign the Treaty of Waitangi. The treaty ceded sovereignty to the British Crown in return for protection of lands, forests, fisheries, and other property possessed by the Maori, collectively or individually. Under the treaty, the Maori became British subjects. New Zealand moved from colony to dominion status in 1907 and to national sovereignty in 1947, though it remained a constitutional monarchy. Economically New Zealand was closely tied to Britain from the 1880s to 1945. In the 1930s, 80 percent of its exports went to Britain. British investors supplied most of the overseas capital borrowed by the New Zealand government or by private concerns. New Zealand’s economy rested primarily on sheep and the dairy industry, and its prosperity was greatly assisted by the introduction of refrigerated shipping in 1882. Though situated in the South Pacific, New Zealand identified so closely with Britain that it saw itself as an outpost of Britain and Europe rather than identifying with its Pacific and Asian neighbors. This perception helped define its sense of identity. New Zealand’s nationalism was also promoted by the determination to remain distinct from neighboring Australia.

Instituting the Nation The first “planned” British settlement was established by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his New Zealand Company at Port Nicholson (Wellington) in 1840, the same year that the Treaty of Waitangi was signed. Colonizing on systematic principles was continued by two other associations, which founded Otago (a Scottish Presbyterian settlement) in 1848 and Canterbury (an Anglican settlement) in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1850. Five of the six provinces set up under the 1852 constitution were systematic settlements, comprising about 15,000 British immigrants. Auckland, by contrast, was a garrison town, dominated by the presence of Maori and British troops, and half of its population in the 1850s had come from Australia. The total non-Maori (“European” or “Pakeha”) population in New Zealand increased from about 2,000 in 1840 to 32,500 by 1854. The Maori population had declined from 100,000 at the time of Captain James Cook’s visit in 1769 to around 70,000 by 1840. It continued to fall in the late 19th century. In 1860 the European population surpassed that of the Maori for the first time. By 1881 the Pakeha population was 470,000 whereas the number of Maori had dropped to 46,000. When colonial New Zealanders of the 1890s looked back to their origins, they fostered certain myths and stereotypes about the “founding fathers” of the mid19th century, which contributed to their own sense of identity. First, early settlers were cast in an heroic mold, with their work of clearing the bush and “breaking in” the land considered central to nation-building. Early pioneering life was portrayed as harsh, tough, and lonely, and physical prowess and ingenuity were considered a mark of the New Zealander. Women shared in this pioneering feat as “colonial help-meets.” Moreover, it was believed that those who populated the planned settlements and other pioneers were hand-picked, the highest-quality immigrants; unlike their Australian neighbors with their convict roots, the New Zealand settlers were “the best of British.” As the authors of Progress of New N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Australians as the “Other” New Zealanders were determined not to be Australian, despite the close connections between the two countries. In 1891, 23,000 New Zealanders were living in Australia, and 16,000 Australians in New Zealand, and trade unions and churches had connections. However, much of the talk about the pioneers being of “selected stock” and “the best British” was an implicit slight on the convict origins of Australians. New Zealanders liked to see themselves as distinct from, and maybe even better than, Australians. When the idea of an Australian federation came up in the 1880s and the 1890s, New Zealand expressed little interest in joining. There were concerns about a loss of political identity and the swamping of local interests by Australia’s size, population, and resources. Basically, most New Zealanders did not want to become Australians.

Zealand in the Century (1902) wrote: “The stock from which New Zealanders are sprung is not only British but the best British” (cited in Sinclair 1986, 12).

Defining the Nation By the 1890s, three specific developments had helped contribute to New Zealand’s sense of nation. One was an improvement in communications. Mid-19thcentury New Zealand settlements were extremely isolated, separated by mountain ranges, rivers, and dense bush, and almost all travel was by coastal shipping between a large number of small ports. The public works schemes initiated by Sir Julius Vogel in the 1870s vastly improved communications, particularly in the South Island with its new railway line. The telegraph cable laid between the North and South Islands in 1866 also facilitated closer communication. Second, Vogel’s abolition of the provinces as geographical boundaries and separate administrative units in 1876 aided a sense of national identity. With enhanced mobility and interaction, people began to think of themselves as New Zealanders rather than as members of separate settlements or provinces. A third factor that contributed to a distinctive identity was the recognition in the late 19th century that there were now more New Zealand–born Europeans than immigrants, first shown in the 1886 census. One result was the founding of New Zealand native associations “to stimulate patriotism and national sentiment; to provide for social intercourse, and unite all worthy sons of New Zealand in one harmonious body throughout the colony” (Sinclair 1986, 37). These groups were in fact not tremendously successful, and the key determinant of the new identity was instead the school classroom. Compulsory primary education had been introduced in 1877. By the 1890s, 63 percent (440,000 out of 700,000) of the European population was native-born, and 300,000 of those were under the age of 21. It was in the classrooms that a distinctive New Zealand voice was developing. By the turn of the century, a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Saluting the Flag Schools contributed to nationalism through their enthusiasm from the 1890s in raising the New Zealand blue ensign or flag, with the Union Jack and four stars symbolizing the Southern Cross. The New Zealand flag was officially adopted in 1902, five years before the colony attained dominion status. Although the weekly saluting of the flag became compulsory in public schools in 1921, a practice that persisted for many years, schools could still choose whether to salute the Union Jack or the New Zealand flag. An oath of loyalty to the Crown was also required of all teachers at this time. Schools taught “civics,” or how to be a good citizen of the British empire and of New Zealand. A hallmark of Kiwi kids was their preference for wearing no shoes.

recognizable dialect had been adopted by the native-born and by schoolchildren wherever born—it did not seem to matter where their parents had come from. This “colonial twang” caused a great deal of concern among their elders and schoolteachers, but they had no success in checking it. New Zealand’s environment was regarded as important in molding the New Zealander. Much 19th-century writing focused on New Zealand’s natural abundance, good climate, and spaciousness, portraying it as a laborers’ paradise where those who were prepared to work hard would prosper. The opportunities for working-class people in New Zealand to become materially independent were celebrated and contrasted with the “Old World.” This was the beginning of a strong component of New Zealand’s nationalism—the belief that it was an egalitarian society with fair opportunities for all. The typical New Zealander was the self-made man, hardworking and self-sufficient; New Zealand was proud of the fact that there was no aristocracy, no social hierarchy—it was, so the myth went (and it was a myth), a classless society, or at least a society in which all who were sober and hardworking could get on. The New Zealand of the late 20th century defined itself as bicultural and multicultural. However, this was not the view of the white majority during the late 19th century and first half of the 20th century. The dominant belief around 1900, based on Social Darwinism, was that the Maori were a dying race. The first natural increase in the Maori population, which occurred shortly after 1900, challenged that belief. If the Maori were to survive, it was believed that they needed to be converted into “brown skinned New Zealanders” and assimilated into the dominant culture. The Maori themselves did not always share that view; for example, some Maori in the Waikato (central North Island) would not fight in World War I on the grounds that they did not recognize the king of England as their king. Maori separatist movements date back to the 1850s. A separate destiny was the goal of the Great Council or Kauhanganui set up under the Kotahitanga movement of the 1890s. The dominant Pakeha population of New Zealand, however, was not really forced to confront the issue of race relations until the rapid urbanization of the Maori following World War II. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Many colonists defined themselves by what they were not, leading to an unrelenting racial hatred directed against Asians or “Asiatics,” especially Chinese people who formed a small but visible ethnic minority. There were only 4,000 Chinese in New Zealand in the 1890s, and they were generally hardworking and lawabiding, yet New Zealanders convinced themselves that the Chinese were prone to all sorts of vices and were a threat to the purity of the Anglo-Saxon race. From 1881 a series of anti-Chinese immigration acts were passed; measures included a £10 poll tax on Chinese entering the country, a sum raised to £100 in 1896. The Liberal government of the 1890s felt it was necessary to restrict the number of Chinese, fearing that there were countless millions waiting to swarm down from Asia to the thinly populated lands of the South Pacific, a threat dubbed the “Yellow Peril.”

A Maori teacher conducts a class of mixed white and Maori children outdoors in 1946. (George Silk / Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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In the first half of the 20th century, most New Zealanders defined themselves as British New Zealanders and Britain as “Home.” In 1927 Alan Mulgan, a renowned New Zealand–born novelist, wrote a book about his travels in Britain that he called Home. Only after World War II, and more intensely from the 1980s, did this attitude change. By then New Zealand welcomed Asian immigrants and had a significant Pacific Island population. By the turn of the century, the ethnic makeup of New Zealand’s 4 million population was 73 percent Pakeha, 18 percent Maori, 6 percent Asian, and 5 percent Pacific Island.

Narrating the Nation New Zealand’s national anthem, “God Defend New Zealand,” was composed by a poet, Thomas Bracken, in the 1870s and first performed in 1876. Despite recurring criticism of its lack of musical and lyrical distinction, the hymn caught on and was made New Zealand’s national song during the 1940 centennial celebrations. In 1977 it was accorded equal status to the British “God Save the Queen” as a national anthem for New Zealand. By the 1890s, New Zealand was popularly known as “God’s Own Country,” a catchphrase variously attributed to Bracken and the Liberal premier Richard John Seddon. The phrase referred to New Zealand’s natural resources and abundance, its high living standards at the time, and also the determination of the Liberal government (1891–1912) to implement a social and economic program to promote equal opportunities for all. New Zealand was proud of the fact that British prime minister Herbert Asquith at the time described New Zealand as a “laboratory in which political and social experiments are every day made for the information and instruction of the older countries of the world” (cited in Sinclair 2000, 195). Although New Zealand did not set out to be a “social laboratory,” this reputation became a mark of its identity. Nationalism was also narrated in terms of the bravery of New Zealand men at war. The country sent 6,500 men to fight alongside Britain in the South African War of 1899–1902. In proportion to its population, New Zealand contributed more men than any other British colony, a source of national pride. In South Africa, the New Zealanders were said to be excellent soldiers who shone in riding and shooting, and the British generals were apparently effusive in their praise of the New Zealanders. The troops themselves constantly drew comparisons with other national groups, as this was the first time that a significant group of New Zealanders had been placed in contact with other nationalities. The New Zealanders were especially disparaging of the British Army hierarchy; they criticized the way the British officers treated their men and prided themselves on the good relations between New Zealand officers and men. However, it was World War I, and in particular the events at Gallipoli in 1915, that saw New Zealand “born as a nation.” The Australian and New Zealand ExpediN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tionary Force (ANZAC), comprising 8,500 New Zealanders and 20,000 Australians, suffered heavy losses in this campaign on the Turkish coast—the New Zealanders suffered an 88 percent casualty rate. New Zealand’s prime minister William Massey said that the soldiers’ heroism at Gallipoli had made New Zealand a respected country with all the nations of the Earth. To commemorate the tragedy of Gallipoli, a national holiday was declared on April 25, 1916, with a set ceremony evolving during the 1920s that was as fully military as possible. The celebration of Gallipoli, as historian Jock Phillips noted, signaled a culture that identified nationalism with virility and successful performance in war (Phillips 1987, 164–165). There were other ways in which the war contributed to a sense of nationalism. On a larger scale than during the South African War, New Zealanders were thrown into contact with others. The labeling of New Zealanders as “Kiwis” originates from World War I, derived from New Zealand’s native flightless bird. Historians have analyzed letters and diaries and concluded that the troops often compared New Zealand men favorably with the others they encountered. Good relations between officers and men were noted by other nationals, which the New Zealanders took pride in, as in the South African War. The New Zealanders (and the Australians) showed resentment at the intrusion of the British class system into its army and prided themselves on having citizen’s armies, where social equality ruled as far as possible. The New Zealanders disliked saluting officers and parade ground discipline. Another part of the image of the troops was one of racial harmony. Despite the refusal of some Waikato Maori to participate in the war, in 1916 Maui Pomare (the first Maori to train as a doctor) claimed that misunderstandings between the Pakeha and Maori were swept away forever when their blood comingled in the trenches of Gallipoli. Maori participation in World War I was perceived to be crucial to their acceptance by Pakeha as full partners within the New Zealand nation. Historian Michael King wrote that, as a result of the Maori contribution to the war effort, “it became more difficult for Pakeha leaders to discriminate against Maori” (King 1992, 302). In the early 20th century, there was a widespread belief that New Zealand had the best race relations in the world. The vision of ideal race relations was a myth, but it was a powerful and nation-building one. The situation prevailed, historian Michael King wrote, because Our Nation’s Story, the school text of the 1920s and 1930s, claimed that the Treaty of Waitangi had been “the fairest treaty ever made by Europeans with a native race.” It was also because, in the words of William Herries, minister of native affairs between 1912 and 1921, the Maori constituted “the finest coloured race in the world” (King 2003, 468). New Zealand was proud to compare its race relations with those prevailing elsewhere. World War II reinforced images created during World War I, in particular the concepts of an egalitarian army, good relations between officers and men, and good race relations. General Freyberg fought and drank with the men. The Maori Battalion, all volunteers, won the admiration of other New Zealand units, of other N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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allied troops, and even of the Germans, for their bravery, a source of pride for all New Zealanders. Nationalism was also fostered by New Zealand’s sporting activities and heroes. Many of the national sporting bodies were formed in the late 1880s and 1890s. They included those for athletics, mountaineering, bowling, golf, horse racing, cricket, soccer, rowing, swimming, and tennis. The silver fern leaf became the emblem of many sports organizations. The New Zealand Rugby Union was formed in 1892, and rugby soon emerged as New Zealand’s national sport. New Zealanders began playing overseas teams in the 1890s, but the most famous was the United Kingdom tour of 1905. The All Blacks scored over 800 points against Britain’s 20odd. The only game they lost was against Wales—a loss described by historian Keith Sinclair as “the Gallipoli of New Zealand sport” and as “a major episode in the mythology of New Zealandism” (Sinclair 1986, 147). Explaining the success of the 1905 tour, one newspaper reporter claimed that the New Zealander lived a more natural life than the Englishman, that he took more exercise, that he was resourceful, and that he was full of an “overflowing vitality and virility. . . . He beats the Englishman because he lives nearer to nature” (Sinclair 1986, 150). It was the country life, the lack of urban decadence, that produced the superior physical manhood. In colonial conditions the transplanted Briton was made better. The sense of their own identity as New Zealanders was combined with a pride in being of British stock. This included an intense loyalty to the British Crown. When the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York, the future King George V and Queen Mary, toured New Zealand in 1901, there were endless scenes of enthusiasm, as there were for later royal tours, including the visit by Queen Elizabeth II in 1953–1954.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The 19th-century image of New Zealand as a land of milk and honey had been propagated for the express purpose of attracting new immigrants to the country from Britain. When this image was challenged by the development of large sheep runs and capitalist interests in the depression years of the 1880s, the Liberal government rose to power and passed extensive legislation in favor of the ordinary worker/settler. Through their land legislation, they broke up the large estates and converted the land into small family farms. They introduced labor and social legislation to protect the workers and the underprivileged. The Liberals were famous for their radical social legislation, and the international acclaim that they received as a “social laboratory” was a source of great pride to New Zealanders. Premier Richard Seddon (or “King Dick”), a self-made man from Lancashire who had managed a hotel on the west coast of the South Island of New Zealand, was a national hero. New Zealand was the first country in the world to grant women N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the vote in 1893 (only the American states of Wyoming and Utah had preceded it), and the second country in the world (after Denmark) to grant old-age pensions out of general taxation in 1898. When the well-being of the people was again threatened by the 1930s depression, the first Labour government rose to power and legislated for social security “from the cradle to the grave,” paid for out of general taxation, in its famous Social Security Act of 1938. Again, New Zealand attracted international attention, and Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage also became a national hero. The legislation of the 1890s and 1930s had a major impact on New Zealand’s sense of nationalism, defining its society as fair and just. Other welfare initiatives contributed to that image, such as the world-famous Royal Society for the Health of Women and Children (the Plunket Society) and its founder Sir Frederic Truby King. The Plunket Society, set up in 1907, took the credit for New Zealand having the lowest infant death rate in the world. New Zealand also attracted international attention for its health camps, school dental service, and the first state-funded maternity hospitals in the world. The Labour government played another important part in nation-building through its foreign policy. Although Britain had encouraged its dominions to build their own defenses from the 1920s, New Zealand was still totally reliant on Britain strategically. The Labour government, elected to office in 1935, was intensely nationalistic; one of its election pamphlets declared that its foreign policy came from New Zealand citizens with a lifetime study of New Zealand problems, implying that the (Conservative) opposition’s foreign policy was dictated by British interests. As part of this nationalism, Labour aimed to “insulate” New Zealand economically from the world market and Britain in particular by making the country more self-sufficient. Local manufacturing was consequently heavily subsidized. In foreign policy, Labour claimed to be international in outlook rather than oriented toward Britain and the Commonwealth. Australian-born Michael Joseph Savage was New Zealand’s first prime minister to bring to the office a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the British monarchy.

Royal New Zealand Plunket Society The Royal New Zealand Plunket Society was founded in 1907, initially as the Society for Promoting the Health of Women and Children. Its name “Plunket” came from the patronage of Lady Plunket, the wife of the then governor of New Zealand. It was a voluntary organization run by women, though heavily subsidized by the government. Local Plunket committees were set up all around the country that employed Plunket nurses (who were trained in infant care) to visit mothers of newborn babies in their homes and run health clinics for older babies. By the 1950s, over 90 percent of mothers availed themselves of this free service, and it had attained iconic status in New Zealand society. Most New Zealanders born after 1920—or their mothers—have kept their Plunket Baby Record Book as a memento of an important phase of their life.

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Labour believed that collective security was the answer to international disputes. In its endeavor to support this policy through the League of Nations, the new Labour government adopted positions that brought New Zealand into conflict with Britain. In 1936 New Zealand was elected to the League of Nations Council and supported the Soviet Union’s proposals for collective security. At the close of the 1937 Imperial Conference, a left-wing British paper, the New Statesman, reported that New Zealand had had the courage to criticize severely the British attitude to the League and to the Spanish war: “New Zealand, once Britain’s white-headed boy, has now, under a Labour Government taken Australia’s place as the most intractable member of the family” (McKinnon 1993, 25–26). In the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, while Britain remained neutral, New Zealand looked to the League to settle it. In 1939 the British recognized the fascist dictator in Spain, General Franco; New Zealand did not. While New Zealand leaped to the support of Britain when World War II broke out in 1939, the Labour government maintained a sense of independence from Britain by declaring war on Germany independently, unlike Australia, which claimed to be bound by the British declaration of war. World War II was to signal a direct break with Britain. Historian Keith Sinclair wrote that “New Zealand history changed dramatically in a few days in December 1941” (Sinclair 2000, 292). He explained that previously New Zealanders had often acted as though their country lay somewhere near Europe and had given little thought to the Pacific. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the fall of the supposedly impregnable British base in Singapore in 1942, New Zealand felt much more vulnerable in the Pacific and looked to America for support. This trend was to continue in the postwar years, for example with the signing of the ANZUS treaty (the Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. defense agreement) in 1951. However, New Zealand’s refusal in 1985 to allow U.S. nuclearpowered or nuclear-armed ships to enter its ports caused the United States to abrogate its ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand in 1986. Through its antinuclear stance, New Zealand was standing up to the major world powers. In 1947 the Statute of Westminster was adopted in New Zealand, giving legal fulfillment to the fact of sovereignty or independence from Britain, though New Zealand continued to owe allegiance to the British Crown as a member of the British Commonwealth. This trend away from Britain accelerated during the second half of the 20th century. It was stimulated in part by Britain joining the European Economic Community in 1972, which brought to an end New Zealand’s privileged position in trade with Britain and forced it to look elsewhere for markets. A further major move away from traditional dependence on Britain occurred in 2004 when the Supreme Court was established in New Zealand, bringing to an end the right of appeal from New Zealand–based courts to the United Kingdom– based Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Recently debates have occurred as to whether New Zealand should adopt a new flag, in particular whether it should abandon the Union Jack as part of its flag. For the time being at least, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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there is not much support among the New Zealand public for republicanism, either among Maori or Pakeha. Though separatist Maori movements stemmed back to the 1850s and led to the setting up of a separate parliament (the Kauhanganui) in the 1890s, as noted earlier, most Maori leaders by the early 20th century sought to work within existing structures. For example, the Ratana movement allied itself with the Labour Party in the 1920s. A long-standing goal of Ratana was, however, to have the Treaty of Waitangi recognized in law as a binding document of partnership and protection of Maori rights. This goal became more politicized in the 1970s and must be seen in the context of international civil rights movements. In 1975 the Treaty of Waitangi Act was passed (amended in 1985) to compensate Maori for land losses in the 19th century and to protect Maori rights. All government departments thereafter had to acknowledge the principles of the treaty in policy making. In 1974, the day the treaty was signed, February 6, was declared a national holiday. Instituted to celebrate a bicultural society, this day has been marked by Maori protest movements. In 1990 the Tino Rangitiratanga (“self-determination”) flag was adopted as a symbol of Maori identity. Protests have, however, remained a minority movement within New Zealand society. Many Maori, along with other New Zealanders, now celebrate New Zealand’s ethnic diversity. Selected Bibliography Belich, James. 1996. Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century. Auckland, New Zealand: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Belich, James. 2001. Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000. Auckland, New Zealand: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Fairburn, Miles. 1989. The Ideal Society and Its Enemies. The Foundations of Modern New Zealand Society, 1850–1900. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press. King, Michael. 1992. “Between Two Worlds.” In The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., edited by G. W. Rice, 285–307. Auckland, New Zealand: Oxford University Press. King, Michael. 2003. The Penguin History of New Zealand. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books. McKinnon, Malcolm. 1993. Independence and Foreign Policy. New Zealand in the World since 1935. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press. Mein Smith, Philippa. 2005. A Concise History of New Zealand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Orange, Claudia. 2004. An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi. Wellington, New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books. Phillips, Jock. 1987. A Man’s Country: The Image of the Pakeha Male, A History. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books. Sinclair, Keith. 1986. A Destiny Apart: New Zealand’s Search for National Identity. Wellington, New Zealand: Unwin. Sinclair, Keith. 2000. A History of New Zealand. Rev. ed. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books.

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Note: Page numbers in bold indicate a main entry for that subject, and numbers in italic refer to the sidebar text on that page. Aasen, Ivar, 226 Abacha, Sani, 1188 Abayomi, Kofo, 1180 Abbas, Ferhat, 1099 Abbas, Gulam, 1763 Abbas, Mahmoud, 1142 Abbas II (Egypt), 261 Abbas the Great, Shah, 1108, 1113 Abd-ul-Ilah, 1745 Abdallah, King (Transjordan), 728, 729 Abdelkader, Emir, 1098, 1099, 1102 Abduh, Muhammad, 731 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman Empire), 764, 765 Abdullah, Farooq, 1767, 1768, 1770 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 1142 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, 1761, 1761, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766–1767 Abiola, Moshood, 1188 Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 1847, 1851 Aborigines, Australian, 932. See also Pan-Aboriginalism Abrams, Lynn, 53 Abyssinia, 736–737, 739 Aceh, 954, 1468, 1734 Achebe, Chinua, 913, 914, 917, 920, 921, 925 Acton, Lord, 687 Adams, Abigail, 50 Adenauer, Konrad, 947, 973–974, 1549 Adivar, Halide Edib, 770 Afghanistan, 1683–1695, 1684 (map) and education, 1388–1389 Germany and terrorists in, 1554 invasion of, 1497 and music, 1440 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Soviet Union, 954 and terrorism, 1488 and women, 904, 1457 Aflaq, Michel, 731, 732, 733, 981, 1740 Africa and colonialism, 890 education in, 39–40, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 431 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence/separatist movements in, 1461, 1464, 1468–1469

literature/language in, 919–920, 925–927 and music, 1440 and religion, 108 and socialism, 980–981 supranational organizations and, 962, 965 See also specific African nations African Americans, 493–494 Afrikaner nationalism, 1144–1153 Afzelius, Arvid August, 73 Agathangelos, 1706 Aghulon, Maurice, 49 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 1245 Aguirre, José Antonio, 1515–1516 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar, 1741 Ahmad Shah, 1686, 1691 Ahmadinejad, Mahmmoud, 1117 Ahmed, Imam, 739, 743 Aho, Juhani, 605 Aidoo, Ama Ata, 927 Aizawa Seishisai, 810–811, 813–814, 814, 815 Akbar, 802 Akçura, Yusuf, 766, 770, 771, 773 Akhmatova, Anna, 1074 Akhmetov, Renat, 1625 Aksakov, K. S., 692 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 261 al-Alayili, Shaykh Abdallah, 732, 733 al-Azmah, Yusuf, 728 al-Azmeh, Aziz, 725 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hasan, 756 al-Banna, Hassan, 984, 985 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 731, 981 al-Bustani, Butrus, 731 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1139 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim, 1136 al-Husri, Sati, 730, 732–733, 751 al-Jawahiri, Mohammad Mahdi, 1740 al-Jazairi, Amir Abd al-Qadir, 727 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 753 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman, 727 al-Miqdadi, Darwish, 734 al-Nashshashibi, Raghib, 1136 Al Qaeda, 986–987, 1484, 1488, 1492 and Pakistan, 1232 al-Qaysi, Nuri Ali Hammudi, 1741 Al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, 1488–1489

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I-2 al-Said, Nuri, 753 al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Adb, 984 Alamán, Lucas, 352 Albéniz, Isaac, 1437 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 275, 276 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 840, 840 (illus.), 841, 844, 845, 846 Alem, Leandro, 281 Alevi, 1650–1651, 1653, 1654–1655 Alexander I, Czar (Russia), 20–21, 209, 211, 1576 Alexander I (Bulgaria), 578 Alexander II, Czar (Russia), 210, 598 Alexander III, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Alford, Kenneth J., 1442 Alfred the Great, King (England), 165 Algeria, 1094–1105, 1096 (map) and colonialism, 48 diaspora population of, 1371 and France, 1050–1051 and independence, 1464, 1490 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1496 and women, 903 Ali, Monica, 927 Ali, Muhammad, 258–259, 263 Aliyev, Heidar, 1715, 1720 Aliyev, Ilham, 1715 Allende, Salvador, 331 Almirall, Valentí, 703, 710 Alsace, 475, 1501–1510, 1503 (map) Althusser, Louis, 486, 1052 Amami Island, 1754 Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 1684, 1686, 1688, 1689 Amazon basin, 1827–1831, 1829 Ambedkar, B. R., 802, 1204–1205 Ambrose, Stephen, 905 American Revolution, 21 and Canada, 299 and education, 32 gender roles and, 45–46, 50 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 Americanization, and Puerto Rico, 841 Americas and language, 478 and music, 75–76, 1432 nationalism and gender in, 44 See also Central America; North America; South America Amharanization, 739, 741, 742 Amin, Hafizullah, 1687 Amir, Yigal, 1400, 1403 Amrane-Minne, Daniele Djamila, 903 Anatolian movement, 1646, 1646 Andersen, Hans Christian, 228 Anderson, Benedict, 25 and diaspora populations, 1368–1369, 1370

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and the “imagined political community,” 475, 481, 912, 1342 and Latin America, 826 and national symbols, 122, 900 on print technology, 129, 485, 1475 on the realistic novel, 923 on “young” and “youth,” 1859 Andic, Helmut, 545 Andrade, Mário de, 1662, 1662 Angell, Norman, 532 Anger, Carl, 228 Anglo-Boer Wars, 198, 204, 449, 490, 1146 and Canada, 305–306, 306 Anglo-Burmese wars, 776 Anglo-Chinese war, 27 Anglo-Nepal war, 1805 Angola, 968, 1657–1667, 1658 (map) and Cuba, 1285 and independence, 1464 Anjala Conspiracy, 223 Ankara, Turkey, 770–772 Anthem, national, 68, 116, 117, 1430, 1431, 1442–1444 and Basques, 1521 and Belgium, 145 and Brazil, 294 and Burma, 782 and Canada, 303 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and the EU, 1042 and France, 175, 1502 and Germany, 619 and Indonesia, 1732 and Japan, 1756, 1757 and Mexico, 354 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 1184, 1186–1187 and Poland, 211, 215 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 230, 230 and the United States, 1308 and Uruguay, 401 Anthias, Floya, 902 Anti-Catholicism, and England, 163, 166 Anti-free-trade movements, 1448 Anti-Semitism, 439, 447, 517, 520–521, 907 and Bulgaria, 582 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and France, 179 and Hungary, 639, 645 in Turkey, 1649 and Ukraine, 1078 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Zionism as reaction to, 1121, 1128 Antiabortion movement, 1446

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Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism, 912–928, 957–970 and Algeria, 1095, 1100 and Angola, 1658, 1664 and Burma, 777, 779, 780–781, 782, 783 and China, 1191, 1193, 1196, 1198–1199, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157–1158, 1163 and Gandhi, 1203 and India, 131, 796, 800–801 and Iran, 1110, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 753, 1739, 1740 and Malaysia, 1216 and nationalism, 26–27, 47–48, 486–487, 1461–1465 and Nigeria, 1178–1179 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 840 and Vietnam, 1269 and women’s rights, 457 Anticommunism, 520, 1310, 1394 Anticosmopolitanism, 415 Antinuclear-power movements, 1449 Antiracist movements, 1457 Antislavery, 161, 163 Antwerp, Belgium, 200 Apartheid, 1151–1153 Appadurai, Arjun, 136, 1374–1375 Aquino, Benigno, 1242, 1242 Aquino, Corazon (Cory), 1242, 1242, 1244 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 729, 1125, 1129, 1135, 1136, 1139–1140 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 1137, 1394–1395 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 1039 Arab League, 726 (map) Arab nationalism, 724–734, 726 (map), 965, 981 and Iraq, 751–752, 753, 754, 754, 757–758, 1739 Arabs, in Turkey, 1650–1651 Arafat, Yasir, 1136–1137, 1141, 1142, 1488–1489 Aral Sea, 882 Arana, Sabino de, 704, 709, 710, 1515 Arason, Jón, 228 Araucanian Indians, 323, 324–326 Arcand, Denys, 1294 Arce, Mariano José, 317–318 Architecture, 30, 37, 407–408, 409, 413, 414–415 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Brussels, 144 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1024 and Malaysia, 1224 and Russia, 692–693 and Turkey, 770–771 Arena y Goiri, Sabino, 1294 Argentina, 268–281, 270 (map) and film, 1335 immigration and national identity in, 492 and music, 1439, 1443 national identity and education in, 39 Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 755 Arif, Abd al-Salam, 754–755 Aristocracy, 5–9

Aristotle, 529 Armageddon, 1394 Armenia, 1696–1711, 1698 (map) and Azerbaijan, 1719 and diaspora populations, 1376 and the Soviet Union, 946 Armenian Apostolic Church, 1699–1700, 1701 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 1718–1719. See also Gharabagh conflict ethnic cleansing/genocide of, 438, 523 and the Ottoman Empire, 764, 765 and Turkey, 1648–1649 Arminius (Hermann), 618 Armstrong, John, 1368 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 187, 1504 Arne, Thomas, 1438 Arnim, Achim von, 73 Arnold, Matthew, 915 Árpád (chief), 643 Art, 16–17, 49, 405–409, 412–417 and Australia, 859–860 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1522 and Canada, 305, 1841 and Finland, 605 and France, 177 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569 historic paintings of Denmark, 154 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127 and the Maori, 1860 and Mongolia, 1794 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Poland, 212, 216, 682 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 402 and Wales, 1637 See also Culture; Landscape Artigas, José Gervasio, 397–398, 401, 402 Asbjørnsen, Peter C., 228 Ashoka, Emperor (India), 802, 1815–1816 Asia and education, 39–40, 428 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence movements in, 1461–1463, 1465–1468 and language, 478 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Asian countries Asquith, Herbert, 868 Assimilation, 29, 522, 931–932 and Australian Aborigines, 858 and China, 1196, 1199 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 and Ethiopia, 744–746

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Assimilation (continued ) and Hungary, 644 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 866 and Poland, 685 and the Sami, 1612–1613 and Turkey, 768, 1647, 1652 and Ukrainians, 716 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Education Asylum and the EU, 1042 and Germany, 1556, 1557, 1558–1559 See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Atahualpa, 373 Atatürk. See Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) Atlee, Clement, 1461 Atwood, Margaret, 1841 Auber, Daniel, 144 Audubon, John James, 389 Augustina of Aragon, 51 Aung San, 784, 785 (illus.) Aung San Suu Kyi, 784 Austin, John, 1372 Australia, 849–860, 851 (map) and Aborigines, 932, 1844–1853 communication in, 1473 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1375 and education, 1379, 1382 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigration, 883, 1420–1421 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 Macedonians in, 1415 and music, 1439 and new social movements, 1448 and New Zealand, 865 Austria, 539–554, 543 (map) education and, 33–34, 35, 36, 429 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 442 fascism in, 516 and German unification, 192 and Hungary, 638 and Poland, 210 politics and political philosophy in, 535, 1410 Austro-Hungarian empire. See Habsburg empire Autonomy, 899, 939–940 and Armenia, 1698 and Basques, 1516, 1517, 1522 and Catalonia, 1536, 1544–1547 and China, 1200 and the EU, 1041–1042 and Greenland, 1562–1563 and minorities, 1357–1358 and Nepal, 1805 and Pakistan, 1232 and Poland, 679 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 843, 845–847 and Spain, 707, 707–708, 708, 711, 1084–1085, 1088, 1090–1091

Avellaneda, Nicolas, 280 Awolowo, Obafemi, 1180, 1182, 1182, 1183 Ayala, Julio César Turbay, 833 Ayubi, Nazih, 734 Azaña, Manuel, 705 Azerbaijan, 469, 1713–1721, 1714 (map) and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1078–1079 and Turkey, 769 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 1180, 1180, 1183 Aznar, José María, 1544 Aznavour, Charles, 1707 Aztecs, 345–346, 351–352 Ba Maw, 779–780, 785 Ba’ath Party, 731, 981 and Iraq, 753, 754, 756, 1740–1741, 1743, 1745, 1746 Babangida, Ibrahim, 1188 Babenberg monarchy, 539–541 Babenco, Hector, 1334–1335 Babeuf, François-Noël, 1489 Bache, Otto, 228 Bachyns’kyi, Yulian, 722 Bacon, Sir Francis, 61 Bagehot, Walter, 162–163 Bahais, 1113, 1118 Bainimarama, Frank, 1324, 1325 Bakongo, 1660–1664, 1664 Bakshi, Gulam Mohammad, 1766 Baku, 1716 Bakunin, M., 38 Balakirev, Mili, 75, 79, 80, 82, 1437 Baldorioty de Castro, Román, 839 Balearic Islands, 1546 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 1183, 1185 Bali, 1440 Balkan nations, 435, 436 Balkan Wars, 437 and Bulgaria, 572, 580 and Turkey, 1645 Baltic states, 555–568, 559 (map), 1573 (map) independence, 503 and new social movements, 1449 racism in the, 518 and the Soviet Union, 946, 955, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1581–1582 Bancroft, George, 389 Bandaranaike, Nathan, 1467 Bandera, Stepan, 718, 1624 Bandung Conference (1955), 958–962, 964–965, 1206 Bangladesh, 1201, 1234, 1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1466 Bano, Shah, 1209 Bao Dai, 1264 Barassi, Ron, 857 Barbosa, José Celso, 839, 841 Barceló, Antonio, 840 Barcelona, 1539–1540

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Barker, Ernest, 531–532, 535 Baron, Beth, 264 Barons, Krišj¯anis, 564, 1577, 1577, 1578 Barrès, Maurice, 416 Barrios, Agustín (“Mangoré”), 365, 365 Barruel, Abbé, 45 Barry, Brian, 97 Barry, Sir Charles, 408 Barthes, Roland, 1052 Bartók, Béla, 1435 Basanáviˇcius, Father Jonas, 567 Basarab, 1592 Basedow, Johann, 34 B˘asescu, Traian, 1589 Basques, 1512–1524, 1514 (map) concessions to, 932 and cultural survival, 878 and the ETA, 1090, 1091–1092 and language, 477, 482 and the mixing of ethnic and civic nationalisms, 938–939 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1470, 1471 and Spain, 702–711, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1496 Batavian Republic, 197, 198 Batista, Fulgencio, 1276, 1277 Batman, John, 1845 Battle of Kosovo (1389), 100 Battle of Maysalun, 728 Battle of Yungay, 327–328 Battle y Ordóñez, José, 403 Bauer, Otto, 535, 1071 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1368 Baumer, Gertrude, 453 Bavaria, 621, 631 Beatrix, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Becker, Nikolas, 189–190 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 16, 117, 185, 186–187, 1431, 1432 Beg, Mirza, 1763 Begin, Menachem, 1488–1489 Bejarano, Jorge, 830 Belarusia, 1079 Belaúnde, Victor Andrés, 373, 375 Belgian Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Belgium, 137–146, 141 (map) colonialist policies of, 958, 968, 1464 and Congo/Zaïre, 437, 1156–1158, 1160 fascism in, 517 and language, 472 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1678 secession from the Netherlands, 197 Bello, Ahmadu, 1182, 1185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 1099, 1100 Ben Bouali, Hassiba, 1099 Ben-Gurion, David, 953, 1123, 1128 Bendjedid, Chadli, 1099 Beneš, Edvard, 587, 588, 588, 596, 596 (illus.), 1017 and World War II, 595, 1019

Bengalil, 1466 Benkheddda, Benyoucef, 1100 Bennett, Louise, 913, 921 Bennett, Robert Russell, 1433 Bentham, Jeremy, 19, 855 Berbers, 1101 Berg, Christian, 153 Berkl¯aus, Edvards, 1578 Berlin, Isaiah, 97 Berlioz, Hector, 1431, 1435 Bernstein, Leonard, 1439 Berra, Francisco, 402 Betances, Ramón Emeterio, 839–840, 841 Bethlen, Count István, 638 Bhabha, Homi, 914, 927 Bhanubhakta Acharya, 1807 Bhimsen Thapa, 1806–1807 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 1466 Bhutto, Benazir, 1231, 1398 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 1231, 1767 Biafra, 1469 Biblical texts, 473–474 Biculturalism, and the Maori, 1858–1859 Biehl, Janet, 882–883 Bierstadt, Albert, 65, 389 Billig, Michael, 121, 479 bin-Laden, Osama, 986–987, 1399, 1400 Bingham, George Caleb, 389 Biogenetics, 883 Bioregionalism, 879 Birendra, King (Nepal), 1808, 1809 Bismarck, Otto von, 24, 150, 192–193, 436, 611 and Alsace, 1505 monuments to, 410–411 and Poland, 678 Bjørnson, Bjørnstjerne, 78, 228, 230 Blake, Christopher, 1439 Blanc, Louis, 239 Blest Gana, Alberto, 329 Block, Alexander, 1602 Bluetooth, Harald, 226 Boer Wars. See Anglo-Boer Wars Boers. See Afrikaner nationalism Bohemia, 584, 1022 and Hussitism, 1023 and music, 1435–1436 Boland, Eavan, 926 Bolger, Dermot, 927 Bolivar, Simón, 16, 272, 370, 825, 831 Bolivia, 371–372, 1443 Bolognesi, Francisco, 377 Bolshevik Revolution, 436, 520, 593 Bolsheviks, and religion, 106 Bonald, Louis de, 178, 179 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 16, 26, 34, 175, 176–177, 474 as father figure, 51 and the French national anthem, 1443 and Haiti, 336 and Switzerland, 248

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Boniface, Pope, 100 Bonifacio, Andres, 1245–1246 Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José, 287–289, 290, 292 Borden, Robert, 306 Borders, 460–461, 966, 967, 968 and Afghanistan, 1684–1685, 1689 in Africa, 1464, 1469 and Algeria, 1096 and Armenia, 1697–1699, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 562–563, 1582 and Basque Country, 1513, 1514 (map) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 289, 1831 and Bulgaria, 574 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 298 in Central America, 316 and the collapse of communism, 1413 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Denmark, 152 and Egypt, 262 and Ethiopia, 740, 742 and the European Union, 1042 and Fiji, 1318 and Finland, 598 and France, 175 and Germany, 187–188 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 639–640 and Indonesia, 1729–1730 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1738–1739 and Ireland, 655 and Israel, 1124–1125, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1771 and Japan, 1753 and language, 471, 474–475, 477 Mexican, 353 (map) and Mongolia, 1792 and Nepal, 1805 and the Netherlands, 199 and Paraguay, 359, 362 and Peru, 368, 371 and Poland, 212–213, 685 and Romania, 1591 and Russia, 1599 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669 and Scandinavia, 225 and Scotland, 236 and South Africa, 1145 Spain/France, 1513 and Taiwan, 1255 and Turkey, 768, 769, 1647 and Ukraine, 713–714, 719, 1620 and the United States, 390, 1390 and Uruguay, 395 and Wales, 1636 and the War of the Pacific, 376 (map)

after World War I, 514, 524 See also Expansionism Borglum, Gutzon, 65, 411 Borneo, 1218–1220 Borodin, Aleksandr, 78–79, 82, 417, 1437 Bosanquet, Bernard, 534–535 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 806 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1358, 1409, 1525–1535, 1526 (map) Bosse, Abraham, 62 Botero, Fernando, 832 Botev, Hristo, 573, 576–577 Botha, Pieter Willem, 1152 Botswana, 1443 Bouchard, Lucien, 1292 Boudiaf, Mohammed, 1099 Boudicca, Queen (England), 165 Bouhired, Djamila, 1099 Boumaza, Djamila, 1099 Boumedienne, Houari, 890, 1099, 1100, 1100 Boundaries. See Borders Boupacha, Djamila, 1099 Bourassa, Henri, 306, 1289, 1293–1294, 1296 Bourassa, Robert, 1291 Bourbon reforms, 350, 371 Bourgeoisie, 12, 585, 626. See also Elites Bourguiba, Habib, 1464 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 1099, 1100 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 333, 337, 340, 342 Bracken, Thomas, 868 Bradley, F. H., 531 Bradman, Sir Donald, 857 Brahms, Johannes, 117 Brandt, Willy, 976 Brathwaite, Kamau, 917, 921 Brazil, 282–297, 284 (map), 1824–1832, 1826 (map) and the Amazon, 876 and the arts, 1334–1335, 1439 and colonialism, 889 and Uruguay, 396–397 Brazilian Portuguese, 478 Brentano, Clemens, 73 Bretagne, 1490 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1026, 1076–1077 Brinker, Hans, 204 Bristow, George, 76 British North America Act, 300, 300 Britishness, 159, 162, 167 and Scotland, 233 Britten, Benjamin, 1434 Brock, Sir Isaac, 304 Brooklyn Bridge, 128, 134 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom, 164 Brussels, 144 Buddhism and Asian political identity, 972 and Burma, 779, 780 and Japan, 106 and Mongolia, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1798

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and politics, 983, 988 and Tibet, 1815–1817, 1821, 1822 Buenos Aires, 395–396, 397 Buhari, Muhammadu, 1187 Bulgakov, M. A., 697 Bulgaria, 437, 570–582 Bull, John, 117 Burghers, Thomas, 1150 Buriats, 1784, 1785, 1788–1795, 1791 Burke, Edmund, 89, 162, 1489 Burlington, Lord, 62 Burma, 776–785, 1370 Burnley, I. H., 883 Burns, E. Bradford, 292 Burns, Robert, 73, 238 Burschenschaften, 187 Burundi. See Rwanda and Burundi Bush, George H. W., 1306, 1395 Bush, George W., 1306, 1347, 1395–1396, 1453 Bushnell, David, 834 Bustamante, Carlos María de, 350, 352 Byron, Lord, 631 Cabero, Alberto, 330 Cabinda, 1660 Cabral, Amílcar, 1661 Cáceres, Andrés A., 377 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth, 53, 57 Cakobau, King (Fiji), 1318 Calhoun, John C., 390 Caliphate, 760–761 Cambó, Francesc, 706, 710 Cambodia, 1463 Camden, William, 61 Camphausen, Wilhelm, 408 Canada, 298–307, 301 (map), 1289 (map), 1372, 1834–1842, 1836 (map) communication in, 1473 education and, 424, 428, 429, 1383–1384 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigrants/immigration, 1415, 1418–1419, 1420 and indigenous groups, 1566 and music, 1441 and national symbols, 1344, 1346, 1347–1348 and natural resources, 884 and Nunavut, 1562 and Québec, 1288–1297 railroad in, 127 and sports, 993, 1000–1001 and technology, 1477–1478 Canal, Boisrond, 338 Cannadine, David, 1009 Capitalism and Korea, 1778–1779 and Social Democrats, 976 See also Economy; Globalization Captaincy General of Guatemala, 310, 314 Carbó, Eduardo Posada, 834 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 1829

Carducci, Giousè, 671 Carey, Henry, 117 Caribbean, 838 (map), 1274 (map) Carmichel, Franklin, 1841 Carnegie, Andrew, 239 Carpathian Ukraine, 716 Carr, E. H., 23, 536–537 Carr, Emily, 1841 Carrera, José Miguel, 326 Carrera, Rafael, 315, 318 Carretero, Luis, 711 Carter, Jimmy, 1395 Cartier, Georges-Etienne, 1288 Cartography. See Maps Castile, 1083, 1537 Castilla, Ramón, 372 Castillo, Florencio, 317 Castro, Arturo, 830 Castro, Fidel, 834, 942, 952, 1276, 1278–1279, 1278 (illus.), 1279, 1286 Castro, Raúl, 1279, 1286 Catalonia, 1413, 1415, 1536–1547, 1538 (map) and language, 477 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1091 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and Spain, 702–711, 708, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1490 Catherine the Great, 19–20 Catholicism. See Eastern Orthodox Church; Roman Catholicism Caupolicán (chief), 326 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 669, 673 Ceau¸sescu, Nicolae, 952, 1585, 1589, 1591, 1594 Cederström, Gustaf, 228 ˇ Celakovský, František Ladislav, 73 Celis, Carlos Uribe, 832 Celman, Miguel Juárez, 280 Celtic languages, 471, 472, 477 Celts, 236–237 Central America, 309–321, 312 (map), 838 (map), 1274 (map) Central American Common Market, 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 896, 1746, 1821 Ceremonies, 1347–1348 and Burma, 782 and France, 176 and Iran, 1114–1115 and nationalistic art, 411, 417 See also Holidays/festivals Cervantes, Ignacio, 76 Césaire, Aimé, 488, 917, 919 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de, 1275, 1282 Chabrier, Emmanuel, 1437 Chaco War, 360, 363, 365 Chadwick, George, 76 Chamberlain, H. St., 41 Channing, Edward Tyrell, 389 Charents, Yeghishe, 1707 Charles III (Spain), 350

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Charles V (Habsburg), 196 Charles XII (Sweden), 226 Charrúas Indians, 394 Chartists, 161, 164 Chatterji, Bankimchandra, 800 Chaudhry, Mahendra, 1323, 1324 Chaves, Julio César, 364 Chávez, Carlos, 76, 1439 Che Guevara, Ernesto, 942, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1286 Chechens, ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 441 Chechnya and Russia, 897, 1080, 1597, 1605–1607 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 Chen Duxiu, 789, 793 Chen Shui-bian, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1259 Chenrezig (God of Compassion), 1816, 1817 Chernobyl disaster, 954, 1078, 1457 Cherono, Stephen (Saif Saeed Shaheen), 1001 Chiang K’ai-shek, 791, 792, 794, 1250, 1251, 1251 (illus.) Chibás, Eduardo, 1282 Chile, 39, 323–331, 325 (map) and Peru, 377 China, 787–795, 788 (map), 1190–1200, 1192 (map) and Angola, 1664 anticolonialism in, 27 and the Cold War, 942–943 and colonialism, 890 and communism/Maoism, 952, 977, 978 and diaspora populations, 1372–1373 education and, 426, 1386–1387 and film, 1339 and India, 1210 and Indonesia, 1729 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762 and Japan, 809, 815, 1749, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 and Korea, 1780, 1781 and language, 472, 478, 481 and Mongolia, 1784, 1785, 1786–1788, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1794, 1795–1796 and music, 1440 and population transfers, 876 and religion, 108 separatism within, 1468 and the Soviet Union, 948, 979 and Taiwan, 1251, 1252–1253, 1256, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1462 and Tibet, 1813, 1814–1815, 1818–1821, 1823 and the United States, 1395 and Vietnam, 1263, 1266 Chinese in Japan, 1753 in Malaysia, 1215, 1216, 1385, 1463 in New Zealand, 867 See also Singapore Chipenda, Daniel, 1662, 1662 Cho Man Sik, 1773

Choibalsang, Marshal (Mongolia), 1789, 1792, 1797, 1798 Choinom, R., 1794 Chopin, Frédéric, 74, 81, 212, 214, 216, 686, 1434–1435 Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 1078, 1626 Chou Wen-chung, 1440 Choueiri, Youssef, 730 Christian III (Denmark), 226 Christian IV (Denmark), 226 Christian Coalition, 1395 Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International, 973–975 Christianity and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1706 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and Fiji, 1318 and fundamentalism, 1392, 1393 and the Philippines, 1239 and South Africa, 1148–1149 See also specific Christian religions Christophe, Henry, 337, 340 Chrysanthemum Revolution, 638 Chubais, Anatoly, 1597 Church, Frederic Edwin, 65 Churchill, Winston, 950, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1034, 1461 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 1283 Cinema, 133, 417–418, 497, 1327–1340 and Algeria, 1102 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and France, 1053 and Mongolia, 1794 and Québec, 1294 related to World War II, 1434 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1675 and the Soviet Union, 1075–1076 and the United States, 951–952 See also Theater Cintrón, Rosendo Matienzo, 841, 845–846 Citizenship, 930, 934–936 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 1851 and the Baltic states, 568 and Brazil, 293 and Canada, 298, 1835 and Central America, 320 and Czech Republic, 1027 and Denmark, 154–155 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1366, 1371–1372, 1374, 1376 and the EU, 1041, 1042 and forms of nationalism, 488, 1354 and France, 171, 1050 and gender/sexuality, 444, 446, 909 and Germany, 188, 620, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559 and globalization, 1409

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and Haiti, 335, 338 and immigration, 1419–1420 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 669 and Japan, 1752, 1753 and Malaysia, 1216, 1217, 1223 and Mongolia, 1796, 1798 and Peru, 371, 372–373 and Poland, 207 and Puerto Rico, 836, 843 and Ukraine, 1624 and the United States, 1398, 1401 and Uruguay, 400–401 and Wales, 1639 ˇ Ciurlionis, Mikolajus Konstantinas, 565 Civil rights movement, U.S., 124, 944, 965, 1300–1303, 1304, 1305, 1310 Civil war and Angola, 968, 1658–1659, 1663, 1666 and China, 790 and collapse of communism, 895, 896 and Colombia, 829, 833, 834 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Iraq, 757 and newly independent states, 968 and Nigeria, 967, 1185, 1185 and Palestine, 1142–1143 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and Spain, 707, 711, 1088 and the United States, 382, 391 See also Conflict/violence Civilis, Gaius Julius, 203 Class, 1–12 and Afghanistan, 1692–1693 and Angola, 1661 and Argentina, 280 and Brazil, 285 and Bulgaria, 571 and Catalan nationalism, 1537–1538 and Central America, 311 and Chile, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330–331 and China, 1194–1195, 1195, 1196, 1197 education, nationalism, and, 423, 427, 431, 478–479, 481 and Egypt, 265 and ethnic conflict, 892–893, 895, 897–898 and Finland, 601 gender, nationalism, and, 55–56 and Germany, 611 and Great Britain, 163–164 and Greece, 625 and Haiti, 334, 339 and Hungary, 644–645 and India, 131, 1204–1205 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 755, 1739 and Italy, 669–670 and Mongolia, 1795 and Québec, 1292–1293 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222

and social movements, 1452, 1454, 1456 and Soviet ideology, 693–694 and Spain, 709 and the United States, 1305 and Uruguay, 397, 403 Clavigero, Francisco Xavier, 350, 351, 351 Clay, Henry, 388–389 Clientelism, Iraq and, 750, 750–751, 755, 755, 756 Clifford, James, 1368 Clinton, William, 1408 Cloots, Anacharsis, 86 Clos, Joan, 1541 Coates, Eric, 1433 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 516 Cohen, Leonard, 1296 Cohen, Robin, 1672 Cohn, Roy, 908 Cold War, 525, 942–956, 975–979 and Angola, 1658 and Austria, 550 and Canada, 1840 and Eritrea, 1174 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 442 Europe and the end of the, 1043–1044 and Great Britain, 1012 and Indonesia, 1733, 1734 and Italy, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750 and Korea, 1772, 1773 and the Philippines, 1241 and separatist movements, 1465 and sexuality, 907–908 and sports, 994 and Tibet, 1821 and the United States, 1039, 1303, 1310 See also Nonaligned movement Cole, Thomas, 389 Collins, Bob, 1849 Colombel, Noel, 338 Colombia, 39, 824–834, 827 (map) Colonialism/imperialism, 25, 26, 489, 530, 958, 1301, 1303 and Algeria, 1098 and Angola, 1659 and Arab nationalism, 728–729, 734 and Australia, 855 and Basques, 1513 and Brazil, 283–285 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 299 and Chile, 323–324 and China, 1190 and Congo/Zaïre, 1156–1158, 1160 and diaspora populations, 1364 education and, 419, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 430, 431 and England/Great Britain, 161, 165–167, 490–491, 1005–1007 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737–740

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Colonialism/imperialism (continued ) and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889, 893 and European nationalism, 513–514 and Fiji, 1314–1316 and France, 178, 1050–1051, 1056 and gender, 54–55, 447–448 and Germany, 621 and Greenland, 1566, 1568 and Haiti, 339 and indigenous cultures, 1337 and Indochina, 1264 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1730 and Iraq, 749 and Italy, 665, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 815, 821–822, 1749, 1751 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language/literature, 479–480, 912–913, 914–917 and the Maori, 1859 and the Netherlands, 197–198 and Nigeria, 1178 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 and sports, 992 and Taiwan, 1253 and technology, 1478–1480 and terrorism, 1490 and Third World nationalisms, 1776 and the United States, 1310 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Expansionism Comenius, Jan Amos, 1028 Commonwealth Games, 996–997 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1079, 1715 Communication, 1473–1476 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 279 and Australia, 852 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and Basques, 1521 and Central America, 311, 315 and Colombia, 833 and globalization, 1414, 1416–1417 and ideologies, 972 and immigrants/diaspora populations, 1370, 1427 and India, 800 and Iraq, 1738 and Mexico, 354, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and New Zealand, 865 and Paraguay, 364 and Peru, 368

and the Philippines, 1238, 1247 and Polish nationalism, 216 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavian nationalism, 229 symbols in, 112, 122–123 technological advances in, 127–128, 129, 132, 135–136 and the United States, 388–389, 390 and Wales, 1639 See also Media Communism, 468–469, 944 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1689, 1690, 1693 and Angola, 1663 and anticolonial nationalism, 964 and Armenia, 1706, 1707 and Burma, 780 and China, 789–790, 791, 792, 793, 1190–1200, 1191, 1197 and the Cold War, 947–948, 976, 977–979 collapse of, 1413 and Cuba, 1276–1277, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020, 1022–1026 and France, 1053 and Indonesia, 1727, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 and Iraq, 753, 754, 755–756, 1745 and Korea, 1773 and Malaysia, 1216, 1223 and Romania, 1587–1588, 1589 and Singapore, 1218 versus socialism, 975–976 and Ukraine, 718 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1266, 1267, 1269 Companys, Lluís, 708 Compromise Agreement of 1867, 638 Conder, Charles, 859 Condorcet, Jean Marquis de, 53, 86, 370, 1351, 1362 Conflict/violence, 14–28, 436, 888–898, 929 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Algeria, 1095 and Basque nationalism, 1518, 1521 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527 and Brazil, 1831 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and competition among nation-states, 1032–1033 and education, 1388–1389 and Eritrea, 1172–1173, 1174–1175 and Finland, 606–607 and gender roles, 50–52, 449–450 in Germany, 1555, 1556–1557, 1559 and Gharabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh), 897, 1706, 1707–1709, 1711, 1715, 1718–1719 and ideological differences, 943–944, 977, 988–989 and India and Pakistan, 804–806, 950, 987, 1201, 1203, 1228, 1234–1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1461–1462, 1762, 1769

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and Indonesia, 1734 and instability in postindependent nations, 1469 and Iraq, 1742, 1746–1747 and Ireland/Northern Ireland, 649, 651–652, 662, 1058, 1059, 1060–1062, 1068 in Italy, 665 and the loss of optimism, 935–936 and Malaysia, 1216, 1220–1221, 1223 and minority issues, 939–940, 1412 and Mongolia, 1795–1796, 1796–1797 and natural resources/territory, 523–524, 883–886 in New Zealand, 1856–1857 and Nigeria, 1185 and the Ottoman Empire, 763–764 Palestinian/Israeli, 1129–1130, 1141 and the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 985–986, 1403 and rituals of belonging, 499, 503 role of diaspora populations in, 1365, 1415 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1673–1674, 1676–1677, 1679, 1680–1681 and separatism, 1460, 1465–1470, 1470–1471. See also Separatism/secession and South Africa, 1152–1153 and the Soviet Union, 1075, 1078–1079 and sports, 995 and Taiwan, 1256, 1256 and Tibet, 1823 in Turkey, 1649, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 722 and Vietnam, 1463 See also Civil war; Genocide; specific conflicts and wars; Terrorism Confucianism, 1270 Congo and Zaïre, 962–963, 1155–1165, 1156 (map), 1667, 1671–1672 and Angola, 1662 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and music, 1440 and separatist movements, 1469 Congress of Berlin, 578 Congress of Tucuman, 272, 273 Connolly, James, 652, 654 Connor, Walker, 931, 933 Conrad, Joseph, 489 Conscience, Hendrik, 145, 145 Constantinescu, Emil, 1589 Constantino, Renato, 1245 Consumerism and education, 1380 and image technology, 1339 and Korea, 1778–1779 and sports, 1001–1003 “Contract of the Century,” 1720–1721 Cook, James, 1855 Cook, Ramsay, 1842 Cooke, John Esten, 494

Cooper, James Fenimore, 389 Cooper, William, 1851 Copland, Aaron, 1439 Copps, Sheila, 1839 Copts, 265 Corbin, Margaret, 50 Cornejo, Mariano H., 374 Corradini, Enrico, 515 Corruption and Angola, 1665, 1666–1667 and Armenia, 1710 and the collapse of socialism, 895–896 and Congo/Zaïre, 1160 and Cuba, 1275, 1277, 1283 and Iran, 1111 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1768 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Palestinians, 1140, 1142 and the Philippines, 1243, 1244, 1247 and Québec, 1290, 1292 and Russia, 955 and the Soviet Union, 1076, 1079 and Spain, 704, 705, 1088 and Turkey, 1645, 1651 and Ukraine, 1628 Corsica, 1490 Cortés, Hernán, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 86–88, 97, 1350–1362 and Alsace, 1510 challenging cultural, 416 and Chile, 330 and globalization, 1409 and immigration, 1427–1428 versus national identities, 1342 and Russia, 82 Cossacks, 1620–1621 Costa, Emília Viotti da, 292 Costa Rica, 318, 321 Costa y Martínez, Joaquín, 705, 705 Coubertin, Pierre de, 991 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1502 Council of Europe, 1715 Counterterrorism, 1496–1498, 1757 Cowan, Charles, 235 Cox, Oliver, 1301 Coyer, Abbé, 32 Creole patriotism and Chile, 324, 326, 329 and Mexico, 349, 351, 351–352 and Peru, 369–370 Crete, 1440 Crime and Brazil, 1831 and Colombia, 834 and Iraq, 757 and Mongolia, 1797 and Pakistan, 1232 and the Philippines, 1243 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675

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Crime (continued ) versus terrorism, 1485, 1486. See also Terrorism and women, 904–905 See also Corruption Crimea, 1078, 1625 Crispi, Francesco, 737 Croatia borders of, 1413 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440, 524 fascism in, 516, 518 and language, 481 and new social movements, 1449, 1453 Croats, in Bosnia, 1527–1535 Cromer, Lord, 261 Cross, James, 1291 Cuba, 1273–1286 and Angola, 1658, 1663, 1665 and film, 1335 and music, 1441 Cui, Cesar, 82, 1437 Cultural diversity, 877–879. See also Multiculturalism Cultural revivalism, 407 Culture, 88–90, 92–93, 405–418, 506 and Alsace, 1509 and Argentina, 276, 277–279 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 854–856 and the Baltic states, 558–560, 558–561, 1578 and Basques, 705 and Brazil, 291–295, 296, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 575–577 and Canada, 1837–1842, 1843 and Catalonia, 706, 1537, 1542, 1543–1544 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Danish folk high schools, 151 education and standardization of, 420. See also Education and Egypt, 260, 264 and Ethiopia, 741, 742 and Finland, 599, 600 and France, 1050, 1052–1053 geopolitics and national, 461 German versus Austrian, 542–543 and Germany, 184, 186–187, 617–620 globalization and world, 1407. See also Globalization and Greece, 628, 629 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1728 and Ireland, 657–659 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 671–673 and Korea, 1778 and Malaysia, 1223 and the Maori, 1858, 1860 and Mongolia, 1790, 1793–1794, 1797 music in establishing national, 72–73, 76–83

and nationalism, 31, 47, 53, 129–130, 485–487, 1355 and Nepal, 1801 and the Netherlands, 205 and Nigeria, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Paraguay, 358, 362, 365, 365 and Peru, 369–370, 373, 378 and Poland, 212, 214–216, 217 and Puerto Rico, 841–843, 846–847 and Scandinavia, 226–228 and Scotland, 237–239 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 692–696 and technology, 132–134, 1474–1475 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 400, 402 See also Art; Folk culture; Language; Literature; Music Currency and Austria, 552 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 1039 the euro, 1039, 1043, 1044, 1549, 1551 and Finland, 598 and globalization, 1392 and Tibet, 1818 Cuthbert, Betty, 857 Cygnaeus, Fredrik, 601 Cyprus, 1648 Cyrus the Great, 1107, 1113 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 211–212, 213 Czech Republic, 446, 584 and music, 82, 1435–1436, 1441 See also Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, 583–596, 1016–1028 breakup of, 1413 and communism, 977 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441, 442 and geopolitics, 465 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 215 Dahl, C. J., 228 Dahl, Jens Christian, 67 Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso), 988, 1816, 1816, 1819–1820, 1821–1823 Dalin, Olof, 227 Damas, Léon, 488 Dame Te Atairangikaahu, 1857 Dance, 81, 114 and Angola, 1665 and Catalonia, 1543 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Peru, 378 and Wales, 1637

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Danevirke, 152–153 Dangarembga, Tsitsi, 913, 926–927 Danilevski, Nikolai, 93, 94 D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 489, 670 Darcy, Les, 858 Darius the Great (Persia), 1107, 1113, 1697 Darwin, Charles, 40, 462, 532 Dashbalbar, O., 1794 Daud Khan, Mohammad, 1687, 1689, 1690 David, Jacques-Louis, 177 Davis, H. O., 1180 Davitt, Michael, 451 Dayananda, Swami, 798–800, 802 Dayton Peace Accords, 1527, 1530, 1533 D’Azeglio, Massimo, 665 de Gaulle, Charles, 949, 1038, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1053–1054 de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 1151, 1152–1153, 1489 de Maistre, Joseph, 178, 179 De-Stalinization, 1077 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 245 de Valera, Eamon, 655, 657, 660–661 Deakin, Alfred, 853, 859, 859 Deane, Seamus, 488, 925 Debray, Regis, 61–62 Declaration of Arbroath, 233 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 173 Decolonization and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Eritrea, 1168 and Fiji, 1316, 1320 and Great Britain, 1006–1007, 1012, 1012 and Malaysia, 1216–1217 and the United States, 1303 See also Colonialism/imperialism Decommissioning, 1063 Dehio, Georg, 415 Delacroix, Eugene, 49 Delgado, Matías, 318 Delors, Jacques, 1040 Demchugdongrub, Prince (Mongolia), 1789–1790 Demirchian, Karen, 1707 Democracy, 66, 1360–1361, 1362, 1399–1400, 1488 and Afghanistan, 1686, 1687, 1689–1690 and Angola, 1663 and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Argentina, 275, 276, 281 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 853, 854 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Brazil, 1831 and Canada, 1843 and Central America, 314–315, 318 and Chile, 328–329 and China, 789, 791, 794 and the Cold War, 944–945 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England/Great Britain, 163, 1008 and Eritrea, 1175 in Europe, 419

and Germany, 190, 613, 614, 620–621, 1556, 1559–1560 and India, 981, 1208, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Mongolia, 1784 and Nepal, 1809 and the Netherlands, 199, 206 and Nigeria, 1188 and the Philippines, 1248 and Poland, 214, 215 and Romania, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1594 and Russia, 1596 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1678–1679 and Spain, 1082, 1084, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 248, 249, 250 and Taiwan, 1253–2354, 1259 and Turkey, 1647 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 385, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1311 See also Voting franchise Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Demonstration effect, 1477–1478 Deng Xiaoping, 1200 Denmark, 147–156, 220–222, 226–228 education and, 429 and the European Union, 1038 flag, 229 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1566, 1572 language and, 225, 472 national anthem/music of, 68–69, 230, 1443 Derrida, Jacque, 1052 Desai, Anita, 923 DeSica, Vittorio, 1334 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 336–337, 340, 342 Determinism social, 127–128 technological, 126–127 Deutsch, Karl, 1474–1475 Devolution, and Great Britain, 1013–1015 Devoto, Juan E. Pivel, 399 Dewey, John, 422, 425 Dialectical materialism. See Marxism Diamonds, 968 and Angola, 1659–1660 and South Africa, 1145–1146 Diaspora populations, 1364–1377 and Algeria, 1097 and Armenians, 1698, 1699, 1700–1701, 1703, 1704, 1704, 1707, 1708–1709, 1710, 1711 and discrimination, 1426–1427 and homeland politics, 1414–1415 and India, 1211 and the Internet, 1482–1483 Jews, 1125–1126 and Latvians, 1581 and Nepal, 1807

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Diaspora populations (continued ) and new social movements, 1455 and Nigeria, 1179 and Russians, 698 and supporting terrorism, 1488 Díaz, Porfirio, 355 Diderot, Denis, 102, 171 Die Degenhardts, 133 Diefenbaker, John, 1838, 1839 Diego, José de, 839, 841, 846 Diego, Juan, 347, 349 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 1264, 1264–1265, 1271, 1463 Diffusion of innovations theory, 1477 Dion, Céline, 1296 Discrimination/prejudice and Afghanistan, 1690, 1692 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 858 and Czechoslovakia, 1022, 1027 and Ethiopia, 741 and Fiji, 1316 against immigrants, 1420, 1423–1427 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1729 and Iran, 1113, 1118 and New Zealand, 867 and Nigeria, 1179 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Turkey, 1653, 1655 and the United States, 1304 See also Racism Dixon, Thomas, 1328 Djaout, Tahar, 1100 Djebar, Assia, 1100 Dmowski, Roman, 436, 682, 685 Dobson, Andrew, 877, 880 Dodge, Mary Mapes, 204 Dodson, Mick, 1848 Dodson, Pat, 1848 Dollard des Ormeaux, Adam, 303, 1294 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 516, 546 Domingue, Michel, 338 Dominican Republic, 339. See also Santo Domingo Donskoi, Dmitrii, 696 Dontsov, Dmytro, 718 Dorrego, Manuel, 273 Dorzhiev, Agwang, 1793 Dostoyevski, Fedor, 93, 105–106 Dostoyevski, Mihailo, 93 Dostum, Rashid, 1695 Douglas, Stephen A., 390 Douglas, Tommy C., 1839–1840 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 718 Drake, Sir Francis, 164 Du Bois, W. E. B., 965, 1179, 1301, 1303 du Toit, Daniel, 1149 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 978, 1022, 1026, 1028 Duchy of Warsaw, 209

Dufour, Guillaume-Henri, 253 Dugin, Alexander, 1601 Duke, James, 1399 Duplessis, Maurice, 1290, 1294 Durand, Asher, 389 Dürer, Albrecht, 415 Dürich, Jaroslav, 588 Durkheim, Émile, 5, 99, 111–112, 120, 908–909, 1054 Duruy, Victor, 178 Dutch Antilles, 197 Dutch Reformed church, 1145, 1148, 1149 Duyvendak, Jan Willem, 1446 Dvoˇrák, Antonín, 75, 1436, 1438 Dyer, Reginald, 804 Eagleton, Terry, 922 East Germany, 1449. See also Germany East Slavic nationalism, 716 East Timor, 1381, 1468, 1729, 1731–1732, 1734 and Christianity, 1239 Easter rising of 1916 (Ireland), 651–652, 652 Eastern Europe and communism, 977 development of nationalism in, 26 ethnic conflict and, 888, 895–897 and new social movements, 1449, 1456 Eastern Orthodox Church, 946 and Eritrea, 1171 and Greek independence, 627 and national identity, 103 and politics, 983 and Russia, 105–106, 1080, 1602–1603, 1605 and Serbs, 1529 and Slavic peoples, 972 Ebbesen, Niels, 153–154 Ecologism versus environmentalism, 877, 880–881, 883 Economic liberalism, 19 and Argentina, 276 and Central America, 316 and India, 1211 and Peru, 368, 372 and Turkey, 1645 See also Liberalism Economy, 18–19, 433, 895–896, 1359, 1380, 1407, 1474, 1496, 1939 and Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1095–1096 and Alsace, 1502, 1510 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Arab nationalism, 729 and Argentina, 269–271, 279, 280 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 850–851 and Austria, 545, 553 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1719–1721 and Basques, 1513, 1522 and Brazil, 296, 1825, 1827, 1828–1832 and Burma, 777

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and Canada, 302, 1477–1478, 1837, 1842 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 310–311, 315 and Chile, 324, 330 and China, 1198, 1372–1373, 1387 and Colombia, 826 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Denmark, 149 and Egypt, 257, 258, 259 and the European Union, 1044 and Fiji, 1322–1323 and France, 172, 175, 1047, 1054 and Germany, 191–192, 611 and Greenland, 1563, 1568 and Haiti, 333, 337, 342–343 and India, 1206, 1211 and Indonesia, 1723, 1733 and Iraq, 756, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 653, 660–661 and Israel, 1130 and Italy, 665, 669, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755–1756, 1757 and Korea, 1778–1779, 1781 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 and Mongolia, 1784–1785, 1796 and Nepal, 1801, 1808, 1811 and the Netherlands, 205 and New Zealand, 863 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1059–1060 and Pakistan, 1227–1229 and Paraguay, 358–359 and Peru, 368, 377 and the Philippines, 1247–1248 and Poland, 217, 678, 679, 680 and Puerto Rico, 837, 847 and Romania, 1585 and Russia, 692, 1597, 1599, 1604 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670–1671 and the Sami, 1609–1610, 1613 and Scandinavia, 221 and Scotland, 233 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1077 and Spain, 706, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1644–1645, 1651, 1656 and the United States, 388–389, 1395 and Uruguay, 396 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Economic liberalism; Globalization Edelfelt, Albert, 605 Edgerton, Lynda, 903 Education, 9–10, 29–41, 81–82, 130, 419–433, 461, 464–465, 478–479, 482, 504–505, 1379–1390 and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Arab nationalism, 731

and Argentina, 276–277, 279 and Armenia, 1703 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 287, 289, 293, 296 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 303, 1477–1478, 1843 and Central America, 315 and China, 1193, 1198, 1199 and Colombia, 833 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 746 and Finland, 608 and France, 178, 409, 1049 and Greek independence, 627 and Greenland, 1566, 1571–1572 and Haiti, 342 and India, 796, 798 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 751–752, 755, 756, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1745 and Italy, 675, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 811, 816, 1749, 1757 and Korea, 1776–1777 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1785, 1796, 1797, 1798 and Nepal, 1808 and the Netherlands, 197, 198, 199–200, 205 and New Zealand, 865–866 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Paraguay, 362 and Poland, 217, 688 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and the Sami, 1613, 1615 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 and Scotland, 234 and Singapore, 1225 and Slovakia, 587 and South Africa, 1148–1149 and the Soviet Union, 696, 1073 and Spain, 708–709 and Switzerland, 250, 254 and Taiwan, 1254 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1646, 1652, 1656 and Ukraine, 714, 1621, 1625 and the United States, 1305–1306 and Uruguay, 400, 401, 403 and Vietnam, 1271 Eelam, 1467, 1491 Egypt, 256–266, 257 (map), 982 anticolonialism in, 26 and Arab nationalism, 725, 728, 729–730, 734

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Egypt (continued ) and gender, 446, 450 and new social movements, 1452 and religious fundamentalism, 984–986, 1396 and terrorism, 1490 Eicher, Carolyn, 56 Eiffel, Gustave, 134 Eiffel Tower, 134 Einstein, Albert, 1350, 1362 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 697, 700, 1330 El Salvador, 318, 321 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 1715 Elgar, Edward, 1438 Elias, Norbert, 1369 Elites and Afghanistan, 1689 and Angola, 1665 and Belgium independence, 142–143 and Colombia, 826–827, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 of Ethiopia, 739–741 and Finland, 598, 600, 601 in Hungary, 637–638 and Iraq, 749, 750–751 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 1751 and new social movements, 1453 and Peru, 368, 371 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Russia, 690, 692–697 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672, 1676 and Spain, 707 and sports, 999 technology and the authority of, 1480 in Turkey, 1651, 1653 and Vietnam, 1269 and Wales, 1633 See also Intellectuals Elizabeth I, Queen (England), 164–165 Elizabeth II (Great Britain), 870 Ellison, Ralph, 1303 Emecheta, Buchi, 927 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 59, 389 Emigration and Afghanistan, 1687 and Algeria, 1095, 1097, 1102 and Alsace, 1505, 1507 and Basques, 1513 and Cuba, 1277 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1365–1366, 1371 and Fiji, 1325 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Ireland, 649, 660–661 and Korea, 1781 and Mongolia, 1798 and Poland, 212 and Puerto Rico, 847

and Turkey, 1648 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Diaspora populations; Immigrants/ immigration Eminescu, Mihai, 1592 Emmet, Robert, 649 Enculturation. See Assimilation Engels, Friedrich, 217 England, 158–167 constitution of, 162 and counterterrorism, 1496 economic liberalism and nationalism in, 18–19 education and, 423 and Greek independence, 631 and music, 1432 nationalism in, 5–6, 502 nationalistic art in, 408, 410 and Uruguay, 395 See also Great Britain English language, 480, 483 Enlightenment, the and the American Revolution, 21 erosion of religious power in the, 102 and France, 171 and liberalism, 1350–1351 and organicism, 462 and origins of nationalism, 9–10 and romantic nationalism, 406 Enloe, Cynthia, 901, 904 Ensor, Robert, 425 Environment and Brazil, 1825, 1827–1831, 1832 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and Haiti, 343 and Latvia, 1575–1576, 1581 and the Sami, 1615 and Tibet, 1814 See also Environmentalism/environmental movements; Natural resources Environmentalism/environmental movements, 875–886, 1446–1458 Eötvös, Jószef, 96 Epicurus, 476 Erben, Karel Jaromír, 73 Ercilla, Alonso de, 324–326, 329 Eriksson, Magnus, 226 Eritrea, 1167–1175, 1168 (map), 1469 diaspora population of, 1370 and Ethiopia, 742 Erk, Ludwig Christian, 73 Erkel, Ferenc, 79 Erskine, David Stuart, 239 Erslev, Kristian, 227 Escher, Hans Konrad, 254 Eskimo. See Inuit Estonia, 1078, 1374. See also Baltic states Ethics. See Morality Ethiopia, 736–746, 738 (map) and Eritrea, 1171–1172, 1174, 1175, 1469

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Ethnic cleansing, 435–442, 522–523 and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1507 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530, 1531, 1532 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 596, 1020 and Germany, 617, 622 and Hungary, 645 and Jews in Iraq, 756 and Poland, 681 and Turkey, 1648–1649 in Ukraine, 722 See also Conflict/violence; Genocide Ethnic conflict. See Conflict/violence Ethnicity, 931, 1354 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688–1689, 1693, 1694–1695 and Angola, 1660, 1664 and Argentina, 276, 277 and Armenia, 1703, 1709 and Austria, 543–544 and Azerbaijan, 1716, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528–1530, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 580 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 1836 and Catalonia, 1542–1543 and Central America, 311, 314 and China, 1193–1197, 1196, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1020–1021 and education, 35, 36, 39, 40, 1379 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 741, 742–743 and Fiji, 1314 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1412–1413, 1415, 1416 and Greece, 633 and Greenland, 1570–1571 and Hungary, 644 and immigrants, 1424 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 672, 673 and Japan, 1753 and Latvia, 1574–1575 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1213–1215, 1225 and Mongolia, 1790–1791, 1797–1798, 1798–1799 and music, 1431–1432 and nationalist movements, 10, 11, 27, 46, 1460, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1469–1470 and Nepal, 1808, 1809–1810 and the Netherlands, 199 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 967, 1178, 1185, 1186

and Northern Ireland, 1063 and the Ottoman Empire, 101–102 and Pakistan, 1231–1232, 1236 and Paraguay, 362 and the Philippines, 1243–1244 and Poland, 209, 212, 213, 214, 216 in political philosophy, 88–90, 95, 461, 464 and Québec, 1296–1297 and religion, 103–105, 107–109 and Romania, 1592–1594 and Russia, 1079–1080, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669–1670 and Scotland, 236–237 and South Africa, 1144, 1145 and the Soviet Union, 1076 and Taiwan, 1254, 1257–1258 and Turkey, 1650 and Ukraine, 712–713, 1621 and the United States, 1309 See also Minorities; Religion Eto Shin’pei, 820 Eurasianism, 466 Europe borders after World War II, 581 (map), 591 (map), 616 (map), 668 (map), 684 (map), 1018 (map), 1550 (map), 1590 (map) borders from 1914 to 1938, 170 (map), 184 (map), 540 (map), 556 (map), 579 (map), 586 (map), 612 (map), 624 (map), 636 (map), 656 (map), 666 (map), 680 (map), 762 (map) borders in 1815, 139 (map), 148 (map), 182 (map), 208 (map), 246 (map), 610 (map), 664 (map) colonialism and, 420–421 and cultural identity in, 445 development of nationalism in, 26, 31 education and, 33–36, 38–39, 422, 427 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 437, 441–442 and gender/sexuality, 44, 908 and immigration, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1425 imperative and imaginary forms of nationalism in, 501–503 and landscape art, 64 and language, 472, 477 and music, 73–75, 1432 nationalism and class in, 4, 11 nationalism and conflict in, 16, 23–26 and new social movements, 1447 perversions of nationalism in, 512–525 revolutions of 1848 in, 24–25, 47, 52 supranational bodies in, 948–949, 974 systems of governance in, 419 and terrorism, 1494, 1495, 1497 and transnationalism, 1509–1510 women’s suffrage in, 453 and xenophobia, 1412 See also European institutions; specific European countries and organizations

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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1034–1035, 1037 European Convention on Human Rights, 908 European Court of Justice, 1035 European Economic Community (EEC), 1010, 1036, 1038, 1049, 1509–1510 European institutions, 1034–1036, 1039, 1040 and Great Britain, 1007, 1010 See also European Union (EU) European Parliament, 974, 1035, 1039 European Union (EU), 948–949, 1021 (map), 1030–1046, 1032 (map), 1532–1533, 1551 (map) and Algeria, 1095 and Alsace, 1510 and Armenia, 1704 and Basques, 1517, 1522 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528 Committee of the Regions, 1043, 1541 and Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1028 education and, 432 flag, 1410 (illus.) and France, 1048 and Germany, 1549–1551, 1555 and globalization, 1407, 1409, 1410–1411 and indigenous groups, 1610 and Ireland, 1060 and Latvia, 1582 and minorities, 1412–1413 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Spain, 1092 and Turkey, 1645, 1648, 1650, 1656 and Ukraine, 1623 Europeanization, 1406 Evans, Gwynfor, 1633, 1635 Evans, Robert, 1434 Evatt, H. V., 858 Evolutionary theory. See Social Darwinism Exhibitions, 412–414. See also Holidays/festivals Exile and diaspora populations, 1365, 1369, 1370 Expansionism affect on Hungary of, 639 and Brazil, 283–284 and Canada, 300–302, 1837 and geopolitics, 459 and Germany, 617, 621 Herder on, 88 and Italy, 665–667 and manipulation of ethnic autonomy claims, 940 nationalism as justifying, 40 and Nazi Germany, 518 and perversions of nationalism, 523–524 Soviet, 945 and the United States, 22, 37, 39, 465, 1308 See also Colonialism/imperialism Expedition of the Thousand, 672, 674 Expressionism, 491

Fabianism, 471 Factionalism and the Maori, 1857 and nationalist movements, 940–941 See also Conflict/violence Factory, 129–130 Faehlmann, Friedrich Robert, 561 Fairhair, Harald, 226 Faisal I, King (Iraq), 727, 728, 728, 749–750, 750, 1742, 1743, 1745 Falkland Islands, 275, 1009 Falla, Manuel de, 1437 Fallersleben, Hoffmann von, 117 Falwell, Jerry, 1395 Fanon, Frantz, 963, 1100 Færoe Islands, 220–222, 225, 231 Fascism, 515–517, 525, 973, 1301 and gender, 454–456 and Hungary, 638, 639 and imperative nationalism, 502 and Italy, 419, 667, 670–671, 674–675, 675–676 and Japan, 817 and nationalistic art, 413–415, 417 and the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 and race, 672 See also Nazism Fashoda Incident, 460 Fatah, 1137, 1142–1143 Faulkner, William, 495 Favre, Louis, 254 Federal Republic of Central America, 310, 313, 316 Federalism and Australia, 850, 852–853 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1171–1172 and India, 1205–1206, 1766 and Indonesia, 1723 and Malaysia, 1216, 1218 and Nigeria, 1183, 1185 as solution to minority demands, 933 and Ukraine, 721–722 and the United States, 383 Feminists, 451–453, 454 versus nationalists, 902, 907 See also Women’s rights Fennoman movement, 598–599, 600, 601, 601 Feraoun, Mouloud, 1100 Ferdinand, Franz, 1490 Ferdinand, King (Romania), 1586 Ferdinand of Aragon, 709 Ferdowsi, 1107, 1113–1114 Ferguson, Adam, 234 Ferguson, William, 1851 Fernández, Emiliano R., 364 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 400 Ferry, Jules, 178 Festival of Britain, 1011 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 17, 34, 90–92, 186, 475, 533

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Fidelis, Malgorzata, 53 Fiji, 1313–1325, 1315 (map), 1441 Film. See Cinema Film noir, 1333 Finland, 220–222, 597–608, 599 (map) education and, 429 and gender, 54, 450 and independence, 223, 231 language and, 225 and music, 1432, 1436, 1443 national identity and culture of, 226–228, 466 and national symbols, 230 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1614, 1616 Finno-Russian War, 607 Firley, Barker, 1841 (illus.) First Schleswigian War, 149, 152 Fischer, Joschka, 1555 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 489 Fitzpatrick, Brian, 857 Flag(s), 112–113, 116–117 Australian, 855 Basque, 1521 Belgium, 145 Brazilian, 294 and Burma, 781 Canadian, 1835 Catalonian, 1538–1539 and Central America, 318–319 Chilean, 327 Colombian, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 Egyptian, 265 and the European Union, 1042, 1410 (illus.) French, 175 German, 619 and Greenland, 1569, 1570 Indonesian, 1732 Irish, 659 Japanese, 1756, 1756 (illus.), 1757 Maori, 873 and New Zealand, 866 Nigerian, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 Polish, 686 Puerto Rican, 842 (illus.), 844 and Québec, 1294 Romanian, 1592 Russian, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 229–230 Swiss, 253 and Tibet, 1818 Turkish, 1646, 1647, 1653 and the United States, 1308 Flemings, 144–145, 146, 200, 413 Folk culture, 406, 462, 530 and Alsace, 1510 and the Baltic states, 561, 563–564 and Cuba, 1280

and Finland, 599, 604 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 Haiti and folktales, 342 and Hungary, 643 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1797 and music, 73, 76, 77, 80–82, 417, 1434–1435, 1436, 1437, 1444 and Paraguay, 364 and Poland, 212, 216 and Russia, 693 and the Sami, 1612, 1614–1615 and Scandinavia, 226, 228, 229 and Switzerland, 251 and Turkish folklore, 774 and Ukraine, 721 and Wales, 1634 See also Culture; Indigenous groups Food insecurity and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Peru, 378 Ford, John, 1337 Foreign intervention and Angola, 968, 1658 and China, 793 during the Cold War, 943–944, 945, 947–948, 977 and Cuba, 1275, 1277 and globalization, 1408–1409 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117 and Turkey, 1652 and the United States, 1305 See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign policy and Armenia, 1710–1711 and Brazil, 1831 and China, 1200 and Cuba, 1285–1286 and the European Union, 1040, 1042 and geopolitics, 458 and Germany, 1554, 1555 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1751, 1757–1758 and Latvia, 1576 and Mongolia, 1798 and New Zealand, 871 and post-World War II Europe, 974 and the Soviet Union, 979 and sports, 994–995 terrorism as, 1488 and Ukraine, 1622–1623 and the United States, 955–956 Forster, E. M., 490 Forster, Georg, 86 Fortuyn, Pim, 1453, 1486 Foster, Stephen, 389 Foucault, Michel, 1052 Four Freedoms, 972 Fourier, Charles, 423 Fowler, Robert, 1839

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France, 102, 169–179, 172 (map), 502, 1047–1057, 1048 (map) and Algeria, 1097, 1098 and Alsace, 1502–1504, 1505, 1507 and Arab nationalism, 727–728 aristocracy and nationalism in, 5–8 and Basques, 1513, 1513, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Belgium, 140–141 and Canada, 298 colonialism and, 424–425, 958, 1463–1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the Dreyfus affair, 520 education and, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 423 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1034, 1038 fascism in, 515 and film, 1336 and gender, 43, 48–49, 448 and geopolitics, 468 and Greek independence, 631 and Haiti, 333, 335–336, 340 and Indochina, 1263–1264 and Iraq, 1739 and language, 420, 480, 482 and the Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities/immigrants, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1424 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1437, 1441, 1443 and national identity, 461, 465 national symbols of, 134 nationalistic culture/art in, 407, 408, 409–410, 413, 415, 416 and new social movements, 1448, 1457 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and political philosophy, 14–17, 475 and the Rhine crisis of 1840, 189–190 and the Suez War, 266 and Syria, 728 and Uruguay, 395 See also French Revolution Francia, José Gaspar de, 361, 364 Franco, Francisco, 705–706, 707, 709, 973, 1088–1089, 1089 (illus.), 1471, 1515, 1519, 1536 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 409, 412, 465 Francophonie, 1056–1057 Franklin, Benjamin, 21 Franko, Ivan, 720 Franks, 1537 Fraser, Dawn, 857 Frederick I (Holy Roman Empire), 619 Frederick II (Denmark), 226 Frederick William IV (Prussia), 191 Frederik, Christian, 224 Freinet, Célestin, 425

French Canadians and the defeat at Québec, 299 and duality in Canada, 303, 306 identity and, 302 tensions over political control in, 299–300, 303 See also Québec French Revolution, 34, 174 and Alsace, 1502 and the aristocracy, 7 and Basques, 1513 gender and symbols in the, 45–46, 49, 50–51 and Germany, 185–186 impact on Haiti of the, 334–335 influence in Brazil of, 293 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 and popular sovereignty, 15–16 and terrorism, 1489 French West Africa, 424–425 Friedrich, Caspar David, 67, 463 Friel, Brian, 917, 925 Fröbel, F., 36 Frost, Robert, 392 Fry, William Henry, 76 Fuad, King (Egypt), 263 Fucik, Julius, 1441 Fugner, Jindrich, 594 Fukuyama, Francis, 988 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 9 Furnivall, J. S., 783 Furphy, Joseph, 857 Gagarin, Yuri, 951 Gaidar, Yegor, 1597 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 833 Gaitskell, Deborah, 904 Galicia, 209, 210, 1088 and Ukrainians, 715, 716, 718 Gallen-Kallela, Akseli, 605 Gálvez, Mariano, 317 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 1079 Gance, Abel, 1328 Gandhi, Indira, 1207, 1207–1208, 1466, 1766, 1767 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), 798, 801, 802–804, 803, 805 (illus.), 950, 963 and gender issues, 451 and India’s social structure, 1205, 1208 and nonviolent resistance, 976, 1203, 1822 Gandhi, Priyanka, 1207 Gandhi, Rahul, 1207 Gandhi, Rajiv, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1492, 1767, 1768 Gandhi, Sanjay, 1207 Gandhi, Sonia, 1207 García, Calixto, 1282 García Calderón, Francisco, 375 García Márquez, Gabriel, 832 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 502, 672, 673, 674, 674 (illus.) monuments to, 410 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Garnier, Charles, 134

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Garrigue, Charlotte, 585 Garvey, Marcus, 494, 1179, 1850 Gasperi, Alcide De, 973–974 Gaudí, Antoni, 706 Gay, Peter, 613 Gediminas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Geffrard, Fabre, 337, 339 Gégoire, Abbé, 34 Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 73, 228 Gellner, Ernest, 130, 461, 476, 479, 1475, 1835 Gender, 43–57, 444–457, 899–910 and colonialism, 926–927 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Uruguay, 401 Genocide, 435–442 and American indigenous groups, 893 and Armenians, 765, 1699, 1704, 1704, 1706, 1709, 1711, 1718 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Hungary, 645 and Kurds in Iraq, 756 and Nazi Germany, 517, 622 and perversions of nationalism, 522–523, 524, 525 and Rwanda and Burundi, 968, 1671, 1672, 1674, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679, 1680 and Tibet, 1820 See also Conflict/violence; Ethnic cleansing; Holocaust Geoffrin, Madame de, 7 (illus.) Geopolitics, 458–469 George, Lloyd, 468, 593 George, Terry, 1674 George V (Great Britain), 132, 870 Georgia, 897, 1071, 1079, 1080, 1710 German Confederation of 1815, 149–150, 189, 191 German Customs Union, 191–192 German National Society, 192 Germanization, 617 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 594–595, 595 Germany, 181–194, 525, 609–622, 1548–1560 and Alsace, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1508 anti-Semitism in, 520 and Austria, 544, 546–548 citizenship in, 1354 and colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and democracy, 946–947 education and, 34, 35, 36, 38, 419, 421, 422–423, 426, 429–430 and the environment, 882–883 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and the European Union, 949 and expansionism, 524 and film, 1330–1331 and France, 1051 and gender, 448, 453 and geopolitics, 458, 459, 462–464, 466–467, 468 and immigration, 1419, 1424

and language, 472 and minorities, 1374 and the Moroccan crises, 514 and music, 1431, 1432 and national identity, 465 National Socialism/Nazism in, 133–134, 517–519 nationalism and political philosophy in, 9–10, 17–18, 90–93, 474–475, 491, 502, 533–534 nationalistic art of, 408–409, 410–411, 413–414, 415–417, 418 and new social movements, 1450, 1453 and Poland, 678 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 and rituals of belonging, 507–508 Soviet advancement into, 950 symbols in, 49, 114, 117 unification of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 512 and World War II, 1309 See also East Germany; West Germany Gershwin, George, 1439 Geser, 1791 Gettino, Octavio, 1335 Gezelle, Guido, 145 Ghana (Gold Coast), 962, 964, 980 and independence, 1464 and music, 1443 Gharabagh conflict, 897, 1078–1079 and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1716, 1718–1719 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 1589, 1594 Gibbs, Pearl, 1851 Gilgamesh, 1738 Ginestera, Alberto, 1439 Gladstone, William E., 241–242, 651, 654 Glaize, Léon, 409 Glinka, Mikhail, 75, 78, 79, 694, 1437, 1602 Global institutions and globalization, 1412 for governance, 1359–1362, 1406, 1456 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 sports, 991 and transnationalism, 1407 and values, 1392 See also United Nations (UN) Globalization, 1405–1417 and Brazil, 1826, 1830, 1832 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1374, 1376 and education, 1380, 1389 and the environment, 877 and global governance, 1359 and image technology, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1427–1428 and India, 1211 and Japan, 1750 and the loss of optimism, 936 and minorities, 1547 versus nationalism, 1392

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Globalization (continued ) and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and religious fundamentalism, 1397–1404 and sports, 999, 1000, 1001–1003 technology as facilitating, 135–136 and Vietnam, 1271 Glyndwr, ˆ Owain, 1637 Gobineau, Arthur, 40 Gocar, Josef, 594 “God Save the King,” 117 Godard, Jean-Luc, 1336 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 1332 Goh Chok Tong, 1384 Gökalp, Mehmet Ziya, 766, 766, 770, 774 Gömbös, Gyula, 638 Gómez, Máximo, 1282 Gonçalves, Gomide, Antônio, 283 Gongaze, Georgiy, 1628 Gonne, Maud, 451 González, Juan Natalicio, 365 González Prada, Manuel, 373, 374 González Vigil, Francisco de Paula, 377 Good Friday Agreement, 1062, 1062, 1063 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 946, 979, 1039, 1079, 1581, 1582 and the Baltic states, 1078 Gordon, Andrew, 815 Gordon, Walter, 1842 Gorodetskii, S. M., 700 Görres, Joseph, 92 Gothicism, 223 Gottschalk, Louis Moreau, 76, 389, 1438 Gottwald, Klement, 1019, 1024 Gouges, Olympe de, 173–174 Gouldner, Alvin, 1473 Gounod, Charles, 117 Government(s) and Afghanistan, 1686, 1686–1687, 1692 and Algeria, 1099 and Angola, 1663 and Argentina, 272, 275 and Armenia, 1699 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 282–283, 284, 287, 289–290, 296 and Bulgaria, 578 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 302–303 and Catalonia, 1538–1539 and China, 795, 1192–1193 and Colombia, 828 and Czechoslovakia, 590 and England, 162, 163 and Ethiopia, 740, 741 European systems of, 419 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1317, 1317, 1321, 1323, 1323 and Finland, 598 and France, 169–171, 175, 176, 1048–1049, 1053–1054 German, Italian, Japanese postwar, 946–947

and Germany, 609, 611–613 and Great Britain, 1007–1008 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1565, 1567 Haiti and instability in, 336–338 and India, 1204 instability of postindependence, 1469 and Iran, 986 and Iraq, 750, 1747 and Ireland, 648 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1766 and Japan, 812 and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and Nigeria, 1183, 1186 and Northern Ireland, 1059, 1063 and the Ottoman millet system, 761 and Palestinians, 1142 and Romania, 1588, 1588–1589 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Scotland, 234–235 and Spain, 702–703, 1084–1085, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 247–250, 249, 254–255 Tibetan exile, 1821, 1822 and the United States, 383–387, 391 and Uruguay, 398–399 and Vietnam, 1270–1271 and Wales, 1632 See also Democracy; Federalism Govineau, Arthur, 415 Gowon, Yakubu, 1185, 1186 Goya, Francisco de, 1437 Grabski, Stanisław, 685 Gracia, Gilberto Concepción de, 845 Gramsci, Antonio, 486 Granados, Enrique, 1437 Granatstein, Jack, 1842 Grant, George Parkin, 1838 Grant, James, 235 Grant, John, 235 Grau, Miguel, 377 Grau San Martín, Ramón, 1276 Great Britain, 236 (map), 1005–1015, 1006 (map), 1061 (map) and Arab nationalism, 727–728, 729 and Argentina, 269, 275, 279–280 and Australia, 850–851 and Brazil, 289 and Burma, 776–777, 781, 783, 783 and Canada, 299–300, 300, 307 and Central America, 318 and colonial divestment, 1461, 1464 and colonialism, 27, 490–491, 889, 958 communication and technology in, 128, 132, 1473 and Denmark, 150 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 36, 38–39, 426, 429, 432, 1381–1382 and Egypt, 259, 260–261, 262–263, 265

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and Eritrea, 1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1036, 1038, 1040 fascism in, 516 and Fiji, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1317, 1319 and film, 1337 and gender, 447–448, 450 and geopolitics, 468 and Haiti, 335, 340 and immigration, 1419, 1420 and India, 55, 131, 797, 798, 804–806, 1203 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 749–750, 752–753, 1739, 1742, 1745 and Ireland, 915 Irish in, 654 and Israel/Palestine, 1123, 1125, 1129, 1133, 1134–1135, 1140, 1402 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762, 1763, 1764 and landscape art, 61, 62–64 and language, 472, 480, 482, 912 and Malaysia, 1213–1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and the Maori, 1856 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities, 1412 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1442, 1443 national anthem of, 117, 1431 and natural resources, 885 and Nepal, 1805 and New Zealand, 863, 868, 872 and Nigeria, 1178, 1181, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1058–1068 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and Pakistan, 1227, 1231 political philosophy in, 534–535 and Québec, 1288 and rituals of belonging, 507 and Scotland, 233–242 and South Africa, 1145–1146, 1150 and sports, 992, 996–998 symbols of, 114 and terrorism, 1488 and Tibet, 1818 and Uruguay, 396, 397 and Wales, 1631–1633, 1632 Great Depression and Burma, 777, 777 and Canada, 302 and Japan, 810, 821 Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 (Peru), 370–371 Greece, 623–633, 626 (map) and diaspora populations, 1374 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437–438 and the European Union, 1040 independence of, 46, 53, 464 and language, 477 and minorities, 1424 and Turkey, 1648

Greeks ethnic cleansing of, 438 Greek independence and diasporic, 627, 632 in Turkey, 1648 in the United States, 1427 Greenfeld, Liah, 938 Greenland, 220, 1561–1572 Greenpeace, 1361, 1362, 1448 Grégoire, Abbé, 173, 178 Gregory, Lady Augusta, 918, 922 Grenfell, Maria, 1439 Gretzky, Wayne “The Great One,” 1842 Grieg, Edvard, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 228, 417, 1436–1437 Griffith, David Wark, 1328 Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm, 67, 406 Grímsson, Magnus, 228 Grofé, Ferde, 1439 Grotius, Hugo, 203 Groulx, Abbé Lionel, 1290, 1293, 1294 Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap, 1637 Grundtvig, N. F. S., 151, 151, 228, 429 Guantánamo Bay, 1280 Guaraní Indians, 358, 395 Guardiola, Santos, 315 Guatemala, 318, 319, 321 Guernica, 1515, 1519–1521 Guerrier, Philipe, 337 Guindon, Hubert, 1293 Guiteras, Antonio, 1282, 1283 Guizot, François, 177 Gulf War (1990–1991), 756, 952, 1408–1409, 1746–1747 and Germany, 1554 Gumilev, Nikolai, 94, 1601 Gustav I Vasa (Sweden), 226, 230 Gustav II Adolf, King (Sweden), 223, 224 (illus.), 226, 565 Gustav III (Sweden), 223 Gyanendra, King (Nepal), 1809 Haakon IV (Norway), 226 Habermas, Jürgen, 97, 1481, 1556 Habibullah II, 1686, 1688, 1691 Habsburg empire, 512, 541 and Austria, 539, 541, 543–544 and Belgium, 138–139 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Czechoslovaks, 584, 587–588 and the formation of Austria-Hungary, 512 and Germany, 189, 191 and Hungary, 407, 637 and language, 472 and Mexico, 350 nationalistic philosophers from the, 96 and the Netherlands, 196 and Poland, 679–681 and Switzerland, 252 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 1677

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Hadj, Messali, 1097, 1099 Hadjiiski, Ivan, 577 Haegy, Xavier, 1508 Hagemann, Karen, 52 Haider, Jörg, 553 Haile Selassie, 740, 742, 743 Hailu, Kasa (Emperor Tewodros), 739, 743, 744 Haiti, 26, 174, 332–343, 334, 1414 Halbwachs, Maurice, 1343 Hallgrímsson, Jónas, 228 Halonen, Pekka, 605 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 394 Hals, Frans, 203 Hamas, 972, 978, 986 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1142–1143 Hambach Festival, 190 Hamilton, Alexander, 22, 386, 387 Hamilton of Gilbertfield, 239 Hamitic hypothesis, 1678 Hammershaimb, Venceslaus, 225 Hansen, H. P., 156 Hanson, John, 386 Haq, Abdul, 1690 Harb, Talat, 729 Harlem Renaissance, 494 Harris, Lawren, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Harris, Leonard, 1008 Harry (Scottish minstrel), 239 Hasan, Zoya, 902 Hashshashin, 1489 Hatta, Mohammad, 1463 Haushofer, Karl, 460, 466, 467 (illus.), 491 Havel, Václav, 1026, 1027, 1028 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 117, 1432 Hayes, Joy Elizabeth, 132 Hazaras, 1693 Hazelius, Arthur, 229 Head, Bessie, 927 Health, and the environment, 882 Health care and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Canada, 1840 and New Zealand, 871, 871 and Pakistan, 1228 Heaney, Seamus, 925 Hebrew, 477 Hecht, Abraham, 1400, 1403 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17, 92–93, 187, 534 Hegemony Anglo-American, 1393 and Baltic nationalism, 558, 562 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1534 of Buenos Aires in Argentina, 275 and Chilean identity, 327 and Ethiopia, 738, 741 and Finnish nationalism, 605, 608 and gender issues, 445, 906 of German music, 80, 82

and Germany, 611 Germany and French, 186 and Great Britain, 397, 490 Japan and U.S., 1754, 1757 and literature, 486 and Mexican identity, 349, 352 nationalism in maintaining, 898, 1481 nationalist music as reaction against, 79 and Nepali nationalism, 1809 and Peru, 374 of political ideologies, 512 Prussian, 544 and Spain, 702, 711 technology as undermining, 136 and Turkey, 1646 and the United States, 837, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1310, 1742-1743 and World War I, 713 Heidegger, Martin, 533–534, 534 (illus.) Heidenstam, Verner von, 228 Heimat, 611, 883, 1344 Heimatbund, 1508 Heimatkunst, 417 Hein, Piet, 203 Heine, Heinrich, 501 Helfferich, Karl, 613 Hellenism, 623 Helvetic Republic, 248–249 Henderson, Paul, 1842 Henlein, Konrad, 595, 595 Henry, Paul, 659 Heraclitus, 533 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 17, 30–31, 73, 88–90, 89 (illus.), 185, 406, 529, 533 and the Baltic states, 561 and organicism, 462 Hernández, José, 278–279 Herndon, Angelo, 1303 Heroes/heroines, 446, 504, 1345 and Afghanistan, 1690 and Algeria, 1098–1099, 1099, 1102 and Armenia, 1706 and Australia, 857, 857 of the Baltic states, 564–565 and Bulgaria, 576, 577 and Burma, 782, 784 and Canada, 304–305 and Central America, 318 and Colombia, 831, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164 and Cuba, 1282, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England, 164–165 and film, 1331, 1332, 1333 and Finland, 604–605 and Great Britain, 1012 and India, 1209 and Indonesia, 1725, 1727 and Iran, 1113–1114, 1115, 1116 and Ireland, 658, 659

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and Korea, 1779–1781 and Latvia, 1578–1579 and Mongolia, 1786, 1789–1790, 1791, 1797, 1798 and New Zealand, 870 and Nigeria, 1187 and Palestinians, 1137 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 377 and the Philippines, 1245–1246 and Poland, 211, 214 and Québec, 1294 Russian, 1074 Scandinavian, 226–227 and Scotland, 232–233 and the Soviet Union, 694, 695, 696, 700, 951 and sports, 995 and Switzerland, 253–254 and Syria, 728 and Turkey, 1643, 1646–1647, 1653 and Uruguay, 402 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637 See also Leaders; Symbols Herrera, Bartolomé, 377 Herrera, Enrique Olaya, 830 Herries, William, 869 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 1148 Hervé, Gustave, 515 Herzl, Theodor, 1121, 1123, 1127 Hezbollah, 986 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 350 Higgins, H. B., 859 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 1693 Hilden, Patricia, 56 Hilty, Carl, 252 Hindenburg, Paul von, 613 Hinduism and fundamentalism, 1393 and India, 107, 797, 803, 803, 987, 1204–1205, 1208–1210 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Nepal, 1806 Hindutva, 107, 108 Hirata Atsutane, 815 Hispanophilia versus hispanophobia in Mexico, 352–353 and Puerto Rico, 841 Historiography, 121, 406, 477, 880, 1343 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Algeria, 1098–1099 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 733–734 and Armenia, 1702, 1705–1708 and Australia, 855–858 and Austria, 551 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 564 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531 and Brazil, 292–295

and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 303–305, 1840 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 320 and China, 1195–1197, 1199–1200 and Colombia, 831–832 and colonialism, 917, 923–924 and Congo/Zaïre, 1162, 1163–1164 and Cuba, 1277–1278, 1281–1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1022–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Ethiopia, 742–744 and Fiji, 1318 and film, 1327–1328, 1336–1338 and Finland, 604 and France, 177–178, 1051–1052 and Germany, 188–189, 614, 617–619 and Great Britain, 1010–1011, 1011 and Greece, 629 and Greenland, 1568 and Haiti, 341 and India, 802–803, 1209 and Indonesia, 1727, 1728, 1730 and Iran, 1107, 1107, 1113–1116 and Iraq, 752–754, 757, 1741 and Ireland, 658–660 and Israel, 1125–1127 and Italy, 673–675 and Japan, 1750–1751 and Mexico, 354, 355–356 and Mongolia, 1788 and New Zealand, 864–865, 868–870 and Nigeria, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and Palestinians, 1139–1140 and Paraguay, 362–364 and the Philippines, 1244, 1245–1246 and Poland, 212, 214, 685–686 and Puerto Rico, 843–844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and Romania, 1592 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1677–1678, 1679 and the Sami, 1618 and Scandinavia, 223, 223, 226–228, 228 and Scotland, 234, 237–239 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 700, 1076 and Spain, 708–709, 1086 and Switzerland, 247, 251, 252–254 and Taiwan, 1252, 1255–1256 and Turkey, 771, 773–774, 1646 and Ukraine, 721, 721 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637–1638 Hitler, Adolf, 413, 611, 613 and anti-Semitism, 517 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and Austria, 545, 546, 547

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Hitler, Adolf (continued ) and Czechoslovakia, 1019 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438, 439 and gender, 450, 454 and Hungary, 638 and music, 1431 ties with Mussolini, 516 Hiwet, Addis, 737 Hjärne, Harald, 228 Hlinka, Andrej, 585, 590 Ho Chi Minh, 952, 962, 963–964, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1267 (illus.) Hoad, Lew, 857 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 (illus.) Hobsbawm, Eric, 19, 23, 132, 473, 476, 478, 481 Hobson, William, 863 Hodge, John R., 1773 Hofmeyr, Jan, 1149 Hogg, James, 238 Holberg, Ludwig, 227 Holidays/festivals, 116, 504, 1346 and Australia, 855–856 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 567 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 295 and Bulgaria, 575–576 and Burma, 782 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 319 and Chile, 327, 328 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1025 and France, 1053 and Germany, 620 and India, 800, 1204 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 754 and Israel, 1129 and Japan, 1752 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 and the Maori, 1857 and Mexico, 347–349, 354 and the Netherlands, 204 and New Zealand, 869, 873 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1067–1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 211, 216–217, 685–686, 688 and Romania, 1586 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 and South Africa, 1150 and the Soviet Union, 695 and Spain, 709 and Switzerland, 244, 254 and Taiwan, 1256 and Turkey, 1651, 1652–1653, 1653

and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637, 1638 Holly, James Theodore, 340 Holocaust, 439–440, 517–518, 523, 524 and Austria, 546 and Czechoslovak Jews, 1020 and German guilt, 1555–1556, 1557–1558 guilt and the foundation of Israel, 1402 and immigration to Israel, 1121 and legitimacy of Zionism, 1128 as reconstituting ethnic borders, 617 remembrances of the, 1345 See also Genocide Holst, Gustav, 1432 Holstein, 147, 149, 150, 220, 222 Holy Roman Empire, 183, 186, 543, 619, 1816 Homosexuality, 907–908, 909–910 Honduras, 318, 321 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1304 Horowitz, Donald, 989 Horthy, Miklós, 638 Hosokawa, Toshio, 1440 Hotel Rwanda, 1674, 1675 Hou Hsaio-hsien, 1338 Hoxa, Enver, 952 Hozumi Yatsuka, 816 Hrushev’skyi, Mykhailo, 721, 721 Hsaya San, 777, 782 Hu Shi, 789, 793 Hua Guofeng, 1200 Hueber, Charles, 1509 Huggins, Jackie, 1849 Hugo, Victor, 177 Humanism, 41, 86, 87 Humbert, Ferdinand, 409 Humboldt, Alexander von, 34, 64, 65, 423, 462 Hume, David, 18, 234 Hume, John, 1062 Hunedoara, Iancu de, 1592 Hungary, 635–645, 640 (map) anti-Semitism in, 520, 521 and the Austro-Hungarian empire, 24 autonomy and, 407 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441 and expansionism, 524 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and music, 1432, 1435 and nationalistic art, 412 and Slovakia, 587 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Huntington, Samuel, 929, 988, 1374 Hurston, Zora Neale, 494 Hurt, Jakob, 563–564, 567 Hus, Jan, 592, 1023 Husayn, Imam (Iran), 1115 Hussein, Saddam, 756–757, 758, 952, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Iran, 1115–1116 Hussein, Sharif, 727, 749, 750, 1739

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Hussitism, 1023 Hutton, C. M., 481 Hutus, 1669, 1675, 1677, 1678 Hyde, Douglas, 654–655, 657, 918 Hypernationalism, 1389–1390. See also Xenophobia Hyppolite, Florville, 338 Iancu, Avram, 1592 Ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 1113 Ibn Taymiyyah, 725 Ibsen, Henrik, 228 Iceland, 220–222, 226–228 and the environment/natural resources, 875–876, 885 independence and, 231 and national symbols, 230 reading and, 229 Icelandic Sagas, 227 (illus.) Idealism, 534–535 Identity, 27, 405, 528, 537, 930–932, 1351, 1418–1429 and Afghanistan, 1693–1695 and Algeria, 1100–1101, 1105 and Alsace, 1504 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 276–279 and Armenia, 1698, 1699–1700, 1701–1705, 1704, 1708 and Austria, 550, 551, 554 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1716–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 558, 561–562, 563, 563–565, 1576, 1577, 1577–1578, 1581 and Basques, 1519–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527, 1528–1530, 1531, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 283, 285–287, 288, 292–295, 294, 1826–1827 British versus English, 159–161, 162, 163, 167 and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 780–781 and Canada, 298, 302, 303–305, 1835–1843 and Catalonia, 1536–1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Central America, 313, 319–321 and Chile, 324–326, 327–329, 328 and China, 1198–1200 civic versus ethnic, 933–936 and Colombia, 832, 833, 834 and communications, 1474 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160–1165 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1282–1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1025 Dutch, 197, 198, 204 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 265 and the environment/landscape, 875–876, 879–880, 883, 884, 886 and Eritrea, 1174 and Ethiopia, 741–743, 744–746 European, 974, 1045–1046 and film, 1327, 1338–1340

and Finland, 598–605, 608 and France, 1056, 1057 and gender/sexuality, 43–45, 444–447, 909–910 and geopolitics, 458–459, 464–466 and Germany, 183–187, 190, 192–193, 611, 613–620, 621–622, 1549, 1552, 1555–1556, 1558 globalization and de-territorialization of, 1416 and Greece, 630, 633 and Greenland, 1565, 1567–1568, 1570 and Haiti, 341–342 and Hungary, 639–644, 645 after independence, 1465 and India, 797, 803 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726–1728, 1732, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 757, 758–759, 1740, 1743 and Israel, 1124, 1127–1130 and Italy, 665, 670–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and Japan, 809–810, 813, 815, 820, 822, 1750–1751, 1755–1756, 1757–1578 and Korea, 1773, 1775–1776, 1778–1781 and landscape art, 59, 60–71 and language/literature, 482, 486, 492–495, 922–923 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1225 Maori, and intertribal unity, 1856, 1858, 1859–1860, 1863 and Mexico, 345, 347, 347–350, 351–356 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788–1789, 1792, 1793–1794, 1797, 1798 and music, 78–83 and national symbols, 113, 122–123, 1342–1348 in nationalist political philosophy, 97, 473–476 and Nepal, 1803, 1804, 1805–1806, 1807, 1811 and New Zealand, 863, 864–870 and Northern Ireland, 1065–1066 and overdetermination, 121 and Palestinians, 1133, 1134, 1138–1139 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1849 and Paraguay, 360, 362, 365–366 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 209, 213, 682, 686–688 and Puerto Rico, 839, 841–843 and Québec, 1293–1294 and religion versus ideology, 972–973 religious, 99, 103, 109, 983, 988–989. See also Religion and rituals of belonging, 499, 509. See also Rituals of belonging role of education in, 29–41 and Romania, 1589–1591 and Russia/Soviet Union, 690–701, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672–1673, 1677, 1679 and the Sami, 1614, 1615, 1617 and Scandinavia, 222–225, 226–228 and Scotland, 233, 234

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Identity (continued ) and social class, 1, 3–4 and South Africa, 1149–1150 and Spain, 1083, 1085–1087, 1092 and sports, 995, 996, 997–998, 1002–1003 and Switzerland, 251, 251–252, 253 and Taiwan, 1253–1255, 1257–1260 and technology, 134–135, 1476, 1481 and Tibet, 1815, 1817–1818, 1821–1823 and Turkey, 761–763, 764–765, 766, 768–770, 1645–1647, 1650 and Ukraine, 718–721, 720, 1622–1623 and the United States, 389, 392, 1307, 1307–1308 and Uruguay, 400, 401–402, 403 and Vietnam, 1266–1269, 1271 and Wales, 1636, 1640 Ideology, 971–989 and China, 794–795, 1193, 1194–1197, 1195, 1197 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1280–1281 globalization, disillusionment, and, 936–941 and Iraq, 752 and Malaysia, 1223 and nationalist movements, 940–941 and Russia, 692–697 and the United States, 1307–1308 and Vietnam, 1269 See also Communism; Fascism; Nationalism; Philosophy, political Igbo, 1469 Iglesias, Santiago, 839 Ileto, Reynaldo, 1245 Iliescu, Ion, 1586, 1587, 1589 Iliolo, Ratu Josefa, 1325 Immigrants/immigration, 1418–1429 and Alsace, 1510 and Argentina, 276, 277, 279, 280, 492 and Australia, 850 and Basques, 1517 and Burma, 777, 783 and Canada, 304, 1837 and Catalonia, 1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Colombia, 833 and cosmopolitanism, 1362 and Cuba, 1275 and Denmark, 155 education and, 420, 423–424 and the European Union, 1042 and France, 1055–1056, 1056 and gender, 448 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1409, 1411–1412, 1415 and Great Britain, 1007, 1009, 1013 and Greenland, 1566 and homeland politics, 1414–1415, 1416 and Indonesia, 1729 and Israel, 1121, 1129, 1130 and Japan, 1749, 1753, 1753 and language, 482, 483–484

and Latvia, 1575 and Malaysia, 1215 and Mongolia, 1797 and nativism, 883 and the Netherlands, 202, 206 and New Zealand, 864, 867, 868, 1856 and Pakistan, 1237 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Québec, 1296–1297 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Scandinavia, 231 and sports, 1000 and Turkey, 1650 and the United States, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1311 and Uruguay, 402 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnicity; Minorities; Refugees Imoudu, Michael, 1181 Imperialism. See Colonialism/imperialism Incas, 367–368, 370–371, 373 Income distribution and Australia, 853 and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Iran, 1111 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 955 and the United States, 1307, 1308 Independence and Afghanistan, 1684 in Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1098, 1099, 1100 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 728 and Argentina, 269–273 and Armenia, 1709–1710 and Austria, 542, 548–550, 552–553 and the Baltic states, 556–557, 562, 568, 1575, 1577–1578 and Belgium, 140, 142–143 and Brazil, 282, 287, 289, 295 and Bulgaria, 573–574, 578–580 and Burma, 777, 782–785 and Central America, 313, 319 and Chile, 326–327, 328 during the Cold War era, 949–950, 960, 969 and Colombia, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1161 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1277 and developing countries, 980 and Eritrea, 1173, 1173–1175 and Fiji, 1316–1317, 1320 and Finland, 223, 231, 605, 606 and Greece, 46, 53, 623, 625–631 and Greenland, 1571 and Haiti, 336 and Hungary, 638 and Iceland, 231 and India, 804–806, 889–890, 1201–1203 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1725, 1727, 1733–1734

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and Iraq, 750, 752–753 Latin America and, 46, 272 and Mexico, 349–350 and Mongolia, 1790, 1795 and New Zealand, 872 and Nigeria, 1181–1183 and Norway, 223–225, 231 and Pakistan, 1229–1231 and Paraguay, 359, 360–361 and Peru, 370, 371 and the Philippines, 1240–1241 and Poland, 681, 687–688 and popular nationalist movements, 503 to protect national culture, 1355 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 841, 843, 844–847 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Santo Domingo, 332–333 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and Taiwan, 1256–1257 and technology, 1479 and Tibet, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 767–768 and Ukraine, 722, 1626, 1626–1627 and Uruguay, 397 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Separatism/secession; Sovereignty India, 796–806, 799 (map), 943, 949–950, 1201–1211, 1202 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and colonialism, 48 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1373 education and, 424, 429 and gender, 446, 451, 902 government in, 981 and Great Britain, 889–890 and independence, 963, 1006, 1461–1462 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1771, 1765 and the Khalifat Movement, 1763 language/literature in, 920, 922, 923, 927 and music, 1440, 1441, 1443 and Nepal, 1802 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 967–968, 1229–1231, 1234–1235, 1235 politics in, 976–977, 987 railroad in, 131 and religion, 107 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 and terrorism, 1495 and the Tibetan government-in-exile, 1821, 1822 and water, 885 Indians, in Malaysia, 1215, 1216 Indigenismo, 352 Indigenous groups and Argentina, 277, 280 and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 283, 285, 293, 1826, 1828

and Canada, 303, 1837, 1840 and Central America, 310, 311, 317 and Chile, 324–326, 327 and Colombia, 829, 830 colonialism and, 889, 893, 912–913, 914–917 and education, 1383, 1385 and the environment/natural resources, 879, 883–884 and Fiji, 1314–1325 influence on music of, 1438–1439 Inuit, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 and language, 472, 482 and Malaysia, 1213–1215 and Mexico, 345–346, 351 and new social movements, 1448, 1451–1452 and Peru, 370–371, 372–375 and Québec, 1297 and Taiwan, 1252 and the United States, 1309 and Uruguay, 394–395 See also Maori; Pan-Aboriginalism; Sami Indo-Fijians, 1314–1325, 1318 Indo-Pakistan War, 1767 Indonesia, 1722–1735, 1724 (map) aircraft industry in, 1476 diversity and government in, 953–954 and independence, 1462–1463 and Malaysia, 1220 and the Netherlands, 197, 204 political tensions in, 938 radio hobbyists in, 128 separatist movements in, 1468 and technology, 1479–1480 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and transmigration, 876 Industrial Revolution, 161 Industrialization and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Basques, 1514–1515, 1517 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 317 and class, 55–56 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and England, 161 and Eritrea, 1169 and the European revolutions of 1848, 47 and Finland, 598 and geopolitics, 461 and Germany, 611 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 648, 661 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 424, 1748–1749 and Korea, 1778 and Mongolia, 1785 and nationalism, 1475, 1480 and Pakistan, 1228 and Poland, 209, 679, 681 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Québec, 1293–1294

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Industrialization (continued ) and Romania, 1585, 1587 and Russia, 699 and Scandinavia, 221 socialism and, 205 and the Soviet Union, 1075 and Spain, 703–704, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Ukraine, 714–715 and the United States, 1309 See also Economy Inequality and education, 1382, 1385–1386 and gender, 901–902, 903–904 and globalization, 936 and oil revenues in the Middle East, 1396 See also Income distribution; Rights Infrastructure and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 296, 1829 and China, 1193, 1200 education, 1381 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1169 and Indonesia, 1723 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 205 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1680 and Spain, 706, 708 and technological advances, 127–128, 131–132 and Tibet, 1814 and the United States, 389–390 Ingrians (Ingers), 557 Ingush, 441 Injannashi, 1788, 1789 Innis, Harold Adams, 1474, 1475 ˙Inönü, ˙Ismet, 768 Inoue Nissho, 816–817 Intellectuals, 1707 and Algeria, 1100 and Arab nationalism, 725, 730–733, 734 and Armenia, 1706 and Bulgaria, 571–572, 573 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1842 and China, 789–790, 792, 793, 793 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and France, 1052 and Germany, 183–185 independence and Greek, 626–627, 629–630 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 1741, 1745 and Latvia, 1575, 1577 and Mongolia, 1785–1786 and Nigeria, 1180 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222, 223

the Soviet Union and disciplining, 1074–1076 and Ukraine, 718 Young Ottomans/Turks, 763, 763, 764–765, 767, 771, 774 See also Elites International institutions. See Global institutions International Labour Organization (ILO), 1610 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1229, 1829, 1829 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 1359–1361 Internationalism, 536 and Angola, 1663 and Germany, 1551, 1559–1560 and globalization, 1408–1410 issue-specific, 1361–1362 versus nationalism, 418, 1342 and sports, 991 See also Post-nationalism; Transnationalism Internet and Armenia, 1709 and diaspora populations, 1370 and national identity, 1476, 1481–1483 and transnationalism, 1339 Interpellation, 486, 489–490 Intervention. See Foreign intervention Intifada, 1141 Inuit, 879, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 Ioann, Metropolitan, 106 Iqbal Lahori, Muhammad, 1229–1230, 1230, 1233 Iran, 1106–1118, 1108 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714 and gender, 446 and Iraq, 758, 1743 and Islamic fundamentalism, 986 and new social movements, 1452 and Palestine, 1142 and religious fundamentalism, 1396–1397 and terrorism, 1488 and the United States, 952 See also Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 756, 757, 952, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1746 Iraq, 747–759, 748 (map), 1736–1747, 1738 (map) borders of, 966 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1389 and Iran, 1115–1116 U.S. invasion of, 954, 955, 1497 water, 884–885 See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ireland, 647–662 Celtic revival in, 407 and colonialism, 915 and diaspora populations, 1374, 1375–1376

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economy of, 1060, 1408 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 112–113 and gender/sexuality, 452, 908 and immigration, 1424 and independence, 166, 1006 language and literature in, 488, 913–914, 918, 919, 920, 922–925 and Northern Ireland, 1060–1062, 1062, 1068 and sports, 997–998, 999–1000 Irian Jaya, 1734 Irish National Land League, 653–654 Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, 1185 Irving, Washington, 389 Isabella of Castile, 709 Islam and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1694 and Arab nationalism, 731, 733 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and the caliphate, 760–761 and India, 797 and Indonesia, 1728, 1734 and Iraq, 755, 1737, 1743–1745 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and national identity, 103–105 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763, 764 and Pakistan, 1236 and the Philippines, 1239 and politics, 983–987 in Russia, 1605–1607 and Turkey, 768, 1653–1654 See also Islamic fundamentalists; Shiism/ Shiites; Sunnis Islamic fundamentalists, 984–987, 1392, 1393, 1396–1400 and Algeria, 1101, 1102–1103 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1769 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1141–1143 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 in Turkey, 1649 Islamization, 1397–1400 Ismail, King (Egypt), 259, 260 Israel, 953, 1120–1130, 1122 (map) and counterterrorism, 1496 and diaspora populations, 1367 and education, 1387–1388 and environmental nationalism, 880 and minorities, 1374 and music, 1443 and Palestinians, 1133–1143 and religious fundamentalism, 1394, 1398, 1401–1402 and the Suez War, 266 symbols of, 114, 116 and water, 885 Isto, Edvard (Eetu), 603 (illus.) István, King (Hungary), 643

Itagaki Taisuke, 820 Italy, 663–677 and democracy, 946–947 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 426, 429, 432 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737, 740, 740 fascism in, 419, 514–516, 518–519 and film, 1333–1334 form of nationalism in, 502 and gender, 448–449 and language, 472 and the Libyan war, 514 and minorities, 1374, 1412, 1424 and music, 1437–1438, 1441 and nationalistic art, 410, 413, 414–415, 418 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and terrorism, 1491 unification (Risorgimento) of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 468, 512 Ivan the Terrible, 700 Ives, Charles, 1439 Iwakura Mission, 818–820 Izetbegovi´c, Alija, 1527 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev (Vladimir), 1123 Jacini, Stefano, 669 Jackson, A. Y., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jacobitism, 175, 233, 238, 238 Jacobsen, J. C., 154 Jacobus, Stephanus, 1149 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 92, 186 Jakobson, Carl Robert, 562 Jamaica, 495 James, C. L. R., 992, 1301 James VI (Scotland)/James I (England), 61 Jamieson, John, 239 Jammu and Kashmir, 1462, 1759–1771, 1762 (map) conflict in, 1203–1204, 1234–1235, 1235, 1465–1466 Jang Bahadur, 1807 Jangghar, 1791 Jannsen, Johann Voldemar, 562 Japan, 808–822, 811 (map), 819 (map), 821 (map), 1748–1758, 1750 (map) and Burma, 777, 784–785 and China, 791, 792, 795, 1190 colonialism and, 1462 and democracy, 947 education and, 38, 40, 424, 426 and gender, 445, 450, 456 and India, 806 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language, 472, 478 and the Meiji Restoration, 27 and Mongolia, 1792, 1795, 1796 and music, 1439–1440, 1441 nationalism and literature in, 491–492 origins of nationalism in, 9

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Japan (continued ) and politics, 988 and religion, 106–107 and sports, 1001 and Taiwan, 1250, 1251 and terrorism, 1491 Jargalsaikhan, D., 1794 Jarl, Birger, 226 Järnefelt, Eero, 605 Jefferson, Thomas, 22, 32, 65, 211, 370, 387, 388 Jesuits, 350–351 Jews and Austria, 546 in the Baltic states, 563 in Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and the Diaspora, 1366, 1367 as discredited sexuality, 907 and Egypt, 265, 266 and establishment of Israel, 1402 ethnic cleansing and genocide in Russia, 438 and Germany, 188, 193, 430 and the Holocaust, 439–440, 523 and Hungary, 644, 645 in Iraq, 755–756 in Macedonia and Thrace during the Holocaust, 582 and the Netherlands, 199 and pogroms in Ukraine, 722 and Poland, 207, 209 in Romania, 1594 and Switzerland, 249 in Turkey, 1649 in the United States, 1398, 1400 See also Anti-Semitism; Israel; Judaism Jibzundamba Khutugtu, Eighth, 1788, 1792 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 804, 976, 1229, 1230, 1230–1231, 1233, 1461 Joergensen, A. D., 152, 154 Jogaila (Lithuanian prince), 564 John, King (England), 165 John Paul II, Pope, 948, 988 Johnson, Barry, 1399 Johnson, James, 73 Johnson, Lyndon, 944, 1310 Johnson, Samuel, 60 Johnston, Frank, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jones, Aneurin, 1637 Jones, Inigo, 61 Joseph II (Austria-Hungary), 138, 140 Jospin, Lionel, 1510 Joubert, Piet, 1146 Joyce, James, 489, 658, 914, 923, 924 Juan Carlos I, King (Spain), 1087 Judaism and fundamentalism (Ultra-Orthodoxy), 1124, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1400–1403 and national identity, 103 See also Jews Juliana, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Júnior, Caio Prado, 292

Kabila, Joseph, 1165 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 1165 Kagame, Paul, 1674 Kalaallit. See Greenland Kalevala, The, 227, 228, 406, 599, 602, 604 Kallay, Benjamin von, 1529 Kalmyks, 1784, 1790–1791, 1792, 1794–1795 Kamenev, Lev, 520 Kamil, Husayn, 262 Kamil, Mustafa, 261 Kangxi, Emperor, 1252 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 17, 86, 87–88, 533, 1352 Kaplan, Robert, 929 Karaites (Karaim), 557 Karamzin, Nikolai, 94 Karavelov, Luben, 573 Karel IV, king of Bohemia, 592 Karelia, 599, 600, 608 Karlsbad Decrees, 187, 189 Karmal, Babrak, 1687 Karnaviˇcus, Jurgis, 560 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 638 Karzai, Ahmed Wali, 1694 (illus.) Karzai, Hamid, 1686, 1695 Kasavubu, Joseph, 1158 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kasparov, Gary, 951 Katanga, 1158, 1469 Kaunitz, Chancellor (Austria), 33–34 Kayibanda, Gregoire, 1677 Kazakhs, 1798 Kazakhstan, 1079, 1798 Kazimierz (Casimir) III (Prussia), 214 Keane, John, 1446, 1456 Kedourie, Elie, 474, 533 Keller, Ferdinand, 413 Kellerman, François, 1504 Kelly, Edward “Ned,” 857, 857 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 451, 633, 767–770, 1643, 1646–1647, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653 and Turkish identity, 766 Kemal, Namik, 763, 763, 766, 770, 774 Kemboi, Ezekiel, 1001 Kennan, George C., 945 Kennedy, John F., 944 Kent, William, 62 Kenya education and, 429 and literature, 919–920, 925–926 and music, 1440, 1441 Kenyatta, Jomo, 965 Kerber, Linda, 50 Kerkorian, Kirk, 1707 Key, Francis Scott, 117, 1443 Keyser, Rudolf, 228 Khachaturian, Aram, 1707 Khalifat Movement, 1763 Khan, Abatai, 1791 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 1236 Khan, Altan, 1817

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Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 1786, 1786, 1791, 1798, 1816 Khan, Dayan, 1786 Khan, Ishaq, 1232 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1232 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 801 Khan, Yahya, 1232 Khan, Yaqub, 1690–1691 Khan Khattak, Khushal, 1690 Khatami, Mohammad, 1117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 952, 986, 1111, 1114, 1396, 1397, 1399, 1400 Khomiakov, A. S., 692 Khorenatsi, Movses, 1702, 1708 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 948, 952, 979, 1076, 1077, 1603 Khutugtu, Jibzundamba, 1790 Khyvliovyi, Mykola, 718 Kidd, Benjamin, 532 Kierkegaard, Søren, 228 Kim Dae Jung, 1779 Kim Il Sung, 952, 1773, 1779–1781, 1780 Kim Jong Il, 1780 Kincaid, Jamaica, 924 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 123, 938, 1203, 1304 King, Michael, 869 King, Rodney, 1339 King, Sir Frederic Truby, 871 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 306 Kireevskii, I. V., 692 Kiribati, 1443 Kissinger, Henry, 458 Kivi, Aleksis, 602 Kjellén, Rudolf, 460, 463, 491 Klaus, Václav, 1027, 1028 Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 1504 Klingler, Werner, 133 Knudsen, Knud, 225–226 Kochanowski, Jan, 214 Kodály, Zoltán, 81, 1432, 1435 Kohl, Helmut, 1549 Kohn, Hans, 23, 392, 474 Koidula, Lydia, 564 Koirala, B. P., 1803, 1807 Koizumi, Prime Minister (Japan), 1755 Kolberg, Oskar, 216 Köler, Johann, 564 Kolettis, Ioannis, 632 Kollár, Jan, 592 Kołła˛taj, Hugo, 211 Kollontai, Alexandra, 453, 454 Konovalets, Yevhen, 718 Kopernik, Mikołaj (Nicholas Copernicus), 214 Korais, Adamantios, 626, 628, 628 Korchynsky, Dmytro, 1628 Korea, 1467, 1772–1781, 1774 (map) education and, 424 and independence, 1462 and Japan, 809, 810, 815, 818, 1749 and sports, 1001

Koreans, in Japan, 1753 Körner, Theodor, 73 Korppi-Tommola, Aura, 54 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 96, 211, 211, 214, 686 Kosovo, 1409, 1554, 1555 Kossuth, Lajos, 638, 643 Kossuth, Louis, 239 Kostecki, Platon, 716 Koyama Eizo, 822 Kozyrev, Andrei, 1597 Kracauer, Siegfried, 1330–1331 Kramáˇr, Karel, 590 Krasicki, Ignacy, 214 Krasi´nski, Zygmunt, 212, 214, 216 Kraszewski, Józef Ignacy, 216–217, 685 Kravchuk, Leonid, 1078, 1597, 1621, 1622, 1626 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhard, 564, 567 Krieck, Wilhelm, 426 Kronvalds, Atis, 1577 Kruger, Paul, 1146, 1150–1151 Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 453, 454 Kuchma, Leonid, 1080, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1628 Kun, Béla, 520 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 1079 Kunchov, Vasil, 580 Kurds and European partition, 891–893 and Iraq, 752–753, 755, 756, 1737, 1741–1742, 1745 and terrorism, 1491 and Turkey, 769, 885, 1646, 1650, 1653, 1655 Kushner, Barak, 822 Kutuzov, Dmitrii, 696 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 1074 Kuwait, 1743 Kuyper, Abraham, 200, 1149 Kymlicka, Will, 97, 931 Kyoto treaty, 877, 1447, 1456, 1457 Kyrlylenko, Vyacheslav, 1626 Labor/employment and Australia, 852 and Burma, 777, 781 and England, 164 and Fiji, 1314–1315 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Iraq, 1746 and the knowledge worker, 1380 and migration, 1422, 1424 and Nigeria, 1181 shortages and ethnic cleansing/genocide, 441 slavery, 889. See also Slavery and South Africa, 1145–1146 specialization of, 130 and the United States, 1304, 1309 Ladulås, Magnus, 226 Lagarde, Pierre, 409 Lagerbring, Sven, 227 Lahiri, Jhumpa, 927 Laicism, 769

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Lal, Brij V., 1322 Lalli (Finnish hero), 604–605 Lamanskii, Vladimir, 1601 Lamas, Andrés, 402 Lamming, George, 913, 917, 924 Land ownership and Australia, 1851–1852 and Fiji, 1314, 1322 and Haiti, 338, 342 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Ireland, 648, 653 and Japan, 811–812 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1861–1863, 1862 and Paraguay, 358 and Puerto Rico, 845 and South Africa, 1151 Land rights/claims and Afghanistan, 1692 and the Baltic states, 568 and Burma, 783 and the Inuit, 1567 and new social movements, 1450, 1451–1452 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846 and the Sami, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1617 Land sacralization, 100, 103 Landes, Joan, 49 Landsbergis, Vytautus, 1078 Landscape, 59–71 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Canada, 1841 and Denmark, 154 and England, 162 and Finland, 599, 604 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127–1128, 1129 and music, 78–79 and national identity, 875–876, 1342, 1344–1345 and Russia, 698 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 228 and Switzerland, 251, 252 as symbols, 114–115 and Turkey, 770 and Ukraine, 1621 and Wales, 1633 See also Environment Lange, Christian, 228 Language, 471–484, 912–928 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1692 and Afrikaner nationalism, 1147 and Algeria, 1095, 1101 and Alsace, 1502–1503, 1509, 1510 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 733 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703 and Austria, 542 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 560, 561, 562, 563 and Basques, 704, 710–711, 1092, 1512, 1514 (map), 1516, 1522

and Belgium, 138, 141–142, 144–145, 146 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 289, 1825 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Canada, 303, 307, 1840 and Catalans, 706, 1537, 1542, 1544, 1546 and China, 1199 and cultural survival, 878–879 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1021 and Denmark, 154 dictionaries and standardizing, 477 education and, 420, 424–425, 427 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1170, 1172, 1173–1174 and Ethiopia, 741, 746 and Europe, 1031 and Fiji, 1320 and Finland, 598–599, 601, 601–602, 605–606 and France, 34, 178 and Germany, 185 and globalization, 1392 and Greece, 629–630 and Greenland, 1565, 1566, 1568, 1570–1571 and Haiti, 339 and Hungary, 641 and immigration, 1420, 1421 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723–1725, 1728 and Ireland, 657, 660 and Israel, 1124, 1127, 1129 and Italy, 665, 671 and Japan, 813 and Latvia, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1582 and Malaysia, 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 345, 346 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1796, 1798 and national boundaries, 461 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 16, 533, 1355–1356 and nationalistic music, 78, 80 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 199 and New Zealand, 1383 and Pakistan, 1233, 1235–1236 and Paraguay, 358, 364, 365 and the Philippines, 1247 and Poland, 217, 679, 688 and political philosophy, 88–89, 91 and print technology, 1475 and Puerto Rico, 841, 845 and Québec, 1291, 1293, 1296 and Romania, 1588, 1589–1591 and the Sami, 1613–1614 and Scandinavia, 225–226 and Singapore, 1224–1225 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Spain, 707

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and Switzerland, 245 and Taiwan, 1258 and Tibet, 1815, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 772–773, 1646, 1646, 1652, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 719, 719, 720, 721, 1621, 1623–1624, 1625, 1627 and the United States, 389 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 and Wales, 1632, 1634–1636, 1635, 1638 Laos, 1463 Lapage, Robert, 1294 Laporte, Pierre, 1291 Laqueur, Walter, 1489, 1498 Larrazábal, Antonio, 317 Larsson, Carl, 228 Laski, Harold, 981 Lassale, F., 38 Lastarria, José Victorino, 329 Latin America development of nationalism in, 8, 9, 16, 26, 46 and film, 1335 and language, 472 and nationalistic music, 76 and new social movements, 1450–1452 See also specific Latin American countries Latvia, 1573–1582, 1573 (map) fascism in, 517 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, 399 Lavater, Johann Kaspar, 251 Lavin, Mary, 925 Lawson, Henry, 854 Laxman, Adam, 810 Le Carre, John, 951 Le Corbusier, 1206 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1054, 1056, 1447, 1453, 1510 Le Republicain (L’Union), 341, 342 Leaders and Africa, 890 and Angola, 1661–1663, 1662 anticolonial nationalist, 962–964 and Arab nationalism, 730–731, 732, 732–733 and Argentina, 277–278 and Armenia, 1699 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532 and Canada, 306, 1837 and Central America, 317–318, 320–321 and China, 790, 794, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158, 1160 and Denmark, 153 and Egypt, 258–259 and France, 1051, 1052 and Germany, 189, 190 and Haiti, 336–337, 338 and India, 1206–1207, 1207, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1726, 1727 and Iraq, 758 Islamic attacks on Muslim, 1397–1398

and Islamic movements, 984–985 and Israel, 1121, 1123, 1123, 1128 and Japan, 818–820, 1751–1752, 1752 and Korea, 1775, 1780 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1857, 1858 and Mongolia, 1789–1790 monuments to, 410–411 and national identity, 1345 as national symbols, 114, 116 and Nepal, 1803, 1806 and new social movements, 1453 and Nigeria, 1180, 1180–1181, 1182, 1187 and Pakistan, 1230 and Palestinians, 1134, 1136–1137, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1848, 1848, 1851, 1853 and Paraguay, 364 and the Philippines, 1241–1242, 1242, 1244 and Poland, 210–212, 681–683, 682 and Puerto Rico, 839–840 qualities of, 982 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1597 and the Sami, 1616, 1616–1618 and separatist movements, 1464–1465 and Singapore, 1221 and South Africa, 1150–1151, 1152 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1075 and Taiwan, 1253 and Uruguay, 398 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Heroes/heroines League of Arab States, 729 League of Nations failure of the, 1402 and Iraq, 750, 1739 and Israel, 1123 Mandates, 728, 1461 and New Zealand, 872 Lebanon, 728 Lechner, Frank, 1392 Leclerc, Charles, 336 Leclerc de Buffon, Georges-Louis, 351 Lee, Richard Henry, 385 Lee Kuan Yew, 1220, 1221 Lee Teng-hui, 1253, 1253–1254, 1255, 1256, 1258, 1259 Legal system/institutions and Central America, 314, 315, 319 and France, 174, 176 and the Netherlands, 202 and Scandinavia, 227 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 254 Legitimacy and Angola, 1666 and Chinese communists, 1196, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1370–1371 and ideologies and religions, 972–973 and Iran, 1109

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Legitimacy (continued ) and modern nation-states, 930 and national sports, 998–999 and North versus South Korea, 1776, 1778–1779 and the Qing Dynasty in China, 788 Legitime, Francois, 338 Leino, Eino, 605 Lej Iyasu, 740, 740 Lelewel, Joachim, 212, 214, 692 Lemarchand, Rene, 1676 Lemieux, Mario “The Magnificent,” 1842 Lemkin, Raphael, 436 Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov), 436, 697, 978, 981, 1072 and ethnicities, 1599 and film, 1330 on nationalism, 1071 León y Gama, Antonio de, 351, 351 Leopold I (Belgium), 142 Leopold II (Belgium), 1156 Lepeletier, L. M., 34 Lerroux, Alejandro, 710 Lesage, Jean, 1290, 1290 Lespinasse, Beauvais, 341 Lester, Richard, 1337 Lévesque, René, 1290, 1290, 1291, 1291 (illus.), 1294 Levitt, Kari, 1842 Levski, Vasil, 573, 576, 576 Levsky, Vasil, 96 Levy, Andrea, 928 Lewis, C. S., 971 Lewis, Geoffrey, 773 Lewis, Saunders, 1635 Liberalism, 14–15, 23–28, 535–536, 537 and Australia, 854 and Brazil, 1830 as detached from democracy, 1306 and European nationalism, 512–513 and Finland, 598 German, 17 and Indonesia, 1732 and Italy, 669 versus nationalism, 1350–1351. See also Nationalism, liberal and Paraguay, 364–365 and Puerto Rico, 841 and Spain, 704 See also Economic liberalism Liberties. See Rights Liborio, 1283 Libyan war, 514 Liebermann, Max, 416 Liebknecht, Karl, 520 Liechtenstein, 1443 Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 Lijphart, Arend, 206 Lilburn, Douglas, 1439 Lincoln, Abraham, 382, 391

Lindeman, Ludvig Mathias, 73 Lindsay, A. D., 536 Linguistic internationalists, 471 Lippmann, Walter, 950 Lira, Luciano, 401 Lismer, Arthur, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Lisson, Carlos, 374 List, Friedrich, 18, 191, 192, 463 Liszt, Franz, 74, 81, 1432, 1435 Literacy rates, 495–497, 496 (map) and Pakistan, 1228 Literature, 465, 485–497, 912–928 and Argentina, 278–279 and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703 Austrian, 543 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Brazil, 285, 287 and Bulgaria, 576–577 and Canada, 1841 and Catalonia, 1543 and Chile, 329, 330 and Colombia, 832 and Finland, 602, 604, 605 and France, 177, 1052 and gender, 49 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and India, 800, 1209 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1740 and Ireland, 657, 658–659 and Mongolia, 1789, 1794 and Nepal, 1807, 1808 and the Philippines, 1244–1245 and Poland, 682, 685 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavia, 228 and Scotland, 238–239 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 1075–1076, 1077, 1077 and Spain, 708 and Turkey, 763, 770 and Ukraine, 720 and the United States, 389, 951 See also Poetry Lithuania, 561 and gender/sexuality, 908 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Livingston, David, 164 Livs, 557 Localism and globalization, 1411 nationalism as, 1415 and subsidiarity, 881 See also Regionalism Loggia, Enrico Galli della, 676 Lomonosov, M. V., 694 Lönnrot, Elias, 228, 406, 599, 602 López, Carlos Antonio, 362, 363, 364

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López, Narciso, 1282 Lopez, Vicente Fidel, 276 López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 830–831, 832 Louis-Philippe, 408 Louis XVI, King (France), 1489 Louis XVIII, King (France), 1443 Louisiana Purchase, 390 Lower, Arthur, 305 Loya jirga, 1686, 1687, 1690, 1691 Lu Xun, 793 Lubbe, Marinus van der, 119 Luce, Henry, 1309 Ludendorff, Erich, 613 Lumumba, Patrice, 962–963, 1158, 1158, 1159, 1159 (illus.), 1160–1162 heroicizing of, 1164 Luther, Martin, 188, 618, 983 Luxemburg, Rosa, 520 Lyngbye, Hans Christian, 225 Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 718 MacArthur, Douglas, 1751 Macartney, C. A., 1368 Macaulay, Hebert, 1179–1180, 1180 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 165, 912 MacCunn, Hamish, 1438 MacDonald, J. E. H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Macdonald, John A., 1837 MacDowell, Edward, 76, 1438 Macedonia and Bulgaria, 580, 582 and diasporic communities, 1415 Germany and peacekeeping in, 1554 Maceo, 1275, 1282 Machado, Gerardo, 1276 Maˇciulis, Jonas, 565 Mackenzie, Alexander, 300, 1438 Mackinder, Halford, 460, 468 Maclennan, Hugh, 307 Macpherson, James, 462 Mada, Gajah, 1727 Madison, James, 386, 387, 388 Magna Carta, 165 Magnus, Olaus, 223 Magnus VI (Norway), 226 Magsaysay, Ramon, 1241, 1242 Magyarization, 644 Magyars, 587 Maharaja (of Jammu and Kashmir), 1764–1765 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, 1803, 1807–1808 Maimonides, 1402, 1403 Maistre, Joseph de, 92 Majoritarian nationalist movements, 940 Makarenko, Anton, 425, 429 Malan, Daniel François, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1151 Malawi, 1440 Malay(s), 1213–1215, 1217, 1219, 1225 as dominant culture in Malaysia, 1220–1222 and education, 1384–1385 and the Philippines, 1243

Malaysia, 1213–1225 and education, 1385–1386 and independence, 1463 and Indonesia, 1729, 1733 and natural resources, 884 Malcolm X, 965 Mâle, Emile, 415 Malthusianism, 518 Mamluks, 257–258, 259–260 Mammeri, Mouloud, 1100 Manchester, England, 161 Manchuria and independence, 1462 and Japan, 810, 818 Manchurian Incident (1931), 810, 821 Manchus, 1818 Mandela, Nelson, 995, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1488–1489 Mandukhai, Empress, 1786 Manifest destiny. See Expansionism Mann, Horace, 37 Mann, Thomas, 617 Mansell, Michael, 1848 Manzanilla, Matias, 374 Manzoni, Alessandro, 671 Mao Zedong, 948, 952, 977, 1191, 1816, 1819, 1821 economic and political programs, 1198–1199 ideology of, 978, 1194–1197, 1197 influence of, 1192–1193 Maoism, 978–979 and Angola, 1664 and Nepal, 1810–1811 Maori, 866, 1855–1863 and education, 1383 and music, 1439 and New Zealand, 873 population, 864 and the Treaty of Waitangi, 863 and the world wars, 869–870 Maps, 465 and Central America, 319–320 and Finland, 602–604 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 640 and Japan, 810 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1320, 1324 Maragall i Mira, Pasqual, 1539, 1540, 1541 (illus.) Marcinkowski, Karol, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 1241–1242, 1244, 1246 Marcos, Imelda, 1242, 1244, 1245 Margalit, A., 97 Marginalization, 935–941 Maria Theresa (Austria-Hungary), 138 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 1469 Maritz, Gerrit, 1150 Markievicz, Countess, 654 “Marseillaise,” 175 Marshall, George C., 948 Marsland, David, 114

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Martí, José, 1275, 1276, 1282, 1283 Martin, Henri, 177 Martins, Wilfred, 975 Marure, Alejandro, 319 Marx, Karl, 1–3, 17–18, 217, 1195 and gender roles, 56 and religion, 1397 on socialism versus communism, 975 Marxism, 1–3, 12 and Angola, 1661, 1662 and Arab nationalism, 730–731 and culture, 485–486 and the environment, 881 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 471 See also Communism Mas, Artur, 1539 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 585, 585, 587–588, 589, 589 (illus.), 592, 593, 1017, 1028 Masculinity, 900–901. See also Gender Mashtots, Mesrop, 1701 Mason, Lowell, 389 Masood, Ahmad Shah, 1690, 1693 Massey, Vincent, 1838 Massey, William, 869 Masur, Gerhard, 834 Matejko, Jan, 682 Mathews, Robin, 1843 Matto de Turner, Clorinda, 374 Maude, Sir Stanley, 1742 Maupassant, Guy de, 134 Maura, Antonio, 707 Maurits of Orange (the Netherlands), 196 Maurras, Charles, 533 May, Glenn, 1246 May Fourth movement, 793, 793 Mayer, Gustav, 611 Maynard, Charles Frederick, 1848 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24, 90, 94–95, 468, 502, 673, 673 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Mbundu, 1660, 1664, 1665 McCarthy, Joseph, 907–908, 944 McCubbin, Frederick, 859 McDougall, William, 530, 535 McKay, Claude, 494 McLuhan, Marshall, 129 McVeigh, Timothy, 1492 Meˇciar, Vladimir, 1026–1027 Media and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Alsace, 1509 and Armenia, 1709 and Azerbaijan, 1719 and the Baltic states, 567 and Brazil, 287 and Bulgaria, 573 and Burma, 783 and Canada, 1839 and Central America, 316, 320

and China, 1193, 1199 culture and forms of, 1474–1475 education and, 422, 433 and Egypt, 261, 262 and Eritrea, 1172 and Ethiopia, 746 and globalization, 1412 in Haiti, 341 and immigration, 1427 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iraq, 1738, 1745 and Korea, 1781 as maintaining psychological stability, 123 manipulation of, 1480–1481 and national identity, 30, 31, 38, 464–465, 486, 1473 and Nepal, 1808 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1853 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 217 and Québec, 1296 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 technological advances and, 129, 132–134, 135–136 in Turkey, 1649 and the United States, 390, 1308 See also Cinema; Literature; Newspapers; Print technology; Radio; Television Megali Idea, 632–633 Mehmed V (Ottoman Empire), 765 Mehmed VI (Ottoman Empire), 767 Meiji Restoration, 818, 1748, 1751 Meiren, Gada, 1789 Mekhitarians, 1700 Melgar, Mariano, 373 Mella, Julio Antonio, 1282, 1283 Melnyk, Andrei, 718, 1624 Melucci, Albert, 1446 Men and gendered role in conflict, 449 nationalist imagery and, 445–446 See also Gender; Masculinity Mendelssohn, Felix, 1431 Mendes, Chico, 1829 Mendes-France, Pierre, 1054 Menelik II (Ethiopia), 737, 737–740, 744 Mercantalism, 18–19 Merchants. See Bourgeoisie Mercier, Honoré, 305, 1288–1289 Merse, 1789 Mesopotamia, 748, 757–758 Messiaen, Olivier, 1434 Mestiço, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1665 Mestizaje, 349, 349, 356 Mexican-American War, 347, 352, 354, 390 Mexico, 344–356, 346 (map), 353 (map) and communications, 1475 and music, 1439 national identity and education in, 39 national radio of, 132–133

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and politics, 1414 and terrorism, 1491 Zapatista movement in, 1412, 1451–1452 Meyer, John, 1392, 1397 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 117 Michael the Brave (Romania), 1585, 1592 Michelet, Jules, 102, 177, 177–178 Mickiewicz, Adam, 212, 213, 214, 216, 686, 692 Micombero, Michel, 1677 Middle East and education, 428, 1387–1388 and European colonization, 891 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Mier, Servando Teresa de, 350, 351, 352 Migration and consolidating sovereignty, 876 globalization and international, 1414–1415 and sports, 1001–1002 See also Emigration; Immigrants/immigration Mikhalkov, Sergei, 1602 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 722 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 683 Military and Algeria, 1100 and Angola, 1667 and Armenia, 1710 and Brazil, 1827, 1828–1829, 1830–1831, 1832 and Burma, 781 and China, 790 and Ethiopia, 740 and Fiji, 1314, 1324 and gender/sexuality, 903, 910 and Germany, 620, 621 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726 interventions and terrorism, 1497 and Iraq, 751, 753, 1743, 1745 and Ireland, 661 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1748–1749, 1752 music, 1430, 1431 and New Zealand, 868–869 and Nigeria, 1185, 1188 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Russia, 955 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1679, 1680 and Spain, 703, 705, 706 technology, 1473 and Turkey, 1646, 1647 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 57 Mill, John Stuart, 19, 57, 85, 95, 527 and cosmopolitanism, 1356 Miller, Ferdinand von, 416 Mindaugas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Minghetti, Marco, 669 Minin, Kuz’ma, 700, 1602 Minorities and Afghanistan, 1689–1690, 1692–1693, 1694 in the Baltic states, 557

and Basques, 1516–1517 and Bulgaria, 580–582 and Burma, 781 and China, 1193, 1199–1200 and citizenship, 1374 and Colombia, 833 and concerns about cultural survival, 878–879 cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and, 1356, 1357–1362 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and demands for rights, 932–933, 936–941. See also Rights and discrimination, 1420, 1425. See also Discrimination/prejudice education and, 419, 422, 427, 429–430, 431, 432 and the environment, 882 and Ethiopia, 741 and Germany, 617 globalization and mobilization of, 1412–1413, 1414 and Hungary, 639, 644 and India, 976, 1203 and Indonesia, 1728–1729 and Iran, 1112–1113, 1117–1118 and Iraq, 1741–1742 and Israel, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and Japan, 1753, 1756, 1758 and Latvia, 1575 and the legacies of colonialism, 894 and Malaysia, 1463 marginalization in modern states of, 931–932 and Mongolia, 1798 and nationalist ideologies, 513 and Nepal, 1804, 1809–1810 and new social movements, 1448, 1453, 1457, 1458 and New Zealand, 866–867 and Nigeria, 1182–1183 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and Poland, 683, 685, 687 and Romania, 1587, 1591, 1593–1594 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672 and state terrorism, 1488 and Turkey, 1648–1651, 1654–1655 and Ukraine, 1625 and the United States, 1307, 1308 and Vietnam, 1271 and Wales, 1636 See also Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Genocide; Language Missionary activity, 480 Mistral, Frédéric, 477 Mitre, Bartolomé, 276, 279 Mitterrand, François, 458, 1051–1052, 1054 Mixed race descent and Brazil, 293 and Central America, 311 and Paraguay, 358

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I-40 Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga), 1158–1159, 1160, 1161, 1162–1165 Modarres, Hassan, 1114 Modernization and Afghanistan, 1686, 1688 and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Australia, 853–854 and China, 792, 1191–1192, 1197, 1198–1199, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1372 and Ethiopia, 740–741 and film, 1337 and Greece, 625, 630 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Italy, 669–670 and Japan, 1753 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 as necessitating the nation-state, 930–932 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Spain, 705, 705, 706 and Turkey, 771 Moe, Jørgen, 228 Mohammad, Mahathir bin, 1223–1224 Mohammed, Murtala Ramat, 1186, 1187, 1187 Mohaqeq, Mohammad, 1695 Moldavia/Moldova, 469, 1414 Molina, Felipe, 319 Molina, Pedro, 315, 316 Molotov, Viacheslav, 1077 Moluccans, 1491 Monarchy and France, 169–171 and Great Britain, 1007–1008, 1008 Mondlane, Eduardo, 1661 Mongolia, 1783–1799 and independence, 1818, 1819 Mongols, and Tibet, 1816–1817 Moniuszko, Stanisław, 74, 216, 686 Monnet, Jean, 1034 Montcalm, Louis de, 299 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, 62–64, 171, 529 Montevideo, 395–396, 397, 402 Montgomerie, Archibald William, 235 Montilla Aguilera, José, 1539, 1541 Montúfar, Manuel, 319 Monuments, 117–120 and Algeria, 1102 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 294–295 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 594, 1024–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Germany, 618, 619 and Indonesia, 1732, 1733, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Ireland, 659 and Japan, 1754–1755

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and Latvia, 1580 and Mongolia, 1798 and national identity, 1342, 1345–1347 and nationalism, 408, 409, 410–412, 414–415, 417 and Nigeria, 1187 and rituals of belonging, 502, 504 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1603 Scottish, 239 and Turkey, 774 Mora, José María Luis, 352 Mora, Juan Rafael, 315, 318 Moral Majority, 1395, 1446 Morality and cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, 1351–1353, 1356–1357 and Cuba, 1283 and gender and sexuality issues, 447, 899, 908–909 and national character, 531 U.S. idealistic, 944 See also Values Moravia, 584 Morazán, Francisco, 318 Moreno, Manuel, 398 Moro, Aldo, 676 Moroccan crises, 514 Morocco, 1096–1097, 1464 Moros, 1243 Moscow Declaration, 548 Moscow metro, 134 Mosley, Oswald, 516 Mossadegh, Muhammad, 1109, 1109, 1111, 1114 Mosse, George, 905 Motoori Norinaga, 815 Mott, Lucretia, 53, 57 Motz, Friedrich, 191 Mount Ararat, 1702 Mount Rushmore, 134 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 1765 Mourer, Jean-Pierre, 1509 Mozambique, 968, 1464 Mubarak, Hosni, 985 Muhammad V, 1464 Mujahideen, 1687, 1688, 1693 Mukhtar, Mahmud, 264 Mulgan, Alan, 868 Müller, Adam, 92, 463 Multiculturalism and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 1826 and Canada, 1838, 1840, 1843 and education, 1379, 1382–1384, 1386 and Fiji, 1325 as a form of nationalism, 934, 935 and globalization, 1411–1412 and Great Britain, 1011–1013 and immigration, 1367

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and India, 1765 and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 1784 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and the Netherlands, 206 and Poland, 685 and Romania, 1589 and Singapore, 1224 as solution to minority demands, 933, 939 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 1306 Multilateralism, 877, 881 Multinationality, 1358 Munch, P. A., 228 Munich Conference, 595 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 840, 841, 845, 846 Muñoz Rivera, Luis, 839, 841 Museums, 31 and the Baltic states, 560 and France, 1053 in Germany, 1558 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Latvia, 1578 and nationalistic art, 412–414 and Scandinavia, 229 Musharraf, Pervez, 1232 Music, 72–83, 1430–1445 and Angola, 1665 Baltic folk songs, 561, 567 and Basques, 1522 and Brazil, 1826 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Finland, 600, 605 folk songs and nationalistic, 417 and France, 1053 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569–1570 in Indonesia, 1479 and Israel, 1127, 1128 and Italy, 671 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and national identity, 31, 132–133, 407 and Paraguay, 364, 365 and Poland, 214, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 songs in Denmark, 154 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637 See also Anthem, national Musical instruments, 1440–1441, 1442 Muslim Brotherhood, 984–986, 1396

Muslim League, 801, 804, 806, 976, 1761 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171 and Pakistan, 1230, 1231 Muslims and Egypt, 265 and India, 801, 803, 804, 806, 1203, 1209 and the Netherlands, 202 See also Islam Musset, Alfred de, 177 Mussolini, Benito, 448–449, 514–516, 518, 667, 670, 676 and Roman history, 674 Mussolini, Vittorio, 1334 Mussorgsky, Modest, 75, 75 (illus.), 78, 82, 1437 Nadim, Abdullah, 261 Nadir Shah, Mohammed, 1686, 1688 Nagorno-Karabakh. See Gharabagh conflict Naguib, Muhammad, 266 (illus.) Nagy, Imre, 978 Naipaul, V. S., 924 Nairn, Tom, 933 Naji, Dr., 1740 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1687 Napier, Theodore, 242 Napoleon, Louis, 197 Napoleon III, 407, 1443 Napoleonic Civil Code, 174, 176 Napoleonic wars, 463 and Central America, 317 and Germany, 186, 618–619 music and resistance in the, 73 as stirring nationalism, 14, 16, 26, 46 Nariño, Antonio, 831 Naruszewicz, Adam, 214 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 687 Nassef, Malak Hifni, 450 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 265–266, 266 (illus.), 730, 890, 964, 1396 and the Bandung Conference, 962 and pan-Arabism, 965, 982 Nation-building, 929–941 National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), 235, 235, 241 National character, 527–537. See also Culture; Identity National Socialism, 419, 422, 513, 514, 517–519. See also Nazism Nationalism defining, 4–5, 85, 1351 ethnic-genealogical versus civic-territorial, 1353–1354 forms of, 5–12, 934–935 and geopolitics, 458–469 as an ideological political project, 875 imperative and imaginary forms of, 501–503 and language, 473, 482–484. See also Language as a legitimating ideology, 436 liberal, 488–490, 1355–1359, 1362

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Nationalism (continued ) and masculinity, 900–901 origins of, 473–474 particularistic, 90–94 versus patriotism, 45 perversions of, 512–525 religious, 100–101. See also Religion technological, 1478 transnational, 1407, 1414–1415 universalistic culture-based, 88–90 See also Identity; Philosophy, political; Politics Nativism, 883 Natsir, Mohammed, 965 Natsugdorji, D., 1794 Natural resources and Azerbaijan, 1714 and Brazil, 283, 1827–1828, 1832 and Canada, 1842 and conflict, 883–886 and India, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 877 and the Philippines, 1247 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1671 and Scandinavia, 221 and Wales, 1632 Nau, Emile, 341 Naumovych, Ivan, 716 Navarra, 1516, 1517, 1523 Nazism and Austria, 545, 546, 550, 552 and Czechoslovakia, 592 education and, 426 and the environment, 882 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438–440, 523, 622 and expansionism, 621 and film, 1331 and gender, 454–456 on German national character, 533 and Iran, 1110–1111 and language, 481 and music, 1431 nationalism of, 1353 propaganda of, 133–134 and rituals of belonging, 505, 507–508 and sexuality, 907 Ndadaye, Melchior, 1673, 1679 Negritude movement, 488, 918–919 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 981, 1207, 1461, 1761, 1764, 1765, 1766 and the Bandung Conference, 961, 962, 1206 and the Dalai Lama, 1820 economic policies of, 1206 and Indian federalism, 1205 and the nonaligned movement, 982 Nehru, Motilal, 1207 Nejedlý, Zdenˇek, 1023–1024 Nekrasov, N. A., 694

Nelson, Lord Horatio, 164 Neo-fascism, 525, 974 Neo-Nazis and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557, 1558 and the Soviet Union, 1078 Neo-Stalinism, 1077–1078 Neoliberalism, in education, 1381–1382 Neorealism, 1333–1335, 1336, 1337 Nepal, 1800–1811, 1802 (map) Netherlands, the, 195–206, 201 (map), 202 (illus.) and Belgium, 141–142 and Brazil, 283–284 and colonialism, 1479 education and, 34, 429 fascism in, 516 and immigration, 1420 and Indonesia, 1463, 1723, 1733, 1734 and Japan, 809, 810 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 and music, 1443 national anthem, 117 and Taiwan, 1252 and technology, 1480 and terrorism, 1486–1487, 1491 See also Afrikaner nationalism Neto, Agostinho, 1661–1662, 1662 Nevskii, Aleksandr, 696, 700 New France, 1288 New Guinea, 852 New Zealand, 862–873, 864 (map) and education, 1382, 1383 and the Maori, 1855–1863 and music, 1439, 1441 and sports, 993 Newspapers and Algeria, 1103 and Arab nationalism, 752 and Australia, 854 and Colombia, 833 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and Iraq, 1740, 1745 and Irish resistance, 918 and Japan, 816, 817 in Latvia, 1576 and nationalism, 1473, 1475–1476 and Nigeria, 1179, 1181 and Québec, 1296 and the Sami, 1613 and Wales, 1639 Ngata, Sir Apirana, 1858, 1859 Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, 1818 Ng˜ ug˜ı wa Thiong’o, 913, 915, 919–920, 925–926 Niagara Falls, 134 Nibelungenlied, 406 Nicaragua and national identity, 321 symbols of, 319 and William Walker, 318

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Niceforo, Alfredo, 672 Nicholas I, Czar (Russia), 210, 690–692 Nicholas II, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Nicholls, David, 341 Nichols, Terry, 1492 Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn, 214 Nietzsche, F., 10 Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 205 Nigeria, 1177–1189, 1178 (map) Biafran secessionist movement in, 967 education and, 424 and literature, 920 Nightingale, Florence, 164 Nitze, Paul, 950 Nixon, Richard, 1039, 1395 Nkrumah, Kwame, 962, 964, 965, 980, 1161 Noble, Paul, 734 Nolan, Sidney, 857 Nolte, Ernst, 515 Nonaligned movement, 961, 969, 982 and Algeria, 1095 and Cuba, 1285 and India, 1206 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 944, 1359–1361, 1412 and Brazil, 1830 and Fiji, 1322 and new social movements, 1453 Nora, Pierre, 121–122, 1343 Nordau, Max, 416 Nordraak, Rikard, 230 North America and immigration, 1421, 1425 and terrorism, 1494 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1294, 1407, 1412, 1451 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 943, 974, 1532–1533 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Germany, 1549, 1555 and international interventions, 1409 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Russia, 1604 and Turkey, 774 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 1303 North Borneo (Sabah), 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 North Korea, 977, 1757. See also Korea Northern Ireland, 1014–1015, 1058–1068 conflict in, 1470–1471 and counterterrorism, 1496 symbols in, 113 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1492 Norway, 220–222 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 229–230 and gender, 450 independence and, 223–225, 231 and language, 225–226, 472, 477

and music, 1432, 1436–1437 national anthem, 230, 230 national identity and culture of, 226–228 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1617 Notari, Elvira, 1327 Nourrit, Adolphe, 144 Novalis, 92 Nuclear weapons/energy and India, 1210, 1236 and Iran, 1117, 1117 and Pakistan, 1235, 1236 Nunavut, 1562 Núñez, Rafael, 828 Nussbaum, Martha, 97 Nyerere, Julius, 890, 962, 964, 980–981 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 1186, 1188 O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth, 133 Öcalan, Abdullah, 1655 Oceania, and language, 478 O’Connell, Daniel, 658, 920 O’Connor, T. P., 654 O’Donoghue, Lowitja, 1848 O’Dowd, Bernard, 853 Oehlenschläger, Adam, 67–69, 70, 228 O’Faolain, Sean, 925 Oge, Vincent, 335 Ogi´nski, Michał, 215–216 O’Gorman, Edmundo, 354 O’Higgins, Bernardo, 272, 326 Ohmae, Kenichi, 929 Oil/gas and Algeria, 1095 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Armenia, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1715, 1719–1721 and Canada, 1837 and Egypt, 729 and Iran, 1109, 1111 and Iraq, 755, 756, 1742, 1746 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 Oirat Mongols, 1797–1798 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 1185, 1185 Okinawa, 1757 Olav II (Norway), 226 O’Leary, Juan, 365 Olympic Games, 991, 994 O’Neill, Onora, 97 Onn, Hussein, 1223 Oommen, T. K., 1393 Opera, 79–80 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 Oral traditions, and the Sami, 1615. See also Folk culture Orange Free State, 1145 Organicism, 462–464 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1033, 1380, 1706 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 1095, 1742

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Oribe, Manuel, 275, 399 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 667 Ortega y Gasset, José, 704, 705, 707, 707 Orwell, George, 995 O’Shea, Katherine, 651 Oslo Accords, 1137, 1141 Ossian, 237 Otero, Mariano, 354 Otto of Wittelsbach, Prince, 631 Ottoman Empire, 760–767 and Algeria, 1097 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 734 and Armenia, 1704, 1704 and Armenian genocide, 522–523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Bulgaria, 571, 573, 577 collapse of the, 891 and Egypt, 258–259 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 436, 437–438 and Greece, 623–625 and India, 801 and Iraq, 748–749, 1737, 1739, 1742 and language, 472, 482 religion and the, 101–102 and Turkey, 1643, 1645 Ottomanism, 761–763, 764, 766, 768 Overdetermination, 120–121 Ovimbundu, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1664 Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 682, 682, 683, 683 (illus.) Padmore, George, 1179, 1301 Page, Thomas Nelson, 494–495 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 952, 986, 1109, 1111, 1114, 1396–1397 coronation ceremony of, 1114–1115 and minorities, 1113 Pahlavi, Reza, 986, 1110–1111, 1114 Paine, Thomas, 162, 370 Paisii, Father, 571 Paisley, Ian, 1065 Pakistan, 976–977, 1227–1237, 1228 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1689 creation of, 1201–1203, 1461–1462 and India, 950 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1767, 1768–1769, 1771 and religion, 107 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 and terrorism, 1488 and water, 885 Palach, Jan, 1026, 1028 Palacký, František, 96, 587, 594 Palais de Justice, Belgium, 143 (illus.), 144 Palestine, 1132–1143, 1134 (map) and Arab nationalism, 729 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1387

and Israel, 1120–1121 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1492 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 1137, 1140–1142 Palestinians and European partition, 891–893 and Israel, 1125, 1129–1130 Pamuk, Orhan, 1649 Pan-Aboriginalism, 1844–1853 Pan-Africanism, 965, 1161, 1179 Pan-Arabism, 965, 981, 982 and Iraq, 1740–1741, 1743 Pan-ethnic identities, 939 Pan-Germanism, and Austria, 544, 545 Pan-Islamism, 965 and Egypt, 261 and Turkey, 1645 Pan-Mongolian nationalism, 1790, 1792–1793 Pan-nationalist movements, 964–965, 980 Pan-Slavism, 93–94 and Russia, 20 and the Soviet Union, 946 Pan-Turkism, 764–765 Panama, and Colombia, 828, 829, 830 Pancasila, 953, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1731, 1732 Panchayat system, 1803, 1807–1808 Panchen Lama, 1821 Pandita, Zaya, 1791 Pankhurst, Christabel, 453 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 453 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 300, 306, 1288, 1292 Paraguay, 358–366, 359 (map) and Argentina, 275 Paraguayan War, 296, 359–360, 360, 362, 363 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 472, 1790 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and Hungary, 640 Parizeau, Jacques, 1201, 1297 Park Chung Hee, 1778, 1780 Parkes, Henry, 852 Parlacen, 316 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 649, 649 (illus.), 651, 651, 653–654 Parry, Hubert, 1438 Parry, Joseph, 1438 Parsons, T., 1399 Pashtuns, 1688–1689, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1693 Pasternak, Boris, 1074 Pastoral ideal, 251 Pat, Joe, 1853 Patel, A. D., 1318, 1319 Paterson, “Banjo,” 854 Pátria, and Brazil, 285–287, 288, 295 Patriarca, Silvana, 52 Patriotism and Austria, 553 and China, 1195 and France, 172 Iraq and local, 752

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and Mongolia, 1794 and national symbols, 1347 versus nationalism, 45 and Nigeria, 1186–1187 and political philosophy, 86, 91 and the Soviets, 945 and sports, 997 and the United States, 1308 Päts, Konstantin, 560, 565, 568 Patten, Jack, 1851 Paulin, Tom, 925 Pauw, Corneille de, 351 Paz, Octavio, 345–346 Peace movements, 1447–1448 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 183 Péan, Pierre, 1052 Pearse, Padraic, 449 Pearse, Patrick, 652, 918, 919, 922 Pearson, Karl, 532 Pearson, Lester B., 1838, 1839, 1840 Pearson, Noel, 1848 Peck, Raoul, 1674 Peckinpah, Sam, 1337 Pedro I, Emperor (Brazil), 289, 290, 294, 296 Pedro II, Emperor (Brazil), 290–291, 291 (illus.), 293, 296 Pelletier, Gerard, 1290 Penderecki, Krzysztof, 1434 Peres, Shimon, 1400, 1488–1489 Performance, and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 Perkins, Charles, 1846, 1848, 1851 Perlee, Kh., 1794 Perón, Juan Domingo, 278, 281, 942 Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita), 278 Perry, Matthew, 809 Persia, 1106–1107, 1700. See also Iran Peru, 367–379, 369 (map) and Colombia, 830 independence and, 272 and terrorism, 1491 Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 371–372 Pestalozzi, J. H., 34, 36 Pétain, Marshall, 1052 Peter the Great, 8, 20, 105, 696, 700 Peterloo Massacre, 163 Peters, Janis, 1575 Petion, Alexandre Sabes, 337, 340 Pham Van Dong, 963 Philip II (Netherlands), 196 Philippines, 1238–1248, 1240 (map) and gender, 450 and independence, 1462 separatist movements in, 1468 and terrorism, 1495 Philips, Caryl, 927 Phillips, Jock, 869 Philosophy, political, 85–97 and defining national identity, 474–476 and fascism, 514–517 and France, 171–172

and geopolitics, 460–464, 466–467 and Lenin, 1072 and national character, 527–537 and post-World War II France, 1052 postcolonial nationalist, 957–970 and Scotland, 234 See also Cosmopolitanism; Ideology Phuc Anh Gia Long, 1263 Picasso, Pablo, 1519 Pierrot, Jean Louis, 337 Pikul, Valentin, 1077 Piłsudski, Józef, 681, 682, 682, 683, 685, 687 Pinochet, Augusto, 331 Pinochet Le-Brun, Tancredo, 330 Pius IX, Pope, 665 Place names and Afghanistan, 1692 and Basque Country, 1513 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Turkey, 1652 Plato, 529 Platt Amendment, 1277, 1282 Poetry Chilean, 324–326 and Finland, 599 and forming national identities, 31, 32 and Greenland, 1570 and Japan, 491–492 and landscape, 67–69 and language, 78 and Latvia, 1577 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and Nepal, 1808 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 213, 214, 686 and Uruguay, 401 Pogge, Thomas, 97 Pogroms. See Genocide Poland, 207–218, 210 (map), 678–688, 679 (map) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and gender, 53 hostility toward German-speaking minority in, 522 Kingdom of, 209–210 and Lithuania, 558, 561, 562–563, 563 nationalism and literature in, 492–493 partition and, 21–22, 207, 209 and the Soviet Union, 948, 950 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716 uprisings against Russia in, 46 Poland-Lithuania, 207, 209, 212–213 Poles in the Baltic states, 563 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440 and Germany, 617, 1557 Political participation and Finland, 601 and France, 174

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Political participation (continued ) and gender, 46, 49–50, 53 and Germany, 620–621 and Japan, 812, 813 and Nigeria, 1188 and Northern Ireland, 1059 See also Voting franchise Political power and Afghanistan, 1685, 1686, 1686–1688 and Angola, 1666 and Armenia, 1710 and the Baltic states, 560 and Chile, 324 and China, 792 collapse of socialism and struggles for, 895–896 and Fiji, 1317 and Finland, 606 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iraq, 756–757, 1739, 1741, 1745. See also Clientelism, Iraq and and Malaysia, 1220–1223 and nationalist movements, 940 and newly independent states, 966, 967–968, 969 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Spain, 707 and the United States, 385 and Uruguay, 399 Political system. See Government(s) Politics and Afghanistan, 1686–1687, 1689–1690 and Algeria, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101 and Alsace, 1507–1509, 1508, 1509, 1510 and Angola, 1660, 1661, 1665–1666 and Arab nationalism, 728–731 and Argentina, 271, 275, 280–281 and Armenia, 1703, 1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711 and Austria, 544–546, 548–553 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1515, 1516, 1517–1519, 1521–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1535 and Brazil, 1827 and Burma, 777–780, 783–785 and Catalonia, 1539, 1539–1541 and Central America, 316–317 and China, 791–792, 793, 794 and Colombia, 827–828, 832, 833 and communications technology, 1480 and Cuba, 1275–1276, 1277, 1285–1286 and Czechoslovakia, 1017–1019 Danish, 150–151 and Egypt, 260, 261, 265 and England, 161, 162–163 and the environment, 876–877, 882–883 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171, 1172–1175 and Fiji, 1319, 1320–1322 and Finland, 605–606 and France, 178–179, 1054

geopolitics and legitimizing, 465 and Germany, 190–191, 611, 613, 620–621, 1552–1557, 1555, 1557, 1558 and Great Britain, 1011 and Greece, 628–629 and Haiti, 337–338 and Hungary, 638, 639, 641–644, 643 and hypernationalism, 1389 and the ideology of nationalism, 875 and immigration, 1427 and India, 798–802, 987, 1206–1207, 1207, 1208, 1209–1210, 1461–1462, 1763 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726, 1730 and international migration, 1414–1415 and Iran, 1109–1112, 1117 and Iraq, 754, 755, 1745–1746 and Ireland, 649–657 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 667–671, 676–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764–1765, 1768–1771 and Japan, 988, 1751, 1752, 1757 and Korea, 1780 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 and Malaysia, 1216–1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1857, 1858–1860, 1862 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1789 and Nepal, 1810–1811 and the Netherlands, 205–206 and new social movements, 1446, 1453, 1455–1456, 1458 and Nigeria, 1179–1183, 1185 and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1062–1063, 1064–1065, 1066, 1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, 1850–1853 and Peru, 372–373 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 213–214, 681–685, 687 post-World War II, 973–976 and Puerto Rico, 837, 839–840, 844–847 and Québec, 1288–1289, 1290–1292 and religion, 982–989, 1064, 1112, 1394, 1395–1396 and Romania, 1586–1587, 1587, 1589 and Russia, 1597, 1597–1599, 1604, 1605 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678–1679 and the Sami, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616 and Scandinavian nationalism, 228–231 and Scotland, 241–242, 1014 and South Africa, 1147–1149, 1148, 1152–1153 Soviet, 979 and Spain, 702–703, 709–711, 1086 and Switzerland, 250 and Turkey, 1645, 1654 and Ukraine, 718, 1621, 1622–1629, 1623, 1624, 1626, 1629 and the United States, 387–388, 389, 391, 1304, 1306

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and Uruguay, 398–399 and Wales, 1014, 1633, 1633–1635, 1639–1640 See also Government(s); Ideology; Leaders; Political power Pomare, Maui, 869 Ponce de Leon, Ernesto, 1375 Poniatowski, Józef, 211, 686 Poniatowski, Stanisław August, 210, 215 Popławski, Jan Ludwik, 681, 683 Popper, Karl, 534 Population and Algeria, 1096, 1098 and Argentina, 269, 277, 280 and Armenia, 1699 and Australia, 851–852, 1382 and Brazil, 1825, 1831 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 1836 and Central America, 311 and Colombia, 829 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Fiji, 1314 and France, 1054–1055 and Germany, 190 and Gharabagh, 1706 and Haiti, 333, 336 and Indonesia, 1723 and Israel, 1121 and Latvia, 1574 and Mexico, 346 and the Middle East, 885 and Native Americans, 893 and New Granada, 826 and New Zealand, 864, 865, 868 and Nigeria, 967 and Paraguay, 360 and the Philippines, 1247 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Russia, 1604 and the Sami, 1609 and Turkey, 1645 and Uruguay, 402 U.S., 1836 See also Ethnicity; Immigrants/immigration; Migration Population transfers. See Migration Populism, 281, 643 Porter, Jane, 239 Portugal and Angola, 1666 and Brazil, 282, 283–285, 287–289, 293 and colonialism, 889, 1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 and geopolitics, 465 and immigration, 1424 and language, 472 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397

Post-nationalism and Germany, 1555 and globalization, 1406, 1408–1410, 1411 See also Multilateralism; Transnationalism Poster, Mark, 1476 Potatau Te Wherowhero, 1856 Potocki, Ignacy, 211 Poujade, Pierre, 1054 Poverty and Brazil, 1831 and Fiji, 1322 and Pakistan, 1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 and the United States, 1308 See also Income distribution Powell, Adam Clayton, 962 Powell, Enoch, 1013 Power. See Political power Pozharsky, Dmitry, 700, 1602 Prague, 584–585 Prague Spring, 1025, 1026 Prat de la Riba, Enric, 706 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Premchad, 923 Press. See Media Pretorius, Marthinus, 1146 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 516, 705, 706, 709 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 516 Primrose, Archibald Philip, 242 Print technology, 127, 129 and Armenia, 1701 and diaspora populations, 1370 and India, 796 and Japan, 1749 and language, 479, 485 and national identity, 1474, 1475 See also Newspapers Prithvi Narayan Shah, 1803, 1803–1804, 1804, 1806 Pro-natalist policies, 878 Propaganda and Angola, 1665-1666 the arts and, 83, 176 and Australia, 1852-1853 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306 and China, 952, 1193, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 1020, 1025 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and ethnic cleansing, 441 and Germany, 186 and Greenland, 1571 and Indonesia, 1727, 1734 and Iran, 1115, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 758 and Italy, 667, 674 and Korea, 1781 and the Jacobins, 31 and Japan, 817, 818

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Propaganda (continued ) and Nazis, 133, 455 (illus.), 456, 614, 621, 1332 and Nigeria, 1181 and the Philippines, 1246 and Puerto Rico, 846 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and the Soviet Union, 508, 694, 696, 696 (illus.), 697, 699-701, 1074, 1708 and Switzerland, 255 and terrorism, 1490 and Yugoslavia, 896 Protectionism, 25, 316 and Amazonia, 1827–1828, 1831 and Argentina, 271 and Canada, 1837, 1839, 1842 and film, 1331–1332 and natural resources, 886 and new social movements, 1448 and Peru, 368 Protestantism and Czechoslovakia, 1023–1024 Dutch, 199, 200, 200–202 and fundamentalism, 1393, 1398 and Germany, 188–189 and politics, 982–983 Proust, Marcel, 489 Provençal, 471, 477 Prussia, 611, 617 and Denmark, 150 and education, 34 and German unification, 186, 191, 192 national anthem of, 117 and Poland, 210 resistance to Napoleon and women, 52 Puerto Rico, 836–847 colonialism and, 425 literacy rates in, 495 and terrorism, 1491 Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de, 273 Pujol, Jordi, 1539, 1539, 1541, 1542 Pumpurs, Andr¯ejs, 564 Punjabi Muslims, 1231, 1236, 1764–1765 Purcell, Henry, 117 Pushkin, Aleksandr, 78, 213, 694, 1437 Putin, Vladimir, 1080, 1597, 1601, 1602, 1604, 1605 Qanuni, Yunus, 1695 Qarase, Laisenia, 1324–1325 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 754, 754, 1742, 1746 Québec, 478, 1287–1297 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and separatism, 306, 307, 1470, 1471, 1836–1837, 1843 and terrorism, 1490–1491 Québec City, 299 Quezon, Manuel, 1241 Quinet, Edgar, 177 Rabin, Yitzhak, 1141, 1400–1401, 1488–1489 Rabuka, Sitiveni, 1321, 1321, 1323, 1323

Race and Afghanistan, 1688–1689 and Alsace, 1504 and Arab nationalism, 732 and Argentina, 277 and Australia, 850, 851 and the Bandung Conference, 961 and Basques, 710 and Brazil, 290, 293, 297, 1826 and Central America, 314 and Colombia, 826 and colonialism, 958 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1281 and Darwinism, 480 and Fiji, 1317, 1319, 1321, 1323, 1325 and France, 179 and gender, 47–48, 54–55, 447–448 and Haiti, 333–336, 337–339, 341 and India, 131 and Italy, 672 and Malaysia, 1222 and Mexico, 349 and Mongolia, 1792 and nationalist ideologies, 415–417, 513, 517 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 866–867, 869 and Peru, 373–375 and Puerto Rico, 837–839, 843–844 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and South Africa, 1151–1153 and the United States, 391–392, 894, 1300–1303, 1307 and Völkisch nationalism, 614, 614, 622 See also Ethnicity; Minorities Racism and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1510 and anticolonialism, 958 and Colombia, 829 education and, 429–430 and Egypt, 263 and film, 1328 and France, 1056, 1097 and gender, 447, 452–453 and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557 and Great Britain, 1013 and Hungary, 645 and immigration, 1424–1426 and imperative nationalism, 502, 510 and India, 798 and nationalism, 533–534 and Nazism, 426, 517–518 and new social movements, 1448 and Nigeria, 1179 and perversions of nationalism, 518–521 and Puerto Rico, 837 and the United States, 1310, 1339–1340 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnic cleansing; Genocide

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Radio and Canada, 1839 and Colombia, 833 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and Indonesia, 1727 in Indonesia, 1479 in nationalism, 132–133, 1474, 1475 and promoting nationalistic art, 418 and Puerto Rico, 846 Rahman, Abdul, 1218–1219, 1222 Rahman, Abdur, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1691, 1692 Rahman, Mujibur, 1466 Railroads and Argentina, 279–280 and Canada, 302, 1837 and Central America, 315 and Ethiopia, 740 and Germany, 192 in India, 131, 796 and Mexico, 355 and New Zealand, 865 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Rainis, J¯anis, 560, 564 Rakovski, Georgi, 573 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 164 Rangihau, John, 1860 Rao, Raja, 914, 921, 922 Rapp, Jean, 1504 Ras Tafari Mekonnen, 740 Rasputin, Valentin, 1077 Ratzel, Friedrich, 460, 461, 463, 488–489 Ravel, Maurice, 1437 Rawls, J., 97 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 351 Razak, Tun Abdul, 1222, 1223 Reagan, Ronald, 945, 946, 1039, 1244, 1310–1311, 1395, 1453 Rebet, Lev, 1624 Reddy, Jai Ram, 1323 Redmond, John, 651 Reeves, Sir Paul, 1322 Reformation, 618, 1502 Refugees and Europe, 1044 and the Gharbagh conflict, 1716, 1719 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Korea, 1781 and Pakistan-Indian violence, 1234 Palestinian, 1135, 1140 Sahrawi in Algeria, 1096–1097 and Taiwan, 1257 and Tibet, 1813, 1821–1822 See also Asylum; Immigrants/immigration Regionalism, 407 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 271 and Australia, 852 and Austrian provincialism, 551–552

and Basques, 1518–1519 and Canada, 306–307, 1837, 1843 and Central America, 311–313 and Chile, 324 and Colombia, 828–829, 834 education and, 432 and the European Union, 1043, 1044 and Finland, 608 and France, 1056 and Germany, 611 and globalization, 1413, 1415 and India, 1205 and Italy, 665, 672–673 and language movements, 482 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1808, 1811 and Nigeria, 1181–1183, 1185 and Romania, 1591 and Scandinavia, 225 and Spain, 1083, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 245 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 1623 and Vietnam, 1263 See also Separatism/secession Reich, Robert, 1407–1408 Reichsland, 1505 Rej, Mikołaj, 214 Religion, 971–989 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1692, 1693–1694 and Algeria, 1095, 1102–1103 and Arab nationalism, 725, 731–732, 733 and Armenia, 1700, 1701 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Basques, 710 and Belgium, 140, 142 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1525–1526, 1528–1530 and Brazil, 289, 1825–1826 and Bulgaria, 573, 580 and Burma, 781 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1280–1281 and Czechoslovakia, 1020 and discrimination against immigrants, 1423–1424 education and, 424, 428 and Egypt, 265 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 736, 741, 742, 746 and Europe, 1031–1032 and Fiji, 1314, 1315 and France, 176 and gender, 902 and Germany, 188–189, 618 and Greece, 627 and Haiti, 339–340 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1203, 1461–1462 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728

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Religion (continued ) and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 657–658, 1470–1471 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1768 and Japan, 813–814 and Malaysia, 1217, 1223 and Mexico, 346, 347, 347–350, 356 and Mongolia, 1785, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1792 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 99–109, 519–520 and Nepal, 1806 and the Netherlands, 196, 197, 199–202, 200, 202 (illus.), 205, 206 and Nigeria, 967 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233, 1236, 1461–1462 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1243 and Poland, 216, 686 and Québec, 1293 ritualism and nationalism as substitutes for, 500–501 and Russia, 1603, 1605 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 245, 250 and terrorism, 1487, 1494–1495, 1498 and Tibet, 1816–1817 and Turkey, 769–770, 1653–1654 and Ukraine, 720 and Uruguay, 403 and Vietnam, 1270 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 See also specific religions Religious fundamentalism, 1392–1404 and the United States, 1306 Rembrandt, 203 Renan, Ernest, 95–96, 415, 475–476, 477, 501, 528–529, 1504 Renner, Karl, 542, 542 Repression and Afghanistan, 1685, 1694 and Australia, 1845–1846 and Congo/Zaïre, 1165 and counterterrorism, 1496–1498 and Eritrea, 1172 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Korea, 1773, 1775 and Latvia, 1576, 1578, 1581 and the legacies of colonialism, 893–894 and Mongolia, 1784, 1794 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Russia, 690–692 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675, 1680 and the Sami, 1615

and the Soviet Union, 1074–1075, 1075 and Spain, 708, 709, 1089, 1092 and Tibet, 1820 and Turkey, 769 and Ukraine, 722 and the United States, 1310 and women, 904 Republic of the United Provinces, 196 Republicanism, French, 409 Resettlement, forced. See Ethnic cleansing Resnick, Philip, 1842 Retief, Piet, 1150 Reventós, Joan, 1539 Revueltas, Silvestre, 76 Reyntjens, Filip, 1675 Rezanov, Nikolai, 810 Rhee Syngman, 1780 Rhodes, Cecil John, 1151 Ricasoli, Bettino, 669 Richard, Maurice “Rocket,” 1842 Richard the Lionheart, King (England), 165 Riche, Jean Baptiste, 337 Richler, Mordecai, 1296 Riefenstahl, Leni, 1332 Riegl, Alois, 415 Riel, Louis, 301, 305, 1289 Rights, 14, 129, 444 Argentina and political, 272 and Armenia, 1703, 1708 and Australia, 852, 855 Brazil and political, 290 Central America and political, 316 Colombia and human, 834 demands for, 499–500 and diaspora populations, 1371 England and political, 161, 164 and the European Union, 1041 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1325 and forms of nationalism, 1352–1354 France and, 34, 173–174, 176, 179 free speech and the United States, 387–388 Greenland and civil, 1570 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 812 and the Maori, 1858 minority verus majority, 932–933 and Nepal, 1809 the Netherlands and political, 199 and New Zealand, 873 and Nigeria, 1183 Rwanda and Burundi and human, 1675, 1679, 1680–1681 and the Sami, 1612 Switzerland and political, 249, 252–253 and Turkey, 1648, 1650 Ukraine and human, 1626 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Liberalism; Minorities Riguad, Andre, 335 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 82, 417, 1437

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Rinchen, B., 1794 Rinchino, Elbek-Dorzhi, 1793 Risorgimento, 663–665, 669, 672, 673 culture and identity and the, 671, 673–674 Rituals of belonging, 499–511. See also Ceremonies; Symbols Riva Aguero y Osma, José de la, 373, 374–375 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 355 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 272, 273 Rivera, Fructuoso, 399 Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 320 Riviere-Herard, Charles, 337 Rizal, Jose, 1245 Robert I, the Bruce, 233 Roberto, Holden, 1662, 1662 Roberts, Hugh, 1101 Roberts, Tom, 859 Robertson, Roland, 1393, 1399 Robertson, William, 234, 351 Robespierre, 175, 1489 Robinson, Mary, 1375–1376 Robles, Mariano, 317 Roca, Julio A., 280 Rodgers, Richard, 1433 Rodrigo, Joaquín, 1437 Rodrigues, José Honório, 292 Roma. See Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies) Roman, Petre, 1587 Roman Catholicism and Alsace, 1507–1508, 1508 and Belgium, 140 and Brazil, 1825–1826 and Central America, 317 and Colombia, 827, 828, 829, 832, 833 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1023–1024 and France, 179 and Germany, 189, 192, 193, 618 and Haiti, 339–340 and Ireland, 654, 661 and Mexico, 346, 347–350 and the Netherlands, 199, 200, 200–202, 202 (illus.), 204, 205 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 686 and politics, 982–983, 987–988 and Québec, 1292 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Spain, 703, 705, 707 and Uruguay, 399 Romania, 1584–1594, 1586 (map) anti-Semitism in, 521 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Romantic nationalism, 31, 406, 463, 474–475, 476 German, 10, 92 Romanticism, 527, 882, 1352–1353 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 950, 1276, 1277 Roosevelt, Theodore, 448

Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 273–275, 274 (illus.), 276, 277–278 Rosenau, James, 1368 Rosenberg, Alfred, 416, 417 Rosewall, Ken, 857 Rossé, Joseph, 1509 Rossellini, Roberto, 1333–1334 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 15, 22, 30–31, 86–87, 171, 501 and the collective will, 1054 and organicism, 462 and sovereignty of the people, 530 and Switzerland, 251 and the Terror, 174 Rozent¯als, J¯anis, 565 Rubin, Marcus, 227 Rubinstein, Anton, 82 Rubriks, Alfr¯eds, 1582 Rudbeck, Olof, 223 Runeberg, Johan Ludvig, 228, 601, 605 Rusesabagina, Paul, 1674 Rushdie, Salman, 913, 920, 921, 927 Russell, Bertrand, 1676 Russia, 689–701, 691 (map), 1596–1607, 1598 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714–1715 and the Baltic states, 562, 567–568 and the Bolshevik Revolution, 436 and Bulgaria, 575 and Denmark, 150 education and, 423 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438 and Eurasianism, 466 and Finland, 598, 605 and Greek independence, 631 and Hungary, 638 and indigenous groups, 1566 intelligentsia and nationalism in, 8 and Iran, 1110 and Japan, 815 and language, 472 and Latvia, 1576, 1582 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790–1791, 1791–1792, 1796 and music, 82, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1441 national symbols, 134–135 and new social movements, 1449 and Orthodoxy, 105–106, 983 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and Poland, 209–210, 679 and political philosophy, 93–94 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1594 and Russian nationalism, 1079–1080 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 and Scandinavia, 220 Slavophilism versus Westernizers in, 19–21 and terrorism, 1489, 1495

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Russia (continued ) and Tibet, 1818 and Ukraine, 714, 1621 See also Soviet Union Russian nationalism, 1074, 1076–1078 Russians in Latvia, 1575, 1582 in Ukraine, 1627–1628 Russification, 946, 955 and Finland, 605 versus Germanization in the Baltic states, 561–562 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), 810, 816, 820 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 574, 763, 764 Rustaveli, Shota, 694 Rustow, Dankwart, 929 Ruthene-Americans, 589 Ruyter, Michiel de, 203 Rwagasore, Prince (Burundi), 1670 Rwanda and Burundi, 1668–1681, 1670 (map) genocide in, 968–969 Ryan, Claude, 1296 Ryckman, Pierre, 1157 Ryklin, Mikhail, 135 Ryukyu Island, 1754 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 1080 Saba, Isak, 1614 Sadat, Anwar, 266 (illus.), 985, 1398 Sadiq, G. M., 1763 Šafàrík, Pavol Jozef, 592 Safavid Dynasty, 1107–1109 Saget, Nissage, 338 Sahak, Catholicos, 1701 Said, Edward, 915, 924 Saigo Takamori, 820 Saint-Domingue. See Haiti Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 410 Sakharov, Andre, 951 Salanga, Alfredo Navarro, 1245 Salazar, Antonio, 516 Sale, Kirkpatrick, 879 Salisbury, Lord, 460 Salnave, Sylvain, 338 Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 338 Salvarrieta, Policarpa, 831 Samarin, Iu. F., 692 Sami, 225, 231, 1608–1618, 1610 (map) Samper, José María, 829 Sampson, Deborah, 50 San Martín, José de, 271, 272, 277 and Peru, 370, 371 San Stefano Peace Treaty, 575 Sánchez, Miguel, 347, 349 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 354 Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 372 Santander, Francisco de Paula, 826, 827, 831, 831 (illus.) Santo Domingo, 332–333

Santos, José Eduardo dos, 1662 São Tomé e Príncipe, 1667 Sarawak, 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 Sardà, Joan, 706 Sarmatian ideology, 213–214 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino, 276, 277, 278, 279 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1052 Saryan, Martiros, 1707 Saudi Arabia, 984, 1492 Saussure, F. de, 482 Savage, Michael Joseph, 871 Savimbi, Jonas, 1659, 1662, 1662–1663 Savoy, 175 Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1370, 1419 Sayeed, Mufti, 1769, 1770–1771 Scandinavia, 219–231, 221 (map) languages of, 471–472 Schaepman, Herman, 205 Schefferus, Johannes, 1615 Schelling, Friedrich, 67 Schieder, Theodor, 501–502 Schiller, Friedrich, 188, 251 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 7, 415 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 67, 92, 415, 1110 Schleswig, 147, 149, 152, 155–156 Schmid, Alex, 1484 Schoenberg, Arnold, 1434 Schoenfeld, Eugen, 1393 Schöning, Gerhard, 227 Schumacher, John, 1245 Schuman, Robert, 190, 1034, 1509 Scotland, 166, 232–242, 1413, 1415 and communication, 1639 and devolution, 1014 and music, 1442 Scott, James, 903 Scott, Robert, 1434 Scott, Sir Walter, 238 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 241–242, 242 Sculpture. See Monuments Sculthorpe, Peter, 1439 Second Schleswigian War, 150, 152, 153 Secularism and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Azerbaijan, 1713 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527 and France, 175, 409 and globalization, 1401–1402 and India, 1765 and Iraq, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1761, 1769 legitimacy and, 973 and Mongolia, 1796 and the Netherlands, 206 and Pakistan, 1233 and Palestinians, 1139, 1141–1142 and Québec, 1292, 1294 and religious fundamentalism, 1403

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role of symbols in, 115 and Turkey, 769, 1647, 1651–1652, 1653–1654 and Uruguay, 403 Seddon, Richard John, 868, 870 Sedition Act (U.S.), 387–388 Segregation and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1064 and South Africa, 1151–1152 Séguin, Maurice, 1294 Seipel, Ignaz, 551 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1662 Self-determination and Austria, 544–545 and the Baltic states, 558 ethnic conflict and denial of, 888 and ethnicity, 464 and Fiji, 1317 and forms of nationalism, 1354–1355 and Israel, 1402 and Mongolia, 1790 and the Napoleonic wars, 474 and nationalistic philosophy, 476, 524 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1845 in political philosophy, 536–537, 965–966, 969 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 as a precondition of rights, 972 See also Independence; Sovereignty Self-government. See Autonomy Selim III (Egypt), 258 Sella, Quintino, 669 Senegal, 963 Senghor, Léopold, 488, 919, 963, 980–981 Separatism/secession, 1460–1472 and Angola, 1660 and Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and Burma, 780–781 and Catalonia, 1540–1541 during the Cold War, 949 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and cultural distinctiveness, 461 and gender and sexuality issues, 899 and Georgia, 897 and global governance, 459 increases in, 929 and India, 800, 804, 806 in Iran, 1112 and Ireland, 649–657 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764, 1766, 1769 and Latvia, 1581–1582 linguistic, 477 and Malaysia, 1222 and minorities, 933, 1359 and Mongolia, 1784, 1798 and New Zealand, 866 and newly independent states, 966–967 and Nigeria, 1185 in the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 844

in Russia, 1600 and Swedish speakers in Finland, 606 and Taiwan, 1259 and terrorism, 1487, 1490–1492, 1494–1495, 1494 (table) in Turkey, 1655 and Ukraine, 716, 1625 See also Civil war; Independence Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 119, 955, 1399, 1410, 1457, 1488, 1492, 1493 (illus.), 1496 casualties, 1495 Serbia, 437, 481, 1413 Serbs in Bosnia, 1527–1535 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440, 524 Sergeev-Tsenskii, S., 697 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1368 Setus, 557 Sevak, Paruir, 1707 Sexuality, 446, 899–910 Sha, Mirwaiz Yusuf, 1764 Sha’arawi, Huda, 450 Shagari, Shehu, 1187 Shah, G. M., 1768 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 732, 733 Shakespeare, William, 474, 915–917 Sharif, Nawaz, 1232 Shatterbelts, 942 Shays, Daniel, 386 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1626 Sheng Bright, 1440 Shepstone, Theophilus, 1145–1146 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei, 718 Sheridan, Jim, 927 Sheridan, Richard, 915 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1080 Shevchenko Society, 718, 719 Shiism/Shiites differences from Sunnis, 983–984, 986 and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112, 1115–1116 and Iraq, 748, 752–753, 755, 755, 757, 1745, 1747 and Pakistan, 1236 Shinto, 106–107, 108 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 1074, 1432, 1433 Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 718 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 1597 Sibelius, Jean, 79, 228, 417, 600, 605, 1436 Sidgwick, Henry, 527, 531 Sidqi, Bakr, 752 Siebenpfeiffer, Philipp Jakob, 190 Siemiradzki, Henryk, 682 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 493, 682, 683, 685 Sierra, Justo, 355 Sieyès, Abbé, 172 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 350 Sikhs, 1466 Sikorski, Władysław, 683 Silesia, 584

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Sillars, Jim, 997 Silva, Lula da, 1829, 1830, 1831 Simeon I the Great, 574 Simms, William Gilmore, 389 Simon, Claude, 1052 Simpson, L. P., 494 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 1246 Sinai peninsula, 262 Sinclair, Keith, 870, 872 Sindici, Orestes, 828 Singapore, 1218–1219, 1220–1221, 1221, 1224–1225 and education, 1384–1385, 1386 and Indonesia, 1733 Singh, Gulab, 1763 Singh, Hari, 1465, 1764 Singh, Manmohan, 1207 Singh, V. P., 1769 Sinhalese, 1466–1467 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), 810, 820, 1774 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 795, 810, 817, 822 Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies), 440, 517, 521, 523, 1022, 1027 Skalagrímsson, Egil, 226 Skoropad’kyi, Pavlo, 716 Skötkonung, Olof, 226 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 718 Slanský, Rudolf, 1020 Slave rebellions, Haitian, 335–336, 340 Slavery, 1301 and Brazil, 283, 289, 292, 293 and colonialism, 889, 890, 893 and Cuba, 1275 and the development of nationalism, 47 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 262 and France, 174 and Haiti, 333, 334–336 and Mexico, 345 paternalistic justifications of, 54 and Peru, 371 and the United States, 383, 385, 388, 390–391 and Uruguay, 401 Slavophilism, 20, 213, 692 and religion, 105, 108 Slesvig, 220, 222, 225 Slovakia, 584, 1017, 1021–1022, 1026–1028 and separatism, 590, 594 See also Czechoslovakia Slovenia, 1450 Słowacki, Juliusz, 212, 214 Smart, Mary Ann, 671 Smetana, Bedˇrich, 74, 74 (illus.), 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 417, 593, 594, 1435–1436 Smetona, Antanas, 560, 565, 568 Smiles, Samuel, 531 Smith, Adam, 19, 234, 855 Smith, Anthony D., 113–114, 400, 473, 929, 931, 1368–1369

Smith, Dennis Mack, 674 Smith, Zadie, 927–928 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 1151 Smyrna, 633 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 601 Social Darwinism, 437, 439, 518, 532–533 and gender, 447, 452–453 and language, 480–481 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Social Democrats, 149, 975–976 Social mobility and ethnic minorities, 931 and nationalism, 5–6, 11 and technology, 1475 and the United States, 1305 See also Class Social movements and Finland, 600–601 new, 1446–1458 and the United States, 1303–1304, 1305 Social policy education reform as, 421–422, 428–429 and gender, 448–449 and women’s rights, 446–447 Social structure and Eritrea, 1170–1171 and France, 1050 and India, 1204–1205 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1676, 1680 See also Class Socialism and Alsace, 1508 and Arab nationalism, 732, 733 and Canada, 1839 and China, 789 versus communism, 975–976 and developing countries, 980, 981 disillusionment and discredit of, 936 and Egypt, 266 and France, 179, 1054 and gender, 453, 456 and Great Britain, 1011 and Iraq, 754 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and the Netherlands, 205 and Poland, 212 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Communism; Marxism Socialization and Finland, 600, 607–608 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 See also Assimilation Sokol, 594 Solanas, Fernando, 1335 Solano, Armando, 830 Solano López, Francisco, 362, 363, 363 (illus.), 364 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 951, 1077, 1601 Somalia, 949

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Somaliland, 459 Sonam Gyatso, 1817 Songtsen Gampo, King (Tibet), 1815, 1816, 1821 Sonnenstern, Maximilian von, 320 Sontsen Gyatso, 1816 Sorel, Georges, 514 Soulouque, Faustin-Elie, 337 Sousa, John Philip, 1441 South Africa, 1144–1153, 1146 (map) and Angola, 1664, 1665 and apartheid, 890 and education, 1386 and language, 478 and music, 1440, 1441 and the Netherlands, 198 and sports, 995 and terrorism, 1491 South America and language, 478 national identity and education in, 35, 37, 39 See also specific South American countries South Korea and Japan, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 See also Korea South Tyrol, 1490 South-West Africa, 437 Southeast Asia, 778 (map), 1214 (map), 1262 (map), 1724 (map) Southern Mindanao, 1468 Sovereignty and Australia, 855 and Brazil, 1830–1831 and the environment, 886 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1718, 1719 versus globalization, 1406, 1408 and Greenland, 1571 and Japan, 814–815 and the Maori, 1856 nationalism and popular, 5, 15 and Nepal, 1805 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 and Québec, 1291–1292 See also Independence; Self-determination Soviet Union, 699 (map), 714 (map), 1070–1080, 1072 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Angola, 1663 and Armenia, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709–1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714, 1716–1717, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 563 breakup of the, 888, 895–897, 972, 1413, 1596 and China, 1197 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Cuba, 1276 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 education and, 419, 426, 430 and the environment, 881–882 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440–441

and film, 1330, 1332 and gender, 449, 450, 454 and geopolitics, 459 and Japan, 822, 1754 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780 and language, 482 and Latvia, 1575, 1576, 1578, 1581–1582 and Mongolia, 1785, 1789, 1794–1795, 1795–1796 and national identity, 693–701, 880 nationalistic art of the, 411 nationalities policy, 468–469, 946, 1599 and new social movements, 1449 and Poland, 681 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1588, 1591 and Siberia, 876 and sports, 993 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716, 719, 722 See also Russia Soyinka, Wole, 925 Spain, 702–711, 703 (map), 1082–1092, 1085 (map), 1540 (map) and Argentina, 269 and authoritarianism, 973 and Basques, 1514, 1517, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Catalonia, 1536–1537, 1544–1547 and Central America, 311–313, 314, 317–318 and Chile, 323–327 and Colombia, 825 and colonialism, 889 education and, 36, 432 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 interventions in Haiti by, 335 and Mexico, 345–346, 350, 353 and minorities, 1412 and music, 1437 and the Philippines, 1239, 1243 resistance to Napoleon, 51–52 and Santo Domingo, 332–333. 339 separatist movements in, 1471 and sports, 997, 999 symbols in, 49 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397 Spanish-American War, 1086 Speight, George, 1323–1324 Spencer, Herbert, 532–533 Spengler, Oswald, 70 Spenser, Edmund, 915 Spinoza, Baruch, 203 Spivak, Gayatri, 926 Sports, 991–1003 and Australia, 852, 857 and Canada, 1841, 1842 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and England, 165

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Sports (continued ) and Ireland, 657 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 870 and Peru, 378 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 soccer and Brazil, 295 and Turkey, 1651 and Wales, 1637 and war, 901 Sri Lanka, 1466–1467 and terrorism, 1484, 1491, 1492 St. Erik (Sweden), 226 St. Gregory, 1700 St. Laurent, Louis, 1838 Stalin, Joseph (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), 945, 1075, 1603, 1603 (illus.) and China, 978 and the Cold War, 977–978 cult of personality, 952 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 440 and gender, 449 and nationalism, 1071, 1076 nationalities policy of, 469 and Russianness, 693, 694, 697, 700–701 and Yugoslavia, 948 Stambolov, Stefan, 578 Stanford, Charles Villiers, 1438 Stanley, Henry Morton, 1156, 1160 “Star-Spangled Banner,” 117, 118 (illus.) Starˇcevi´c, Ante, 96 Statue of Liberty, 119 Steele, James, 1843 Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 587, 588, 1017 Stefano, Alfredo Di, 1002 Steffens, Henrik, 66–68, 69–70 Stein, Freiherr von, 34 Stephen the Great (Moldavia), 1592 Sternberger, Dolf, 1556 Stetsko, Slava, 1624 Stoilov, Konstantin, 578 Strasbourg, France, 1510 Stratification. See Class Streeton, Arthur, 859 Strindberg, August, 228 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 237–238, 238 Stubbs, Paul, 1450 Štúr, L’udovit, 96, 592 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 589 Subsidiarity, 881, 1042, 1045 Sudan, 263, 1468–1469 Sudeten-Germans, 595 Sudetenland, 595, 1017–1019, 1025 Suez Canal, 259, 265–266 Suez Canal crisis, 1012 Suffrage, women’s, 446 and Australia, 853 and Germany, 620 and nationalist movements, 450

and New Zealand, 870–871 and transnational movements, 452–453 and Turkey, 770 See also Voting franchise; Women’s rights Suharto, President (Indonesia), 954, 1723, 1725, 1726, 1728, 1730–1731, 1733 Suhm, P. F., 227 Sukarno, Ahmad, 953–954, 964, 1463, 1725, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1734 and the Bandung Conference, 960–961, 962 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1734 Sükhebaatur, General (Mongolia), 1789, 1797, 1798 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala, 1318 Sullivan, A. M., 658–659 Sultan, Ibrahim, 1171 Sun Yat-sen, 789, 789 (illus.), 790, 791, 794 Sunnis differences from Shiites, 983–984 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 748, 751, 754, 755, 755, 757 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1764 Suriname, 197 Suvorov, Aleksandr, 696, 1074 Švec, Otakar, 1024 Svecoman movement, 599 Sweden, 220–222 communication in, 1473 and Finland, 598 and language, 472 national anthem and holidays, 230 national identity and, 223, 226–228 and Norway, 224–225 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 Swildens, J. H., 198 Swiss army, 253 Swiss Confederation, 245, 247–248 Switzerland, 244–255, 248 (map) education and, 429 flag of, 114 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 national identity and education in, 35 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 Symbols, 111–124, 1342–1348 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Armenia, 1702 and Australia, 856, 860 and the Baltic states, 565 and Basques, 1519–1521 and Belgium, 144, 145 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Brazil, 285, 286 (illus.), 294–295 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 305 and Catalonia, 1543–1544 and Central America, 318–319, 320–321 and Chile, 327–328, 328 and Colombia, 825, 831 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 and Cuba, 1283–1284

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and England, 163 and Ethiopia, 744 and the European Union, 1042 and Finland, 600, 602, 604 and France, 175 gender and familial, 43–45, 46, 48–50, 54, 445–446, 449, 904–905, 907 and Germany, 618, 619 and Greenland, 1568–1569, 1570 and Hungary, 641–644 and Indonesia, 1732–1733 and Iran, 1114–1115 and Iraq, 757 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 1752, 1757 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 in literature, 917, 926, 927 and Mongolia, 1786, 1793–1794, 1797 and national identity, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 465 and national self-invention, 900 and Nepal, 1803 and the Netherlands, 204, 204 and Nigeria, 1184 and Northern Ireland, 1066–1067 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847, 1850 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 215, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844, 846 and Québec, 1297 religious, 99, 102, 115–116 and rituals, 500. See also Rituals of belonging and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and Scandinavia, 229–230 and Singapore, 1225 and South Africa, 1150 and Spain, 709 and Taiwan, 1258 technologies as national, 128, 134–135 and Tibet, 1818 transnational, 115 and Turkey, 766, 770, 774, 1646–1647 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 1308 and Wales, 878, 1633, 1637–1638 Syncretism and Mexico, 347–350, 349 and Paraguay, 358 Synge, John Millington, 918, 920–921, 922 Syngman, Rhee, 1773 Syria and Battle of Maysalun, 728 and Egypt, 982 as French Mandate, 728 water, 884–885 Syrian Arab Kingdom, 727–728 Szálasi, Ferenc, 516, 638 Széchenyi, Count István, 637, 643

Tacitus, 64, 617 Tagore, Rabindranath, 918 Taine, Hippolyte, 415 Taiping Rebellion, 101, 108 Taiwan, 1249–1260, 1250 (map) and film, 1337–1338 and independence, 1462, 1468 and Japan, 810, 818, 1749 Tajiks, 1692–1693, 1694–1695 Takemitsu, T¯oru, 1439–1440 Taliban, 986–987 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1691, 1692, 1693–1694 and Pakistan, 1232, 1233 Tamils, 1385, 1466–1467, 1492 Tamir, Yael, 97 Tammsaare, Anton Hansen, 565 Tan Dun, 1440 Tanzania, 962 Tarai, 1801–1802, 1804, 1808, 1811 Taraki, Mohammad, 1687 Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 1290 Tarnowski, Count Stanislaw, 493 Tartars, 1621 Tatars, 441, 469 Tawfiq, King (Egypt), 260, 261 Taylor, Charles Wood, 328, 989 Taylor, T. Griffith, 851–852 Tchaikovsky, Piotr, 82, 1432, 1437 Technology, 126–136, 1473–1483 Cold war and weapon, 944 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1370, 1376 as enabling ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and the Holocaust, 524 and ideologies, 972 image, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1428 and Iraq, 1738 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and promoting nationalistic art, 417–418 See also Internet Tegnér, Esias, 228 Telegraphy, 127–128 and Central America, 315 and Germany, 192 and Mexico, 355 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Television and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Angola, 1666 and Canada, 1838 and Catalonia, 1546 education and, 422, 433 versus film, 1336, 1339

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Television (continued ) and India, 1209 and language in Italy, 671 and Québec, 1296 and Wales, 1635, 1639 Tenzin Gyatso. See Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso) Terre’Blanche, Eugène, 1148 Territory and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532, 1532 and Israel, 1125 See also Borders; Expansionism Terror, French (1793–1974), 174–175 Terrorism, 1484–1498 and Armenia, 1707 and the Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and hypernationalism, 1389, 1410–1411 and India, 801 and Indonesia, 1728, 1729 and Italy, 676 and Japan, 821 and Pakistan, 1232 and religious fundamentalism, 986–987, 1400 and Russia, 955, 1607 and the 1970s, 1939 and Turkey, 1651, 1655 in the United States, 955 and Wales, 1637 See also Conflict/violence Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), 1493 Thailand, separatism in, 938, 1468 Thakin Soe, 780 Than Tun, 780 Thatcher, Margaret, 1013, 1040, 1453 The Birth of a Nation, 1328, 1329 (illus.) Theater and the Baltic states, 559–560 and France, 176–177 and Ireland, 918 and Québec, 1294 See also Cinema Theweleit, Klaus, 904 Thibaw, King (Burma), 782 Thiers, Adolphe, 177 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 115, 183, 188, 592 Thomas, Harold, 1850 Thomas, W. I., 1403 Thompson, Tom, 1841 Thomson, James, 32, 1438 Thorarensen, Bjarni, 228 Thorbecke, Johan, 198, 201 Thrace, 580, 582 Thubden Gyatso, 1818, 1820 Thyra, Queen (Denmark), 153 Tibet, 988, 1468, 1813–1823, 1815 (map) Tidemand, Adolph, 228 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 800 Tiso, Jozef, 1019 Tito, Josip Broz, 948, 978, 982, 1530 Tokugawa Nariaki, 814, 815

Tokugawa Narinobu, 814 Tokutomi Soho, 813 Tolstoi, A. N., 697 Tone, John, 51 Topelius, Zacharias, 228, 604, 605 Toronto, Canada, 1837 Totalitarianism education and, 429–430 and Europe, 419 and gender, 454–456 and imperative forms of nationalism, 501, 502, 510 Touraine, Alain, 1446, 1456 Tourism, 1028 and Cuba, 1285 and Iran, 1115 and Tibet, 1823 Tours, Georges Moreau de, 409 Toussaint-Louverture, 332, 335–336, 335 (illus.), 340, 341, 342 Toynbee, Arnold, 1368 Trade Argentina and, 269–271, 280 and Brazil, 285, 287 expositions and Scandinavia, 229 and Peru, 368 Transjordan, 728 Transnationalism and diaspora populations, 1369 and globalization, 1407 and identity among immigrants, 1427–1429 and ideologies, 972 and image technology, 1339 and literature, 927–928 versus national identities, 1348 and new social movements, 1447, 1455 and sports, 1001–1003 and women’s rights, 451–453 See also Cosmopolitanism Transportation and Argentina, 279–280 and Colombia, 833 and immigration, 1427 and Iran, 1112 and Malaysia, 1224 and Nepal, 1807 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 technological advances in, 127, 131, 136 and the United States, 388–389, 389–390 See also Railroads Transvaal, 1145–1146 Transylvania, 472 Trautmann, Catherine, 1510 Trdat III, King (Armenia), 1700 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1549 Treaty of Kiel, 220, 223 Treaty of Lausanne, 437–438, 768, 1647, 1648 Treaty of Maastricht, 1549

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Treaty of Nice, 1549 Treaty of Rome, 669 Treaty of St. Germain, 542 Treaty of Trianon, 638–639, 645 Treaty of Utrecht, 299 Treaty of Versailles, 459, 468, 476, 513–514 and Bulgaria, 580 and Czechoslovakia, 595 and Germany, 613, 617, 621 Treaty of Waitangi, 863, 873 Tremaglia, Mirko, 1372 Tremblay, Michel, 1294 Trimble, David, 1062 Troels-Lund, F., 227 Trofimenkoff, S. M., 1294 Tromp, Maarten, 203 Troost, Paul Ludwig, 413 Trotsky, Leon, 520 Trubetskoy, Prince, 94 Trubetzkoy, N. S., 94 Trudeau, Pierre, 1291, 1835, 1836, 1837–1838, 1838, 1840 Truman, Henry, 950, 1309 Tsai Ming-liang, 1338 Tschudi, Aegidius, 252 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin, 1798 Tshombe, Moise, 1469 Tsongkhapa, 1817 Tubin, Eduard, 560 Tucholsky, Kurt, 111 Tucker, George, 494 Tuheitia, 1857 Tunisia, 1464 Tupac Amaru II, 370, 371 Turanism, 641, 773–774, 1645 Turgenev, I. S., 694 Turia, Tariana, 1862 Turina, Joaquín, 1437 Turkey, 760–775, 767 (map), 1642–1656, 1644 (map) and Armenia, 1704, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1714 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438, 442 and the European Union, 1411 and gender, 446 and new social movements, 1452 water, 884–885 Turkish-Greek war (1919–1922), 522 Tutsi, 1669, 1670, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1678 Tuvan Republic, 1792 Twa, 1669, 1672, 1678 Twelve Years Truce, 200, 201 (map) Ty-Casper, Linda, 1245 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 1629, 1629 Tyrs, Miroslav, 594 U Chit Hlaing, 779 U Nu, 783 U Ottama, 779 U Saw, 780, 782

Uhde, Fritz von, 416 Ukraine, 712–722, 715 (map), 1619–1629, 1620 (map) borders of, 1413 and new social movements, 1449 and the Orange Revolution, 1080 and the Soviet Union, 1071, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1079 Ulanfu, 1790, 1794 Ulmanis, K¯arlis, 560, 565, 568, 1576, 1578 Unifications, national, 464 Union of Utrecht, 196 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Monarchy of Denmark, 147 United Nations (UN) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1533 and Canada, 307 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171 and Fiji, 1322 and Germany, 1554 High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1535 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 and interventions, 1469 and Iraq, 756, 1743 and Israel, 1121, 1125, 1135 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1765, 1767 and Korea, 1780, 1781 membership, 957 and Mongolia, 1795 and new social movements, 1456 and the nonaligned movement, 961–962, 969 and peacekeeping, 1412 and the self-determination doctrine, 972 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 510 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 273 United States, 381–392, 384 (map), 1299–1311, 1302 (map) and Afghanistan, 1690 and African Americans, 493–494 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 275 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 850 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1533 and Canada, 305, 307, 1835–1836, 1842 and China, 1191 and the civil rights movement, 938 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Colombia, 829, 830 and colonialism/expansionism, 22, 1462 and counterterrorism, 1497–1498 and Cuba, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1280 Czechoslovaks in the, 588–589 and decolonization policy, 1320 and diaspora populations, 1372 economic policy and globalization, 1407–1408, 1409 education and, 32–33, 35–39, 420, 422–426, 429, 433, 1381–1382

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United States (continued ) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and European integration, 1033 and film, 1328–1330, 1332–1333, 1337, 1339–1340 and France, 1050 and gender and sexuality, 447, 448, 450, 452, 901, 902, 907–908 and Greenland, 1563 and Haiti, 340 and immigration, 1412, 1418–1419, 1420–1421, 1424, 1428 and indigenous groups, 1566, 1845 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117, 1117 and Iraq, 1742–1743, 1746–1747 Irish in the, 654–655 and Israel, 1398, 1401 and Japan, 810, 822, 1749–1754, 1756–1757 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780, 1781 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 and landscape art, 64–66, 70 and language, 472, 482 and the League of Nations, 1402 and Mexico, 353–354 and minorities, 894, 935 and Mongolia, 1796 and music, 76, 117, 118 (illus.), 1433, 1438–1439, 1441–1442, 1443 and national identity, 465, 930, 931 nationalistic art of the, 411 and new social movements, 1446, 1448 and New Zealand, 872 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Pakistan, 1229, 1235, 1236 and Palestine, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 372 and the Philippines, 1239, 1240–1242, 1243, 1248 and Puerto Rico, 836–837, 837, 845, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1394–1396, 1400 and rituals of belonging, 509 and Russia, 1604, 1607 and Southern identity, 494–495 and sports, 994, 1000–1001 symbols of the, 114, 119, 124, 128, 134, 1346, 1347 terrorism and xenophobia in the, 1410, 1488, 1490, 1492 and Vietnam, 954, 1264–1265, 1265 and Yugoslavia, 896 See also American Revolution Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 972 Unterhalter, Elaine, 904 Urabi, Ahmed, 263–264 Urabi Revolt, 260, 263–264 Urbanization and Argentina, 278 and Basques, 1515

and Central America, 311 and Denmark, 149 and France, 1055 and Iraq, 753, 755, 755, 1737 and Korea, 1778 and language, 479 and the Maori, 1860–1861 and Scandinavia, 221 and Turkey, 772 and Ukraine, 714–715 Urquiza, Justo José de, 275, 279 Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 829, 830 Uruguay, 393–403, 395 (map) and Argentina, 275 Argentine-Brazilian war over, 273 and Brazil, 289 and Garibaldi, 672 Utilitarianism, 531 Uvarov, S. S., 692 Uvin, Peter, 1680 Uygur, 1468 Uzbekistan, 1079 Uzbeks, 1693 Vaculík, Ludvík, 1026 Vagris, Janis, 1581 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 987, 1208 Vakatora, Tomasi, 1322 Valdemar IV (Denmark), 226 Valdemar the Great (Denmark), 153 Valdem¯ars, Krišj¯anis, 561, 562 Valdivia, Pedro de, 323, 326 Valencia, 1546 Valera, Eamon de, 1294 Valle, José Cecilio del, 315, 316 Valle-Riestra, José María, 76 Vallejo, José Joaquín, 329 Valois, Georges, 515 Values and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 1830 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1839 and Cuba, 1283 in education, 1381 exporting U.S., 944, 955–956 and Great Britain, 1008 and India, 797 and Iran, 1116 and Japan, 1754 and Latvia, 1576, 1580 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mongolia, 1793 and national character, 528–529, 530–531, 537 and nationalism, 901 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847–1848 and Poland, 686 post-materialist, 1454 and Puerto Rico, 844 and religion versus ideology, 971

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and religious fundamentalism, 1397, 1399 and rituals of belonging, 504–506 See also Morality; Religion Van der Noot, Henri, 140 van Gogh, Theo, 1486–1487 Van Thieu, Nguyen, 1265 Vanessa-Mae, 1440 Varikas, Eléni, 53 Varley, Fred H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Varnhagen, Francisco, 292 Vasnetsov, V. M., 694 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1180 Vazov, Ivan, 576–577 Velestinlis, Rigas, 626, 631, 631 Velvet Revolution, 1026, 1028 Verchères, Madeleine de, 303 Verdi, Giuseppe, 75, 77, 79, 80, 671, 1437–1438 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 197, 203 Vermeer, Johannes, 203 Vertov, Dziga, 1330 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch, 1152, 1152 Vian, Boris, 1052 Victoria, Queen (England), 164, 237 Vieira, Luandino, 1665 Vienna Congress of 1815, 46, 197 of 1819, 35 Vietnam, 963–964, 1261–1271 and France, 1050 and gender, 446 and independence, 1463 Vietnam War, 944, 952, 954, 1265, 1265, 1310 and the United States, 1304 Vigneault, Gilles, 1294 Vigny, Alfred de, 177 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 1579 Vikings, 228 Vilde, Eduard, 565 Villa-Lobos, Heitor, 76, 1439 Villarán, Manuel Vicente, 374 Vilnius, Lithuania, 563, 563 Vinnen, Carl, 416 Violence. See Conflict/violence Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 415 Virgin of Guadalupe, 347, 348 (illus.), 349–350, 356 in Peru, 376 Visconti, Luchino, 1334 Vivekananda, Swami, 802 Vizcardo y Guzmán, Juan Pablo, 370 Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), 1592 Vodou (Voodoo), 340 Vogel, Sir Julius, 865 Volhynia, 716 Völkisch nationalism, 613, 614, 614, 622 Voltaire, 14–15, 370 Voluntarism, 1196, 1197, 1198–1199 von Flüe, Niklaus, 253 von Metternich, Klemens, 671

von Ranke, Leopold, 41, 101, 227 Vonk, Jean Francoise, 140 Voting franchise and Argentina, 275 and Australia, 853 and diaspora populations, 1365, 1366, 1371–1372 and England, 161, 164 and Finland, 605 and Germany, 611 and Haiti, 336 and Italy, 669, 670 and the Netherlands, 199 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 250 and Uruguay, 401 See also Democracy; Suffrage, women’s Vramshapuh, King (Armenia), 1701 Vytautas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Wade, P., 1450 Wagner, Richard, 74, 77, 79, 406, 463, 1431 Wagner, Robert, 1508 Wais, Mir, 1690 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 863 Walcott, Derek, 914, 921 Waldheim, Kurt, 550 Walensa, Lech, 948 Wales, 166, 1631–1640, 1634 (map) and devolution, 1014 nationalism and environmentalism in, 878, 881 Walker, William, 313, 318 Wallace, Henry, 1303, 1309 Wallace, William, 232–233, 238–239, 240 (illus.) Wallot, Paul, 408 Walser, Martin, 1558 Walton, William, 1433, 1438 Walzer, M., 97 Wang Xilin, 1440 War of 1812, 388 War of the Pacific, 327, 330, 376 (map), 377, 377–378 Ward, Russel, 854 Warren, Robert Penn, 495 Warsaw Pact, 945 Wartburg Festival, 187 Washington, George, 387 Water, 884–885 Watkins, Melvin, 1842 Weber, Carl Maria von, 73, 74, 117, 1431 Weber, Eugen, 9, 102, 179 Weber, Max, 3–4, 40, 982, 1399, 1402 Webster, Noah, 32–33, 389 Weimar Republic, 613, 613, 620–621 and film, 1330–1331 See also Germany Weissman, Stephen, 1676 Weitz, Margaret, 905 Weizmann, Chaim, 1123, 1123

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Welfare state and Canada, 302–303, 306, 1290 and New Zealand, 870–871 and the United States, 944, 1300, 1309 See also Socialism Welhaven, Johan, 228 Wellington, Duke of, 164 Werner, Abraham, 67 Werner, Anton von, 409 West Germany, 976, 1448, 1490. See also Germany West Papua, 1468 Western, the ( film), 1332–1333, 1337 Western Sahara, 1468 Westernization and India, 1211 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Russia, 692 Wetterlé, Emile, 1508, 1508 Whitehead, Gillian, 1439 Whitlam, Gough, 1845 Wielopolski, Aleksander, 212 Wilhelm I (Germany), 619 Wilhelm II (Germany), 416, 621 Wilhelmina, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Willems, Jans Frans, 145 William I of Orange (the Netherlands), 141, 142, 196, 197, 203 William II (the Netherlands), 199 William III (the Netherlands), 201 Williams, Edward (Iolo Morgannwg), 1638 Williams, Kyffin, 1637 Williams, Ralph Vaughan, 1434 Wilson, A. T., 1742 Wilson, Woodrow, 464, 1328 Fourteen Points Speech, 436, 972 and Iraq, 749 principle of self-determination, 1790 Winter War, 607 Wirth, Johann Georg August, 190 Wislicenus, Hermann, 408 Wolfe, James, 299, 303, 304, 1840 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 416 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 53 Women and Afghanistan, 1457, 1690, 1694 and Algeria, 1105 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 264, 265 Eritrean, 1173 and fascism, 454–456 and France, 1047, 1050 and Germany, 620 and India, 1209, 1210 and Ireland, 661 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1065 and the Philippines, 1246 and postcolonial gender roles, 926–927 and social policies, 448–449 as symbols, 445–446, 926, 1345

and Turkey, 769, 770, 1653, 1654 and the United States, 901, 1304 and Wales, 1636 and war, 449–450 See also Gender; Women’s rights Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 453 Women’s movements, 1449, 1450, 1452–1453 Women’s rights, 53–54, 57, 446, 450–451 and France, 173–174, 176 and Germany, 620 and Greece, 53 revolution and, 46, 50–52 social policy and, 446–447 and socialism, 56–57 and Switzerland, 249 transnationalism and, 451–453 See also Suffrage, women’s Wood, Henry, 1438 World Bank, 1610 World divided. See Cold War World War I and Arab nationalism, 727–728 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and assassination of Habsburg heir, 1490 and Australia, 855–856 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529–1530 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306, 1835 colonialism and the causes of, 514 and the Czechoslovaks, 588–589, 593 education and, 426 and Ethiopia, 740 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 438 and fascism, 515 gender roles and, 449 and Germany, 613, 621–622 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 638 and India, 804 and Iraq, 1739, 1742 and Ireland, 651, 660 and Italy, 667, 670 and New Zealand, 868–869 and the Ottoman Empire, 765 and Poland, 682, 682–683 results of, 419, 436, 527 and South Africa, 1150 and statuary, 412 and Turkey, 1643, 1649 and Ukraine, 713 World War II and Alsace, 1507, 1508 and Australia, 857 and Austria, 547–548 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Bulgaria, 582 and Burma, 781, 784–785 and Canada, 302, 1835 and China, 1197

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Yassin, Ahmad, 1137, 1138 Yeats, William Butler, 487–488, 487 (illus.), 489, 654–655, 657, 659, 914, 918 Cathleen ni Houlihan, 922 Yeltsin, Boris, 946, 1079, 1080, 1597, 1597, 1605 Yohannes, Emperor (Tigray), 739 Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 281 Yrjö-Koskinen, Yrjö Sakari, 601 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 1725 Yugoslavia civil wars of, 525, 896, 1044, 1413–1414 common language versus religious difference in, 529 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and international interventions, 1408–1409 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Yushchenko, Viktor, 1080, 1622–1623, 1623, 1626, 1628 Yuson, Alfred A., 1245 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 902

and Czechoslovakia, 594–596 and Eritrea, 1170 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 435, 437–441. See also Holocaust and expansionism after World War I, 524 and Fiji, 1318–1319 and France, 1051–1052, 1052 and gender roles, 450 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 645 and India, 804–806 and Indonesia, 1733 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 667, 674–675 and Japan, 817–818, 822, 1749, 1751 and Malaysia, 1215–1216 music related to, 1433–1434 and nationalism, 509–510, 1490 and New Zealand, 869–870, 872 and Nigeria, 1181 and Palestinians, 1135 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1851 and Poland, 681, 683, 688 role of religion in, 106–107 and Russia, 1603 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and sexualized imagery, 905–907 and the Soviet Union, 1073, 1074, 1075 and Taiwan, 1250–1251 and terrorism, 1496 and Ukraine, 713, 722 Woronicz, J., 692 Worringer, Wilhelm, 415 Wright, Erik Olin, 2 Writing/alphabets, 481, 577, 1529 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703, 1706 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1798 and Romania, 1591 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Tibet, 1815 and Turkey, 773, 1652 Wybicki, Józef, 215 Wysłouch, Bolesław, 681, 685 Xenophobia, 1411–1412, 1415. See also Hypernationalism Xenophon, 1697 Xu¯ant˘ong, Emperor, 1818 Yacine, Kateb, 1100 Yamin, Muhammad, 1727, 1727–1728 Yanaev, Gennadii, 1582 Yang, Edward, 1338 Yanukovych, Viktor, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625

Zaghlul, Saad, 262–263, 263 Zaghlul, Safiyya, 263 Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 1687, 1689 Zaïre. See Congo and Zaïre Zanabazar, 1791 Zavala, Lorenzo de, 353–354 Zealots, 1489 Zeroual, Liamine, 1099 Zetkin, Clara, 453 Zhamtsarano, Tsyben, 1793 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1075–1076 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 1078, 1079–1080 Zhou Enlai, 962, 1816, 1821 Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 1232 Zimbabwe, 1441 Zimmers, Oliver, 244 Zinnermann, J. G., 41 Zinovief, Grigory, 520 Zionism, 103, 104 (illus.), 1120–1121, 1121, 1123–1125, 1126 and agricultural settlements, 1122 and Arab nationalism, 730 and the arts, 1127 and forming national identity, 1127–1130 and language, 477 and Palestinians, 1133 Žižka, Jan, 1023 Zografos, Panagiotis, 632 (illus.) Zola, Emile, 134 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1074 Zta-Halein, Kathinka, 52 Zulus, 27, 1150 Zurayq, Qustantin, 732, 732 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1079–1080, 1597

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About the Editors

Guntram H. Herb, Ph.D., is associate professor of geography at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. In addition to peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, his published works on nationalism include Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945 and the collection of essays co-edited with David H. Kaplan, Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. David H. Kaplan, Ph.D., is professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio. He is an editor of the journal National Identities. His six books include Boundaries and Place (with Jouni Häkli) and Nested Identities (with Guntram Herb). He has also published over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters, many of them in the field of nationalism.

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

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volume 3 1945 to 1989

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 3 1945 to 1989

GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nations and nationalism : a global historical overview / Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-907-8 (alk. paper) 1. History, Modern—18th century. 2. History, Modern—19th century. 3. History, Modern—20th century. 4. Nationalism—History. I. Herb, Guntram Henrik, 1959– II. Kaplan, David H., 1960– D299.N37 2008 320.54—dc22 2008004478

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

volume 3 1945 to 1989

Contents List of Contributors

vii

1016 Czechoslovakia Cynthia Paces

Preface xi

1030 European Union Warren Mason

Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii

1047 France Philippe Couton

Thematic Essays 875 Nationalism and Environmentalism Paul Hamilton

1058 Northern Ireland Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See

888 Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism Berch Berberoglu 899 Gender, Sexuality, and Nationalism Joane Nagel

1082 Spain Elisa Roller

912 Literature, Language, and Anticolonial Nationalism Kim McMullen

Middle East 1094 Algeria Catherine Lloyd, with Ghania Azzout, Samira Hanifi, and Ouassila Loudjani

929 Nation-Building: From a World of Nations to a World of Nationalisms David Brown

1106 Iran David N. Yaghoubian

942 Nationalism in a World Divided Saul B. Cohen 957 Postcolonial Nationalist Philosophies Brett Bowden 971 Religion, Ideology, and Nationalism Zachary Irwin 991 Sports and Nationalism Alan Bairner

Europe 1005 Britain Stephen Heathorn

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1070 Soviet Union Hugh Hudson

1120 Israel Arnon Golan 1132 Palestine Chris Bierwirth

Africa 1144 South Africa Christopher Paulin and Kathleen Woodhouse 1155 Congo and Zaïre Kevin C. Dunn 1167 Eritrea Fouad Makki

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CONTENTS

1177 Nigeria Bonny Ibhawoh

1261 Vietnam Christopher A. Airriess

Asia

Americas

1190 China Orion Lewis and Jessica Teets

1273 Cuba Antoni Kapcia

1201 India Laura Dudley Jenkins

1287 Québec James Kennedy

1213 Malaysia and Singapore Albert Lau

1299 United States Melanie E. L. Bush and Roderick D. Bush

1227 Pakistan Hooman Peimani

Oceania

1238 Philippines Christine Doran

1313 Fiji Martha Kaplan Index

1249 Taiwan Stéphane Corcuff

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List of Contributors

Marco Adria University of Alberta

Linda Bryder University of Auckland

Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University

Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University

Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University

Roderick D. Bush St. John’s University

Stephen Alomes Deakin University

Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico

Celia Applegate University of Rochester

Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii

Christopher P. Atwood Indiana University

Colin M. Coates York University

Ghania Azzout University of Algiers

Saul B. Cohen Queens College CUNY

Alan Bairner Loughborough University

Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor)

Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Joshua Barker University of Toronto Roderick J. Barman University of British Columbia Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Stefan Berger Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Brett Bowden University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Stella Coram Independent Scholar Stéphane Corcuff University of Lyon Jeffrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Ralph Coury Fairfield University Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Ben Curtis Seattle College Patrice M. Dabrowski Harvard University

David Brandenberger University of Richmond

Dev Raj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal

David Brown Murdoch University

Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jason Dittmer University College London

Dennis Hart Kent State University

Chris Dixon University of Queensland

David Allen Harvey New College of Florida

Christine Doran Charles Darwin University

Stephen Heathorn McMaster University

Maria Dowling St. Mary’s College

Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University

Stéphane Dufoix Universite Paris X–Nanterre

Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol

Jordana Dym Skidmore College

Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands

Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University

Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University

Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University

Hugh Hudson Georgia State University

Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University

Bonny Ibhawoh McMaster University

Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen

Grigory Ioffe Radford University

Will Fowler University of St. Andrews

Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, The Behrend College

Michael E. Geisler Middlebury College Paul Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere

Tareq Y. Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto

Seyoum Hameso University of East London

Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna

Paul Hamilton Brock University

Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Samira Hanifi University of Algiers

Cynthia Joseph Monash University

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CONTRIBUTORS

John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh

Christopher Marsh Baylor University

Gregory Jusdanis The Ohio State University

Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio

Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University

John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia

Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University

John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College

Martha Kaplan Vassar College

John McLane Northwestern University

Sharon Kelly University of Toronto

Kim McMullen Kenyon College

James Kennedy University of Edinburgh

Neil McWilliam Duke University

Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma

Nenad Miscevic Central European University

P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California

Graeme Morton University of Guelph

David B. Knight University of Guelph Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Taras Kuzio George Washington University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Orion Lewis University of Colorado, Boulder Hong-Ming Liang The College of St. Scholastica Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers

Joane Nagel University of Kansas Byron Nordstrom Gustavus Adolphus College Kevin C. O’Connor Gonzaga University Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Brian S. Osborne Queen’s University Cynthia Paces The College of New Jersey

Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee

Razmik Panossian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University

Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College

Fouad Makki Cornell University

Hooman Peimani Bradford University

Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London

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CONTRIBUTORS

Linda Racioppi Michigan State University

Ray Taras University of Colorado

Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki

Jessica Teets University of Colorado, Boulder

Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst

Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University

Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney

Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion

Toon van Meijl University of Nijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber University of Applied Languages (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings The Australian National University George W. White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David N. Yaghoubian California State University, San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu

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Preface

What is a nation? What is nationalism? What does it mean to examine them in global perspective? We conceive of a nation or national identity as a form of loyalty. People have a multitude of loyalties: to family, friends, places, clubs, institutions, regions, countries, even to their place of work or brands of products. What distinguishes loyalty to a nation is the primacy it holds on people’s allegiance. It is so powerful that people are willing to give their lives to ensure the continued existence of the group members and territory that make up their nation. By extension, we call nationalism the process that defines, creates, and expresses this essential loyalty to the nation. We view the term nationalism in a neutral sense. While this process can take extreme forms and lead to violent aggression and the extermination of others, nationalism can also be benign and form the basis for peaceful coexistence. Nations and nationalism have found a bewildering range of expressions across the world and through time, and it is this geographic and temporal variation that we seek to address in a systematic fashion. Given the sheer number of nations that exist or have existed historically—some scholars argue that there are as many as 4,000–5,000 in just the contemporary era—our global perspective does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead we have chosen to follow cross-sections through time and space. We identify major historical eras in the development of nations and nationalism to examine characteristic themes and representative cases from all major regions of the world. Our emphasis is on depth rather than breadth. The 146 entries in this encyclopedia are full-length articles that go in depth to cover major debates and issues instead of brief descriptions of general features. They are authored by reputable scholars and try to provide accessible introductions to topics that are ambiguous, complex, and frequently misunderstood. Because literature on nations and nationalism arguably ranks among the most diverse and convoluted, our goal is to provide students, nonspecialists, and even junior scholars with concise information on this subject. In deciding what cases and themes to use, we take representative examples from each world region. These run the gamut from large powerful nations such as China and Russia to smaller nations that do not enjoy any form of sovereignty, like Tibet and Wales. We try to cover both prosperous nations of the developed world along with ex-colonial nations in the less-developed world. Similarly, some nations only appear during one time period, and others do not appear at all, because the most important consideration for us was that at least one representative example from all major regions of the world was included, even if scholarship has sorely neglected or sidelined that area, such as in Africa. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The selection of specific themes and cases that are treated intensively means that our coverage will have some unavoidable gaps. For example, there are no thematic chapters that treat race independently. This omission is not because we consider the issue to be of little significance, but because we feel that race is so elemental to discussions of nations and nationalism that it cannot be separated out. Similarly, it was not always possible to stick to the neat historical categorization into the four time periods. Some of our entries bridge several volumes to provide the most effective treatment of individual cases and themes. This encyclopedia is arranged chronologically in four volumes. The first volume traces the origins and formative processes of nations and nationalism from 1770 to 1880. The second volume covers the aggressive intensification of nationalism during the age of imperialism, from 1880 to 1945. The third volume deals with the decline of nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, from 1945 to 1989. The final volume outlines the transformations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War in 1989. All 104 country essays have the same format, and each is approximately 4,000 words. Each includes a chronology to position the reader in time; a discursive essay on main features; illustrations to help the reader visualize specific issues, situations, or persons; and a brief bibliography to guide additional inquiries. The case study essays also contain sidebars that highlight unique events, persons, or institutions. The main essays all contain five sections that help structure the inquiry and provide a universal key to access the information: (1) “Situating the Nation” places the national case in a historical, political, social, and geographic context; (2) “Instituting the Nation” examines key actors and institutions as well as philosophical foundations; (3) “Defining the Nation” discusses the role of ethno-cultural, civilizational, and geographic markers in creating the us–them distinction that is at the heart of national identity; (4) “Narrating the Nation” addresses particular events, stories, and myths that are used to create a community of belonging; and (5) “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” focuses on actions and strategies that help legitimize the national idea. Our 42 thematic essays address the interplay between national identity, politics, culture, and society and are generally 6,000 words long. They focus on geopolitical contexts and economic conditions, such as postcolonialism and globalization; social relations, such as gender and class; dominant philosophies and ideologies, such as fascism and fundamentalism; and nationalist cultural creations and expressions, such as art, literature, music, or sports. Though specific themes vary in each of the four volumes, each of the thematic essays include bibliographies and illustrations, and touch on the following questions: (1) How were the issues/phenomena under discussion important? (2) What is the background and what are the origins? (3) What are major dimensions and impacts on different groups, societal conditions, and ideas? (4) What are the consequences and ramifications of this issue for the character and future development of nations and nationalism? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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PREFACE

We feel that our encyclopedia makes an important addition to the current reference literature on nations and nationalism. Existing encyclopedias in the field generally contain only very brief entries (Spira 1999, 2002; Leoussi 2001); are dated (Snyder 1990); neglect such civic nations as the United States or Switzerland (Minahan 2002); or are uneven because they combine a few excessively long survey articles with several extremely short entries (Motyl 2001). A universal and significant shortcoming is the lack of maps and illustrations. Except for a limited number of general maps and select illustrations in Minahan, the other works do not have a single map, figure, or image. We believe that an encyclopedia on nationalism must contain visual information for it to effectively convey the contexts within which nationalist movements arose and to depict the important symbology that was used to galvanize national sentiment. Our encyclopedia also offers a unique and novel way to access information on nations and nationalisms. The thematic entries give insights into the larger contexts for the country essays and illustrate linkages among them in regard to general topics such as national education. The individual country entries allow readers to compare and contrast developments in different places and to examine trends in major regions of the world during different time periods. Finally, since some of the places and themes appear in all four volumes, it is possible to trace developments and identify linkages not only among places, but also through time. We hope that this encyclopedia helps to further an understanding of perhaps the most influential set of identities and ideologies in the world today. We also hope that this collection of cases and themes selected across space and time sheds some light on the different ways in which these loyalties are manifested. While this encyclopedia constitutes a very large body of work, it can only scratch the surface of all of the different varieties inherent in a study of nations and nationalism. We encourage the reader to follow up on some of the selected readings that are listed at the end of each entry and to further explore some of the various cases and themes that have not been explicitly addressed. References Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Minahan, James. 2002. Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. San Diego: Academic Press. Snyder, Louis. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House. Spira, Thomas. 1999 (vol. 1), 2002 (vol. 2). Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

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Acknowledgments

An enormous undertaking such as this four-volume work could not be accomplished without the help of several individuals. Of course we would like to thank all of our contributors, who were wonderful about following formatting guidelines, making revisions, and cheerfully supplying additional material as the need arose. We are very saddened that one of our contributors, Jeffrey Cormier, did not live to see the publication of this work. We would also like to pay special thanks to the people at ABC-CLIO, among them Ron Boehm, Wendy Roseth, Kristin Gibson, and especially Alex Mikaberidze. The efforts of ABC-CLIO’s publication team have allowed us to complete this project in a sustained and timely manner. Above all we wish to extend our gratitude to those people who have worked tirelessly in assisting us in this endeavor. Their efforts are reflected throughout these four volumes. Kathleen Woodhouse from Kent State University was instrumental in helping to conceive of this project, in identifying and lining up the contributors, and in evaluating and editing each and every entry in Volumes 3 and 4. She also played a major part in the development of three of the essays. She has been an enormous asset and has worked tirelessly to see this project from start to finish. Gruia Badescu, Zachary Hecht-Leavitt, Jonathan Hsu, and Conor Stinson provided invaluable assistance in Middlebury, Vermont. Their contributions would not have been possible without the generous support of Middlebury College, which is deeply appreciated. Zach and Gruia aided in identifying contributors, selecting illustrations, and managing numerous administrative tasks. Zach’s excellent writing and editorial skills ensured that many of the entries authored by non-native English speakers were transformed into stylistically polished pieces. Gruia’s remarkable linguistic skills and knowledge of the scholarship of nationalism allowed him to contribute deep insights to the review process as well as to the drafting of two introductory essays. Jonathan Hsu and Conor Stinson are to be credited for the beautiful cartographic design. Producing maps for these volumes proved to be a challenging and enormous project. The maps needed to vary greatly in scale—from small areas, such as Estonia, to giant regions, such as Russia—but at the same time needed to allow for easy comparisons. The historical maps were particularly difficult given the numerous border changes that took place and the lack of good reference sources, but Jonathan mastered this hurdle with ease. He is not only a gifted cartographer but an excellent researcher. Putting on the finishing touches to turn the massive manuscript and numerous images and maps into a coherent and beautiful set of volumes was also an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

enormous challenge, and we were fortunate to have the able assistance of Cami Cacciatore, Kristine Swift, and Kerry Jackson at ABC-CLIO and of Samuel Lazarus, Caitlin Sargent, and Mithra Harivandi at Middlebury College. Finally, we would like to thank our families for the unwavering support they gave us throughout this giant undertaking. We dedicate this work to the memory of David Woodward.

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Introduction Volume 3: 1945 to 1989

This volume examines nationalism and national identities between 1945 and 1989. The year 1945 marks the end of World War II, the largest, most comprehensive conflict fought in the history of the human race. World War II was also a war of nationalism. The Germans, Japanese, and Italians began the war believing that their own nations should be accorded greater status than that of other nations and peoples. Nazism, fascism, and Japanese militarism exalted nationalism and national ideology above all else. By the end of World War II, these countries were defeated, many of the ideas that had spawned the war were completely discredited, and, with the notable exception of the United States, most of the major combatants lay devastated. The end of World War II signaled a watershed in the development of nationalist thinking and national identities. This volume considers a series of thematic essays and case studies that deal with particular aspects of some of the changes in both thought and identity. We consider in this Introduction four principal changes: (1) the end of the European era; (2) the beginning of superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union; (3) the spread of decolonization as formerly dependent colonies became independent states; and (4) the increased assertion of stateless nations, as manifested in both national separatist and irredentist movements. Before World War II, it was the European powers, particularly Great Britain, France, and Germany, that dominated the world order. These countries were at the top of the global hierarchy, both militarily and economically. After 1945, European influence over world affairs, while still considerable, ebbed. Moreover, most European countries saw their major cities bombed, their resources tapped out, and their populations decimated by six long years of conflict. The major front lines of World War II—at least in the Atlantic theater—were on European soil, but even those countries that were removed from the front paid a heavy price in human and natural resources. For countries in Western Europe, the seeds of a new prosperity were planted in the ruins of warfare. New social welfare systems were developed, new industries were established, and many societies were able to enjoy, over the decades, a standard of living far higher than what they had experienced before the war. Japan enjoyed even greater success as it went from a bombed-out shell to an economic superpower in only 30 years. It is worth mentioning that the major antagonists in World War II—Germany, Italy, and Japan—also adopted new democratic institutions that were stable and enduring. This was not true in Eastern Europe where many societies fell under the umbrella of Soviet domination. Such countries had never been particularly wealthy, but their experience under communism ensured N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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that they would remain stuck at a fairly low standard of living. Truly democratic institutions were not given a chance to thrive, and soon almost all countries fell under the domination of single-party, communist governments. Perhaps in recognition of their altered status, many Western European countries began to form a common market in the 1950s. This European Common Market evolved into a European Union that eventually included most of the countries within Western Europe (and later in the 1990s and early 21st century began to incorporate countries in Eastern Europe as well). This European Union took on certain attributes of a political state and required that each of the member states cede some authority to this larger supranational entity. Although other unions had sprung up in other parts of the world, the European Union represented something quite special and distinct. The second change has to do with the beginning of an intense superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The so-called Cold War marked not only a struggle between two countries but also a conflict between two ideological systems and those countries that subscribed to either a free-market ideology or an ideology based around communist or socialist principles. To some thinkers this ideological alignment overshadowed the traditional alignments that had been based on national identity, religion, language, and other such expressions of affinity. This ideological struggle helped shape the world. The world became bipolar as the superpowers developed a stable set of allies and military blocs. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization—comprising the United States together with countries in Western and Central Europe and Canada—was an alliance built around the containment of communism, formulated most famously by George Kennan. The United States forged other alliances with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. For the Soviet Union, most countries in Eastern Europe joined together to form the Warsaw Pact. Beyond these alliances lay a series of client states that each superpower sought to cultivate. The list of such client states is too numerous to mention here but consisted at various times of such countries as China, Vietnam, Cuba, perhaps even Israel. China notably became independent of Soviet influence and began to develop a set of alliances and military interests on its own at odds with the interests of the Soviets. The effect of the Cold War may have been to stifle some aspects of nationalism. Certainly from a military standpoint, it was the first time in history that each power or superpower had the capacity to completely annihilate the other superpower and waste large parts of the world. Thus began the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction,” which kept conflict at an angry simmer. Instead of all-out war, much of the fighting was conducted through a series of proxy wars as each superpower took sides in battles between or within other countries. The Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and the Afghan war were all good examples of proxy wars that were fought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Another consequence of this superpower rivalry was that countries were sometimes N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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partitioned between communist and capitalist sections. The most famous case was, of course, Germany, the preeminent power before the war, now split between a communist East and a capitalist West. The attempt to develop a series of alignments and alliances meant that superpowers would support other countries even if they flouted their ideological ideals. The United States, which prided itself on its democratic institutions, often bolstered military dictatorships if these dictators tended to support the larger struggle against communism. The U.S. support for the Philippines and Chile is a good example of this tendency during this time. The third change has to do with decolonization. Before World War II, much of the world was organized into a series of overseas empires led by European countries, Japan, and the United States. After the war, many of these colonies became independent. This process took some 30 years and began most notably with the huge colony of India, which split eventually into the countries of India, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh. The Dutch colony of Indonesia also gained independence at this time, as did Southeast Asian countries within French Indochina and in the Philippines. Later, several countries within North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean basin also gained their independence. This massive decolonization led to a threefold increase in independent states from 1945 to 1989. When colonies became independent, they were forced to follow existing spatial units rather than the territorial contours of existing nations or ethnic groups. As a result, one of the key challenges for newly independent countries was forging a unified national identity that could transcend ethnic rivalries. In some instances, partition, as was effected between India and Pakistan, was one (imperfect) solution to this dilemma. But in other cases, there was really no clear path by which to create true nation-states, or even multinational states, that felt a common bond. From the outset many of these new countries were riven by major factional struggles, making it very difficult for them to develop politically and economically. The case of Nigeria is instructive, as it comprised three major national regions. Yet efforts to create new states from these disparate regions—as attempted by the proposed country of Biafra in the 1960s—proved impossible. While some countries, like India, were able to create a vibrant democracy, most newly independent countries did not. Military dictatorships sprang up, rapidly fostered by suspicion and a lack of mature institutions. Dissent was often squashed. Governments spent less time attempting to create a viable country than in building up their militaries, looting their country’s resources, and ravaging the national trust. The attempts by the superpowers to enlist some countries in various alignments only made matters worse. The Cold War era together with decolonization spawned the creation of the so-called Third World. These were countries that considered themselves to be nonaligned and outside of the Soviet or American orbit. The term “Third World” later came to mean countries that were less economically advanced and much poorer than countries in North America, Europe, and Japan. Many Third World countries suffered from problems related to uneven development, an explosion in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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their population, excessive urbanization, and environmental degradation. With few resources, they had difficulty just trying to feed their own people, much less developing in any substantive way. A 1950s’ book by W. W. Rostow titled Stages of Development indicated that economic development went hand in hand with cultural, social, and political developments. Yet scholars like Andre Gunder Frank argued that dependent economic relations between former colonies and metropoles continued long after the colonial era, which exacerbated the problem of uneven development. The fourth change was what analysts such as Bernard Nietschmann described as the discovery of a fourth world, a shorthand for nations without political independence and sovereignty. Clearly, this was a problem in those countries recently carved out of colonial territory, but it also affected much of the developed world. In country after country, movements were formed or reignited to claim their rights as a sovereign group of people. National separatist movements, in which a territory desired political independence, or irredentist movements in which members of a territory desired to be reunited with a country across the international boundary, became a feature in much of the stable West. (In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, such movements were suppressed but have become much more prominent in the 1990s and into the 21st century.) In Canada, French Canadians within the province of Québec declared that Québec should be independent, and they successfully pursued part of these goals through the election of an avowedly separatist provincial government. In the United Kingdom, Catholics within Northern Ireland claimed that they should be reunited with their brethren in the southern republic of Ireland. The growth of these nationalist movements belied the major ideological struggles that were going on between the superpowers, but they also suggested that it was possible for smaller groups to assert their rights. Beyond separatist or irredentist movements, many societies in the Western world also experienced a redefinition of their own national identity. In part, this was sparked by immigration or the introduction of guest workers, as prosperous societies saw themselves being “invaded” by ethnically distinct people. Even the United States and Canada —long habituated to the immigration of peoples from Europe—had to contend with rising numbers of immigrants from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, during this period, national identity was transformed by the promotion of rights among those groups that had previously been marginalized. Civil rights movements sought the emancipation of minorities. Women’s liberation movements improved rights and opportunities for women. That all segments of society should be able to participate in the life of the nation became at least a stated ideal, although perhaps less observed in practice. In any event, these movements changed what it meant to belong to a nation. National identity would never again be the same. david h. kapl an

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Nationalism and Environmentalism Paul Hamilton Relevance Nationalism resists easy comprehensive definition because of its variability across time and space. There are examples of racist, ethnic, civic, and irredentist (Latin for redemptus, “brought back” or restored territory) nationalism, among other things. Nationalism is a blunt instrument, a means of unifying individuals in a political project. If we think of nationalism in this way, then we can see how political entrepreneurs might link identity to salient or relevant contextual factors, like territory or the environment. This does not, of course, imply a commitment to some kind of progressive politics, or to any particular environmental problem, but rather illustrates the extent to which nationalism is a malleable, or flexible, organizing principle. It is not a coherent ideology but, rather, tends to act as an ideological parasite hosted by other ideologies. In other words, while ideologies like liberalism and Marxism contain a program of specific assumptions, goals, and values, nationalism simply implies a political program whose central concern is the nation. Beyond that central concept, nationalisms may vary widely in their specific policy concerns. Nationalism is a political project linked to the aspirations of a community who share one or more “objective characteristics” (language and culture) and a sense of a shared past and future. It is not simply the presence of a commonality; for example, many people speak English, but this is a very unlikely basis of shared national community now that English boasts one of the largest linguistic populations spread across every continent. On the other hand, nationalism can vary in its form and content. There is no single definition of nationalism universally agreed upon, but most would contend that nationalism is concerned with the political aspirations of a defined community and that these aspirations are obviously of political import. Politically loaded, also, is the relationship of communities to the natural world. Almost all political projects have an implicit or explicit place for nature in their worldview. In this essay, I argue that nature is critically important for nationalists, but not necessarily in the same way or in a single ideological fashion. Environmentalism is a rich source of national identity. In settler societies where most of the native population was marginalized by European colonists, the environment is part of the national character embodying the steely resolve of early pioneers engaged in “conquest” of the natural world. In many parts of the world, the character of the society is said to be shaped by the landscape. Think of the central Asian steppe, or the Arabian Peninsula’s vast desert, and how these backdrops shaped national identity. Icelandic nationalism and identity have been N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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characterized by pride in being one of Europe’s last wild spaces, with clean rivers and cheap, clean hydrothermal power. The linkage between the natural environment and national history and character is very frequently observed. In Brazil and the Soviet Union, conquest of the frontiers of Amazonia and Siberia, respectively, was part of a broader mission to master nature, inculcate national pride, and establish sovereignty, especially in recent decades. After World War II, both states emphasized the development of these vast and potentially vulnerable regions to protect them from neighboring states. Part of this project included the migration of people to underpopulated parts of the state. In both cases this settlement was meant to establish sovereignty and to encourage the assimilation of minorities. This practice of population movement is known as transmigration in Indonesia where the large population of the island of Java stands in stark contrast to the relatively empty spaces of Borneo, Sumatra, and the Indonesian half of New Guinea (Irian Jaya). Transmigration is a means to establish the dominant culture of the state, which is both Javan and Islamic. The program serves to establish and protect Indonesian sovereignty over the periphery of the Indonesian state and to further Javanize the society. In “new states,” the impetus to consolidate sovereignty and a shared identity is powerful and practically important. New states are often territorially arbitrary, with many disparate societies residing in the same postcolonial space. In such states, political borders do not reflect cultural borders, and this disjunction can lead to interethnic strife. Population transfers implicitly reveal the aim of the central government to place its stamp on all parts of the national territory. These transfers have not been uncontroversial. Minorities (Christians, Hindus, traditional indigenous communities) have had to face both an influx of alien settlers and the resultant environmental problems, particularly habitat destruction via deforestation and mining. Environmental problems therefore get intertwined with disputes over resources development and distribution. In China, population transfers, aided by the authoritarian nature of that regime, have been used to reduce local distinctiveness in Tibet and Chinese Turkistan with an aim of putting a Han Chinese stamp on the entire territory of China, a state that has a remarkable disparity in settlement, with a sparsely populated center and west and a heavily populated east coast. Brazil and the Soviet Union have similar disparities of population density that governments have attempted to reduce via economic incentives and, in the case of the Soviet Union, the establishment of the infamous prison camp system, the Gulag. It is difficult to discuss the linkages between environmentalism and nationalism without some acknowledgment of the historical backdrop of both phenomena. The political phenomenon of environmentalism, or ecologism, is a particular manifestation of what is sometimes described as part of the “new politics” of the postwar West. This particular political project is usually tied to a critique of bureaucracy, atomizing society, consumerism, and a lack of meaning in everyday life. Ecologists, as manifested in green political parties, have long sought to include the environment on the economic and social balance sheet in modern sociN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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eties. Furthermore, we can see in this movement an appeal to global consciousness and global solutions to what are clearly problems beyond the realm of any single state. A great example of a global environmental problem beyond the control of an individual state is global warming. The only way to combat the climate change associated with greenhouse gas production is a treaty that binds states to a compulsory program of greenhouse gas reduction along with a specific timetable. The Kyoto Treaty was designed to do this, but as often happens with international problems, some countries rejected participation to protect their own economic interests. For example, both Australia and the United States rejected participation in Kyoto out of fear that their economies would be hurt by compulsory targets for greenhouse gases not being applied to developing countries like China and India. It is precisely the global dimension of environmental problems that has led some environmentalists to look to global cooperation (what political scientists call “multilateralism”) between states to move beyond narrow nationalism. The “ecopax” movements demanding peace, ecological consciousness, and human rights clearly emerged after World War II. Their “ancestors” are the conservation movements of the 19th century found in North America and western Europe. The “new politics” that emerged after World War II are hostile to nationalism and to the privileged status of the modern state. This orientation is clear in the antimilitarist, anti-imperial, and antiracist agendas of such movements. There is also a great and consistent commitment to multilateral solutions to complex international problems, which further suggests that this strain of environmental thought is antinationalist. It must be acknowledged, though, that the “new politics” tilt of contemporary ecologism does not imply that environmental issues cannot also be used by reactionary forces of the fascist right and by a variety of nationalists. Andrew Dobson makes a clear distinction between ecologism and environmentalism. In short, ecologism is a holistic perspective that considers important the relations between human beings and nature. Really, we could say that this view erases the cultural border between humans and nature; we are part of nature. This revived self-consciousness is very different from the ethos of environmentalism, which often takes an instrumental view of nature as a resource to be managed like capital. The terminology of environmentalist or green discourse becomes quite laden with political freight. It is tempting to conclude that ecologism is a political project that places nature at the center of human life, whereas environmentalism can be conveniently wedded to almost any political project. Nationalism and environmentalism are most closely joined in two ways. First, nationalists often use biogenetic metaphor to underpin their political demands. In other words, the nation is like a family, all related by ancestry. Second, nationalists will appeal to concerns about natural resources and link them to the overall health and future of the nation. They will contrast their wise and sensitive stewardship of the natural world with the rapaciousness of outsiders. One way that nationalists link biological conservation to the health of the nation is by appealing to concerns about cultural submergence. As with concern N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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over biodiversity, nationalists may point to threats to cultural diversity and raise alarms about the precarious state of the culture of the nation. There is considerable weight to this concern with some national groups. If language is one of the best distinguishing features of a nation, then concern with linguistic diversity becomes very important for nationalists. This is obvious with the minority nationalism of western Europe. The Basques and the Welsh nationalists are just two of the many minority nationalisms that use concerns about cultural survival in their political discourse. Diversity is a core value for environmentalists and for many nationalists. The Basques speak a language unlike any other on Earth, and this gives Basque nationalism an obvious ethnic character. Less obvious is a formal political effort to firmly link Basque national discourse to environmentalism. One does find this with Wales’ nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru is a party dedicated to both the preservation of Welsh culture and of the local and global environment. Plaid Cymru was founded in 1925 by cultural elites (poets, academics, etc.) who feared that the Welsh language was being threatened with extinction. This relatively narrow focus broadened after World War II when the party adopted a pacificist position and embraced a “new left” politics. The party thus made efforts to interact with the local (and urban) peace and ecology movements that flowered in the 1950s and 1960s. The trend toward the adoption of pacifism, environmentalism, and anti-imperialism remains today, along with a commitment to internal Welsh diversity (welcoming immigrants and the descendants of English and other settlers) and decentralization within the European Union. The party’s symbol, the Triban (“three mountains”), is composed of three peaks representing the mountains of central Wales. The symbol fuses the natural and the political but in doing so manages to avoid an essentialist conception of Welshness. This is interesting because environmental themes are flexible enough to link to almost any political agenda. A territorially based nationalism is much less arbitrary than an ethnic one, as residency becomes the primary criterion for membership in the political community. The environment and nationalism come together clearly in pro-natalist (childbirth encouraging) policies, too. Nationalism might be preoccupied with maintaining population that in turn can serve as a pressure on the natural environment. Nationalists may also use the vocabulary of nature conservation when considering their nation’s birthrate. Pro-natalist policies are ones that encourage higher fertility rates via economic or other incentives. In the Stalin era, Soviet women were provided economic incentives to have more children, and medals were awarded to “Heroine Mothers” who had 10 children or more. In postwar Europe, pro-natalist policies have been tried and debated as Europe (and other developed societies) has experienced a decline in birthrates with greater economic growth and individual autonomy. Nationalists are often concerned with diversity, and this concern is certainly justified. The 20th century witnessed mass language extinction. There are 6,000 languages on Earth today, but many are being threatened by the forces of globalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ization, local assimilation, and marginalization. The majority of languages that are threatened are in regions where modern states were imposed from abroad and the official language is often that of the old colonial power. This is particularly evident in the Western Hemisphere and the South Pacific. Without the platform of a state to preserve the language (many of these are oral languages), the language’s fate mirrors the fate of traditional lifestyles and older generations. Coupled with aggressive assimilative pressures, no more than 200 of the world’s languages can be assumed to be safe from extinction in the coming century. Languages under threat heightens awareness of diversity, and nations with such minorities can become ready allies of environmentalists. This is particularly true in the Western Hemisphere where native languages are threatened alongside natural and native habitats. It is impossible not to see the connection, for example, between the fate of Inuit communities and the global warming that will alter the lifestyles of these societies more, perhaps, than any other groups. In the South Pacific, entire societies will have to be uprooted in anticipation of the submergence of islands such as Tuvalu in the 21st century. As minority nationals are threatened by the environmentally damaging consequences of the activities of outsiders, we can readily see how nationalism will be underpinned or grafted onto concerns about the environment.

Origins Environmentalism has been explicitly linked with nationalism in a variety of contexts. In other cases the connection is subtle and only a component of a broader nationalist discourse. The concept of bioregionalism is one that has a clear connection to nationalism. Kirkpatrick Sale identifies four key elements of bioregionalism: community, self-reliance, knowing the land, and learning and transmitting the lore of the land. These elements can help support a conception of nationalism. Community implies the identification of a group sharing a sense of a shared past and future. The link between group solidarity and environmental health is clear, and groups may be particularly zealous about protecting their local environment when its health is linked to group survival. Self-reliance resembles the Greek term autarky, where nations strive for autonomy from outsiders. True autarchy is impossible in the modern world of political, economic, and cultural integration, but its appeal for nationalists is understandable. Knowing the land is also key to group identity, and one sees knowledge of place as a key component to the identity of groups, particularly indigenous communities. The final principle of bioregionalism is an obvious component of group identity maintenance. The content of the stories and lore of a community help build intergenerational identity and solidarity. All four elements may enhance the receptiveness of a community to a nationalist discourse. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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In societies where there is no core ethnic group, territory and nature may serve as an innocuous and inoffensive basis of unity. In Canada, where there are three “founding nations” (Québécois, Anglo-Saxons, and indigenous people), national myths have the potential to be divisive and controversial. The best option for nation-builders is to focus on the myths of settlement, the invigorating properties of the northern wilderness, and the exploitation of abundant resources. The theme of settlement and triumph over natural adversity is found in Canadian national myth, literature, and culture. The wilderness distinguishes Canada from its European roots and serves as an object of unity. This hasn’t prevented the emergence of a strong nationalist movement in Québec, or a similar revival of indigenous culture and demands for recognition and autonomy, but it does provide a thread of commonality that all Canadians can share regardless of their origins. One might apply the same argument to Australia, another settler society with similar divisions between settlers and indigenous people, and after World War II, between Anglo-Celtic and European and non-European immigrants. In another context, Israel, a settler ethos was coupled with a mission. Zionists (Israeli nationalists) sought a “restorative” project that would restore the fertile, pristine Zion (Israel) with the return of the “chosen people.” This may, in fact, be one of the most intensely connected instances of environmental nationalism, where territory and stewardship are linked fundamentally to the health of the nation and the fulfillment of national/spiritual destiny. Nationalism is often thought to be a European phenomenon like the modern state. Still, the novelty of nationalism in most of the world does not make people less receptive to its call. Nationalism is a means to mobilize and inculcate group loyalty, and so we should not underestimate nationalism’s importance as a political force. Its key strength lies in its flexible character. Nationalists are able to harness the power of preexisting sources of identity and merge them with a political project. Thus we have the veneer of the new Soviet person after 1917, but in reality, this identity was supported by a clear connection with Russian identity and language. The malleability of nationalism makes it convenient for leaders and political entrepreneurs but makes it frustrating for scholars seeking clear, universally applicable definitions. In fact, nature can be prominently featured in the discourse of nationalist movements, with context being the determining factor in whether a nationalist movement is “reactionary” or “progressive.” Andrew Dobson introduces a helpful distinction between environmentalism, which is concerned with the management of human impacts on the planet, and ecologism, which is concerned more deeply with our relationship to nature. The second term implies an ideological outlook; the first, a technocratic one. Environmentalists wish to protect, but this commitment to conservation might be human-centered and concerned with resource management; ecologism, on the other hand, implies treating nature as an end in itself, that is, that nature ought to be preserved and protected regardless of human commercial interests. But both can potentially be wed to some kind of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nationalist discourse. The best example of a nationalism that is consistent with ecologism is that of Plaid Cymru. The policy of Plaid Cymru is so similar to that of the British Green Party that electoral alliances were struck in the early 1990s. There are differences, to be sure, but if contemporary green parties value human rights, pacifism, decentralization, nuclear disarmament, equality, and deep democracy, then they find a ready ally in Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru is a great example of a civic nationalist political party. It is nationalist because it is, literally, the “Party of Wales.” Plaid Cymru seeks to achieve autonomy for Wales in a reconfigured federal European Union. It has long been committed to nuclear disarmament. Plaid Cymru critiques the democratic deficit in the United Kingdom, where permanent minorities like the Welsh are unable to fully achieve their potential and the society they want because of the centralization of the British state. Th ere is a desire to humanize politics by localizing decision making as much as possible. The term subsidiarity is a central concept in Plaid Cymru thought. Subsidiarity is the principle that decision making ought to be made at the lowest possible level except where impractical. This view is in keeping with the ecologist commitment to local democracy and global cooperation in the form of multilateralism. Plaid Cymru seeks a federal Europe of regions in which the smallest jurisdictions exercise power, leaving residual power to the supranational level. An obvious example would be the strategy to address global warming, a problem beyond any single jurisdiction’s reach. The close of World War II ended the prospects of fascism as a model of societal organization and served to discredit one version of nationalism. The two systems that remained enjoyed considerable legitimacy and were buttressed by varying sorts of nationalism. The command economies of the nominally Marxist states provided equality and collective advancement and modernization. Th ese systems also enjoyed the affection generated by military victory. However, the revolutionary project of Marxism-Leninism was reduced mainly to rhetoric and tepid support for like regimes in the developing world. The dominant ethos of the Marxist world was rationality and collective advance via strong states. In environmental terms, these states were not very different from their counterparts in the liberal capitalist world. Resource exploitation and industrial development were seen as the means to leap ahead and modernize. Like in the West, this commitment to growth carried an environmental price. In the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact countries, environmental crisis emerged slowly with a general crisis of legitimacy. States that had derived legitimacy from military victory, economic growth, and individual welfare found themselves confronted with the environmental consequences of industrial society. The linkage to nationalism was most clearly seen in the periphery of the Soviet Union where local populations, already tentative in their allegiance to the state, began to link environmental problems with the dominance of Moscow. Of course, nationalism was already being fueled by fears of cultural submergence, the absence of democracy, and outright oppression of religion and language, but environmental N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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crisis should not be overlooked as a factor in the renaissance of minority nationalism in the Soviet Union. Even before Chernobyl, ecological problems related to pollution and resource depletion encouraged local politicians to blame the center for local problems, and these complaints could then be linked to a general nationalist demand for autonomy. The decline of the Aral Sea in central Asia is a testament to the folly of authoritarian centralization. Karakalpakistan, Uzbekistan’s shoreline on the Aral Sea, has long been in epidemiological crisis, which mirrors the decline of the vast inland sea. Hanks has linked the eco-catastrophe to nationalism in central Asia, as specific ethnic groups encountered health problems, such as disproportionate rates of anemia and cancer. The deplorable environmental practices fueled anger at the abuses of the Soviet system and provided nationalists with arguments for local management of the environment. The Karakalpaks have been disproportionately hurt by the Aral’s problems, caused primarily by huge diversions of water from the Amu Dyra and Syr Dyra rivers to the cotton fields of the Uzbek republic. The mega projects of the Soviet Union undoubtedly aided development and raised living standards, but the capacity of nature to absorb such changes was exceeded, and a witch’s brew of environmental problems has accompanied the shrinking Aral Sea. The sea was greatly reduced in volume and area over the decades, and what remains is hypersalinated, heavily polluted with pesticides, and depleted of fish. Complicating matters since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been the emergence of two sovereign states (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) sharing the Aral Sea and the prospect of regional disputes over the primary rivers feeding the sea. One fascinating linkage between environmentalism and nationalism can be observed in the discourse and political thought of the European far right, especially the German far right. Of course, Nazism was the flip side of Marxism-Leninism with its commitment to rational planning, transnational solidarity and equality, and narrative of mastery over nature. Nazism—as distinct from other European fascist movements—was peculiar in its celebration of nature, its observance of ancient Teutonic religious tradition, and its dedication to a sinister, quasi-Darwinist view of the world involving competition and outright conflict between “races.” Moreover, the Nazis demonized enemy ethnic groups with the use of medical terminology—referring to Jews, for example, as parasites and worse. Employing a kind of ideological forensic examination, one can see the origins of far-right German eco-nationalism in the Romanticism of early periods. German nationalist intellectuals appealed to the romantic instincts of their compatriots against the tide of modernization and democratization that surfaced in 19th-century Europe. Because Germany was a relatively young nation-state, it was the site of competing national narratives. The environmentally flavored fascism of the Nazi period was preceded by movements to protect nature and encourage the young to engage in outdoor sports and leisure activities. Although considerably discredited, a strain of this romantic fascism remains in small parties of the right that have clung to life in postwar Germany. Janet Biehl (1993) disN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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cusses the “New” German right and the continuity that is evident with previous manifestations of eco-nationalism. This movement is romantic in that it idealizes a mythical and pure past. It is critical of the metanarratives of monotheism, Marxism, liberal democracy, and capitalism. The Heimat (“homeland”) is vital to the health of the nation and must be protected just as vulnerable ecosystems are. The ideas advanced by these fringe parties of the German far right are a witch’s brew of xenophobia, cultural protectionism, and concerns for the natural world, all infused with a mystical reverence for nature often thought the monopoly of the ecologist greens. Nationalism has been described as “protean,” after the shape-shifting god of Greek mythology. This description nicely captures the nature of nationalism, with its malleable and ideologically promiscuous character. Linked to an ethnic, reactionary, or Marxist project, nationalism serves as a useful complement, especially with its ability to harness the romantic, the irrational, and the passions so important for group mobilization. Much to the dismay of ecologists, nature is not their exclusive issue.

Dimensions It is particularly important not to conflate the “progressive” notion of ecologism with a broader link between nature or the environment and nationalism. What we can assume is that the environment can serve as a powerful means of bonding a group together. It is unlikely that the environment will be the sole binding factor; instead, its relative contribution to group identity will vary according to context. Historically, nationalists have employed biogenetic metaphor to communicate a myth of national descent. This was a powerful feature of early German nationalism, and contemporary movements of the far right often appeal to their audience with a mixture of environmentally informed concerns about population decline, “foreigners,” and competition from other ethnic groups. I. H. Burnley (2003) detects a strain of nativism in Australia linked to ecology. Nativism is a political reaction to immigration in which newcomers to a society are painted as invaders who should be kept out. This new nativism has been manifested in calls for a reduced immigration flow to Australia, a country that only recently (1970) eliminated a ban on non-European immigration. There is a nationalist element in calls for a sustainable Australia unburdened by immigration-led population growth. The fear of observers is that such concerns with the environment are merely a mask for resurgent nativist nationalism. The more problematic impact of the linkage between environmentalism and nationalism is likely to be the use of nationalist rhetoric in competing claims over scarce natural resources. Within existing states, this conflict may emerge when indigenous (“original”) people make claims over resources claimed by the state in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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which they reside. An example would be disputes over logging rights, as have occurred all over the world, especially in sensitive tropical rainforests. In Clayquot Sound on Vancouver Island in Canada, native land claims and the concerns of environmentalists were linked to a protest that prevented logging in the area in 1993. Similarly, linkages have been forged in places like Malaysia, where a minority is threatened by logging in its home territory. The Penan people of Malaysian Borneo are a great example of what happens when environmental conflict raises the profile of ethnic identity in response to threat. For indigenous people around the world, the combination of delicate social bonds, minority status, and fragile environments add to the stakes in contests over development and scarce resources. For indigenous people tied to the land, the connection between identity and environment is clear. One cannot be meaningfully Penan without the physical underpinnings of that society; its social rhythms, food, stories, and religious beliefs are all linked to a particular place and the rhythms of its ecology. With the prospect of worsening environmental conditions, it seems inevitable that conflict over natural resources will take on a nationalist flavor. This adds another dimension to nationalist politics by providing another opportunity to mobilize people based on their real or perceived links to nature. This dimension will be particularly important if the link is made between national survival and access to resources. One could imagine such conflicts becoming more emotionally potent and volatile when resource use is linked to ancient claims and fears of national survival.

Consequences One of the most important connections between nationalism and environmentalism is the proprietary struggle over natural resources that characterizes relations between states in the international system. One of the most obvious sources of conflict is over water. In watersheds like the Tigris-Euphrates, the Nile, and the Jordan, states are experiencing ever-increasing demands for the finite water supplies. This need is intertwined with nationalist discourse because water is the lynchpin of development in the newly developing countries. In the case of the Turkey, the Atatürk dam is a potent symbol of Turkey’s determination to develop a strong economy and enter the European Union. The dam will provide the hydroelectricity needed to develop the relatively poor eastern half of the country and is a critical part of Turkey’s development strategy. Of course, the dam is built on a river that feeds the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and therefore a crucial resource for southern neighbors Syria and Iraq. Turkish sources comprise 88 percent of the volume of the Euphrates River and 50 percent of the Tigris. This gives Turkey a potent potential bargaining chip in its dealings with its neighbors. Both Syria and Iraq are completely dependent on these rivers for their water needs, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Construction of the Atatürk Dam in Sanliurfa, Turkey, in 1990. Named for Mustafa Kemal, known as Atatürk (“father of the Turks”), the controversial dam was designed to harness the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which has resulted in less water for Syria and Iraq downstream. (AP/Wide World Photos)

and existing tensions among these nations are exacerbated by the merging of national security and national identity. Turkish fears of Kurdish separatism in Turkey are underpinned by the fact that the Kurds inhabit this watershed. All three states are growing in population, and there is great demand for water for industrial and agricultural purposes. Similar simmering problems exist between Israel and its neighbors over the Jordan River and between India and Pakistan over the Indus River’s Kashmiri watershed. In each case, scarcity of a basic resource with inelastic demand is straining relations already tense due to prior disputes. It is impossible for water not to become politicized in these disputes, and this can take on a nationalist hue. Water and its use are inextricably intertwined with national pride and territorial disputes. This is particularly true in the smallest of the above-mentioned watersheds, the Jordan. Disputes over scarce resources are not specific to the developing world. There have been important disputes over fishing that have taken a decidedly nationalistic tone over the years. In 1975 Iceland and the United Kingdom experienced a high-profile dispute over fishing stocks in the North Atlantic. Such disputes invariably encourage displays of nationalist bombast by politicians. With unprecedented levels of resource exploitation after World War II, we have seen the “nationalizing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of scarcity” as states employ history, myth, and the law to assert protectionist stances over what remains of natural resources. To some extent, this was the case with whaling when, after the collapse of that industry, some states persisted in fishing after the global regulatory body (the International Whaling Commission) declared a moratorium on hunting whales. States like Japan and Norway linked whaling to national culture and sovereignty and, in doing so, could arouse public support for what was in fact a relatively minor economic activity. The proprietary ethos of the era of state sovereignty ensures that disputes over natural resources will have a nationalist element in the decades to come. Nationalism is a very flexible and open-ended political agenda. At its base it is concerned with the fate of a particular national group. Beyond this, nationalists link their project to other ideological programs like socialism or fascism. In an era of environmental degradation and resource depletion, it is easy to see how conflicts over resources might take on a nationalist flavor. Politicians eager to mobilize public support might appeal to already strong nationalistic feelings by linking the future of the nation to the protection and ownership of a resource. Often, states seek to conquer nature and in doing so extend the territory and sovereignty of their nation. This process can also help shape national identity. The emergence of global environmental problems such as climate change underline the contrast between post-national political programs that seek interstate cooperation and the ongoing politics of nationalism, national interest, and state sovereignty that can hinder state cooperation for mutual interest. Selected Bibliography Biehl, Janet. 1993. “ ‘Ecology’ and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-right.” Society and Nature 2:130–170. Burnley, I. H. 2003. “Population and Environment in Australia: Issues in the Next Half Century.” Australian Geographer 34 (November): 267–280. De-Shalit, Avner. 1995. “From the Political to the Objective: The Dialectics of Zionism and the Environment.” Environmental Politics 4 (Spring): 70–87. Dobson, Andrew. 1990. Green Political Thought: An Introduction. London: Unwin Hyman. Filho, João R. Martins, and Daniel Zirker. 2000. “Nationalism, National Security, and Amazonia: Military Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil.” Armed Forces and Society 27:105–129. Freeden, Michael. 1998. “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” Political Studies 46:748–765. Hamilton, Paul. 2002. “The Greening of Nationalism: Nationalising Nature in Europe.” Environmental Politics 11 (Summer): 27–48. Hanks, Reuel R. 2000. “A Separate Space? Karakalpak Nationalism and Devolution in PostSoviet Uzbekistan.” Europe-Asia Studies 52 (July): 939–953. Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999. Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Johannesson, Ingolfur Asgeir. 2005. “Icelandic Nationalism and the Kyoto Protocol: An Analysis of the Discourse on Global Environmental Change in Iceland.” Environmental Politics 14 (August): 459–509.

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Klare, Michael. 2001. Resource Wars. New York: Owl Books. Lynch, Peter. 1995. “From Red to Green: The Political Strategy of Plaid Cymru in the 1980s and 1990s.” Regional and Federal Studies 5: 197–210. Podoba, Juraj. 1998. “Rejecting Green Velvet: Transition, Environment and Nationalism in Slovakia.” Environmental Politics 7: 129–144. Pritchard, Sara B. 2004. “Reconstructing the Rhône: The Cultural Politics of Nature and Nation in Contemporary France, 1945–1997.” French Historical Studies 27 (Fall): 765–799. Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1991. Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.

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Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism Berch Berberoglu Relevance Nationalism, which historically emerged with the rise of the nation-state, has during the course of the 19th and 20th centuries become a potent force that has dominated the political landscape across the globe for over two centuries. During the 20th century, several major factors have given rise to nationalism and ethno-national conflict around the world. First is the dispossession of a people through colonial and imperial domination, occupation, and carving out of their historic homeland, reducing them to a subject population, as in the case of Western colonial domination and enslavement of the African people through the slave trade. Later, the peoples of the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East came under similar forms of domination and rule, culminating in the occupation and partition of various territories through a series of mandates, as in the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the Western powers and the dispersion of its native populations, which led to the current predicament of the Palestinian and Kurdish peoples. Second is the denial of the right to national self-determination to peoples dominated by the imperial state in the advanced capitalist countries. These include the domination of Northern Ireland by Great Britain, of Puerto Rico by the United States, of the Basque country by Spain, and of Quebec by the Canadian state, among others. A related situation within the advanced capitalist countries involves the oppression of immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities, such as Native Americans, African Americans, and Mexican Americans in the United States, and Algerians, East Indians, Arabs, Turks, and others in France, Britain, Germany, and other advanced capitalist countries in Europe and elsewhere. Third, and more recently in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the past decade and a half, we have seen the rise of nationalism and national movements in these regions. Here, the nationalist forces have an opportunity to capture state power through ethnonational mobilization by targeting an increasingly ineffective and weakened socialist state that came under pressure during the Cold War years. As in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalism and ethno-national conflict has led to ethnic strife and civil war across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. We will take up each of these cases briefly and highlight the dynamics that affect the nature and forms of national identity and expression, which then culminate in ethno-national conflicts that have fostered the emergence and development of social movements for national self-determination. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Origins and Dimensions Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the Third World Historically, the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, British, and, later, U.S. imperial powers confronted indigenous peoples and cultures around the world that more and more came under the control and influence of the dominant Western powers and were suppressed and denied their national identity, autonomy, and self-determination. Spanish expansion to the New World was characterized by the plunder of the newly acquired colonies. As the Indian population declined, Spain accelerated its acquisition of new territory, and it became necessary to secure Indian labor to work the land. The Spanish conquerors destroyed native irrigation systems, incorporated native land into Spanish estates, and forced the evacuation of Indians from their land. In Brazil, an insufficient number of Indians necessitated the importation of slaves from Africa. Feudal Portugal thus set up slavery as the dominant mode of production in its Brazilian colony to facilitate the extraction of precious metals and other raw materials for sale on the world market. Slaves were used first in sugarcane fields and later in mining gold and diamonds. In the Caribbean and along the Atlantic coast of North America, a similar pattern was established. Black slaves from Africa worked the sugar and cotton plantations, while the Native Americans of these areas were displaced or physically eliminated, thus transforming local social structures. In these regions, the British colonialists became the dominant force. Large areas of Asia were colonized by Western powers until the middle of the 20th century. British and European colonists mercilessly plundered these regions at the height of their empires. Through their presence in the region, they effected major changes in the social and economic structures of the societies they came to dominate. Britain assumed political sovereignty in India late in the 18th century. As trade with Britain increased and the demand for Indian goods grew, local capital expanded into crafts, textiles, and industrial production. This expansion of local manufacturing industry and with it the development of national industrial capital came to be seen as competition with British interests, prompting Britain to take steps to crush Indian industry and turn India into an appendage of its colonial economy. Antagonism between the British and local industrial capital led to the alliance of national capital with the peasantry to throw off the British yoke through the independence movement. Much as in North America, but unlike the situation in Latin America, the nationalist forces were able to consolidate power, and the leadership of the movement led them to a victory over the British. By the late 1940s, they had installed a state committed to the development of local capitalism in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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India following independence. Given the relatively weak position of national capital, the victorious nationalist forces were able to utilize the powers of the state and establish a state-capitalist regime to assist in the accumulation of capital in India through state aid. Although not formally colonized, China, too, came under the influence and control of the West as traditional forms of exploitation were reinforced through the link to Europe and other centers of Western power. The Western powers intervened in China and attempted to incorporate it into the world economy at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. A protracted struggle against the Western powers followed and ushered in a period of intense nationalism that paved the way for the nationalist forces to capture state power by the early 20th century. In Africa, the European colonial powers imposed slavery and spread the slave trade throughout the continent in the 16th century. Slaves became Africa’s major export, as they were sold to masters in various parts of the world, especially in the Americas. During this period, the African economy became highly dependent on the European colonial economy tied to the slave trade. Until the middle of the 20th century, when most African countries won their formal independence, the local economies were a direct appendage of the colonial center, which directed development in the colonies. The pattern was based on a system of production that dominated the economies of the center states and evolved according to its needs of accumulation, resulting in uneven development between the colonial and imperial center and the colonies, and within the colonies. This classic colonial relationship prevailed in a number of African countries after the granting of formal independence and led to the restructuring of socioeconomic relations on a neocolonial basis. Elsewhere in Africa, nationalist forces have taken the initiative to lead the newly independent states along a less dependent path. Utilizing the military and state bureaucracy as supportive institutions to carry out their development programs, middle-class bureaucratic leaders in these countries have opted for a state-capitalist path that has corresponded well with their vision of society and socioeconomic development. Nasser in Egypt, Boumediene in Algeria, Kaunda in Zambia, and Nyerere in Tanzania could be cited as prime examples of nationalist leaders in charge of postcolonial states developing along the statecapitalist path. Historically, the presence of a racist apartheid regime in South Africa has been a great impediment to the development of revolutionary forces in the southern cone of Africa and has had a major impact on the scope and pace of development on the continent in a progressive direction. With the official abolition of the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1990s, however, the last vestiges of racist colonial and neocolonial oppression were removed so that an open political struggle could be waged by the masses to take control of their destiny and build a new society free of the oppression and exploitation they have suffered for so long. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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In the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was the major political force until the beginning of the 20th century. After centuries of expansion and conquest, the Ottoman state began to lose ground to rival powers in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries and became vulnerable to pressures from the West. European powers, taking advantage of the endless wars in the empire’s various provinces, found their way in through direct economic controls and military occupation of large parts of Ottoman territory, which culminated in the occupation of virtually every corner of the empire during World War I. Following the collapse of the empire at the end of the war, Britain, France, Italy, and other European powers colonized its territories and remained in control of its various provinces for several decades. From the Persian Gulf to Palestine, to the Suez Canal, down to the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa, the Ottoman territories came under the jurisdiction primarily of Britain and France, who divided up these lands to secure trade routes, raw materials, and new markets for the expanding, European-controlled world economy. The Palestinian and Kurdish national questions—two classic cases of ethno-national oppression—are a product of this Western division and occupation of the Middle East. The partition of Palestine and Kurdistan, as well as the rest of the Middle East that came under British and French rule, effectively dispersed or divided these two peoples from their historic homelands. Moreover, it subjected them to the whims of newly emergent postcolonial states that came to power in the aftermath of World War I or following the British and French mandates: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. All were created under treaties that parceled out occupied Ottoman lands among the Western powers that came to rule over the peoples of the Middle East, including the Palestinians and the Kurds. The Palestinians came under the jurisdiction of the British, and the Kurds under the jurisdiction of the French and the British in what later became Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. The Turkish territories fell to the new Turkish nationalist government, which was able to control the Anatolian portion of the Ottoman Empire and succeeded in salvaging its core into an independent republic. The masses in some Arab territories under French and British control were able to rise up and throw off colonial and imperial rule and declare their independence. In Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, the Kurds came under newly independent states in which they became minorities. Palestine came under the control of Israel, which emerged as an independent state at the end of the British occupation of this old Ottoman territory. Subsequently, many Palestinians were either forced to disperse to neighboring Arab states, becoming a minority immigrant population that constituted the Palestinian diaspora, or remain in Israel as a secondclass minority population under repressive rule of the Israeli state. Today, it is in these independent Middle Eastern states that the Palestinians and the Kurds have been facing the most brutal oppression and are in turn fighting for their national liberation. Because of these two historic events (that is, the division of their homeland by the Western powers and the denial of their rights as minorities in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Palestinian nationalists demonstrate in Ramallah, West Bank, under an Arafat banner in 2002. (Ricki Rosen/Corbis)

the new states in which they now reside), the Palestinians and the Kurds came to face their predicament as oppressed national groups who lack a national homeland and a national state. The parallels between the Palestinian and Kurdish national struggles over the course of the 20th century highlight the similarities in the experience of two ethnic and national communities that have been victims of displacement and dispersion under the rule of dominant political forces. These experiences led to the development of a national identity and national movement that became the expression of the communal will of the respective communities struggling to be free. The Palestinian and Kurdish national movements thus emerged in direct response to the forces that kept them down and relegated them to outright subjugation in states hostile to their struggle for national autonomy. The national movements of both the Palestinian and the Kurdish peoples thus came to represent their aspirations for nationhood and free development of their language, culture, and very being in a setting that promoted all that they stood for as a people. Internal divisions that arose along class and ideological lines were at once a divisive and a unifying expression of maturing movements that focused on the social and political forces that would lead their people to victory in the next phase of the national struggle. However, these efforts to forge unity among various sectors of the Palestinian and Kurdish peoples do not resolve the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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complicated situation regarding the class character of the national movement and its leadership, nor the class nature of the movement’s agenda to establish its sovereignty and the type of state and society it strives to establish after achieving independence. As in other spheres of social life, then, the Palestinian and Kurdish national movements and struggle for national liberation are not immune to the class forces and class dynamics that govern social life. Elsewhere, in my book Turmoil in the Middle East, I provide a further analysis of the origins and development of the Palestinian and Kurdish national movements and examine the dynamics and contradictions of this process at greater length. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the Advanced Capitalist Countries In the advanced capitalist countries, the national question and ethno-national conflict have continued to be central components of racial and ethnic relations for centuries. The slave trade that accompanied the looting and enslavement of Africa by the Western colonial powers transported entire populations of diverse ethnic origin across the oceans to exploit their labor in the vast plantations and mines of the colonies. Africans, Native Americans, and indigenous populations across the world came under this global assault of the colonizers as the latter engaged in the plunder of native lands and the exploitation and oppression of natives in distant outposts, which served to further the economic expansion of the colonial and imperial centers. Thus, a dual process of domination of racial and ethnic minorities began to unfold as the lands and peoples of the conquered territories (as in the case of the Americas) came under colonial control, while other groups were brought in from distant colonial outposts to the imperial heartland to generate wealth through the use of slave labor. The North American Indians became subjugated by the white European colonists, as the indigenous populations of North and South America came under the direct control of the British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and other European colonial powers. During this period, new colonial empires were built on the backs of the exploited and oppressed peoples of the continent, and millions of natives perished through a combination of factors that together resulted in genocide of unprecedented proportions, leading to an enormous decline in native populations throughout the Americas. The conquered Native American populations, north and south, were supplanted by a steady flow of African slaves brought in to labor in the mines and fields across the U.S. South and the Caribbean basin. These peoples in time became part of the local population, albeit as second-class citizens who were counted as three-fifths of their white colonial counterparts. Together, the Native American and black African American peoples came to constitute the basis of the early minority population in North America. Elsewhere in the rest of the continent, a varied combination of mestizo, mulatto, and native populations came under severe discrimination over the course of centuries of exploitation and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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oppression under colonial and imperial rule, first by foreign and later by local ruling classes of European origin. Later, during the Spanish occupation of North America and following the Mexican-American War of the mid-19th century, the United States inherited a Mexican population of native-born Chicanos and Mexican immigrants who came to constitute another major ethnic group in the new nation-state. Hence, the Native American, African American, and Mexican (or Hispanic) American populations form the three main minority populations of the United States. Notwithstanding the steady flow of immigrants from various European, Asian, and other countries who came to America in the 19th and the turn of the 20th centuries, adding to the diversity of the U.S. population, these three major racial/ethnic groups came to define the nature of race and ethnic relations in the United States over the course of the 20th century. While the struggles of colonized peoples like Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and others under the U.S. yoke raise the issue of defining the nation, racist oppression and reduction to powerlessness as second-class citizens result in tensions surrounding race and ethnic relations that are a part of domestic, national life within established nation-states such as the United States. The racial/ethno-national conflict that defines the parameters of both the national question and domestic race/ethnic relations confronting the advanced capitalist countries are not restricted to the United States alone. They are, in fact, the creation of the major European colonial and imperial powers like Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and others who are responsible for colonial plunder and occupation of distant native lands. The problems that these powers face with their own racial/ethnic minority populations at home, who were either forcefully brought in from the colonies to supplant local labor or have (through their economic, political, cultural, and educational links with the colonies) immigrated to the colonial/imperial centers, stem from the legacy of colonialism. Thus, East Indians, Africans, Middle Easterners, Caribbean islanders, and others in Britain; Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, and other African and Middle Eastern immigrants in France; and a variety of other peoples from the ex-colonies of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other European powers who carved out Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas, all represent the historic end result of colonial and imperial domination that has created this dual problem of the national question, on the one hand, and domestic racial/ethnic oppression, on the other. While the oppression of ethnic minorities in the advanced capitalist centers continues to be the main source of racial/ethnic tensions at home, the occupation of ethno-national territory by the chief imperialist states, such as the British occupation of Northern Ireland, the U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico, Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the domination of the Basques in Spain and the Québécois in Canada, continues to foster struggles for national liberation.

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Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union Transformations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s fueled the upsurge in national rivalries and led to ethnic conflict and civil war. The rise of nationalism and nationalist movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism during the past decade and a half came about when right-wing nationalist forces in these countries found the opportunity to capture state power through ethno-national mobilization directed against the weakened socialist states, which had been under constant assault by the West during the Cold War years of Western expansion. Under socialism, the multitude of nationalities and ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union lived together in peace and progressed within the context of a cooperative social environment in which minority culture and values were protected. The customs, traditions, languages, and ways of life of these groups were promoted within the boundaries of socialism and the social life that brought together these diverse nationalities under one roof, cultivating cooperation and diffusing conflict as part of the progress toward an egalitarian social order. With the collapse of socialism and communist rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, these former socialist states have been in turmoil and embroiled in violent ethno-national conflict and civil war that has been tearing down their societies. The most violent and bloody of these conflicts have occurred in traditionally peaceful regions of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (namely, Yugoslavia and the Transcaucasian republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan). Why? Why have formerly peaceful regions that lived in harmony for years suddenly erupted in flames and brought wars and destruction and despair? What social forces are responsible for this predicament, and for what results? How and why have these forces succeeded in imposing their rule on society and unleashing a reign of terror over the people to maintain their dominance and to prolong their rule? The social forces that stand to benefit from the recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been able to mobilize a considerable amount of support in the wake of the problems created by the post-Soviet transition to a private market-oriented economy. Such mobilization has served a dual purpose: to protect the interests of a newly privileged dominant class and to channel the discontent of the general population in a right-wing, ultranationalist direction that can be controlled and regulated. At the same time, the economic crises that these countries have been facing in this period of transition have led to enormous material deprivation of broad segments of the population, the primary factor for the emergence of ultranationalist movements. Mindful of the declining living standards of the general population, while enriching themselves through legal and illegal means (especially through government corruption), the newly emergent dominant groups have promoted right-wing nationalist activity

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to fan the flames of ethnic strife as a means of social control. But behind the ethno-national conflicts fostered by these forces, it is increasingly becoming evident that they are deeply rooted in socioeconomic relations that are at base political in nature—that is, struggles for political power. Looking at the situation in Yugoslavia, one is struck by the fact that this once peaceful multiethnic and multinational society of diverse cultures and religions was forced into senseless conflict, hatred, and civil war. The Western forces (the United States through NATO) that pushed Yugoslavia into civil war and subsequently caused its destruction wanted Yugoslavia to be dismembered, broken up, and turned into a series of weak dependent states—dependent on the West. The partition of Yugoslavia and the dismemberment of its constituent parts into small independent states served rival capitalist interests in the Balkans and led to an all-out war against the last remaining territory of the former Yugoslav state (Serbia) following the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and BosniaHerzegovina. If one were to examine the Yugoslav case and explore the social forces behind this conflict, one would inevitably draw the following conclusions: (1) the opposition forces fighting the central government were clearly anticommunist; (2) these right-wing reactionary forces used nationalism as a cover to achieve capitalist ends; (3) they were aided by the Western powers to topple the existing socialist state and replace it by a capitalist one; (4) by stirring up entire populations through nationalist propaganda to serve narrow capitalist ends, they were able to pit one segment of the population against another and capture power through the practice of divide and conquer; (5) separatist action and secession from the federation well served the reactionary forces, who wanted to establish their own separate state to exploit the masses for private gain and link their future to the West; (6) the final collapse and disintegration of Yugoslavia came about with the Western intervention in Kosovo and the bombing of Belgrade, forcing the Serbs to surrender; and finally, (7) the Western armies and the internal right-wing opposition cultivated by Western intelligence (as in CIA assistance to the anti-Serbian forces through such criminal organizations as the Kosova Liberation Army, which has been heavily engaged in drug and gun trafficking, prostitution, and sex slavery) were successful in bringing down Milosevic and his regime and thus succeeded in incorporating Yugoslavia into the Western orbit, subjugating the country and its people to Western capital and its internal reactionary agents. Through this process (a process based on intense social conflict), the fate of Yugoslavia was decided in favor of privileged elite interests to the detriment of the masses. The new rulers of Yugoslavia represent the interests of a rising bourgeois elite that has entered the political scene with Western assistance. With the secessionist republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming integrated into the Western orbit, the United States has succeeded in transforming Yugoslavia to serve as a key power broker in the Balkans to advance Western economic and geopolitical interests. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The former Soviet Union likewise went through a similar process of upheaval and ethnic conflict that led to open war in various parts of its vast territories. The war in Chechnya, pitting rebel groups against the Russian army, and separatist violence in Georgia were dwarfed by the all-out war between two former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasian region—Armenia and Azerbaijan. The rapid changes set into motion by the collapse of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s prompted a number of former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasian region and elsewhere to assert themselves in seeking national independence, cultural freedom, and political autonomy. Such political assertion, under the leadership of a series of right-wing nationalist movements, gained these republics their formal political independence in the form of sovereign nation-states. Deep-seated national sentiments throughout the Transcaucasian region, which go back several decades and were kept in check during Soviet times, subsequently led to the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the territorial dispute over NagornoKarabagh, an Armenian enclave within the boundaries of the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh led to much bloodshed and destruction. Ultranationalist forces on both sides fanned the flames of violence to achieve narrow national ends rather than working out a solution to alleviate a situation that did not need to get out of hand and cause so much pain and suffering; instead, they went to war to settle their differences over a piece of territory that cost much in human lives. The intense nature of the conflict between these two newly independent states brought to the surface long-suppressed national aspirations of ethnic identity and self-determination among Armenians and Azeris, which go to the heart of the phenomenon of nationalism. Nationalist movements in this region of the world thus found an opening to give expression to popular national feelings that lie deep in the collective psyche. Ethno-national conflicts, emerging from pent-up popular drives for national identity and self-determination, are thus the outcome of the clash of national interests articulated by organized political forces that are determined to advance their own narrowly defined national agenda. And the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, no less than the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, confirms this particular feature of nationalism and ethno-national strife.

Consequences As the recent experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as the Third World and the advanced capitalist countries amply illustrates, nationalism and national movements are often used to advance narrow class interests. Ethno-national conflicts, fostered by age-old hostilities between rival ethnic and national groups have often served to advance the interests of dominant class forces in society. Much like religion, patriotism, and other forms of ideological N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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control and hegemony, nationalism has been used as a tool by powerful social forces to maintain class domination and class rule, hence as a mechanism of social control in favor of the dominant classes. Thus, to develop a better understanding of nationalism and ethno-national conflict in the world today, nationalism must be seen from the vantage point of class and class interests that are rooted in the social structure that defines the parameters of social relations on a national and, ultimately, global level. Selected Bibliography Adam, Jan. 2000. The Social Costs of Transformation in Post-Socialist Countries: The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. New York: Palgrave. Berberoglu, Berch, ed. 1995. The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and SelfDetermination in the 20th Century. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Berberoglu, Berch. 1999. Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability. Albany: State University of New York Press. Berberoglu, Berch, ed. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Class, State, and Nation in the Age of Globalization. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. Carmichael, Cathie. 2002. Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition. New York: Routledge. Churchill, Ward. 1997. A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present. San Francisco: City Lights Books. Farsoun, Samih, and Christina Zacharia. 1997. Palestine and the Palestinians. Boulder, CO: Westview. Gocek, Fatma Muge, ed. 2002. Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East. Albany: State University of New York Press. Goldenberg, Suzanne. 1994. Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder. London: Zed. Kecmanovic, Dusan. 2001. Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia. Westport, CT: Praeger. Marger, Martin N. 2000. Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Moulder, Frances V. 1977. Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olson, Robert, ed. 1996. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. Pavkovic, Aleksandar. 2000. The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Rodney, Walter. 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London and Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House and Bogle L’Ouverture. Stein, Stanley J., and Barbara H. Stein. 1970. The Colonial Heritage of Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press. Udovicki, Jasminka. 1995. “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Former Yugoslavia.” In The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the 20th Century, edited by B. Berberoglu, 280–314. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

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Gender, Sexuality, and Nationalism Joane Nagel Relevance Gender and sexuality are building blocks of nations and nationalism. Historically and in most contemporary societies, women and men occupy distinct places in the nation and play different roles in nation-building and governance. Men’s honor and women’s purity are important, though often overlooked, symbols in national ideologies, mobilizations, and conflicts. This chapter examines the intimate intersection of gender, sexuality, and nationalism. We will explore the feminized spaces available to women in the nation, the close connection between ideologies of masculinity and nationalism, and the place of sexuality in shaping national boundaries—in particular, the emphasis on heterosexuality and the condemnation of homosexuality in defining who is and is not a member of the nation. The global system is composed of many new and long-standing nations (peoples) and states (countries) that do not always coincide with one another. Nationalist movements often arise when a national or ethnic group is stateless (e.g., the Palestinians in the Middle East) or when a national group is located in a region of a country from which it seeks independence (e.g., Kashmiris in India or Québécois in Canada). Nationalist movements can be irredentist, where a nation is divided into two or more states and one part seeks to join the other to gain autonomy or independence (e.g., Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey who seek an independent state of Kurdistan or Armenians in Azerbaijan who desire to join territory with Armenia). Nationalist movements also can be secessionist, where a nation seeks independence from a state (e.g., the East Timorese who recently obtained independence from Indonesia or Eritreans who recently obtained independence from Ethiopia). What is important to note, for our purposes here, is that very often these seemingly purely political, economic, cultural, or territorial matters are both gendered and sexualized. Definitions that identify members of the nation (“us”) and exclude nonmembers (“them”) have a moral and sexual dimension that should not be underestimated. Calls to defend the sexual honor of those inside the nation and insults to the sexual purity of those outside the nation are among the strongest “fighting words” that nationalists can speak. The specification of some groups as morally superior and the designation of others as inferior socially, economically, politically, culturally, morally, and sexually are central to nationalism’s mass appeal.

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Origins In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that all nations are embarked on an ongoing journey of self-invention. He notes, for instance, that there is no more evocative a symbol of modern nationalism than the tomb of the unknown soldier. The illustrative power of this icon lies in the fact that the contents of such tombs are unknown, and thus, they are open to interpretation and waiting to be filled. Like tombs of unknown soldiers, “nations” are empty vessels waiting to be filled by the symbolic work of nationalist founders and defenders. In countries around the world today there are arguments over the gender, racial, and sexual contents of national vessels. What is the proper place for women and men, blacks and whites, gays and straights in the nation? Who should vote, who should serve in the military, who should be given a security clearance, who should run for political office? These debates are nationalist discussions about the contours and contents of the national vessel and the places of various gendered, raced, and sexed people in it. Gender has a particularly important place in the nation-building enterprise. All genders are not socially created as equal partners in nation-building. Men and women do not play the same roles on national stages. The idea of the nation and the history of nationalism are intertwined with the idea of manhood and the history of manliness. This is not to say that women do not have roles to play in the making and unmaking of nations and states: as citizens, as members, as activists, as leaders. It is to say that nationalist scripts historically have been written primarily by men, for men, and about men. In these national dramas, women have been relegated to mainly supporting roles—as mothers of the nation, as vessels for reproducing the nation, as teachers passing the national culture to new members, and as national housekeepers maintaining home and hearth for the nation’s men who are out and about on important official business. Men’s national business historically has been to fight wars, defend homelands, represent the nation abroad, and run the government. The prominent role of men in the nation reflects a model of masculinity that closely fits the ideology of nationalism—concepts like patriotism, bravery, and duty are hard to distinguish as being masculine values or nationalist values. While we often think of such values as “natural” characteristics of men or nations, these are social constructions that arose and changed during various historical periods. For instance, in The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity, George Mosse (1996) argues that it is no accident that features of ideal masculinity and ideal nationalism reflect one another since the qualities associated with both were forged in the new nationalist movements of the 19th century—a time when masculinity was being reinvented as well. Nationalist politics is a major opportunity for “men to be men” and “women to be women” for two reasons. First, as noted above, the national state is essenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tially a masculine institution. Feminist scholars point out its hierarchical authority structure, the male domination of decision-making positions, the male superordinate/female subordinate internal division of labor, and the male legal regulation of female rights, labor, and sexuality. Second, the culture of nationalism is constructed to emphasize and resonate with the culture of masculinity. As noted above, terms like honor, loyalty, and cowardice are hard to distinguish as either nationalist or masculinist since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manhood. The “microculture” of masculinity in everyday life articulates very well with the demands of state-level nationalism, particularly its militaristic side. Many scholars note, for instance, the similarities between sports and war. The playing field can be seen as a micro-level proxy for the battlefield where opposing teams/armies exhibit bravery in the face of danger or injury, and where a premium is placed on strength, daring, loyalty, and fighting or playing through the pain. In different societies at different times, national masculine cultures might be somewhat dissimilar from one another in terms of the class, race, or ethnicity of dominant and privileged manhoods. In all societies, however, there are distinct gender cultures shaping the lives of boys and girls and of men and women. It is male gender culture that tends to dominate nationalism. As Cynthia Enloe observes, nationalism and masculinity are intimate partners: nationalism reflects men’s honor, men’s humiliation, and men’s hopes. As a result, most ideologies of nationalism are both “masculinist” (which privileges men’s points of view and values) and “patriarchal” (which privileges men’s interests and power). Nationalist systems of power typically place men in top positions and relegate women to secondary roles with less influence and access to power. Even though the U.S. political system is based on representative government and political equality, a look at the gender distribution of the U.S. Congress reflects its patriarchal history. In 2008, 86 women served in the U.S. Congress: 16 women in the Senate (16 percent of the 100 seats) and 70 women in the House of Representatives (16.3 percent of the 435 seats). Women remain vastly underrepresented in the U.S. federal government, but their numbers have been growing during the past three decades: from 5 percent in Congress in 1986 to 16 percent in 2008. Although women constitute 51 percent of the U.S. population, the United States has never had a woman president or vice president. Women around the world make strong cases against their historical and contemporary exclusion from power, however, nationalists generally are unsympathetic to feminist efforts to eliminate gender inequality. Nationalist masculinism tends to define women’s rights as secondary and subversive to nationalist goals and struggles. In nationalist discourse, it is the national interest that comes first; the interests of women, ethnic communities, or other groups are only a second thought. Although the “national interest” often reflects mainly men’s agenda and vision, nationalists generally argue that what is good for the nation is good for everyone—whether men or women, ethnic majority or ethnic minority, upper or N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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lower class. Nationalists tend to argue for equality of interests and ignore inequality of outcomes that favor them. For instance, in U.S. history, arguments made by segregationists against the racial integration of schools and workplaces stressed the threat to traditional national values that such changes would pose and underplayed the benefits to privileged whites of superior schools and preferred access to jobs. Similarly, nationalist and masculinist arguments against allowing women and homosexuals to serve in the military stressed the threat to male solidarity and national security that such changes would pose and underplayed the benefits to heterosexual males of sole access to military jobs and service.

Dimensions The male-dominated nature of much nationalism has led some scholars to argue that “woman nationalist” is an oxymoron that reflects the historic contradiction between the goals and needs of women and those of nationalists. Feminists often find themselves attempting to negotiate the difficult, some would say, impassable terrain that separates the interests of women and the interests of nationalists. For instance, Zoya Hasan discusses Hindu and Muslim nationalism in Indian politics and notes the tension between feminist principles and communal religious solidarity in both communities. She observes that sometimes both Muslim and Hindu women resist their community’s nationalist programs because they result in women’s subordination. Religious fundamentalism, whether Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or Hindu, often emphasizes men’s place at the top of decisionmaking bodies such as family or government. As a result, nationalisms based in conservative religions that limit women’s rights generally are inconsistent with feminist goals of equality between women and men. There are spaces available to women in the nation despite limitations created by masculinist nationalism. In their essay on gender and nationalism, Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias identify five ways in which women have participated in national and state processes and practices: (1) as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities; (2) as reproducers of the (normative) boundaries of ethnic/national groups (by enacting proper feminine behavior); (3) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; (4) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and (5) as participants in national, economic, political, and military struggles. Although some of these roles involve action, with women participating in or even leading nationalist struggles, the list is short, and the same names tend to be repeated again and again: Joan of Arc, Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, many researchers note the pressure felt by women nationalists to remain in supportive, symbolic, often suppressed and traditional roles lest they be seen as traitors to their community or nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Faced with such constraints, sometimes women attempt to enact nationalism through the traditional roles assigned to them by nationalists—by supporting their husbands, raising their (the nation’s) children, and serving as symbols of national honor. In these cases women can exploit both nationalist and enemy patriarchal views of women’s roles to aid nationalist struggles. For instance, in situations of military occupation, male nationalists seen on the street alone or in groups are often targets of arrest or detention. Women are less likely to be seen as dangerous or “up to something,” so women can serve as escorts for men or as messengers for men who are sequestered inside houses. Similarly, women often are more successful at recruiting support for nationalist efforts because they are seen as less threatening and militant. Lynda Edgerton describes Northern Irish Catholic women’s use of traditional female housekeeping roles as a warning system against British army raids in the 1970s and 1980s; the practice was called “bin [trash can] lid bashing”: “When troops entered an area, local women would begin banging their bin lids on the pavement; the noise would carry throughout the area and alert others to follow suit. . . . At the sound of the bin lids, scores of women would emerge armed with dusters and mops for a hasty spring clean” (Edgarton 1987, 65). In addition to these strategies, which James Scott refers to as “weapons of the weak,” women have participated more directly in various nationalist movements and conflicts by involving themselves in cadres and military units. Despite their bravery, sometimes taking on traditional male military roles, and despite the centrality of their contribution to many nationalist struggles, feminist nationalists often find themselves once again under the thumb of institutionalized patriarchy once national independence is won. A nationalist movement that encourages women’s participation in the name of national liberation often balks at feminist demands for gender equality. Algeria is perhaps the most well-known case of a nationalist movement turning on its female supporters. In 1962 Algeria finally freed itself from French colonial rule. The struggle was a long and bitter one, and the fight for Algerian independence was notable for the involvement of Algerian women. Daniele Djamila Amrane-Minne, who interviewed women veterans of the Algerian liberation movement for her book, Des Femmes dans la Guerre d’Algerie, reports that 11,000 women were active participants in the national resistance movement, and 2,000 women were in the armed wing of the movement. Despite this extensive involvement of women in an armed revolutionary movement, once independence was won, Algerian women found themselves pressured to go “back in the kitchen” and to trade their combat fatigues for the hijab (traditional Islamic dress) and veil. Although the new independent Algeria embraced principles of socialism, few gender equality aspects of that doctrine were institutionalized into the formal or informal politics of independence. While women had the vote, their “place” in Algerian society was dictated more by patriarchal traditionalism than by egalitarian socialism. Four decades after Algerian independence, Algerian women still face the violent enforcement of patriarchal social customs in their daily lives. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Algerian example suggests that women who participate in nationalist movements face the prospect of having contributed to a masculinist repressive system after their brothers are in power. In such cases, women arguing for equality in the new nation often have been told to wait and be patient, that national unity comes first, then their concerns will be addressed. But, as Cynthia Enloe argues, waiting can be a dangerous strategy for women nationalists: “Every time women succumb to the pressures to hold their tongues about problems they are having with men in nationalist organizations, nationalism becomes that much more masculinized” (1990, 60). Women who press their case face challenges to their loyalty, their sexuality, or their ethnic or national authenticity; they are said to be “carrying water” for colonial oppressors, they are labeled lesbians, or they are accused of being unduly influenced by Western feminism. Third World feminists are quite aware of these charges but note the need for an indigenous feminist analysis and agenda that address local concerns not necessarily faced in industrial and/or Western societies. Despite efforts to build an indigenous, not-exclusively Western feminism into nationalist movements around the world, many nationalist movements fail to overthrow patriarchal ancien régimes. Indeed, conservative masculinist notions of men’s and women’s proper roles often become more entrenched during nationalist mobilizations. One example is the human rights violations of Afghani women by the patriarchal nationalism of Afghanistan’s former ruling Taliban party. The Taliban government initially was widely supported when it came to power in 1996, partly because it was reputed to provide protection for women who had become targets of sexual abuse under the previous government. The Taliban’s draconian measures against women, who were required to wear headto-toe coverings and forbidden to work outside the home or to attend school, became an international scandal and a partial justification for the 2002 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States by members of the Muslim extremist organization, al-Qaeda, whose leadership was based in Afghanistan. The interests of nationalists in “their” women’s sexuality are not unique to Algeria, Afghanistan, and Muslim nationalists, or nationalists in the developing world. Women’s sexuality turns out to be a matter of prime national interest around the world because of their symbolic and reproductive importance. Women as mothers are exalted icons of nationalism. In their discussion of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, for instance, Deborah Gaitskell and Elaine Unterhalter (1989) argue that Afrikaner women appear regularly in the rhetoric and imagery of the Afrikaner “volk” (people) and that “they have figured overwhelmingly as mothers.” Klaus Theweleit (1987) observes that women have been symbolic vessels for men’s utopian dreams and desires throughout history. Women’s sexuality is of further concern to nationalists around the world because, as wives, sisters, mothers, and daughters, women often are considered to be the bearers and incarnations of national and masculine honor. For instance, the physical assaults and murders of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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women suspected of adultery by jealous husbands tend to be taken less seriously or ignored by law enforcement in many countries, including the United States. While there are certainly variations across history and around the world in the extent to which such “honor killings” are tolerated, in all cases they reflect a common connection between men’s and family honor and women’s sexual respectability. Honor is something for men to gain and women to lose. It is not only Third World men whose honor is tied to their women’s sexuality, respectability, and shame. Female fertility is valued in the mothers of most nations, and unruly female sexuality is a potential threat to any nation’s honor. George Mosse describes this duality of purity and fertility in the depiction of women in European nationalist history. On the one hand, “female embodiments of the nation stood for eternal forces . . . [and] suggested innocence and chastity” and, most of all, respectability. On the other hand, the right women need to be sexually available to the right men: “the maiden with the shield, the spirit that awaits a masculine leader [ for] the enjoyment of peace achieved by male warriors” (1985, 98). An example of how women’s sexuality became intertwined with national honor occurred in August 1944, when U.S. army photographers documented the World War II Allied forces’ liberation of France from German Nazi occupation. One photo captured in a now-famous picture of two “shorn women” who were accused of sexually collaborating with the Nazis in occupied France during the war. In the photograph we can see the women’s shaved heads, shoeless feet, stripped clothing, and the swastikas tattooed on the women’s foreheads. Margaret Weitz interviewed a young Frenchwoman whose father was in the French resistance; she described the fate of similar French women who were identified as “Nazi collaborators” in the summer of 1944: “The war was not finished, but in Paris it assumed another form—more perverse, more degrading. . . . The ‘shorn woman’ of rue Petit-Musc . . . walked along with her wedge-soled shoes tied around her neck, stiff like those undergoing a major initiation. Her face was frozen like a Buddha, her carriage tense and superb in the midst of a shouting, screeching mob of faces contorted by hatred, groping and opportunistic hands, eyes congested by excitement, festivity, sexuality, sadism” (1995, 277). This picture was published in a pictorial history of World War II edited by Stephen Ambrose. On the adjacent page of that volume is another photograph. It shows a man on his knees with a blindfold over his eyes; he is just about to be executed with a shot to the head. He is also a French collaborator, but the difference in the images and the treatment of the women and the man speak volumes about the sexualized and gendered nature of patriotism, treason, betrayal, and the relation and relative importance of men and women to the nation. These images and the above account illustrate several important features about national gender and sexual boundaries and show how (in this case hetero) sexual behavior on the margins can strengthen dominant national gender and sexual orders. First, we can see that national, gender, and sexual boundaries are N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Two women, partially stripped, their heads shaved and with swastikas painted on their faces, are marched barefoot down the streets of Paris in August 1944 to shame and humiliate them for collaborating with the Germans during World War II. (Three Lions/Getty Images)

mutually reinforcing. Implicit in the idea of the nation (“Who are we?”) are certain prescriptions and proscriptions for proper gender and sexual behavior—what good male and female citizens should and should not do sexually, and whom they should and should not have sex with. In this case, “our” women should not be having sex with “their” (particularly, “enemy”) men. Second, we can see the ubiquitous double standard that applies to many gender boundaries. Our men can have consensual sex, rape, or even sexually enslave their women and not have their heads shaved and tattooed and be paraded around the town; in fact, men’s sexual misconduct in war is seldom prosecuted. On the contrary, in times of war, our women might even want to do their patriotic duty by making themselves sexually available to our men while the sexual police look the other way. Another lesson to be learned from this tale of punishing women sexual collaborators is that their rule breaking was seized as an opportunity to reinforce and reestablish sexual and nationalist hegemony. By disciplining women collaborators, proper gender and sexual demeanor and approved partners were publicly proclaimed. The N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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national gender and sexual order was reinstated: a place for every man and woman, and everyone in their place. As we know, there are much more familiar images from World War II, the most notorious, of course, being the six-sided Star of David that Nazis forced Jews to wear—an insignia that reflects the ethnic intolerant face of nationalism. Less familiar than the Star of David is the pink triangle that homosexuals in Germany and Nazi-occupied territories were forced to wear—a stigma that reflects the more hidden sexually intolerant face of nationalism. Pink triangles and Stars of David not only served to distinguish publicly outcast non-Aryans from true Aryans, but these symbols also attributed potent and degenerate sexual stereotypes to their wearers. In fact, discredited sexuality is an important part of anti-Semitism. While Jews were not often described as homosexuals in articulations of fascist and European racism, they were considered nonetheless “sexual degenerates.” The Nazis used sexualized racism, homophobia, and misogyny as foils against which to contrast their claims to superior morality and virile, but proper, sexuality. Just as feminism has the capacity to challenge the stability of the masculinist heterosexual order that underlies nationalist boundaries, so, too, does homosexuality. Nationalism is not only a man’s game. It is a heterosexual man’s game. Nationalist ideologies tend to value manliness in the form of virile heterosexuality. Masculinist standards for national conduct are not only misogynist—devaluating women, valorizing men—they also tend to be homophobic—intolerant of gender and sexual diversity, particularly homosexuality. Both homosexuals and feminists are problems for nationalists. This is partly because nationalists almost always are traditionalists. Nationalism, even “revolutionary” nationalism, is inherently conservative because nationalists tend to fix their gaze backward to real or imagined pasts for their legitimation and to mark their paths to the future. Feminists and homosexuals are among the most vocal critics of these histories, and they oppose many retraditionalizing aspects of contemporary nationalist movements since these steps backward usually do not lead to improvements in the rights and options of women and homosexuals. Further, feminists raise questions about the accuracy and justice of patriarchal “golden ages” so often celebrated by nationalist leaders, and homosexuals contradict the core nationalist project of reproducing the nation. Both feminists and homosexuals also tend to be seen by nationalists as potential sources of disloyalty, since their commitment to gender and sexual equality raises doubts in the minds of nationalists about the strength of their allegiance to the nation as the primary unit of identification. Nationalist preoccupation with homosexuality was not confined to the Nazi targeting of homosexuals during World War II. The Cold War witnessed another period of “homosexual panic” when many gay men working in Western governments, particularly in the British Foreign Office and U.S. State Department, were fired or reassigned because they were considered to be “security risks.” In the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy was not only interested in finding and flushing out communists in various arenas of American life; he was also interested in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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homosexuals, presumably because they were vulnerable to blackmail because of their “lifestyle” and because their weak moral character made them susceptible to communist influence. The fact that one of McCarthy’s most vicious lieutenants, Roy Cohn, was a gay man was one of the McCarthy era’s best-kept secrets and most ironic breaches of Republican security. Another irony of the focus on homosexuals as likely blackmail targets is that heterosexual misconduct was and is a far more common source of government employee vulnerability, since, as history has shown again and again, people frequently engage in, and frequently go to great lengths to hide, heterosexual affairs. In recent years, lesbian and gay rights groups around the world, but particularly in the West, have mounted assaults on exclusionary policies, claiming equal rights to be members of the ethnic community or nation. During the past few decades, both straight and gay sexual rights advocates have asserted equal rights and membership in ethnic and national communities around the world. The integration of Europe is playing an interesting and emerging role in efforts to liberalize conservative nationalism inside European states. In the Republic of Ireland, for instance, both feminist and gay rights groups have appealed outside Irish national boundaries, to the European Union, to claim rights within the Irish state. The notorious case of a pregnant Irish teenager denied an abortion in Ireland in 1997 led feminists opposed to Ireland’s restrictions on abortions to seek support in the more liberal arenas of European legal and public opinion. Irish gay and lesbian rights groups have appealed to the European Convention on Human Rights to force the decriminalization of same-sex acts between consenting adults in Ireland. In eastern Europe, there has been pressure on states seeking admission to the Council of Europe to abandon codes outlawing homosexual relations; for instance, in 1993, Lithuania repealed its laws against same-sex acts.

Consequences What is it about nationalism—mainstream and extremist—that makes imaginings of, judgments about, and the regulation of gender and sexuality such central concerns? Part of the answer to this question can be found in the observations of Émile Durkheim, a sociologist writing at the turn of the last century. Durkheim posed the question: Why do all societies have crime? If crime, deviance, and rulebreaking are socially universal, then is deviance “normal,” and does it serve some important social purpose or function? Durkheim was asking a question about the edges, the periphery, the boundaries of civil society, and also about the relationship between activity on the fringe (deviance, rule-breaking) and the center (“normal” society). His answer was that both trivial and serious rule-breaking are not only common but useful for societies for several reasons. He argued that rulebreaking raises questions about the location of a community’s moral boundaries N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and the content of its core values. Deviance either can challenge the rules (when it becomes widespread), and thus be a useful means of accomplishing social change, or can reinforce the rules (when deviants are punished), and thus be a useful means of affirming the prevailing social order by reminding everyone what is considered right and wrong and what will happen to those who deviate. Durkheim further argued that punishing deviants can create solidarity, a sense of common purpose, and a feeling of renewed community among members who draw themselves together in righteous indignation to pursue and purge deviants. Nationalist boundaries are a specialized form of the moral boundaries Durkheim described. The margins of nations—ethnic frontiers, gender frontiers, sexual frontiers—are locations where rules about citizenship and proper national demeanor are tested and contested. National symbolic boundaries, like all moral boundaries, are sites for the creation and enforcement of the rules of citizenship; the surveillance, apprehension, and punishment of national deviants or “traitors”; and the formation of revised or new definitions of loyalty to the nation. Punishment like that doled out to the shorn women in World War II France reminds everyone in the nation, not just those labeled “deviant,” about the presence and power of national boundaries. Questions about core social categories such as gender and sexuality become questions about the nation and what it signifies. Identifying “outsiders” in the nation is part of the process of designating “insiders” and “citizens,” and thus of defining the nation itself. The building of nations and national identities involves inspecting and controlling the sexuality of citizens and condemning the sexuality of noncitizens and those considered outside the sexual boundaries of the nation. The punishment of women inside national boundaries for disloyal sexual behavior, the sexual exploitation of women considered to be outside the nation, the control of women’s reproduction through official policies regulating contraception and abortion, and suspicions about the patriotism of homosexuals all reflect the sexualized, indeed, heterosexualized envisioning of the nation. Contemporary nationalist ideologies define proper places for men and women and valorize the heterosexual family as the bedrock of the nation. This uniformity in sexualized nationalist discourse is a striking and surprisingly consistent feature of the global system of national states. Whether national sexual ideologies are spoken by nationalists from former ruling colonial powers or by nationalists in former ruled colonies, the similarities can easily be heard. In matters involving sex and nationalism, the apparatus of the state is perhaps most visible in its operation. The tendency for national governments around the world to exclude women and homosexuals from what are defined as the most important national institutions, such as those involved in war-making and governance, illustrates the gendered, sexualized face of nationalism. The points of convergence between gender and sexuality inside nations can be dangerous intersections. The imposition of strict controls on the national meanings and enactments of gender or sexuality can reinforce national identities N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and movements, but such disciplinary regimes can generate resistance and can become the nation’s undoing. Masculinist heterosexuality is a central component of the bedrock upon which nationalist boundaries rest. Feminism, unruly female sexuality, and homosexuality are three cracks in that foundation. Contemporary states must manage both the frontiers of international borders as well as their internal ethnic, gender, and sexual frontiers. Calming gender and sexual restlessness inside national borders represents one of the most controversial challenges facing contemporary nations in the global system. Recent increases in the number of women in national governments and heading national states, the growing presence of women in the military in the United States and elsewhere, and recent expansion of human sexual rights in many countries suggest that the traditional tight grip of masculinity on nationalism might be loosening. Questions remain, however, about the capacity of hypermasculine institutions like the military and national governments to resist change. What will be the consequences of larger numbers of women in the military and government? Will the institutions become feminized—more reflective of women’s perspectives and interests? Or will the women become masculinized—more reflective of men’s perspectives and interests? What will be the effect on changes in the laws governing gender and sexual rights? Will we see a decline in misogyny and homophobia in nationalist rhetoric and culture? Or will there be a masculinist backlash and a retrenchment of traditional patriarchal nationalism? These are all possibilities that can occur sequentially or simultaneously as long as nationalism remains an organizing principle in the global system. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Bederman, Gail. 1995. Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Connell, Robert. 1995. Masculinities. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dudink, Stefan, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh, eds. 2004. Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Durkheim, Émile. 1938. The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press. Edgerton, Lynda. 1987. “Public Protest, Domestic Acquiescence: Women in Northern Ireland.” In Women in Political Conflict, edited by R. Ridd and H Callaway, 61–83. New York: New York University Press. Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gaitskell, Deborah, and Elaine Unterhalter. 1989. “Mothers of the Nation: A Comparative Analysis of Nation, Race, and Motherhood in Afrikaner Nationalism and the African National Congress.” In Woman-Nation-State, edited by N. Yuval-Davis and F. Anthias, 58–78. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Hasan, Zoya. 1994. Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and State in India. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kimmel, Michael. 1996. Manhood in America: A Cultural History. New York: The Free Press. Mosse, George L. 1985. Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Mosse, George L. 1996. The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity. New York: Oxford University Press. Nelson, Dana D. 1998. National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Scott, James. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. Theweleit, Klaus. 1987. Male Fantasies. Vol. 1. Translated by Stephen Conway. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Weitz, Margaret Collins. 1995. Sisters in the Resistance: How Women Fought to Free France, 1940–45. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Yuval-Davis, Nira, and Floya Anthias. 1989. Woman-Nation-State. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Literature, Language, and Anticolonial Nationalism Kim McMullen

In the last half of the 19th century, Britain was coloring the map of the world imperial red from South Asia to Africa, to the Caribbean and beyond. At the same time, “English” was developing as an academic discipline, and the study of English literature and language was replacing Greek and Latin classics in the curriculum of the aspiring British. This conjunction might seem like historical coincidence until we look more closely at the ideological tasks literature performed on behalf of the nation. At home, the expanding working classes found educational opportunities through extension schools and mechanics institutes where they learned the moderation and continuity of the English “spirit” and the nobility of English cultural achievement through lessons in Shakespeare and Milton. Literature thus taught national unity and social harmony and helped counter civic unrest. Overseas, when English joined mathematics as a core subject on the new Indian Civil Service exam, literature and language became an explicit part of the “civilizing” burden colonial administrators carried to the edges of empire. English was both a justification for and agent of imperial ideology. In the words of eminent Victorian Thomas Macaulay, British civil servants bore “that literature before the light of which impious and cruel superstitions are fast taking flight on the banks of the Ganges. . . . And, wherever British literature spreads, may it be attended by British virtue and British freedom’” (quoted in Baldick 1983, 71). As this example suggests, nations are constructed, tended, and disputed as linguistic and cultural systems as well as political and economic structures. By circulating literary texts, rituals, visual icons, symbols, and other cultural utterances, each nation constitutes itself as an “imagined community,” in Benedict Anderson’s phrase—even established and powerful states like Victorian Britain. In emergent nations like Ireland, India, Nigeria, Jamaica, Kenya, and Barbados —all former British colonies—the process of imagining a community is more complicated and arguably more urgent. In postcolonial settings, the imperial power systematically constructed native peoples as culturally inferior in order to control them. Colonial rulers may have forced indigenous people of different ethnicities, linguistic groups, religions, and tribal loyalties into the administrative borders of a particular colony, where a divide-and-govern strategy often exacerbated local differences. Subject peoples have thus had to develop a compelling counternarrative to imagine an alternative to their subordinated and fragmented colonial status. They needed to find a way to defy the representations of the infeN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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rior native “other” that are the foundation of colonial rule, and they had to develop new languages (figurative and literal) with which to articulate an autonomous collective identity across ethnic, religious, or linguistic borders. Nationalism has proven to be one such powerful decolonizing discourse, and literature is influential in its project. Postcolonial literature does not merely reflect passively on the historical events leading to national independence. Instead, it can be an instrument for actively confronting colonial discourse and a medium through which a colonized people can voice their sovereignty. The visionary and affective powers of the written and spoken word have been important weapons in many anti-imperial nationalist struggles. Novels can construct a revised history of indigenous peoples to replace imperial distortions. Poems and songs can inspire resistance to foreign rule through images of a precolonial golden age or a liberated future. Theatrical spectacles can awaken a sense of common purpose. Yet even as literature has been a valuable tool for nationalists, it has become critical of nationalism itself in some postcolonial contexts when writers pursue the project of social liberation and cultural decolonization beyond the emergence of a new state.

Relevance Anomalous States Every postcolonial nation is distinctive, shaped by the length of its colonization, the policies and attitudes of the imperial power, the traditions of the native peoples, and the distinct forms of their resistance. Therefore it is dangerous to generalize a master narrative of postcolonial national literature. However, even as we note the historic particularities of one emerging nation’s culture, we can recognize patterns and trends common to many. As we shall see, the decolonizing strategies that were important to Irish writers at the beginning of the 20th century can be found in the work of more recent postcolonial writers like Chinua Achebe (Nigeria), Louise Bennett (Jamaica), Tsitsi Dangarembga (Zimbabwe), ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o (Kenya), and Salman Rushdie George Lamming (Barbados), Ng u (India). Ireland is an “anomalous state.” Often described as Britain’s oldest colony, it is one of the few European countries to experience lengthy colonization. Ireland is also one of the oldest postcolonial states, winning its independence in 1922, decades before the great period of anticolonial national emergence following World War II. Yet the recent violence and political conflict in Northern Ireland suggest that questions of national identity remain unresolved. Many in the former empire may perceive the Irish to be closer to the British than to other colonized people. Yet the Irish and their writers have inspired subject peoples around the world in their struggles for independence. Discussing the challenge of reclaiming Caribbean culture from its legacy of enslavement N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and degradation, St. Lucian poet Derek Walcott borrowed James Joyce’s famous description of the crisis of the native intellectual—“history is the nightmare from which I’m trying to awake”—asserting that the Irish situation was directly analogous to his own. When Indian novelist Raja Rao defended his decision to write Kanthapura (1938) in English rather than his mother tongue, Kannada, he prophesied the emergence of Indian English—“a dialect which will some day prove to be as distinctive and colorful as the Irish” (1963, vii). Nigerian Chinua Achebe, seeking a metaphor for the profound dispossession of the Igbo by British incursion, borrows a phrase from “The Second Coming,” W. B. Yeats’s great poem of apocalyptic change—Things Fall Apart. Positioned between the Third World and the First, Ireland’s precocious emergence marks many of the issues and several of the stages of anticolonial nationalism. After describing the process of cultural subordination used to justify colonization, this essay will examine a sequence of strategies by which Irish literature— and postcolonial literature generally—has been mobilized in the national cause. First, it has offered resistance to imperial policies. Second, “nativists” have used literature and the language question to refute the images of a debased indigenous “other” and have, instead, imagined a resurrected and unitary people by celebrating their folklife, language, and heritage. Third, literature has helped nationalists assert a more politically self-conscious and historically focused analysis of their colonial status. And finally, literature has allowed some postindependence intellectuals to voice their disillusionment with the new state and to extend the process of decolonization beyond independence.

Origins Creating the Colonial Subject Culture itself nourished the empire, as the words of Thomas Macaulay demonstrate. When Derek Walcott asserts that “language [is] the tool that dominates the colonial” (1996, 23), he recognizes that the discourse that arrives with the imperial power regulates what can be known and said about the territory and people it has claimed. Colonial discourse dominates in literal terms when English displaces Gikuyu or Hindi or Irish as the official language of a place. More broadly and subtly, colonial discourse—the ideas, representations, beliefs, and practices of the colonizer—rules by ratifying all knowledge, and particularly any “truths” about the subject people, exclusively through imperial ideology and European values. Literary theorist Homi Bhabha has shown that the general goal of colonial discourse is to make the apparent racial difference of the colonized group the source of its perceived cultural limitations and degeneracy. In turn, the “natural” inferiority of indigenous people becomes the justification for occupation, supervision, and instruction by the “superior” imperial civilization (1994, 70). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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For example, in Ireland the work of colonial discourse dates back centuries. The English poet and colonial administrator Edmund Spenser argued in A View of the Present State of Ireland (1596) that the Irish were descended from the “barbaric” Scythians. His catalog of their alleged primitive qualities—violence, lawlessness, laziness, duplicity, superstition, filthiness—highlights by contrast the presumed reason and gentility of their English overlords. His description also warrants English ruthlessness by showing that only the sword can cut out “inherent” Irish degeneracies and allow civilization to flourish. Subsequent versions of the inferior Irish “other” were disseminated by English literature and popular media. The stage Irishman invented by such dramatists as Shakespeare and Richard Sheridan was drunken, feckless, and loquacious but comically misspoken; his “fighting Irish” companion was reflexively rebellious but ineffectual. Victorian poet and critic Matthew Arnold described a dreamy, feminized “Celt” during the same period that Punch and other British periodicals circulated vicious caricatures of a subhuman, apelike “Paddy.” These representations naturalized Irish subordination by creating a pseudo-evolutionary scale that categorized them and other colonized peoples as “primitive” races—simple, childish, brutal. Such images argued for the preeminence of British civilization and the necessity of British rule. One 1870 cartoon registers anxieties in Britain over nationalist stirrings in Ireland by casting Prime Minister Gladstone as Shakespeare’s Prospero, protecting Miranda (an idealized Hibernia) from assault by the simian Paddy (Caliban). As with the caricatures of many colonized people, Paddy was everything John Bull was not: irrational in the face of reason, childish before British maturity, lazy and truculent before British industriousness and discipline (Kiberd 1995, 30). Colonial discourse taught the Irish their subject status by denying the integrity and coherence of their native language and traditions. In turn, their presumed inferiority justified British seizure of their lands in the 17th century and of their economic, educational, and social opportunities in the 18th century when Penal Laws were leveled against Irish Catholics. This pattern plays itself out in any number of colonial settings. In Orientalism (1978), critic Edward Said describes how imperial Europe invented its cultural antithesis in the mysterious “Orient” by circulating a discourse that constructed the East as the West’s other, describing it, studying it, judging it, and eventually ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o argues that the effect of colonial ruling over vast regions of it. Ng u discourse in Africa is a “cultural bomb . . . [that] annihilate[s] a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement. . . . It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other peoples’ languages rather than their own” (1986a, 3). Colonial discourse circulates broadly in such literary texts as The Tempest, when Shakespeare characterizes the “savage and deformed slave” Caliban as a native islander whose inborn unruliness and corruption justify the unyielding N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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John Tenniel’s 1870 cartoon, for the popular British magazine Punch, recycles characters from Shakespeare’s proto-imperialist romance The Tempest to express English anxiety about Irish resistance. The role of Caliban is played by a simian Irishman. (Reproduced with permission of Punch Ltd., www.punch.co.uk.)

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discipline of the Milanese duke, Prospero. Frustrated by the creature’s transgressions, Prospero declares him “a born devil, on whose nature / Nurture can never stick” (IV.i.188–189). However, recently a number of Caribbean writers including Martinican Aimé Césairé and Barbadians George Lamming and Kamau Brathwaite have exposed The Tempest as an imperial fantasy. They rewrite the masterslave relationship to suggest that the latter’s rebelliousness is the revolt of the colonial subject. The rage of their anticolonial Caliban asserts political and cultural resistance, not innate barbarity. Just as the postcolonial Caliban steals the language of his European master to curse his servitude, so many writers use their creative powers to subvert colonial discourse. Excavating lost indigenous societies and examining the methods by which they were undermined is one important motif. Chinua Achebe’s novel Things Fall Apart (1958) and Brian Friel’s play Translations (1980) are both set at a tipping point of territorial and cultural dispossession. The first half of Achebe’s novel offers an intimate collective view of Igbo village life just before European contact. The second section records the accelerating disorientation and fragmentation of this traditional African society when the British impose new religious, educational, economic, and legal systems. The final chapter of Things Fall Apart brilliantly shifts the story’s point of view from that of the Igbo villagers to that of a colonial administrator. Achebe thus symbolizes the abrupt and decisive displacement of Igbo culture by an alien discourse—their literal loss of control over their own narrative—when the British district commissioner proposes to condense the complex tragedy we’ve just read into a single “objective” paragraph in his imperial history, The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes on the Lower Niger. Friel’s play similarly yokes linguistic and cultural disinheritance with territorial loss in Ireland. Translations opens in the 1830s in a remote Donegal village where Irish-speaking children learn the elements of a sophisticated Gaelic civilization in a clandestine “hedge school,” in defiance of the Penal Laws and the colonial government’s Anglocentric curriculum. But this traditional community—and its linguistic relationship with its homeland—is ruptured when cartographers from the British Ordnance Survey intrude and begin to (mis)translate Irish placenames into English. The Anglophone map literally rewrites the Irish landscape and becomes, in turn, the tool by which the imperial army seizes control of this last wild corner of Ireland. In Friel’s play and Achebe’s novel, a web of native “things” (language, tradition, belief, economic power) falls apart when colonial discourse sustains territorial conquest. Even the right to write this history is claimed by the colonizer. Resistance and Revivalism As powerful as colonial discourse and its construction of the native subject could be, it was not absolute. If European imperialism was nourished by literature and other intellectual fare, subsequent anticolonial revolts, revolutions, and independence movements were similarly fed by local cultures of resistance. In N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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17th- through 19th-century Ireland before the emergence of nationalism per se, we can identify covert refusal of English domination in the persistence of Irishspeaking hedge schools and the oral and textual circulation of poetry in Irish, both remnants of precolonial Gaelic culture. More direct—but still coded—opposition can be found in the widespread aisling (“vision”) poems. Typically in these allegorical love lyrics, a beautiful, defenseless woman (emblematically Ireland) laments her captivity by a hated stranger and begs to be rescued by her true Irish protector. But when does the publication of an allegorical poem or the daily use of a local language become a deliberate act of national struggle? In Ireland, it may have happened with the founding of The Nation in 1842, a newspaper that reached hundreds of thousands when it was read aloud in communal gatherings. It circulated a popular history of resistance and rebellion in Anglophone ballads that appealed to middle-class and illiterate mass audiences alike. Later in the century, the founding of a language revival movement marks another nationalist beginning. Poet, playwright, and eventual first president Douglas Hyde delivered “Ireland’s declaration of cultural independence” (Kiberd 1995, 138) in “The Necessity for De-Anglicizing Ireland” (1892). Hyde urged the Irish people to resuscitate the traditions smothered by colonial discourse (“Anglicization”), arguing that, if they recovered their language, they would be reborn. The Gaelic League was founded in 1893 to encourage such revival through a network of local, primarily urban and bourgeois, Irish language clubs that took inspiration from rural Irish-speaking communities. In turn, these clubs encouraged nationalist rebels like Patrick Pearse and educated many postindependence leaders. At the same time, Anglo-Irish writers pursued a vigorous program of Irish cultural renaissance in English. William Butler Yeats, Lady Augusta Gregory, and John Millington Synge directed the Irish Literary Theatre (1897) and eventually the Irish National Theatre (1902) with the express hope of “show[ing] that Ireland is not the home of buffoonery and of easy sentiment, as it has been represented, but the home of an ancient idealism,” as their founding charter asserts (Gregory, quoted by Harrington 1991, 378). In this early stage, Irish writers, like intellectuals in many colonies, sought authority and inspiration for their political aspirations in a nativist rhetoric of rebirth and recovery. Indeed, Yeats’s friend Rabindranath Tagore pursued much the same course in Bengal. They retold sagas and epics, collected folktales, reclaimed the landscape in romantic verse and “peasant” dramas, and learned the native language of the rural people. They thus hoped to authenticate their nation’s autonomy by recuperating the lost essence of a people. When Lady Gregory described her work as theater-founder, folklorist, and translator of Irish epics by claiming “I am not fighting for it [independence], but am preparing for it” (quoted by Kiberd 1995, 87), literary resistance and linguistic recovery blossomed into full-blown cultural nationalism. In Africa, the Négritude movement of the 1930s and 1940s used a similar nativist rhetoric. Founded by an indigenous black elite educated in the imperial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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metropolis (in this case Paris), Négritude operated through simple inversion of the binary oppositions through which Europeans created the debased African other. If imperialists saw Africa as the primitive, primordial heart of darkness and Africans as childlike and ignorant, writers like Léopold Senghor (Senegal) and Aimé Cesairé celebrated black culture and identity for its elemental emotions, deep spirituality, and organic rhythms. Like Irish revivalists, they revered native values and idealized a precolonial world of coherence and authenticity. Négritude offered an essentializing vision of black unity reaching across Africa and the African diaspora. While not directly part of a particular nationalist movement, it laid the groundwork for later liberation campaigns by challenging the racist foundation of colonialism and constructing a rhetoric of solidarity and common struggle.

Dimensions The Language Question One of the dilemmas that bedevils many postcolonial writers and nations long past independence immediately arises in the Francophone Négritude movement and the Anglophone writings of many Irish nationalists: the language question. The debate over whether to write a new nation into being in the imperial tongue or in the native language(s) is a residue of colonial discourse. It probes the heart of who “we” are as a political and cultural community, often dividing an indigenous elite (educated in the language of the colonizer) from the illiterate, vernacularspeaking masses. It implicitly raises questions of assimilation, authenticity, consistency, and loyalty—as when Hyde used English to argue that the Irish should “de-Anglicize.” In some African nations, the language question is further complicated by the profound differences between orality and its traditional forms (e.g., praise songs and epics) and literacy and its imported genres (e.g., the novel). On the one hand, revival of languages like Irish grows from an attempt by nationalists and others to reconnect with beliefs and traditions untainted by foreign domination. They thus hope to establish a cultural justification for political separatism. From this perspective, a simple, categorical answer to the language question seems imperative: English must be boycotted as the language of subjugation. The new nation must speak the old language. Or, as Patrick Pearse had it, Irish literature must be written in Irish. ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o insists, the power disparity between English Moreover, as Ng u and the language of a subject people remains beyond the latter’s independence. Long after the Union Jack is lowered, images of the cultural inferiority of the colonized circulate in the English lexicon and literary canon. Thus, even given Kenya’s ˜ g˜ı famously rejected the English in which he was educated, independence, Ng u choosing to write his early novels in Gikuyu. He thereby sustains an emotional N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and political connection to rural people and their oral traditions and resists the neocolonialism of international capitalism. Pragmatists might argue, on the other hand, that in many postcolonial nations it would be unwise or even impossible to dismantle an established Englishlanguage educational, legal, and social infrastructure. This outlook might seem especially valid in a global intellectual and commercial marketplace where, for better or worse, English is the lingua franca. In 19th-century Ireland, Daniel O’Connell anticipated this position when he urged Irish speakers to learn English as the language of economic opportunity, even as he worked for repeal of the Union. Such expediency might seem even more pressing in countries like India or Nigeria where the Anglophone colonial administration was overlaid upon hundreds of different local languages. Defending his decision to write in the Nigerian “national language” of English rather than in Igbo or any of the country’s other “ethnic languages,” Achebe observes: “There are not many countries in Africa today where you could abolish the language of the erstwhile colonial power and still retain the facility for mutual communication” (1975, 95). Ironically, the same was true of revolutionary-era Ireland, where centuries of English-language domination left less than 20 percent of the population able to speak Irish, despite the Gaelic League’s activism. Still, many critics condemn the pragmatist defense of the “metropolitan” language that consolidated the bourgeois colonial state because it could extend the same system of cultural domination to class and regional divisions in the independent nation. If the elite speak English, all other utterances become “local,” “uncivilized,” “trivial.” This argument is especially compelling in India, where a small fraction of the population is English literate and where Indian writers working in English are sometimes accused of pandering to Western audiences. Irish versus English; Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Efik, Edo versus English; Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, Bengali, Marathi versus English—the binary opposition of the language question seems to reiterate, but not resolve, a colonial dilemma. A third possibility remains. Over centuries of contact, languages like cultures mix, interact, and cross-pollinate, making it impossible to rescue some “pure” precolonial vernacular language even where a sufficient number of native speakers remain. Moreover, the imperial language itself is reshaped by colonization. Many would argue that such cross-cultural exchange creates a linguistic synergy that gives the postcolonial writer a unique authority over the imperial language. He or she has the power to use it subversively and to adapt it to local, decolonizing purposes. What emerges is a hybrid “de-Anglicized” form of English that claims the ownership and agency of the syncretic language for the postcolonial nation. Its dynamic syntax and distinctive idioms implicitly refute the colonialist logic that ranks the local and native as inferior. As Salman Rushdie proclaims: “English, no longer an English language, now grows from many roots. . . . The empire writes back” (1982, 8). This is the strategy that underlies the rich “HibernoEnglish” of many of Synge’s plays, which draw their linguistic energy from the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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rhythms, idioms, and grammatical patterns of English speakers whose mother tongue was Irish. Similarly, Anglophone novelists like Rao, Rushdie, and Achebe and poets like Brathwaite, Walcott, and Louise Bennett, working in India, Africa, and the West Indies, filter the imperial language through the syntax, lexicons, and cadences of various oral vernaculars. They thereby reinvent their new English not as a substandard “dialect” of the Queen’s English but rather as what Brathwaite calls a “nation language.” Describing the linguistic complexity of the Caribbean, with its Carib and Arawak tongues, the languages of the Ashanti, Congo, and Yoruba people imported as slaves, and the imperial speech of the Spanish, English, French, and Dutch, Brathwaite argues that, even when the European dialect dominated as “the language of public discourse and conversation, of obedience, command and conception,” it “was still being influenced by the underground language, the submerged language that the slaves had brought, . . . [in turn] constantly transforming itself into new forms” (1984, 7). Specific “nation languages” and Creoles—Jamaican English, Indian English, Hiberno-English—manifest the heterogeneity and hybridity of particular postcolonial cultures. They simultaneously challenge the supremacy of a single metropolitan linguistic standard. Louise Bennett wittily flaunts the self-confidence of the Creole speaker in “Dry Foot Bwoy”: Wha wrong wid Mary dry-foot bwoy? Dem gal got him fe mock, An wen me meet him tarra night De bwoy gi me a shock! Me tell him sey him auntie an Him cousin dem sen howdy, An ask him how him getting’ awn, Him sey, “Oh, jolley, jolley!” Me start fe feel so sorry fe De po bad-lucky soul, Me tink him come a foreign-lan Come ketch bad foreign cole! Me tink him have a bad sore-throat, But as him chat-chat gwan, Me fine out sey is foreign twang De bwoy was a-put awn! For me notice dat him answer To nearly all me sey Was “Actually, what oh deah!” An all dem stinting deh.

Just as new nations are born from the history of colonization, so are new “Englishes.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Literary Essentialism Literary theorist Terry Eagleton observes a fundamental paradox at the center of national emergence. The “metaphysics of nationalism” invents an independent and self-authorized subject called “the people” whose organic existence must ironically precede its actual manifestation as a sovereign society (1990, 28). Literature’s capacity for intensely emotional fabrication bridges this conceptual gap by creating “the nation” before one’s very eyes, in a play or a marching song. It can overwrite colonial discourse and conjure an imagined community that joins past and present by contriving an organic essence that is, literally, a fiction. The 1902 premier of Yeats’s and Gregory’s play Cathleen ni Houlihan helped galvanize its audience into a “people” years before the revolution. In it, an allegorical old woman appears to a rural family on the eve of their son’s wedding to lament the loss of her “four beautiful green fields” and her need to put “the strangers out of my house” (Harrington 1991, 7, 9). As the bridegroom vows to defend the old woman, she is transformed into a “young girl” with the “walk of a queen”—a liberated Ireland. The bridegroom’s renunciation of earthly desire is rewarded with the promise of immortality: “They that have red cheeks will have pale cheeks for my sake. . . . They shall be remembered for ever” (11, 10). The onstage performance of patriotic sacrifice enacted for the spectators a vision of communal selfrecognition and modeled a ritual conversion to nationalist ideals. This ideological transfiguration was articulated in Christian terms in the poetry of Patrick Pearse. Pearse glorified heroic sacrifice in a figure that fused Christ, the legendary Irish warrior Cuchulain, and contemporary revolutionaries. Such texts function as secular myths by retroactively authenticating—even sanctifying—the essence of “the people” and by propelling them, through a fantasy of heroic action, into an independent future. Less overtly political, the plays of John Synge were attempts to ground a sense of unitary Irish identity in the vitality and legitimacy of “peasant” culture and especially their Hiberno-English folkways. An extension of nativist strategies, Synge’s search for authentic Ireland in rural communities insulated from colonial distortions and practicing timeless traditions echoes with Raja Rao’s desire to discover the real Indian motherland in pastoral villages like the eponymous Kanthapura. Even as they record such historical events as “this Gandhi business,” texts like Kanthapura seek national identity in the essence of “the folk” and in the unchanging rhythms of life in bucolic market villages. The remote settings of Synge’s plays—on “the wild coast of Mayo” or in “the last cottage at the head of a long glen”—connect the domestic habits, beliefs, and emotions of his characters with the unconquered landscape, a nationalist primitivism that equates “wildness” with spiritual authenticity and cultural vitality. Yet as much as he sought organic community, Synge relished rebellion. His most memorable creation is the “playboy” Christy Mahon—“a fine lad with the great savagery to destroy [his] da” (Harrington 1991, 94). Written less than a de-

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cade before the Irish Easter Rising, The Playboy of the Western World ’s oedipal themes seem to justify the ultimate patricide—anticolonial revolution. Ironically, however, socially conservative Catholic nationalists were appalled by the play’s sexual energy and impiety and the general wildness of the population it discovers on Mayo’s “wild coast.” They rioted at its 1907 premier. These demonstrations pitted an emerging Catholic middle class against an Anglo-Irish elite over the right to define the essence of “the people.” They thus offer a cautionary tale about nationalist metaphysics and the difficulty of generating the “deep horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991, 7) necessary for building an imagined national community across class, caste, and sectarian divisions.

The Nation in History Disagreement over “the people’s” character threatens to widen the very racial, class, or sectarian fissures nationalism needs to bridge. But an alternative decolonizing strategy locates the nation not in mythic time or essential identity, but in history. Historicized literature invents its imagined community by carefully observing the social and political realities of individual lives lived out in specific colonial settings. Benedict Anderson has suggested that, along with the newspaper, the realistic novel “provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imaginative community that is the nation” because it offered a means for portraying “a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous empty time.” The novel thus becomes an analogue for the nation itself (1991, 25). Mimetic narrative can incarnate collectivity without sacrificing heterogeneity; its “people” are not a transcendent entity but one joined by shared history. James Joyce’s Dubliners (1914) approximates this “sociological organism” by describing what Joyce called a “chapter in the moral history of my country.” Taken individually, its 15 stories dissect the economic constraints, emotional fatigue, and imaginative enervation of individual lower-middle-class Catholics in one particular city in the empire. Taken together, Dubliners diagnoses the paralysis of Dubliners as a chronic, communal, social disease spread by their status as colonial subjects. The stories of Hindi writer Premchad offer a similar panoramic view of Indian society, yoking the rise of Gandhi and the independence movement to the sociological realities of the caste system, widespread poverty, and governmental corruption. Decades later, the English-language novels of Anita Desai help to consolidate independent India’s burgeoning urban middle class through realistic accounts of the stress of family, community, religion, modernity, and tradition in individual lives. Such narratives find their imagined community in historic specificity. Less panoramically, the postcolonial Bildungsroman, or novel of development, chronicles the education of an individual native consciousness striving to

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liberate itself. The protagonist journeys across a landscape inside the novel that mirrors the social and political territory outside, and the individual’s story thus becomes a metaphor for the nation’s decolonizing struggle. Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) records the education of Irish-Catholic Stephen Dedalus in 1890s Dublin, where the clash of religion and politics sabotages his family’s Christmas dinner and his debate with an English-born schoolmaster leads invariably to the language question: “The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine!” (1992, 205). Stephen’s adolescent rebellions are shaped by his particular subaltern history, rendering his psychological and cultural campaign to invent himself analogous to the nation’s. Portrait anticipates such influential novels of budding postcolonial consciousness as George Lamming’s In the Castle of My Skin (1954), Antiguan Jamaica Kincaid’s Annie John (1985), or more ambivalently, Indian Trinidadian V. S. Naipaul’s A House for Mr. Biswas (1961). Lamming’s autobiographical novel follows its Afro-Caribbean protagonist on a lurching journey into political awareness on an island proud of its status as “Little Britain” yet burdened with the economic and racial legacy of the plantation system. His proper English education may raise his economic prospects, but it leaves him ignorant of the history of slavery and colonization. Worse, his community is betrayed from within by a member of the native elite—a man who belongs to the class to which the protagonist aspires. Only when a friend returning from the United States speaks of “negritude” can the young man recognize the imperial and racist roots of his own oppression and begin to feel political solidarity with other diaspora Africans. In the Castle of My Skin is a powerful story of awakening to anticolonial political awareness, a personal history linked to that of Barbados and the wider Caribbean and, in turn, to the postcolonial world’s history. Yet however emblematic of national emergence the development of the Bildungsroman protagonist might be, nationalism per se is not the focus of such novels. Instead, they gesture toward a later phase of decolonization where national autonomy is assumed. Edward Said, citing Franz Fanon, suggests that, at this stage, liberation moves beyond national independence to focus on the individual and the “transformation of social consciousness beyond national consciousness” (1993, 230). Even as he lays claim to Ireland, Joyce, for one, famously sees nationalism as an impediment to full personal autonomy. When Stephen’s Fenian friend asks him, “Are you Irish at all?” (1992, 219), Stephen self-confidently asserts his identity as a fully empowered Irishman even as he disavows essentialist notions of Irishness: “This race and this country and this life produced me. . . . I shall express myself as I am” (220). Stephen assumes his citizenship even as he identifies nationalism as one of the snares that might check his boundless flight as an artist. He seeks imaginative emancipation beyond the authority of a particular state.

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Consequences Independence and Afterward Indeed, the disillusionment that critics have noted in some postindependence writing may register the suspicion that national liberation has not brought enough freedom or change. Many newly independent postcolonial states remain burdened by economic inequities, social and ethnic tensions, and repressive or corrupt governments. Many writers acknowledge that decolonization does not end with independence and that full liberation from the “nightmare of [colonial] history” requires persistent negotiation with its residues. To develop “social consciousness beyond national consciousness,” the postcolonial writer might need to interrogate the metaphysics that called the nation into being in the first place. Alternatively, he or she may need to analyze how current caste, class, race, or gender oppressions might have been shaped by colonialism and anticolonial struggle. For example, after 1922, the Irish Free State consolidated a homogeneous vision of the essential nation through a Gaelicized Catholic educational system and a “cultural isolationist” policy that included widespread censorship. Immediately, writers like Sean O’Faolain and Mary Lavin countered this monolithic version of official Ireland with stories that detailed the daily struggles of women, the sociocultural disjunctions between city dwellers and rural “folk,” and the chronic emigration of economic exiles to Britain. Such literature pointed toward decolonizing work yet to be done. Moreover, because partition of Ireland suspended, rather than resolved, many pressing political issues, when sectarian violence tore across the North in the late 1960s and afterward, Irish intellectuals felt called upon to revisit questions of cultural identity, language, and community. In particular, the Field Day group (including Brian Friel, Seamus Heaney, Tom Paulin, and Seamus Deane) used poetry, literary analysis, theatrical productions, and other cultural works to address the crisis. Their five-volume A Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing (1991–2002) modeled an ecumenical, multicultural, and inclusive construction of Ireland to bridge the sectarian chasm of the Troubles. In a postindependence African context, novels such as Achebe’s A Man of the People (1966) and Anthills of the Savannah (1987) and Wole Soyinka’s Season of Anomy (1980) have turned their attention to the hard realities of building new societies in the face of poverty, neocolonialism, the tensions between modernity and tradition, and the limits of national consciousness. The ongoing challenges ˜ g˜ı’s A Grain of Wheat of decolonization in independent Kenya are central to Ng u (1967). The novel is set literally on the eve of freedom in 1963, counterbalancing the euphoric public celebration of Uhuru with the private stories of compromise, treachery, weakness, and misunderstanding that, along with heroic sacrifice, are the complex legacy of many liberation struggles. One returning rebel, upon whom the community projects its best hopes and purest motives, reveals that he has

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betrayed a comrade. Another, Gikonyo, learns that independence brings no change in the economic prospects of the common people when he is cheated in a ˜ g˜ı writes in his author’s land deal by a member of the local political elite. As Ng u note: “All the characters in this book are fictitious. . . . But the situation and the problems are real—sometimes too painfully real for the peasants who fought the British yet who now see all that they fought for being put on one side.” Yet whatever the disappointments of independence, the novel implicitly embraces the ongoing process of decolonization with the words of Gikonyo’s mother, who refutes her son’s despair and anger with a command to look to the future: “Let us now see what profit it will bring you, to go on poisoning your mind with these things when you should have accepted and sought how best to build your life” (1986b, 177). ˜ g˜ı scrutinizes independent Kenya in the name of the masses. He thereby Ng u pursues one of the most provocative themes in postindependence literature by asking the question famously posed by Gayatri Spivak: “Can the subaltern speak?” That is, where, in the evolving narrative of the nation, is the space for those subordinate groups who have, historically, been left on the margins of public debate by every ruling elite—specifically, the lower classes, the uneducated, and women? For example, Irish nationalists may have discovered a powerful decolonizing weapon in the metaphor of the nation-as-woman, as in Cathleen ni Houlihan. But this image simultaneously displaced historical Irish women with a symbol of passive suffering and laid the groundwork for gender inequalities in the independent nation. Poet Eavan Boland writes: “At the end of the colonial 19th century, the national tradition operated as a powerful colonizer. It marked out value systems; it politicised certain realities and devalued others. To those it recognised and approved, it offered major roles in the story. To others, bit parts only” (1995, 197). Refusing to play the bit part of “Cathleen,” postcolonial feminists like Boland turn the decolonizing lens on nationalist discourse itself. They simultaneously attempt to portray more historically accurate representations of Irish women and more diverse and heterogeneous visions of their country. Like Boland, Tsitsi Dangarembga relates an alternative story of her nation. Her Bildungsroman, Nervous Condition (1988) is not concerned with the civic events by which Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. Instead, it examines the “nervous conditions” created by postcolonial class and gender relations in Shona society after independence, as the protagonist, Tambu, struggles to liberate herself intellectually and psychologically. The novel chronicles Tambu’s “escape” from the rigidly patriarchal clan structure that “traps” her peasant mother and her universityeducated aunt alike. The success of Tambu’s uncle as a mission-school principal raises the family’s economic and social status, but he is a mimic man whose autocratic control of the clan stems from his emasculated position as a native subject. His rigid rule over his daughter and niece is intensified by his need to raise model children as the “good African” in the mission school. Thus, Dangarembga suggests, residual colonialism distorts traditional Shona gender roles. In contrast, his daughter Nyasha rebels against his patriarchal control, inspired by her growN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ing insight into the politics of colonial oppression. Meanwhile, Tambu naively believes an exclusively European-style convent education will free her from the sexism and poverty of the traditional Shona homestead. Nyasha scorns her cousin’s assimilation and the cultural alienation it demands of Africans, even as she seeks the liberation of a modern woman—a double bind that eventually consumes her. In this pair of cousins, Dengarembga embodies two possible responses to the “nervous condition” of postcolonial engenderment—a theme that engages other writers such as Buchi Emecheta (Nigeria), Bessie Head (Botswana), and Ama Ata Aidoo (Ghana). Similarly ambivalent about the fruits of independence, Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1980) is a preeminent novel of postcolonial nationhood for many international readers, although his prominence as an Indo-Anglian writer remains controversial for some Indian critics. Midnight’s Children takes the symbolic relationship between a new nation and its children to a comic extreme by imagining a clan of magical children, born at the hour of India’s independence, whose fantastic powers embody the linguistic, cultural, and social complexity and the infinite potential of the new state. However, as the children mature along with India, their diversity produces not a rich, heterogeneous community but a fractured polity whose capacities are wasted in endless squabbles. They are nearly finished off at last in the “sperectomy”—the excision of hope—performed by the authoritarian regime of Indira Gandhi’s “Emergency.” Yet even if Rushdie believes the initial promises of Indian nationhood have been squandered, he insists it is possible to reimagine that community in some newer, centrifugal, and multivoiced form. The sheer inventive capacity of his narrator, Saleem—his ability to transform the past into a rich metamorphic “chutnification of history”—asserts a continued faith in linguistic plenitude and the regenerative powers of the human imagination. Rushdie’s symbolism also insists that storytelling—literature—remains a critical tool for political transformation. Beyond the Nation Have we reached a post-national moment? Intellectuals like Homi Bhabha might argue that the very idea of “homogeneous national cultures” based in the shared history of a place or in an organic essence of a people is being redefined by migrations across an increasingly cosmopolitan world. Bhabha points to a “transnational and translational sense . . . of imagined communities” that span the globe (1994, 5). Once relatively uniform and isolated, Irish culture is being reshaped by the new global realities of international guest workers and asylum seekers, as Dermot Bolger suggests in his novel Valparaiso Voyage (2001). Similarly, the interwoven histories of the Irish, African, and Latino diasporas create a transnational community in a New York tenement in Jim Sheridan’s film In America (2002). Indeed, the recent flurry of migrant texts on the South Asian and African diasporas —Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (1988), Monica Ali’s Brick Lane (2003), Jhumpa Lahiri’s The Namesake (2003), Caryl Philips’s Crossing the River (1995), Zadie Smith’s White N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Teeth (2000), and Andrea Levy’s Small Island (2004)—attests to the widening circle of global “Englishes” and to the complex proliferation of postcolonial communities beyond the borders of particular nations. Selected Bibliography Achebe, Chinua. 1975. “The African Writer and the English Language.” Morning Yet on Creation Day, 91–103. Garden City, NY: Anchor Doubleday. Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. ed. London: Verso. Baldick, Chris. 1983. The Social Mission of English Criticism, 1848–1932. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bennett, Louise. 1966. Jamaica Labrish. Jamaica: Sangster’s Book Stores. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. Boland, Eavan. 1995. Object Lessons: The Life of the Woman and the Poet in Our Time. Manchester, UK: Carcanet Press. Brathwaite, Edward Kamau. 1984. History of the Voice: The Development of Nation Language in Anglophone Caribbean Poetry. London: New Beacon Books. Dangarembga, Tsitsi. 1988. Nervous Conditions. New York: Seal Press. Eagleton, Terry. 1990. “Nationalism: Irony and Commitment.” Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature, 23–39. Introduction by Seamus Deane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Harrington, John P., ed. 1991. Modern Irish Drama. New York: W. W. Norton. Joyce, James. 1992. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. New York: Penguin Books. (Orig. pub. 1916.) Kiberd, Declan. 1995. Inventing Ireland: The Literature of the Modern Nation. London: Jonathan Cape. Ngu ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o. 1986a. Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: James Currey. Ngu ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o. 1986b. A Grain of Wheat. Rev. ed. Oxford: Heinemann. (Orig. pub. 1967.) Rao, Raja. 1963. Kanthapura. New York: New Directions. (Orig. pub. 1938.) Rushdie, Salman. 1982. “The Empire Writes Back with a Vengeance.” The Times (London), July 3. Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Random House. Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books. Walcott, Derek. 1996. “The Sea Is History.” Frontiers of Caribbean Literature in English, edited by Frank Birbalsingh, 22–28. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Nation-Building: From a World of Nations to a World of Nationalisms David Brown Relevance Until the 1960s, it was widely assumed that, despite transitional problems, modernization was promoting the national integration of contemporary sovereign states. The cautious optimism of that time was reflected in Dankwart Rustow’s influential book titled A World of Nations. Evidence to the contrary was growing, however. When Anthony Smith’s The Ethnic Revival appeared in 1981, political movements by diverse racial, religious, and linguistic groups were demanding changes to the boundaries, governmental structures, and cultures of numerous states that had until then been regarded as incipient or established “nation-states.” By the end of the 1980s, pessimism about the future of the nation-state was becoming widespread. This was reflected in the warnings by Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations, by Robert Kaplan in his Coming Anarchy, and by Kenichi Ohmae in The End of the Nation-State. The problems facing nation-states manifested themselves in various ways, most dramatically in the escalation of civil violence. In several countries, including Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Ethiopia, major civil wars broke out. In other cases, as in Northern Ireland, Spain, the Philippines, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka, longstanding separatist tensions escalated into terrorist or guerrilla violence. Elsewhere violence erupted in the form of social riots, as occurred in the American civil rights movement in the 1960s and in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians in the 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, civil conflict had overtaken interstate conflict as the main political cause of death. Even when it did not take a primarily violent form, nationalist contention was clearly increasing from the mid-1960s onward. In the emergent nation-states of Asia and Africa, a clash between “tribe” and nation was seen by some as a necessary “rite of passage” for decolonization and the transition to modernity. However, nationalist conflicts were also increasing in developed countries whose national integration had hitherto seemed well established. Québec separatism erupted in Canada; the United Kingdom faced an upsurge in Scottish, Welsh, and Irish Catholic separatisms; and tensions between Flemish and Walloon communities flared in Belgium. The increased incidence of such disputes in diverse nation-states served to promote the idea that the “nation-state” in general was in crisis. Talk of cosmopolitan globalization on the one hand and of multiculturalist minority rights on N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the other seemed to imply that the nation-state was being squeezed both from above and below by new forces of social change. The implication, for some, was that the end of the nation-state might be in sight and that a transformation into some new form of polity might be in process. The purpose here is first to explain the main line of argument that underlies this view of a structural crisis of the nation-state, and then to suggest a revised view that depicts nationalist contention as more ideological than structural, thence as more variable in its impact on contemporary nation-states.

Origins Role of Modernization and the Ethnic Core Possibly the most influential explanation for the rise and spread of nation-states has been that they emerged out of the commercial and industrial revolutions that began in western Europe in the late 18th century. It was suggested that commercial and industrial development required sovereign and culturally cohesive territorial states to facilitate the control and mobilization of labor. In some cases, for example, Germany and Italy, existing cultural and linguistic communities began demanding their own sovereign states, whereas in other cases, including the United States, existing or emergent states began promoting the cultural and linguistic integration of their populations. World War II then provided a major impetus for the diffusion of the nation-state when it precipitated the replacement of European colonialism by “new nations” in Asia and Africa. Modernization demanded states with coinciding cultural, linguistic, and political boundaries. It also required states whose members felt a strong identification with their nation, since the legitimacy of state elites now depended primarily upon their claims that they represented the common will of all those permanently resident within the state. The implication seemed to be that this sense of national identity would have to focus on “civic” ideas of equal citizenship rather than on any subnational or pre-national ties to “ethnic” community. Few states approximated this civic ideal, but all were seen as being pulled and pushed in this direction. The United States was widely depicted as offering a model for such national integration, in the sense that it seemed to constitute a civic nation-state. It was a state in which people from diverse ethnic backgrounds appeared to be integrating and developing a shared national identity on the basis of commonalities of interest arising from their social interactions within the territorial state, their shared vision of collective development, and their common citizenship. These citizens might retain their ethnic identities for some social purposes, but they had apparently developed an overarching national loyalty that was not ethnically defined and that provided the primary political focus for their identity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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It was soon remarked, however, most influentially by Anthony Smith and by Walker Connor, that the nation-states of the modern world were rarely completely modern and that the national identities of their citizens were not primarily civic. In most cases, the nationalist symbols, governmental structures, and cultural values of the modern nation-states turned out to be built on premodern ethnic foundations. In some cases, this meant that the modern state was recognized as the inheritor state of an earlier ethnic community or ethnically focused empire (e.g., Thailand, based on the Buddhist kingdom of Sukkothai). Other nation-states arose out of the political unification of hitherto divided ethnie (e.g., Germany). In other cases, as with Britain, the contemporary nation-state developed out of several centuries of ethnic amalgamation. Even in those cases where the population of the modern state clearly included diverse linguistic, racial, or religious communities, the homeland of the ethnic majority was frequently depicted as the historic birthplace of the modern nation, whereas the homelands of the ethnic minorities (Basques in Spain, Scottish in Britain, Moro in the Philippines, Ewe in Ghana) were depicted as marginal, or even antagonistic, to that process. Not all nation-states claimed a historical and status ethnic core in this way, but it was effectively argued that a degree of ethnic distinctiveness was necessary for a nation-state to survive in the modern world. This observation—that successful nation-states must be built on an ethnic core—soon gave rise to the argument that this ethnic bond was intrinsically stronger and more authentic than any civic (nonethnic) attachment to the state. Even those states that claimed a national identity that was ethnically neutral would be found, on inspection, to be using the rhetoric of civic patriotism as a camouflage for the promotion of the values and dominance of an ethnic core. Thus the United States was revealed as an ethno-cultural nation built on a western European (WASP or “white Anglo-Saxon Protestant”) ethnic core. If modern nation-states invariably favored a high-status ethnic core, then it followed that national integration would be crucially dependent upon the progressive assimilation of ethnic minorities. The upward social mobility of minority linguistic, religious, or racial groups depended primarily upon their adoption of the language, religion, or culture of the ethnic core. But such assimilation was always difficult and was, in some cases, blocked, as has been pointed out persuasively by Will Kymlicka. Indigenous minorities, like the Inuit of Canada or migrants like the British Asians, frequently found that a combination of market forces and assimilationist pressures were eroding the viability of their distinctive cultures and social structures. Those who sought social mobility through assimilation into the culture of the ethnic core found themselves trapped between an increasingly unviable ethnic culture and a partially inaccessible national culture. The specific character and intensity of the problem varied, but in a wide range of countries, ethnic minorities began to be increasingly aware of their social, political, or economic marginalization within the nation-state. Their responses took differing forms, depending in part upon whether they were migrant minorities, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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like Turkish workers in Germany; indigenous groups pushed to the margins by subsequent settler communities, like the Aboriginals in Australia; homeland minorities whose political autonomy had been eroded by their encapsulation within the nation-state, like the Acehnese in Indonesia; or ethnic communities divided by state boundaries, like the Kurds divided between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Most members of such ethnic minority communities accepted marginalization or disruption with resignation. They were, however, increasingly being mobilized to various forms of protest by political activists who sought to oppose the entrenched bias of nation-states in favor of their ethnic cores. These political activists sought to achieve mobilization by claiming that the rights of “self-determination” applied not just to territories reclaiming a lost autonomy but also to ethnic minorities. Role of Rising Ethnic Tensions within Nation-States The initial response of state governments to the upsurge of protests against the alleged “hijacking” of nation-states by their ethnic cores was (where possible) to deny the charges. They claimed that their policies and institutions did not promote ethnic discrimination and that the ethnic minority rights protests were therefore subversive of national unity and could legitimately be suppressed. Where the exclusion or “forced assimilation” of ethnic minorities was overt, as in the case of Australia’s treatment of Aboriginals, governments frequently claimed that the assimilation of backward races into the more advanced ethnic cores was both inevitable and beneficial. The coercive response was often strongest in those cases where ethnic minorities claimed territorial autonomy, as with Basque separatism in Spain, since this directly threatened the integrity of the nation-state. Nevertheless, as ethnic minority protests grew in militancy and in moral legitimacy, some states began to offer minimal concessions to appease the activists and facilitate their co-option into state structures. The first concessions to Spanish Basques in the 1970s, the Belgian constitutional reforms toward federalization in the 1970s, and Australia’s enhancement of Aboriginal citizenship status in 1967 were all reactions to these changes. It soon became clear, however, that even minimal concessions to the marginalized ethnicities might be perceived as a threat to disadvantaged or downwardly mobile sections of the ethnic core communities. The latter lacked access to the “ethnic minority rights” argument for state welfare support. The result was the rise of a backlash “majority rights” ethnic nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s, as espoused by the Freedom Party in Austria, the National Front in France, the One Nation Party in Australia, and the Hindu BJP in India. In some cases, governments sought to distance themselves from the more “racist” articulations of such ethnic core unrest while simultaneously adopting some aspects of their agenda. Elsewhere, as in India and Fiji, nationalist advocates of ethnic core prioritization managed by the end of the 1980s to enter government. The danger facing the nation-state was thus clear: the structural bias of nation-states in favor of their ethnic cores engendered a reactive upsurge of ethnic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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minority rights, which in turn engendered a countervailing upsurge of majority rights ethnic nationalism. The idea that nations had a right to political autonomy, and ultimately to sovereign statehood, was now being employed against the nation-states themselves, as ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities each claimed to embody the nationhood that legitimated their diverse demands. States that had hitherto been depicted as progressing toward national integration were now regularly depicted as endangered by a downward spiral of mutually reactive confrontations between the ethnic core nationalisms of the nation-states and the ethnic minority nationalisms of diverse civil rights, group rights, autonomy, or separatist movements. Even the United Kingdom, according to Tom Nairn, was threatened by the “break-up of Britain.” The very idea of the “nation-state” came under threat, as it began to be claimed that the term “nation” implied ethnic homogeneity and that, since almost all modern states were in fact ethnically heterogeneous, their claims to be engaged in “nation-building” were now surely exposed, in Walker Connor’s words, as exercises in “nation-destroying.” For some observers, the solution was clear, at least at the level of principle. Since most modern nation-states were structurally biased in favor of their ethnic cores, then the only morally and politically effective way to respond to ethnic minority demands was surely to accede to them. Governments should promote “multiculturalism” by giving special rights of autonomy, political representation, or resource allocations to ethnic minorities to correct for and counterbalance the existing bias in favor of ethnic majorities. In those cases where homeland ethnic minorities were demanding separate statehood, as in the Québec case, the “parent” state should avoid bloodshed by acceding. A new and more ethnically homogeneous state could then be formed, either fully independent of the parent state or with “authentic” federated autonomy. Only by moving in this direction could the idea of the nation-state be saved. Since the civic nation was a “myth,” the rescue of the nation-state necessitated moves toward ethnic federalism, toward ethnic power sharing and multiculturalism, or toward a political separatism that would produce new mono-ethnic nation-states.

Dimensions Alternative Approach to Viewing Nation-States This pessimism about the breakup of the nation-state derived from the belief that ethnic loyalty was intrinsically stronger than any civic loyalty to the state. States may claim to promote civic ideas of equal citizenship, but the pervasive reality of ethnic bias would always, it was argued, prove more influential in political practice. This assumption is questionable, however. Several psychologists have shown that the strength of group loyalties does not depend on the organic “naturalness” or authenticity of the group. Even if it were the case that people did feel a primary loyalty to organic or natural family groups, this would not explain loyalties to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ethnic communities, which are socially constructed entities held together by the myth, rather than the reality, of common kinship. Ethnic communities employ myths of common ancestry, ancestral homeland, and cultural sameness so as to offer moral and cognitive certainty to individuals experiencing social change, cultural dissonance, and cognitive confusion. The idea that graded distinctions of linguistic, religious, or racial attributes might give rise to a shared ethnic consciousness and that such an “ethnic community” might constitute a potential nation worthy of political autonomy rights is clearly not a description of social reality, or a definitional equation, but rather an ideological claim. Contending Serb and Kosovar ethnic nationalists, who each demanded a return to a premodern unity or autonomy, were in fact using the language of historicism to construct new political communities with new goals. But this ethnic nationalist ideology is not intrinsically more “natural” or more potentially powerful than are other ideological formulations that offer individuals simplistic and persuasive explanations for complex contemporary disruptions. In particular, those in search of a resolution for contemporary dilemmas might seek it not just in myths of a return to ethnic purity and autonomy but in myths of progress toward a civic vision of equal citizenship. Once we have recognized that the civic bond formed by common residence in a territorial polity might be just as authentic and just as powerful as the ethnic bond, it becomes possible to modify the “ethnic bias” explanation for the crisis of nation-states and, indeed, to explain why the extent of this “crisis” might have been overstated by some observers. Instead of simply assuming that civic nationalism is weaker than ethnic nationalism, we need to explain the particular circumstances that led many of the civic nationalisms that had been strong in the post-1945 period to weaken during the period between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. The structures, policies, and symbolism of some states did discriminate in favor of ethnic core communities, but this was never completely so. Even in the extreme case of apartheid South Africa, some elements of the constitution and the legal code applied equally to all citizens irrespective of color. Indeed, in most countries, state structures, government policies, nationalist symbolism, and the national identities of citizens have reflected diverse nationalist visions. Some have tended to be characterized by an ethno-cultural nationalist bias in favor of the ethnic core community, some by civic nationalist ideals of ethnically blind equal citizenship, and some by multicultural nationalist ideals advocating the protection of ethnic minority rights. These three distinct nationalist ideals (ethno-cultural nationalism, civic nationalism, and multiculturalist nationalism) each offer differing visions of the character of the nation. They coexist in varying strengths in all countries and influence government policies and contribute to the national consciousness of citizens. All three nationalist ideals have mobilizing and legitimizing power and provide the ingredients from which modern nation-states are built. The insight that modern nation-states are built eclectically on diverse ethnocultural, civic, and multiculturalist structures and values makes it possible to see N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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national integration as being dependent on the successful intertwining of these three types of collectivist visions in nationalist rhetoric and public policies and in the minds of citizens. The language of nationalism is indeed frequently ambiguous. States can employ the symbolism of “founding fathers” in the knowledge that this image will evoke ideas of common ethnic ancestry for some, but ideas of a foundational interethnic alliance or of a civic constitutional contract for others. Moreover, it is perfectly feasible that any one individual might simultaneously hope, for example, that migrants will ethnically assimilate, that they will be accepted as equal citizens irrespective of any ethnic differences, and that they should have their own ethnic cultures protected by the state. This kind of “fudging” of the different ideals of nationalism has depended crucially upon the strength of the civic vision to act as a kind of buffer to defuse the tensions between ethno-cultural and multiculturalist ideals of the nation. Proponents of the ethno-cultural ideal could seek to deploy policies advocating civic integration as a means toward the advancement of their ethno-cultural assimilationist goals. At the same time, proponents of the multiculturalist ideal could seek to adapt civic ideas of equal citizenship toward their goals of interethnic social justice. Both could direct their political energies into reforming ethnically blind civic institutions of the state and civil society in the direction of their ethnically focused ideals. This explains the strength of American nationalism in the post–World War II period. While advocates of WASP dominance and advocates of minority rights both retained faith that they could put pressures on government to bend its policies in their direction, neither could capture the state and its civic constitution so as to significantly reduce their opponents’ hopes of progress. As long as the marginalized members of ethnic minority communities, and those of ethnic core communities, shared a belief that the state structures and government leaders could promote the development of society so as to facilitate their upward mobility, they would, to that extent, retain their loyalties to the variously perceived nation-state and refrain from the ethnic confrontation that would arise out of a direct clash between majority and minorities. It is thus the decline of this state-focused developmental optimism that emerges as the primary reason for the increase in ethnic conflict within and across state boundaries. It provoked, in several states, the disentwining of the diverse civic, ethno-cultural, and multiculturalist visions of nationalism that had previously been at least partially interwoven. This disentwining, in turn, generated the ideological confrontation between these visions and thence acted as the core precondition for ethnic conflict. The period from 1945 to the mid-1960s was one of unprecedented optimism as to the capacity of states both to promote economic development and to achieve progress toward egalitarian social justice. The communist vision still retained some credibility in Eastern Europe. In the Third World, one-party states were mobilizing new nation-states toward modernity through state-led development. In the West, governments were constructing the welfare state. But instead of seeing the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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realization of these social justice promises, the late 1960s saw instead the first stages of what was to become the new wave of economic globalization, characterized by the reduced capacity or willingness of governments to protect individuals and communities against the vagaries of increasingly deregulated markets. Moreover, it was not until the late-1980s that this trend toward deregulation began to boost global economic growth rates. From the late 1960s until the mid-1980s, world per capita income growth slowed down. This was accompanied by rising inequalities between countries and, according to some economists, also within countries. This was significant since people tend to evaluate income disparities not just in terms of objective trends but also in terms of their social justice expectations. Thus even in those cases where inequalities remained stable from the 1960s onward, the disillusionment of those who had been mobilized by the social justice promises of their state elites, but who now felt marginalized, began to increase. The impact of this globalization was not just economic. Various observers have focused attention on the role of cultural and political aspects of globalization in disrupting preexisting social interaction networks, political structures, and moral norms. The implication was that perceptions of economic marginalization were often accompanied by an increase in social dislocation and by the weakening of political authority structures. The responses of those who felt disempowered varied greatly, some adopting a deferential “colonial mentality,” others locating individualistic routes to upward mobility, and still others seeking collectivist forms of protest. Prior to the 1970s, one available resource was the socialist ideal. But by the 1970s, the marginalized were less likely to believe that they could exert pressure on their governments in the name of socialism. Faced with the rise of corrupt and autocratic dictatorships or military regimes in the Third World, the corrosion of Eastern European communist regimes, and the end of the postwar “golden age” in Western Europe, marginalized sections of society began to seek alternative ideologies to those offered by liberal individualism and socialist class movements. Both the established and emergent nation-states of the post-1945 world were in many cases built around a strong civic element in their governmental structures and policies, as well as around the high civic expectations of their populations. The increase in economic inequalities from the mid-1960s to the 1980s meant that those who felt relatively deprived began to lose faith in the civic vision of statefocused development and to look elsewhere for visions of progress. This result was not an inevitable consequence of globalization but rather an ideological variable.

Consequences The Effects of Anti-State Nationalism and Violence From the mid-1960s onward, there were frequent and vociferous protests from those who felt that they had been marginalized by development, that their netN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Falintil (Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor) soldiers drill at their guerrilla base in East Timor in August 1999. Falintil was engaged in a guerrilla war for independence since the Indonesian invasion in 1975. (Reuters/Corbis)

works of social interaction had been disrupted, and that they had been betrayed by state elites whose developmental and social justice promises they had believed. The widespread depiction of these protests as primarily an “ethnic revival” should not blind us to the recognition that the alignments, consciousness, and goals of the resultant contentions had a civic as well as an ethnic component. This was partly because feelings of marginalization were not confined to ethnic minority activists. It was also because the decline in faith that existing state structures and elites could promote civic goals did not inevitably mean the abandonment of civic ideals. If the existing state could not promote the civic goals of development and social justice, then perhaps these goals could be pursued through some other route, either by seeking a radical transformation of the existing state (most dramatically in the attempts at the democratization of communist Eastern Europe from the late 1980s onward) or by fighting for the secession of a peripheral region to form a new state (as in the movement for East Timorese secession from Indonesia). Anti-state nationalism was not the only resource available to combat perceptions of marginalization, but it did have specific appeal to those in peripheral regions or from minority linguistic, religious, or racial backgrounds. The depiction of such regional or cultural aggregations as potential nations offered a resolution to feelings of marginalization by ideologically transforming those who had been marginalized into a strong moral community. Once Eritreans, Philippine Moros, or Sri N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Lankan Tamils, for example, came to imagine themselves each as a “nation,” their collective interests could be asserted as the rights of national self-determination. Nationalism offered them a simple explanation for why social and economic networks, which had developed on the basis of linguistic, religious, racial, or territorial affinities, were apparently being unjustly disrupted or deprived of resource benefits by alien “others” who could now be depicted as colonial oppressors. The resultant nationalisms, both ethnic and civic, often had roots in earlier protest movements. These were now revived or radicalized by activists who felt their authority to be under threat and who appealed to constituencies feeling increasingly marginalized from the promised “world of nations.” The marginalization of the Malay minority in southern Thailand, for example, found expression in calls for a “return” to the autonomy of the Patani Sultinate, which would free them from domination by the ethnic Thais. Such anti-state nationalisms were reactive forms of collective identity in which the self-esteem of the marginalized came to be dependent upon the devaluation, or even the demonizing, of a perceived oppressor. As Liah Greenfeld has argued, such nationalisms manifested themselves in an illiberal “collectivist-authoritarian” form, since marginalized communities could only be mobilized to confront the perceived “enemy” if they prioritized their collective interest over the interests of constituent individuals. These nationalisms, structured on the basis of aggressive assertiveness, could not remain intertwined in the service of the existing nation-states. Their explicit absolutisms undermined the eclectic ambiguities of national integration. Thus ideologies of ethnic core nationalism, ethnic minority nationalism, and civic nationalism now began to be constructed in counterpoint to mobilize those who felt most marginalized. Indonesia, for example, began to experience escalating political tensions among claims for the nation-state to be built more strongly on the Islamic values of its ethnic core, claims for a defense of a secular civic nationstate against both Islamic and ethnic minority assertions, and claims for the autonomy rights of its ethno-regional minorities. The U.S. black civil rights movement, which intensified in the early 1960s, was an ethnic nationalist movement in the sense that it depicted the ethno-racial minority as a “nation” deserving of political rights, confronting a “racist” United States dominated by its ethnic core. It argued that these minority rights could only be attained by policies of positive ethnic discrimination embodied in affirmative action programs. But the most influential articulation of the movement’s goals, by Martin Luther King, was in purely civic language. The nation was to move toward a polity where destiny was determined not by race but by the character of an individual. This kind of mixing of civic and ethnic elements is particularly evident in those reactive nationalisms that sought some form of territorial autonomy from the state. Basque nationalism in Spain has been sometimes depicted as a classic case of an ethno-racial movement. However, the claim that the Basque race was culturally disrupted and damaged by the pro-Castilian bias of the Spanish state, and therefore deserves independence, has long been accompaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nied by the claim of the main Basque nationalist movement (ETA) and its political arms that they are seeking independence for, and mobilizing support among, all inhabitants of the Basque country, including its migrant majority. Minority nationalisms have varied as to the weighting of their civic and ethnic elements, but this difference has not correlated closely with variations in the extent and form of violence accompanying nationalist contention. The type of violence, whether social riots, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, has depended primarily on the character of the society and on the authoritarianism or democracy of the state. The widespread incidence of nationalist violence, in whatever form, is in part merely a reflection of the absolutist language of national rights. But it should be noted that violence derives both from the tendency of the state to respond coercively to perceived threats to its national unity and from the predisposition of some anti-state nationalist activists to deliberately seek confrontation. Faced with the fact that some in their ethnic and civic constituencies adopt positions of dependency, deference, or resignation, minority nationalist elites have sometimes provoked violent repression to generate a siege mentality to unite the ethnic community and legitimate their role as its leaders. This strategy appeared to be particularly evident in the case of the ETA in Spain. The incidence of violence has also clearly depended upon the capacity of the state to concede to reactive nationalist claims. State accommodations have in general been easiest in response to those minority rights movements that have pushed the state in a multiculturalist direction, toward legal protections for minorities, greater shares of national resources, or greater access to power positions, including representation in government. Where migrant minorities have sought to protect their cultures from erosion through assimilation, at the same time as seeking affirmative action to facilitate upward social mobility, state accommodation has often involved little more than a shift to a “soft” multiculturalist position of providing resources to facilitate a more inclusive civic integration of migrants, as was done, for example, in the United Kingdom. State concession has proved more problematical, however, where multiculturalist pressures have come from indigenous minorities, pushed to the social margins by subsequent settlers, who began developing new “pan-ethnic” identities as a legitimatizing basis for their affirmative action demands, as with the indigenous communities of Canada and Australia. In such cases, the multiculturalist pressures have involved claims to various forms of ethnic group rights, to degrees of self-government, and to differential citizenship and have thus been more difficult for nation-states to reconcile with the civic elements in their national identities. Nation-states have faced particular difficulties responding to ethno-regional demands when focused on claims for territorial separatism, as for example in Aceh or Kosovo. One of the factors inhibiting concession to such demands was that it threatened to undermine the balance of existing constitutional arrangements. Once special autonomy was granted to one territorial region of the state, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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other regions would resent the anomaly and make similar demands, thus promoting the potential disintegration of the state. Such fears were evident in Canada in the responses to the 1987 Meech Lake accord. Violence, however, has been greatest when the demand for territorial autonomy is focused on a claim that contemporary state boundaries have deprived a state of some of its ethnic core homeland. This prompted, for example, Pakistani Muslim claims to Kashmir, the Greek attempt to annex Cyprus in 1974, and Palestinian claims to Israeli territory. In such cases, states have manipulated ethnic autonomy claims for territorial expansionist purposes, at the same time as ethnic activists have sought to manipulate the states’ territorial claims for ethnic autonomy purposes. In such cases, violence was particularly prone to become internationalized and to escalate into war. Such upsurges in ethnic minority unrest were accompanied by, and served to exacerbate, the development of majoritarian nationalist movements. State concessions to migrant or indigenous ethnic minorities or to regionalist autonomy movements were depicted as a “betrayal” of the ethnic majority in the nation. The resultant wave of majoritarian nationalism continued into the 1990s. The civicethnic mix of such majoritarian nationalist movements is shown by the frequency with which they have been portrayed by their opponents as “racist” ethno-cultural nationalisms, while their supporters have frequently depicted them as defending the civic virtue of ethnic blindness against divisive claims by ethnic minorities. The widespread portrayal of these various forms of reactive nationalism (multiculturalist, territorial autonomy, and majoritarian) as constituting an “ethnic revival” has followed from the tendency to assume that the weak civic claims of the state would inevitably give way to the stronger bond of ethnicity. The recognition here that these movements have been used by some of their proponents to pursue the civic vision of equal, ethnically blind citizenship in a reconstituted state, and by others to pursue the vision of ethnic autonomy, does not, however, imply that the outcome resulted in strong nationalist movements that intertwined civic and ethnic strands so as to accommodate both constituencies. On the contrary, anti-state nationalisms have been characterized primarily by their internal disunities and cleavages. These schisms have arisen partly from personal power struggles, rivalries between traditional and educated elites, and disagreements between pragmatic instrumentalists and absolutist ideologues. But it is this latter element, the tendency toward the construction of ideologies, which has been crucial in promoting the fragmentation of reactive nationalisms. Once political contention has been imagined in nationalist terms, the language of collective stereotyping becomes endemic, and politics is constructed as a battle between the virtuous Us and the evil Other. This attitude means that even “genuine” concessions by the state will be perceived by some anti-state nationalists as a “trick” by the “alien” state. This distrust inhibits the definitive resolution of ethnic conflicts, as is evident, for example, in Northern Ireland. Ideological construction turns potentially negotiable conflicts of interest into nationalist confrontations. However, it also splits, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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therefore weakens, the anti-state nationalisms. Those anti-state activists pursuing civic goals can indeed sometimes ally with those pursuing ethnic goals to put pressure on the state. But ideological absolutism increasingly means that their commitment to different goals generates splits between proponents of “racial” purity and proponents of civic equity. Such divisions were evident, for example, in the black civil rights movement, the Basque nationalist parties, and the Moro separatist movements in the Philippines. The result of this tendency to schism is that anti-state nationalist movements are rarely strong enough to impose their will on nation-states. Nationalist contention thus becomes a continuing feature of contemporary politics. The Continuing Salience of Nationalist Ideology The shift from national integration to national disintegration was well under way by the mid-1980s, even before the next upsurge of nationalist conflict triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. But this disintegration has not heralded the death, or even the decline, of the nation-state. Nationalist contentions arose from the disentwining of the civic and ethnic strands of national identities, and the outcome of this disentwining has been the increased salience of nationalism as a mobilizing ideology. Selected Bibliography Brown, D. 2000. Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multiculturalist Politics. London: Routledge. Connor, W. 1972. “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics 24:319–355. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Greenfeld, L. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Horowitz, D. L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Horowitz, D. L. 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley: University of California Press. Huntington, S. L. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Kaplan, R. D. 2000. The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War World. New York: Vintage. Kymlicka, W. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Clarendon. Nairn, T. 1977. The Break Up of Britain. London: New Left Books. Ohmae, K. 1995. The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies. London: HarperCollins. Rustow, D. A. 1967. A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization. Washington DC: Brookings Institute. Smith, A. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin. Yack, B. 1999. “The Myth of the Civic Nation.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by R. Beiner, 103–118. Albany: State University of New York. Young, C. 1976. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: Wisconsin University Press.

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Nationalism in a World Divided Saul B. Cohen

The end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations were widely heralded as marking the onset of a peaceful era, free of the virulent nationalism that had led to the slaughter of so many millions and the widespread suffering and displacement of so many more. Much of Europe, the Soviet Union, and East and Southeast Asia had been devastated, and it was assumed that national energies would be fully applied to the rebuilding of societies and lands. However, considerable energy was invested in other directions.

Relevance The outbreak of the Cold War initiated a geopolitical system that balanced the competing strategic and ideological interests of the two major powers that had emerged from World War II—the United States and the Soviet Union. They divided the world hierarchically into two global geostrategic realms within which each dominated the geopolitical subdivisions of its realm. Where the realms clashed directly, as in the Middle East and at various periods in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, shatterbelt regions emerged. Shatterbelts are highly fragmented regions characterized by deep internal geopolitical divisions, exacerbated by the intervention of external major powers. South Asia was geographically removed from the grasp of both and remained independent. During the Cold War era, the dynamic structure of the system underwent significant changes, with shifting power relationships. Though the two realms were divided along strategic and ideological lines, they were also differentiated economically and in world outlook. The United States dominated an open, trade-dependent Maritime realm, which included as geopolitical subdivisions maritime Europe, the Asia-Pacific Rim, and, at various periods, sub-Saharan Africa. South America, as a whole, remained under U.S. sway despite serious challenges in Cuba from Fidel Castro’s communist revolutionary nationalism, supported by Che Guevara’s liberation Marxist theology, and in Argentina by Juan Peron’s populist nationalism. The Soviet Union dominated the Eurasian-Continental realm, a relatively self-sufficient, closed, inwardly oriented part of the world, centering around the Eurasian heartland. Th e realm included the Eastern European geopolitical region and, at the outset, China as a second subordinate region. Continental Eurasia was mainly rural and oriented toward the land, not the sea. As the global geopolitical system evolved, China beN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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came the core of its own East Asia geostrategic realm. This included Indochina, which from the 1950s to the early 1970s had been a shatterbelt. Also, during the 1970s and 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa was pulled away from the maritime realm to become a shatterbelt. With the end of the Cold War, this region and South America have become a “Quarter-Sphere of Marginality.” Only the Middle East remained a shatterbelt during the entire Cold War period, as well as today. Since the end of the Cold War, India, the core of the independent South Asia geopolitical region, indicates that it will soon expand this region into a separate realm. Both India and China have developed as powerful maritime industrial trading nations, while the majority of their peoples remain rural and continentally bound. They have maintained strong nationalisms despite these new roles. At the national and local levels, Cold War divisions were intensified as much of the world was freed of colonialism. In shaping their nationalist identities, newly independent states were torn by left- and right-wing struggles for power, sometimes in the face of sharp separatist struggles. In this dynamic geopolitical situation, the United States and the Soviet Union, and to a certain extent Maritime Europe and China, were powerful interventionist forces. Many of the rulers of the new countries, who had frequently led the struggles for independence, corrupted nationalist ideals to serve their own interests. All too often they imposed ruthless, authoritarian regimes upon their peoples, as their Cold War patrons provided the military and economic support for them to gain or keep power. Competing Superpower Nationalisms—Fear of the Enemy Fear of the enemy permeated the nationalisms of both superpowers, reshaping and at times distorting deeply held national values and traditions. Soviet imposition of communist regimes drew an “Iron Curtain” across Europe, from Poland’s Stettin (Szcetin) in the Baltic to Rijeka, Yugoslavia, at the head of the Adriatic. Soviet occupation of North Korea (1947), its backing of the communist insurrection in Greece (1947–1948), the Berlin blockade (1948), and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia (1948) all sparked vigorous U.S. reactions. These included the Truman Doctrine and “Containment” policy (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), and then the Korean War (1950–1953). These reactions escalated to the U.S. policy of deterrence and massive retaliation through the race for nuclear superiority. Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan (1948) was to establish the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, 1949), which organized industrial production and regional development among its East European satellites. This era is appropriately described as the “Cold War” in the sense that the two superpowers did not engage in direct conflict with one another. However, each became enmeshed in wars—the United States in Korea and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In these situations, the nonbelligerent superpower used surrogates to further its objectives. Examples are China as a Soviet ally in North Korea and U.S. support of the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. They provoked N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and supported internal and interstate conflicts in much of the world, as they jockeyed for strategic, ideological, and economic advantage. In the United States, patriotic faith and pride in country infused the national spirit during and immediately following World War II. However, self-confidence and optimism were shaken when the atomic weapons monopoly was challenged by Soviet success in atomic test explosions (1949) and subsequent matching of U.S. hydrogen bomb developments, and later in launching the first artificial satellite, Sputnik (1957), one year ahead of the U.S. Explorer satellite. Fear of communism was exploited in the early 1950s to distort nationalism into a xenophobic hysteria by sensationalist tactics and unsubstantiated accusations. Senator Joseph McCarthy and his allies held the State Department and army hostage to charges of infiltration by communists, extending the investigations to include others in government, the arts, and private industry. In 1954, McCarthy was finally censured by the Senate, bringing the witch-hunt to a close, but only after untold damage had been done to private lives and government agencies, and national unity had been shaken. The Soviet nuclear and space achievements, as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1961–1962) brought home to the U.S. public the specter of nuclear warfare and the reality that two oceans no longer guaranteed security. Home air-raid shelters and evacuation route drills increased the sense of insecurity. Patriotism, love of country, democracy, constitutional freedoms, an open society, self-reliance, innovation, and economic opportunity are internal hallmarks of U.S. nationalism. The external manifestation is idealistic moralism based on commitment to the spread of democratic values abroad and the development of impoverished societies. This commitment was reflected during the Cold War in massive U.S. aid programs to Third World countries, governmental institutions such as the Peace Corps founded by John F. Kennedy (1961), and widespread nongovernmental organization overseas activities in health, sanitation, education, and housing. The strain of the nuclear arms and missile race, together with the human and economic costs of the Vietnam War (1965–1973), blocked the fulfillment of many of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society goals, which sought to extend to all the national principles of liberty, equality, and opportunity. These goals included winning the War on Poverty and implementing sweeping economic, social, and educational programs. Despite the bitter opposition of segregationists, he did succeed in implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1954. The Vietnam War triggered massive antiwar demonstrations that eroded the powerful base of patriotism that undergirded American nationalism. While racial desegregation was judicially and politically overcome, the scars left by the bitter struggle and local police brutality were slow to fade. Black nationalism and the Black Power movement, while attracting only fringe support, challenged the unity that was both a real and mythic element of nationalism. The Cold War competition mocked and undermined this idealism. In the interest of defeating Soviet and other communist enemies, democracy was often N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ignored. Washington gave extensive military and economic support to right-wing dictatorships and engineered the toppling of popularly elected leftist regimes. In the Middle East, it propped up despotic, oil-rich monarchies, including that of the Shah of Iran, who was overthrown by religious fundamentalists. During the latter years of the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1980–1988), U.S. nationalism regained many of its traditional values and sense of balance. The bitter internal schisms of the Vietnam War had faded. Soviet nationalism was even more strongly shaped during the Cold War by fear of the enemy. Responding to both real and imagined threats, security became the major rationale for Soviet expansionism, along with the ideological mission of spreading the gospel of communism. This reaction was to lead to the economic and military overstretch that ultimately brought on the destruction of the Soviet state. Fear of invasion was deeply rooted in the Russian national psyche. Memories of Napoleon’s invasion, defeat in the Crimean War, British intervention in the Russian Civil War, and the German invasions in World Wars I and II inspired the need to rally against a hostile outside world. Patriotism, infused with national pride, was another energizing force of Soviet nationalism. The victorious Red Army in the “Great Patriotic War” and the heroic stands of the army and people in the sieges of Leningrad (St. Petersburg) and Stalingrad (Volgagrad) were, for most of the people, accomplishments that overshadowed Stalin’s early wartime strategic blunders that had led to nearly 1 million killed or captured and made possible the deep penetration of Soviet territory by the Nazis. Stalin exploited this combination of patriotic pride and fear, and the memory of the 26 million who had died in the war, to rule with an iron hand, establishing a cult of personality that outlived his death in 1953. He executed dissidents and conducted periodic campaigns of terror against the citizenry to sustain this rule. The principle of economic and social equality intrinsic to Marxism was distorted by the creation of a privileged political class and rewards to the party faithful. Much of the nation’s resources were invested in armaments and economic aid to satellite countries at the expense of the general Soviet populace, for most of whom equality meant low-quality social services and consumer deprivation. Soviet response to the remilitarization of Germany and its admission to NATO was to create the Warsaw Pact (1955). A unified military command, headquartered in Moscow, was established to direct the united forces of the Eastern and Central European countries. This move was part of the Soviet strategy to leapfrog U.S. containment policy, which had initially been proposed by George C. Kennan. Kennan argued that Soviet expansionism could be contained by applying counterforce at constantly shifting geographical and political points by rimming the Soviet heartland through NATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955). The Soviet response was to support indigenous communist groups in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and to forge alliances with any regime that had an anti-Western tendency. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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While Soviet nationalism was not the same as Russian nationalism, public acceptance of Stalin’s dictatorial and centralized regime had its roots in czarist traditions of authoritarianism and in the hierarchically organized Russian Orthodox Eastern Church that had been under czarist patronage. Pan-Slavism and imperial expansion were integral to Russian nationalism. Pan-Slavism led to the mission of protecting the “Little Slavs” of southeastern Europe. The mission of imperialism in the 19th century had led to expansion in Asia to the Amur Valley and the Pacific and was the impetus for Russia’s entry into World War I. Both of the national drives were instruments to enhance the power and ambitions of the czarist regimes; they were not deep expressions of national feeling. In addition to this heritage, Russian nationalism was expressed by linguistic and cultural Russification and colonization by Russians of non-Russian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). However, the Soviet constitution protected the rights of the different nationalities embraced within the SSRs and some of the Autonomous Oblasts. Though Russian remained the unifying language of the Soviet Union, native languages and cultures enjoyed the protection of the state. The structure also offered the illusion of self-government to these republics, while political and economic decisions remained centralized within the Communist Party, the Politburo, and the Central Committee. Armenian memories of the massacres at the hands of the Turks (1915) and their felt need for protection against Turkey kept in check the nationalist fires of this very ancient, independent, Christian people. Baltic state nationalism, on the other hand, was more assertive. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all regarded Soviet rule as illegitimate and welcomed Nazi occupation during World War II. They were the first to gain independence with the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 in an effort to bind the former republics in a free association with Russia. More importantly, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union began to make overtures that would lead to the end of the Cold War. Summits between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev led to limitations on intermediate nuclear forces (1987) and to Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost (“openness”) and Perestroika (“economic restructuring”), followed by relaxation of the Soviet hold on its East European satellites. Reagan’s greatly increased defense spending had forced the Soviet Union to try to keep pace, leading to its near bankruptcy. Boris Yeltsin, the first popularly elected president, then dissolved the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, formally ending the Cold War and ushering in an era of chaotic capitalism (1991). From the Ashes of Defeat—Nationalism without Militarism Defeat in World War II was followed by the complete transformation of German, Japanese, and Italian nationalisms. Germany and Italy had had short-lived experiences with democracy—Germany during the socialist-democratic WeiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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mar Republic and Italy with the republican moderate and liberal values of the 1848 revolution and the Risorgimento, the movement for unity of state and land. Japan had not. Its homogenous, enclosed society had been tightly controlled by feudal nobility and military classes. Traditionally militant Japanese nationalism had been guided by the Confucian concept of loyalty to a system headed by the emperor, descendant of the Sun Goddess, and governed by a highly centralized bureaucracy. Shaken by its defeat, the devastation wrought by the atomic bombs, and U.S. occupation, Tokyo renounced these traditions and its expansionist militarism. The emperor was relegated to a figurehead role, and a democratically based system focused on reconstructing the economy through international trade rather than through control of human and natural resources by seizure of territory. For security, the now heavily pacifist and antinuclear Japanese people turned to the United States for defense. Most recently, however, fear of China has stimulated nationalist efforts to eliminate renunciation of war from the constitution. In addition, some traces of the historic closed system remain in the barriers to foreign ownership of Japanese firms in the homeland and to any immigration of non-Japanese. In emerging from its defeat in World War II, Germany thoroughly renounced all traces of its extreme Nazi racist and militaristic nationalism, including its conservative Prussian Junker traditions of the pre–World War I era. With the help of Marshall Plan aid, and reacting to the threat posed by Soviet control of East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR), West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) became strongly committed to liberal democracy under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the political architect of its economic recovery. While still under Allied occupation, it adopted a constitution similar to that of the democratic and moderately centralized Weimar Republic, but with more power to the individual states and less to the presidency. The nationalism that emerged fostered a focus on individual freedom, business interests, and a free-market economy, while building a strong social service network. The reconstituted German armed forces under NATO, close political relations with France, and persistent Holocaust guilt engendered a strong indigenous pacifist movement and militated against a reemergence of militant nationalism. This was reinforced by de facto acceptance of Germany’s division and loss to Poland of German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, together with treaties of nonaggression and cooperation with Poland and the Soviet Union (1970). Along with France, Germany has become the leader in the evolving European unity movement. Contradictions between Soviet and Other Communist Nationalisms The Marxist-Leninist philosophy of world revolution had been distorted by Stalin and his successors to serve Moscow’s strategic and economic interests. Their strategies meant seeking defensive depth through creating a buff er of satellites in Eastern and Central Europe and gaining allies in China and North Korea. To N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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bypass the U.S. wall of containment, the Soviet Union supported communist efforts to gain regime control in Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. This counterencirclement strategy succeeded in Cuba, Angola, and Mozambique. However, in pursuit of this strategy, the Soviets were not loathe to support regimes that outlawed and repressed local communists—Egypt and Libya being prime examples. The greatest contradiction was between Soviet nationalism and that of its two major communist allies, Tito’s Yugoslavia and Mao Zedong’s China. The schism with each of these countries weakened Soviet global power. The antipathy of Tito (Josip Broz) to Stalin was based on Moscow’s denial of military assistance to his partisan guerilla forces during World War II, Soviet opposition to Yugoslavia’s claim to Trieste, and Moscow’s attempt, through the Cominform, to make the Yugoslav Communist Party subservient to Soviet economic and political policies. Stalin’s attempted coup against Tito failed, and the Yugoslav Party was ejected from the Cominform (1948). Tito then succeeded in establishing a neutral position between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and enacted decentralization policies and a modicum of social and economic liberalization. Mao’s China split with its Soviet ally on ideological grounds when Mao strongly opposed Khruschev’s de-Stalinization (1956) and subsequent coexistence policies. Earlier differences between the two powers had developed over Mao’s two-stage revolutionary model of the rural versus urban “war of contradictions” and his opposition to Soviet nuclear policy. Mao’s nationalism was based upon strong, authoritative central government and China’s quest for preeminence within the rural, underdeveloped world through support of revolutionary struggles there. The rift widened when the Soviet Union withdrew all of its technicians and aid, objecting to Mao’s launching of the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” (1962). It became irreparable when the two powers clashed over the Ussuri River borderlands between Manchuria and Siberia (1969), which had been seized by csarist Russia in the previous century. In Eastern and Central Europe, Moscow was able to suppress, but not eliminate, the anticommunist nationalism of its weaker satellites. Popular revolts against communist regimes in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) were ruthlessly repressed. Polish nationalism was fueled by the resentment of the working class and the strength of the Catholic faith, openly supported by Pope John Paul II. Lech Walensa led a worker uprising in the Gdansk shipyards (1980), which succeeded in introducing some liberalization into the Polish communist system. Reconciling European Regionalism with Traditions of Nationalism European unity was initiated by the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan, advanced by U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshall). This was followed by a number of supranational European bodies—the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, 1947), the Council of Europe (1949), the Shuman N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Plan (the European Coal and Steel Community, 1952), and the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market, 1957). The Western European Union (1954) became the European Union (EU) in 1992. On the military front, the Brussels Pact of Five (1948) was absorbed by NATO the following year. Half a century later, the EU established a separate European Rapid Reaction Force (2004) and deployed its first troops in 2005. Recognizing the advantages of partnership, France and Germany took the lead in promoting European regional unity. This union posed internal dilemmas in balancing the advantages of regionalism with nationalist traditions, especially within France and Great Britain. In France, Charles de Gaulle achieved a constitutionally strengthened presidency. He appealed to the distinctive values of French national history, culture, and language in restoring France’s sense of national grandeur. While supporting the Common Market and fostering strong ties with Germany, de Gaulle promoted independent development of French atomic weapons and argued unsuccessfully for parity between the United States and France in NATO. Britain expanded its national outlook to include European unity, but did so with considerable ambivalence. British nationalism had been reinforced by its heroic struggle in World War II. With its island status and special bond with the United States, which had been strengthened by the wartime partnership, it had never felt fully part of continental Europe. This ambivalence was later expressed in Britain’s refusal to adopt the euro and, most recently, in joining the U.S. war in Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein, despite the opposition of France, Germany, and other western European countries, as well as domestic opposition. Building Nationalism in Newly Independent States Almost 100 states gained independence during the Cold War era. In shaping national values, many were caught up in struggles for power among revolutionary Marxists, right-wing oligarchs, and social/democratic/liberal forces. Many of these states also had a mix of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities that sought to break away as sovereign, independent states. During the age of colonialism, boundaries had often been drawn up to meet the needs of the colonial powers rather than preserve homogeneity and historic territorial entities. This struggle for the creation of a national consensus over cultural and political values, and a fair allocation of natural resources, continues to this day. A few separatist movements have succeeded in gaining independence, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Singapore, and Eritrea. Somalia, a failed state, has broken into three malfunctioning units. Pursuing a “Third Way” independent of the Cold War rivalry shaped the nationalism of certain new states such as India, Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia, and Tunisia, where neutrality and pacifism became intrinsic elements of their nationalism. Indian nationalism is secular and democratic in nature, and its economic policy at the onset had a strong statist component. As a predominantly Hindu N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nation with large Muslim and Sikh minorities, nation-building has been plagued by intercommunal violence. It has also struggled with the contradiction between the nonviolence, pacifist teachings of Mohandas K. Gandhi and the bloody fighting that has attended the division that created Pakistan, and in recent years it has tapped a militarist strain in Hinduism that has now become a feature of Indian nationalism. This militarism has been expressed in the continuing conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, punctuated by three wars and a nuclear weapons competition, two border wars fought with China, and the invasion of rebellious Tamil in northern Sri Lanka at the request of the Sinhalese government.

Origins The immediate origins of the Cold War, a term coined by Walter Lippmann (1947), were in the Yalta Conference of 1945 held by the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. According to secret terms agreed to by all the participants, the Soviet Union would occupy Poland and establish a sphere of control there. Later in that year, at Potsdam, the four powers agreed that east Prussia and northern and southern Silesia would be detached from Germany and annexed to Poland, forming a boundary along the Oder-Neisse line, in exchange for land transfers from eastern Poland that benefited the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of the Soviet dominion over all of Eastern and Central Europe. The unexpectedly rapid advance of Soviet troops deep into Germany at the war’s end took them to the Elbe River, where they met the American forces. This river became a major part of the demarcation line between the Soviet and Allied zones of occupied Germany. It was along this boundary that the “Iron Curtain” (a term coined in 1956 by Winston Churchill in his Fulton, Missouri, speech) was drawn. The stage was set for superpower separation and competition, fueled in the United States by the Truman Doctrine, the containment policy, and the domino theory. The latter had been advanced by Paul Nitze, who warned against Soviet expansion into Southeast Asia through its Chinese ally (1947). Soviet response was the Berlin blockade (1948) and, ultimately, the Berlin Wall, built in 1961 by the East Germans to staunch the flow of escapees, 4 million of whom had already fled to the West. The wall was later extended all along the border. In 1943, there had been a conference in Tehran at which Churchill had promised Stalin (with the acquiescence of Roosevelt) free access through the Turkish Straits. However, in line with the containment policy, President Harry Truman reneged on this commitment and stationed a U.S. naval fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet resentment of the West was fueled by this act and other expressions of anticommunism. Nationalism was diffused and maintained during the Cold War period by stirring speeches and slogans, recourse to historic memory, parades, holidays, monN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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A group of West Germans peer over the Berlin Wall, a barricade constructed by the East German government in 1961 that closed the border between West Berlin and East Germany for 28 years. The wall, a symbol of communist tyranny during the Cold War, was destroyed in late 1989. (Library of Congress)

uments, literature, art, and symbols. The Soviets rigidly controlled all cultural output, rewarding artists and musicians whose work conformed to communist dogma. Heroes, such as Yuri Gagarin, the first man in space, and Gary Kasparov, the world chess champion, were extolled as epitomizing Soviet national virtues. Dissidents such as the physicist Andre Sakharov, who helped develop the hydrogen bomb and criticized the arms race and repression, for which he was banished to Gorky (1980), were suppressed. Another Nobel Prize winner and dissident, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, whose writings exposed the brutality of the Soviet regime, became an exile. In the United States, anticommunist sentiment was fueled by “red-scare” speeches, writings, and films. Particularly popular was the genre of spy novels involving American and Soviet agents and double-agents, such as those of John Le Carre. Patriotic films of the early Cold War era included The Big Lift (1950), Walk East on Eden (1952), and Strategic Air Command (1955). Red Dawn (1984) was an example of right-wing jingoism. The epitome of Cold War film criticism was Dr. Strangelove (1964). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The patriotic song and film of the Vietnam War era was Ballad of the Green Berets (1966). However, popular opposition to the war generated considerably more antiwar expressions.

Dimensions My Enemy’s Enemy Is My Friend Washington policy makers were shocked by the overthrow of the U.S. close ally, the autocratic Shah of Iran (1979), and his replacement by the anti-Western regime led by Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, who carved out a political role for religious fundamentalism. A series of hostile acts by the new Islamic republic culminated in the nationalization of industry and the banks and seizure by militants of the U.S. embassy in Iran, with 52 U.S. hostages being held for 444 days. Approximately a half year later, Iraq invaded Iran, igniting a lengthy, bloody war (1980–1988), the objective of which was to seize the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and the oil-rich southwestern province of Khuzistan, with its largely Arab ethnic population. The Saddam Hussein regime was supported not only by Soviet arms but also by clandestinely supplied U.S. weaponry. The war ended in a stalemate, with Islamist control of Iran being stronger than ever. Three years later, the United States turned on Iraq in the Gulf War to defend its client state, Kuwait. Cult of Personality Many of the leaders of the Cold War period succeeded in developing a cult of personality around themselves that permeated their country’s nationalism—Ho Chi Minh, Nicolae Ceau¸sescu, Enver Hoxa, Kim Il Sung, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein. Khrushchev used the term to describe the excessive adulation accorded Stalin, who used all the organs of the state to portray himself as the savior of his people. For none was the personality cult more pervasive than in the case of Mao Zedong. His “greatness and wisdom” were promoted by omnipresent portraits and statues, as well as by the quotations from his Red Book. These quotations were required in all Chinese essays to demonstrate his wisdom as the greatest MarxistLeninist of the era. The book preached that Chinese “democracy” meant centralized government and “freedom with discipline,” as well as plain living and hard struggle. Control of the state propaganda machinery and inculcation of belief in Mao’s infallibility led the people to accept the terror of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, which led to massive famines and the estimated death of 30 million people. Linking his omniscience to Han ethnocentrism and its traditional view of China as the center of the world enabled Mao to beguile the Chinese people into following policies recognized as disastrous only after his death. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Building a New State through Immigration and Historic Memory Unique to state-building in modern times was the establishment of the state of Israel. Based on “ingathering of the exiles” from over 40 countries, the challenge to nationalism was the absorption of people of diverse culture, language, and social development. The national values of the new state (1948) were articulated by its founding leader, David Ben-Gurion, in the Declaration of Independence—liberty; justice without distinction for creed, race, or sex; freedom of religion; and extension of the hand of peace to the Arabs. A goal of the state was to forge a cooperative society using the instrumentalities of a powerful confederation of labor (Histadrut) and a pioneering vanguard (Kibbutzim) through a controlled, statist approach. Israel’s victory in the war of 1967 marked the beginning of a change in the nature of Israeli nationalism. The very small, cohesive society found itself in control of the Arab Palestinian West Bank and Gaza. At the onset, Israeli settlements in these areas were established on purely strategic, defensive grounds. From 1977 onward, when the right-wing, nationalist Likud government came to power, the settlement movement in the territories became an instrument for realizing its Messianic philosophy of a biblical “Undivided Land of Israel.” An increasing number of the nationalist settlers were ultrareligious, uncompromising in their belief that they were reclaiming their holy birthright. Israeli nationalism has not yet reconciled secular humanism with religious nationalism, nor has it found a place for its now 20 percent Arab populace, which does not have either the full economic benefits or military obligations of the Jewish citizenry. This group has neither a distinct Israeli nor Palestinian Arab identity. The economic policies of both the Likud and Labor parties moved the state from the cooperative vision of the founders to a commitment to private, freemarket principles very much in the mode of the United States. In building a state, the Israeli experience demonstrates that the ideals of its founders can influence, but not control, the future direction of its nationalism. Challenge of Diversity Many states struggle with the challenge of unifying diverse peoples. Indonesia is an example of the triumph of diversity over national unity. The peoples of this 3,000-mile island state included the fundamentalist Islamic Sumatrans and Sulawesians, the “Black Dutch” Ambonese, the Christians of Bali, the several million Chinese and Indians of Java, and the head-hunting Dyaks of Kalimantan. The bold effort of Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, to unite this highly complex, multiracial, multireligious, multiethnic, and multicultural society failed. He offered a syncretic political philosophy that combined Marxism, religion, and representative democracy, based upon five pillars, or the pancasila—nationalism, internationalism, representative democracy, social justice, and belief in a unitary deity (1945). Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism were all recognized as official religions. The differences made the Parliament established by Sukarno all but inoperable, and he soon turned to a government of “guided democracy.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Trying to steer clear of the East-West struggle, Sukarno was a leader of the “Third Way” and played host to 29 Asian-African states at the Bandung Conference (1955), whose goal was to promote economic and cultural cooperation and oppose colonialism. Separatist revolts for independence and Islamic dominance in oil-rich Sumatra spread to Sulawesi (1958–1961). They were quelled by the army, but turmoil continued in Aceh. The Communist Party that Sukarno brought into the government, opening the way to Chinese influence, proved to be a Trojan horse. An attempted communist coup was put down with much bloodshed by a military junta (1963), which later ousted Sukarno and installed General Suharto. Whereas the anti-imperialist Sukarno had managed to maintain Indonesia’s formal neutrality while accepting military aid from the Soviet Union, Suharto immediately turned to the United States for military assistance, erasing any vestige of neutrality. While the country has recently held democratic elections, the military continues to hold it together. Indonesia is a case in which an overall nationalism has not captured the hearts of the diverse peoples, despite the idealism of the five pillars. Loyalty to the individual groups remains primary. Backlash War generally serves as a unifying force, promoting patriotic ardor, faith in national values, and willingness to endure suffering and privation. This, however, was not the case for many Americans during the Vietnam War who felt that this action was the wrong war in the wrong place. The backlash to the war engendered widespread opposition, punctuated by mass demonstrations, draft card and flag burnings, and flights to Canada, dividing the country along ideological lines as never before. The backlash was exacerbated by the crippling of many of the Great Society programs, including deep cuts in antipoverty efforts that touched off widespread rioting in the black ghettos. The peace agreement (1973) by which the United States extricated itself from Indochina did not prevent the North Vietnamese from invading the South and unifying the country (1975). The U.S. people recognized that the United States had lost this war, despite overwhelming superiority in manpower and weaponry. The long-term backlash reverberates still. The “Vietnam Syndrome” haunts Americans as a new crisis of faith grips the nation in the debate over the wisdom of the invasion of Iraq and in the bitterness over the false premises over which the war was initiated. Another backlash can be illustrated by the highly unpopular and ultimately unsuccessful Soviet war to prop up the communist regime in Afghanistan. This effort eroded confidence in the foreign policy of the regime and was one of the factors that eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet state. Another factor in the erosion of patriotic belief in the Soviet government was the incompetence and indifference of the regime in reaction to the Chernobyl disaster. Also, as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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previously noted, Russification of some of the SSRs backfired by arousing fears in the native peoples of becoming minorities in their own homelands. This fear served to strengthen Baltic nationalism, as ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities took on heightened significance, and led to the resolve of the Baltic states to orient themselves to Europe after the Soviet Union was dissolved.

Consequences A ramification of the end of the Cold War has been the erosion of Russian nationalism during a wave of corruption and the despoiling of national resources that followed uncontrolled privatization. The peoples’ high expectations for improving their lives economically have been dashed with the widening of the gap between the poor and the very rich. The pride and faith of the public in the army has been shattered by corruption of the officer class, physical abuse of conscripts, and its general disintegration. Military weakness in the face of the war in Chechnya and terrorism in Dagestan and North Ossetia has further undermined national confidence. Another consequence has been the increase in the number of failed states. Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Moldova, and Haiti are among those states once propped up by one of the superpowers. Loss of external support has undermined their capacities to carry out basic functions of governance, civil order, education, and health. For the most part sub-Saharan Africa and South America have become a vast “Zone of Strategic Marginality.” Efforts to aid these regions are now motivated largely by humanitarian considerations, not by strategic national interests (with the exception of those countries with oil resources). Emergence of the United States as the world’s unchallenged superpower at the end of the Cold War restored the confidence of the public in U.S. “exceptionalism” —pride in the nation’s social, cultural, economic, and political values, expressed in the faith that there is no limit to what Americans can achieve. Support of exporting U.S. democratic and free-market ideals, already at a high pitch, was magnified by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. The forces sustaining this nationalism are the country’s military strength, wealth, and economic reach. Where exceptionalism has become distorted has been in its recent absolute faith in the right of the United States to protect and enhance its sovereignty by maintaining military and economic supremacy and in spreading its own precepts without reference to their impact upon local cultures, religions, and political sensitivities. In many cases, the attempted imposition has backfired by intensifying local nationalism. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 may prove to be such a case. Supremacy is neither permanent nor static in a dynamic geopolitical world. There are already challenges emerging to U.S. absolute supremacy from China, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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India, and the European Union. Enlightened nationalism will recognize that foreign policy in this multi-polar world requires that the United States consult, negotiate, and seek common ground with others in exporting its values. Selected Bibliography Bassin, Mark. 1994. “Russian Geographers and the National Mission in the Far East.” In Geography and National Identity, edited by David Hooson, 112–133. Oxford: Blackwell. Eisenstadt, S. N. 1967. Israeli Society. New York: Basic Books. Herb, Guntram H., and David H. Kaplan. 1999. Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory and Scale. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kennan, George F. 1947. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs 25:566–582. Lin Piao. 1966. Quotations from Mao Tse-Tung. Peking: Foreign Language Press. Service, Robert. 2005. Stalin—A Biography. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. Sulzberger, C. L. 1974. The Coldest War: Russia’s Game in China. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1945. Democracy in America, vol. 2. Edited by Phillips Bradley. New York: A. A. Knopf. Tuminez, Astrid S. 2000. Russian Nationalism since 1856—Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Walker, Edward W. 2003. Dissolution, Sovereignty and Breakup of the Soviet Union. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. White, George F. 2000. Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Wilson, Duncan. 1980. Tito’s Yugoslavia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Postcolonial Nationalist Philosophies Brett Bowden Relevance Nationalist philosophies and nationalist movements in the post–World War II period have been highly influential factors in shaping the turbulent arena of postwar domestic and international politics. In the immediate postwar decades, anticolonial nationalism played a prominent role in shaping state formation across the globe, from the Caribbean to Africa—especially sub-Saharan Africa but also the north—and from the Middle East to the expanses of Asia and the Pacific Islands. Naturally, anticolonial nationalist movements could not help but impact the domestic and international political relations of the former colonial powers, both new and old, from the long-standing colonial powers like Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands to the latecomers such as the United States of America and Australia. At the heart of anticolonial or anti-imperial nationalism are the all-important principles of self-determination and state sovereignty. Th e general argument goes that a self-identified or self-selecting people or nation of a viable size has a legitimate right to the freedom of national self-determination and to govern itself as it sees fit. Regardless of how good or bad the government turns out to be, the principle of state sovereignty has traditionally held that states should be left to govern themselves free from external interference—especially imperialist interference. One way to get a good idea of the significance of post–World War II anticolonial nationalism is to understand the number of people it affected around the globe. And a good way to do this is to look at the number of newly independent sovereign nations that came into existence in the decades immediately after 1945. When the United Nations was founded in 1945, it originally included only 51 member states; by 1955, there were 76 members. This increase was primarily attributable to the inclusion of preexisting states that had not signed on to the UN Charter at its founding. The most dramatic increase came in the next five years, particularly in 1960, when many of the newly independent states of Africa joined the United Nations, bringing its membership total to 99. With further waves of independence in Africa (particularly sub-Saharan Africa), the Middle East, Asia, and the Caribbean, by 1970 the United Nations had 127 member states. In the 1970s, the number of newly independent states was beginning to slow, as many anticolonial fights had been fought and won; by 1980 the number had crept up to 154, and by 1990 only 5 more had joined. In 2007, there are 192 member states of the United Nations. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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No two colonial powers governed in precisely the same manner or necessarily for the exact same reasons. For most colonizers, various combinations of motivating factors affected governance, such as geopolitical prestige and power, the expansion of trade routes and concomitant economic benefits, among others. However, what colonizing powers did have in common is that they left longlasting scars and divisions in many of the resultant independent states. For instance, colonial governance techniques such as divide-and-rule colonialism practiced by the Belgians and the French, in which indigenous minorities were privileged over majorities—such as the Belgians did with minority Tutsis over majority Hutus in what is now Burundi and Rwanda—continue to have serious ramifications in the successor states. So, too, Britain’s practice of indirect rule, in which the colonial administration worked through what were believed to be long-standing traditional structures of power or authority, continues to be an obstacle to good governance and national unity in many of its former colonies. Another common trait among the colonial powers, particularly the European colonial powers in the 18th and 19th centuries with the rise of Social Darwinism and the advent of disciplines such as ethnography or ethnology, was their treatment of the issue of race. It is painfully evident that the characterization of different peoples as occupying different places on the civilizational hierarchy was undeniably a motivating factor in the subjection of “peoples of color” to colonial rule. In many ways, the colonial powers saw it as their duty to take up the “white man’s burden” and embark on “civilizing missions” in the many so-called “backward” or “uncivilized” corners of the globe. Despite the differences in the various colonial projects, then, common to all anticolonial nationalist movements was the waging of a war, often literal and often very violent, against a ruling regime, an oppressor, who viewed their subjects as racially inferior. One of the most significant achievements of nationalist movements in the former colonial world, then, and perhaps in world history, is that, by opposing imperialism and colonial rule, they struck a blow to such blatantly racist ideas as the “white man’s burden” and concomitant “civilizing missions” that were to save the colored peoples of the world from themselves. As to whether such ideas have received a fatal blow is still open to question; some would argue that similar sentiments endure, albeit far more implicitly, in international humanitarian and development assistance agendas and projects.

Origins Though there were unhappy rumblings among colonized peoples prior to World War II and immediately afterward, it was not until the 1950s that anticolonial nationalist movements really began to gather steam. The event that sparked this off as much as any other, if not more, was the Bandung Conference of April 18–24, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Delegates at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, 1955. (Lisa Larsen/Time & Life Pictures/ Getty Images)

1955. In December 1954, the leaders of Burma, Ceylon (later Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, collectively known as the Colombo group, met in Bogor, Indonesia, where they jointly proposed convening an Asian-African conference to be held the following year at Bandung, the capital of the Indonesian province of West Java. According to official accounts, in addition to the conference’s five proposers, the Bandung Conference was attended by representatives of 24 other Asian and African countries, namely, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Peoples Republic of China (Communist China), Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (later Ghana), Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam, later reunified with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam), and Yemen. However, other accounts suggest that more than 1,000 representatives from 50 states and 30 anticolonial or nationalist liberation movements also attended the conference. Among them were the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), the Tunisian Neo-Destour movement, and the Moroccan Istiqlal. Notably, South Africa (under apartheid rule at the time), Israel (for obvious reasons given the general sympathy at the conference for the plight of Palestinians), Taiwan (presumably at China’s insistence), South Korea, and North Korea (both at war less than two years earlier) were not invited to attend the conference. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The End of Empire — National Liberations Won Post-1945 Belgian colonies: Belgian Congo (future Congo-Kinshasa, future Zaire, future Democratic Republic of the Congo) gains independence June 30, 1960; Burundi and Rwanda follow on July 1, 1962. British colonies: India wins independence through campaigns of nonviolence and civil disobedience on August 15, 1947. Ceylon, the future Sri Lanka, becomes a dominion on November 14, 1947. Burma gains independence January 4, 1948. Independence is granted to the Gold Coast (future Ghana) on March 6, 1957; Nigeria on October 1, 1960; Sierra Leone on April 27, 1961; Uganda on October 9, 1962; Kenya on December 12, 1963; Tanganyika (and Zanzibar later merged into Tanzania) on December 9, 1961; Malawi on July 6, 1964; Zambia on October 24, 1964; Gambia on February 18, 1965; Botswana on September 30, 1966; Lesotho on October 4, 1966; Mauritius on March 12, 1968; Swaziland on September 6, 1968; Seychelles on June 29, 1976; and Rhodesia (future Zimbabwe) on April 18, 1980. French colonies: Following years of conflict in Indochina, France signs the Geneva Accords on July 21, 1954. Morocco gains independence on March 2, 1956; Tunisia on March 20, 1956; Guinea on October 2, 1958; Cameroon on January 1, 1960 (also part of the British empire); Togo on April 27, 1960; Mali on June 20, 1960; Senegal on June 20, 1960; Madagascar on June 26, 1960; Benin on August 1, 1960; Niger on August 3, 1960; Burkina Faso on August 5, 1960; the Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) on August 7, 1960; Chad on August 11, 1960; the Central African Republic on August 13, 1960; the Republic of Congo on August 15, 1960; Gabon on August 17, 1960; Mauritania on November 28, 1960; Algeria on March 18, 1962; Comoros on July 6, 1975; and Djibouti on June 27, 1977. Dutch colonies: Indonesia wins independence on August 17, 1945. Portuguese colonies: Independence is won by Guinea-Bissau on September 10, 1974; Mozambique on June 25, 1975; Cape Verde on July 5, 1975; São Tomé and Principe on July 12, 1975; and Angola on November 11, 1975. Spanish colonies: The vestiges of a once powerful empire are all but gone when Equatorial Guinea gains independence on October 12, 1968, and Western Sahara follows on February 28, 1976. United States colonies: Washington grants autonomy to the Philippines on March 24, 1934, with true independence coming on July 4, 1946.

The aim of the Bandung Conference was to promote greater economic and cultural cooperation among recently decolonized nations and to further oppose colonialism “on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.” In his opening address to the conference, the Indonesian president, Ahmad Sukarno, proposed two mottos or catchphrases to rally the delegates: “Live and let live” and “Unity in diversity” were offered as a “unifying force which brings us all together—to seek in friendly, uninhibited discussion, ways and means by which each of us can live his own life, and let others live their own lives, in their own way, in harmony, and in peace.” His speech went on to declare that, despite recent N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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moves toward decolonization, “colonialism is not yet dead. How can we say it is dead, so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree. . . . Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful [sic] and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing and one which must be eradicated from the earth” (Bandung Conference 1955). The conference began with two days of plenary sessions, after which the delegates were divided into three subcommittees to workshop opportunities for greater economic, cultural, and political cooperation. The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference included sections on economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, human rights, self-determination, problems of dependent people, and promotion of world peace. Among the principles listed within the communiqué was an insistence on racial equality—something that could not be agreed upon following the conclusion of World War I and the establishment of the UN precursor, the League of Nations. Essentially, the African and Asian states and the various anticolonial nationalist movements represented at Bandung sought to reaffirm and strengthen their ambitions for independence from Western imperialism while also seeking to keep the Soviet bloc at a comfortable and manageable distance. Naturally there were some exceptions to this general aim given the varying range of interests represented. For instance, the Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, later stated of the conference: There was the political interplay and backstage intrigues. Quite a number of people there were permanent performers of the UN and they functioned with all due pomposity. A tightly knit group represented, if I may say so, the United States policy. This consisted chiefly of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Also, of course, the Philippines and Thailand. These two were at least somewhat moderate in their expression. The other four were quite aggressive and sometimes even offensive. A threat was made out that the conference would be broken up if their viewpoint was not adopted. (quoted in Arpi 2005)

Nevertheless, collectively those gathered at Bandung got the ball rolling on a strategic bloc that was intended to be independent from the superpowers and the dangerous machinations of the Cold War. As history shows us, not all of the newly independent postcolonial states were able to stay out of harm’s way during the ensuing East-West antagonism. But this six-day conference effectively marks the beginning of what was to become known as the “Third World” and later gave rise to the “nonaligned movement.” In the following years, issues raised by the Bandung Conference were taken up by the nonaligned movement. With growing representation in the UN General Assembly, in November 1963 the movement urged that body to institute a new international trade and development policy that would assist developing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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countries in promoting economic development, in facilitating the export of goods to the developed world, and in providing greater financial resources. These demands met with limited success, for they remained very similar to the reforms being sought by many to the existing international trading system in the pursuit of a fairer system. An interesting footnote to the original Bandung Conference is that from April 22–24, 2005, an Asia-Africa summit was held in Jakarta, Indonesia. To mark the 50th anniversary of the conference, on April 24 the participating leaders attended a ceremony in Bandung. The 2005 summit was attended by 106 countries—well over half of the then 191 UN member states— representing 75 percent of the world population. Key players at Bandung in 1955, apart from the host, Indonesian president Ahmad Sukarno, were Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser; the premier of Communist China, Zhou Enlai; Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru; Kwame Nkrumah, the prime minister of the Gold Coast (later Ghana); Ho Chi Minh, prime minister of Vietnam; and U.S. congressman Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem, New York. Beyond the Bandung Conference, other prominent anticolonial nationalist figures included Julius Nyerere, who studied history and economics at the University of Edinburgh and was well known for his policy of agricultural collectivization known as Ujamaa (“familyhood”). He was a cofounder of the Tanganyika African National Union and worked tirelessly for independence, social equality, and harmonious race/ethnic relations. As prime minister when independence was won in 1961, Nyerere became the first president of Tanzania upon the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Nyerere also played a significant role in the foundation in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Another prominent African anticolonial nationalist leader was Kwame Nkrumah of the British-ruled Gold Coast. Nkrumah furthered his education in the United States and England, where in 1945 he was active in organizing the Pan-African Congress. Returning to Ghana in 1947, he joined the newly founded United Gold Coast Convention but soon left to establish the Convention People’s Party (CPP). Imprisoned for independence activism, Nkrumah was released to form a government when his CPP was successful in the elections of 1951, subsequently leading Ghana to independence in 1957. Like Nyerere, he was a committed pan-Africanist and also played a prominent role in the foundation of the OAU. In the Belgian Congo, Patrice Lumumba drove the struggle for national liberation as the founder in 1958 of the National Congolese Movement (MNC). Leading strike actions and protests against the Belgian colonial government, he called for immediate independence. Lumumba was also arrested for his activism, but his popularity saw him released. Following parliamentary elections in 1960, Lumumba became prime minister, with his government based in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in the country’s western region. The former Belgian Congo is a classic case of a nationalist liberation movement not actually having a self-identified “nation” to represent; Lumumba’s government had little or no control over the rich mining N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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province of Katanga, which declared itself an independent republic. The events that ensued are complicated and not without controversy; they involve the United Nations, the death of a UN secretary general, a military coup, and ultimately, the murder of Patrice Lumumba in January 1961, with European and American complicity. The former Belgian Congo has not had a freely elected government since, nor has it come close to stability. Léopold Senghor was a Senegalese poet and intellectual who went on to become the country’s first president, serving from 1960 to his resignation in 1981. He is known in African and black nationalist circles as one of the names behind the concept of Négritude and was a proud spokesperson and defender of African culture and African identity in the face of French colonial oppression. Frantz Fanon is another intellectual and activist whose life and body of written work has left an enduring mark on anticolonial nationalist and black nationalist movements. Educated in Martinique and France and an equally accomplished psychoanalyst and social philosopher, Fanon fought with the French army during World War II and later went on to join the Algerian liberation movement, becoming an editor of its newspaper in 1956. Though his life was cut short by leukemia in 1961, by the time of his death he was an established authority on black consciousness and black identity, the strengths and weaknesses of nationalism as a liberating force, and the violence that liberation almost inevitably demanded. Perhaps no one is more significant in the realm of anticolonial liberation movements than Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, more commonly known as Mahatma Gandhi. Ghandi brought the Indian case for independence from British rule to the outside world. Armed with a philosophy of nonviolence, which he termed Satyagraha, and a law degree from London, Gandhi fought for the cause of Indians in South Africa and at home. Jailed for his activism in 1922, 1930, 1933, and 1942, Gandhi went on a number of highly publicized hunger strikes that attracted worldwide attention to the cause. With the upsurge in nationalist sentiments following World War II, Britain resigned itself to withdrawing from India and granting independence, leaving behind the states of India (Hindu), with Nehru as prime minister, and Pakistan (Muslim). Reluctantly, Gandhi realized that India’s religious divisions ran deep and acquiesced to the partition of his homeland. Within months Gandhi was assassinated by a fanatical Hindu who could not accept Gandhi’s belief that Hindus and Muslims were equals. In speaking of nationalist leaders of the era, it would be remiss to overlook Ho Chi Minh and the case of Vietnam. In 1930, Ho founded the Indochinese Communist Party and then in 1941 established the Viet Minh (“independence”) League as an alliance of communist and nationalist organizations to oppose French and Japanese occupation, and later American forces. After decades of leading a struggle for a Vietnam that was unified and free from occupation, Ho Chi Minh died in September 1969 with the war in Indochina far from resolved. Vietnam’s reunification under a communist government did not take place until July 1976 under the leadership of Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese premier, but for many it is N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the leadership and legacy of Ho Chi Minh in opposing foreign occupation that endures as a source of Vietnamese nationalist pride. Many nationalist luminaries of the post–World War II era were both theorists and activists. Some have left behind significant bodies of work that are still studied to this day. Others have left lasting legacies to their nations and peoples, not all of them positive, and some have done both. As we have seen, Gandhi and Lumumba paid with their lives for their respective nationalist causes, while an attempt was made on Nasser’s life. The government of Indonesian president Sukarno was toppled, while Ghana went on to become a one-party state with Nkrumah in effect its dictator, until he was also overthrown by a military coup. Even those who left office of their own choice did not always live up to the promises; deciding not to contest the 1985 election, Nyerere admitted the shortcomings of his Uhuru na Ujamaa (“freedom and socialism”) program, declaring in his farewell speech, “I failed. Let’s admit it” (McDonald and Njeri Sahle 2003).

Dimensions One of the issues central to anticolonial or anti-imperialist nationalist movements —particularly in the way they affected outside states that thought they also had a stake in developments—was whether they were truly just guises for extending the communist or capitalist spheres of influence. This is a question that people still argue about, and it is not one that is easy to separate out and draw clear-cut conclusions about. Even with the benefit of hindsight, there are more shades of gray than black or white. That said, Marxism-Leninism was undeniably an influence for many leaders and adherents of national liberation movements; whether they intended to establish a communist or socialist state having won independence, however, is another matter altogether. Vietnam is the obvious example here, where the West and the United States in particular feared that, should Vietnam be lost to the communist sphere of influence, a domino effect would quickly follow suit across much of southern Asia. While Vietnam and the Vietnam War is the most well-known such scenario, other nationalist liberation movements across Africa and elsewhere spiked similar concerns in the East and West alike. From American and Australian forces fighting in Vietnam to the presence of Cuban troops in southern Africa, the newly identified Third World became the site of a number of Cold War proxy wars that were anything but cold. Another prominent theme in nationalist movements and philosophies of this era involved the various strains of pan-nationalisms, such as pan-Africanism, panArabism, and pan-Islamism. These pan-nationalist movements were in many ways intended to cut across national boundaries and unite even greater collectives with a common cause, which then became a greater struggle. The Bandung Conference N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of 1955 played no small part in breathing life into these movements, although in some cases the idea had been floating around for a good many years prior. The first pan-African conference, for instance, was held in London in 1900. The cause of pan-Africanism was promoted by a number of black leaders and intellectuals from around the world, not just Africa. Its prominent leaders and adherents included W. E. B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, and Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta. Pan-Africanism also had a distinct influence on some black American civil rights leaders, particularly Malcolm X. At the Sixth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in 1945, Nkrumah founded the West African National Secretariat, with the aim of forming the United States of Africa. As we have seen, Nkrumah and other African leaders went on to found the Organization of African Unity in 1963, which in turn became the African Union. This intergovernmental body, however, falls well short of approaching the degree of cooperation and integration achieved by the European Union and is not likely to do so any time soon. Of the Bandung Conference attendees, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser is most readily identified as pushing the cause of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, and even pan-Africanism. Nasser accused both the West and the United Nations of siding with Israel and of complicity in the displacement of Palestinians from their homeland, a cause that will not lose anyone favor in either the Arab or greater Islamic worlds. Broadly, Arab nationalism rallies around the idea that all Arab peoples share a common heritage, a common history, a common culture, and a common language, and in this they are united in their opposition to a common enemy or enemies. Arab nationalists need not necessarily subscribe to a brand of pan-Arabism that calls for the creation of a single Arab state to which all Arabs should belong; rather, they merely seek an Arab world, particularly the Middle East, free from external interference and influence. Pan-Islamism is a similar idea that extends beyond the Islamic Middle East and North Africa to the broader Muslim world. At the Bandung Conference, Mohammed Natsir, an advocate of Persatuan Islam (“unity of Islam”) and a prominent political figure in the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia, proposed the creation of a theocratic pan-Islamic state that would be aligned to neither the capitalist West nor the communist East. The proposal had few takers at the time and is an even less likely event today, although it still has its adherents, some of them radical militant groups. Nevertheless, Muslims and Muslim countries across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa do throw their moral and practical support behind one another when circumstances demand, such as when it is perceived that their common faith is under threat. Impacts on Different Groups When it comes to thinking about subnational groups in the postcolonial world, nationalism and nationalist liberation movements pose some particularly sticky questions. It was noted above that the principle of self-determination generally holds that a self-identified or self-selecting people or nation of a viable size has a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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fundamental right to self-government. However, in the vast majority of postcolonial states, perhaps in all, there is generally no single self-identified or self-selecting collective to speak of. Rather, most postcolonial states are an agglomeration of different groups distinguishable by various combinations of ethnicity, religion, caste, and other such markers. What has bound them together prior to their gaining independence is their common colonial history and a common enemy, their colonial overlords. Once that enemy is defeated or willingly grants independence and national self-determination is achieved, the vexing question then becomes, Who is represented by the “self,” which, if any, collective constitutes the “nation,” and is there a nation at all? In most instances, the postcolonial state is not a freely formed geopolitical space; rather, it is an artificial construct that is the result of arbitrary boundaries agreed to at a roundtable of colonial powers, such as at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 at which the European powers sketched some lines upon a map and in the process carved out the future internal borders of Africa. The borders of the states that make up the Middle East were drawn up in much the same way. For instance, part of Iraq’s justification or rationalization for invading and annexing Kuwait as its 19th province in 1990 was based on 19th-century Ottoman maps that showed Kuwait as part of Iraq’s southern province of Basra. It is true that the borders of most modern states are not exactly “naturally” occurring, with the possible exception of island states such as Australia or New Zealand (the issue of archipelagos such as Indonesia is much more complicated, and Ireland offers up another set of problems altogether). In Europe, they were forged—drawn and redrawn—after what were often seemingly endless years of battle and bloodshed. The difference, however, in much of the postcolonial world, and especially in Africa, is that this process did not take place, at least not to any satisfactory conclusion. Instead, the borders were imposed by external forces who neither understood nor cared much about the existing demarcations and subgroup power relations. When this vexing problem of state formation is coupled with the ongoing effects of colonial governance techniques, such as divide and rule and indirect rule, some rather large obstacles remain to be overcome when it comes to forging national unity and establishing stable postcolonial governments. In most colonies, the struggle for decolonization spewed forth a good many liberation movements and leaders who, although they were Indian nationalists, or African nationalists, or Arab nationalists, were also members of particular clans, or followed specific faiths, or adhered to particular ideologies. Once independence was won and the new nationalist elite had been installed in power, the genie could not easily be put back in the bottle, so to speak. A political space and a share in power had to be found for all of these competing forces if there was to be any hope of a smooth transition to independence and “national” self-determination. And as history has shown, sharing the power was not often the case. Hence postcolonial liberation movements gave rise to further secessionist movements, such as that described above in the Belgian Congo. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Biafran secessionist movement in Nigeria in the late 1960s is another prominent case of a postcolonial country whose subsequent history of independence has been anything but smooth sailing. The secessionist movement plunged the country into years of civil war during which untold thousands perished. In fact, Nigeria is a very good example of the problems that are created and the complex sociocultural issues that must be dealt with when national borders are externally imposed to create a “nation” with little appreciation of the array of peoples falling within its borders. For instance, Nigeria’s population is estimated to be close to 134 million (July 2003) and is made up of more than 250 different ethnic groups. The larger of these are the Hausa and Fulani in the north (29 percent), the Yoruba in the southwest (21 percent), and the Igbo or Ibo in the southeast (18 percent). The “nation’s” population is further differentiated in that its people are 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian, including Roman Catholic, Anglican, Baptist, and Methodist, and 10 percent Animist. It should also be borne in mind that many of these ethnic and religious cleavages overlap with and cut across borders with its West African neighbors. (Similar issues confront much of the postcolonial world, from Africa to the Middle East, with Indonesia being a good example in Southeast Asia). Small surprise, then, that throughout its postcolonial independence, the “nation” of Nigeria has rarely chosen its government via electoral consensus; rather, it has more often than not been held together by a brutal dictatorial military regime. Only now, after 40 years of independence, does Nigeria have a civilian government that is trying to come to grips with the issues of nationhood and national stability. One of the real vexing problems for many postcolonial states is that, though they may now be independent and self-governing states, very few, if any of them, are “nation-states.” Backlashes As can be gleaned from the above, nationalism in the postcolonial world is something of a double-edged sword. In the first instance it can serve as a unifying force that brings together disparate groups of peoples when there is a common enemy to be opposed, such as a colonial oppressor. At the same time, however, the sentiments aroused by nationalist fervor can distill into pride and affection for a more discreet and exclusive subgroup that can, in turn, pose a disrupting or fragmenting threat once the common enemy exits the scene. Sometimes these fissures in the “nation” fighting for independence might lie shallowly beneath the surface, continuing to simmer and fester while a seemingly unified struggle is being fought against an occupying force or colonizer. The divisions between Hindus and Muslims in the British colony of India are a good example, although there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this long-existing tension was anything but well hidden. The subsequent contest for political power after the colonizer has departed can play itself out in a number of ways. In the former British India, it resulted in partition and the creation of two states—the Hindu-dominated India and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Muslim-dominated Pakistan. While this outcome has some positives, it also has a downside: the two countries have fought a number of wars in the 50-plus years since gaining independence, and they continue to posture and even fight on and off over the disputed border region of Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions between the two nations is further complicated by the fact that both countries went nuclear in the late 1990s, a source of national pride for many people in both countries. In other postcolonial countries, preexisting divisions have led to exhaustive civil wars in the contest to fill the power vacuum created by the departure of the colonial power. Good examples can be found in the former southern African Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, which did not win their independence until the mid-1970s and only then after fighting a violent and bloody liberation war against their colonizer. Take Angola as an example to illustrate how events become complicated by the existence of competing nationalist groups. In this case, three nationalist liberation movements were involved in the struggle for independence: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, or MPLA), the National Front of Angolan Liberation (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, or FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, or UNITA). In the early days of independence, a tripartite, powersharing transition government was formed by the three nationalist movements. Cooperation was short-lived, however, and conflict soon erupted between the three power-seeking factions. As in some other postcolonial states, the Angolan civil war was complicated and intensified by the Cold War meddling of the superpowers; the Soviet Union and its allies, including a large contingent of Cuban troops backed the MPLA, while the West, through apartheid South Africa, got behind UNITA. The Angolan civil war only ended in 2002, and elections were not scheduled to be held until 2006. The war has been a long and costly one that has rent the country asunder and exposed the deep-seated problems created by the imposition of colonial borders around peoples in a vain attempt to forge a nation that simply does not exist. The presence of a valuable resource, such as diamonds in the case of Angola, further complicates matters and invites yet more foreign meddling. As recent history has shown in often graphically violent detail, Angola does not stand alone in grappling with such issues. The postcolonial era has witnessed many years of civil wars or struggles for control of the state between competing groups in former colonies; some are based on ideological divisions, some religious, some ethnic, and some a volatile mixture of all of the above. Perhaps the most recent and most disturbing depiction of this violent contest for control of the state between competing subnational groups is the genocide in the former Belgian Congo, played out across the borders of Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which destabilized the delicate political balance of the entire region. As in so much of the postcolonial world, the arbitrary drawing of borders by the European colonial powers, the divide-and-rule colonial governance techniques administered by colonizers such as Belgium, and the various naN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tionalist liberation movements that arose decades later all contributed to a national volatility wherein various forces pulled equally in as many different directions.

Consequences As is evident from the discussion above and the highlighting of a few examples, post–World War II nationalist liberation movements in the former colonial world have had both positive and negative effects. On the upside, by and large those nationalist movements have been successful in fighting for and winning liberation from their various colonial masters. Sometimes independence was necessarily achieved through violent and bloody guerilla-style revolutionary wars. Today very few people argue against a nation’s inherent right to the freedom of selfdetermination and sovereign self-government. The liberation of the former colonial world also gave rise to the nonaligned movement, a loosely allied bloc of states that during the Cold War and afterward neither sided with the East nor the West in intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. Many would see this development as positive, whereas others argue that it has led to a new set of problems in international relations between states; there is probably some measure of truth to either contention. But nationalist movements in the postcolonial world have obviously also led to more than a few negative outcomes for successor states, the former colonial powers, and the international community at large. As noted, competing nationalist movements have often struggled violently to fill the power void left by the quick exit of colonial governments, governments that left in place an administrative apparatus that was ill-suited to governing after the people became citizens and no longer subjects. The arbitrary demarcation of state boundaries that cut existing collectives in halves and bunched together other collectives into artificially constructed states has posed serious obstacles when it comes to attempts to forge some measure of national unity. There remain questions and contestations over who should lead the state, who is best equipped to hold the reins of state power, who are “the people” over which they will govern, and on whose authority. The problems posed by the postcolonial moment and the often disorderly transition to it are still highly relevant for many postcolonial countries today. Although quite a few of these successor states have been self-governing for close to 50 years, small numbers have had stable governments in which the national leadership is decided on by consensus. All too often national leaders have not represented the nation, and all too often they have come to and held onto power through violence, often using the military as a vehicle. Too many postcolonial nationalist elites have been anything but national leaders; rather, they have represented or acted in the interests of their own distinct subgrouping, or, equally as traumatic for the country, they have acted purely out of self-interest, with corruption and endemic poverty plaguing their so-called peoples. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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As identified at the outset, the problem for so many still relatively newly liberated states is that, though they might in theory be self-governing and sovereign states, they are not actually nation-states. That is, the state is generally not made up of a readily self-identified or self-selecting collective that is bound together by long-standing commonalities. Instead, the state holds a diverse range of different tribal, ethnic, caste, and religious groupings that occupy the same demarcated geographical space and compete for social, economic, cultural, and political power in that space. As relatively new “nations” with very little national history to bind them together, other than the struggle for independence, which can be both a blessing and a curse, they are still working out the best means to peacefully coexist in that geopolitical space. And some subnational collectives for whom the nation is not their primary marker or point of allegiance continue to seek to govern themselves, either through their own state through secession or through autonomous regions. Hence, despite having won national liberation from colonial oppressors, the struggle for national liberation, autonomy, and self-rule goes on. Selected Bibliography Arpi, Claude. 2005. “Was Bandung in Vain?” (Retrieved April 22, 2007), http://www.Rediff.com. Bandung Conference. 1955. Africa-Asia Speaks from Bandung. Jakarta: Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chatterjee, Partha. 1993a. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Chatterjee, Partha. 1993b. The Nation and Its Fragments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Emerson, Rupert. 1960. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1965. A Dying Colonialism. New York: Grove Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1967a. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1967b. The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. Gandhi, Mohandas K. 1951. Satyagraha: Non-violent Resistance. Abmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House. Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mayall, James. 1990. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McDonal, David A., and Eunice Njeri Sahle, eds. 2003. The Legacies of Julius Nyerere: Influences on Development Discourse and Proactice in Africa. Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press. Nandy, Ashis. 1983. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Panaf Books. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1973. Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle against World Imperialism. London: Panaf Books. Oommen, T. K. 1997. Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage. Said, Edward. 1994. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage.

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Religion, Ideology, and Nationalism Zachary Irwin Relevance Any effort to discuss this subject must start by suggesting introductory definitions. By ideology we are referring to any system of thought that seeks to expose or criticize an existing explanation of social reality in favor of one more in accord with “real” social forces, whether psychological, historical, or material. Our concern will be less to consider ideologies as examples of critical thought than as efforts to reconstruct society, like the use of Marxist principles to shape “socialist” or social democratic policies. Also, nationalism may be understood as a doctrine and a movement that is a type of ideology. Nationalism elevates the nation as a core value by emphasizing its place as the primary source of communal identity and social value. Nationalism is evident in movements that pursue self-determination for a group of people that consider themselves a “nation.” Nationalistic values may be easy to recognize, but exactly what constitutes a nation may be little more than an act of will uniting a collectivity. Nationalism, like most ideologies, claims a “higher” level of rationality, often expressed in some notion of human nature, history, or current politics. Because national identity has often been distinguished by a distinctive religious identity, it is necessary to consider religion’s place in both nationalist and ideological movements. Religion may also claim a higher notion of reality, but one founded in the faith of transcendental revelation. Ideologies are intended to alter secular public values and policies and are of diminished purpose beyond public life. By contrast, religion has an independent meaning and purpose that may be expressed through private and collective organizations. The Christian writer C. S. Lewis has remarked that religion and law differ fundamentally. Although both are concerned with outward human conduct, religion is also concerned with the inner state of human motivation and ultimate destiny. In a sense, totalitarian ideologies, like Nazism and communism, may count as “political religions” because of their goal of human transformation in some novel sense. Other ideologies, like nationalism, may seek to borrow religious symbols and values to win popular respect and gain a deeper sense of identity, but primarily they emphasize behavior. Some religious leaderships may seek political power independently and appeal to religious feeling for that purpose. Religion and ideology also differ in the ways that they seek justification for their claims for loyalty. Ideologies often claim tangible social results through a system of self-selected values, whereas religion asserts ideals of social rectitude whose values are ends in themselves and refer to a transcendental reality expressed in faith. Occasionally, some N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nationalist movements link national identity with religion. For example, Christian Arabs have been active in both Arab and Palestinian nationalism, but the Islamic Palestinian movement Hamas considers its goal of an Islamic state identical to Palestinian self-determination. The rise of mass national movements since 1945 is inseparable from the rise of mass political consciousness. Typically, the nation that did not govern itself was considered to have forfeited its natural right to be free of foreign domination. Moreover, two world wars mobilized the great majority of peoples throughout the world who were subject to foreign rule. World War I defeated the German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires. U. S. president Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” promised a new era of peace through “autonomous development” of former subject nations in independent states. During and after World War II, a similar idealism animated the language of the Four Freedoms (1941), the United Nations Charter (1945), and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948). Although these documents do not refer to nationalism, they imply that selfdetermination is a prior condition of all rights. The relation of ideology and religion in global politics since 1945 suggests that each has evolved distinctively. Marxism, for example, has continued to develop as an ideological critique of capitalism after the general collapse of communist party rule, but its historical impact as a political movement has been shaped by changes in technology and communication. For example, the development of Stalinist totalitarianism was as dependent on modern technology as the collapse of the Soviet Union was a consequence of developments in communications and the global economy. Religious involvement in politics, either in social movements, statecraft, or in some combination, is a staple of most historical periods, but the postwar decades have differed from earlier times in important respects. Through the development of “mass” political activity, religious claims have broadened to ideas of collective identity and popular legitimacy. As we have mentioned, religion and national identity have become more closely identified. For example, Slavic peoples have considered a self-governing (autocephalous) Orthodoxy as much the basis for identity as a distinctive homeland and language. Varieties of Buddhism have been identified with political identity in some Asian nations. Moreover, whether or not we choose to consider some aspects of modern thought to be “ideological,” that is, as a critique or rationale of state claims and actions, ideological movements are as traditionally transnational as their religious counterparts. This transnational character makes possible generalizations about religion and nationality beyond the experience of a certain political culture or a religious tradition. Apart from this shared attribute, several distinct developments distinguish the interaction of religion and ideology within recent decades. First, the authority of both has been challenged in a way comparable to the challenge posed to religion following the destructive wars of the 17th century. Peoples have found ideologies like fascism and communism insufficient for public purposes, whether owing to the consequences of even more deadly wars or N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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from the criteria of political legitimacy. Traditional religious institutions have fared somewhat better in preserving their moral claims through charismatic leadership or their perceived exceptional rectitude. Second, whether one chooses Ortega y Gasset’s notion of the “revolt of the masses” or a more appealing description, the democratic character of postwar politics has narrowed the public space between categories of religious and political action (Revolt of the Masses). Religion has become too popular to evade secular public values, and politics, too transparent to escape the criticisms of the religious. Finally, within the last two decades, religion and ideology have arrived at a condition of mutual influence, if not tolerance. Thus, by the 1990s, a clear delineation of religion from ideology might beg the question of recognizing the separate attributes of each. In relatively secular European societies, religious identities have been pervasively influenced by “ideologies” like feminism and notions of egalitarian justice. Conversely, political leaders in some developing countries in and out of power have justified violence on religious grounds. Secular ideologies have not fared well within the last decade. For example, for decades the state of Israel realized a political compromise between secular and religious ideas of Jewish identity. More recently, the consensus behind that compromise has decayed as different groups assert a more exclusive politics of identity and an uncompromising sense of rectitude. This development is characteristic of a more general political phenomenon. Whatever their motive, religious and secular leaders alike have found the pursuit of “identity” a badge of political legitimacy, group cohesion, and mutual obligation. Not only has the distinction between religion and ideology eroded, but their political expressions include a diverse lot of parties, movements, associations, and violent insurgencies. This diversity is quite recent, but its origins lie in the postwar era. Arguably, the present would be unintelligible without an appreciation of the immediate postwar era, since events in those years have cast a long shadow. The European Postwar Era Understanding political parties is central to understanding the place of religion and ideology in postwar politics. Whether parties are open and democratic or self-selecting and totalitarian, their purpose is to govern. The most significant ideological feature of the postwar era is the destruction of fascism and most authoritarian ideologies of the right. Postwar Spain, under the authoritarian rule of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, represents an exception, yet Franco’s rule survived until the dictator’s death by avoiding war with the Allies. In Western Europe, the political vacuum of defeated Italy and Germany was filled both by the left and the democratic right. In both countries, Christian Democratic parties were led by the surviving leaders of interwar Roman Catholic parties. Alcide De Gasperi (1881–1954) and Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967) were both imprisoned by the fascist authorities as political leaders of interwar Catholic parties in opposition to fascism. With the defeat of Italian fascism and Nazism, their Christian N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Democratic past provided a credible democratic basis for new political leadership, acceptable both to fellow citizens and to the victorious Allies. The heritage of nationalism was too closely associated with the defeated regimes to have influenced Christian Democracy in a positive sense. Instead, national identity was associated with the larger project of European identity, expressed through such institutions as the Council of Europe (1949), the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), and the European Economic Community (1957). Neo-fascist parties, such as Italy’s “Italian Social Movement” (MSI) or the British National Party (BNP), remained marginal to the political process, and many considered them to be extremist rather than nationalist in the conventional sense. Ideologically, Christian Democracy offered a program of policies and ideas expressing social conservatism, individual rights, and capitalism, modified for social welfare and economic reconstruction. The Catholic element emphasized the moral heritage of Christianity and, in the case of Italy, the Vatican’s influence in political life. Both were “catch-all” or mass parties that adapted their programs to national conditions in Italy, West Germany, and other European countries and sought to appeal to the center and right of the political spectrum. The Christian Democratic approach to foreign policy came to stand for two enduring features of postwar Europe: a close military alliance with the United States and consistent support for European reconciliation and unity. This meant becoming founding members of NATO (1949) and a united Europe. The association of Christian Democracy with Europe’s remarkable economic success is an important theme of postwar Europe. However, as with all parties, prolonged responsibility for government may undermine effectiveness. Italy’s Christian Democrats collapsed and created a wholly new party in the early 1990s after a series of scandals. Christian Democracy continues as the dominant form of democratic conservatism in continental Europe and in Latin America. Although parties in other countries have not replicated Italian and German Christian Democratic dominance, Christian Democracy represents a common and enduring political expression. The Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International comprise more than a hundred allied parties. The International provides a forum to make common ideas and experience public. That the organization includes major parties in Chile, Mexico, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand shows the adaptability of Christian Democracy. Parties in Sweden, Estonia, and Norway are members of the International despite their Protestant tradition of state Lutheranism. Within the European Parliament, the European Peoples Party (EPP), elected at the all-European level, is the Parliament’s largest party and describes itself as a family of political center-right parties from across the 27-member European Union (EPP-ED Group). Its program of empowering local government (subsidiarity) and promoting political transparency as well as human rights is difficult to oppose. Formulating a common and distinctive response to issues that have challenged the European right in each country has been more difficult for the EPP. What, for example, distinguishes a Christian Democrat from a traditional nationalist on N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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issues like Turkey’s membership in the European Union or wearing religious symbols in state schools? Despite differences on such controversial issues among member parties of the International, its chairman, Wilfred Martins, has supported the right of Muslim girls to wear headscarves in French schools as an expression of religious freedom, a view contrary to the ruling Gaullist Party. Despite its diversity and breadth, Christian Democracy has not lost a distinctive identity.

Origins Communism and Ideological Conflict The postwar destruction of fascism simplified the problem of unity on the political right and center, and, perhaps as important, the impending Cold War compelled a common response from democratically elected parties on the left. As the defeat of the Axis powers greatly reduced the appeal of fascism, so the victorious Soviet Union raised the prestige of the left. But the “left” remained a house divided. Communist and socialist parties agreed about the need for a “united front” against fascism, but soon after 1945 the deep division created by the Russian Revolution between the Communist and Social Democratic parties returned. The writings of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels never offered much guidance in settling the differences between communist and socialist parties, and both might be considered legitimate heirs to Marx’s legacy. There has been some confusion about the meaning of the phrases “socialist” and “communist.” Marx wrote that “socialism” was in fact a lower and transitory order of a communist society of freedom and material abundance. The Soviet doctrine known as “Marxism-Leninism” does not dispute this distinction, but in practice “socialism” justified the claims and decisions of ruling communist parties, while “communism” was left to an indefinite future. Social Democrats emphasized economic planning and public ownership but became reconciled with a version of capitalism, complemented by social guarantees of medical care and welfare. Also, they were willing to yield power if voted out of office. In the immediate postwar world, the same could not be said of communist parties. Other differences distinguish communism from socialism. Communists and some Social Democrats consider capitalism a system doomed to self-destruction, but communist parties claimed that only violent revolution on the Soviet model could ensure the victory of socialism. Second, Social Democrats looked forward to peaceful elections to realize their goals of public ownership and state planning. They insisted on open party membership and that major party decisions be made by majority vote among all members. Although Stalin dissolved the Communist International in 1943, non-Soviet communists insisted that there could be no conflict between loyalty to their own country and to the Soviet Union, the “homeland of socialism.” Social Democrats remain loyal to their national state. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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One consequence of the Cold War was that the conflict compelled a more rapid accommodation between capitalist economics and the Social Democrats. For example, the West German Social Democrats emerged as the primary opponent of the Christian Democrats. Willy Brandt was elected chairman of the Social Democratic Party in 1964 and chancellor in 1969. Brandt’s previous experience as mayor of Berlin had involved cooperation within a coalition of other parties. One of his first decisions as party leader was to promote the adoption of the “Bad Godesberg Program,” a party manifesto that ended any reference to Marxism, the nationalization of private property, and neutrality in the Cold War. Social Democracy increasingly came to stand for greater equality and better working conditions, as it had in the Scandinavian countries since the prewar period. Brandt’s experience in Berlin left him no reason to identify Social Democratic goals with the Soviet Union. Understanding the Cold War is central to understanding postwar ideological conflict. While European politics was increasingly polarized between Soviet and American policies about Europe’s future, colonial areas emerged as a center of nationalist activity. By the mid-1950s, newly independent states had become a focus of Cold War rivalry. However, most newly independent states sought to avoid economic dependence on the West and political dependence on the Soviet Union and native communist parties. India’s experience demonstrates the priority of an authentic “Indian” style of independent political institutions and nation-building. India’s National Congress Party was among the first political movements in colonial areas closely identified with anti-imperialist movements in Asia and Africa, in a way similar to that of anticolonialism in the Americas a century earlier. India’s National Congress Party was founded in 1885, and by the interwar period the party had developed both the experience and the vision to govern an independent India. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1947) first organized nonviolent “passive resistance” (Satyagraha) against British rule and a boycott of imported goods in favor of those produced by hand within India. Gandhi was assassinated the year of India’s independence by a religious fanatic who sought to undermine Gandhi’s ideal of an independent India equally acceptable to its different national and religious groups. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) and the Muslim League advanced a movement for an independent Muslim nation that eventually became Pakistan. Partition of India became inevitable as the two sides could not agree on a single government. Tragically, many thousands died in communal riots at the time of independence. The consequences of India’s independence demonstrated the critical problems of identity and nationalism. Specifically, the Congress Party’s idea of a secular “allIndia” movement avoided a more narrow notion of nationalism, as it sought to govern an independent federal India with some 14 “mother tongues” and significant religious minorities, including 12 percent Muslim (123 million people). Ultimately, the party was vulnerable to the political challenge of seeking to appeal to the Hindu identity of 82 percent of the population. Pakistan emphasized territory as well as its Islamic identity. The country’s name was derived from the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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names of British India’s northern provinces: Punjab, Afghan, Kasmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. India and other developing countries became the focus of Soviet-American rivalry for political influence. Economically, the two sides sought to demonstrate the respective superiority of their economic systems and their capacity to create wealth. As an ideological conflict, the “free” and the “socialist” countries sought to appeal to the peoples of the world through fundamental arguments about the relevance of their respective systems to the world’s problems of war and peace, human rights, and economic development. Some historians have considered the United States to be “imperialist” in its military defense of autocratic capitalist regimes and its alleged protection of commercial interests before all other values. However, variations in the practice of “capitalism” were not a source of conflict among capitalist countries, whereas Chinese, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav versions of “socialism” became at times sources of open and violent conflict with the Soviet Union. Intellectual conflict regarding the origins of war in the abstract was a marker of ideological conflict. In turn, debate about the responsibility for the Cold War became a staple of ideological conflict. U.S. involvement in the overthrow of leftist governments in Iran, Guatemala, Congo, Chile, and elsewhere was rationalized ideologically. Among socialist countries, communist parties sought a monopoly on power wherever other political forces were unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Noncommunists were prosecuted, harassed, or driven into exile. Only in Czechoslovakia in 1948 did a communist party win an electoral plurality in a free election, but within two years the government had arrested noncommunist party leaders. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, communist parties were installed with the support of Soviet force. The idea of a communist “bloc” of states was considered especially threatening in the United States, Western Europe, and parts of Asia. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Zedong drove the defeated nationalist Guomindang to the island of Taiwan. The following year, North Korean forces invaded the South in an apparent effort to unify the peninsula under communist power. Significantly, communist Chinese and Yugoslav forces acted independently of Soviet command. After the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the threat of a vastly more violent conflict became even greater. Without doubt, some American decisions, for example, the suspension of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union and support for anticommunist parties, provoked Soviet mistrust. Stalin spoke about World War II as an “inevitable” result in the development of capitalism. The thought echoed an earlier idea of Lenin’s and suggested that future wars were a result of capitalism, whose hostility toward socialism was unchanged by the wartime alliance against fascism. The origins of the Cold War emerged under specific circumstances, in certain personalities, and whether or not Stalin believed that another world war was “inevitable”; he seemingly sought to promote communist domination by any means possible to enforce an ideological conformity. Any leadership that attempted to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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act independently was expelled from all communist institutions with the clear expectation that it would be overthrown from within or invaded by the United States. Tito’s Yugoslavia was one example of expulsion from the Stalinist “Communist Information Bureau.” Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) sought to act independently in the Balkans and resisted Soviet domination of Yugoslav politics. Until the final collapse of socialist Yugoslavia in 1990, Yugoslav communism evolved separately from the socialist bloc. Similarly, Mao Zedong sought to shape Marxism in a way appropriate for conditions in China. Mao explained his approach to nationalism in one of his most important theoretical works, On New Democracy (1940), emphasizing “the dictatorship of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat.” The revolution of the Chinese Communists would create a “new democracy” fundamentally different from the “bourgeoisie” democracy of his opponent, the nationalist Guomindang. Mao’s distinction of “revolutionary classes” enabled him to explain the Chinese revolution from a Marxist viewpoint. Identifying the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the petty bourgeoisie as “revolutionary” classes offered a theoretical justification for a socialist revolution in a country whose proletariat was vastly outnumbered by the peasantry. Lenin had resolved a comparable problem in explaining Russia’s revolution by redefining the nature of capitalism in his 1914 work, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. After Lenin’s death and the consolidation of Stalin’s power, any initiative on the part of local communist leaderships was considered unacceptable. Stalin distrusted Mao or any Communist who acted independently of Moscow, but because of Mao’s success and China’s importance, Stalin did not criticize Mao publicly. After Stalin’s death, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated at the state and party levels and remained embittered until the mid-1980s. Regardless of Chinese policy, the Soviet Union could not intervene with military force, especially after China developed nuclear weapons in 1964. Communist leaderships in Eastern Europe were not as secure as China’s. Efforts to create distinctive socialist regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were understood in the Kremlin as a threat to world socialism and Soviet primacy. The communist leaderships of Imre Nagy (1896–1958) in Hungary and Alexander Dubcˇek (1921–1992) in Czechoslovakia were overthrown after Soviet invasions in 1956 and 1968, respectively. The priority of political and military cohesion arrested the development of Marxism outside the Soviet Union. However, Mao Zedong’s approach to insurgent political organization has proven more durable. “Maoism” was both a revolutionary doctrine, adapted to conditions where communists were dependent on the peasantry, and a military doctrine of guerilla warfare. Mao’s writings about the political organization of the peasantry and defeat of a stronger adversary have influenced insurgent movements in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Not all have claimed any connection to Mao or Marxism. For example, the Islamic Palestinian movement Hamas has sought to increase its support by providing welfare (Da’wa) in a strategy similar to Mao’s. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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However, some insurgent movements, like those in Nepal and northern India, are avowedly “Maoist” in their approach to organizing the poorest people in their poor regions for prolonged, irregular warfare. Maoism started as a war against Japan’s occupation of China, became a strategy in civil wars, and is now a general approach to insurgency. After Stalin’s death in 1953 and a brief instability in the Soviet leadership, Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) denounced Stalin’s “cult of the personality” in 1956. “De-Stalinization” became a theme of reform in Soviet politics. Although Stalin’s totalitarian regime did not survive the dictator, serious efforts to alter Soviet socialism did not take place prior to the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931). Gorbachev’s ideals of perestroika (“reconstruction”), glasnost (“openness”), and democratizacia (“democratization”) introduced late in the 1980s raised a central question about whether the reforms were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union, whether that collapse was inevitable, or whether Gorbachev’s reforms could have been successful were they introduced a decade earlier. Khrushchev’s innovations in foreign policy were as important as his criticism of Stalin. His proclamation of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalism and a vast “zone of peace” in former colonial areas provided a new political agenda in the Cold War and stimulated nationalism in developing countries. “Peaceful coexistence” meant neither the end of conflict with the West nor surrender in contested areas, but a willingness to negotiate areas of mutual interest in an era of “ideological struggle.” In fact, improved relations were associated with major disarmament treaties concerning the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons, and with the Helsinki process, a series of treaties that sought resolution of outstanding issues in territorial, economic, and human rights relations. The idea of a “zone of peace” identified Soviet potential allies in developing countries that had taken the “noncapitalist” path of development or were “nationalist democracies.” As a rationale for supporting anticolonial regimes, like Nasser’s Egypt, Sukarno’s Indonesia, and Nkrumah’s Ghana, Khrushchev’s innovation sought to reconcile nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, but in fact only regimes that became fully Communist Party dominated like Cuba proved to be sufficiently stable to become reliable allies. Leaderships in such countries seldom accepted the argument that Soviet Central Asia offered a serious model of development. Moreover, after the Cuban revolution, Soviet policy not only confronted a more aggressive American rival but also Chinese Communist influence. Ironically, Chinese spokesmen denounced Soviet Marxism as “revisionist” as a result of Khrushchev’s accommodation with the West, and Soviet sources dismissed Chinese Marxism as “dogmatism.” The “Sino-Soviet conflict” remained a defining feature of international politics until the 1980s. What began as a public debate about the nature of socialist practice assumed the character of an embittering military and territorial conflict that polarized the socialist bloc and threatened open warfare. Not even the common cause of defending communist Vietnam against the United States created a basis for cooperation between the two states. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dimensions The Rise and Decline of Ideology in Less Developed Countries By the late 1960s, it became commonplace to conceptualize global politics as three distinct “worlds of development”: Western democratic (first), socialist (second), and developing (third). In its less complex form, the division became a means of ideological simplification that remained prevalent until the collapse of communism. The Third World resembled a residual category whose members shared little except their former colonial status, yet ideologically they expressed common themes. Many Third World leaderships identified with general antiimperialism and a future of equality, justice, and modernization, a rhetorical style similar to that of Soviet communism. But unlike communist party leaderships, those in developing countries are better understood as espousing nationalist rather than socialist ideologies. By “nationalism,” we are implying that the ultimate point of political reference is the nation-state and the promotion of its interests. In this sense, the nationalism of developing countries differed fundamentally from 19th-century ideals of “pan-nationalist” movements that sought to unite political interests. The “pan” movements sought to emphasize the common identity of such peoples as Slavs, Germans, and Italians who were the citizens of one state and the ethnicity of another. These movements envisioned an ideal of the “nation” over the more transitory organization of a particular state. Postwar nationalism in developing countries differed in that the “nation” was closely identified with inherited boundaries of former colonial administrations, regardless of ethnic composition. The “nation” was a creation that won its meaning through the pursuit of political independence. Developing and socialist countries also differed in that the claims of communist party leaderships were based on a universal idea of “socialism,” while developing countries often created “Indian” or “Arab” socialism. Developing countries were especially vulnerable to the difficulty of political development. Many such states were undermined by internal rivals, external dependence, and pervasive corruption. Nevertheless, “national” was not to be understood in the simple sense of the values in an existing national community, especially in multinational societies. For example, in Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development, Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah denied, contrary to Marx, that socialism could have developed from capitalism and that instead its origins lay in communalism, an idea consistent with the values of African society. But “African” meant a social construct suitable for Nkrumah’s image of socialism rather than an actual group of people. Elsewhere, a common nation suggested the ideal of a socialist-nationalist synthesis. Like most African states, Ghana was a multiethnic society, and similar ideals of an authentic precolonial identity compatible with “socialism” and modernization existed in other developing countries. Julius Nyerere (1922–1999) in Tanzania and Léopold Senghor (1906–2001) in Senegal N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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sought to refashion traditional ideas of African identity into the basis for a common identity promoted through a centralized state. Arguably, nationalist leaders, especially in former British colonies, were influenced by the ideas of Harold Laski (1893–1950), English Labor Party member and university professor. Most shared ideas of nationalism, collectivism, and anticolonialism, but their actual practice differed widely. We have mentioned the example of India. After Gandhi’s death, “socialism” in India became identified with the Congress Party and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964). Prior to independence, India had developed distinctive democratic institutions, including a professional bureaucracy, a legitimate multiparty legislature, and nonpolitical armed forces. The country would eventually liberalize its economy, abandoning the effort of state planning, and unlike the authoritarianism of most postcolonial leaderships, India retained a democratic government. Arab efforts to synthesize socialism and nationalism took a different course. Arab areas had been divided into separate states following the creation of mandatory regimes under the League of Nations in 1920. The goals of Arab nationalism were necessarily different from those of Africa. In the postwar era, the founders of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (Ba ’ athist), Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1912–1980), authored a party constitution proclaiming the “special merit” of the Arab nation and its historic “tendency towards reform and resurgence,” recognizing in nationalism a “sacred sentiment” uniting nation and individual party (Sigmund 1972, 175–177). Pan-Arab nationalism found in socialism an “exemplary system” that allowed the “realization of the Arab character in history.” The Ba ’ athist program understood “socialism” to mean state policies, that is, social welfare, land reform, equality, and free expression “within the limits of Arab nationalist ideology.” Thus the subordination of national to socialist goals was explicit. Nkrumah and the Ba ’ athists confronted problems that Lenin would have understood: the task of explaining how socialism was politically possible in a society that was not yet fully capitalistic and how to reconcile the universal ideals of socialism with those of the nation. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin argued that revolution was possible in Russia because the nature of capitalism had changed since Marx, that is, it had become a world system vulnerable to revolution at its “weakest link”—Russia. Third World socialists owed no such allegiance to an interpretation of Marx, for a “socialist” state depended on the values of political leadership rather than the forces of production. The question of nationalism was also vexing. Lenin had emphasized that the “bourgeois” or “class” nature of nationalism was intrinsically hostile to transnational, revolutionary socialism, but Lenin’s enemies were Russian nationalists. Third World leaderships sought to create a stable political order within the boundaries of a colonial legacy, regardless of the pan-Arab ideals of the Ba ’ athists. Instead, Ba ’ athism’s pan-Arabism separated into deeply hostile regimes in Iraq and Syria once the Ba ’ athists came to power. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Moreover, other approaches to the problem of nationalism emerged. As the most popular Arab leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s (1918–1970) version of Arab nationalism presumed Egypt to be the preeminent leader of the Arab countries. Nasser emphasized anticolonialism and unity among Arab states, an idea exemplified by his negotiation of British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone and its subsequent nationalization in 1956. Nasser considered that Arab unity was the path to Arab influence, but his union with Syria failed after three years owing to Syrian resentment of Egyptian domination and a ban on political parties. A coup d’état in Syria brought to power a regime that seceded from the United Arab Republic. Within Egypt, Nasser’s version of “Arab socialism” emphasized land reform and state-sponsored industrial projects under the leadership of a single party. A core problem of Nasser’s leadership is common to other “charismatic” leaders. The German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) considered “charisma” a unique set of personal qualities that identified the leader as “set apart from ordinary men and treated as though he were endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or, at least exceptional qualities” (1968, 48). By comparison with other political leaders in the area, Nasser enjoyed exceptional loyalty from most Egyptians, but it would be an exaggeration to separate his personal qualities from his performance. Nasser’s “Arab socialism” created little wealth or productive investment. Similarly his success in resisting an Anglo-French-Israeli attempt to overthrow his regime greatly increased his popularity but did not create lasting security. For example, Nasser’s popularity attracted diplomatic attention to the 1961 meeting of developing countries in Belgrade that created the “nonaligned” group of states. Nasser, Nehru, and Yugoslavia’s Tito led the group, which met periodically supposedly to coordinate policies among states that considered themselves outside Cold War alliances. However, apart from broad themes of anti-imperialism, nonalignment was seldom a barrier to whatever any of its members declared it to mean. By the late 1970s, the nonaligned meetings had become ineffective and quarrelsome. Domestic problems left little attention for foreign policy initiatives. Nasser’s own authority never recovered from the catastrophic defeat to Israel in 1967. He died three years later. Significantly, Nasser was among the first Arab leaders to confront the challenge of religious opposition.

Consequences The Rise of Religion in Postwar Politics Prior to discussing the place of religion in postwar politics, it is useful to remember that its impact varies widely among regimes and faith traditions. For example, we have mentioned the emergence of Christian Democracy in postwar Europe. Generally speaking, Protestant Christianity offered no basis for a political movement comparable to that of Roman Catholicism. Catholicism could draw on a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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history of relations with secular authority since the legalization of Christianity in the Roman Empire in AD 325. Papal Encyclicals (circular letters) have routinely dealt with significant political issues, and some, such as Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (Concerning New Things), entail a developed political theory. Finally, with the exception of those within the Anglican Communion, the public role and responsibility of Roman Catholic bishops offer no precise counterpart among Protestant clerical orders. Martin Luther’s distrust of secular politics set a precedent in the Reformation that has influenced Protestantism generally. Of course, there are exceptions. American Evangelical Protestants have often supported conservative political issues in the United States, and interpreting the role of Catholicism and Presbyterian Christianity in the political conflict of Northern Ireland requires careful qualification. In addition, the traditional identification of church and state in Christian Orthodoxy creates a distinctive relationship between the Orthodox church in postcommunist Russia and the Balkans. Russia’s postcommunist governments have enjoyed good relations with the Orthodox church. The Russian patriarch and president have taken part in consecrating the remains of the last czar and his family, have jointly promulgated legislation concerning nonOrthodox churches, and have restored church property seized or destroyed under communism. Such a relation helps to enhance government legitimacy. Clearly, the impact of “Christianity” in these cases demands examination of both a particular tradition and the character of public life. We might draw similar contrasts between the varieties of Buddhism and the political cultures of Japan, Tibet, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar or of Sunni Islam and Shiite Islam in Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively. In these cases, the syntheses of political culture and religious tradition are relevant to such basic questions as national identity, party formation, and protest. The level of political development is as relevant. Religion has been more influential in the public life of developing countries than in developed ones for several reasons. In developing countries, political institutions are generally less effective, so rivals to government might emerge from the military, state-owned firms, or religious establishments. Second, religious groups often enjoy a reputation for rectitude and trust that the state does not. Finally, for many the relation of religion and personal identity is sometimes more comprehensible than identification with a nation-state or an ethnicity. Indeed, the idea of a state separate from religious principles is unacceptable to many Muslims. Islamic influence on politics is especially present wherever Muslims are a majority. One important consideration concerns the difference between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Both share a fundamental devotion to the Koran and the “pillars” of common belief and practice but differ concerning the legitimacy of the early caliphs. “Sunna,” literally the “way of the Prophet,” is used to describe the majority of Muslims (Sunni) that accept the historical caliphate of the Dynasty of Umayyad (661–750), whereas Shiite Muslims consider Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali (599–661), to have been both the first Imam after Muhammad and the last of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the “rightly guided” (legitimately chosen) caliphs. These historical differences remain as important for each group of believers as their role in shaping separate communities, their different ideas about legitimate rule, and their different styles of political activity. In the case of Iran (Shiite) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni), faith tradition is the basis of each state’s claim to legitimate rule. In Turkey, Iraq, and Bangladesh, Islamic parties have taken part in electoral politics. In Egypt and Palestine, Sunni Islam has been a basis of protest as well as of electoral politics. The use of Islam as a means of expressing political protest and terror has been a distinctive feature of its role since 1945. Egypt’s “Muslim Brotherhood” was among the first modern Sunni groups to be called an “Islamist organization.” The phrase implies any political party that seeks political power for the purpose of changing public life according to what it considers the principles of the Koran and Shar’iat law. Unlike other religious traditions, historic Islam does not recognize the distinction between public policy and private practice where Muslims are a majority. It is important to recognize that all Islamist groups are neither illegal nor violent, although they oppose traditional nationalism and Western influence. The Islamic legacy includes a complex of movements and personalities that offer a rich assortment of precedents. Saudi Arabia and Iran offer a useful contrast. The 18th-century reformer Muhammad ibn Adb al Wahhab (1703–1792) is considered the founder of “Salafism” (Islam of “pious ancestors”) and the Islam of the Saud dynasty in Saudi Arabia. The methods and doctrine of al Wahhab resembles present-day revolutionary Islamist movements, each of which may claim historical legitimacy. The conservative Saudi ruling dynasty, however, is well accommodated with Western states, if not with Western values. Thus, the political significance of Islam within Saudi Arabia is as much about the character of Islam within the region as about its relation with the non-Islamic world, and the same could be said about terrorist Islamist movements. Most often, radical or violent movements seek to alter or overthrow conservative parties and regimes, claiming they have made too many concessions to Western values and practice. Recent radical Islamic movements have been shaped by several distinctive factors: disappointing performance of secular leaderships, the strain of socioeconomic change in Muslim countries, and the perceived postcolonial aggression by Western culture and states. Individual leaders have played a decisive role. The Egyptian Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, typifies these modern features. His first effort to organize workers of the Suez Canal Company in 1928 was driven by resentment of British influence and a perceived drift away from Islam among Egyptians. Although Egypt had been formally independent since 1922, al-Banna and other devout Sunni Muslims believed that the “Koran as constitution” was a far more legitimate basis for rule than Egypt’s corrupt monarchy, and they bitterly opposed large, foreign-owned companies’ exploitation of Egyptians. In a decade, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood had increased to over 200,000 in Egypt, while branches of the group were established N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Hundreds of protestors from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and opposition movement Kefaya demonstrate in Cairo as they protest against the government and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on September 1, 2005. (Mona Sharaf/Reuters/Corbis)

in other Arab countries. The Brotherhood was popular among Egyptians who migrated from villages to large cities because it offered important material support. In 1948, the Brotherhood was outlawed, and the following year Egypt’s prime minister was assassinated by one of its members. Al-Banna himself was murdered in 1950, probably by Egyptian intelligence. The early years of the Brotherhood were important for establishing a pattern of violence against the government that did not cease under Nasser’s rule. Nasser’s pan-Arabism avoided any endorsement of Islamic principles as a basis for unity. Since Nasser’s death, Egyptian governments have sought to deal with the organization by its partial legalization. Anwar Sadat attempted to mollify the group by releasing its imprisoned members who pledged nonviolence. However, an extremist branch of the group, Islamic Jihad, assassinated the Egyptian president in 1981 after he made peace with Israel. Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak (b. 1928), has also compromised: on the one hand, by outlawing the organization and, on the other hand, by allowing its members to run in Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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election, where they received about 20 percent of the vote, becoming the primary opposition party. Although the Palestinian organization Hamas represents an offshoot of the Brotherhood, Islamic groups have tended to divide over inspiration and tactics. It is significant that both Hamas and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood have contested parliamentary elections despite their terrorist heritage. In the 2006 elections, Hamas won 56 percent of the vote in the West Bank and Gaza, a comfortable majority that allowed the party to form the Palestinian Authority Government. Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel leaves uncertain its evolution as a responsible political actor, while in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has been repressed and cannot perform the functions of an opposition party. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 inspired a general support for Islamic involvement in politics despite the fact that most Iranians belong to the minority Shiite Muslims. Shiite (the party of Ali) Muslims believe that Muhammad’s cousin Ali (d. 661) should have succeeded the prophet as “Leader of the Faithful,” but in fact Ali accepted the caliphate of Muhammad’s successor, Abu Bakr. Nevertheless, Shiite Islam developed distinctly from Sunni Islam. On religious conversion, the ideal of a ruling Islamic dynasty was compatible with Persian political tradition. Prior to the 20th century, Iran had been governed by a series of ruling dynasties. A military officer, Reza Pahlavi, seized power in 1921, seeking to create a new dynasty, but his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980), failed to create a legitimate regime based on his own rule and Iranian nationalism. Th e Shah’s dependence on the United States was especially unacceptable to much of the Islamic leadership, who long opposed foreign interference in Iranian affairs. The military and political organization Hezbollah has a strong following among Lebanon’s Shiite population and is considered an Iranian client. Elsewhere, the impact of the Iranian Revolution outside Iran is difficult to judge, but within the country its revolutionary fervor has decayed among the majority of Iranians born after 1978. Like other revolutionary regimes, Iran’s has sought to create a set of parallel institutions to those of a formal parliamentary democracy. Following the 1989 death of Ayatollah (“Sign of God”) Khomeini, the Islamic “Council of Experts” selected a new “Supreme Spiritual Leader,” whose duties include serving the “Guardian Council of the Constitution,” a body with powers to review and overturn the elected parliament. A variety of Islamic terrorist groups have attacked both Islamic opponents and Western targets. For example, in 1997 a previously unknown Islamic group, unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood, murdered 68 foreign tourists in Egypt. This group considers the regime of President Hosni Mubarak an enemy. In 1995, with the support of neighboring Pakistan, the Taliban (“students of Islamic knowledge”) emerged in Afghanistan as an Islamic reformist alternative to the Mujahideen (“holy warriors”) who fought the Soviet occupation. Their differences have less to do with interpretations of Islam than with the Taliban’s support among Pashtun people in southern Afghanistan and rivalry among Mujahideen warlords. In fact, Al Qaeda (“the base”) emerged under the leadership of Osama bin-Laden N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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in Afghanistan as a close ally of the Taliban, but the global reach of the organization has brought its style of terrorism outside the Middle East. Apart from the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, there is evidence of Al Qaeda in places as diverse as Chechnya in the Russian Federation, the southern Philippines, Somalia, Bali, and Uzbekistan. The future and durability of these groups are difficult to assess. It is unlikely that consistent central direction exists among groups that claim some association with Al Qaeda. There are many instances of religious influence apart from Islam in the politics of developing countries, and there is considerable evidence of its flexibility. One of the most impressive examples of this influence is the rise of Hindu nationalism in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has emerged as the primary parliamentary opposition to the Indian Congress Party. The main ideals of the BJP are both its relative political, social, and economic conservatism and its emphasis on Hindutva (“Hinduness”). The party won a plurality of votes in 1998 and retained power in alliance with other parties until 2004. Founded in 1980, the party gradually built its power base as popular dissatisfaction with the Congress Party increased. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the government privatized most of India’s state industries, increased the power of the police to fight terrorism, tested India’s nuclear weapons, and promoted Indian identity as a Hindu nation. Unfortunately, BJP followers became associated with violence against India’s Muslim minority, some 12 percent (123 million) of the population. The most important incident of these was the 1992 destruction of a 16th-century mosque in the city of Ayodhya that had been the site of an earlier Hindu temple. The BJP has not encouraged attacks on Muslims. Nevertheless, some BJP followers and those of more extremist Hindu groups have exploited the party’s success as an occasion for violent anti-Muslim riots reminiscent of those at the time of India’s partition. Many observers faulted the BJP for indirectly encouraging a climate of intolerance and for its failure to effectively prosecute those responsible for violence, especially following a 2002 riot in the state of Gujarat. The party’s defeat in the 2004 parliamentary and local elections is a likely consequence of this perception. The experience of the BJP demonstrates the importance of religious parties mastering electoral politics in countries where they can be effective. Other religious traditions have been important sources of political opposition. In Latin America, rural poverty and Roman Catholicism after the Vatican II sessions inspired a 1968 meeting of Latin American bishops in Medellín, Columbia. The bishops held that, in the absence of social justice, widespread violence would be inevitable. Consequently, the church must throw its influence squarely on the side of the poorest. The foundation of “base communities” in rural areas became a locus of mobilization for political action. Apart from its larger achievements, “liberation theology” was both a consequence of the influence of the Cuban revolution and the potential of Christian teaching. Elsewhere, clergy became involved in opposition to military government in Central and South America. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Vatican under John Paul II accepted the pursuit of social justice but rejected the notion of Christ as a political figure and the influence of Marxism on theology. Both Buddhism and Christianity show the capacity of religious doctrine to adapt to social and religious conditions. Buddhism seems intuitively less serviceable as a belief system in politics because of its cultivation of “nonattachment” to worldly goals, yet the Tibetan Buddhist resistance has been effective against Han Chinese domination, whether through the influence of the exiled Dalai Lama or its survival in a repressive political climate. Altogether differently, the Buddhist Soka Gakkai Organization in Japan created the New Komeito or Clean Government Party. The party has shared power with the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. It has come to represent a particular version of “humanitarian” politics that emphasizes a less materialistic policy, a more transparent political style, and greater administrative decentralization.

Conclusion Broader consideration of belief structures over the postwar decades suggests a few conclusions. Since the failure of communism, the future of religion, ideology, and nationalism in the world has been a matter of great attention. No single account of the postwar era has provided a completely satisfactory explanation of postwar development, but efforts to create a general theory remain instructive. For example, the noted scholar Francis Fukuyama has forecast the “end of history.” The phrase implies that ideological conflict characterizing the Cold War has become irrelevant to questions about the purpose and design of human progress. The apparent triumph of liberal capitalism is synonymous with a world in which the achievement of material progress will eliminate the irrational violence of war about human purpose and destiny. Although Fukuyama has since acknowledged that Islamic societies are anti-Western in a way that differs from simple opposition to the United States, he continues to maintain that radical Islam can never be an alternative to liberal democracy. The thesis of a “clash of civilizations” created by the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has been an even greater source of debate about the future of nationalism, ideology, and religion. Huntington considers that the end of the Cold War marked the end of traditional political and ideological conflict. Instead, conflicts that center on the “fault lines” of “civilizations” become dominant locations of international conflict. Although national, territorial, and linguistic factors might shape the identity of civilizations, Huntington considers religious identity to be the “most important.” Such “fault lines” might exist within individual states, such as the former Yugoslavia or China, or between existing states. For example, the war in former Yugoslavia involved Islamic (Bosnian), Christian Orthodox (Serb), and Roman Catholic (Croat) peoples. Conflict in China has involved the dominant Confucian majority (Han) with Islamic (Uighur) and Buddhist (Tibetan) minorities. The “clash” might emerge between terrorist movements, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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such as Al Qaeda and the West, or states, such as Pakistan and India or Israel and some of its neighbors. There has been much criticism of Huntington’s thesis. Huntington did not claim that conflicts based in civilizations would be the exclusive form of conflict, that “civilizations” would replace nation-states, or that cooperation between civilizations would be impossible. In addition, Huntington’s thesis requires careful qualification. For example, Donald Horowitz has studied “the deadly ethnic riot,” without regard to “civilizations” or the postcommunist era. He determined that such communal violence can be relatively minor or as vast in scope as the 1993 Rwandan genocide. Regardless of its impact, the “deadly ethnic riot” often conforms to a set of characteristics, or a “process” concerning the impact of place, time, rumor, economic class, and prior group relations. Although the two authors would seem to discuss different forms of conflict, in individual cases they appear to offer different explanations of similar phenomena. More explicit criticism of the “clash of civilizations” theory involves examining the premises that seemed apparent to Huntington and others in 1993. It is unlikely that any single theory can account for the nature and violence of recent conflict, but several considerations seem beyond dispute. First, secular ideologies of nationalism in the sense of “nation-building” have been eclipsed for communal notions of identity. Whether one speaks of divisions among “Hispanic voters” in the United States or the consequences of “nationalism” in China, the politics of group identity must be carefully qualified by more specific values that are often “religious.” Second, major differences exist in the way Western societies perceive themselves and are perceived by others, especially by Islamic societies. Finally, Charles Taylor, winner of the 2007 Templeton prize, noted that the depth of religious belief and intolerance for the beliefs of others “do not correlate” and, rather, the “opposite” may be true (“Templeton Winner” 2007). It seems unlikely that group identity, regardless of its form, will become less politically important. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Barber, Benjamin, Peter Singer, Orlando Patterson, Akeel Bilgrami, et al. 2006. “Jihad, McWorld, Modernity: Public Intellectuals Debate ‘the Clash of Civilizations.’ ” Salmagagundi (Saratoga Springs), no. 150–151 (Spring). Burleigh, Michael. 2007. Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics, from the Great War to the War on Terror. New York: HarperCollins. Drachkovitch, Milorad M. 1965. Marxism in the Modern World. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. http://www.epp-ed.eu/home/en/default.asp. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press. Gehler, Michael. 2004. Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945. New York: Routledge. Gutierrez, Gustavo. 1973. A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

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Horowitz, Donald L. 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley: University of California Press. Horowitz, Irving Lewis. 1972. Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification. New York: Oxford University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Karpat, Kemal H. 1982. Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. New York: Praeger. Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. 1969. Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism. Moscow: International Publishers. Levitt, Matthew. 2006. Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism the Service of Jihad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mao Tse-Tung. 1940. “On New Democracy.” http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/ selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm. Ortega y Gasset, Jose. 1985. The Revolt of the Masses. Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press. Sigmund, Paul E., ed. 1972. The Ideologies of the Developing Countries. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger. Stalin, J. V. Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at a meeting of the voters at the Stalin Electoral District, February 9, 1946. http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html. “Templeton Winner Stresses Balance of Spirituality.” 2007. All Things Considered. National Public Radio. (Retrieved March 6, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=8904420. Weber, Max. 1968. “The Nature of Charismatic Authority and Its Routinization.” In On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt, 48–65. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Sports and Nationalism Alan Bairner Relevance At the most basic level of analysis, it is easy to see the extent to which sport, arguably more than any other form of social activity in the modern world, facilitates flag waving and the playing of national anthems, both formally at moments such as medal ceremonies and informally through the activities of fans. Indeed, there are many political nationalists who fear that, by acting as such a visible medium for overt displays of national sentiment, sport can actually blunt the edge of serious political debate. No matter how one views the grotesque caricatures of national modes of behavior and dress that so often provide the colorful backdrop to major sporting events, one certainly cannot escape the fact that nationalism, in some form or another, and sport are closely linked. It is important to appreciate, however, that the precise nature of their relationship varies dramatically from one political setting to another and that, as a consequence, it is vital that we are alert to a range of different conceptual issues. For example, like the United Nations, sport’s global governing bodies, such as the International Olympic Committee or the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), consist almost exclusively of representatives not of nations but rather of sovereign nation-states. It is also worth noting that pioneering figures in the organization of international sport, such as Baron Pierre de Coubertin who established the modern Olympics in 1896, commonly revealed a commitment to both internationalism and the interests of their own nation-states. Thus, while de Coubertin could write enthusiastically about a sporting event that would bring together young (male) athletes from across the globe, he was also specifically concerned with the physical well-being of young French men in the wake of a demoralizing defeat in the Franco-German War. Although in most cases these nation-states that constitute international sporting bodies are coterminous with nations, the fact remains that numerous nations throughout the world, as well as other forms of collective belonging, are stateless and are consequently denied representation in international sporting competition, just as they are in the corridors of global political power. When considering the relationship between sports and nationalism, therefore, it is important to think in terms both of nation-states and of nations. This also provides the means whereby sport’s connection with nationality and also with national identity can be separately explored. It is also useful to bear in mind that sport often acts as a window through which we are able to examine a whole range of social developments and to test a variety of theoretical concepts and perspectives. With specific reference N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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to the relationship between sports and nationalism, observing the world of sport offers insights into the relevance and reliability of such concepts as ethnic and civic nationalism and the validity of explanatory approaches to the rise of nations and nationalism such as primordialism and modernism. Sport can also provide important insights into varieties of imperialism, the cultural politics of anti-imperialist struggle, and postcolonial legacies.

Origins Sport, Imperialism, and Postcolonial Legacies Britain, and in particular England, is usually credited with the “invention” of modern sport, in general, and of numerous specific sports. The global diffusion of sport certainly owes much to the imperial exploits of the British, with sports such as cricket and rugby union becoming rapidly and firmly established in various corners of the British empire. Furthermore, even in those parts of the world that did not constitute elements of that empire, British citizens played a major role in the diffusion of sports such as soccer. The evidence remains to the present day in the names of clubs in Spain (Athletic Bilbao) and in Italy (AC Milan), with English usages still preferred to Spanish (or Basque) and Italian equivalents. Thus, through informal business connections as well as through the mechanisms of the formal empire, sport operated, alongside Christianity and the works of William Shakespeare, to provide cultural support to Britain’s expansionist ambitions in the second half of the 19th century. In the case of sport, it would be easy to assume that its role consisted solely of ensuring that first indigenous elites and later entire native populations would accommodate themselves to British games and by extension to British rule. But sport’s legacy in this respect is double-edged. While playing the imperialist masters’ games might well be conceived of as an indication of cultural inferiority, it has also given colonial peoples opportunities to measure themselves against their present and former rulers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in that most quintessential of English sports, cricket, which became hugely important as a marker of identity in many corners of the former British empire—perhaps most notably in Australia, the Indian subcontinent, and the English-speaking Caribbean. Victory over the English cricket team in such countries became one of the most convenient and visible ways of measuring the extent to which the colonial mantle had been lifted. It is no accident that one of the most influential books on the relationship between sport and politics was written by a Trinidadian, C. L. R. James. It is also worth noting that cricket, in the shape of the West Indies test team made up of players from a number of islands and island groups as well as from mainland Guyana, demonstrates that sport can from time to time transcend national and nation-state boundaries. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Cricket in England, 1949. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Today, at least one nation-state that was formerly part of the British empire and remains a member of the Commonwealth appears to be partaking in its own kind of sporting imperialism. Rugby union has long been regarded as being of massive symbolic importance for New Zealand. In recent years, however, the national team, the All Blacks, has drawn increasingly upon players from various Pacific islands, such as Samoa and Fiji, arguably with serious, detrimental consequences for the further development of the game in these countries. Meanwhile Canada, another Commonwealth member, far from investing any energy in competing with the British, has sought to establish a sporting national identity in part by distancing itself from the United States, for example, through a fierce determination to retain symbolic ownership of hockey, but also by competing against its more powerful neighbor to the south, sometimes with “real” Canadians or, on other occasions, with proxies such as the predominantly American baseball players at the Toronto Blue Jays. Since the end of World War II, sport has also played its part in the development of new “empires.” The Soviet Union, for example, increased its sphere of influence in part by helping to support sport and also individual athletes in a number of African countries. Meanwhile the diffusion of baseball can be seen as part of a wider process of Americanization, especially in the Caribbean, Central N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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America, and Japan. In this particular case, comparisons can be made with the trajectory of cricket, with baseball bats being used quite literally (although without causing physical damage) by some countries to challenge their neocolonial status. The issue of the use of sport for the purposes of nationalist struggle is one that will be returned to. First, however, it is necessary to establish how sport is used in the world of constitutional politics. Sport, Nation-States, and Constitutional Nationalism Much of the literature on the relationship between sport and politics has been concerned with the ways in which nation-states seek to promote themselves, or simply carry out their business, using sport as a useful and highly visible medium. During the Cold War, for example, it was apparent that the Soviet Union and most, if not all, of its East European neighbors used sport in general and especially the Olympic Games to advertise their particular brand of communism. In addition, international rivalry was not only acted out on the athletics track or on the high beam but also impacted the wider context of events, such as when the United States sought to lead a boycott of the Moscow games in 1980 and the Soviet Union and its allies responded in kind when the Olympics moved to Los Angeles in 1984. Related to this is the fact that nation-states also put considerable efforts into acquiring the right to host major events, which are then turned into spectacular exercises in self-promotion by the successful bidders. There can be little doubt that most national leaders in the modern world are highly conscious of the role that sport can play in boosting confidence and gaining markers of esteem. In some cases, most notably that of the United States, the role of sport in relation to national feeling need not even depend upon the scale or even the availability of international competition. Baseball acquired the status of a national pastime precisely because it was regarded as America’s game, and the rivalries that for so long helped maintain its place in the country’s popular mythology involved cities and even neighborhoods in the same cities rather than other nationstates. Thus, American isolationism, rather than any felt need to take on the rest of the world, has been crucial in the formation of a sense of sporting nationalism. Another use of sport that is connected to the political interests of nationstates relates to diplomacy. There exists a school of thought in certain governmental circles and even more obviously at the level of sports administration that sport is a valuable tool in assuaging international tension and, in some cases, even helping to broker peace. The process has been referred to as “ping pong diplomacy,” a nod in the direction of American attempts in the 1960s to improve relations with the People’s Republic of China by establishing contact through the use of table tennis players as quasi envoys. More recently, qualified claims have been made with respect to the integrative role that sport has played or can play in peace processes in such places as Northern Ireland and the Middle East. While claims of this sort need to be viewed with a certain amount of caution, what is N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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not in doubt is the extent to which many nation-states have invested substantial amounts of money in sport and leisure facilities in an effort to lessen antisocial behavior in general and especially the violence that is associated with intercommunal tension. Nevertheless, this kind of social engineering through sports has been viewed with considerable skepticism not least by those who argue that, by their very nature, sports are more likely to be catalysts for violence than vehicles for spreading harmony. According to George Orwell, international sporting competition can best be described as war minus the shooting. The statement is sufficiently ambiguous as to be open to two radically different interpretations. On the one hand, Orwell could be understood to be arguing that international sporting competition acts as a safety valve that makes warfare increasingly less likely. Alternatively, he may have meant that international sporting competition actually keeps alive those very tensions out of which violent conflict is often the inevitable consequence. In fact, from other observations that Orwell expressed about sport, the latter reading of his comment gets closest to an accurate understanding of his meaning. Sport is necessarily competitive and, by implication, conflictual. It is also an important element in the construction and reproduction of social identities. It brings people together. About that there can be no question. It does so, however, in contexts that are arguably more likely to exacerbate tensions than to help resolve them. This “fact” of sporting life can be particularly problematic for newly established nation-states, the rulers of which may be inclined to look to sport in their endeavors to foster a sense of national unification. This has been a common practice in many sub-Saharan African nation-states. It is often the case that alongside national flags and anthems, sporting heroes are of vital importance in promoting unity among people who have been brought together within the same constitutional entity that owes its existence far more to the mapmakers of various European empires than to any collective sense of a shared history. But using national sporting representatives to this political end can be a difficult strategy to manage where people retain deep affinities for their own tribal, ethnic, or linguistic groups. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent, and certainly more discussed, than in the “new” Republic of South Africa where sport has frequently been saluted as the actual, or at least the potential, repository of the collective identity of the Rainbow Nation. It is true that at the symbolic level few gestures have had more impact than Nelson Mandela donning the shirt of the Springboks rugby union team, so long regarded as the main sporting medium of Afrikaner nationalism. Such gestures notwithstanding, subsequent events in South Africa have demonstrated how difficult it is to unite divided peoples around the banner of national sport. This becomes all the more apparent when one turns one’s attention to sport’s relationship with unofficial nationalism. It should be noted that politicians in Africa who now seek to use sport to help establish and consolidate a sense of unified national purpose are the successors of those anti-imperialists who, as mentioned above, also harnessed sport for their N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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particular political purposes. On one level, applying the games of their colonial masters could have given the impression that indigenous peoples were willing to accept cultural assimilation. At the same time though, sports clubs became important centers for the dissemination of anticolonial sentiments. Most of the discussion so far relates to constitutional or proto-constitutional nationalism, that is, whatever is bound up with the politics of nation-states, either already in existence or in embryonic form. However, before considering further the relationship between sports and nationalism, it is essential to reiterate and elucidate the distinction between the nation and the nation-state. The latter features prominently in the formal organization of international sporting competition. Representatives of nation-states constitute sport’s world governing bodies and take part as athletes in global events such as soccer’s World Cup and the Olympic Games. To do so, these competitors need to be in possession of a nationality—a designation that is itself bound up with the idea of the nationstate. Many nation-states, however, are comprised of more than one nation. In some instances, identification with those nations is relatively weak and has long since been transcended by a national identity that accords legitimacy to the nation-state. In other cases though, primary identification relates to the nation, with the nation-state being accorded secondary importance except in formal situations. As far as sporting competition is concerned, however, regardless of the depth of feeling that exists for submerged nations, nation-states alone are granted international recognition. One obvious exception to this rule is to be found in the United Kingdom, the example of which helps explain more fully the diverse relationships that can exist between nations and nation-states, nationalities, and national identities. Sport, Nations, and Submerged Nationalism Britain is in itself a nationless entity. Nowhere is this demonstrated more publicly than in the world of international sport. With a single Olympics squad, four “national” soccer teams, and three “national” rugby teams, together with Northern Ireland’s share in the Irish team, the United Kingdom’s sporting landscape is testimony to the complex relationship between nations and nation-states. In addition, the Commonwealth Games allow all of the United Kingdom’s four nations —England, Scotland, Wales, and, more contentiously, Northern Ireland, which, in the eyes of most Irish nationalists, is merely a political entity isolated from the nation, Ireland, to which its six counties properly belong—to participate in a major international sporting event. Indeed, their presence at this event is further bolstered by the participation of three offshore islands—the Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey. The reasons the nations of Britain are given opportunities to compete at the Commonwealth Games and in international soccer in their own right and not as part of the United Kingdom can largely be traced to Britain’s pioneering role in the development of modern sport. Not surprisingly, the current situation, particularly as it relates to international soccer, has long been a source N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of some disquiet among other nation-states, which resent the fact that one of their peers is allowed to retain four places in competition for the World Cup and the European Championship. Certainly this is not a privilege extended to other nation-states, such as Spain, which, it could be argued, is similarly a state made up of a number of nations. Furthermore, no such allowance could ever be made to incorporate the sense of collective belonging that is felt by the members of tribal, ethnic, and linguistic groups that are scattered throughout the world of nation-states. What the British example underlines is that, when we refer to the prestige that nations can derive from sport, it is important to think in terms not only of internationally recognized states whose politicians seize upon sporting success for ideological and propagandist reasons but also of submerged nations (Scotland, Wales, the Basque country, Catalonia, Québec perhaps, and so on) for which sport has commonly been one of the most effective vehicles for cultural resistance by both cultural and political nationalists. Sport provides both athletes and fans with opportunities to celebrate a national identity that is different from and, in some cases, opposed to their ascribed nationality. The two forms of engagement need not be mutually exclusive. It is possible to support both British teams and Scottish ones, or to represent Wales and also the United Kingdom. Another example is provided by Spain where football fans from Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia find it possible to support the selección (that is, the Spanish “national” soccer team) without necessarily identifying with the Castillian version of Spanishness. It can be argued, however, that national identity (which often equates to nationality) tends to take priority in the minds of sports fans—hence the passion for those soccer clubs that represent the submerged nations of Spain such as Celta de Vigo and Deportivo de la Coruña in Galicia, Athletic Bilbao and Real Sociedad in the Basque country, and FC Barcelona in Catalonia. Nationality, however, is normally what matters to athletes since this alone guarantees the right to compete on behalf of nation-states, which, unlike many nations, can be represented in international sport just as they are at the United Nations itself. It is worth noting, of course, that nationality rules have become increasingly flexible in sport as a response to labor migration. This trend is taken up later in the discussion of globalization and its consequences for nations and nationalism. The desire, particularly on the part of fans, to express their national identity in the realm of sport is clearly linked to nationalism in the broadest sense or, at the very least, to patriotism. Former British member of Parliament Jim Sillars dismissed the attitude of his fellow Scots toward national sporting representatives as “ninety-minute patriotism.” Similar views are also held, in certain quarters, with regard to some Irish supporters of sport. Thus, Irish support for national representatives in global sporting activities such as golf, rugby union, and soccer is seen by some followers of the Gaelic games tradition as patriotic rather than nationalistic and, by implication therefore, relatively politically shallow. The relationship between Gaelic games and Irish nationalism, on the other hand, is, as we N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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shall see, regarded as much more profound. In general, however, attempts to distinguish the passions aroused by international sport from “real” nationalism miss the point. It is undeniable that expressions of solidarity for players and teams that represent one’s nation are closely linked to cultural nationalism. Whether or not they are also bound up with political nationalism is a different question, the answer to which necessarily varies from one individual to the next. For many people, even those whose national identity is associated with a submerged nation, cultural nationalism is enough. They may well feel that they could not become any more Scottish or Welsh or Catalan than they already are, even with the formation of a nation-state that would correspond to their sense of national identity. For others, though, cultural nationalism is nothing more than the emotional embellishment of a strongly held political ideology that will settle for nothing less than national sovereignty. For most sportsmen and women, even in an era when money is a major incentive for sporting success, representing the nation remains important. It is not inconceivable that they might represent more than one nation, with neither ethnic origin nor even well-established civic connections being necessary for a move from one to another. However, for the overwhelming majority of athletes engaged in international sport, the matter is still relatively clear-cut. For fans, things are arguably even simpler. In the modern era, following one’s “proxy warriors” into international competition is one of the easiest and most passionate ways of underlining one’s sense of national identity, one’s nationality, or both. Needless to say, not everyone wishes to celebrate his or her national affiliation in this way, in most instances, simply through lack of interest in sport, the nation, or the relationship between the two. But just as for most active participants, for the majority of sports fans, the choice is relatively straightforward. This is not to deny, of course, that in certain circumstances athletes and fans alike may well understand their nations in different ways. Furthermore, it is not only sporting individuals who demonstrate the contested character of most, if not all, nations. Sports themselves also do so to the extent that they become “national” in the popular imagination for a variety of reasons.

Dimensions A discussion of the concept of national sports has particular value for the study of nationalism more generally, inasmuch as it necessitates some reference to the main debates in this area. For example, a primordialist interpretation of the origins of nations would allow for the possibility that national sports are bound up with the various criteria that legitimate historic nationhood—blood ties, language, topography, the soil, and so on. According to theories linking the rise of nationalism to the exigencies of modernization, on the other hand, national sports are N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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simply part of a panoply of elements that serve to legitimize the nation-state. In addition, concepts such as “imagined community” and “invented tradition” can then be invoked in an attempt to explain how attempts are made to bestow some historic legitimacy on what are essentially modern responses to particular political necessities. Furthermore, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism may also be invoked to advance the case that the national sport is about true belonging, whereas other sports that are played within the nation can be linked to what constitutes the civic nation or, more properly, the nation-state but lack the stamp of authenticity. In reality, however, no single approach can fully explain how specific sports acquire national significance. National sports take different forms, and in so doing, they provide us with interesting insights into the character of particular nations. Indeed, the concept of a “national” sport not only illuminates the relationship between the various terms listed above, which are associated with the nation, but also helps us begin to understand how it is that nations resist globalization even in a global era. Some “national” sports are peculiar to specific nations. Their “national” status is fenced in by their exclusivity—echoes here of ethnic nationalism. National sports and games of this type are in some sense linked to the essence of the nations in question, even though their actual origins may be pre-national or at least prior to the emergence of nation-states. They represent “the nation” symbolically, despite the fact that they may well have demonstrably failed to capture the interest of most of the people who constitute the civic nation and/or the nation-state. It should be noted that those activities most likely to be fenced in because of their specific cultural resonance do not always find favor with members of particular nations’ cosmopolitan elites, who may well believe that the nation is better represented by sports that are both modern and transnational. Certainly the corrida de toros, the classic form of the bullfight, is not universally popular throughout Spain, nor does it even take place at all in some Spanish regions. In the “Spanish” context, one should also mention the sport of pelota, played and watched enthusiastically in the Basque country together with numerous arcane, rustic types of competition. Nevertheless, in terms of popularity, the “national sport” of Spain is almost certainly soccer (association football). Yet, at least as much as taurine activities, soccer also makes us appreciate the extent to which Spain is at best a divided nation and, at worst, not a nation at all—merely a nation-state. In part, this reality explains morbo, the disease that infects football rivalry between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid CF, for example, and, perhaps above all, between clubs located in the Basque “nation” (Euskadi) and those at the “center” (understood both physically and metaphorically) of Spain. In Ireland, while hurling may well be the sport of choice in the eyes of Bord Fáilte (the Irish Tourist Board) or the advertising executives responsible for selling a variety of Irish products, including stout and whiskey, the sport’s popularity varies considerably from one county, and even one parish, to another. Gaelic football is more uniform in terms of the support it receives throughout the 32 counties, yet N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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there are isolated pockets where it loses out to hurling. Furthermore, the right of any Gaelic game to be assigned “national status” is considerably weakened not only because some Irish nationalists opt for other sports, such as rugby union and soccer, but also because the overwhelming majority of the Protestant community in the north of Ireland have resolutely set their faces against the whole Gaelic games movement. It might seem easy to dismiss this difficulty by simply taking these people at their word and accepting that, since they do not consider themselves to be truly Irish, their sporting preferences need have no impact on what does or does not constitute an Irish national sport. But this would be to ignore the basic precepts of Irish republican ideology, which has consistently sought to embrace not only Catholics but Protestants and dissenters as well. Games such as rugby union and soccer have some claim on the right to be called “national” in the Irish context. Despite their British origins, they are played throughout the island. Moreover, although rugby tends to be played by Protestants rather than Catholics in Northern Ireland, both football codes enjoy considerable support from both traditions on the island as a whole. They offer Irish sportsmen the opportunity to represent the nation at an international level. Indeed, rugby, unlike soccer, allows northern unionists the chance to acknowledge their sporting Irishness while retaining a political allegiance to the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It should be noted, however, that regardless of any claims that either sport may have to be recognized as “national,” neither has escaped the influence of globalization. The two Irish “national” soccer teams have both fielded players whose ethnic “right” to belong has been relatively weak. The same thing has happened in rugby union, which in recent years has witnessed a flood of antipodean coaches and players, some of whom have qualified to play for Ireland despite having accents that conjure up images of Dunedin or Durban, not Dublin or Dungannon. Gaelic games have been less affected by the movement of people commonly linked to globalization, except in the sense that Irish migrants have taken their traditional activities to other parts of the world, most notably to North America. This is not to deny that changes taking place beyond the shores of Ireland have had an impact on the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Nevertheless, the factors that have been most influential are best understood in terms of modernization and capitalism as opposed to the more specific category of globalization. Gaelic games have been relatively unscathed by the latter. As a result, the GAA offers rich insights into the processes whereby the nation has been able to resist the global in sport as in much else. In terms of national sports, the United States and Canada also provide interesting food for thought. One could plausibly argue that the various games and pastimes engaged in by the continent’s aboriginal peoples are the true national sports of what became known as North America. Of these, however, only lacrosse has acquired a wider popularity (and that fairly minimal), whereas baseball has achieved the status of “the national pastime” in the United States, and ice hockey N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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has been similarly elevated in Canada. In the former, however, it would be foolish to ignore the rival claims of football and basketball. Physical activities originating in the Far East have had their own particular trajectories. The martial arts of Japan and Korea have been adopted enthusiastically in the West and imbued with more easily accessible characteristics, whereas sumo wrestling, though attracting participants from other parts of the world, remains very much a Japan-based sport. Meanwhile, in both Korea and Japan, the global sport of soccer and the American national pastime, baseball, have become hugely popular. Such examples are common enough in an increasingly globalized world sporting order.

Consequences Despite the resilience of traditional pastimes such as pelota and sumo and of organizations such as the GAA in Ireland, there are strong grounds for believing that the link between nationalism and sports is becoming weaker and that the very existence of international competition is threatened by the twin forces of globalization and consumer capitalism. Athletes migrate from one nation-state to another in rapidly increasing numbers, and not only to play for different clubs. In many cases, the move also involves the adoption of a new sporting nationality. This process has been notably exemplified in the global movement of Kenyan runners—representing their “real” nation at one major event and Qatar, for example, at the next. In this way, Stephen Cherono became Saif Saeed Shaheen and won a gold medal for his new nation in the 3,000-meter steeplechase at the World Athletics Championships in Paris in 2003, pushing a “true” Kenyan, Ezekiel Kemboi, into second place. Furthermore, it is increasingly believed that, although most professional athletes in team sports continue to represent the nation-states of their birth, their true feelings of loyalty are for their clubs and even for their corporate sponsors. This leads to concerns that in soccer the European Champions’ League has now virtually surpassed the World Cup in terms of its significance for players and that, in most sports, major competitions will in the long run involve representatives of Nike, Adidas, and a host of other corporations, with nations and even long-established sports clubs having greatly reduced importance. At present, the Ryder Cup in golf pits golfers from various European nation-states against their counterparts from the United States, providing a relatively rare opportunity for the expression of American sporting nationalism prompted by international, or more accurately intercontinental, competition. But how realistic are fears that competition between nations is in the process of being superseded by a transnational, global sports culture? First, we should always be cautious when we talk about the transformation of modern society into a globalized postmodernity. Throughout the history of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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modern sport, which is itself not much older than that of most of the world’s nation-states, players have moved from one country to another. Furthermore, “national” teams have always reflected the movement of peoples and the creation of diasporas. Indeed, the fact that some nation-states now select representatives on the basis of the place of birth of one or more of their grandparents is little more than a reversal of that particular trend. If the host state’s national selectors show little interest in a particular athlete, then it becomes increasingly likely that another set of selectors will. All of this suggests that, though there may indeed be more anomalies than ever before with respect to who represents the nation, the phenomenon of representing a nation that is not fully one’s own (whatever that actually means in relation to the idea of authenticity) is in no way new. Between the 1940s and 1960s, it was possible for one of the greatest soccer players of his time, Alfredo Di Stefano, who was born in Argentina into a family of Italian immigrants, to play for three different national teams—Argentina (7 caps), Colombia (4 caps), and Spain (31 caps). The life of this one sportsman alone is indicative of the extent to which modern sport has always thrown up issues surrounding the concepts of nationality and national identity. It should be added, however, that for the most part throughout this period, the overwhelming majority of people who have represented their countries at sport have had remarkably strong ties with the nation-state in question. In most instances, that is where they (or at least their parents) were born, or they have come to live there at some stage in their lives and have acquired citizenship and with it a legally recognized nationality. In addition, as suggested earlier, an even greater majority of fans have always been irrevocably tied to their respective national teams and representatives. This is not to deny that it is easier than ever before for sports fans to watch, to support, and to wear the colors of nations other than their own. Yet most choose not to do so. As a Scot, I could conceivably have enjoyed soccer’s World Cup Finals over the years far more than has been the case had I chosen to support Brazil, Italy, or Germany rather than my own country. But it is not something that I have ever seriously contemplated. This is not to say that, were I offered a large sum of money to transfer my allegiance, I would find it physically or indeed psychologically impossible to do so. To that extent, one can understand the action of a Kenyan athlete who opts to represent Qatar. However, I would still find more meaning in watching a losing Scottish team than in giving my support to another, more successful football nation to which I feel no emotional attachment whatsoever. Sports fans who are in any manner motivated by the relationship between sport and nationalism are largely stuck with the nation or the nation-state to which through nationalist identity or nationality they can be said to belong. It should be added, though, that this type of fan is also most likely to be attracted to team sports or to major events, such as the Olympic Games, at which athletes compete as representatives of their nation-states. For more individualistic, highlevel competitions—tennis, for example, or golf—it becomes easier for a fan to celebrate the achievements of a chosen player regardless of his or her place of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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origin. Once again, it is fair to say that this has always been the case; it is not the consequence of increasingly influential forces of globalization or of the chaos believed by some to characterize the postmodern condition. There is no denying that sport is constantly affected by social change. Sports that were once played only in certain places—national sports, according to one set of criteria—are now played throughout the world. American influence, although insufficient to allow sports such as baseball and American football to supersede soccer in most parts of the world, has clearly impacted the ways in which a sport such as soccer is now played, packaged, mediated, and observed. The fact remains, however, that sport is still far more likely to contribute to the perpetuation of strongly held local, regional, and national identities than to the construction and consolidation of a homogeneous global culture. This is scarcely surprising since sport is so central to the construction and reproduction of particularistic identities so different from the idea of a global culture, which is so often heralded but which evokes so little emotion. For the time being, the relationship between sports and nations remains strong, although it is equally apparent that this relationship manifests itself in a wide variety of ways. Sport can help to promote the image of a nation-state, but it may also bring shame and financial ruin. Sport can unite a nation-state, but, then again, it may not. Sport can often be the most important symbol of the continued existence of a submerged nation. Sport can allow nations and nation-states alike, as well as regions and other localities, to resist cultural homogenization. Yet it can also serve the purposes of global capitalism. Like nationalism itself, sport is Janus-faced. Perhaps for that reason alone, their continued relationship is secure. Selected Bibliography Allison, Lincoln. 2000. “Sport and Nationalism.” In Handbook of Sports Studies, edited by J. Coakley and E. Dunning. London: Sage. Allison, Lincoln, ed. 2004. The Global Politics of Sport: The Role of Global Institutions in Sport. London: Routledge. Bairner, Alan. 2001. Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization: European and North American Perspectives. Albany: State University of New York Press. Bairner, Alan, ed. 2005. Sport and the Irish: Histories, Identities, Issues. Dublin, Ireland: University College Dublin Press. Ball, Phil. 2001. Morbo: The Story of Spanish Football. London: When Saturday Comes Books. Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Cronin, Michael. 1999. Sport and Nationalism in Ireland: Gaelic Games, Soccer and Irish Identity since 1884. Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press. Douglass, Carrie B. 1997. Bulls, Bullfighting, and Spanish Identities. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Hoberman, John. 1984. Sport and Political Ideology. London: Heinemann. Houlihan, Barrie. 1994. Sport and International Politics. Hemel Hempsted, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf. James, C. L. R. 1963. Beyond a Boundary. London: Stanley Paul and Co.

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Levermore, R., and A. Budd, eds. 2004. Sport and International Relations: An Emerging Relationship. London: Routledge. Maguire, Joseph. 1999. Global Sport: Identities, Societies, Civilizations. Cambridge: Polity Press. Miller, T., G. Lawrence, J. McKay, and D. Rowe, eds. 2001. Globalization and Sport. London: Sage. Orwell, S., and I. Angus, eds. 1970. The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 4: In Front of Your Nose. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. (First published in the Tribune, December 14, 1945.) Porter, D., and A. Smith, eds. 2004. Sport and National Identity in the Post-War World. London: Routledge. Silk, M. L., D. L. Andrews, and C. L. Cole, eds. 2005. Sport and Corporate Nationalisms. Oxford: Berg.

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Britain Stephen Heathorn Chronology 1945 End of World War II. Labour Party wins majority in July elections. 1947 India gains independence. 1948 British Nationality Act passed, creates common citizenship rights for all empire and Commonwealth subjects. 1951 Labour outpolls Conservative Party but loses election; Winston Churchill becomes prime minister. 1952 King George VI dies; Elizabeth II becomes queen. 1955 Churchill retires as prime minister; Conservatives increase their majority in May election. 1958 Notting Hill race riots. 1959 Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan announces “wind of change” policy of decolonization in Africa. 1961 Britain’s first application to the European Economic Community (EEC). 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricts entry to Britain. 1964 Labour wins election; Harold Wilson becomes prime minister. 1969 British send troops to Ulster to quell sectarian violence. 1970 Conservatives win election; Edward Heath made prime minister. 1974 Labour narrowly wins in two general elections; Wilson returns as prime minister. 1975 Referendum in Britain on EEC membership passes (after success of third application, 1973). 1979 Referendums on Scottish and Welsh devolution fail to garner sufficient votes. Conservatives win general election; Margaret Thatcher becomes prime minister. 1981 Race riots in Toxteth and Brixton; British Nationality Act reverses provisions of 1948 act. 1982 Britain goes to war against Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. 1983 Conservatives win general election with increased majority.

Situating the Nation The period from 1945 to 1983 was one of considerable transition for Britain as a nation and as a state. Britain emerged victorious from World War II with tremendous international prestige but with a ravaged infrastructure and economy, and without the resources to resume its prewar position as a global imperial power. Since 1707, Great Britain had actually been the political union of the English, who by dint of demographic preponderance and economic development predominated, and the Scottish and Welsh. To this union was grafted an increasing number of imperial dependencies, including the old empire of white settler colonies in the Americas that had been founded in the 17th century (the United States N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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formally leaving the empire in 1783, but the Canadian colonies remaining), and the newer settlements of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Ireland, dominated by English landlords for centuries, formally became incorporated into the Union of Great Britain and Ireland only in 1801. Nonsettler dependencies were also added to the empire, most significantly the Indian subcontinent in the 18th century, African and other Asian territories in the late 19th century, and several Middle Eastern territories at the end of World War I in 1918. After the American colonies, Ireland was the first major territory of the British empire to become independent, a feat accomplished only through a partition of the southern three provinces of Ireland from the northern province of Ulster in 1922. Between the late 1860s and the late 1940s, the white settler colonies and India gained increased status and a degree of self-rule within the empire, first as “Dominions” and then as sovereign states bound to Britain through the institution of the Commonwealth and the person of the British monarch. The remaining colonial possesN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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sions of the empire retained their status as dependent territories until the major wave of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This process of decolonization was achieved largely without the major wars that marred French and Portuguese decolonization, but it did not occur without considerable violence. This breakup of the empire had profound consequences for British nationalism and the nation-state. Two of the immediate and unanticipated but deep changes that resulted from the loss of empire was the subsequent rise of postcolonial immigration to Britain —which fundamentally transformed the ethnic composition and cultural assumptions of the nation—and the simultaneous recognition that Britain’s future lay with continental Europe through membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). The retreat from empire had reduced much of the coherence of Britain’s composite national identity as it had evolved over the previous two and half centuries, and there was a corresponding loosening of the bonds of the union of national cultures at the center. Latent, but until the 1960s relatively minor, nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales were reinvigorated by postcolonial developments, and a violent clash developed between Irish nationalists and supporters of continued union with Britain in Northern Ireland. With the dismantling of empire came a reduction of Britain’s international power, at first not fully perceived, which ultimately led successive British governments to seek integration with Europe. In less than 40 years, then, Britain was transformed from one of the largest imperial powers on the planet, centered on a number of distinct but integrated national cultures within a largely unified state structure, to a more fractured and increasingly multiethnic nation ensconced within the political and economic structures of the supranational European Union.

Instituting the Nation While Britain’s decline as an empire was the main catalyst for the nation’s transformation from 1945 to 1983, institutional and philosophical continuities from the pre-1945 era helped ease the process to postcolonial nation-state. In particular, the monarchy and parliamentary democracy remained the key touchstones of national continuity and identity. For many, the continued existence of the monarchy gave Britain national prestige, moral leadership, and a focus of national identification that was supposedly above politics. Seen as the head of the national family, the monarchy was thought by many commentators to be key in overcoming internal social and geographic divisions within Britain. Royal tours of Britain’s various regions were a regular feature of the monarchy’s calendar throughout the period and were intended to project a sense that the monarchy was in touch with the entire population. Overt criticism of the monarchy between the 1940s and early 1960s was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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beyond the pale of acceptable behavior, but criticism and even hostility to the idea of monarchy did develop in some quarters over the later 1960s and 1970s. Still, the Queen’s Silver Jubilee in 1977 was genuinely popular and seems to have temporarily masked the extent of social tensions and regional divisions within Britain. If the monarchy appealed to the social and cultural continuities of the British nation, then parliamentary democracy remained the major institution providing coherence to the British political nation between 1945 and the mid-1980s. Despite the fact that 1945 saw the election of a socialist party intent on fundamentally transforming Britain’s polity and economy through the establishment of universal welfare programs and state-run, “nationalized” industry, these goals were envisaged and attempted entirely through parliamentary means. Similarly, at the end of the period, after 1979, when an economically laissez-faire but socially authoritarian-inclined Conservative government set about dismantling large parts of the welfare state, parliamentary means were used and longstanding traditions and customs respected. In both cases, despite deep social and political divisions, British parliamentary democracy fundamentally moderated the measures that could be debated and enacted. Moreover, just as the political class affirmed by its actions that loyalty to parliamentary democracy trumped social divisions like class, gender, or ethnicity, acceptance of the sovereignty of parliamentary democracy was key in easing, though by no means eliminating, social tensions and allowing for the incorporation of new migrants to the British polity.

The Monarchy The extraordinary prominence of the monarchy in British society since World War II suggests that the Royals personify what the British—over the last couple of centuries at least —regard in themselves as unique and special. The monarchy remains the supposed repository of many values that the British hold near and dear: values like decency, pragmatism, solidity, and moderation. In Long to Reign over Us? (1966), Leonard Harris explained the importance of the monarchy to British identity: “Its existence means safety, stability and continued national prestige: it promises religious sanction and moral leadership; it is ‘above party’ focus for group identification; . . . it is an important, and perhaps increasingly important, symbol of national prestige” (quoted in P. Ward 2004, 31). Despite calls to modernize this institution, for many the thought of doing so offends the very basic principles of the national character. It goes against the image that many Britons have fashioned for themselves: as the plucky, stiff-upper-lipped people of a small and rainy land that conquered an empire and won a world war so that they might spread throughout the world their ideals of civilized life. In the faint afterglow of imperial decline, the British people as a whole have had to come to terms with their diminished stature. Deferential reverence for the monarchy, once the very symbol of imperial power, ultimately serves as a culture of consolation for faded national glory.

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Defining the Nation Historian David Cannadine has rightly quipped that the British empire disappeared rapidly from the map, but much less quickly from the British national imagination. The 1948 British Nationality Act reflected a sense of Britishness anchored in an older imperial worldview that was expected, but failed, to match reality. The act gave all citizens of Commonwealth countries and the remaining colonies guaranteed right of entry into Britain as empire subjects. It was hoped this would help cement ties between Britain and the Commonwealth. Contrary to expectations, however, it was nonwhite postcolonial migrants that chose to exercise their rights under the act rather than the white populations of the former dominions. The arrival of nonwhite migrants to Britain challenged traditional definitions of Britishness. On the one hand, the presence of large nonwhite communities led to calls for a new multicultural definition of national identity. But on the other, postcolonial immigration led to an anti-immigration backlash, evident in the violent race riots of 1958 in Nottingham and in the Notting Hill district of London. At first the government tried to stem the influx of nonwhite immigrants by using informal controls, but in 1962 restrictive legislation was passed enforcing a system based on employment vouchers. Subsequent immigration restrictions would be enacted in 1968 and 1971; race relations legislation was passed throughout the 1970s in an effort to stem racial discord; and even more severe legislation, effectively reversing the provisions of the 1948 act, was passed by Margaret Thatcher’s government in 1981. After 1981, overseas British citizens no longer had the right to enter Britain, and the children of recent immigrants lost the right to automatic British nationality. Ironically, Thatcher’s government went to war with Argentina over one of the few remaining British imperial outposts— the Falkland/Malvina Islands—the following year. Support for this controversial war among a wide swath of the British population, along with the turnabout in the Thatcher government’s electoral fortunes that followed in the election in 1983, indicates a deep vein of nostalgic imperial nationalism that well demonstrates the kernel of truth in Cannadine’s quip. At the same time, the shrinking of the empire and of the imperial state resulted in the various national regions of Britain taking on more prominence in political discussion, as did the future place of Britain within Europe. The importance of the national and regional components of the British union were highly touted in the 1951 Festival of Britain celebrations, but they were defined in terms of four contributing cultures to the nation (English, Northern Irish, Scottish, and Welsh) rather than a unified imperial Britishness as had been the case in exhibitions prior to World War II (such as at Wembley in 1924). By the 1970s, there were increasing demands for actual decentralization and the devolution of administrative and political power to the national regions, particularly to Scotland and Wales. However, a referendum on devolution in 1979 failed to garner enough support to be enacted. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dancers perform in traditional Irish attire during the Festival of Britain in London, May 16, 1951. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Initial, post–World War II talk of Western European federation made little headway in Britain, primarily due to the belief that Britain remained a major power in global affairs and had a special relationship with the United States. Consequently, Britain played no significant part in the discussions that led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the founding of the EEC. By the end of the 1950s, however, it was evident to many policy makers that Britain’s economic future was tied to Europe, and the British applied to join the EEC in 1961, only to see their application vetoed by the French in 1963. Two more applications were required before Britain was accepted into the EEC in 1973, a decision ratified in the 1975 referendum.

Narrating the Nation In 1945 the British state was about 240 years old, but the national cultures of Britain traced their histories back much further. The past was a source of great pride and satisfaction for the postwar nation, as demonstrated in the remarkable foregrounding of British history in the 1951 Festival of Britain. But the heritage of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Festival of Britain, 1951 The 1951 Festival of Britain was planned by the resource-strapped, postwar moderate socialist Labour government as a reward for 12 years of war and reconstruction austerity and as a declaration of national recovery under socialist planned leadership. The festival was presented as a narrative of the British national character, past and future, and set forth many of the values of the new, modern nation that would dominate British conceptions of themselves until the 1970s. The story told by the festival celebrated the distant, transhistorical past, particularly the imagined ancient ancestry of the peoples of the British Isles, and also the innovations of modernity embraced by the Labour Party–supporting, middleclass technocrats that planned the various exhibitions. This presentation effaced the industrial, class-conflicted past (and indeed present) in favor of a timeless social harmony that was leading inexorably toward a more rational, educated, and scientific future. Approximately 2,000 communities organized their own activities, and nine government-funded regional and traveling exhibits took the festival’s message across the land. For the organizers, Britain’s imperial legacy was an embarrassment that could not be easily incorporated into the dominant narrative of the festival. Thus, although the diversity of Britain’s regions and national groups was celebrated in a myriad of ways, ultimately the festival was inward-looking and chauvinistic and presented a fundamentally white conception of Britishness—a perception that was echoed by those opposed to postimperial immigration later in the 1960s and 1970s.

distant past and Britain’s glories as an empire, while often referred to in political discourse and popular culture, had to compete with the more recent mythic narrative of the “People’s War”—the story of Britain standing in unity against fascism between 1939 and 1945. The populist narrative of the war years was part of the ideological underpinning of the postwar Labour government’s socialist experiment to consolidate on the perceived social consensus for a managed economy through nationalized key industries and a policy of government-contrived full employment, a social safety net of welfare provisions, and the maintenance of “fair shares” and income equalization. Labour had to pursue these measures in the teeth of economic hardships and a policy of enforced austerity between 1945 and 1951. The Conservative Party, however, also had a national narrative that utilized the image of the indomitable wartime leader, Winston Churchill, in the early 1950s to mobilize support for its own platform of eliminating austerity measures and reasserting Britain’s international prestige. Both Labour and the Conservatives thus traded on narratives of Britain’s former glories and of recent wartime triumph to mobilize the nation behind their respective polices.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The transition from an imperial British nation to a multiethnic and multicultural one was the product of both contingent circumstance and deliberate state policy. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Winston Churchill (1874 –1965) Although his most significant accomplishment was undoubtedly his leadership of wartime Britain (1940–1945), Winston Churchill’s shadow fell across most of the period 1945–1983 primarily as a symbol of British national prestige. After being defeated by the Labour Party in the 1945 elections, Churchill resumed his lifelong opposition to decolonization of the British empire and encouraged stiff resistance to the Soviets during the Cold War. He returned to office as prime minister in 1951 and set about removing the remaining austerity measures—rationing and price and wage controls—that had first been instituted during World War II and were then continued under Labour to ensure “fair shares” in the distribution of goods. Churchill rebuilt the Conservative Party, and although Labour’s policy of nationalizing industries was reversed, Churchill’s government did not dismantle the welfare state that had been created by Labour, thereby ensuring that these policies were considered beyond party politics and a permanent feature of British life until the economic pressures and an ideological sea change in the late 1970s. Churchill retired as prime minister in 1955 and thereafter only occasionally sat in the House of Commons until 1964 when he fully retired. He died the following year. Although he was on the losing side of many policy decisions after the war, Churchill’s significance was still immense, as he was the physical embodiment of the nation’s “finest hour” (a phrase coined by Churchill himself) during the darkest days of World War II — the national hero whose leadership during the war helped determine not only British, but world, history.

Initially, successive British governments after 1945 tried to retain and retool the empire for metropolitan needs. Colonial nationalism within the empire and the politics of the Cold War, however, forced the hand of British governments from the late 1940s. The loss of India and other Asian colonies was a severe blow to British prestige, but further attempts to act like an imperial power ran into the reality of the changed international situation, in particular the 1956 crisis with Egypt over the Suez Canal. Britain’s forced retreat over Suez was a diplomatic humiliation and national crisis that prompted a dramatic shift in British government thinking about its imperial role. Macmillan undertook to reexamine the “balance sheet” of empire and decided it was in the nation’s best interest to divest itself rapidly of the vast majority of its remaining imperial territories. The socalled “winds of change” policy swept most of Britain’s dependencies out of the imperial fold and into independence between 1959 and 1964. While the very substance of the empire was being taken apart, British nationality laws were adjusted to preserve the illusion of imperial unity. Between World War I and World War II, emigration from, rather than migration to, Britain was the more typical population flow. Despite being faced with a severe labor shortage, the postwar British government continued to encourage emigration schemes to the former dominions in an attempt to strengthen the ties between the “mother country” and the postimperial Commonwealth. Altogether over 1.5 million citizens emigrated from Britain between 1945 and 1960, with about 80 percent of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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them going to the former dominions. To ease the labor shortage within the British Isles, the government recruited immigrants from the displaced persons camps of war-torn Europe and from the Republic of Ireland. Together more than a million migrants from Europe and Ireland settled in Britain after 1945. In the 1950s, employers within Britain also sought labor from existing and former colonies. London Transport, for example, set up a recruiting office for bus drivers in Barbados; cotton and wool mills in Yorkshire recruited labor from South Asia, especially for the night shift and for lower-paying jobs. Unassisted immigration from the West Indies accelerated after 1952 when the United States restricted entry to its own labor market. A second wave of immigrants from eastern Africa—many of them of Indian descent who had originally been encouraged to settle in Africa by the British—started arriving in the later 1960s, pushed out of former British colonies like Kenya, which had embarked on “Africanization” policies after gaining independence. Between 1948 and 1971, Britain gained approximately 1.5 million new residents from the former colonies, a little under 3 percent of the total population. Over half the immigrants were from India and Pakistan or were East African Asians. Most of the remainder came from the British Caribbean. Almost all the newcomers settled in London and in a few major towns in the midlands and north of England. Rural and suburban England, and most of Wales and Scotland, were home to very few of the new arrivals prior to the 1980s. Growing resistance to the multicultural transformation of Britain, however, reflected lingering imperial prejudices based on race and color. A few politicians, such as Enoch Powell, tried to capitalize on anti-immigrant feeling for political purposes, and while there is no doubt that a sizable minority of the population felt some sympathy with his views, Powell’s blatant appeal to racism effectively ended his ambition to lead the Conservative Party. Still, poor race relations in the cities became an established fact over the course of the 1970s. Between 1976 and 1981, for instance, at least 31 black people in Britain were murdered because of racist motives. In 1977, the National Front, an extreme right-wing party formed in 1967, secured 120,000 votes in the election for Greater London municipal government, although it failed to win a national parliamentary seat. This latter fact is partly explained by how Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher mobilized antiimmigrant sentiment, suitably moderated, in 1978 with claims that the white British feared “their” country was being “swamped” by people with a different culture. This not-so-veiled attack on postcolonial immigrants helped Thatcher form a government in 1979, despite failing to get an absolute majority of votes in the general election. Race relations reached their postwar nadir soon afterward with more race riots in various cities. Although in the first two decades of the period under review the key policies for building the nation were those that surrounded Labour’s promotion of nationalized industry and the welfare state, from the 1960s renewal of the nation tended to take the form of decentralization through demands for devolution. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Such demands were those of a minority, however, as deep social and economic divisions prevented strong nationalist movements from developing. Welsh attitudes were divided between the rural north and industrial south of Wales. The Welsh-speaking and largely nonconformist north was opposed to the liberal social policies favored in the south. The postwar efforts of Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist Party) to create a unified nationalist movement failed largely because of this divide. Plaid Cymru won its first by-election seat in 1966, only to lose it in the general election of 1970. A further blow to Welsh nationalism was the 1979 referendum on devolution of the British state (the idea was to provide Scotland and Wales their own national assemblies to debate domestic policy), in which 46.5 percent of the vote opposed devolution (as opposed to 11.8 percent in favor). And Plaid Cymru won only two seats in the 1979 election, with the Conservative Party gaining 11 and Labour, 24. In fact, the Labour Party was clearly the most powerful political force in Wales throughout this period. Scottish nationalism also remained surprisingly weak for most of this period. Discontent with the postwar economic depression in Scotland and the increasing alienation from the south led to a rise in votes for Labour, not for the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). Support for the Union of Great Britain remained strong in Lowland Scotland, fortified by militant Presbyterianism, perhaps stronger than anywhere else in the British Isles except Ulster itself. The industrial west of Scotland consistently voted for Labour, and even in the more rural and conservative east and north, Labour did well in the 1950s and 1960s. The SNP did win the occasional seat, but it was not until the discovery of North Sea oil in the early 1970s that the SNP found an issue that they could use effectively in elections. The demand of “Scottish Oil for Scotland” breathed new life into the SNP, which capitalized on this economic nationalism in the 1974 election by winning 22 percent of the Scottish vote and gaining seven seats in Parliament. As with Wales, devolution became a growing demand over the course of the 1970s, and in the 1979 referendum, 52 percent of the Scottish electorate voted in favor of devolution, although this amounted to only 33 percent of the total electorate and the government had laid down as a prerequisite for legislation a minimum of 40 percent of the total vote. In the 1979 election, there was also a decisive swing against the SNP, which lost all but two of its seats; Labour regained its position in Scotland, largely due to the strong protest vote against the Conservatives registered in Scotland. The situation was radically different in Northern Ireland, where the longstanding patterns of political and religious divisions remained. The Protestant community in Northern Ireland had been badly hurt by the collapse of the linen industry and the decline of the Belfast shipbuilding industry. Among the Catholic population in Ulster, there were rising expectations after the 1944 Education Act, which made higher education more accessible to the poorer sections of the population throughout Britain, and promises of further reform. In 1967 members of the Catholic middle class founded a Civil Rights Association along the lines pioneered in the United States and began actively protesting Protestant discriminaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tion against the Catholic minority. A fierce Protestant backlash ensued, turning to violence in 1969 and a prolonged crisis involving the direct intervention of the British army. The British government took over direct governing responsibility for Northern Ireland in 1972, and for the next 25 years, republican activists in the Irish Republican Army waged an urban guerilla insurgency against Ulster loyalists (and their paramilitary organizations) and the British authorities and symbols of British rule in Ulster and in Britain itself. This situation remained until agreement was reached for a cease-fire in the late 1990s. Selected Bibliography Conekin, Becky. 2003. “The Autobiography of a Nation”: The 1951 Festival of Britain. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.. Gilroy, Paul. 1987. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Kearney, Hugh. 1995. The British Isles: A History of Four Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kumar, Krishnan. 2003. The Making of English National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marwick, Arthur. 1996. British Society since 1945. London: Penguin. Paul, Kathleen. 1997. Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era. Cornell, UK: Cornell University Press. Robbins, Keith. 1998. Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness. London: Longman. Ward, Paul. 2004. Britishness since 1870. London: Routledge. Ward, Stuart, ed. 2001. British Culture and the End of Empire. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press Webster, Wendy. 1998. Imagining Home: Gender, Race and National Identity, 1945–64. London: Routledge.

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Czechoslovakia Cynthia Paces Chronology 1918 1935 1937 1938 1939 1940 1945 1946 1948 1952 1953 1955 1968 1969 1977 1989 1990 1991 1993 1997 1998 2003 2004

Republic of Czechoslovakia is proclaimed. Tomáš G. Masaryk is elected president. Masaryk is succeeded as president by Edvard Beneš. Death of Masaryk. Munich Accords grant the Sudetenland to Germany. Beneš resigns. Nazi Germany invades Czechoslovakia, establishing the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and an independent Slovakia under pro-fascist puppet leader Jozef Tiso. Beneš establishes a government-in-exile in London. Leading Communist Party members escape to the Soviet Union. Red Army liberates Prague. Beneš returns and issues decrees ordering the expulsion of over 2.5 million Sudetan Germans and more than 500,000 ethnic Hungarians. Czechoslovak Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald becomes prime minister in a coalition government following national elections. February Revolution: Communists organize a wave of mass protests and take over the government. Gottwald succeeds Beneš as president and institutes a Stalinist-style dictatorship. Leading Communist figures, including former party secretary general Rudolf Slanský, are falsely convicted of treason and espionage and are executed. Gottwald dies of pneumonia just days after attending Stalin’s funeral. Warsaw Treaty Organization is founded, including the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. (January) Alexander Dubcˇ ek becomes party leader and ushers in the Prague Spring reform movement. (August) Warsaw Pact troops invade Czechoslovakia. Student Jan Palach burns himself to death in protest of the occupation by Warsaw Pact armies. Gustav Husák replaces Dubcˇ ek as party leader. Dissidents sign Charter 77 demanding civil and political rights. “Velvet Revolution” brings about the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia. Václav Havel elected president. Country is renamed Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. The first free elections since 1946 establish a coalition government. Havel is reelected president. Withdrawal of all Soviet troops. Czechoslovakia’s “velvet divorce” results in two independent countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech Republic joins NATO. Havel is reelected for a second five-year term. Former prime minister Václav Klaus is elected president succeeding Havel. Czech Republic and Slovakia join European Union. Slovakia joins NATO.

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Situating the Nation Czechoslovakia was a multiparty democracy that formed from the vestiges of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I. Founded on October 28, 1918, on the principle of national self-determination, the independence of the state was ratified by the 1919 Versailles Treaty. The multinational state, which had strong, democratic institutions and universal suffrage nonetheless, had profound weaknesses that contributed to its fate during and after World War II. The major difficulty was that much of the ethnically diverse population did not feel equally represented in the state dominated by Czech speakers. Of a population of approximately 13.5 million, 3 million citizens were German speaking. Also, the state did not recognize the nearly 9 million “Czechoslovaks” as comprising two national groups, although many of the approximately 2 million citizens living in Slovakia saw themselves as distinct from the Czechs. Except for small Hungarian, Polish, Roma, and Jewish minorities, the remaining population was Czech speaking. The main geographic entities of Czechoslovakia were the Bohemian Crown Lands (sometimes known as the Czech Lands) of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, plus Slovakia and Ruthenia in the east. These regions had different ethnic makeups and histories. The western part of the country loosely conformed to the 10thcentury historic borders of the lands of St. Wenceslas. The population of Bohemia-Moravia was approximately two-thirds Czech speaking and one-third German speaking. Before the late 19th century, German was the language of commerce, government, and education, but the Czech national revival reintroduced the Czech vernacular to the public sphere. Slovakia was historically part of the Hungarian Crown lands of St. Stephen. The region was Slavic speaking but long known simply as “northern Hungary.” During the 19th century, intellectuals worked to create a Slovak literature and were closely associated with Czech revivalists. “Czechoslovakism” proposed that Czech and Slovak were dialects of the same language and that the two groups constituted one nation. During World War I, Czech politicians Tomáš G. Masaryk and Edvard Beneš worked closely with Slovak patriot Milan Štefánik to propose a Czechoslovak state. Masaryk and Beneš became the first two Czechoslovak presidents, but Štefánik was tragically killed in May 1919 in an airplane accident while flying to the Slovak capital, Bratislava, from the Paris Peace Conference. The loss of the Slovak patriot led some nationalists to create conspiracy theories accusing Czechs of ridding their community of a political leader. During the interwar period, many Slovaks as well as German and Hungarian minorities felt disgruntled by Czech political domination. When the Great Depression hit, minorities became further angered with the uneven economic structure of the state. In Slovakia, right-wing politics, often associated with the Roman Catholic Church, took hold. Many Germans in the Sudetenland (the western border region) looked toward the Nazi movement for inspiration. The German citizens’ N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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protests against Czechoslovakia gave Hitler the ammunition he needed at the Munich Accords, which ceded the Sudetenland to Germany in March 1938. When the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia in September 1938, they incorporated Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich and established a pro-fascist independent Slovakia, led by Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. President Edvard Beneš left for London, where he established a Czechoslovak government-in-exile, and leading communist politicians fled to the Soviet Union. Beneš also visited the Soviet Union during the war and proposed Czechoslovakia as a bridge between East and West. Beneš was hopeful that this metaphor could serve as a new identity for his small, vulnerable state. An agreement among Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt called for the Red Army to liberate Prague in May 1945. American troops freed the western corriˇ eské Budˇejovice (Budweis). Beneš returned dor of Czechoslovakia, from Pilsen to C shortly after the war’s end and resumed his presidency. In 1946, parliamentary elections resulted in a power-sharing agreement among the five major political parties. The Communist Party won 38 percent of the vote, not a majority but nearly double what any other party received. The head of the Communist Party, Klement Gottwald, became prime minister, and Beneš remained president. In February 1948, the Communist Party encouraged mass demonstrations and strikes. When leaders of the other political parties resigned in protest, the Communists quickly filled the empty positions and declared themselves the sole leaders of the state. Beneš resigned as president, and Gottwald assumed the position. Beneš died later that year. The Communist Party held power from 1948–1989, and Czechoslovakia was in effect a Soviet satellite state. In 1955, Czechoslovakia joined the Warsaw Treaty Organization, along with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Albania. As a state founded on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, the working class was celebrated as the true Czechoslovak citizenry.

Instituting the Nation In the postwar era, Czechoslovakia had to be reinstituted rather than instituted as a nation. There were several tasks for the party in instituting a postwar, communist regime: creating a command economy, asserting the supremacy of the Communist Party, and ensuring a loyal citizenry. Instituting the “nation” involved recasting Czechoslovakia as a nation of workers. To do this, the primary enemies of a Marxist state had to be eliminated. While large-scale industries were nationalized before the Communists assumed total power, smaller businesses and personal property were targeted after 1948. Business owners were labeled as “class enemies,” and many served jail time. Middle-class families fled Czechoslovakia in large numbers. From 1948 to 1967, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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approximately 250,000 Czechoslovaks illegally emigrated, and from 1968 to 1989, another 250,000 left the country. Beyond targeting capitalist leaders, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia sought to expose its supposed enemies. From 1948 until 1953 (the year of Stalin’s and Gottwald’s deaths), the Czechoslovak Communist Party ruled with a Stalinist style, which included show trials, political purges, and actions against business owners and the Catholic Church. Propaganda against the Catholic Church was widespread, and many church leaders were imprisoned. The church’s allegiance to the pope and its pre-1918 associations with the Habsburg monarchy were cast as antinational conduct. Even after communism fell, organized religion remained unpopular, particularly in the Czech regions. In the 2000 census, nearly 60 percent of Czechs listed themselves as “nonreligious” and just over a quarter of the population called itself Roman Catholic. The Czech Republic has one of the lowest church attendances in Europe. Not only did the Communist Party root out enemies such as Catholics and capitalists, but they also turned inward. The pinnacle of this “Stalinist” era was the Slanský trial, which accused former general secretary Rudolf Slanský and 12 Communist Party associates of treason. The state executed 11 men, 9 of whom, including Slanský, were Jewish. The anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist overtones of the trial contrasted with the Communist Party’s inclusive national message. Numerous Czechoslovaks, including many Jewish survivors, had joined the party after the war since it promised equality and a remedy for right-wing politics. The trial also called into question how “national” or independent the Czechoslovak party was from the Soviet Union. The show trials that took place in several Eastern Bloc countries were used to demonstrate loyalty to Stalin, as opposed to the betrayal by Tito’s Yugoslavia. Thus, instituting a definition of a particular nation always had to include loyalty to the new Eastern Bloc.

Defining the Nation Whether Czechoslovakia could be called a nation had been debated since 1918. During the interwar period, approximately 30 percent of the country was German speaking. Despite some attempts to integrate the Germans into the interwar government, the Slavic population was assumed to constitute the true nation. In the 1930s, particularly when German-speaking north Bohemian industry suffered disproportionately from the collapse of the world economy, many German citizens of Czechoslovakia turned toward Germany and Hitler’s Volksdeutch call to unite Europe’s Germans. Following the war, the Beneš decrees ordered the expulsion of approximately 2.5 million Germans and 500,000 Hungarians as a collective punishment for support of the Nazi annexation. The Holocaust also eliminated the majority of Czechoslovak Jews from the population. Sub-Carpathian Russia, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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with high Hungarian and Ukrainian populations, was ceded to the Soviet Union. Before the war, Czechs and Slovaks made up approximately two-thirds of the population, but by 1950 they represented 94 percent of the country. The Czechoslovakia that the Communists inherited, thus, was more closely aligned to a nation-state than its interwar predecessor. Whether “Czechoslovak” could be considered one nation was the primary question in defining the nation. The Czech and Slovak national movements began as linguistic enterprises in the 19th century, and early nationalists claimed the languages were dialects, not separate entities. During the Communist period, however, linguistic parity between the Czechs and Slovaks was considered important. For example, the national television news was read in both languages, the stories alternating between Czech and Slovak newscasters. As with the former German population, the experiences of each group during World War II accounted for the difficulty in defining the nation. The Czech regions had been incorporated into the Reich, whereas the Slovaks gained their N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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own state, albeit one subservient to Nazi goals. On the other hand, though, the Slovaks could argue that their wartime resistance movement was more widespread and effective than the Czech counterpart. Geographic, political, and economic disparity marked the relationship between the two components of the Czechoslovak nation. Much of Slovakia is mountainous, dominated by the High Tatras. The majority of the population was in the agricultural sector. In the Czech lands, there was a strong agricultural economy as well. Yet, Bohemia also had a long history of industrialization and was noted for its car factories, glass industry, and breweries along the western border of the country. The Communists’ ideological focus on industry led to the placement of industry throughout the country, and Slovakia became the site of a national arms industry. Prague remained the capital city. This emphasized Czech domination of the state and fueled resentment among the Slovak population. Despite promises of equality, Czechs still dominated the state, to the disappointment of Slovaks. Not until 1968 was a Slovak, Alexander Dubcˇek, chosen as secretary general of the party. The reformer Dubcˇek, who was ousted by the Soviet leadership for his liberal policies, called for political parity between the Czechs and Slovaks, and the lasting outcome of his brief reign was the federalization of the Czechoslovak state. In 1969 an amendment to the 1960 constitution that declared the Communist Party’s leading role in the state restructured the political institutions of Czechoslovakia, replacing the National Assembly with a Federal Assembly and creating separate Czech and Slovak national councils. In practical terms, however, the state remained largely centralized. Other groups remained on the margins of the Czechoslovak nation-state. Anti-Semitism and prejudice against Roma (Gypsies) were widespread. Holocaust survivors reported resentment by their former neighbors when they returned to their homes, and later Jews became targets of Communist Party purges. The Communist Party’s solution to the Roma population was to integrate them into a national community by preventing certain cultural behaviors, such as migration. Thus, Roma were forcibly settled in large numbers in the Sudetenland, where they worked in coal mining and heavy industry. To this day, the largest settlements of Roma are in the border regions, where they remain the most economically disadvantaged citizens.

Narrating the Nation Two main themes constituted the official “national memory” of Czechoslovakia during the Communist period: Bohemia’s Protestant heritage and the Red Army’s role in saving their younger Czech brothers during World War II. While the state promoted these topics, various dissident movements posited their own definitions of the true Czechoslovak nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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View of Prague at sunrise, featuring the landmark St. Vitus Cathedral. (PhotoDisc, Inc.)

Minister of Education and Public Enlightenment Zdenˇek Nejedlý, a scholar of medieval music, argued that early communist ideology prevailed in Hussitism, the Bohemian church reform movement of the late Middle Ages. This unique history in Bohemia had attracted 19th-century nationalists and interwar politicians. By continuing the promotion of Hussite ideology, Nejedlý demonstrated that the communist movement was a continuation, rather than a rupture, of Czechoslovakia’s historic arc. In 1415, Bohemian priest Jan Hus was executed for preaching against official church teachings. Hus advocated use of the vernacular in Mass, translations of the Bible, and the opportunity for laypeople to receive both Eucharistic wine and bread. Nejedlý saw in Hus’s teachings an emphasis on equality and a critique of the excessive wealth of the medieval church. After Hus’s death, Bohemia erupted into the Hussite Wars, led by Jan Žižka (ca. 1370–1424), a brilliant military tactician and one-eyed general (who eventually lost the second eye as well). Žižka’s followers, known as the Taborites, lived with their families in communities in southern Bohemia and relinquished their property upon entering the military encampments. Nejedlý argued that this was an early form of socialism, predating communist experiences elsewhere in Europe. A convenient aspect of the Hussite legacy was that it enabled the party to create historical justifications for the persecution of Roman Catholic leaders. AntiCatholicism had been associated with Czech nationalism since the 19th century. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Although over 90 percent of Czechoslovakia was nominally Catholic, nationalists blamed the Habsburg’s 17th-century Counter-Reformation and exile of Bohemian Protestants for a loss of a distinct Czech national culture. The party further pointed toward the betrayal of the Czechoslovak unified nation by Slovak priests and Catholic pro-fascist politicians in the 1930s. Of course, the irony of Nejedlý’s promotion of Hus and Žižka was in the religious implications, as atheism was the official teaching of the Communist Party. Nejedlý claimed that, if Hus were born in the 20th century, he would not have been a priest; he used the only means available to him in medieval Europe to promote his message of equality. Nonetheless, two of the most important projects of the Stalinist 1950s embraced this religious and national heritage. One ambitious project was the rebuilding of Bethlehem Chapel, where Hus had preached. Spearheaded by Nejedlý, the project involved archeological studies and reconstruction of a building that had been long destroyed. Nejedlý planned the chapel as a secular meeting place for national events. The Communist state completed the National Memorial on Vítkov Hill, the site of Žižka’s victorious Prague battle in 1420. The First Republic government had begun the modernist structure during the 1930s, but the project was halted by the Nazis, who used the building as a weapons armory. In 1950, the state unveiled a statue of Žižka, reportedly the largest equestrian statue in the world, in front of the memorial. The memorial was originally planned to honor Czech legionnaires who deserted the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I and fought alongside their Russian brothers. After the Russian Revolution, many Czech legionnaires sided with the Whites, and the Communist government needed to rid the monument of these associations. With Gottwald’s death, in March 1953, the party declared that the monument would become a mausoleum for party leaders. Gottwald’s poorly embalmed body was displayed for years, even though it began to disintegrate and parts had to be replaced with wax. The national monument was decorated with new works of art, including Socialist Realist statues of Soviet soldiers. A series of bronze friezes highlighted the connection between the Hussite armies and the Red Army by showing corresponding scenes from both wars. The Žižka memorial linked the Protestant narrative to the pro-Soviet ideology. The Czechoslovak Communist Party celebrated the nation’s saviors in the Red Army, who liberated most of the country. The Soviet soldiers, officers, and Stalin himself became national heroes. As fellow Slavs, the Russians were portrayed as the protective big brothers of the Czechoslovaks. The Communist Party used symbolic forms to legitimate its national leadership but also used the important connection between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The most elaborate project relating to this theme was the Stalin monument in Letna Park overlooking Prague’s Vltava River. The monument featured an enormous (15.5 meters) standing figure of Stalin, who led a procession of fellow statues representing soldiers and workers. The statue was unveiled in 1955, shortly after its sculptor, Otakar Švec, committed suicide. However, following Khrushchev’s denunciation N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of Stalin, Moscow ordered the destruction of the statue, and the granite behemoth was blown up in 1962.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation As in all Communist countries, May 1 became the premier holiday of the state and featured parades and military exercises. Victory in Europe Day was celebrated on May 8, and gratitude for the Red Army’s liberation of Czechoslovakia was particularly emphasized. The anniversary of Hus’s death was acknowledged on July 6. As a communist state, one method of assuring loyalty to the nation was through social services. Health care, education, and the economy were state planned and administrated. Major improvements were made in medicine, and the state profoundly increased the rural population’s access to reliable health care. The state also worked to promote gender equality in education and career choice and provided support for maternity leave and daycare. However, little was done to reduce women’s “double burden” in the home, and many Czechoslovaks considered women’s domestic knowledge part of the national heritage. The symbol of the New Workers, both male and female, was central to mobilizing the nation around the party’s goals of industrialization and economic modernization. As with all communist states, the mythology of the happy, strong, and patriotic worker played an enormous role in shaping a new national identity. This image was popularized in Socialist Realist poster art of the late 1940s and 1950s. One important use of this mythology was to recruit citizens willing to resettle the Sudetenland, which had been depopulated with the expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s German citizens. Emphasizing the need for patriotic workers and families to build the future industrial infrastructure of the nation, the state also gave incentives to those willing to relocate to the border regions. Socialist Realist poster art was a major propaganda method to encourage the resettlement project. Education at all levels was infused with communist ideology and a revised historical narrative. In higher education, Marxist-Leninist philosophy dominated the discourse. The numerous attempts to bring the public firmly into the new nationalcommunist ideology could not counter the fact that Czechoslovakia had one of the most rigid regimes in Eastern Europe. During the mid-1960s, however, Czechoslovakia experienced some liberalization, which culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968 (see sidebar). The 1970s were called a period of “normalization” during which the party attempted to regain the loyalty of citizens by providing more consumer products and forms of popular culture, such as television programming. However, strict censorship was enforced, religious practice was severely curtailed, and the party purged its reformist elements. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Prague Spring The period of January through August 1968 was characterized by a liberalization of Communist Party practices and became known as the “Prague Spring.” Slovak Alexander Dubcˇ ek, who was appointed secretary general of the party in January 1968, called “for Socialism with a Human Face,” and through his Action Program restored freedom of expression, promised a greater availability of consumer goods, and proposed a federal political system. The population responded with displays of patriotism, such as traditional ethnic costume and dance, and calls by intellectuals like Ludvík Vaculík to revive a creative national culture. Although Dubcˇ ek worked to assure the Soviet leaders that Czechoslovakia’s experiment did not signal disloyalty, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev feared that Dubcˇ ek was going the way of Tito and parting from the Soviet Bloc. Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia, and tanks entered Prague on the morning of August 21, 1968. Street fighting ensued, resulting in the deaths of approximately 72 Czechs and Slovaks, the arrest of Dubcˇ ek, who was brought to Moscow, and the crushing of the Prague Spring. In January 1969, university student Jan Palach immolated himself in front of the statue of King Wenceslas on Wenceslas Square in protest of Soviet troops and tanks occupying the city. Palach became a national icon for dissidents, who saw his action as a means to display national sovereignty in the face of Soviet domination.

The atmosphere of the 1970s led to the formation of a small but active dissident movement comprised of intellectuals, artists, priests, and reform communists. The goal of the dissidents was to mobilize the nation in a different way. Intellectuals who once supported the party resented the dulling of a once vibrant, national creative culture. Others decried the desecration of the environment from heavy industry or the loss of true religious freedom. Under the leadership of Václav Havel and others, intellectuals created a “civil society” or parallel community that claimed to be a more authentic representation of the Czechoslovak nation. Havel’s writings particularly focused on the regime’s attempts to “mobilize” the nation with consumer goods, spa holidays, and dull popular culture to distract the population from the losses of freedoms the nation endured. By 1989, fueled by Gorbachev’s glasnost policy and revolutions throughout the region, Prague erupted into peaceful mass demonstrations and a general strike. The culmination of the 10-day “Velvet Revolution” of November 1989 was the resignation of the Communist Party and the selection of dissident leader Václav Havel to lead a new Czechoslovakia. Despite the initial euphoria, the Czechoslovak nation could not sustain itself through the initial years of adjustment to a capitalist market. Suddenly nationalists, particularly in Slovakia, sought to mobilize the population to support a breakup of Czechoslovakia, and they pointed to continued disparity between the economies of the Czech lands and Slovakia. Further, Slovak nationalism took a turn toward the right, as some Slovaks looked back to wartime Slovak independence as a golden era. By 1992, Slovak prime minister Vladimir Meˇciar was advocating a looser confederation within N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Czechoslovakia or a total break from their Czech counterparts. Negotiations between Meˇciar and Czech prime minister Václav Klaus proved fruitless, and the two politicians agreed to divide the country. Though President Havel profoundly opposed this breakup, he promised not to use force to keep the country unified. On January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent countries. The “velvet divorce” prevented the ugliness and violence of Yugoslavia’s demise, but the Czech and Slovak republics were not immune to the postcommunist wave of racist nationalism. Roma were targets of skinhead attacks and employment discrimination. In 1999, Ustí nad Labem, a resettled Sudeten city, built a wall to divide its Roma citizens from the Czech population. The opposition of President Havel and international institutions led to its swift dismantlement, however. The Czech-Slovak split raised the question of citizenship. The Czech citizenship law required those of Slovak descent to prove two years of residency in a single domicile, a clean criminal record for five years, and fluency in Czech. Since many Roma in the Czech Republic were originally from Slovakia and frequently moved, they often did not qualify for citizenship in the new state. International pressure finally persuaded the Czech Parliament to liberalize their citizenship law in 1996. By the mid-1990s, the Czech Republic and Slovakia focused more on integration with Europe rather than with creating unique national narratives. Where

Mass demonstration against the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia during the Velvet Revolution, November 25, 1989. (Peter Turnley/Corbis)

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Velvet Revolution Stimulated by Solidarity’s victory in Poland and the fall of the Berlin Wall, citizens flocked to Wenceslas Square in November 1989 demanding regime change. A catalyst for the protests was a ceremony marking the anniversary of a student killed by the Nazis, which then led to a remembrance of Jan Palach. In late November, the party relinquished its leading role in Czechoslovak politics, and the democracy movement became known as the “Velvet Revolution” for its peaceful character. Dubcˇ ek returned to Prague and stood on a balcony overlooking Wenceslas Square with Havel, who was chosen and later elected as the first noncommunist president of Czechoslovakia since 1948. A wave of emotional national feeling swept the country as people spontaneously sang national anthems and the medieval hymn to Saint Wenceslas and waved Czechoslovak flags. The movement’s leaders called upon familiar national images and sayings. For example, Havel proclaimed in his New Year’s speech to the nation on January 1, 1990, “My people, your government has returned to you,” paraphrasing first president Masaryk, who in turn had used the words of the 17th-century Protestant exile and follower of Hussite ideology, Jan Amos Comenius.

one can see Czechs and Slovaks continuing to embrace their national histories is in the tourist industry. Tourism accounts for 5.5 percent of the gross national product and employs 2 percent of the population. Prague has become a leading European tourist destination, and the Czech Republic invests heavily in its historic capital to attract foreign visitors. To distance themselves from the communist past, Slovaks and Czechs frequently cite their place in “Central” as opposed to Eastern Europe. In 1997 the Czech Republic joined NATO, and Slovakia joined in 2004. In 2003 both countries overwhelmingly voted to join the European Union and entered in 2004. However, President Václav Klaus, who succeeded Havel in 2003, is a Euro-Skeptic (or in his terms a Euro-Realist) who has warned that the smaller states have little power in comparison to the large founding members. An awareness of the perils of the “small nation” continues to inform the political views of the citizenry of both countries. Selected Bibliography Abrams, Bradley F. 2004. The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Connelly, John. 2000. Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Havel, Václav. 1990. Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in East-Central Europe. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Innes, Abby. 2001. Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kovaly, Heda Margolius. 1986. Life under a Cruel Star: A Life in Prague, 1941–1968. New York: Homes & Meier. Kraus, Michael, and Allison Stanger, eds. 2000. Irreconcilable Differences? Explaining Czechoslovakia’s Dissolution. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Long, Michael. 2005. Making History. Czech Voices of Dissent and the Revolution of 1989. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Mamatey, Victor S., and Radomír Luža. 1973. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mlynar, Zdenek. 2003. Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism. New York: Columbia University Press. Renner, Hans. 1989. A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945. London and New York: Routledge. Pontuso, James F. 2004. Václav Havel: Civic Responsibility in the Postmodern Age. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Williams, Kieran. 1997. The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath, Czechoslovak Politics 1968–1970. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

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European Union Warren Mason Chronology 1946 Winston Churchill’s speech in Zurich calling for a United States of Europe encourages European leaders to take steps toward political union. 1947 Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program) is proposed by U.S. secretary of state George Marshall. 1948 Start of the Benelux Union—a customs union formed by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The Treaty of Brussels links the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries in a security agreement. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) is formed by 16 European countries, the United States, and Canada to administer and coordinate Marshall Plan grants. The Congress of Europe meets in Den Haag, the Netherlands, with 750 delegates from 16 countries and observers from the United States and Canada. No agreement is reached on a federal Europe, but the decision is reached to form the Council of Europe as an ongoing forum for discussion among European governments. 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is formed to confront the Soviet Union, link the United States with Europe, and organize the defense of the Western Bloc of nations. 1951 The Treaty of Paris is signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 1954 A proposal to establish a European defense community and European political community is abandoned when the treaties are defeated in the French Parliament. The Treaty of Brussels is expanded to create the West European Union (WEU). The WEU will be linked with the European Union (EU) by the Treaty on European Union (1992) and become the embryo of the EU’s own security organization. 1957 Treaty of Rome is signed by the six signatories to the Treaty of Paris. The European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM) are established. 1961–1963 First application by the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland to join the EEC (1961) is vetoed by French president de Gaulle in 1963. 1965–1966 Conflict among member states about supranational powers of the EEC results in the Luxembourg Compromise, which left the national veto effectively intact. 1967–1968 Second veto by de Gaulle of British application to join the EEC (1967). Three communities—the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM—merge to form the European Community (EC) (1967). The EC begins a customs union and reaches agreement on Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (1968). 1969–1970 EC member states meet at a summit conference in Den Haag to “relaunch” European integration (1969). Agreement is subsequently reached on financing for CAP, EC enlargement, and formation of a monetary union (initially proposed for 1980). Foreign policy cooperation is formalized with the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (1970). 1973 The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland accede to the EC, bringing membership to nine.

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1979 First direct elections to the European Parliament and since then, every five years. European Monetary System is established. Twenty years later, cooperation in this field results in the Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the euro as a common currency. 1981 Greece joins the EC to bring membership to 10. 1985 France, Germany, and the Benelux countries sign the Schengen Agreement. 1986 Single European Act (signed 1986) consolidates EC institutions, brings the EPC and nonmilitary aspects of security into the treaty, and sets the goal of a single market by the end of 1992. Spain and Portugal joins the EC to bring membership to 12. 1992 Treaty on European Union is signed. It creates a three-pillar structure—the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs—under the umbrella of a European Union (EU), including EU citizenship. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) authorizes EU activity in all aspects of security. Later revised and extended by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and Nice Treaty (2001). 1993 The Treaty on European Union comes into effect, and the European Union comes into being. 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden join the EU. 1997 The Stability and Growth Pact sets criteria for economic discipline in advance of a monetary union. The Amsterdam Treaty is signed. 1998 The European Central Bank begins its work in Frankfurt. 1999 The final stage (Stage III) of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) begins with 11 participating countries agreeing on a single monetary policy and irrevocable fixed exchange rates. 2001 The Nice Treaty is agreed. Greece adopts the euro. 2002 Euro notes and coins are introduced in all 13 EMU member states. The Convention on the Future of Europe begins in Brussels. 2003 The Nice Treaty comes into effect. 2004 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia join the European Union. The Constitutional Treaty is signed in Rome. 2005 French and Dutch voters reject the Constitutional Treaty in referenda. EU leaders agree on a “period of reflection” to consider the future of the Constitutional Treaty. 2007 Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union. Lisbon Treaty signed.

Situating the European Union The landscape of European nationalism is that of a relatively small continent that has, over the past several thousand years, become densely packed with tribes, ethnic and regional communities, small and large states, federations, and empires. In the course of centuries of migration, trade, conquest, revolt, assimilation, and annihilation, modern Europeans have inherited deep memories about themselves and their experience with the other communities that share the continent. This long evolution has left Europe with a complex and multilayered human geography. Even after the elimination of many early cultures and languages, there remain at least nine major cultural and language groups (Germanic, Latin, Slavic, Celtic, Hellenic, Ibero-Caucasian, Turkic, Magyar, and Finnish-Estonian), most with multiple subdivisions. Five major religious communities (Roman Catholic, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, and Jewish) and numerous ethnic groups overlap with the cultural-linguistic groupings to add other dimensions of complexity. All of these combinations are organized into no fewer than 49 sovereign states and hundreds of political subdivisions. In such an environment, it is not difficult to understand why Europe became the spawning ground of nationalism. Indeed, the modern history of Europe is the story of nations and nationalism; the very concepts of nation and nation-state emerged first in Europe. Some historians have argued that it was the coexistence of many more or less equally powerful political authorities in close proximity to one another that created the competitive environment that stimulated both innovation and conflict in Europe. One of those innovations was the mobilization of popular loyalties toward the nation and away from parochial attachments and religious commitments. Political authorities that could draw on popular loyalty to the abstract and often mystical idea of the nation were better suited to the competitive struggles N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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that were constantly increasing in Europe. So, once nationalism appeared in one state, competitive survival required that it develop elsewhere as well. By the 20th century, the modern nation-state had subordinated nearly all other forms of identity and loyalty, and it claimed absolute sovereignty—as a matter of principle if not necessarily of fact—over its territory and population. The problem for nation-states, however, is that they exist in an inherently competitive and insecure environment of similar states, each claiming to pursue values linked with its sovereignty. The increasingly destructive and uncompromising conflicts among national states that resulted from this competition are the outstanding features of the history of Europe in the past several centuries, especially since the French Revolution of 1789.

Instituting the European Union What we know today as the European Union emerged in the last half of the 20th century in the complex European landscape of communal identities and political loyalties. After the vast and destructive “world wars” of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, there was a broad consensus that nationalism had brought Europe to the edge of total ruin and that it must be contained or suppressed. Indeed, the memory of conflict and ruin would be the ghost in the room at all the subsequent discussions of Europe’s future. Speaking in 1946 at the University of Zurich in Switzerland, Winston Churchill attempted to rally the flagging spirits of the European continent and to mobilize people toward a cooperative and democratic Europe. He held out the vision of a United States of Europe that could take its place alongside the United States of America and the British empire and Commonwealth and make its contribution to a better future. It was a call that sent a current of political electricity through Europe and reinforced the drive to form a congress of representatives from throughout the continent for the purpose of shaping some kind of political federation for postwar Europe. In the troubled setting of post–World War II Europe, the initial interest in a political reconstruction of Europe—Churchill’s idea of a United States of Europe —gave way to a more modest effort to draw European economies together as a precondition for a more distant political union. The United States supported this approach in 1948 with the Marshall Plan, a program of economic grants to help Europe rebuild its economic strength. The United States also helped to set the future direction of European integration when it required that European states receiving grants under the Marshall Plan form an organization to direct Marshall aid. The result was the pioneering Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which later evolved to become the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Churchill Sets a New Vision for Europe In 1946, Britain’s famous wartime leader and former prime minister, Winston Churchill, gave a speech at the University of Zurich in Switzerland that electrified Europe with excitement and hope about a different kind of future. The essence of that vision and Churchill’s characteristically inspiring language is reflected in the following excerpts from his speech: I wish to speak to you today about the tragedy of Europe. . . . And what is the plight to which Europe has been reduced? . . . Over wide areas a vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn and bewildered human beings gape at the ruins of their cities and homes, and scan the dark horizons for the approach of some new peril, tyranny or terror. Among the victors there is a babel of jarring voices; among the vanquished a sullen silence of despair. That is all that Europeans . . . have got by tearing each other to pieces and spreading havoc far and wide. Indeed, but for the . . . great Republic across the Atlantic Ocean . . . the Dark Ages would have returned in all their cruelty and squalor. They may still return. Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally . . . adopted, would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene. . . . What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European Family . . . and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.

During the same period, the chief of economic planning for postwar France, Jean Monnet, came to the conclusion that the revival and expansion of the French economy required the economies of scale that a larger economic area could provide and that this would, in turn, mean reconciliation with France’s long-time adversary, Germany. Monnet’s concept, a functional approach to unity, was formally articulated by the French foreign minister of the period, Robert Schuman, and became known as the Schuman Plan. The practical strategy of this plan was to start to build a more prosperous and stable Europe by integrating the French and German coal and steel industries— then the primary energy source and the key component of manufacturing, respectively, and both essential components of the war machine. The real brilliance of the plan, however, was that it set out to solve both the economic and security problems of Western Europe by moving control over two of the essential ingredients for economic growth and military mobilization to a new set of supranational institutions located in Luxembourg. In the process, a European political and economic context was created for the new and much reduced German state. Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg joined to give the plan an initial group of six participating countries. The new initiative of “the six” was called the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), formally outlined by the Treaty of Paris (1951) and designed from the outset by Jean Monnet to be “the first expression of the Europe that is being born.” The ghost of Europe’s past national conflicts is clearly visible in the preamble of the treaty, which makes it clear that its goals are to “substitute for ageN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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old rivalries” among people “long divided by bloody conflicts” the merging of interests and the building of institutions “which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared.” Yet, just as Churchill had pointedly omitted Britain from his vision of a United States of Europe, Monnet’s plan invoked a destiny that the United Kingdom declined to share in 1951. Europe’s first effort at integration outlined all the core institutions that continue to serve the modern European Union. An executive authority, the High Authority, became the European Commission that today has the primary responsibility for both initiating and implementing EU policies. The commissioners, one from each of 27 member states, are assisted by a staff of nearly 25,000 officials based mainly in Brussels. The Treaty of Paris also created a Council of Ministers to represent the member states. All EU legislation proposed by the Commission requires the approval of the Council to become law, a role that it shares increasingly with the European Parliament. The Parliament, in turn, has evolved from the Common Assembly of the original Coal and Steel Community, and since 1979, it has been directly elected by the citizens of each member state. The most recent revisions of EU treaties have given the Parliament extensive powers of co-decision with the Council. The fourth core institution designed by Monnet was the Court of Justice headquartered in Luxembourg. The Court serves as the highest court in the EU for all matters concerning EU treaties and the laws and regulations based

European Parliament building in Brussels, Belgium. (iStockPhoto.com)

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upon them. Among the most important decisions of the Court have been those establishing the doctrine of Direct Effect, which established the right of individuals (and not just member states) to sue under EU law, and the doctrine of Primacy, which confirmed the supremacy of EU law over the national laws of the member states. The European Central Bank, European Investment Bank, and Court of Auditors are among the other institutions that have been created in the decades since 1951. The treaties and institutions of the European Union (see below) as well as its laws, agreements, procedures, judicial rulings, and bureaucratic practices are all part of the accumulated political and legal structure of the EU known as the acquis communautaire.

Defining the European Union The political life of modern Europe has been shaped by the creative tension between the drive to achieve the benefits of unity—security, prosperity, stability, influence in the world—and the commitment to preserve the autonomy and distinctive characteristics of its national states. It was to resolve that tension that the project to build a European Union was begun after World War II, and continues to be built. But what is the nature of the European Union, and who is to be included within it? For the original six countries that formed the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957, Europe was to achieve a steady advance toward “an ever closer union.” For this core group, economic integration was a means by which to reach an eventual political union. For the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, and their allies, on the other hand, the benefits of free trade and other forms of cooperation were attractive, but those countries were very hesitant about creating a political union that would limit national autonomy. For a time, the “inner six” were united in the EEC under the Treaty of Rome, while the “outer seven” created a European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In the end, the economic opportunities offered by the Treaty of Rome proved strongest. After more than a decade of exclusion, Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EEC in 1973. (Norway declined to join, and Sweden and Finland did not apply because of concerns about issues of Cold War neutrality.) The new Europe of nine member states was united in seeking better economic conditions but fundamentally divided about the ultimate goal of European integration. In the following decade, Greece (1981), Spain (1986), and Portugal (1986) became members and brought the membership of the European Community to 12. Once the Cold War ended in 1990–1991, the accession of Sweden, Finland, and Austria (1995) gave the European Community a total of 15 members. The “big bang” enlargement of 2004 brought in 10 former Communist Bloc countries as new member states. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Member States of the European Union The Original Six Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg The Netherlands

First Enlargement (1973) Denmark Ireland United Kingdom Second Enlargement (1981) Greece Third Enlargement (1986) Portugal Spain Fourth Enlargement (1995) Austria Finland Sweden

Fifth Enlargement (2004) Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia Sixth Enlargement (2007) Bulgaria Romania

By that time, the 25 member European Community had been renamed the European Union and had, in the process, taken on important new responsibilities. The rejection in 2005 by voters in France and the Netherlands of a new treaty, the so-called Constitution of the European Union, put the ratification process for that treaty on hold and signaled deep popular doubts about the scope and pace of EU enlargement and about the ever-expanding arena of competitive economic liberalism it has created. The prospect of further enlargements to the east, even including Turkey with its profoundly different cultural and economic characteristics, has stimulated a new debate about what Europe is about and who should be included in it. The creative tension between national values and the benefits of union is still strongly felt, and the definition of the European Union is still evolving.

Narrating the European Union In view of deeply rooted national identities in Europe and a history of conflict among the nation-states representing them, even the relatively modest goals of the Schuman Plan were unprecedented at the time. Nonetheless, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created in 1951 did set out the procedures and central institutions that have driven Europe’s long march toward increased unity. The experience of working together under a set of common institutions also created a new degree of trust and shared interest that shaped later steps toward integration. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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After an unsuccessful attempt in the early 1950s to move integration back onto the political track by creating new defense and political communities for Europe, the six nations of the ECSC agreed to extend integration among them from coal and steel to the entire economy. With the Treaty of Rome (1957), they decided to create the European Economic Community (EEC), a common market with at least some elements of an economic union, and the European Atomic Energy Community or EURATOM. Once again, Britain opted not to join the six in either venture. During the initial decade of European integration in the 1950s, national interests and national values continued to be the bedrock of European political life, but what is remarkable is the degree to which overt expressions of nationalism were muted. By 1958, however, unremitting colonial warfare had inflamed national sentiments in France, and the strains of conflict in Algeria created a political crisis that brought to power a long-time advocate of the supremacy of national values, General Charles de Gaulle, as president of France. Initially, de Gaulle’s nationalism was focused on the domestic reintegration of France, but within a few years, that style of leadership came into conflict with the supranationalism that inspired the treaties of Paris and Rome. While the booming prosperity of the 1960s smoothed the way for the successful completion of the customs union two years ahead of schedule in 1968, the further political development of the EEC was largely put on hold by French-led resistance. The most notable of President de Gaulle’s efforts to reassert national interests was his 1963 “veto” of Britain’s belated application for membership in the EEC. To slow down or stop the movement toward a more supranational structure for the EEC, including a move away from unanimous to weighted majority voting, France forced the so-called Luxembourg Compromise that, in effect, left the national veto intact for important EEC decisions. With the coming of the Vietnam War, civil discord and protest everywhere, the death of Charles de Gaulle, and the breakdown of the world’s monetary system, Europe turned again toward building a structure of integration that could transcend competitive nationalism and create a European zone of stability. Such a Europe, it was anticipated, would be a more persuasive partner to the United States, a stronger influence in world economic councils, and a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing world. The Den Haag Conference of December 1969 was called to recapture the momentum of the European project, and in short order, a remarkable series of steps toward further integration were taken. Britain’s renewed application for membership—along with those of Ireland and Denmark—was quickly approved, and the original six became a Europe of the nine in 1973. Norway also applied and was accepted for membership at that time, but eventually it decided not to join. Meanwhile, a system of financing for the community’s most ambitious and complex policy initiative, the Common Agricultural Policy, was agreed upon. Yet more significant was the approval of a plan to achieve an Economic and Monetary N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Union by 1980, an ambitious goal that indicates the sense of urgency that animated Europe’s leaders at the beginning of the 1970s. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the first oil price crisis followed the 1971 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, the anchor currency of the world system. At the same time, American political leadership was in retreat under pressure from the disintegrating situation in Vietnam, the Watergate crisis, and the eventual resignation of President Richard Nixon. The 1970s was also a decade in which the democratic and capitalist values of every European country were being challenged by a militant counterculture—most dramatically with the emergence of urban terrorism in Germany, France, Italy, and Britain. The collapse of established dictatorships in Greece, Portugal, and Spain also opened the prospect of serious instability in the Mediterranean, an instability that the Soviet Union seemed well poised to exploit. Underlying this political turmoil, the European and American economies were mired for a decade in high inflation and stagnant economic growth. In spite of and perhaps because of the domestic and international pressures of the 1970s, European leaders were prepared to move forward with new efforts at integration. By 1979, the European Monetary System emerged with a new proto-currency, the ECU, at its core. Two decades later, it would evolve into the Economic and Monetary Union and the replacement of most national currencies by the euro. Important new European institutions were created, prominent among which were the European Council that brought together on a regular basis the heads of state and government of the nine member countries. A new structure called European Political Cooperation began to coordinate the foreign policies of member states. The Court of Auditors was created to give the Parliament a practical means to oversee the community’s growing finances, and the first direct elections for the European Parliament were held in 1979. The climate of external threat that characterized the 1970s did not abate but took a different form in the 1980s. Concerns about oil prices gave way to alarm about severe economic competition from Japan and other trading partners in East Asia. As one European market after another—motorcycles, watches, cameras, and electronic equipment—was taken over by foreign competitors, the member states of the EEC began to discuss new steps to deal with a more intensely competitive global economy. As the trade pressures on Europe were increasing, the member states of the EEC were also confronted with new political challenges. The United States under the Reagan administration increased the intensity of Cold War conflict with a fresh campaign of confrontation with the Soviet Union, a policy change that profoundly affected both the security and economic interests of Europe but that was launched without significant European input. Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership was taking the Soviet Union in a new direction with a program of internal reforms and loosening controls over Central European nations allied with the Soviet Union. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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During the same period, the community faced two internal challenges. Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was aggressively demanding a renegotiation of Britain’s role and responsibilities and even a rollback in aspects of European integration. At the same time, three new and not very stable Mediterranean democracies—Greece, Portugal, and Spain—joined the community, bringing the total membership to twelve. Since other European countries were also preparing for eventual membership, it was becoming clear that the internal structure of the community would have to change. With pressure mounting on every side, the member states reached agreement on the first major treaty revision since 1957 when they signed the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. Besides streamlining the institutions and regulations that the member states had created over the previous 30 years, the new treaty launched a program to complete the single market by removing all remaining barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, people, and business enterprise. At the same time, the unanimity principle that had been enshrined in the Luxembourg Compromise since the mid-1960s was set aside, and weighted majority voting was authorized for nearly all decisions about the single market. The Single European Act broke another taboo of the older European system when it incorporated in the treaty the procedures for foreign policy cooperation and nonmilitary aspects of security cooperation. Almost before the SEA came into effect, the rigid structure of the Cold War began to crumble. In spite of strong opposition in the 1980s from Britain’s prime minister, the majority of member states were convinced that deeper cooperation leading to political union was the only route to security and prosperity for Europe. Led by the new Commission president, Jacques Delors, what was now called the European Community began to prepare for the future by assembling two conferences of the member states, one on economic union and another on political union. The recommendations of both conferences became the basis for the new Treaty on European Union, a truly comprehensive revamping and extension of the Treaty of Rome.

Mobilizing and Building the European Union The Treaty on European Union (TEU), or “Maastricht Treaty” (after the Dutch city in which the treaty was signed), significantly changed the balance between national autonomy and shared European interests. The European Community that had been created by the Treaty of Rome and expanded by the Single European Act, along with the accumulated body of tens of thousands of pages of institutional details, legislation, regulations, legal precedents, and procedures, was left in place as Pillar I of the new treaty. To it were added Pillars II and III empowering joint action in the fields of “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and “Justice N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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New Citizens and New Rights in the European Union When the Treaty on European Union (TEU, also called the Maastricht Treaty after the Dutch city in which it was signed) came into force in November 1993, it introduced a new citizenship of the European Union without replacing the existing national citizenship of individuals. The concept of EU citizenship, as well as the rights that attach to it, are specified within the TEU in the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), articles 12, 17–22, and 255. With the new treaty, EU citizens acquired certain new rights: the right to be considered a national in any EU member state and therefore not to suffer discrimination on the basis of nationality [article 12 of the TEC; most other rights derive from this fundamental right]; the right to move and reside freely within the EU [article 18 of the TEC]—subject to certain limitations introduced by community law; the right to vote for and stand as a candidate at municipal and European parliament elections in whichever Member State an EU citizen resides [article 19 of the TEC]; access to the diplomatic and consular protection of another Member State when outside the EU [article 20 of the TEC] if his/her Member State is not represented there; the right to petition the European Parliament and to complain to the European Ombudsman [article 21 of the TEC]. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in May 1999, extended the rights of citizens by: allowing EU institutions to take action against discrimination on the basis of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation; reinforcing the right of citizens to move freely within the EU by bringing the Schengen Agreement into the treaty. The Treaty of Nice, which came into force in February 2003, further strengthened the right of citizens to move and reside freely within the EU by: allowing qualified majority voting for decision making within the Council of Ministers. In addition to the rights specifically laid out in the treaties, EU citizens also enjoy a set of related rights derived from other provisions of the treaties, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the constitutions of the EU member states.

and Home Affairs,” respectively. With characteristic caution, the member states decided to restrict majority voting and other practices that limited national prerogatives to Pillar I. Decision making in Pillars II and III would preserve the autonomy of members as much as possible. The treaty was signed by the member states in 1991 and later extended and modified by two revising treaties signed at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). The diplomatic language and bureaucratic jargon of these new treaties could not conceal that the balance had been reset between integration and national autonomy N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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in the EU—between the protection of national interests and national identity, on the one hand, and the pursuit of common goals and further integration, on the other. Henceforth, more important decisions would be taken jointly within the European framework than ever before. Among the important changes was the creation of the European Union to encompass the three pillars set up by the treaty: the European Community (Pillar I), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Pillar II), and Justice and Home Affairs (Pillar III). The flag and the anthem of the new European Union became prominent symbols of a new political identity that has come to be recognized all over Europe and the world. The treaty also created citizenship of the European Union for all persons who are citizens of one of the member states. In effect, all citizens of member states of the EU also have a second layer of citizenship that confers European rights to supplement national rights. Partly as a reaction to the more ambitious European agenda of the EU, the new treaties also stressed the principle of subsidiarity: the need to keep decisions as close as possible to the citizens and to move policy to the level of the EU only when that is essential for effectiveness. Making subsidiarity a principle of the treaty reemphasized the creative struggle between the benefits of integrated policy and the preservation of national autonomy. Pillar II of the new treaties significantly extended the capabilities of the new European Union to make policy and take joint action via a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Bureaucracies supporting both activities, including a High Representative for CFSP, were created under the Council of Ministers, with administrative support from the European Commission. The well-practiced system for consultation and cooperation in foreign policy already in place was brought into the Treaty on European Union and its subsequent revisions. What was original to the new treaties was authorization to create institutions and procedures designed to support the field operations of the EU Rapid Reaction Force and EU Battle Groups, created in 1999 under the so-called European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). These forces have already been deployed in humanitarian, crisis management, and peacekeeping and peace making missions in former Yugoslavia, Africa, and elsewhere. Under Pillar III for Justice and Home Affairs, the new treaties brought for the first time the sensitive areas of immigration, asylum, and control of borders, as well as police and judicial coordination, within the framework of EU bargaining and policy making. Open internal borders among most member states have made movements across the external border of the EU a concern for all. With the new treaties, at least two procedures for so-called “variable geometry decisions” open the way for joint action that does not include the entire membership of the Union. Constructive Abstention allows member states to abstain on a given decision without blocking action by the rest of the Union. Enhanced Cooperation allows a small group of member states to apply to the Council of Ministers for approval to undertake an initiative or action for the Union without involving, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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at least initially, other members. The clear implication of both procedures is that individual member states may find themselves part of a Union that undertakes actions against their interests or wishes, but that they cannot stop. The creation of the Committee of the Regions by the new treaties resulted in the representation for the first time at the EU level of hundreds of subnational regions. It is a change that has encouraged the emergence of new regional leaders and given a new sense of regional empowerment. The continuous dialogue in search for a workable balance between the capabilities and efficiencies of union, on the one hand, and the preservation of national and regional values, on the other, is still at the center of politics in the European Union. Beyond the changes introduced by the new treaties, the political and security environment of Europe has been transformed in several ways that affect the relationship between the European Union and its member states and citizens. A truly fundamental change came with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a decompression of European politics that has given more latitude for the expression of national and regional values than was possible in the constrained political environment of the Cold War. A second shift in the geopolitical environment was produced by the large-scale instability that arose from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the economic disruptions, migration flows, and security threats resulting from it. Another unprecedented change occurred with the emergence of the Economic and Monetary Union and with the replacement of the national currencies of member countries by a new currency, the euro, created and managed by the European Union, a change that illustrates the degree to which economic decisions have migrated to the EU level. The dramatic enlargement of the European Union between 2004 and 2007 to include 12 new member states was another set of transformative events that changed the landscape of politics within the Union and gave voice to national communities that are far less assimilated to EU norms than the older member states. The End of the Cold War When the Soviet Union broke apart at the end of 1991, residual fear about the menace of Soviet military power began to fade in Western Europe and with it the need to be especially vigilant about maintaining national political solidarity as well as the cohesion of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. The high stakes of the Cold War confrontation had tended to suppress divisive political activity by most regional, ethnic, and other communities. The decompression that followed the end of the Cold War allowed groups and communities of all kinds to express themselves, often in ways that challenged the authority of the nation-state. Some of these communities found in the European Union an opportunity to appeal for material and moral support beyond the framework of the member states, as well as the possibility to interact with other subnational groups and with a nonnational bureaucracy in Brussels. Some communities even saw the prospect of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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greater regional autonomy under the EU political roof. Without much doubt, a more robust period of subnational politics emerged in Europe after the Cold War ended, and that mobilization of more decentralized interests, in turn, has begun to change both national- and Union-level politics. At the same time, the political demise of the former Soviet Union has confronted the European Union with a less threatening but also much less stable set of neighbors in eastern Europe. Instability and Conflict in Former Yugoslavia One of the many effects from the civil war in Yugoslavia and its tragic culmination in strife-torn Bosnia and Kosovo has been a renewed awareness of the intensity and vitality of subnational identity communities. Few had anticipated the capacity for ethnic mobilization in a country like Yugoslavia or suspected the intensity with which subnational identities were held or the violent effects they could produce. After Yugoslavia, no policy maker could comfortably assume that, given the right opportunity, similar strife might not emerge in other parts of the former communist world. It was a lesson that argued strongly for EU enlargement on a more, rather than less, rapid schedule. Another effect of the same conflict was the mass migration of refugees from the Yugoslav regions. Italy, Austria, and Germany absorbed the first wave of such refugees, but the ripple effects were felt throughout the EU. The sudden appearance of a large and mostly destitute population, a visible minority of whom turned to illegal activities of various kinds, won few recruits in western Europe for a policy of open immigration. This was especially true among working-class citizens who often saw themselves in competition with the refugee population for jobs, status, and benefits. At least some of the backlash in national politics against EU enlargement and open borders was a reaction to negative experiences arising from the disintegration of the Yugoslav political system. The Emergence of the Economic and Monetary Union From the point of view of relations between the EU and its national and subnational communities, two consequences emerged from the establishment of an economic and monetary union within the EU. The shifting of the “commanding heights” of economic policy to the Union level has tied the policy hands of member state governments in ways that tend increasingly to focus the attention of subnational groups upon Brussels and to create pressure for EU action. The replacement of national currencies with euro notes and coins in member states is a demonstration of Union presence in mundane affairs and a powerful symbol of EU solidarity. An important psychological distinction among member states has disappeared, with long-term consequences difficult to predict. The Enlargement of the European Union The decision to pursue a policy of enlargement in Central Europe and the Balkans was driven at least in part by the fear of further instability in that region. It N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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may also have been a way of embracing a challenge of political and economic assimilation that could not be avoided if members of the European Union wanted to safeguard regional stability and secure the benefits of an expanded economic zone in the long run. Whatever the reasons, the decision to take in 12 additional member states between 2004 and 2007 had major implications for the political environment of the Union. Each of the new states was in a very different phase of political and economic evolution. Among the older members of the EU, national identity had become less salient as the Union had become more established. For the newer members, however, a renewed emphasis upon national identity was a positive reaction to decades of Soviet control and a necessary support to the legitimacy of the new postcommunist political systems. The entry of the new members —and those yet to enter—seems most likely to have the effect of encouraging a renewed emphasis on national issues and the importance of preserving national values. Such different priorities and needs makes constructive bargaining and decision making among 27 or more member states much more difficult than in the past. Such a situation could erode the cohesion of the Union, but ironically, it could also promote greater EU effectiveness by encouraging more variable geometry decision making and forcing the increased use of qualified majority voting. The Future of National Identity within the European Union There seems little question that the emergence of the European Union has transformed the political environment of the entire European continent. Member states that may once have thought in terms of autonomous action no longer do so. Officials confess that it has become impossible to conceive of the national interest apart from the interest of at least the closest collaborators of the member state in question. Over and over, political elites and ordinary citizens alike can be heard to link the success or failure of EU policies with the well-being of their national community and their own personal circumstances. Public opinion research indicates that ordinary citizens are becoming increasingly more attentive to EU policies and the behavior of EU institutions. The consequences for the politics of both member states and the European Union are not easy to predict, but there are indications that the increasing mobilization of citizens and citizen groups into awareness and action about Union affairs is forcing change in decision-making processes that have previously been dominated by political and economic elites. Partly as a consequence of these trends, the era of deliberate centralization in the European Union appears to be coming to an end. The commitment to take decisions at the level of the lowest effective unit (subsidiarity) has come to mean returning decision making to the national level wherever possible. In some cases, subnational regions exert pressure to devolve decisions still further. In any case, it is possible to see a genuine concern with preserving the autonomy of national communities in those policy areas where centralization is not essential. Moreover, there is a concern among many that, in a union with nearly 500 million citizens, excessive centralization may lead to rigidity and undermine the legitimacy N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of the Union. A continuous dialogue in search of a workable balance between the capabilities and efficiencies of union, on the one hand, and the preservation of national and regional values, on the other, is still at the center of politics in the European Union. Selected Bibliography Baun, M. 2000. A Wider Europe. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield. Dinan, D. 2004. Europe Recast: A History of the European Union. London: Palgrave. Dinan, D. 2006. Origins and Evolution of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duchene, F. 1994. Jean Monnet: First Statesman of Interdependence. New York: W. W. Norton. Duff, Andrew. 2005. The Struggle for Europe’s Constitution. London: Federal Trust. Gartner, H., A. Hyde-Price, and E. Reiter. 2001. Europe’s New Security Challenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Haas, E. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Economic and Social Forces 1950–1957: Challenge and Response. London: Macmillan. Hix, S. 1999. The Political System of the European Union. London: Macmillan. Moravcsik, A. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Nelson, B., and A. Stubb, eds. 2003. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Nugent, N., ed. 2000. At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s. Nugent, N. 2006. The Government and Politics of the European Union. 6th ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Rodriguez-Pose, Andres. 2002. The European Union: Economy, Society, and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sbragia, Alberta, ed. 1992. Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community. Washington DC: Brookings. Wallace, H., and W. Wallace. 1996. Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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France Philippe Couton Chronology 1945 The end of World War II. France is liberated, the puppet Vichy government having collapsed the year before. 1945–1975 Sustained efforts at economic reconstruction is marked by active involvement of the state, leading to 30 years of rapid economic growth (“the glorious thirty”). 1946 Reinstatement of a republican form of government, the Fourth Republic. 1952 France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and Germany form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), based on the 1951 Treaty of Paris. 1957 Signature of the Treaties of Rome creating the European Economic Community (EEC), further unifying the six founding countries. 1958 Stabilization of French republicanism in the Fifth Republic (with a strong presidency), led by de Gaulle. 1962 End of the Algerian war, marking the end of France’s colonial era. 1968 Student uprising and national strike challenges France’s political and cultural establishment. 1973 Oil shock triggers a worldwide depression, with profound social and political ramifications in France (unemployment and inflation, a halt to immigration, etc.). 1981 François Mitterrand is elected president; the left also wins a strong majority in the National Assembly, opening a new political era.

Situating the Nation France emerged from World War II considerably weakened but also poised to regain its place as one of the world’s great nation-states. Despite having suffered the worst defeat in its history at the hands of Germany, it was still a major economic and political power, in possession of a vast empire. The participation of French forces in the liberation under General de Gaulle allowed France to position itself as an active participant in the demise of fascism. Economic conditions were of course disastrous after years of war and occupation, with about a quarter of the national wealth destroyed, but national reconstruction was rapidly under way, with the prospect of generous American aid. A new set of political institutions was put in place under the Fourth Republic, formally constituted in 1946 to replace the collaborationist Vichy regime. French women were liberated in two senses of the term: from German occupation but also from political subordination, winning the right to vote and be elected in 1945. In France, as in the rest of Europe, there was a sense that democracy had triumphed over fascism and that a new phase of history was opening. And indeed, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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over the next 30 years, France would be transformed from a colonial empire into an ethnically diverse part of the European Union. One of France’s enduring national characteristics, the belief in the importance of a single, homogenous national identity, would endure but would also be greatly expanded both from within (immigrant-induced cultural diversity) and from without (European unification and the forces of the globalizing economy).

Instituting the Nation The key institutions of this period were first and foremost the Fourth and Fifth Republics and the rise of what would become the European Union. These three institutions represent both the continuity of the French republican-national tradition and an ongoing transition to a wider, European model of nationhood. Republicanism is the political doctrine that had the strongest influence on the development of France as a nation during the two centuries that followed the 1789 Revolution. In many ways, republicanism continued to define French national identity during the postwar period, but it was modified by political forces N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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(socialists, for instance, attempted to widen and diversify the scope of the Republic) and by social change (with new constituencies claiming to become part of the republican community of citizens, including women and immigrants). The Fifth Republic, a semi-presidential democratic regime, provided the political stability for evolving republicanism, proving much more resilient than previous parliamentary versions. The birth of the European Economic Community in 1958, which strengthened the ties established among the six founding nations of the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), marked the beginning of a completely new era for France. Its national sovereignty was partly delegated to a supranational institution for the first time in its history. Still an imperial nation, France was joining a multinational economic and political structure, in close cooperation with its old enemy and now close ally, Germany. This contribution to European integration was perhaps the single greatest transformation French nationalism underwent during this period. Despite the hesitation of more traditional nation-statist political forces (Gaullism in particular), France proved ready to join a supranational framework and to relinquish some of its national prerogatives. The role of the state, independently of particular regimes, also changed rapidly during this period. Reconstruction on an unprecedented scale demanded centralized intervention. Postwar nationalization (of financial, transport, and other companies) and central planning played a key role in the economic recovery but also signalled a new alignment of state and nation; the tragedy of war strengthened the nation-statism that had been the object of struggles since the Revolution. Keynesianism provided the economic and ideological justification of this increased role of central institutions, in France as in most of the West, until its slow demise from the 1970s onward. Keynesianism, in the French case, was filtered through a particular national tradition; it became part of egalitarianmeritocratic republicanism, a statist translation of the ideals of what the French nation should be. Other institutions also mattered during this period. Public education, for instance, was central to republicanism, ever since at least the birth of the Third Republic at the end of the 19th century. It continued to play a significant role in French social, cultural, and political life during the postwar period, but it, too, was challenged and transformed by student movements, democratization, and increasing cultural diversity.

Defining the Nation Attempts at defining the French nation have generally focused on political rather than strictly ethnic terms (see Brubaker 1992, for a classic treatment of this question). The main legacy of the Revolution was the institutionalized belief in a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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universal political subject, the idea that anyone could become a French citizen if she or he adopted French political values. This definition of French nationhood was largely maintained during the period examined here but experienced a number of serious challenges, from which it emerged vastly transformed. One of the first threats to French self-understanding in the immediate postwar period was U.S. cultural and political domination. As part of a set of conditions for providing aid under the Marshall Plan, the United States demanded the removal of import barriers. As a result, the United States increased its cultural and economic influence through films, magazines, comic books, and food exports. This led to some open musings about whether France was becoming a U.S. colony or, at the very least as some put it, a “Coca-Colony.” The threat of U.S. cultural imperialism is still perceived to be significant today, but an uneasy arrangement has emerged wherein French national culture lost some ground but managed to maintain key strengths as well. A second, equally great challenge was the radical transformation of the French social structure. The peasantry, often described as the foundation of French national identity, was disappearing, as in much of the West, but so was the traditional working class. The dominant industrial occupations of the 19th and early 20th centuries, including textile, mining, and metallurgy, were being displaced by new manufacturing activities and the service sector, a world of semi-skilled workers, technicians, engineers, and managers, marking the “end of the working class” (Gildea 1997, 103). This decline was marked by the weakening of unions and their growing institutionalization as partners of the government rather than direct opponents. The traditional family was also fast disappearing. Birth rates climbed during the postwar era but quickly declined in the 1970s and 1980s. This was due in part to women’s entry into the labor force and economic development in general, as in most other industrialized countries. Women were also challenging their traditional role in the nation. Although they had been granted the right to vote and to participate in electoral politics in 1945, women organized into a coherent movement only in the late 1960s. Loss of empire was the third great challenge of the period. France at first attempted to continue defining itself as a major colonial power. The significance of France’s overseas possessions was increased by the role colonies had played during the war, remaining out of German hands. This of course highlighted a major contradiction: having just fought to free itself, and claiming to defend national ideals of freedom and democracy, France nevertheless wanted to cling to its own colonies. Disastrous wars ensued: Indochina (Vietnam) quickly turned from a colonial war to a part of the larger, unfolding Cold War. Weak French forces were decisively defeated and left in 1954. Algeria launched an insurrection that same year, opening one of the worst episodes in French history. Algeria was considered by many as an integral part of France, in no small part because of the about 1 million French settlers who lived there. The brutality of the war, and especially the widespread use of torture by French troops, forever demolished one of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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De Gaulle and Gaullism The leader of the Free French forces and of the forces that participated in the liberation in 1944, as well as provisional president in 1945–1946, de Gaulle was a leading figure of French politics from the 1940s to the 1960s. In 1958 he acceded to executive power amid threats of the seizure of power by the military and a political crisis over Algeria. De Gaulle was able to draft a constitution with strong presidential powers, approved in a landslide referendum, and was elected president. Amid controversy, he finalized France’s postcolonial transition by allowing Algerian independence. He also initiated the drive for France to acquire a powerful nuclear arsenal, withdrew from parts of NATO, and removed Allied bases from French soil, arguing that France needed to be an independent national power subordinated to no other government. De Gaulle also initially resisted European unification, considering it a threat to national sovereignty. He came to embody one of the defining traits of the French nation: a near-mystic belief in national unity and in the messianic role of a strong leader. This national-Bonapartism is of course highly authoritarian but also draws on a Rousseauist idea of the nation as a single body. His legacy survived as Gaullism, the core ideology of the French right.

defining myths of French imperialism: its civilizing, liberating mission. De Gaulle played the leading role in the liberation of Algeria, attempting to rescue France’s image in the process. The last key aspect to profoundly alter France as a nation during this period was its relationship with Germany. Since 1871, Germany in particular had provided the backdrop to the very definition of French nationalism: the need for revenge after the 1871 defeat, punishment and looming danger after World War I, and of course the shame of collaboration and the mythologized resistance after 1940. Despite this bloody past, France and Germany became close allies after World War II and jointly redefined Europe. As a result, French nationalism has become far less oppositional and militaristic, although other, less directly ominous threats have replaced it, including U.S. cultural imperialism, immigrant pluralism, and the fear of absorption into a nebulous a-national Europe.

Narrating the Nation An important narrative of that era was that of France as innocent victim of and fierce resister to the Nazi invaders. During the immediate postwar period, this was solidified into orthodoxy by governmental and other forces, in no small part because of de Gaulle’s influence. But during the 1970s and 1980s, a counteranalysis emerged that depicted a large section of the French as German sympathizers and Vichyite collaborationists. Filmmakers, historians, and journalists debated both the role of the resistance and the influence of Vichy. Even Mitterrand was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Resistance and Collaboration: France and World War II The role of the French government and French citizens during the war remains to this day a controversial topic. France suffered a quick and humiliating defeat, followed by the emergence of the collaborationist Vichy government led by former war hero Marshall Pétain. But a number of loosely organized armed groups emerged and fought occupying Germany and were eventually coordinated by General de Gaulle, leader of the exiled resistance. This role allowed him to emerge as one of the leading political figures of the postwar era and allowed France to reconstruct its wartime history as one of innocence, defeated by Nazi cruelty followed by fierce resistance. Pétain and a number of key Vichy figures were put on trial and convicted of treason. The reputations of other leading political figures, including Mitterrand, were affected by their often ambiguous role during the war.

found to have harbored Petainist sympathies in the work of his biographer Pierre Péan. Postcolonialism became another important and highly controversial cultural theme during that period. Boris Vian’s 1954 song “Le Déserteur,” for instance, became an antiwar classic, highlighting the futility of colonial war, and was banned as were a number of films thought to promote similar ideas. One of the leading figures in French social and political life has been the intellectual, at least since the coining of the term during the Dreyfus affair in the late 1800s. The second half of the 20th century was no exception, and a number of important intellectuals emerged, eager to participate in emerging social and political debates. Sartre was the emblematic intellectual of the immediate postwar year. His own writings—philosophical, journalistic, and literary—generally excoriated the conformist bourgeoisie and deployed the leading philosophical thought of the day, existentialism. He later moved closer to the other great system of ideas of that era—communism—embraced by other major intellectuals, especially Althusser. Both communism and existentialism were later displaced by the emergence of structuralism and post-structuralism, led by the now canonical Foucault and Barthes. The main idea of post-structuralism was the importance of larger social and especially discursive structures in determining social life. This was taken further by later intellectuals, chiefly Derrida, who emphasized the discontinuities and fragmentation of texts and social products. It came to embody French intellectual culture both domestically and abroad. French literature continued to be influential as well, picking up some of the intellectual trends noted above with, for instance, the emergence of the “new novel,” spearheaded by Claude Simon, who went on to win the Nobel Prize for literature in 1985. Emblematic of new French intellectual movements, Simon’s work broke with literary tradition and emphasized fragmentation and social arbitrariness. Despite these developments, French national culture was felt to be under attack during this period more than during any other. The global dominance of Hollywood was perceived as a direct threat to the integrity of French cultural proN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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duction. But French film held its own, particularly after the launching of the new wave movement in the late 1950s. French directors, including Truffaut, Goddard, and others were spearheading a new type of filmmaking, using new cinematic techniques and dealing with controversial topics. This did not prevent French films from losing market shares during the 1970s and 1980s, but it did establish an influential cinematic voice. With a strong tradition of singer-songwriters who partly resisted and partly adopted the influence of English and North American popular music, French musical expression also found its own national voice. Alongside popular culture, French authorities continued to promote and develop institutional, traditional cultural forms, including museums, theater, and art education. The events of 1968 gave official cultural policy a welcome renewal, symbolized in the controversial Beaubourg center built in Paris, which aimed to revitalize culture by making it more dynamic, interactive, and open. The socialists gave this new tendency even more vitality in the 1980s, creating a number of new national festivals (the now well-known Music Day every June 21, for instance). The result was a wide-ranging diversification of the voices participating in the narration of French culture, which became both more inclusive and more complex.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation One of the first political forces to emerge from the war was the Communist Party. Communism had lost much credibility when the Soviet Union signed the 1939 pact with Nazi Germany, but French communists played a leading role in the resistance. There was a very good chance that the communists would be in a position to instigate a revolution in 1944. But the strategic choices of both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well the preference of most French communists for participation in a renewed nation, put the revolution on hold. National patriotism, especially after a period of fierce armed resistance, trumped revolutionary political mobilization. The other mobilizing force of the period was the autocratic nationalism of de Gaulle. His drive for the restoration of the national greatness of France was based first and foremost on restoring the power of the state. The divided parliament of the prewar period was to be replaced by a strong presidential regime, where much of the authority resided in the executive. De Gaulle at first lost his bid and resigned as provisional head of state in 1946, and a parliamentary constitution was passed by referendum that same year. The Fourth Republic was born, continuing to define the French nation as a politically divided entity. It oversaw the dismantling of the French empire and experienced high political instability (26 different governments between 1944 and 1958). But it was also stable, though coalitions shifted to ward off the political sirens of revolution and dictatorship that had marked N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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large parts of French history in preceding centuries. De Gaulle nevertheless eventually triumphed, imposing his vision of a strong executive in 1958. Another facet of France’s national identity was expressed by politician Pierre Mendes-France, whose ideology and party mirrored that of earlier thinkers, Rousseau and Durkheim in particular, who emphasized the importance of the collective will, above parties and petty disputes. A recurrent feature of French social and political identity from the 1789 Revolution to the beginning of the Third Republic, the collective will again proved only partially reflective of French reality. The vitality of another contemporaneous movement, Poujadism, named after populist politician Pierre Poujade, made that very clear. Poujadism had the support of shopkeepers and other members of the petty bourgeoisie, who mobilized in 1953 to oppose taxes and government regulation. The movement veered to the extreme right, incubating later extremists like Jean-Marie Le Pen. He rose to prominence in the 1970s, incarnating a narrow, xenophobic version of French nationalism that would remain a significant political force for decades to come. One of the great political turning points of this period was the election of François Mitterrand in 1981 and the control of the legislative assembly that same year by his Socialist Party. Mitterrand himself interpreted his election as being part of the radical tradition of the French left and as an attempt to create a clear break with capitalism. But by 1983, the initially bold economic and institutional reforms (including large-scale nationalizations) were abandoned, and the socialists resigned themselves to accepting the reality of a market economy. In any case, socialist control of political power was short-lived. They lost the 1986 legislative elections, forcing a prolonged period of the “cohabitation” of a socialist president with a conservative assembly and ministers. This combination, however, worked relatively well and ushered in a new, moderate form of politics. France was new to political moderation, having experienced more spectacular regime changes than most Western countries over the preceding two centuries, to the point where revolution had become part of France’s national identity—recently expressed in the near-revolutionary events of 1968, which hastened the demise of de Gaulle’s rule. Unrest had been simmering for some time and exploded in May 1968, first led by students who were joined by workers in a general strike aimed at the Gaullist regime and its strict hierarchy. In 1969, de Gaulle lost a referendum and resigned. The 1980s introduced a new form of politics, where forces from the right and the left had to coexist and share power. This also, of course, implied a softening of political positions, which facilitated the emergence of extremism given dissatisfaction with the “soft center,” particularly the resilient National Front. In addition to these political movements, the period of hyperactive national rebirth that followed the war was marked by several major trends, the first of which was the “trente glorieuses,” the glorious 30 years of nearly uninterrupted economic growth between 1945 and the global economic slump of the mid-1970s. Second, France experienced one of its fastest periods of demographic growth (from 40 to 52 million inhabitants during that period). For the century that preN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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A crowd looks at cars destroyed in the 1968 Paris riots. In May, angry students and workers took to the streets to protest widespread poverty, unemployment, and the conservative government of Charles de Gaulle. (Alain Nogues/Corbis Sygma)

ceded the war, France had been among Europe’s slowest-growing populations. Increasing birth rates and high levels of immigration put an end to this sluggishness. France had, in other words, become a dynamic, diversifying, growing nation, which had several consequences. France had long defined itself as a predominantly rural nation but was fast becoming heavily urbanized. The new urban centers were also home to large groups of immigrants (mostly from North Africa), often concentrated in impoverished neighborhoods. Immigrants have been an integral part of French history, particularly during the industrial era (see Noiriel 1996, for a classic work on the topic). But immigration as a key political issue emerged during the 1970s and 1980s and became a central part of France’s national self-understanding. This is largely due to the fact that immigrants were from a few, largely postcolonial source countries, were culturally more distant than previous immigrant groups, and were concentrated in a few urban centers (Paris, Marseille, etc.). France also failed to manage this new diversity adequately, often concentrating recent immigrants in poorly conceived public housing complexes and hiding a fairly homogeneous idea of French nationhood behind a veil of universal republicanism. Worsening economic conditions after the 1973 oil shock and subsequent restrictions on immigration further aggravated the situation. This led to the first and largest uprising of immigrants in French history, the short-lived but influential movement of the early 1980s, which N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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France and Its Colonies Although France lost its colonial possessions during the period examined here, it did retain a few small overseas territories, and it maintained close, and often conflictual, relations with the independent countries that were once under its control. The largest immigrant peoples who established themselves in France during the postwar, postcolonial era were former inhabitants of former French colonies. They played a major role in the reconstruction of the country, but their presence also generated both a virulent form of xenophobic nationalism and a countervailing antiracist movement that sought to redefine the contours of French citizenship and identity. Like other European colonial powers, France’s national identity was profoundly marked by the legacy of its colonial era.

coincided with the coming to power of the socialists and renewed hopes for radical social change. North African immigrants were particularly active in the movement that culminated in the 1983 march on Paris, which exacted concessions and more liberal immigration regulations from the government. The movement was successful at challenging the racism inherent to much of French society and redefining French identity as more diverse and open. But it evolved into a more particularistic movement at the end of the 1980s, in part because of the tension over some Muslim practices (the wearing of headscarves by women). This evolution of the movement was in part the product of a backlash that took place in the late 1980s in favor of a hard line on immigration and more restrictive access to citizenship. Fear of the rise of the extreme right led by Jean-Marie Le Pen led even moderate politicians to adhere to this perspective and to simply ignore some of its racist implications. But despite the danger of extremism, France was evolving politically toward a form of pragmatic, pluralist liberalism. Totalizing ideologies had largely failed, and new interest groups were emerging (students, immigrants, women) and claiming their place within the nation. Despite these changes, French national identity continued to be affected by political centralization. A number of regionalist groups (in Brittany and Alsace, for instance) had hoped German occupation would be in their interest and, as a result, were thoroughly discredited during the postwar era. Centralizing Jacobinism, historically one of the great ideological currents to come out of the 1789 Revolution, emerged that much stronger. It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that regionalist movements became more vocal and assertive, to the point of occasional political violence. Some demanded local autonomy, others (Corsica in particular), outright independence. Some of these movements contributed to the partial reversal of Jacobinism in the 1980s. The newly elected socialists granted a local (albeit only consultative) assembly to Corsica and implemented a large measure of regional decentralization throughout France. France also played an active role in the development of the Francophonie, the network of countries where French is spoken. Various summits were organized N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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where France and Canada played key organizational roles. The Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (ACCT) was created in 1970, which would become the Agence de la Francophonie in 1995. This network was a way for France to preserve some of its cultural and political influence over what were largely former colonies (from Africa to Québec), but also a way to transcend its own national borders and become a global actor within a French-influenced global domain. In sum, France during this period developed a new pluralistic view of the nation while preserving many of the basic aspects that had come to define it historically. The threefold transformation identified above—the decline of traditional social categories, European integration, and demographic and cultural diversification—durably transformed French national identity. Selected Bibliography Birnbaum, Pierre. 1997. Sociologie des nationalismes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Couton, Philippe. 2004. “A Labor of Laws: Courts and the Mobilization of French Workers.” Politics and Society 32 (Fall): 3. Gildea, Robert. 1997. France since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Girardet, Raoul. 1996. Nationalismes et nations. Paris: Éditions Complexes. Noiriel, Gerard. 1996. The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rosanvallon. 1990. L’État en France. Paris: Seuil. Schnapper, Dominique. 1998. Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Simmons, Harvey G. 1996. The French National Front. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tilly, Charles. 1986. The Contentious French. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weber, Eugen. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Winock, Michel. 1997. Le Siècle des Intellectuels. Paris: Seuil.

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Northern Ireland Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See Chronology 1981 Republican prisoners undertake hunger strike to demand political status. 1982 Northern Ireland Act establishes a power-sharing assembly. 1984 Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing at the Conservative Party conference targets the prime minister. Anglo-Irish summit held. 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement signed. 1986 Unionist Day of Action to protest Anglo-Irish Agreement. Northern Ireland Assembly dissolved. Riots in Portadown at the Drumcree Orange Order Parade. 1988 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader John Hume and Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams begin series of meetings to seek a nationalist consensus. 1991 IRA launches a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street. 1993 Downing Street Declaration affirms that any change to Northern Ireland’s status requires a majority consent. 1994 IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries declare cease-fires. 1996 Canary Wharf bombing ends IRA cease-fire. Elections are held to a peace forum. 1997 IRA renews cease-fire. 1998 Referendum held on the Good Friday Agreement to establish a power-sharing government. Elections to new assembly held. Splinter IRA group bombs Omagh, killing 29. Nobel Peace Prize awarded to John Hume and David Trimble. 1999 Direct Rule ends. 2000–2001 Controversies over decommissioning, parades, and policing disrupt the assembly. 2002 Direct Rule reimposed. 2005 IRA announces end to armed campaign, and the Monitoring Commission confirms successful decommissioning.

Situating the Nation Northern Ireland is the site of the longest-running nationalist conflict in Europe: more than 3,500 people have been killed and about 48,000 injured in sectarian violence since the late 1960s. Given the small size of the province’s population, these numbers make the conflict, known euphemistically as the Troubles, one of the world’s most violent. The Troubles have their roots in the partition of Ireland in 1922, which left the north with a Protestant majority, dedicated to union with Great Britain (Unionists) and a Catholic minority, many of whom desired the reunification of the island (Nationalists). Britain devolved political power to Northern Ireland, allowing development of a Unionist-dominated government whose practices of gerrymandering, cronyism, and favoritism advanced Protestant unity and interests. Rejecting the legitimacy of the regime, Nationalists abstained from N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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participation in the government, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) undertook a campaign to destabilize the government and force the British out. However, in the 1960s, civil rights activists took to the streets to demand an end to discrimination and sociopolitical exclusion of Catholics. British army intervention in the face of Loyalist backlash fragmented the civil rights movement, led to the imposition of Direct Rule, and ushered in the Troubles. For the next three decades, warring paramilitary groups and increasing numbers of British troops and of largely Protestant police forces created a highly militarized and polarized society. Efforts to forge a negotiated settlement to the conflict were unsuccessful until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and resultant power-sharing assembly. But even today, the outcome of the peace process is uncertain. The nations and nationalisms of Northern Ireland must be understood in the context of the conflict that persisted from the onset of the Troubles. Throughout this period, paramilitaries mobilized not only to fight the enemy but also to define and police ethnic boundaries. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos), the military wing of Sinn Féin, undertook a campaign of violence against the British state and its representatives as well as against symbols and centers of Unionism. Loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) targeted the Catholic community more broadly. The actions of paramilitaries contributed to the militarization and polarization of Northern Ireland politics and society, ensuring that the Green-Orange (Irish-Ulster) nationalist divide would dominate provincial politics. However, despite the seeming intractability of this ethno-nationalist divide, this period witnessed changes in the political and economic contexts of bilateral British-Irish relations, of the regional and Europe-wide environment, and of transatlantic involvement that helped generate the peace process in the 1990s. The economic decline and deindustrialization that occurred during the Troubles weakened the relative economic advantages of the Protestant working class over its Catholic counterpart. It also fostered a socioeconomic climate in which ethnic competition was seen in zero-sum terms, especially as long-term unemployment grew among working-class men and as the unemployment rate was higher and income levels were lower than in the rest of Britain as a whole.

Direct Rule The system of governance imposed throughout the Troubles whereby the province was ruled by London through the secretary of state and the Northern Ireland Office was called Direct Rule. Although elected councils continued at a local level, their powers were quite limited. The Northern Ireland Office sought to eliminate practices of ethnic discrimination through regulations and also through the establishment of organizations such as the Central Community Relations Unit and Equal Opportunity Commission. Despite these efforts, it was criticized by both Unionists and Nationalists for creating a “democratic deficit.”

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Although both Ireland and Northern Ireland were targeted by the European Union (EU) for their economic disadvantage and provided substantial funding for economic development, United Kingdom membership in the European Union did not redress Northern Ireland’s economic woes. In contrast, the Republic of Ireland was able to take advantage of its EU connections and, during the late 1980s and 1990s, was transformed from economic backwater to Celtic Tiger, with economic growth over twice the European average and increasing wages, low unemployment, and low inflation. By the end of the century, Ireland’s economic success undermined the historic Unionist claim that Irish unification would burden the Northern economy. Long-standing patterns of social segregation of Catholics and Protestants persisted throughout the Troubles. Paramilitary violence increased residential segregation, particularly in urban ethnic enclaves with high rates of poverty, intensified ethnic polarization, and reinforced Nationalist identities. Throughout the province, residents mark their national territories with flags, murals, and curb paintings. Communally distinct churches, social clubs, sports teams, and schools, often located in ethnic neighborhoods, ensure that social interactions are largely limited to members of the same ethno-national group. Against this backdrop of ethnic conflict, economic stagnation, and social segregation, the governments of Britain and Ireland pushed forward a process for negotiated settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Beginning in the 1980s, they sought to involve political parties from both communities, including those associated with paramilitary groups. In 1982, elections were held for a powersharing assembly. Subsequently, in 1985, Westminster signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement that recognized Ireland’s legitimate interest in the North and indicated that the boundaries set up by partition were not necessarily inviolable. The agreement was seen by Unionists as a direct repudiation of the premises of the Union and a sign that Britain was not committed to the Loyalist population in Northern Ireland. In the wake of this agreement, many Unionists began mobilizing to assert their province’s intrinsic Britishness and to try to halt what they saw as government appeasement of Irish interests. A month after the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, all Unionist members of Parliament resigned in protest. In the following year, Unionist opposition mounted, including a “day of action.” By the summer of 1986, the Northern Ireland Assembly was dissolved. Although Sinn Féin ended its policy of abstaining from electoral politics, Republicans remained suspicious of British government motives. IRA violence continued throughout this period, including major attacks on Enniskillen and Downing Street. At a series of meetings beginning in 1988, the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) sought to persuade Sinn Féin to engage in a peaceful political process. These were followed by talks between the British and Irish governments about how to include the major political parties in a negotiated settlement; these talks were known as Brooke/Mayhew, after the British secretaries of state for Northern Ireland. In 1993, to encourage the IRA to abandon its armed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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campaign, the British government issued the Downing Street Declaration, reasserting its position of no change in Northern Ireland’s status without majority consent but leaving open the possibility that the status of Northern Ireland could change (i.e., that it would not necessarily remain within the Union). The strategy seemed successful when in August 1994 the IRA unilaterally announced a ceasefire, followed by cease-fire declarations by Protestant paramilitary groups. In the wake of these cease-fires, the United States appointed a special envoy to help promote a negotiated settlement, and the European Union announced it would invest significant funds through the introduction of a Special Support Programme. While the citizens of Northern Ireland welcomed the cease-fires, the Unionist community was suspicious about the intentions of the IRA and its political arm, Sinn Féin, and the creeping influence of Dublin over Northern Irish affairs. Their anxieties were hardly relieved in 1995 when the British and Irish governments issued a Joint Framework Document, addressing relations between Ireland and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland, and by the renewal of the IRA campaign of violence, which later intensified with the dramatic Canary Wharf bombing in London in February 1996. Despite this escalation in violence, elections were held for a peace forum that included representatives from the major political parties as well as smaller paramilitary-affiliated parties and even a new Women’s Coalition. Despite vociferous resistance from many Loyalists and Republicans and despite paramilitary cease-fires that were broken and reinstituted, the process produced the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that laid the basis for the establishment of a consociational form of government. David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, and John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their successful efforts in bringing the peace negotiations to fruition. The Good Friday agreement, which was affirmed by referenda in Northern Ireland and Ireland, created a power-sharing assembly and executive that were to replace Direct Rule with devolved government. This government would no longer be propped up by British troops, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary would be revamped into an integrated police service that would be neutral to ethno-nationalist orientation. The agreement stipulated that the union with Britain would be maintained as long as a majority desired it. However, it also established cross-border bodies to foster economic and social linkages with the Republic of Ireland. It committed paramilitary groups to decommissioning weapons, and the polity to a process of reconciliation and social inclusion. Part of that process would entail the release of many paramilitary prisoners and the regulation of contentious ethnic (largely Protestant) parades. From the outset, the Nationalist community was more supportive of the agreement than were Unionists, who were sharply divided and particularly suspicious of the motivations of Sinn Féin and the IRA. The decommissioning process did not proceed as quickly as Unionists expected and undermined Protestant confidence in the agreement. Although paramilitaries maintained the cease-fire, intra-ethnic violence proliferated as some engaged in drug trafficking and neighborhood vigilantism. And both Nationalist and Loyalist splinter groups continued to target their ethnic enemies. As the

Good Friday Agreement The result of talks between political parties in Northern Ireland and the governments of Britain and Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement was signed in April 1998 and supported by a majority of voters in Ireland and Northern Ireland in a referendum the following month. It established a power-sharing executive and legislative assembly in Northern Ireland and cross-border bodies between Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Britain to address common political and economic matters. It committed Northern Ireland’s government to address key issues of decommissioning weapons, regulation of parades, and reform of the police service and to policies of nondiscrimination, social inclusion, and reconciliation.

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Decommissioning Decommissioning refers to the elimination of weapons among paramilitary groups. Decommissioning became a key problem for the peace process after the Good Friday Agreement, which was ambiguous about whether paramilitary-affiliated parties could participate in power-sharing until decommissioning was completed. Sinn Féin saw the agreement as providing a long-term process for decommissioning that required building confidence in new institutions, including a reformed police system, and external monitoring of all paramilitary groups. Unionists insisted that the IRA decommission its weapons as a condition of Sinn Féin’s participation in the power-sharing government. Hardliners within the Ulster Unionist Party joined the DUP to force the suspension of the new political institutions. As late as 2004, the Independent Monitoring Commission established by Britain and Ireland stated that it had no evidence of decommissioning, and it was not until September 2005 that it confirmed that the IRA had completely disposed of its weapons.

gains of the peace process seemed to falter, the electorate shifted its political support toward the more extreme political parties. The Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin surpassed their more moderate counterparts in the 2003 and 2005 elections, making devolved government unworkable. In the face of political infighting, the British government was forced on several occasions to reimpose Direct Rule in Northern Ireland. Despite efforts to reinvigorate the peace process, the assembly was suspended from 2002 to 2007.

Instituting the Nation Throughout this entire period, political and social relations in Northern Ireland have been shaped by ethnic identities and interests; nearly every important public institution in the province, from government and political parties to churches and civic organizations, has been strongly linked to ethnicity. Direct Rule removed responsibility for all major areas of public policy from the Unionistcontrolled Stormont political system that clearly favored the Protestant populace. London established the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) at the old Stormont to oversee the province’s various administrative departments. Over the next several decades, the NIO managed Northern Ireland’s economy, legal system, health care, and social services through its bureaucracy and through a growing body of quasi-nongovernmental organizations (QUANGOs). District councils had little power, exercising decisions only over the most local matters, such as trash removal. Both Nationalists and Unionists therefore critiqued Direct Rule for generating a democratic deficit. At the same time, the NIO worked to rectify some of the most obvious inequities of the Stormont system, adopting policies to redress discrimination in public N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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housing, civil service jobs, higher education, and provision of health services. Although the NIO developed nondiscrimination policies and invested in crosscommunity initiatives, it was unable to overcome sectarian alignments. For example, even under Direct Rule, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Northern Ireland’s police force, remained overwhelmingly Protestant. This was due in part to recruitment practices but also to IRA targeting of Catholic officers, whom it deemed to be colluding with the British. The educational system has also remained segregated. Despite the presence of a small integrated school movement, Catholics and Protestants have continued to attend and support the system of separate primary and secondary educational institutions that thrived under the Stormont regime. And attempts to develop integrated public housing have also failed, as paramilitaries and neighborhood vigilantes intimidate “outsiders” in ethnically marked territories. Indeed, in Belfast, a barrier known euphemistically as the peace line was built to separate working-class neighborhoods to limit inter-ethnic violence. Not surprisingly, neighborhoods on either side remain ethnically homogenous, and social relations are limited to members of the same community. Civil society has also been marked by ethnic separatism. Despite denominational differences among Protestants, religious identity has been closely linked to ethnic identity, demarcating Protestants from Catholics. Church affiliation and attendance in Northern Ireland are higher than in most countries of Europe, and much social and civic life revolves around parishes. Among the most important of the religious and sectarian organizations has been the Orange Order. A Protestant, Loyalist fraternity that crosses class and denominational lines, the Order is politically significant. It was formally affiliated with the Ulster Unionist Party, holding seats on its decision-making council. Its influence permeates Protestant communities throughout the province, through a system of local lodges and sponsorship of official holidays and commemorative events that advance the Protestant identification with the Union. The annual Orange parades celebrating Protestant ascendancy from the 17th century and the union with Great Britain have become major political flashpoints. However, even secular organizations, such as charities that serve all needy populations in Northern Ireland, tend to draw their membership along confessional lines. Ethnic identities are reinforced by a wide range of ethnically specific leisure activities from athletic teams and sports clubs to bands and bars. Even organizations that have been open to moving across the ethnic divide have been trapped in this social environment. Women’s centers, for example, have not been explicitly ethnic; however, because they are oriented to serving the needs of local women, they have been constrained by the social relations of the often segregated neighborhoods in which they are located. Nonetheless, the network of women’s centers has been at the forefront of organizations and associations combating sectarianism. During the Troubles and the postagreement periods, four major parties dominated Northern Ireland politics. Among Unionists, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is considered more moderate, secular, and upper and middle class comN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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pared to the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which is more militant, Protestant, and middle and working class. The Ulster Unionist Party was established in 1905 as the official voice of Unionism at the time of partition, and it remained in power throughout the Stormont era (1921–1972). The Democratic Unionist Party was established by Reverend Ian Paisley, a fundamentalist Protestant minister, in 1971 to oppose any compromise with Irish Nationalists or Catholics. Among Nationalists, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is considered more moderate and middle class than Sinn Féin (SF), which is more militant and working class. The SDLP was established in 1970 by constitutional Nationalists and was until recently the dominant party among Catholics. Sinn Féin, now Northern Ireland’s largest Catholic party, has its roots in the early-20th-century armed struggle for independence from Britain and has only recently cut its ties to the IRA. In addition to these four major parties, a range of smaller parties compete in elections, among them parties identified as cross-community. Alliance is the oldest of these. Founded in 1970, this largely upper middle-class party has consistently adopted the position of majority rule on the constitutional question and garnered modest support in elections since its inception. A more recent attempt at cross-community political mobilization is the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition. Created in 1996 by community activists to ensure that women’s voices and interests would be incorporated into the peace process, it secured two seats in the 1998 assembly elections but lost them in 2003.

Defining the Nation National identities have remained fairly consistent since the onset of the Troubles. Surveys over this period document strong differences between the two populations: Catholics largely identify themselves as Irish Nationalists (Green) and Protestants as Unionists (Orange). It might seem that confessional and theological differences are what shape the national boundaries in Northern Ireland. Yet, differences in religious belief have political significance for only a small minority of largely fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants, such as Reverend Ian Paisley. Rather, national identities are largely defined by orientation toward the constitutional question and reinforced by patterns of social segregation and of marriage within groups. Moreover, variations within each populace complicate the apparent Green-Orange uniformity. Although a British identity has become increasingly strong among Protestants, some working-class Unionists continue to identify themselves as Northern Irish or Ulsterite. And although the predominant identification of Catholics regardless of social class is Irish, a significant minority identifies as Northern Irish. Of course, what being Northern Irish means to these two communities is quite different: for Protestants, it signals distinctiveness from other regions of Britain, whereas for Catholics, it suggests a particular region of Ireland. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Northern Ireland’s long relationship with Republicanism has had a major impact on Irish nationalism. As the Provisional IRA undertook the defense of Catholic urban enclaves during the early Troubles, Sinn Féin promoted its vision of nationalism, which legitimated armed struggle, glorified its martyrs, and propagated an anti-imperialist, socialist ideology. The SDLP offered an alternative vision of Irish nationalism, rejecting armed struggle and arguing for peaceful, democratic change. As the peace process developed, Sinn Féin shifted to an assertion that reunification could be achieved through political means. Among Protestants, Unionist identity is broadly shared; but Unionism as a political movement has fragmented over the past 25 years, and political parties do not necessarily offer clear indicators of the boundaries of nationalist ideologies. Secular Unionists who embrace a view of a civic and multicultural British identity may support the UUP or the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). Religious Unionists and ethno-nationalists who see their identity as Protestant and defend the Union as necessary to protect that identity are likely to affiliate with the DUP, the UUP, or the PUP.

Narrating the Nation In this situation of protracted conflict, political parties have been important in narrating the nation but so, too, have social organizations that seek to advance and develop cultural identities. During the last several decades, cultural associations have mushroomed, advocating particular versions of history and seeking to revive either Irish or Ulster-Scots languages and traditions. In neighborhoods and towns throughout the province, flags and their colors, the Union Jack for Unionists and the Tri-Color for Nationalists, are used to signify political allegiance and to mark ethno-political boundaries. Each group invokes historic events to emphasize their national valor and heroic sacrifice. For Unionists, these include the Siege of Derry, at which Protestant apprentice boys held back a charge by those loyal to the Catholic King James; the Battle of the Boyne, at which William of Orange defeated James; the World War I Battle of the Somme, at which scores of Ulster Protestants were killed; and the Stormont period during which the Protestant Ascendancy was preserved. For Nationalists, they include the Easter Rebellion of 1916; Bloody Sunday in 1972 when Catholics in Derry were shot down by British troops; and the hunger strikes in the 1980s when IRA prisoners starved themselves, sometimes to death, in a collective demand that the British government recognize them as political prisoners. Northern Ireland is well known for the political murals that mark ethnic territories, especially in working-class enclaves of Belfast and Derry. In Nationalist neighborhoods, images of Mother Ireland, Celtic symbols, and Gaelic words prevail, as well as depictions of British imperialism and Unionist intransigence and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Loyalist mural in Belfast, Northern Ireland. (Alain Le Garsmeur/Corbis)

of Republican support for Third World liberation struggles. In Unionist neighborhoods, murals depict paramilitaries as the descendants of the Ulster Volunteer Force during World War I and often combine symbols of Protestantism, such as an open Bible with Masonic symbols that have been long used by the fraternal Orange Order.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Political parties and paramilitary organizations have been important in mobilizing national sentiments. However, even at the height of the Troubles, paramilitary organizations were relatively small. Although few Catholics or Protestants engaged in party activism during the Direct Rule period, parties were able to mobilize substantial voter turnout, generally higher than the United Kingdom average. Ethnic festivals and parades became increasingly important vehicles for mobilizing national political loyalties. The Sinn Féin stronghold of West Belfast has sponsored an annual Feile en Phobaile (Festival of the People) to underscore Irish national identity in the North, and parades are held to mark traditional Irish Catholic holidays such as St. Patrick’s Day. But the parades that have had the greatest political impact in the last several decades have been those of the Loyalist fraternal associations and especially the annual summer marches of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Orange Order. Held in July and August, members of the Order gather to celebrate the Union and to cement Protestant solidarity. Men in traditional Ulster garb and bands playing Loyalist songs march the Queen’s highways, carrying banners that reinforce key elements of Protestant identity and assert their vision of Ulster history. Many of the parade routes are controversial as they pass through Nationalist neighborhoods, banging massive drums and playing music that is sometimes explicitly anti-Catholic. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was an exponential increase in the number of parades, and conflicts over parade routes and behaviors became an important impediment to the peace process. The annual parade at Drumcree in Portadown became a flashpoint for ethnic mobilization, as the Orange Order and its sympathizers would “stand off ” against Catholic residents and even against British troops. The frequent crises generated by these parades made the regulation of marches a key controversy during the peace process. Conclusion Since the 1960s, Northern Ireland has been wracked by a conflict rooted in ethnonationalist identities and claims. Politics and society have been shaped by the competition between Unionism, which insists on maintaining the province’s connection to Britain, and Nationalism, which seeks the reunification of the island and an end to British rule. Both of these nationalisms are reinforced by religious affiliations, with Unionists primarily identifying as Protestants and Irish Nationalists as Catholics. However, the conflict is driven by political belief and perceived ethno-national interest rather than theological differences. Political parties, military and paramilitary organizations, and civic associations all mobilized around these competing visions of the nation, drawing upon collective narratives and symbols to reinforce loyalties to a specific ethno-national identity. These national loyalties are replicated in the social patterns of housing segregation and group separatism in social relations and civil society. Nonetheless, throughout the Troubles, activists and political actors have sought to work across the ethnic divide. Repeated attempts to find a negotiated solution to the conflict and establish power-sharing institutions were resisted by paramilitaries and political parties. However, paramilitary cease-fires in the 1990s opened the door to a renewed peace process, and the governments of Ireland and Britain, supported by the European Union and the United States, took advantage of this opportunity. The peace process resulted in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, and the establishment of a power-sharing government. The peace process, however, has been shaky, and the future of Northern Ireland’s constitutional arrangements and national identity remains uncertain. Selected Bibliography ARK, Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive. http://www.ark.ac.uk. CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet). http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk.

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Cochrane, Feargal. 1997. Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press. Coulter, Colin. 1999. Contemporary Northern Irish Society: An Introduction. London: Pluto Press. Darby, John. 1997. Scorpions in a Bottle: Conflicting Cultures in Northern Ireland. London: Minority Rights Publications. English, Richard. 2003. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hennesey, Thomas. 2001. The Northern Ireland Peace Process. New York: Palgrave. Jarman, Neil. 1997. Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland. Oxford: Berg. O’Leary, Brendan, and John McGarry. 1996. The Politics of Antagonism. 2nd ed. London: Athlone. Ruane, Joseph, and Jennifer Todd. 1996. The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sales, Rosemary. 1997. Women Divided: Gender, Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland. London: Routledge.

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Soviet Union Hugh Hudson Chronology 1914–1918 World War I. The czarist regime, essentially defeated by Germany, collapses during the winter of 1917. 1917 The Russian Revolution. The monarchy falls in February. In October, the Bolsheviks lead a coup to overthrow the all but defunct Provisional Government. 1918–1921 Civil War between the “Reds,” “Whites” (czarist supporters), and “Greens” (peasant anarchists). A military intervention in support of the Whites is led by Great Britain and France but includes the United States and others. 1921–1928 New Economic Policy attempts to restore devastated country through mixed capitalistsocialist economy. Great experimentation in arts, literature, and culture. 1924 Lenin dies in January. A three-year political struggle over succession begins. 1928–1939 Stalinism is established. Collectivization of peasant private lands begins in 1928, leading, together with climatic conditions, to famine in 1932–1933. First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) attempts rapid industrialization. Massive influx of peasants into cities. 1936–1938 Height of Stalinist terror. Show trials of former Soviet leaders, purge of the party, repression of large segments of society. 1939–1945 World War II. September 1939 invasion of Poland by Germany; June 1941 invasion of Soviet Union by Germany. War leads to some 25 million deaths in the Soviet Union. Cold War with the West, led by the United States, follows the end of World War II and lasts until the end of the Soviet Union. 1953–1964 Stalin dies, and Khrushchev emerges as the new leader. Attempted de-Stalinization of Soviet system. The power of the secret police is severely curtailed. 1964–1982 Brezhnev years of initial growing prosperity, followed by economic stagnation. 1985–1991 Gorbachev emerges as the leader of the reform movement, centered on cultural reform ( glasnost) and economic reconstruction ( perestroika). Economy falters. National separatism leads to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. 1991–present Efforts to establish a new political system and economy in Russia under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin is plagued by corruption and growing authoritarianism.

Situating the Nation The post–World War II Soviet Union confronted the issue of nationalism within a complex theoretical and practical universe. The question of some form of “Soviet nationalism” emerged as a result of the October Revolution, which left the theoretically internationalist Bolsheviks in charge of some 90 percent of the old Russian empire. The westernmost reaches of the empire, the Polish, Baltic, and Finnish provinces, established themselves as independent countries, but at the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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end of the civil war, most of the empire remained under a single government. This country contained some 100 separate language groups and cultures ranging from hunting and gathering groups to emerging industrial societies. The problem of nationalism had bedeviled the Bolsheviks prior to the October Revolution, with Lenin engaged in polemics with the Austrian Social Democratic Party, especially Otto Bauer. In a simplistic rejection of modern reality, Lenin took his lead from Marx, who had declared nationalism to be a product of the feudal mode of production. Lenin thus concluded that nationalism was already being undermined by modern imperialism with its disregard for national borders, and thus a problem that was withering away. Until that final withering, every particular case had to be individually analyzed. The general principle, however, remained: the national question (including self-determination) remained subordinate to what the party defined as the general interests of the proletariat and world revolution. To the extent that the national liberation movements of “oppressed” nations, that is, nations living within multinational empires or under colonial domination, were seen as directed against imperialism, those movements should be supported by the party (and “the proletariat”). But no concessions could be made to national sentiments directed against “the revolution.” This philosophy thus justified armed opposition to nationalist movements in Ukraine and Georgia. The young Soviet state was simply too weak to effectively resist independence movements in Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland.

Instituting the Nation The belief that nationalism was a doomed ideology did not prevent Lenin from recognizing Russian nationalism, renamed Great Russian Chauvinism, as one of the primary “distortions” plaguing the young Soviet state. This came to a head in the so-called Georgian Affair. In 1920, Georgia had been recognized by the Soviet state as an independent country. However, in 1921 Stalin and his allies staged essentially a coup in Georgia, purging the Georgian Mensheviks and removing any Georgian Bolshevik leaders who protested this move. But before anything meaningful could be done to address Stalin’s coup, Lenin suffered a series of strokes and then died. Lenin’s death did little to end the problem of nationalism within the Soviet Union. In a manifestation of the logo-centric universe of emerging Stalinism, Stalin solved the problem of nationalism by repeating Lenin’s argument that, in the Soviet Union, nationalism would be “socialist in content and national in form.” In effect, this meant the direction of all political and economic matters from Moscow, where the party and state bureaucracy was overwhelmingly Russian. It further meant that the charge of “national deviation” would play a significant role in the Stalin terror, with particular vengeance in Ukraine. The permitted national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov (Lenin) Lenin was born the son of a provincial nobleman. Having graduated from the university with the gold medal in law, he quickly established himself as the head of the most radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), the Bolsheviks. Lenin, while claiming to be an orthodox Marxist, actually added two constructs unknown to Marx: the concept of the party as the creative historymaking force and general staff of the world revolution; and the theory of imperialism, wherein European imperialism in the 20th century had been able to buy off European workers through expropriation from the colonies, thereby changing revolutionary dynamics from European to world revolution. Lenin successfully led the new Soviet state during the civil war (1918 –1921) through centralizing and militarizing policies dubbed War Communism. Confronted with peasant resistance and economic collapse, he was able to convince the party and government to accept the New Economic Policy (1921–1928), which attempted a mixed capitalist-socialist economy and permitted great experimentation in culture and the arts. The economy gradually improved during the New Economic Policy. He suffered a series of strokes during 1922 and 1923 that limited his ability to direct policy. During that period, Joseph Stalin was able to gradually accumulate power through control of the party bureaucracy and the political police. Lenin’s last efforts in the winter of 1923–1924 to limit Stalin’s influence failed. Lenin died on January 21, 1924, setting off a struggle for power among the Bolshevik leadership.

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“form” included language and cultural traditions, the content of which nonetheless could still be deemed anti-Soviet or bourgeois.

Defining the Nation Under Stalin, and particularly during World War II, Russian patriotism and nationalism became more acceptable. The Russian language remained the respectable lingua franca of the union, and the history of the Great Russian people was presented as the foundation for the unity of the state. In the eastern republics, the Cyrillic alphabet forcibly replaced the Latin in the written form of native languages. In education, the Russian language was emphasized union-wide and became de rigueur for higher education. During the war, cases occurred of Soviet populations initially welcoming the German invaders, most notably in the recently annexed Baltic republics and in Ukraine, where anti-Soviet guerilla units would continue to operate for years after the war. But the vast majority of Red Army and partisan units vigorously and heroically resisted the Nazis, as did the citizens of Leningrad who, despite three years of encirclement and huge losses to starvation, maintained their defenses and loyalty to the country.

Poster from 1951, Stalin as Father of the Nation: “The Great Friend of Children.” (Library of Congress)

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Narrating the Nation Although World War II in many ways provided a definition of “Sovietness”—a sense of shared identity—the Soviet Union emerged from the war as a country where Western influences had penetrated, a situation defined as a major problem by the Stalinist leadership. The war brought a reawakening of various nationalisms that the party could not but theoretically disdain. This was especially true among the non-Russian peoples. A greater sense of local chauvinism was experienced than had been in existence since the Revolution. These instances were especially true in the “new territories”—the Baltic states that reentered the empire in 1940 and western Ukraine. The Russian intelligentsia had also suffered from dislocations. During the war, the intelligentsia had been permitted to receive and develop Western contacts on a level not seen since the mid-1920s. This association was regarded by the party as a type of virus within the body politic. The Russian intelligentsia, in addition, was affected by the new “Russian” nationalism fostered by Stalin during the war, having been permitted to infuse their works with patriotism and to direct them against the enemy. In many ways, the war had seen a return of the nationalism of the old empire. This nationalism included the recognition of the military heroes of the Old Regime, such as Catherine the Great’s commander Gen. Aleksandr Suvorov and Gen. Mikhail Kutuzov, the hero of 1812. The military revisited the old marks of rank, including epaulettes for officers. Saluting once more was required, and discipline was returned to the officers. In all these ways, the intellectual elites were susceptible to what the party labeled infections from the West that were clearly of a nonrevolutionary, if not counterrevolutionary, nature. These developments led the party to draw certain conclusions, among which was a drive for orthodoxy against the dissidents and future possible dissidents. A new orthodoxy had to be asserted quickly and effectively, driving underground those who opposed it if the damage of the war was to be repaired. Thus in 1946 the party was prepared to announce the intense disciplining of the country. The process began in a public way in August and September 1946 when rulings were issued for “Disciplining the Intelligentsia.” The first declaration appeared on August 14 in the name of both the Central Committee of the party and the government. On the surface it chastised two Leningrad literary periodicals, Leningrad and The Star (Zvezda), for having published pieces of literature of no obvious educational or propaganda value. They were accused of portraying the Russian people as crude and of other sins of defaming the people. Two of the country’s leading intellectuals were singled out for special criticism—the satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko and the poet Anna Akhmatova—who were labeled “anti-Soviet, underminers of socialist realism, and unduly pessimistic.” Along with others such as the poet and author Boris Pasternak, the filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein, and great composers Sergei Prokofiev and Dmitrii Shostakovich, they were condemned for N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin) Having been expelled from seminary, Stalin joined the revolutionary movement in Georgia, where he engaged in “expropriations” to fund the Social Democratic Party’s Georgian branch. By 1912 he had obtained membership in the Central Committee. He played a minor role in the 1917 Revolution, but because he was a member of a national minority, he was appointed the first commissar of nationalities. He was then named general secretary of the party in 1922, a post none of the intellectual leaders of the party desired or considered particularly important. Using the appointment powers of that office, Stalin came to dominate the growing party machine and used that bureaucratic power to gradually eliminate political opposition within the party. A skillful and ruthless politician, he consolidated his authority through a series of party purges that, particularly in the years 1936–1938, spread into the general population. Although debate exists regarding how much of the violence of the purges was planned by Stalin and how much resulted from general social dislocations and fear of renewed warfare within society, there is no disagreement that the violence was enormous and that millions of people suffered some form of repression. Stalin’s two major policy innovations were the replacement of the New Economic Policy by the Five-Year Plan, focused on rapid industrialization, and the elimination of private peasant farming through collectivization. The latter was violently resisted by many peasants, resulting in millions of casualties amid famine and mass repression. Stalin’s bumbling performance early in World War II almost led to the defeat of the Soviet Union in the early months of the war. Competent generals managed to save the country, although Stalin then claimed credit for victory. Over 25 million Soviet citizens died as a result of the Nazi invasion. In the midst of planning a new purge, Stalin died on March 5, 1953. He still remains a hero to some in the former Soviet Union, while despised by others.

“neglect of ideology and subservience to Western influence” (Postanovlenie Orgbiuro TsK VKP(b) 1946). Andrei Zhdanov, a party hack and one of Stalin’s long-time thugs, led this assault. Juxtaposed to “bourgeois cosmopolitanism”—in reality, a “crime” invented to disguise officially sanctioned anti-Semitism—Zhdanov trumpeted “Soviet patriotism.” According to the official party journal Bolshevik, Soviet patriotism “expresses the devotion of the soviet people to their socialist fatherland and serves to cement the foundation of the soviet multinational state, rallying all the peoples and nationalities of our country into a united, fraternal family.” Zhdanov queried, “Where can one find another people like ours, or a country like ours? Where can one find such wonderful human qualities?” (Chernov 1949). In many ways, Zhdanov was harkening back to earlier discussions on creating a new Soviet man, one who was freed from such atavistic emotions as “family” and who was able to understand the necessity of working for the benefit of the group (class) as opposed to the individual. Soviet architects and urban planners of the 1920s and 1930s had debated how to build an environment that would help create this new type of person who lived for the collective good, while literature and film of the period provided the image of the new Soviet hero as an essentially N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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desexualized being who lived only for production or defense. For Zhdanov, the new Soviet man was stripped not only of family and sex but also of nation, or at least previously existing loyalties to “bourgeois” constructs of nation.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The postwar drive for Soviet/Russian patriotism and the use of the term soviet narod (“people”) did not displace the theoretical position shared by Lenin and Stalin that nations (natsii) indeed existed and had rights. Stalin (1913) had written: “A nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.” In the postwar period, this equality was expressed in the continuation of the prewar celebration of the “friendship of the peoples.” The translation of literary works, the production of histories of the Soviet Union that attempted to incorporate the histories of all the peoples, and traveling cultural exhibitions served to laud the achievements of the various nations. The number of nations that were now determined as appropriate for inclusion in this celebration was reduced from the initial 192 officially recognized languages with corresponding bureaucratic rights, but the principle of nationalities as the legitimate foundation of a multinational state remained. So, too, did the practice of indigenizing local party and managerial bureaucracies. So strong was this “right” to fill local jobs with local elites that when Khrushchev attempted to moderate the corruption associated with it by promoting an ethnically neutral personnel policy he encountered determined resistance. The Stalinist nationalities policy thus became the basis for some of the worst corruption of the postwar period. The continued use of ethnic quotas meant that members of nationalities residing within their national republics received the greatest advantages. In the postwar Soviet Union, most Union republics were controlled by native elites, whose ability to obtain educational and job preferences rested with their claims to ethnicity. This was particularly true among intellectuals, whose job it was to produce national histories, linguistic studies, and literature. Thus the major cultural creation of the postwar period was that of the cult of the nation, which until the Gorbachev reforms merely had to be semihidden within some ill-defined “socialist” content. Under Brezhnev, nationalist sentiments and claims of discrimination and repression were brewing among Russians and non-Russian nationalities. Russians were quick to argue that the other nationalities were being mollycoddled at their expense. Anxieties were expressed regarding population growth rates among Muslims, who were depicted as threatening to overwhelm European Russia. The Brezhnev regime permitted manifestations of Russian nationalism that exalted N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the supposed virtues of Russia’s rural life as well as the czarist past and even the Orthodox religion. This was most pronounced in the works of the village prose writers, who manufactured a simple, honest, family-centered, even God-fearing past. The writers Valentin Rasputin and Valentin Pikul headed this literary movement, with Pikul throwing in anti-Semitism for good measure. Other manifestations of Russian nationalism could be seen in religious observance and even in the emergence of preservation and environmental societies and movements. The currents of Russian nationalism that had flowed during the Brezhnev years became ever stronger under Gorbachev. The village-prose nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s was surpassed by neo-Stalinists who dreamed of a mythical lost past of strong government, patriotism, law and order, and patriarchal obedience. The group Memory (Pamiat’ ) took center stage in this commingling of Stalinism

De-Stalinization De-Stalinization came to describe the efforts of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who emerged as leader of the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death, to restructure the Soviet Union away from the Stalinist system of repression and secret police control. Specifically, Khrushchev declared an amnesty for some political prisoners and closed many of the forced labor camps, increased availability of consumer goods at reduced prices, and relaxed restrictions on the peasants’ private plots used to produce food for the market. The symbolic act of de-Stalinization was Khrushchev’s so-called secret speech to the 20th Party Congress that denounced the Stalin cult of personality and condemned many of the crimes of the period. With the power of the Stalinists thereby undermined, Khrushchev further attacked the concentration camp system ( gulag). In what is undoubtedly the most significant act of the post-Stalin period, Khrushchev closed down two-thirds of the prison camps and freed a majority of the roughly 2.5 million people in internment. He further curbed the power of the political police and gave more attention to “socialist legality” by revitalizing the legal codes. Khrushchev also attempted to de-Stalinize the economy by pressing for the production of consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry. An effort by the Stalinists within the leadership to remove Khrushchev failed in 1957, and Khrushchev’s reaction demonstrated that de-Stalinization was more than empty words: none of the so-called “antiparty group” was shot. The 22nd Party Congress in 1961 saw additional efforts: the “hero city” Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd; Stalin’s body was removed from the mausoleum on Red Square; and Stalin’s prime henchman, Viacheslav Molotov, was expelled from the party. Along with greater personal freedom and more consumer goods came a cultural thaw. Writers were freed from the restrictions of socialist realist literature and were permitted to publish works that reflected the problems of Soviet life. Aleksander Solzhenitsyn’s portrayal of life and death in a Stalinist camp, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, was the most famous product. Toward the end of the Khrushchev period (1953–1964), some of this limited freedom was restricted as the conservatives in the party became increasingly uncomfortable with change and as many in the party came to fear Khrushchev’s economic and political reorganizations. But the Soviet Union was a far better place in 1964 than it was in 1953, and the concept of bringing socialism back to its humanistic roots would reemerge under Mikhail Gorbachev 20 years later.

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and 19th-century official nationality. Even more disturbing was the so-called “Red-Brown” alliance between the neo-Stalinist and neo-Nazis gangs who had first emerged in the 1970s. Russian ultranationalism found its parliamentary expression in the Liberal Democratic Party headed by the demagogue Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Among the non-Russian peoples, the Gorbachev period saw the revitalization of nationalist movements on a scale not witnessed since the 1920s. Glasnost fed discussions of matters from history to the environment with a common claim that “freedom” for the nation would somehow make it all better. The Baltic republics led the way with cultural manifestations of nationalism in such forms as songfests, leading rapidly to demands that the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 be renounced (and thus the justification for Latvia’s, Estonia’s, and Lithuania’s inclusion in the Soviet Union). Popular fronts emerged in all three republics, bringing together nationalists and independence-minded local communists. In the rosy picture of Baltic history being produced, the infatuation with fascism and the emergence of large, powerful fascist parties in the 1930s were conveniently ignored. With genuine voting opportunities, nationalists filled the Baltic parliaments. In 1987, the Estonian government declared economic autonomy, followed the next year by a claim of “sovereignty.” In 1989 both Lithuania and Latvia also claimed sovereignty, leading to a “war of laws,” with the Baltic states declaring that republics’ laws had precedence over Soviet law. In Lithuania, the Sajudis Party under Vytautus Landsbergis won a majority in the Lithuanian parliament in 1990 and declared independence, which Moscow rejected. Bloody confrontations with Soviet forces broke out in January 1991 in Lithuania and Latvia, but Gorbachev refused to unleash massive force, and the violence was limited. Ukrainian nationalism, maintained among intellectuals since the 19th century, received another boost with the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. The Ukrainian Popular Front for Perestroika (Rukh) emerged in 1989 calling for economic and cultural autonomy with an emphasis on Ukrainian language. The following year, former dissident Vyacheslav Chornovil was elected mayor of Lviv. In 1991 a referendum asked whether voters desired an “independent Ukraine”; the proposition passed. The former communist leader turned Ukrainian nationalist, Leonid Kravchuk, was elected president. But an independent Ukraine soon saw expressions of ethnic violence against Jews and conflict between Orthodox and Uniate Christians in western Ukraine. It further saw conflict with Russia over the Red Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, which the Ukrainian government sought to claim, and over the Crimea, which had been presented by Khrushchev to Ukraine in a relatively meaningless gesture while the Soviet Union existed but which took on significance now, especially for much of its highly Russified population. In the Caucasus, nationalism expressed itself first and foremost in inter-ethnic conflict, which the Soviet government had until then held in check. In 1988 a nationalist majority of the Armenian-dominated, autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijan Republic demanded reunification with Armenia. Azeris responded by murdering dozens of Armenians in the Azerbaijani town of Sumgait. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Conflict between Armenians and Azeris followed over the course of the next two years, all in the name of the nation. In 1990 Soviet troops fired on demonstrators in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, to suppress a nationalist movement there, adding fuel to an already volatile situation. In Georgia conflict emerged between the Georgians and the Abkhazian minority demanding its independence from Georgia at the time when Georgians were demanding theirs from the Soviet Union. Georgian nationalists called for the restoration of the brief independence the republic had experienced from 1917 to 1921. In April 1989, Soviet troops broke up with significant loss of life an independence rally in Tbilisi directed as much against Abkhazian demands as for Georgian independence. In 1990 former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, leader of the nationalist coalition “Round Table–Free Georgia,” headed a new government that declared its independence. But almost immediately this government was at war with an autonomous republic in its territory—South Ossetia—that also demanded independence from Georgia. In central Asia a similar pattern unfolded. In 1986 Gorbachev attempted to rein in the endemic corruption in Kazakhstan by removing the Brezhnev-era party chief Dinmukhamed Kunaev. Gorbachev selected a Russian as the party replacement, which became the excuse for nationalist riots directed against Russians. Soon ethnic riots broke out in neighboring Uzbekistan, this time directed by Uzbeks against Meshkhetian Turks who had been deported to Uzbekistan from Georgia in 1944. Then in 1990, Kirgizs murdered Uzbeks in the town of Osh. The stimulation of nationalist emotions had become by 1990 an excuse for significant violence within the Soviet Union. In most cases, with the Baltic republics being the primary exception, these emotions were manipulated by communist leaders turned nationalists. They sought to seize control over the government of the former republics, using mass demonstrations and threats of violence, and to proceed to establish systems of corruption. No one manipulated the nationalist sentiment more than Boris Yeltsin who, as president of Russia, met in December 1991 with the presidents of Ukraine and Belarusia to divide up the spoils of the Soviet Union and create a new “Commonwealth of Independent States” in its place. In Ukraine and Belarusia, old party hacks had emerged as presidents of independent countries, waving the banner of nationalism while instituting regimes of corruption and repression. Former party bosses re-created themselves as presidents in central Asia as well. The 1990s in the former Soviet Union was a period of cronyism and corruption, with those seduced by the siren song of nationalism left to wonder what had actually been achieved. Even within Russia the creation of a true national identity proved difficult, as Russia had never truly been a modern nation-state but, rather, an imperial power. Some 21 ethnic national republics remained within its borders, comprising approximately 15 percent of the population. Zhirinovskii’s right-wing Liberal Democratic Party spent most of the decade contesting with the supposedly left-wing new Communist Party under Gennady Zyuganov to see N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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who could beat the drum of wounded national pride the loudest. But nationalism expressed itself in the decade primarily in the war between Russia and the breakaway Chechnya region. First Boris Yeltsin and then his hand-picked presidential heir, former KGB agent Vladimir Putin, dragged the country into two wars against the Muslim rebels in the Caucasus. Anti-Islamic and growing anti-Western sentiments, in part sponsored by the revived Orthodox church (itself engaged in its own war against Catholics and Protestant missionaries), seemed to give Russian nationalism some definition by the end of the decade. By 2005 nationalism could perhaps be seen as taking a new and more democratic turn in Ukraine with the overturning of the rigged election concocted by outgoing president and accused murderer Leonid Kuchma by forces allied with Viktor Yushchenko, who eventually was elected president. The so-called Orange Revolution spoke to desires within the country to end police repression, crony capitalism, and pseudo-democracy. By 2007, however, the Orange Revolution had disintegrated among petty political bickering and continued social dissention over whether Ukraine should look primarily to the West or to Russia for its identity. Even less promising was the so-called Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia that saw the ouster of president Eduard Shevardnadze by forces led by Mikheil Saakashvili. The new president appeared primarily concerned about Georgia’s territorial integrity, determined to restore Georgian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and engaged internationally in condemnations of Russia as the primary source of Georgia’s multiple economic and social problems. In many ways, Saakashvili appeared a throwback to early-20th-century nationalist leaders in central and eastern Europe, with a single-minded focus on foreign affairs. The problem of creating a unifying “national” consciousness and mythology thus remained following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The attempt by the Stalin regime to amalgamate older Russian nationalism with a new “Soviet” consciousness had generated ethnic hostilities across and within the former Soviet republics. The experience of World War II had indeed provided a sense of interdependence for that generation, and for a brief period one might well have been able to speak of a new Soviet nationalism. But with the emergence of a new post– World War II generation to positions of cultural and political leadership, the consciousness of interdependence provided by the war evaporated. How does one create a sense of community, of shared values and goals, among peoples as varied as those of the former Soviet Union? The former Soviet Union of the first decade of the 21st century looks all too much like the hostile, embittered land of czarist Russia, where national hatreds were glorified as political principles. Selected Bibliography Beissinger, Mark R. 2002. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. New York: Cambridge University Press. Brandenberger, David. 2002. National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Chernov, F. 1949. “Burzhuaznyi kosmopolitizm i ego reaktsionnaia rol’.” Bol’shevik 5 (March 15): 30–41. Golovenchenko, F. 1949. “Vysoko derzhat’ znamya sovetskogo patriotizma v iskusstve i literature.” Bol’shevik 3 (February 15): 39–48. Goldman, Marshall I. 1992. What Went Wrong with Perestroika. New York: W. W. Norton. Gorenburg, Dmitry P. 2003. Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hough, Jerry F. 1997. Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Jack, Andrew. 2004. Inside Putin’s Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. Lewin, Moshe. 1985. The Making of the Soviet System. New York: Pantheon Books. Miner, Steven Merritt. 2003. Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Postanovlenie Orgbiuro TsK VKP(b) o zhurnalakh “Zvezda” and “Leningrad.” 1946. Pravda (August 14 and 21). Stalin, I. 1913. “Marksizm i natsionalnyi vopros.” Prosveshchenie 3–5 (March–May), republished in I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia (1946), vol. 2: 290–367. Suny, Ronald Grigor. 1993. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Suny, Ronald Grigor, and Terry Martin, eds. 2001. A State of Nations: Empire and NationMaking in the Age of Lenin and Stalin. New York: Oxford University Press. Taubman, William. 2003. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: W. W. Norton. Tucker, Robert C. 1969. The Marxian Revolutionary Idea. New York: W. W. Norton. Von Geldern, James, and Richard Stites, eds. 1995. Mass Culture in Soviet Russia: Tales, Poems, Songs, Movies, Plays, and Folklore, 1917–1953. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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Spain Elisa Roller Chronology 1479 Union of the Crowns (Aragón and Castile) by the marriage of King Ferdinand and Isabelle. This marks the origins of the Spanish state in its present form. 1898 Spain loses its last colonies, including Cuba, with its defeat against the United States in the Spanish-American War. 1923 Spain becomes a dictatorship led by Gen. Primo de Rivera. 1931 Second Republic established in Spain. 1936 Beginning of Spanish Civil War. Catalonia and the Basque country side with the Spanish Republican forces and suffer heavily for their opposition during the ensuing Franco regime. 1939 Spain becomes a dictatorship led by Gen. Francisco Franco. 1975 Death of Gen. Francisco Franco. Restoration of the monarchy—Juan Carlos I is proclaimed king. 1977 First democratic elections held in Spain. 1978 Spain adopts its first democratic constitution. 1980 Jordi Pujol, leader of Convergència i Unió (CiU), wins the first elections to the Generalitat de Catalunya. The CiU remains in power until 2003. 1981 Failed attempt of a coup d’état by Civil Guard Antonio Tejero following the resignation of Spain’s first democratically elected prime minister, Adolfo Suarez. 1982 In the first alternation of power since the advent of democracy, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), the Spanish Socialist Working Party, is elected by absolute majority in a general election. Felipe González becomes prime minister until 1996. 1996 The center-right Partido Popular (PP), Popular Party, is elected to office for the first time in Spain’s democracy, with José María Aznar as prime minister. 1998 The Basque separatists, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), unilaterally declare a cease-fire that ends 10 months later. 2006 ETA declares a cease-fire.

Situating the Nation Spain has been a constitutional monarchy with a democracy in place since the death of Gen. Francisco Franco in 1975. It is made up of 17 regions, or “autonomous communities” as they are commonly referred to. Some regions, like Catalonia (in northeast Spain, bordering France) and the Basque country (in northern Spain, also bordering France), have strong yet very different nationalist movements. While the Catalan nationalism movement is moderate and nonviolent, Basque nationalism has evolved as a movement divided by those that advocate violence as a means to achieving Basque independence and those that embrace a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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more moderate form of separatism. The presence of these two strong nationalist movements has been instrumental in shaping Spanish national identity. Thus, national identity in contemporary Spain is a product of a long process of struggle to establish a democratic Spanish state combined with a strong set of regional identities. Consequently, Spanish national identity has been forced to coexist with a strong sense of regional identity. For many Basques and Catalans, being “Spanish” is seen as something artificial, imposed by the Spanish state and the product of centuries of political turmoil. Thus, defining what it means to be “Spanish” is very much linked to how these different regional identities and the Spanish state itself have evolved over time. As ever, history provides us with clues to some of these answers. The historical context within which Spanish national identity has evolved has helped shaped attitudes both toward the Spanish state and the nations and regions that comprise it. For Spain’s “historic communities” such as Catalonia and the Basque country, the evolution of Spanish national identity has been characterized by the parallel development of two very different forms of minority nationalism: the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements. Although the presence of strong nationalist movements has certainly influenced Spanish national identity, particularly in the 20th century, it has also been accompanied by a political, economic, and social transformation of Spain as both a nation and a state. The 20th century saw Spain undergo two dictatorships, one democratic republic, one civil war, a postwar economic miracle, and a successful transition to democracy. These events have certainly influenced how Spanish national identity has changed.

Instituting the Nation The modern Spanish state, as we know it today, had its origins in the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469 and the subsequent Union of the Crowns of the Catholic kings in 1479. Catalonia, which had until then belonged to the Crown of Aragón, and the Basque country, which had belonged to the Crown of Castile, thus became part of a new Spanish state. Unity was guaranteed in the short term by a united front against Muslim aggression. After the Muslims had been driven out of Spain, Castile remained the dominant unifying force despite growing resistance in the peripheries of the Spanish state. The unity of the Spanish state, as well as a new notion of Spanish national identity, was thus based on concepts of conquest and occupation of the various regions that make up the Iberian peninsula. Despite the territorial unification that followed the Union of the Crowns of Castile and Aragón and the conquest of the Kingdom of Granada with the expulsion of the Moors, a peculiar situation developed in which territorial unification did not necessarily coincide with complete political unification. Different regions of Spain, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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notably Catalonia and the Basque country, were allowed to keep their own administrative arrangements, although they technically belonged to the Spanish state. During the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain established a presence throughout the world, but regions like Catalonia and the Basque country remained fairly marginalized from the rest of Spain’s imperial ambitions. During the 18th century, the Spanish monarchy attempted to further unify the country by exerting greater control over economic, political, and social matters. The traditional model of a highly centralized state favored by the French was adopted and was designed to assimilate all of Spain’s regions into a structure modeled on traditional Castilian cultural and political practices. While the rest of Spain continued to suffer from inherent poverty, corruption, and the inefficient administration of the Bourbon dynasty, the Basques and Catalans continued to enjoy growing economic prosperity, becoming one of the cores of the uneven and overdue process of industrialization. The Catalans’ successful economy and their modern, outward-looking views contrasted sharply with their limited participation, like the Basques, in the Spanish political process. This lack of incorporation into the political process contributed to many Catalans’ and Basques’ sense of differentiation. It also hindered the development of a uniform Spanish national identity. By the 19th century, some Basque and Catalan intellectuals even began to question the existence of the Spanish state. Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, the process of state-building in Spain had not succeeded in completely integrating other existing communities, something that had succeeded in the unification of city states elsewhere in Europe, most notably in Germany and Italy. As would occur during the latter part of the Franco regime (1939–1975), the Restoration (1876–1923) and the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–1930) were characterized by the state forcibly trying to assimilate the different regions and cultures that made up Spain. These policies generated a backlash in the form of growing Basque and Catalan nationalist sentiment, as well as increasing demands for democratization and regional autonomy. Thus, by the time the Spanish democratic transition began in 1975, the Spanish state faced two fundamental problems. The first and perhaps most important problem was on how to embark on a successful transition to democracy, an experience that had not been successful in Spain’s history. A second problem regarded how to persuade many Spaniards, particularly Basques and Catalans, to both embrace this new political system but continue to be loyal to the Spanish state. A sense of a united Spanish national identity seemed far away. The answer came with Spain’s 1978 Constitution. The Constitution lays out a nontraditional model of territorial organization for the Spanish state. It is neither a centralized model (like France) nor a federal model (like Germany or the United States). Instead, it comprises a multilayered system of 17 regions or “autonomous communities” (comunidades autónomas) but retains some of the traditional administrative units in the form of 50 provinces (diputaciones). Thus, the Spanish state is neither a multinational state (such as Canada) nor a single nation-state N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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(such as France). The Constitution is also very much a product of compromise. On the one hand, the Constitution recognizes the various regions’ right to autonomy for either political or historical reasons. Cultural and regional differences are recognized within a constitutional framework that guarantees regional governments a certain degree of self-government. At the same time, it emphasizes the unity and indivisible nature of the Spanish state. The political and institutional arrangements provided by Spain’s 1978 Constitution have very much shaped Spanish national identity in the post-Franco era. This unique system of governance allows Basques and Catalans to have their own regional autonomy yet provides for the unity of the Spanish state. In a sense, this allows for multiple forms of identity; in other words, you can be Catalan and Spanish or Basque and Spanish at the same time, without one identity threatening the other.

Defining the Nation Although the origins of the Spanish state go back to the Union of the Crowns in 1479, the formation of contemporary Spanish national identity had its origins in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the 19th century. The French invasion in the early part of that century would shape Spanish national identity in the century to come by providing it with myths and references to draw from. These myths would frequently be referred to during both the Primo de Rivera and Franco dictatorships and used to glorify Spain’s position abroad and its sense of historical continuity. Along with the unstable political situation that characterized the first few decades of the 20th century, the growth of nationalist movements in various regions led to the emergence of a conservative authoritarian right-wing movement that would dominate Spanish politics for much of the 20th century with its own strand of nationalist discourse. Second, with the loss of the Spanish empire, notions of a Spanish national identity were weakened by the emergence of nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country with a strong social base. Spanish national identity toward the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries continued to revolve around its imperial identity. The loss of the Spanish empire and particularly Spain’s 1898 defeat in the Spanish-American War exposed the inherent weaknesses of Spanish national identity. The imperial nature of Spanish identity, while sustainable for several centuries, proved unable to adapt to the needs of a modern state. In addition, the disastrous political and economic consequences of the Spanish-American War weakened the Spanish state and its control over its population by breaking the links between the state and Spanish identity. The Spanish state lacked the resources to effectively carry out policies that could lead to a greater sense of national identity and loyalty. With this separation between state and national identity, a new multiple form of national identity began to emerge in Spain’s regions. Thus, the loss of the Spanish empire and the events of 1898 contributed to the prolonged disintegration of Spanish identity in Catalonia and the Basque country. Although by no means the single most important factor, it was no coincidence that the rapid development of many of the nationalist movements in both Catalonia and the Basque country coincided with the events surrounding the 1898 tragic defeat. In Catalonia, the events of 1898 marked the moment when a growing group of Catalan intellectuals and bourgeoisie began to refer to Catalonia as a “nation” rather than as a “region” and to Spain as the “state.” The loss of Cuba also significantly hurt the Catalan economy, for which exports to the former Spanish colony had constituted a valuable part. In addition, the ensuing taxes levied by the central government on commerce and industry to finance the debts accrued by the costly conflict affected important sectors of the Catalan and Basque economies, primarily its upper and middle classes. Thus, the rapid industrialization and economic success of Catalonia and the Basque country helped reassert Catalan and Basque identity, to the detriment of an emerging Spanish national identity. This new sense of distinctiveness, and the growing instability that seemed to characterize Spanish politics, would prevent a sense of uniform Spanish identity to develop throughout the 20th century. During the Franco regime (1939–1975), N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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King Juan Carlos I King Juan Carlos I, grandson of King Alfonso XII who was exiled after the establishment of the Second Republic in Spain (1931–1936), is largely credited with guiding Spain through its transition to democracy following the death of Gen. Francisco Franco in 1975. King Juan Carlos faced a difficult task for two reasons. First, Spain had never experienced a successful transition to a democracy; the short-lived Second Republic was marked by widespread chaos and instability leading to the Spanish Civil War. Second, by the time of Franco’s death in 1975, many sectors of Spanish society, notably Basque and Catalan nationalists, no longer believed in the unity of the Spanish state. Through skillful negotiation and a form of consensual politics based on a series of pacts, King Juan Carlos managed to steer Spain’s political forces to a successful democratic transition. He is highly popular in Spain, and the royal family generally is seen as an important symbol of Spanish identity.

Spanish national identity was very much imposed from above, but by 1975, the skepticism of what it meant to be “Spanish,” which had characterized the late 19th century and 20th century, returned in full force. It was only with a successful transition to democracy in the late 1970s that a new sense of Spanish national identity began to form.

Narrating the Nation As described above, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many Basque and Catalan intellectuals began to view the Spanish state as one composed by regions, each possessing a unique national identity, culture, and language that, it was argued, should benefit from a high degree of autonomy. They began to advocate a policy of national solidarity and compromise, with mutual respect for other cultures and languages, by resisting demands for total assimilation within the Spanish state. On the cultural and linguistic fronts, the latter part of the 19th century was characterized by a “renaissance” of regional cultures with a renewed emphasis on regional languages and literature. This cultural revivalism along with the role of economic interests and disenchantment with the Spanish state detailed above combined to form the leading impetus behind the development of nationalist movements within the Spanish state. This movement was partially inspired by nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe promoting Romanticist ideas and a new form of cultural nationalism. By the beginning of the 20th century, the so-called Catalan and Basque “problem” increasingly began to preoccupy the Spanish political elite, especially with the introduction of universal male suffrage, and even led to the proposal of a military N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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“solution” during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. The Catalan and Basque bourgeoisie had grown increasingly bewildered at the inability of the Spanish state to foster industrial development and economic restructuring and were frustrated with the Spanish state’s inherent corruption and inability to impose law and order. The debate on the chaotic condition of the Spanish state intensified, with a growing sense that autonomy was preferable to enduring the corruption and misadministration of the Spanish central government. Thus, the conflict between centralist-unitary forms of statehood and a more decentralized arrangement played a key role in the consolidation and transformation of the Spanish state. This conflict crystallized in the ongoing power struggle among a variety of movements within Spanish society, which proved to be continuous obstacles to the creation of a modern nation-state. Furthermore, and in spite of the internal ideological divisions of Basque and Catalan nationalism, the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931 led to an intensification of the “regional problem.” The Constitution established by Spain’s Second Republic provided for autonomy statutes for the three historic nationalities—Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia—with the recognition that the previous state-building and political integration had failed to include these communities. This brief period of regional autonomy was abruptly interrupted by the political disintegration of the country with the eruption of the civil war, followed by the Franco dictatorship. The recognition by the Spanish republican government that the regional problem was inseparable from the need to transform the Spanish state ensured the loyalty of many Catalan and Basque nationalists to the Second Republic, until its demise at the end of the civil war. Following the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the dictatorship set up by Gen. Francisco Franco dealt with the decentralizing efforts of the Second Republic by imposing a regime that refused to recognize national, cultural, or linguistic differences among the Spanish regions. A single language, culture, administrative structure, political system, and economic structure based on the “sacred unity of the homeland” were implemented to consolidate the centralist grip of the regime. Fear of social chaos led to the adoption of a strict, state-imposed ideology based upon the purist notion of “one state, one homeland, one nation.” This thinking was to remain one of the untouched foundations of the regime’s ideology throughout its existence, part of a long-standing political tradition in Spanish history to reject any attempts at internal territorial, political, and cultural reconciliation. By the end of the Franco regime, demands for regional autonomy went hand in hand with demands for the political liberalization of the Franco regime. Nevertheless, it was during this period that the Spanish state began to undergo an intense process of state-building, with the creation of a large administrative and bureaucratic network designed to carry out the regime’s policies and ensure the maintenance of opposition-free law and order. This process of statebuilding was justified by the regime’s continual references to a Spanish pátria, or fatherland, rather than to a Spanish nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Considered by many to be the most dominant figure in Spanish history since the 16th century, Francisco Franco was the generalissimo of the Spanish armed forces and the authoritarian leader of Spain from 1936 until his death in 1975. (Library of Congress)

Despite an official government policy of cultural and linguistic censorship, Catalan and Basque civil society flourished, particularly during the last few years of the regime. Clandestine opposition groups, students, and intellectuals met on a regular basis to try to coordinate some sort of opposition to the Franco regime. The state’s refusal to acknowledge existing cultures and languages within Spain that did not conform with the so-called Castilian model, the attempt to homogenize Spanish society by forcefully imposing a culture and ideology linked to the Castilian history and language, and the excessive centralized nature of the state led to the emergence of nationalist movements with two main objectives. On the one hand, these groups wanted to overthrow the dictatorship and restore democracy. On the other, these groups denounced the Franco regime’s offensive against Spain’s diverse makeup of varying ethnic identities and cultures as well as its objection to the demand for autonomy for Spain’s “historic” regions. Experiences in exile and of the excesses of both the Spanish Civil War and World War II led many of the opposition democratic forces, particularly on the left, to incorporate the demand for the recognition of Spain as a multicultural state into the struggle for democracy. Resistance to the regime was particularly fierce in Catalonia and the Basque country. The state-sponsored repression directed against particular core values ingrained in the Catalan and Basque nationalist movements, such as language, only served to strengthen their mobilization. Demands for autonomy began to go hand in hand with demands for democratization of the Spanish state and protection of regional languages and cultures. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ETA ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) is a Basque separatist group that has fought a violent campaign for independence since 1959. The ETA’s main objective is the establishment of an independent state in northeastern Spain in the mountainous northeastern Spanish provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra and the southwestern French departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. It was founded in 1959 when it broke away from the larger Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and claimed its first victim in 1968. It has subsequently killed over 800 people in its violent campaign against the Spanish state. ETA, whose name is a Basque-language acronym for Basque Homeland and Freedom, has also kidnapped around 100 individuals and wounded thousands. During the Franco regime (1939–1975), it mainly carried out attacks against members of the regime or security forces. ETA’s strategy has been less focused post-Franco, resulting in its use of car bombs against civilians. In 1980 alone, ETA’s operations claimed 118 lives. In 1998 it declared a short-lived cease-fire, but its influence has rapidly declined.

With the death of Franco in November 1975, the Catalan and Basque problems emerged at the forefront of Spanish politics and would continue to do so throughout the democratic transition, playing a prominent role in the consolidation of the democratic process. By this time, certain sectors of Spanish society, most notably in the Basque country, no longer believed in the legitimacy of the Spanish state. Clearly, the attempts by much of Spain’s political elite during the 19th and 20th centuries to impose a centralized, uniform vision of the Spanish state had backfired. Nevertheless, the only real precedent for the concession by the central government of significant measures of political and institutional autonomy to the regions had been set during the Second Republic with well-known, unfortunate consequences. By the 1970s, however, the general consensus among most political forces opposing the Franco regime was that the status quo would merely perpetuate the out-of-date administrative and institutional structures of the Franco regime. It was thus felt that something new was needed. The transition to democracy resulting from the death of Franco in 1975 has often been described as dominated by consensual politics and cooperation among the negotiating political forces. One of the most contentious issues became the question of regional autonomy and the political and administrative arrangements that would have to be made to accommodate regional demands for decentralization. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, most politicians accepted the idea that, unless the issue of the nations and nationalities that made up the Spanish state was addressed, little progress would be made to achieve a widespread acceptance of the Constitution and its political arrangements. It was widely acknowledged that a refusal or reluctance to address the issue of regional autonomy and cultural, linguistic, and historical differentiations would endanger the consolidation and establishment of the post-Franco democratic regime. This new awareness helped political leaders find a stable solution to the conflict. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Finding the solution proved to be a difficult task since it entailed an entirely new way of conceptualizing the Spanish state. It also meant cooperating with nationalist forces in Catalonia and the Basque country, something some of Spain’s political elite were reluctant to do. This new conceptualization of the Spanish state involved the formal recognition of nationalist demands for regional autonomy (to preserve the freedom of the “historic” nationalities and other regions) as well as guaranteeing regional participation and representation in the Spanish state. As a result, Spain’s democracy has been consolidated by addressing the regional problem. This is not to say that Basque and Catalan national identities are less strong than they were in the 1970s. On the contrary, these identities have flourished with newfound political freedoms and regional autonomy. What has changed, however, is that Spanish national identity is now based for the first time on a successful political transition. Being Spanish today can mean being loyal to a democratic regime and unified state, where regional identities can coexist peacefully with a sense of Spanish national identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Spain’s current political system, with its highly decentralized system of autonomies, is considered a unique form that both conserves the unitary character of the state and allows for varying forms of self-government. Despite the stability and widespread acceptance of the system, however, there is one area that remains unresolved: the Basque problem. The Basque separatist group, Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA]), has murdered over 800 people since

Catalan Nationalism The wealthy northeastern region of Catalonia became part of Spain with the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469 and the subsequent Union of the Crowns of the Catholic kings in 1479. During the Middle Ages, Catalonia was influential in the Mediterranean, primarily through trade and commerce. Until the second half of the 17th century, it enjoyed high levels of autonomy within the Spanish state, but this came to an abrupt end when successive Bourbon kings attempted to create a more unified and centralized Spanish state. An important nationalist movement emerged in the 18th century, at first characterized by the protection of Catalan culture and language. This movement became more politicized during the 19th century when the Catalan bourgeoisie became more involved in a political movement demanding greater autonomy from Spain. During the Franco regime (1939–1975), Catalan language, culture, and demands for autonomy were not recognized by the regime, which had an important effect on the emergence of a strong nationalist movement. Today, Catalonia enjoys high levels of autonomy, but the nationalist movement, which does not advocate separating from the Spanish state, remains strong.

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1968 in its campaign for independence from Spain. Since breaking away from the larger Basque Nationalist Party in 1959, ETA has fought for an independent state. The evolution of Spanish national identity has thus been hindered by the lack of a strong sense of Spanish identity or loyalty to the Spanish state in the Basque country. Whereas Catalan nationalists have been able to find a happy medium given wide-ranging self-governing powers and a special place within Spain’s unique constitutional framework, Basque nationalism has evolved in a different way. Basque identity has historically evolved in a more “exclusive” fashion, with the separation of Basques and non-Basques, primarily due to the difficulty of the language. Furthermore, in the early years of Spain’s transition to democracy, political polarization and violence in the Basque country were direct responses to the repressive nature of the Franco regime, violence that spiraled out of control into a self-reinforcing and uncontrollable cycle. Thus, with the exception of a brief cease-fire in 1998–1999, the violent campaign has continued virtually uninterrupted in the Basque country throughout both the Franco regime and the more recent democratic transition. Besides the unresolved Basque issue, Spanish national identity can be described as multifaceted. On the one hand, given its historical legacy, Spanish national identity is characterized by a conservative discourse that sees Spain as being different from the rest of Europe, a unitarian, centralized vision of Spain that only grudgingly accepts regional differences. The other, so-called “liberal” discourse equates Spain with Europe and sees the major components of national identity as being modernity and Europeanism. For Spain’s other competing identities, this picture is even more complex. For Catalans and Basques, Spain is often seen as a problematic political structure. Nevertheless, whereas Catalans see themselves as “solving” the Spanish problem, more radical Basque nationalism sees Spain and the Basque country as two fundamentally different historical and sociological entities that should be separate. Although “being Spanish” was for many years equated with the Franco regime, the stability of Spain’s political system, its rapid economic development, and its full membership in the European Union demonstrate how Spanish national identity has dramatically changed. Selected Bibliography Alvarez-Junco, J., and A. Shubert, eds. 2000. A History of Spain since 1808. London: Macmillan. Balfour, S. 1997. The End of the Spanish Empire 1989–1923. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Carr, R., ed. 2000. A History of Spain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conversi, D. 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. London: Hurst & Company. Díez Medrano, J. 1995. Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Guibernau, M. 2004. Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition and Democracy. New York: Routledge. Heywood, P. 1995. The Government and Politics of Spain. London: MacMillan. Keating, M. 2001. Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.

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McDonough, P., S. H. Barnes, and A. Lopez Pina. 1998. The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. McRoberts, K. 2001. Catalonia: Nation Building without a State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mar-Molinero, C., and A. Smith, eds. 1996. Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula. Oxford: Berg. Preston, P. 1986. The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. London: Methuen. Shafir, G. 1995. Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia and Estonia. Albany: State University of New York Press. Smith, A. 1996. Historical Dictionary of Spain. London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Solis, F. L. 2003. Negotiating Spain and Catalonia: Competing Narratives of National Identity. Portland, OR: Intellect.

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Algeria Catherine Lloyd, with Ghania Azzout, Samira Hanifi , and Ouassila Loudjani Chronology 1525–1830 Ottoman rule. 1830 French military expedition lands at Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers. 1832 Emir Abdelkader begins a resistance to the French, which continues throughout the century under different leaders. 1848 Algeria becomes a department of France. 1926 North African Star (ENA) formed by Messali Hadj. 1936 A Muslim congress of ulama in Algiers proposes integration. 1943 Ferhat Abbas publishes Manifesto of the Algerian People. 1945 (May 8) The French massacre Algerian nationalist demonstrators at Setif, Kherrata, Guelma, and Saida. 1952 First oil exploration permits in the Saharan region. 1954 (November 1) Outbreak of the Algerian revolution and war of independence. 1955 French emergency law and censorship is enacted. 1956 Establishment of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and the announcement of the Soummam Declaration, the platform of the National Liberation Front (FLN). 1960 (December 11) FLN organizes the first mass demonstration of Algerians to reaffirm the principle of self-determination. 1962 A cease-fire is arranged. (March) Tripoli Congress and signing of the Evian Accord. On July 5, Algerian independence is proclaimed. 1963 Ahmed Ben Bella is elected the first president. Creation of Sonatrach, a state-controlled enterprise to develop oil and gas. 1964 First congress of the FLN: the Charter of Algiers sets out its program. 1965 Ben Bella is overthrown by Houari Boumedienne, who promises to end corruption. 1971 Algeria nationalizes oil and gas. 1978 Death of Boumedienne, who is replaced by Chadli Bendjedid. 1980 Berber Spring protests establish Berber Cultural Movement (MCB). 1984 Family code enacts shari’a law for women. 1988 (October) Riots in Algiers spread across the country following the collapse of world oil prices, inflation, and unemployment. 1989 The new constitution is ratified; opposition parties are allowed to contest elections. Formation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). 1990–1991 First Gulf War: FIS leads mass demonstrations and wins 55 percent of the vote in municipal and regional elections; later it seems poised to gain an absolute majority in the second round. 1992 The army dissolves the National People’s Assembly, and a High State Council chaired by Mohammed Boudiaf takes power. A state of emergency is declared, the FIS is outlawed, and all its local and regional authorities are dissolved. (June 29) Boudiaf is assassinated by a member of his bodyguard linked to Islamist groups. As violent attacks on the security forces increase, the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) emerges as the dominant militia.

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1999 (April) Abdelaziz Bouteflika is elected president unopposed. (September) Concorde Civil (policies to restore peace and security) is approved by a referendum. Members of the AIS (the FIS armed wing) are amnestied. The violence since 1992 is thought to have cost more than 150,000 lives.

Situating the Nation Algeria (whose capital city is Algiers) is the largest of the three states of the Maghreb, stretching from the Saharan heart of Africa to the Mediterranean Sea. In 1962, the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria was formed after an exceptionally violent war against more than a hundred years of French colonial rule. Anticolonial struggle is one of the persistent themes of the country’s national identity. Nationalist discourses refer to the “colonial night,” which was transformed into a more hopeful future through struggle. The constitution provides that the state religion is Islam, and the official language is Arabic, although Tamazight is now recognized as a national language and French is widely used. The country’s geographical position is reflected in its membership in international organizations. Algeria played a leading role in the nonaligned movement, became a member of OPEC in 1969 and the Organization for African Unity (known as the African Union since 2002) since its formation in 1963, is an associate member of the European Union (since 2002), and participates in programs such as MEDA. During a brief period of democratic opening in the late 1980s, an Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was poised to win legislative elections. In early 1992, the military stepped in and cancelled the elections. In the following conflict between Islamist militias and the security forces, which lasted almost a decade, assassinations, disappearances, and massacres took place, costing some 200,000 lives. Since 1999, Algeria has experienced a period of growing stability and prosperity, even though some lethal armed militia attacks persist. Algeria’s economy has been largely determined by the exploitation of hydrocarbons, an attempt at rapid industrial development, and substantial emigration of semi- and unskilled workers, especially to France. Immediately after independence, there was a mass exodus of European settlers (known as pieds noirs), which left a substantial gap in the professional and managerial elite that higher education worked hard to fill, with the help of solidarity workers. Many harkis, that is, Muslims who had supported the French during the war of independence, also left the country at this time. The discovery of substantial oil and gas deposits in the Sahara complicated the decolonization process and provided the basis for industrial development. Hydrocarbons were nationalized in 1971 and remain the single most important component of Algeria’s economy. After independence, many of the old colonial landowners expected to be able to return, so they left their affairs with local managers. In the early 1960s, to alleviate chronic rural poverty, there was an experiment in workers self-management N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and then, under President Boumedienne, land collectivization. The rural population remains at 41.7 percent. Algeria’s income per capita is U.S.$1,630 (2001), and in recent years unemployment has been falling spectacularly—from 30 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2006. Algeria is on the northern rim of the Mediterranean Sea, sharing borders with Morocco, Western Sahara, and Mauritania to the west, Mali and Niger to the south, and Libya and Tunisia to the east. It is the second biggest country on the continent of Africa, comprising an area of 2,380,000 square kilometers, although four-fifths of Algeria’s surface area is the Sahara. Its population has tripled since independence and stood at 32 million in July 2006. Life expectancy is 70.03 years for men and 72.8 for women, while infant mortality (2000) is 54.2 per 1,000 for boys and 47.8 per 1,000 for girls and the fertility rate is 2.54 (2000). Young people aged 15 to 24 form 23 percent of the population. Although they share much cultural and historical heritage, relations with neighboring Morocco have been affected by the latter’s claims to portions of Western Algeria (Sand War, 1963) and Algerian support for the Polisario Front, a Sahrawi movement seeking independence for the Western Sahara (which has been occupied by Morocco since 1975). Approximately 165,000 Sahrawi refugees N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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are based in four Polisario-managed refugee camps near the Algerian city of Tindouf. These tensions have made it difficult to consolidate the Maghreb Arab Union, established in 1989. Algeria’s proximity to Europe, and its colonial ties to France, enabled a culture of migration to develop in Algeria. Algerian emigration has helped to meet national and individual aspirations by providing foreign exchange, returning support for the family back home, and alleviating unemployment. In 1962 on the eve of independence, there were 410,000 Algerians living in France, and migration continued in a regulated form during the 1960s as Algerians were recruited into the automobile industry. After the early 1970s, families began to reunify, and by 1999 there were some 700,000 Algerians living in France, together with some 1 million French citizens of Maghrebi origin and another estimated 300,000 North African Jews. Public hostility toward Algerians has frequently caused tension between the two countries, notably in 1973 when racism in France prompted the Algerian government to suspend immigration. Algerian migrants, often from rural backgrounds in Kabylie and employed in unskilled jobs in heavy industry, provided an important support for the nationalist revolution. Many of them supported Messali Hadj’s North African Star (ENA), later the Algerian National Movement (MNA), until 1956 when the newly ascendant National Liberation Front (FLN) became the dominant party. During the war of independence, the FLN raised funds through a system of donations and fines for failing to respect its proscriptions on tobacco, alcohol, or patronage of French cafés, nonrespect of Ramadan, or marriages or circumcisions that had not been officially sanctioned. After independence, remittances were an important source of foreign exchange for the new republic, and immigration helped keep levels of unemployment (and hence discontent) down. The diaspora did not identify with either side during the conflict of the 1990s but rather offered informal support to a range of political movements. Most of the major Algerian parties have offices in France, and the Algerian government provides for 680,000 registered voters in France; consulates in most countries with Algerian populations open polling booths during legislative and presidential elections. Algeria has had a particularly turbulent history. It was colonized during the second millennium BC by the Phoenicians and Romans, invaded in the seventh century AD by Arab armies carrying the message of Islam, and part of the Islamic empire that extended to Spain and Portugal by 711. Algerians still look back with nostalgia to the enlightenment of Islamic Andalusia. To counter the influence of the Catholic kingdoms in Europe in the 15th century, the region became a vassal state of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the early 1500s. Under Turkish rule, the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria were excluded from government, Turkish became the official language, and the country was controlled by a Turkish dey, who divided the country under the rule of Caids or tribal leaders. During three centuries of Ottoman rule, the region’s economy was integrated into the permeable, mobile society of the Mediterranean. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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French colonial rule after 1830 brought fundamental changes in government. During decades of resistance and economic hardship, the Algerian Muslim population stagnated at around 3 million, and the French military and settlers expanded across the coastal cities and into the hinterlands of Saharan Algeria. Algeria was a French colony between 1830 and 1848, then fully assimilated as three departments of France from 1848 until independence in 1962. Colonial settlement deprived the original population of their lands and denied them any rights. The European population grew from 833,000 in 1926 to 984,000 in 1954 (forming 13 percent of the population by the 1950s compared with 6–8 percent in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco). By the mid-1950s, 79 percent of this population had been born in Algeria. The uprising of November 1, 1954, emerged from a much older political tendency, with its roots in the migrant working class. Algerian nationalism can be traced back to the integrationist Young Algerians, composed of the liberal, educated Algerian elite who demanded equal rights with the non-Muslim French. In the 1930s, the movement of the ulama (religious teachers) focused on cultural and religious demands, whereas the radical, eventually nationalist current in Algeria emerged from rural laborers and working-class emigrants to industrial France. The short-lived Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), founded in 1926 and reincarnated as the MNA, began a process of reclaiming Algerian identity and self-determination. The war of independence (1954–1962) was violent and protracted. After independence, there was no process of reconciliation, or even recognition of the brutality that had taken place on both sides. In the 1950s, only a few accounts of the torture used against Algerian nationalists by the French escaped censorship. Recent memoirs have documented the atrocities committed against Algerian nationalists, including rape and torture of women. Only in 1999 did the French government officially recognize the war, which it had previously described as “operations” or “events.” In the following year, the newspapers Le Monde and L’Humanite published the “Appel des Douze,” signed by distinguished historians, human rights activists, and opponents of the war in the 1950s, calling for both sides to accept that atrocities had taken place during the war and for the French authorities to recognize their use of torture.

Instituting the Nation Different groups in Algeria commemorate or relate to different key actors, but they all relate to the theme of historic resistance. Women’s groups often refer to el Kahina, the Berber queen in the 680s, or to Lalla Fatma N’Soumer, who led resistance to the French during the 1830s. The emir Abdelkader, who mobilized against and fought the French between 1832 and 1847, is remembered in popular culture. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Emir Abdelkader (1808 –1883) Abdelkader was a member of a noble family, claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammed. He was well traveled and educated, and when the French invaded Algeria in 1830, he was at the forefront of resistance in Western Algeria. Between 1832 and 1842, he waged guerilla warfare against the French, with some notable successes. Stories about Abdelkader emphasize his learning and chivalry in contrast to the brutal tactics of the French. On one occasion, he is thought to have released French prisoners because there was not enough food. Faced with defeat, he surrendered in 1847, but the French broke their promise to allow him to go to Alexandria, imprisoning him at Amboise until 1852. Upon promising not to intervene in Algerian affairs, he was deported to Turkey and later moved to Damascus. There he intervened to protect Christians during disturbances and focused on literary and theological work. After independence, Abdelkader’s remains were returned to Algeria.

Others recall the early, sometimes integrationist, nationalist leaders such as Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas, or the individuals who pushed them aside by initiating the insurrection of November 1994 and who were involved in active service with the FLN during the 1950s, such as Ahmed Ben Bella, Houari Boumedienne, Chadli Bendjedid, Mohammed Boudiaf, Liamine Zeroual, and the current president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Collective actors are also notable, during the war of the 1950s, the mujahideen and the moudjahidates (women resistance fighters), notably Djamila Bouhired, Djamila Boumaza, Djamila Boupacha, and Hassiba Ben Bouali. The status of moudjahid entitles the bearer to a lifetime’s pension. The Algerian state is slowly changing from a highly centralized and authoritarian one to a more accountable form of government. The president is elected on national suffrage, eligible for two five-year terms, and it has a bicameral legislature —the National People’s Assembly and the upper house, the Council of the Nation. The lower house is composed of 389 members (24 of whom are women), comprising members of 9 political parties and 30 independents. The upper house has 144 members, two-thirds of whom are elected by a college composed of members of communal and departmental people’s assemblies, and the remaining third appointed by the president of the republic. The independence of the Algerian judiciary is guaranteed by article 138 of the Constitution. The Constitution (amended in 1979, 1988, 1989, and 1996) provides for a multiparty state. All parties must be approved by the Ministry of the Interior, and a law of 1997 provides that political association must not be “based on differences in religion, language, race, gender or region.” The FLN and its armed wing, the ALN, were key actors in the struggle for independence. During this period, the command was divided between the internals, in charge of the wilayat or military regions, and the externals, initially based in Cairo and aiming to gain foreign support and to raise funds. At independence N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Oujda Group One of the external bases of the ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) during the struggle for independence in the 1950s was Oujda, a Moroccan town on the frontier with Algeria. There, a group formed around the chief of staff of the ALN, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, that imposed a military-backed government in preference to the FLN’s government-in-exile. Since then, the Oujda men have played a dominant role in Algerian politics. After he overthrew Ben Bella in 1965, Boumedienne served as president until his death in 1978, after which his associates continued to exert a powerful influence behind the scenes. Bouteflika, who has been president since 1999, was part of the Oujda group. The group’s key contribution was to confirm the role of the military in Algerian politics. It also helped to produce a unitary Arabo-Islamic narrative of the struggle for national liberation, which erased earlier nationalist groups and marginalized the Kabyles, often referred to as the Berbers.

there was a struggle for power between politician Benyoucef Benkhedda and other representatives of the provisional government (GPRA) who had negotiated the Evian agreements between the French and leaders of the FLN such as Ben Bella and Boumedienne. For two months during the summer of 1962, it seemed that Algeria might descend into civil war. The group led by Ben Bella and Boumedienne triumphed and focused on the building of national unity. The risk of this focus was a tendency to erase the complex historic origins of Algerian nationalism in favor of a monolithic construction privileging the role of the FLN. The philosophical and cultural foundations of the Algerian revolution and of the new republic lay in a socialist, even populist ideology and the politics of anticolonialism in which politics and identity were intertwined. The preamble to the Constitution refers to “the long resistance to attacks on Algerian culture, values and the fundamental components of its culture: Islam, Arabness and Tamazight identity.” It emphasizes the unity of the Algerian people behind the FLN to “shed its blood in order to assume their collective destiny in liberty, the re-found national cultural identity and to give itself authentically popular institutions.” Especially after the decline of Nasser’s Egypt, Algeria became “the longrange artillery platform of revolutionary third-worldism” (Stora 2003, 22), known through the writings of Franz Fanon for many in the Anglophone world. Many Algerian nationalist intellectuals were/are much less well known and have been infrequently translated—for example, Mouloud Mammeri, Kateb Yacine’s Nejma, Mouloud Feraoun, or Tahar Djaout. Assia Djebar is widely known for her work on women in Algerian history and her critique of contemporary Algeria. For the first 25 years, this resistance to external aggression and unity of purpose behind the FLN was only challenged intermittently. After 1988, however, serious divisions and conflicts began to appear, which resulted in the 10-year civil conflict. These divisions were implicit in postcolonial Algeria, whose national identity was based on uncompromising and mutually exclusive concepts of Arabo-Muslim, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Berber, and Islamist identity. Hugh Roberts points to the complex mix that held the nation together during the Boumedienne period: “the original outlook of the leaders of the historic FLN, . . . the Arabo-Muslim conception of Algeria’s cultural identity, . . . [combined] with an ambitious development strategy, an egalitarian social policy and a populist discourse, . . . [tempered] with a pragmatic attitude to both the French cultural legacy and le fait berbère” (Roberts 2002, 148).

Defining the Nation At independence the new constitution defined Algeria as Arab and Muslim. But Berbers experienced this ethno-cultural definition of the nation, as holders of a common language and religion, as “effacing [them] and all the other various influences which have historically interacted” (Stora 2003, 22). Berbers (Amazigh), the descendants of the original indigenous inhabitants of North Africa, are traceable to the 5th century BC. While cities and the coast were Arabized during the 7th century AD, most of the countryside remained Berber until Arab invasions began to penetrate the countryside in the late 11th century. By the end of the 18th century, the Berbers were confined to inaccessible areas, such as the high mountains, distant oases, and desert plateaus, where the vast majority of Berbers live today. These areas are Kabylia (Djurdia Mountains) southeast of Algiers, the Aures Mountains southeast of Constantine, and Ouarseni Massif southwest of Algiers. After independence, the FLN government determined to Arabize the country as a means of making a break with the past; hence, Arabic was the only official language of Algeria. Berber political parties focused on the resulting linguistic disadvantage, and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) split from the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) in 1963. The FFS called for official status for Tamazight, for a secular, pluralist polity, and for greater autonomy for Berber-dominated regions and more Berber input into central policy decisions. In 1989, a second Berber political party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), was formed, focusing on Berber cultural rights as well as broader democratization issues. Th e two parties formed the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) for joint action. In 1999, the RCD joined the coalition government, the first time since independence that a Berber-dominated party was part of a ruling coalition. The challenge to the Algerian government by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other Islamic parties during the 1980s and 1990s constituted a new challenge for the Berbers, especially in the call for Islamization and Arabization. The appeal of the Islamists was perceived as a threat to Berber aspirations, and in recent years fundamentalist militias (notably the Groupe Salafist pour la Predication et le Combat or GSPC) have retreated into Kabylie, where they have been responsible for periodic attacks. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Narrating the Nation The myths that created the Algerian image of a unique nation was one of resistance, of a generation of men—the (female) moudjahidates were rarely mentioned —who had been martyred for the nation or gifted in their intransigence and capacity for survival. Places of memory were dedicated to national heroes who had resisted different waves of colonialism, notably the emir Abdelkader, who fought the French for 15 years. The Place Abdelkader in central Algiers is dominated by a heroic sculpture of the emir mounted on a horse, and other places, such as the mosque and university Abdelkader in Constantine, many schools, and streets, are named after him. There are references to Abdelkader in popular culture, as in Cheb Khaled’s song “Abdel Kader.” Heroes of the war of independence are commemorated throughout Algeria’s cities and towns; on a walk through the center of Algiers one encounters, for instance, the streets Didouche Mourad, Larbi ben M’Hidi, Ben Boulaid, and Boudjemaa Souidani. To commemorate the 20th anniversary of independence in 1982, a huge monument was built to the million martyrs on the hill at the Riadh el Feth, dominating Algiers. The statue depicts three gigantic, stylized palm leaves at the foot of which are three statues of moudjahidine. The square on the seafront by the old mosque Djamaa el Djedid was renamed the Place des Martyrs. The idea of Algeria as a revolutionary and anticolonial state formed in the fulcrum of resistance was reinforced by representations of the war of independence, notably through Pontecorvo’s classic film The Battle of Algiers.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The struggle against the French mobilized part of the population of Algeria, but it did not fully unite them. On the eve of independence, some 900,000 people left the country for different reasons, the European colonialist pied noirs as well as the harkis. Even the FLN was divided on the future shape of the Algerian state. To impose some unity on this complex society, mobilization took place through the mechanism of a one-party state, and radio and television fell under central authority. The constitution allowed for one religion and one language, at least in theory. The FLN government established mass organizations, notably trade union, women’s, and youth organizations, to channel social movements. Since the conflict with Islamic fundamentalists during the 1990s, the Algerian government has introduced new controls over religious activities. While the Islamists may have been defeated militarily, they continue to attempt to influence everyday life, in a context characterized more by market values than those of anticolonial socialism. The Ministry of Religious Affairs provides financial supN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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port to mosques, paying the salary of imams, although mosque construction is funded through private contributions. In February 2005 the ministry created an Educational Commission charged with developing a Koranic syllabus, supervising the hiring of teachers for the madrassas, and controlling the qualifications and practice of all imams. The government appoints imams, provides general guidance, and approves sermons before they are delivered publicly during Friday prayers. The government also monitors activities, has prohibited the use of mosques as public meeting places outside regular prayer hours, and convokes imams to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in disciplinary cases. In September 2005, eight imams in Annaba were sanctioned by the Ministry of Religious Affairs because they had refused to pray for two diplomats who were kidnapped and later killed in Baghdad. Amendments to the penal code in 2001 established strict punishments for anyone other than a government-designated imam who preaches in a mosque or for any person, including government-designated imams, who acts “against the noble nature of the mosque” or acts in a manner “likely to offend public cohesion.” The government requires established religious groups to obtain official recognition prior to conducting any religious activities and has authorized the Protestant, Catholic, and Seventh-day Adventist churches to operate in the country. Algeria has several daily newspapers, which produce a circulation of 1.4 million copies a week. Six newspapers are owned by the state, and 26 are privately owned or controlled by political parties. A further 20 bimonthly or monthly periodicals have a total circulation of 300,000 copies per month. Until the 1990s, the National Television Company (ENTV) broadcast a limited schedule, and because its programs tended to reflect government views, it became known as la chaîne unique. The Chadli government introduced satellite television in 1989 as part of a policy of liberalization. Satellite television was launched at the Riadh el Feth commercial center, the shop window of the government’s policy of liberalization. The satellite dish, which could be imported free of tax to Algeria, was thus not an elite privilege as in other Arab countries. Those who could not afford to formally subscribe found experts who linked households to a central dish through communal subscriptions and inventive electronics. European television channels and more recently the Arab satellite stations like Al Jazeera and Al Arabia competed with ENTV. Connection to satellite television meant that viewing hours were dramatically extended, enabling those confined to the home (especially women) to watch a wide range of programs. Initially, Islamic fundamentalist groups condemned the paradiaboliques as responsible for exposing the population to temptation. Satellite dishes and the Internet have enabled Algerians to extend their view of local events by giving them access to global media. In May 1998 the Algerian government moved toward the liberalization of its media policy with a draft organic law on information, which was intended to lead to further private investment in audiovisual businesses and to changes in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Satellite dishes adorn overcrowded city apartment blocks in Algiers, Algeria, in 2004. (Jack Dabaghian/Reuters/Corbis)

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regulation and ownership of Algerian television. However, accusations of corruption have halted the development of the media interests of the privately owned Khalifa corporation. Conclusion The Algerian national idea was legitimized in the early years through anticolonial rhetoric, supported by revenues from oil and gas that allowed the government to subsidize food, health, and education. This resource enabled the population to achieve a reasonable standard of living, despite serious pressure on housing in particular. Muslim religious identity and the Arabic language, which had been the basis for denial of citizenship under French rule, became key components of the new national identity. By the 1980s, this apparent unity was challenged by the Berber population, but also by groups, especially women, who pressed for their rights in the face of new restrictions. The conflict of the 1990s and support for the FIS revealed the depth of popular discontent, but the turn to religious fundamentalism, though it highlighted profound divisions within society, was relatively short-lived and never achieved sustained popular support. Since 1999 Algeria has been slowly moving toward a more open, pluralistic society, with some of the characteristics of a liberal market economy and an increasingly self-confident civil society. Selected Bibliography Aissaoui, A. 2001. The Political Economy of Oil and Gas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alleg, H. 2006.The Question. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Orig. pub. 1958.) Djebar, A. 1989. Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade. London: Quartet. Fanon, F. 1965. “Algeria Unveiled”: Studies in a Dying Colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press. (Orig. pub. 1959.) Feraoun, M. 1953. La Terre et le sang. Paris: Le Seuil. Feraoun, M. 1957. Les Chemins qui montent. Paris: Le Seuil. Le Sueur, J. 2001. Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Mammeri, M. 1956. La colline oubliee. Paris: Plon. Meynier, G. 2002. L’Histoire intérieure du FLN. Paris: Fayard. Roberts, H. 2002. The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity. London: Verso. Stora, B. 1991. Histoire de l’Algerie Coloniale 1830–1954. Paris: La Decouverte. Stora, B. 2003. “Algeria/Morocco: The Passions of the Past—Representations of the Nation That Unite and Divide.” In Nation, Society and Culture in North Africa, edited by J. McDougall, 14–34. London: Frank Cass. Yacine, K. 1956. Nedjma: Roman. Paris: Seuil.

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Iran David N. Yaghoubian Chronology 1796–1925 Reign of Qajar shahs. 1890–1892 Tobacco Revolt: a nationwide boycott of tobacco products forces cancellation of the British tobacco concession. 1905–1911 Constitutional Revolution forces Qajar shah to accept creation of a constitution and parliament. 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement: Great Britain and Russia formally recognize their spheres of economic and military influence in Iran. 1925–1941 Reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi brings a 15-year period of intensive infrastructural, legal, social, and economic reforms. 1941–1945 Allied occupation of Iran: Reza Shah is forced to abdicate to his 19-year-old son Muhammad Reza due to close German ties. Press and political freedoms return. 1951–1953 Oil nationalization movement: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) holdings in Iran are nationalized by the government of democratically elected prime minister Muhammad Mossadegh. 1953 CIA Operation Ajax: The CIA and British MI-6 initiate a coup d’état to overthrow Mossadegh and return autocratic power to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. 1953–1979 Dictatorship of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi: Iran becomes a client state of the United States and its primary anti-Soviet ally in the region. 1963 Ayatollah Khomeini exiled after an anti-regime speech and subsequent protests in which hundreds of religious students are killed by the Iranian military. 1969 Nixon Doctrine and Twin Pillars Policy: Iran and Saudi Arabia become the primary pillars of U.S. defense strategy in the Persian Gulf. 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution: nationwide protests involving nearly all sectors of Iranian society succeed in overthrowing the Pahlavi regime. 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War: Iraqi invasion initiates brutal World War I–style trench warfare and stalemate. Iran suffers roughly 1 million casualties. 1988 Downing of Iran Air 655: USS Vincennes accidentally shoots down an Iranian civilian airliner killing 290 civilians while attacking Iranian naval vessels in Iranian territorial waters. 1993 Dual containment policy: U.S. effort to isolate Iran and Iraq via sanctions largely fails due to lack of international cooperation. 2002 Axis of evil: U.S. president George W. Bush declares that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constitute an “Axis of Evil” that threatens the United States and its allies.

Situating the Nation Iran’s contemporary borders surround what was the heartland of the ancient Achaemenid Persian empire, which was established in 559 BC and, within 50 years, would become one of the largest empires in world history, stretching N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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from Egypt and Greece east to what is now Afghanistan. While the term “Iran” (Land of the Aryans) has been used alternatively with “Persia” or “Pars” to refer to the region since political consolidation by the Indo-Iranian Achaemenid Dynasty, it would not be until the 1930s that the name Iran would officially supplant Persia. The political and military achievements of the Achaemenid shahs (kings), such as Cyrus the Great (reigned 559–530 BC) and Darius the Great (reigned 521–485 BC), and the culture and civilization generated by their conquests and governance constitute one primary root of contemporary Iranian nationalism and one of two core national myths (see sidebar on Shahname). The ruins of the Achaemenid administrative city of Susa and of the ceremonial capital Persepolis mark the physical center of the Iranian homeland, and while they are nationally and internationally recognized as traditional Persian archaeological treasures, the two sites are particularly dear to Iranians of royalist and secular nationalist orientations, as well as to Zoroastrians. The country’s contemporary external borders—which at times have encompassed much if not all of what is now the nation of Iraq—were approximated in the early modern era by the Safavid Dynasty (1501–1722), which established “Twelver” Shiism as the state religion and forcibly converted the majority of the population. It is a direct result of Safavid rule that slightly less than 90 percent of Iranians are adherents to this branch of the Islamic faith today, while around 8 percent are Sunni Muslims and the remainder are Zoroastrians, Bahai’s, Armenian and Assyrian Christians, and Jews. The prior conquest of the Persian Sassanian empire (226–651) by Arab Muslim armies in the 7th century, and the subsequent conversion of large portions of the population to Sunni Islam, had by the 10th century begun to supplant or meld Zoroastrian and Persian monarchal

Shahname The Shahname (Book of Kings) written by the Persian poet Ferdowsi in the late 10th century is the Iranian national epic, melding history and myth as it tells of the glorious and heroic deeds of ancient Aryans and Persian kings up to the 7th century when Iran was conquered by Arab-Muslim armies. Penned in beautiful Persian (Farsi) prose almost devoid of Arabic terminology at a time when Arabic and Turkish regimes were competing for control of Iran, the Shahname is revered as a historical, literary, as well as linguistic masterpiece—and is one of a handful of works responsible for the persistence of Persian culture and language. Eternally popular with Iranians and Persian-speakers worldwide, the Shahname is read aloud in teahouses and parks throughout Iran, and its recitation is for some both a passion and occupation. Rumored to have been slated for destruction shortly after the Iranian Revolution due to its significance to pre-Islamic monarchal traditions and Iranian royalists, Ferdowsi’s tomb in Tus was not only spared but has since undergone extensive renovations. The tomb’s survival and continued importance as a somber site of national pilgrimage underscore the centrality of Ferdowsi and the Shahname to Iranian nationalism, and perhaps the pragmatism of the Iranian government.

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traditions, culture, and myths with those of the Islamic faith. However, Iran’s conversion to Shiism in the 16th century under Safavid shahs of Turkic origins, who derived legitimacy from claims to Islamic lineage and who concurrently sought to adopt the mantle of Persian monarchial heritage, perpetuated the dynastic traditions and culture embodied in the Shahname, while simultaneously instilling a reverence for the religious inspiration and heroic example left by the Shiite imams and reinforcing Islamic cosmology. Thus, the Safavids renewed Persian dynastic and cultural heritage and propagated Shia Islam as an equally powerful and appealing facet of Iranian national identity. Shah Abbas the Great (reigned 1587–1629), who ruled at the zenith of Safavid power, selected Isfahan as his imperial capital and economic hub. As well as fortifying the city with parks, bridges, and libraries, Shah Abbas commissioned a vast square surrounded by ornate mosques, a palace, and a bazaar complex that has remained one of Iran’s most treasured historical sites and tourist destinations. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Until 1979 the site was known as Maydan-e Shah (King’s Square or Royal Square). After the Iranian Revolution, the name was officially changed to Maydan-e Imam (Imam’s Square) to reflect the post-monarchal, Shia-oriented character of the new regime. Nevertheless, Isfahani bazaar merchants and local craftsmen openly persist in referring to the square as Maydan-e Shah, despite contemporary governmental decree—and perhaps in direct opposition to it. The complex tensions and competition as well as points of convergence between the two primary strands of contemporary Iranian nationalism represented by the square—Persian and Shiite—became firmly intertwined by the close of the Safavid era. As a result of this Safavid legacy, in the modern era any Iranian government to be deemed legitimate by the people must carefully calibrate its emphasis on both.

Instituting the Nation Despite important contributions by a handful of intellectuals and secular nationalist political leaders such as Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh (see sidebar on Operation Ajax), the actors most responsible for defining modern Iranian nationalism have been Iranian shahs and prominent Shiite clerics of the 19th and 20th centuries. The Safavid shahs, whose empire fell in the wake of an Afghan invasion in 1722, were the last Iranian leaders who attempted to garner legitimacy by making broad claims to continuity in both Persian dynastic and Shia Islamic religious lineages, and who sought to wield the political and religious authority that was the implicit birthright of this dual heredity.

Operation Ajax In 1951 the Iranian Majles (parliament) led by the democratically elected and widely popular prime minister Muhammad Mossadegh nationalized the holdings of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) due to dissatisfaction with the unequal division of profits from Iran’s oil concession to the British. A global boycott of Iranian oil was subsequently imposed by the British navy that shattered the Iranian economy over the next two years. While the Truman administration remained essentially neutral, in 1953 the incoming Eisenhower administration—prodded by effective British lobbying in a climate of increasing fear of communism—became increasingly concerned about a potential communist takeover of Iran due to worsening economic conditions and political instability. Thus, a joint CIA/MI-6 covert operation code-named “TP-Ajax” was initiated to overthrow Mossadegh and return autocratic power to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. On August 19, 1953, the coup d’état was successful, bringing the oil nationalization movement to a close and marking the beginning of what would be a strong client relationship between Iran and the United States. As 25 years of anti-Soviet alliance and stability in Iranian oil production for the United States also brought the equivalent duration of despotic rule to the Iranian people, the seeds of anti-Americanism and of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 were sown.

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Between 1796 and 1979, political and religious authority was separated, as successive shahs of the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties inherited the rights and traditions of the political lineage and utilized the institution of monarchy to pursue their political and economic agendas. Religious affairs during this period—which until the 1920s included important legal and educational duties—remained largely the province of the Shiite ulema (“the learned” clergy), operating through the clerical establishment and a vast network of mosque communities throughout the country. Qajar rule (ca. 1796–1925) had an unintended impact on Iranian nationalism and on the role of the ulema in political affairs. Because the Qajar government was too weak to dissolve strong corporate groups within Iranian society such as the ulema, the guilds, bazaaris, and nomadic and semi-sedentary tribes—as had been largely accomplished during the 19th century by Ottoman and Egyptian governments—these groups gained power during the 19th century in Iran. The Qajars were also too weak to oppose the Russians and the British, who established spheres of economic influence in the north and south of the country (respectively) by the mid-19th century and were granted vast concessions to Iranian resources and capitulatory economic agreements. Incensed by Qajar ineptitude and what was perceived to be the selling out of the country’s sovereignty and resources, Iran’s Shiite ulema—who had both the necessary organizational capacity and the perceived moral and ethical legitimacy—led the country’s strong corporate groups in open opposition to the regime’s policies, eventually joining with secular intellectuals at the helm of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911. Thus, several things were inadvertently achieved by and for Iranian nationalism under Qajar rule, including the realization of the citizenry’s power when unified for a common cause, the solidification of the role of the ulema as defenders of the Iranian people and the interests of the nation, and the generation of antiimperialist sentiment that served as a vehicle for national unity. The Pahlavi era (1925–1979) largely reinforced this trend. While authoritarian rule and the rapid modernization, industrialization, and secularization that it enabled eliminated many of the institutions and structures that gave power to Iran’s corporate groups, political repression focused largely on the secular political opposition, and thus the ulema bided their time. Reza Shah Pahlavi (reigned 1925–1941) was responsible for perpetuating Persian monarchal traditions through his establishment of a new dynastic lineage and for the “purification” of modern Farsi (Persian) by purging Arabic and Turkish terminology. His intent to locate the roots of ancient Iranian nationalism and identity, combined with his strong anti-British, anti-Soviet sentiment, led him to establish close ties with Nazi Germany, which was, according to German philologist Friedrich Schlegel and advocates of the Aryan invasion hypothesis, a fellow Indo-European nation of common ancestry. It was in this context in 1935 that Reza Shah decreed that the nation be referred to officially as Iran instead of Persia. While successful in many areas of domestic reform, Reza Shah’s increasing political, economic, and ideoN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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logical ties to Germany would be his undoing, as he was forced to abdicate the throne to his son Muhammad Reza and was sent into exile following the Soviet invasion of August 1941. The ulema survived relatively unscathed, though now chafing under combined British, Soviet, and American occupation. Muhammad Reza Shah (reigned 1941–1979) was seated on the throne by the invading Allies and served as a figurehead throughout the four-year occupation, under which secular political parties ranging from the communist Tudeh to the liberal nationalist National Front emerged and rallied for control against each other and the monarchy, as well as against British interference and the AngloIranian Oil Company (AIOC). Between 1945 and 1953, the popularly elected Majles (the parliament) maintained its newly acquired strength, and open debate flourished in what had finally become a free and vibrant press. It was in this context that the Swiss-educated reformer and veteran Iranian politico Dr. Muhammad Mossadegh rose to prominence as a leading Majles member and head of the National Front. Emboldened by overwhelming demonstrations of support on the streets and in the Majles, Mossadegh led the movement to nationalize the AIOC and was ultimately elected prime minister in 1951. The 1953 coup ended this brief period of Iranian democracy and the oil nationalization movement, ousted Mossadegh, and reseated Muhammad Reza on the throne as dictator. It was followed up by a concerted effort to liquidate the secular opposition, which by the following decade left the ulema as the best-organized indigenous opposition. The 25 years of Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule are considered a golden age by Iranian nationalists of the royalist orientation, who laud the country’s infrastructural and economic advancements, rapid Westernization, and close ties with the United States and Israel during this period. The same period is viewed dimly by Iranians of liberal nationalist and Islamist orientations, who recall the dramatically unequal distribution of wealth and the poverty of the rural and urban lower classes, political repression and rampant corruption, the shah’s megalomania, and a range of domestic and foreign policy issues that offended the religious and cultural sensibilities of many traditional Iranians. Outside of the elite royalist camp, the vast majority of Iranians clearly agreed by 1979 that the dictatorial abuses of the shah and the client relationship with the United States had to end. Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, in which the ulema played a leading organizational role as they had in 1905–1911, the secular opposition was once again crushed as Ayatollah Khomeini—wielding political and religious authority —seized power and instituted a form of Islamic government that was radical and unprecedented within Shia Islamic tradition, thus ending the rule of the kings and sending most monarchists into exile. Although expressions of positive royalist sentiments are not tolerated in the Islamic Republic, which pragmatically purveys an amalgam of Islamic and Persian cultural nationalism narrated via selective use of history, they are nevertheless palpable when visiting sites such as Persepolis, Susa, and Tus (see sidebar on Shahname) and run strong in the large exile community. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The actors in the contemporary Islamic Republic most influential in attempting to define and perpetuate the revolutionary Shia Islamic form of Iranian nationalism are the ulema, religious students, conservatives, Iran-Iraq War veterans and their families, and to an extent the urban lower classes. They organize via the mosque community, the military and volunteer forces (basij), and charitable foundations and endowments (bonyads). Funding comes largely from state coffers, which are replenished by the predominantly petroleum-based rentier economy. Yet, like the Qajars and Pahlavis, the government’s impact on Iranian nationalism is also indirect, as disenchantment with the regime perpetuates the hope of political alternatives. Reformists in Iran—many seeking full representative democracy —attempt to garner legitimacy by claiming their vision as true Iranian nationalism. These groups organize and agitate in the Iranian Majles, through reformist and opposition newspapers, and upon thousands of Internet Web sites and “blogs,” but as yet are no match for the resources and juridical power of the state.

Defining the Nation The Iranian national idea is based on a combined ethno-linguistic (Persian) and religious (Shiite) amalgam that is not congruous with the global distribution of Persian speakers or Shia Muslims. Its modern borders demarcate early Qajar-era territories, which were established through defensive warfare and subsequent treaties with Ottomans, Russians, and the British in the 18th and 19th centuries, rather than being constrained or enabled by the character or limitations of the natural landscape. Iran’s highly variegated physical terrain, which includes vast deserts, mountain ranges, and jungle and offers no major navigable rivers to enable communication and transportation, has in fact been a primary hindrance to national unity, especially before the development of a modern transportation infrastructure in the early to mid-20th century. In the contemporary era, Iran has demonstrated no propensity toward irredentism, while it fiercely guards the borders it has struggled to maintain since the mid-19th century. The historical record clearly illustrates this: Iran has neither initiated war with, nor attacked outside its historic borders since 1747, whereas since then its territory has been invaded and occupied repeatedly, three times in the 20th century alone. Most devastating was the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), which caused over 1 million Iranian casualties and devastated the country’s infrastructure and economy. In the face of repeated attack and occupation by Russian/ Soviet, British, American, and Iraqi forces during the 20th century—sometimes acting in concert, sometimes independently—Iranian governments have been concerned with maintaining sovereignty over the country’s dwindling territories. Part of this effort includes staving off the separatist impulses of large ethnolinguistic minorities in border regions, such as the Kurds and Azeri Turks in the Iranian northwest and the Baluchis in the country’s southeast. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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One of the strategies Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (reigned 1941–1979) used to maintain stability and sufficient allegiance of ethnic and religious minorities, and that has been adopted by the government of the Islamic Republic (1979–present), is via official statements and policies that assert the “inclusive” nature of Iranian nationalism and the important place of minorities in the country’s history and national fabric. In this pragmatic formulation—which differs dramatically from the “exclusive” formulation of Turkish nationalism in the 20th century—the country’s minorities (only 60 percent are native Farsi speakers) are given a layered, hyphenated national identity (i.e., Armenian-Iranian, AssyrianIranian, Kurdish-Iranian) whereby their religious and linguistic distinctiveness is recognized, along with their contributions and sacrifices to the nation. Allowing the perpetuation of their unique religious and educational institutions and cultural traditions, the Iranian government enables Iranian nationalism to appeal to a broad spectrum of Iranian citizens, beyond the Persian-Muslim majority. Beginning in the late 1940s under Muhammad Reza Shah, these policies were expressed as representing continuity in the Persian monarchal tradition of inclusion and toleration of religious and ethnic minorities, which dates back to Cyrus the Great and Achaemenid rule. After 1979, the Islamic Republic recast the wellspring of these policies as the assertion of true Islamic traditions of toleration of “recognized” religious minorities (Iranian Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians) and general rejection of ethnic distinctions. The one unfortunate exception to this inclusive policy has been the Bahais of Iran, who, as an “unrecognized” religious minority perceived by the ulema to be an anticlerical foreign innovation, suffered violence and destruction of their religious and educational institutions after the 1979 revolution, and since the 1990s have endured ongoing discrimination.

Narrating the Nation Because contemporary Iranian nationalism is defined by Persian monarchal and Shia Islamic traditions, the figures and events that have played the greatest role in the nation’s history are subjectively determined and ranked based on one’s orientation toward monarchism, liberal nationalism, or Islamism. Indeed, the national memory is rent, whereby one Iranian’s primary heroes of the modern era are another’s villains. Nevertheless, there remain common founders, cultural figures, and historical events that all Iranians recognize and honor. Exalted political founders that all Iranians recognize are Achaeamenid shahs Cyrus and Darius, and Safavid shahs Isma’il and Abbas. One would be hard-pressed to find an Iranian anywhere in the world who did not revere the 11th-century doctor and philosopher Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the 13th- and 14th-century poets Hafez, Saadi, and Rumi, and/or any veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. The poet Ferdowsi (see sidebar on Shahname) is also considered a national icon by a vast N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Iranian high school students visit the tomb of Ferdowsi, author of the Iranian national epic Shahname. (David Yaghoubian)

majority of Iranians. With that said, perhaps Ferdowsi’s biggest modern promoters, Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, remain two of the most controversial figures in Iranian history, rivaled only by their respective contemporary critics, the ayatollahs Modarres and Khomeini. Royalists laud and adore the Pahlavi shahs, while Islamists solemnly revere “Imam” Khomeini and his teacher Modarres. Inversely, the Pahlavis are anathema to revolutionary/religious nationalists, and Khomeini ranks as the primary nemesis of royalists and most liberal nationalists. Iranians with a strong liberal nationalist orientation generally loathe all three, while revering former prime minister Muhammad Mossadegh, progressive martyrs of the revolutions of 1905–1911 and 1979, and prisoners of conscience imprisoned and tortured by both regimes. The pomp and grandeur of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s lavish 1967 coronation ceremonies and the 1971 celebration at Persepolis of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy (skirting the more than eight centuries of Arab-Islamic rule) epitomize the monarchal symbolism, nationalist iconography, and strategic historicizing of the Pahlavi era. Both fetes, the latter costing in excess of $100 million, sought to make explicit links between the Pahlavi regime and the Achaemenids and to demonstrate continuity in the traditions, values, power, and benevolence inherN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ent to the (forged) lineage through replication of ancient Persian icons—most commonly Achaemenid reliefs and artifacts—on everything from commemorative postage stamps and posters to engraved plates and sewing kits. Beyond the Persian dynastic imagery that characterized the Persepolis festivities and parades, the shah made the connection as explicit as physically possible by opening the ceremonies standing at the door of the tomb of Cyrus the Great in Pasargadae and proclaiming, “Sleep easily, Cyrus, for we are awake” (Mottahedeh 2000). The event stands as the height of the shah’s power and glory for royalists and the height of hubris and conspicuous consumption for critics of the regime. In spite of the antimonarchal stance of the current government, continued implications for national unity, the global appeal and “brand recognition” of ancient Persian imagery, and direct economic implications for tourism pragmatically dictate that the same images of Persepolis that typified the rule of the Pahlavis are again omnipresent throughout the country and have become primary tools of the 21st-century Iranian tourism industry. Even the most casual observers of the Shia Islamic faith in Iran revere the Prophet Muhammad and the twelve Shiite imams, while more observant Iranian Shiites consider the imams to be among the founding fathers of the nation and the guides of Iranian culture, revolution, and government. The stark and profound example of self-sacrifice to achieve justice and proper governance that was set by the second imam, Husayn, at the Battle of Karbala in southern Iraq in 680— ritually reenacted in the intense public passion play and group catharsis known as ta’ziya—instilled brave defiance among Iranian political dissidents during the Pahlavi era and emboldened street protestors to face down machine guns and tanks in the 1979 revolution. The memory of Husayn’s martyrdom was also critical to the nation’s defense during the Iran-Iraq War, inspiring millions of Iranians to rush to the front lines and participate in exceedingly heroic and certainly suicidal trench warfare and mass infantry attacks. As Shiism is one of the few Islamic traditions that allows physical depictions of revered religious figures, posters and stickers of Imam Ali sitting cross-legged with his esteemed sword Zulfiqar (which, not coincidentally, is the name of Iran’s indigenously produced main battle tank) and of Imam Husayn riding his white steed into battle adorn teahouses and grace the dashboards of taxicabs throughout the nation. Posters and stickers depicting the trinity of Ayatollah Khomeini, Imam Ali, and current supreme leader Khamenai, or that juxtapose the Battle of Karbala with Iran-Iraq War scenes, are intended to render this metaphorical lineage, its implicit legitimacy, and its strong nationalist implications abundantly clear. Often perceived outside Iran as morbid and/or government-decreed propaganda, vivid murals depicting the events of Karbala and/or of Iran-Iraq War shohadat (martyrs) in life and in death abound in urban centers and are ways the population recognizes and honors these tremendous struggles and sacrifices. That former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s final words on the gallows included a parting curse for “the Persians” is a reflection of the deep-seated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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historical rivalry between Iraqi-Arab-Sunni and Iranian-Persian-Shiite nationalisms, which reached a new and brutal apex during the Iran-Iraq War. To rally the Iraqi nation behind the invasion, Saddam attempted to cast the struggle as a modern-day version of the seventh-century Arab-Muslim invasion of the Persian empire, thus referring to the offensive as “al-Qadisiyya” after the battle of 637 that toppled the Sassanian Dynasty and opened Iran to Arab-Muslim conquest. He did not predict how such propaganda would be used to motivate Iranians to their own nation’s defense, nor how the Islamic Republic could utilize the same strategy, albeit with a powerful twist—sequentially numbering a series of Iranian military offensives Karbala I, II, and III to link the contemporary struggle to the most powerful and turnpoint event in Shiite history and thus imbue it with the requisite thirst for justice and self-sacrifice. The public recitation of the Shahname and reenactment of the Battle of Karbala sustain the knowledge of primary Iranian heroes and values and perpetuate the centrality of these two defining narratives to Iranian nationalism. Disproportionately favored by royalists and Islamists respectively, who alternatively emphasize Persian culture and tradition versus the defense of Islamic values and the Shia community, together the two narratives can be interpreted to encapsulate most if not all of the values that nationalists the world over idealistically laud: egalitarianism, justice, bravery, self-sacrifice, faith, and persistence. Whether attributable more to Persian or to Shiite culture and traditions, or to a product of the unique, situational amalgam of both, hospitality and kindness to guests— especially foreigners who heed local traditions and laws—is an unofficial national duty that is demanded by Iranian culture and has remained one of the most memorable characteristics distinguishing the people and culture of Iran to travelers throughout the ages.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Rooted in both Persian monarchal and Islamic traditions, the intervention of foreign powers in Iranian affairs and the repeated violation of Iran’s territorial sovereignty in the 19th and 20th centuries added a strong antiforeign, anticolonial component to modern Iranian nationalism. The CIA-initiated coup of 1953 (see sidebar on Operation Ajax) and the subsequent support of the United States for the shah’s dictatorial regime—as well as its material, logistical, and naval support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War—inflamed sentiments already well established as a result of past Russian and British interventions, and as such U.S. foreign policy remains the focal point of nationalist fears and animosity. This issue is complex, because an aggressive U.S. stance toward the regime of the Islamic Republic is potentially the last hope for the hundreds of thousands of royalists in exile, all of whom certainly consider themselves Iranian nationalists. Yet within Iran, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Iranian Nuclear Program Whether or not Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program has yet to be determined. What is certain is that, while they ardently and at times violently disagree on politics and the national trajectory, Iranian nationalists of all types—whether Islamist/Khomeinist, royalist, or liberal nationalist in orientation—almost unanimously agree that Iran should have the same rights as any other Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory to pursue a civilian nuclear energy program. After forging an agreement on nuclear cooperation in the late 1950s with its then-ally the United States, Iran acquired its first nuclear test reactor from the United States in 1967 and signed the NPT in 1968. Encouraged to develop nuclear energy to wean the economy off exhaustible petroleum revenues and thereby ensure long-term stability, Iran initiated contracts with American, French, and German companies for the establishment of 22 reactors with a planned total output of 23,000 megawatts of electricity by 1994. Mothballed as a result of the 1979 revolution and Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran revived its nuclear energy program in the 1990s, seeking Chinese and Russian assistance to restart projects begun under the Pahlavi regime. International concerns and U.S. threats regarding the program, generally centering on a potential secret nuclear weapons adjunct, are perceived as unacceptable double standards by Iranians, who rally around the flag at the mere hint that Iran should not be able to exercise its full rights under the NPT.

ongoing calls for “regime change” under successive American presidential administrations since the revolution, the unilateral imposition of economic sanctions by the Clinton administration in the 1990s, and more recently the overt threats of a potential U.S. military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities (see sidebar on Iranian Nuclear Program) and/or of covert agitation within Iran’s ethnic minority communities by the Bush administration have perpetuated these sentiments into the 21st century. Facilitated by popular memory of such recent and painful national offenses, the contemporary Iranian government seeks to gain maximum advantage from the specter of foreign intervention, wielding it as a strategy of national mobilization and unity as well as an eternal scapegoat, while Iranian politicians deftly manipulate antiforeign, nationalist sentiment in their electoral campaigns. This strategy proved especially effective for conservative candidate Mahmmoud Ahmadinejad, who was elected president in 2005, and proved inversely devastating to the agenda and legitimacy of his reformist predecessor, President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2004), and parliamentary supporters of the reform movement. The government of the Islamic Republic seeks to inculcate Iranian nationalism and maintain the allegiances of Iran’s minority groups by stressing Perso-Islamic glory and the inclusiveness of Iranian national identity. Since the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979), the ruling elite has stressed the unifying nature of Iranian nationalism and allowed for hyphenated national identities by recognizing the distinctiveness of most minority groups and allowing them to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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perpetuate their linguistic and cultural heritage when it does not interfere with state development, national cohesion, or security. The Iranian constitution provides representation in the 290-seat Majles (the parliament) for recognized religious minorities, thus providing guaranteed seats for Armenians (2), Assyrians (1), Jews (1), and Zoroastrians (1) based on population. Bahais are not recognized as religious minorities and have suffered discrimination and persecution throughout modern Iranian history, and especially since the 1979 revolution. Ethnic minorities such as Azeri Turks, Kurds, Baluchis, and Kuhuzestani Arabs receive national representation in parliament via geographic districting, thus unlike the religious minorities, they do not receive a fixed number of seats. Governmental strategies to sustain Iranian nationalism include mass public education in Farsi with standardized curriculum and the construction and maintenance of museums and national monuments to ancient Persian, Shiite, and modern Iranian heroes. Regime-friendly historical narratives and propaganda are disseminated in every conceivable format—from paper flyers to streaming Internet videos—and deftly crafted for domestic and foreign audiences. In addition to festivals and holidays central to Shia Islam, the Islamic revolution, and/or the Iran-Iraq War, the government also pragmatically respects important preIslamic Persian traditions such as Nowruz (New Year celebrations). Where the festivities and/or political interests of Iranian minorities pose insignificant risk to, or are deemed to overlap with, policies and security of the state, they are tolerated if not encouraged. A case in point would be the annual April 24 mass commemoration of the Armenian genocide in the streets of Tehran by the city’s large Armenian-Iranian community, which for the government serves the dual purpose of poking “popular” criticism at their U.S.-allied secular rivals in Ankara and demonstrating the regime’s toleration for the broader history and concerns of Iranian religious minorities. The dialogic, collaborative relationship illustrated by this example runs throughout the Iranian body politic and allows for multiple interpretations of what it is to be an Iranian, thereby promoting relatively broad allegiance to the state. History suggests that tensions, if not open hostility, will always remain among competing traditions within Iranian nationalism, as will the challenges associated with sustaining Iranian national identity among the country’s diverse population. It also demonstrates that the fiber woven of Persian, Islamic, and anti-imperial strands is extremely durable and like almost all nationalisms becomes even stronger when the nation is perceived to be under attack. Selected Bibliography Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Abrahamian, Ervand. 1993. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Afary, Janet. 1996. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism. New York: Columbia University Press. Arjomand, Said Amir. 1988. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: Oxford University Press. Cottam, Richard W. 1979. Nationalism in Iran: Updated through 1978. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Malcolm Byrne, eds. 2004. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 2000. Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keddie, Nikki R. 2005. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. Oxford: Oneworld. Marashi, Afshin. 2007. Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1941. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Mottahedeh, Roy. 2000. Mantle of the Prophet. Oxford: Oneworld. Vaziri, Mostafa. 1993. Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity. New York: Paragon House.

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Israel Arnon Golan Chronology 1945 1946 1947 1948

1949 1956 1965 1966 1967 1969–1970 1973 1977 1979 1982 1985 1987–1993 1993 1994 2000 2005

End of World War II in Europe. Full horrific dimensions of the Holocaust are revealed. President Truman issues a statement indicating U.S. support for the creation of a “viable Jewish state” in Palestine. UN General Assembly recommends the partition of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. First Arab-Israeli War. The end of the British Mandate and declaration of Israeli independence. David Ben-Gurion nominated Israel’s first prime minister. Military forces of Arab states invade Palestine. Israel signs armistice agreements with neighboring Arab states. Sinai campaign. Israel retreats from the Sinai peninsula in February 1957 under American and Soviet pressure. First attack by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on Israel on January 1. Abolition of the military government over Israeli Arabs. Six Day War. Israel gains control of Arab territories. War of attrition with Egypt. Yom Kippur War. Right-wing Likud Party rises to power, ending three decades of Labor dominance. Menachem Begin becomes prime minister. Signing of peace treaty with Egypt. Peace of Galilee War (Lebanon War). Israel retreats to self-proclaimed security zone in southern Lebanon. First Arab uprising (Intifada) in the occupied territories. Signing of a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles based on an agreement worked out in Oslo. Signing of peace treaty with Jordan. Outbreak of second Palestinian uprising (Intifada). Israeli retreat from the Gaza Strip.

Situating the Nation The Jewish national movement known as Zionism developed in the second half of the 19th century. It was a form of diaspora nationalism, initiated by members of an ethnic group most of whose members did not reside in the destined homeland. The national territory, Palestine, seen by Jews as the biblical Land of Israel, at that time was a part of the Ottoman Empire and was populated mainly by Arabs. Zionism also adhered to concepts of Western modernism, especially to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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modernist economic and societal models developed by European liberal and socialist thinkers. The first wave of Zionist immigration to Palestine was in the 1880s and 1890s, the second from the start of the 20th century to the start of World War I. Numbers were small as most Jews preferred to immigrate to the New World. Substantial Jewish immigration to Palestine took place with the establishment of the British Mandatory government in Palestine following World War I and the closure of the gates to the United States in the early 1920s. The rise of anti-Semitism in central and eastern Europe in the 1920s, and especially the rise of Nazism in Germany, resulted in the migration of tens of thousands of Jews from these areas to Palestine. The extermination of 6 million European Jews in the Holocaust resulted in growing international recognition of the right of the Jews to form a state of their own. This right was formally acknowledged by the United Nations in November 1947. Independence was formally declared on May 14, 1948, during Israel’s war of independence, fought against the local Palestinian Arab community, later augmented by the armies of neighboring Arab states that resented Zionism and the establishment of Israel. In 1947 Palestine had a population of 625,000 Jews and 1.25 million Arabs. The Jews resided mainly in the coastal plain and the northern inland valleys of Palestine, where they had been able to purchase land from Arabs. The main urban concentration was in the city of Tel Aviv, located in the center of the coastal plain, which had rapidly developed since the early 1920s in proximity to the mixedpopulation port town of Jaffa. Jerusalem was the second city with a sizable Jewish

Theodor (Binyamin Ze’ev) Herzl (1860–1904) Theodor Herzl, the visionary of Zionism, was born in Budapest in 1860. In 1884 he was awarded a doctorate of law from the University of Vienna. He became a writer, playwright, and journalist, the Paris correspondent of an influential liberal Vienna newspaper. The 1894 Dreyfus affair, the unjust accusation of treason of a Jewish officer in the French army, caused a fundamental transformation of his views. Herzl witnessed mobs shouting “Death to the Jews” in France, and he resolved that there was only one solution to anti-Semitism: the mass immigration of Jews to Palestine, the historic homeland of the Land of Israel, and the formation of an independent Jewish state. Herzl’s ideas were met with some enthusiasm by eastern European Jews, encouraging him to convene the First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, on August 1897, in which Zionism was established as a political movement. The difficult state of Russian Jewry, witnessed firsthand by Herzl during a visit in 1903 to Russia, had a profound effect on him. Subsequently, he proposed British Uganda as a temporary refuge for Jews in Russia in immediate danger. While Herzl made it clear that this program would not affect the ultimate aim of forming a Jewish entity in the Land of Israel, the proposal nearly led to a split in the Zionist movement. The Uganda program was finally rejected by the Zionist movement in 1905. Herzl died in Vienna in 1904. In 1949 his remains were brought to Israel and reinterred on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem.

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urban concentration, and the main port city of Haifa was the third. The latter two cities were both of mixed population, with the Jews being the majority. About 80 percent of the Jewish population of Palestine lived in the above three cities and nearby towns, forming the main core areas of the Jewish community. Although only a minority of the Jewish community lived in rural areas, the importance of those areas in Zionist ideology and the formation of territorial integrity was decisive. Zionist ideology regarded agriculture as a fundamental element of national revival, creating the bond between immigrants from the Diaspora and their old/new homeland. It also demarcated the territorial extent of the Zionist presence in Palestine. The dwellers of the rural settlements, most of which were collective (kibbutz) or cooperative (moshav) villages, were regarded as the harbingers of the national Zionist venture. The dominance since the early 1930s of Socialist-Zionist parties in the Jewish community in Palestine was crucial to the formation of the image of the Jewish agricultural settler as the prototype of a new Jew, contrasting and contradicting the image of the Diaspora Jew. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Instituting the Nation Zionism became a political movement following the convening of the First Zionist Congress in 1897, initiated by a Jewish journalist from Vienna, Theodor Herzl. The establishment of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and institutions intended to collect funds and purchase land for Jewish settlement marked the institutionalization of the Jewish national idea. Following the death of Herzl in 1904, Chaim Weizmann became a leading figure in the Zionist movement. Weizmann’s political activities during World War I resulted in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, committing the British empire to the constitution of a national home in Palestine for the Jews, a commitment repeated in the 1920 League of Nations mandate charter. During the first decade of British Mandatory rule, the WZO, headed by Weizmann, became the main organization representing the Jewish community in Palestine. The Jewish Agency, established in 1929 according to the mandate charter and also including non-Zionists, replaced the WZO in this role, although Weizmann headed both. With the rise of Socialist Zionism to power in the early 1930s, David Ben-Gurion, the leader of MAPAI (Hebrew acronym for the Land of Israel Workers’ Party) and chairman of the Histadrut, the main Jewish trade union, became the chairman of the executive of the Jewish Agency. A group of right-wing Zionists headed by Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky seceded from the WZO and formed the New World Zionist Organization, a rightwing activist alternative to the formal organization of the majority. Zionist organizations and political parties formed a framework for the establishment and amalgamation of the national home. The Jewish community was

Chaim Azriel Weizmann (1874–1952) Chaim Weizmann was born in 1874 in Motol, near Pinsk, then in the bounds of the Russian empire. He studied in Germany and Switzerland and taught chemistry at Manchester University in England from 1904 to 1914. While there he discovered a method of producing synthetic acetone and butyl alcohol that, during World War I, became essential for creating explosives needed for the British war effort. He became a Zionist spokesperson in England and was a major influence in the creation of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 in which Britain expressed its commitment to the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He headed the Jewish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and worked there to have the League of Nations assign administration of Palestine to Britain. He was the leader of the World Zionist Organization from 1920 to 1930 and from 1935 to 1946. In 1949 he was elected the first president of the state of Israel. He also played an essential role in the establishment of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, Israel’s leading scientific research organ. Chaim Weizmann died on November 9, 1952, after a long and painful illness. His grave is situated in the garden of his home in Rehovot.

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autonomous in almost all spheres of life: inner politics, education, health, religious matters, and more. Other institutions that did not belong formally to the Zionist movement as established by the mandate government, namely the National Committee (Va ’ ad Le’umi)—a sort of parliament—and municipalities, were also dominated by Zionist parties.

Defining the Nation Zionists considered all Jews living in different countries of the five continents as part of the Jewish nation. Jewish tradition fashioned the fundamental framework for the preservation of an ethno-cultural identity, preserving a unique Jewish world outlook based on Jewish religious law, defining and separating Diaspora communities from non-Jews, the “Gentiles.” The uniqueness of the Jewish people also stemmed from a common troubled history of persecutions, deportations, and massacres of Jews in different historical periods and areas. To redeem Jews from the cycle of strife, the Zionists sought their concentration in the ancient homeland to form a modern independent nation-state, based on concepts of social justice and universal civil rights for the Jewish and non-Jewish populations alike. Jewish culture and history were essential common denominators. Ancient Jewish symbols were manipulated for the purpose of forming a modern national identity. The menorah, the sacred temple lamp, and the Star of David, the mythological emblem of the biblical kingdom, became respectively the symbol and the ensign of the Zionist movement and later the state of Israel. The definition of the national territory was based on biblical sources relating to the array of the Israelite/Jewish presence in the Land of Israel. Moreover, Jews spoke different languages and were wholly shaped by their local Diaspora cultures, which worked against their integration. Therefore, an essential trait of Zionism was the adoption of Hebrew, mostly used in the Diaspora for ritual purposes, as its formal language. Through a thriving educational system, Hebrew was installed as the language spoken among most Jewish immigrants in Palestine, forming a fundamental instrument for nation-building. Most newspapers, theaters, and other cultural institutions used Hebrew, and Tel Aviv, almost wholly inhabited by Jews, was considered “The First Hebrew City.” Various Jewish groups opposed Zionism. Many assimilating Western Jewish communities regarded Jewish nationalism a threat because it could foster in nonJewish compatriots suspicions of Jewish dual loyalty. Ultra-orthodox Jews regarded Zionism as sacrilege, blaspheming the religious tenet of miraculous redemption and return to the old homeland. Another problem Zionism faced was territorial definition. In the Bible, taken as the source text, ancient descriptions of the boundaries of the Land of Israel were rather vague. Palestine’s political borders were drawn only with the estabN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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lishment of the British Mandatory government. The British soon decided to separate the area east of the Jordan River from Palestine. The area left for the establishment of a Jewish national homeland was rather small, about 27,000 square kilometers, and it contained an Arab majority. In view of such territorial obscurity, and in the absence of direct support from the British Mandatory regime, in practice the extent of the national territory was mostly determined by the process of rural settlement as it advanced over the coastal plane and through the northern inland valleys, where the Zionists could purchase empty land from Arabs. The major obstacle to the formation of a Jewish national home was the emergence of the rival Palestinian Arab national movement. Efforts to resolve this conflict, which occasionally escalated into violent riots, resulted in the formulation of several partition plans, initially by the British (1937) and later by the United Nations (1947). Failure of such efforts resulted in the termination of British Mandatory rule and the outbreak of the 1948 war. The Jewish victory resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel, whose boundaries were defined by the 1949 armistice lines between the Israeli and Arab armies, which came to be known as the Green Line or the 1949 boundaries. The Six Day War in 1967 resulted in the expansion of territory under Israeli control. Since the return of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, and of East Jerusalem, as well as control of Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have been highly debated. Israel seems to be the only nation-state in the world whose territorial extent has not yet been settled.

Narrating the Nation The Israeli-Zionist national memory includes events and figures from three periods: glorious biblical times, which ended in a series of catastrophes that resulted in the end of Jewish dominance in the Land of Israel; the formation of Diaspora communities, a history regarded as successive cycles of flourishing, persecution, and destruction, culminating in the emancipation of European Jews followed by the Holocaust; and national revival, the Zionist project, or the return to the old/ new homeland. Biblical figures and their deeds form the first layer of national memory. Such figures include the patriarch Abraham, the father of the nation; Moses, who led the Exodus from Egypt; Joshua, who conquered the Promised Land; King David, founder of the Israelite kingdom; and Judah the Maccabee (Judas Maccabaeus), who liberated the nation from the Greek-Syrian yoke. These times of splendor ended in catastrophes, above all the destruction of the first and second temples, which symbolizes decay, exile, and despair. The second layer consists of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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golden ages that periodically illumine the dark centuries of exile. These eras include the golden age of Spanish Jewry at the time of Muslim dominance of the Iberian peninsula, the rise and flourishing of the Jewish community in Poland in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the 19th-century emancipation and enlightenment of Jewish communities of western and central Europe. But all these golden periods ended in the persecution, massacre, and deportation of Jews, proving the fragile existence of a nation dislocated from its territory and dispersed among nations. The third layer is the modern history of Zionism, from the formation of the Zionist concept to the recent history of the state of Israel, and the process of secular redemption. Ancient and modern Jewish history are both located in and connected to places that form core areas of the national territory. Most prominent in this context is the ancient capital, the holy city of Jerusalem. Other places are biblical cities such as Hebron and Bethlehem, battlefields like Mount Gilboa, Judas Maccabaeus’s hometown of Modi’in, and the last strongholds resisting the Roman occupation of the Land of Israel, Masada and Betar. Modern sites in this context are Degania in the Jordan valley, considered the first kibbutz; the Valley of Jezreel (Esdraelon), the initial concentration of collective and cooperative rural settlements, known simply as “The Valley” in the Zionist historical narrative; Tel Aviv, the first Hebrew city; the sites of battles in the wars of 1948 and later; and more.

Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre, first established in AD 330. The church grounds include the spot where Jesus of Nazareth was crucified, as well at the cave used as his tomb. (Corel)

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A formative myth of the Jewish nation is its status as the chosen people, the Almighty’s elect to spread his word among the nations, “a light to the Gentiles.” In secular Zionist terms, presented by Herzl in his utopian book Altneuland (OldNew Land), this choiceness was interpreted as a mission to form an ideal modern state according to the most enlightened principles of Western liberal democracy. Moreover, Zionists considered themselves heralds of modernism and enlightenment to the backward population of Palestine, in particular, and to the Levant in general. The latter concept did not originate in Jewish tradition alone but also in the idea of the beneficial role of European colonialism in redeeming non-European peoples. A national Zionist revival is evident also in the realm of arts, reflecting and presenting the old/new nation. The most flourishing trait of the renewed national culture seems to be folk music. Thousands of songs have been written since the beginning of the Zionist venture describing and praising the homeland and its landscapes. The plastic arts have also developed, beginning with the Jerusalembased Bezalel school of art, which specialized in the romantic presentation of biblical landscapes. Later, urban and rural landscapes became prevalent motifs in the work of most local artists. Landscape paintings and large photographs became powerful tools for the representation of the Zionist venture.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Zionist movement sought the total mobilization of the Jewish people for the national venture, namely the formation of a Jewish nation-state in the biblical Land of Israel. Nevertheless, within the Diaspora communities, joining Zionism’s ranks was a voluntary act, for the movement lacked formal political power and could not force membership on potential adherents. For those who did immigrate to Palestine, Zionism intended to form a melting pot in the historical homeland, in which Jews from different parts of the world with a variety of social and political values and speaking different languages would undergo a process of political, economic, social, and cultural transformation and amalgamation. In the absence of formal political power, the Hebrew language became Zionism’s main device for assimilating immigrants. The use of other languages in the emerging homeland project was regarded intolerable. The education system, newspapers, theaters, offices of different national and sectarian Zionist organizations, and municipalities all used Hebrew. Streets signs and outdoor advertisements had to be in Hebrew. It became almost impossible for an individual to manage everyday life without at least basic mastery of the language. Integration of immigrants took place through other cultural means, too, first and foremost exposure to biblical and recent landscapes and the history of the land. This initially took place through excursions guided by specialists in history N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and culture, organized by different Zionist institutions, and by schools and youth movements. It was aimed at forming an intimate bond between the Jew and his or her ancient and freshly stirring homeland. This practice, known as yediat ha’Aretz (“knowing the land”), along with popular songs praising the merits of the homeland, formed a crucial role in the mobilization of the nation. To increase its ability to integrate and shape the nation, and to achieve territorial integrity and suzerainty, the Zionist movement sought the formation of a political entity, an independent Jewish state in the Land of Israel. This aim was not proclaimed openly until 1942 due to the need to ease relations with the British authorities and the rival national movement that also considered Palestine its homeland, namely, the Palestinian Arabs. In 1939, the 450,000 Jews living in Palestine accounted for only some 3 percent of the total number of Jews worldwide, meaning that before World War II Zionism did not appeal to the majority of Jews. The Holocaust was a turning point in the legitimization of Zionism, causing many Diaspora Jews, especially those living in the United States, to become keen supporters of Zionism. The Holocaust proved the need to form a nation-state serving as a safe asylum for Jews; the Zionist concept likewise won international support, crucial for the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The rise of modern anti-Semitism and consequent Jewish disillusionment with 19th-century European enlightenment and emancipation were the main catalysts for the formation of modern Jewish nationalism. The nationalist alternative, rather than assimilation or preservation of old lifestyles and isolation from the modern world, was in step with the rise of nationalism in other European ethnic groups.

David Ben-Gurion (Green) Ben-Gurion was born in Plonsk (a city then in Russia) in 1886. At the age of 17, he joined the Socialist-Zionist party of Poalei Zion (Zionist workers) and immigrated to Palestine in 1906. He was forced to leave the country during World War I due to Ottoman persecution of Zionists, finally settling in New York where he was instrumental in preparing young Jews to immigrate to Palestine immediately after the war. Following the Balfour Declaration, he joined a Jewish Battalion formed within the British Army and returned to Palestine by the end of the war. In 1921 he became general secretary of the Histadrut, and in 1930 he united the main Jewish Socialist parties in Palestine to form MAPAI, which shortly afterward became dominant among the Jewish community in Palestine. Subsequently, in 1935 he became chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Ben-Gurion led the Jewish community in Palestine through the troubled years of the Arab revolt, World War II, and the Holocaust, as well as through the postwar struggle against the British empire and the 1948 war. In Tel Aviv, on May 14, 1948, he proclaimed independence for the state of Israel. He served as Israel’s prime minister for 13 years, 1948–1953 and 1955–1963. Ben-Gurion died on his kibbutz, Sde Boker in the Negev, a few weeks following the end of the Yom Kippur War, on December 1, 1973.

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Major strategies used by Zionism were primarily in the cultural realm: first the use of the Bible as the wellspring of legitimacy; second the revival of Hebrew and its reconstitution as the exclusive national language. The third strategy was the augmentation of the Jewish calendar through inclusion of Israel’s Independence Day and memorial days for the Holocaust and fallen soldiers. Fourth was yediat ha’aretz, creating an array of meaning-filled places, biblical and modern, that symbolized the long-lasting bond between the Jew and his or her homeland. In the political realm, the Zionist movement was formed as a voluntary democratic system, affording representation in Zionist institutions of left- and rightwing Zionists, religious Zionists, and even non-Zionists; such was the case in the Jewish Agency, too, the main organ of the Zionist movement since the 1930s. Regarding external politics, Zionism wished to secure a national home through collaboration with European powers, especially the British empire. This goal was frustrated, so in the late 1930s and 1940s, guerilla warfare and civil disobedience were applied, together with political maneuvering, to bring about the termination of British Mandatory rule. The Zionist endeavor developed in conditions of a constantly intensifying conflict with the Palestinian Arabs, later joined by neighboring Arab states, over control of territory disputed between Jews and Arabs. This developed into a succession of violent clashes during the British Mandate period: the Arab riots of 1920, 1921, and 1929, and the 1936–1939 Palestinian Arab revolt. To meet the Arab challenge, the Zionist movement formed an underground militia, precursor to the postindependence Israeli army. The termination of British rule sparked the escalation of the armed conflict into the 1948 war, from which Israel emerged intact as an independent state and more than half the Palestinian population became refugees. The state of Israel was by and large based on political, administrative, and cultural institutions and concepts engendered by the Zionist movement. Its juridical system largely followed the colonial British Mandatory system, although it gradually became adjusted to the needs of an independent nation-state. Due to the development of an etatist ideology in the 1950s, a variety of functions performed by Zionist institutions were transferred to Israeli government ministries and agencies. Most important in this context was the crucial role played by the state in the absorption into Israeli economic, cultural, political, and social systems of about 900,000 Jewish immigrants in the 1950s, and myriads more in subsequent decades. The development of a pernicious conflict with the Arab world resulted in a series of wars between Israel and neighboring Arab states, in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. The peace agreements with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and the Oslo accords in 1993 formed a basis, albeit rickety and problematic, for rapprochement with the Palestinian Arabs. The long conflict has played a crucial role in the formation and development of Israeli society, in the political, cultural, economic, and social realms. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The absorption of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants resulted in the rise of economic and cultural conflicts between the mostly European pre1948 population group and the post-1948 immigrants, many originating in Middle Eastern and North African countries. Nevertheless, the external conflict with the Arab world has exerted a moderating effect on intra-Jewish social and cultural conflicts, although the control since 1967 of territories densely populated by Palestinian Arabs has resulted in gathering discord between right- and left-wing parties in the Israeli polity. It has also raised tensions with the Arab Israeli minority, which officially enjoys equal civil rights; in practice, however, their absorption into Israeli society has suffered innumerable setbacks due to their identification with a hostile Arab world. Israeli foreign policy and Israel’s place in the world is largely affected by the conflict with the Arabs. Due to the dominance of European culture among the pre-1948 Zionists, Israel aspired to be included among Western countries. Consequently, and due to Arab affiliation with the Third World and former communist regimes, Israel became identified with “Western imperialist reactionary regimes.” Since the 1980s, the changing world political system and the peace agreements Israel signed with Arab states have produced many changes, although Israel’s place in the international arena is still mostly affected by the state of its changing relations with the Arab world in general, and with the Palestinians in particular. Despite the need to maintain a large army, Israel has developed a modern Western-style economy. Despite the salience of the military in Israeli society, protracted poor relations with the Arab minority, and intra-Jewish tensions in an immigrant society, the democratic political structure has largely been preserved. Demarcation of the boundaries of the national territory and the control of large Palestinian Arab populations continue to be the foremost problems of the state of Israel, affecting its relations with its own Arab minority, the Palestinians as a whole, the Arab world, and the international system. Selected Bibliography Avineri, Shlomo. 1981. The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Cohen, Michael J. 1987. The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dershowitz, Alan. 2003. The Case for Israel. New York: John Wiley. Dowty, Alan, 1998. The Jewish State: A Century Later. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gilbert, Martin. 1978. Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland. Philadelphia: Lippincott. Goldberg, David J. 1997. To the Promised Land: A History of Zionist Thought from Its Origins to the Modern State of Israel. London: Penguin. Halpern, Ben, and Jehuda Reinharz. 2000. Zionism and the Creation of a New Society. New York: Brandeis University. Kimmerling, Baruch. 1983. Zionism and Territory: The Socioterritorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Laqueur, Walter. 2003. A History of Zionism. New York: Schocken Books. Morris, Benny. 1999. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881–1999. New York: Knopf. Nethanyahu, Benjamin. 2000. A Place among the Nations: Israel and the World. New York: Bantam Books. Sachar, Howard M. 1998. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York: Knopf.

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Palestine Chris Bierwirth Chronology ca. 1840–1880 Precursors of Zionism appear in the writings of Rabbi Tzvi Hirsh Kalisher, Moses Hess, Leon Pinsker, and others; foundation of Hovevei Tzion (“Lovers of Zion”). 1882 Pogroms in the Russian empire lead to the beginnings of Jewish immigration to Palestine; over the next six decades, more than 400,000 Jews will immigrate, peaking in the 1930s. 1904 First clashes between Zionist immigrants and Palestinian Arab farmers. 1911 Filastin, an Arab nationalist newspaper, begins publication in Jaffa. 1917 The British government issues the Balfour Declaration. 1919 First Palestinian National Congress was held in Jerusalem. 1920–1921 Jewish-Arab riots in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv–Jaffa result in over 150 deaths. 1928–1929 Conflict over the Western Wall, resulting in riots in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Hebron; 133 Jews and 116 Arabs are killed. 1932–1935 Four Palestinian political parties are founded, each representing a traditional faction. 1936–1939 The Great Arab Revolt; formation of the Arab Higher Committee in an attempt to coordinate Palestinian Arab actions; British White Paper revokes Balfour Declaration. 1945 Arab League charter includes an annex asserting the Arab character of Palestine. 1947 The British government turns the Palestinian problem over to the newly established United Nations. 1948 First Arab-Israeli War (Israel’s “War of Independence”; Palestine’s “Catastrophe”). 1957 Yasir Arafat and others found the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (Fatah). 1964 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is established. 1967 The Six Day War (Israel versus Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) ends with Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. 1970–1971 War between the Jordanian army and Palestinian forces leads to PLO expulsion from Jordan. 1973 The “October War” (or “Yom Kippur War”), Israel versus Egypt and Syria. 1974 The Arab League declares that the PLO is “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; the “Palestinian Question” is glossed over. 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, aimed at destroying the PLO; the Sabra and Shatila massacres. 1987 Beginning of the first Intifada; Hamas is founded. 1993 Negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian representatives in Oslo, Norway, produce an outline agreement; signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington DC. 1994 Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is established pursuant to the Oslo Accords. 1995 Oslo 2 agreement; partial Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. 1999 Oslo 2 deadline for permanent status talks passes without talks having begun. 2000 Palestinian-Israeli negotiations at Camp David, mediated by the United States, fail to produce an agreement; Ariel Sharon’s visit to al-Haram al-Sharif provokes the “Al-Aqsa Intifada.”

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2002 2004 2005 2006 2007

Israel begins construction of the “security barrier” separating most of the West Bank. International Court of Justice rules against the “security barrier”; Yasir Arafat dies. Mahmoud Abbas elected PNA president; Israeli forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Hamas wins a large majority in Palestinian elections; Kadima wins the Israeli elections. Fighting between Fatah and Hamas forces escalates; the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas establishes a Palestinian national unity government.

Situating the Nation Despite the claims of the most ardent Palestinian nationalists, it seems quite clear that Palestinian national identity and Palestinian nationalism began to emerge in the early 20th century as a direct result of and response to Zionism. Conversely, despite the claims of the most ardent Zionists, it seems clear that, even if there were no clearly identifiable “Palestinian people” at the beginning of the 20th century, a Palestinian people does now exist, and this national identity has crystallized in the course of their struggle for independence and recognition. Zionism could not have provoked Palestinian nationalism had there not been substantial antecedents. Indeed, Palestinian nationalism emerged as part of a nascent Arab national consciousness that had been growing among Arab-speaking peoples of the Levant for several decades toward the end of the 19th century. The constraint, of course, was that no jurisdictional territory of “Palestine” existed at the time. Thus, although Arab protests against Jewish immigration, which began at the turn of the 20th century, clearly marked an awareness of separate identity, the development of a “Palestinian” nationalism could not begin until the creation of the territory as a British Mandate following World War I. Internal social divisions constituted another constraint on the development of Palestinian nationalism. The Arab-speaking populations in the region that would eventually form Palestine were divided into numerous sectarian groups, including a small Jewish community. In addition, the Arab population was divided along urban-rural and class lines. In cities like Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, an educated upper class, the a‘yan, formed a land-owning gentry. In the countryside, the population was mainly made up of peasant tenant farmers, the fellahin, who worked land owned by absentee a‘yan landlords, and groups of herders who followed the ancient ways of the bedouin in peripheral regions like the Negev. After World War I, the British maneuvered to set up a mandate in Palestine— assembled from parts of three different Ottoman districts—to fulfill the Balfour Declaration’s pledge for the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” The creation of the mandate territory began the process by which local Arab populations would develop a distinctly Palestinian national identity. Moreover, as the Jewish population in Palestine grew under the British Mandate, feelings of Palestinian nationalism intensified in reaction against the influx of foreign interlopers. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The struggle for the future of Palestine would rely largely on leadership. In contrast to innovative, cohesive leadership institutions in the growing Jewish community, the a‘yan who should have provided the natural leaders of the Palestinian cause relied on traditional religious and municipal institutions and remained divided by long-standing rivalries among powerful families like the Husaynis and Nashshashibis. As a result, for the first 10 or 15 years of the Mandate period, there was little effective leadership for the Palestinian Arabs, and the Palestinian people often took matters into their own hands. Popular opposition that had been sporadically expressed in the decades before World War I intensified with the resumption of Zionist immigration in the 1920s; deadly clashes occurred in 1920–1921 and 1928–1929, and a major Arab rebellion convulsed the territory from 1936–1939. Despite the lack of effective leadership, the Arab population of Palestine had begun what can only be called a national struggle, and it seems clear that, by the late 1930s, a distinctive Palestinian identity had begun to coalesce. In the wake of the Arab rebellion, the British reappraised their situation, and in a 1939 White Paper repudiated the Balfour N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Declaration and announced stringent limits on further Jewish immigration. The creation of an independent, Arab-controlled Palestinian state seemed within reach—but World War II proved its undoing. Some important Palestinian politicians, notably Hajj Amin al-Husayni, backed the Germans, hoping that their victory would lead to a quick British—and Jewish —expulsion from the Middle East. In the wake of the Allied victory, this collaboration undercut the Palestinian cause. In addition, the war also created enormous sympathy for the Zionist project once the horrors of the Holocaust became known; nothing could have more strongly vindicated the claim that a national state was absolutely necessary to protect the Jewish people. The pivotal event in the development of Palestinian nationalism would be the postwar establishment of the state of Israel. In early 1947, the British government turned the problem of Palestine’s future over to the United Nations. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly endorsed a partition plan, creating separate Arab and Jewish states. By this time, the British had already announced their plans for total withdrawal in May 1948. As Zionist and Palestinian forces fought for control of the country in the winter and spring of 1947–1948, five Arab nations—Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—prepared to invade, ostensibly in support of Palestinian independence. However, this Arab “coalition” was debilitated by political rivalries and, frankly, a lack of commitment to the Palestinian cause, as each nation sought to use the situation for its own advantage. Not surprisingly, the coalition forces performed poorly in the 1948 war. By the end of the year, both the Arab armies and Palestinian militias had been beaten back by the better-trained and betterequipped Israeli forces. By July 1949, all five Arab nations had signed armistice agreements with Israel, ending the war—known to the Israelis as the “War for Independence” and to the Palestinians simply as al-Nakba, “the Catastrophe.” The consequences of this catastrophe would be enormous. As many as 800,000 Palestinians fled their homes and lands, seeking refuge in Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, where they were treated like unwanted stepchildren, deprived of political and economic rights, and lived in miserable conditions. Moreover, in December 1948, the Israeli government decreed that Palestinian Arabs who had fled their homes during the fighting would lose their property rights, applying the rule even to those who had simply moved to another area under Israeli control. As a result, all 800,000 refugee Palestinians, and approximately 90 percent of the 150,000 Arabs still living in Israel, lost their homes and land.

Instituting the Nation Several individuals and groups have played key roles in establishing Palestinian national institutions, though this process is still ongoing and its outcome still unclear. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dayr Yasin In the last stages of the civil war, just before the final British withdrawal from Palestine, the Jewish community in Jerusalem was cut off and under siege. The Palestinian strategy during the winter and spring of 1947–1948 had been to attack traffic on the roads leading to Jewish communities, effectively isolating them from one another. In early April 1948, the Israelis launched a major offensive to reopen the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. On April 9, a strike force led by IZL and Lehi (two radical Zionist commando groups) seized control of the Arab village of Dayr Yasin on the western outskirts of Jerusalem. Until that time, the residents of Dayr Yasin had remained neutral in the civil war and had offered little or no support to the Palestinian commandos of the Arab Liberation Army. Nonetheless, with the IZL-Lehi takeover, more than 100 residents of Dayr Yasin were killed and the remaining villagers either fled or were forcibly transferred to Arab-held East Jerusalem. IZL and Lehi suffered no more than five dead. Soon after the massacre, published accounts in both the Israeli and Arab press claimed a death count of 250 or more, and all sides had motives for exaggerating the scale of the atrocity. The official Israeli armed forces sought to discredit the irregulars of IZL and Lehi; the Arabs, to paint the Israelis as wanton aggressors; and IZL and Lehi, to provoke terror in the Arab population. And, in fact, the willingness of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs to flee their homes was certainly one of the main consequences of the Dayr Yasin massacre. Dayr Yasin remains one of the most emblematic events of al-Nakba.

In 1920, the British administration in Palestine removed Musa Kazim al-Husayni, the mayor of Jerusalem, from office, replacing him with Raghib al-Nashshashibi, and two prominent a‘yan families that had long been rivals then became bitter enemies. The Husaynis became the chief opponents of British rule in Palestine and, therefore, the presumptive leaders of a budding national movement. In December 1920, Musa Kazim, along with other Arab nationalists, organized the first of a series of Palestinian national congresses, which provided the beginnings of an institutional framework for the nationalist cause. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had been appointed mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, emerged as the most prominent Palestinian leader after Musa Kazim’s death in 1934. In 1936, Hajj Amin attempted to create a sense of Palestinian unity with the establishment of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), which represented all major factions within the Palestinian Arab community. Within a year, though, most of the AHC leadership had been arrested and Hajj Amin forced to flee. He eventually landed in Berlin, where he lived from 1941 to 1945, actively supporting Germany’s war effort against those he saw as common enemies: the British and the Jews. Though this crippled Hajj Amin’s leadership position, he had identified the objectives of the national struggle and is still regarded as one of Palestine’s first national heroes. If Hajj Amin al-Husayni helped to identify the political objectives of Palestinian nationality, that is, the defeat of British and Zionist “colonialism,” Yasir Arafat N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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can be credited with transforming the movement into an armed struggle. In 1958, Arafat and several friends formed a militant group called Fatah (meaning “conquest” in Arabic and a reverse acronym for Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini, “Palestinian National Liberation Movement”), aimed at coordinating fidayin commando attacks against Israel. In 1964, the Arab League agreed to sponsor the formation of a party to represent the Palestinian people, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), though the PLO at first rejected belligerent actions like those advocated by Fatah. However, in 1967 the front-line Arab states and Palestinians suffered another bitter defeat at Israeli hands, and in the war’s aftermath, Fatah, which was clearly the best-organized Palestinian commando group, launched a series of raids into Israeli-held territory, establishing Arafat’s reputation as a national hero. In 1968 the PLO issued a new charter declaring that “armed struggle was the only means to liberate Palestine” and granted Fatah and other commando groups seats on the Palestine National Council. This led to Yasir Arafat’s election to head the PLO in 1969. His leadership signaled the end of the PLO’s status as a puppet of the Arab states, as he seemed determined to make it into an effective and independent nationalist organization. This determination, though, led Arafat and the PLO into a series of confrontations with Arab states that eventually forced his exile to Tunis. Arafat reached the apogee of his career with the signing of the Olso Accords in 1993 and his assumption of the presidency of the Palestinian Authority. Yet many hardliners condemned him as a traitor and collaborator, claiming that Arafat had conceded too much: the accords made no mention of a Palestinian state; territories promised to the Palestinians were isolated and included a relatively small fraction of the land, leading some to liken them to “Bantustans”; nor did the accords give any indication of ending Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. In the late 1990s, the Oslo process ground to a halt, and Arafat’s style of governing, more dictatorial than democratic and more corrupt than capable, opened him up to additional criticism from both within and outside the national movement. Moreover, Arafat became increasingly marginalized as Islamist groups like Hamas, which appeared to be beyond his control, aggressively assumed the initiative in the struggle to achieve Palestinian statehood. Nonetheless, his death in November 2004 brought a huge outpouring of grief that showed that many Palestinians still regarded him as a national hero. Hamas was an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been active in the Gaza Strip since the 1950s, providing extensive welfare services to poor Palestinians and preaching a message of gradual social transformation. In the 1980s, with an organization already in place and with the PLO increasingly discredited, Islamists moved quickly to seize the initiative. In 1987 Shaykh Ahmad Yassin established the new militant organization (Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, “Islamic National Movement,” and also means N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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President Bill Clinton (center) watches as Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (left) and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat (right) shake hands at the ceremony for the signing of the historic Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (also known as the Oslo Accords) on September 13, 1993. (William J. Clinton Presidential Library)

“zeal” or “enthusiasm” in Arabic). With the goal of establishing an Islamic theocratic state in all of Palestine, including territory belonging to Israel, Hamas’s creation, in some ways, marked a return to the objectives of Hajj Amin and the AHC: the defeat and total expulsion of the Jews. Not surprisingly, this new organization had broad appeal, expressing as it did strong moral integrity and promising resolute action against the Israeli occupation. Before long, Hamas was outdoing all secular groups in violent action against Israeli targets, both military and civilian. Yassin’s assassination by Israeli forces in 2004 did not deter the self-sacrificing zeal of his followers; indeed, it made him a national martyr. As the 2006 Palestinian elections demonstrated, Hamas remains an important force in the institution of Palestinian national identity.

Defining the Nation Clearly, the definition of the Palestinian nation remains an ongoing task. Before World War I, the residents of what would become Palestine looked upon themN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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selves variously as Syrians, Arabs, Bedouin, and so forth. In the days of the Mandate, as the struggle against Zionism progressed, a distinct national identity began to emerge, though to some extent as a negative definition; that is, to be “Palestinian” meant to be a non-Jewish resident of the Mandate territory and included people of all classes and sectarian affiliations. Nonetheless, the uprising of the late 1930s signaled the emergence of a distinctly Palestinian national movement. After 1948, the deprivation of the Palestinian people, the loss of their lands and homes, and radical social revolutionary ideologies adopted by groups like Fatah, the PLO, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) added ideas of persecution and victimization. By the 1960s, Palestinians could be self-identified as those Arab peoples engaged in the struggle to liberate themselves and their lands from Israeli subjugation. Feelings of deprivation and alienation were enhanced as Palestinians living in neighboring Arab countries found themselves treated as outsiders. This sense of dispossession became a primary marker of Palestinian identity. For the first half century or more of its development, Palestinian nationalism remained explicitly secular, and even Islamic religious leaders like Hajj Amin alHusayni worked hard to include Christian Palestinians in the movement. Likewise, the political doctrines of Fatah, the PLO, and other organizations active in the movement since the 1950s had been drawn from secular social revolutionary sources, ranging from Fanon to Mao. But in the 1970s and 1980s, as the secular nationalist movement personified by Arafat and the PLO suffered repeated setbacks and seemed increasingly inept and corrupt, political Islam began to offer a strong contrast. With the growing strength of Islamist groups since the 1980s, inclusive definitions of previous generations appear to be weakening. Although Islamists like Hamas proclaim a pluralist vision of sovereign Palestine, it seems increasingly apparent that being Palestinian—or at least being a militant Palestinian—means being Muslim. What this bodes for Christian or nonobservant Palestinians and for the nation’s future remains unclear. Unless Islamist and secularist parties can reach some kind of accommodation, it seems likely that national identity will remain in dispute and the establishment of Palestinian statehood will remain in doubt.

Narrating the Nation While dramatic victories can be extremely important in creating a national epic, so can dramatic defeats. The most significant event in Palestinian history was al-Nakba, the catastrophic loss of the 1948 war. The Palestinian Arabs had begun this decisive battle confident in victory; after all, even after decades of Jewish immigration, they still formed a large majority in the territory, and even in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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UN-designated Jewish state, Arabs constituted nearly half the population. Moreover, they had been assured military assistance by surrounding Arab states, whose combined armies would surely overwhelm the small Jewish defense force. There did not seem to be any possibility that Palestine could fail, and yet it did. This disaster embodies the essential characteristics of the Palestinian national saga: a valiant struggle against dispossession and betrayal. National mythologies assert that Palestine failed in 1948 because the British favored the Zionist cause and did everything possible to obstruct Palestinian Arab efforts to achieve statehood. In the ensuing war for control of Palestine, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians lost their homes, their lands, their livelihoods, and their self-respect. It is true that the British did little to help develop Arab-governing institutions under the Mandate and that the Mandate charter specified the establishment of such institutions only as they related to the creation of a Jewish homeland. In addition, it is said that al-Nakba occurred because Palestinians were deceived, misused, and betrayed by their fellow Arabs. Again, it is equally true that the military support promised by the Arab states fell far short of Palestinian expectations. None of the Arab countries committed a sizable percentage of their armed forces to this war, and their attacks quickly bogged down due to lack of coordination and lack of preparation. In fact, the Arab states were deeply divided by mutual mistrust, jealousy, and fear, and none really had any interest in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The twin themes of dispossession and duplicity remain powerful after more than half a century. The role played by the British in depriving the Palestinians of their land and hopes has been assumed by Israel, which continues to throw up obstacles to Palestinian statehood. Sometimes these barriers are figurative, like the foot-dragging negotiations following the 1993 Oslo Accords; sometimes they are literal, like the “security barrier” under construction since 2002. Additionally, as in 1948, other Arab countries have continued to let the Palestinian cause down, and it seems clear that Arab states’ support for Palestinian organizations has mainly been motivated by the desire to manipulate the Palestinian cause to achieve their own, sometimes conflicting political objectives. And finally, after generations of ineptitude and corruption, the Palestinian people feel that even their own leaders betrayed them, as well.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Since the catastrophe, the Palestinian national cause has undergone significant development. The two decades from 1967 to 1987 were years of defeat and retreat for the Palestinian nation. Swift Israeli advances into the Gaza Strip and West Bank during the 1967 war brought the last remaining Palestinian territories under occupation and created another 100,000 refugees. In addition, the PLO was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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twice forced to relocate its headquarters during this period, from Jordan to Lebanon in 1971, then from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982; the last relocation represented a dramatic setback since it removed the organization hundreds of miles from its homeland. The beginning of a popular uprising in December 1987 marked a significant turning point. Like the 1936–1939 revolt, the Intifada (“shaking off ”), as it soon came to be called, represented a spontaneous popular expression of Palestinian frustration. Once again, lacking effective leadership, the people pushed the movement ahead. Over the course of the next five years, hundreds of Palestinians would die, and thousands more would be arrested, but the revolt also gained enormous sympathy for the Palestinian cause as the Intifada made it clear that the Palestinian people were not prepared to accept an open-ended occupation of their territories. The PLO’s announcement of willingness to recognize Israel’s sovereignty, and the Knesset’s authorization of official contacts with the PLO, led to the Oslo Accords of 1993. Once again, the cause of Palestinian nationalism seemed on the brink of success; yet once again this would prove a false hope. Violence by radicals on both sides undermined the peace, and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 removed the Israeli leader most likely to achieve a lasting resolution. Since the mid-1990s, the PLO has continued to founder, disabled by ineffectual leadership and Israeli intransigence. The ongoing failure of Palestine’s secular leadership to achieve national independence has increased the appeal of militant Islamist groups, and the future of the national movement remains quite uncertain. Clearly, the Palestinian movement is splitting between secular and Islamist interests, and each focuses on differing approaches to mobilize support. Since the 1980s, the PLO has sought ways to mitigate Israeli control over Palestinian populations, thus achieving some sense of relief from oppression, while at the same time maintaining a measured level of militant pressure on the Israelis through organizations like the Al-‘Aqsa Martyrs to retain credibility among the general population. In addition, Arafat and others attempted to build bridges to other Arab leaders, hoping to win genuine support for the cause. Islamists, though, have rejected these incremental strategies and limited goals. Instead they have returned to the original far-reaching objective of the first Palestinian nationalists, promising nothing short of the emancipation of all of Palestine, including territory now constituting the “Zionist entity” (i.e., Israel) and perhaps beyond. Thus, they assure the Palestinian people not only of their liberation from Israeli subjugation but also that duplicitous Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan may one day be punished. Secularists and Islamists both seek full Palestinian sovereignty, but the means of constructing the Palestinian state, as well as its final form, remain in dispute. While the original objective of the national movement was to retain control of all of Palestine, the reverses of the last six decades forced secularist groups like the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Death of Arafat More than any other man, Yasir Arafat was responsible for the making of the Palestinian nation. Unlike Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Arafat had not relied on tradition to establish his leadership but was a self-made man who had launched his political career as a hero in the armed struggle against Israel. While still a young student in Cairo, he had cofounded the Fatah commando organization; within a decade he had become the best-known Palestinian freedom fighter and the acknowledged leader of the armed struggle to achieve nationhood. However, though his status as fidayin leader won him the leadership of the Palestinian cause, it crippled his ability to negotiate effectively with Israeli governments, which viewed him as nothing more than a terrorist. To the end of his days, the Israelis would deal with him only under duress and put every effort into keeping him isolated. Many therefore came to see him as an obstacle to peace and to the establishment of a Palestinian state and hoped that after his death in November 2004 these objectives might be achieved. That they have not is perhaps an indication of how irrelevant Arafat had, in fact, become.

PLO to retreat from this winner-take-all position and agree to accept a smaller share of the land in return for achieving independence. The Islamists, though, are clearly less willing to accept compromise on this issue. Nor are they as willing to fudge the question of the “right of return” for dispossessed Palestinians. The sweeping victory for Hamas in the elections of January 2006 may indicate that the majority of Palestinians strongly favor the Islamists’ unconditional position. Just as likely, though, it represents frustration with a dozen years of ineffective and corrupt government by Fatah. As has happened so many times in the past, the people felt let down by their leadership and sought dramatic action, this time through the ballot box. Following the election, relations between Fatah and Hamas continued to deteriorate, and their conflicting visions of the nation’s future led them to the brink of full-blown civil war by early 2007. In February 2007, King Abdullah of Jordan, rightly concerned about the implications of Palestinian civil war for his own country, partnered with the Saudi government to broker a power-sharing deal between Fatah and Hamas, known as the Mecca Agreement. Nonetheless, it took five weeks of further negotiations between the two parties to agree on the formation of a cabinet, as each sought the upper hand. Moreover, the United States and Israel have refused to recognize this “national unity” government, which undoubtedly means that both will continue to interfere in internal Palestinian politics and pressure Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas to end the partnership with Hamas. Likewise, the Iranian government has been providing Hamas with arms, money, and training and has no desire to see a rapprochement between the Palestinians and Israel. Predictably, mutual mistrust arising from an unbridgeable ideological gap, coupled with susceptibility to outside influence, quickly led to another break between Fatah and Hamas. By mid-2007, gun battles between militia forces deployed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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by the two parties had again broken out, resulting in the partition of Palestinian territories between Hamas (in Gaza) and Fatah (in the West Bank). It seems increasingly likely that this dispute may not be resolved until one side has crushed the other. Even that outcome holds little promise for furthering the national cause, hence, yet again, a failure of leadership will have frustrated the aspirations of the Palestinian people. Selected Bibliography Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), with Eric Rouleau. 1981. My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle. New York: New York Times Books. Aburish, Said K. 1998. Arafat: From Defender to Dictator. London: Bloomsbury Press. Finkelstein, Norman G. 2003. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. 2nd ed. London: Verso. Gelvin, James L. 2005. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: One Hundred Years of War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hart, Alan. 1994. Arafat: A Political Biography. Rev. ed. London: Sidgewick & Jackson. Hroub, Khaled. 2000. Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. Khalidi, Rashid. 1997. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press. Khalidi, Rashid. 2006. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Struggle for Palestinian Statehood. Boston: Beacon Press. Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 1999. Islamic Politics in Palestine. London: I. B. Taurus & Co. Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. 2000. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press. Pappe, Ilan. 2006. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rogan, Eugene L., and Avi Shlaim, eds. 2001. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Said, Edward W. 1992. The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Books. Said, Edward W. 2001a. The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After. New York: Vintage Books. Said, Edward W. 2001b. Out of Place: A Memoir. New York: Vintage Books. Smith, Charles D. 2001. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Tessler, Mark. 1994. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Whitelam, Keith W. 1996. The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History. London: Routledge.

N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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South Africa Christopher Paulin and Kathleen Woodhouse Chronology 1877 Great Britain annexes the independent South African Republic, known as the Transvaal. 1880 The organization Afrikaner Bond is formed to maintain Boer political rights and cultural heritage. 1880–1881 To regain their independence, Afrikaners from the South African Republic declare a republic. 1881 Great Britain agrees to the retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881 through the Pretoria Convention but maintains control over its foreign affairs. 1884 Great Britain grants complete autonomy to the Transvaal through the London Convention. 1899–1902 War erupts between the British empire and the two independent Afrikaner republics, ending in their defeat and the creation of a federated South Africa. 1912 South Africa is granted dominion status. 1913–1914 J. B. M. Hertzog establishes the National Party (NP) to give voice to rising Afrikaner nationalism. 1918 Broederbund secret society is founded to promote Afrikaner nationalism. 1924 The NP in coalition with the Labour Party wins an electoral victory raising, Hertzog to prime minister. 1933 NP merges with the pro-British South African Party to create the United Party. 1933–1934 Daniel F. Malan establishes the Purified National Party, later the National Party. 1948 The National Party gains control over the South African government and will remain in power until 1994. 1952 First official legislation for what will become known as apartheid. 1989 Election of Prime Minister de Klerk; reforms begin. 1990 Nelson Mandela is granted freedom by the prime minister. 1994 The end of apartheid; democratic elections are held.

Situating the Nation Afrikaner nationalism teetered over the years between the need for freedom from European influence and dominance and the quest for a common identity. The majority of Afrikaners live in present-day South Africa, with others scattered further north or on entirely different continents. The country of South Africa contains a fascinating mix of communities, all with their own history and sense of self. The “rainbow nation,” as it is often called, has attempted to include all of the races and ethnic groups living within its borders. Black Africans make up the majority, with about 79 percent, whites total 9.6 percent, colored peoples make up 8.9 percent, and Indian/Asian groups, 2.5 percent. During the years of Afrikaner N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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rule, particularly apartheid, the country was divided along racial lines. Its vast territory of plateaus and farming land was parceled out to different communities. Today, South Africa borders Namibia (formerly part of South Africa), Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. It also provides the majority of Swaziland’s border and completely envelopes Lesotho. It is difficult to judge the number of Afrikaners living in present-day South Africa because the census does not cover ethnicity. Looking at race and language, it appears that over 2 million of the country’s inhabitants belong to this group. Afrikaners are the descendants of Europeans, particularly the Dutch, who migrated from the northwest. The establishment of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope attracted many seeking a change in life or fleeing religious persecution. The first colony established itself in 1652, mostly comprised of Dutch farmers and traders. The term Afrikaner emerged in 1707 as these Europeans began to view themselves as Africans belonging to this new land. Due to the amazing landscape and resources of the South Africa region, the Afrikaners were largely farmers, or Boers. These farmers settled originally in the cape region but began to migrate due to conflicts with local tribes and the need for farmable land. Two wars followed during which the Afrikaners fought for their rights to freedom and control of South Africa. Today, the community resides in various parts of the country, with a large number in the urban areas.

Instituting the Nation The origins of Afrikaner nationalism emerged with the British annexation of the South African Republic in 1877. Previous struggles and changes such as the series of resettlements called the Great Trek (1830s) and the establishment of two independent Boer Republics, Transvaal (1852) and the Orange Free State (1854), suggest a divide in the Afrikaner mindset. The Dutch Reformed church leaders frowned upon the exodus of thousands of Afrikaners from the British-controlled Cape Colony, fearing the moral degradation of Boers living among Africans outside the church community. The church played a pivotal role in reinforcing the notion that the Afrikaners were a chosen people, with the right to their land. However, this did little to slow the changes in this region. The two provinces also tended to act in opposition with the designs of Cape Colony Afrikaners, particularly in regards to land. Friction resulted from the constant drain of resources from the Cape Colony due to wars between independent African polities and the Afrikaner republics. However, differences began to fade after the British sent Theophilus Shepstone to annex the republics on April 12, 1877. The South African Republic at that time was engaged in a disastrous war against the Pedi people residing in the northern parts of South Africa. The annexation officially was to prevent the slaughter of the Transvaal European population. In reality, however, the need for cheap African labor and the lure of diamond mining had inspired the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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British involvement in the region. Shepstone alleged his good intentions of helping the Transvaal Boers with the protection of the British army, however consent from the republic’s president or the Volksraad was never given. Britain’s refusal to retrocede the Transvaal through peaceful means stemmed from the fact that annexation had created a more favorable labor situation for the diamond mines at Kimberley. This refusal, however, led to a forceful resolve by the Boers to regain their freedom. On December 13, 1880, Paul Kruger, along with Piet Joubert and Marthinus Pretorius, declared a republic. Transvaal Boers ambushed the small British force, thus triggering the First Anglo-British War. After several defeats, Britain granted Transvaal autonomy for local politics but maintained control of foreign affairs, including relations with other African nations. Afrikaner nationalism received a boost, though, as a result of the Second or Great Anglo-Boer War from 1899 to 1902. President Paul Kruger of Transvaal ordered a preemptive strike against the British as the desire for an independent state increased. The Orange Free State and Boers from the Cape Colony took up arms as well. A key ideology clearly emerged during this time: the idea of Afrikaners as a persecuted people.

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The British fight the Boers at the Battle of Belmont on November 23, 1899, during the Boer War. The second of two conflicts centering on the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, the war of 1899–1902 was the result of British determination to dominate areas of South Africa that had been settled by the Boers and were growing in economic strength. (Library of Congress)

After the South African provinces gained some autonomy from the British, several political parties emerged. The establishment of the National Party of South Africa in 1914 became the first nationalist party. It included a young Daniel François Malan, a preacher in the Dutch Reformed church. The National Party (NP), known for its disapproval of entering World War I, played an important role in furthering the use and development of Afrikaans as the people’s language. The NP appealed to poor whites by founding two companies, the South African National Trust Company and the South African National Life Assurance Company. The two focused on aiding Afrikaners in economic distress. They catered exclusively to this clientele, using only Afrikaner capital and investing exclusively in Afrikaner businesses. In turn these companies played a key role in gaining the NP its popularity through grassroots measures. Among other things, they provided relief to families whose husbands fought against participating in World War I. Furthermore, banking in South Africa lay entirely in British hands until this point, offering few loans to Afrikaners. The NP realized the importance of supporting this community as well as driving a wedge between poor whites and poor blacks who may have united due to their economic circumstances. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood), comprised of mainly Dutch Reformed church ministers, government bureaucrats, teachers, and other professionals, was initially formed in secret. The Brotherhood became a powerful force behind the scenes, manipulating many political affairs because of its impressive membership. Post–World War I depression led to growth of both the Brotherhood and the NP, especially after the mineworkers’ strike of 1922. The government’s breaking of the strike resulted in the deaths of 80 workers, bringing Afrikaner nationalists closer together. A coalition of the NP and the new Labour Party influenced the following elections. Prime Minister James Barry Munnik Hertzog showed support of poorer Afrikaner whites by setting ratios for whiteblack employment in the mining industry, giving management to whites only. During the 1930s, the merging of the NP with the South African Party created the United Party, which controlled the government until 1948. Many Afrikaners viewed this alliance as antinationalist, spurring D. F. Malan to found a new opposition party, the Purified National Party. The Brotherhood and the National Party played a significant role in maintaining Afrikaner control throughout the decades of apartheid. Upon the election of Nelson Mandela, the new NP continued to be a powerful party. Other groups, such as the Afrikaner Bond and the extreme-right Afrikaner Resistance Movement, appealed to a wide range of whites, depending on their political convictions. The Dutch Reformed church stretched its power not only across political boundaries but also into other institutions such as education. Not only did classrooms emphasize the allegiance and belief in a free Afrikaner nation but they highlighted important aspects of self-identity. Afrikaners desired a deep religious content to be added to the syllabus. Christianity was a part of their pedagogy, largely because they could interpret texts to support their beliefs in Afrikaner purity. The allocation of South Africa to the Afrikaners was explained via the educa-

The Afrikaner Resistance Movement Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) was founded as a political and paramilitary group. Seen as a white supremacy group, members grew from seven to several thousand in the 1970s and 1980s. Founded in the 1970s by Eugène Terre’Blanche in a small town outside of Johannesburg, this group initially focused its attention on the dwindling power of the white government. The AWB based its convictions on traditional Boer values, striving to establish a free Boer state and all that was lost after the Anglo-Boer War. The group objected particularly to the ANC, which they believed welded too much influence in local politics (though the party was banned at this time). The NP government never took the party particularly seriously, though officials did squelch AWB riots in the mid-1980s. The group gained international infamy in 1994 when they were defeated in Bophuthatswana (a Northwest homeland). After shooting at residents and wreaking havoc on the area, the Bophuthatswana military was able to subdue Terre’Blanche’s group. Since the imprisonment and then release of Terre’Blanche in 2004, the AWB activities have greatly subsided.

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tional system as part of the divine plan or Providence. For instance, the theory of evolution was not taught because it clearly removed divine reasons for South Africa’s existence and the Afrikaner as God’s chosen people. Faculty was highly encouraged to belong to the Purified National Party and the Broederbund.

Defining the Nation The ideology of an Afrikaner people distinct from both the English and their own Dutch ancestors emerged in two movements: one cultural, the other political. The cultural movement stemmed from an attempt to create a formal, written Afrikaans language, generally referred to as Taal. Because Afrikaners descended from several European countries, differences between groups existed. Two brothers, Reverend Stephanus Jacobus (founder of Afrikaner Bond) and Daniel du Toit, emerged as pioneers in developing the Afrikaans language. They provided a translation of the Bible into Afrikaans along with a newspaper and also started the Society of Afrikaner Rights to protect the emerging language. Targeting language as a means of developing identity proved challenging at first. Not all Boers were eager to abandon their traditional Dutch tongue. Some, including the influential Cape Colony Afrikaner Jan Hofmeyr, saw this language as an affront to both God and Afrikaners, calling it a “kitchen language.” The tension associated with using Afrikaans was echoed through communities as the simplified language that allowed masters to easily talk to their African servants. However, using the language as a foundation would pave the way to believing God created separate nations and languages, and ignoring this was akin to blasphemy. D. F. Malan, who propagated an extreme nationalism, focused his attention on language as well. Ideas taken from Dutch Reformed church minister Abraham Kuyper pressed the notion that nation and language are divine creations. Preserving the purity of the nation was essentially obeying God’s command. This idea, along with the church’s ideology and the rise of Nazi Germany, further formed the Purified National Party’s extreme beliefs. Afrikaans slowly blossomed and became an official language in the 1920s. In June 1976, the government designated Afrikaans as the language for teaching in schools. This announcement reaped considerable backlash from blacks living in the area outside of Johannesburg, the last straw for many and helping to solidify the Black Consciousness Movement. Violence continued, followed by considerable backlash from officials. Today, the language is recognized as only one of 11 official languages. With changes in the mentality of whites, many “Coloured” South Africans now speak Afrikaans as well. This result has caused interesting changes within the community. Self-identity as a persecuted people also contributed to Afrikaner nationalism. The Great Anglo-Boer War offered one of the first obvious examples of persecution. Two other poignant examples included the burning of Boer farms and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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internment of Afrikaner women and children, which became focal points over the generations. The high number of deaths of women and children in the concentration camps due to disease provided sympathetic martyrs for nationalists. Over the period that followed, relations between the Afrikaners and the British ameliorated as the colonialists began to achieve a status of equality with Europeans. The beginning of World War I demonstrated this newfound ease, as many believed it their duty to fight alongside the British. Not all Afrikaners agreed, however, causing the eruption of new rebellions among nationalists. Even under the apartheid government, Afrikaners fell back on their important history of persecution and rights to land. This attitude justified not only their strong sense of community but their actions as well.

Narrating the Nation Many events and individuals contribute to the Afrikaner nation’s memory. Initial struggles to gain a foothold in the region and build a common identity continue to be significant to the people. Aside from the rich tradition of poetry and music, specific days in history help symbolize the Afrikaner mentality. During the initial settling of the Great Trek, a war began due to complications between the Trek leaders Piet Retief and Gerrit Maritz and the Zulu tribe. Though previously an understanding existed between the two groups, the death of the Afrikaner leaders, followed by the murder of hundreds of Afrikaner women and children, brought the need for retaliation. A group of 470 attacked 10,000 Zulus at the Battle of Blood River. Their determination and firearms won them victory with only three injuries, whereas the Zulus lost 3,000 men. This victory became less of a simple win and more of a defining moment in Afrikaner history. The people had vowed to God that, if they succeeded, December 16 would be honored as the Day of the Vow. In postapartheid Africa, the day is celebrated as the Day of Reconciliation. Over the decades, many Afrikaners dressed in traditional Boer clothing and reenacted many day-to-day farming rituals as a means of honoring this special day. The symbols associated with strong convictions and emotional ties to the land illustrate the importance of Boer history even to younger Afrikaners. Many key figures have played important roles in symbolizing and leading the effort toward a cohesive Afrikaner nation. Paul Kruger, known as the Boer resistance leader, led many efforts to help gain independence from British rule in the 1800s in the Transvaal. A former vice president of the South African Republic, he became the voice of retrocession after the former president, Thomas Burghers, accepted a pension from the British government. Kruger traveled to London in 1877 to urge the Colonial Office to grant Transvaal Afrikaners their independence. His plea fell on deaf ears. Upon his return to southern Africa, Kruger drummed up support for independence among the Transvaal Boers and held a series of meetN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ings in which differences among them were set aside in support of the movement. This national spirit seemed to spill over to Cape Colony Afrikaners, especially those within its parliament. Desire for independence swelled to dangerous levels after the British removed the immediate African threats, the Pedi and the Zulu. Kruger remains an important figure in Afrikaner history. Cecil John Rhodes also gained notoriety in the Afrikaner community. British born, he favored British influence but also decried the so-called “Imperial Factor” as meddlesome. A businessman and a politician, he was both pro- and anti-Boer during his career. He became prime minister of the Cape Colony but lost the position as a result of the Jameson Raid, which further united the Afrikaners against British interests. This event inevitably paved the way to the Second Boer War. In more recent times, Prime Minister de Klerk is seen as one of the most influential Afrikaners of the 20th century. His leadership toward abolishing apartheid gained him mixed reviews in his community. However, the younger generations have responded in a positive manner.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation While the majority of events that helped define Afrikaners took place during the formation of the community and fights against the British, the 20th century was dominated by the need to maintain Afrikaner dominance through apartheid. Apartheid classified people through a racial system and created a political framework to ensure economic and political dominance for the white category. The main categories were white, black, colored, and Indian. Jan Christiaan Smuts, as leader of the NP, ran under the platform of apartheid, which continued until the 1990s. By the end of the 19th century, whites owned the vast majority of land through the government or by surveyed titles. After their involvement in both world wars, Afrikaners were ready to explore their position in South Africa. Prime Minister Malan, elected in 1948, appealed to newly successful whites. During the earlier part of the century, Afrikaners began to move to urban areas as jobs pulled them away from the traditional Boer farms. Malan’s government promised reforms catered especially to the white ruling class. The idea of apartheid was established to create a definite divide between whites and other races. For example, the Population Registration Act provided a method for each race to remain separate, such as outlawing interracial marriage. Each town was required to decide who would own or occupy property through the Group Areas Act. Whites benefited greatly under these laws, especially when land reforms made the most lucrative employment available to them. The apartheid government also set up “homelands” to help separate the races geographically, making states for each group. This segregation hindered others, particularly blacks, from economic opportunity and voting. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd Verwoerd served as South Africa’s leader from 1958 until his assassination in 1966. Born in the Netherlands, he lived in several areas including Rhodesia and the Orange Free State. A great deal of mystery surrounds his studies and interests. Many accused Verwoerd of being influenced by German philosophers, particularly during the rise of Nazism. Though this has never been proven, he did take particular interest in the ideas of Social Darwinism. After a yearlong stint in Germany, he returned to South Africa and became politically active. Many refer to him as the principal “architect” of apartheid during his role as minister of native affairs. His distaste for the British Crown was apparent during his premiership, when South Africa finally left the Commonwealth. In 1960 he was shot by David Pratt but recovered from the injuries. In 1966, he was stabbed to death in the House of Ministries by Dimitri Tsafendas, who claimed that the worm in his stomach made him kill the politician. Verwoerd’s influences and ideology may have been controversial at the time, but he remains one of the most important Afrikaner figures of the 20th century.

Though Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd recommended creating industrial jobs on homeland boundaries, the government refused to fund the project. These homeland areas survived until the 1980s when corruption and uprisings finally destroyed the system. During this time, the African National Congress (ANC) was viewed by Afrikaners as their main threat. This pro-African party gained substantial support during the first portion of the 20th century. The initial movement relied on nonviolent confrontation but, nonetheless, raised concern within the white government. In the 1960s the Afrikaners pushed for pro-white reforms within the political system. These actions spurred violent protests from the African population. In response to these events, the government banned the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Prime Minister Verwoerd encouraged his government to leave the British Commonwealth, inciting more activity from the ANC. Nelson Mandela, along with his fellow instigators, were captured and given life sentences. After a harsh economic depression in the early 1980s, the Afrikaners were now represented by Pieter Willem Botha, who fought to keep white dominance intact. Among other things, he desired an ethnically separated house of parliament for each race category. Ultimately, due to the homeland system and other obstacles, this plan allowed for no African representation. Lack of representation incited new violence among nonwhite groups. The government’s inability to control the violence and changes within the government incited a small increase in popularity of the Afrikaner extreme right (AWB). Though this group looked to overthrow the Botha government, the 1989 election brought NP leader Frederik Willem de Klerk to power. Prime Minister de Klerk ushered in a new type of Afrikaner who was raised under the apartheid government. Surprisingly, his govN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ernment saw the mounting violence of other groups as a major threat to South Africa’s very survival and moved to abolish apartheid. Prime Minister de Klerk released Nelson Mandela in 1990, a signal to both national and international communities that the Afrikaner government was ready to change. Internationally, the Afrikaner government had been viewed unfavorably, an outlook aggravated by its refusal to support sanctions against the white government in Rhodesia. The de Klerk government continued to make strides toward sculpting a new South Africa. The prime minister attended celebrations for the newly independent Nambia, formerly South West Africa. He and Nelson Mandela worked closely together and were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. The major opposition at this time was from the AWB. Fearing that these changes would move Afrikaners further from their traditional Boer past, the AWB continually appealed to the NP. However, these appeals had little effect. April 1994 marked the end of the lengthy white rule. The first democratic election held was both chaotic and inspiring. The black population was finally given a voice, and the ANC was named victorious with Nelson Mandela as their leader. Today, the Afrikaners are adjusting to the new South Africa much like all the other racial groups. Though many roadblocks still exist, the country has made strides in reallocating land, helping individuals in need of economic support, and attempting to foster understanding among groups. As the country deals with heavy burdens, such as the AIDS epidemic, the sense of Afrikaner nationalism is constantly changing. While the community no longer enjoys the economic and political benefits of the past, many Afrikaners have maintained their positions in society. Though it is difficult to say what direction Afrikaner nationalism will take, its strong roots will help keep the community together. Selected Bibliography Du Toit, Andre, and Hermann Giliomee. 1983. Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis & Documents. Berkeley: University of California Press. Giliomee, Hermann. 2003. The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Keegan, Timothy. 1996. Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Marks, Shula, and Richard Rathbone, eds. 1982. Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870–1930. New York: Longman. Marks, Shula, and Stanley Trapido, eds. 1987. The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa. New York: Longman. Moodie, T. Dunbar. 1975. The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the African Civil Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press. O’Meara, Dan. 1983. Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital, and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934–1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paulin, Christopher M. 2001. White Men’s Dreams, Black Men’s Blood: African Labor and British Expansionism in Southern Africa, 1877–1895. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc.

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Schreuder, D. M. 1969. Gladstone and Kruger: Liberal Government and Colonial “Home Rule,” 1880–1885. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Shillington, Kevin. 1987. History of Southern Africa. Harlow, UK: Longman. Templin, J. Alton. 1984. Ideology on a Frontier: The Theological Foundation of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1652–1910. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Thompson, Leonard. 1985. The Political Mythology of Apartheid. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Congo and Zaïre Kevin C. Dunn Chronology 1878–1887 Henry Morton Stanley is hired by Belgium’s King Leopold II to establish trading posts and acquire land throughout the Congo River basin. 1884–1885 At the Berlin Conference, Leopold II obtains personal sovereignty over the Congo, which soon becomes known as the Congo Free State. 1908 Facing growing international criticism, Leopold II agrees to sell the colony to the Belgian government. 1959 Anticolonial riots erupt at Leopoldville and several other cities. 1960 The Congo becomes independent on June 30, with Patrice Lumumba as prime minister. Mutinies within the armed forces break out on July 5. Katanga secedes, and the United Nations intervenes. Patrice Lumumba is captured and eventually murdered. 1961–1965 Continued political instability and civil war. 1965 Failed elections are held in March. The military seizes power on November 24 and installs Joseph Mobutu as head of state. 1966 The Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) is formed. City names are Africanized beginning in May. 1970 Elections are held with Mobutu as sole candidate. The MPR is declared the sole political party and supreme institution of the country. The country is renamed Zaïre the following year. 1990 Under internal and external pressure, Mobutu announces the end of the one-party state. 1996 Rebels, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, launch an offensive in the eastern part of the country, rapidly gaining strength and quickly moving westward. 1997 Kinshasa falls to the rebels on May 17. Mobutu flees, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaims himself president and changes the country’s name back to the Congo. Mobutu dies in exile.

Situating the Nation Like most African states, the Congo was a colonial invention. Subsequently, the seeds of Congolese nationalism were generated largely from within and in opposition to the colonial experience. While the development and manifestations of Congolese nationalism are admittedly complex and often contradictory, this chapter will focus on three specific phases in the development of Congolese/Zaïrian nationalism from 1945 to the 1980s: the colonial experience, the short tenure of Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s first prime minister, and the lengthy reign of Mobutu Sese Seko, during which the country was renamed Zaïre. Each phase contributed distinct elements within the development of a national identity for the Congo. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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European conquest and colonization of the Congo was overseen by Belgian King Leopold II and executed via his colonial agents, most notably Henry Morton Stanley, a young American newspaper reporter turned explorer. Under the guise of various international associations, Leopold II directed Stanley to establish treaties with local African leaders that would cede their land to the Belgian Crown (not the Belgian state), thus establishing the groundwork for a colonial state. Leopold II was able to achieve international recognition for his personal rule over the Congo River basin at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference. International outcry, led by the Congo Reform Association, later arose as mounting evidence emerged concerning the severity of Leopold II’s colonial rule and his monopolization of trade and resources. In 1908, Leopold II gave in to the growing international pressure and sold the colony to the Belgian state, which assumed control over the colonial government. In the wake of Belgium’s inheritance of the Congo from Leopold II, the colonial state instituted a colonial practice termed “Paternalism,” with an overt emphasis on the white man as “father” and African as “child.” While arguing that some progress had been made in civilizing the Congolese people, the Belgian colonial project maintained that, by and large, they remained precariously close to their savage roots and were still evolving. This claim justified the Belgian colonial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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project’s strict control over most aspects of Congolese daily life. The policy was articulated in Governor-General Pierre Ryckman’s 1948 treatise Dominer Pour Servir (Dominate to Serve). This paternal metaphor continued to inform Belgian colonial policy until the granting of independence in 1960. A significant development during Belgian colonial rule was the emergence of an indigenous elite social class called évolués—Congolese who had relatively advanced education and/or civil service jobs. For the colonial government, the évolués were regarded as symbols of their “civilizing” mission. Évolués were defined by the colonial government as those blacks in the midst of the transition from “traditional” tribal customs to Western “developed” culture. The colonial state engaged in the act of measuring and documenting the level of “civilization” individual Congolese had reached, going as far as introducing the Carte du Mérite Civique, which was awarded to Africans who could prove that they were “living in a state of civilization.” An African had to go through an application process to show that he or she was free of “uncivilized” practices, such as polygamy, witchcraft, and theft. It was within the évolués milieu that Congolese nationalism was incubated. By midcentury, the évolués were pressing for a greater voice in the colony’s future and articulating a nascent Congolese national identity. The nationwide publication La Voix du Congolais became a forum for indigenous ideas and art, helping construct, in Benedict Anderson’s terminology, an “imagined community” among Congolese elites. Yet, most of the political and social changes that were granted were largely reserved for the évolués and not the masses, which further incited general anticolonial sentiment. But there were few accepted outlets for anticolonial or nationalist expressions. Because the colonial state only permitted “cultural” or “mutual self-help” indigenous associations, most of the political movements that emerged during the colonial era, such as the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), were firmly rooted in ethnic or regional identities. Anticolonial activities were thus generally expressed within ethnic and/or regional, not national, frameworks. The Belgian colonial government experienced an unexpected surprise in January 1959 as powerful anticolonial riots broke out in Leopoldville, the capital of

Évolués Évolués was the term used to describe Congolese who were assimilated into European lifestyles. The product of the Belgian colonial policy of “Paternalism,” this elite social class enjoyed relatively advanced education and/or civil service jobs. Regarded as symbols of the colonial “civilizing” mission, the évolués were awarded the Carte du Mérite Civique, signifying that they were “living in a state of civilization.” By the mid-1950s, the évolués actively pressed for a greater voice in the colony’s future. Most évolués were from urban areas and moved into positions of leadership after independence.

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the Belgian Congo. Most Belgians assumed that the nationalist movements sweeping across Africa would somehow bypass their colony. The colonial government had long maintained that the Congolese had neither political consciousness nor engagement. In the wake of the 1959 riots, the Belgian government moved quickly to decolonize. On June 30, 1960, the Belgian Congo became the independent Republic of the Congo. The political structures put in place were similar to the Belgian parliamentary system, and in national elections, Patrice Lumumba was elected prime minister. In a gesture of national unity, Lumumba created a unity government with his chief rival, ABAKO’s Joseph Kasavubu, as president. However, on July 5, 1960, several units in the Congolese army mutinied, demanding promotions, pay raises, and the removal of white officers. As rioting and unrest spread, Belgian troops stationed in the Congo intervened and actively engaged the Congolese army and civilians, further increasing the volatility of the situation. Illustrating the absence of strong national cohesion, the southern province of Katanga announced its secession. In response, Lumumba and Kasavubu asked for military assistance from the United Nations. The United Nations responded by sending a multinational force to the Congo to “restore law and order.” But the internal political situation quickly worsened, with President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Lumumba, and Gen. Joseph Mobutu each claiming national leadership. Despite being under UN protection/house-arrest, Lumumba managed to escape from Leopoldville but was soon captured. Lumumba was then flown to Katanga, where he was handed over to the secessionist forces, beaten, tortured, and eventually murdered. After several years of political instability and civil war, Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965. After consolidating his control of the country, Mobutu launched several campaigns to define, narrate, and instill a national identity for the country, which he renamed “Zaïre.” Mobutu’s project of nationalism was largely an attempt by a segment of Congolese to define and inscribe their own identity within an international context that had heretofore portrayed the Congo in almost exclusively negative terms (e.g., the “Heart of Darkness”). In an attempt to foster a

Patrice Lumumba (1925–1961) The Congo’s first prime minister, Lumumba was born on July 2, 1925, in the Kasai province. He rose to political prominence in Stanleyville after helping found the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), which he attempted to make into a nationally based political party. He participated in the 1960 Brussels Round Table Conference, which established the terms of Congolese independence. After the MNC scored significant victories in the May 1960 election, Lumumba became prime minister and defense minister of the new Congolese government. After the army’s uprising and Mobutu’s coup, Lumumba was captured and eventually flown to the secessionist region of Katanga, where he was murdered under mysterious circumstances.

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His arms roped behind him, ousted Congolese premier Patrice Lumumba is captured by troops loyal to Col. Joseph Mobutu in 1960. Lumumba was killed in early 1961, exacerbating the violence that began shortly after independence and continued for years under Mobutu’s dictatorship. (Bettmann/Corbis)

sense of national identity, Mobutu began a renaming campaign in 1966 and introduced the philosophy of authenticité and the political/economic program of “Zaïrianisation.” In later years, the regime also introduced a cult of personality known as Mobutisme, which was less concerned with articulating a national identity than with justifying Mobutu’s regime.

Instituting the Nation Congolese nationalism has been a complex project, shaped by myriad forces and events. For the sake of brevity, this chapter focuses on three of the most important forces shaping the evolution and articulation of discourses of Congolese nationalism from 1945–1990: the tensions within the colonial project between the colonial narrative and the emergence of an educated Congolese social class known as the évolués, the nationalist identity narrated by Patrice Lumumba, and the creation of a Zaïrian national identity by Mobutu Sese Seko. While the colonial era évolués helped introduce a nascent sense of nationalism, Patrice Lumumba embarked on the project of articulating a coherent national identity. Unfortunately, his administration was extremely short-lived. The project of defining and instilling a Congolese/Zaïrian national identity was carried out largely under Mobutu’s reign. Despite the eventual emergence of a cult of personality, Mobutu’s attempts to create a sense of national cohesion among the disparate population largely succeeded, as evidenced by the levels of nationalism displayed in the Congo following the multiple foreign invasions and “civil wars” that began in 1996. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Defining the Nation The Congo is an entirely colonial invention. Though the entity borrows its name from the Kongo Kingdom, the Congo was made up of diverse and disparate ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups. At the time of its creation, there was no commonality among the peoples that would become “Congolese.” During his 1879–1884 expedition for Leopold II, Henry Morton Stanley was responsible for establishing the physical space of the “Congo” by traveling on foot throughout the region, physically demarcating the geographical limits of Leopold II’s possession. In effect, Stanley colonized by traversing; assimilating that space into the larger colonial structures, and scripting the colonial subjects’ identity and history to necessitate their conquest. Under Belgian colonial rule, the Congo was administered by the colonial state, in cooperation with the church and Belgian corporations, and was treated as a collection of regional spaces rather than as a unified and homogenous whole. Within the colonial ideology of paternalism, the Congolese were regarded as largely uncivilized children requiring the strong guiding hand of Belgian rule. As Congolese elites emerged to articulate alternative visions of the Congo and Congolese, regional, ethnic, and cultural divisions were pronounced. The first coherent articulation of a national identity—as opposed to a regional and ethnic one —was produced by Patrice Lumumba, who emerged as one of the most popular articulators of a Congolese nationalist/pro-independence position in the 1950s. Lumumba helped form the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), becoming its leader and serving a prison sentence in 1959 for reputedly fomenting anticolonial riots in Stanleyville. He was begrudgingly released by colonial authorities in January 1960 to attend the Roundtable Conference on decolonization in Brussels. Prior to independence, the MNC was victorious in the May 1960 elections. Lumumba’s popularity was largely based on the fact that he articulated a coherent

Mobutu Sese Seko (1930 –1997) Born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu on October 14, 1930, Mobutu spent his early adult years in the Congolese army as a journalist. In 1958, he joined Patrice Lumumba’s Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and was appointed state secretary when Lumumba became prime minister at independence. Mobutu led a coup on September 14, 1960, establishing a College of Commissioners that ran the country until February 1961. Mobutu led a second coup on November 25, 1965, eventually gaining extensive political powers through a one-party state centered around the Mouvement Populaire de Révolution (MPR). By the 1980s, Mobutu had constructed a political aristocracy that became infamous for extracting state resources for personal enrichment. It is generally estimated that Mobutu and his close friends pillaged between $4 billion and $10 billion of the country’s wealth. Mobutu was eventually overthrown in 1997 by forces led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Mobutu died in exile later that year from prostate cancer.

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and nationally based challenge to the Belgian colonial project. He offered an interpretation of the previous 80 years that focused on colonial exploitation, violent repression, and economic plundering. For most of the 1950s, however, Lumumba had accepted most of the colonial myths, even praising Belgium’s supposed civilizing mission in his 1956 book Congo, My Country (published posthumously). Lumumba’s position changed, however, after his visit to Ghana in December 1958 for the All-African People’s Conference. This meeting of African nationalist parties was organized by Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah to support the anticolonial struggle and to strengthen the ideas of pan-African unity. It proved a valuable meeting place for African national leaders to share ideas and develop anticolonial strategies. This trip proved formative for Lumumba, who afterward drew heavily from the pro-nationalist, anticolonial rhetoric espoused there. Returning to Leopoldville, he proclaimed that independence from Belgium should be considered a “right” not a “gift” and began demanding immediate decolonization. In articulating a narrative of Congolese identity, Lumumba was the sole Congolese politician stressing a “national” identity rather than one based on region or ethnicity. Subscribing to the dominant Western view that territorial space was the sole spatial form in which to secure a political community, Lumumba accepted the colonially constructed space of the Congo as entailing a single, unified political entity. For him, Congolese sovereignty resided within the population that dwelt within that space. While other politicians privileged smaller, fragmented spaces bound by ethnicity, language, or regional memories, Lumumba tied Congolese identity to the larger colonially demarcated space of the Congo state. Employing the rhetoric of Afro-nationalism, Lumumba sought to create a unified identity for the people inhabiting that territory. The specifics of Lumumba’s national identity narrative will be explored in the following section. In the wake of Lumumba’s murder, the Congo suffered several years of political instability and civil war. It was not until after Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965 that a semblance of stability and order was established across the country. After consolidating his power, Mobutu engaged in furthering Lumumba’s nationalist project. Whereas Lumumba was only able to introduce a vision of Congolese national identity, Mobutu’s regime was able to instill a sense of national solidarity over the next several decades. Mobutu’s success in doing so stems from several projects: his renaming campaign, the introduction of the philosophy of authenticité, which was based on an invention of national identity, and the program of “Zaïrianisation,” which began in 1973. The specific elements of these projects will be discussed in the following sections.

Narrating the Nation As previously stated, Patrice Lumumba was instrumental in articulating a national identity discourse that enabled Congolese to see themselves as part of an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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“imagined community.” Lumumba articulated what it meant to be “Congolese” by grounding Congolese identity in the collective social memories of suffering at the hands of Belgian colonizers. This conception was clearly articulated in his Independence Day speech, which followed the Belgian king’s recitation of a glorified Belgian colonial history. Lumumba offered an alternative history of the colonial project and of Congolese identity. In the opening passages, for example, he stated: Our lot was eighty years of colonial rule; our wounds are still too fresh and painful to be driven from our memory. We have known tiring labor exacted in exchange for salary which did not allow us to satisfy our hunger, to clothe and lodge ourselves decently or to raise our children like loved beings. We have known ironies, insults, blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were “Negroes.” (quoted in Merriam 1961, 353)

Lumumba’s narrative exposed the repression, exploitation, and violence that the Belgian colonial narrative sought to erase. Lumumba’s speech politicized the tensions and resistance between whites and blacks that were romanticized or dismissed within the Belgian colonial historical narrative. Moreover, Lumumba created a counterimage of the Congolese population. The Congolese, in Lumumba’s narrative, were not the immature children or irrational savages portrayed within the Belgian paternalism project; rather, they were presented as part of a “we”—as victimized men and women who had survived Belgian brutality and exploitation with dignity, humanity, strength, and unity. Paternalism was replaced with “brotherhood.” Yet Lumumba’s narrative on the Congo’s identity contained a fundamental tension because, to articulate a national identity among the diverse elements of the population, essential markers for this identity had to be created and articulated. Lumumba chose not to use preexisting ethnic, linguistic, or regional markers to delineate this identity, largely because similarities of these kinds did not exist. Rather, he offered a narrative of the colonial project based on shared memories of exploitation and brutalization. By articulating a shared history of colonial suffering, Lumumba tried to unite a disparate population. Moreover, Lumumba accepted not only the colonially created embodiment of the Congo but also the Western-scripted concepts and practices that constituted the Congo. Thus, Lumumba sought to Africanize the colonial state institutions by replacing white state officials with Congolese and reaping the benefits that such a transition would entail (in terms of both power and wealth). Lumumba, like most other postcolonial leaders, viewed the state as the primary vehicle for forging national cohesion. His attempts to do so were unfortunately cut short by his brutal murder. The project of forging a unifying sense of nationalism among the Congo’s ethnic, cultural, and linguistically diverse population would be deferred until after Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965. In May 1966, the Mobutu government began N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the policy of renaming many of the country’s major cities, replacing their colonial names with “African” ones. Leopoldville became Kinshasa, Elisabethville became Lubumbashi, Stanleyville became Kisangani, and so forth. A few years later, streets in Leopoldville with colonial names were given African ones, and statues of colonial icons such as Leopold II and Stanley were removed. On October 27, 1971, Mobutu announced that the Congo—both the country and the river—would henceforth be known as “Zaïre.” The flag was replaced by the ruling party’s flag, and a new national anthem was written. Continuing this trend, Mobutu proclaimed that all citizens of Zaïre were required to change their names by adopting more “African” ones. Those who refused to do so ran the risk of losing their citizenship. In January 1972, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu changed his own name to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga. These name changes were justified on the grounds of overcoming the colonial legacy, making the country more authentically African, and removing the negative baggage associated with the “Congo.” These acts of renaming were transformative in that they sought to create new knowledge formations grounded in a nationalist ideology. The renaming of Zaïre by its political elites represented the self-invention of the populace they sought to govern. Mobutu’s construction of a national identity for Zaïre was most clearly realized in his authenticité campaign. According to this campaign, the first step of building national unity required the decolonization of the mind. It was held that authenticité sought to move away from borrowed or imposed ideas toward an increased awareness and privileging of indigenous cultural beliefs and values. This campaign was seen by its supporters as a pivotal act of decolonization because it was aimed at restoring among the Zaïrian people a sense of pride in their own traditional culture, which had been taken away by colonialism. The underlying domestic goal of these projects was to increase cultural pride in the hope of furthering national unity. The dilemma for Mobutu’s regime was that there was no preexisting “nation” to unify. Prior to colonization, the “Congo” had been made up of diverse and fragmented societies and sociopolitical systems. There were no “national” traditions, beliefs, and values to “authenticate.” The history of modern nationalism indicates that many nations must be invented. Such was the case in Zaïre. While European nations had centuries to construct a national identity, Zaïrians had to make do with a few years, and thus the artificiality and forced nature of authenticité were more obvious than similar projects had been in Europe and elsewhere. Mobutu’s regime engaged in selecting, plotting, and interpreting the events and characteristics that narrated a Zaïrian identity. The discourses on authenticité were thus engaged in a larger project of inventing a national identity, which required the production of a narrative of common precolonial historical memories, myths, and traditions. Yet, by focusing on a return to traditional cultures, the Zaïrian elites ran the risk of increasingly fragmenting a precariously unstable multicultural country since the cultural identities at play in the region N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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bore little relationship to the territorially delineated state of “Zaïre.” To counter this trend, the regime engaged in trumpeting and, in many cases, inventing commonalties. Mobutu and his propagandists spent a great deal of time defining the philosophies, beliefs, and values of “traditional Zaïre.” Much of this entailed synthesizing different cultural traditions and beliefs into a single invented “Zaïrian” discourse. Mobutu’s production of national identity also relied on the scripting of the country’s colonial and postcolonial eras. Through the authenticité campaign, Mobutu continued Lumumba’s project of narrating a national community by selecting, plotting, and interpreting the shared colonial experiences of abuse at the hands of the Belgians. At the same time, Mobutu and his agents narrated the history of the failed first republic as one of communal Congolese suffering under the “Imperialists” and corrupt, incompetent rulers. Despite repeated rhetorical moves to “put those years behind us,” great attention was paid to the “mistakes” of the pre-Mobutu era to solidify shared historical experiences. One of the most interesting acts involved the heroicizing of Patrice Lumumba, the assassinated first prime minister. Despite the fact that Mobutu led the coup against Lumumba and was implicated in his murder, Mobutu appropriated his image in the name of Zaïrian nationalism.

Building and Mobilizing the Nation The goal of Mobutu’s nationalism campaign was to create a feeling of national pride and cohesion among the heretofore diverse and divided population. Thus, the target audience was the average citizen, regardless of social class or ethnicity. Much of the nationalism project relied on narrating common memories and (invented) precolonial cultural commonalities. However, creating a Congolese/ Zaïrian nationalism also involved performative aspects. For example, the Mobutu regime held extravagant displays of dancing, performances, parades, and other “authentic” displays of national character across the country. These performances of Zaïrian identity were called animation and were regarded as expressions of a shared “national spirit.” Animation involved public dancing and singing songs of praise to Zaïre, Mobutu, and his regime, usually by numerous women dressed in “national” garb. Mobutu himself also became an important site for the performance of an imagined national identity, gradually transforming himself into a personification of the body politic. He dressed in the accoutrements of authenticité, drawing from different cultures around the country. Often he would wear an abacos (an acronym for à bas le costume, which means “down with suits”), the two-piece male garment that was designed as part of the authenticité campaign to replace the European suit and tie. It eventually became mandatory business attire. As both the author and symbolic representation of what it meant to be and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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dress like a Zaïrian, Mobutu attempted to become the physical embodiment of Zaïrian national identity. In its invention of common traditions within the narrative of Zaïrian identity, the Mobutu regime emphasized the image and political beliefs of “chieftaincy,” redefined according to their own needs and agendas. In fact, the regime sought to interpret Zaïrian tradition as undemocratic and authoritarian, much as earlier colonial agents had done. This aspect of the imagined national identity allowed the regime to suppress other political parties and engage in repressive practices. For example, the regime warned that, because individual liberties may lead to anarchy, the authority of the government could not be questioned. Mobutu often claimed that the traditional rule by chiefs meant that Africans could not understand European or American-style democracy. Mobutu’s domestic control was intimately tied to his narrative of national identity. Exploiting the image of the traditional chief helped Mobutu establish himself as a contemporary dictator. Moreover, the rhetorical imagining of the Zaïrian community as a family with Mobutu as the father figure harkened back to the colonial discourse of paternalism and produced the political dynamic of coercive authoritarianism and violent repression. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Mobutu’s invention of a Zaïrian national identity was merely a self-serving attempt to mask his authoritarian rule. In the 1990s, as the country was ravaged by two foreign invasions and subsequent “civil wars,” it was clear that some sense of nationalism existed in the renamed Congo. All suggestions that the country be officially balkanized into separate regional entities were strongly resisted by most citizens in the name of Congolese unity. Thus, a clear sense of Congolese nationalism seems to resonate among the citizens of the country. That said, however, it should be noted that the definition of Congolese nationalism remains strongly contested. There is no clear agreement on what it means to be Congolese—or even who is Congolese. During the closing years of Mobutu’s reign, the embittered ruler would frequently heighten ethnic and regional divisions to maintain power. This practice was also employed by his successors, Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila. Indeed, the question of Congolese citizenship and national identity has been a particularly contentious, fractious, and violent political issue for many years and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Selected Bibliography Anstey, Roger. 1966. King Leopold’s Legacy: The Congo under Belgian Rule 1908–1960. London: Oxford University Press. Callaghy, Thomas M. 1984. The State-Society Struggle: Zaïre in Comparative Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press. De Witte, Ludo. 2001. The Assassination of Lumumba. New York: Verso. Dunn, Kevin C. 2003. Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity. New York: Palgrave.

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Hochschild, Adam. 1998. King Leopold’s Ghost. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. MacGaffey, Wyatt. 1997. “Kongo Identity, 1483–1993.” In Nations, Identities, Cultures, edited by V. Y. Mudimbe, 45–58. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Merriam, Alan. 1961. Congo: Background of Conflict. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. 2002. The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History. London and New York: Zed Books. Schatzberg, Michael G. 1988. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaïre. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Willame, Jean-Claude. 1972. Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Young, Crawford. 1965. Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. 1985. The Rise and Decline of the Zaïrian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

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Eritrea Fouad Makki Chronology 1869 Opening of the Suez Canal. An Italian shipping company acquires a coaling station at Assab on the southern Red Sea coast. 1882 Assab is transferred from the shipping company to the Italian state, which gradually extends control over the region. 1890 Eritrea declared an Italian colony. 1894 Peasant revolt against Italian expropriation of village land. 1896 Ethiopian forces defeat the Italian army at the Battle of Adwa. 1900–1908 Three treaties are signed delineating the boundaries between Italian Eritrea and the adjacent states. 1935–1936 Italy invades Ethiopia and establishes the Italian East African empire. 1940 Italy enters World War II and launches an offensive against British-occupied Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya. 1941 The British counteroffensive leads to the collapse of the Italian empire, and Eritrea comes under British administration. Formation of the patriotic Association for Love of Country. 1942 Publication of first vernacular newspapers in Tigriña and Arabic. 1946 Formation of pro-independence Muslim League. 1947 Formation of pro-Ethiopian Unionist Party. 1950 Establishment of the Independence Bloc. A UN General Assembly resolution establishes a federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia. 1952 Transfer of power to the new federal government. 1958 Worker and student demonstrations against the subversion of Eritrea’s autonomy. 1959 Formation of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM). 1960 Formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). 1961 The ELF commences armed operations. 1962 Ethiopia abrogates the federal arrangement and annexes Eritrea. 1970 Formation of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). 1974 The Ethiopian Revolution topples the monarchy, and a government dominated by leftleaning military officers proclaims the formation of a republic. 1991 Eritrea is liberated by the EPLF. A coalition of Ethiopian ethno-nationalists controls Addis Ababa. 1993 Eritrea becomes a sovereign state after a UN-monitored referendum. 1994 The EPLF holds its third organizational congress, adopts a new charter, and changes its name to the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). 1997 The draft constitution is ratified by the Eritrean Assembly. A national currency, the Nakfa, is introduced. 1998 A border war breaks out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 2000 A peace treaty is signed ending the war, and an international tribunal is mandated to determine the boundary between the two states. 2001 Leading critics of the Eritrean president as well as many others are arrested, and the independent press is shut down.

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In the context of the unresolved dispute over the border, the constitution remains suspended, political critics remain incarcerated, and the independent press remains shut down. Over 100,000 Eritreans are still in the Sudan as refugees, while a large percentage of the nation’s youth remain mobilized in work brigades under military discipline.

Situating the Nation Some 60 years ago, at a time when political independence was far from being the obvious and inevitable option it would later become, Eritrea was one of the first colonies in Africa to grapple with the issue of decolonization. In the years immediately following World War II, there were just as many Eritreans who favored independence as chose union with Ethiopia. Few would have imagined at the time that Eritreans would eventually be engaged in one of the most bitter and prolonged wars of national liberation in the African continent in the name of a common identity. The origins of Eritrea as a distinct political entity date back to the end of the 19th century, when virtually the entire continent of Africa was partitioned among a handful of European powers. Throughout the precolonial era, the territory was never under the control of a single political entity, even though large portions of

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it formed part of the Aksumite empire between the first and eighth centuries. Following the collapse of that empire, the political geography of the region was fragmented so that, by the mid-16th century, the constituent peoples had been incorporated as tributaries of either the Ottoman Empire, the Abyssinian Kingdom, or the Funj Sultanate, whereas village communities in the frontier areas between them remained relatively autonomous. For much of the past two millennia, the peoples of Eritrea were part of a wider northeast African and Red Sea world, connected by culture and commerce if not always by political affiliation. European overseas expansion gradually destroyed the wider matrix that had underlain those connections, fundamentally altering the social and economic dynamics in the region. At the time of the Italian occupation in the late 19th century, there were nine ethno-linguistic and two main religious communities coinciding roughly with a highland-lowland geographic divide. The lowland Muslims were all Sunni, while the highland Christians were predominantly Orthodox Christian, although Catholicism and Protestantism had made some inroads through missionary activities. In the course of the 20th century, politics and culture became linked to territorial identity, and by the time of independence in 1991, the interrelations of the territory’s peoples had taken on new meaning.

Instituting the Nation The boundaries of today’s Eritrea are the product of the extension of Italian imperial power between 1869 and 1890. Beginning with a coaling station on the Red Sea coast of Assab, the Italians gradually expanded their colonial empire to include all of today’s Eritrea. They had planned to turn Eritrea into a settler colony, but faced with a peasant rebellion in 1894 and defeat by Ethiopian forces at the Battle of Adwa in March 1896, they were forced to abandon their settler schemes. The colonial project was subsequently reconfigured to make Eritrea part of an Italian commercial empire, which provided the impetus for the construction of a relatively extensive rail and road network connecting various settlements, markets, and military garrisons. This infrastructure laid the foundations for the development of a light industrial sector that by the 1930s had turned Eritrea into the most industrialized zone in northeast Africa. Besides employment in the construction and industrial sectors, tens of thousands of Eritrean youth were conscripted into the colonial army, serving in Italian-occupied Somalia, Libya, and Ethiopia. The colonial state ruled via the Italian language but made little effort to provide modern education for Eritreans. In 1941, when the population of the colony was estimated at 1 million, there were no more than a thousand Eritrean students enrolled in modern schools. The schooling that did exist was limited to the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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fourth grade, and different schools were designated for particular religious or social groups. The colonial bureaucracy’s need for trained translators and clerks nonetheless produced a small but influential stratum of bilingual intellectuals who were to play a critical role in the subsequent politics of the territory. The Italian empire collapsed in 1941 in the context of World War II, and Eritrea came under British rule. The priority for the newly arrived British was to stabilize the situation in Eritrea in order to mobilize the territory’s human and economic resources to advance their own war effort. Toward this end, the Italian colonial apparatus, including much of its personnel, were left intact. It was only with the end of World War II that the situation changed and the political and educational restrictions that had been imposed on Eritreans were gradually relaxed. The Paris Peace treaties at the conclusion of World War II mandated the victorious Allied powers—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France—to determine the future of the former Italian colonies. Unable to reach a consensus, they transferred their mandate to the newly formed United Nations. The United Nations set up a Commission of Inquiry to canvas the views of the population regarding the territory’s political future, and it was during this period that the first Eritrean political organizations came into being. Like the Italians, the British viewed Eritrea as composed of two sharply defined religious communities. Arabic and Tigriña had consequently become recognized as the respective print languages of “Muslims” and “Christians,” each possessing vernacular newspapers and administrative representation. Two main political blocs eventually crystallized—the Muslim League, campaigning for independence, and the Unionist Party, advocating amalgamation into Ethiopia—and the stage was set for a bitter conflict over the future of Eritrea. Other smaller political formations—the National Party, the Progressive Liberal Party, the Pro-Italia Party, the War Veterans Association—that also emerged at this time were eventually drawn by the gravitational pull of the Muslim League or the Unionist Party.

Defining the Nation Although a self-conscious “Eritrean” nationalism appeared at this time, it was from its inception hindered by religious and linguistic divides, and remained for some time the notion of small groups in the urban areas. It gained an initial following in the Muslim towns where reaction to the prospect of being absorbed into the Ethiopian empire galvanized the population, and acquired a mass form when the rural plebeian Tegra revolted against their aristocratic overlords. At the top of Tegra society was a patrician nobility of various origins that had come to dominate the region in the 16th century. Their authority was secured by recognition from regional kingdoms and empires and, in the 20th century, from the colonial state. Below them were the masses of agro-pastoralists who had to pay tribute N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Ibrahim Sultan (1916 –1988) Born into a plebian Tegra family from northern Eritrea, Ibrahim Sultan grew up in the town of Keren, where he studied Arabic and Italian and then worked as a clerk in the colonial bureaucracy. Following the emergence of a legally sanctioned political sphere in the 1940s, he was instrumental in linking the social emancipation movement of the Tegra with the political struggle for Eritrea’s independence. He was the founding leader of the Muslim League, the main pro-independence organization of the 1940s, and secretary general of the Independence Bloc. Elected to the Eritrean Assembly in 1952, he remained a staunch opponent of Ethiopian rule. He went into exile in Egypt in 1958, where he lived out the rest of his life.

to the nobility in exchange for physical “protection.” In the context of the collapse of Italian authority in 1941, the Tegra revolted against the hated tributary system and refused to pay tribute or render services to their overlords. The British initially suppressed the revolt, but by 1947, they had come to recognize that the system had to be reformed if social order was to be maintained. They turned to the Tegra leaders in the towns for assistance, and the result was a complete dismantlement of the tributary structure. It was the political charge released by this impressively self-mobilized social movement that generated the possibility of an Eritrean nationalism rooted in popular social strata. The Muslim League impressed upon the plebeian Tegra that only national sovereignty could secure their social emancipation and prevent a restoration of patrician privileges, which would be almost inevitable in the event of Unionist victory and the imposition of Ethiopian rule. In so doing, they were able to draw the Tegra into the organizational and symbolic structures of Eritrean nationalism, which in turn became the key vehicle through which the mobilized Tegra entered the stage of national politics. Meanwhile, in the Christian highlands, the forces of nationalism took longer to develop. There, the Orthodox church had served as the bulwark of the call for union with Ethiopia, a call that appeared not to have offended the political sensibilities of any except a small sector of the bilingual functionaries. It was along this inherited vocabulary of religious differences that the rival imaginings of Eritrea’s future became articulated, and in this context of internal political rivalry and imperial manipulation, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in 1950 establishing a federal arrangement between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Narrating the Nation From the start, the federation proved unworkable. Ethiopia was an empire ruled by an absolutist monarchy that was hostile to any semblance of democracy. Eritrea’s N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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UN-drafted constitution, with its provisions of democratic guarantees, was anathema to the monarchy, and over the next decade, the monarchy systematically dismantled the democratic freedoms Eritreans had enjoyed. Political parties, independent associations, and labor unions were suppressed. Th e once vibrant Eritrean press was muzzled, and Eritrea’s two administrative languages, Arabic and Tigriña, were struck down and substituted by Amharic—the official language of Ethiopia. In 1959, following the suppression of political protests and a general strike in the towns of Asmara and Massawa, the Eritrean flag was lowered. This was followed three years later by the formal abrogation of the federation and the annexation of Eritrea into the Ethiopian empire. In response, nationalist politicians initially put most of their energies into international appeals for redress against the disabling of Eritrea’s autonomy. By the late 1950s, confronted with an intransigent autocratic order that resisted all calls for reform, the main impetus of nationalist activity shifted to armed opposition. Repression acted as a decisive accelerator of this shift and drove nationalist politics underground. The efforts of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) at a broader political mobilization were soon outflanked by the emergence of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which emphasized the exclusive efficacy of armed struggle and commenced armed operations in September 1961. In the subsequent decade, the nationalist movement went through a series of internal crises,

A young female soldier of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in 1975. (Patrick Chauvel/ Sygma/Corbis)

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Eritrean Women The women of Eritrea played a prominent role in the war of independence. Thousands of young women joined the liberation movements in the 1970s, serving in various capacities, including combat units where they constituted close to 30 percent of the fighting force. The mass entry of women into the nationalist organizations helped transform prevailing gender norms. In the postindependence period, these veterans of the war of liberation have continued to organize and mobilize to ensure that the gains they have made are not eroded and to advance the rights of women in Eritrean society at large.

culminating with the breakaway formation of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1970. It was in this altered context that Eritrean nationalism underwent a cultural and political mutation. The breakdown of the old urban-based politics became serviceable for a larger reconstitution of nationalist politics. Divisions, partly of a generational outlook, opened up as old status demarcations came under attack and new forms of radical nationalism appeared. A new generation of nationalists inspired by revolutionary anticolonial movements elsewhere came to dominate the nationalist movement. Venerating progress, science, and rationalism, they saw national liberation as the path to modernity, knowledge, and freedom. For them, the nation was to be understood as the structural form of modernity, and they were averse to forms of subnational cultural or regional affiliations and allegiances. In this sense, radical nationalism was articulated not only in opposition to imperial rule but against other forms of cultural attachments as well. By the mid-1960s, the fortunes of nationalism in Eritrea were changing as nationalism ceased to be the prerogative of only one sector of Eritrean society and entered the general currency of political affirmation. Significantly, a new generation of Christians had begun affirming their own nationalist credentials, clothing themselves in the modern legitimacy of the nation. This represented an unprecedented extension, both socially and spatially, of nationalist politics, which now embraced all Eritreans regardless of their faith or ethnicity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation This reconstitution of the constituency for nationalism was ironically as much a source of contestation as of unity. The mass entry into the nationalist movement of Tigriña-speaking Christian youth brought to the fore the dialectic of political unity and cultural diversity that was a key dynamic of Eritrean nationalism from the beginning. If religion provided an inherited vocabulary of difference in the 1940s, that divide by the 1970s had become secularized in the form of language. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Unlike so many other colonies in Africa, the colonial language was not diffused enough to serve as the language through which Eritrea could be imagined. Arabic and Tigriña had become the means through which national consciousness was to develop. While Tigriña was the language of the ethnic group by the same name, Arabic had come to serve as the lingua franca of the various Muslim ethnolinguistic communities. No single language had emerged to serve the public role of national unifier. The central political challenge for the nationalist movement consequently was how to forge the bonds of solidarity in a population otherwise fragmented along cultural and regional lines. A more deeply rooted sense of Eritrean-ness had to be fostered in the crucible of a three decades–long war of national liberation. Within the constricted conditions of a rural-based armed movement, nationalists had to devise various forms of cultural and political projects to nurture the sense of commonality. From music and popular theater to the cultivation of civic values and secular marriages, nationalists worked hard to fashion local cultural differences into a society-wide political project. There were, however, clear limits to this nationalist political culture. In the absence of a legally sanctioned, society-wide public sphere, various notions of representation substituted for the popular will. The hierarchical structures of an armed movement fostered a compliant culture in which the ideal of a selfempowering citizenry was constrained by the cult of efficiency and rationality. The sheer brutality of the war, and the massive social dislocation it occasioned, was understood as necessitating a movement that had to be exceptionally disciplined while being intimately attuned to the sympathies of the people. Nationalism therefore became impregnated by the model of war, and at two bitter moments in the history of Eritrean nationalism, the early years of the 1970s and the 1980s, the rival nationalist movements, the ELF and the EPLF, crossed swords with each other. The period between 1961 and 1991 was therefore both a creative and a limiting one. While the process of forging a common Eritrean nation was well advanced, it was clearly not without tensions. But, in the end, neither religious and ethnic differences nor the repression by the imperial state were strong enough to contain the emergence of a widely diffused and popular sense of Eritrean-ness. By May 1991, a propitious context for the realization of the long-sought dream of independence had emerged as a result of three major developments. The first was the changed international context, characterized by the end of the Cold War and the fact that Eritrea was no longer a strategic theater of superpower conflict. The second was the collapse of the coercive apparatus of the Ethiopian state in the face of mounting resistance not only in Eritrea but within Ethiopia as well. And finally, by the 1980s, the EPLF had secured its dominance over the national movement in Eritrea, militarily marginalizing or politically subsuming rival organizations. Relatively freed from external dictates or internal contestations, and in conditions of popular legitimacy derived from its role in the struggle for liberaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tion, the EPLF was provided an auspicious opportunity to fashion the emerging state institutions. The formal declaration of independence came on May 24, 1993, following the holding of a referendum. Based on a relatively broad and inclusive conception of the nation, the referendum confirmed what was in actuality never in doubt: with 98.5 percent of the 1,173,706 eligible voters participating, 99.8 percent voted in favor of independence. With this fitting climax to a decades-long struggle for national liberation, the state of Eritrea became part of the interstate system, accepting its covenants and protocols and joining its central institutions: the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and a host of other multilateral institutions. The attainment of national sovereignty once again shifted the field of political contestation back to the arena of an embryonic national public sphere. The transition to statehood and the prevalent sense of peace worked to mobilize popular expectations behind a vision of reconstruction that incorporated strong ideals of democratic citizenship and social justice. The sacrifices needed for victory in the face of years of embattled hardship made a powerful case for equitable social and cultural policies in the peacetime to come. But once the initial euphoria of liberation had settled, political power seemed less susceptible to the popular expectations that the wartime ethos of common sacrifice had generated, and there was a slow assertion of a restrictive normalization. In the society at large, there was a general retreat to the mundane concerns of the everyday as people started reassembling the dispersed fragments of their interrupted lives: education, careers, marriage, children, and homes. The onset of the tragic war with Ethiopia (1998–2000) further threatened to reduce the promise of national liberation and unmasked the underlying authoritarianism latent in the nationalism articulated by the EPLF. The period after the conclusion of the war already marks an important watershed, and a new political landscape is now taking shape in which the regime finds itself confronted with a popular longing for democratic rights and representative government. Selected Bibliography Connell, Dan. 1993. Against All Odds. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Habte Selassie, Bereket. 2003. The Making of the Eritrean Constitution. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Iyob, Ruth. 1995. The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 1941–1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Killion, Tom. 1998. Historical Dictionary of Eritrea. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press. Markakis, John. 1987. National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mehreteab, Ammanuel. 2004. Wake Up, Hannah! Reintegration and Reconstruction Challenges for Post-War Eritrea. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. Negash, Tekeste. 1987. Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882–1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact. Stockholm, Sweden: Uppsala University Press.

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Pool, David. 2001. From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Athens: Ohio University Press. Tesfai, Alemseged. 2002. Two Weeks in the Trenches: Reminiscences of Childhood and War in Eritrea. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. Trevaskis, G. K. N. 1960. Eritrea: A Colony in Transition 1941–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Amrit. 1991. Women and the Eritrean Revolution: The Challenge Road. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Yohannes, Okbaghzi. 1991. Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

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Nigeria Bonny Ibhawoh Chronology 1900 Britain establishes colonial rule over the Niger Coast Protectorate, previously under chartered company rule. 1914 Britain consolidates its hold over Nigeria with the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates. This brings the predominantly Muslim North and the Christian and animist South under a single colonial administration. 1924 The first indigenous political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) is formed. 1960 Nigeria gains independence from Britain with Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa leading a coalition government. 1966 Ethnic and political conflicts lead to a military coup in which the elected civilian government is overthrown. 1967 Eastern states dominated by the Igbo ethnic group secede from Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra, sparking a bloody civil war. 1970 Biafran leaders surrender; the former Biafran regions are reintegrated into the country. 1976 The nationalist military ruler Gen. Murtala Mohammed is assassinated in coup attempt. He is replaced by Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, who introduces an American-style presidential constitution. 1979 The new constitution is introduced with the “federal character principle,” an affirmative action principle aimed at ensuring equitable distribution of national resources. Elections bring a new civilian government to power. 1984 The military regime of Gen. Muhammadu Buhari launches the “War Against Indiscipline,” an ambitious national campaign to mobilize the country that stresses the work ethic and emphasizes patriotism. 1993 Military ruler general Ibrahim Babangida annuls the results of presidential election following an extended and controversial democratic transition program. 1999 Transition from military dictatorship to democratic rule. Former military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo is elected president. 2003 President Olusegun Obasanjo is reelected president for a second term.

Situating the Nation The foundations of contemporary Nigerian nationalism can be traced to 19thcentury European imperialism in Africa. Until it gained independence in 1960, Nigeria was a British colony and nationalist activities during this period focused mainly on challenging colonial domination and ending British rule. With the attainment of independence, Nigerian nationalism began to focus more on fostering national integration and a sense of national identity among Nigerians. The main trust of postcolonial nationalism was establishing a cohesive nation out of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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about 200 constituent ethnic groups in the country. The largest of these ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. The origin of the Nigerian state dates back to 1900 when the British government took over the administration of the Niger Coast Protectorate that was previously under chartered company rule and formed the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. In 1914, the British government amalgamated both protectorates to formally establish the colonial state of Nigeria. Colonial efforts at creating a Nigerian nation were fraught with many challenges. The most significant of these were the cultural and religious differences between the predominantly Muslim North and the Christian and animist South. For most of the colonial period, the British administration maintained a policy of divide and rule that sought to keep the prevalent Western Christian influences of the South from the Muslim North where appeals to Islamic legitimacy upheld the rule of the emirs. The policy of indirect rule was aimed at preserving the indigenous cultures of each area. Yet, the bringing together of various ethnic and religious groups under a common colonial administrative unit fostered a spirit of oneness and some sense of unity. This sense of unity was strengthened by the desire for self-rule and freedom from foreign control, which gave rise to an organized nationalist movement soon after the imposition of colonial rule. At the forefront of this early anticolonial nationalist movement was an emergent class of Western-educated Nigerians, many N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of whom were products of Christian missionary schools in the South. Like colonial rule elsewhere in Africa, British colonial rule carried with it racial intolerance and discrimination that limited the opportunities of Nigerians, particularly the intelligentsia in political and economic life. Colonial policies that excluded Africans from important political positions in the state affected all Nigerians, irrespective of their ethnic origins, and helped them to see themselves not as separate ethnic entities but a marginalized group collectively in opposition to British colonialism. This became the basis of the early nationalist movement.

Instituting the Nation The first group of anticolonial Nigerian nationalists emerged in the South. These nationalists opposed the British policy of indirect rule, which entrenched what was considered to be an anachronistic traditional ruling class in power while shutting out the Westernized elite. The nationalist organizations they led aimed to mobilize not only a particular class or group but also the entire nation against what they saw as oppressive British rule. The ideological inspiration for many of these early nationalists came from different sources, including prominent American and Europe-based pan-Africanists, such as Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore. Inspiration also came from Nigerian students abroad who joined those from other colonies to form such nationalist and pan-African groups as the West African Students Union, founded in London in 1925. One of the first nationalist organizations in the country was the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Although there were several nationalist-oriented political movements before it, its formation in 1923 marked the emergence of organized political parties in Nigeria. A central figure in its formation was Herbert Macaulay, a former civil servant and newspaper publisher who became a dominant figure in post–World War I Nigerian politics. By the 1930s, Macaulay had gained a reputation as the leading symbol of the anticolonial nationalist movement. His central demand was greater representation and participation of Nigerians in the colonial government. He was also strongly opposed to colonial racial discrimination and segregation. The chief sources of Macaulay’s strength and mobilizing power were his newspaper, the Lagos Daily News; his party, the NNDP; the highly organized labor unions in the South; and his unique ability to fire the imagination of semiliterate and illiterate masses of the country. His fiery public speeches and newspaper commentaries appealed to both educated elites and chiefly authorities. Under his leadership, the NNDP emerged as the most powerful group and a major political force in Nigeria in the 1930s. However, like most first-generation West African nationalists, Macaulay was conservative in his approach. Although he was deeply critical of British imperial policies, he also at times demonstrated great loyalty to the British Crown and devotion to the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Herbert Macaulay Herbert Macaulay was a pioneer of the Nigerian nationalist movement. Trained as a civil engineer in England, he established the first Nigerian political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which successfully contested and won seats in the colonial Legislative Council. He was a leading campaigner for the welfare of Nigerians and gained a reputation for his principled opposition to the excesses of the colonial government. He is often described as the “father of Nigerian nationalism.”

British cause. He did not quarrel with the goal of British policy in Nigeria but with specific actions and policies of the colonial administration. This seeming paradox in Macaulay’s political beliefs was seen by some of his contemporaries as a limitation of his political vision for Nigeria. Many believed that his loyalty to Britain compromised his nationalist activities. Such concerns paved the way for a new phase of nationalism in the 1940s with the emergence of a new breed of men (and a few women) who were more radical in their opposition to colonialism. These men, many of whom had been trained in England and the United States, and had therefore been more intensely and directly exposed to the Atlantic race discourse, came back to their country to right what they regarded as historic wrongs by the Europeans against African peoples. This new phase in the nationalist movement in Nigeria was inaugurated with the formation of the Lagos Youth Movement (later, Nigerian Youth Movement, or NYM) in 1934, which embraced most of the young intellectuals of the period—H. O. Davis, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Olufemi Vaughan, Kofo Abayomi, and Obafemi Awolowo. The NYM proclaimed as its political goal the “immediate and complete independence of Nigeria from British colonial rule.” Yet, it also agitated for dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations so that Nigeria would have the same status as Canada and Australia. Although the NYM represented a departure from the conservative nationalism of the past, it did not have the mobilizing power of Macaulay’s NNDP. A split in the ranks of the organization in 1941 led to the formation of two political organizations that subsequently dominated the nationalist movement—the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the Action Group (AG) led by Obafemi Awolowo.

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was born in 1904 and educated in Nigeria and the United States. In 1937, he founded a newspaper, the West African Pilot, and later cofounded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, a major political party that dominated Nigerian politics in the 1940s and 1950s. He was elected premier of the Eastern Region in 1952 and served as governor general and later president of Nigeria between 1960 and 1966.

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The outbreak of World War II strengthened the nationalist movement. Leaders of the nationalist movement sought to link local nationalist aspirations with global issues associated with the war. Allied propaganda that the war against Germany was being fought to preserve democracy and to ensure that people in every part of the world live in freedom and peace, provided a basis for Nigerians to demand that these same ideals be extended to them. British wartime assurances to improve the welfare of colonized people, which were made as a way of securing their support for British war efforts, were also used by Nigerian elites to press their demand for political reforms. They charged that colonial rule prevented the unshackling of progressive forces in the country and demanded immediate self-government. This more radical phase of Nigerian nationalism was also marked by numerous protests of postwar political and economic conditions. Prominent among these were the agitations of Nigerian ex-soldiers and trade union leaders who led popular protests against the economic hardships that Nigerians faced after the war. During the war, Nigerian soldiers fought alongside other British forces in Palestine, Morocco, and Burma. Wartime experiences provided a new frame of reference for many of these soldiers, who interacted across ethnic boundaries in ways that were unusual in Nigeria. This experience engendered a unique sense of unity and nationalism among the soldiers. Besides, many of these soldiers who returned home after the war had learned skills and trades in the army that they found difficult to apply after the war. Demobilized and unemployed, they felt that the colonial government had not given them a fair deal in spite of their contributions to the war efforts. These soldiers, returning from theaters of war, brought back with them dreams of national self-expression and became very active in the nationalist movement. At the same time, the increase in the spread of education swelled the ranks of the middle class, leading to the emergence in the late 1940s of a vibrant nationalist newspaper press and organized labor union movement. The most active of the unions was the Railway Workers Union under the leadership of Michael Imoudu who organized a successful national workers strike in 1945. Many of these workers and trade union leaders were exposed to nationalist propaganda and became increasingly involved in nationalist politics. Under these domestic and international circumstances that challenged the legitimacy of colonial rule, Britain began to reappraise Nigeria’s political future, paving the way for the country’s independence.

Defining the Nation In the period leading up to independence in 1960, the nationalist movement began to assume a more ethnic and regional character. The new political parties that emerged placed greater emphasis on regional and ethnic concerns rather than on national interests. For instance, the AG evolved from Egbe Omo Oduduwa N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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(Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa), a Yoruba cultural movement in 1948. The latter had as one of its main objectives, “the inculcation of the idea of a single nationalism throughout Yoruba land.” The founders of the party openly declared it to be a regional party aimed at organizing within its fold all nationalities in the Western Yoruba-dominated region of Nigeria. Similarly, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was a purely Northern political party, dominated by the Muslim Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. The membership of the party was limited to people from the Northern region and its declared objective was to seek regional autonomy within Nigeria. The third major party was the Igbo-dominated NCNC (later the National Council of Nigerian Citizens). Although these regionalist parties jointly negotiated with the British government over constitutional changes leading up to independence, cooperation among them was the result of expediency rather than an emerging sense of national unity. For the most part, political groups articulated their political aspirations on the basis of regional, rather than national, interests. Once it became evident that political independence was within reach, the tenuous sense of national unity and consensus that had sustained the anticolonial movement gave way to rigidly parochial ethnic and regional interests. In championing their various regional causes, some political leaders even questioned the viability and desirability of a Nigerian nation. Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the NPC, characterized the British amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 as a mistake, while Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the AG, famously stated: Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same sense as there are “English,” “Welsh,” or “French.” The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not. (Awolowo 1947, 48)

With growing regional sentiments among the dominant ethnic groups, leaders of minority ethnic groups began to demand either for separate states of their own or for constitutional safeguards to prevent their domination by majority ethnic groups in an independent Nigeria. The concerns were based on the fact that the major regional parties were effectively controlled by leaders of the numerically dominant ethnic/cultural groups—the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo.

Obafemi Awolowo Obafemi Awolowo was a foremost Nigerian nationalist and political leader. Trained as a lawyer, he became involved in politics in the 1940s and organized the Action Group in 1951. He was elected premier of Western Nigeria in 1954 and later became the opposition leader in the national parliament. During the civil war he served as the federal commissioner for Finance and deputy chairman of the Federal Executive Council. In 1979, he ran unsuccessfully for president. He died in 1987.

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Minority groups were concerned that independence from British colonial rule would only be replaced by permanent Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, or Igbo domination. To address these concerns, the British colonial government established a commission in 1957 to ascertain the facts about the fears of minority ethnic groups in Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears. In its report, the commission identified two main grounds for the fears of suppression and political marginalization among minority ethnic groups in the country. First was the use of physical force by the major political parties to intimidate smaller political groups. In the view of the commission, this trend was a grave threat to national integration and inter-ethnic harmony. A second reason for the fears of the minority groups was the tendency of regional governments, secure in their majority, to disregard the wishes of the minorities. But in spite of these observations, the commission rejected the idea of creating more states because it thought that would “create more problems as great as it sought to cure.” It suggested instead that a “Bill of Rights” modeled after the European Convention on Human Rights be included in the independence constitution as a way of promoting national integration and guaranteeing minority rights. Following this recommendation, the constitution introduced at independence contained elaborate provisions guaranteeing to every Nigerian certain basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Narrating the Nation Although Nigeria became independent in 1960, it retained formal links with the British Crown until 1963 when the country became a Republic. With independence, Nigeria also adopted a federal form of government. This was thought to be the best form of government for a country with such diverse regional and ethnic groups. Federalism, which guaranteed some level of regional autonomy, was also seen as a way of protecting the rights and interests of minority groups within the country. The country also adopted the Westminster style of government as a way of ensuring that political power was not concentrated in the hands of any single ethnic or regional group. Thus, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, from the Muslim-dominated Hausa-Fulani group, became the prime minister; Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo from the East, became governor general (later president); and Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba from the West, became leader of the opposition party in parliament. Under these circumstances, postcolonial Nigerian nationalism tended to focus on promoting a shared sense of national belonging. Old colonial histories that stressed ethnic divisions and cultural disparities were rejected for new national histories that stressed national unity. Nationalist historians challenged the idea that the Nigerian state was an artificial colonial creation and stressed, instead, the long history of precolonial economic and cultural contacts between the diverse ethnic groups in the country. The underlying message was that there were cultural and historical bases for national unity. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Nigerian coat of arms. (Vector-Images.com)

The aspiration toward national integration was also evident in some of the national symbols that were adopted at independence. The national anthem, composed by a British expatriate, acknowledged ethnic differences but stressed national unity: “Nigeria, we hail thee/ Our own dear native land/ Though tribe and tongue may differ/ In brotherhood we stand.” Similarly, the new national motto and coat of arms evoked unity by incorporating symbols that connected the land and people of Nigeria. The coat of arms consisted of wavy bands of silver on a black shield representing the Niger and Benue rivers, two major rivers that run across the country. It also included the Cactus spectabilis, a wild flower common throughout the country. The adopted national motto was “Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress.”

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Beneath these national symbols, however, were serious challenges to the idea of the Nigerian nation. Ethnic and regional differences were accentuated in the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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struggle for economic power and limited state resources. In the absence of a truly national political platform, politicians drew on ethnic and regional loyalties in staking their claim to national office. Even supposedly national institutions such as the military and the police were not spared the divisive ethnic politics of this period. In 1966, the military overthrew the elected government of Tafawa Balewa in a coup led by Igbo officers in the Nigerian Army. The coup led to the assassinations of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and the Northern Premier Ahmadu Bello, leading many to conclude that it was ethnically motivated. The new military ruler, Maj. Gen. Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, sought to stem the tide of ethnicity and regionalism in Nigerian politics by abrogating the federal system and introducing a unitary system of government. His hope was that by centralizing political power, the regional governments would cease to be bases of ethnic agitations. This reform was short-lived as Aguiyi Ironsi was himself overthrown in a bloody countercoup by military officers, mostly of Northern extraction. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was named as the new head of state amidst the violence and killings of Igbos in the northern part of the country. These killings were apparently to avenge the assassination of Northern political office holders during the earlier Igbo-led coup. The killing of Igbos led to the mass departure of over a million Igbos from the North back to their homelands in the Eastern Region. It also led to calls in the Eastern Region for secession from Nigeria, as several Igbo leaders proclaimed that they had lost faith in the Nigerian nation. In May 1967, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region, proclaimed the establishment of the independent Republic of Biafra. This led to a devastating civil war from 1967 to 1970. The Biafra War was the most serious threat to the Nigerian nation since its creation. Leaders of other ethnic groups made it clear that they too would seek secession if the Biafran secessionist movement was successful. This scenario was, however, averted with the surrender of Briafran forces in 1970. One of the main challenges that faced the country after the civil war was restoring confidence in the nation, which had been shaken by the conflict. The military rulers realized that there was an urgent need to repair the damage of war and to foster a renewed sense of national belonging, particularly among the Igbos

Biafra War The Nigerian Civil War (also known as the Biafra War) broke out in 1967 following political and ethnic crisis in the country. The Eastern states dominated by the Igbo ethnic group under the leadership of Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu declared the Eastern Region the sovereign and independent Republic of Biafra. The federal government declared a state emergency, and the ensuing fighting raged until 1970 when Ojukwu fled the country and Biafran forces surrendered. One million Nigerians died in the war.

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who had lost the war. To this end, the government of Gen. Yakubu Gowon declared the official principle of “No victor, No vanquished,” indicating that there would be no retribution against leaders of the secessionist movement. No military medals of valor were awarded to the victorious federal troops since, as General Gowon argued, the war had been a conflict between brothers. Instead, the government promised to adopt the policy of the three R’s: rehabilitation, reconciliation, and reconstruction. Efforts were made to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during the war and reintegrate Igbos into national institutions, such as the civil service, the police force, and the army. Although these postwar reconstruction initiatives had their limitations, they represented an attempt at promoting national integration. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Nigeria continued to be ruled by a succession of military rulers. The most prominent of these was Brig. (later Gen.) Murtala Ramat Mohammed, a Muslim Northerner, who came to power in 1975. Mohammed assumed power with an agenda to reform key institutions of the state and foster a new sense of national belonging among Nigerians. This included a purge that affected the civil service, judiciary, armed forces, and public corporations. He strengthened the power of the central government and imposed the authority of the federal government in areas formerly reserved for the states. His successor, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, continued with these reformist policies and oversaw the transition from military rule to elected civilian rule in the country. One of the tasks of nation-building that the Mohammed-Obasanjo regime grappled with was formulating new political institutions, processes, and orientations that would address the problem of ethnic and regional politics that had plagued the nation since independence. One solution was to divide the country into more states to reduce the concentration of ethnic groups in particular states. It was thought that this would “help to erase memories of past political ties and emotional attachments.” Thus, in 1976, 6 new states were created, bringing the number of states in the country from 13 to 19. Also, as part of reforming political structures to foster national integration, the country adopted the American-style presidential system of government and a new constitution in 1979. Under the constitution, parties applying for registration had to have national objectives and executive boards whose members represented at least two-thirds of the states. This was clearly aimed at avoiding the divisive ethnic and regional politics of the past. Another provision of the 1979 constitution aimed at eliminating past loopholes was the “federal character principle.” This was an affirmative action principle requiring that appointments to top government positions be made to reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the country. This principle also applied to the composition of the armed forces and the distribution of national resources. Apart from the federal character principle, other initiatives taken by the Mohammed-Obasanjo regime that were aimed at promoting national integration included the adoption of a new national anthem composed by a Nigerian to replace the old nation anthem handed down from the colonial period. Unlike the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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old anthem, the new anthem made no reference to ethnic differences but, rather, emphasized faith in the fatherland and the labors of past heroes: “Arise, O compatriots/ Nigeria’s call obey/ To serve our fatherland/ With love and strength and faith/ The labor of our heroes past/ Shall never be in vain.” The government also launched a public-awareness campaign that promoted patriotism and pride in Nigerian culture. Public officers were encouraged to dress in local attire rather than Western cloths, particularly when representing the country abroad. It became common to see Nigerian public officials dressed in flowing traditional gowns known as Agbada. The assassination of Gen. Murtala Mohammed in an unsuccessful coup d’état in 1976 provided a rare moment of national unity in the country with the outpouring of national loss. Although Gen. Mohammed was a Muslim Northerner, his political and social reforms won him popular admiration and support throughout the country. His decisive leadership seemed to promise a bright future and many saw him as a national hero. Several national monuments were subsequently built or named in his honor, and his image adorns the national currency. In the 1980s, Nigeria was ruled by a combination of military and elected civilian regimes, all of which adopted policies aimed at promoting national unity and a sense of patriotism in the country. The elected civilian government of Shehu Shagari, which succeeded the military government in 1979, strove to ensure that each region of the country was represented in public appointments in accordance with the federal character principle in the constitution. Similarly in 1984, the military regime headed by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari launched an ambitious national campaign to mobilize the country. The military-style initiative, which it called the “War Against Indiscipline,” stressed the work ethic, emphasized patriotism, decried corruption, and promoted environmental sanitation. In government-sponsored media campaigns throughout the country, Nigerians were encouraged to take pride in their country and eschew the ethnic animosities of the past. Daily recitals of the national anthem were made compulsory in schools, and public institutions were mandated to fly the national flag to demonstrate their patriotism. Although this campaign for reform and national mobilization created an unprecedented awareness of the importance of national symbols like the flag and anthem, it met

Gen. Murtala Ramat Mohammed (1938 –1976) Gen. Murtala Mohammed, an army general and later head of state, was born in 1938. He received his military training in Nigeria and England and was a commanding officer during the Nigerian Civil War. Following a military coup in 1975, he was named head of state. His dynamic administration gave this country a new sense of direction, duty, and patriotism. He pursued a radical program of reforming major national institutions and outlined a democratic transition program. He was assassinated on February 13, 1976, in an abortive coup.

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few of its aims. An economic recession coupled with the authoritarian character of the regime undermined the efforts at promoting patriotism and national integration. Sporadic conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the northern part of the country also seemed to undermine the message of national unity. Like several other African countries, Nigeria was caught in the wave of democratization that swept across the world in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Its military rulers came under sustained international and domestic pressure to restore democratic constitutional rule in the country. Between 1989 and 1993, the military ruler general Ibrahim Babangida oversaw an extended and controversial transition program aimed at terminating military rule and restoring the country to full democracy. The Babangida regime stressed the need for a democratic system of government that was suited to the geopolitical and multiethnic realities of Nigeria. It was repeatedly argued that Nigerian democracy had to be “home grown” and need not be modeled after Western democracies. Although the country’s previous experimentation with the Westminster style of government had indeed been unsuccessful, the argument for a “home grown” democracy was often an excuse for excessive government intervention in the democratic transition process. For example, participation in the democratic process was limited to two national political parties established by the government. The justification for this was that by limiting political participation to two national political parties, the nation would avoid a repeat of the divisive ethnic and regional politics that marred previous attempts at democratic rule. This democratic transition program ended in a fiasco in 1993 when General Babangida abruptly annulled a presidential election that was widely believed to have been won by Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba businessman from the southern part of the county. The country was thrown into political and social turmoil, particularly in the South where the annulment of the election was seen as an attempt by a military regime dominated by Northerners to prevent a shift in political power to the South. This political situation intensified ethnic and regional tensions across the country for much of the 1990s as the military struggled to maintain its hold on power amidst growing opposition. However, following the death of the military ruler general Sani Abacha in 1998, the military leadership inaugurated a new, more transparent democratic transition program that sought to open up the political space by encouraging mass participation. The two national political parties established by the previous government were abolished and multiparty politics was reintroduced. Old arguments about the need for a uniquely Nigerian “home grown” democracy were abandoned with the adoption of a federal constitution and a system of government modeled after the American presidential system. The transition program culminated in the election of a former military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo, as president in 1999. It also led to the establishment of a fragile but inclusive democratic political system that ushered Nigeria into the 21st century. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Like most colonial creations, African nations are unique in the fact that the people who make up the nation often had little or no say in the creation of these nations. Modern nation-states in Africa were more or less accidents of colonial rule. With the end of colonial rule, the central challenge that many of these states face is one of forging cohesive nations out of the fragmented colonial states bequeathed at independence. Nigeria epitomizes this challenge. The greatest challenge to the idea of the Nigerian nation remains the sheer diversity of its constituent ethnic and religious groups as well as the arbitrary colonial circumstances that led to its creation. The task of building a cohesive nation and forging a sense of national identity among its people is one that the country has grappled with since its independence and will likely continue to grapple with in the years ahead. Selected Bibliography Arikpo, O. 1967. The Development of Modern Nigeria. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Awolowo, O. 1947. Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber and Faber. Azikiwe, N. 1943. Political Blueprint of Nigeria. Lagos: African Book Company. Burns, A. 1972. History of Nigeria. London: George Allen and Uwin. Coleman, J. S. 1958. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Crowder, M. 1962. The Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber. Dudley, B. J. 1982. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ikime, O., ed. 1980. Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books for Historical Society of Nigeria. Nwabueze, B. O. 1982. A Constitutional History of Nigeria. New York: Longman. Oseghae, E. 1988. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tamuno, T. N. 1972. The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914. London: Longman. Tamuno, T. N., and J. A. Atanda, eds. 1989. Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

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China Orion Lewis and Jessica Teets Chronology 1842–1860 China signs the “unequal treaties” with Western powers after losing the Opium Wars. 1912 (January 1) End of the Qing Dynasty and beginning of the Republican Era under Sun Yat-Sen. 1919 (May 4) Movement in the wake of Versailles Treaty where Chinese territory is not returned. 1921 (July) Formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 1925 (March) Dr. Sun Yat-Sen dies. 1927 (March) Nationalist Party, Guomindang (GMD), rule under Chiang K’ai-shek. 1931 The Japanese invade China (Manchuria) during World War II. 1945 (August) The Japanese are defeated and withdraw from China. 1945–1949 Civil war between GMD and CCP. 1949 (October) Establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) headed by the CCP. 1958–1960 Great Leap Forward. 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution. 1972 (February 21) Nixon visits China to normalize U.S.-China relations. 1976 (September 9) Mao Zedong dies and Hua Guofeng takes control of the CCP. 1978 Deng Xiaoping takes control of the CCP. 1979 Deng begins economic reforms.

Situating the Nation Although China’s ancient history as the Middle Kingdom—the center of commerce, power, and culture in Asia—was seen as a time of strength, the 100 years before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was known as the “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi). This period began with China’s defeat at the hands of Western forces during the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century, which initiated the partial colonization of areas of China via a series of “unequal treaties.” Further humiliation occurred when the Chinese territory taken by the Germans during World War I was given to the Japanese in the Treaty of Versailles, spawning the anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement of 1919. Out of the anti-imperialist fervor of this time emerged a nascent communist movement, which would spend the next few decades contesting the ruling Nationalist Party, Guomindang (GMD). Yet it was not until fighting against Japan’s military invasion during World War II that the communists gained the nationalist credentials and peasant support that helped them to emerge victorious in the country’s civil war. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The early years of the PRC clearly brought dramatic political change to China, yet from a nationalist perspective, one can look at the Communist Party’s policies as a continuation of previous attempts to deal with the great national question that had plagued China since its first clash with the Western nations in the 19th century. That is, how should China regain a place as a great independent nation in a Western-dominated international system that centered on the nationstate as the primary unit of political organization? Indeed, the dilemma of transforming a traditional society, based on universal cultural principles and local kinship ties, into a modern country with cohesive national unity was one that Chinese elites perpetually grappled with during the 20th century. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attempted to provide a new answer to this old question by relying on the communist ideology of class struggle, its legitimacy rested to a great extent on popular ideas of anti-imperialism and national self-strengthening. American hostility to communist China during the Cold War, a political rivalry with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, and American involvement in conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, all provided a continuous pretext for appeals to the strong anti-imperialist sentiments throughout the country. Thus, it was the seemingly constant threat of foreign imperialism that continued to serve as the paramount justification for many of the policies that sought to unify the country under a common ideology of communism and a common goal of national modernization. This nationalistic impulse to become a strong modern nation was a common theme underlying the efforts of the CCP to achieve a number of nation-building goals, including rewriting ethnic boundaries in a

Century of Humiliation The period from approximately the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, when China was partially colonized by Western powers, is known as the “century of humiliation.”

Mao Zedong The leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the civil war. The chairman of the party, he wielded tremendous power and influence until his death in 1976.

Mao the Nationalist: How the Communists Were More Nationalist than the Nationalist Party Although the Nationalist Party named Guomindang (GMD) conceived of themselves as the party to unify the varied peoples of China, the majority of Chinese perceived the GMD to be a corrupt party more interested in personal enrichment than protecting China’s territorial integrity from the Japanese incursions in 1931. The CCP, on the other hand, earned a nationalist reputation by fighting the Japanese troops more effectively during World War II. Mao continued to stress an anti-imperialism brand of nationalism that sought to unify and modernize the disparate ethnicities within China. This anti-imperialism nationalism was a strong source of legitimacy for the CCP throughout this period.

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broad multicultural land, cultivating a common socialist belief system, and modernizing the economy.

Instituting the Nation Shortly after coming to power, the CCP instituted a political view of the nation that sought to define China as a unitary multiethnic nation. This was clearly viewed as the best means to create a strong country and maintain an aggressive stand against imperialism. When examining nationalism during the early years of the PRC, the dominance of the government in creating and instituting nationalist policy is evident: it was the decisions of the CCP that promoted new ways of thinking about the nation and the means by which to implement those ideas. However, the CCP itself was organized along hierarchical lines, and as the supreme leader, Mao Zedong clearly had tremendous influence over the project of national construction. His writings on the composition of the people, national modernization, and the ongoing fight against imperialism were instrumental in spreading the official message of the new China. Even after he was removed from his official positions of power following the disastrous “Great Leap Forward,” Mao continued to exert tremendous influence among the people, as was witnessed by his ability to incite anti-traditionalist nationalism during the Cultural Revolution. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Thus, a clear focus on the decisions of the CCP and Mao himself are the best means to understanding the development of the Chinese nation during this time period. The institutions of the PRC were characterized by the partial adoption of the Soviet model of political and economic development. In this type of political system, the CCP was the dominant political institution that was designed to embody the “revolutionary classes” of the people and to guide the “correct thinking” of the population. Once in power, the CCP embarked on an ambitious agenda of changing traditional social and ethnic relations, ostensibly to unite the people under the common communist purpose. To do this, the CCP maintained tight control over the media, instituted organizations at every level to promote socialist teachings, set up a variety of institutions to incorporate ethnic minorities in the government, and built infrastructure that helped to physically link together a large and diverse country. Beginning in 1950, the CCP began the process of instilling a communist ideology of class struggle, which was a difficult social transformation as the Chinese people had traditionally identified primarily with their birthplaces as opposed to universal economic classes. Thus, the CCP embarked on a broad effort of mass education and propaganda designed to develop ideas of class consciousness and promote the CCP’s agenda of a unified people. First, borrowing in part from the Soviet model, the CCP organized study groups at all levels of society in order to promote communist indoctrination and class consciousness. Most work places had groups organized to study the writings of Mao Zedong and almost every organization had a Communist Party representative to ensure correct thinking among the masses. This education campaign in the workplace was bolstered by the government’s control over two other institutions—the public education system and the media. By maintaining tight control over school curricula, the CCP was able to ensure that generations of youth were indoctrinated regarding the superiority of the communist system and the importance of political loyalty. This teaching was reinforced by the state-run media that served to disseminate CCP propaganda. In sum, the CCP designed a complex set of institutions that pervaded every aspect of the citizen’s life and ensured that the CCP’s messages of patriotism and anti-imperialism were heard by all. In addition to general principles of class struggle and communist unity, the CCP was also faced with the challenge of governing a large and diverse multiethnic country. In this regard, the government sought to co-opt traditional leaders in order to ensure the allegiances of these groups to the new government. Consequently, ethnic leaders, such as the Dalai Lama, came to play a pivotal role in promoting either national integration or separatism. Additionally, the CCP established a variety of institutions to incorporate minority groups into the broader project of national unity, which included an ethnic identification campaign, partially autonomous regional governments, and a “united front” of traditional ethnic leaders within the CCP itself. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Chinese propoganda poster: the glory of Mao’s ideologies brightens up the new China. (Library of Congress)

Defining the Nation During its early years in power, the CCP set out to redefine the nature of social relationships as well as the identities of ethnic minorities within the country— all for the purpose of building a cohesive nation united under the banner of communism. As indicated, the ideology of communism presented a view of class struggle, whereby the oppressed classes were to revolutionize social relations, changing society from a backward “feudal” one to a modern progressive one. The primary definition of “the people” in the new China was based on the communist notion of the revolutionary classes. Mao defined the citizens, or the “people,” based on communist ideas of the four revolutionary classes: the workers, the small-business owners, the peasants, and the national business class. Yet Mao also argued that the composition of the people would change as the country progressed beyond the early stages of national development, and eventually the nation was to comprise the peasant and worker classes. However, as many researchers have pointed out, ultimately the simple class categories were insufficient to explain whether someone was to be included in the nation. Eventually, the emphasis on class would devolve into struggles over political loyalty to the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Class Struggle as the Basis of the Nation Drawing on Marxist philosophy, the CCP emphasized “class” as the primary political category. Class represented an individual’s economic background, but also came to indicate an individual’s political position. The “revolutionary” classes were glorified as the people that would lead China down the road to communism. They were to struggle against the “feudal” classes, comprised of landowners, capitalist, and imperialists. Usually this struggle entailed teaching “correct thinking” to these classes so that they would support national policy. According to Karl Marx, the process of class struggle was to ultimately give way to a unified people that no longer required class distinctions. This utopian goal thus provided a theoretical justification for the CCP’s emphasis on national unity among the people.

state and to Mao in particular. During the great upheavals that characterized this time period, it was only loyalty to Mao that guaranteed inclusion as a valid citizen of the nation and prevented political and social ostracism. It is important to note that the term “nationalism” (minzu zhuyi) was not used by the government because of the danger that it would alienate the minority ethnicities. Instead, the concept of patriotism (aiguo) was constantly evoked by the ruling party to justify policies, most often in the context of external threats. Thus the nation and citizenship were defined primarily by political—not ethnic— criteria. Political allegiance and territorial integrity were the primary rules used for determining the composition of the people and therefore the nation. While the nation was defined by political criteria, the leadership also tried to promote ideas of a single Chinese civilization that would unify the various ethnicities within the country. The concept of “Chinese nationalism” (zhonghua minzu) became crucial to thinking about the Chinese nation. To this end, the CCP directed the academic establishment to construct a myth about the cradle of Chinese civilization, and archeological evidence of multiple origins of the “Chinese” nation was suppressed. The theory surrounding the concept of zhonghua minzu presented a picture of the Chinese nation, originating in the Yellow River basin, that had mixed with various ethnicities over time, yet retained its essential cultural character. This theory promoted the notion of a unified yet diverse nation that was able to adapt and evolve over the centuries despite interaction with many different ethnic groups. This concept formed the theoretical basis of a modern Chinese nationalism under the CCP. While Mao himself rarely used the term, his writings did indicate that zhonghua minzu signified all of China’s “multinational people.” In essence, this term helped to resolve the dilemma that had faced Chinese leaders since its initial contact with the modern nation-state system: how to build a unified nation-state on the same terms as the European powers. The concept of the Chinese nation thus implied a unified nation based on vague cultural principles, yet it also left space to acknowledge the various ethnicities N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Centrality of the Han Ethnicity While the term zhonghua minzu referred to a general concept of Chinese nationalism, one that was modern and multiethnic, in fact, one ethnic group, the Han, was promoted as the leading ethnicity. The term “Han” originated in the late 19th century as a relatively modern national construction. It simply refers to the children of the Han Dynasty, which symbolized China’s classical greatness. Within the narrative of a multiethnic zhonghua minzu, the Han were always the most advanced and civilized. This helped justify an assimilationist policy during the early years of the PRC that sought to integrate minorities into the Han.

(minzu) within China. In this way, China claimed to be a unified multiethnic country, which helped align the Chinese with the nation-state ideal advocated by the West.

Narrating the Nation As indicated, communist ideology, and Mao Zedong’s writings in particular, provided a new answer to the continuing narrative surrounding the “century of humiliation.” This rhetoric of the Chinese fall from great nation status continuously provided legitimacy for the modernization efforts of the PRC. Communism provided an answer to this problem, because it was a very similar story of oppression by the capitalist class, which was easily associated with the United States and the other capitalist nations that had infringed on China’s national sovereignty during the 19th century. Communism thus lent itself well to an international narrative of a struggle for independence in the Third World. After consolidating its control over China, the CCP downplayed the class divisions within the country and opted for an international perspective on communism, which divided the world into “capitalist” nations and the oppressed “working” nations. This fostered the nationalist narrative of a struggle for independence, which was intertwined with the broader international communist movement in the rest of the colonized world. This perspective carried on throughout the Maoist years. Indeed, Mao and the CCP often blamed international “imperialists” for China’s backward economic development and used international threats to solidify national unity. Yet under Mao, this international narrative also became linked to domestic actors that opposed CCP policy, and domestic class struggle became as important as the international one. The implication was that only by putting one’s full energies behind the socialist program of the new China would the nation become strong and modern. This was the impetus behind Mao’s emphasis on “voluntarism”—the idea that the collective willingness of the people could create revolutionary change and improve the country’s economic conditions. In effect, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Chinese Nationalism and Communist Internationalism Communist ideology advocated class struggle on an international scale. Mao adhered to the rhetoric of international communist solidarity, but it was tinged with clear nationalist overtones. In the initial years of the PRC, Mao advanced an international communism, which placed China at the center of the Third World’s struggle against capitalism. He perceived China as a leading communist country in the fight against international capitalism, which was responsible for China’s weakness. Yet the nationalist overtones of this message also implied that China’s domestic modernization took precedence over international solidarity. This tendency created friction between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China, and ultimately led to a split between the two communist countries. The ethnically driven, anti-imperial nationalism that propelled the CCP into power in China, ultimately separated China from the international influence of other communist states, particularly the Soviet Union.

Voluntarism This was an explicitly Maoist idea, which argued that collective willpower could overcome backward economic conditions. It contradicted Marxist philosophy that held material factors to be the most important drivers of social change. Mao used this idea to mobilize people during the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution.”

Mao blended long-standing feelings of national humiliation with the ideas of a national collective will, which served to mobilize people behind the goal of a classless, modern, and strong country. In addition to creating a socialist narrative of national strength, the national unification project also involved the revision of China’s ethnic history, or as Mao stated, “the past should be used to support the present.” Thus, the academic establishment became instrumental in rewriting Chinese history to tell a story of a single Chinese civilization, which formed a “core” people and had evolved by interacting with and assimilating various ethnic groups over thousands of years of development. In this account, the Han are always at the center of the multiethnic China. This myth of an essential multiethnic Chinese culture came to be embodied by the concept of the zhonghua minzu. This story thus gave the government a political tool by which they could play down the differences among China’s various ethnicities and, conversely, appeal to a vague notion of the common “Chineseness” that supposedly pervaded all citizens.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The CCP actively mobilized the countryside during World War II to fight the Japanese and continued to use the peasant army it created to defeat the GMD after the end of World War II. While the peasants were the primary group that the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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communists mobilized, the CCP also undertook mass education campaigns to mobilize the urban population and non-Han population. Although the national identity still largely depended on ethnicity and anti-imperialism, the CCP under Mao added a new component—a political identity. Now peasants and CCP members were identified as being the most patriotic. Mao’s version of nationalism consisted of ridding China of the things that made her weak and thus susceptible to foreign aggression, mainly tradition and a nonindustrial economy. Two main impetuses existed that drove the construction of a national identity: the threat of disunity from inside China and the threat of foreign aggression from outside. Given the large population spread out over a great distance, as well as the lingering pockets of resistance facing the CCP after its civil war with the GMD, the CCP undertook a nation-building project designed to create an ethnic, political, and anti-imperial national identity. This identity was intended to allow the CCP to mobilize the Chinese to modernize the economy and withstand any further foreign aggression. To accomplish these aims, Mao undertook a modernization program called the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which lasted until 1960. By emphasizing voluntarist ideas of collective willpower, Mao mobilized the peasants behind efforts to industrialize the economy in only a few years’ time. Although this was an elitedefined national modernization project, the citizens supported the idea of making China a strong state that would cast off the century of humiliation and retake her rightful place in relation to other states. However, the Great Leap Forward failed to modernize China’s economy and in fact resulted in an estimated 20–30 million dead due to famines. After 1960, under a more rational economic plan, China’s economy began to slowly recover from the Great Leap Forward. Further emphasizing the political dimension of nationalism begun in 1949, Mao once again mobilized people behind a project of socialist upheaval and nationalist awakening in 1966. The Cultural Revolution called for students to overthrow the four olds: old ideas, old customs, old traditions, and old habits. Students were encouraged to demonstrate their commitment to Mao specifically and the nation more generally by eradicating the things that made China vulnerable to foreign aggression during the “century of humiliation,” namely tradition. The enormous social upheavals that resulted from the student uprising created what is known as the “lost generation”—indicating the loss of economic progress made before 1966 and the education of the student population between 1966 and 1976. The goal of this revolution was first to create strong political loyalties to Mao, but also to completely re-create traditional social relationships in China, which supposedly prevented the country from realizing its national potential. The Red Guard policed every household and conducted what were called struggle sessions, which entailed questioning and public humiliation as a means to gain power. These struggle sessions were enacted on teachers and government bureaucrats—all in the hope of re-creating China in the image of a modern socialist nation. This conception of nationalism relied heavily on voluntarism and anti-imperialism, as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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well as on a strain of anti-traditional thought that had been present in elite debates since the late 19th century. Once again, membership in a modern socialist China depended on one’s political commitment to Mao as well as strong support of modernizing China through voluntarism and adherence to socialist economic theory as interpreted through Mao Zedong thought. Throughout Mao’s leadership, and beyond, a sense of national unity was cultivated by the CCP through a strong education campaign in the schools and factories, as well as an active propaganda department that controlled all media outlets. While the media was to serve as the mouthpiece of the party, the study groups in factories, schools, and villages were designed to create citizens who held unified views on the origin and purpose of the Chinese nation, as well as to construct identification with the party and the nation. In addition to the “voluntary” mobilization of Mao’s modernization policies, the CCP also focused on an ethnic component in their nation-building project. Although minority groups were eligible for certain benefits from the government, they were not encouraged to consider self-determination. Instead, Mao envisioned China as a state of many nationalities slowly being incorporated into the Han ethnicity. As mentioned, archeologists and historians were encouraged to rewrite China’s history so that the earliest Chinese civilization was the Han ethnicity that supposedly expanded across the country from the Yellow River (Huanghe) and incorporated all other ethnicities into the “Chinese” civilization. All groups within Chinese territory were incorporated into this notion of Chinese civilization. In addition to creating a new history, the CCP encouraged assimilation through the adoption of Mandarin as the official language, mandatory education, and migration of Han Chinese to “minority” areas. Moreover, the PRC constitution legally obligated all citizens to “protect the unity of the state and solidarity among all nationalities.” As important as the mythical notion of a Chinese civilization was for helping to unify the nation, it was clearly not enough on its own to ensure the loyalty of the ethnic minorities. Therefore, the second front in the multiethnic national project was the creation of a number of institutions to incorporate all regions into the political structure. First, starting in 1950, the government created an ethnic identification program (minzu shibie) to classify the various minorities within the country. Mao sent teams of approximately 200 ethnographers throughout the minority populations in China to classify them using a Soviet categorization system that divided groups based on four criteria: common language, common territory, common economic base, and common psychological character. This project resulted in 55 official minority groups and the formation of 8 autonomous regions. The program also had strong political motivations to weaken the power of the larger groups. For example, the Muslim peoples in the west were divided into 10 different ethnic groups, while other groups, such as the Zhuang, were literally invented by the government. The goal was to divide potentially divisive groups and promote an ideal of a multiethnic, yet unitary, state. Secondly, the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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PRC allowed for a certain degree of regional autonomy in such areas as Inner Mongolia and the western Xinjiang province. This policy allowed for somewhat autonomous governance and provided these regions with certain economic privileges. Third, the CCP sought to maintain traditional leaders in certain positions of power as symbols of ethnic autonomy. By co-opting ethnic elites, the CCP once again sought to legitimize its rule in these areas and ensure their continuing inclusion in the territory of the new China. Finally, the importance of the construction of infrastructure, which connected the far hinterlands to the center of China, cannot be underestimated. All of these institutions were designed to help legitimize CCP rule in these areas and further promote the idea of a multiethnic, yet unified, country. After Mao’s death in 1976, Hua Guofeng and then Deng Xiaoping took control of the CCP. Deng also emphasized a national identity that was a conglomeration of ethnic, anti-imperialism, and political components; however, his focus was much more on the anti-imperial and political components. Similarly to Mao, Deng desired to strengthen and modernize both China and the CCP. However, unlike Mao, his foreign policy was more conciliatory toward the Western powers, except for Japan who was still associated mostly with her imperialistic practices during World War II. Under Deng, less emphasis was placed on a unified myth of the past, and more was placed on the anti-imperial component, such as the reunification of Hong Kong and Macau that China lost during the unequal treaties period. Deng also advocated the use of nationalism to advance economic modernization. In fact, strong feelings of nationalism helped the transition from a socialist to a market-driven economy beginning in 1979. The continued emphasis on economic modernization to build a strong nation justified using whatever methods necessary to achieve this modernization: socialist or capitalist. As Deng famously stated, “it doesn’t matter if the cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice.” Selected Bibliography Callahan, W. 2004. “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism.” Alternatives 29:199–218. Fitzgerald, J. 1995. “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33:75–104. Friedman, E. 1993. “A Failed Chinese Modernity.” Daedalus 122 (Spring): 1–17. Gries, P. H. 2004. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Johnson, C. 1962. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moskalev, A. 2003. “Doctrine of the Chinese Nation.” Far Eastern Affairs 31, no. 1: 64–82. Unger, J., ed. 1996. Chinese Nationalism. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Zhao, S. 2004. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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India Laura Dudley Jenkins Chronology 1947 1948 1950 1955 1956 1964 1965 1971

1974 1975 1977 1984 1989 1999 2004

Independence from Great Britain and the Partition of India and Pakistan. Mohandas (The Mahatma or “Great Soul”) Gandhi is assassinated. India’s constitution goes into effect. Bandung Conference of Asian and African leaders, including Prime Minister Nehru, start a nonaligned movement. States Reorganization Act results in linguistic states in India. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, dies. Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, becomes prime minister. Simla Agreement formalizes the Line of Control in Kashmir, designating areas controlled by India and Pakistan. With the help of India, East Pakistan breaks from Pakistan to become the independent country of Bangladesh. India detonates first nuclear bomb. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declares Emergency, suspending many democratic rights. The Emergency ends. Indira Gandhi loses the election and falls from power for three years. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is assassinated. Her son Rajiv Gandhi becomes prime minister. Rajiv Gandhi is assassinated. Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party government is in power. Congress Party–dominated coalition government is in power.

Situating the Nation India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, but Independence Day is also recalled as a day of tragedy due to Partition. British India was divided into two countries, Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, and the ensuing mass exodus of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan and of Muslims from India led to violence and deaths. Millions of people moved and hundreds of thousands of people, some estimate 1 million, were killed in the aftermath of Partition. East Pakistan (ethnically and linguistically distinct from West Pakistan and separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory) later broke from the rest of Pakistan to become the independent country of Bangladesh. In addition to Pakistan and Bangladesh, India’s geographic neighbors include (from east to west) Burma, China, Bhutan, Nepal, and Afghanistan, as well as Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean to its south. India is one of the most geographically varied countries on Earth, including some of the wettest and driest climates, ranging from the Himalayan Mountains of the north to the tropical beaches of the south. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Partition of India and Pakistan at independence was an outcome of a debate over the model of nationalism that India should embody after independence. Could religious minorities be guaranteed their rights in a Hindu majority country? Ultimately, British administrators, in the waning days of their empire, rather hurriedly drew the lines that would divide India from East and West Pakistan, and many Muslims (who still are India’s largest religious minority) opted to leave. Shared colonial history and family ties between Indians and Pakistanis have not prevented repeated military conflicts over territory, particularly in Kashmir, making the India-Pakistan relationship one of the most intense and volatile in the world. Indian politicians have long constructed Pakistan as a nemesis and frequently attribute violence even within India to Pakistani involvement. Partition did not solve the national question of how to encompass a multireligious population in the new Indian nation. India encompasses Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, Jains, Buddhists, and other religious minorities in addition to Hindus, and many of the most contentious national issues, ranging from the status of Muslim-majority Kashmir to the role of religious laws in the Indian legal system, stem from India’s religious diversity and continue to this day. The status of Kashmir remains so contested in part because it is a symbol of the competing ideas of nationhood in India and Pakistan. Kashmir was a Muslimmajority state with a Hindu king at the time of Partition. The first Indo-Pakistani military conflict began over this region in 1947, and conflicts continued, most notably in 1965 and 1999. As a Muslim-majority area, according to the logic underlying the formation of Pakistan, it should have become part of Pakistan. Yet as a state that was both Hindu and Muslim, Kashmir exemplified one major ideology of Indian nationalism, epitomized by Mohandas Gandhi’s nationalist movement, the ideal of unity in diversity.

Satyagraha: Gandhian Nonviolent Resistance Anticolonial nationalist Mohandas Gandhi is widely known for his use of nonviolence resistance to achieve independence from British rule. Known as satyagraha (literally, truth force), Gandhi’s approach should not be confused with “passive” resistance. He and his many followers strategically chose active and forceful campaigns that challenged the British economically, politically, and morally. Examples include boycotting British goods, marching in defiance of new taxes, starting national educational institutions, and being arrested in large numbers. The spinning wheel became a nationalist symbol, and as nationalists, both men and women made homespun cloth (khadi ) rather than buy imported British textiles. Gandhi’s technique challenged and rebuked the British by highlighting the contradictions between their own moral and political arguments regarding colonialism and their actions. The image of Gandhi in simple homespun cloth walking into meetings with British authorities was reproduced in media around the world and remains one of the most striking nationalist images of the modern era. Gandhian satyagraha has inspired many subsequent leaders, including United States civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

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Recent historical work cautions us that the situation should not be reduced to a competition between religious versus secular visions and reminds us of the marginalization of the inhabitants of Kashmir themselves. A symbol of national ideas that are at odds, Kashmir remains divided by a “Line of Control.”

Instituting the Nation In part because Independence Day brings to mind the tragedies of Partition, the commemoration of independent India’s constitution in 1950 has become a national celebration known as Republic Day. India’s constitution is one of the longest in the world and includes a rather idealistic section on the goals the country hopes to achieve, providing a window through which to see national aspirations. These “directive principles” include such ideals as equal justice, living wages, free and compulsory education, protection of the environment, and promotion of international peace and security. The principle architect of India’s constitution, which, in amended form, is still in use today, was Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Independent India’s first law minister, Dr. Ambedkar was born an “untouchable,” in other words, a member of the lowest status group in the Indian caste system. Although people viewed as untouchables face extreme social stratification as well as discrimination in education and employment, Dr. Ambedkar had the extraordinary opportunity to study for advanced degrees in Britain and the United States, thanks to a progressive patron and his own academic achievements. He returned to India to work tirelessly for the rights of India’s lowest castes. The constitutional recognition of the need for special policies for certain disadvantaged groups reflects Dr. Ambedkar’s and many early Indian lawmakers’ recognition that the Indian nation was severely stratified. Official lists or “schedules” of disadvantaged communities include the “Scheduled Castes” (the constitutional name for those formerly known as untouchables), “Scheduled Tribes” (certain culturally distinct, socioeconomically disadvantaged, and, in many cases, spatially isolated communities), and the “Other Backward Classes” or OBCs (another constitutional category that encompasses other economically and socially disadvantaged castes or communities, such as lower castes that are not considered untouchables or other similarly disadvantaged non-Hindu communities). Recognizing these groups has resulted in far-reaching affirmative action for disadvantaged citizens in government employment and higher education policies that continue today. Supporters of these policies view them as an essential means to achieve national integration and social justice. Critics decry the policies as nationally divisive due to their organization on the basis of groups. These affirmative action policies, known as reservations, are most controversial when targeting the complex and large OBC category. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Although both Dr. Ambedkar and Mohandas Gandhi fought for the rights of untouchables, their divergent approaches relate to their different ideas about the nationalist movement, extending back to debates about constitutional reforms in the last decades of British rule. Gandhi emphasized reform of Hinduism from within to achieve lower caste rights and worried that distinct legal rights for lower castes or large-scale conversions from Hinduism as a route to social mobility would splinter Indians, who needed to remain united to achieve independence. He even fasted to protest against some of Dr. Ambedkar’s proposals for lower castes. In contrast, Dr. Ambedkar insisted that group rights were necessary, and he eventually left Hinduism to convert to Buddhism along with about a half million of his followers in 1956. Notably, he picked a “national” religion with roots in India. Another defining moment that instituted the Indian nation-state was the States Reorganization Act of 1956, which defined federalism on a linguistic basis. Although various changes have been made to the federal structure, including the addition of three new states as recently as 2000, language remains a key feature of India’s federalism. In a nation where shared language was an impediment to national unity rather than a basis for national identity, this reorganization recognized ethno-linguistic units within the national structure. The demand for linguistic states was particularly strong in south India, due to the dominance of the single largest linguistic group, Hindi/Urdu speakers, in the north. The linguistic diversity in India encompasses not just dialects, but languages and even different language families. South Indian languages are in a different language family altogether from north Indian languages, so speakers of Tamil and other south Indian languages were at the forefront of linguistic nationalist demands. Prime Minister Nehru was initially reluctant to create a linguistically based federal system, because such units could become the basis for secessionist challenges to national unity. Indeed Indians to this day maintain strong linguistic, state, and regional identities in addition to their Indian national identities. Such subnational ethno-linguistic identities are maintained through bi- and trilingual schooling as well as distinct literatures, holidays, and other art forms. Hindi written in the Devanagri script is the official language of India, but both Hindi and English (preferred by many southern elites) must by law be used for many official purposes. State legislatures may adopt their own language(s) to be used for official purposes within their states, and states and localities are supposed to provide children with education in their “mother tongue” at least through the primary stage. Indians routinely have a working knowledge of multiple languages, allowing them to converse with people and enjoy films from neighboring states. Although the division into 14 linguistic states in 1956 has since doubled into twice that many states, linguistic federalism has not proven as divisive to the nation as Nehru feared. Federalism has not solved all the tensions of regionalism, as border disputes, tensions over the distribution of resources, such as water, and even secessionist N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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movements have continued. Yet the recognition of diverse identities in the form of castes, tribes, and ethno-linguistic groups in India’s constitution and in the federal structure has arguably helped rather than hindered its efforts to sustain national unity.

Defining the Nation Because Indian identity is fragmented by cross-cutting identities, political leaders have often looked outward in order to define Indian nationalism. One postcolonial legacy was the first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s tendency toward economic nationalism. Nehru was a protégé of nationalist leader Mohandas Gandhi, who advocated boycotting British goods as part of his strategy to achieve independence. Nehru’s economic policies differed from Gandhi’s rural, villagebased vision of development in that Nehru embraced all that was modern and industrial; however, like his mentor, Nehru recognized the intertwined nature of political and economic independence. Nehru’s economic policies were guided by his desire to achieve economic independence along with India’s new political independence and resulted in a relatively closed economy until recent years. He also oversaw a number of spectacular development projects that became symbols of national progress and modernity in the postcolonial era, including massive dams and, most strikingly, the new city of Chandigarh, largely designed by Le Corbusier, the high modernist urban planner and architect. Another key form of externally oriented nationalism was India’s involvement in the nonaligned movement in the context of the Cold War. This involvement was epitomized by Prime Minister Nehru’s participation in the Bandung Conference of 29 African and Asian leaders in 1955. Attempting to avoid new forms of imperialism in the wake of anticolonial struggles and successes, these leaders not only were concerned about economic issues but also security issues. Many, including Nehru, tried, at times with difficulty, to maintain a “nonaligned” posture in the Cold War by refusing to definitively side with the United States or the Soviet Union. By remaining nonaligned, Third World leaders could rally nationalist sentiments by snubbing the great powers of the day and occasionally use their lack of commitment to a certain side to strategic advantage. Economic nationalism and nonalignment helped to define the nation as independent and sovereign in the international sphere; yet the nation needed internal definition as well. A kind of democratic dynasty in Indian politics helped to provide this definition, as the Indian nation became intertwined in the minds of its own citizens and the world with a single, remarkable political family. Not only did Jawaharlal Nehru (son of an anticolonial nationalist leader) lead India as prime minister from independence to his death in 1964, but also his daughter, and then her son and his family have been central figures in Indian politics. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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How have Indian democracy and national identity persisted despite the endemic poverty, widespread illiteracy, and multifaceted diversity of its population? The Nehru family and their political party provide one answer to this puzzle. The transformation of the Indian National Congress from an anticolonial nationalist movement into the major political party of modern India provided continuity and leadership for the new nation. The charisma and appeal of one nationalist family, for many citizens of independent India, transcended cultural, economic, and educational differences. Indira Gandhi became prime minister after her father’s death in 1964 and recalibrated Indian nationalism through her rhetoric and her policies. Chosen by her Congress Party’s elite, who viewed her as the electable yet malleable daughter of a revered national figure, she proved to be less malleable than anticipated after her election. She is remembered for her populist nationalism, epitomized by her appeals to India’s poor, and her militant nationalism, particularly in the 1965 conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir and the 1971 conflict with Pakistan that resulted in the independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan). She also exacerbated religious nationalism, particularly in the Indian state of Punjab, where

The Nehru Dynasty and Congress Party Motilal Nehru was a wealthy and influential member of the Indian National Congress, the leading nationalist movement for independence from the British. He served as president of this organization, a role that his son, Jawaharlal, later took over. Jawaharlal Nehru, with the support of Mohandas Gandhi, built on his leading role in the nationalist movement to eventually serve as independent India’s first leader. He oversaw not only the transition from colonial rule to independence but also the transformation of the Indian National Congress into the Congress Party, which became the dominant political party for decades to come. After his death, his daughter, Indira Gandhi (no relation to Mohandas Gandhi), became the next prime minister. Indira Gandhi groomed her son Sanjay for politics, giving him extensive powers during the Emergency, when his heavy-handed approach to population control made him quite notorious. Sanjay’s accidental death prior to the assassination of Indira meant that her other son, Rajiv, became heir apparent and the next prime minister to be elected. After Rajiv’s assassination by a Tamil extremist who was angered by his use of Indian troops in Sri Lanka in 1987, Rajiv’s wife Sonia Gandhi gradually took on more political roles and now heads the Congress Party. Hindu nationalists criticize her role in Indian politics by making an issue of her Italian and Catholic heritage. Sonia wears a sari, speaks Hindi, and seems to have tapped in to the national psyche. Evoking the traditional veneration of renunciation in India, she led her Congress Party to victory in 2004 and then refused to take power herself, instead handing over the prime ministership to Manmohan Singh. Rajiv and Sonia’s children, Rahul and Priyanka, are the most recent members of this illustrious family to make their marks on Indian politics. Rahul is a member of Parliament, and Priyanka has been very active in her mother’s and brother’s campaigns.

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she sent troops to attack secessionists while they were within the holiest site of Sikhism, the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Ultimately, she was assassinated by her own bodyguard, a Sikh, after which many Sikhs were targeted and killed, particularly in the capital city of Delhi. A defining moment for Indian nationalism was Indira Gandhi’s crackdown on democracy during the Emergency and the response of India’s citizens. Facing increasing political opposition and instability, Indira Gandhi declared a national emergency in 1975. She arrested many people who opposed her and suspended many democratic rights by postponing elections, limiting civil liberties, and restricting the independence of the press and the courts. When she ended the Emergency and called for new elections in 1977, she and her party were decisively defeated. This suggests that democracy had become a key component of India’s national identity. India’s citizens were willing to defeat even a member of the Nehru family to protect democracy in India.

Narrating the Nation Diversity on the basis of religion, gender, and caste has resulted in varied narratives of the Indian nation. Competing narratives have emerged with the rise of Hindu nationalism, controversies over women and personal laws, and the increasing presence of low-caste political parties. Hindu nationalism extends back to colonial days. Although known for his ecumenical approach within the nationalist movement, Mohandas Gandhi defended some aspects of the caste system and eschewed conversions from Hinduism. Extremist Hindu nationalists, however, felt he was pandering to Muslims and other minorities. Mohandas Gandhi was killed by such an extremist shortly after Indian independence, an act that gave Hindu nationalism a bad name for some time. Yet Hindu nationalist organizations continued and made a resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which eventually ruled the national government, in coalition, from 1999 to 2004. In addition to this political party, Hindu nationalists also have interlinked networks of social, cultural, and political organizations, including wings for youth, women, and Indians living abroad. The ideology of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, is that India (in some versions, a greater India extending beyond its current borders) should be reimagined as a Hindu nation, and that historical attempts to be inclusive of other religions are appeasement, which should cease. Persons within the Hindu nationalist movement vary from moderate to extreme. Achieving power at the center necessitated a more moderate face and approach, personified by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee; yet attacks on Muslims and Muslim sites, with the encouragement of other Hindu nationalist leaders and organizations, have continued, as in the state of Gujarat in 2002. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Hindu epics such as the Mahabharat and Ramayan have played a role in Hindu nationalism by presenting ideal leaders and heroes as well as familial and societal relationships. Beginning in the 1980s, these religious epics were shown in the form of serials on the government television network, Doordarshan. When they were initially shown, often the streets emptied due to the number of viewers. Interestingly, the nationally shown television programs may have homogenized the varied regional versions of these epics into one version that dominated the national imagination. Women frequently become national or community symbols, and women in India are no exception. One example of this dynamic is the ongoing controversy over “personal law”—certain civil laws that vary by religious community. One court case became a national controversy, when Shah Bano, a divorced, Muslim woman, demanded alimony from her husband. The Supreme Court, Parliament, and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi became embroiled in a national debate over the role of Muslim family law and the meaning of secularism in India. Although Hindus and Christians also have personal law codes, which are also inequitable to women, Muslim personal law, and particularly Muslim women, remain the emotive center of attention in debates over personal law. A uniform civil code still has not emerged, in part due to minority groups’ concerns about the clout of Hindu nationalists in the design of such a code. The issue of these distinct civil codes is part of an ongoing debate over how to implement the key concept of “unity in diversity” in Indian nationalism. Lower caste political parties are on the rise in India, and they offer distinct narratives of Indian nationalism. Challenging both the Congress Party that has claimed to speak for them and the Hindu nationalist BJP, lower caste parties, including the Bahujan (majority) Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samaj Party (SP), have increasingly challenged the status quo, particularly at the state and local levels. Political parties dominated by lower castes (which have been most successful in the north) promote the idea that low castes, including both Dalits and OBCs (a category discussed above), actually form a majority in India. Their majoritarian nationalism counters the Hindutva narrative, which they see as an upper-caste dominated version of majoritarian nationalism. Many politically active members of the very lowest castes now prefer to be called Dalits (the crushed or oppressed). Their narratives of nationalism have taken a variety of forms. Some in the 1970s modeled their counternationalism on the Black Panthers in the United States and called themselves the Dalit Panthers. Like the Black Panthers, theirs was a militant nationalism, but it also took a literary turn, with an outpouring of Dalit literature, particularly the western state of Maharashtra (and written primarily in Marathi). Some low-caste groups (particularly in the south) promote a counternarrative of nationalism by arguing that low castes were the original inhabitants of India, who were oppressed by invaders from the north who moved south and invented the caste system to control the sons of the soil. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dalits, or “Untouchables,” rally in India on January 11, 2004. The aim of the march, begun on December 6, 2003, is to increase awareness of the plight of this strata of society, considered “impure” according to the rigid caste system still in place throughout India today. (Antoine Serra/In Visu/Corbis)

Individuals from the lowest castes, including women, have been able to enter local politics in larger numbers due to a constitutional amendment in 1993 that reserved varied percentages of seats in local legislative bodies for candidates who are members of the Scheduled Castes and one-third of seats for women. This practical measure, although not always perfectly implemented, is a far-reaching effort to achieve national integration of some of India’s most disadvantaged citizens.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Joining the nuclear “club” with its first nuclear test in 1974 seemed to clash with the national legacy of Gandhian nonviolence, although India remains in favor of nuclear disarmament if done on a global scale. Periodic nuclear tests have mobilized various reactions within India, ranging from national pride in technological prowess to criticism of national priorities. Although the outside world tends to focus on the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry, Indians point out that another neighbor, China, is also a security threat. India and China went to war in 1962 over territory and still disagree on border issues.

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Building the nation in economic terms is a policy area that has undergone dramatic changes in recent decades. Breaking from his grandfather’s legacy of closed economic nationalism, Rajiv Gandhi’s government embraced a new era of economic liberalization, a trend that has continued. Certain aspects of Westernization that have accompanied this liberalization have sparked some cultural nationalist backlash, as in protests related to Kentucky Fried Chicken or Saint Valentine’s Day. Concerns about obesity related to the former and promiscuity related to the latter seemed to spark as much concern as their promotion of a nonvegetarian diet or a Christian saint. Uneasiness about such imports is rather varied and diffuse, and concerns related to Westernization have not sparked widespread backlash, perhaps because the upper classes in India have become so globalized themselves. Many work in multinational companies within India, and many have gone abroad to work. The government of India is paying more and more attention to the Indian diaspora, dubbing them Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and creating various incentives to encourage their continued identification as Indians. Various policies encourage NRIs to establish residences in India and to invest in India. In addition to government outreach efforts, organizations such as the Hindu nationalist Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) also encourage their own versions of diasporic nationalism through culture camps for NRI children and various international fundraising efforts for political, cultural, and social causes. The Indian diaspora is economically diverse. In addition to computer engineers in Silicon Valley, several at the forefront of the information technology revolution, the diaspora includes many lower-class NRIs working overseas as laborers and domestic help. In some cases, particularly in the Middle East, these laborers are working under dangerous conditions. The modern Indian diaspora builds on earlier waves of emigration under colonial rule and has resulted in the spread of India’s rich national heritage to all of the regions of the world (South Asian Diaspora Project Database). Modern Indian citizens balance a variety of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and caste identities and various competing ideologies of nationalism. Over the years, nationalist leaders have attempted to integrate this nation through nonviolence and inclusion (Mohandas Gandhi), distinct rights for the oppressed (B. R. Ambedkar), reverence for a leading political family (the Nehru dynasty), or appeals to the Hindu majority (the Bharatiya Janata Party). In addition to the challenges of internal diversity, relations with the outside world have shaped Indian nationalism. From the heady days of freedom from colonial rule, through the struggles to achieve economic development and political nonalignment, Indian nationalists have defined India as a politically and economically independent nation. In this era of globalization, the increasing role of India and the Indian diaspora in the global economy means that the ever-changing ideas of Indian nationalism are undergoing another incarnation.

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Selected Bibliography Brass, P. 1994. The Politics of India since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, J. 2003. Nehru. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hardgrave, R. L., and S. A. Kochanek. 2000. India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers. Jaffrelot, C. 2003. India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of Lower Castes in North India. New York: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, L. D. 2000. “Shah Bano: Muslim Women’s Rights.” (Retrieved December 21, 2007), http://homepages.uc.edu/thro/shahbano/allshahbano.htm. Jenkins, L. D. 2003. Identity and Identification in India: Defining the Disadvantaged. New York: Routledge Curzon. Mistry, R. 2001. A Fine Balance. New York: Vintage. Nehru, J. 1989. The Discovery of India. New York: Oxford University Press. Pandey, G. 2001. Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rai, M. 2004. Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Robinson, R. 2005. Tremors of Violence: Muslim Survivors of Ethnic Strife in Western India. New Delhi, India: Sage. Scott, J. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. South Asian Diaspora Project Database. 2007. South/Southeast Asian Library, University of California, Berkeley. (Retrieved December 20, 2007), http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/South AsianDiaspora/.

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Malaysia and Singapore Albert Lau Chronology 1941 Japanese forces invade and occupy “British Malaya.” British forces reoccupy both Malaya and Singapore in 1945. 1946 The Malayan Union is inaugurated. Singapore becomes a separate British colony. Malays protest by forming the United Malays National Organization. 1948 The Federation of Malaya replaces the Malayan Union. The Malayan Communist Party launches its armed insurrection and a state of emergency is declared. 1957 Britain grants Malaya independence after the Alliance Party wins a resounding mandate in the federal elections two years before. Tunku Abdul Rahman becomes the first prime minister of Malaya. 1959 Britain grants Singapore self-government after the People’s Action Party wins the Singapore general elections. Lee Kuan Yew becomes first prime minister of Singapore. 1963 Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah join Malaya to form the Federation of Malaysia, through which the former British dependencies attain their independence from British rule. 1965 Singapore leaves Malaysia, after their deep-seated political disagreements could not be reconciled. 1969 The ruling Alliance Party wins the general elections but without securing a two-thirds majority. After the outbreak of race riots, a national state of emergency is declared. The Tunku resigns as prime minister the following year. 1971 Parliament is restored and the New Economic Policy is approved. 1981 Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohammad becomes Malaysia’s longest serving prime minister. Under his 22 years at the helm, Malaysia saw rapid modernization and prosperity. 1990 Goh Chok Tong becomes Singapore’s second prime minister after Lee Kuan Yew steps aside to become senior minister. 2003 Datuk Seri Ahmad Badawi succeeds Dr. Mahathir as premier. 2004 Lee Hsien Loong succeeds Goh Chok Tong as prime minister of Singapore.

Situating the Nation Modern Malaysia, comprising Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak, is a multiethnic and multicultural nation—a mix of communities of Malays, Chinese, Indians, and other indigenous peoples, and their distinctive cultures. As a political community, however, the Malaysian nation reflects the political primacy of the Malays— a result of the historical dominance of its ethnic Malay base. The Malays were the first indigenous group to be organized politically in the Malay Peninsula through their founding of the earliest Malay “states.” From the 19th century, however, the establishment of formal and informal British control in the Malay Peninsula, Sarawak, and North Borneo (now Sabah) brought both stability and economic N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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opportunities, and invariably encouraged the influx of immigrants from within and without the region. “British Malaya” became a popular destination for many of these immigrants. A smaller number made their way to Sarawak and North Borneo. Malay migrants from the neighboring islands, sharing similar linguistic, religious, and cultural affinities, were easily assimilated into Malay society. But the arrival of non-Malay, and particularly Chinese and Indian, migrants in increasingly large numbers led to the creation and growth of ethnically and culturally differentiated communities in Malaya, and similarly in Sarawak and North Borneo. In the latter two states, ethnic and cultural heterogeneity also characterized their indigenous peoples to an even greater extent than those of the Peninsula. Sarawak included, for instance, the largely non-Muslim communities of Ibans, Bidayuhs, Kayans, Kenyahs, and the Kelabits and Muslim groups like the Kedayans, Bisayas, and Melanaus. In North Borneo, the largest indigenous communities— the Kadazans and Muruts—are largely non-Muslim while groups like the Bajaus, Bruneis, Sulus, Illanuns, and Kedayans share ethnic and cultural affinity with the Malays of the Peninsula. It was this background of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that dictated the course of political evolution and set in motion the process of nation-building in Malaysia and the nature of the underpinning nationalism that sustains it.

Instituting the Nation Malaysia’s heterogeneity, to be sure, presented a fundamental challenge to any notion of territorial nationalism and nation-building. Divided by sectional loyalties, and owing allegiance primarily to the rulers of their states, the Malays in “British Malaya” were unable to transcend state loyalties to embrace a common nationhood. They were even less prepared to embrace a pan-Malayan territorial nationalism that included non-Malay participation. Threatened by the influx of “immigrant” Chinese and Indians who, by 1941, had outnumbered them, the Malays also felt at once the pressure to check the spread of non-Malay influence. It did not help that, by and large, Chinese and Indian political orientation was still very much influenced, and fueled, by developments in their respective motherlands. Inter-ethnic competition, state parochialism, and the stimuli of an externally oriented activism had doomed any prospect of a united pan-Malayan nationalist movement emerging from among Malaya’s heterogeneous communities to challenge the logic of British trusteeship. In Sarawak and North Borneo, where political development lagged even further behind Malaya’s, there was little nationalist awakening among the indigenous communities. If the national project had been put on hold by default, it was World War II that finally set it in motion. In Malaya, the shock of defeat at the hands of Japanese N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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forces had left an indelible imprint on indigenous minds that the British were, alas, vulnerable rulers, and set the stage for a simmering anticolonial nationalism among the more radical nationalist elements in its aftermath. But the nascent territorial nationalism was still unable to transcend the ethnic divides that had since deepened as a result of Japan’s uneven handling of the various communities during the war. The Chinese, in particular, were singled out for harsh treatment by their new invaders because of their prewar record of anti-Japanese activities, and the increased state of ethnic competition and insecurity wrought by wartime conditions. Heightened ethno-nationalism was played out after the Japanese surrender, as Chinese and Malays clashed in parts of Malaya. The communal vendetta and bloodletting that ensued sorely tested inter-ethnic peace and threatened Malaya’s increasingly fragile social stability. Inter-ethnic tensions further increased after the British introduced in April 1946 their controversial Malayan Union scheme that sought to “invent” a unitary, British-governed, multiracial Malayan nation-state out of the prewar disparate Malay states and British settlements (excluding Singapore). Through its new common citizenship provisions, the scheme also sought to benefit many non-Malays, and Chinese in particular, by empowering them politically for the first time. But the Malay backlash that it immediately provoked led to the closing of Malay ranks behind a newly formed Malay political party—the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)—that successfully campaigned for the replacement of the Malayan Union by the new Federation of Malaya in February 1948. Partly in response to Malay mobilization and partly in defense of their own community interests, Chinese and Indian nationalists started to muster their communities as well. Yet their belated efforts failed to derail the Anglo-Malay settlement that tightened up the new federal citizenship provisions to permit only qualified non-Malay residents to share citizenship with the Malays, and the restoration of a pro-Malay agenda in the creation of the new Malayan nation-state. The outbreak of the “Emergency,” a communist-led armed insurgency for national liberation, four months into the life of the new federation, further undermined the prospects of creating a Malayan nation-state. As the majority of the communist insurgents were Chinese, Sino-Malay friction intensified. However, the rising economic and political costs of fighting the insurgency soon precipitated a stocktaking of British colonial trusteeship in Malaya and strengthened the conviction of hastening constitutional progressivism as a weapon in the ideological and political contest against totalitarian communism. With decolonization at last thinkable, Malaya’s moderate political forces worked out a formula of interracial cooperation that was to take the form of an alliance of three communal parties—comprising UMNO, as the principal partner, and two major nonMalay political parties, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress, representing the Chinese and Indian communities, respectively. This formula was to meet London’s prerequisite of social stability before effecting a transfer of power. The Alliance Party, as the coalition came to be known, won a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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resounding mandate—winning 51 out of the 52 contested seats—in the national elections in 1955, paving the way for the formation of the new, independent state of the Federation of Malaya with its seat of government in Kuala Lumpur two years later. Impressed by the level of support accorded to the Alliance Party and the determination of its moderate and pro-British leaders for independence, London accepted their demand to end its empire in Malaya, even though its requirement of a noncommunal, multiracial, Malayan consciousness had not yet been fully met.

Defining the Nation When Britain transferred power in 1957, it was to an essentially communally oriented, “pro-Malay” territorial state, based, as it was, on an extension of the framework of the 1948 constitution. As before, UMNO had prevailed on the other non-Malay parties and dictated Malay terms. The so-called historic bargain or social contract worked out among the three Alliance Party partners in 1957 basically upheld the earlier British recognition of Malay sovereignty and endorsed what had been tacitly assumed in the 1948 agreement—that the Malays were the original “sons of the soil” and therefore accorded a “special position” that would be safeguarded by special privileges, such as quotas for jobs in the civil service, permits to engage in business or trade, and scholarships. In addition, Malay was made the national language, Islam recognized as the official religion, and the Malay rulers became constitutional monarchs. The non-Malay parties in the Alliance received federal citizenship rights for those in their communities born on or after (but not before) Independence Day in Malaya. Also, the non-Malay who qualified due to terms of residency gained the freedom to worship and the right to use and study their mother tongues. But though the non-Malay parties conceded to Malay political primacy, and UMNO accepted that non-Malays could be admitted to the “nation” through the provision of federal citizenship, there was no conclusive agreement by both the Malay and non-Malay leadership about what the “imagined” nation-state ought to be. Debates surrounded the question of whether it should be an exclusive “Malay” nation-state, or bangsa Melayu, as the Malay nationalists would have it, or a more inclusive multiracial and egalitarian “Malayan” nation-state, as desired by the non-Malays. For Malay nationalists, the use of the term “Malayan” was objectionable not only because it had previously been used as a shorthand reference for non-Malay residents in Malaya but also because of its association with the outlawed Malayan Communist Party and the unpopular Malayan Union. With Malays forming just under half of the population of 6.2 million in 1957, Malay national leaders were justifiably wary of alienating non-Malay support by pushing too hard for a Melayu bangsa and, in the process, threatening the viability of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Malay as the National Language With so many languages spoken in the country, Malaysia has designated Bahasa Melayu or the Malay language as its specific national language, and its constitutional status may not be questioned. Malay replaced English as the language of administration upon Malaya’s independence in 1957, although the status of English as an official language remained until 1967 to allow for the smooth transition of administration and education into the national language. After the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the status of Malay as the national language was upheld, even though English was given a further 10-year lease as an official language in the two new territories, Sabah and Sarawak, that had joined Malaysia. As the national language, Malay is the language of government and administration, although it is not the medium of instruction in all schools, and English has continued to play an unofficial role as the de facto language of the professions and business.

nascent state. The question of a “common nationality” was therefore left vague and largely undefined, though it had been assumed that its form would include a nucleus of Malay nationalism encased within an inclusive “Malayan nationalism” that was forged through the interracial alliance. The “historic bargain” managed, for a time, the friction of Malay dominance against the backdrop of contesting nationalisms. In 1963, Malaya was transformed into an enlarged federation, Malaysia, which included the states of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (formerly North Borneo). However, the “historic bargain” that had been the cornerstone of the old Malaya started to crack under the stresses of accommodating the new members, not all of whom shared a common understanding of the nature of the new “Malaysian nationalism” that should be forged to undergird the new Malaysian entity. The inclusion of the former British dependencies into the enlarged grouping had been part of a long simmering British project for postwar regional consolidation conceived during World War II. But momentum for the proposed confederation was lost in the immediate aftermath of war, overtaken as it was by a series of events, including the postwar separation of Singapore from Malaya (1946), the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), and the ending of the British empire in Malaya (1957). While British officials kept the idea alive, progress was slow as the difficulties of integrating the different territories at different stages of political, social, and economic development deterred them from forcing the pace. This was until May 1961, when during a meeting in Singapore, Malaya’s premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in an unexpected initiative, publicly broached the subject of bringing the territories closer together. He was concerned about how political instability and a communist revival in Singapore might affect Malaya’s own internal security. No doubt the prospect of inheriting the Borneo territories, including oil-rich Brunei, from the British as the price of the “package deal” for taking in Singapore must have been an added attraction. Not only would the Tunku have N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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gained an enlarged federation that would enhance the size and status of Malaya, but he would also simultaneously be able to ensure his Malay base by using the indigenous peoples of the Borneo territories as a counterweight to the Singapore Chinese, tipping the racial balance against the Chinese and providing a safeguard sufficient to justify the risk of accepting Singapore’s incorporation. By envisioning the new Malaysia as an extension of the old Malaya, Kuala Lumpur had inadvertently transformed the unfinished debate on the nature of the Malayan nation-state into a Malaysian one. Fears of Malayan, and in particular Malay, “colonialism” replacing British imperialism, dogged the inter-state negotiations on the terms of membership in the run-up to the formation of the new federal state. In Sarawak and North Borneo, the threat of an encroaching Malay ethnonationalism invariably stimulated the awakening of Iban and Kadazandusun nationalism, respectively. Nervous of being rushed headlong into some uncharted venture, the outcome of which they were uncertain, and fearful of Malay-Muslim political, administrative, and cultural domination, opinion in the Borneo territories

From left to right, the Duke of Gloucester, the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (Paramount Ruler), an aide-de-camp, and Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister of Malaya, attend the Malayan Proclamation of Independence ceremony in Kuala Lumpur on August 31, 1957. (Central Press/Getty Images)

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hardened against absorption. They wished inclusion on their own terms, not on the basis of Malaya’s “historic bargain.” A commission of enquiry sent to Sarawak and North Borneo between February and April 1962 to determine the level of support for Malaysia in the Borneo territories found only one-third of the inhabitants supportive of the new federation, another third against, and the remaining third desiring safeguards. Wary of the inherent dangers of an encroaching Malay ethno-nationalism, Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) leaders, led by Lee Kuan Yew, also struck hard bargains in negotiations to protect the island’s interests, even if they deliberately played down in public the Malay threat in their consuming desire to achieve a merger with Malaya and at risk of communist subversion. A referendum conducted in Singapore in September 1962 resulted in over 70 percent of the people declaring their support for the PAP’s platform for merger. Contradictory objectives, in the end, were reconciled, and grudging compromises were brokered only after much hard bargaining and maneuvering behind the scenes by the key players. Twenty-eight months after the Tunku first broached the subject, an uneasy agreement on the nature of the new federation was finally achieved, and Malaysia was birthed on September 16, 1963.

Narrating the Nation The new federal state almost immediately found itself embroiled in controversy that threatened to undermine the very basis of its territorial and political integrity. Suspicious of Malaysia’s creation as a “neocolonial” plot, and also probably harboring territorial ambitions over Malaysia’s Borneo states, neighboring Indonesia had, since January 1963, embarked on a campaign of Konfrontasi (confrontation) against the former that subsequently developed into small-scale skirmishes across the border. This required the deployment of Commonwealth military forces to defend the nascent state until the official ending of hostilities in 1966. The more serious threat to Malaysia’s integrity, however, came from within—the mutual suspicion and intense political rivalry between the PAP-led Singapore state government and the Malay-led Alliance federal government invariably brought into sharp relief the unresolved debate over the fundamental character of the Malaysian nation-state and the nature of the nationalism that sustained it. Was Malaysia to be a “Malay” Malaysia, where Malays held supreme political power over a communally weighted political system and enjoyed special privileges, or a “Malaysian” Malaysia, where all communities were treated equally regardless of their race? The lack of consensus on the nature of the relationship between Malay culture and the Malaysian identity remained problematic: If Malay culture were to serve as the basis for Malaysian culture, how would this affect the position of other cultural groups? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Lee Kuan Yew Lee Kuan Yew was Singapore’s first prime minister from 1959 to 1990. Born in 1923, and educated in both Singapore and the United Kingdom, where he graduated with top honors in law at Cambridge University in 1949, Lee’s political awakening apparently occurred during the war years. Subsequently, as a student in Britain, he joined other Singapore and Malayan students in the Malayan Forum, a discussion group, in London to press for an independent Malaya, inclusive of Singapore. Later, his involvement in left-wing causes in Singapore and his growing interest in politics led him to found the People’s Action Party that spearheaded the anticolonial struggle and attained independence for Singapore through a merger with Malaysia in 1963. After the merger collapsed in 1965, Lee was in tears at his press conference during his “moment of anguish.” But Singapore has since been transformed from a struggling new state into one of the most stable and economically successful nation-states in Asia, for which Lee has often been regarded as its principal architect.

Kuala Lumpur, as it turned out, never seriously departed from the former conception of Malaysia as an extension of the old Malaya. To Singapore’s leaders, riding on a Singapore-oriented territorial nationalism that had emerged since the island’s separation from the Malayan Union in 1946 and had developed in earnest from the mid-1950s, a “Malay” Malaysia was a political anomaly as Malays no longer formed the majority community upon the inclusion of the peoples of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. Singapore’s alternate conception of a “Malaysian” Malaysia, on the other hand, was perceived by Kuala Lumpur as nothing short of a direct challenge to the Malay ethno-nationalism of the Malayled Alliance government and one that needed to be contained. After the ensuing tensions precipitated two politically charged race riots in Singapore in July and September 1964, leaving 36 dead (which was blamed on incitement by UMNO activists), collision seemed inevitable as both sides mobilized for renewed political battle. In May 1965, joined by two parties from Malaya and another two from Sarawak, the PAP formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, a united front of opposition parties, to campaign for a “Malaysian Malaysia,” which it declared “is the antithesis of a Malay Malaysia, a Chinese Malaysia, a Dayak Malaysia, an Indian Malaysia or Kadazan Malaysia and so on. The special and legitimate interests of different communities must be secured and promoted within the framework of the collective rights, interests and responsibilities of all races” (Cheah, 2002). The looming political crisis was averted only with Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in August 1965, some 23 months after it joined the federation, to become an independent sovereign state, a decision made by key leaders from both territories. Singapore’s separation from the federation checked a potentially serious threat to the molding of the “Malay” nation-state (Bangsa Melayu), but it caused much foreboding among the non-Malays who felt even more acutely the threat N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of political domination by the Malays. Latent ethnic tensions were kept very much alive as pressure mounted from Malay nationalist circles to implement fully the basic agreement reached in 1957 to make Malay not only the national language but also the sole official language by 1967, 10 years from Merdeka Day (Independence Day). Singapore’s departure was also nearly followed by Sabah and Sarawak, which resented the Tunku’s failure to consult their leaders before taking precipitous action to “expel” Singapore. Fears that the rights of their respective states would be similarly brushed aside by Kuala Lumpur further fueled their antipathy toward Kuala Lumpur. They were also sensitive to issues like the imposition of Malay (a minority language in these states) as the official language, and the status of Islam in the two largely non-Muslim states. Federal leaders, however, moved quickly to nip the secessionist tendencies in the bud by removing the incumbent chief ministers of the two states. Such underlying tensions were brought to the surface during the watershed Malaysian general election of May 10, 1969. The results shocked the Alliance party. For the first time, the ruling Alliance party lost its two-thirds majority in parliament, winning only 66 of the 104 parliamentary seats in west Malaysia, and polling only 48 percent of the total votes. A victory procession by opposition supporters in Kuala Lumpur during the next two days provoked a Malay backlash on May 13 that led to tragic race riots over two days that left at least 178 people dead and threatened to split the nation asunder. Parliament was suspended, a state of emergency was declared, and a National Operations Council, headed by the deputy prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, took over the reins of power from the Tunku, who subsequently resigned in September 1970 in favor of his deputy. It was not until 1971 that parliament reopened.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Tunku’s greatest legacy perhaps lay not so much in his role in securing independence for the nation, for which the appellation Bapa Kermerdekaan (“Father of Independence”) had been applied to him, but in the crafting of a mechanism for managing race relations built upon the “historic bargain” that made both independence in 1957 and subsequent nation-building possible. By casting himself in the role of an inclusivist Malaysian nationalist, and not an exclusivist, the Tunku accommodated demands within the context of power sharing among the respective communities without the need for him to publicly acknowledge the fact of Malay political primacy. By 1969, however, the questioning of old assumptions and the unleashing of new political forces and alignments since the creation of Malaysia in 1963 brought new stresses and strains that led to the unraveling of the “bargain,” with the May 13 incident as its tragic manifestation.

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It was the Tunku’s deputy, Razak, who set new terms for intercommunal relations. These were based on a more open and vigorous assertion of Malay political primacy through a program of affirmative action—the New Economic Policy (NEP)—to restructure Malaysian society in favor of the Malays, so as to enable them to achieve economic parity and balance with the non-Malay communities within the framework of an expanding economy. This gave way to what came to be known as the “bumiputera” policy (“sons of the soil,” a reference to the ethnic Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups). Taken out of public debate were also certain “sensitive” provisions of the constitution—like the special position of the Malays and the citizenship rights of non-Malays, the status of Islam as the official religion, the status of Malay language as the sole official national language, and the status and powers of the rulers. A new national ideology (the Rukunegara) was crafted based on five principles—belief in God, loyalty to King and country, upholding the constitution, the rule of law and good behavior, and morality—and taught in the study of civics in schools. A national culture, based largely on Malay and Islamic culture, but including suitable elements of other cultures, was also formulated. To broaden the political consensus, Razak, over a period of three years, expanded the Alliance into the Barisan Nasional (National Front) with the inclusion of a host of largely non-Malay and former opposition parties from Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak. However, this excluded the Democratic Action Party, which had refused to join the coalition, and the Parti Islam se-Malaysia, which had joined the coalition in 1973 but subsequently left it in 1977. For his contributions to Malaysia’s nation-building, Razak, who died suddenly in 1976 while undergoing treatment for leukemia in London, was accorded the title Bapa Pembangunan (“Father of Development”). Razak was succeeded by Hussein Onn (1976–1981) and then Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammad (1981–2003). During their tenures, policies were put in place to manage the process of nation-building in Malaysia. A number of challenges confronted Razak’s immediate successor: a revived communist terror campaign, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, localized incidents of religious violence, revival of intra-ethnic and interparty conflicts in Sarawak and Sabah, and growing disunity within Malay ranks, which saw Parti Islam se-Malaysia leaving the UMNOled Barisan Nasional in 1977. Still, by building on his commitment to the rule of law, Hussein Onn succeeded in stabilizing the broad political and social architecture of the new nation by maintaining political stability and racial harmony during this tenure, helped in no small part by a growing economy, and earning him the title Bapa Perpaduan (“Father of Solidarity”). But it was to Mahathir Mohammad to whom the appellation Bapa Pemodenan (“Father of Modernization”) was accorded for his leadership in engineering Malaysia’s rapid modernization and resulting prosperity. During his 22 years as prime minister, Mahathir raised Malaysia’s nation-building project to a different level by making economic success a determinant of national identity and developing the

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nation’s psychological capacity to modernize by infusing in Malaysians —and especially in a Malay community where years of colonial rule had bred values that discouraged initiative—a new sense of pride and a “can-do” mindset (“Malaysia Boleh”) by embarking on a series of “mega” projects, including building the world’s tallest twin towers (the Petronas Twin Towers, which were also the world’s tallest buildings between 1997 and 2003); developing the Proton Saga national car project; building the North-South Highway on the west coast of Malaysia, which reduced transport times by half; creating of the Multimedia Super Corridor, modeled on Silicon Valley and designed to take Malaysia into the information technology age; and building Malaysia’s new administrative capital, Putrajaya, which incorporated elements of Islamic-Mogul architecture. Mahathir also sought to project an international identity for Malaysia that showcased its commitment to justice and equity for all nations, especially its solidarity with the Third World, Islamic identity, and the Malaysian model of a democratic, rapidly modernizing, and economically successful moderate Muslim nation, whose multiethnic and multirelgious communities lived together in harmony. The realization of Mahathir’s conception of a progressive Bangsa Malaysia, or Malaysian nation, depended to a large extent on the relative strength of the overlapping pull of Malay nationalism at its nucleus and the Malaysian nationalism that undergirded it. The stronger the pull of Malay nationalism, the greater was the demand for a Bangsa Melayu (“Malay” nation), and the more challenging it was to realize the vision of a more inclusive Bangsa Malaysia. In Singapore, separation from Malaysia had opened the way for the PAP government to embark on its nation-building project to create its own version of a “Singaporean Singapore”—a natural extension of its former campaign for a “Malaysian Malaysia”—based on the nonassimilationist principles of multiracialism, multilingualism, multiculturalism, and multireligiosity. These principles were subsumed under the social formula of what came to be known as the C+M+I+O model of managing the polity’s social heterogeneity: Singapore society is considered to be the sum of its conceptually “separate” but “equal” (in status) component parts, namely, Chinese (C), Malays (M), Indians (I), and Others (O) (with the majority in this category being Eurasians). In this model, social and economic mobility would be determined by the corollary principle of meritocracy, not ethnicity. While Malay remains the national language for historical and geopolitical reasons and is used in the national anthem, four official languages are recognized— Chinese (Mandarin), Malay, Tamil, and English, with the latter promoted not only as the common “link” language for the various communities and the language of administration, but also the language of science and technology that would support Singapore’s economic development. For the politically significant and majority Chinese community, a regular series of “Speak Mandarin” campaigns have been launched since 1979 to discourage the proliferation of dialects and to promote the speaking of Mandarin as the community’s unifying lingua franca. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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In short, the “Singaporean Singapore” that its founding leaders envisaged is a dominant English-educated Singapore society reinforced by Singaporeans speaking their respective “mother tongues” and retaining their Asian “cultural ballast.” This is perpetuated through the “bilingual” education policy where English is used as the main language of instruction and students also learn their respective “mother tongues.” Daily nation-building rituals like the ceremony of raising the flag, singing the national anthem, and reciting the national pledge take place in every school. The national pledge, for instance, exhorts its citizens to “pledge ourselves as one united people, regardless of race, language, or religion, to build a democratic society based on justice and equality so as to achieve happiness, prosperity, and progress for our nation.” Since 1997, a national education program, drawing lessons from recent history to “develop national cohesion, the instinct for survival, and confidence in our future,” was also introduced into the educational curriculum. To give citizens a stake in the country and a common experience, the national housing policy ensured that every eligible citizen of all income levels would have the opportunity of owning their own apartment. An overwhelming 80 percent of Singaporeans are living in apartments developed by the Housing and Developing Board. Compulsory national service for all male citizens in the nation’s defense forces afforded another means of building a common nationalism and national integration. The annual National Day parade, drawing on the use of ritual, mass participation, pomp, spectacle, and ceremony, provided another visual and aural “bonding” event for the nation. Both Malaysia and Singapore have chosen different nation-building approaches and solutions that have worked for their respective countries. The adoption of divergent strategies is as much a product of historical circumstances as it is reflective of the extent of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that dictated the process of political change in both countries. In the making of the Malaysian nation-state, the dominant culture of its largest ethnic group, the Malays, continues to exert a strategic influence on Malaysian identity creation. But as the Malays make up slightly more than half the population, neither Malay ethnicity nor culture could realistically be the raison d’être for nation-building without alienating the other half. Malaysian nationalism provides the obvious alternative ideological nation-building construct but much would depend on its content —whether it could, in practice, be differentiated from Malay nationalism. Singapore, like Malaysia, had sought to create a separate national identity out of the multiple ethnic identities that it inherited from its historical legacy. But while acknowledging the prominence of multiple ethnic identities, Singapore sought to depoliticize ethnicity in its approach to nation-building. It went on to create instead a national identity that is based, not on the dominant culture of its ethnic majority, but on common integrative economic criteria and ideologyneutral values designed to ensure the long-term viability and survival of the young island state. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Selected Bibliography Cheah, Boon Kheng. 2002. Malaysia: The Making of a Nation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Cheah, Boon Kheng, ed. 2004. The Challenge of Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia. Singapore: Cavendish Academic. Daniels, T. P. 2005. Building Cultural Nationalism in Malaysia: Identity, Representation and Citizenship. New York: Routledge. Hill, M., and Lian Kwen Fee. 1995. The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore. London: Routledge. Kong, L., and B. S. A Yeoh. 1997. “The Construction of National Identity through the Production of Ritual and Spectacle: An Analysis of National Day Parades in Singapore.” Political Geography 16, no. 3: 213–239. Lau, A. 2003. “ ‘Nationalism’ in the Decolonisation of Singapore.” In The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization, edited by M. Frey, R. Preussen, and Tan Tai Yong. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Lau, A. 2005. “Nation-Building and the Singapore Story: Some Issues in the Study of Contemporary Singapore History.” In Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories, edited by Wang Gungwu. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Ongkili, J. P. 1985. Nation-Building in Malaysia 1946–1974. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Shamsul, A. B. 1996. “The Construction and Transformation of a Social Identity: Malayness and Bumiputeraness Re-examined.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 52:15–33. Siddique, S. 1989. “Singapore Identity.” In Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, edited by Kernial Singh Sandhu and P. Wheatley. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Wang Gungwu. 1981. “Malayan Nationalism.” Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese. Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia. Wilmott, W. E. 1989. “The Emergence of Nationalism.” In Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, edited by Kernial Singh Sandhu and P. Wheatley. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Yeoh, B. S. A., and L. Kong, ed. 1995. Portraits of Places: History, Community and Identity in Singapore. Singapore: Times Edition. Zawawi, I., ed. 1998. Cultural Contestions: Mediating Identities in a Changing Malaysian Society. London: ASEAN Academic Press.

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Pakistan Hooman Peimani Chronology 1947 India gains independence, after about two centuries of British colonialism, and is partitioned into a state for Muslims (Pakistan) and another for Hindus (India). Pakistan and India fight over Jamo and Kashmir, ending in Pakistan’s defeat. The agreed ceasefire line in 1949, adjusted in 1972, leaves the region’s major part under India. India defeats Pakistan in another war in that region in 1965. 1971 Pakistan and India fight a war over East Pakistan as it declares independence. Pakistan’s defeat marks that region’s independence as Bangladesh. 1978 Army chief of staff, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, proclaims martial law and becomes president. He tries to Islamize Pakistan and gives a free hand to religious groups and extremists/fundamentalists. He dies in 1988 in a plane crash. 1979 The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan to keep the pro-Moscow Afghan regime in power begins a civil war that lasts until 2001 when the Taliban regime collapses, although those troops leave Afghanistan in 1989. 1980–2001 Pakistan is heavily involved in Afghanistan, supporting mainly armed Afghan Pashtun groups, including the Taliban, until 2001 when its joins the U.S.-led coalition. 1988–1999 Pakistan’s People Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto and Muslim League leader Nawaz Sharif form a few governments that will be dismissed on corruption charges. 1998 Pakistan conducts five nuclear tests after India’s nuclear tests. 1999 Gen. Pervez Musharraf stages a coup and overthrows Nawaz Sharif’s government. He is still in power as president and military commander in chief. 2005 Pakistan and India hold talks to improve their relations, resulting in an ease of tensions in their relations, and sign an agreement regarding measures to avoid a nuclear war, while expressing a desire for a peaceful settlement of conflicts over Jamo and Kashmir. 2007 In advance of scheduled elections in early 2008, Benazir Bhutto returns to Pakistan but is assassinated while campaigning.

Situating the Nation Pakistan was part of India until 1947, when it gained independence, creating the two states of India and Pakistan. About two centuries of British colonialism in India had an impact on Pakistan. It retarded Pakistan’s development, because India as a whole was primarily meant to provide for the British empire’s certain needs. Therefore, the British directed India’s economic development to suit their needs, requiring a limited degree of economic development. Unsurprisingly, in 1947, Pakistan, like India, was mainly underdeveloped, lacking viable agrarian and industrial sectors and an adequate infrastructure. Comparatively, Pakistan was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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less developed than India, where most of the industries and financial and educational institutions of the colonized country were located. Additionally, like India, Pakistan suffered from poverty, unemployment, a low literacy rate, and poor health care services. Despite all its negative aspects, colonization helped create an intellectual and scientific strata, a degree of industrialization, an infrastructure, an administrative system, and a military. Since independence, those institutions have helped Pakistanis achieve significant industrialization, more efficient agriculture, and a remarkable scientific community. With an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of only $368 billion in 2005, Pakistan had suffered from decades of economic problems after its initial rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Contributing factors include bureaucratic barriers, rampant corruption, inadequate domestic revenues, and investments and limited foreign investments. Other major factors were instability and political uncertainty caused by intra-elite disputes, various military coups, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a five-decade-long conflict with India. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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However, the Pakistani economy has improved since 2001 because of limited economic reforms bolstered by generous foreign assistance and renewed access to global markets. In particular, Pakistan’s positioning itself as the main U.S. ally in the region in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, has significantly contributed to its economic recovery. Washington has since rewarded Islamabad by writing off some of its foreign debts (debt relief), renegotiating others on better terms, and providing it with over $3 billion worth of grants and loans on favorable conditions. Moreover, Pakistan has received a significant share of reconstruction projects in its neighboring Afghanistan and supplies some of the consumer products to meet the growing needs of that country and the U.S.-led coalition forces stationed there. To this, one should add a large ($1.3 billion) International Monetary Fund Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility loan, which has helped Pakistan implement an antipoverty project. As a result, in 2004, Pakistan exported $15.07 billion worth of goods, reflecting a significant increase in the value of its exports compared with 1999, when it was $8.4 billion. This amount of export helped Islamabad have a positive balance of payment compared with 1999, as the value of its imports in 2004 ($14.01 billion) was less than that of its exports, unlike 1999 when it imported more ($9.8 billion). Briefly, economic improvement is evident in an impressive increase in GDP, from 3.1 percent in 1999 to 6.1 percent in 2004. Pakistan’s economic improvement is not yet a steady trend. While economic reforms are partly responsible for such development, their main stimulus has been Islamabad’s alliance with the United States, rather than addressing the internal situations preventing a sustainable economic growth. Therefore, Pakistan has a long way to go to deal with its economic problems as reflected, for example, in its growing foreign debt, which amounted to $35.5 billion in 2004—equal to about 10 percent of its GDP ($368 billion), a significant increase from 1999 ($32 billion), whereas its public debt was equal to 61.7 percent of the GDP in 2005. Late in the 19th century, the idea of independence emerged among the welloff, educated Indian elite, who became India’s leaders both for the Hindus and the Muslims. The movement toward creating Pakistan started as a demand for the recognition of the Muslim minority’s interests in a Hindu-dominated country as it was heading toward independence. In 1929, as the leaders of independence movements were discussing the nature of an independent Indian state, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a Muslim leader, put forward 15 points that would satisfy his constituents’ interests, including the creation of “safeguards” to prevent a Hinducontrolled Indian legislature. The rejection of Jinnah’s proposals by the Hindu leaders paved the way for the development of the idea of a separate state for the Indian Muslims upon independence. A year later, in his address to a session of the Muslim League, a party advocating the Muslims’ interests, Sir Muhammad Iqbal Lahori (1876–1938), a prominent poet and philosopher, demanded the establishment of a confederated India to include a Muslim state consisting of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP). In his subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876 –1948) Known as Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader), Muhammad Ali Jinnah was born into a prosperous business family in Karachi on December 25, 1876. Jinnah received his early education at the Sindh Madrasa (meaning “school” in Urdu) and later at the Mission School, Karachi. He went to England for further studies in 1892, where he studied law and was called to the bar in 1897. Jinnah started his political career in 1906 when he attended the Calcutta session of the All India National Congress in the capacity of private secretary to the president of the Congress. He therefore became active in the pro-independence movement in India, seeking an end to the British colonial rule. In 1910, he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council, India’s parliament under British rule with a limited legislative power. In 1919, Jinnah resigned from the Congress and turned his focus to Muslim interests as he joined the All India Muslim League. Early in his political career, Jinnah was chiefly concerned with achieving independence for a unified India. Increasingly, he worried that in an independent India with a Hindu majority, British oppression would be replaced by Hindu oppression and the subjugation of India’s Muslim minority. Gradually over three decades, he became the architect of an independent state for the Indian Muslims, requiring the partition of India along religious lines to preserve Muslim political and economic interests upon independence of India, a dream first voiced by India’s Muslim poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal Lahori. In the 1930s, Jinnah was a major Indian Muslim political figure and became the leader of the Muslim League late in that decade. He led the pro-independence Muslim movement in the 1940s. The idea of partitioning India into two states, one for Muslims and another for Hindus, was formally accepted by the British government on June 3, 1947. This led to the independence of India and the creation of Pakistan and India on August 14, 1947. Jinnah became Pakistan’s first governor general and president of its legislative assembly. Despite his efforts for an independent state for Indian Muslims, he envisaged Pakistan as a secular state where people of different faiths could live in peace, a dream that disappeared when he died on September 11, 1948.

reiterated the claims of Muslims to be considered a nation “based on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests.” In 1933, this view was developed into a clear plan for creating a separate state for Muslims in a pamphlet by a group of Indian students at Cambridge (United Kingdom) entitled Now or Never. Rejecting India as a single nation, it demanded India’s partition to make its northwest region the state of “Pakistan.” Accordingly, “Pakistan . . . is . . . composed of letters taken from the names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghania [North-West Frontier Province], Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure and clean.” In his efforts to unite the divided Muslim movement, in 1934, Jinnah emphasized the Two Nations Theory envisaging the creation of two states, one for Hindus and another for Muslims, upon India’s independence. He further developed his theory at the Muslin League’s annual session on March 23, 1940, when he demanded, in a resolution (Lahore Resolution), independent separate states N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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for the population of the predominately Muslim northwestern and eastern India. He declared unacceptable for Muslims any independence plan without this provision as he demanded India’s partition into separate states for Muslims and Hindus. The roots of Pakistan can be traced back to the rise of the Indian independence movement. In its embryonic form, it reflected itself in the formation in 1885 of the Indian National Congress (Congress Party). As an umbrella organization, it represented a variety of ideas and individuals, Hindus and Muslims, advocating changes to the British rule as a prelude to independence. After World War I, Congress advanced the idea of a speedy end to British rule, while opposing any sectarian division of India. However, fear of Hindu domination in independent India provided grounds for the Two Nations Theory. Founded in 1906, the All India Muslim League (now Muslim League) demanded a separate state for India’s Muslims in 1940. Prior to independence, the rise and expansion of violent communal conflicts that pitted Muslims and Hindus against each other strengthened the desire for a separate state for Muslims and helped expand its social basis among average Muslims. The expanding demand for independence among the Indians in the 1940s was reflected in mass nonviolent political activities, which made the continuation of British rule impossible. It thus left no choice for the British but to accept India’s independence on August 14, 1947. Prior to independence, and given the strong demand, the British split India into two states: a predominantly Muslim (Pakistan) state and a predominantly Hindu (India) state.

Instituting the Nation Forming the single largest ethnic group, the Punjabis have dominated Pakistan with a noticeable predominance in the upper echelons of the military and civil service and also in the economy. They have run Pakistan for most part of its history, a source of resentment for other major ethnic groups: the Pakhtuns (Pashtuns), the Balochis, and the Sindhis. The Sindhis have been the main challengers as reflected in the efforts of two Sindhi prime ministers: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1970s) and his daughter Benazir Bhutto (1980s and 1990s), who tried to end the Punjabi domination. Both of them were ousted from power before ending their terms. Another major ethnic group with political clout is the Muhajirs (immigrants), the Indian Muslims (and their offspring) who migrated from India to Pakistan at the time of independence. They form a strong minority group in Sindh, especially in its capital, Karachi. Generally speaking, they have been well represented in government institutions, partly thanks to their better education, which enables them to fill many positions left vacant because of the migration of Hindus and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Sikhs to India in 1947. Conflict between the Sindhis, who view the Muhajirs as a major challenge to their power and culture, and the Muhajirs was the major source of instability in Sindh during the 1980s and the 1990s. Since independence, the military has been the major power broker and kingmaker in Pakistan. Its influence lies in its role as the country’s defender, facing a hostile and strong neighbor, India, and in the weakness of the civil society and the political parties. At the time of crises, that weakness created a power vacuum to be exploited by the only organized force ready to take charge, the military. In practice, the military has ruled over Pakistan for most of its history (about 30 years), through coups removing civilian governments on the grounds of incompetence and the need to preserve national security. The Pakistani military rulers include Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Gen. Yahya Khan, Gen. Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, and the current president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who came to power through a coup in 1999. The military is also a powerful institution within civilian governments and is capable of influencing events. For example, in July 1993, it forced President Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to resign. The direct rule of the military and its intervention in political affairs during civilian periods have contributed to the expansion of corruption in the military and in the bureaucracy. Pakistan’s constitution institutionalizes the power of tribal leaders only to weaken the central government’s authority. Accordingly, the tribal region of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province has a practical autonomous status, a condition for its joining Pakistan in 1947. The central government’s limited power in that region enables the local tribal leaders to run it as they wish. Hence, it is a haven for illegal activities, including arms production and trafficking, drug trafficking, and the operation of Pakistani extremist religious groups, including those operating in other countries, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Certain factors have contributed to the rise and expansion of extremist Islamic groups all over Pakistan. Apart from the existence of a situation that is ripe for their expansion, one caused by rampant poverty, a high illiteracy rate, and the absence of democracy, two factors have been prominent. One is the efforts of certain military leaders, first and foremost, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who sought the support of the clergy and the fundamentalist extremist groups to expand their social basis. During his rule (1973–1988), Zia ul-Haq sought to Islamize Pakistan through his plan to make the Sharia the law of the country and implement social restrictions that would result in the strength of the clergy, while courting fundamentalist groups, such as Jamat-i Islami. Although he was not fully successful in achieving his objectives, his reign helped the expansion of fundamentalist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Current president General Musharraf, while limiting the power of some fundamentalists with direct terrorist ties, has also sought to appease other fanatics to consolidate his power. The second factor is the heavy involvement of Pakistan in the Afghan Civil War (1979–2003). To stop Soviet expansion in the region, Western countries and their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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regional allies, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, helped the expansion of Afghan and non-Afghan fundamentalist groups fighting in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Pakistani government tried to use the religious card to expand its influence in Afghanistan by supporting certain Afghan Mujahideen groups, such as that of Gulbadin Hekmatiar, and eventually through its contribution to the Taliban’s formation.

Defining the Nation During the years leading to independence, such major figures as Iqbal Lahori justified their objective of a Muslim nation (Pakistan) based on the “unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests” of the Indian Muslims. However, in practice, language is not a unifying factor because there are more than 20 spoken languages in Pakistan. Nearly half of all Pakistanis (48 percent) speak Punjabi. The next most commonly spoken language is Sindhi (12 percent), followed by the Punjabi variant Siraiki (10 percent), Pakhtu or Pashto (8 percent), Balochi (3 percent), Hindko (2 percent), and Brahui (1 percent). Although Urdu is the official national language, it is spoken as a mother tongue by only 8 percent of the population, of whom the majority are the Muhajirs. India’s Muslims considered Urdu the main literary language during British colonialism. Upon independence, the Muslim League promoted Urdu as the national language to help develop a national identity for the Pakistanis. Hence, what gave birth to the idea of a state for Muslims was not their having a common language, but a fear backed by the reality of living in a predominately Hindu country (India) as a minority with expected religious and economic discrimination. Therefore, a common religion that made Muslims of various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds closer to each other than to the Hindus served as the main factor. Although Islam was the basis for unifying Muslims to establish a separate state, it was not expected to serve as the model of government. Known as Quaid-e Azam (Great Leader), Muhammad Ali Jinnah made clear his commitment to secularism in Pakistan in his 1947 inaugural address. However, viewing Pakistan as a secular state where all Pakistanis should enjoy equal rights despite their religion has been challenged since independence. Shia Muslims, Ahmadis (an Islamic sect), and Christians have been ill-treated by extremist Sunnis and/or the Pakistani authorities, while efforts have been made to Islamize the entire country and its laws. As a state for India’s Muslims, Pakistan was meant to be formed by those parts of India where the Muslims were in majority. Prior to independence, the Muslim leaders considered two states for Indian Muslims because, even though they lived throughout India, Muslims mainly were concentrated in its far western and eastern parts. However, at the time of independence, this plan was dropped in favor of a single state to include the current Pakistan, consisting of Balochistan, Punjab, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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British lord Louis Mountbatten (in uniform) officially hands off power to Mohammed Ali Jinnah (to left of Mountbatten), leader of the new nation of Pakistan, on August 14, 1947. (Library of Congress)

NWFP, and Sindh, and India’s Bengal, which was to become East Pakistan and Bangladesh when it gained independence in 1971.

Narrating the Nation At least three major events have strengthened the Pakistanis’ resentment toward the Indians. These have been major contributing factors to five decades of hostility and mistrust between Pakistan and India. One is the communal violence pitting Hindus and Muslims against each other, especially in the last three decades of independence (1920s–1940s). The last major communal violence took place upon independence, as the Hindus and Sikhs were leaving Pakistan for India while the Muslims residing in India’s Hindu-dominated territories were heading toward Pakistan. The violence left at least 250,000 killed and made 12–24 million people refugees on both sides. Being a predominately Muslim region to which Pakistan has a claim, the status of Jammu and Kashmir, which did not become part of Pakistan at the time of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Wars with India Pakistan and India have been each other’s main national security threat since their independence in 1947. They have fought three major wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971. They were on the verge of another war in 1999, and they have experienced hundreds of smallscale skirmishes along their long borders over the last 50 years. Pakistan lost all three wars, which is a major source of humiliation for the Pakistanis. The first war (1947–1948) was fought over Kashmir, a predominately Muslim region that remained in India when India was portioned into two states. The war failed to secure Pakistan’s sovereignty over the region as it left the majority of it under India. After engaging in many skirmishes, the two neighbors again went to war over the region in 1965. This war ended with another humiliating defeat for Pakistan, whereas it showed India’s military superiority, which had been reinforced by a flow of Soviet state-of-the-art arms. Weapons supplied by Pakistan’s main ally and military supplier, China, were simply no match for those supplied by the Soviet Union to India. Washington DC’s reluctance to help Islamabad, and its efforts to convince Islamabad to accept a cease-fire, made the Pakistanis annoyed with the United States, who now seemed to favor India and who were anti-China like India, unlike the Pakistanis. The third war started in 1971, when Indian forces intervened in favor of the East Pakistanis (Bengalis), whose bid to declare independence from Pakistan was met by force. Pakistan’s military weakness led not only to its defeat, but to the loss of its eastern part, which became Bangladesh. In 1999, Pakistan and India fought a 73-day limited military conflict along the cease-fire line in Kargil, putting the two neighbors on the verge of war, but which was avoided by international mediation.

independence, is another factor. It has been an agonizing issue for the Pakistanis and the single major factor responsible for hostility between Pakistan and India since independence. The two nations went to war over it in 1947 and in 1965— both conflicts ended without resolving the situation in Pakistan’s favor—and they were close to beginning another war in 1999 (Kargil War). India still controls the majority of this region. Finally, the third war between Pakistan and India in 1971 resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan, when its eastern part became independent as Bangladesh through India’s military intervention. Pakistan’s May 1988 nuclear tests, which were conducted after India’s tests, boosted the Pakistanis’ morale that had been weakened by the memory of three consecutive defeats in their wars with India. These tests have since been a major source of pride for them.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Two issues have been used to create a sense of nationhood among the Pakistanis. One is language. Hence, efforts have been made to make Urdu, which is not the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests Following five Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests of its own, which heralded its joining the club of nuclear states. The two neighbors’ efforts to become nuclear states were not secret as they had been involved in nuclear weapon activities for about three decades. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, which revealed India’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. Under Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, Pakistan started its nuclear project in the 1970s. Pakistan probably acquired the capability to produce nuclear weapons around 1990. Because of President George H. W. Bush’s inability to certify Pakistan’s lack of nuclear weapons, the majority of most American aid and military and nonmilitary trade ceased. Pakistan received assistance from China, including a blueprint for a basic atomic bomb, as well as research and technology assistance. Its nonmilitary nuclear activities backed by Western countries, including the United States, enabled it to acquire technology, know-how, and equipment of dual implications of use in its military program as well. While all nuclear states condemned the Indian and Pakistani tests, their actions were not technically in violation of any international agreement, as they never joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Nevertheless, Pakistan and India were faced with a degree of military, scientific, and economic sanctions imposed and implemented mainly by the Western countries, which had a limited impact on their societies. However, these sanctions basically ended, especially the American ones, when Pakistan joined the U.S.-led anti-Taliban/Al Qaeda war in Afghanistan, which marked the United States’ practical recognition of Pakistan as a nuclear state.

mother tongue of more than 90 percent of the Pakistanis, the national language. It has become the official state language, although English is the de facto one. The second is religion. Islam, the religion of about 97 percent of the Pakistanis, has been promoted in the postindependence era as a unifying factor. Efforts to Islamize the country have provoked hostility among religious minorities, especially the Shias, accounting for about 20 percent of the Pakistanis. The process has strengthened the power of extremist fanatic Sunnis who view their Shia compatriots as infidels. The Punjabis account for about 48 percent of the Pakistanis and form the single largest ethnic group. Their dominance since independence over all the major professional fields has mainly marginalized other ethnic groups who lack a proportional representation in those fields. This notwithstanding, the Pakistani constitution declares all Pakistanis equal regardless of their ethnicity. Unsurprisingly, this situation has fostered a strong sense of resentment among other ethnic groups toward the Punjabis. Added to political and economic factors, the political tension made a contribution to the disintegration of Pakistan in December 1971. At that time, the East Pakistanis declared East Pakistan the independent state of Bangladesh, after about a year of political strife and a bloody war that ended in their favor. Being ethnically Bengali, they resented the high-handed policy of the Pakistani elite N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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residing in West Pakistan who also sought to impose their official language (Urdu) while, according to the Bengalis, treating them as second-class citizens. The Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, who form a large immigrant group, have been integrated into Pakistani society. However, they have become a target of Sindhi nationalism, which portrays them as a challenge to Sindhi power and culture in their own province. Violence between the two social groups reached a very high level in the 1980s and the 1990s. Selected Bibliography Ahmad, S. Si. 2004. History of Pakistan and Role of the Army. London: Royal Book Company. Burke, S. M., and S. A.-D. Quraishi. 2004. The British Raj in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. P. 2004. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Harrison, S. S., P. H. Kreisberg, and D. Kux, eds. 1998. India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years. Woodrow Wilson Center Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hussain, J. A. 1997. History of the Peoples of Pakistan: Towards Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaffrelot, C. 2002. A History of Pakistan and Its Origins. London: Anthem Press. Jalal, A. 1994. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khan, R. 1997. Pakistan—A Dream Gone Sour. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peimani, H. 2000. Nuclear Proliferation in the Indian Sub-Continent: The Self-Exhausting “Superpowers” and Emerging Alliances. Westport, CT: Praeger. Peimani, H. 2003. Falling Terrorism and Rising Conflicts: The Afghan “Contribution” to Polarization and Confrontation in West and South Asia. Westport, CT: Praeger. Qureshi, J. H. 1992. A Short History of Pakistan. Karachi: University of Karachi Press. Qureshi, S., ed. 2003. Jinnah: The Founder of Pakistan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schofield, V. 2003. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sinkler, A. 2002. Pakistan. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press. Verkaaik, O. 2003. Migrants and Militants: Fun and Violence in Pakistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Weaver, M. A. 2003. Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Ziring, L. 1997. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Philippines Christine Doran Chronology 1565 1896–1902 1898 1899 1935 1942–1944 1946 1946–1948 1948–1953 1953–1957 1957–1961 1961–1965 1965 1969 1972 1981 1983 1986 1986–1992 1992–1998 1998–2001 2001

Arrival of the first Spanish settlement party. (August–April) Philippine Revolution. (June 12) Independence from Spain. Annexation of the Philippines by the United States. Beginning of the Commonwealth period. Japanese occupation. (July 4) Independence from the United States. Presidency of Manuel Roxas. Presidency of Elpidio Quirino. Presidency of Ramon Magsaysay. Presidency of Carlos Garcia. Presidency of Diosdado Macapagal. Ferdinand Marcos is elected president. Marcos is reelected. (September) Marcos declares martial law. Martial law officially ends, but the controls continue. Benigno Aquino is assassinated. Marcos is ousted from power. Presidency of Corazon Aquino. Presidency of Fidel Ramos. Presidency of Joseph Estrada. Presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Situating the Nation The Philippines is an archipelago in the region of Southeast Asia, located between the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea. On the face of it, the most outstanding feature of the nation is its geographical fragmentation. It is composed of more than 7,100 islands, of which about 900 are inhabited. On the larger islands, the geography is further divided between central highland areas and coastal riverine plains. The difficulty of communications, both between and within islands, has until very recent times been a significant constraint influencing the historical development of the nation, and even today remains an obstacle to national integration. The archipelago can be divided into three major regional zones. In the northern zone, Luzon is the main island, and since the era of Spanish colonization, it has been the dominant island politically and culturally. Many of the major develN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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opments of the national movement have been initiated in Luzon. Manila, the capital, is situated on the island of Luzon. The central group of islands is known as the Visayas and includes the important islands of Samar, Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Leyte. In the south, the main island is Mindanao, with the Sulu Archipelago extending out into the Sulu Sea toward the northeastern tip of Borneo. The distinguishing feature of the southern zone is the widespread adherence of the people to Islam, which differentiates it from the remainder of this predominantly Christian nation. Islam began to make a significant impact on the southern Philippines from the 14th century, transmitted by traders and missionaries along the trade routes skirting the coast of Borneo. Prior to the impact of European colonization, the Philippines was not a unified nation or state, and the people had no concept of the Philippines as such. In that sense, the nation of the Philippines is a colonial creation. It is the area that was ruled as a political unit by the Spanish colonizers. Indeed, the very name, Philippines, derives from that of King Philip II of Spain and was given to the islands by an early Spanish explorer, Villalobos. In precolonial times, the most extensive and sophisticated forms of political organization were developed in the Muslim south, notably the Magindanau Confederacy centered on the island of Mindanao and the Sulu Sultanate, which covered the Sulu Archipelago. In other parts of the archipelago, social and political organization did not usually extend beyond the level of the local community, known as the barangay. The Spanish began the process of colonizing the Philippines in the 1560s and remained in control of the islands until 1898. They established their administrative headquarters at Manila, which is still the capital city. Probably the most important long-term consequence of Spanish colonization was the adoption of the Christian religion by the majority of the population, creating the first and, until recently with the independence of East Timor, only Christian nation in Southeast Asia. More than 90 percent of the population is Christian. The Filipino people resisted the European interlopers during the three centuries of Spanish rule, but it was only during the Philippine Revolution, which broke out in 1896, that they finally began to achieve military victories. It is noteworthy that this war of the Filipinos against Spain was the first successful nationalist revolution staged by a colonized Asian nation against a Western imperial power. By 1898 independence was in sight, but the Filipino revolutionaries had formed an alliance with the United States and their nationalist aspirations were betrayed by their American allies. The United States saw advantages in annexing the Philippines as a colony for reasons of commercial gain, geopolitical strategy, and international prestige. After intense resistance from the revolutionaries and great loss of life, the Philippines was subdued by American forces by 1902. The Philippines remained an American colony until 1946, apart from a period of Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1944. The confusing nature of the Filipino experience of Western colonization has been summed up as 300 years in a Spanish convent followed by 50 years in Hollywood. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Philippines achieved independence as a modern nation state on July 4, 1946. After independence, the new nation retained close ties with the United States, economically, politically, and culturally. The Republic of the Philippines is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the United Nations (UN) organizations.

Instituting the Nation The process of creating a new nation really began with the American decision to inaugurate, in 1935, a 10-year Commonwealth period that would lead to full independence. The Americans’ reasons for this decision can be traced to the desire N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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to eliminate trade competition from Philippine products in the context of the Great Depression, strategic worries about the proximity of the Philippines to an increasingly militaristic Japan, and the continuing influence of an anti-imperial strand in American political culture. Within the Philippines, the dominant political party, the Nacionalista Party, under the leadership of Manuel Quezon from 1916 until his death in 1943, constantly pushed for independence, while at the same time, the real links between the Filipino elite and American interests were continually being strengthened. Under American rule, the Filipino elite was gradually given more political say and gained administrative experience. The Commonwealth period was interrupted by World War II and Japanese occupation of the country. After the war, the American debate on whether to retain the Philippines was revived, but the outcome was a decision to go ahead with independence in 1946. In the emerging political context of the Cold War, American leaders saw advantages in presenting the Philippines as a showcase for democracy in Asia. After independence on July 4, 1946, the date itself an echo of American history, ties with the United States remained strong. The economic relationship continued, the Bell Trade Relations Act (1946) providing for free trade between the two countries until 1954, and after that, a sliding scale of increasing tariffs to be applied up to 1974. In return for what they considered these economic concessions, the Americans insisted upon “parity” rights, which gave Americans rights to dispose, exploit, develop, and utilize all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands in the Philippines, as well as the right to operate public utilities. The American government offered aid for postwar reconstruction, but this was made dependent on the Filipinos’ acceptance of the trade relations act containing the “parity” clauses. “Parity” was to become a highly contentious issue, producing much bitterness among Filipinos concerned about the unfettered rights of Americans to continue to exploit the resources of their country after it was formally independent. American military bases in the Philippines were another sore point for many Filipinos. After World War II, the destruction of Japanese military power and the communist victory in China made an American military presence in the Philippines seem important to the United States. Under the Military Bases Agreement signed in 1947, the United States was to retain 23 military base sites in the Philippines, of which 5 were developed extensively, most notably Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. These bases, both their existence on Philippine soil and the social problems that sprang up around them, provided a continuing source of friction in Philippine-American relations, up to 1992 when the United States withdrew from the bases. With these laws and agreements at its foundation, the first 20 years of the postcolonial period, during the tenure of the first five presidents, saw close relations maintained with the former colonizing power, perhaps reaching a high point during the presidency of Ramon Magsaysay from 1953 to 1957. The American connection continued with the election of a new president, Ferdinand Marcos, in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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1965. Marcos was reelected in 1969, although allegations of electoral rigging were widespread. In both elections, a significant element in Marcos’s campaigning hinged on the popularity of his wife, Imelda, a former beauty queen and singer with an ostentatious persona. In 1972, Marcos’s presidential term was due to expire and elections should have been called. Under the constitution of the Philippines, Marcos could not run for a third term. He was also aware that his successor would probably be his political opponent, Benigno Aquino. Rather than face the result of elections, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. He obtained a change in the constitution to allow him to stay in power and rule by decree. In reality, the political system of the Philippines became a dictatorship. Martial law continued officially until 1981, but even after that, strict controls were still imposed. In 1983, Benigno Aquino was assassinated under suspicious circumstances. This sparked off a growing groundswell of popular protest against the dictator, culminating in the “People Power” Revolution that overthrew Marcos in 1986 and inaugurated a return to democratic government under the presidency of Benigno’s widow, Corazon (Cory) Aquino. Cory Aquino retained the presidency, despite several unsuccessful coup attempts, until 1992.

Ramon Magsaysay (1907–1957) Ramon Magsaysay was a guerrilla leader during the Japanese occupation who was later appointed as a provincial military governor by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. After the war, he developed a plan for subduing the Hukbalahap guerrillas. Elected as president in 1953, he cooperated closely with the United States, leading some critics to identify him as an American puppet. He was killed in an airplane crash in 1957.

Benigno Aquino (1932–1983) Benigno Aquino trained as a lawyer, then entered politics and soon became mayor of his town, governor of the province, and then a senator. Benigno was Ferdinand Marcos’s strongest political opponent. When martial law was declared, Benigno was imprisoned for nearly eight years. After spending three years in the United States for medical reasons, he returned to Manila despite warnings that his life could be in danger; he was gunned down at the airport. His assassination gave momentum to the popular movement against the Marcos dictatorship.

Corazon Aquino (1933– ) Corazon (Cory) Aquino came from a wealthy, landowning family in Luzon. After studying in the United States, she married Benigno Aquino in 1954. Following the assassination of her husband in 1983, Cory declared her candidacy for the presidency. After the election, both sides claimed victory. When Marcos refused to step down, Cory Aquino organized mass demonstrations. Marcos was forced into exile and Aquino became the first female president of the Philippines. However, many of the reforms and improvements she had promised failed to materialize, and her tenure as president was marked by economic problems, human rights abuses, and six failed coup attempts. She did not stand for reelection in 1992.

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Defining the Nation The Philippine experience of defining the nation in the postcolonial era has thrown up a number of distinctive issues, giving rise to varying interpretations of the national idea. In developing a concept of nationalism, the Philippines has had the advantage of a large degree of ethno-cultural commonality within the population, with the Malays being the numerically preponderant, and culturally and politically dominant, ethnic group. Nevertheless, one prominent issue has been the problem of the integration of the Muslim south within the predominantly Christian nation, an issue with a long history. During the Spanish colonization, the Spaniards waged many military campaigns against Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, whose inhabitants they identified as the Moros, reflecting the earlier Spanish historical experience of domination by the Muslim Moors from northern Africa. The Spaniards achieved no lasting triumph against the Moros until the final 20 years or so of their rule, the turning point in the conflict coming with the advent of new military technology, notably in the form of steam gunboats. Nevertheless, the south was never completely subdued, and guerrilla resistance never ceased. Th e south went on to become a constant problem for the American administrators in the first half of the 20th century. After independence, the Muslim south continued to pose problems of integration for all national governments. In the postcolonial period, the south has generated separatist movements, seeking independence from the Philippine nation. These movements have been more or less active, and more or less violent in their methods, in various periods. The Moro National Liberation Front was the umbrella organization for the separatist movement during much of the period under review. From the 1980s, the movement has comprised a variety of organizations, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaff, which has gained international notoriety by its strategy of kidnapping tourists. The problems of exerting effective control over the south and integrating the region within the nation have been compounded by corruption within the local administration, both civil and military, involvement of various parties and organizations in drug trafficking and extortion, and lack of resources on the part of the national government. Through enhanced links with the United States as part of the Bush administration’s War on Terror, the national government has sought to overcome its lack of military resources to bring southern separatism under central control. While the Muslim south has proved to be the greatest challenge to developing a clear and inclusive definition of the nation, it should be noted that there have been other significant issues of integration in the northern and central zones as well. One notable issue has been the bases for inclusion of the mountain peoples within the nation. These peoples, known as Igorots, live in the mountainous areas of Luzon and are of non-Malay ethnicity. This complex issue has links with factors of geographical fragmentation, ethnic diversity, language differences, religious N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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differences, inter-ethnic prejudice and intolerance, and differential access to economic opportunities.

Narrating the Nation During the postcolonial period, undoubtedly the most significant event within the national memory and national imaginary was the Philippine Revolution of 1896–1902. Even though this revolution did not succeed in achieving de facto national independence because of the intervention of the United States, Filipinos regarded it as the foundational narrative of their nation. The revolutionary era has remained central to the national psyche. The peaceful hand over of power from the American colonizers to the Filipino elite in 1946 has appeared far less glamorous or emotionally stirring. During the postcolonial period, the Philippine Revolution was frequently taken up as a theme by Filipino artists working in a variety of media. During the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, a number of novels appeared set in the revolutionary era. This was a time of rising social stress building up to the “People Power” Revolution in 1986 and the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship. It is not surprising that in the fictional works of the period comparisons and parallels were frequently drawn between the final years of Spanish rule and the Marcos regime, and between the revolution of 1896–1902 and the potential for another outbreak of popular revolutionary protest.

Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) Ferdinand Marcos trained as a lawyer and was elected to the presidency in 1965. As president, he maintained close ties with the United States, especially President Ronald Reagan. Marcos launched major military campaigns against communist insurgents and Moro rebels. After declaring martial law in 1972, by the following year he had assumed dictatorial powers with a new constitution. His regime was marked by corruption, extravagance, and human rights abuses. Opposition to Marcos united behind Corazon Aquino and Marcos was forced to flee to Hawaii, where he died in exile.

Imelda Marcos (1929– ) Imelda Marcos was a beauty queen and singer who married Ferdinand Marcos in 1954. She was actively involved in Marcos’s electoral campaigning for the presidency. When her husband became president in 1965, Imelda took a prominent part in political life. Imelda Marcos became notorious for her extravagant spending on clothes, especially her shoes. Forced to flee to Hawaii in 1986, Imelda returned to the Philippines after her husband’s death. In 1995, she was elected to the House of Representatives.

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For example, in a short work of extraordinary literary power, The Birthing of Hannibal Valdez (1984), Alfredo Navarro Salanga traces how revolution can result merely in the oppressed of today becoming the oppressors of tomorrow. Written during the Marcos regime, the novella would have prompted readers to reflect that the achievement of national independence had not reduced inequalities of power and access to resources among Filipinos. Although Salanga had been held briefly as a political prisoner during the early days of martial law in 1972, his novella was completed with financial assistance from the Cultural Center of the Philippines under the sponsorship of Imelda Marcos. As in much of the literary output of the period, the political implications of his work were never overt, but would have been clear to readers at the time. In Alfred A. Yuson’s Great Philippine Jungle Energy Café (1988), the adventures of a 19th-century millenarian rebel are interwoven with the experiences of the modern Filipino writer doing research on him. The chronology swings between the last years of Spanish rule, 1886–1898, and the era of Marcos’s domination of Philippine politics, 1968–1984, suggesting parallels between the two periods. Like Salanga’s, this work received financial support from the Cultural Center of the Philippines. This exuberant and original novel, which mixes history and fiction in an irreverent blend, concludes in the Great Philippine Jungle Energy Café, where a motley assortment of Filipino national heroes, heroines, and other historical figures, both worthy and notorious, together with representatives of other nationalities who have had an input into the Filipino national psyche, gather to drink coffee, tell stories, and have a lovely party. Another significant Filipino novel set during the revolutionary period was Linda Ty-Casper’s The Three-Cornered Sun (1979). The title an allusion to the national flag, Ty-Casper develops her story around the contrasting temperaments of the men of the Viardo family, who are taken to represent the various components of the Filipino nation, displaying a range of different attitudes and responses to the revolutionary experience. Historians have also contributed significantly to narrating the Filipino nation in the postcolonial era. Again, much of their work has focused on analyzing the revolutionary period at the turn of the 20th century, often with subtle implications for the politics of the postcolonial period. For instance, the role played by various social classes in the Philippine Revolution has been hotly debated by historians. Some have emphasized the leadership role of the educated class, the ilustrados (for example, John Schumacher), some have asserted the importance of the revolt of the masses (for example, Teodoro Agoncillo), while others have placed the emphasis on the involvement of peasants in the revolutionary outbreak (for example, Reynaldo Ileto). Renato Constantino raised questions about the appropriateness of Jose Rizal, a moderate intellectual from a relatively wealthy background, as the national hero. Constantino argued that the American colonizers had created Rizal as a suitable heroic figure in their own interests. Teodoro Agoncillo promoted the rival claims of Andres Bonifacio, the leader of the revolutionary organization that sparked off the revolution, as a national hero of plebeian origins N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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in place of the more conservative Rizal. This question resurfaced as a heated controversy in the late 1990s when an American historian, Glenn May, questioned the evidentiary basis for the claims made in favor of Bonifacio as revolutionary hero. In postcolonial Philippines, competing narratives of the nation have been strongly contested in the field of historiography.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During both the American colonization and the postcolonial period, Filipino political thought and behavior have been influenced by the persistent idea that their national revolution was as yet unfinished. The Philippine Revolution of 1896–1902 was seen as unfinished because of American intervention followed by a second colonization. The achievement of independence in 1946 was regarded as unfinished because of binding American economic and military ties. As the Marcos dictatorship gathered oppressive momentum in the 1970s, the idea that the creation of a democratic and independent nation-state had not yet been fully achieved gained popular currency. The belief that further revolutionary activity on the part of the people was required to realize that goal became a basis for popular political mobilization in the “People Power” Revolution of 1986. In February 1986, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos of all social classes came out onto the streets to protest against the Marcos dictatorship and demand regime change. This popular upsurge is often called the “EDSA Revolution” from the name of the broad road through Manila where the protestors gathered: the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, usually referred to simply as EDSA. As noted above, literary fiction and historiography played important roles in the creation of an ethos of continuing revolution. The propaganda movement against Marcos, often seen by Filipinos as a reenactment of that leading up to the 1896 revolutionary outbreak, was driven by intellectuals and students and promoted by such means as the dissemination of alternative histories and biographies; gaining control over school and university texts and courses; publication of magazine and journal articles; presentation of conferences, speeches, and debates; mass distribution of pamphlets and leaflets; and creation of mass organizations, especially among youth and students. The resurgence of nationalism leading up to the EDSA Revolution was propelled to a large extent by an organized youth movement. It should also be emphasized that Filipino women played a prominent role in EDSA. Indeed, women were Cory Aquino’s initial power base. Another significant factor promoting the mobilization of the populace in 1986 was support for the popular protest from the Catholic Church. In Manila the Catholic archbishop, Cardinal Jaime Sin, called residents out onto the streets to join the demonstrations, thus reinserting the church into the national movement. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Celebrating the overthrow of President Ferdinand Marcos, February 1986. (Reuters/Corbis)

Despite a relatively high degree of ethnic uniformity, the Philippines, since independence, faced significant problems of integration. The issues of the Muslim south and the highland Igorots have been outlined above. Since independence, the new nation has had to face the problems of geographical fragmentation, with the consequent obstacles to communications and transportation. One result of fragmentation, differences in language within the archipelago, has also caused significant issues, with more than 90 different languages and dialects being spoken. Pilipino, based on Tagalog, one of the local languages of Luzon, and English were adopted as the national languages. When independence was gained in 1946, the national economy was at an extremely low ebb because of the run down of infrastructure during the Japanese occupation followed by intensive bombing during the Allied liberation. Since independence, the economy has continued to develop only slowly. More than 40 percent of the population live below the poverty line. Many Filipinos are forced to work overseas and remit part of their income home. The country’s main natural resources include timber, petroleum, and minerals, such as cobalt, nickel, copper, silver, and gold. Forty-five percent of total production remains agricultural. The population is approximately 97 million. The rate of population increase is relatively high, unemployment is high at over 10 percent, and there is a markedly unequal distribution of income. Other problems encountered in building prosperity have been the prevalence of administrative corruption and nepotism, and the political obstacles that have limited all attempts to redistribute land. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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main trading partners are the United States and Japan. The Philippines was less severely impacted by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 than its neighbors in Southeast Asia, partly because of remittances from overseas workers. The vicissitudes of the relationship with the United States, the Philippines’ former colonizer and by the late 20th century the dominant global power, have deeply influenced the development of the new nation. Attempts to ameliorate economic dependence have been only partly successful. Some gains have been made, such as the removal of American military bases. During the whole postcolonial period, especially during the Magsaysay era and, most saliently, the Marcos period, the United States has exerted continuing influence on the politics of the Philippines. Despite all the obstacles, nevertheless, the historical trajectory of the nation from 1945 to 1990 demonstrated the commitment of the Filipino people to progressive ideals of democracy and independence. Selected Bibliography Constantino, R. 1975. The Philippines: A Past Revisited. Quezon City, Philippines: R. Constantino. Doran, C. 2001. “Behind the Lines: Women in the History and Literature of the Philippine Revolution.” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies 7, no. 3: 7–30. Fast, J. 1973. “Imperialism and Bourgeois Dictatorship in the Philippines.” New Left Review no. 78 (March–April): 69–96. Fry, H. T. 1973. A History of the Mountain Province. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day. Gowing, P. G. 1988. Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day. Guerrero, A. 1971. Philippine Society and Revolution. Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao. Ileto, R. C. 1986. Critical Questions on Nationalism: A Historian’s View. Manila, Philippines: De La Salle University Press. Ileto, R. C. 1998. Filipinos and Their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Krinks, P., ed. 1987. The Philippines Under Aquino. Canberra: Australian Development Studies Network. Mijares, P. 1976. The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. San Francisco, CA: Union Square. San Juan Jr., E. 2000. After Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippines–United States Confrontations. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Santiago, L. Q. 1995. “Rebirthing Babaye: The Women’s Movement in the Philippines.” In The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women’s Movements in Global Perspective, edited by A. Basu, 110–128. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Taiwan Stéphane Corcuff Chronology 50,000–15,000 BC Changbin culture, earliest human trace found to date on Taiwan. 1430 Chinese sailors set foot temporarily on the island (Taiwan) after a shipwreck. 1557 Portuguese sailing to Japan see the island, and name it “Ilha Formosa.” 1593, 1620, 1874 Repeated official Japanese expeditions to the island. 1624–1681 Dutch colonization. Chinese economic migrants flood in and start settling. 1661 Ming loyalist and pirate Zheng Chenggong expels the Dutch and seizes Taiwan. 1683 Shi Lang obtains the last Zheng king’s allegiance to the Manchu throne. 1684 Though hesitant, Manchu emperor Kangxi decides to integrate Taiwan into his empire. 1684–1895 The Chinese colonize the plains; there are frequent ethnic feuds and rebellions. 1885 Taiwan elevated to the status of province of the Manchu (Qing) empire. 1895 Sino-Japanese War. Taiwan ceded to Japan. Taiwanese establish a brief republic. 1895–1945 Japanese colonial rule. Rapid economic development and social progress. 1945 Military occupation by the Republic of China (ROC) troops as decided by Gen. MacArthur. 1945 Taiwan is elevated to the status of province of the Republic of China. 1947 An island-wide rebellion is crushed by the Chinese army; suppression of the elite. 1949 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is founded. Fall of the ROC government, which takes refuge in Taiwan. 1951 San Francisco Treaty. Japan declares the end of its sovereignty over Taiwan. 1952 ROC-Japan Peace Treaty. 1971 The UN General Assembly unseats the ROC as the representative of China. 1975 Chiang K’ai-shek dies; Chiang Ching-kuo becomes president; dies in 1988. 1988 Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, a reformist native Taiwanese, is sworn in. 1990–2000 Lee Teng-hui leads the democratization and nativization of the regime. 1995 President Lee Teng-hui quasi-officially visits the United States of America. 1996 China tries to oppose Lee’s reelection. Missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. 2000–2008 Moderate pro-independence policy led by minority president Chen Shui-bian.

Situating the Nation Where is the nation, and what is or should be the identity of the state? These have probably been the two underlying questions of most contemporary political debates in Taiwan since the early 1990s. The answers are embedded in the contested status of the island, in its history, and in the political psychology of its ethnic groups. The island of Taiwan, or Ilha Formosa (the “Beautiful Island,” in Portuguese), is presently ruled by the Republic of China (ROC)—founded in 1912 in Nanjing, and now reduced to the island. This rule is contested, although in different N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ways—both by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), founded in Beijing in 1949, and by Taiwan’s radical pro-independence movements—on three fundamental issues: history, international status, and belonging. At the end of World War II, the ROC, then the master of mainland China, received from General MacArthur the mandate to accept Japan’s instrument of surrender on Taiwan and to militarily occupy the island before a peace treaty could formalize the termination of Japan’s sovereignty. Formosa had been a possession of the Japanese for 50 years, since the end of the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, when the Manchus, who had ruled Taiwan for the previous 200 years, ceded the island by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In December 1943, at Cairo, U.S. president Roosevelt, Chinese president Chiang K’ai-shek, and British premier Churchill had discussed the idea that “territories stolen from China” by Japan should be retroceded, once Japan was defeated. The question of Taiwan was discussed during the closed-door talks, but the United Kingdom initially opposed its mention in the announcement to the press that followed the meeting, which resulted in the so-called Cairo Declaration, often misperceived as a written, legal document. However, the declaration by the press N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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attachés did include a mention of Taiwan and the neighboring Pescadores Islands. Consequently, two years later in 1945, Chiang K’ai-shek considered the military occupation of Taiwan as a genuine and legitimate retrocession of Formosa to China, immediately turning the island into a province of the Republic. Yet the clarification of Taiwan’s status and the recognition in international law of the ROC’s legitimate control over the island was still pending. It became all the more urgent when, in 1949, the Communists’ PRC was founded, forcing the Nationalists to retreat to the island province. The 1952 peace treaty between Japan and the ROC, now de facto reduced to Taiwan, cancelled all treaties previously signed between China and Japan. With the implicit denunciation of the 1895 treaty, the formal retrocession was finally enacted, and it was made in favor of the one Chinese state signing the treaty, the ROC, which had survived on the island, officially preparing to recover the mainland from “Communist bandits” who, on their side, were preparing for the “liberation” of the island. Meanwhile, immediately after the relocation to Taiwan of the central Nationalist government in 1949, the new PRC regime declared that the ROC was now defunct. Formosa was to be incorporated into the PRC territory, since the PRC was viewed as the ultimate beneficiary of the so-called 1945 Retrocession of an island now declared to be “part of China since ancient ages.” Caught in the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan became a political stake, a prize to keep or to get. During the following decades, this would prevent Formosan identity from expressing itself free from the interferences of the political competition between Nationalists and Communists and its geopolitical consequences.

Pre-communist leader of China and then long-time ruler of Taiwan, Chiang K’ai-shek and his Nationalist Party supporters were forced to flee the mainland for Taiwan in 1949 by Mao Zedong and his communist forces. Chiang ruled Taiwan until his death in 1975. (Library of Congress)

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Instituting the Nation The two Chinese governments tried to monopolize the discourse over Taiwan’s history, status, and belonging with a noticeable dislike for the island’s aboriginal tribes (between 2 and 3 percent of the present-day population), some of which (the plain aborigines) had already been assimilated, and the others (the mountain aborigines) were still regarded as half savage. None of them had ever been considered as valuable historiographical “material”: in the Sino-centrist worldview, the history of Taiwan had merely started the day the Chinese started to colonize it, even though the first trace of human history in Taiwan was 10 times older than the Chinese civilization itself. For the Nationalists, stressing that Taiwan was indisputably part of China and had been so since a vague “ancient times” was crucial to show that they were not a government-in-exile, and to legitimize their “re-Sinicization” of the island, after 50 years of Japanese rule. For the Communists, the same discourse on history and Chineseness served a new claim over an island that Mao Zedong, back in the 1930s, could hardly situate on a map, and for which the Chinese Communist Party had expressed the desire that it would one day become an independent country, freed of its Japanese masters. A myth was born, that of Taiwan’s undisputable Chineseness, and of the island being a part of China “since ancient ages.” A simple knowledge of Taiwan’s history could easily dispel such a myth. In May 1684, Taiwan was loosely integrated into the Chinese empire after months during which Emperor Kangxi had considered selling the island—which had just been cleared of its anti-Manchu rebels, the Zhengs (1661–1683)—to its original colonial masters, the Dutch, who had created Taiwan’s first government, under colonialism, and ruled part of the plains between 1624 and 1661. “Taiwan,” Emperor Kangxi had written before changing his mind, “is an insignificant piece of land. Obtaining it doesn’t bring any advantage, not obtaining it will not do any harm.” Taiwan had been finally integrated and colonized, but never benefited from any developmental policy until the last decade of Chinese rule on Taiwan. The 212 years of Manchu rule had been a history of corruption, mismanagement, ethnic feuds, and rebellions against the rulers. And before the end of World War II, after decades of Japanese rule on the island, no one in China really cared about Taiwan, which was far away beyond the sea. The discourse on Taiwan’s “Chineseness” was created for legitimization purposes during the pivotal years of 1945–1949. In asserting Taiwan’s Chineseness, the question of what it means to be Chinese was eluded. Discussing it could expose one to dangerous consequences. No alternative discourse would be tolerated about Taiwan’s history, status, and identity. After World War II, “instituting the nation” in a Taiwan ruled by the Chinese Nationalists was a matter of reconstructing a Chinese nationality for Taiwan and of eradicating any idea of a Taiwanese nation. To the Nationalists, Taiwanese nationalism could lead to the independence of Taiwan, which would mean the extinction of the ROC. It was a matter of survival. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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As dissidence was fiercely suppressed at home, the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) started to organize abroad, mainly in Japan, the United States, and some European states. Official discourses about Taiwan’s status and identity were contested by intellectuals opining that Taiwan was now ruled by a new colonial (and dictatorial) government; that the legality of the ROC’s rule over Taiwan was disputable (to say nothing of the PRC’s claim to rule the island); and that Taiwanese identity had long since evolved into a culture distinct from China’s.

Defining the Nation Different policies were used to implement the official discourse on Taiwan’s Chineseness: the promotion of a language new to the Taiwanese, Mandarin; the extensive use of school textbooks; the control of the media; the promotion of Chinese culture; and the severe limitation on the use of Taiwanese languages (Minnan, Hakka, and Aboriginal languages) and expression of local cultures. Such policies could not but strongly impact Formosans’ identification processes and their discourse regarding the island’s history, its status, and its identity or belonging. As a result, when democratization was launched in the 1990s by the first native president, Dr. Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000), most people needed time to distance themselves from the teachings of the political socialization that had shaped their minds for four decades. Because it was liberalizing Taiwanese society, democratization in the 1990s paved the way for the identity debate, which instantly resurfaced. A passionate introspection movement blossomed, and people dared again to ask the question of where the nation was and who they were. But defining this new nation was no easy task: if President Lee managed to reduce drastically the political and military influence of the mainlander-dominated establishment of the Nationalist

Dr. Lee Teng-hui Dr. Lee Teng-hui was a Taiwanese statesman, born in 1923. He was educated in colonial Taiwan, in Japan, and in the United States. Chosen in 1984 by Chiang Ching-kuo to be his vice-president, Lee succeeded him in 1988, was elected president of the ROC in 1990, and was reelected in 1996 during a missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. With rare political intelligence, he managed to peacefully democratize and Taiwanize a mainlander-dominated, prounification ROC inherited from the Chinese civil war. Under constant pressure from China, confronted with an unceasing political opposition from the Nationalist Party’s powerful conservative faction, often misunderstood by media, Teng-hui totally redesigned Taiwan’s polity and shaped the form of moderate, inclusive nationalism that has become mainstream; he can be viewed as one of the most prominent figures in Taiwanese history.

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At the 2004 Festival of Taiwanese Cultures in Taipei, where the public is invited to express itself, one attendant illustrated how the political conundrum and Chinese military pressure polarize love and hate (“Taiwan (heart) / China (skull and crossbones) out!”). (Stéphane Corcuff)

regime, the promoters of the Chinese nation managed to retain, throughout the process, influential political positions, a legislative majority, and a pervasive influence over the printed and electronic media. A conflict quickly developed over differing versions of Taiwan’s history, status, and belonging, without showing signs of appeasement. Under Lee’s presidency, the questions to be discussed were numerous. School textbooks had to be changed, adopting a more Taiwanese-centered point of view to foster individuals’ identification to Taiwan. It consisted, for instance, in showing that the island was inserted into the center of world trade in Asia well before China took possession of it. The issue of what it means to be “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” was reopened by Taiwanese intellectuals: it was in fact at the heart of the debate. Could people be ethnically or culturally Chinese, while being at the same time politically or civically Taiwanese? The debate naturally extended to the future of Taiwan, with the claim that the status quo or a “future unification,” even with a democratized China, should not be the only two possible options, excluding self-determination and the creation of a Taiwanese Republic. The questions of ethnicity and the nation were inevitably raised. Is it possible to assert the existence of a Taiwanese nation? If so, to when could it be dated back, and if not, is it legitimate to build one and how? Central to the question of the viability of any nation-building was the issue of how to associate Taiwan’s mainlanders with the process of creating a state or a nation, or both, as it was clear that nothing could be peacefully achieved without their consent. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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By the end of the 1990s, Taiwan had already become a laboratory of identities, where not only a new Taiwanese identity was discussed and started to be elaborated, but also where a new way to be Chinese was envisioned—by separating “race” and governance, or ethnicity and civic identification. The intellectual maturity of the debate only contrasted with its rapid politicization. Each move by some to further Taiwanize the state and society was inevitably criticized by the others as a policy of “de-Sinicization.” The promoters of the Chinese nation, disoriented and afraid, were forgetting that Taiwanization was simply a response to decades of acculturation under a regime that had promoted a form of idealized Chinese culture, largely foreign to the island’s local culture—and to most of the refugee population itself, which was coming from every little local corner of China. The spatial dimension of the nation was not easy to define either. Both Lee Teng-hui and his successor, Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), of the former opposition Democratic Progressive Party, were presidents of the ROC. In spite of their declared inclination toward a Taiwanese nation, they remained constrained by Taiwan’s “constitutional deadlock”: no such move as redrawing the “national boundaries,” which so far had remained officially those of the ROC, and which constitutionally encompassed the mainland, could be made. Changing this would mean making the reduction of the ROC to Taiwan official. For the pro-unification camps in Taiwan and China this would be the equivalent of so-called Taiwan independence. However, much has been done within these political limits. Unofficial military, administrative, security, and economic boundaries, both maritime and aerial, have been discreetly drawn in the Taiwan Strait, with the Chinese part being sometimes unofficially advised of it. The government of the Province of Taiwan, with jurisdiction over 60 percent of the total population administered by the ROC, was “suspended.” The question of the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu remain a complex issue, with some pro-independence diehards convinced that the nation doesn’t encompass those islands “inserted” into China’s coast and that they are too costly to defend. All other offshore islands, the Penghus, in the Taiwan Strait, and the islets in the Pacific Ocean, were more commonly viewed as belonging naturally to this emerging nation. Taiwan, as an island, seemed to have a “natural boundary.” This became obvious when 400 years of ambiguities and misunderstandings between the two sides of the strait started to be reexamined by historians, demonstrating that this geographical separation had incarnated itself into the evident, political boundary of an “Island Nation.”

Narrating the Nation If any nation needs the mythology, or the narrated reality, of a foundation, the “February 28 Incident” was the perfect historical milestone for Taiwan. This 1947 N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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massacre indeed provoked a dramatic shift in Taiwan’s political situation, acting instantly as a brutal psychological divorce between the native Taiwanese and the Chinese regime, which had come to be seen by Taiwanese as yet another colonial master, who was worse than the Japanese one without compare. But this time, it was no ethnically foreign regime. It was China, the country that had most influenced Taiwan’s culture and ethnicity from 1624 (when permanent Chinese immigration began under the Dutch) to 1895 (when China gave Taiwan away to Japan); and a “motherland” that the Taiwanese had been, in 1945, happy to join again after 50 years of estrangement. The “February 28 Incident” was in every sense a founding massacre, the birth certificate of Taiwan’s independence movement, which soon developed abroad into an initial form of anti-Chinese, anti-“Chiang K’ai-shek’s clique,” promoting the “Independence of Taiwan”—not from the PRC of course, which did not rule Formosa, but from the ROC on Taiwan. The “February 28 Incident” was the most sensitive taboo for 50 years. Any important move on the national identity question (whether simply a reconciliation between mainlanders and Taiwanese, or the start of a nation-building movement) needed to end this taboo. In 1995, President Lee, in his capacity as Taiwanese president of the ROC, presented to the Formosans, in the name of the State, the first official apologies and had February 28 turned into a new day of commemoration. It was the first on the calendar of the ROC that remembered an event not experienced by the mainland Chinese before the 1949 separation, the first one that the Taiwanese experienced alone. Commemorations of the “February 28 Incident” within civil society, which had been held regularly since the start of democratization, obtained recognition, enshrined in a memorial in Taipei. The “2.28 Peace Memorial” became the first memorial of the Taiwanese nation. However, narrating the nation in Taiwan quickly ran up against the impossibility of the nation, as no consensus existed on these issues. Most often, mainlanders interpreted these moves as directed against them. In addition, any unilateral dec-

The “228 Event” This 1947 event could be seen as the founding massacre of a Taiwanese nation. De facto reunified with China in 1945, Taiwan was about 20 years ahead of China in terms of socioeconomic development, and yet the Taiwanese were happy to return to the motherland. However, months of economic depredation by a new, notoriously incompetent Chinese government on the island, determined to exclude local Taiwanese from the administration, dispelled their illusions. A rebellion quickly started in Taipei after a policeman beat a woman for selling cigarettes on the black market; the rebellion spread instantly to other cities throughout Taiwan. While the governor was buying time, pretending to “listen to the grievances” of the Taiwanese elite, troops were secretly sent as reinforcements from the mainland, and finally crushed the rebellion with terrible bloodshed (an estimated 10,000–20,000 victims). The “228” sealed the psychological divorce between the native Taiwanese and China.

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laration of a Taiwanese Republic was unfeasible politically, insofar as President Chen Shui-bian never got a legislative majority sufficient to pass radical changes to the Constitution. Lastly, the geopolitical constraint remained: China claimed it would attack Taiwan if such changes were made. As a result, one nation has not replaced the other; instead, two nations started, in the 1990s, to intertwine: the ROC, fading away, and the Taiwanese, being promoted within the framework of the official title of the regime and its constitutional boundaries. Such is the constitutional deadlock constraining Taiwanese nationalism: the difficulty of changing the constitutional name of the country from the Republic of China to the (Republic of) Taiwan, because of political and geopolitical factors—a determined opposition from the mainlanders, the Chinese military threat, and, as a result, a hesitant Taiwanese society, and no legislative majority supporting the nationbuilding movement.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Collective memory in Taiwan has been deeply divided since the arrival of the last wave of Chinese immigrants between 1945 and 1955. The division in the collective memory finds its origin in the role of political psychology in the building of ethnicity. The Nationalists crossed the Taiwan Strait in 1949 with a refugee population of approximately 1 million civilians and military, fleeing the Communists in a traumatic condition. Most of these mainlanders long denied the Taiwanese any specific identity, encouraged by the official policy of “re-Sinicization” of Taiwan. Both the government and the mainlanders suspected those “fellow Chinese” of having been brainwashed by the Japanese. The native population, for its part, soon began to see them as invaders supporting a dictatorial regime—with its imminent defeat on the continent, the Republic had indeed declared a state of emergency and severely curbed civic freedoms. All those resentments were already strong when the Nationalists moved to Taiwan two years after the February 28, 1947, massacre. Prejudices in the perception only grew deeper as it became a taboo to discuss ethnicity, collective memory, identity, and the “February 28 Incident.” As they permeated the mindsets of both populations, they initiated two sets of world views: Important events that would happen in Taiwan in the following decades, experienced by both populations at the same time, would be interpreted sometimes very differently. It would be later known as “a Chinese consciousness” as opposed to a “Taiwanese consciousness,” mind-sets where identification with China or Taiwan prevailed without, in most cases, making the other totally disappear. If not everyone has an opinion about the complex issues of the existence of a Taiwanese nation and the Chineseness of Formosa, the most opinionated people in Taiwan vehemently contest each other’s positions. On one side are the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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promoters of a Taiwanese nation who are convinced that Taiwan is culturally distinct from China; on the other side are those who deny the possibility that a Taiwanese nation could ever exist because the Taiwanese are of Chinese ancestry and are deeply attached to an ROC rescued from history. Countless positions between these two poles constituted the richness of Taiwan’s debate on nation and nationalism. Mobilizing the nation, in such a context, has proved a particularly difficult challenge. The division of collective memory and the opposition between Chinese and Taiwanese “consciousnesses” have led to radically opposed interpretations of what has been going on since the 1990s. What the nation builders who reached supreme power, presidents Lee and Chen, tried to do during the 20 years that followed the death of the last mainlander president in 1988 was to invent a modern, moderate, and inclusive Taiwanese nationalism. This meant abandoning as much as possible the old political myths and symbols of the regime, within the limits of Taiwan’s constitutional deadlock; removing all limitations on the identity debate (a policy consubstantial to the democratization process); indigenizing national curricula; and promoting local culture. At the same time, it was proposed (by President Lee) that the mainlanders join the Taiwanese in forming a “new Taiwanese people,” and decided (by President Chen) that Mandarin Chinese, being the only language understandable by every community on the island, would remain the only national language and prevail over other choices (like changing to the local Minnan language) promoted by more radical pro-independence movements (Chen Shui-bian). Such ideas, however, never got support from the mainstream mainlander population. The mainlanders had indeed been, until the democratization and the nativization of the regime, in the situation of being a minority (about 13 percent of the population), coming from abroad and being strongly overrepresented in the ROC state—in other words, in a quasi-colonial situation. The rank-and-file soldiers and powerless mainlanders were certainly not often living in enviable socioeconomic conditions, and this exiled population had found relief in a colonial state that was monopolizing all powers, reimposing Chinese culture on Taiwan, and cracking down on pro-Taiwan independence movements. Inevitably, they were unprepared when a Taiwanese rose to the presidency and reversed such policies. The “Taiwanese ascendancy” meant the end of their illusions and the beginning of a deep identity crisis for them, which strongly contributed to the intensity of the new century’s debates over nationalism and identity. Their identification with China, the past political socialization they had received, the military threat of the PRC, and the mobilization against the two presidents led by the former ruling party turned parliamentary opposition, made it difficult for these mainlanders to find legitimate the idea of a Taiwanese nation and the Taiwanization policies led by the native Taiwanese. They did not trust the new rulers when they said they were genuinely inviting them to join in. Not only did the mainlanders not consider this form of nationalism to be inclusive, but more N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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importantly, most did not accept as legitimate any “Taiwanese nation.” Between those whose Chinese consciousness prevails and Taiwan’s nation-builders, there is a basic absence of communicability on the questions of Taiwan’s history, status, belonging, and future: their perceptions are based on two incompatible sets of worldviews. To build the nation, the two presidents—Lee and Chen, and especially the latter, who had inherited an already democratized regime and could focus more openly on its nativization—had also to target the Taiwanese themselves and not only the mainlanders. For the native Taiwanese are reluctant to change Taiwan’s status quo as a result of the island’s constitutional deadlock and its political and geopolitical consequences. Although a vast majority of the Taiwanese now identified themselves as “Taiwanese” only (as opposed to “Chinese” only or “Taiwanese and Chinese”), and while they considered Taiwan as being their country, if not their nation, the military pressure exerted by China as well as the political feuds provoked within Taiwan by any major change on such issues, prompted most of the Taiwanese to shy away from these sensitive issues. President Chen, for both of his two terms, had been a minority president, unable to get a parliamentary majority to implement the most important reforms, especially sensitive ones. He often tried to circumvent this institutional predicament by appealing directly to the people. This was a logical response to the absence of a legislative majority as well as to the absence of a consensus within the native Taiwanese population on the question of changing the nation’s name—or at least, of giving a new constitution to Taiwan, even under the ROC name. Taiwan being a democracy, with a high frequency of elections, such a strategy was naturally revived in several major political campaigns, quickly but wrongly leading to denunciations at home and abroad of nationalist demagogy, whereas it was precisely the opposite: a moderate, inclusive nationalism unable to develop under strong constraints. However, not every sensitive issue regarding the nation is divisive in Taiwan. If the cohabitation between a legal nation, the ROC, and a real nation, Taiwan, creates much political infighting, all the players have stayed within the bounds of legality and the democratic process. Parties, in democracies, need platforms, and elections suppose boundary drawing, which, in Taiwan, constantly politicizes the opposition between a Chinese consciousness and a Taiwanese consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a consensus a minima, between the moderates in both camps, who together form the vast majority of the electorate and the politicians: the island of Taiwan has a sovereign state, called the ROC, whatever the PRC and the world may think about it, and whether this denomination should be kept or not; and Taiwan is politically, if not culturally, distinct from present-day China. Secession is thus not envisioned, for a simple reason: Taiwan is not ruled by China. And the central point under discussion in Taiwan, coming before the existence or not of a Taiwanese nation, is the identity of the state—is the ROC a Chinese state being Taiwanized, or does Taiwan already have a Taiwanese state without the right to proclaim its nation yet? In this sense, not only are there not N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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one, but several nationalisms in Taiwan (moderate and radical forms of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms), but nationalism, contrary to what a tumultuous debate agitating the island on the question of the nation may indicate, is perhaps not the central issue, if we consider Taiwan’s constitutional deadlock. Taiwan’s moderate nationalism is in fact the face, and the fate, of the (presently) impossible Taiwanese nationalism. Selected Bibliography Brown, M. 2004. Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power and Migration on Changing Identities. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ching, L. T. S. 2001. Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Corcuff, S., ed. 2002. Memories of the Future. National Identity Transition and the Search for a New Taiwan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Hsiau, A-c. 2001. Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism. New York: Routledge. Lai, T-h., R. H. Myers, and W. Wei. 1991. A Tragic Beginning. The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lee, T-h. 1999. The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity. Tokyo: PHP Institute. Makeham, J., and A-c. Hsiau. 2005. Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan. Bentuhua, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Mendell, D. 1970. The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Peng, M-m. 1972. A Taste of Freedom. Memoirs of an Independence Leader. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Rigger, S. 1999. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. New York: Routledge. Rubinstein, M. A., ed. 1999. Taiwan, A New History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Tsai, S-s. H., 2005. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Vietnam Christopher A. Airriess Chronology 111 BC–AD 939 The northern Red River valley functions as a Chinese vassal state and adopts selective Chinese cultural and political institutions. 1300s–1700s Various dynasties engage in periodic wars with China; Hanoi is established as the capital of an independent polity of Dai Viet; southern expansion includes much of present-day Vietnam. 1600s Territorial division by Trinh lords in the north and Nguyen lords in the south; Catholic missions are established. 1860s–1890s French colonial control includes Cambodia and Laos in a larger Indo-Chinese Union. 1945 Japan surrenders; Ho Chi Minh creates the National Liberation Committee of Vietnam and forms a provisional government. 1954 The French are defeated at Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh; French colonial rule ends; the Geneva Conference partitions Vietnam into north and south, and independent governments are established, led by Ho Chi Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem, respectively. 1966 The United States increases troop strength to 500,000 in South Vietnam. 1973 The United States signs the Paris Peace Accords with North Vietnam and begins to withdraw troops. 1975 North Vietnamese troops enter Saigon and Vietnam is unified one year later. 1978–1979 Vietnam invades Cambodia, overthrows Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. China briefly invades across the northern Vietnam border. 1986 Market liberalization, or doi moi, is implemented. 1989 Vietnamese troops withdraw from Cambodia. 1995 The United States restores diplomatic ties; Vietnam joins Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Situating the Nation While the present Vietnamese government describes the country’s history as one of continuity and unity, in reality, its experience has been full of conjunctures that have both exacerbated and promoted a national identity. Direct control by China for over 1,000 years was followed by northern and southern rivalries, only to be replaced by French colonial rule that heightened existing regional differences. The postcolonial period witnessed the division of north and south into two independent states in a Cold War proxy conflict, followed by a unified socialist Vietnam during the past 30 years. Vietnam’s socialist-based nationalism is being challenged as the country’s economy becomes more market oriented and globalized. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Unlike most other modern Southeast Asian countries, Chinese cultural, social, and political influences have been deep and pervasive in Vietnam. This link was first established more than 2,000 years ago when the Vietnamese people, who once occupied the most southern Chinese province of Guangdong, were pushed southward into the Red (Hong) River lowlands of northern Vietnam. In their expansion to the far south, Chinese military garrisons occupied the Red River lowlands by 111 BC and eventually came to control central Vietnam as well. Despite numerous rebellions against Chinese occupation, successive Chinese dynasties ruled this vassal state until AD 939. During this 1,000-year period, all manner of Chinese cultural and political institutions were adopted, such as Mahayana Buddhism, Chinese classical education, and most importantly, the Confucian scholarbased system of bureaucratic governance. China’s cultural impact was greatest among the Confucian bureaucratic urban elite, whereas village culture remained tied to folk cultural traditions. After throwing off their Chinese overlords in AD 939, the Ly Dynasty (1010–1225) was established, whose land encompassed Dai Viet and centered on what today is Hanoi. Despite periodic incursions by the Chinese, the Ly Dynasty was the first of many dynasties comprising the “Golden Age” of Vietnam. The Ly was replaced by the Tran Dynasty (1225–1400), centered in Thanh Hoa just south of the Red River Delta, and marked the first concerted efforts at southern expansion by gradually conquering the Indianized Champa empire. The standard historical portrayal of this expansion southward is of a northern-orchestrated process of rolling back the frontier, when in fact, territorial growth was managed by a power base in central Vietnam that was oftentimes at odds with northern rule. An excellent example of multiple political power bases engendering regional rather than national identities was the Trinh-Nguyen Wars of the 1600s. While allied to expel the rogue Mac from the Red River lowlands and claiming to be loyal to the figurehead king, the armies and navies of the respective Trinh (northern) and Nguyen (southern) lords engaged in open warfare. By the mid-1700s, the far southern Mekong Delta region (or Nam Bo, traditionally) controlled by the Khmer was finally conquered by the Nguyen. By the late 1700s, Vietnam was briefly united by the Tay Son in the south, who succeeded in conquering both the lands of the Nguyen and Trinh. Final unification, however, only came under Nguyen Phuc Anh Gia Long, who, as a member of the Nguyen noble family, established his base of power in Saigon but soon thereafter founded the royal capital at Hue in central Vietnam, which was his original homeland. As a symbol of growing Vietnamese nationalism and sense of unity, Nguyen Phuc Anh replaced the Chinese imposed name of An Nam with Vietnam (although this was short lived) and adopted the name Gia Long (the traditional name for Saigon is Gia Dinh and for Hanoi is Thang Long) to symbolically unify Vietnamese territory. The Nguyen Dynasty lasted until 1945. After the 1858 landing of French forces in Danang, the Nguyen royal court in Hue ceded southern Vietnam (Cochin China) to the French as a colony in 1862, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and by 1885, the north (Tonkin) and central region (Annam) became protectorates. By 1893, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were administratively formed as French Indochina. As a formal colony, Cochin China in the south experienced greater and more direct Western influences when compared with the protectorates of the central and northern regions. Nevertheless, knowing that some Annamese elite possessed a vision of a greater Annam and Confucian-centered civilizing mission, the French used Annamese as civil servants and merchants throughout Indochina in what might be referred to as a form of domestic colonialism. After the defeat of the Japanese during World War II, the French returned in an attempt to reclaim its Asian colonial empire, but they met resistance in the north by the nationalist Viet Minh, founded in 1941 by Ho Chi Minh to resist the Japanese occupation. Despite Ho proclaiming an independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, with the abdicated Bao Dai, the last Nguyen emperor, as an advisor, he signed the ambiguous Franco-Vietnamese Agreement of 1946, which stated that Vietnam was to become a free state within the larger French Union with the continued presence of French troops. Other nationalist groups were sharply critical of the agreement. Because of the agreement’s ambiguity and because of continued skirmishes between Viet Minh and French military forces in the north, the First Indochina War (1946–1954) broke out and ended with a French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. France’s colonial rule ended with the signing of the 1954 Geneva Conference that partitioned Vietnam into north and south at the 17th parallel. In the south, the Roman Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem came to power after abolishing the monarchy of Emperor Bao Dai, who was exiled to Paris. Elections for national assemblies were held in both the north and the south, but in the south these elections were hijacked by Diem and the U.S. government for fear of a Communist victory. In a classic Cold War “proxy” conflict, the Soviet Union backed North Vietnam and the United States formally allied themselves with the South Vietnamese government; this marked the beginning of the Second Indochina War. Due to increased resistance to Diem’s dictatorial rule by the Buddhist Hoa Hao and the syncretic Cao Dai religious sect, plus the territorial gains of the southern-based

Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963) Ngo Dinh Diem was the first president of South Vietnam (1955–1963). His early adult life was spent as a colonial French provincial governor, and in 1955, he won a fraudulent election against Emperor Bao Dai for the presidency of South Vietnam. Backed by the U.S. government, he was a conservative Catholic and staunch anticommunist nationalist who became unpopular among the Buddhist majority and others because of his authoritarian manner and pro-Catholic policies. Increased popular protests because of the mass jailing of dissidents, many of whom were Buddhist monks, led to his overthrow and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–backed assassination by South Vietnamese army generals.

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Vietnam War (1956–1973) The Vietnam War was also known by the Vietnamese Communists as the American War. The U.S. government began sending military advisors to South Vietnam in 1956, and by 1969, some 500,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed in the south. Gradual control by the Communist Viet Minh in the south led to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, which marked the beginning of the withdrawal of the U.S. military. The final withdrawal of the United States came in April 1975, with a frantic evacuation from Saigon.

North Vietnamese Viet Cong guerilla army, the U.S. government gave its blessings to South Vietnamese generals to overthrow and assassinate Diem in 1963. To bolster the new Nguyen Van Thieu–led government, the United States began bombing North Vietnam and, by 1966, sent almost 500,000 troops to South Vietnam. With the increased disillusionment in the United States toward the continued success of the Viet Cong, the U.S. government signed the Paris Peace Accords with the North Vietnamese government in 1973. American military withdrawal, demoralized South Vietnamese troops, and a well-organized North Vietnamese army eventually led to the liberation of Saigon by North Vietnamese military forces in 1975 and the establishment of the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976.

Saigon falls to the North Vietnamese, 1975. (Françoise de Mulder/Corbis)

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The government then set about establishing a socialist state through nationalizing industry and collectivizing agriculture. Vietnam invaded and occupied eastern Cambodia during 1978–1989, and in response, Chinese troops briefly crossed the Vietnamese border in 1979 in what is known as the Third Indochina War. After a decade of poor economic performance, the national economy became more market oriented, predicated on a philosophy of doi moi, or “renovation,” that has led to a more globalized economy based primarily on foreign investment. In response, economic growth rates were some of the highest in the world. Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 to improve regional trade prospects, and a bilateral trade agreement was signed with the United States in 2001. While most regions benefited from foreign investment, it was the south that attracted the lion’s share of investment. Although poverty rates declined, unemployment remained high, especially in rural areas. Nevertheless, Vietnam remains, along with China, Cuba, and North Korea, one of the handful of states ideologically wedded to communism. Still controlled by the old guard, the authoritarian political system continues to censor the media and punishes outspoken religious leaders. This situation will only change with a newer and younger group of leaders.

Instituting the Nation Perhaps the first period in which there emerged a sense of national identity was during the Ly Dynasty (1010–1225), the first time in which Vietnam was relatively free of Chinese political domination. While the sense of national identity anchored in being anti-Chinese was strong among the elite, rural-based society no doubt was less politically engaged in their isolated villages. Resistance against China anchored a sense of national identity, but it must be recognized that Chinese institutions, such as Confucianism and political dynasties, were borrowed from its northern neighbor.

Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) Ho Chi Minh was the father of the socialist revolution, statesmen, and the founder of the Viet Minh. He spent much of his young adult life in France, the Soviet Union, and China where he was introduced to nationalist and communist ideology. As Vietnam’s most celebrated national hero, he was commonly viewed not as a stern father but as a kinder “Uncle Ho.” His body is embalmed and on display at a Hanoi mausoleum modeled after Lenin’s tomb in Moscow. Like Mao in China, statues and framed pictures continue to be found throughout public and private spaces in Vietnam, which attests to his cultlike status.

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As in many colonial possessions, the first true and inclusive modern Vietnamese national identity emerged during the late colonial period with the formation of the Viet Minh in 1941. As is true in many colonial possessions with native communist movements, the Viet Minh’s origins were ideologically communist, but were decidedly nationalistic in nature. Indeed, its name is an abbreviation of the “League for the Independence of Vietnam” and possessed members with no communist leanings; two of Ho Chi Minh’s most famous political quotes are “I only follow one party: the Vietnamese party” and “It was patriotism, not communism, that inspired me.” The Viet Minh, however, did encounter strong opposition to a socialist-based independence movement from noncommunist nationalists. The Viet Minh’s 1954 victory at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu only solidified this growing nationalist movement. This Soviet-inspired and rural-based Communist Party of Vietnam became a successful anchor for promoting national pride and identity and was in part more successful when compared to China because Vietnamese socialist ideology was less strident on such issues as class warfare, the purging of intellectuals, and the persecution of landlords. This in part explains why the Communist Party of Vietnam was able to facilitate market-oriented reforms based on “market socialism” in the mid-1980s, with less opposition when compared with China.

Ho Chi Minh founded the Indochina Communist Party in 1930 and was president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 1945 to 1969. (Library of Congress)

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Defining the Nation Like so many other Southeast Asian states, nationalism was often framed with reference to external threat. Despite the deep Sinicization of the Vietnamese ruling class, the “Golden Age” of Vietnamese dynasties, when Chinese control waned, marked the origins of Vietnam’s “national essence” because of the switch from being East Asian– to Southeast Asian–centered. This new orientation only increased with the conquering of Champa lands to the south. While upland ethnic groups were digested into this expanding lowland-based empire, the definition of being Vietnamese was promoted based on a shared common culture, historical heritage, and language. Nationalism, of course, was given greater motive force because Vietnam lost its independence for some 150 years during the period of French colonialism, the Japanese occupation during World War II, and the military engagement with the United States. Throughout much of Vietnam’s history, there also existed conflicting definitions of national identity, particularly between northern and southern regions. The early 1600s’ southern Nguyen government, for example, formed a cosmopolitan government that included Siamese, Khmers, Chams, and Malays. This far southern base is commonly viewed as the ascendancy of the south over the northern heartland; however, it is best viewed as one of many regions—no less authentic nor less Vietnamese than the north—that through time contributed to a larger national identity. While a national identity has always been assumed to be northern-centered, the southern Nguyen perceived themselves as being more freedom loving, moral, and self-confident, and less bound to tradition, when compared with the corrupt, Mandarinized institutional culture of the northern Trinh. Indeed, the villages of the north have traditionally been more communalist, whereas those in the south have been characterized as more individualistic. A unified national identity based on a Viet Minh–centered independence movement was also obviated because of differing natures of French colonial administration. Unlike the central and northern regions where a Confucian culture endured under protectorate status, direct rule in the south cultivated a Westernoriented Vietnamese elite, a Chinese capitalist class, and the vociferously anticommunist Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, which were far more resistant to a Viet Minh nationalist ideology than the population in the north. Nevertheless, northern nationalists of various political persuasions were able to solidify a sense of Vietnamese nationalism during 1920–1950 through the appropriation of the name Vietnam. Although the French colonial government demanded that their possession be called Annam or Indochina by all subjects, the name Vietnam was increasingly being used by nationalists as a form of ethnocultural and patriotic vocabulary. By the end of World War II, no longer did nationalist refer to the colonial names of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China. Even the Indo-Chinese Communist Party changed it’s name to the Vietnamese Workers N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Party in 1951, despite the urging of the Comintern (an internationalist Communist organization) to keep Laos and Cambodia part of a larger revolutionary struggle.

Narrating the Nation Construction of narratives was primarily a project of the elite and often deployed ancient historical events or anticolonial sentiments to mold a distinctive Vietnamese cultural identity. In addition to the many literary elite who published newspapers and periodicals, nationalism narratives during the mid-1900s primarily originated from the Communist Party of Vietnam in the north, who attempted to build a national identity by conflating nationalism and communism based on premodern national heroes, cultural institutions, and external threats; assimilating premodern culture into a postrevolutionary context was a great concern. When the Indo-Chinese Communist Party’s Standing Committee met in 1943, for example, they discussed not only economic and political issues but also cultural ones. One example of deploying national heroes is that of the Trung sisters who valiantly organized armies to fight off the Chinese between AD 40 and 43, but ultimately failed. Vietnamese families often had statues of the Trung sisters at home, and an evolving communist ideology appropriated them as examples of the importance of participating in struggles against foreign invaders, in this case Americans, and also dovetailed with the suffrage goals of the revolution. Northern nationalist ideology also conflated traditional communal village life with revolutionary goals. This was in part accomplished because with their Confucian culture backgrounds, revolutionary leaders were predisposed to the twin self-reinforcing ideologies of Confucianism and communism that included the cultivation of individual morality, the importance of community over the individual, and the culture of political indoctrination. Revolutionaries attempted to add to and secularize traditional religious village festivals to create new village “meetings” that promoted increased rice production, military enlistment, and attention to the critical role of national heroes in the national consciousness. Linked to village life was its basic communal psychology, based on the family and ancestor worship; family ancestral altars were simply transformed into altars of national heroes that, in turn, symbolically meant that all Vietnamese were imagined as possessing a shared ancestry. Referring to Ho Chi Minh as “Uncle Ho,” for example, reoriented identities from the family to the state. For several reasons, the construction of alternative nationalistic narratives in the south was far more difficult when compared with the north. It was difficult for southern politicians to speak of national self-determination and independence from foreign rule when the stability of the government was dependent upon American military and financial aid. In addition, the political elite were primarily drawn from the ranks of military officers who were trained at French military N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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academies and, thus, were less troubled by the foreign presence and erosion of an imagined Vietnamese culture. Nevertheless, they did learn from the northern government how to deploy narratives of recognized national heroes to construct a southern form of nationalism. For example, the “new life villages” that were constructed to resettle southern villagers displaced by U.S. military action and targeted for pacification under the U.S.-inspired “winning the hearts and minds of the people” campaign, were frequently named after the pantheon of historical “undead” national heroes. While less common in the north, various religious sects in the south provided an alternative narrative of national identity. One was the Hoa Hao, an anticolonial, anticommunist, and anti-Diem Buddhist millenarian movement of the western Mekong Delta that, in the late 1960s, claimed 18 percent of the southern population as adherents. Under conditions of greater Westernization, social inequalities, and urbanism, sect doctrine called for a return of an imperial and Confucianized moral political order and idealized the true essence of Vietnamese folk culture as being village-based. With modern socialist Vietnam experiencing rapid social change, the government is attempting to draw upon its historical and cultural past as a source of stability and national identity to legitimize its authority in the context of globalization. This is difficult, however, because much of Vietnam’s history and culture is indirectly antithetical to the socialist revolution that claims to be the torchbearer of modernization and progress. As a result, the government selectively harnesses the “positives” of Vietnam’s past, such as festivals and handicrafts, for its own ends in fashioning national identity, while disposing of “outdated” customs. Confucianism, for example, is making a comeback despite its Chinese origins and being symbolic of elitism and class; the government views the institution of Confucianism as an avenue to combat the “social evils” of Western culture by stressing the importance of the traditional family. The royal capital of Hue is being promoted as an important tourist destination, despite it functioning as a symbol of French colonialism and the feudalistic Nguyen Dynasty. Indeed, no recent governmentsanctioned and official history of the country has been written because of the contradictory nature of historical events and periods and their relationship to national identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The institutions that build a sense of national identity are many, but the most important were the central government and educational institutions. The National Assembly in the north first met in 1946 and served as an important mechanism for promoting national inclusiveness and integration. Assembly members were to represent all economic, political, social, religious, and ethnic groups, and even southerners, irrespective of party affiliation, were to assist in defining the national N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ideology. While membership was reserved for such minorities as highland ethnic groups or ethnic Chinese, over time they became marginalized and thus not part of the nation-building process. The northern National Assembly granted autonomy to tribal peoples and promised to preserve their traditional culture, but they continued to view highlanders as uncivilized and backward. This produced an informal policy of assimilation, through populating the highland with lowland Vietnamese, and tribal resettlement in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Even more aggressive “Vietnamization” assimilation policies directed toward highland ethnic groups were common in the south under Diem’s rule during the 1950s and 1960s. After unification, the government abolished the autonomous zones in 1976 and introduced lowland Vietnamese socialism into the southern highlands. In a similar vein, while ethnic Chinese were reserved representation in the National Assembly, they were in reality not part of the dialogue defining national identity; postunification discrimination resulted in the mass emigration of ethnic Chinese, especially in the south, during the 1980s because of their incompatibility with Vietnam’s socialistic ideals. As in all countries, the educational system afforded opportunities for governments to promote a nationalist identity. Much like the utilization of villages to inculcate a national identity, the northern government in the early 1960s decentralized education based on the hypothesis that stimulating patriotism at the national scale requires cultivating loyalties at the local, agricultural collective level. Stimulating a patriotic education involved adults telling personal stories to schoolchildren of the abuse under the feudalistic landlord system and the economic stress during the colonial period. In addition, standard academic subjects possessed an applied nature with reference to improving agricultural and industrial production to meet socialist productivity goals. A localized education to promote a nationalistic identity was supported in the south during the 1960s as well, but was constrained for various reasons. Southern middle schools, for example, eschewed any post-1940s’ indigenous literature that spoke to anticolonial themes or a war-ravaged southern population. Private elite schools that were very common in southern urban areas favored a curriculum that was French-centered and thus not geared toward cultivating a postcolonial and nationalistic consciousness. Much the same was found at universities, where administrators and faculty were still tied to colonial intellectual models. Since the implementation of doi moi policies that have opened Vietnam’s economy to the liberalized forces of globalization, the role of education in building a national identity is somewhat ambiguous. Although the Education Law of Vietnam passed by the National Assembly in the late 1990s recognizes the practical needs and realities of a university education, such as private-sector funding and a knowledge-based training, there continues to exist a strong vein of MarxismLeninist and Ho Chi Minh thought in the curricula. The government remains strident in its goals of cultivating a national identity anchored by socialist theory to combat bourgeoisie capitalism that is associated with increased globalization. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Selected Bibliography Cheung-Carter, J. 2004. “The Moral Imperative and the Politics of Confucianism in French Indochina: Vietnamese Strategies of Resistance, Appropriation and Transformation.” Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies 5, no. 2. (Retrieved December 18, 2006), http://www. hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/explore/cheung-gertler.html. Goscha, C. 1995. Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism (1887–1954). Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Jamieson, N. 1995. Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kerkvliet, B., A. Chan, and J. Unger. 1998. “Comparing the Chinese and Vietnamese Reforms: An Introduction.” The China Journal 40:1–7. Long, C. 2003. “Feudalism in the Service of the Revolution: Reclaiming Heritage in Hue.” Critical Asian Studies 35:535–558. McLeod, M. 1999. “Indigenous Peoples and the Vietnamese Revolution, 1930–1975.” Journal of World History 10:353–389. Ninh, K. 2002. A World Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary Vietnam. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pelley, P. 2002. Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Taylor, K. 1998. “Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Histories of Nation and Region.” The Journal of Asian Studies 57:949–978. Taylor, P. 2001. Fragments of the Present: Searching for Modernity in Vietnam’s South. Honolulu: Allen and Unwin and University of Hawaii Press. Tonkin, D. 1997. “Vietnam: Market Reform and Ideology.” Asian Affairs 28:187–196. Woodside, A. 1971. “Ideology and Integration in Post-Colonial Nationalism.” Pacific Affairs 44:487–510.

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Cuba Antoni Kapcia Chronology 1868 1879 1892 1895 1898 1902 1933 1934 1940 1944 1947 1952 1953 1955 1956 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1965 1967 1972 1975 1976

Start of the 10-year Guerra Grande rebellion against Spain. Start of the Guerra Chiquita rebellion. Creation of José Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC). Start of the War of Independence. U.S. military intervention and start of the U.S. military occupation. Independence. Nationalist revolution against the dictator Machado. Batista’s coup; start of a new U.S.-Cuban arrangement. Election of Batista; new Constitution. Election of Ramón Grau San Martín’s Auténtico Party. Creation of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxos), under Eduardo Chibás. (March 10) Batista’s coup. (July 26) Fidel Castro leads an attack on the Moncada barracks (Santiago de Cuba); formation of the 26th of July Movement. The Castro brothers are in exile in Mexico, where they meet Che Guevara. Invasion of Oriente on the yacht Granma; start of the Sierra Maestra campaign. (January 1) Che Guevara takes Havana. Cuban-Soviet commercial agreement; first U.S. economic sanctions; creation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). (April 17–19) Bay of Pigs invasion (Playa Girón); creation of the first single party (ORI). Cuban Missile Crisis; Cuba’s expulsion from the Organization of American States. Full U.S. economic embargo. Creation of Cuban Communist Party (CCP); start of “moral economy.” Death of Guevara. Cuba joins Comecon, the Socialist Bloc’s trading organization. First Congress of the Communist Party. Constitution of the revolution.

Situating the Nation Although nationalism was late to develop in Cuba, the question of national identity has been the central theme of Cuban political debate since the moment, in the early 19th century, when Cuba, almost alone in Spanish America, remained a Spanish colony, leading many Cubans to question their ability, right, and willingness to be independent. This was complicated by the race issue; until the shock of slave rebellion in Saint Domingue in 1791, some white Cubans (criollos) and a few black ex-slaves had advocated separatism or autonomy within the Spanish N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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empire, but after that, many white Cubans preferred a continuation of colonialism to protect their new slave-based sugar wealth and to protect themselves against a possible slave revolt. Thereafter, race influenced Cuban debates on identity; the perceived threat of a progressive “blackening” of the island through increased mass slave imports, the parallel threat of black rebellion, and the increased “Hispanization” of Cuba through greater Spanish immigration between the 1870s and the 1930s all conspired to postpone the evolution of a clear consensual sense of national identity. Besides, there was no consensus about the entity to which such an identity was opposed: Was it Spain, the black Caribbean, or (in the 20th century) the United States? Moreover, was Cuba a Latin entity, a Caribbean island, or an adjunct to the United States? These debates continued well into the 20th century, being complicated, after 1959, by the rapid evolution of a socialist society and a close affiliation with the Soviet-led Socialist Bloc. Because of this, when separatism emerged in the 1840s it came in the form of “annexationism,” whereby white sugar growers sought to preserve slavery by advocating for U.S. statehood rather than an independent nationhood. Ultimately, it was only in 1868, when this option was closed by the U.S. Civil War, when Spanish resistance to Cuban demands for fairer treatment created frustration, and when the cost of slave imports became prohibitive, that white planters, under Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, declared rebellion in the eastern province of Oriente. Th e war that resulted—the Guerra Grande (Great War)—was a long, divisive, bitter struggle, increasingly fought by thousands of black guerrillas (called mambises), who saw it as a struggle for social liberation; this, coupled with their fear of the popular black general Maceo, led the white leadership to surrender in 1878, which Maceo refused to accept, and in 1879–1880, he led another rebellion, the exclusively black-fought Guerra Chiquita (Little War). After 1878, Spanish retribution alienated many, especially the growing Florida colony of emigrant tobacco workers, who soon became the radical base for the new Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) under José Martí, who, in 1895, launched the final rebellion in Oriente. That rebellion (which saw both Martí and Maceo killed) was ended in 1898 by unilateral U.S. intervention (turning the Cuban War of Independence into the Spanish-American War), which began a 40-month occupation and a process of “Americanization.” Independence finally arrived in 1902—on the condition that the terms of the Platt Amendment were incorporated into the new Constitution and that a commercial treaty cementing Cuba’s role as a supplier of raw sugar to the United States and as a market for U.S. manufactures was ratified. Although the resulting prosperity guaranteed loyalty to the U.S. link, disillusionment soon set in as politics became unstable and corrupt, generating three U.S. interventions. The first of these (1906–1909) brought the formally nationalist liberals into office and finally stimulated a process of institutional nation-building (creating an army, various academies, museums, and ministries). Following the economic crisis in 1920–1921, nationalism became radicalized (especially among N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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José Martí (1853–1895) José Martí towers over modern Cuban history. Exiled from Cuba at 17, he spent most of his life abroad, achieving fame as a leading poet, a journalist, a diplomat for several Latin American countries, an essayist, and, above all, the leader who organized opposition to Spain among Cuban émigré communities. Increasingly radical in his views and worried about growing U.S. designs on Cuba, he founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) and launched the final independence rebellion in 1895, dying in battle after a few weeks. Relatively neglected before 1910, “rescued” by student radical Mella in 1923, and institutionalized as the héroe nacional after 1934, he became seen as a stark contrast with Cuban political life, a symbol of purity, self-sacrifice, and committed patriotism, thus being adopted by the 1950s’ rebels as the “author of the Revolution.” After 1959, his works were republished in huge quantities, and the post-1977 Centro de Estudios Martianos launched a since undiminished wave of research into and veneration of Martí.

Havana students) and social unrest generated the new Communist Party, union militancy, an abortive Veterans’ rebellion, and the election of the nationalist Gerardo Machado, whose drift into authoritarianism further radicalized politics. The University Students Directorate, Directorio Estudiantil Universitario (DEU), generated armed and violent “action groups,” and labor insurrection and several uprisings by the Union Nacionalista occurred in 1931. These events all resulted in a rebellion in September 1933 by an uneasy alliance of the DEU and mutinous soldiers, producing the “100-days revolution,” led by law professor, Ramón Grau San Martín, but increasingly underpinned by the soldiers’ leader, Fulgencio Batista. However, the resulting instability and radicalism worried Washington and Batista, the latter finally seizing power in January 1934. Between 1933 and 1953, the key actors were therefore the “generation of 33”: Batista dominated during 1934–1944 (as elected president from 1940), returning to power in a coup in 1952, while Grau’s new Auténtico Party (the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party) governed during 1944–1952. Even the third force, Chibás’s anticorruption Ortodoxos (the Cuban People’s Party) was a split from the Auténticos in 1947. During this period, Cuba’s relationship with the United States became less formally neocolonial (President Roosevelt abrogating the terms of the Platt Amendment in 1934), but effective U.S. domination of the sugar link continued to constrain full economic independence. However, the 1959 revolution led by Fidel Castro reacted to this continuing domination and produced a more radical definition of nation, increasingly influenced by socialism. Following the United States’ abolition of Cuba’s annual sugar quota, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics purchased Cuba’s unsold sugar, leading to a long-standing oil-sugar exchange, to Soviet funding of social reforms, and, after 1972, to a close economic relationship with the Socialist Bloc. This was accompanied, from 1960 (after U.S. economic sanctions), by a “siege mentalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Platt Amendment The Platt Amendment was the name given to the wording inserted, at the United States’ insistence and against fierce Cuban resistance, into the draft Cuban Constitution in 1901; ultimately, the nationalist Constitutional Convention was obliged to accept it as the price of even partial independence. The amendment’s terms effectively legalized U.S. neocolonial control of Cuba until their abrogation by President Roosevelt in 1934. They included three key issues: the right of the U.S. government to intervene militarily in Cuba to restore order, limitations on the Cuban government’s freedom to enter into foreign treaties and loans (apart from those with the United States), and U.S. ownership of Cuban territory as naval bases (of these, only one—Guantánamo Bay—survived, remaining U.S. territory after 1934 and even after 1959). The effects of the amendment were counterproductive, generating repeated U.S. intervention and a permanent instability caused by rebellions designed to provoke such interventions.

ity,” which intensified and distorted definitions of nation, especially during the 1960–1971 exodus of a largely white urban-based middle class (mostly to Florida), making the island blacker and more working class, changing residential patterns, and, with social reforms and desegregation, bringing greater equality and support for the revolution among rural and black Cubans.

Instituting the Nation The initial phase of official nation-building after 1910 disintegrated in the face of economic collapse after 1921, but the 1933 nationalist revolution presaged a conscious construction of a new, formally nationalist, interventionist state under the successive leaders of 1934–1952. However, just as after 1902, institutionalization of national politics increased the opportunities for patronage, generating a corruption of social and political life, which was especially evident in the post-1938 problem of political gangsterism, and which helped to undermine the new state. The fragility of that state was revealed in 1952 when Batista’s coup produced minimal opposition, state organizations either collaborating or being easily taken over; Batista’s subsequent dictatorship (until December 31, 1958) fatally weakened that state. Given the nationalist importance of historiography, key institutions during this period were the 1938 Office of the Historian of Havana (Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana) and the 1941 Congreso Nacional de Historia (National History Congress) and Sociedad Cubana de Estudios Históricos (Cuban Society of Historical Studies). The Sociedad de Folklore (Folklore Society) and Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos (Society for Afro-Cuban Studies) also emphasized AfroCuban culture and history for the first time, reflecting a shift in attitudes among N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Fidel Castro, the long-standing leader of Cuba. Castro has been in power since 1959, serving as Prime Minister from 1959 to 1976, before being elected as president, the position he still holds today. (Library of Congress)

the cultural elite, from its early European-oriented tendency toward derivative art to an appreciation of the black contribution to Cuban history and society. As Batista’s coup ended the sway of the 1933 generation, a new political generation arose, led especially by Fidel Castro, an ex-student, practicing lawyer, and founding Ortodoxo member. On July 26, 1953, he led an abortive armed assault on the Moncada barracks, Santiago de Cuba, after which he was arrested, tried, and imprisoned. From prison, and after his release and exile to Mexico, he constructed a new force, the 26th of July Movement (whose initial manifesto was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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based on Castro’s 1953 defense speech, “History Will Absolve Me”) and led an initially unsuccessful invasion in December 1956. A 25-month guerrilla war followed in the eastern Sierra Maestra in which the Rebel Army eventually defeated Batista in late 1958. Throughout this time, the University of Havana, long a base for student radicalism, became known as the crucible of the anti-Batista movement. The revolution under Fidel Castro (as prime minister from February 1959 and then president from 1976) inevitably reconstructed the nation totally, creating new institutions, centralizing the economy (from 1963), organizing a conscious drive toward a national culture, and developing a constant process of popular mobilization through new “mass organizations.” After 1961, a single-party system was instituted, eventually creating in 1965 the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). However, since the new party remained somewhat dormant until 1975, the more important political institutions of the first 16 years of the revolution were the Rebel Army (which became the Revolutionary Armed Forces in 1959), the post1959 militias, and the post-1960 neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR)—the mainstay of civil defense, political socialization and involvement, and key instruments in the new nation-building. The new revolutionary nation was therefore largely based on central political and economic control, mass mobilization and involvement, a vigorous drive to spread a new national culture to all Cubans—through such institutions as the new Cinema Institute (ICAIC), Casa de las Américas, and the Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC), and through mass literacy and education campaigns—and a carefully fostered spirit of national defense against, and resistance to, the United States (a “siege mentality” and a “guerrilla ethos” that ensured unity and did not tolerate deviation or dissent).

The Cuban Revolution The rebellion of 1953–1958 was led by three people: Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl Castro, and, after 1956, the Argentine radical, Ernesto Che Guevara, who joined the Cuban rebels in Mexico, becoming Fidel Castro’s deputy. After the 1956–1958 guerrilla campaign and the defeat of Batista’s troops, the revolution remained ideologically unclear for some months; essentially a coalition of anti-Batista forces at the start, unity soon disintegrated in the face of growing U.S. opposition to its radicalism, the increasingly socialist orientation of its leaders and philosophy, growing popular demands for social reform, and the collapse of a “liberal” pole (the latter finally destroyed by the failure of the CIA-backed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, known as Playa Girón in Cuba). After 1961, Cuba increasingly gravitated toward the Soviet Union and a socialist economic, political, and social structure, although never losing the nationalist orientation and inspiration of the early days. This inherent nationalism resurfaced repeatedly thereafter: much of the 1960s’ radicalism was nationalist in character (rejecting Soviet models as much as “U.S. imperialism”) rather than socialist, and many aspects of the political system, foreign policy, and cultural development reflected this nationalism.

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Defining the Nation Being an island culture with no external threats, the geographical definition of a Cuban identity has never been in doubt, apart from two cases: the Guantánamo Bay naval base and the Isle of Pines, both claimed by the United States under the Platt Amendment. While the latter was returned, Guantánamo remains more contentious, its U.S. status confirmed in 1934; after 1961, it became “proof ” of U.S. imperialism and occupation of Cuba. Equally, there are few internal geographical obstacles or cultural divisions to affect nationalism, apart from a perceived historical dichotomy between Havana (seen as less “Cuban” and, firstly, more “Spanish” and, later, more “Americanized”) and Oriente (often seen as more essentially “Cuban,” given its historical associations with independence struggles, blackness, and revolution). Given this, debates over identity have tended to focus firstly on racial difference and, after 1959, on political and ideological orientation, with a constant current of historical identification with past struggles. In the latter respect, the historical ethos of “Free Cuba,” Cuba Libre (the mambí slogan of 1868–1878), was more an existential belief (sustaining opposition to colonialism) than a pragmatic goal; after 1902, it became a symbolic slogan, justifying either the new republic or continuing rebellion (as in 1933). As disillusionment with 1940–1952 politics grew, Castro eventually had recourse to that notion; using the coincidence of symbolic anniversaries in 1952–1953 (50 years of a questionable independence and 100 years since Martí’s birth), his new movement adopted the epithet “Generation of the Centenary” to identify explicitly with Martí. Before independence, arguments over cubanidad (“Cuban-ness”) were driven by race fears or, conversely, a growing black consciousness, whereas after independence, and especially after the repression of a 1912 black rebellion, there was a sustained campaign of denial and exclusion of black Cubans’ role in Cuban history and, even more, a denigration of the different Afro-Cuban religions (generally grouped together as santería—worship of the saints), which were now dismissed as witchcraft. By the 1920s, however, artistic interpreters had become aware of black Cuba, mostly focusing on an anthropological and folkloric “AfroCubanism” rather than “blackness.” Hence, by the 1950s, a Cuban cultural identity was presumed to include “Afro-Cuba.” After 1959, ethnic definitions tended to disappear because of a de facto “blackening” as thousands of whites left and through a conscious attempt to resist supposedly divisive classifications, rejecting prevalent notions of black consciousness. However, ethnographers and the national music and dance ensemble, the Conjunto Folkórico, sought to rescue Afro-Cuban cultural forms, including the rumba, as a source of national pride. One curious development of this was the gradual supremacy of santería over the largely white Catholic Church (the latter already weakened by mass emigration and expulsions): not only did a growing number of Cubans, white and black, adhere to these N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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religious forms, but santería itself fused increasingly with notions of cubanidad to become seen by many as the essential Cuban form of religious expression. Identity debates also had an external dimension. After independence, cubanidad continued to be defined by external referents: the emerging cultural elite looking to a European cultural tradition and the political and economic elites looking to the United States. By the 1950s, however, any suggestion of a “Spanish” or European identity for Cuba was limited to intellectual groupings; instead, the middle-class identification was with North American values and consumption. As Cuba became separated from the United States and then excluded from Latin America after 1961, Cuba retreated into a cultural “autarky,” the revolution seeking definitions in Cuba’s past and character. There was, however, a new awareness of Latin America born of pragmatism (to break isolation) and ideology (seeing Cuba as the “front line” against imperialism) but also responding to the Latin American cultural renaissance. Similarly, Cuba became aware of the Third World from the early 1960s, a consciousness that, from 1975, became a strategy to aid Africa, presented as the “return of the slaves,” and also brought a realization that Cuba shared a Caribbean identity. Both campaigns generated prestige for Cuba’s African roots. After 1960, as many of the white middle class left Cuba (largely for the United States), a new dichotomy emerged, seeing those who remained in Cuba as the “true” nación and condemning as “traitors” and gusanos (worms) those émigré Cubans who sided with the U.S.-led isolation and “siege” of Cuba. Beyond this, the most consistent dichotomy in interpretations of “Cuba” and Cuba’s historical failures (to gain independence and then to govern with stability and without corruption) has been between those blaming innate weaknesses and those blaming external forces. In the early republic, this focused on “decadence,” seeing Cubans as either the “problem” (and an attachment to North American values as the solution) or the “solution,” blame being accorded to successive imperialisms. After 1959, this dichotomy continued implicitly: the attraction toward Soviet models partly still saw the “solution” as lying outside, while the growing preference for a more indigenous solution followed the “nationalist” tradition.

Narrating the Nation Given the importance of historical awareness and revisionism in the creation of a consensual Cuban identity, a pantheon of dates, events, figures, and places has inevitably evolved that was interpreted as the expression or symbolism of that identity, and included several powerfully mobilizing historical myths. With “action” often being extolled over thought, one consistent theme has been the tendency to exalt events, rebellions (including failed ones), and any acts of selfsacrifice and “martyrdom.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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With “struggle” (lucha) being the most powerful historical theme in Cuban political life, Cuban nationalism has long extolled the Guerra Grande (framed by the declaration of rebellion in 1868, the Grito de Yara, and Maceo’s refusal in 1878 to accept the white leaders’ surrender to the Spanish, the so-called Protesta de Baraguá), the Guerra Chiquita, and the 1895–1898 War of Independence. Around these seminal events, there has also been a consistent veneration of annexationist rebellion led by Narciso López (which, despite its ambiguity regarding Cuban independence, created the Cuban flag) and, of course, Martí’s 1895 death. After 1933, the “heroism” of that year’s revolution “struggle” also became a symbolic reference point, signaling the birth of the “Second Republic” to replace the discredited neocolonial and “Plattist” system, and creating the basic principles of the 1940 Constitution. After 1959, new historical moments were added to the canon: Moncada (July 26, 1953), the Granma invasion (December 1956), the rebel victory (January 1, 1959), and April 17, 1961, the defeat of the U.S.-backed invasion at the Bay of Pigs. By 1968, the revolution was consciously presenting its own struggle as part of a 100-year-long struggle for national independence. A parallel demonology of events also grew up, including, especially, the imposition of the Platt Amendment (1901), the start of the pseudorepública (May 20, 1902), and Batista’s coup (March 10, 1952). Of these, “Platt” was the strongest theme, generating a whole mythology that, as opposition to the U.S. link grew after 1910, was used to explain Cuba’s ills. Given the prominence of event over person, there is an inevitable veneration of certain places associated with historically resonant events, almost all of them in Oriente, especially Céspedes’s farm at La Demajagua (the site of the Grito de Yara), Guáimaro (site of the 1869 rebel constitution), Baraguá (Maceo’s refusal), and Dos Ríos (where Martí was killed). After 1959, a new nationalist geography equally added the Moncada (Santiago) and the Sierra Maestra. Within the nationalist pantheon, José Martí has figured most prominently, his death, ideas, and image being seen from the start as symbolic of this struggle, of past betrayals, and of future hope. However, that pantheon also includes people like the 1868 leader Céspedes, the mambí leader Maceo, the 1895–1898 generals Calixto García and Máximo Gómez. Of the politicians and leaders of the 1902–1953 period, only two have been extolled: Antonio Guiteras (the leftist radical of Grau’s 1933 revolution, killed by Batista in 1935) and Eduardo Chibás (the Ortodoxo founder who committed suicide in 1951). After 1959, the pantheon became more radicalized, adding the figure of Julio Antonio Mella (founder of the Communist Party), and, after 1968, Che Guevara, who was exalted as the “heroic guerrilla,” as el Che, to whom all schoolchildren ritually aspire at each morning’s assembly. Consistent and clearly consensual myths have of course been fundamental to the construction and preservation of a collective historical memory and to mobilization of collective action. One of the most enduring of these has been that surrounding sugar, seen alternately as Cuba’s blessing or curse, the latter often being counterposed to the more indigenous and “Cuban” tobacco. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The mythification of struggle (lucha) has also been consistent, legitimizing two ruling “generations” (1895 and 1933) and creating a pantheon of betrayed heroes. Hence, the mambí became fundamental, even allowing the generals dominating post-1902 politics to call themselves the mambisado. This also implied the construction of subsidiary myths around Oriente, Martí, generations (each one rescuing “betrayed” ideals), and after 1959, a similar mythification of the Sierra-based guerrillas, epitomized by Che Guevara. Myths about identity have also identified the “natural” Cuba with the countryside and the peasant (whether the more political campesino or the simpler, and usually white, guajiro). Given the prominence of lucha and “action,” the personality trait most valued by Cuban nationalists over the years has logically tended to be a selfless heroic willingness to fight, regardless of the outcome; the national anthem enshrines this, incanting morir por la pátria es vivir (“to die for the country is to live”), and it is kept alive by the constant veneration of a genealogy of “martyrs” who died young in struggle, notably Martí, Maceo, Mella, Guiteras, and, after 1959, Camilo Cienfuegos (a leading 1950s rebel) and Che Guevara. However, from the early republic and reflecting national self-doubt, an alternative to this cult of “heroism” was the comic figure of Liborio, reproduced repeatedly in magazines and on posters: an obtuse but wily peasant with a cunning approach to life, an innate wisdom, and an ability to fool authority. This became related to the choteo, the exaltation of Cubans’ supposed tendency to take nothing seriously and joke in the face of adversity. Conversely, however, morality has always been associated with national identity, especially through Martí, immediately after his death given the epithet el Apóstol by émigré tobacco workers who saw him as the epitome of selflessness and purity and a direct contrast to the reality of the new Cuba. As corruption became an issue, the underlying nationalist binarism between corruption and purity grew, underpinning the symbolic importance of youth in 1923, 1933, and 1953. It was resurrected after 1959, enshrined especially in the figure of the “New Man” and the 1960s’ “moral economy,” and in the person of Che Guevara after 1967. With this powerful pantheon of symbols, a parallel argument developed in cultural circles about the most essentially “Cuban” cultural forms. According to this, a Cuban identity has long been identified with popular dance: in the late 19th century the danzón was seen as the national dance, giving way, successively, to the eastern son after 1910, then the urban rumba, despite the latter often being disparaged as a black, erotic, and crude dance form. After 1959, the rumba was rescued formally, with “rumba Saturdays” (sábados de la rumba) becoming a weekly event in Havana. Beyond music and song, the symbols of Cuban nationalism have tended to be baseball (especially after 1959), and those associated with the national emblem or flag (e.g., the royal palm and the lone star), but echoing pre-Columbian and African traditions, the indigenous ceiba tree also came to be seen as quintessentially Cuban. The Cuban shirt, the guayabera, also has nationalist significance, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and the cigar has long symbolized national identity, given its working-class associations and the cigar-workers’ historical role.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Before 1959, national mobilization was never easy and usually suffered from partisanship and doubts about Cuba’s “true” identity and best route to genuine independence, whereas the post-1959 experience has seen mobilization become fundamental to the political process, with mass organizations and the media mobilizing thousands regularly for defense, labor, social transformation, or public support, always stressing such themes as duty, patriotism, collectivity, and defense. Each one of these mobilizations has its own militant discourse of “battles,” “campaigns,” “struggles,” “combat,” and so forth, and regular rallies (e.g., May Day or July 26) are periodic moments for renewing the collective and individual “belonging” to the national project. Given this, post-1959 political life has seen the steady fusion of the notions of pátria (or nación) and Revolución, in both official discourse and popular parlance. This is the result of decades of socialization through mass organizations, schooling, collective labor, and, especially, by painting U.S. opposition as a threat to the pátria; the continuation of that opposition has thus been critical to popular nationalism, reinforced by continuing Cuban resistance, and also by more mundane issues such as sporting success and by the post-1975 successes of “internationalism,” especially in Angola. Unlike after independence, when institutional and monumental nationbuilding was slow, the institutionalization of the post-1934 “Second Republic” began under Batista; this included his vainglorious and ambitious plans for a new Havana, including a civic center that, apart from a few buildings and the modernist Martí monument, remained incomplete in 1958. Inevitably, in 1959, a new wave of monumentalization emerged, stressing the revolution’s Cuban roots but also borrowing heroic styles from Eastern Europe. Over the whole period being described, the nationally celebrated days tended to be the obvious ones: before 1959, October 10 (Grito de Yara) and May 20 (independence) were consensually important, while after 1959, the latter was downgraded (since the 1902–1958 independence was now questionable) and replaced by January 1 (the “triumph of the revolution”), July 26 (now the real national day) and May 1, which, although increasingly celebrated as the international workers’ day as Socialist Bloc links grew, became a largely patriotic celebration. Days associated with Martí have also long been significant: on January 28 (Martí’s birth), the student torch-lit march commemorates the 1953 demonstration that spawned the rebel movement, and May 19 (Martí’s death) sees processions to a “shrine” (the Fragua) in Havana or at Dos Ríos. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The failure between 1902 and 1958 to construct a strong state and a legitimate sense of “nation” ultimately ensured political polarization and the success of the 1959 revolution. It also meant that, after 1959, with the departure of the elite and the middle class and with Cuba’s increasing isolation, a tabula rasa was created for the revolutionary regime, which now used nationalism to construct a defensive unity and a historical rationale. Hence, the creation of a single ruling party was presented as a logical and patriotic continuation of Martí’s 1892–1898 PRC and a necessary act of wartime national unity. Building a nation, of course, also meant building a distinct external identity. Between 1934 and 1960, Cuba’s foreign policy was inevitably closely aligned with U.S. policy: Cuba sided with the Allies in World War II and with the West during the Cold War, joining the Organization of American States (OAS) and suppressing the Communist Party (PSP). After 1960, Cuba shifted toward the Soviet Union. Expulsion from the OAS in 1962 ensured regional isolation (apart from Mexico), but with security from invasion guaranteed (under the secret protocol to the October 1962 U.S.-Soviet agreement) and with rapid disillusionment with Moscow, a more independent foreign policy was adopted after 1963, which meant advocating armed revolution in Latin America, defying both U.S. “imperialism” and Soviet policies of “peaceful coexistence,” and becoming the spearhead of what was seen as the regional antiimperialist revolution by financing, arming, and training “national liberation” guerrilla groups. This independence was still evident after 1975, when established links led the Cubans to defend the new Angolan government against a South African invasion, eventually defeating South African troops in 1988. This was part of a wider policy of seeking leverage through leadership of the Third World, leading to the “internationalism” of 1975–1989 (sending people and aid to over 40 countries) and Castro’s 1979 election as head of the nonaligned movement. In conclusion, after almost two decades of a more “Sovietized” system and ideological apparatus, the traumatic and devastating economic crisis after 1991 (as the Soviet Union and the old Socialist Bloc collapsed) led to a new siege mentality and a wide political debate about what aspects of “the revolution” should and could be saved, especially as unprecedented economic reform and an opening to tourism (which now replaced sugar as the main foreign exchange earner) threatened to undermine long-held principles of equality and solidarity. One result was a noticeable shift away from the patterns of 1971–1990 and toward the more nationalist version of revolution espoused during 1959–1969, which extolled the struggles of Cuban history (and especially Martí) rather than proletarian struggle and reached out to non-Communist elements inside Cuba (including the churches) and even outside (as the pro-dialogue émigrés were again courted and brought into the fold). Instead of “people” (pueblo), the talk was now more about the nación, the “Cuban family,” and the community, and defending national sovereignty and building commercial and diplomatic alliances against the U.S. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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embargo became the key issues for foreign policy, especially because the crisis had led the United States to tighten sanctions even more. As part of this new nationalism—enhanced increasingly by the fact of survival against all the odds— the figure of Che Guevara was adopted as another national (rather than socialist) “hero,” being almost “Cubanized” as an updated version of Martí, for the younger generation. By 2000, after being legitimized by the January 1998 visit of Pope John Paul II and mobilized by a six-month popular national campaign to return a small child, Elián González, from Florida to Cuba, the Cuban leaders embarked on a new “struggle,” the “Battle of Ideas,” designed to fortify Cuba (and especially Cuban youth) against what were seen as the corrosive effects of tourism and the dollar, but also to shift the burden of national “defense” and sovereignty to a new generation. In 2006, this became especially important as, for the first time, Fidel Castro temporarily relinquished ultimate authority to his brother, Raúl Castro (first vice president). By 2008, this arrangement became permanent as Fidel resigned, ending this remarkable chapter in Cuban history. Selected Bibliography Ferrer, A. 1999. Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation and Revolution, 1868–1898. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Fuente, A. de la. 2000. Una Nación para Todos: Raza, Desigualdad y Política en Cuba, 1900–2000. Madrid: Editorial Colibrí. Gott, R. 2004. Cuba: A New History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Helg, A. 1995. Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Kapcia, A. 2000. Cuba: Island of Dreams. Oxford: Berg. Kapcia, A. 2005. Havana: The Making of Cuban Culture. Oxford: Berg. Moore, C. 1988. Cuba, the Blacks and Africa. Berkeley: Centre for Afro-American Studies, University of California. Moore, R. 1997. Nationalising Blackness: Afrocubanismo and Artistic Revolution in Havana, 1920–1940. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Pérez, L. 1988. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pérez, L. 1999. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture. New York: Ecco Press. Thomas, H. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.

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Québec James Kennedy Chronology 1534 1603 1759 1763 1774 1790 1837 1840 1867 1899 1914 1917 1939 1942 1944 1945 1960 1963 1967 1970

1976 1977 1980 1990 1992 1994 1995 2000 2003

Jacques Cartier’s first voyage to the Saint Lawrence, from which dates New France. Samuel de Champlain’s first voyage to the Saint Lawrence. Québec City falls to British forces. Treaty of Paris brings an end to the Seven Years’ War between Britain and France, and formerly transfers New France to British rule. The Québec Act recognizes the Catholic Church, the Civil Code, and seigneurialism. The Constitution Act divides Québec into Upper and Lower Canada. Patriote rebellion in Lower Canada (Québec). The Union Act unites Canada East (Québec) and Canada West (Ontario). The Canadian Confederation forms, initially comprises Québec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. Outbreak of the South African War. Outbreak of World War I. Conscription Crisis I: conscription was imposed in August; in March 1918, an anticonscription riot broke out in Québec City in which five civilians were killed by the military. Outbreak of World War II. Conscription Crisis II: the referendum on conscription is opposed by 72 percent in Québec (85 percent among francophones) and supported by 79 percent outside Québec. Conscription imposed. Union Nationale provincial government elected, remains in power until 1960. The Liberal provincial government is elected; led by Jean Lesage, it ushers in the period known as the “Quiet Revolution.” Nationalization of Hydro-Québec. Controversial visit by French president Charles de Gaulle, during which he declares “Vive le Québec libre!” (“Long live free Québec!”). Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnaps the British consul James Cross and the Québec minister Pierre Laporte. Laporte is murdered following the introduction of the War Measures Act by the federal government. The first Parti Québécois (PQ) provincial government is elected. Bill 101 passed, introduces a range of measures to stabilize French language use in Québec. The first referendum on sovereignty is defeated by 59.6 to 40.4 percent. Meech Lake Accord is agreed upon; later, it is not ratified by Manitoba and Newfoundland. Referendum on the Charlottetown Agreement is defeated by 55.4 to 42.4 percent in Québec (and by 54.4 to 44.6 percent in Canada). Bloc Québécois, led by Lucien Bouchard, becomes the official federal opposition. The second referendum on sovereignty is defeated by 50.1 to 49.9 percent. The Clarity Act is passed by the federal government, introducing a series of obstacles for a future Québec referendum. There is a “sponsorship scandal” in which federal government funds, intended to bolster the image of Canada in Québec, are misused by the federal Liberal Party in Québec.

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Situating the Nation Despite the establishment of the 16th-century French colony of “New France” on territory occupied by the Canadian province of Québec, “Québécois nationalism” only emerged in the 20th century, that is, a nationalism centered on Québec making political and cultural claims on behalf of “la nation québécoise.” However, 19th-century precursors can be identified in the form of Canadien or “French Canadian” nationalism. In 1837, Louis-Joseph Papineau led the Patriotes’ rebellion in Lower Canada and a further rebellion broke out in 1838. The rebellions were a response to the marginal position of the majority French Canadians within the political structure that dominated the legislature yet were excluded from the executive branch and power. The Durham Report on the causes of the rebellions placed the blame on the existence of “two nations warring within the bosom of a single state,” and recommended French Canadian assimilation. However, the resulting Union government established an informal consociational arrangement between Canada East (Québec) and Canada West (Ontario), in which power was effectively shared between French and English Canadians. French Canadian interests were thereby secured. With Confederation in 1867, Canada grew to include not only Québec and Ontario but also Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, implementing a new federal structure. Former dependencies of British North America joined the Confederation over subsequent decades. The Québec politician, George-Etienne Cartier, viewed the Confederation as an opportunity for the expansion of French Canadian interests through Canada’s westward expansion. However, Québec’s misgivings were already in evidence with the formation of Honoré Mercier’s Parti

New France New France was established in 1534, making a French claim to North America. Its subsequent settlement mirrored the social organization of European feudalism. While the fur trade initially led its early economy, following a period of settlement in which indigenous peoples were displaced, particularly the Huron in the Saint Lawrence Valley, seigneurialism dominated. The king of France owned the land; landlords or seigneurs controlled a piece of land, a seigneury, which was then subdivided and rented to censitaires. This was a relatively static society that did not permit the sort of social communication necessary for the emergence of a modern nation. In this regard a modern nation had yet to be established, and would only develop under British rule, for New France fell to Britain in 1760 during the Seven Years’ War between France and Britain. Following the conquest, French Catholics were initially excluded from political office. However, with growing unrest among its American colonies, Britain sought to secure the loyalty of its Catholic French minority. It did so through the Québec Act of 1774 in which the Catholic Church and the Civil Code were recognized, and the continuation of seigneurialism tolerated.

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National, a provincial political party that brought together Liberals and dissident Conservatives in opposition to the execution of Louis Riel, leader of the Métis rebellions of 1869–1870 and 1884–1885. Riel, who was part French Canadian, had sought to preserve the Métis and the native traditional nomadic way of life from the incursions of the Canadian drive westwards. Mercier’s party was elected in 1896, becoming the first administration to espouse a conservative French Catholic nationalism. In the early 20th century, Henri Bourassa, grandson of Papineau, and a group of like-minded Nationalistes railed against the British imperialism of that era (South African War, tariff reform, and naval rearmament) and its consequences for Canada, a dominion of the British empire. But just as importantly, they promoted a binational vision of Canada, seeking to revive the consociational arrangements of the Union era throughout the new federation. However, their vision failed to garner support outside Québec, where largely as a result of mass, nonfrancophone immigration, French Canadian influence had been significantly reduced. This was demonstrated by the virtual eradication of schooling in French outside Québec. Québec’s isolation, as the only French-speaking province, was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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accentuated by the imposition of conscription in 1917 during World War I, despite its opposition to compulsory drafting. The failure of pan-Canadian nationalism allowed a Québec-centered version to develop. Hitherto it had been relatively marginal, associated with those such as Jules-Paul Tardivel. However, it was the priest and historian, Abbé Lionel Groulx, who transformed nationalism in the interwar era. His groups, Action Française and later Action Nationale, promoted a Québec-centered nationalism that was both conservative and Catholic in character. These groups remained largely outside of politics. This conservative nationalism took a political form in Maurice Duplessis’s provincial political party, the Union Nationale, formed in 1935. It received a political boost in 1944 when during World War II the federal government imposed conscription on a reluctant province, this time contrary to Québec’s wishes in a 1942 Canada-wide referendum. The Union Nationale dominated Québec politics through the 1950s. Duplessis’s administration was notorious for its political corruption and its willingness to accede to the wishes of big business while rejecting participation in federal social programs on the pretext of defending “provincial autonomy.” This is a period frequently referred to as le grand noirceau (“the great darkness”). However, this descriptor underplays the degree to which there was also an undercurrent of change. These years were, in the federal Liberal politician Gerard Pelletier’s words, “years of impatience,” which ultimately led to the electoral triumph of the provincial Québec Liberal Party, led by Jean Lesage, in 1960—a period known as the “Quiet Revolution.” This was a period marked by “rising expectations” among the population as a whole, but especially among its political elite. The Parti Québécois (PQ) was formed in 1968 by René Lévesque, a merger of his Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA) and the right-wing Ralliement national (RN); the left-wing Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN) dissolved and joined the new party. The PQ provided an umbrella for a range of social movements that emerged in this era: women’s, students’, gay, and ecology movements, as well as the radicalized trade

Quiet Revolution There is some controversy over the dating of the period known as the “Quiet Revolution,” though generally there is agreement that it began with the provincial Liberal governments of 1960–1966 headed by Jean Lesage. It was characterized, above all, by the intervention of the Québec provincial state, officially replacing the Catholic Church in education, health, and social welfare. This was the chief means by which the Lesage government sought to achieve ratrappage (“catch-up”) with the rest of Canada and the developed West. The growing role of the state was exemplified by the nationalization of HydroQuébec, navigated by the dynamic energy minister René Lévesque under the banner maîtres chez nous (literally, “masters in our own house”). This period exemplifies the development of “welfare state nationalism,” itself a nation-building strategy.

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René Lévesque, founder of the sovereignist Parti Québécois (PQ) and Québec’s prime minister (1976–1985). (Bettmann/Corbis)

union movement. However, nationalism in this era also had an ugly and violent side. The Marxist Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) was responsible for a series of bombings and, in October 1970, the kidnapping of the British consul in Montréal, James Cross, and the kidnap and murder of the Québec government minister, Pierre Laporte. This is bitter irony given that Laporte had been a forceful proponent of the reforms ushered in during the Quiet Revolution. The federal government briefly imposed martial law during the “October Crisis.” In 1976, the PQ assumed power for the first time. The PQ pursued a social democratic program that extended the Québec state’s welfare provision. Its nationalist agenda was focused on the introduction of language legislation (see “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” section) and a referendum in 1980, asking for a mandate to negotiate “sovereignty-association,” in which Québec would be politically independent but economically integrated with Canada. The referendum was resoundingly defeated—“à la prochain fois” (“until the next time”) declared Lévesque. Despite this defeat, the PQ was reelected in 1981 with an increased majority. In 1982, the federal Canadian government, under Pierre Trudeau, sought to repatriate the Canadian Constitution, until then an act of the Westminster Parliament. However, the new Constitution was unacceptable to the PQ government and was not ratified. Thereafter, the sovereigntist movement fell into a period of demobilization. However, the combination of a revived PQ under the leadership of Jacques Parizeau and the failure of the Meech Lake Accord reinvigorated the sovereignty movement. Specifically, the Québec Liberal government led by Robert Bourassa had made five demands under which it would agree to ratify the Constitution. The most celebrated was the insistence that Québec be recognized as a “distinct N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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society.” The failure of Manitoba and Newfoundland to ratify the accord led to its collapse. This fallout gave rise to the formation of a federal sovereigntist political party, the Bloc Québécois (BQ). The Bloc was formed in 1990 by a number of conservative and liberal members of parliament in response to the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord. The charismatic Lucien Bouchard, a former Conservative government minister, became its first leader. The party became the Official Opposition in the Canadian House of Commons following the 1993 federal election. In 1992, another accord was formulated, the Charlottetown Agreement, which sought not only to appease Québec but also a range of other constituencies, including the Canadian West and the first nations. This was defeated in a Canada-wide referendum. The election of the PQ in 1994 set the scene for a second referendum on sovereignty. This took place in 1995, and following the intervention of the popular Bouchard to lead the “Yes campaign,” was only narrowly defeated. While the PQ remained in power until 2003, there was little popular appetite for constitutional reform. The Clarity Act, passed by the federal government in 2000 in an attempt to place constitutional hurdles in the way of Québec sovereigntists, failed to ignite Québécois nationalism; however, the 2003 revelations surrounding federal Liberal Party corruption in Québec briefly did.

Instituting the Nation Historically, the Catholic Church and the Civil Code have been key institutional markers of Québec’s distinctiveness. Th e Catholic Church dominated Québec society, particularly following the defeat of the Patriotes in the 1840s to the 1930s; thereafter it fell into decline. This period of decline allowed for a genuinely secular civil society to emerge through the 1950s and 1960s. During the Quiet Revolution, the Québec state officially replaced the church as the provider of education and welfare and became the key Québécois institution. It subsequently amassed a range of powers, including immigration and pensions—powers unmatched by other Canadian provinces or other substates in the developed West. State-owned Hydro-Québec epitomized the power of the new Québec state. Symbolically, its Montréal headquarters also houses the Montréal office of the Québec premier. Québec’s significant public sector has a particularly vociferous trade union movement to represent it. Among them, the Confédération des Syndicaux Nationaux (CSN) has been among the most prominent supporters of sovereignty. In addition, the cooperative movement, the Mouvement Desjardins, and its credit union, the Caisses Populaires, have been hugely successful, enjoying unrivaled (in North America) penetration of Québec’s banking sector. The social carriers of nationalism in Québec reflected these distinctive institutions. In the early 19th century, it was urban middle-class professionals, such as the lawyer Papineau, who led the Patriotes. It was middle-class professionals, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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with careers in politics and journalism, who were prominent among the Nationalistes. The sociologist Hubert Guindon suggested that it was the emergence of a “new middle class,” the creation of postwar state expansion, which accounted for both the Quiet Revolution and the rise of the PQ. While it was certainly the case that provincial public sector employees in Québec disproportionately supported the PQ and sovereignty, a “new middle class” was established too late to explain these developments. The PQ leadership remained reflective of the professional middle class. Québécois nationalism was only exclusively a cultural project in the interwar years. Thereafter, it has sought specific political objectives whether in the form of “autonomy” or “sovereignty-association.” However, the “cultural ideal” on which Québécois nationalism was based has been reinterpreted. Interwar nationalism, inspired by Lionel Groulx, was exclusive and ethnically based—only those with French ancestry properly belonged—however, a more open, civic nationalism, which still imposes requirements on membership, notably language, has largely superseded this earlier form of nationalism.

Defining the Nation Language and religion have been the chief markers around which French Canadian and later Québécois national identities have formed. Both were based on a consciousness that French Canadians and later the Québécois constituted a religious and linguistic minority not only of the Canadian population but also among the wider North American population. The changing appellations “Canadien,” “Canadien Français” and “Québécois” reflected the changing cultural and political space delimited by these conceptions of nation. In the early 19th century, French speakers in Lower Canada were defined as “Canadien.” Papineau’s party initially was called the Parti Canadien and sought to represent the interests of French speakers. However, with the expansion of political space following Confederation in 1867, the Nationalistes in the early 20th century sought to promote a French Canadian nation beyond Québec. This meant embracing existing French-speaking communities in Ontario and Manitoba in the west and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in the east, and promoting French settlement in the soon-to-be established provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. The failure of the Nationalistes’s binational project meant that nationalism was once again focused on Québec. Lionel Groulx was instrumental in promoting this Québec-centered nationalism, a course followed by subsequent nationalist movements on both the political right and left. It is only from the 1960s that “Québécois” has emerged as the most popular identity among francophones. Nationalists varied in their embrace of “industrial society.” This can be grasped by reviewing the key 20th-century nationalist figures. Henri Bourassa N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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was ambivalent: he wrestled with reconciling the benefits of industrialism with the moral Catholic order. Lionel Groulx was outright hostile. Groulx shared with his contemporary nationalists, Eamon de Valera in Ireland and Sabino Arena y Goiri in the Basque Country, a desire to maintain Catholic rural society against the onslaught of industrial society. While Duplessis’s rhetoric romanticized rurality and religion, he nevertheless oversaw the relatively rapid postwar industrialization of Québec. In contrast, Lévesque’s neonationalism wholeheartedly embraced modernity and was avowedly secular in its orientation. Moreover, PQ rhetoric emphasized its embrace of continental economic integration, arguing that Québec could be independent within the U.S.-Canada Trade Agreement of 1989, and later with the inclusion of Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These treaties were more popular in Québec than elsewhere in Canada.

Narrating the Nation Québécois historians played an influential role in depicting New France as a “golden age” brought to a premature end by the trauma of “the Conquest.” This nationalist school of thought was popularized in the writings of Lionel Groulx at the Université de Montréal, and was continued by Maurice Séguin. Groulx and Action Française used history explicitly for nationalist purposes. For example, they promoted Dollard des Ormeaux as a hero of New France whose exploits should be celebrated (a public holiday still exists in Québec that bears his name). Yet as Trofimenkoff noted, “Dollard belonged less to history than to the Action Française. Dollard portrayed all the traits that the Action Française advocated for young French Canadians: he was religious, strong, brave, dominant, patriotic and self-sacrificing.” In 1948, Québec acquired its own flag: the Fleurdelisé. The flag is a white cross with an azure background with four fleurs-de-lis in each of the four quarters. The cross and fleurs-de-lis are taken from French heraldry, though are white rather than gold, symbolizing religious purity. The flag’s religious overtones reflect the imprint of Duplessis and Groulx who were instrumental in its development. This dominant conservative nationalism was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s by a period of cultural ferment, in music, theater, and film. Many of the francophone artists of this era not only identified themselves as Québécois but also championed the sovereigntist cause. Among its number were the playwright Michel Tremblay, the theater director Robert Lapage, and the filmmaker Denys Arcand. These works used distinctly urban Québécois idioms to comment critically not only on Québécois society, its traditionalism and religiosity, but also to make a more general comment on the modern human condition. Tremblay’s use of the working-class dialect, joual, is particularly notable. The singersongwriter or chansonnier Gilles Vigneault’s “Gens de pays” has become an N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The “Two Solitudes” (the flags of Canada and Québec) fly side by side in Montreal. (iStock Photo.com)

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unofficial national anthem. However, contemporary francophone artists such as Céline Dion and Cirque du Soleil, with an appeal beyond Québec, have remained outside of the constitutional debate. Anglophone and allophone artists have varied in their response: the singer Leonard Cohen has remained aloof from the debate, while the late novelist Mordecai Richler was a vociferous opponent of Québécois nationalism.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Media plays an important role in reproducing a sense of nationhood in Québec, not necessarily in an overt “hot” way but rather in a “banal” everyday way. Both French-language print and television media have provided its francophone audience with a “national” lens through which to view the rest of Canada and the outside world. This applies as much to the broadcast media—notably the public funded Radio-Canada, the French counterpart to the English-speaking CBC—as it does to the print media, particularly the mass circulation tabloid Le Journal de Montréal and the broadsheet La Presse. Le Devoir remains the newspaper most identified with the nationalist cause; founded by Henri Bourassa in 1910, it was initially characterized by a conservative Catholic nationalism. In the 1960s, it adopted a campaigning journalism, and its editors have included the future Liberal premier Claude Ryan. As the medium of communication, the French language is crucial here. Since the abrupt decline of Catholicism, language has become the key national marker. Since the 1960s, a series of provincial laws have sought to both elevate the status of the French language in Québec and maintain its demographic position. The most famous remains the “Chartre de la langue française,” or “Bill 101,” passed by the PQ in 1977. Its main provisions concerned the restriction of English-language schooling so that immigrant children would be compelled to be educated in French, establishing French as the language of business, the professions, and government, and promoting a French public face for Québec by ensuring that public signs were preponderantly French. Bills 86 and 178 have since amended Bill 101. Language laws have been successful: they have both stabilized the demographic proportion of francophones in Québec and raised the status of the French language. However, they have been highly contentious, particularly among Québec’s minority anglophone and allophone populations concentrated in the Montréal municipal area. In 1989, the Equality Party, established in response to the provincial Liberal government’s failure to amend its language laws, had some success in that year’s provincial election, electing four members of Québec’s National Assembly in anglophone ridings, and achieving 4 percent of the overall vote. More generally, Québec has had a varying degree of success at the integration of its immigrant population. It has developed a policy of “interculturalism,” which N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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sought to promote the equality of ethnic groups within Québec. The independence movement, too, has had only partial success in attracting support from its ethnic minority populations: the greatest success has been among such francophone groups as Haitians and Vietnamese. Parizeau’s now infamous outburst immediately following the 1995 referendum defeat in which he blamed “money and the ethnic vote” did little to improve relations. However, since then there has been a concerted effort by sovereigntists to broaden their appeal. For example, the annual fête national organized by the nationalist Societé Saint-Jean-Baptiste has sought to include the range of cultural communities found in Québec. This was an attempt to broaden belonging beyond the pur laine (literally, “pure wool”), those who can trace their ancestry to the original settlers of New France. Québec’s relations with its indigenous peoples or first nations have been fraught. The most noted events concerned the expansion of a golf course on a Mohawk burial ground that led to the Oka Crisis in 1990, in which a Québec police officer died, and Cree opposition to Hydro-Québec’s James Bay development in northern Québec. In many ways, first-nation nationalism in Québec and Canada has sought to replicate Québécois nationalism’s own demand for sovereignty. This overview of the development of Québécois nationalism has highlighted its modernity. In large part, it is political events, instigated by the Canadian state, that explain its strength at particular moments, notably the imposition of conscription in 1917 and 1944 and the failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord in the late 1980s. Yet its character has changed, from one suspicious of modernity to one that embraces modernity, from one exclusive and ethnic to one inclusive and civic. National symbols have reflected this change; religious symbols in particular have been demoted.

Selected Bibliography Behiels, M. D. 1985. Prelude to Québec’s Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945–1960. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Coleman, W. D. 1984. The Independence Movement in Québec, 1945–1980. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Gagnon, A. G. 2004. Québec: State and Society. 3rd ed. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. Greer, A. 1993. The Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Kennedy, J. 2004. “‘A Switzerland of the North?’ The Nationalistes and a Bi-National Canada.” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 4: 499–518. Kymlicka, W. 1998. Finding Our Way. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linteau, P.-A., R. Durocher, J. C. Robert, and F. Ricard. 1989. Histoire du Québec contemporain, tomes I et II. Montréal: Boréal. [English edition available.] McEwen, N. 2006. Nationalism and the State: Welfare and Identity in Scotland and Québec. Brussels: P. I. E.-Peter Lang. McRoberts, K. 1997. Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

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Pinard, M. 2005. “Political Ambivalence Towards the Parti Québécois and Its Electoral Consequences, 1970–2003.” Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 30, no. 3: 281–314. Quinn, H. F. 1979. The Union Nationale: Québec Nationalism from Duplessis to Lévesque. Enlarged Edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Taylor, C. 1993. Reconciling the Solitudes. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Trofimenkoff, S. M. 1975. Action Française: French Canadian Nationalism in the Twenties. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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United States Melanie E. L. Bush and Roderick D. Bush Chronology 1945 The term “Cold War” is instituted to describe the tense relationship between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1947 The Truman Doctrine initiates U.S. policy to support nations opposing communism. 1950 U.S. troops are sent to South Korea. The Korean War ends in 1953, leaving 3 million people dead. 1954 (May 17) The Supreme Court rules in Brown v. Board of Education that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional. 1955 United States begins sending financial aid to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 1959 (January) Alaska and (August) Hawaii are admitted as the 49th and 50th states. 1962 The United States planned and funded the attempt to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. 1963 Civil rights demonstrators (200,000) march in Washington DC in support of the Civil Rights Act. Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. delivers “I Have a Dream” speech. 1964 The Civil Rights Act requires integration of public accommodations and prohibits job discrimination; the National Voting Rights Act outlaws literacy requirements in voting. 1965 Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Cellar) Act of 1965 abolishes national-origin quotas. 1968 (August) Massive antiwar demonstrations occur at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Protesters were beaten and arrested. 1974 (August 8) After the House Judiciary Committee recommends impeachment based on the “Watergate Affair,” Richard Nixon becomes the first president to resign office. 1975 (April) The war in Vietnam ends claiming 6.56 million Southeast Asian and over 58,000 U.S. lives. 1981 (July 29) Tax cuts are approved, shifting funds away from social services; President Ronald Reagan fires air traffic controllers and decertifies the union for striking. 1982 Congress deregulates the banking industry and lifts controls on airfares. 1984 The World Court calls upon the United States to “cease and refrain” from the “unlawful use of force” against the government of Nicaragua. The term “collateral damage” is coined for civilian deaths. 1986 Iran-Contra Affair exposes that profit from Iranian arms sales were diverted to Nicaraguan contras. 1991 U.S., Western, and Arab forces eject Iraq from Kuwait by force. The Gulf War begins. (December 31) The Cold War ends as the Soviet Union dissolves. 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) passes in Congress and eliminates trade barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 2000 (December) The Supreme Court rules (5 to 4) on the Florida recount that Republican candidate George W. Bush is the 43rd president with a majority of the electoral votes but not the popular vote. 2001 (September 11) Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The United States retaliates by bombing Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban government.

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2003 The United States invades Iraq. 2005 (August 29) The levees break in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, leading to at least 1,836 deaths and massive dislocation of the population, the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. 2006 Study reported in the Lancet estimates the number of Iraqi deaths due to the U.S. invasion is close to 654,965, though the meaning of this is contested by forces supporting the war. The death toll of U.S. soldiers reaches 3,106. The election marks a significant increase of Democrats and decrease of Republicans in both the Senate and the House of Representatives and shifts control to Democrats for the first time in a dozen years. 2007 Nancy Pelosi becomes the first woman Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Key leaders of antigay legislation are revealed to have been involved in homosexual activities.

Situating the Nation From its establishment out of the settler colonies of British North America, the United States of America occupied a unique position among nations as a new start for Europeans, because opportunities were collectively much greater than they had been in their homelands. And while this new nation expanded possibilities for some, it did not do so for all. From the displacement and decimation of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, the conquest of Mexican territory and relegation of her people to a subordinate role in the economy and society, and the import of Chinese people as cheap and degraded labor to build the transcontinental railroad, the nation was born of and grew out of this embedded contrast. The United States has been a Euro-centered and white-dominated nation for most of its history, but with the rise of the nation to international preeminence in the 20th century, it began to cast off what had become the albatross of racism and create an image of U.S. society as a multiracial democracy. The modern civil rights movement emerged during the period of easy accumulation within the world economy after World War II, which enhanced the bargaining power of the working classes (throughout the core world-economy zones) whose social struggles ultimately allowed them to forge a new social compact within the pan-European world, the social democratic welfare state. The New Deal was an expression of this social compact and initiated social policies based on the idea of collective responsibility for the common good. The coincidence of this period of economic expansion with the rise of the United States to a hegemonic position in the world economy (the so-called American Century, coined by Time Magazine magnate Henry Luce) and the political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union created a political opening that was favorable to the elevation of the social position of blacks and similarly “disadvantaged” groups in U.S. society. Although the 1930s would be a period of incorporation of white ethnics into the mainstream of the U.S. body politic, African Americans continued to be N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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treated as second-class citizens. This was problematic as the nation entered into the global struggle against fascism, a struggle for democracy and against racism. This was also a period in which the United States emerged increasingly as the most powerful economic, military, political, and cultural power within the world system. As a contender for hegemonic status within the world system, the United States could no longer afford the isolationist and insular culture of the upstart new entity on the block. It had to think seriously about its appeal as a global leader and, thus, of how it looked to the rest of the world. In the context of a struggle against fascism abroad and racism at home, it was clear that the second-class status of the black population had to be remedied. This set the stage for massive changes in legislation and reforms leading to desegregation and the liberalization of immigration policies, and it culminated in the historic Brown v. Board of Education, an event that is generally taken as the official beginning of the modern civil rights era. Racial exclusion had been deeply interwoven into the fabric of U.S. law and society as the nation entered the 1940s. Scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, George Padmore, along with Oliver Cox, viewed fascism as a logical development of Western civilization, with slavery and imperialism rooted not only in capitalist political economy but racist ideologies that were already in place in the very origins of the modern world system.

The March on Washington DC on August 28, 1963, called for equal rights, integrated schools, decent housing, jobs, and an end to racial inequality. (Library of Congress)

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Henry Wallace (former vice president under Franklin D. Roosevelt and Progressive Party candidate for president in 1948) and the intellectuals associated with him at such periodicals as Common Ground, The Nation, and The New Republic claimed the 1900s to be the Century of the Common Man, or the People’s Century. Angelo Herndon and Ralph Ellison, the editors of The Negro Quarterly, a leading voice of the Black Popular Front, argued that if in fact the U.S. government stood for the common man that the administration would have to provide more convincing proof, particularly for minorities. They held that the strategic goal of U.S. blacks should be the struggle for human rights against domestic racism and imperialism, and in alliance with the “common man.” When this stance is considered alongside of the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, the social uprisings within most European countries, and anticolonial struggles around the globe, the parameters of the imperial project of the American Century had to be set both internationally and domestically. The Truman administration advocated a more limited version of civil rights and won an alliance with centrist liberals within the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which expelled the scholar W. E. B Du Bois from the organization, deeming that his positions were too extreme. Consequently, the civil rights movement that emerged in the next decade, seeking only assimilation and acceptance into U.S. society, was a component of the American Century.

Instituting the Nation By the post–World War II era, the United States was firmly established as a nation and as the dominant state within the world system whose economic and military power far outstripped that of any other state. However, the rise of the socialist states and decolonization of the globe posed formidable political challenges in the international realm. The impending question was where it would be positioned in the global hierarchy of nations. This open question was epitomized internationally by the Cold War struggle with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and domestically through what became known as the “McCarthy era” that sought to minimize dissent within the nation and define loyalty and patriotism as incompatible with communist allegiance. The Truman Doctrine provided support for political forces opposing communism and sought allies around the globe. U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) linked the United States and West European countries against the “threat” of the Communist Bloc. Despite this, the period of 1945–1972 was characterized by a whole range of social movements that sought profound transformation in the structure of U.S. society. In particular, the 1960s is sometimes known as a Second Reconstruction era, during which the civil rights movement, Black Panther Party, Young Lords, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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American Indian movement, Feminist movement, Poor Peoples and Welfare Rights movements, Gay Liberation movement, and major labor union organizing demanded the inclusion of those populations previously marginalized within U.S. society. The stakes were high as people in the government and positions of power, such as Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) director J. Edgar Hoover, understood that the future direction of the society was being questioned by the broad masses of people. Ultimately, a program entitled “COINTELPRO” was established to undermine the power of these movements. Landmark legislation, such as Brown v. Board of Education, the Voting Rights Act, and the Civil Rights Act outlawed Jim Crow segregation. The federal government was called upon to take a stand about whether the United States was truly a nation where “all men are created equal.” Congress passed Title IX Legislation in 1972 outlawing discrimination against women. The Hart-Cellar Act opened the doors for increased immigration by removing national-origin quotas. The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, along with many unions, gained strength by representing working people during this period. The war in Vietnam and in Cambodia became a significant issue related to the contestation about the meaning of U.S. nationalism. While the antiwar movement built slowly through this era, the GI movement ultimately played a critical role in ending that military invasion. At the beginning of the Vietnam War, to be patriotic was to support the bombing of Southeast Asia to protect the world from the domino effect of communism. By the mid-1970s, the definition expanded to include war resisters and protesters of all sorts. By the 1980s, the rightward shift took firm hold on U.S. politics. Labor movements were under attack, the tax base shifted away from the corporations and toward the general population, and regulations were adjusted to maximize profit. Ultimately, by the turn of the century, several million jobs were eliminated, particularly in manufacturing.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is often identified as the greatest leader of the 20th century. He played a critical role within the civil rights movement, as a galvanizing thinker and speaker. Responsible for the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963 along with a coalition of activists, he is well known for his famous “I Have a Dream” speech as well as his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” in which he castigated liberals who want justice without struggle and call for patience and going slow in pushing for social change. In 1964, King became the youngest man to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; he was assassinated on April 4, 1968, while in Memphis, Tennessee, in support of the black sanitation workers. He was known for his staunch opposition to the war in Vietnam and called for the people of the United States to unite with the “barefoot people of the world.” King believed that the United States was the most violent country in the world and sought to challenge the triple evils of militarism, racism, and economic inequality.

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Throughout this period, the United States was engaged in multiple military interventions, firmly rooting its imperial power around the globe. These interventions included involvement in the invasions or coups of Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada, the Gulf region (particularly Iraq) and Afghanistan, and others. These occurred most often without public consensus, however, and have been consistently used as a means to provide funds for corporate entities involved in war, thereby strengthening the military and soliciting unquestioning loyalty from the peoples of the United States in support of foreign policy. The nation was portrayed as benevolent saviors, the epitome of democracy and standing up for everyone’s freedom. That philosophical and cultural framing created and reinforced the cooperation of the broad masses of people and provided a raison d’être for the U.S. nation.

Defining the Nation The post–World War II period was one of economic expansion and upward mobility, in particular for people of European descent. The GI Bill provided educational opportunities for veterans returning from the war. Communities such as Levittown on Long Island, New York, were constructed to facilitate mass migration from urban areas, and the Federal Housing Act provided low-interest loans. These developments offered upward mobility almost exclusively to whites. In cities, large housing projects were constructed and highways erected, distancing black communities from resources and jobs. The 1960s was an era of struggle and contestation about how the United States would self-define as a nation, and who in fact was to be included in the “American Dream.” The Labor movement, Poor Peoples movement, and Welfare Rights Organization articulated demands along class lines; the civil rights movement and such organizations as the Black Panthers, Young Lords, Brown Berets, Crusade for Justice, and the Young Patriots addressed issues of white supremacy and represented the interests of marginalized and subordinated racial and ethnic communities. The Student movement, Antiwar and GI movement, Feminist movement, and others put pressures that led to legislation, programs, and policies and that called upon the “Great Society” to live up to its rhetoric of equality. Opportunity and access expanded as did income and wealth for large numbers of people. The balance of power swung toward support for a society that cared about the common good. In the late 1960s, a movement led by scholars of color, in particular, demanded that the educational system better represent the society and that it specifically provide education relevant to previously excluded populations. These were often insurgent movements that aligned with the democratic movements mentioned above and radicalized large sectors of the academy. The liberal establishment was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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American Dream The idea of the American Dream emerged post–World War II expressing the notion that immigrants can arrive to the United States penniless and get rich through hard work. This central pillar of the social ideology of U.S. society insists that all Americans can achieve material success. For many, this was the case as rapid industrial growth and expanding global power initially provided jobs, the Federal Housing Act provided access to suburban homes, and the GI Bill opened the door to higher education. These rewards, however, were disparately distributed so that access to the “Dream” has been differentially achieved. This notion of infinite possibilities for those who work hard provides justification to work without questioning the structure of society, because the reason for inequality and for lack of success is deemed a weakness of the individual.

challenged as the reforms of the 1970s, generational shifts, and the much more repressive atmosphere of the 1980s led to the expression of needs in the form of a less-confrontational demand for multiculturalism, and then a more moderate demand for diversity. This included the movement for curricular reform and transformation within all levels of the educational system. However, this perspective has continuously been contested as the more traditional view asserted that multiculturalism represents “special interests.” Another key struggle in the defining of the nation during the second half of the 20th century was related to the massive waves of immigration that occurred after the legislative changes in 1965, and especially in the 1990s. This shifted national demography as large numbers of people from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia came to the United States. Because the economic situation became increasingly difficult for poor, working, and middle-class citizens, the presence of these immigrants emerged as an easy scapegoat for their troubles. Major controversies occurred about whether legislation needed to be more restrictive or supportive. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, political and ideological trends caused many tensions. The far right and religious right were initially mobilized in the 1960s as a response to the calls for radical transformation in U.S. society. They came to greatest power, however, toward the 2000 election, where they lobbied strongly for Republican candidates. While the United States and the core states of Western Europe had been called liberal democracies, by this period, the concepts of liberalism and democracy became detached from each other. This began in 1988 when George H. W. Bush branded a democratic presidential candidate as a card-carrying member of the American Civil Liberties Union and has continued in George W. Bush’s pursuit of a neoconservative inspired campaign to “spread democracy” to the “dark corners” of the Earth by preemptive warfare. The dominance of this political environment was also evident in government actions after Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, when not only were warnings of catasN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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American or United Statesian? Given that the Americas include over 20 countries in addition to the United States, “American” as equated with the peoples of the United States is deemed by some to be a narrow and arrogant expression. While some may assert that this is semantic, others feel that the use of “United Statesian” is more appropriate. This issue has been raised most primarily by peoples from Canada and Latin America who articulate that the use of “American” reinforces their marginalization and is actually an expression of power.

trophe not heeded, but the breaking of the levees and the destruction of so much of New Orleans that precipitated a massive migration from the city laid bare the vast inequalities of wealth, particularly evident in racial terms, within the U.S. nation and despite the rhetoric of the American Dream. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the concept of being “American” has carried significant ambiguity as it sometimes is used to refer to those born in the United States, at other times to legalized citizens of the United States, and still at other times to all peoples who inhabit the over 20 countries in the Americas. The meaning of being American shifts between something tangible (naturalization and citizenship), something unambiguous (bestowed by birth), something ambiguous (a belief system), and something transitory (a combination of any of these). For people of European descent, there is a clearer sense of belonging than for communities with tenuous acceptance. The mystification of the term “American” and its equation with someone from the United States, specifically of European descent, symbolize underlying patterns of structured inequality and naturalize these two concepts as one and the same. For many people of African descent, their marginalization within U.S. society has resulted in a detachment from a sense of national belonging. Referring to one’s self as “American” and believing that “God blessed America” provides a sense of elevated status in relationship to the rest of the world, the primary basis for the nation’s collective identity. At the same time, distinctions are made between images of “true Americans” and people of status made questionable by the ambiguous borders and margins at which they are positioned. Thus native-born blacks, Latinos, and Asians hold a tentative status as Americans, depending on circumstance. Additional distinctions often are made between generations, linguistically, and within both immigrant and native-born populations.

Narrating the Nation U.S. national formation occurred with the explicit concept of exceptionalism and destiny. From inception, the constituting documents, policies, and practices N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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invoked the notion that the United States as a nation was unique in its calling to demonstrate and implement a new form of democracy. The frameworks of “manifest destiny” and “westward expansion,” along with the rhetoric of civilizing the non-European world and exemplifying “freedom,” provided cornerstones for the very meaning of being “American” and “America.” Like the American Dream and democracy, the American flag came to symbolize the status of the United States in the global order from its years after the First Reconstruction and through World War I. Many of the symbols and rituals of patriotism that are now assumed as having always existed, actually came into being within the last century. The “Pledge of Allegiance” was written in 1891; the “Star-Spangled Banner” was taken as the national anthem in 1931. These symbols embody points of contestation, contradiction, and ambivalence about American ideals and their everyday manifestations. The ideal of the American Dream depicted routinely in all forms of discourse is that immigrants can arrive penniless and in time will get rich. This idea is a central pillar of the ideology of U.S. society prior to World War II, but it was never applied to African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. However, the period 1945–1970 saw the increased inclusion of some strata within these formerly excluded populations. After immigration laws changed in 1965, increasing numbers of people came to the United States, just when deindustrialization began to occur. The most prominent explanations for why these groups were not upwardly mobile drew increasingly from a culture-of-poverty framework. Central tenets of the Dream revolve around the achievement of success in the forms of high income, a prestigious job, a nuclear family, a suburban lifestyle, and an economic security. The idea that this is an achievable goal for all has been built into what it means to be an American. However, over the last several decades, the wealth and income gap has significantly grown. Average annual compensation of the top 100 chief executives skyrocketed to almost 300 times the pay of the average worker. While media in the United States intermittently covers the reality of poverty rampant throughout the world, the realities of the stratification within the nation are rarely shown. It was in this way that the dire poverty revealed in New Orleans, post Hurricane Katrina, was considered shocking. The “united we stand” slogan, and “we are all in this together against the enemy” rhetoric function to obviate internal tensions and differences and to further promote the notion that America is the “greatest country in the world,” with more equality, modernity, technology, efficiency, liberty, culture, and democracy than anywhere else on the globe. The rendering invisible of structural patterns allows some flexibility in the representations of what being American means. Hence, patriotism and nationalism, with implicitly racialized ideological underpinnings, need not always be articulated. They are called upon, at such moments as those after September 11, 2001, to impose the presumptions and draw the lines between who is and who is not a trustworthy, loyal, and “true” American. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation After World War II, the United States emerged from a center-left alliance with France, Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against fascist forces in Germany, Italy, and Japan. But the struggle had actually begun in 1870 when the United States and Germany were locked in fierce rivalry for succession to Britain, who had begun its slide from the heights of Pax Britannica. Both countries expanded their industrial base between 1870 and 1914 until they each surpassed Britain in industrial might. Germany tried to transform the world economy into a world empire, the “Thousand-Year Reich.” But while the kind of military conquest at the root of such empire-building had the advantage of vigor and speed, it was also expensive and united the victims of such a strategy. Since the war did not take place on U.S. territory, the United States emerged from the war as the hegemonic power in the world system. Internally, the United States had constructed a welfare state that was a governing alliance dominated by economic elites, but included the professional-managerial class, intellectuals, and organized labor. The left-led popular front played an important role in this alliance. The choice facing the nation at this time was whether they would continue with the center-left alliance that the left-wing of the New Deal led by Henry Wallace called the “Century of the Common Man,” or embark on the more frankly imperial project that Henry Luce had dubbed the “American Century” under the leadership of Harry Truman. The New Deal coalition had incorporated European ethnic groups into the nation. The Jewish American, Italian American, and Irish American ethnic groups who had formerly been viewed as distinct and “not quite white” finally were fully accepted as a part of the white race. African Americans had been partially incorporated into the nation but remained marginal throughout the nation, and were legally denied citizenship rights in the South. Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans (Chicanos), Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans, and Japanese Americans occupied positions similar to that of African Americans, although Mexican Americans at that time were actually deemed to be white. The status of these groups was a legacy of the long period when the United States had been considered a white nation. Native Americans were the most marginal group in the nation. The emergence of the New Deal within the United States had been a part of a social compact in all of the states, with large numbers of industrial workers concentrated in the leading sectors of the economy, known as the social democratic welfare state. In the United States, this was deemed a liberal system because the strength of anticommunism would not allow such an ideologically tinged movement to become a part of the social fabric of the nation. But such compromises emerged throughout these nations to obtain social peace in countries that were often on the verge of social revolution. Labor unrest had been a significant part of the landscape in all of these countries. In the United States, there had been widespread labor strikes involving 4.6 million workers in 1946. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The United States used the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe in the camp of the United States and in opposition to a putative workers’ state in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Anticommunism was central to the achievement of national unity in a country in which the left had been a central part of the working-class movements of the interwar period. The elaboration of anticommunism as central to the mobilization of the nation after World War II was to break the center-left alliance of World War II and to justify the repression of the left internally so that the United States would now be in a position to oppose its new competitor, the Soviet Union—a socialist state that stood at the head of an international revolutionary workers movement. This was the context in which the social democratic compromise made so much sense. While the rise of U.S. hegemony had been central to the story of the United States nation in the 20th century and dramatically affected the structuring and mobilization of U.S. nationalism, U.S. nationalism was powerfully affected by the rise of the “dark world,” which had slowly but surely, over the course of the century, pushed back against domination by the pan-European world. The world workers movement now under the leadership of the Soviet Union had changed its slogan from “workers of the world unite” to “workers and oppressed people unite,” signifying a strategy of united workers fighting for social revolution and colonized nations fighting for liberation. The United States, however, was able to distinguish itself from the European nations that had been colonial powers in many parts of the world by claiming that it too had been a product of a national liberation movement from European colonialism. But for this claim to ring true, it was necessary for the United States to eliminate the structures of de jure racism from the nation. This then was the way in which civil rights became an element of the “American Century” like the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. Thus, in the 1960s, the “white nation” ended, and President Johnson embarked on a plan to complete the Great American Revolution via his promulgation of a Great Society. The war in Vietnam and end of the great postwar economic expansion undermined Johnson’s program, while the social base of the Second Reconstruction had expanded to encompass not the issue of race, but of gender, sexuality, and social class. The democratic forces had pressed too far; the nation had reached the limits of democracy, which caused a dramatic turn away from the social democratic compromise. The struggle for racial justice that had been central to the spread of the democratic forces within the United States was said to have ended racism in the United States, and that henceforth the quest would be for a colorblind society. This universalism was then the basis for the construction of a neoliberal project designed to not only eliminate the social democratic welfare state but also the very processes by which such a system could be envisioned. While during several decades post-1945, U.S. nationalism was shaped by the New Deal framework—one which was essentially egalitarian, pro-labor, and so on. Ronald Reagan’s policies and practices in the 1980s mark a significant shift away N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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from that conceptualization of the U.S. nation and toward the neoconservative/ neoliberal orientation that had characterized the decades up to then. This period is also characterized by the significant increase in numbers of immigrants coming to the United States, partially as a result of the earlier legislative opening but also as a consequence of the economic and political destabilization of Central and Latin America and parts of Asia. People coming into the United States have been both documented and undocumented largely seeking employment and a means to economically support themselves and their families. The numbers parallel those at the beginning of the 20th century. This reality has led to significant controversy within the U.S. population about immigration policy and just how inclusive the nation should be. This issue calls into question the portrait of the United States as a “nation of immigrants,” and the historical, political, social, and economic relationship of the nation to the globe and in particular to peoples everywhere. This issue has raised debate about what constitutes the essence and the core of the U.S. nation. The story of the U.S. nation therefore is one of democratic ideals and tremendous possibility, conceived of, applied to, and actualized for some communities but not others. Additionally, certain eras expanded opportunities, while in others they were constricted. This complex history cannot be told without recognizing the moments of significant opening to the broad masses of people that occurred as a result of struggles for equality and representation, but also the ways in which the nation has been used as a means to create and then replicate structural hierarchies both within its boundaries and globally. Selected Bibliography Bush, M. E. L. 2004. Breaking the Code of Good Intentions: Everyday Forms of Whiteness. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Bush, R. D. 1999. We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century. New York: New York University Press. Foner, E. 1998/1990. The Story of American Freedom. New York: W. W. Norton. Gerstle, G. 2001. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Glenn, E. N. 2002. Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gonzalez, J. 2000. Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America. New York: Penguin. Hochschild, J. L. 1995. Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class and the Soul of the Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Marable, M. 1991. Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945–1990. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. Martinez, E. 2003. De Colores: Latina Views for a Multiracial Century. Boston: South End Press. O’Leary, C. E. 1999. To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Steinberg, S. 2001. The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity and Class in America. Boston: Beacon Press. Wallerstein, I. 2003. Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World. New York: New Press. Winant, H. 2001. The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II. New York: Basic Books. Zinn H. 1995. A People’s History of the United States 1492–Present. New York: Harper Perennial.

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Fiji Martha Kaplan Chronology 17th and 18th centuries Fiji Islands consist of multiple chief-led kingdoms/confederations and smaller polities. 1643 Dutch navigator Abel Tasman charts the islands. 1800s Coastal Fijian kingdoms /confederations vie with each other and with the Tongan Kingdom. European and American whaling ships and ships engaged in trade with China increasingly come to Fiji. 1835 Wesleyan Methodist missionaries from London Missionary Society arrive. 1854 Cakobau, an influential high chief and self-styled “king” of Fiji, converts to Christianity, followed by the majority of Fijians. 1860s White settlers buy land and experiment with growing cotton and sugar. 1874 Cession of Fiji to Great Britain by Cakobau and other high chiefs. 1875 Sir Arthur Gordon becomes governor of Fiji. He sets in place a paternalistic system of indirect rule in which traditional and colonially chosen ethnic Fijians serve as colonial officials at the village and province level. He also sets in place Native Land commissions that survey and eventually reserve 83 percent of Fiji’s land as communally and inalienably owned by ethnic Fijian kin groups. 1878 The first Indian indentured laborers arrive. Between 1878 and 1919, departing through depots in Calcutta and later Madras, over 60,000 indentured workers from India come to Fiji to work on sugar plantations. 1882 Colonial Sugar Refining Corporation is brought in to dominate sugar refining and lead the sugar industry, becoming a monopsony in 1926. 1920 Indenture is abolished. Indo-Fijians become small-scale independent sugar cane growers on land leased from ethnic Fijians or move to the cities to various forms of salaried and wage work. 1946 Deed of Cession debate. 1947 India becomes independent. 1970 Fiji becomes independent. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of the Alliance Party is prime minister from 1970 to 1987; National Federation Party is the opposition party. 1973 Colonial Sugar Refining Corporation leaves Fiji; the sugar industry is nationalized. 1987 (April 12) National Federation Party–Fiji Labour Party coalition wins the national election. Labour Party leader Dr. Timoci Bavadra becomes prime minister. (May 14) Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka leads coup. 1990 New Fiji Constitution. 1997 New Fiji Constitution. 1999 (May) Fiji Labour Party wins the election and forms a coalition government. The Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry becomes prime minister. 2000 (May) George Speight leads a coup. Ethnic Fijian–led caretaker government installed. 2001 (May) Court of Appeal upholds the 1997 Constitution but does not reinstate Chaudhry government.

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Situating the Nation Independent in 1970, Fiji has had military coups in 1987 and 2000, in which ethnic Fijian nationalists ousted democratically elected multiethnic Labour Party coalition governments. Unlike most other Pacific nation-states whose decolonization history follows encounters between Pacific indigenes and colonizing Westerners, Fiji’s story is one of a three-way encounter, among Pacific island indigenes, white colonizers, and plantation laborers from India. Thus, any understanding of Fiji as a nation-state involves the histories, goals, and rights of both postcolonial indigenes and labor diasporic peoples. Today, Fiji citizens debate, with words and force, leadership of the nation-state and its very nature: Is Fiji to be a nation in which a core people—colonial chiefly rulers and one ethnic group—has special rights or a multiethnic democracy? Fiji is an independent nation-state. Formerly a colony of Great Britain, its colonial history shapes its independence history of constitutionally institutionalized separation of ethnic groups. In the 1996 census, with Fiji’s population at 775,077, people identifying themselves as ethnic Fijians were 50.7 percent of the population, Indo-Fijians were 43.7 percent, and people of East Asian, other Pacific islander, and European heritage, and those locally termed “part Europeans” comprised the remaining 6 percent. Fiji has been a member of the British Commonwealth from 1970, excepting a hiatus of 10 years following the 1987 coup. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the islands were composed of chiefly-led coastal kingdoms or confederacies and less hierarchical polities located in the interior and hill areas. From 1874 to 1970, the colonial British ruled Fiji through a paternalist system of indirect rule based on the indigenous Fijian chiefly system, and preserved ethnic Fijian land ownership. Consequently, ethnic Fijian kin groups inalienably now own 83 percent of the nation’s land. Ethnic Fijians are Christians, predominately Methodists. At independence in 1970, colonially groomed Fijian chiefs were the highest national leaders. Fiji’s first and succeeding constitutions were written to ensure various degrees of ethnic Fijian political paramountcy and landholding rights. Ethnic Fijians have predominated in civil service, maritime work and comprise almost 100 percent of Fiji’s military, but many still partially gain their livelihood from subsistence economic activities on communally owned, inalienable land. The ethnic Fijian military has been responsible for all of Fiji’s coups. In contrast, the Indo-Fijians came to colonial Fiji as indentured laborers, in the era of colonial capitalist plantations. During this time, Fiji was a classic sugar colony, with one colonial-installed monopsony (monopoly buyer), the Colonial Sugar Refining Corporation. Exploited in Fiji’s sugar plantation system, Indo-Fijians served as the economic backbone of the colony and nation. (Additionally, a small number of Indo-Fijians were free migrants to Fiji as merchants and importexport specialists.) They also resisted European domination. Joining with the nationalists in India and forming local labor unions, they sought political and ecoN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nomic parity with colonial whites and a path to self-determination. Indo-Fijians are predominantly Hindus, with some Muslims and Christians. At the end of indenture, rural Indo-Fijians became cane growers for the Colonial and—at independence—the National Sugar Corporation. Farming on leased land and entering diverse fields of professional and wage work, Indo-Fijians predominated in many areas of business and wage labor, while ethnic Fijians dominated in government. A consistent trend has been the decreasing number of Indo-Fijian cane farmers each year since independence, due in large part (at present) to the decline in the world sugar market and instability of leases on ethnic Fijian-owned agricultural land. Indo-Fijians never participated in organized violence directed against any ethnic group in Fiji. Many Indo-Fijians seek to emigrate from Fiji due to military coups and loss of political rights. A central problem for Fiji as a nation-state involves ensuring both the rights of the postcolonial Pacific indigenes and the rights of South Asia–descended laborers. In the 1870s, the colonial British created a political framework for ethnic Fijian representation, consisting of village, district, and provincial “chiefs” and a

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colony-wide council called the Great Council of Chiefs. Colonial policy paternalistically codified ethnic Fijian tradition as sacred, timeless, and shared by all Fijians. Explicitly made in 19th-century social evolutionary terms, colonial policy assumed that ethnic Fijians were on a lower rung of the human evolutionary ladder: less civilized, more communal, unfit for individualized property ownership or rights, and requiring colonial protection from the depredations of the market. Many ethnic Fijians have explicitly linked “Fijian tradition” with non-capitalist, kin-based forms of production and exchange, with Christian conversion, and with the colonial paternalist protection from the market. Though ethnic Fijians also had some significant anticolonial movements, overall, most did not actively reject Christianity and colonialism, nor did they seek independence from the British or from their own chiefs. Ethnic Fijians attended government- and church-sponsored schools, read government- and church-sponsored newspapers (in Fijian), and joined government- and church-sponsored associations. They did communal work and attended rituals sponsored by and in service to traditional chiefs, the colonial government, and the Methodist Church. The British regulated residence, keeping Fijians in villages and apart from Indo-Fijians who resided in cities or on leased cane-farming land. Arriving to work on sugar plantations beginning in 1878, Indo-Fijians had no colonially sanctioned representation, but formed Hindu and Muslim religious associations and community uplift organizations. They also sponsored schools, newspapers (in several Indian languages), and unions. After the indenture system ended, sugar cane farmers’ unions were important social and political organizations. Colonial social evolutionary ranking saw Indians as more civilized, but less deserving of special protection than the allegedly simple Fijians. Unfortunately, colonial Christian prejudices against Hindus and Muslims, and colonial resentment of Indo-Fijian assertions of equality, negatively influenced ethnic Fijians. These divisions inspired prejudice against Indo-Fijians as living “life in the way of money” (as though engagement in commerce or wage labor was not a situation inevitable for landless immigrants). Intermarriage between the two major population groups has been rare.

Instituting the Nation Fiji came into existence as a nation-state due to the imperatives of post–World War II world decolonization. The United Nations (UN) and the UN-era institutions that were sought by the United States, were key players in bringing Fiji into nationhood. Decolonization was part of the American plan for the post–World War II world, involving, on the one hand, a commitment to greater political selfdetermination for the world’s peoples and, on the other, a commitment to dismantling the unilateral system of trade and currency regulations that had powerfully undergirded the British empire. Independence was resisted by many ethnic Fijians who found colonial hierarchy compatible with chiefly-led Fijian society that N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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denied the capacity of common Fijians to engage in democracy. In parallel with the Gandhian quest in India, independence was sought by Indo-Fijians who held to the ideals of equality and respect for the world’s peoples’ self-determination. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress made the end of indenture throughout the empire a key issue as they struggled for India’s independence Since independence, Fiji has had three constitutions. Both the constitutional provisions themselves, and the manner in which each constitution was authorized, tell a clear story of the power relations in the new nation-state. Upon gaining independence, the constitution set in place by the departing British administration reproduced the unequal political relations formed in the colonial era in favor of ethnic Fijians, and it reinforced and further reified “race” as a category in Fijian social and political life. In 1970, Fiji’s national government (formally the Commonwealth Dominion of Fiji) followed the so-called Westminster model, with a governor general representing the queen and a bicameral legislature of appointed senators and elected members of the House of Representatives. Electorally, the majority party’s (or coalition’s) leader became the prime minister. Most of the seats in the House of Representatives were “communal” with three voters’ rolls: Fijians, Indians, and general electors. There were also seats on a so-called national roll on which all voters were listed. Thus, to vote as a Fiji citizen, one had to also define oneself as a member of a colonially constituted “race.” Further, while at the time there were more Indo-Fijian citizens than ethnic Fijian citizens, the two groups received equal numbers of representatives in the House of Representatives.

Fiji’s 1970 Constitution The 1970 Constitution was written under the auspices of the departing colonial British and promulgated by their authority. In independent Fiji’s bicameral representative system, the House of Representatives had 52 members: 22 members were Fijians, 12 elected by Fijians and 10 elected by all of the voters (on the national roll) in particular districts; 22 members were Indians, 12 elected by Indians and 10 by all of the voters in their districts; 8 were general electors, 3 elected by general electors and 5 by all the voters in the districts. (Note that at the time, the numbers were not proportionate.) In 1980 figures, Fijians, who were 44 percent of the population, elected 42 percent of the elected representatives. Indians, who were 50 percent of the population also elected 42 percent of the representatives, while general electors (people of European, East Asian, or other Pacific islander descent), who were 6 percent of the population, had 15 percent of the seats. The “overrepresentation” of general electors (as some would term it) worked largely to ethnic Fijian advantage, since general electors tended to form coalitions with the predominantly ethnic Fijian party. The second house, the Senate, had 22 appointed members, 8 named by the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, 7 named by the prime minister (head of the party in power), 6 named by the opposition party, and 1 member represented people from the small island of Rotuma, which had been colonized by the British and was incorporated into Fiji at decolonization.

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Defining the Nation The national boundaries of Fiji follow those of the colony, and the multiethnic citizenry is colonial in origin as well. Multiple visions of the nation have existed and been propagated. There is no single definition or shared goal for Fiji as a nationstate. Ethnic Fijian and Indo-Fijian goals have been highly different. Over the years, colonial British and postcolonial ethnic Fijian narratives stressed the founding relationship of cession (between Fijians and the British), in which, in 1854, Fiji’s leading chief, Cakobau, Vunivalu of Bau, converted to Christianity, followed by the vast majority of Fijians. Then in 1874, King Cakobau and a group of Fijian chiefs “gave” Fiji to Queen Victoria in an act of ritual-political homage. This narrative of colonial chiefly relationship was embodied by Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, a Fijian chief and, from the 1920s–1950s an official in the colonial Native Lands and Native Affairs bureaucracies. Ratu Sukuna is famous for coining the expression that Fiji is a “three-legged stool,” dependant on Fijians, the colonial British, and Indo-Fijians. Sukuna’s actual political role was to enshrine the relationship of ethnic Fijians and the state as a special one, in which ethnic Fijians, especially chiefs, would hold special political rights. In the narrative of “cession” the Crown had a duty to return Fiji to ethnic Fijians at independence. Within this narrative, ethnic Fijians debated whether the nation was to be defined by Fijian chiefs, by all ethnic Fijians, or as a Christian nation under the Christian God. Indo-Fijian narratives of the nation and their place in it emphasized a pioneering spirit and the role of Hindu and Muslim faith in overcoming the adversity of the plantation experience. However, most Indo-Fijians and many other people in Fiji seek to lessen Fiji’s history of sharp legal divides between ethnicities. When defining the nation, they emphasize not Fiji’s divided past, but their hopes for a “common future”; see for example, the title of the 1997 Constitutional Commission report: “Toward a Common Future.” Indo-Fijians have pointed to important leaders like A. D. Patel, who, in the 1940s, conjoined narratives of the dignity of working people with a Gandhian anticolonial message. Indo-Fijians, as well as many ethnic Fijians, acted as strong supporters of the multiethnic Fiji Labour Party, founded in 1984.

Narrating the Nation These different national narratives were first concretized during the mid-20th century. World War II saw the end of the British imperial era and the beginning of the UN era of nation-states. In Fiji, the war brought into sharp focus the differing colonial pasts and visions of the future of ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Fijians envisioned a postwar world run along similar lines to the imperial politics of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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colonial era. Indo-Fijians, like the Indian nationalists, were more attuned to impending decolonization. Ethnic Fijians fought eagerly on behalf of the British during the war. The Indo-Fijians, in contrast, offered to serve in the army and auxiliary services on the condition of equal status and pay with white British citizens. Denied equal pay for equal work, they followed Gandhi in refusing to fight for an imperial system that classed them as inferior. Faced with the Indian challenge, British political rhetoric forged an ever-stronger alliance with ethnic Fijians, drawing upon ethnic Fijian fears of Indo-Fijian population growth and denigrating Indian and Indo-Fijian anticolonial resistance. At the so-called Deed of Cession debate in the Legislative Council in 1946, European members argued that the original deed of cession “giving” Fiji to Queen Victoria and her heirs in 1874 provided that the British would preserve and protect Fijian interests. These arguments were clearly directed at quelling Indo-Fijian initiatives for greater legislative representation. Fiji Indian legislative council member A. D. Patel pointed out the irony of colonial claims to protect indigenous Fijians against foreigners, and made powerful arguments against the colonial position. “As a matter of fact,” he argued, “if anything the coming of my people to this country gave the Fijians their honor, their prestige, nay indeed their very soul. Otherwise I have no hesitation in saying that the Fijians of this Colony would have met with the same fate that some other indigenous races in parts of Africa met with” (Legislative Council of Fiji 1946, 48). In the colonial era, it was assumed that different populations, “races” or “communities,” had different natures and roles to play in the colonial polity and would each be represented separately in the governing bodies of the colony. At this key moment in world history, with the impetus to world decolonization taking shape, Fiji’s colonial Europeans and Fijians wrote laws to protect the colonial ethnic Fijian “polity within the polity” to secure special ethnic Fijian paramountcy. Patel’s arguments on behalf of the Indian contribution to Fiji failed to reshape the colonial-Fijian chiefly position (see also Lal 1992). As Fiji moved slowly toward independence, a model of representation based on “communal” rather than “common” electoral rolls dominated Fiji’s politics, with fundamental implications for the future of the nation. Common roll electoral systems regard all citizens as equal—one person, one vote—within a particular electoral district. Communal roll systems, on the other hand, require people to register themselves as members of particular communities and to choose representatives. They are found primarily in former colonies that relied on “racial” categories for political and economic structuring. Thus, in every constitution in independent Fiji, citizens had to identify themselves as “Indians,” “Fijians,” or “general electors” as they carried out the task of electing representatives and shaping the nation. Given this discourse, Fiji’s independence was a contested matter. On the one hand, Indo-Fijians had long sought equality with the colonial British and equivalent forms of political representation. They argued for a democracy with a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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common electoral roll. Fijians and colonial whites wished to preserve their own special rights, through separate voting rolls, constitutionally mandated proportions of representation, and, especially, nominated representation by the Great Council of Chiefs. Repeatedly in independent Fiji, ostensible pluralism in policy coexisted with colonial continuations of ethnic Fijian paramountcy. The ceremonies of independence in 1970 dramatized these ambivalences. On the one hand, for the first time in Fiji’s history, Indo-Fijians and other peoples had a major role in public ceremonies. The independence celebrations were intended to represent Fiji as a “threelegged stool.” Language policy gave equal status to English, Fijian, and Fiji Hindi. But in fact, the independence ceremonies themselves, presided over by Prince Charles, gave special weight to royalty in political life, underlining the ongoing position of Fijian chiefs, a kind of authority, leadership, and appeal to tradition not open to Indo-Fijians.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In the decades that followed World War II, and in the new frameworks established in the UN, world insistence on decolonization propelled Indo-Fijians seeking independence, and ethnic Fijians resisting it, toward independence. Decolonization was part of the American plan for the post–World War II world, involving, on the one hand, a commitment to a world with greater political self-determination and, on the other, a commitment to dismantling the British empire’s barriers to U.S. trade and investment. Colonial officials, Indo-Fijians, and ethnic Fijians made different assessments of the global plans and institutions that were to break up empires and make decolonization a mandate. The ambivalences toward pluralism seen in the independence ceremonies of 1970 were to harden into polarized political parties. Then in the late 1980s, multiethnic political party democratic victories fell victim to ethnic Fijian coups. In 1970, Fiji had two major political parties that gave voice to the aspirations of Fiji’s peoples for the nation-state. Because of constitutional requirements, each party had mixed “racial” membership and fielded candidates of all three electoral categories (“Fijian,” “Indian,” and “general elector”). Each at times espoused more or less pluralistic ideals. However, they swiftly became parties representing different ethnic groups. The largely Indo-Fijian National Federation Party was founded by leaders of cane growers’ unions and other unions in 1964, with a history of contestation against colonial policies. The largely ethnic Fijian Alliance Party held power from 1970 to 1987. Initially, it aspired to be a multiracial party ideal (these aspirations diminished by the 1980s), under the leadership of a colonially groomed high Fijian chief, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. It was a new form of the colonial-ethnic Fijian partnership of the era of indirect rule. By the 1980s, the Alliance Party lost N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nearly all of its Indo-Fijian support, and since 1987, it has fragmented into a large number of ethnic Fijian parties, which frequently fuse to support ethnic Fijian nationalist projects. In 1984, a new Fiji Labour Party formed to combat the “racial” parties, with such key platforms as the designation of all Fiji citizens as “Fijians.” Labour won the 1987 election, forming a coalition government with the National Federation Party. Within a month, an ethnic Fijian army colonel, Sitiveni Rabuka, led a military coup, claiming to represent ethnic Fijian interests. After criticism of the coup from other British Commonwealth nations, he declared Fiji a republic, withdrawing from the Commonwealth. He first reinstated the Fijian chiefly leaders of the Alliance Party that had lost the election. Colonel Rabuka (later brigadier general) then became Fiji’s prime minister by elections held under the new constitution that he sponsored. This new constitution simultaneously simplified and reinforced principles already at work in Fiji’s constitution at independence in 1970. Not only were the “races” out of balance and demographic proportion, but major offices were reserved for Fijians. Taking upon itself the power to ratify this new constitution, the Great Council of Chiefs institutionalized its role as the central voice of ethnic Fijian authority. Indeed the Great Council institutionalized their claim to national political authority. They promulgated the 1990 Constitution, and it was subject to no popular referendum. However, following the establishment of this constitution, a period of debate among ethnic Fijians ensued, centered especially on arguments among politicians from three historically dominant ethnic Fijian kingdoms (Bau, Rewa, and Lau) and arguments for the creation and representation of a fourth ethnic Fijian confederacy, representing the ethnic Fijians from the west of Viti Levu Island. Urban ethnic Fijians also argued for representation. Competing new ethnic Fijian political parties were formed. Simultaneously, the debates and fragmentation of ethnic Fijian solidarity created opportunities for multiethnic, nonexclusively ethnic Fijian parties as

Fiji’s 1990 Constitution The 1990 Constitution, written under the auspices of coup leader Rabuka and authorized by the ethnic Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, simultaneously simplified and reinforced principles already at work in Fiji’s first constitution. Like the 1970 Constitution, the 1990 Constitution sought to ensure that ethnic Fijians would always dominate government, irrespective of demographics. It was simply more direct about it. The office of prime minister was to be filled by an ethnic Fijian. It created a single House of 70 representatives. Ethnic Fijians elected 37 of the members of the House and Indo-Fijians elected 27 members. The 1990 Constitution defined Fiji as a Christian nation, irrespective of the half of the citizens who were Hindu and Muslim. The new constitution also created a 34-seat Senate (24 ethnic Fijians, 9 others, 1 Rotuman). Not only were the “races” out of both balance and demographic proportion, but major offices were reserved for Fijians.

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partners. Even more importantly, concerns driven by a need to have a constitution that recognized international standards led to the formation of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission of 1996 and to another new constitution in 1997. The Fiji Constitution Review Commission held the first broad-based, nationwide discussion on Fiji’s future as a nation, calling for submissions from all interested groups and individuals within and outside of Fiji. The Commission’s three members were New Zealand jurist Sir Paul Reeves (a Maori), Fiji historian and Australian National University professor Brij V. Lal (an Indo-Fijian), and Fijian longtime parliamentarian Tomasi Vakatora (an ethnic Fijian). They considered an extensive number of submissions from constitutional experts to interested organizations to ordinary citizens. Submissions from within Fiji ranged across political and historical positions. Some proposed reenvisioning Fiji and all Fiji citizens in a Pacific Islander tradition. Others made proposals for affirmative action programs to engage ethnic Fijians in business, not by emphasizing traditional development programs for small businesses, but rather by treating Fijians as groups of stockholding investors. Others outlined the rights and needs of minority (and majority) populations and groups in the islands (e.g., submissions on part-Europeans, Rotumans, other Pacific islanders, and women in Fiji). Key submissions noted the pending crisis of agricultural land leases. The Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act had been negotiated during the move toward independence in the late 1960s. Thirty-year leases of Fijian-owned land were made available to Indo-Fijian farmers to ensure the continuity of the sugar industry, seen as crucial to the soon-to-be independent nation-state. Yet this meant that the vast majority of Indo-Fijian cane farmers’ leases expired in 1997. Ethnic Fijian interest in using the land or, more commonly, in raising rents, created a fearful situation for many Indo-Fijians and an unstable economic outlook. Others addressed the problem of poverty, especially among urban and periurban residents. Importantly, both the submissions from constitution experts and many of those from citizen groups brought new questions to Fiji’s political process by engaging global cases, models, and structures from beyond Fiji. First of all, models for national governance and citizens rights drew on formulations from UN organizations and from a range of international nongovernmental organizations. Constitution experts from all over the world provided comparative studies and citizen groups used a variety of international declarations and conventions to support their positions. Thus, those arguing for ethnic Fijian paramountcy cited the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples along with the Bible and Fijian tradition as their authorities. Supporters of common roll voting appealed to such documents as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Secondly, the global financial situation loomed in the background of every report on Fiji’s economy. Dependence on sugar as a major crop seemed increasingly unwise, and the booming stock market of the 1990s encouraged visions of outside investment. This in turn encourN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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aged new industries including tourism, spring water, gold, film studios, and other luxuries, and fueled landowners’ sense of the potential for high rents on lands. The Review Commission led to the drafting and adoption of a new constitution in 1997, again promulgated by the Great Council of Chiefs and supported by coup leader and then prime minister Rabuka. While it continued some of the 1990 Constitution’s many concessions to ethnic Fijian custom and chiefly power (the Great Council of Chiefs appoint the president and vice president, the largely ceremonial heads of state), it altered the “racial” composition of representation in important ways. Again, crucially for future issues of power and authority in Fiji, this constitution was ratified by the Great Council of Chiefs, rather than popular referendum. The Chiefs’ agreement seems to have been gained via the assurance of Prime Minister Rabuka that it contained clauses that would ensure ethnic Fijian paramountcy, notably in the reservation of the presidency for ethnic Fijians. In a crucial expression of the voice of Fiji’s citizenry, the first election under this new constitution in May 1999 did not lead to the electoral return of coup leader Rabuka. Nor did the National Federation Party win any seats, not even its leader Jai Ram Reddy who had become famous for his efforts to work together with coup leader Rabuka. Rather, to the surprise of many, the Labour Party, led by Mahendra Chaudhry, won an absolute majority and formed a new government in coalition with several ethnic Fijian parties. The voice of the people supported the multiethnic democracy envisioned in 1987 in the first Labour victory. But one year following the election, a complicated aggregation of agents led and solidified a coup against Chaudhry’s Labour coalition government. First, George Speight, a failed businessman, led a group of military personnel and took Prime Minister Chaudhry and coalition parliamentarians hostage. Speight claimed to act on behalf of indigenous Fijian rights. Outside analysts have noted that

Fiji’s 1997 Constitution The 1997 Constitution was drafted by a multiethnic commission. It was promulgated by the Great Council of Chiefs and supported by coup leader, brigadier general, and then prime minister Rabuka. While it continued, some of the 1990 Constitution’s many concessions to ethnic Fijian custom and chiefly power (the Great Council of Chiefs appoint the president and vice president, the largely ceremonial heads of state), it altered the “racial” composition of representation in important ways. The House of Representatives had 71 members, elected from five electoral rolls (23 by Fijians, 19 by Indians, 1 by Rotumans, 3 by others, and 25 by all voters on an “open roll”). Drawing on “consociational” constitutional theory, it required the prime minister to invite into his or her cabinet members from other parties that obtained 10 percent of the seats or more in the House of Representatives, in numbers corresponding to the total percentage of members in the House. Again, crucially for future issues of power and authority in Fiji, this constitution was ratified “from the top down,” by the coup leader and the Great Council of Chiefs, rather than popular referendum.

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Speight, past head of the Fiji Hardwood and Fiji Pine commissions in the Rabuka government, had seen his carefully laid plans to sell Fiji’s mahogany reserves (planted by colonial planners in the 1950s) to a U.S. buyer overturned by the newly elected Labour coalition government. Speight had incited and championed the ethnic Fijian landowners, on whose rented land the mahogany was growing, to back his plans for its sale. Their position was that the timber, or revenue from it, should not be regarded as a national asset (as colonial and national planners had intended) but rather that of the landowners on whose rented land it was grown, and that ethnic Fijian groups deserved a special share and benefit from its sale. On May 19, 2000, Speight got the jump on other potential coup leaders and led a group of armed soldiers into parliament and began the coup against Chaudhry’s Labour coalition government. Speight’s coup was overtaken and solidified by a second simultaneous coup, more from the top down, led by ethnic Fijian stalwarts, including high chiefs and the military. The president, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, dismissed Prime Minister Chaudhry for failure to perform his duties (while Chaudhry was a prisoner of Speight!). Mara then resigned and handed power directly to the military, who installed ethnic Fijian bureaucrat Laisenia Qarase as interim prime minister, with the support of Fiji’s military forces under Comm. Frank Bainimarama. As head of

Supporters of coup leader George Speight wave the Fijian flag in the grounds of Fiji’s Parliament House on May 25, 2000. (Reuters/Corbis)

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the interim government, Qarase announced and implemented a range of programs to solidify ethnic Fijian paramountcy in the nation. In the wake of the takeover of the nation, in May and following months, there were many local takeovers of roads, power stations, tourist resorts, factories, and even police stations by ethnic Fijians asserting their rights as landowners and indigenes to define the nation as a whole. The interim government, headed by ethnic Fijian Laisenia Qarase, presented its role as returning Fiji to peace, order, and “normality.” Their interim budget and blueprint for Fiji sought to reconcile diverse ethnic Fijian claims and projects, their vision making ethnic Fijian interests the main national interests for Fiji and once again diminishing the rights and contributions of Indo-Fijians to the nation. Many Indo-Fijians saw no future in Fiji, emigrating up to the limits set by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. For those who stayed in Fiji, the vision of the nation-state rested on a model of a more democratic multiethnic society. Taking recourse to Fiji’s courts, in 2000, an Indo-Fijian farmer filed suit arguing that his civil rights had been violated by the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution, leaving him dispossessed of his rented land, his livelihood, and in fear for his and his family’s lives. In March 2001, Fiji’s court of appeal upheld his suit. Prime Minister Chaudhry was not reinstated, but the 1997 Constitution was upheld. Elections were held in 2001 and again in 2006 under the electoral rules of the 1997 Constitution. Both elections returned ethnic Fijian Laisenia Qarase and his Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Party, who continued to make ethnic Fijian interests central to the nation. Qarase’s government was deposed by military commander Bainimarama at the end of 2006; he then became prime minister and handed the presidency to Ratu Josefa Iliolo. In conclusion, the history of independent Fiji shows the persistent national dilemma of how to enable diversity while encouraging equality. From independence in 1970 to the 1997 Constitution and beyond, two points repeat themselves. First, to one degree or another, individuals have been required to register themselves as belonging to one or another “racial”/political group. The electoral system has persistently concretized and perpetuated a system of invidious categorizations of persons developed in the colonial era. In essence, it enshrined nationally and constitutionally the claim that Fiji’s people are to be separate, bounded races, with different natures, interests, and political and property rights. Second, however, in every election since 1987, the majority of voters have turned to multiethnic alternatives. Whether the votes for multiethnic parties and coalitions reflect increasingly individualized subjectivities, or result from certain social or economic common denominators well served by a Labour Party, is not clear or fixed. But multiplicity in Fiji need not, one hopes, always result in inequality. Selected Bibliography Clammer, J. 1973. “Colonialism and the Perception of Tradition in Fiji.” In Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter, edited by T. Asad, 199–222. London: Ithaca Press.

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Gillion, K. L. 1977. The Fiji Indians: Challenge to European Dominance, 1920–1946. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Kahn, J. 2000. “The Mahogany King’s Brief Reign.” New York Times, September 14, section C, p. 1, 8. Kaplan, M. 1995. Neither Cargo Nor Cult: Ritual Politics and the Colonial Imagination in Fiji. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Kelly, J. D. 1988 “Fiji Indians and Political Discourse in Fiji: From the Pacific Romance to the Coups.” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, no. 4: 399–422. Kelly, J. D., and M. Kaplan. 2001. Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lal, B. V. 1992. Broken Waves: A History of Fiji in the Twentieth Century. Pacific Islands Monograph Series, no. 11. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Lal, B. V., and T. Vakatora, eds. 1997a. “Fiji Constitution Review Committee Research Papers.” Fiji in Transition, vol. 1. Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific. Lal, B. V., and T. Vakatora, eds. 1997b. “Fiji Constitution Review Committee Research Papers.” Fiji and the World, vol. 2. Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific. Legislative Council of Fiji. 1946. Extracts from Debates of the July Session, 1946. Suva, Fiji: Government Press. Rutz, H. 1995. “Occupying the Headwaters of Tradition: Rhetorical Strategies of NationMaking in Fiji.” In Nation-Making: Emergent Identities in Postcolonial Melanesia, edited by R. Foster, 71–93. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Sahlins, M. 1985. Islands of History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Trnka, S. 2003. “Ethnographies of the May 2000 Fiji Coup.” Special issue of Pacific Studies 25, no. 4 (special issue).

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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold indicate a main entry for that subject, and numbers in italic refer to the sidebar text on that page. Aasen, Ivar, 226 Abacha, Sani, 1188 Abayomi, Kofo, 1180 Abbas, Ferhat, 1099 Abbas, Gulam, 1763 Abbas, Mahmoud, 1142 Abbas II (Egypt), 261 Abbas the Great, Shah, 1108, 1113 Abd-ul-Ilah, 1745 Abdallah, King (Transjordan), 728, 729 Abdelkader, Emir, 1098, 1099, 1102 Abduh, Muhammad, 731 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman Empire), 764, 765 Abdullah, Farooq, 1767, 1768, 1770 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 1142 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, 1761, 1761, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766–1767 Abiola, Moshood, 1188 Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 1847, 1851 Aborigines, Australian, 932. See also Pan-Aboriginalism Abrams, Lynn, 53 Abyssinia, 736–737, 739 Aceh, 954, 1468, 1734 Achebe, Chinua, 913, 914, 917, 920, 921, 925 Acton, Lord, 687 Adams, Abigail, 50 Adenauer, Konrad, 947, 973–974, 1549 Adivar, Halide Edib, 770 Afghanistan, 1683–1695, 1684 (map) and education, 1388–1389 Germany and terrorists in, 1554 invasion of, 1497 and music, 1440 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Soviet Union, 954 and terrorism, 1488 and women, 904, 1457 Aflaq, Michel, 731, 732, 733, 981, 1740 Africa and colonialism, 890 education in, 39–40, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 431 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence/separatist movements in, 1461, 1464, 1468–1469

literature/language in, 919–920, 925–927 and music, 1440 and religion, 108 and socialism, 980–981 supranational organizations and, 962, 965 See also specific African nations African Americans, 493–494 Afrikaner nationalism, 1144–1153 Afzelius, Arvid August, 73 Agathangelos, 1706 Aghulon, Maurice, 49 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 1245 Aguirre, José Antonio, 1515–1516 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar, 1741 Ahmad Shah, 1686, 1691 Ahmadinejad, Mahmmoud, 1117 Ahmed, Imam, 739, 743 Aho, Juhani, 605 Aidoo, Ama Ata, 927 Aizawa Seishisai, 810–811, 813–814, 814, 815 Akbar, 802 Akçura, Yusuf, 766, 770, 771, 773 Akhmatova, Anna, 1074 Akhmetov, Renat, 1625 Aksakov, K. S., 692 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 261 al-Alayili, Shaykh Abdallah, 732, 733 al-Azmah, Yusuf, 728 al-Azmeh, Aziz, 725 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hasan, 756 al-Banna, Hassan, 984, 985 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 731, 981 al-Bustani, Butrus, 731 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1139 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim, 1136 al-Husri, Sati, 730, 732–733, 751 al-Jawahiri, Mohammad Mahdi, 1740 al-Jazairi, Amir Abd al-Qadir, 727 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 753 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman, 727 al-Miqdadi, Darwish, 734 al-Nashshashibi, Raghib, 1136 Al Qaeda, 986–987, 1484, 1488, 1492 and Pakistan, 1232 al-Qaysi, Nuri Ali Hammudi, 1741 Al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, 1488–1489

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I-2 al-Said, Nuri, 753 al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Adb, 984 Alamán, Lucas, 352 Albéniz, Isaac, 1437 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 275, 276 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 840, 840 (illus.), 841, 844, 845, 846 Alem, Leandro, 281 Alevi, 1650–1651, 1653, 1654–1655 Alexander I, Czar (Russia), 20–21, 209, 211, 1576 Alexander I (Bulgaria), 578 Alexander II, Czar (Russia), 210, 598 Alexander III, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Alford, Kenneth J., 1442 Alfred the Great, King (England), 165 Algeria, 1094–1105, 1096 (map) and colonialism, 48 diaspora population of, 1371 and France, 1050–1051 and independence, 1464, 1490 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1496 and women, 903 Ali, Monica, 927 Ali, Muhammad, 258–259, 263 Aliyev, Heidar, 1715, 1720 Aliyev, Ilham, 1715 Allende, Salvador, 331 Almirall, Valentí, 703, 710 Alsace, 475, 1501–1510, 1503 (map) Althusser, Louis, 486, 1052 Amami Island, 1754 Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 1684, 1686, 1688, 1689 Amazon basin, 1827–1831, 1829 Ambedkar, B. R., 802, 1204–1205 Ambrose, Stephen, 905 American Revolution, 21 and Canada, 299 and education, 32 gender roles and, 45–46, 50 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 Americanization, and Puerto Rico, 841 Americas and language, 478 and music, 75–76, 1432 nationalism and gender in, 44 See also Central America; North America; South America Amharanization, 739, 741, 742 Amin, Hafizullah, 1687 Amir, Yigal, 1400, 1403 Amrane-Minne, Daniele Djamila, 903 Anatolian movement, 1646, 1646 Andersen, Hans Christian, 228 Anderson, Benedict, 25 and diaspora populations, 1368–1369, 1370

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and the “imagined political community,” 475, 481, 912, 1342 and Latin America, 826 and national symbols, 122, 900 on print technology, 129, 485, 1475 on the realistic novel, 923 on “young” and “youth,” 1859 Andic, Helmut, 545 Andrade, Mário de, 1662, 1662 Angell, Norman, 532 Anger, Carl, 228 Anglo-Boer Wars, 198, 204, 449, 490, 1146 and Canada, 305–306, 306 Anglo-Burmese wars, 776 Anglo-Chinese war, 27 Anglo-Nepal war, 1805 Angola, 968, 1657–1667, 1658 (map) and Cuba, 1285 and independence, 1464 Anjala Conspiracy, 223 Ankara, Turkey, 770–772 Anthem, national, 68, 116, 117, 1430, 1431, 1442–1444 and Basques, 1521 and Belgium, 145 and Brazil, 294 and Burma, 782 and Canada, 303 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and the EU, 1042 and France, 175, 1502 and Germany, 619 and Indonesia, 1732 and Japan, 1756, 1757 and Mexico, 354 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 1184, 1186–1187 and Poland, 211, 215 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 230, 230 and the United States, 1308 and Uruguay, 401 Anthias, Floya, 902 Anti-Catholicism, and England, 163, 166 Anti-free-trade movements, 1448 Anti-Semitism, 439, 447, 517, 520–521, 907 and Bulgaria, 582 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and France, 179 and Hungary, 639, 645 in Turkey, 1649 and Ukraine, 1078 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Zionism as reaction to, 1121, 1128 Antiabortion movement, 1446

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Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism, 912–928, 957–970 and Algeria, 1095, 1100 and Angola, 1658, 1664 and Burma, 777, 779, 780–781, 782, 783 and China, 1191, 1193, 1196, 1198–1199, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157–1158, 1163 and Gandhi, 1203 and India, 131, 796, 800–801 and Iran, 1110, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 753, 1739, 1740 and Malaysia, 1216 and nationalism, 26–27, 47–48, 486–487, 1461–1465 and Nigeria, 1178–1179 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 840 and Vietnam, 1269 and women’s rights, 457 Anticommunism, 520, 1310, 1394 Anticosmopolitanism, 415 Antinuclear-power movements, 1449 Antiracist movements, 1457 Antislavery, 161, 163 Antwerp, Belgium, 200 Apartheid, 1151–1153 Appadurai, Arjun, 136, 1374–1375 Aquino, Benigno, 1242, 1242 Aquino, Corazon (Cory), 1242, 1242, 1244 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 729, 1125, 1129, 1135, 1136, 1139–1140 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 1137, 1394–1395 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 1039 Arab League, 726 (map) Arab nationalism, 724–734, 726 (map), 965, 981 and Iraq, 751–752, 753, 754, 754, 757–758, 1739 Arabs, in Turkey, 1650–1651 Arafat, Yasir, 1136–1137, 1141, 1142, 1488–1489 Aral Sea, 882 Arana, Sabino de, 704, 709, 710, 1515 Arason, Jón, 228 Araucanian Indians, 323, 324–326 Arcand, Denys, 1294 Arce, Mariano José, 317–318 Architecture, 30, 37, 407–408, 409, 413, 414–415 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Brussels, 144 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1024 and Malaysia, 1224 and Russia, 692–693 and Turkey, 770–771 Arena y Goiri, Sabino, 1294 Argentina, 268–281, 270 (map) and film, 1335 immigration and national identity in, 492 and music, 1439, 1443 national identity and education in, 39 Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 755 Arif, Abd al-Salam, 754–755 Aristocracy, 5–9

Aristotle, 529 Armageddon, 1394 Armenia, 1696–1711, 1698 (map) and Azerbaijan, 1719 and diaspora populations, 1376 and the Soviet Union, 946 Armenian Apostolic Church, 1699–1700, 1701 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 1718–1719. See also Gharabagh conflict ethnic cleansing/genocide of, 438, 523 and the Ottoman Empire, 764, 765 and Turkey, 1648–1649 Arminius (Hermann), 618 Armstrong, John, 1368 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 187, 1504 Arne, Thomas, 1438 Arnim, Achim von, 73 Arnold, Matthew, 915 Árpád (chief), 643 Art, 16–17, 49, 405–409, 412–417 and Australia, 859–860 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1522 and Canada, 305, 1841 and Finland, 605 and France, 177 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569 historic paintings of Denmark, 154 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127 and the Maori, 1860 and Mongolia, 1794 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Poland, 212, 216, 682 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 402 and Wales, 1637 See also Culture; Landscape Artigas, José Gervasio, 397–398, 401, 402 Asbjørnsen, Peter C., 228 Ashoka, Emperor (India), 802, 1815–1816 Asia and education, 39–40, 428 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence movements in, 1461–1463, 1465–1468 and language, 478 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Asian countries Asquith, Herbert, 868 Assimilation, 29, 522, 931–932 and Australian Aborigines, 858 and China, 1196, 1199 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 and Ethiopia, 744–746

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Assimilation (continued ) and Hungary, 644 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 866 and Poland, 685 and the Sami, 1612–1613 and Turkey, 768, 1647, 1652 and Ukrainians, 716 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Education Asylum and the EU, 1042 and Germany, 1556, 1557, 1558–1559 See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Atahualpa, 373 Atatürk. See Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) Atlee, Clement, 1461 Atwood, Margaret, 1841 Auber, Daniel, 144 Audubon, John James, 389 Augustina of Aragon, 51 Aung San, 784, 785 (illus.) Aung San Suu Kyi, 784 Austin, John, 1372 Australia, 849–860, 851 (map) and Aborigines, 932, 1844–1853 communication in, 1473 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1375 and education, 1379, 1382 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigration, 883, 1420–1421 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 Macedonians in, 1415 and music, 1439 and new social movements, 1448 and New Zealand, 865 Austria, 539–554, 543 (map) education and, 33–34, 35, 36, 429 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 442 fascism in, 516 and German unification, 192 and Hungary, 638 and Poland, 210 politics and political philosophy in, 535, 1410 Austro-Hungarian empire. See Habsburg empire Autonomy, 899, 939–940 and Armenia, 1698 and Basques, 1516, 1517, 1522 and Catalonia, 1536, 1544–1547 and China, 1200 and the EU, 1041–1042 and Greenland, 1562–1563 and minorities, 1357–1358 and Nepal, 1805 and Pakistan, 1232 and Poland, 679 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 843, 845–847 and Spain, 707, 707–708, 708, 711, 1084–1085, 1088, 1090–1091

Avellaneda, Nicolas, 280 Awolowo, Obafemi, 1180, 1182, 1182, 1183 Ayala, Julio César Turbay, 833 Ayubi, Nazih, 734 Azaña, Manuel, 705 Azerbaijan, 469, 1713–1721, 1714 (map) and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1078–1079 and Turkey, 769 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 1180, 1180, 1183 Aznar, José María, 1544 Aznavour, Charles, 1707 Aztecs, 345–346, 351–352 Ba Maw, 779–780, 785 Ba’ath Party, 731, 981 and Iraq, 753, 754, 756, 1740–1741, 1743, 1745, 1746 Babangida, Ibrahim, 1188 Babenberg monarchy, 539–541 Babenco, Hector, 1334–1335 Babeuf, François-Noël, 1489 Bache, Otto, 228 Bachyns’kyi, Yulian, 722 Bacon, Sir Francis, 61 Bagehot, Walter, 162–163 Bahais, 1113, 1118 Bainimarama, Frank, 1324, 1325 Bakongo, 1660–1664, 1664 Bakshi, Gulam Mohammad, 1766 Baku, 1716 Bakunin, M., 38 Balakirev, Mili, 75, 79, 80, 82, 1437 Baldorioty de Castro, Román, 839 Balearic Islands, 1546 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 1183, 1185 Bali, 1440 Balkan nations, 435, 436 Balkan Wars, 437 and Bulgaria, 572, 580 and Turkey, 1645 Baltic states, 555–568, 559 (map), 1573 (map) independence, 503 and new social movements, 1449 racism in the, 518 and the Soviet Union, 946, 955, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1581–1582 Bancroft, George, 389 Bandaranaike, Nathan, 1467 Bandera, Stepan, 718, 1624 Bandung Conference (1955), 958–962, 964–965, 1206 Bangladesh, 1201, 1234, 1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1466 Bano, Shah, 1209 Bao Dai, 1264 Barassi, Ron, 857 Barbosa, José Celso, 839, 841 Barceló, Antonio, 840 Barcelona, 1539–1540

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Barker, Ernest, 531–532, 535 Baron, Beth, 264 Barons, Krišj¯anis, 564, 1577, 1577, 1578 Barrès, Maurice, 416 Barrios, Agustín (“Mangoré”), 365, 365 Barruel, Abbé, 45 Barry, Brian, 97 Barry, Sir Charles, 408 Barthes, Roland, 1052 Bartók, Béla, 1435 Basanáviˇcius, Father Jonas, 567 Basarab, 1592 Basedow, Johann, 34 B˘asescu, Traian, 1589 Basques, 1512–1524, 1514 (map) concessions to, 932 and cultural survival, 878 and the ETA, 1090, 1091–1092 and language, 477, 482 and the mixing of ethnic and civic nationalisms, 938–939 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1470, 1471 and Spain, 702–711, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1496 Batavian Republic, 197, 198 Batista, Fulgencio, 1276, 1277 Batman, John, 1845 Battle of Kosovo (1389), 100 Battle of Maysalun, 728 Battle of Yungay, 327–328 Battle y Ordóñez, José, 403 Bauer, Otto, 535, 1071 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1368 Baumer, Gertrude, 453 Bavaria, 621, 631 Beatrix, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Becker, Nikolas, 189–190 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 16, 117, 185, 186–187, 1431, 1432 Beg, Mirza, 1763 Begin, Menachem, 1488–1489 Bejarano, Jorge, 830 Belarusia, 1079 Belaúnde, Victor Andrés, 373, 375 Belgian Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Belgium, 137–146, 141 (map) colonialist policies of, 958, 968, 1464 and Congo/Zaïre, 437, 1156–1158, 1160 fascism in, 517 and language, 472 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1678 secession from the Netherlands, 197 Bello, Ahmadu, 1182, 1185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 1099, 1100 Ben Bouali, Hassiba, 1099 Ben-Gurion, David, 953, 1123, 1128 Bendjedid, Chadli, 1099 Beneš, Edvard, 587, 588, 588, 596, 596 (illus.), 1017 and World War II, 595, 1019

Bengalil, 1466 Benkheddda, Benyoucef, 1100 Bennett, Louise, 913, 921 Bennett, Robert Russell, 1433 Bentham, Jeremy, 19, 855 Berbers, 1101 Berg, Christian, 153 Berkl¯aus, Edvards, 1578 Berlin, Isaiah, 97 Berlioz, Hector, 1431, 1435 Bernstein, Leonard, 1439 Berra, Francisco, 402 Betances, Ramón Emeterio, 839–840, 841 Bethlen, Count István, 638 Bhabha, Homi, 914, 927 Bhanubhakta Acharya, 1807 Bhimsen Thapa, 1806–1807 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 1466 Bhutto, Benazir, 1231, 1398 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 1231, 1767 Biafra, 1469 Biblical texts, 473–474 Biculturalism, and the Maori, 1858–1859 Biehl, Janet, 882–883 Bierstadt, Albert, 65, 389 Billig, Michael, 121, 479 bin-Laden, Osama, 986–987, 1399, 1400 Bingham, George Caleb, 389 Biogenetics, 883 Bioregionalism, 879 Birendra, King (Nepal), 1808, 1809 Bismarck, Otto von, 24, 150, 192–193, 436, 611 and Alsace, 1505 monuments to, 410–411 and Poland, 678 Bjørnson, Bjørnstjerne, 78, 228, 230 Blake, Christopher, 1439 Blanc, Louis, 239 Blest Gana, Alberto, 329 Block, Alexander, 1602 Bluetooth, Harald, 226 Boer Wars. See Anglo-Boer Wars Boers. See Afrikaner nationalism Bohemia, 584, 1022 and Hussitism, 1023 and music, 1435–1436 Boland, Eavan, 926 Bolger, Dermot, 927 Bolivar, Simón, 16, 272, 370, 825, 831 Bolivia, 371–372, 1443 Bolognesi, Francisco, 377 Bolshevik Revolution, 436, 520, 593 Bolsheviks, and religion, 106 Bonald, Louis de, 178, 179 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 16, 26, 34, 175, 176–177, 474 as father figure, 51 and the French national anthem, 1443 and Haiti, 336 and Switzerland, 248

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Boniface, Pope, 100 Bonifacio, Andres, 1245–1246 Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José, 287–289, 290, 292 Borden, Robert, 306 Borders, 460–461, 966, 967, 968 and Afghanistan, 1684–1685, 1689 in Africa, 1464, 1469 and Algeria, 1096 and Armenia, 1697–1699, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 562–563, 1582 and Basque Country, 1513, 1514 (map) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 289, 1831 and Bulgaria, 574 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 298 in Central America, 316 and the collapse of communism, 1413 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Denmark, 152 and Egypt, 262 and Ethiopia, 740, 742 and the European Union, 1042 and Fiji, 1318 and Finland, 598 and France, 175 and Germany, 187–188 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 639–640 and Indonesia, 1729–1730 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1738–1739 and Ireland, 655 and Israel, 1124–1125, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1771 and Japan, 1753 and language, 471, 474–475, 477 Mexican, 353 (map) and Mongolia, 1792 and Nepal, 1805 and the Netherlands, 199 and Paraguay, 359, 362 and Peru, 368, 371 and Poland, 212–213, 685 and Romania, 1591 and Russia, 1599 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669 and Scandinavia, 225 and Scotland, 236 and South Africa, 1145 Spain/France, 1513 and Taiwan, 1255 and Turkey, 768, 769, 1647 and Ukraine, 713–714, 719, 1620 and the United States, 390, 1390 and Uruguay, 395 and Wales, 1636 and the War of the Pacific, 376 (map)

after World War I, 514, 524 See also Expansionism Borglum, Gutzon, 65, 411 Borneo, 1218–1220 Borodin, Aleksandr, 78–79, 82, 417, 1437 Bosanquet, Bernard, 534–535 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 806 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1358, 1409, 1525–1535, 1526 (map) Bosse, Abraham, 62 Botero, Fernando, 832 Botev, Hristo, 573, 576–577 Botha, Pieter Willem, 1152 Botswana, 1443 Bouchard, Lucien, 1292 Boudiaf, Mohammed, 1099 Boudicca, Queen (England), 165 Bouhired, Djamila, 1099 Boumaza, Djamila, 1099 Boumedienne, Houari, 890, 1099, 1100, 1100 Boundaries. See Borders Boupacha, Djamila, 1099 Bourassa, Henri, 306, 1289, 1293–1294, 1296 Bourassa, Robert, 1291 Bourbon reforms, 350, 371 Bourgeoisie, 12, 585, 626. See also Elites Bourguiba, Habib, 1464 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 1099, 1100 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 333, 337, 340, 342 Bracken, Thomas, 868 Bradley, F. H., 531 Bradman, Sir Donald, 857 Brahms, Johannes, 117 Brandt, Willy, 976 Brathwaite, Kamau, 917, 921 Brazil, 282–297, 284 (map), 1824–1832, 1826 (map) and the Amazon, 876 and the arts, 1334–1335, 1439 and colonialism, 889 and Uruguay, 396–397 Brazilian Portuguese, 478 Brentano, Clemens, 73 Bretagne, 1490 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1026, 1076–1077 Brinker, Hans, 204 Bristow, George, 76 British North America Act, 300, 300 Britishness, 159, 162, 167 and Scotland, 233 Britten, Benjamin, 1434 Brock, Sir Isaac, 304 Brooklyn Bridge, 128, 134 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom, 164 Brussels, 144 Buddhism and Asian political identity, 972 and Burma, 779, 780 and Japan, 106 and Mongolia, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1798

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and politics, 983, 988 and Tibet, 1815–1817, 1821, 1822 Buenos Aires, 395–396, 397 Buhari, Muhammadu, 1187 Bulgakov, M. A., 697 Bulgaria, 437, 570–582 Bull, John, 117 Burghers, Thomas, 1150 Buriats, 1784, 1785, 1788–1795, 1791 Burke, Edmund, 89, 162, 1489 Burlington, Lord, 62 Burma, 776–785, 1370 Burnley, I. H., 883 Burns, E. Bradford, 292 Burns, Robert, 73, 238 Burschenschaften, 187 Burundi. See Rwanda and Burundi Bush, George H. W., 1306, 1395 Bush, George W., 1306, 1347, 1395–1396, 1453 Bushnell, David, 834 Bustamante, Carlos María de, 350, 352 Byron, Lord, 631 Cabero, Alberto, 330 Cabinda, 1660 Cabral, Amílcar, 1661 Cáceres, Andrés A., 377 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth, 53, 57 Cakobau, King (Fiji), 1318 Calhoun, John C., 390 Caliphate, 760–761 Cambó, Francesc, 706, 710 Cambodia, 1463 Camden, William, 61 Camphausen, Wilhelm, 408 Canada, 298–307, 301 (map), 1289 (map), 1372, 1834–1842, 1836 (map) communication in, 1473 education and, 424, 428, 429, 1383–1384 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigrants/immigration, 1415, 1418–1419, 1420 and indigenous groups, 1566 and music, 1441 and national symbols, 1344, 1346, 1347–1348 and natural resources, 884 and Nunavut, 1562 and Québec, 1288–1297 railroad in, 127 and sports, 993, 1000–1001 and technology, 1477–1478 Canal, Boisrond, 338 Cannadine, David, 1009 Capitalism and Korea, 1778–1779 and Social Democrats, 976 See also Economy; Globalization Captaincy General of Guatemala, 310, 314 Carbó, Eduardo Posada, 834 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 1829

Carducci, Giousè, 671 Carey, Henry, 117 Caribbean, 838 (map), 1274 (map) Carmichel, Franklin, 1841 Carnegie, Andrew, 239 Carpathian Ukraine, 716 Carr, E. H., 23, 536–537 Carr, Emily, 1841 Carrera, José Miguel, 326 Carrera, Rafael, 315, 318 Carretero, Luis, 711 Carter, Jimmy, 1395 Cartier, Georges-Etienne, 1288 Cartography. See Maps Castile, 1083, 1537 Castilla, Ramón, 372 Castillo, Florencio, 317 Castro, Arturo, 830 Castro, Fidel, 834, 942, 952, 1276, 1278–1279, 1278 (illus.), 1279, 1286 Castro, Raúl, 1279, 1286 Catalonia, 1413, 1415, 1536–1547, 1538 (map) and language, 477 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1091 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and Spain, 702–711, 708, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1490 Catherine the Great, 19–20 Catholicism. See Eastern Orthodox Church; Roman Catholicism Caupolicán (chief), 326 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 669, 673 Ceau¸sescu, Nicolae, 952, 1585, 1589, 1591, 1594 Cederström, Gustaf, 228 ˇ Celakovský, František Ladislav, 73 Celis, Carlos Uribe, 832 Celman, Miguel Juárez, 280 Celtic languages, 471, 472, 477 Celts, 236–237 Central America, 309–321, 312 (map), 838 (map), 1274 (map) Central American Common Market, 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 896, 1746, 1821 Ceremonies, 1347–1348 and Burma, 782 and France, 176 and Iran, 1114–1115 and nationalistic art, 411, 417 See also Holidays/festivals Cervantes, Ignacio, 76 Césaire, Aimé, 488, 917, 919 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de, 1275, 1282 Chabrier, Emmanuel, 1437 Chaco War, 360, 363, 365 Chadwick, George, 76 Chamberlain, H. St., 41 Channing, Edward Tyrell, 389 Charents, Yeghishe, 1707 Charles III (Spain), 350

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Charles V (Habsburg), 196 Charles XII (Sweden), 226 Charrúas Indians, 394 Chartists, 161, 164 Chatterji, Bankimchandra, 800 Chaudhry, Mahendra, 1323, 1324 Chaves, Julio César, 364 Chávez, Carlos, 76, 1439 Che Guevara, Ernesto, 942, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1286 Chechens, ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 441 Chechnya and Russia, 897, 1080, 1597, 1605–1607 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 Chen Duxiu, 789, 793 Chen Shui-bian, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1259 Chenrezig (God of Compassion), 1816, 1817 Chernobyl disaster, 954, 1078, 1457 Cherono, Stephen (Saif Saeed Shaheen), 1001 Chiang K’ai-shek, 791, 792, 794, 1250, 1251, 1251 (illus.) Chibás, Eduardo, 1282 Chile, 39, 323–331, 325 (map) and Peru, 377 China, 787–795, 788 (map), 1190–1200, 1192 (map) and Angola, 1664 anticolonialism in, 27 and the Cold War, 942–943 and colonialism, 890 and communism/Maoism, 952, 977, 978 and diaspora populations, 1372–1373 education and, 426, 1386–1387 and film, 1339 and India, 1210 and Indonesia, 1729 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762 and Japan, 809, 815, 1749, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 and Korea, 1780, 1781 and language, 472, 478, 481 and Mongolia, 1784, 1785, 1786–1788, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1794, 1795–1796 and music, 1440 and population transfers, 876 and religion, 108 separatism within, 1468 and the Soviet Union, 948, 979 and Taiwan, 1251, 1252–1253, 1256, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1462 and Tibet, 1813, 1814–1815, 1818–1821, 1823 and the United States, 1395 and Vietnam, 1263, 1266 Chinese in Japan, 1753 in Malaysia, 1215, 1216, 1385, 1463 in New Zealand, 867 See also Singapore Chipenda, Daniel, 1662, 1662 Cho Man Sik, 1773

Choibalsang, Marshal (Mongolia), 1789, 1792, 1797, 1798 Choinom, R., 1794 Chopin, Frédéric, 74, 81, 212, 214, 216, 686, 1434–1435 Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 1078, 1626 Chou Wen-chung, 1440 Choueiri, Youssef, 730 Christian III (Denmark), 226 Christian IV (Denmark), 226 Christian Coalition, 1395 Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International, 973–975 Christianity and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1706 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and Fiji, 1318 and fundamentalism, 1392, 1393 and the Philippines, 1239 and South Africa, 1148–1149 See also specific Christian religions Christophe, Henry, 337, 340 Chrysanthemum Revolution, 638 Chubais, Anatoly, 1597 Church, Frederic Edwin, 65 Churchill, Winston, 950, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1034, 1461 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 1283 Cinema, 133, 417–418, 497, 1327–1340 and Algeria, 1102 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and France, 1053 and Mongolia, 1794 and Québec, 1294 related to World War II, 1434 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1675 and the Soviet Union, 1075–1076 and the United States, 951–952 See also Theater Cintrón, Rosendo Matienzo, 841, 845–846 Citizenship, 930, 934–936 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 1851 and the Baltic states, 568 and Brazil, 293 and Canada, 298, 1835 and Central America, 320 and Czech Republic, 1027 and Denmark, 154–155 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1366, 1371–1372, 1374, 1376 and the EU, 1041, 1042 and forms of nationalism, 488, 1354 and France, 171, 1050 and gender/sexuality, 444, 446, 909 and Germany, 188, 620, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559 and globalization, 1409

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and Haiti, 335, 338 and immigration, 1419–1420 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 669 and Japan, 1752, 1753 and Malaysia, 1216, 1217, 1223 and Mongolia, 1796, 1798 and Peru, 371, 372–373 and Poland, 207 and Puerto Rico, 836, 843 and Ukraine, 1624 and the United States, 1398, 1401 and Uruguay, 400–401 and Wales, 1639 ˇ Ciurlionis, Mikolajus Konstantinas, 565 Civil rights movement, U.S., 124, 944, 965, 1300–1303, 1304, 1305, 1310 Civil war and Angola, 968, 1658–1659, 1663, 1666 and China, 790 and collapse of communism, 895, 896 and Colombia, 829, 833, 834 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Iraq, 757 and newly independent states, 968 and Nigeria, 967, 1185, 1185 and Palestine, 1142–1143 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and Spain, 707, 711, 1088 and the United States, 382, 391 See also Conflict/violence Civilis, Gaius Julius, 203 Class, 1–12 and Afghanistan, 1692–1693 and Angola, 1661 and Argentina, 280 and Brazil, 285 and Bulgaria, 571 and Catalan nationalism, 1537–1538 and Central America, 311 and Chile, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330–331 and China, 1194–1195, 1195, 1196, 1197 education, nationalism, and, 423, 427, 431, 478–479, 481 and Egypt, 265 and ethnic conflict, 892–893, 895, 897–898 and Finland, 601 gender, nationalism, and, 55–56 and Germany, 611 and Great Britain, 163–164 and Greece, 625 and Haiti, 334, 339 and Hungary, 644–645 and India, 131, 1204–1205 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 755, 1739 and Italy, 669–670 and Mongolia, 1795 and Québec, 1292–1293 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222

and social movements, 1452, 1454, 1456 and Soviet ideology, 693–694 and Spain, 709 and the United States, 1305 and Uruguay, 397, 403 Clavigero, Francisco Xavier, 350, 351, 351 Clay, Henry, 388–389 Clientelism, Iraq and, 750, 750–751, 755, 755, 756 Clifford, James, 1368 Clinton, William, 1408 Cloots, Anacharsis, 86 Clos, Joan, 1541 Coates, Eric, 1433 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 516 Cohen, Leonard, 1296 Cohen, Robin, 1672 Cohn, Roy, 908 Cold War, 525, 942–956, 975–979 and Angola, 1658 and Austria, 550 and Canada, 1840 and Eritrea, 1174 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 442 Europe and the end of the, 1043–1044 and Great Britain, 1012 and Indonesia, 1733, 1734 and Italy, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750 and Korea, 1772, 1773 and the Philippines, 1241 and separatist movements, 1465 and sexuality, 907–908 and sports, 994 and Tibet, 1821 and the United States, 1039, 1303, 1310 See also Nonaligned movement Cole, Thomas, 389 Collins, Bob, 1849 Colombel, Noel, 338 Colombia, 39, 824–834, 827 (map) Colonialism/imperialism, 25, 26, 489, 530, 958, 1301, 1303 and Algeria, 1098 and Angola, 1659 and Arab nationalism, 728–729, 734 and Australia, 855 and Basques, 1513 and Brazil, 283–285 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 299 and Chile, 323–324 and China, 1190 and Congo/Zaïre, 1156–1158, 1160 and diaspora populations, 1364 education and, 419, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 430, 431 and England/Great Britain, 161, 165–167, 490–491, 1005–1007 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737–740

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Colonialism/imperialism (continued ) and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889, 893 and European nationalism, 513–514 and Fiji, 1314–1316 and France, 178, 1050–1051, 1056 and gender, 54–55, 447–448 and Germany, 621 and Greenland, 1566, 1568 and Haiti, 339 and indigenous cultures, 1337 and Indochina, 1264 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1730 and Iraq, 749 and Italy, 665, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 815, 821–822, 1749, 1751 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language/literature, 479–480, 912–913, 914–917 and the Maori, 1859 and the Netherlands, 197–198 and Nigeria, 1178 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 and sports, 992 and Taiwan, 1253 and technology, 1478–1480 and terrorism, 1490 and Third World nationalisms, 1776 and the United States, 1310 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Expansionism Comenius, Jan Amos, 1028 Commonwealth Games, 996–997 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1079, 1715 Communication, 1473–1476 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 279 and Australia, 852 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and Basques, 1521 and Central America, 311, 315 and Colombia, 833 and globalization, 1414, 1416–1417 and ideologies, 972 and immigrants/diaspora populations, 1370, 1427 and India, 800 and Iraq, 1738 and Mexico, 354, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and New Zealand, 865 and Paraguay, 364 and Peru, 368

and the Philippines, 1238, 1247 and Polish nationalism, 216 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavian nationalism, 229 symbols in, 112, 122–123 technological advances in, 127–128, 129, 132, 135–136 and the United States, 388–389, 390 and Wales, 1639 See also Media Communism, 468–469, 944 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1689, 1690, 1693 and Angola, 1663 and anticolonial nationalism, 964 and Armenia, 1706, 1707 and Burma, 780 and China, 789–790, 791, 792, 793, 1190–1200, 1191, 1197 and the Cold War, 947–948, 976, 977–979 collapse of, 1413 and Cuba, 1276–1277, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020, 1022–1026 and France, 1053 and Indonesia, 1727, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 and Iraq, 753, 754, 755–756, 1745 and Korea, 1773 and Malaysia, 1216, 1223 and Romania, 1587–1588, 1589 and Singapore, 1218 versus socialism, 975–976 and Ukraine, 718 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1266, 1267, 1269 Companys, Lluís, 708 Compromise Agreement of 1867, 638 Conder, Charles, 859 Condorcet, Jean Marquis de, 53, 86, 370, 1351, 1362 Conflict/violence, 14–28, 436, 888–898, 929 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Algeria, 1095 and Basque nationalism, 1518, 1521 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527 and Brazil, 1831 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and competition among nation-states, 1032–1033 and education, 1388–1389 and Eritrea, 1172–1173, 1174–1175 and Finland, 606–607 and gender roles, 50–52, 449–450 in Germany, 1555, 1556–1557, 1559 and Gharabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh), 897, 1706, 1707–1709, 1711, 1715, 1718–1719 and ideological differences, 943–944, 977, 988–989 and India and Pakistan, 804–806, 950, 987, 1201, 1203, 1228, 1234–1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1461–1462, 1762, 1769

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and Indonesia, 1734 and instability in postindependent nations, 1469 and Iraq, 1742, 1746–1747 and Ireland/Northern Ireland, 649, 651–652, 662, 1058, 1059, 1060–1062, 1068 in Italy, 665 and the loss of optimism, 935–936 and Malaysia, 1216, 1220–1221, 1223 and minority issues, 939–940, 1412 and Mongolia, 1795–1796, 1796–1797 and natural resources/territory, 523–524, 883–886 in New Zealand, 1856–1857 and Nigeria, 1185 and the Ottoman Empire, 763–764 Palestinian/Israeli, 1129–1130, 1141 and the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 985–986, 1403 and rituals of belonging, 499, 503 role of diaspora populations in, 1365, 1415 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1673–1674, 1676–1677, 1679, 1680–1681 and separatism, 1460, 1465–1470, 1470–1471. See also Separatism/secession and South Africa, 1152–1153 and the Soviet Union, 1075, 1078–1079 and sports, 995 and Taiwan, 1256, 1256 and Tibet, 1823 in Turkey, 1649, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 722 and Vietnam, 1463 See also Civil war; Genocide; specific conflicts and wars; Terrorism Confucianism, 1270 Congo and Zaïre, 962–963, 1155–1165, 1156 (map), 1667, 1671–1672 and Angola, 1662 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and music, 1440 and separatist movements, 1469 Congress of Berlin, 578 Congress of Tucuman, 272, 273 Connolly, James, 652, 654 Connor, Walker, 931, 933 Conrad, Joseph, 489 Conscience, Hendrik, 145, 145 Constantinescu, Emil, 1589 Constantino, Renato, 1245 Consumerism and education, 1380 and image technology, 1339 and Korea, 1778–1779 and sports, 1001–1003 “Contract of the Century,” 1720–1721 Cook, James, 1855 Cook, Ramsay, 1842 Cooke, John Esten, 494

Cooper, James Fenimore, 389 Cooper, William, 1851 Copland, Aaron, 1439 Copps, Sheila, 1839 Copts, 265 Corbin, Margaret, 50 Cornejo, Mariano H., 374 Corradini, Enrico, 515 Corruption and Angola, 1665, 1666–1667 and Armenia, 1710 and the collapse of socialism, 895–896 and Congo/Zaïre, 1160 and Cuba, 1275, 1277, 1283 and Iran, 1111 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1768 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Palestinians, 1140, 1142 and the Philippines, 1243, 1244, 1247 and Québec, 1290, 1292 and Russia, 955 and the Soviet Union, 1076, 1079 and Spain, 704, 705, 1088 and Turkey, 1645, 1651 and Ukraine, 1628 Corsica, 1490 Cortés, Hernán, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 86–88, 97, 1350–1362 and Alsace, 1510 challenging cultural, 416 and Chile, 330 and globalization, 1409 and immigration, 1427–1428 versus national identities, 1342 and Russia, 82 Cossacks, 1620–1621 Costa, Emília Viotti da, 292 Costa Rica, 318, 321 Costa y Martínez, Joaquín, 705, 705 Coubertin, Pierre de, 991 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1502 Council of Europe, 1715 Counterterrorism, 1496–1498, 1757 Cowan, Charles, 235 Cox, Oliver, 1301 Coyer, Abbé, 32 Creole patriotism and Chile, 324, 326, 329 and Mexico, 349, 351, 351–352 and Peru, 369–370 Crete, 1440 Crime and Brazil, 1831 and Colombia, 834 and Iraq, 757 and Mongolia, 1797 and Pakistan, 1232 and the Philippines, 1243 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675

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Crime (continued ) versus terrorism, 1485, 1486. See also Terrorism and women, 904–905 See also Corruption Crimea, 1078, 1625 Crispi, Francesco, 737 Croatia borders of, 1413 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440, 524 fascism in, 516, 518 and language, 481 and new social movements, 1449, 1453 Croats, in Bosnia, 1527–1535 Cromer, Lord, 261 Cross, James, 1291 Cuba, 1273–1286 and Angola, 1658, 1663, 1665 and film, 1335 and music, 1441 Cui, Cesar, 82, 1437 Cultural diversity, 877–879. See also Multiculturalism Cultural revivalism, 407 Culture, 88–90, 92–93, 405–418, 506 and Alsace, 1509 and Argentina, 276, 277–279 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 854–856 and the Baltic states, 558–560, 558–561, 1578 and Basques, 705 and Brazil, 291–295, 296, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 575–577 and Canada, 1837–1842, 1843 and Catalonia, 706, 1537, 1542, 1543–1544 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Danish folk high schools, 151 education and standardization of, 420. See also Education and Egypt, 260, 264 and Ethiopia, 741, 742 and Finland, 599, 600 and France, 1050, 1052–1053 geopolitics and national, 461 German versus Austrian, 542–543 and Germany, 184, 186–187, 617–620 globalization and world, 1407. See also Globalization and Greece, 628, 629 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1728 and Ireland, 657–659 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 671–673 and Korea, 1778 and Malaysia, 1223 and the Maori, 1858, 1860 and Mongolia, 1790, 1793–1794, 1797 music in establishing national, 72–73, 76–83

and nationalism, 31, 47, 53, 129–130, 485–487, 1355 and Nepal, 1801 and the Netherlands, 205 and Nigeria, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Paraguay, 358, 362, 365, 365 and Peru, 369–370, 373, 378 and Poland, 212, 214–216, 217 and Puerto Rico, 841–843, 846–847 and Scandinavia, 226–228 and Scotland, 237–239 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 692–696 and technology, 132–134, 1474–1475 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 400, 402 See also Art; Folk culture; Language; Literature; Music Currency and Austria, 552 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 1039 the euro, 1039, 1043, 1044, 1549, 1551 and Finland, 598 and globalization, 1392 and Tibet, 1818 Cuthbert, Betty, 857 Cygnaeus, Fredrik, 601 Cyprus, 1648 Cyrus the Great, 1107, 1113 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 211–212, 213 Czech Republic, 446, 584 and music, 82, 1435–1436, 1441 See also Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, 583–596, 1016–1028 breakup of, 1413 and communism, 977 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441, 442 and geopolitics, 465 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 215 Dahl, C. J., 228 Dahl, Jens Christian, 67 Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso), 988, 1816, 1816, 1819–1820, 1821–1823 Dalin, Olof, 227 Damas, Léon, 488 Dame Te Atairangikaahu, 1857 Dance, 81, 114 and Angola, 1665 and Catalonia, 1543 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Peru, 378 and Wales, 1637

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Danevirke, 152–153 Dangarembga, Tsitsi, 913, 926–927 Danilevski, Nikolai, 93, 94 D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 489, 670 Darcy, Les, 858 Darius the Great (Persia), 1107, 1113, 1697 Darwin, Charles, 40, 462, 532 Dashbalbar, O., 1794 Daud Khan, Mohammad, 1687, 1689, 1690 David, Jacques-Louis, 177 Davis, H. O., 1180 Davitt, Michael, 451 Dayananda, Swami, 798–800, 802 Dayton Peace Accords, 1527, 1530, 1533 D’Azeglio, Massimo, 665 de Gaulle, Charles, 949, 1038, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1053–1054 de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 1151, 1152–1153, 1489 de Maistre, Joseph, 178, 179 De-Stalinization, 1077 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 245 de Valera, Eamon, 655, 657, 660–661 Deakin, Alfred, 853, 859, 859 Deane, Seamus, 488, 925 Debray, Regis, 61–62 Declaration of Arbroath, 233 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 173 Decolonization and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Eritrea, 1168 and Fiji, 1316, 1320 and Great Britain, 1006–1007, 1012, 1012 and Malaysia, 1216–1217 and the United States, 1303 See also Colonialism/imperialism Decommissioning, 1063 Dehio, Georg, 415 Delacroix, Eugene, 49 Delgado, Matías, 318 Delors, Jacques, 1040 Demchugdongrub, Prince (Mongolia), 1789–1790 Demirchian, Karen, 1707 Democracy, 66, 1360–1361, 1362, 1399–1400, 1488 and Afghanistan, 1686, 1687, 1689–1690 and Angola, 1663 and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Argentina, 275, 276, 281 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 853, 854 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Brazil, 1831 and Canada, 1843 and Central America, 314–315, 318 and Chile, 328–329 and China, 789, 791, 794 and the Cold War, 944–945 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England/Great Britain, 163, 1008 and Eritrea, 1175 in Europe, 419

and Germany, 190, 613, 614, 620–621, 1556, 1559–1560 and India, 981, 1208, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Mongolia, 1784 and Nepal, 1809 and the Netherlands, 199, 206 and Nigeria, 1188 and the Philippines, 1248 and Poland, 214, 215 and Romania, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1594 and Russia, 1596 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1678–1679 and Spain, 1082, 1084, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 248, 249, 250 and Taiwan, 1253–2354, 1259 and Turkey, 1647 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 385, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1311 See also Voting franchise Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Demonstration effect, 1477–1478 Deng Xiaoping, 1200 Denmark, 147–156, 220–222, 226–228 education and, 429 and the European Union, 1038 flag, 229 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1566, 1572 language and, 225, 472 national anthem/music of, 68–69, 230, 1443 Derrida, Jacque, 1052 Desai, Anita, 923 DeSica, Vittorio, 1334 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 336–337, 340, 342 Determinism social, 127–128 technological, 126–127 Deutsch, Karl, 1474–1475 Devolution, and Great Britain, 1013–1015 Devoto, Juan E. Pivel, 399 Dewey, John, 422, 425 Dialectical materialism. See Marxism Diamonds, 968 and Angola, 1659–1660 and South Africa, 1145–1146 Diaspora populations, 1364–1377 and Algeria, 1097 and Armenians, 1698, 1699, 1700–1701, 1703, 1704, 1704, 1707, 1708–1709, 1710, 1711 and discrimination, 1426–1427 and homeland politics, 1414–1415 and India, 1211 and the Internet, 1482–1483 Jews, 1125–1126 and Latvians, 1581 and Nepal, 1807

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Diaspora populations (continued ) and new social movements, 1455 and Nigeria, 1179 and Russians, 698 and supporting terrorism, 1488 Díaz, Porfirio, 355 Diderot, Denis, 102, 171 Die Degenhardts, 133 Diefenbaker, John, 1838, 1839 Diego, José de, 839, 841, 846 Diego, Juan, 347, 349 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 1264, 1264–1265, 1271, 1463 Diffusion of innovations theory, 1477 Dion, Céline, 1296 Discrimination/prejudice and Afghanistan, 1690, 1692 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 858 and Czechoslovakia, 1022, 1027 and Ethiopia, 741 and Fiji, 1316 against immigrants, 1420, 1423–1427 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1729 and Iran, 1113, 1118 and New Zealand, 867 and Nigeria, 1179 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Turkey, 1653, 1655 and the United States, 1304 See also Racism Dixon, Thomas, 1328 Djaout, Tahar, 1100 Djebar, Assia, 1100 Dmowski, Roman, 436, 682, 685 Dobson, Andrew, 877, 880 Dodge, Mary Mapes, 204 Dodson, Mick, 1848 Dodson, Pat, 1848 Dollard des Ormeaux, Adam, 303, 1294 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 516, 546 Domingue, Michel, 338 Dominican Republic, 339. See also Santo Domingo Donskoi, Dmitrii, 696 Dontsov, Dmytro, 718 Dorrego, Manuel, 273 Dorzhiev, Agwang, 1793 Dostoyevski, Fedor, 93, 105–106 Dostoyevski, Mihailo, 93 Dostum, Rashid, 1695 Douglas, Stephen A., 390 Douglas, Tommy C., 1839–1840 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 718 Drake, Sir Francis, 164 Du Bois, W. E. B., 965, 1179, 1301, 1303 du Toit, Daniel, 1149 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 978, 1022, 1026, 1028 Duchy of Warsaw, 209

Dufour, Guillaume-Henri, 253 Dugin, Alexander, 1601 Duke, James, 1399 Duplessis, Maurice, 1290, 1294 Durand, Asher, 389 Dürer, Albrecht, 415 Dürich, Jaroslav, 588 Durkheim, Émile, 5, 99, 111–112, 120, 908–909, 1054 Duruy, Victor, 178 Dutch Antilles, 197 Dutch Reformed church, 1145, 1148, 1149 Duyvendak, Jan Willem, 1446 Dvoˇrák, Antonín, 75, 1436, 1438 Dyer, Reginald, 804 Eagleton, Terry, 922 East Germany, 1449. See also Germany East Slavic nationalism, 716 East Timor, 1381, 1468, 1729, 1731–1732, 1734 and Christianity, 1239 Easter rising of 1916 (Ireland), 651–652, 652 Eastern Europe and communism, 977 development of nationalism in, 26 ethnic conflict and, 888, 895–897 and new social movements, 1449, 1456 Eastern Orthodox Church, 946 and Eritrea, 1171 and Greek independence, 627 and national identity, 103 and politics, 983 and Russia, 105–106, 1080, 1602–1603, 1605 and Serbs, 1529 and Slavic peoples, 972 Ebbesen, Niels, 153–154 Ecologism versus environmentalism, 877, 880–881, 883 Economic liberalism, 19 and Argentina, 276 and Central America, 316 and India, 1211 and Peru, 368, 372 and Turkey, 1645 See also Liberalism Economy, 18–19, 433, 895–896, 1359, 1380, 1407, 1474, 1496, 1939 and Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1095–1096 and Alsace, 1502, 1510 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Arab nationalism, 729 and Argentina, 269–271, 279, 280 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 850–851 and Austria, 545, 553 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1719–1721 and Basques, 1513, 1522 and Brazil, 296, 1825, 1827, 1828–1832 and Burma, 777

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and Canada, 302, 1477–1478, 1837, 1842 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 310–311, 315 and Chile, 324, 330 and China, 1198, 1372–1373, 1387 and Colombia, 826 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Denmark, 149 and Egypt, 257, 258, 259 and the European Union, 1044 and Fiji, 1322–1323 and France, 172, 175, 1047, 1054 and Germany, 191–192, 611 and Greenland, 1563, 1568 and Haiti, 333, 337, 342–343 and India, 1206, 1211 and Indonesia, 1723, 1733 and Iraq, 756, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 653, 660–661 and Israel, 1130 and Italy, 665, 669, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755–1756, 1757 and Korea, 1778–1779, 1781 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 and Mongolia, 1784–1785, 1796 and Nepal, 1801, 1808, 1811 and the Netherlands, 205 and New Zealand, 863 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1059–1060 and Pakistan, 1227–1229 and Paraguay, 358–359 and Peru, 368, 377 and the Philippines, 1247–1248 and Poland, 217, 678, 679, 680 and Puerto Rico, 837, 847 and Romania, 1585 and Russia, 692, 1597, 1599, 1604 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670–1671 and the Sami, 1609–1610, 1613 and Scandinavia, 221 and Scotland, 233 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1077 and Spain, 706, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1644–1645, 1651, 1656 and the United States, 388–389, 1395 and Uruguay, 396 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Economic liberalism; Globalization Edelfelt, Albert, 605 Edgerton, Lynda, 903 Education, 9–10, 29–41, 81–82, 130, 419–433, 461, 464–465, 478–479, 482, 504–505, 1379–1390 and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Arab nationalism, 731

and Argentina, 276–277, 279 and Armenia, 1703 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 287, 289, 293, 296 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 303, 1477–1478, 1843 and Central America, 315 and China, 1193, 1198, 1199 and Colombia, 833 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 746 and Finland, 608 and France, 178, 409, 1049 and Greek independence, 627 and Greenland, 1566, 1571–1572 and Haiti, 342 and India, 796, 798 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 751–752, 755, 756, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1745 and Italy, 675, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 811, 816, 1749, 1757 and Korea, 1776–1777 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1785, 1796, 1797, 1798 and Nepal, 1808 and the Netherlands, 197, 198, 199–200, 205 and New Zealand, 865–866 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Paraguay, 362 and Poland, 217, 688 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and the Sami, 1613, 1615 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 and Scotland, 234 and Singapore, 1225 and Slovakia, 587 and South Africa, 1148–1149 and the Soviet Union, 696, 1073 and Spain, 708–709 and Switzerland, 250, 254 and Taiwan, 1254 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1646, 1652, 1656 and Ukraine, 714, 1621, 1625 and the United States, 1305–1306 and Uruguay, 400, 401, 403 and Vietnam, 1271 Eelam, 1467, 1491 Egypt, 256–266, 257 (map), 982 anticolonialism in, 26 and Arab nationalism, 725, 728, 729–730, 734

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Egypt (continued ) and gender, 446, 450 and new social movements, 1452 and religious fundamentalism, 984–986, 1396 and terrorism, 1490 Eicher, Carolyn, 56 Eiffel, Gustave, 134 Eiffel Tower, 134 Einstein, Albert, 1350, 1362 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 697, 700, 1330 El Salvador, 318, 321 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 1715 Elgar, Edward, 1438 Elias, Norbert, 1369 Elites and Afghanistan, 1689 and Angola, 1665 and Belgium independence, 142–143 and Colombia, 826–827, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 of Ethiopia, 739–741 and Finland, 598, 600, 601 in Hungary, 637–638 and Iraq, 749, 750–751 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 1751 and new social movements, 1453 and Peru, 368, 371 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Russia, 690, 692–697 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672, 1676 and Spain, 707 and sports, 999 technology and the authority of, 1480 in Turkey, 1651, 1653 and Vietnam, 1269 and Wales, 1633 See also Intellectuals Elizabeth I, Queen (England), 164–165 Elizabeth II (Great Britain), 870 Ellison, Ralph, 1303 Emecheta, Buchi, 927 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 59, 389 Emigration and Afghanistan, 1687 and Algeria, 1095, 1097, 1102 and Alsace, 1505, 1507 and Basques, 1513 and Cuba, 1277 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1365–1366, 1371 and Fiji, 1325 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Ireland, 649, 660–661 and Korea, 1781 and Mongolia, 1798 and Poland, 212 and Puerto Rico, 847

and Turkey, 1648 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Diaspora populations; Immigrants/ immigration Eminescu, Mihai, 1592 Emmet, Robert, 649 Enculturation. See Assimilation Engels, Friedrich, 217 England, 158–167 constitution of, 162 and counterterrorism, 1496 economic liberalism and nationalism in, 18–19 education and, 423 and Greek independence, 631 and music, 1432 nationalism in, 5–6, 502 nationalistic art in, 408, 410 and Uruguay, 395 See also Great Britain English language, 480, 483 Enlightenment, the and the American Revolution, 21 erosion of religious power in the, 102 and France, 171 and liberalism, 1350–1351 and organicism, 462 and origins of nationalism, 9–10 and romantic nationalism, 406 Enloe, Cynthia, 901, 904 Ensor, Robert, 425 Environment and Brazil, 1825, 1827–1831, 1832 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and Haiti, 343 and Latvia, 1575–1576, 1581 and the Sami, 1615 and Tibet, 1814 See also Environmentalism/environmental movements; Natural resources Environmentalism/environmental movements, 875–886, 1446–1458 Eötvös, Jószef, 96 Epicurus, 476 Erben, Karel Jaromír, 73 Ercilla, Alonso de, 324–326, 329 Eriksson, Magnus, 226 Eritrea, 1167–1175, 1168 (map), 1469 diaspora population of, 1370 and Ethiopia, 742 Erk, Ludwig Christian, 73 Erkel, Ferenc, 79 Erskine, David Stuart, 239 Erslev, Kristian, 227 Escher, Hans Konrad, 254 Eskimo. See Inuit Estonia, 1078, 1374. See also Baltic states Ethics. See Morality Ethiopia, 736–746, 738 (map) and Eritrea, 1171–1172, 1174, 1175, 1469

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Ethnic cleansing, 435–442, 522–523 and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1507 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530, 1531, 1532 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 596, 1020 and Germany, 617, 622 and Hungary, 645 and Jews in Iraq, 756 and Poland, 681 and Turkey, 1648–1649 in Ukraine, 722 See also Conflict/violence; Genocide Ethnic conflict. See Conflict/violence Ethnicity, 931, 1354 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688–1689, 1693, 1694–1695 and Angola, 1660, 1664 and Argentina, 276, 277 and Armenia, 1703, 1709 and Austria, 543–544 and Azerbaijan, 1716, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528–1530, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 580 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 1836 and Catalonia, 1542–1543 and Central America, 311, 314 and China, 1193–1197, 1196, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1020–1021 and education, 35, 36, 39, 40, 1379 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 741, 742–743 and Fiji, 1314 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1412–1413, 1415, 1416 and Greece, 633 and Greenland, 1570–1571 and Hungary, 644 and immigrants, 1424 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 672, 673 and Japan, 1753 and Latvia, 1574–1575 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1213–1215, 1225 and Mongolia, 1790–1791, 1797–1798, 1798–1799 and music, 1431–1432 and nationalist movements, 10, 11, 27, 46, 1460, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1469–1470 and Nepal, 1808, 1809–1810 and the Netherlands, 199 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 967, 1178, 1185, 1186

and Northern Ireland, 1063 and the Ottoman Empire, 101–102 and Pakistan, 1231–1232, 1236 and Paraguay, 362 and the Philippines, 1243–1244 and Poland, 209, 212, 213, 214, 216 in political philosophy, 88–90, 95, 461, 464 and Québec, 1296–1297 and religion, 103–105, 107–109 and Romania, 1592–1594 and Russia, 1079–1080, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669–1670 and Scotland, 236–237 and South Africa, 1144, 1145 and the Soviet Union, 1076 and Taiwan, 1254, 1257–1258 and Turkey, 1650 and Ukraine, 712–713, 1621 and the United States, 1309 See also Minorities; Religion Eto Shin’pei, 820 Eurasianism, 466 Europe borders after World War II, 581 (map), 591 (map), 616 (map), 668 (map), 684 (map), 1018 (map), 1550 (map), 1590 (map) borders from 1914 to 1938, 170 (map), 184 (map), 540 (map), 556 (map), 579 (map), 586 (map), 612 (map), 624 (map), 636 (map), 656 (map), 666 (map), 680 (map), 762 (map) borders in 1815, 139 (map), 148 (map), 182 (map), 208 (map), 246 (map), 610 (map), 664 (map) colonialism and, 420–421 and cultural identity in, 445 development of nationalism in, 26, 31 education and, 33–36, 38–39, 422, 427 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 437, 441–442 and gender/sexuality, 44, 908 and immigration, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1425 imperative and imaginary forms of nationalism in, 501–503 and landscape art, 64 and language, 472, 477 and music, 73–75, 1432 nationalism and class in, 4, 11 nationalism and conflict in, 16, 23–26 and new social movements, 1447 perversions of nationalism in, 512–525 revolutions of 1848 in, 24–25, 47, 52 supranational bodies in, 948–949, 974 systems of governance in, 419 and terrorism, 1494, 1495, 1497 and transnationalism, 1509–1510 women’s suffrage in, 453 and xenophobia, 1412 See also European institutions; specific European countries and organizations

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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1034–1035, 1037 European Convention on Human Rights, 908 European Court of Justice, 1035 European Economic Community (EEC), 1010, 1036, 1038, 1049, 1509–1510 European institutions, 1034–1036, 1039, 1040 and Great Britain, 1007, 1010 See also European Union (EU) European Parliament, 974, 1035, 1039 European Union (EU), 948–949, 1021 (map), 1030–1046, 1032 (map), 1532–1533, 1551 (map) and Algeria, 1095 and Alsace, 1510 and Armenia, 1704 and Basques, 1517, 1522 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528 Committee of the Regions, 1043, 1541 and Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1028 education and, 432 flag, 1410 (illus.) and France, 1048 and Germany, 1549–1551, 1555 and globalization, 1407, 1409, 1410–1411 and indigenous groups, 1610 and Ireland, 1060 and Latvia, 1582 and minorities, 1412–1413 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Spain, 1092 and Turkey, 1645, 1648, 1650, 1656 and Ukraine, 1623 Europeanization, 1406 Evans, Gwynfor, 1633, 1635 Evans, Robert, 1434 Evatt, H. V., 858 Evolutionary theory. See Social Darwinism Exhibitions, 412–414. See also Holidays/festivals Exile and diaspora populations, 1365, 1369, 1370 Expansionism affect on Hungary of, 639 and Brazil, 283–284 and Canada, 300–302, 1837 and geopolitics, 459 and Germany, 617, 621 Herder on, 88 and Italy, 665–667 and manipulation of ethnic autonomy claims, 940 nationalism as justifying, 40 and Nazi Germany, 518 and perversions of nationalism, 523–524 Soviet, 945 and the United States, 22, 37, 39, 465, 1308 See also Colonialism/imperialism Expedition of the Thousand, 672, 674 Expressionism, 491

Fabianism, 471 Factionalism and the Maori, 1857 and nationalist movements, 940–941 See also Conflict/violence Factory, 129–130 Faehlmann, Friedrich Robert, 561 Fairhair, Harald, 226 Faisal I, King (Iraq), 727, 728, 728, 749–750, 750, 1742, 1743, 1745 Falkland Islands, 275, 1009 Falla, Manuel de, 1437 Fallersleben, Hoffmann von, 117 Falwell, Jerry, 1395 Fanon, Frantz, 963, 1100 Færoe Islands, 220–222, 225, 231 Fascism, 515–517, 525, 973, 1301 and gender, 454–456 and Hungary, 638, 639 and imperative nationalism, 502 and Italy, 419, 667, 670–671, 674–675, 675–676 and Japan, 817 and nationalistic art, 413–415, 417 and the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 and race, 672 See also Nazism Fashoda Incident, 460 Fatah, 1137, 1142–1143 Faulkner, William, 495 Favre, Louis, 254 Federal Republic of Central America, 310, 313, 316 Federalism and Australia, 850, 852–853 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1171–1172 and India, 1205–1206, 1766 and Indonesia, 1723 and Malaysia, 1216, 1218 and Nigeria, 1183, 1185 as solution to minority demands, 933 and Ukraine, 721–722 and the United States, 383 Feminists, 451–453, 454 versus nationalists, 902, 907 See also Women’s rights Fennoman movement, 598–599, 600, 601, 601 Feraoun, Mouloud, 1100 Ferdinand, Franz, 1490 Ferdinand, King (Romania), 1586 Ferdinand of Aragon, 709 Ferdowsi, 1107, 1113–1114 Ferguson, Adam, 234 Ferguson, William, 1851 Fernández, Emiliano R., 364 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 400 Ferry, Jules, 178 Festival of Britain, 1011 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 17, 34, 90–92, 186, 475, 533

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Fidelis, Malgorzata, 53 Fiji, 1313–1325, 1315 (map), 1441 Film. See Cinema Film noir, 1333 Finland, 220–222, 597–608, 599 (map) education and, 429 and gender, 54, 450 and independence, 223, 231 language and, 225 and music, 1432, 1436, 1443 national identity and culture of, 226–228, 466 and national symbols, 230 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1614, 1616 Finno-Russian War, 607 Firley, Barker, 1841 (illus.) First Schleswigian War, 149, 152 Fischer, Joschka, 1555 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 489 Fitzpatrick, Brian, 857 Flag(s), 112–113, 116–117 Australian, 855 Basque, 1521 Belgium, 145 Brazilian, 294 and Burma, 781 Canadian, 1835 Catalonian, 1538–1539 and Central America, 318–319 Chilean, 327 Colombian, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 Egyptian, 265 and the European Union, 1042, 1410 (illus.) French, 175 German, 619 and Greenland, 1569, 1570 Indonesian, 1732 Irish, 659 Japanese, 1756, 1756 (illus.), 1757 Maori, 873 and New Zealand, 866 Nigerian, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 Polish, 686 Puerto Rican, 842 (illus.), 844 and Québec, 1294 Romanian, 1592 Russian, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 229–230 Swiss, 253 and Tibet, 1818 Turkish, 1646, 1647, 1653 and the United States, 1308 Flemings, 144–145, 146, 200, 413 Folk culture, 406, 462, 530 and Alsace, 1510 and the Baltic states, 561, 563–564 and Cuba, 1280

and Finland, 599, 604 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 Haiti and folktales, 342 and Hungary, 643 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1797 and music, 73, 76, 77, 80–82, 417, 1434–1435, 1436, 1437, 1444 and Paraguay, 364 and Poland, 212, 216 and Russia, 693 and the Sami, 1612, 1614–1615 and Scandinavia, 226, 228, 229 and Switzerland, 251 and Turkish folklore, 774 and Ukraine, 721 and Wales, 1634 See also Culture; Indigenous groups Food insecurity and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Peru, 378 Ford, John, 1337 Foreign intervention and Angola, 968, 1658 and China, 793 during the Cold War, 943–944, 945, 947–948, 977 and Cuba, 1275, 1277 and globalization, 1408–1409 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117 and Turkey, 1652 and the United States, 1305 See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign policy and Armenia, 1710–1711 and Brazil, 1831 and China, 1200 and Cuba, 1285–1286 and the European Union, 1040, 1042 and geopolitics, 458 and Germany, 1554, 1555 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1751, 1757–1758 and Latvia, 1576 and Mongolia, 1798 and New Zealand, 871 and post-World War II Europe, 974 and the Soviet Union, 979 and sports, 994–995 terrorism as, 1488 and Ukraine, 1622–1623 and the United States, 955–956 Forster, E. M., 490 Forster, Georg, 86 Fortuyn, Pim, 1453, 1486 Foster, Stephen, 389 Foucault, Michel, 1052 Four Freedoms, 972 Fourier, Charles, 423 Fowler, Robert, 1839

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France, 102, 169–179, 172 (map), 502, 1047–1057, 1048 (map) and Algeria, 1097, 1098 and Alsace, 1502–1504, 1505, 1507 and Arab nationalism, 727–728 aristocracy and nationalism in, 5–8 and Basques, 1513, 1513, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Belgium, 140–141 and Canada, 298 colonialism and, 424–425, 958, 1463–1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the Dreyfus affair, 520 education and, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 423 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1034, 1038 fascism in, 515 and film, 1336 and gender, 43, 48–49, 448 and geopolitics, 468 and Greek independence, 631 and Haiti, 333, 335–336, 340 and Indochina, 1263–1264 and Iraq, 1739 and language, 420, 480, 482 and the Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities/immigrants, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1424 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1437, 1441, 1443 and national identity, 461, 465 national symbols of, 134 nationalistic culture/art in, 407, 408, 409–410, 413, 415, 416 and new social movements, 1448, 1457 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and political philosophy, 14–17, 475 and the Rhine crisis of 1840, 189–190 and the Suez War, 266 and Syria, 728 and Uruguay, 395 See also French Revolution Francia, José Gaspar de, 361, 364 Franco, Francisco, 705–706, 707, 709, 973, 1088–1089, 1089 (illus.), 1471, 1515, 1519, 1536 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 409, 412, 465 Francophonie, 1056–1057 Franklin, Benjamin, 21 Franko, Ivan, 720 Franks, 1537 Fraser, Dawn, 857 Frederick I (Holy Roman Empire), 619 Frederick II (Denmark), 226 Frederick William IV (Prussia), 191 Frederik, Christian, 224 Freinet, Célestin, 425

French Canadians and the defeat at Québec, 299 and duality in Canada, 303, 306 identity and, 302 tensions over political control in, 299–300, 303 See also Québec French Revolution, 34, 174 and Alsace, 1502 and the aristocracy, 7 and Basques, 1513 gender and symbols in the, 45–46, 49, 50–51 and Germany, 185–186 impact on Haiti of the, 334–335 influence in Brazil of, 293 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 and popular sovereignty, 15–16 and terrorism, 1489 French West Africa, 424–425 Friedrich, Caspar David, 67, 463 Friel, Brian, 917, 925 Fröbel, F., 36 Frost, Robert, 392 Fry, William Henry, 76 Fuad, King (Egypt), 263 Fucik, Julius, 1441 Fugner, Jindrich, 594 Fukuyama, Francis, 988 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 9 Furnivall, J. S., 783 Furphy, Joseph, 857 Gagarin, Yuri, 951 Gaidar, Yegor, 1597 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 833 Gaitskell, Deborah, 904 Galicia, 209, 210, 1088 and Ukrainians, 715, 716, 718 Gallen-Kallela, Akseli, 605 Gálvez, Mariano, 317 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 1079 Gance, Abel, 1328 Gandhi, Indira, 1207, 1207–1208, 1466, 1766, 1767 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), 798, 801, 802–804, 803, 805 (illus.), 950, 963 and gender issues, 451 and India’s social structure, 1205, 1208 and nonviolent resistance, 976, 1203, 1822 Gandhi, Priyanka, 1207 Gandhi, Rahul, 1207 Gandhi, Rajiv, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1492, 1767, 1768 Gandhi, Sanjay, 1207 Gandhi, Sonia, 1207 García, Calixto, 1282 García Calderón, Francisco, 375 García Márquez, Gabriel, 832 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 502, 672, 673, 674, 674 (illus.) monuments to, 410 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Garnier, Charles, 134

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Garrigue, Charlotte, 585 Garvey, Marcus, 494, 1179, 1850 Gasperi, Alcide De, 973–974 Gaudí, Antoni, 706 Gay, Peter, 613 Gediminas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Geffrard, Fabre, 337, 339 Gégoire, Abbé, 34 Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 73, 228 Gellner, Ernest, 130, 461, 476, 479, 1475, 1835 Gender, 43–57, 444–457, 899–910 and colonialism, 926–927 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Uruguay, 401 Genocide, 435–442 and American indigenous groups, 893 and Armenians, 765, 1699, 1704, 1704, 1706, 1709, 1711, 1718 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Hungary, 645 and Kurds in Iraq, 756 and Nazi Germany, 517, 622 and perversions of nationalism, 522–523, 524, 525 and Rwanda and Burundi, 968, 1671, 1672, 1674, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679, 1680 and Tibet, 1820 See also Conflict/violence; Ethnic cleansing; Holocaust Geoffrin, Madame de, 7 (illus.) Geopolitics, 458–469 George, Lloyd, 468, 593 George, Terry, 1674 George V (Great Britain), 132, 870 Georgia, 897, 1071, 1079, 1080, 1710 German Confederation of 1815, 149–150, 189, 191 German Customs Union, 191–192 German National Society, 192 Germanization, 617 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 594–595, 595 Germany, 181–194, 525, 609–622, 1548–1560 and Alsace, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1508 anti-Semitism in, 520 and Austria, 544, 546–548 citizenship in, 1354 and colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and democracy, 946–947 education and, 34, 35, 36, 38, 419, 421, 422–423, 426, 429–430 and the environment, 882–883 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and the European Union, 949 and expansionism, 524 and film, 1330–1331 and France, 1051 and gender, 448, 453 and geopolitics, 458, 459, 462–464, 466–467, 468 and immigration, 1419, 1424

and language, 472 and minorities, 1374 and the Moroccan crises, 514 and music, 1431, 1432 and national identity, 465 National Socialism/Nazism in, 133–134, 517–519 nationalism and political philosophy in, 9–10, 17–18, 90–93, 474–475, 491, 502, 533–534 nationalistic art of, 408–409, 410–411, 413–414, 415–417, 418 and new social movements, 1450, 1453 and Poland, 678 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 and rituals of belonging, 507–508 Soviet advancement into, 950 symbols in, 49, 114, 117 unification of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 512 and World War II, 1309 See also East Germany; West Germany Gershwin, George, 1439 Geser, 1791 Gettino, Octavio, 1335 Gezelle, Guido, 145 Ghana (Gold Coast), 962, 964, 980 and independence, 1464 and music, 1443 Gharabagh conflict, 897, 1078–1079 and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1716, 1718–1719 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 1589, 1594 Gibbs, Pearl, 1851 Gilgamesh, 1738 Ginestera, Alberto, 1439 Gladstone, William E., 241–242, 651, 654 Glaize, Léon, 409 Glinka, Mikhail, 75, 78, 79, 694, 1437, 1602 Global institutions and globalization, 1412 for governance, 1359–1362, 1406, 1456 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 sports, 991 and transnationalism, 1407 and values, 1392 See also United Nations (UN) Globalization, 1405–1417 and Brazil, 1826, 1830, 1832 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1374, 1376 and education, 1380, 1389 and the environment, 877 and global governance, 1359 and image technology, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1427–1428 and India, 1211 and Japan, 1750 and the loss of optimism, 936 and minorities, 1547 versus nationalism, 1392

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Globalization (continued ) and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and religious fundamentalism, 1397–1404 and sports, 999, 1000, 1001–1003 technology as facilitating, 135–136 and Vietnam, 1271 Glyndwr, ˆ Owain, 1637 Gobineau, Arthur, 40 Gocar, Josef, 594 “God Save the King,” 117 Godard, Jean-Luc, 1336 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 1332 Goh Chok Tong, 1384 Gökalp, Mehmet Ziya, 766, 766, 770, 774 Gömbös, Gyula, 638 Gómez, Máximo, 1282 Gonçalves, Gomide, Antônio, 283 Gongaze, Georgiy, 1628 Gonne, Maud, 451 González, Juan Natalicio, 365 González Prada, Manuel, 373, 374 González Vigil, Francisco de Paula, 377 Good Friday Agreement, 1062, 1062, 1063 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 946, 979, 1039, 1079, 1581, 1582 and the Baltic states, 1078 Gordon, Andrew, 815 Gordon, Walter, 1842 Gorodetskii, S. M., 700 Görres, Joseph, 92 Gothicism, 223 Gottschalk, Louis Moreau, 76, 389, 1438 Gottwald, Klement, 1019, 1024 Gouges, Olympe de, 173–174 Gouldner, Alvin, 1473 Gounod, Charles, 117 Government(s) and Afghanistan, 1686, 1686–1687, 1692 and Algeria, 1099 and Angola, 1663 and Argentina, 272, 275 and Armenia, 1699 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 282–283, 284, 287, 289–290, 296 and Bulgaria, 578 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 302–303 and Catalonia, 1538–1539 and China, 795, 1192–1193 and Colombia, 828 and Czechoslovakia, 590 and England, 162, 163 and Ethiopia, 740, 741 European systems of, 419 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1317, 1317, 1321, 1323, 1323 and Finland, 598 and France, 169–171, 175, 176, 1048–1049, 1053–1054 German, Italian, Japanese postwar, 946–947

and Germany, 609, 611–613 and Great Britain, 1007–1008 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1565, 1567 Haiti and instability in, 336–338 and India, 1204 instability of postindependence, 1469 and Iran, 986 and Iraq, 750, 1747 and Ireland, 648 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1766 and Japan, 812 and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and Nigeria, 1183, 1186 and Northern Ireland, 1059, 1063 and the Ottoman millet system, 761 and Palestinians, 1142 and Romania, 1588, 1588–1589 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Scotland, 234–235 and Spain, 702–703, 1084–1085, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 247–250, 249, 254–255 Tibetan exile, 1821, 1822 and the United States, 383–387, 391 and Uruguay, 398–399 and Vietnam, 1270–1271 and Wales, 1632 See also Democracy; Federalism Govineau, Arthur, 415 Gowon, Yakubu, 1185, 1186 Goya, Francisco de, 1437 Grabski, Stanisław, 685 Gracia, Gilberto Concepción de, 845 Gramsci, Antonio, 486 Granados, Enrique, 1437 Granatstein, Jack, 1842 Grant, George Parkin, 1838 Grant, James, 235 Grant, John, 235 Grau, Miguel, 377 Grau San Martín, Ramón, 1276 Great Britain, 236 (map), 1005–1015, 1006 (map), 1061 (map) and Arab nationalism, 727–728, 729 and Argentina, 269, 275, 279–280 and Australia, 850–851 and Brazil, 289 and Burma, 776–777, 781, 783, 783 and Canada, 299–300, 300, 307 and Central America, 318 and colonial divestment, 1461, 1464 and colonialism, 27, 490–491, 889, 958 communication and technology in, 128, 132, 1473 and Denmark, 150 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 36, 38–39, 426, 429, 432, 1381–1382 and Egypt, 259, 260–261, 262–263, 265

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and Eritrea, 1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1036, 1038, 1040 fascism in, 516 and Fiji, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1317, 1319 and film, 1337 and gender, 447–448, 450 and geopolitics, 468 and Haiti, 335, 340 and immigration, 1419, 1420 and India, 55, 131, 797, 798, 804–806, 1203 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 749–750, 752–753, 1739, 1742, 1745 and Ireland, 915 Irish in, 654 and Israel/Palestine, 1123, 1125, 1129, 1133, 1134–1135, 1140, 1402 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762, 1763, 1764 and landscape art, 61, 62–64 and language, 472, 480, 482, 912 and Malaysia, 1213–1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and the Maori, 1856 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities, 1412 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1442, 1443 national anthem of, 117, 1431 and natural resources, 885 and Nepal, 1805 and New Zealand, 863, 868, 872 and Nigeria, 1178, 1181, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1058–1068 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and Pakistan, 1227, 1231 political philosophy in, 534–535 and Québec, 1288 and rituals of belonging, 507 and Scotland, 233–242 and South Africa, 1145–1146, 1150 and sports, 992, 996–998 symbols of, 114 and terrorism, 1488 and Tibet, 1818 and Uruguay, 396, 397 and Wales, 1631–1633, 1632 Great Depression and Burma, 777, 777 and Canada, 302 and Japan, 810, 821 Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 (Peru), 370–371 Greece, 623–633, 626 (map) and diaspora populations, 1374 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437–438 and the European Union, 1040 independence of, 46, 53, 464 and language, 477 and minorities, 1424 and Turkey, 1648

Greeks ethnic cleansing of, 438 Greek independence and diasporic, 627, 632 in Turkey, 1648 in the United States, 1427 Greenfeld, Liah, 938 Greenland, 220, 1561–1572 Greenpeace, 1361, 1362, 1448 Grégoire, Abbé, 173, 178 Gregory, Lady Augusta, 918, 922 Grenfell, Maria, 1439 Gretzky, Wayne “The Great One,” 1842 Grieg, Edvard, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 228, 417, 1436–1437 Griffith, David Wark, 1328 Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm, 67, 406 Grímsson, Magnus, 228 Grofé, Ferde, 1439 Grotius, Hugo, 203 Groulx, Abbé Lionel, 1290, 1293, 1294 Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap, 1637 Grundtvig, N. F. S., 151, 151, 228, 429 Guantánamo Bay, 1280 Guaraní Indians, 358, 395 Guardiola, Santos, 315 Guatemala, 318, 319, 321 Guernica, 1515, 1519–1521 Guerrier, Philipe, 337 Guindon, Hubert, 1293 Guiteras, Antonio, 1282, 1283 Guizot, François, 177 Gulf War (1990–1991), 756, 952, 1408–1409, 1746–1747 and Germany, 1554 Gumilev, Nikolai, 94, 1601 Gustav I Vasa (Sweden), 226, 230 Gustav II Adolf, King (Sweden), 223, 224 (illus.), 226, 565 Gustav III (Sweden), 223 Gyanendra, King (Nepal), 1809 Haakon IV (Norway), 226 Habermas, Jürgen, 97, 1481, 1556 Habibullah II, 1686, 1688, 1691 Habsburg empire, 512, 541 and Austria, 539, 541, 543–544 and Belgium, 138–139 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Czechoslovaks, 584, 587–588 and the formation of Austria-Hungary, 512 and Germany, 189, 191 and Hungary, 407, 637 and language, 472 and Mexico, 350 nationalistic philosophers from the, 96 and the Netherlands, 196 and Poland, 679–681 and Switzerland, 252 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 1677

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Hadj, Messali, 1097, 1099 Hadjiiski, Ivan, 577 Haegy, Xavier, 1508 Hagemann, Karen, 52 Haider, Jörg, 553 Haile Selassie, 740, 742, 743 Hailu, Kasa (Emperor Tewodros), 739, 743, 744 Haiti, 26, 174, 332–343, 334, 1414 Halbwachs, Maurice, 1343 Hallgrímsson, Jónas, 228 Halonen, Pekka, 605 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 394 Hals, Frans, 203 Hamas, 972, 978, 986 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1142–1143 Hambach Festival, 190 Hamilton, Alexander, 22, 386, 387 Hamilton of Gilbertfield, 239 Hamitic hypothesis, 1678 Hammershaimb, Venceslaus, 225 Hansen, H. P., 156 Hanson, John, 386 Haq, Abdul, 1690 Harb, Talat, 729 Harlem Renaissance, 494 Harris, Lawren, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Harris, Leonard, 1008 Harry (Scottish minstrel), 239 Hasan, Zoya, 902 Hashshashin, 1489 Hatta, Mohammad, 1463 Haushofer, Karl, 460, 466, 467 (illus.), 491 Havel, Václav, 1026, 1027, 1028 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 117, 1432 Hayes, Joy Elizabeth, 132 Hazaras, 1693 Hazelius, Arthur, 229 Head, Bessie, 927 Health, and the environment, 882 Health care and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Canada, 1840 and New Zealand, 871, 871 and Pakistan, 1228 Heaney, Seamus, 925 Hebrew, 477 Hecht, Abraham, 1400, 1403 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17, 92–93, 187, 534 Hegemony Anglo-American, 1393 and Baltic nationalism, 558, 562 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1534 of Buenos Aires in Argentina, 275 and Chilean identity, 327 and Ethiopia, 738, 741 and Finnish nationalism, 605, 608 and gender issues, 445, 906 of German music, 80, 82

and Germany, 611 Germany and French, 186 and Great Britain, 397, 490 Japan and U.S., 1754, 1757 and literature, 486 and Mexican identity, 349, 352 nationalism in maintaining, 898, 1481 nationalist music as reaction against, 79 and Nepali nationalism, 1809 and Peru, 374 of political ideologies, 512 Prussian, 544 and Spain, 702, 711 technology as undermining, 136 and Turkey, 1646 and the United States, 837, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1310, 1742-1743 and World War I, 713 Heidegger, Martin, 533–534, 534 (illus.) Heidenstam, Verner von, 228 Heimat, 611, 883, 1344 Heimatbund, 1508 Heimatkunst, 417 Hein, Piet, 203 Heine, Heinrich, 501 Helfferich, Karl, 613 Hellenism, 623 Helvetic Republic, 248–249 Henderson, Paul, 1842 Henlein, Konrad, 595, 595 Henry, Paul, 659 Heraclitus, 533 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 17, 30–31, 73, 88–90, 89 (illus.), 185, 406, 529, 533 and the Baltic states, 561 and organicism, 462 Hernández, José, 278–279 Herndon, Angelo, 1303 Heroes/heroines, 446, 504, 1345 and Afghanistan, 1690 and Algeria, 1098–1099, 1099, 1102 and Armenia, 1706 and Australia, 857, 857 of the Baltic states, 564–565 and Bulgaria, 576, 577 and Burma, 782, 784 and Canada, 304–305 and Central America, 318 and Colombia, 831, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164 and Cuba, 1282, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England, 164–165 and film, 1331, 1332, 1333 and Finland, 604–605 and Great Britain, 1012 and India, 1209 and Indonesia, 1725, 1727 and Iran, 1113–1114, 1115, 1116 and Ireland, 658, 659

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and Korea, 1779–1781 and Latvia, 1578–1579 and Mongolia, 1786, 1789–1790, 1791, 1797, 1798 and New Zealand, 870 and Nigeria, 1187 and Palestinians, 1137 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 377 and the Philippines, 1245–1246 and Poland, 211, 214 and Québec, 1294 Russian, 1074 Scandinavian, 226–227 and Scotland, 232–233 and the Soviet Union, 694, 695, 696, 700, 951 and sports, 995 and Switzerland, 253–254 and Syria, 728 and Turkey, 1643, 1646–1647, 1653 and Uruguay, 402 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637 See also Leaders; Symbols Herrera, Bartolomé, 377 Herrera, Enrique Olaya, 830 Herries, William, 869 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 1148 Hervé, Gustave, 515 Herzl, Theodor, 1121, 1123, 1127 Hezbollah, 986 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 350 Higgins, H. B., 859 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 1693 Hilden, Patricia, 56 Hilty, Carl, 252 Hindenburg, Paul von, 613 Hinduism and fundamentalism, 1393 and India, 107, 797, 803, 803, 987, 1204–1205, 1208–1210 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Nepal, 1806 Hindutva, 107, 108 Hirata Atsutane, 815 Hispanophilia versus hispanophobia in Mexico, 352–353 and Puerto Rico, 841 Historiography, 121, 406, 477, 880, 1343 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Algeria, 1098–1099 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 733–734 and Armenia, 1702, 1705–1708 and Australia, 855–858 and Austria, 551 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 564 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531 and Brazil, 292–295

and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 303–305, 1840 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 320 and China, 1195–1197, 1199–1200 and Colombia, 831–832 and colonialism, 917, 923–924 and Congo/Zaïre, 1162, 1163–1164 and Cuba, 1277–1278, 1281–1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1022–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Ethiopia, 742–744 and Fiji, 1318 and film, 1327–1328, 1336–1338 and Finland, 604 and France, 177–178, 1051–1052 and Germany, 188–189, 614, 617–619 and Great Britain, 1010–1011, 1011 and Greece, 629 and Greenland, 1568 and Haiti, 341 and India, 802–803, 1209 and Indonesia, 1727, 1728, 1730 and Iran, 1107, 1107, 1113–1116 and Iraq, 752–754, 757, 1741 and Ireland, 658–660 and Israel, 1125–1127 and Italy, 673–675 and Japan, 1750–1751 and Mexico, 354, 355–356 and Mongolia, 1788 and New Zealand, 864–865, 868–870 and Nigeria, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and Palestinians, 1139–1140 and Paraguay, 362–364 and the Philippines, 1244, 1245–1246 and Poland, 212, 214, 685–686 and Puerto Rico, 843–844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and Romania, 1592 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1677–1678, 1679 and the Sami, 1618 and Scandinavia, 223, 223, 226–228, 228 and Scotland, 234, 237–239 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 700, 1076 and Spain, 708–709, 1086 and Switzerland, 247, 251, 252–254 and Taiwan, 1252, 1255–1256 and Turkey, 771, 773–774, 1646 and Ukraine, 721, 721 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637–1638 Hitler, Adolf, 413, 611, 613 and anti-Semitism, 517 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and Austria, 545, 546, 547

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Hitler, Adolf (continued ) and Czechoslovakia, 1019 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438, 439 and gender, 450, 454 and Hungary, 638 and music, 1431 ties with Mussolini, 516 Hiwet, Addis, 737 Hjärne, Harald, 228 Hlinka, Andrej, 585, 590 Ho Chi Minh, 952, 962, 963–964, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1267 (illus.) Hoad, Lew, 857 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 (illus.) Hobsbawm, Eric, 19, 23, 132, 473, 476, 478, 481 Hobson, William, 863 Hodge, John R., 1773 Hofmeyr, Jan, 1149 Hogg, James, 238 Holberg, Ludwig, 227 Holidays/festivals, 116, 504, 1346 and Australia, 855–856 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 567 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 295 and Bulgaria, 575–576 and Burma, 782 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 319 and Chile, 327, 328 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1025 and France, 1053 and Germany, 620 and India, 800, 1204 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 754 and Israel, 1129 and Japan, 1752 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 and the Maori, 1857 and Mexico, 347–349, 354 and the Netherlands, 204 and New Zealand, 869, 873 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1067–1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 211, 216–217, 685–686, 688 and Romania, 1586 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 and South Africa, 1150 and the Soviet Union, 695 and Spain, 709 and Switzerland, 244, 254 and Taiwan, 1256 and Turkey, 1651, 1652–1653, 1653

and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637, 1638 Holly, James Theodore, 340 Holocaust, 439–440, 517–518, 523, 524 and Austria, 546 and Czechoslovak Jews, 1020 and German guilt, 1555–1556, 1557–1558 guilt and the foundation of Israel, 1402 and immigration to Israel, 1121 and legitimacy of Zionism, 1128 as reconstituting ethnic borders, 617 remembrances of the, 1345 See also Genocide Holst, Gustav, 1432 Holstein, 147, 149, 150, 220, 222 Holy Roman Empire, 183, 186, 543, 619, 1816 Homosexuality, 907–908, 909–910 Honduras, 318, 321 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1304 Horowitz, Donald, 989 Horthy, Miklós, 638 Hosokawa, Toshio, 1440 Hotel Rwanda, 1674, 1675 Hou Hsaio-hsien, 1338 Hoxa, Enver, 952 Hozumi Yatsuka, 816 Hrushev’skyi, Mykhailo, 721, 721 Hsaya San, 777, 782 Hu Shi, 789, 793 Hua Guofeng, 1200 Hueber, Charles, 1509 Huggins, Jackie, 1849 Hugo, Victor, 177 Humanism, 41, 86, 87 Humbert, Ferdinand, 409 Humboldt, Alexander von, 34, 64, 65, 423, 462 Hume, David, 18, 234 Hume, John, 1062 Hunedoara, Iancu de, 1592 Hungary, 635–645, 640 (map) anti-Semitism in, 520, 521 and the Austro-Hungarian empire, 24 autonomy and, 407 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441 and expansionism, 524 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and music, 1432, 1435 and nationalistic art, 412 and Slovakia, 587 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Huntington, Samuel, 929, 988, 1374 Hurston, Zora Neale, 494 Hurt, Jakob, 563–564, 567 Hus, Jan, 592, 1023 Husayn, Imam (Iran), 1115 Hussein, Saddam, 756–757, 758, 952, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Iran, 1115–1116 Hussein, Sharif, 727, 749, 750, 1739

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Hussitism, 1023 Hutton, C. M., 481 Hutus, 1669, 1675, 1677, 1678 Hyde, Douglas, 654–655, 657, 918 Hypernationalism, 1389–1390. See also Xenophobia Hyppolite, Florville, 338 Iancu, Avram, 1592 Ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 1113 Ibn Taymiyyah, 725 Ibsen, Henrik, 228 Iceland, 220–222, 226–228 and the environment/natural resources, 875–876, 885 independence and, 231 and national symbols, 230 reading and, 229 Icelandic Sagas, 227 (illus.) Idealism, 534–535 Identity, 27, 405, 528, 537, 930–932, 1351, 1418–1429 and Afghanistan, 1693–1695 and Algeria, 1100–1101, 1105 and Alsace, 1504 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 276–279 and Armenia, 1698, 1699–1700, 1701–1705, 1704, 1708 and Austria, 550, 551, 554 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1716–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 558, 561–562, 563, 563–565, 1576, 1577, 1577–1578, 1581 and Basques, 1519–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527, 1528–1530, 1531, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 283, 285–287, 288, 292–295, 294, 1826–1827 British versus English, 159–161, 162, 163, 167 and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 780–781 and Canada, 298, 302, 303–305, 1835–1843 and Catalonia, 1536–1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Central America, 313, 319–321 and Chile, 324–326, 327–329, 328 and China, 1198–1200 civic versus ethnic, 933–936 and Colombia, 832, 833, 834 and communications, 1474 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160–1165 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1282–1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1025 Dutch, 197, 198, 204 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 265 and the environment/landscape, 875–876, 879–880, 883, 884, 886 and Eritrea, 1174 and Ethiopia, 741–743, 744–746 European, 974, 1045–1046 and film, 1327, 1338–1340

and Finland, 598–605, 608 and France, 1056, 1057 and gender/sexuality, 43–45, 444–447, 909–910 and geopolitics, 458–459, 464–466 and Germany, 183–187, 190, 192–193, 611, 613–620, 621–622, 1549, 1552, 1555–1556, 1558 globalization and de-territorialization of, 1416 and Greece, 630, 633 and Greenland, 1565, 1567–1568, 1570 and Haiti, 341–342 and Hungary, 639–644, 645 after independence, 1465 and India, 797, 803 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726–1728, 1732, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 757, 758–759, 1740, 1743 and Israel, 1124, 1127–1130 and Italy, 665, 670–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and Japan, 809–810, 813, 815, 820, 822, 1750–1751, 1755–1756, 1757–1578 and Korea, 1773, 1775–1776, 1778–1781 and landscape art, 59, 60–71 and language/literature, 482, 486, 492–495, 922–923 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1225 Maori, and intertribal unity, 1856, 1858, 1859–1860, 1863 and Mexico, 345, 347, 347–350, 351–356 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788–1789, 1792, 1793–1794, 1797, 1798 and music, 78–83 and national symbols, 113, 122–123, 1342–1348 in nationalist political philosophy, 97, 473–476 and Nepal, 1803, 1804, 1805–1806, 1807, 1811 and New Zealand, 863, 864–870 and Northern Ireland, 1065–1066 and overdetermination, 121 and Palestinians, 1133, 1134, 1138–1139 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1849 and Paraguay, 360, 362, 365–366 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 209, 213, 682, 686–688 and Puerto Rico, 839, 841–843 and Québec, 1293–1294 and religion versus ideology, 972–973 religious, 99, 103, 109, 983, 988–989. See also Religion and rituals of belonging, 499, 509. See also Rituals of belonging role of education in, 29–41 and Romania, 1589–1591 and Russia/Soviet Union, 690–701, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672–1673, 1677, 1679 and the Sami, 1614, 1615, 1617 and Scandinavia, 222–225, 226–228 and Scotland, 233, 234

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Identity (continued ) and social class, 1, 3–4 and South Africa, 1149–1150 and Spain, 1083, 1085–1087, 1092 and sports, 995, 996, 997–998, 1002–1003 and Switzerland, 251, 251–252, 253 and Taiwan, 1253–1255, 1257–1260 and technology, 134–135, 1476, 1481 and Tibet, 1815, 1817–1818, 1821–1823 and Turkey, 761–763, 764–765, 766, 768–770, 1645–1647, 1650 and Ukraine, 718–721, 720, 1622–1623 and the United States, 389, 392, 1307, 1307–1308 and Uruguay, 400, 401–402, 403 and Vietnam, 1266–1269, 1271 and Wales, 1636, 1640 Ideology, 971–989 and China, 794–795, 1193, 1194–1197, 1195, 1197 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1280–1281 globalization, disillusionment, and, 936–941 and Iraq, 752 and Malaysia, 1223 and nationalist movements, 940–941 and Russia, 692–697 and the United States, 1307–1308 and Vietnam, 1269 See also Communism; Fascism; Nationalism; Philosophy, political Igbo, 1469 Iglesias, Santiago, 839 Ileto, Reynaldo, 1245 Iliescu, Ion, 1586, 1587, 1589 Iliolo, Ratu Josefa, 1325 Immigrants/immigration, 1418–1429 and Alsace, 1510 and Argentina, 276, 277, 279, 280, 492 and Australia, 850 and Basques, 1517 and Burma, 777, 783 and Canada, 304, 1837 and Catalonia, 1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Colombia, 833 and cosmopolitanism, 1362 and Cuba, 1275 and Denmark, 155 education and, 420, 423–424 and the European Union, 1042 and France, 1055–1056, 1056 and gender, 448 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1409, 1411–1412, 1415 and Great Britain, 1007, 1009, 1013 and Greenland, 1566 and homeland politics, 1414–1415, 1416 and Indonesia, 1729 and Israel, 1121, 1129, 1130 and Japan, 1749, 1753, 1753 and language, 482, 483–484

and Latvia, 1575 and Malaysia, 1215 and Mongolia, 1797 and nativism, 883 and the Netherlands, 202, 206 and New Zealand, 864, 867, 868, 1856 and Pakistan, 1237 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Québec, 1296–1297 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Scandinavia, 231 and sports, 1000 and Turkey, 1650 and the United States, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1311 and Uruguay, 402 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnicity; Minorities; Refugees Imoudu, Michael, 1181 Imperialism. See Colonialism/imperialism Incas, 367–368, 370–371, 373 Income distribution and Australia, 853 and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Iran, 1111 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 955 and the United States, 1307, 1308 Independence and Afghanistan, 1684 in Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1098, 1099, 1100 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 728 and Argentina, 269–273 and Armenia, 1709–1710 and Austria, 542, 548–550, 552–553 and the Baltic states, 556–557, 562, 568, 1575, 1577–1578 and Belgium, 140, 142–143 and Brazil, 282, 287, 289, 295 and Bulgaria, 573–574, 578–580 and Burma, 777, 782–785 and Central America, 313, 319 and Chile, 326–327, 328 during the Cold War era, 949–950, 960, 969 and Colombia, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1161 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1277 and developing countries, 980 and Eritrea, 1173, 1173–1175 and Fiji, 1316–1317, 1320 and Finland, 223, 231, 605, 606 and Greece, 46, 53, 623, 625–631 and Greenland, 1571 and Haiti, 336 and Hungary, 638 and Iceland, 231 and India, 804–806, 889–890, 1201–1203 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1725, 1727, 1733–1734

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and Iraq, 750, 752–753 Latin America and, 46, 272 and Mexico, 349–350 and Mongolia, 1790, 1795 and New Zealand, 872 and Nigeria, 1181–1183 and Norway, 223–225, 231 and Pakistan, 1229–1231 and Paraguay, 359, 360–361 and Peru, 370, 371 and the Philippines, 1240–1241 and Poland, 681, 687–688 and popular nationalist movements, 503 to protect national culture, 1355 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 841, 843, 844–847 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Santo Domingo, 332–333 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and Taiwan, 1256–1257 and technology, 1479 and Tibet, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 767–768 and Ukraine, 722, 1626, 1626–1627 and Uruguay, 397 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Separatism/secession; Sovereignty India, 796–806, 799 (map), 943, 949–950, 1201–1211, 1202 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and colonialism, 48 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1373 education and, 424, 429 and gender, 446, 451, 902 government in, 981 and Great Britain, 889–890 and independence, 963, 1006, 1461–1462 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1771, 1765 and the Khalifat Movement, 1763 language/literature in, 920, 922, 923, 927 and music, 1440, 1441, 1443 and Nepal, 1802 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 967–968, 1229–1231, 1234–1235, 1235 politics in, 976–977, 987 railroad in, 131 and religion, 107 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 and terrorism, 1495 and the Tibetan government-in-exile, 1821, 1822 and water, 885 Indians, in Malaysia, 1215, 1216 Indigenismo, 352 Indigenous groups and Argentina, 277, 280 and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 283, 285, 293, 1826, 1828

and Canada, 303, 1837, 1840 and Central America, 310, 311, 317 and Chile, 324–326, 327 and Colombia, 829, 830 colonialism and, 889, 893, 912–913, 914–917 and education, 1383, 1385 and the environment/natural resources, 879, 883–884 and Fiji, 1314–1325 influence on music of, 1438–1439 Inuit, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 and language, 472, 482 and Malaysia, 1213–1215 and Mexico, 345–346, 351 and new social movements, 1448, 1451–1452 and Peru, 370–371, 372–375 and Québec, 1297 and Taiwan, 1252 and the United States, 1309 and Uruguay, 394–395 See also Maori; Pan-Aboriginalism; Sami Indo-Fijians, 1314–1325, 1318 Indo-Pakistan War, 1767 Indonesia, 1722–1735, 1724 (map) aircraft industry in, 1476 diversity and government in, 953–954 and independence, 1462–1463 and Malaysia, 1220 and the Netherlands, 197, 204 political tensions in, 938 radio hobbyists in, 128 separatist movements in, 1468 and technology, 1479–1480 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and transmigration, 876 Industrial Revolution, 161 Industrialization and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Basques, 1514–1515, 1517 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 317 and class, 55–56 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and England, 161 and Eritrea, 1169 and the European revolutions of 1848, 47 and Finland, 598 and geopolitics, 461 and Germany, 611 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 648, 661 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 424, 1748–1749 and Korea, 1778 and Mongolia, 1785 and nationalism, 1475, 1480 and Pakistan, 1228 and Poland, 209, 679, 681 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Québec, 1293–1294

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Industrialization (continued ) and Romania, 1585, 1587 and Russia, 699 and Scandinavia, 221 socialism and, 205 and the Soviet Union, 1075 and Spain, 703–704, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Ukraine, 714–715 and the United States, 1309 See also Economy Inequality and education, 1382, 1385–1386 and gender, 901–902, 903–904 and globalization, 936 and oil revenues in the Middle East, 1396 See also Income distribution; Rights Infrastructure and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 296, 1829 and China, 1193, 1200 education, 1381 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1169 and Indonesia, 1723 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 205 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1680 and Spain, 706, 708 and technological advances, 127–128, 131–132 and Tibet, 1814 and the United States, 389–390 Ingrians (Ingers), 557 Ingush, 441 Injannashi, 1788, 1789 Innis, Harold Adams, 1474, 1475 ˙Inönü, ˙Ismet, 768 Inoue Nissho, 816–817 Intellectuals, 1707 and Algeria, 1100 and Arab nationalism, 725, 730–733, 734 and Armenia, 1706 and Bulgaria, 571–572, 573 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1842 and China, 789–790, 792, 793, 793 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and France, 1052 and Germany, 183–185 independence and Greek, 626–627, 629–630 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 1741, 1745 and Latvia, 1575, 1577 and Mongolia, 1785–1786 and Nigeria, 1180 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222, 223

the Soviet Union and disciplining, 1074–1076 and Ukraine, 718 Young Ottomans/Turks, 763, 763, 764–765, 767, 771, 774 See also Elites International institutions. See Global institutions International Labour Organization (ILO), 1610 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1229, 1829, 1829 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 1359–1361 Internationalism, 536 and Angola, 1663 and Germany, 1551, 1559–1560 and globalization, 1408–1410 issue-specific, 1361–1362 versus nationalism, 418, 1342 and sports, 991 See also Post-nationalism; Transnationalism Internet and Armenia, 1709 and diaspora populations, 1370 and national identity, 1476, 1481–1483 and transnationalism, 1339 Interpellation, 486, 489–490 Intervention. See Foreign intervention Intifada, 1141 Inuit, 879, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 Ioann, Metropolitan, 106 Iqbal Lahori, Muhammad, 1229–1230, 1230, 1233 Iran, 1106–1118, 1108 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714 and gender, 446 and Iraq, 758, 1743 and Islamic fundamentalism, 986 and new social movements, 1452 and Palestine, 1142 and religious fundamentalism, 1396–1397 and terrorism, 1488 and the United States, 952 See also Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 756, 757, 952, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1746 Iraq, 747–759, 748 (map), 1736–1747, 1738 (map) borders of, 966 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1389 and Iran, 1115–1116 U.S. invasion of, 954, 955, 1497 water, 884–885 See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ireland, 647–662 Celtic revival in, 407 and colonialism, 915 and diaspora populations, 1374, 1375–1376

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economy of, 1060, 1408 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 112–113 and gender/sexuality, 452, 908 and immigration, 1424 and independence, 166, 1006 language and literature in, 488, 913–914, 918, 919, 920, 922–925 and Northern Ireland, 1060–1062, 1062, 1068 and sports, 997–998, 999–1000 Irian Jaya, 1734 Irish National Land League, 653–654 Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, 1185 Irving, Washington, 389 Isabella of Castile, 709 Islam and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1694 and Arab nationalism, 731, 733 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and the caliphate, 760–761 and India, 797 and Indonesia, 1728, 1734 and Iraq, 755, 1737, 1743–1745 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and national identity, 103–105 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763, 764 and Pakistan, 1236 and the Philippines, 1239 and politics, 983–987 in Russia, 1605–1607 and Turkey, 768, 1653–1654 See also Islamic fundamentalists; Shiism/ Shiites; Sunnis Islamic fundamentalists, 984–987, 1392, 1393, 1396–1400 and Algeria, 1101, 1102–1103 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1769 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1141–1143 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 in Turkey, 1649 Islamization, 1397–1400 Ismail, King (Egypt), 259, 260 Israel, 953, 1120–1130, 1122 (map) and counterterrorism, 1496 and diaspora populations, 1367 and education, 1387–1388 and environmental nationalism, 880 and minorities, 1374 and music, 1443 and Palestinians, 1133–1143 and religious fundamentalism, 1394, 1398, 1401–1402 and the Suez War, 266 symbols of, 114, 116 and water, 885 Isto, Edvard (Eetu), 603 (illus.) István, King (Hungary), 643

Itagaki Taisuke, 820 Italy, 663–677 and democracy, 946–947 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 426, 429, 432 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737, 740, 740 fascism in, 419, 514–516, 518–519 and film, 1333–1334 form of nationalism in, 502 and gender, 448–449 and language, 472 and the Libyan war, 514 and minorities, 1374, 1412, 1424 and music, 1437–1438, 1441 and nationalistic art, 410, 413, 414–415, 418 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and terrorism, 1491 unification (Risorgimento) of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 468, 512 Ivan the Terrible, 700 Ives, Charles, 1439 Iwakura Mission, 818–820 Izetbegovi´c, Alija, 1527 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev (Vladimir), 1123 Jacini, Stefano, 669 Jackson, A. Y., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jacobitism, 175, 233, 238, 238 Jacobsen, J. C., 154 Jacobus, Stephanus, 1149 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 92, 186 Jakobson, Carl Robert, 562 Jamaica, 495 James, C. L. R., 992, 1301 James VI (Scotland)/James I (England), 61 Jamieson, John, 239 Jammu and Kashmir, 1462, 1759–1771, 1762 (map) conflict in, 1203–1204, 1234–1235, 1235, 1465–1466 Jang Bahadur, 1807 Jangghar, 1791 Jannsen, Johann Voldemar, 562 Japan, 808–822, 811 (map), 819 (map), 821 (map), 1748–1758, 1750 (map) and Burma, 777, 784–785 and China, 791, 792, 795, 1190 colonialism and, 1462 and democracy, 947 education and, 38, 40, 424, 426 and gender, 445, 450, 456 and India, 806 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language, 472, 478 and the Meiji Restoration, 27 and Mongolia, 1792, 1795, 1796 and music, 1439–1440, 1441 nationalism and literature in, 491–492 origins of nationalism in, 9

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Japan (continued ) and politics, 988 and religion, 106–107 and sports, 1001 and Taiwan, 1250, 1251 and terrorism, 1491 Jargalsaikhan, D., 1794 Jarl, Birger, 226 Järnefelt, Eero, 605 Jefferson, Thomas, 22, 32, 65, 211, 370, 387, 388 Jesuits, 350–351 Jews and Austria, 546 in the Baltic states, 563 in Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and the Diaspora, 1366, 1367 as discredited sexuality, 907 and Egypt, 265, 266 and establishment of Israel, 1402 ethnic cleansing and genocide in Russia, 438 and Germany, 188, 193, 430 and the Holocaust, 439–440, 523 and Hungary, 644, 645 in Iraq, 755–756 in Macedonia and Thrace during the Holocaust, 582 and the Netherlands, 199 and pogroms in Ukraine, 722 and Poland, 207, 209 in Romania, 1594 and Switzerland, 249 in Turkey, 1649 in the United States, 1398, 1400 See also Anti-Semitism; Israel; Judaism Jibzundamba Khutugtu, Eighth, 1788, 1792 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 804, 976, 1229, 1230, 1230–1231, 1233, 1461 Joergensen, A. D., 152, 154 Jogaila (Lithuanian prince), 564 John, King (England), 165 John Paul II, Pope, 948, 988 Johnson, Barry, 1399 Johnson, James, 73 Johnson, Lyndon, 944, 1310 Johnson, Samuel, 60 Johnston, Frank, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jones, Aneurin, 1637 Jones, Inigo, 61 Joseph II (Austria-Hungary), 138, 140 Jospin, Lionel, 1510 Joubert, Piet, 1146 Joyce, James, 489, 658, 914, 923, 924 Juan Carlos I, King (Spain), 1087 Judaism and fundamentalism (Ultra-Orthodoxy), 1124, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1400–1403 and national identity, 103 See also Jews Juliana, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Júnior, Caio Prado, 292

Kabila, Joseph, 1165 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 1165 Kagame, Paul, 1674 Kalaallit. See Greenland Kalevala, The, 227, 228, 406, 599, 602, 604 Kallay, Benjamin von, 1529 Kalmyks, 1784, 1790–1791, 1792, 1794–1795 Kamenev, Lev, 520 Kamil, Husayn, 262 Kamil, Mustafa, 261 Kangxi, Emperor, 1252 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 17, 86, 87–88, 533, 1352 Kaplan, Robert, 929 Karaites (Karaim), 557 Karamzin, Nikolai, 94 Karavelov, Luben, 573 Karel IV, king of Bohemia, 592 Karelia, 599, 600, 608 Karlsbad Decrees, 187, 189 Karmal, Babrak, 1687 Karnaviˇcus, Jurgis, 560 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 638 Karzai, Ahmed Wali, 1694 (illus.) Karzai, Hamid, 1686, 1695 Kasavubu, Joseph, 1158 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kasparov, Gary, 951 Katanga, 1158, 1469 Kaunitz, Chancellor (Austria), 33–34 Kayibanda, Gregoire, 1677 Kazakhs, 1798 Kazakhstan, 1079, 1798 Kazimierz (Casimir) III (Prussia), 214 Keane, John, 1446, 1456 Kedourie, Elie, 474, 533 Keller, Ferdinand, 413 Kellerman, François, 1504 Kelly, Edward “Ned,” 857, 857 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 451, 633, 767–770, 1643, 1646–1647, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653 and Turkish identity, 766 Kemal, Namik, 763, 763, 766, 770, 774 Kemboi, Ezekiel, 1001 Kennan, George C., 945 Kennedy, John F., 944 Kent, William, 62 Kenya education and, 429 and literature, 919–920, 925–926 and music, 1440, 1441 Kenyatta, Jomo, 965 Kerber, Linda, 50 Kerkorian, Kirk, 1707 Key, Francis Scott, 117, 1443 Keyser, Rudolf, 228 Khachaturian, Aram, 1707 Khalifat Movement, 1763 Khan, Abatai, 1791 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 1236 Khan, Altan, 1817

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Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 1786, 1786, 1791, 1798, 1816 Khan, Dayan, 1786 Khan, Ishaq, 1232 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1232 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 801 Khan, Yahya, 1232 Khan, Yaqub, 1690–1691 Khan Khattak, Khushal, 1690 Khatami, Mohammad, 1117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 952, 986, 1111, 1114, 1396, 1397, 1399, 1400 Khomiakov, A. S., 692 Khorenatsi, Movses, 1702, 1708 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 948, 952, 979, 1076, 1077, 1603 Khutugtu, Jibzundamba, 1790 Khyvliovyi, Mykola, 718 Kidd, Benjamin, 532 Kierkegaard, Søren, 228 Kim Dae Jung, 1779 Kim Il Sung, 952, 1773, 1779–1781, 1780 Kim Jong Il, 1780 Kincaid, Jamaica, 924 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 123, 938, 1203, 1304 King, Michael, 869 King, Rodney, 1339 King, Sir Frederic Truby, 871 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 306 Kireevskii, I. V., 692 Kiribati, 1443 Kissinger, Henry, 458 Kivi, Aleksis, 602 Kjellén, Rudolf, 460, 463, 491 Klaus, Václav, 1027, 1028 Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 1504 Klingler, Werner, 133 Knudsen, Knud, 225–226 Kochanowski, Jan, 214 Kodály, Zoltán, 81, 1432, 1435 Kohl, Helmut, 1549 Kohn, Hans, 23, 392, 474 Koidula, Lydia, 564 Koirala, B. P., 1803, 1807 Koizumi, Prime Minister (Japan), 1755 Kolberg, Oskar, 216 Köler, Johann, 564 Kolettis, Ioannis, 632 Kollár, Jan, 592 Kołła˛taj, Hugo, 211 Kollontai, Alexandra, 453, 454 Konovalets, Yevhen, 718 Kopernik, Mikołaj (Nicholas Copernicus), 214 Korais, Adamantios, 626, 628, 628 Korchynsky, Dmytro, 1628 Korea, 1467, 1772–1781, 1774 (map) education and, 424 and independence, 1462 and Japan, 809, 810, 815, 818, 1749 and sports, 1001

Koreans, in Japan, 1753 Körner, Theodor, 73 Korppi-Tommola, Aura, 54 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 96, 211, 211, 214, 686 Kosovo, 1409, 1554, 1555 Kossuth, Lajos, 638, 643 Kossuth, Louis, 239 Kostecki, Platon, 716 Koyama Eizo, 822 Kozyrev, Andrei, 1597 Kracauer, Siegfried, 1330–1331 Kramáˇr, Karel, 590 Krasicki, Ignacy, 214 Krasi´nski, Zygmunt, 212, 214, 216 Kraszewski, Józef Ignacy, 216–217, 685 Kravchuk, Leonid, 1078, 1597, 1621, 1622, 1626 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhard, 564, 567 Krieck, Wilhelm, 426 Kronvalds, Atis, 1577 Kruger, Paul, 1146, 1150–1151 Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 453, 454 Kuchma, Leonid, 1080, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1628 Kun, Béla, 520 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 1079 Kunchov, Vasil, 580 Kurds and European partition, 891–893 and Iraq, 752–753, 755, 756, 1737, 1741–1742, 1745 and terrorism, 1491 and Turkey, 769, 885, 1646, 1650, 1653, 1655 Kushner, Barak, 822 Kutuzov, Dmitrii, 696 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 1074 Kuwait, 1743 Kuyper, Abraham, 200, 1149 Kymlicka, Will, 97, 931 Kyoto treaty, 877, 1447, 1456, 1457 Kyrlylenko, Vyacheslav, 1626 Labor/employment and Australia, 852 and Burma, 777, 781 and England, 164 and Fiji, 1314–1315 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Iraq, 1746 and the knowledge worker, 1380 and migration, 1422, 1424 and Nigeria, 1181 shortages and ethnic cleansing/genocide, 441 slavery, 889. See also Slavery and South Africa, 1145–1146 specialization of, 130 and the United States, 1304, 1309 Ladulås, Magnus, 226 Lagarde, Pierre, 409 Lagerbring, Sven, 227 Lahiri, Jhumpa, 927 Laicism, 769

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Lal, Brij V., 1322 Lalli (Finnish hero), 604–605 Lamanskii, Vladimir, 1601 Lamas, Andrés, 402 Lamming, George, 913, 917, 924 Land ownership and Australia, 1851–1852 and Fiji, 1314, 1322 and Haiti, 338, 342 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Ireland, 648, 653 and Japan, 811–812 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1861–1863, 1862 and Paraguay, 358 and Puerto Rico, 845 and South Africa, 1151 Land rights/claims and Afghanistan, 1692 and the Baltic states, 568 and Burma, 783 and the Inuit, 1567 and new social movements, 1450, 1451–1452 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846 and the Sami, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1617 Land sacralization, 100, 103 Landes, Joan, 49 Landsbergis, Vytautus, 1078 Landscape, 59–71 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Canada, 1841 and Denmark, 154 and England, 162 and Finland, 599, 604 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127–1128, 1129 and music, 78–79 and national identity, 875–876, 1342, 1344–1345 and Russia, 698 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 228 and Switzerland, 251, 252 as symbols, 114–115 and Turkey, 770 and Ukraine, 1621 and Wales, 1633 See also Environment Lange, Christian, 228 Language, 471–484, 912–928 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1692 and Afrikaner nationalism, 1147 and Algeria, 1095, 1101 and Alsace, 1502–1503, 1509, 1510 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 733 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703 and Austria, 542 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 560, 561, 562, 563 and Basques, 704, 710–711, 1092, 1512, 1514 (map), 1516, 1522

and Belgium, 138, 141–142, 144–145, 146 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 289, 1825 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Canada, 303, 307, 1840 and Catalans, 706, 1537, 1542, 1544, 1546 and China, 1199 and cultural survival, 878–879 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1021 and Denmark, 154 dictionaries and standardizing, 477 education and, 420, 424–425, 427 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1170, 1172, 1173–1174 and Ethiopia, 741, 746 and Europe, 1031 and Fiji, 1320 and Finland, 598–599, 601, 601–602, 605–606 and France, 34, 178 and Germany, 185 and globalization, 1392 and Greece, 629–630 and Greenland, 1565, 1566, 1568, 1570–1571 and Haiti, 339 and Hungary, 641 and immigration, 1420, 1421 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723–1725, 1728 and Ireland, 657, 660 and Israel, 1124, 1127, 1129 and Italy, 665, 671 and Japan, 813 and Latvia, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1582 and Malaysia, 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 345, 346 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1796, 1798 and national boundaries, 461 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 16, 533, 1355–1356 and nationalistic music, 78, 80 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 199 and New Zealand, 1383 and Pakistan, 1233, 1235–1236 and Paraguay, 358, 364, 365 and the Philippines, 1247 and Poland, 217, 679, 688 and political philosophy, 88–89, 91 and print technology, 1475 and Puerto Rico, 841, 845 and Québec, 1291, 1293, 1296 and Romania, 1588, 1589–1591 and the Sami, 1613–1614 and Scandinavia, 225–226 and Singapore, 1224–1225 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Spain, 707

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and Switzerland, 245 and Taiwan, 1258 and Tibet, 1815, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 772–773, 1646, 1646, 1652, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 719, 719, 720, 721, 1621, 1623–1624, 1625, 1627 and the United States, 389 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 and Wales, 1632, 1634–1636, 1635, 1638 Laos, 1463 Lapage, Robert, 1294 Laporte, Pierre, 1291 Laqueur, Walter, 1489, 1498 Larrazábal, Antonio, 317 Larsson, Carl, 228 Laski, Harold, 981 Lassale, F., 38 Lastarria, José Victorino, 329 Latin America development of nationalism in, 8, 9, 16, 26, 46 and film, 1335 and language, 472 and nationalistic music, 76 and new social movements, 1450–1452 See also specific Latin American countries Latvia, 1573–1582, 1573 (map) fascism in, 517 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, 399 Lavater, Johann Kaspar, 251 Lavin, Mary, 925 Lawson, Henry, 854 Laxman, Adam, 810 Le Carre, John, 951 Le Corbusier, 1206 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1054, 1056, 1447, 1453, 1510 Le Republicain (L’Union), 341, 342 Leaders and Africa, 890 and Angola, 1661–1663, 1662 anticolonial nationalist, 962–964 and Arab nationalism, 730–731, 732, 732–733 and Argentina, 277–278 and Armenia, 1699 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532 and Canada, 306, 1837 and Central America, 317–318, 320–321 and China, 790, 794, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158, 1160 and Denmark, 153 and Egypt, 258–259 and France, 1051, 1052 and Germany, 189, 190 and Haiti, 336–337, 338 and India, 1206–1207, 1207, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1726, 1727 and Iraq, 758 Islamic attacks on Muslim, 1397–1398

and Islamic movements, 984–985 and Israel, 1121, 1123, 1123, 1128 and Japan, 818–820, 1751–1752, 1752 and Korea, 1775, 1780 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1857, 1858 and Mongolia, 1789–1790 monuments to, 410–411 and national identity, 1345 as national symbols, 114, 116 and Nepal, 1803, 1806 and new social movements, 1453 and Nigeria, 1180, 1180–1181, 1182, 1187 and Pakistan, 1230 and Palestinians, 1134, 1136–1137, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1848, 1848, 1851, 1853 and Paraguay, 364 and the Philippines, 1241–1242, 1242, 1244 and Poland, 210–212, 681–683, 682 and Puerto Rico, 839–840 qualities of, 982 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1597 and the Sami, 1616, 1616–1618 and separatist movements, 1464–1465 and Singapore, 1221 and South Africa, 1150–1151, 1152 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1075 and Taiwan, 1253 and Uruguay, 398 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Heroes/heroines League of Arab States, 729 League of Nations failure of the, 1402 and Iraq, 750, 1739 and Israel, 1123 Mandates, 728, 1461 and New Zealand, 872 Lebanon, 728 Lechner, Frank, 1392 Leclerc, Charles, 336 Leclerc de Buffon, Georges-Louis, 351 Lee, Richard Henry, 385 Lee Kuan Yew, 1220, 1221 Lee Teng-hui, 1253, 1253–1254, 1255, 1256, 1258, 1259 Legal system/institutions and Central America, 314, 315, 319 and France, 174, 176 and the Netherlands, 202 and Scandinavia, 227 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 254 Legitimacy and Angola, 1666 and Chinese communists, 1196, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1370–1371 and ideologies and religions, 972–973 and Iran, 1109

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Legitimacy (continued ) and modern nation-states, 930 and national sports, 998–999 and North versus South Korea, 1776, 1778–1779 and the Qing Dynasty in China, 788 Legitime, Francois, 338 Leino, Eino, 605 Lej Iyasu, 740, 740 Lelewel, Joachim, 212, 214, 692 Lemarchand, Rene, 1676 Lemieux, Mario “The Magnificent,” 1842 Lemkin, Raphael, 436 Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov), 436, 697, 978, 981, 1072 and ethnicities, 1599 and film, 1330 on nationalism, 1071 León y Gama, Antonio de, 351, 351 Leopold I (Belgium), 142 Leopold II (Belgium), 1156 Lepeletier, L. M., 34 Lerroux, Alejandro, 710 Lesage, Jean, 1290, 1290 Lespinasse, Beauvais, 341 Lester, Richard, 1337 Lévesque, René, 1290, 1290, 1291, 1291 (illus.), 1294 Levitt, Kari, 1842 Levski, Vasil, 573, 576, 576 Levsky, Vasil, 96 Levy, Andrea, 928 Lewis, C. S., 971 Lewis, Geoffrey, 773 Lewis, Saunders, 1635 Liberalism, 14–15, 23–28, 535–536, 537 and Australia, 854 and Brazil, 1830 as detached from democracy, 1306 and European nationalism, 512–513 and Finland, 598 German, 17 and Indonesia, 1732 and Italy, 669 versus nationalism, 1350–1351. See also Nationalism, liberal and Paraguay, 364–365 and Puerto Rico, 841 and Spain, 704 See also Economic liberalism Liberties. See Rights Liborio, 1283 Libyan war, 514 Liebermann, Max, 416 Liebknecht, Karl, 520 Liechtenstein, 1443 Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 Lijphart, Arend, 206 Lilburn, Douglas, 1439 Lincoln, Abraham, 382, 391

Lindeman, Ludvig Mathias, 73 Lindsay, A. D., 536 Linguistic internationalists, 471 Lippmann, Walter, 950 Lira, Luciano, 401 Lismer, Arthur, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Lisson, Carlos, 374 List, Friedrich, 18, 191, 192, 463 Liszt, Franz, 74, 81, 1432, 1435 Literacy rates, 495–497, 496 (map) and Pakistan, 1228 Literature, 465, 485–497, 912–928 and Argentina, 278–279 and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703 Austrian, 543 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Brazil, 285, 287 and Bulgaria, 576–577 and Canada, 1841 and Catalonia, 1543 and Chile, 329, 330 and Colombia, 832 and Finland, 602, 604, 605 and France, 177, 1052 and gender, 49 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and India, 800, 1209 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1740 and Ireland, 657, 658–659 and Mongolia, 1789, 1794 and Nepal, 1807, 1808 and the Philippines, 1244–1245 and Poland, 682, 685 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavia, 228 and Scotland, 238–239 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 1075–1076, 1077, 1077 and Spain, 708 and Turkey, 763, 770 and Ukraine, 720 and the United States, 389, 951 See also Poetry Lithuania, 561 and gender/sexuality, 908 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Livingston, David, 164 Livs, 557 Localism and globalization, 1411 nationalism as, 1415 and subsidiarity, 881 See also Regionalism Loggia, Enrico Galli della, 676 Lomonosov, M. V., 694 Lönnrot, Elias, 228, 406, 599, 602 López, Carlos Antonio, 362, 363, 364

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López, Narciso, 1282 Lopez, Vicente Fidel, 276 López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 830–831, 832 Louis-Philippe, 408 Louis XVI, King (France), 1489 Louis XVIII, King (France), 1443 Louisiana Purchase, 390 Lower, Arthur, 305 Loya jirga, 1686, 1687, 1690, 1691 Lu Xun, 793 Lubbe, Marinus van der, 119 Luce, Henry, 1309 Ludendorff, Erich, 613 Lumumba, Patrice, 962–963, 1158, 1158, 1159, 1159 (illus.), 1160–1162 heroicizing of, 1164 Luther, Martin, 188, 618, 983 Luxemburg, Rosa, 520 Lyngbye, Hans Christian, 225 Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 718 MacArthur, Douglas, 1751 Macartney, C. A., 1368 Macaulay, Hebert, 1179–1180, 1180 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 165, 912 MacCunn, Hamish, 1438 MacDonald, J. E. H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Macdonald, John A., 1837 MacDowell, Edward, 76, 1438 Macedonia and Bulgaria, 580, 582 and diasporic communities, 1415 Germany and peacekeeping in, 1554 Maceo, 1275, 1282 Machado, Gerardo, 1276 Maˇciulis, Jonas, 565 Mackenzie, Alexander, 300, 1438 Mackinder, Halford, 460, 468 Maclennan, Hugh, 307 Macpherson, James, 462 Mada, Gajah, 1727 Madison, James, 386, 387, 388 Magna Carta, 165 Magnus, Olaus, 223 Magnus VI (Norway), 226 Magsaysay, Ramon, 1241, 1242 Magyarization, 644 Magyars, 587 Maharaja (of Jammu and Kashmir), 1764–1765 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, 1803, 1807–1808 Maimonides, 1402, 1403 Maistre, Joseph de, 92 Majoritarian nationalist movements, 940 Makarenko, Anton, 425, 429 Malan, Daniel François, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1151 Malawi, 1440 Malay(s), 1213–1215, 1217, 1219, 1225 as dominant culture in Malaysia, 1220–1222 and education, 1384–1385 and the Philippines, 1243

Malaysia, 1213–1225 and education, 1385–1386 and independence, 1463 and Indonesia, 1729, 1733 and natural resources, 884 Malcolm X, 965 Mâle, Emile, 415 Malthusianism, 518 Mamluks, 257–258, 259–260 Mammeri, Mouloud, 1100 Manchester, England, 161 Manchuria and independence, 1462 and Japan, 810, 818 Manchurian Incident (1931), 810, 821 Manchus, 1818 Mandela, Nelson, 995, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1488–1489 Mandukhai, Empress, 1786 Manifest destiny. See Expansionism Mann, Horace, 37 Mann, Thomas, 617 Mansell, Michael, 1848 Manzanilla, Matias, 374 Manzoni, Alessandro, 671 Mao Zedong, 948, 952, 977, 1191, 1816, 1819, 1821 economic and political programs, 1198–1199 ideology of, 978, 1194–1197, 1197 influence of, 1192–1193 Maoism, 978–979 and Angola, 1664 and Nepal, 1810–1811 Maori, 866, 1855–1863 and education, 1383 and music, 1439 and New Zealand, 873 population, 864 and the Treaty of Waitangi, 863 and the world wars, 869–870 Maps, 465 and Central America, 319–320 and Finland, 602–604 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 640 and Japan, 810 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1320, 1324 Maragall i Mira, Pasqual, 1539, 1540, 1541 (illus.) Marcinkowski, Karol, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 1241–1242, 1244, 1246 Marcos, Imelda, 1242, 1244, 1245 Margalit, A., 97 Marginalization, 935–941 Maria Theresa (Austria-Hungary), 138 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 1469 Maritz, Gerrit, 1150 Markievicz, Countess, 654 “Marseillaise,” 175 Marshall, George C., 948 Marsland, David, 114

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Martí, José, 1275, 1276, 1282, 1283 Martin, Henri, 177 Martins, Wilfred, 975 Marure, Alejandro, 319 Marx, Karl, 1–3, 17–18, 217, 1195 and gender roles, 56 and religion, 1397 on socialism versus communism, 975 Marxism, 1–3, 12 and Angola, 1661, 1662 and Arab nationalism, 730–731 and culture, 485–486 and the environment, 881 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 471 See also Communism Mas, Artur, 1539 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 585, 585, 587–588, 589, 589 (illus.), 592, 593, 1017, 1028 Masculinity, 900–901. See also Gender Mashtots, Mesrop, 1701 Mason, Lowell, 389 Masood, Ahmad Shah, 1690, 1693 Massey, Vincent, 1838 Massey, William, 869 Masur, Gerhard, 834 Matejko, Jan, 682 Mathews, Robin, 1843 Matto de Turner, Clorinda, 374 Maude, Sir Stanley, 1742 Maupassant, Guy de, 134 Maura, Antonio, 707 Maurits of Orange (the Netherlands), 196 Maurras, Charles, 533 May, Glenn, 1246 May Fourth movement, 793, 793 Mayer, Gustav, 611 Maynard, Charles Frederick, 1848 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24, 90, 94–95, 468, 502, 673, 673 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Mbundu, 1660, 1664, 1665 McCarthy, Joseph, 907–908, 944 McCubbin, Frederick, 859 McDougall, William, 530, 535 McKay, Claude, 494 McLuhan, Marshall, 129 McVeigh, Timothy, 1492 Meˇciar, Vladimir, 1026–1027 Media and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Alsace, 1509 and Armenia, 1709 and Azerbaijan, 1719 and the Baltic states, 567 and Brazil, 287 and Bulgaria, 573 and Burma, 783 and Canada, 1839 and Central America, 316, 320

and China, 1193, 1199 culture and forms of, 1474–1475 education and, 422, 433 and Egypt, 261, 262 and Eritrea, 1172 and Ethiopia, 746 and globalization, 1412 in Haiti, 341 and immigration, 1427 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iraq, 1738, 1745 and Korea, 1781 as maintaining psychological stability, 123 manipulation of, 1480–1481 and national identity, 30, 31, 38, 464–465, 486, 1473 and Nepal, 1808 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1853 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 217 and Québec, 1296 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 technological advances and, 129, 132–134, 135–136 in Turkey, 1649 and the United States, 390, 1308 See also Cinema; Literature; Newspapers; Print technology; Radio; Television Megali Idea, 632–633 Mehmed V (Ottoman Empire), 765 Mehmed VI (Ottoman Empire), 767 Meiji Restoration, 818, 1748, 1751 Meiren, Gada, 1789 Mekhitarians, 1700 Melgar, Mariano, 373 Mella, Julio Antonio, 1282, 1283 Melnyk, Andrei, 718, 1624 Melucci, Albert, 1446 Men and gendered role in conflict, 449 nationalist imagery and, 445–446 See also Gender; Masculinity Mendelssohn, Felix, 1431 Mendes, Chico, 1829 Mendes-France, Pierre, 1054 Menelik II (Ethiopia), 737, 737–740, 744 Mercantalism, 18–19 Merchants. See Bourgeoisie Mercier, Honoré, 305, 1288–1289 Merse, 1789 Mesopotamia, 748, 757–758 Messiaen, Olivier, 1434 Mestiço, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1665 Mestizaje, 349, 349, 356 Mexican-American War, 347, 352, 354, 390 Mexico, 344–356, 346 (map), 353 (map) and communications, 1475 and music, 1439 national identity and education in, 39 national radio of, 132–133

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and politics, 1414 and terrorism, 1491 Zapatista movement in, 1412, 1451–1452 Meyer, John, 1392, 1397 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 117 Michael the Brave (Romania), 1585, 1592 Michelet, Jules, 102, 177, 177–178 Mickiewicz, Adam, 212, 213, 214, 216, 686, 692 Micombero, Michel, 1677 Middle East and education, 428, 1387–1388 and European colonization, 891 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Mier, Servando Teresa de, 350, 351, 352 Migration and consolidating sovereignty, 876 globalization and international, 1414–1415 and sports, 1001–1002 See also Emigration; Immigrants/immigration Mikhalkov, Sergei, 1602 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 722 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 683 Military and Algeria, 1100 and Angola, 1667 and Armenia, 1710 and Brazil, 1827, 1828–1829, 1830–1831, 1832 and Burma, 781 and China, 790 and Ethiopia, 740 and Fiji, 1314, 1324 and gender/sexuality, 903, 910 and Germany, 620, 621 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726 interventions and terrorism, 1497 and Iraq, 751, 753, 1743, 1745 and Ireland, 661 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1748–1749, 1752 music, 1430, 1431 and New Zealand, 868–869 and Nigeria, 1185, 1188 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Russia, 955 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1679, 1680 and Spain, 703, 705, 706 technology, 1473 and Turkey, 1646, 1647 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 57 Mill, John Stuart, 19, 57, 85, 95, 527 and cosmopolitanism, 1356 Miller, Ferdinand von, 416 Mindaugas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Minghetti, Marco, 669 Minin, Kuz’ma, 700, 1602 Minorities and Afghanistan, 1689–1690, 1692–1693, 1694 in the Baltic states, 557

and Basques, 1516–1517 and Bulgaria, 580–582 and Burma, 781 and China, 1193, 1199–1200 and citizenship, 1374 and Colombia, 833 and concerns about cultural survival, 878–879 cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and, 1356, 1357–1362 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and demands for rights, 932–933, 936–941. See also Rights and discrimination, 1420, 1425. See also Discrimination/prejudice education and, 419, 422, 427, 429–430, 431, 432 and the environment, 882 and Ethiopia, 741 and Germany, 617 globalization and mobilization of, 1412–1413, 1414 and Hungary, 639, 644 and India, 976, 1203 and Indonesia, 1728–1729 and Iran, 1112–1113, 1117–1118 and Iraq, 1741–1742 and Israel, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and Japan, 1753, 1756, 1758 and Latvia, 1575 and the legacies of colonialism, 894 and Malaysia, 1463 marginalization in modern states of, 931–932 and Mongolia, 1798 and nationalist ideologies, 513 and Nepal, 1804, 1809–1810 and new social movements, 1448, 1453, 1457, 1458 and New Zealand, 866–867 and Nigeria, 1182–1183 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and Poland, 683, 685, 687 and Romania, 1587, 1591, 1593–1594 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672 and state terrorism, 1488 and Turkey, 1648–1651, 1654–1655 and Ukraine, 1625 and the United States, 1307, 1308 and Vietnam, 1271 and Wales, 1636 See also Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Genocide; Language Missionary activity, 480 Mistral, Frédéric, 477 Mitre, Bartolomé, 276, 279 Mitterrand, François, 458, 1051–1052, 1054 Mixed race descent and Brazil, 293 and Central America, 311 and Paraguay, 358

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I-40 Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga), 1158–1159, 1160, 1161, 1162–1165 Modarres, Hassan, 1114 Modernization and Afghanistan, 1686, 1688 and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Australia, 853–854 and China, 792, 1191–1192, 1197, 1198–1199, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1372 and Ethiopia, 740–741 and film, 1337 and Greece, 625, 630 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Italy, 669–670 and Japan, 1753 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 as necessitating the nation-state, 930–932 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Spain, 705, 705, 706 and Turkey, 771 Moe, Jørgen, 228 Mohammad, Mahathir bin, 1223–1224 Mohammed, Murtala Ramat, 1186, 1187, 1187 Mohaqeq, Mohammad, 1695 Moldavia/Moldova, 469, 1414 Molina, Felipe, 319 Molina, Pedro, 315, 316 Molotov, Viacheslav, 1077 Moluccans, 1491 Monarchy and France, 169–171 and Great Britain, 1007–1008, 1008 Mondlane, Eduardo, 1661 Mongolia, 1783–1799 and independence, 1818, 1819 Mongols, and Tibet, 1816–1817 Moniuszko, Stanisław, 74, 216, 686 Monnet, Jean, 1034 Montcalm, Louis de, 299 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, 62–64, 171, 529 Montevideo, 395–396, 397, 402 Montgomerie, Archibald William, 235 Montilla Aguilera, José, 1539, 1541 Montúfar, Manuel, 319 Monuments, 117–120 and Algeria, 1102 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 294–295 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 594, 1024–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Germany, 618, 619 and Indonesia, 1732, 1733, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Ireland, 659 and Japan, 1754–1755

INDEX

and Latvia, 1580 and Mongolia, 1798 and national identity, 1342, 1345–1347 and nationalism, 408, 409, 410–412, 414–415, 417 and Nigeria, 1187 and rituals of belonging, 502, 504 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1603 Scottish, 239 and Turkey, 774 Mora, José María Luis, 352 Mora, Juan Rafael, 315, 318 Moral Majority, 1395, 1446 Morality and cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, 1351–1353, 1356–1357 and Cuba, 1283 and gender and sexuality issues, 447, 899, 908–909 and national character, 531 U.S. idealistic, 944 See also Values Moravia, 584 Morazán, Francisco, 318 Moreno, Manuel, 398 Moro, Aldo, 676 Moroccan crises, 514 Morocco, 1096–1097, 1464 Moros, 1243 Moscow Declaration, 548 Moscow metro, 134 Mosley, Oswald, 516 Mossadegh, Muhammad, 1109, 1109, 1111, 1114 Mosse, George, 905 Motoori Norinaga, 815 Mott, Lucretia, 53, 57 Motz, Friedrich, 191 Mount Ararat, 1702 Mount Rushmore, 134 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 1765 Mourer, Jean-Pierre, 1509 Mozambique, 968, 1464 Mubarak, Hosni, 985 Muhammad V, 1464 Mujahideen, 1687, 1688, 1693 Mukhtar, Mahmud, 264 Mulgan, Alan, 868 Müller, Adam, 92, 463 Multiculturalism and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 1826 and Canada, 1838, 1840, 1843 and education, 1379, 1382–1384, 1386 and Fiji, 1325 as a form of nationalism, 934, 935 and globalization, 1411–1412 and Great Britain, 1011–1013 and immigration, 1367

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and India, 1765 and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 1784 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and the Netherlands, 206 and Poland, 685 and Romania, 1589 and Singapore, 1224 as solution to minority demands, 933, 939 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 1306 Multilateralism, 877, 881 Multinationality, 1358 Munch, P. A., 228 Munich Conference, 595 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 840, 841, 845, 846 Muñoz Rivera, Luis, 839, 841 Museums, 31 and the Baltic states, 560 and France, 1053 in Germany, 1558 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Latvia, 1578 and nationalistic art, 412–414 and Scandinavia, 229 Musharraf, Pervez, 1232 Music, 72–83, 1430–1445 and Angola, 1665 Baltic folk songs, 561, 567 and Basques, 1522 and Brazil, 1826 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Finland, 600, 605 folk songs and nationalistic, 417 and France, 1053 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569–1570 in Indonesia, 1479 and Israel, 1127, 1128 and Italy, 671 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and national identity, 31, 132–133, 407 and Paraguay, 364, 365 and Poland, 214, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 songs in Denmark, 154 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637 See also Anthem, national Musical instruments, 1440–1441, 1442 Muslim Brotherhood, 984–986, 1396

Muslim League, 801, 804, 806, 976, 1761 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171 and Pakistan, 1230, 1231 Muslims and Egypt, 265 and India, 801, 803, 804, 806, 1203, 1209 and the Netherlands, 202 See also Islam Musset, Alfred de, 177 Mussolini, Benito, 448–449, 514–516, 518, 667, 670, 676 and Roman history, 674 Mussolini, Vittorio, 1334 Mussorgsky, Modest, 75, 75 (illus.), 78, 82, 1437 Nadim, Abdullah, 261 Nadir Shah, Mohammed, 1686, 1688 Nagorno-Karabakh. See Gharabagh conflict Naguib, Muhammad, 266 (illus.) Nagy, Imre, 978 Naipaul, V. S., 924 Nairn, Tom, 933 Naji, Dr., 1740 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1687 Napier, Theodore, 242 Napoleon, Louis, 197 Napoleon III, 407, 1443 Napoleonic Civil Code, 174, 176 Napoleonic wars, 463 and Central America, 317 and Germany, 186, 618–619 music and resistance in the, 73 as stirring nationalism, 14, 16, 26, 46 Nariño, Antonio, 831 Naruszewicz, Adam, 214 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 687 Nassef, Malak Hifni, 450 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 265–266, 266 (illus.), 730, 890, 964, 1396 and the Bandung Conference, 962 and pan-Arabism, 965, 982 Nation-building, 929–941 National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), 235, 235, 241 National character, 527–537. See also Culture; Identity National Socialism, 419, 422, 513, 514, 517–519. See also Nazism Nationalism defining, 4–5, 85, 1351 ethnic-genealogical versus civic-territorial, 1353–1354 forms of, 5–12, 934–935 and geopolitics, 458–469 as an ideological political project, 875 imperative and imaginary forms of, 501–503 and language, 473, 482–484. See also Language as a legitimating ideology, 436 liberal, 488–490, 1355–1359, 1362

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Nationalism (continued ) and masculinity, 900–901 origins of, 473–474 particularistic, 90–94 versus patriotism, 45 perversions of, 512–525 religious, 100–101. See also Religion technological, 1478 transnational, 1407, 1414–1415 universalistic culture-based, 88–90 See also Identity; Philosophy, political; Politics Nativism, 883 Natsir, Mohammed, 965 Natsugdorji, D., 1794 Natural resources and Azerbaijan, 1714 and Brazil, 283, 1827–1828, 1832 and Canada, 1842 and conflict, 883–886 and India, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 877 and the Philippines, 1247 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1671 and Scandinavia, 221 and Wales, 1632 Nau, Emile, 341 Naumovych, Ivan, 716 Navarra, 1516, 1517, 1523 Nazism and Austria, 545, 546, 550, 552 and Czechoslovakia, 592 education and, 426 and the environment, 882 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438–440, 523, 622 and expansionism, 621 and film, 1331 and gender, 454–456 on German national character, 533 and Iran, 1110–1111 and language, 481 and music, 1431 nationalism of, 1353 propaganda of, 133–134 and rituals of belonging, 505, 507–508 and sexuality, 907 Ndadaye, Melchior, 1673, 1679 Negritude movement, 488, 918–919 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 981, 1207, 1461, 1761, 1764, 1765, 1766 and the Bandung Conference, 961, 962, 1206 and the Dalai Lama, 1820 economic policies of, 1206 and Indian federalism, 1205 and the nonaligned movement, 982 Nehru, Motilal, 1207 Nejedlý, Zdenˇek, 1023–1024 Nekrasov, N. A., 694

Nelson, Lord Horatio, 164 Neo-fascism, 525, 974 Neo-Nazis and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557, 1558 and the Soviet Union, 1078 Neo-Stalinism, 1077–1078 Neoliberalism, in education, 1381–1382 Neorealism, 1333–1335, 1336, 1337 Nepal, 1800–1811, 1802 (map) Netherlands, the, 195–206, 201 (map), 202 (illus.) and Belgium, 141–142 and Brazil, 283–284 and colonialism, 1479 education and, 34, 429 fascism in, 516 and immigration, 1420 and Indonesia, 1463, 1723, 1733, 1734 and Japan, 809, 810 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 and music, 1443 national anthem, 117 and Taiwan, 1252 and technology, 1480 and terrorism, 1486–1487, 1491 See also Afrikaner nationalism Neto, Agostinho, 1661–1662, 1662 Nevskii, Aleksandr, 696, 700 New France, 1288 New Guinea, 852 New Zealand, 862–873, 864 (map) and education, 1382, 1383 and the Maori, 1855–1863 and music, 1439, 1441 and sports, 993 Newspapers and Algeria, 1103 and Arab nationalism, 752 and Australia, 854 and Colombia, 833 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and Iraq, 1740, 1745 and Irish resistance, 918 and Japan, 816, 817 in Latvia, 1576 and nationalism, 1473, 1475–1476 and Nigeria, 1179, 1181 and Québec, 1296 and the Sami, 1613 and Wales, 1639 Ngata, Sir Apirana, 1858, 1859 Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, 1818 Ng˜ ug˜ı wa Thiong’o, 913, 915, 919–920, 925–926 Niagara Falls, 134 Nibelungenlied, 406 Nicaragua and national identity, 321 symbols of, 319 and William Walker, 318

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Niceforo, Alfredo, 672 Nicholas I, Czar (Russia), 210, 690–692 Nicholas II, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Nicholls, David, 341 Nichols, Terry, 1492 Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn, 214 Nietzsche, F., 10 Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 205 Nigeria, 1177–1189, 1178 (map) Biafran secessionist movement in, 967 education and, 424 and literature, 920 Nightingale, Florence, 164 Nitze, Paul, 950 Nixon, Richard, 1039, 1395 Nkrumah, Kwame, 962, 964, 965, 980, 1161 Noble, Paul, 734 Nolan, Sidney, 857 Nolte, Ernst, 515 Nonaligned movement, 961, 969, 982 and Algeria, 1095 and Cuba, 1285 and India, 1206 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 944, 1359–1361, 1412 and Brazil, 1830 and Fiji, 1322 and new social movements, 1453 Nora, Pierre, 121–122, 1343 Nordau, Max, 416 Nordraak, Rikard, 230 North America and immigration, 1421, 1425 and terrorism, 1494 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1294, 1407, 1412, 1451 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 943, 974, 1532–1533 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Germany, 1549, 1555 and international interventions, 1409 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Russia, 1604 and Turkey, 774 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 1303 North Borneo (Sabah), 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 North Korea, 977, 1757. See also Korea Northern Ireland, 1014–1015, 1058–1068 conflict in, 1470–1471 and counterterrorism, 1496 symbols in, 113 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1492 Norway, 220–222 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 229–230 and gender, 450 independence and, 223–225, 231 and language, 225–226, 472, 477

and music, 1432, 1436–1437 national anthem, 230, 230 national identity and culture of, 226–228 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1617 Notari, Elvira, 1327 Nourrit, Adolphe, 144 Novalis, 92 Nuclear weapons/energy and India, 1210, 1236 and Iran, 1117, 1117 and Pakistan, 1235, 1236 Nunavut, 1562 Núñez, Rafael, 828 Nussbaum, Martha, 97 Nyerere, Julius, 890, 962, 964, 980–981 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 1186, 1188 O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth, 133 Öcalan, Abdullah, 1655 Oceania, and language, 478 O’Connell, Daniel, 658, 920 O’Connor, T. P., 654 O’Donoghue, Lowitja, 1848 O’Dowd, Bernard, 853 Oehlenschläger, Adam, 67–69, 70, 228 O’Faolain, Sean, 925 Oge, Vincent, 335 Ogi´nski, Michał, 215–216 O’Gorman, Edmundo, 354 O’Higgins, Bernardo, 272, 326 Ohmae, Kenichi, 929 Oil/gas and Algeria, 1095 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Armenia, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1715, 1719–1721 and Canada, 1837 and Egypt, 729 and Iran, 1109, 1111 and Iraq, 755, 756, 1742, 1746 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 Oirat Mongols, 1797–1798 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 1185, 1185 Okinawa, 1757 Olav II (Norway), 226 O’Leary, Juan, 365 Olympic Games, 991, 994 O’Neill, Onora, 97 Onn, Hussein, 1223 Oommen, T. K., 1393 Opera, 79–80 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 Oral traditions, and the Sami, 1615. See also Folk culture Orange Free State, 1145 Organicism, 462–464 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1033, 1380, 1706 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 1095, 1742

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Oribe, Manuel, 275, 399 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 667 Ortega y Gasset, José, 704, 705, 707, 707 Orwell, George, 995 O’Shea, Katherine, 651 Oslo Accords, 1137, 1141 Ossian, 237 Otero, Mariano, 354 Otto of Wittelsbach, Prince, 631 Ottoman Empire, 760–767 and Algeria, 1097 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 734 and Armenia, 1704, 1704 and Armenian genocide, 522–523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Bulgaria, 571, 573, 577 collapse of the, 891 and Egypt, 258–259 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 436, 437–438 and Greece, 623–625 and India, 801 and Iraq, 748–749, 1737, 1739, 1742 and language, 472, 482 religion and the, 101–102 and Turkey, 1643, 1645 Ottomanism, 761–763, 764, 766, 768 Overdetermination, 120–121 Ovimbundu, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1664 Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 682, 682, 683, 683 (illus.) Padmore, George, 1179, 1301 Page, Thomas Nelson, 494–495 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 952, 986, 1109, 1111, 1114, 1396–1397 coronation ceremony of, 1114–1115 and minorities, 1113 Pahlavi, Reza, 986, 1110–1111, 1114 Paine, Thomas, 162, 370 Paisii, Father, 571 Paisley, Ian, 1065 Pakistan, 976–977, 1227–1237, 1228 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1689 creation of, 1201–1203, 1461–1462 and India, 950 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1767, 1768–1769, 1771 and religion, 107 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 and terrorism, 1488 and water, 885 Palach, Jan, 1026, 1028 Palacký, František, 96, 587, 594 Palais de Justice, Belgium, 143 (illus.), 144 Palestine, 1132–1143, 1134 (map) and Arab nationalism, 729 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1387

and Israel, 1120–1121 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1492 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 1137, 1140–1142 Palestinians and European partition, 891–893 and Israel, 1125, 1129–1130 Pamuk, Orhan, 1649 Pan-Aboriginalism, 1844–1853 Pan-Africanism, 965, 1161, 1179 Pan-Arabism, 965, 981, 982 and Iraq, 1740–1741, 1743 Pan-ethnic identities, 939 Pan-Germanism, and Austria, 544, 545 Pan-Islamism, 965 and Egypt, 261 and Turkey, 1645 Pan-Mongolian nationalism, 1790, 1792–1793 Pan-nationalist movements, 964–965, 980 Pan-Slavism, 93–94 and Russia, 20 and the Soviet Union, 946 Pan-Turkism, 764–765 Panama, and Colombia, 828, 829, 830 Pancasila, 953, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1731, 1732 Panchayat system, 1803, 1807–1808 Panchen Lama, 1821 Pandita, Zaya, 1791 Pankhurst, Christabel, 453 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 453 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 300, 306, 1288, 1292 Paraguay, 358–366, 359 (map) and Argentina, 275 Paraguayan War, 296, 359–360, 360, 362, 363 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 472, 1790 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and Hungary, 640 Parizeau, Jacques, 1201, 1297 Park Chung Hee, 1778, 1780 Parkes, Henry, 852 Parlacen, 316 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 649, 649 (illus.), 651, 651, 653–654 Parry, Hubert, 1438 Parry, Joseph, 1438 Parsons, T., 1399 Pashtuns, 1688–1689, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1693 Pasternak, Boris, 1074 Pastoral ideal, 251 Pat, Joe, 1853 Patel, A. D., 1318, 1319 Paterson, “Banjo,” 854 Pátria, and Brazil, 285–287, 288, 295 Patriarca, Silvana, 52 Patriotism and Austria, 553 and China, 1195 and France, 172 Iraq and local, 752

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and Mongolia, 1794 and national symbols, 1347 versus nationalism, 45 and Nigeria, 1186–1187 and political philosophy, 86, 91 and the Soviets, 945 and sports, 997 and the United States, 1308 Päts, Konstantin, 560, 565, 568 Patten, Jack, 1851 Paulin, Tom, 925 Pauw, Corneille de, 351 Paz, Octavio, 345–346 Peace movements, 1447–1448 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 183 Péan, Pierre, 1052 Pearse, Padraic, 449 Pearse, Patrick, 652, 918, 919, 922 Pearson, Karl, 532 Pearson, Lester B., 1838, 1839, 1840 Pearson, Noel, 1848 Peck, Raoul, 1674 Peckinpah, Sam, 1337 Pedro I, Emperor (Brazil), 289, 290, 294, 296 Pedro II, Emperor (Brazil), 290–291, 291 (illus.), 293, 296 Pelletier, Gerard, 1290 Penderecki, Krzysztof, 1434 Peres, Shimon, 1400, 1488–1489 Performance, and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 Perkins, Charles, 1846, 1848, 1851 Perlee, Kh., 1794 Perón, Juan Domingo, 278, 281, 942 Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita), 278 Perry, Matthew, 809 Persia, 1106–1107, 1700. See also Iran Peru, 367–379, 369 (map) and Colombia, 830 independence and, 272 and terrorism, 1491 Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 371–372 Pestalozzi, J. H., 34, 36 Pétain, Marshall, 1052 Peter the Great, 8, 20, 105, 696, 700 Peterloo Massacre, 163 Peters, Janis, 1575 Petion, Alexandre Sabes, 337, 340 Pham Van Dong, 963 Philip II (Netherlands), 196 Philippines, 1238–1248, 1240 (map) and gender, 450 and independence, 1462 separatist movements in, 1468 and terrorism, 1495 Philips, Caryl, 927 Phillips, Jock, 869 Philosophy, political, 85–97 and defining national identity, 474–476 and fascism, 514–517 and France, 171–172

and geopolitics, 460–464, 466–467 and Lenin, 1072 and national character, 527–537 and post-World War II France, 1052 postcolonial nationalist, 957–970 and Scotland, 234 See also Cosmopolitanism; Ideology Phuc Anh Gia Long, 1263 Picasso, Pablo, 1519 Pierrot, Jean Louis, 337 Pikul, Valentin, 1077 Piłsudski, Józef, 681, 682, 682, 683, 685, 687 Pinochet, Augusto, 331 Pinochet Le-Brun, Tancredo, 330 Pius IX, Pope, 665 Place names and Afghanistan, 1692 and Basque Country, 1513 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Turkey, 1652 Plato, 529 Platt Amendment, 1277, 1282 Poetry Chilean, 324–326 and Finland, 599 and forming national identities, 31, 32 and Greenland, 1570 and Japan, 491–492 and landscape, 67–69 and language, 78 and Latvia, 1577 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and Nepal, 1808 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 213, 214, 686 and Uruguay, 401 Pogge, Thomas, 97 Pogroms. See Genocide Poland, 207–218, 210 (map), 678–688, 679 (map) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and gender, 53 hostility toward German-speaking minority in, 522 Kingdom of, 209–210 and Lithuania, 558, 561, 562–563, 563 nationalism and literature in, 492–493 partition and, 21–22, 207, 209 and the Soviet Union, 948, 950 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716 uprisings against Russia in, 46 Poland-Lithuania, 207, 209, 212–213 Poles in the Baltic states, 563 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440 and Germany, 617, 1557 Political participation and Finland, 601 and France, 174

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Political participation (continued ) and gender, 46, 49–50, 53 and Germany, 620–621 and Japan, 812, 813 and Nigeria, 1188 and Northern Ireland, 1059 See also Voting franchise Political power and Afghanistan, 1685, 1686, 1686–1688 and Angola, 1666 and Armenia, 1710 and the Baltic states, 560 and Chile, 324 and China, 792 collapse of socialism and struggles for, 895–896 and Fiji, 1317 and Finland, 606 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iraq, 756–757, 1739, 1741, 1745. See also Clientelism, Iraq and and Malaysia, 1220–1223 and nationalist movements, 940 and newly independent states, 966, 967–968, 969 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Spain, 707 and the United States, 385 and Uruguay, 399 Political system. See Government(s) Politics and Afghanistan, 1686–1687, 1689–1690 and Algeria, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101 and Alsace, 1507–1509, 1508, 1509, 1510 and Angola, 1660, 1661, 1665–1666 and Arab nationalism, 728–731 and Argentina, 271, 275, 280–281 and Armenia, 1703, 1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711 and Austria, 544–546, 548–553 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1515, 1516, 1517–1519, 1521–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1535 and Brazil, 1827 and Burma, 777–780, 783–785 and Catalonia, 1539, 1539–1541 and Central America, 316–317 and China, 791–792, 793, 794 and Colombia, 827–828, 832, 833 and communications technology, 1480 and Cuba, 1275–1276, 1277, 1285–1286 and Czechoslovakia, 1017–1019 Danish, 150–151 and Egypt, 260, 261, 265 and England, 161, 162–163 and the environment, 876–877, 882–883 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171, 1172–1175 and Fiji, 1319, 1320–1322 and Finland, 605–606 and France, 178–179, 1054

geopolitics and legitimizing, 465 and Germany, 190–191, 611, 613, 620–621, 1552–1557, 1555, 1557, 1558 and Great Britain, 1011 and Greece, 628–629 and Haiti, 337–338 and Hungary, 638, 639, 641–644, 643 and hypernationalism, 1389 and the ideology of nationalism, 875 and immigration, 1427 and India, 798–802, 987, 1206–1207, 1207, 1208, 1209–1210, 1461–1462, 1763 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726, 1730 and international migration, 1414–1415 and Iran, 1109–1112, 1117 and Iraq, 754, 755, 1745–1746 and Ireland, 649–657 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 667–671, 676–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764–1765, 1768–1771 and Japan, 988, 1751, 1752, 1757 and Korea, 1780 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 and Malaysia, 1216–1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1857, 1858–1860, 1862 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1789 and Nepal, 1810–1811 and the Netherlands, 205–206 and new social movements, 1446, 1453, 1455–1456, 1458 and Nigeria, 1179–1183, 1185 and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1062–1063, 1064–1065, 1066, 1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, 1850–1853 and Peru, 372–373 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 213–214, 681–685, 687 post-World War II, 973–976 and Puerto Rico, 837, 839–840, 844–847 and Québec, 1288–1289, 1290–1292 and religion, 982–989, 1064, 1112, 1394, 1395–1396 and Romania, 1586–1587, 1587, 1589 and Russia, 1597, 1597–1599, 1604, 1605 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678–1679 and the Sami, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616 and Scandinavian nationalism, 228–231 and Scotland, 241–242, 1014 and South Africa, 1147–1149, 1148, 1152–1153 Soviet, 979 and Spain, 702–703, 709–711, 1086 and Switzerland, 250 and Turkey, 1645, 1654 and Ukraine, 718, 1621, 1622–1629, 1623, 1624, 1626, 1629 and the United States, 387–388, 389, 391, 1304, 1306

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and Uruguay, 398–399 and Wales, 1014, 1633, 1633–1635, 1639–1640 See also Government(s); Ideology; Leaders; Political power Pomare, Maui, 869 Ponce de Leon, Ernesto, 1375 Poniatowski, Józef, 211, 686 Poniatowski, Stanisław August, 210, 215 Popławski, Jan Ludwik, 681, 683 Popper, Karl, 534 Population and Algeria, 1096, 1098 and Argentina, 269, 277, 280 and Armenia, 1699 and Australia, 851–852, 1382 and Brazil, 1825, 1831 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 1836 and Central America, 311 and Colombia, 829 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Fiji, 1314 and France, 1054–1055 and Germany, 190 and Gharabagh, 1706 and Haiti, 333, 336 and Indonesia, 1723 and Israel, 1121 and Latvia, 1574 and Mexico, 346 and the Middle East, 885 and Native Americans, 893 and New Granada, 826 and New Zealand, 864, 865, 868 and Nigeria, 967 and Paraguay, 360 and the Philippines, 1247 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Russia, 1604 and the Sami, 1609 and Turkey, 1645 and Uruguay, 402 U.S., 1836 See also Ethnicity; Immigrants/immigration; Migration Population transfers. See Migration Populism, 281, 643 Porter, Jane, 239 Portugal and Angola, 1666 and Brazil, 282, 283–285, 287–289, 293 and colonialism, 889, 1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 and geopolitics, 465 and immigration, 1424 and language, 472 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397

Post-nationalism and Germany, 1555 and globalization, 1406, 1408–1410, 1411 See also Multilateralism; Transnationalism Poster, Mark, 1476 Potatau Te Wherowhero, 1856 Potocki, Ignacy, 211 Poujade, Pierre, 1054 Poverty and Brazil, 1831 and Fiji, 1322 and Pakistan, 1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 and the United States, 1308 See also Income distribution Powell, Adam Clayton, 962 Powell, Enoch, 1013 Power. See Political power Pozharsky, Dmitry, 700, 1602 Prague, 584–585 Prague Spring, 1025, 1026 Prat de la Riba, Enric, 706 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Premchad, 923 Press. See Media Pretorius, Marthinus, 1146 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 516, 705, 706, 709 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 516 Primrose, Archibald Philip, 242 Print technology, 127, 129 and Armenia, 1701 and diaspora populations, 1370 and India, 796 and Japan, 1749 and language, 479, 485 and national identity, 1474, 1475 See also Newspapers Prithvi Narayan Shah, 1803, 1803–1804, 1804, 1806 Pro-natalist policies, 878 Propaganda and Angola, 1665-1666 the arts and, 83, 176 and Australia, 1852-1853 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306 and China, 952, 1193, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 1020, 1025 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and ethnic cleansing, 441 and Germany, 186 and Greenland, 1571 and Indonesia, 1727, 1734 and Iran, 1115, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 758 and Italy, 667, 674 and Korea, 1781 and the Jacobins, 31 and Japan, 817, 818

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Propaganda (continued ) and Nazis, 133, 455 (illus.), 456, 614, 621, 1332 and Nigeria, 1181 and the Philippines, 1246 and Puerto Rico, 846 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and the Soviet Union, 508, 694, 696, 696 (illus.), 697, 699-701, 1074, 1708 and Switzerland, 255 and terrorism, 1490 and Yugoslavia, 896 Protectionism, 25, 316 and Amazonia, 1827–1828, 1831 and Argentina, 271 and Canada, 1837, 1839, 1842 and film, 1331–1332 and natural resources, 886 and new social movements, 1448 and Peru, 368 Protestantism and Czechoslovakia, 1023–1024 Dutch, 199, 200, 200–202 and fundamentalism, 1393, 1398 and Germany, 188–189 and politics, 982–983 Proust, Marcel, 489 Provençal, 471, 477 Prussia, 611, 617 and Denmark, 150 and education, 34 and German unification, 186, 191, 192 national anthem of, 117 and Poland, 210 resistance to Napoleon and women, 52 Puerto Rico, 836–847 colonialism and, 425 literacy rates in, 495 and terrorism, 1491 Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de, 273 Pujol, Jordi, 1539, 1539, 1541, 1542 Pumpurs, Andr¯ejs, 564 Punjabi Muslims, 1231, 1236, 1764–1765 Purcell, Henry, 117 Pushkin, Aleksandr, 78, 213, 694, 1437 Putin, Vladimir, 1080, 1597, 1601, 1602, 1604, 1605 Qanuni, Yunus, 1695 Qarase, Laisenia, 1324–1325 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 754, 754, 1742, 1746 Québec, 478, 1287–1297 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and separatism, 306, 307, 1470, 1471, 1836–1837, 1843 and terrorism, 1490–1491 Québec City, 299 Quezon, Manuel, 1241 Quinet, Edgar, 177 Rabin, Yitzhak, 1141, 1400–1401, 1488–1489 Rabuka, Sitiveni, 1321, 1321, 1323, 1323

Race and Afghanistan, 1688–1689 and Alsace, 1504 and Arab nationalism, 732 and Argentina, 277 and Australia, 850, 851 and the Bandung Conference, 961 and Basques, 710 and Brazil, 290, 293, 297, 1826 and Central America, 314 and Colombia, 826 and colonialism, 958 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1281 and Darwinism, 480 and Fiji, 1317, 1319, 1321, 1323, 1325 and France, 179 and gender, 47–48, 54–55, 447–448 and Haiti, 333–336, 337–339, 341 and India, 131 and Italy, 672 and Malaysia, 1222 and Mexico, 349 and Mongolia, 1792 and nationalist ideologies, 415–417, 513, 517 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 866–867, 869 and Peru, 373–375 and Puerto Rico, 837–839, 843–844 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and South Africa, 1151–1153 and the United States, 391–392, 894, 1300–1303, 1307 and Völkisch nationalism, 614, 614, 622 See also Ethnicity; Minorities Racism and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1510 and anticolonialism, 958 and Colombia, 829 education and, 429–430 and Egypt, 263 and film, 1328 and France, 1056, 1097 and gender, 447, 452–453 and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557 and Great Britain, 1013 and Hungary, 645 and immigration, 1424–1426 and imperative nationalism, 502, 510 and India, 798 and nationalism, 533–534 and Nazism, 426, 517–518 and new social movements, 1448 and Nigeria, 1179 and perversions of nationalism, 518–521 and Puerto Rico, 837 and the United States, 1310, 1339–1340 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnic cleansing; Genocide

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Radio and Canada, 1839 and Colombia, 833 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and Indonesia, 1727 in Indonesia, 1479 in nationalism, 132–133, 1474, 1475 and promoting nationalistic art, 418 and Puerto Rico, 846 Rahman, Abdul, 1218–1219, 1222 Rahman, Abdur, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1691, 1692 Rahman, Mujibur, 1466 Railroads and Argentina, 279–280 and Canada, 302, 1837 and Central America, 315 and Ethiopia, 740 and Germany, 192 in India, 131, 796 and Mexico, 355 and New Zealand, 865 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Rainis, J¯anis, 560, 564 Rakovski, Georgi, 573 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 164 Rangihau, John, 1860 Rao, Raja, 914, 921, 922 Rapp, Jean, 1504 Ras Tafari Mekonnen, 740 Rasputin, Valentin, 1077 Ratzel, Friedrich, 460, 461, 463, 488–489 Ravel, Maurice, 1437 Rawls, J., 97 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 351 Razak, Tun Abdul, 1222, 1223 Reagan, Ronald, 945, 946, 1039, 1244, 1310–1311, 1395, 1453 Rebet, Lev, 1624 Reddy, Jai Ram, 1323 Redmond, John, 651 Reeves, Sir Paul, 1322 Reformation, 618, 1502 Refugees and Europe, 1044 and the Gharbagh conflict, 1716, 1719 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Korea, 1781 and Pakistan-Indian violence, 1234 Palestinian, 1135, 1140 Sahrawi in Algeria, 1096–1097 and Taiwan, 1257 and Tibet, 1813, 1821–1822 See also Asylum; Immigrants/immigration Regionalism, 407 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 271 and Australia, 852 and Austrian provincialism, 551–552

and Basques, 1518–1519 and Canada, 306–307, 1837, 1843 and Central America, 311–313 and Chile, 324 and Colombia, 828–829, 834 education and, 432 and the European Union, 1043, 1044 and Finland, 608 and France, 1056 and Germany, 611 and globalization, 1413, 1415 and India, 1205 and Italy, 665, 672–673 and language movements, 482 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1808, 1811 and Nigeria, 1181–1183, 1185 and Romania, 1591 and Scandinavia, 225 and Spain, 1083, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 245 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 1623 and Vietnam, 1263 See also Separatism/secession Reich, Robert, 1407–1408 Reichsland, 1505 Rej, Mikołaj, 214 Religion, 971–989 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1692, 1693–1694 and Algeria, 1095, 1102–1103 and Arab nationalism, 725, 731–732, 733 and Armenia, 1700, 1701 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Basques, 710 and Belgium, 140, 142 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1525–1526, 1528–1530 and Brazil, 289, 1825–1826 and Bulgaria, 573, 580 and Burma, 781 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1280–1281 and Czechoslovakia, 1020 and discrimination against immigrants, 1423–1424 education and, 424, 428 and Egypt, 265 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 736, 741, 742, 746 and Europe, 1031–1032 and Fiji, 1314, 1315 and France, 176 and gender, 902 and Germany, 188–189, 618 and Greece, 627 and Haiti, 339–340 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1203, 1461–1462 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728

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Religion (continued ) and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 657–658, 1470–1471 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1768 and Japan, 813–814 and Malaysia, 1217, 1223 and Mexico, 346, 347, 347–350, 356 and Mongolia, 1785, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1792 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 99–109, 519–520 and Nepal, 1806 and the Netherlands, 196, 197, 199–202, 200, 202 (illus.), 205, 206 and Nigeria, 967 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233, 1236, 1461–1462 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1243 and Poland, 216, 686 and Québec, 1293 ritualism and nationalism as substitutes for, 500–501 and Russia, 1603, 1605 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 245, 250 and terrorism, 1487, 1494–1495, 1498 and Tibet, 1816–1817 and Turkey, 769–770, 1653–1654 and Ukraine, 720 and Uruguay, 403 and Vietnam, 1270 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 See also specific religions Religious fundamentalism, 1392–1404 and the United States, 1306 Rembrandt, 203 Renan, Ernest, 95–96, 415, 475–476, 477, 501, 528–529, 1504 Renner, Karl, 542, 542 Repression and Afghanistan, 1685, 1694 and Australia, 1845–1846 and Congo/Zaïre, 1165 and counterterrorism, 1496–1498 and Eritrea, 1172 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Korea, 1773, 1775 and Latvia, 1576, 1578, 1581 and the legacies of colonialism, 893–894 and Mongolia, 1784, 1794 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Russia, 690–692 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675, 1680 and the Sami, 1615

and the Soviet Union, 1074–1075, 1075 and Spain, 708, 709, 1089, 1092 and Tibet, 1820 and Turkey, 769 and Ukraine, 722 and the United States, 1310 and women, 904 Republic of the United Provinces, 196 Republicanism, French, 409 Resettlement, forced. See Ethnic cleansing Resnick, Philip, 1842 Retief, Piet, 1150 Reventós, Joan, 1539 Revueltas, Silvestre, 76 Reyntjens, Filip, 1675 Rezanov, Nikolai, 810 Rhee Syngman, 1780 Rhodes, Cecil John, 1151 Ricasoli, Bettino, 669 Richard, Maurice “Rocket,” 1842 Richard the Lionheart, King (England), 165 Riche, Jean Baptiste, 337 Richler, Mordecai, 1296 Riefenstahl, Leni, 1332 Riegl, Alois, 415 Riel, Louis, 301, 305, 1289 Rights, 14, 129, 444 Argentina and political, 272 and Armenia, 1703, 1708 and Australia, 852, 855 Brazil and political, 290 Central America and political, 316 Colombia and human, 834 demands for, 499–500 and diaspora populations, 1371 England and political, 161, 164 and the European Union, 1041 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1325 and forms of nationalism, 1352–1354 France and, 34, 173–174, 176, 179 free speech and the United States, 387–388 Greenland and civil, 1570 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 812 and the Maori, 1858 minority verus majority, 932–933 and Nepal, 1809 the Netherlands and political, 199 and New Zealand, 873 and Nigeria, 1183 Rwanda and Burundi and human, 1675, 1679, 1680–1681 and the Sami, 1612 Switzerland and political, 249, 252–253 and Turkey, 1648, 1650 Ukraine and human, 1626 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Liberalism; Minorities Riguad, Andre, 335 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 82, 417, 1437

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Rinchen, B., 1794 Rinchino, Elbek-Dorzhi, 1793 Risorgimento, 663–665, 669, 672, 673 culture and identity and the, 671, 673–674 Rituals of belonging, 499–511. See also Ceremonies; Symbols Riva Aguero y Osma, José de la, 373, 374–375 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 355 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 272, 273 Rivera, Fructuoso, 399 Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 320 Riviere-Herard, Charles, 337 Rizal, Jose, 1245 Robert I, the Bruce, 233 Roberto, Holden, 1662, 1662 Roberts, Hugh, 1101 Roberts, Tom, 859 Robertson, Roland, 1393, 1399 Robertson, William, 234, 351 Robespierre, 175, 1489 Robinson, Mary, 1375–1376 Robles, Mariano, 317 Roca, Julio A., 280 Rodgers, Richard, 1433 Rodrigo, Joaquín, 1437 Rodrigues, José Honório, 292 Roma. See Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies) Roman, Petre, 1587 Roman Catholicism and Alsace, 1507–1508, 1508 and Belgium, 140 and Brazil, 1825–1826 and Central America, 317 and Colombia, 827, 828, 829, 832, 833 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1023–1024 and France, 179 and Germany, 189, 192, 193, 618 and Haiti, 339–340 and Ireland, 654, 661 and Mexico, 346, 347–350 and the Netherlands, 199, 200, 200–202, 202 (illus.), 204, 205 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 686 and politics, 982–983, 987–988 and Québec, 1292 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Spain, 703, 705, 707 and Uruguay, 399 Romania, 1584–1594, 1586 (map) anti-Semitism in, 521 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Romantic nationalism, 31, 406, 463, 474–475, 476 German, 10, 92 Romanticism, 527, 882, 1352–1353 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 950, 1276, 1277 Roosevelt, Theodore, 448

Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 273–275, 274 (illus.), 276, 277–278 Rosenau, James, 1368 Rosenberg, Alfred, 416, 417 Rosewall, Ken, 857 Rossé, Joseph, 1509 Rossellini, Roberto, 1333–1334 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 15, 22, 30–31, 86–87, 171, 501 and the collective will, 1054 and organicism, 462 and sovereignty of the people, 530 and Switzerland, 251 and the Terror, 174 Rozent¯als, J¯anis, 565 Rubin, Marcus, 227 Rubinstein, Anton, 82 Rubriks, Alfr¯eds, 1582 Rudbeck, Olof, 223 Runeberg, Johan Ludvig, 228, 601, 605 Rusesabagina, Paul, 1674 Rushdie, Salman, 913, 920, 921, 927 Russell, Bertrand, 1676 Russia, 689–701, 691 (map), 1596–1607, 1598 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714–1715 and the Baltic states, 562, 567–568 and the Bolshevik Revolution, 436 and Bulgaria, 575 and Denmark, 150 education and, 423 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438 and Eurasianism, 466 and Finland, 598, 605 and Greek independence, 631 and Hungary, 638 and indigenous groups, 1566 intelligentsia and nationalism in, 8 and Iran, 1110 and Japan, 815 and language, 472 and Latvia, 1576, 1582 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790–1791, 1791–1792, 1796 and music, 82, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1441 national symbols, 134–135 and new social movements, 1449 and Orthodoxy, 105–106, 983 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and Poland, 209–210, 679 and political philosophy, 93–94 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1594 and Russian nationalism, 1079–1080 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 and Scandinavia, 220 Slavophilism versus Westernizers in, 19–21 and terrorism, 1489, 1495

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Russia (continued ) and Tibet, 1818 and Ukraine, 714, 1621 See also Soviet Union Russian nationalism, 1074, 1076–1078 Russians in Latvia, 1575, 1582 in Ukraine, 1627–1628 Russification, 946, 955 and Finland, 605 versus Germanization in the Baltic states, 561–562 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), 810, 816, 820 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 574, 763, 764 Rustaveli, Shota, 694 Rustow, Dankwart, 929 Ruthene-Americans, 589 Ruyter, Michiel de, 203 Rwagasore, Prince (Burundi), 1670 Rwanda and Burundi, 1668–1681, 1670 (map) genocide in, 968–969 Ryan, Claude, 1296 Ryckman, Pierre, 1157 Ryklin, Mikhail, 135 Ryukyu Island, 1754 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 1080 Saba, Isak, 1614 Sadat, Anwar, 266 (illus.), 985, 1398 Sadiq, G. M., 1763 Šafàrík, Pavol Jozef, 592 Safavid Dynasty, 1107–1109 Saget, Nissage, 338 Sahak, Catholicos, 1701 Said, Edward, 915, 924 Saigo Takamori, 820 Saint-Domingue. See Haiti Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 410 Sakharov, Andre, 951 Salanga, Alfredo Navarro, 1245 Salazar, Antonio, 516 Sale, Kirkpatrick, 879 Salisbury, Lord, 460 Salnave, Sylvain, 338 Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 338 Salvarrieta, Policarpa, 831 Samarin, Iu. F., 692 Sami, 225, 231, 1608–1618, 1610 (map) Samper, José María, 829 Sampson, Deborah, 50 San Martín, José de, 271, 272, 277 and Peru, 370, 371 San Stefano Peace Treaty, 575 Sánchez, Miguel, 347, 349 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 354 Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 372 Santander, Francisco de Paula, 826, 827, 831, 831 (illus.) Santo Domingo, 332–333

Santos, José Eduardo dos, 1662 São Tomé e Príncipe, 1667 Sarawak, 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 Sardà, Joan, 706 Sarmatian ideology, 213–214 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino, 276, 277, 278, 279 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1052 Saryan, Martiros, 1707 Saudi Arabia, 984, 1492 Saussure, F. de, 482 Savage, Michael Joseph, 871 Savimbi, Jonas, 1659, 1662, 1662–1663 Savoy, 175 Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1370, 1419 Sayeed, Mufti, 1769, 1770–1771 Scandinavia, 219–231, 221 (map) languages of, 471–472 Schaepman, Herman, 205 Schefferus, Johannes, 1615 Schelling, Friedrich, 67 Schieder, Theodor, 501–502 Schiller, Friedrich, 188, 251 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 7, 415 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 67, 92, 415, 1110 Schleswig, 147, 149, 152, 155–156 Schmid, Alex, 1484 Schoenberg, Arnold, 1434 Schoenfeld, Eugen, 1393 Schöning, Gerhard, 227 Schumacher, John, 1245 Schuman, Robert, 190, 1034, 1509 Scotland, 166, 232–242, 1413, 1415 and communication, 1639 and devolution, 1014 and music, 1442 Scott, James, 903 Scott, Robert, 1434 Scott, Sir Walter, 238 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 241–242, 242 Sculpture. See Monuments Sculthorpe, Peter, 1439 Second Schleswigian War, 150, 152, 153 Secularism and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Azerbaijan, 1713 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527 and France, 175, 409 and globalization, 1401–1402 and India, 1765 and Iraq, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1761, 1769 legitimacy and, 973 and Mongolia, 1796 and the Netherlands, 206 and Pakistan, 1233 and Palestinians, 1139, 1141–1142 and Québec, 1292, 1294 and religious fundamentalism, 1403

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role of symbols in, 115 and Turkey, 769, 1647, 1651–1652, 1653–1654 and Uruguay, 403 Seddon, Richard John, 868, 870 Sedition Act (U.S.), 387–388 Segregation and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1064 and South Africa, 1151–1152 Séguin, Maurice, 1294 Seipel, Ignaz, 551 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1662 Self-determination and Austria, 544–545 and the Baltic states, 558 ethnic conflict and denial of, 888 and ethnicity, 464 and Fiji, 1317 and forms of nationalism, 1354–1355 and Israel, 1402 and Mongolia, 1790 and the Napoleonic wars, 474 and nationalistic philosophy, 476, 524 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1845 in political philosophy, 536–537, 965–966, 969 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 as a precondition of rights, 972 See also Independence; Sovereignty Self-government. See Autonomy Selim III (Egypt), 258 Sella, Quintino, 669 Senegal, 963 Senghor, Léopold, 488, 919, 963, 980–981 Separatism/secession, 1460–1472 and Angola, 1660 and Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and Burma, 780–781 and Catalonia, 1540–1541 during the Cold War, 949 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and cultural distinctiveness, 461 and gender and sexuality issues, 899 and Georgia, 897 and global governance, 459 increases in, 929 and India, 800, 804, 806 in Iran, 1112 and Ireland, 649–657 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764, 1766, 1769 and Latvia, 1581–1582 linguistic, 477 and Malaysia, 1222 and minorities, 933, 1359 and Mongolia, 1784, 1798 and New Zealand, 866 and newly independent states, 966–967 and Nigeria, 1185 in the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 844

in Russia, 1600 and Swedish speakers in Finland, 606 and Taiwan, 1259 and terrorism, 1487, 1490–1492, 1494–1495, 1494 (table) in Turkey, 1655 and Ukraine, 716, 1625 See also Civil war; Independence Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 119, 955, 1399, 1410, 1457, 1488, 1492, 1493 (illus.), 1496 casualties, 1495 Serbia, 437, 481, 1413 Serbs in Bosnia, 1527–1535 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440, 524 Sergeev-Tsenskii, S., 697 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1368 Setus, 557 Sevak, Paruir, 1707 Sexuality, 446, 899–910 Sha, Mirwaiz Yusuf, 1764 Sha’arawi, Huda, 450 Shagari, Shehu, 1187 Shah, G. M., 1768 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 732, 733 Shakespeare, William, 474, 915–917 Sharif, Nawaz, 1232 Shatterbelts, 942 Shays, Daniel, 386 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1626 Sheng Bright, 1440 Shepstone, Theophilus, 1145–1146 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei, 718 Sheridan, Jim, 927 Sheridan, Richard, 915 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1080 Shevchenko Society, 718, 719 Shiism/Shiites differences from Sunnis, 983–984, 986 and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112, 1115–1116 and Iraq, 748, 752–753, 755, 755, 757, 1745, 1747 and Pakistan, 1236 Shinto, 106–107, 108 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 1074, 1432, 1433 Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 718 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 1597 Sibelius, Jean, 79, 228, 417, 600, 605, 1436 Sidgwick, Henry, 527, 531 Sidqi, Bakr, 752 Siebenpfeiffer, Philipp Jakob, 190 Siemiradzki, Henryk, 682 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 493, 682, 683, 685 Sierra, Justo, 355 Sieyès, Abbé, 172 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 350 Sikhs, 1466 Sikorski, Władysław, 683 Silesia, 584

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Sillars, Jim, 997 Silva, Lula da, 1829, 1830, 1831 Simeon I the Great, 574 Simms, William Gilmore, 389 Simon, Claude, 1052 Simpson, L. P., 494 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 1246 Sinai peninsula, 262 Sinclair, Keith, 870, 872 Sindici, Orestes, 828 Singapore, 1218–1219, 1220–1221, 1221, 1224–1225 and education, 1384–1385, 1386 and Indonesia, 1733 Singh, Gulab, 1763 Singh, Hari, 1465, 1764 Singh, Manmohan, 1207 Singh, V. P., 1769 Sinhalese, 1466–1467 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), 810, 820, 1774 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 795, 810, 817, 822 Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies), 440, 517, 521, 523, 1022, 1027 Skalagrímsson, Egil, 226 Skoropad’kyi, Pavlo, 716 Skötkonung, Olof, 226 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 718 Slanský, Rudolf, 1020 Slave rebellions, Haitian, 335–336, 340 Slavery, 1301 and Brazil, 283, 289, 292, 293 and colonialism, 889, 890, 893 and Cuba, 1275 and the development of nationalism, 47 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 262 and France, 174 and Haiti, 333, 334–336 and Mexico, 345 paternalistic justifications of, 54 and Peru, 371 and the United States, 383, 385, 388, 390–391 and Uruguay, 401 Slavophilism, 20, 213, 692 and religion, 105, 108 Slesvig, 220, 222, 225 Slovakia, 584, 1017, 1021–1022, 1026–1028 and separatism, 590, 594 See also Czechoslovakia Slovenia, 1450 Słowacki, Juliusz, 212, 214 Smart, Mary Ann, 671 Smetana, Bedˇrich, 74, 74 (illus.), 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 417, 593, 594, 1435–1436 Smetona, Antanas, 560, 565, 568 Smiles, Samuel, 531 Smith, Adam, 19, 234, 855 Smith, Anthony D., 113–114, 400, 473, 929, 931, 1368–1369

Smith, Dennis Mack, 674 Smith, Zadie, 927–928 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 1151 Smyrna, 633 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 601 Social Darwinism, 437, 439, 518, 532–533 and gender, 447, 452–453 and language, 480–481 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Social Democrats, 149, 975–976 Social mobility and ethnic minorities, 931 and nationalism, 5–6, 11 and technology, 1475 and the United States, 1305 See also Class Social movements and Finland, 600–601 new, 1446–1458 and the United States, 1303–1304, 1305 Social policy education reform as, 421–422, 428–429 and gender, 448–449 and women’s rights, 446–447 Social structure and Eritrea, 1170–1171 and France, 1050 and India, 1204–1205 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1676, 1680 See also Class Socialism and Alsace, 1508 and Arab nationalism, 732, 733 and Canada, 1839 and China, 789 versus communism, 975–976 and developing countries, 980, 981 disillusionment and discredit of, 936 and Egypt, 266 and France, 179, 1054 and gender, 453, 456 and Great Britain, 1011 and Iraq, 754 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and the Netherlands, 205 and Poland, 212 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Communism; Marxism Socialization and Finland, 600, 607–608 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 See also Assimilation Sokol, 594 Solanas, Fernando, 1335 Solano, Armando, 830 Solano López, Francisco, 362, 363, 363 (illus.), 364 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 951, 1077, 1601 Somalia, 949

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Somaliland, 459 Sonam Gyatso, 1817 Songtsen Gampo, King (Tibet), 1815, 1816, 1821 Sonnenstern, Maximilian von, 320 Sontsen Gyatso, 1816 Sorel, Georges, 514 Soulouque, Faustin-Elie, 337 Sousa, John Philip, 1441 South Africa, 1144–1153, 1146 (map) and Angola, 1664, 1665 and apartheid, 890 and education, 1386 and language, 478 and music, 1440, 1441 and the Netherlands, 198 and sports, 995 and terrorism, 1491 South America and language, 478 national identity and education in, 35, 37, 39 See also specific South American countries South Korea and Japan, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 See also Korea South Tyrol, 1490 South-West Africa, 437 Southeast Asia, 778 (map), 1214 (map), 1262 (map), 1724 (map) Southern Mindanao, 1468 Sovereignty and Australia, 855 and Brazil, 1830–1831 and the environment, 886 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1718, 1719 versus globalization, 1406, 1408 and Greenland, 1571 and Japan, 814–815 and the Maori, 1856 nationalism and popular, 5, 15 and Nepal, 1805 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 and Québec, 1291–1292 See also Independence; Self-determination Soviet Union, 699 (map), 714 (map), 1070–1080, 1072 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Angola, 1663 and Armenia, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709–1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714, 1716–1717, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 563 breakup of the, 888, 895–897, 972, 1413, 1596 and China, 1197 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Cuba, 1276 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 education and, 419, 426, 430 and the environment, 881–882 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440–441

and film, 1330, 1332 and gender, 449, 450, 454 and geopolitics, 459 and Japan, 822, 1754 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780 and language, 482 and Latvia, 1575, 1576, 1578, 1581–1582 and Mongolia, 1785, 1789, 1794–1795, 1795–1796 and national identity, 693–701, 880 nationalistic art of the, 411 nationalities policy, 468–469, 946, 1599 and new social movements, 1449 and Poland, 681 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1588, 1591 and Siberia, 876 and sports, 993 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716, 719, 722 See also Russia Soyinka, Wole, 925 Spain, 702–711, 703 (map), 1082–1092, 1085 (map), 1540 (map) and Argentina, 269 and authoritarianism, 973 and Basques, 1514, 1517, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Catalonia, 1536–1537, 1544–1547 and Central America, 311–313, 314, 317–318 and Chile, 323–327 and Colombia, 825 and colonialism, 889 education and, 36, 432 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 interventions in Haiti by, 335 and Mexico, 345–346, 350, 353 and minorities, 1412 and music, 1437 and the Philippines, 1239, 1243 resistance to Napoleon, 51–52 and Santo Domingo, 332–333. 339 separatist movements in, 1471 and sports, 997, 999 symbols in, 49 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397 Spanish-American War, 1086 Speight, George, 1323–1324 Spencer, Herbert, 532–533 Spengler, Oswald, 70 Spenser, Edmund, 915 Spinoza, Baruch, 203 Spivak, Gayatri, 926 Sports, 991–1003 and Australia, 852, 857 and Canada, 1841, 1842 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and England, 165

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Sports (continued ) and Ireland, 657 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 870 and Peru, 378 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 soccer and Brazil, 295 and Turkey, 1651 and Wales, 1637 and war, 901 Sri Lanka, 1466–1467 and terrorism, 1484, 1491, 1492 St. Erik (Sweden), 226 St. Gregory, 1700 St. Laurent, Louis, 1838 Stalin, Joseph (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), 945, 1075, 1603, 1603 (illus.) and China, 978 and the Cold War, 977–978 cult of personality, 952 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 440 and gender, 449 and nationalism, 1071, 1076 nationalities policy of, 469 and Russianness, 693, 694, 697, 700–701 and Yugoslavia, 948 Stambolov, Stefan, 578 Stanford, Charles Villiers, 1438 Stanley, Henry Morton, 1156, 1160 “Star-Spangled Banner,” 117, 118 (illus.) Starˇcevi´c, Ante, 96 Statue of Liberty, 119 Steele, James, 1843 Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 587, 588, 1017 Stefano, Alfredo Di, 1002 Steffens, Henrik, 66–68, 69–70 Stein, Freiherr von, 34 Stephen the Great (Moldavia), 1592 Sternberger, Dolf, 1556 Stetsko, Slava, 1624 Stoilov, Konstantin, 578 Strasbourg, France, 1510 Stratification. See Class Streeton, Arthur, 859 Strindberg, August, 228 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 237–238, 238 Stubbs, Paul, 1450 Štúr, L’udovit, 96, 592 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 589 Subsidiarity, 881, 1042, 1045 Sudan, 263, 1468–1469 Sudeten-Germans, 595 Sudetenland, 595, 1017–1019, 1025 Suez Canal, 259, 265–266 Suez Canal crisis, 1012 Suffrage, women’s, 446 and Australia, 853 and Germany, 620 and nationalist movements, 450

and New Zealand, 870–871 and transnational movements, 452–453 and Turkey, 770 See also Voting franchise; Women’s rights Suharto, President (Indonesia), 954, 1723, 1725, 1726, 1728, 1730–1731, 1733 Suhm, P. F., 227 Sukarno, Ahmad, 953–954, 964, 1463, 1725, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1734 and the Bandung Conference, 960–961, 962 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1734 Sükhebaatur, General (Mongolia), 1789, 1797, 1798 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala, 1318 Sullivan, A. M., 658–659 Sultan, Ibrahim, 1171 Sun Yat-sen, 789, 789 (illus.), 790, 791, 794 Sunnis differences from Shiites, 983–984 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 748, 751, 754, 755, 755, 757 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1764 Suriname, 197 Suvorov, Aleksandr, 696, 1074 Švec, Otakar, 1024 Svecoman movement, 599 Sweden, 220–222 communication in, 1473 and Finland, 598 and language, 472 national anthem and holidays, 230 national identity and, 223, 226–228 and Norway, 224–225 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 Swildens, J. H., 198 Swiss army, 253 Swiss Confederation, 245, 247–248 Switzerland, 244–255, 248 (map) education and, 429 flag of, 114 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 national identity and education in, 35 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 Symbols, 111–124, 1342–1348 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Armenia, 1702 and Australia, 856, 860 and the Baltic states, 565 and Basques, 1519–1521 and Belgium, 144, 145 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Brazil, 285, 286 (illus.), 294–295 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 305 and Catalonia, 1543–1544 and Central America, 318–319, 320–321 and Chile, 327–328, 328 and Colombia, 825, 831 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 and Cuba, 1283–1284

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and England, 163 and Ethiopia, 744 and the European Union, 1042 and Finland, 600, 602, 604 and France, 175 gender and familial, 43–45, 46, 48–50, 54, 445–446, 449, 904–905, 907 and Germany, 618, 619 and Greenland, 1568–1569, 1570 and Hungary, 641–644 and Indonesia, 1732–1733 and Iran, 1114–1115 and Iraq, 757 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 1752, 1757 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 in literature, 917, 926, 927 and Mongolia, 1786, 1793–1794, 1797 and national identity, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 465 and national self-invention, 900 and Nepal, 1803 and the Netherlands, 204, 204 and Nigeria, 1184 and Northern Ireland, 1066–1067 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847, 1850 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 215, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844, 846 and Québec, 1297 religious, 99, 102, 115–116 and rituals, 500. See also Rituals of belonging and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and Scandinavia, 229–230 and Singapore, 1225 and South Africa, 1150 and Spain, 709 and Taiwan, 1258 technologies as national, 128, 134–135 and Tibet, 1818 transnational, 115 and Turkey, 766, 770, 774, 1646–1647 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 1308 and Wales, 878, 1633, 1637–1638 Syncretism and Mexico, 347–350, 349 and Paraguay, 358 Synge, John Millington, 918, 920–921, 922 Syngman, Rhee, 1773 Syria and Battle of Maysalun, 728 and Egypt, 982 as French Mandate, 728 water, 884–885 Syrian Arab Kingdom, 727–728 Szálasi, Ferenc, 516, 638 Széchenyi, Count István, 637, 643

Tacitus, 64, 617 Tagore, Rabindranath, 918 Taine, Hippolyte, 415 Taiping Rebellion, 101, 108 Taiwan, 1249–1260, 1250 (map) and film, 1337–1338 and independence, 1462, 1468 and Japan, 810, 818, 1749 Tajiks, 1692–1693, 1694–1695 Takemitsu, T¯oru, 1439–1440 Taliban, 986–987 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1691, 1692, 1693–1694 and Pakistan, 1232, 1233 Tamils, 1385, 1466–1467, 1492 Tamir, Yael, 97 Tammsaare, Anton Hansen, 565 Tan Dun, 1440 Tanzania, 962 Tarai, 1801–1802, 1804, 1808, 1811 Taraki, Mohammad, 1687 Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 1290 Tarnowski, Count Stanislaw, 493 Tartars, 1621 Tatars, 441, 469 Tawfiq, King (Egypt), 260, 261 Taylor, Charles Wood, 328, 989 Taylor, T. Griffith, 851–852 Tchaikovsky, Piotr, 82, 1432, 1437 Technology, 126–136, 1473–1483 Cold war and weapon, 944 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1370, 1376 as enabling ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and the Holocaust, 524 and ideologies, 972 image, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1428 and Iraq, 1738 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and promoting nationalistic art, 417–418 See also Internet Tegnér, Esias, 228 Telegraphy, 127–128 and Central America, 315 and Germany, 192 and Mexico, 355 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Television and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Angola, 1666 and Canada, 1838 and Catalonia, 1546 education and, 422, 433 versus film, 1336, 1339

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Television (continued ) and India, 1209 and language in Italy, 671 and Québec, 1296 and Wales, 1635, 1639 Tenzin Gyatso. See Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso) Terre’Blanche, Eugène, 1148 Territory and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532, 1532 and Israel, 1125 See also Borders; Expansionism Terror, French (1793–1974), 174–175 Terrorism, 1484–1498 and Armenia, 1707 and the Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and hypernationalism, 1389, 1410–1411 and India, 801 and Indonesia, 1728, 1729 and Italy, 676 and Japan, 821 and Pakistan, 1232 and religious fundamentalism, 986–987, 1400 and Russia, 955, 1607 and the 1970s, 1939 and Turkey, 1651, 1655 in the United States, 955 and Wales, 1637 See also Conflict/violence Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), 1493 Thailand, separatism in, 938, 1468 Thakin Soe, 780 Than Tun, 780 Thatcher, Margaret, 1013, 1040, 1453 The Birth of a Nation, 1328, 1329 (illus.) Theater and the Baltic states, 559–560 and France, 176–177 and Ireland, 918 and Québec, 1294 See also Cinema Theweleit, Klaus, 904 Thibaw, King (Burma), 782 Thiers, Adolphe, 177 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 115, 183, 188, 592 Thomas, Harold, 1850 Thomas, W. I., 1403 Thompson, Tom, 1841 Thomson, James, 32, 1438 Thorarensen, Bjarni, 228 Thorbecke, Johan, 198, 201 Thrace, 580, 582 Thubden Gyatso, 1818, 1820 Thyra, Queen (Denmark), 153 Tibet, 988, 1468, 1813–1823, 1815 (map) Tidemand, Adolph, 228 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 800 Tiso, Jozef, 1019 Tito, Josip Broz, 948, 978, 982, 1530 Tokugawa Nariaki, 814, 815

Tokugawa Narinobu, 814 Tokutomi Soho, 813 Tolstoi, A. N., 697 Tone, John, 51 Topelius, Zacharias, 228, 604, 605 Toronto, Canada, 1837 Totalitarianism education and, 429–430 and Europe, 419 and gender, 454–456 and imperative forms of nationalism, 501, 502, 510 Touraine, Alain, 1446, 1456 Tourism, 1028 and Cuba, 1285 and Iran, 1115 and Tibet, 1823 Tours, Georges Moreau de, 409 Toussaint-Louverture, 332, 335–336, 335 (illus.), 340, 341, 342 Toynbee, Arnold, 1368 Trade Argentina and, 269–271, 280 and Brazil, 285, 287 expositions and Scandinavia, 229 and Peru, 368 Transjordan, 728 Transnationalism and diaspora populations, 1369 and globalization, 1407 and identity among immigrants, 1427–1429 and ideologies, 972 and image technology, 1339 and literature, 927–928 versus national identities, 1348 and new social movements, 1447, 1455 and sports, 1001–1003 and women’s rights, 451–453 See also Cosmopolitanism Transportation and Argentina, 279–280 and Colombia, 833 and immigration, 1427 and Iran, 1112 and Malaysia, 1224 and Nepal, 1807 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 technological advances in, 127, 131, 136 and the United States, 388–389, 389–390 See also Railroads Transvaal, 1145–1146 Transylvania, 472 Trautmann, Catherine, 1510 Trdat III, King (Armenia), 1700 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1549 Treaty of Kiel, 220, 223 Treaty of Lausanne, 437–438, 768, 1647, 1648 Treaty of Maastricht, 1549

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Treaty of Nice, 1549 Treaty of Rome, 669 Treaty of St. Germain, 542 Treaty of Trianon, 638–639, 645 Treaty of Utrecht, 299 Treaty of Versailles, 459, 468, 476, 513–514 and Bulgaria, 580 and Czechoslovakia, 595 and Germany, 613, 617, 621 Treaty of Waitangi, 863, 873 Tremaglia, Mirko, 1372 Tremblay, Michel, 1294 Trimble, David, 1062 Troels-Lund, F., 227 Trofimenkoff, S. M., 1294 Tromp, Maarten, 203 Troost, Paul Ludwig, 413 Trotsky, Leon, 520 Trubetskoy, Prince, 94 Trubetzkoy, N. S., 94 Trudeau, Pierre, 1291, 1835, 1836, 1837–1838, 1838, 1840 Truman, Henry, 950, 1309 Tsai Ming-liang, 1338 Tschudi, Aegidius, 252 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin, 1798 Tshombe, Moise, 1469 Tsongkhapa, 1817 Tubin, Eduard, 560 Tucholsky, Kurt, 111 Tucker, George, 494 Tuheitia, 1857 Tunisia, 1464 Tupac Amaru II, 370, 371 Turanism, 641, 773–774, 1645 Turgenev, I. S., 694 Turia, Tariana, 1862 Turina, Joaquín, 1437 Turkey, 760–775, 767 (map), 1642–1656, 1644 (map) and Armenia, 1704, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1714 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438, 442 and the European Union, 1411 and gender, 446 and new social movements, 1452 water, 884–885 Turkish-Greek war (1919–1922), 522 Tutsi, 1669, 1670, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1678 Tuvan Republic, 1792 Twa, 1669, 1672, 1678 Twelve Years Truce, 200, 201 (map) Ty-Casper, Linda, 1245 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 1629, 1629 Tyrs, Miroslav, 594 U Chit Hlaing, 779 U Nu, 783 U Ottama, 779 U Saw, 780, 782

Uhde, Fritz von, 416 Ukraine, 712–722, 715 (map), 1619–1629, 1620 (map) borders of, 1413 and new social movements, 1449 and the Orange Revolution, 1080 and the Soviet Union, 1071, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1079 Ulanfu, 1790, 1794 Ulmanis, K¯arlis, 560, 565, 568, 1576, 1578 Unifications, national, 464 Union of Utrecht, 196 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Monarchy of Denmark, 147 United Nations (UN) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1533 and Canada, 307 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171 and Fiji, 1322 and Germany, 1554 High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1535 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 and interventions, 1469 and Iraq, 756, 1743 and Israel, 1121, 1125, 1135 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1765, 1767 and Korea, 1780, 1781 membership, 957 and Mongolia, 1795 and new social movements, 1456 and the nonaligned movement, 961–962, 969 and peacekeeping, 1412 and the self-determination doctrine, 972 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 510 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 273 United States, 381–392, 384 (map), 1299–1311, 1302 (map) and Afghanistan, 1690 and African Americans, 493–494 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 275 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 850 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1533 and Canada, 305, 307, 1835–1836, 1842 and China, 1191 and the civil rights movement, 938 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Colombia, 829, 830 and colonialism/expansionism, 22, 1462 and counterterrorism, 1497–1498 and Cuba, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1280 Czechoslovaks in the, 588–589 and decolonization policy, 1320 and diaspora populations, 1372 economic policy and globalization, 1407–1408, 1409 education and, 32–33, 35–39, 420, 422–426, 429, 433, 1381–1382

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United States (continued ) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and European integration, 1033 and film, 1328–1330, 1332–1333, 1337, 1339–1340 and France, 1050 and gender and sexuality, 447, 448, 450, 452, 901, 902, 907–908 and Greenland, 1563 and Haiti, 340 and immigration, 1412, 1418–1419, 1420–1421, 1424, 1428 and indigenous groups, 1566, 1845 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117, 1117 and Iraq, 1742–1743, 1746–1747 Irish in the, 654–655 and Israel, 1398, 1401 and Japan, 810, 822, 1749–1754, 1756–1757 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780, 1781 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 and landscape art, 64–66, 70 and language, 472, 482 and the League of Nations, 1402 and Mexico, 353–354 and minorities, 894, 935 and Mongolia, 1796 and music, 76, 117, 118 (illus.), 1433, 1438–1439, 1441–1442, 1443 and national identity, 465, 930, 931 nationalistic art of the, 411 and new social movements, 1446, 1448 and New Zealand, 872 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Pakistan, 1229, 1235, 1236 and Palestine, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 372 and the Philippines, 1239, 1240–1242, 1243, 1248 and Puerto Rico, 836–837, 837, 845, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1394–1396, 1400 and rituals of belonging, 509 and Russia, 1604, 1607 and Southern identity, 494–495 and sports, 994, 1000–1001 symbols of the, 114, 119, 124, 128, 134, 1346, 1347 terrorism and xenophobia in the, 1410, 1488, 1490, 1492 and Vietnam, 954, 1264–1265, 1265 and Yugoslavia, 896 See also American Revolution Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 972 Unterhalter, Elaine, 904 Urabi, Ahmed, 263–264 Urabi Revolt, 260, 263–264 Urbanization and Argentina, 278 and Basques, 1515

and Central America, 311 and Denmark, 149 and France, 1055 and Iraq, 753, 755, 755, 1737 and Korea, 1778 and language, 479 and the Maori, 1860–1861 and Scandinavia, 221 and Turkey, 772 and Ukraine, 714–715 Urquiza, Justo José de, 275, 279 Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 829, 830 Uruguay, 393–403, 395 (map) and Argentina, 275 Argentine-Brazilian war over, 273 and Brazil, 289 and Garibaldi, 672 Utilitarianism, 531 Uvarov, S. S., 692 Uvin, Peter, 1680 Uygur, 1468 Uzbekistan, 1079 Uzbeks, 1693 Vaculík, Ludvík, 1026 Vagris, Janis, 1581 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 987, 1208 Vakatora, Tomasi, 1322 Valdemar IV (Denmark), 226 Valdemar the Great (Denmark), 153 Valdem¯ars, Krišj¯anis, 561, 562 Valdivia, Pedro de, 323, 326 Valencia, 1546 Valera, Eamon de, 1294 Valle, José Cecilio del, 315, 316 Valle-Riestra, José María, 76 Vallejo, José Joaquín, 329 Valois, Georges, 515 Values and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 1830 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1839 and Cuba, 1283 in education, 1381 exporting U.S., 944, 955–956 and Great Britain, 1008 and India, 797 and Iran, 1116 and Japan, 1754 and Latvia, 1576, 1580 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mongolia, 1793 and national character, 528–529, 530–531, 537 and nationalism, 901 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847–1848 and Poland, 686 post-materialist, 1454 and Puerto Rico, 844 and religion versus ideology, 971

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and religious fundamentalism, 1397, 1399 and rituals of belonging, 504–506 See also Morality; Religion Van der Noot, Henri, 140 van Gogh, Theo, 1486–1487 Van Thieu, Nguyen, 1265 Vanessa-Mae, 1440 Varikas, Eléni, 53 Varley, Fred H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Varnhagen, Francisco, 292 Vasnetsov, V. M., 694 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1180 Vazov, Ivan, 576–577 Velestinlis, Rigas, 626, 631, 631 Velvet Revolution, 1026, 1028 Verchères, Madeleine de, 303 Verdi, Giuseppe, 75, 77, 79, 80, 671, 1437–1438 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 197, 203 Vermeer, Johannes, 203 Vertov, Dziga, 1330 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch, 1152, 1152 Vian, Boris, 1052 Victoria, Queen (England), 164, 237 Vieira, Luandino, 1665 Vienna Congress of 1815, 46, 197 of 1819, 35 Vietnam, 963–964, 1261–1271 and France, 1050 and gender, 446 and independence, 1463 Vietnam War, 944, 952, 954, 1265, 1265, 1310 and the United States, 1304 Vigneault, Gilles, 1294 Vigny, Alfred de, 177 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 1579 Vikings, 228 Vilde, Eduard, 565 Villa-Lobos, Heitor, 76, 1439 Villarán, Manuel Vicente, 374 Vilnius, Lithuania, 563, 563 Vinnen, Carl, 416 Violence. See Conflict/violence Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 415 Virgin of Guadalupe, 347, 348 (illus.), 349–350, 356 in Peru, 376 Visconti, Luchino, 1334 Vivekananda, Swami, 802 Vizcardo y Guzmán, Juan Pablo, 370 Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), 1592 Vodou (Voodoo), 340 Vogel, Sir Julius, 865 Volhynia, 716 Völkisch nationalism, 613, 614, 614, 622 Voltaire, 14–15, 370 Voluntarism, 1196, 1197, 1198–1199 von Flüe, Niklaus, 253 von Metternich, Klemens, 671

von Ranke, Leopold, 41, 101, 227 Vonk, Jean Francoise, 140 Voting franchise and Argentina, 275 and Australia, 853 and diaspora populations, 1365, 1366, 1371–1372 and England, 161, 164 and Finland, 605 and Germany, 611 and Haiti, 336 and Italy, 669, 670 and the Netherlands, 199 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 250 and Uruguay, 401 See also Democracy; Suffrage, women’s Vramshapuh, King (Armenia), 1701 Vytautas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Wade, P., 1450 Wagner, Richard, 74, 77, 79, 406, 463, 1431 Wagner, Robert, 1508 Wais, Mir, 1690 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 863 Walcott, Derek, 914, 921 Waldheim, Kurt, 550 Walensa, Lech, 948 Wales, 166, 1631–1640, 1634 (map) and devolution, 1014 nationalism and environmentalism in, 878, 881 Walker, William, 313, 318 Wallace, Henry, 1303, 1309 Wallace, William, 232–233, 238–239, 240 (illus.) Wallot, Paul, 408 Walser, Martin, 1558 Walton, William, 1433, 1438 Walzer, M., 97 Wang Xilin, 1440 War of 1812, 388 War of the Pacific, 327, 330, 376 (map), 377, 377–378 Ward, Russel, 854 Warren, Robert Penn, 495 Warsaw Pact, 945 Wartburg Festival, 187 Washington, George, 387 Water, 884–885 Watkins, Melvin, 1842 Weber, Carl Maria von, 73, 74, 117, 1431 Weber, Eugen, 9, 102, 179 Weber, Max, 3–4, 40, 982, 1399, 1402 Webster, Noah, 32–33, 389 Weimar Republic, 613, 613, 620–621 and film, 1330–1331 See also Germany Weissman, Stephen, 1676 Weitz, Margaret, 905 Weizmann, Chaim, 1123, 1123

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Welfare state and Canada, 302–303, 306, 1290 and New Zealand, 870–871 and the United States, 944, 1300, 1309 See also Socialism Welhaven, Johan, 228 Wellington, Duke of, 164 Werner, Abraham, 67 Werner, Anton von, 409 West Germany, 976, 1448, 1490. See also Germany West Papua, 1468 Western, the ( film), 1332–1333, 1337 Western Sahara, 1468 Westernization and India, 1211 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Russia, 692 Wetterlé, Emile, 1508, 1508 Whitehead, Gillian, 1439 Whitlam, Gough, 1845 Wielopolski, Aleksander, 212 Wilhelm I (Germany), 619 Wilhelm II (Germany), 416, 621 Wilhelmina, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Willems, Jans Frans, 145 William I of Orange (the Netherlands), 141, 142, 196, 197, 203 William II (the Netherlands), 199 William III (the Netherlands), 201 Williams, Edward (Iolo Morgannwg), 1638 Williams, Kyffin, 1637 Williams, Ralph Vaughan, 1434 Wilson, A. T., 1742 Wilson, Woodrow, 464, 1328 Fourteen Points Speech, 436, 972 and Iraq, 749 principle of self-determination, 1790 Winter War, 607 Wirth, Johann Georg August, 190 Wislicenus, Hermann, 408 Wolfe, James, 299, 303, 304, 1840 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 416 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 53 Women and Afghanistan, 1457, 1690, 1694 and Algeria, 1105 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 264, 265 Eritrean, 1173 and fascism, 454–456 and France, 1047, 1050 and Germany, 620 and India, 1209, 1210 and Ireland, 661 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1065 and the Philippines, 1246 and postcolonial gender roles, 926–927 and social policies, 448–449 as symbols, 445–446, 926, 1345

and Turkey, 769, 770, 1653, 1654 and the United States, 901, 1304 and Wales, 1636 and war, 449–450 See also Gender; Women’s rights Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 453 Women’s movements, 1449, 1450, 1452–1453 Women’s rights, 53–54, 57, 446, 450–451 and France, 173–174, 176 and Germany, 620 and Greece, 53 revolution and, 46, 50–52 social policy and, 446–447 and socialism, 56–57 and Switzerland, 249 transnationalism and, 451–453 See also Suffrage, women’s Wood, Henry, 1438 World Bank, 1610 World divided. See Cold War World War I and Arab nationalism, 727–728 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and assassination of Habsburg heir, 1490 and Australia, 855–856 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529–1530 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306, 1835 colonialism and the causes of, 514 and the Czechoslovaks, 588–589, 593 education and, 426 and Ethiopia, 740 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 438 and fascism, 515 gender roles and, 449 and Germany, 613, 621–622 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 638 and India, 804 and Iraq, 1739, 1742 and Ireland, 651, 660 and Italy, 667, 670 and New Zealand, 868–869 and the Ottoman Empire, 765 and Poland, 682, 682–683 results of, 419, 436, 527 and South Africa, 1150 and statuary, 412 and Turkey, 1643, 1649 and Ukraine, 713 World War II and Alsace, 1507, 1508 and Australia, 857 and Austria, 547–548 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Bulgaria, 582 and Burma, 781, 784–785 and Canada, 302, 1835 and China, 1197

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Yassin, Ahmad, 1137, 1138 Yeats, William Butler, 487–488, 487 (illus.), 489, 654–655, 657, 659, 914, 918 Cathleen ni Houlihan, 922 Yeltsin, Boris, 946, 1079, 1080, 1597, 1597, 1605 Yohannes, Emperor (Tigray), 739 Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 281 Yrjö-Koskinen, Yrjö Sakari, 601 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 1725 Yugoslavia civil wars of, 525, 896, 1044, 1413–1414 common language versus religious difference in, 529 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and international interventions, 1408–1409 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Yushchenko, Viktor, 1080, 1622–1623, 1623, 1626, 1628 Yuson, Alfred A., 1245 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 902

and Czechoslovakia, 594–596 and Eritrea, 1170 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 435, 437–441. See also Holocaust and expansionism after World War I, 524 and Fiji, 1318–1319 and France, 1051–1052, 1052 and gender roles, 450 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 645 and India, 804–806 and Indonesia, 1733 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 667, 674–675 and Japan, 817–818, 822, 1749, 1751 and Malaysia, 1215–1216 music related to, 1433–1434 and nationalism, 509–510, 1490 and New Zealand, 869–870, 872 and Nigeria, 1181 and Palestinians, 1135 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1851 and Poland, 681, 683, 688 role of religion in, 106–107 and Russia, 1603 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and sexualized imagery, 905–907 and the Soviet Union, 1073, 1074, 1075 and Taiwan, 1250–1251 and terrorism, 1496 and Ukraine, 713, 722 Woronicz, J., 692 Worringer, Wilhelm, 415 Wright, Erik Olin, 2 Writing/alphabets, 481, 577, 1529 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703, 1706 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1798 and Romania, 1591 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Tibet, 1815 and Turkey, 773, 1652 Wybicki, Józef, 215 Wysłouch, Bolesław, 681, 685 Xenophobia, 1411–1412, 1415. See also Hypernationalism Xenophon, 1697 Xu¯ant˘ong, Emperor, 1818 Yacine, Kateb, 1100 Yamin, Muhammad, 1727, 1727–1728 Yanaev, Gennadii, 1582 Yang, Edward, 1338 Yanukovych, Viktor, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625

Zaghlul, Saad, 262–263, 263 Zaghlul, Safiyya, 263 Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 1687, 1689 Zaïre. See Congo and Zaïre Zanabazar, 1791 Zavala, Lorenzo de, 353–354 Zealots, 1489 Zeroual, Liamine, 1099 Zetkin, Clara, 453 Zhamtsarano, Tsyben, 1793 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1075–1076 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 1078, 1079–1080 Zhou Enlai, 962, 1816, 1821 Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 1232 Zimbabwe, 1441 Zimmers, Oliver, 244 Zinnermann, J. G., 41 Zinovief, Grigory, 520 Zionism, 103, 104 (illus.), 1120–1121, 1121, 1123–1125, 1126 and agricultural settlements, 1122 and Arab nationalism, 730 and the arts, 1127 and forming national identity, 1127–1130 and language, 477 and Palestinians, 1133 Žižka, Jan, 1023 Zografos, Panagiotis, 632 (illus.) Zola, Emile, 134 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1074 Zta-Halein, Kathinka, 52 Zulus, 27, 1150 Zurayq, Qustantin, 732, 732 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1079–1080, 1597

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About the Editors

Guntram H. Herb, Ph.D., is associate professor of geography at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. In addition to peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, his published works on nationalism include Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945 and the collection of essays co-edited with David H. Kaplan, Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. David H. Kaplan, Ph.D., is professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio. He is an editor of the journal National Identities. His six books include Boundaries and Place (with Jouni Häkli) and Nested Identities (with Guntram Herb). He has also published over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters, many of them in the field of nationalism.

N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

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volume 4 1989 to Present

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 4 1989 to Present

GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors

S A N TA B A R B A R A , C A L I F O R N I A

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Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nations and nationalism : a global historical overview / Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-907-8 (alk. paper) 1. History, Modern—18th century. 2. History, Modern—19th century. 3. History, Modern—20th century. 4. Nationalism—History. I. Herb, Guntram Henrik, 1959– II. Kaplan, David H., 1960– D299.N37 2008 320.54—dc22 2008004478

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

volume 4 1989 to Present

Contents List of Contributors

vii

1460 Nationalism and Separatism Sun-Ki Chai

Preface xi

1473 Technology and Nationalism Marco Adria

Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii

1484 Terrorism and Nationalism Virginie Mamadouh

Thematic Essays 1327 Cinema and National Identity Angelo Restivo and Laszlo Strausz 1342 Constructions of National Symbolic Spaces and Places: The State of Place in Identity Brian S. Osborne

1512 Basque Country Pauliina Raento 1525 Bosnia and Herzegovina Steven Oluic

1350 Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism in Liberal Political Theory Christine Straehle

1536 Catalonia Kathryn Crameri

1364 Diaspora and Nationalism Stéphane Dufoix

1548 Germany Paul Maddrell

1379 Education and National Diversity Cynthia Joseph and Stella Coram 1392 Religious Fundamentalism William H. Swatos Jr.

1561 Greenland Søren Forchhammer 1573 Latvia Kathleen Woodhouse

1405 Nationalism and Globalization Victor Roudometof 1418 National Identity and Immigration Anna Triandafyllidou

1584 Romania George W. White 1596 Russia Grigory Ioffe 1608 Sami Jouni Häkli

1430 Nationalism and Music David B. Knight 1446 New Social and Environmental Movements in Relation to Nationalism Joseph M. Whitmeyer

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1619 Ukraine Taras Kuzio 1631 Wales Rhys Jones

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Middle East

1772 Korea Dennis Hart

1642 Turkey Aygen Erdentug

1783 Mongolia Christopher P. Atwood

Africa 1657 Angola Norrie MacQueen

1800 Nepal Nanda R. Shrestha and Dev Raj Dahal

1668 Rwanda and Burundi Helen Hintjens

1813 Tibet P. Christiaan Klieger

Asia 1683 Afghanistan Conrad Schetter

Americas 1824 Brazil Anne Marie Todd

1696 Armenia Razmik Panossian

1834 Canada Jeffrey J. Cormier

1713 Azerbaijan Shannon O’Lear 1722 Indonesia Michael Wood

Oceania 1844 Pan-Aboriginalism in Australia John Maynard

1736 Iraq Tareq Y. Ismael

1855 Maori Nationalism Toon van Meijl

1748 Japan Takashi Yamazaki

Index

1759 Jammu and Kashmir Vernon Hewitt

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List of Contributors

Marco Adria University of Alberta

Linda Bryder University of Auckland

Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University

Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University

Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University

Roderick D. Bush St. John’s University

Stephen Alomes Deakin University

Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico

Celia Applegate University of Rochester

Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii

Christopher P. Atwood Indiana University

Colin M. Coates York University

Ghania Azzout University of Algiers

Saul B. Cohen Queens College CUNY

Alan Bairner Loughborough University

Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor)

Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Joshua Barker University of Toronto Roderick J. Barman University of British Columbia Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Stefan Berger Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Brett Bowden University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Stella Coram Independent Scholar Stéphane Corcuff University of Lyon Jeffrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Ralph Coury Fairfield University Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Ben Curtis Seattle College Patrice M. Dabrowski Harvard University

David Brandenberger University of Richmond

Dev Raj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal

David Brown Murdoch University

Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jason Dittmer University College London

Dennis Hart Kent State University

Chris Dixon University of Queensland

David Allen Harvey New College of Florida

Christine Doran Charles Darwin University

Stephen Heathorn McMaster University

Maria Dowling St. Mary’s College

Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University

Stéphane Dufoix University of Paris

Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol

Jordana Dym Skidmore College

Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands

Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University

Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University

Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University

Hugh Hudson Georgia State University

Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University

Bonny Ibhawoh McMaster University

Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen

Grigory Ioffe Radford University

Will Fowler University of St. Andrews

Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, The Behrend College

Michael E. Geisler Middlebury College Paul Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere

Tareq Y. Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto

Seyoum Hameso University of East London

Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna

Paul Hamilton Brock University

Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Samira Hanifi University of Algiers

Cynthia Joseph Monash University

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CONTRIBUTORS

John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh

Christopher Marsh Baylor University

Gregory Jusdanis The Ohio State University

Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio

Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University

John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia

Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University

John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College

Martha Kaplan Vassar College

John McLane Northwestern University

Sharon Kelly University of Toronto

Kim McMullen Kenyon College

James Kennedy University of Edinburgh

Neil McWilliam Duke University

Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma

Nenad Miscevic Central European University

P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California

Graeme Morton University of Guelph

David B. Knight University of Guelph Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Taras Kuzio George Washington University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Orion Lewis University of Colorado, Boulder Hong-Ming Liang The College of St. Scholastica Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers

Joane Nagel University of Kansas Byron Nordstrom Gustavus Adolphus College Kevin C. O’Connor Gonzaga University Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Brian S. Osborne Queen’s University Cynthia Paces The College of New Jersey

Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee

Razmik Panossian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University

Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College

Fouad Makki Cornell University

Hooman Peimani Bradford University

Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London

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Linda Racioppi Michigan State University

Ray Taras University of Colorado

Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki

Jessica Teets University of Colorado, Boulder

Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst

Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University

Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney

Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion

Toon van Meijl University of Nijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber University of Applied Languages (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings The Australian National University George W. White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David N. Yaghoubian California State University, San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu

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Preface

What is a nation? What is nationalism? What does it mean to examine them in global perspective? We conceive of a nation or national identity as a form of loyalty. People have a multitude of loyalties: to family, friends, places, clubs, institutions, regions, countries, even to their place of work or brands of products. What distinguishes loyalty to a nation is the primacy it holds on people’s allegiance. It is so powerful that people are willing to give their lives to ensure the continued existence of the group members and territory that make up their nation. By extension, we call nationalism the process that defines, creates, and expresses this essential loyalty to the nation. We view the term nationalism in a neutral sense. While this process can take extreme forms and lead to violent aggression and the extermination of others, nationalism can also be benign and form the basis for peaceful coexistence. Nations and nationalism have found a bewildering range of expressions across the world and through time, and it is this geographic and temporal variation that we seek to address in a systematic fashion. Given the sheer number of nations that exist or have existed historically—some scholars argue that there are as many as 4,000–5,000 in just the contemporary era—our global perspective does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead we have chosen to follow cross-sections through time and space. We identify major historical eras in the development of nations and nationalism to examine characteristic themes and representative cases from all major regions of the world. Our emphasis is on depth rather than breadth. The 146 entries in this encyclopedia are full-length articles that go in depth to cover major debates and issues instead of brief descriptions of general features. They are authored by reputable scholars and try to provide accessible introductions to topics that are ambiguous, complex, and frequently misunderstood. Because literature on nations and nationalism arguably ranks among the most diverse and convoluted, our goal is to provide students, nonspecialists, and even junior scholars with concise information on this subject. In deciding what cases and themes to use, we take representative examples from each world region. These run the gamut from large powerful nations such as China and Russia to smaller nations that do not enjoy any form of sovereignty, like Tibet and Wales. We try to cover both prosperous nations of the developed world along with ex-colonial nations in the less-developed world. Similarly, some nations only appear during one time period, and others do not appear at all, because the most important consideration for us was that at least one representative example from all major regions of the world was included, even if scholarship has sorely neglected or sidelined that area, such as in Africa. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The selection of specific themes and cases that are treated intensively means that our coverage will have some unavoidable gaps. For example, there are no thematic chapters that treat race independently. This omission is not because we consider the issue to be of little significance, but because we feel that race is so elemental to discussions of nations and nationalism that it cannot be separated out. Similarly, it was not always possible to stick to the neat historical categorization into the four time periods. Some of our entries bridge several volumes to provide the most effective treatment of individual cases and themes. This encyclopedia is arranged chronologically in four volumes. The first volume traces the origins and formative processes of nations and nationalism from 1770 to 1880. The second volume covers the aggressive intensification of nationalism during the age of imperialism, from 1880 to 1945. The third volume deals with the decline of nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, from 1945 to 1989. The final volume outlines the transformations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War in 1989. All 104 country essays have the same format, and each is approximately 4,000 words. Each includes a chronology to position the reader in time; a discursive essay on main features; illustrations to help the reader visualize specific issues, situations, or persons; and a brief bibliography to guide additional inquiries. The case study essays also contain sidebars that highlight unique events, persons, or institutions. The main essays all contain five sections that help structure the inquiry and provide a universal key to access the information: (1) “Situating the Nation” places the national case in a historical, political, social, and geographic context; (2) “Instituting the Nation” examines key actors and institutions as well as philosophical foundations; (3) “Defining the Nation” discusses the role of ethno-cultural, civilizational, and geographic markers in creating the us–them distinction that is at the heart of national identity; (4) “Narrating the Nation” addresses particular events, stories, and myths that are used to create a community of belonging; and (5) “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” focuses on actions and strategies that help legitimize the national idea. Our 42 thematic essays address the interplay between national identity, politics, culture, and society and are generally 6,000 words long. They focus on geopolitical contexts and economic conditions, such as postcolonialism and globalization; social relations, such as gender and class; dominant philosophies and ideologies, such as fascism and fundamentalism; and nationalist cultural creations and expressions, such as art, literature, music, or sports. Though specific themes vary in each of the four volumes, each of the thematic essays include bibliographies and illustrations, and touch on the following questions: (1) How were the issues/phenomena under discussion important? (2) What is the background and what are the origins? (3) What are major dimensions and impacts on different groups, societal conditions, and ideas? (4) What are the consequences and ramifications of this issue for the character and future development of nations and nationalism? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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We feel that our encyclopedia makes an important addition to the current reference literature on nations and nationalism. Existing encyclopedias in the field generally contain only very brief entries (Spira 1999, 2002; Leoussi 2001); are dated (Snyder 1990); neglect such civic nations as the United States or Switzerland (Minahan 2002); or are uneven because they combine a few excessively long survey articles with several extremely short entries (Motyl 2001). A universal and significant shortcoming is the lack of maps and illustrations. Except for a limited number of general maps and select illustrations in Minahan, the other works do not have a single map, figure, or image. We believe that an encyclopedia on nationalism must contain visual information for it to effectively convey the contexts within which nationalist movements arose and to depict the important symbology that was used to galvanize national sentiment. Our encyclopedia also offers a unique and novel way to access information on nations and nationalisms. The thematic entries give insights into the larger contexts for the country essays and illustrate linkages among them in regard to general topics such as national education. The individual country entries allow readers to compare and contrast developments in different places and to examine trends in major regions of the world during different time periods. Finally, since some of the places and themes appear in all four volumes, it is possible to trace developments and identify linkages not only among places, but also through time. We hope that this encyclopedia helps to further an understanding of perhaps the most influential set of identities and ideologies in the world today. We also hope that this collection of cases and themes selected across space and time sheds some light on the different ways in which these loyalties are manifested. While this encyclopedia constitutes a very large body of work, it can only scratch the surface of all of the different varieties inherent in a study of nations and nationalism. We encourage the reader to follow up on some of the selected readings that are listed at the end of each entry and to further explore some of the various cases and themes that have not been explicitly addressed. References Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Minahan, James. 2002. Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. San Diego: Academic Press. Snyder, Louis. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House. Spira, Thomas. 1999 (vol. 1), 2002 (vol. 2). Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

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Acknowledgments

An enormous undertaking such as this four-volume work could not be accomplished without the help of several individuals. Of course we would like to thank all of our contributors, who were wonderful about following formatting guidelines, making revisions, and cheerfully supplying additional material as the need arose. We are very saddened that one of our contributors, Jeffrey Cormier, did not live to see the publication of this work. We would also like to pay special thanks to the people at ABC-CLIO, among them Ron Boehm, Wendy Roseth, Kristin Gibson, and especially Alex Mikaberidze. The efforts of ABC-CLIO’s publication team have allowed us to complete this project in a sustained and timely manner. Above all we wish to extend our gratitude to those people who have worked tirelessly in assisting us in this endeavor. Their efforts are reflected throughout these four volumes. Kathleen Woodhouse from Kent State University was instrumental in helping to conceive of this project, in identifying and lining up the contributors, and in evaluating and editing each and every entry in Volumes 3 and 4. She also played a major part in the development of three of the essays. She has been an enormous asset and has worked tirelessly to see this project from start to finish. Gruia Badescu, Zachary Hecht-Leavitt, Jonathan Hsu, and Conor Stinson provided invaluable assistance in Middlebury, Vermont. Their contributions would not have been possible without the generous support of Middlebury College, which is deeply appreciated. Zach and Gruia aided in identifying contributors, selecting illustrations, and managing numerous administrative tasks. Zach’s excellent writing and editorial skills ensured that many of the entries authored by non-native English speakers were transformed into stylistically polished pieces. Gruia’s remarkable linguistic skills and knowledge of the scholarship of nationalism allowed him to contribute deep insights to the review process as well as to the drafting of two introductory essays. Jonathan Hsu and Conor Stinson are to be credited for the beautiful cartographic design. Producing maps for these volumes proved to be a challenging and enormous project. The maps needed to vary greatly in scale—from small areas, such as Estonia, to giant regions, such as Russia—but at the same time needed to allow for easy comparisons. The historical maps were particularly difficult given the numerous border changes that took place and the lack of good reference sources, but Jonathan mastered this hurdle with ease. He is not only a gifted cartographer but an excellent researcher. Putting on the finishing touches to turn the massive manuscript and numerous images and maps into a coherent and beautiful set of volumes was also an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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enormous challenge, and we were fortunate to have the able assistance of Cami Cacciatore, Kristine Swift, and Kerry Jackson at ABC-CLIO and of Samuel Lazarus, Caitlin Sargent, and Mithra Harivandi at Middlebury College. Finally, we would like to thank our families for the unwavering support they gave us throughout this giant undertaking. We dedicate this work to the memory of David Woodward.

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Introduction Volume 4: 1989 to Present

This fourth and last volume covers the period roughly from 1989 until the present day. The year 1989 commenced with events that profoundly influenced the nature of national identity, which led to the development of new states and altered prevailing views of nationalism. Most obviously, this year witnessed the dismantlement of the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union itself. Several new states emerged as a result. But we can also view this modern era as a time in which nationalism reasserted itself. Before 1989, the world was locked in an ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. This struggle, conveniently placed within a political economy rubric, defined the global order and influenced how each nation envisioned itself. After 1989, communism was in demise. With the exception of some holdouts—China adheres on its face to the communist ideology (while rapidly building a market-driven economy), Cuba continues as an officially communist country (while eagerly courting Western tourism), and North Korea retains an intensely weird brand of totalitarianism—communism as an ideology no longer shapes the world order. We can consider four changes as being of fundamental importance during this era. The first and most significant was the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc, culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union itself and its replacement by 15 separate countries. The second would be the accelerated impact of globalization as the world became ever more connected in ways both good and bad. Third would be the growth of religious/nationalist movements that shook the world in ways unseen for several decades. The fourth and last change involves the new economic dynamism that has allowed some countries, particularly those that have hitherto been a part of the so-called Third World, to assert themselves through economic growth and development. The consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc have been so far-reaching that we have yet to experience all the ramifications. The most obvious consequence of this change—beginning with the people’s revolutions in several Eastern European countries and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union itself—was the end of the Cold War. The United States consequently emerged as the sole superpower in the world, what some would describe as a hyperpower without equal. These developments may have given American politicians and other countries an enhanced sense of the U.S. ability to shape global events and could have led to an overestimation of how much influence and power the United States truly had. It also appeared to signal an ideological shift as well. Frances Fukuyama’s

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book, The End of History, called the collapse of the Soviet Bloc a victory for “Western” values and the triumph of economic and political liberalism. This change also led to the creation of several new states and the resurgence of nationalism, particularly within Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The 1990s saw the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia into its constituent republics. Accusations of genocide and ethnic cleansing followed the breakup of Yugoslavia into Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and, most notably, Bosnia Herzegovina. Other countries began to split apart as well. Czechoslovakia quietly divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia. The Soviet Union finally dissolved into 15 separate countries. And Russia itself was beset by a series of separatist movements. Notably, this period also saw the reintegration of Germany, which had been divided between its Eastern and Western halves for so long. The emergence of new states happened fitfully as new countries sought to align their newly founded political sovereignty with a national mission. Issues as in how to accommodate minority groups became very important. The political composition of these new states diverged. Some became true democracies, while others took on new forms of dictatorship and repression. Economic fortunes varied as well. Several of these newly independent states joined the ranks of the developed West and joined an expanded European Union. In other places, economic development was illusory. The second major change that occurred during this modern era was continued globalization. Globalization has resulted from a shrinking world where people have the ability to interact with others across the world, an ability accentuated to levels unimagined just a few decades ago. The expansion of telecommunications networks allows for a virtually seamless outsourcing of a variety of services. Brands have become globally omnipresent as more and more trade is interconnected. One defining feature of globalization lies in the growth of the World Wide Web and Internet access that allows everywhere to be part of a virtual community. The era began with the Chinese uprising in Tiananmen Square in 1989, broadcast largely by fax machines. News of later insurgencies—notably the Zapatista movement in the Mexican state of Chiapas—were posted on the Web. Immigration, which has been a feature of society since the very beginning of the nationalist era, has changed its complexion as it has become more possible for people to keep in touch with one another and retain ties to their national communities. Transnationalism among the wealthy and others is far more common. In fact, the era has been marked by an increased “hybridity,” where identities are less discrete and may straddle two or more cultures—the era of “Spanglish.” There is a dark side to this development, however, as globalization threatens local control and community interests. Transnational corporations are able to conduct business everywhere, and many fear that they feel no allegiance to anywhere. Corporations both large and small run roughshod over cultural sensibilities and the interests of nations. A bland “McWorld” typified by ubiquitous golden arches and Mickey Mouse represents a loss of economic autonomy and local identity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The growth of new social movements during this era is thus based on a desire to fight back against the faceless transnational corporations and regain some local control. Labor, too, was hit by the increased flexibility of capital and its ability to obtain the cheapest labor anywhere in the world. The demonstrations against the World Trade Organization in Seattle brought voice to these frustrations. The third major change involves the growth of religious movements, often fused with new nationalist movements. Of course, religious identity is nothing new, but it began to take on an added level of urgency as several countries adopted a stridently religious form of government and recast their national identity along fundamentalist lines. The Iranian revolution of 1979 heralded this shift, later joined by a series of nationalist religious movements based in the Middle East and elsewhere. Such movements are not confined to states or governments. Radical Islamic movements, most prominently Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, attempt to achieve through violent means what they believe cannot be accomplished otherwise. The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that terrorism rooted in a fundamentalist religious ideology could strike anybody at any time. This event restructured how Americans and many in the West view their own identity and also modified the politics and cultural values of some existing states. To some it also crystallized inherent conflicts among different religio-national ideologies. Samuel Huntington’s book, The Clash of Civilizations, vividly describes some of the tensions between Christian and Muslim and other religious realms. While Huntington’s overall thesis has been denigrated by many, notably Edward Said who criticized his use of simplistic abstractions, the argument seemed to gain traction in public policy circles. The so-called War on Terror was initiated to root out terrorist cells and those countries that provide safe havens for them. Most notably, the war in Iraq was cast as an attempt to eliminate the terrorists over there before they could come over here. This new religious fundamentalism challenged some of the forces of globalization, especially the saturation of Western values, Western commercialism, and Western corporate interests. Samuel Barber’s book, Jihad versus McWorld, characterized the tension between these two forces of religious fundamentalism and globalization. The fourth major change taking place within the last two decades has been the rapid economic growth in some countries that were previously impoverished. While the economy in much of the developed world stagnated, and while much of sub-Saharan Africa continued to be mired in extreme levels of poverty, several national economies expanded quite rapidly. The rise of the so-called Asian Tigers has been particularly notable. Countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore moved from a source of cheap labor to major centers of capital investments. Their prosperity began to rival the West. Other countries, particularly within east and southeast Asia, acted to develop their economies in fundamental ways. There have been other successes as well. Latin American countries such as N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Brazil have begun to flex their economic muscles. Chile, during the 1970s and 1980s under the thumb of a military dictatorship, has made some spectacular advances. One interesting facet of the economic resurgence along the Asian Pacific Rim has been the idea—promulgated particularly by Singapore’s premier—that Asian countries do not necessarily have to follow the Western political model to advance economically. In particular, the two demographic giants China and India have begun to experience rapid economic growth. Both of these countries are very different from the United States and countries within Europe. They have different views of nationalism and different ways in which they project their identities. Yet they both seem to be on the verge of overtaking several of the older, richer economies, and the expectation is that both countries will become the world’s largest economies by century’s end. Thomas Friedman’s book, The World Is Flat, discusses how recent technological and social changes have rapidly expanded access and opportunity to places once isolated and deprived. The necessity for members of nations throughout the world to participate in an increasingly seamless economy will even the playing field and alter the global balance of economic power. While an optimist might view this development as a deterrent to future conflict, the past shows us that growing wealth quite often seeks greater political sway and an assertion of national goals. National identity and nationalist ideology will likely retain their potency for years to come. david h. kapl an

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Cinema and National Identity Angelo Restivo and Laszlo Strausz

The problem of cinema’s relationship to national identity is a complex one. On the one hand, film history has traditionally been written as the histories of various national cinemas (French cinema, Iranian cinema, etc.), and indeed the national origin of a film continues to be a major classification device for film festivals. On the other hand, certain national cinemas—particularly Hollywood, and more recently Bollywood, the prolific Indian film industry centered in Bombay—reach global audiences and in many nations reach a larger audience than do indigenous national film. Thus, the extent to which any national cinema can be said to reflect or to express a particular national culture is complicated by uneven exchanges in the global flow of images. To further complicate matters, in its short history of barely over a century, the cinema has passed through four major phases of development: early cinema (from 1895 to the mid-1910s); a “classical” period (mid1910s to 1960); a period of modernization and “new waves” (from the mid-1950s to the 1980s, but continuing to the present); and currently a period of media convergence, in which cinema is situated within a much larger digital image environment (television, home video, video games, and the Internet). Each of these four phases is characterized by a distinct mode of production, as well as by different forms of distribution, different reception environments, and even different audience demographics.

Origins Industrial Art and the Mass Audience The invention of moving pictures in 1895 came at the end of a century that had seen the emergence of great modern nation-states in Europe and North America. While the earliest films—the actualités of Lumière, the Neapolitan city films of Elvira Notari—recorded everyday events and were grounded in the local, by 1913 the standard-length feature film emerged, along with narrative conventions that allowed filmmakers to tell more complex stories in images. At the same time, the cinema, which in the first years of its life was more an attraction than a respectable mode of entertainment like the theater, broadened its audience to include the middle classes. Thus, as the cinema-going public became more and more a cross section of the nation, it is not surprising that some of the most important films of the post-1913 period were ones that attempted to tell the national story. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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In the United States, for example, David Wark Griffith made the controversial The Birth of a Nation in 1914, and Abel Gance made the epic film Napoleon in 1927, both of which were seen by millions. Both of these films were set in critical historic moments in the national history and allowed a mass audience to collectively share a vision of the nation’s imagined origin and destiny, regardless of their inaccurate or exclusionary vision. Griffith’s vision of America in The Birth of a Nation proved incendiary. While President Wilson, a former historian, described the film as “history written with lightning,” liberal intellectuals and politicians condemned the work for its racist portrayal of African Americans; the film sparked riots in several cities. In Birth, Griffith tells the story of a northern and a southern family during the Civil War. At the very beginning of the film, he spends considerable time establishing the audience’s sympathies with the southern slaveowners by portraying them as well-meaning, sympathetic gentlemen. As the film propels forward, however, the director switches back and forth between the two families, using an omniscient storytelling technique that allows the viewer to witness the hardships of the war on both sides. While Birth clearly depicts the southern plantation life as idyllic and superior, the sacrifices of the opponent, the North, are also dramatized by Griffith as part of a national effort. The film romanticizes the idea of a nation that does not change. Griffin’s adaptation of Thomas Dixon’s novel The Clansman offers a xenophobic historical vision, which is as much a document of American social history as of film history. Both in the book and the film, social unrest begins with the mixing of the races. The liberated African American slaves are depicted not only as unable to assimilate into a nation envisioned by Griffith but also as brutes that represent a threat to society. According to the film, the “real nation” consists of the North and the South, uniting to heal the wounds of the Civil War and Reconstruction. However, African Americans are excluded from this image of the nation by being portrayed as rapists, drunks, and criminals. In addition, this exclusion is manifested in the film’s actual production by the fact that the roles of the black characters in the film are played by white actors with their faces painted black. The problematic nature of Griffith’s film stems from the fact that his racist views were presented via techniques that revolutionized film form. The director frequently relies on the power of closer framings to show the emotional state of his characters and so create audience identification. Birth also makes use of pointof-view shots, which put the spectator in the visual position of select characters. Both of these techniques are used in the film to show the viewer the threat of miscegenation for innocent white characters. It was especially Griffith’s use of parallel editing (two different lines of action happening at different places but at the same time), however, that showed how an effective storytelling technique can create powerful emotional responses in the audiences. Critically, Griffith and his work have posed a problem for film studies because, even though he was a pioneer in film form, thematically his work was reactionary. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People picket under the marquee of the Republic movie theater against race discrimination featured in the movie The Birth of a Nation in New York, 1947. They carry signs asking for a ban on hate films. (Corbis)

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Probably the best answer to this conundrum has been offered by Soviet filmmaker and theorist Sergei Eisenstein, who made the case that parallel editing echoes a basic Manichean aspect of American social life. According to this argument, parallel editing is a formal expression of the need to divide the world into black and white categories. Thus, Eisenstein outlined an early and structural explanation for how cinema might display the deeper characteristics of a national culture. For the Soviet filmmakers during the early 1920s, whose aesthetic also centered on editing and montage but in a different way than in U.S. filmmaking, cinema proved a very effective way to project an image of the nation, which emanated from the collectivist communist ideology. In a country where large parts of the population were illiterate, motion pictures represented a highly efficient way of depicting a collective and classless national identity while agitating for an egalitarian economy. This view of the centrality of the cinema to the revolutionary efforts of the nation was expressed by Lenin, who is often quoted as saying, “for us, cinema is the most influential art form.” In 1919, the former Russian film industry was nationalized. This allowed the Communist Party to use film to communicate its political views to the masses that were scattered across a vast country. Formally, the editing-centered style of the Montage School could express abstract political concepts in a nonverbal form. The aim was to create an international language of the image, which would transcend cultures and help export the revolutionary ideology of the Soviets to other countries. In Eisenstein’s 1925 film Battleship Potemkin, the crew of the vessel revolts against their oppressive leaders after being systematically abused. The ship and the entire conflict serve as a microcosm of the nation and, more broadly, the struggle of all working classes. In Battleship Potemkin, first the sailors unite to stand up against the captain, then the shipyard workers of Odessa unite, and finally the entire fleet joins the revolt. The allegory of the ship, which serves as a source for spreading the communist ideology, was strengthened by Eisenstein’s idea of the intellectual montage in which editing was used to create connections between a statue of an awakening lion and the rising working classes. Another of the Soviet montage directors, Dziga Vertov, in Man with a Movie Camera (1928) took a different route to express the revolutionary character of the new nation. In the film, the director combined documentary footage with political commitment and ideological statement. By following one day in the life of a modern city and its working-class inhabitants, Vertov depicts the everyday as spectacular and extraordinary. The viewers can recognize themselves as characters in the film and thus as equal members of the body of the nation. In one of the earliest studies on motion pictures and national culture, Siegfried Kracauer analyzed German Weimar cinema (of the 1910s and 1920s) and its connections to national identity. From Caligari to Hitler (1947) examines the connections between a particular form of cinematic expression and the collective imagination of a nation. According to Kracauer, predominant psychological dispositions of post–World War I Germany can be exposed by analyzing German N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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films produced between 1918 and 1933. He argues that the connections between cinema and national culture are complex, but more direct than that of other artistic media, for two reasons: films are not the products of individuals but of collectives, and they address the widest possible audiences. Therefore, cinema sheds light on what is not said, or, on what is hidden in the “underground” of the social psyche. The motion picture camera records normally unperceived behavior, what he called “visual hieroglyphs,” automatically. Kracauer’s main argument is as follows. As a result of the humiliation of Germany after World War I, German citizens fled into the fictional world of films that offered two general trends: diverse anti-authoritarian tendencies without a positive perspective, and the image of the war hero, a charismatic leader, who leads the nation out of its chaotic state. Films such as The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (Robert Wiene, 1919), The Golem (Paul Wegener, 1920), The Last Laugh (F. W. Murnau, 1924), and Metropolis (Fritz Lang, 1925) revolve around characters who are haunted by their historical or cultural milieus and find ways out of this situation by escapist strategies. The disturbed souls of Weimar cinema cannot be cured by any concrete social action; rebels of these films finally submit to the authorities they revolt against, and their recurring doubles, or doppelgangers, remind the viewer of their split personalities. Kracauer concludes that Weimar cinema offers a precise portrayal of the German mentality, and later events confirm its validity. The rise of the Nazi Party and Hitler was an answer to the psychological disposition of the nation, which looked at itself as a defeated community without a historical perspective. The Expressionist films show that the historical events in Germany after 1933 had their roots in the collective unconscious of a nation, and this disposition is mirrored in the films produced during that period. Kracauer’s argument has been criticized as simplistic, partly because he is charged with writing history “teleologically,” that is, with the conclusion already predetermining the interpretation of the causes. Nevertheless, his work recognized that films are essential documents for understanding how each national culture represents itself and further made the point that the idea of the nation is only perceived against the background of a particular historical trauma, which the cinema can reveal in an encoded form.

Relevance Realism as International Style Whereas silent cinema was an international art form that made it easy to cross national borders (since language barriers were easily overcome via changing the intertitles), the diffusion of synchronous sound made “the talkies” less exportable. The need to translate and dub films for foreign markets not only increased production costs but also resulted in protectionist strategies as nations tried to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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defend their film markets from overseas products. Several European countries started to adopt protectionist rules to reduce the economic impact of Hollywood films. As the national film markets started to withdraw into themselves, the cinematic projection of the nation changed as well. In the Soviet Union, cinema became a contested space between Socialist Realism and the Constructivism of the montage filmmakers. Behind the theoretical differences lay various political views about the role of art. Should art realistically mirror existing social settings and character interaction, or should it portray more abstract scenarios, social forces, and movements? After the early 1930s, the Stalinist state started to exert power over a cinema dominated by the Montage School filmmakers, who did not uncritically support the party. In the subsequent years of Socialist Realist cinema, films became straightforward celebrations of the existing order without critical or artistic challenges. The “production films,” which focused on the joys of collective work and mechanization, and the “partisan films,” which focused on the heroic army’s resistance to fascism, all depicted heroes designed to serve as role models for the Soviet people and to exhibit loyalty to the party. The pluralism of the montage filmmakers gave way to a monolithic Stalinist cinema and put an end to diverse and conceptual depictions of the nation. These were replaced with a one-dimensional propagandistic style that, ironically, closely resembled the classical Hollywood style. The fascist countries in 1930s’ Europe also realized the importance of cinema and used the medium either to compete with the Hollywood product as a sign of nationalistic pride (Italy) or to mobilize the audiovisual power of film in the orchestration of political spectacles (Germany). Certainly it is true that more than 50 percent of the films in Nazi Germany were light comedies and musicals, and the Third Reich created its own image by commissioning a broad range of films beyond the political spectacle. However, the most well-known example of Nazi cinema remains Leni Riefenstahl’s pseudo-documentary Triumph of the Will (1935), which records a rally of the Nazi Party that became a modern media event staged for the motion picture cameras. Besides the monumental sets, the Führer is depicted as a deity who gives shape to the needs of the nation and its people. Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, remarked that German films should learn from the enemy, especially in their ability to intoxicate mass audiences. The enemy, of course, was Hollywood. In Hollywood, the 1930s brought about the golden age of classical style and genre perfection. In terms of projecting images of the nation for mass consumption, two interesting and opposing genres to look at are the Western and film noir. Both create a dualistic world where social experiences are depicted through the prism of genre iconography. Scholars of genre theory agree that the recurring narrative types of the genres epitomize problems that society revisits in a symbolic form. In the case of the Western, this problem revolves around the whole issue of American “exceptionalism,” the idea that, because of the uniqueness of the American experience and the existence of the frontier, America always afforded individuals the opportunity to escape the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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class hierarchies of Europe and engage in a process of self-invention in the undeveloped West. However, in this genre film, a conflict unfolds between the forces of development and the lack of institutional and legal structures that will allow personal development to flourish. The setting for this clash is the wild frontier that literally and metaphorically represents a dividing line between the two sides and where the status quo is most often embodied by the outlaw or the Native American Indians. Character agency plays a key role in the world of the Western. For example, the law of the community is best protected by the actions of a lone, heroic individual, usually unattached to any established community. Thus, the character of the Western hero serves to represent the very contradiction in America’s conception of itself insofar as he is necessary for the establishment of law and order, while, at the same time, he feels the need to constantly escape its confines. Whereas the setting for Western films is the small town on the frontier, gangster films of the 1940s (film noir) look at the coexistence of the criminal underworld and the world we know in the urban spaces of large cities. The numerous connections between the two spheres do not allow for a clear separation, and thus the film noir protagonists interiorize this split. The prospects for individual agency are portrayed much more cynically here than in the Western. The established world and the underworld cannot be separated in the lives of the film noir protagonists, and the Freudian conflict of consciousness and the unconscious often ends with the demise of the hero. The Western and film noir, despite their differences, both project an image of the nation that is structured around the dualistic struggle of opposing forces. Using a style that scholars describe as classicism, the two genres allow the audiences to identify with specific characters, thus positioning themselves on either side of the film’s conflict, though of course identifying with the official hero by the film’s end.

Dimensions Popular Fronts, Resistance, Decolonization The emergence of Italian neorealism in 1943 represents a decisive break from the various realisms of the major national cinemas of the 1930s. Neorealism became extremely influential worldwide as a “counter-style” to the dominant language of the commercial national cinemas. The early neorealist films (1943–1948) developed in a period of great instability in the Italian nation. In 1943 Mussolini was ousted from power, Italy switched sides in the war, and partisan forces mounted resistance to both German and Italian fascists. Indeed, this resistance to fascism and Italy’s liberation by the Allied powers provided important subjects for neorealist films. Rossellini’s Open City (1945), for example, dramatized everyday life in Rome under the German occupation, whereas his later Paisa (1946)—whose N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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title in Italian has the double meaning of “home town” and “nation”—told a chronological story of Italy’s liberation in six vignettes that moved from Sicily up through the peninsula. But it was the style in which these stories were told that made neorealism such a revolution in film language. Neorealist films preferred the actual location to the studio set, nonprofessional actors to professionals, and scripts that, although fictional, were based on real historical incidents as remembered by the people. In other words, neorealist films were not interested in telling the official history of the nation but rather in telling the national story by way of “countermemories,” which were often excluded from the official history books. The power of Open City, for example, comes partly from the shock of recognition that Italians had upon seeing such incidents as the looting of a bread shop by hungry citizens. At the premiere of Visconti’s 1943 film Ossessione, an incensed Vittorio Mussolini, son of il Duce and head of the Italian film studios, was reported to have exclaimed, “This is not Italy!” It certainly wasn’t the Italy of grand hotels and posh Riviera parties that had characterized much of the commercial cinema in Italy during the fascist period. The urgency and the unfinished quality that characterizes neorealist films reflect a nation that was in the difficult process of redefining itself. But more than this, there is an ethical dimension to neorealism that is probably the most important factor in its influence worldwide; cinema’s power was its power to bear witness to the lives of those—especially the poor—who were left out of the official national narrative. A moment in Vittorio DeSica’s Bicycle Thieves (1948), the most beloved of the neorealist classics, can illustrate this ethical aspect. The story is simple: in a devastated postwar Rome where jobs and money are scarce, a young father finds that he can get a job, but only if he has a bicycle. Since his bicycle had already been pawned so that the family could survive, he and his wife decide to pawn the only thing of value they have left, their linens, to retrieve the bicycle. When they hand their linens over to the clerk, the camera follows the clerk across a large room until he arrives at a ladder. When the camera pans up, we see stacks upon stacks of other people’s linen, all pawned out of desperation. In one quick stroke, the film makes us understand how this story of one man is only one of thousands. In a sense, neorealism showed that it was possible for a national cinema to challenge the myths of national unity often promulgated in commercial national cinemas by showing audiences what was repressed in those mass-market features. Less a formula than an attitude, neorealist style has often been taken up in other national contexts, especially in the face of pressing national problems that official governments do not want the world to see. To give only one of hundreds of possible examples, Brazilian director Hector Babenco, in the film Pixote (1981), wanted to expose the problems of impoverished youth living in the favelas or makeshift shantytowns surrounding Rio and São Paulo, many of whom were forced by poverty and homelessness into lives of crime and who even became the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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target of police death squads. To tell the story, Babenco adopted a textbook neorealist style, shooting on location in the favelas, casting nonprofessional teenagers in the film’s lead roles, and developing storylines that came from the actual events the young boys experienced in their lives. The rawness and authenticity Babenco achieved in presenting his brutal and shocking material made the film an international sensation. Of all of neorealism’s many afterlives, perhaps the most significant is the way it helped shape filmmaking in the Third World context. In the 1950s, many young aspiring filmmakers from Latin America enrolled as students in Italy’s national film school, the Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia in Rome. Upon returning to their home countries, they developed a filmmaking practice—initially called “imperfect cinema” and later “Third Cinema”—that, while indebted to the urgency and immediacy of the neorealist program, pushed the aesthetic in important new directions. This approach was necessary because the very concept of a national cinema was quite different in Latin America than in the developed world for three reasons: (1) many of the Latin American nations were “client states” whose central governments could hardly be thought of as representing the people; (2) in terms of infrastructure and annual film output, the national cinemas of Latin America were relatively underdeveloped; and (3) foreign images, usually from Hollywood, circulated widely. The problem in this context was to decide what an Argentine cinema or a Chilean cinema would resemble and whether filmmakers could get beyond the clichés of the gaucho films or the other populist genres in Latin America. Cuba, because of its successful socialist revolution in 1959, took the lead by developing a vibrant new film culture that was able to express both the utopian aspirations and the recalcitrant problems faced by the new nation without falling into the trap of “socialist realism.” In Argentina between 1966 and 1968, the collective Grupo Cine Liberación shot the epic, four-and-a-half-hour film Hour of the Furnaces (1968), a landmark of the new Latin American cinema. The film literally rewrites the history of Argentina, showing the relationships between the lives of the rich colonial elites and the exploited living conditions of the common people. Two of the filmmakers involved in the project, Fernando Solanas and Octavio Gettino, followed up with a manifesto titled “Towards a Third Cinema,” which served as a program for remaking national cinemas in the postcolonial nations. Third Cinema, they argued, should not strive for the technical perfection of First (i.e., Hollywood) and Second (i.e., European) cinemas but instead should exploit for political effect the limitations imposed by underdevelopment. This goal meant no beautiful images but instead images fraught with immediacy and truth. Formally, their argument thus suggests connections both to “imperfect cinema” and, further back, to Italian neorealism. The manifesto goes further by arguing that, in the Third World, filmmakers must also rethink the systems of production and distribution of films. Thus, Hour of the Furnaces was produced collectively, with factory workers and students involved in the production, and shown directly to workers outside of the cinemas. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Modernization and New Waves The economic booms of the 1950s in the United States and Western Europe, the rise of a new consumer culture, and the widespread diffusion of television, had a profound impact on the cinema. On the one hand, mainstream cinema attendance dropped as television provided in-home dissemination of popular entertainment, news, and product information. On the other hand, many young directors rebelled against the constraints of classical cinema and created vibrant “new waves,” which reflected the energy, optimism, and exuberance of the youth cultures sweeping the West. In the case of France (which gave us the first selfproclaimed “new wave”), a group of young film critics at the journal Cahiers du cinéma programmatically attacked what they saw as an outmoded “tradition of quality” in French mainstream cinema, which they sarcastically dubbed the cinéma du papa (“cinema of the old man”). A typical “tradition of quality” film might be a reverent, middle-brow adaptation of a classic French story; but, according to the new wave critics, such films presented a view of Frenchness and French national culture that was more like a sanitized museum piece than a living expression of contemporary culture. Thus, when these critics began to make films in 1959, they created a picture of France unlike anything seen before. Their two main influences seemed paradoxical opposites: Italian neorealism and Hollywood genre filmmaking. From neorealism they borrowed location shooting and a focus on the immediacy of everyday experience. They took from Hollywood genre filmmaking its visual energy, perhaps because they sensed that the United States was less burdened by the weight of heritage. Taken together, the French new wave films paint the most loving portrait of Paris ever put on celluloid, and they did this not by focusing on the clichéd national symbols of Paris such as the Eiffel Tower or the Champs-Elysées but rather by long scenes set in out-of-the-way cafes and bistros, with pinball machines tucked in the corners and Parisian traffic visible outside the plate-glass windows. Equally important, the directors’ improvisatory style put onscreen entirely new social types inhabiting the modern consumerist metropolis; the director JeanLuc Godard called them “the generation of Marx and Coca-Cola.” Among these unforgettable social types are the heroine of Godard’s My Life to Live (1962), a young, aspiring film actress who works in a record store and casually slips into a life of prostitution, and the young people populating Masculine-Feminine (1966), Godard’s incisive portrait of his “generation of Marx and Coca-Cola.” This new wave reflected the attitudes of a younger generation for whom the older national stories seemed out of date. With the French new wave, a critical question emerges regarding the cinema’s role in constructing a picture of the nation, for the new wave attacked the notion of heritage. They took exception to the fact that heritage is often organized and curated by official, middle-class institutions to maintain a shared sense of national identity. Of course, the existence of some kind of national heritage is inevitable. What irked the new wave directors was the elitist and aesthetically uninteresting N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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management of this heritage. This argument against an overly exclusionary heritage was to move beyond the borders of France in the 1960s, and the conflict between “heritage filmmaking” and “new cinemas” was to play out in many surprising ways in different national cinema traditions. In Britain, for example, the Angry Young Man movement in the 1960s made the exploited working-class bloke —in such films as This Sporting Life (1963)—a central figure, with filmmakers adopting a kitchen-sink realism derived in part from neorealism. In the mid1960s, with the rise of the working-class rock group The Beatles, director Richard Lester freely borrowed techniques from the French new wave in his fi lms, A Hard Day’s Night (1964) and Help! (1965), to construct an image of Britain that was hip and youthful, in contrast to the staid, class-bound view of the nation that heritage films presented. In the United States, where Hollywood had arguably been less tied to a rigidly class-based establishment, the new cinema of the 1960s focused on critiquing the monolithic national mythologies that the classical Hollywood genres tended to promote. Nowhere is this focus more evident than in the revisionist Western. In classical Hollywood, the Western was the genre specifically charged with setting forth a vision of the idea of America as a place of infinite possibilities for selfinvention. By the late 1950s, however, even the veteran Western director John Ford began to see the limited vision of the classic Western; in The Searchers (1956), he began to show the dark side of the cultural clash between settlers and the native Indian population, and in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valence (1962), the film’s clever flashback structure allows it to expose the way newspapers promulgate ideological myths at the expense of reality. Perhaps the most elegiac of the new Westerns was Sam Peckinpah’s beautiful but underrated Pat Garrett and Billy the Kid (1973). In Peckinpah’s version of the story, the American West is no longer a place to escape from the confining class hierarchies of the East as it is already being bought up by rich capitalist barons and developers. The idealized bandit Billy the Kid thus becomes the charmed but ultimately doomed representative of the promise of the American West. Since the 1960s and continuing to the present day, new waves have occurred in many national cinemas across the globe, from Czechoslovakia, Japan, and Spain to Iran, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea. In all cases, these new waves can be seen as connected to processes of modernization. Space does not permit a discussion of all these national cinema developments; however, Taiwan provides an interesting recent example. Because of its history of brutal foreign occupations, Taiwan is more akin to a postcolonial country than to an indigenous nation. In this context, the entire issue of heritage and national identity is configured very differently, because colonial occupation tends to devalue indigenous traditions and replace them with the heritage derived from the mother country. Thus, the Taiwanese “New Cinema Movement,” which emerged in the early 1980s, was initially connected to a nativist movement in Taiwanese literary culture that attempted to assert indigenous language and cultural forms as a way for Taiwan to define itself. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The key director in the early phase of the Taiwanese new wave was Hou Hsaiohsien. His early autobiographical films broke from the commercial martial-arts/ melodrama tradition with their adoption of a low-key, neorealist-influenced exploration of the everyday lives of ordinary Taiwanese in urbanized environments. Then, in 1989, after the government lifted the ban on any public discussion of the infamous massacres of February 28, 1947, Hou released City of Sadness (1989). This film, which won awards at major festivals around the world, broke the silence surrounding the February 28, 1947, incident and is one of the great national historical epics ever filmed. In the film, Hou does not abandon his attention to the nuances and rhythms of everyday life but rather uses this aesthetic to sublime advantage; the February incident is never explicitly shown onscreen but rather haunts the film all around its edges, suggesting that the nation never really faced or came to terms with this major trauma in its history. Of the directors who followed Hou in the development of Taiwanese New Cinema, Edward Yang and Tsai Ming-liang are particularly important. More clearly at home in the intensely urbanized and economically booming Taipei of the 1990s, these younger directors masterfully explore the interrelationship between new urban spaces and the modernized young Taiwanese who attempt, with more or less success, to accommodate themselves to them. In this way, they remind us of Godard’s portraits of a modernizing France but with an original and powerful cinematic language that makes the Taiwanese new wave one of the most important national cinemas of recent times.

Consequences New Technologies, Globalization, and National Image Cultures Since the emergence of national television networks in the 1950s and 1960s, new technologies of image diffusion have challenged the primacy of the cinema as the principal site of national image culture. However, since the 1980s, the impact of new technology on national image culture has become more and more pronounced with the advent of, first, new video technologies such as the VCR and lightweight, easy-to-use video cameras, second, the personal computer and the World Wide Web, and, third, the ever-increasing digitization of images. These new technologies are themselves part of an overall globalization in the organization of capitalism that has challenged traditional notions of national boundaries and distinct national cultures. In an age characterized by global flows of capital, populations, and media images, it is not surprising that the very idea of the “national cinema” is currently being rethought, although, at this point, film and media scholars have not arrived at any theoretical consensus about the relationship of global image culture to national cinemas. A few things should be noted at the outset, however. The cinema still exists. As noted earlier, the various cinematic “new waves” now occurring in the develN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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oping nations still work to articulate a sense of national identity, and the Hollywood blockbuster still attracts a vast international audience while, at the same time, expressing a uniquely American vision. However, the relative cheapness and availability of digital video cameras and image-editing computer programs, along with the possibilities for distribution of streaming video via the Internet, is beginning to complicate our picture of national “mediascapes.” In mainland China, for example, there is a national film school that trains directors to make films to comprise the “official” national cinema; however, there is now also a lively, and partly “underground,” flow of digital videos made mostly by young people and exhibited in venues like clubs and cafes that present an image of China that is decidedly different from the official national cinema. Another factor complicating any model of contemporary national cinemas is the changing role of television. From its initial diffusion in the 1950s until relatively recently, national television systems were organized around a few large networks. One could argue that, in the age of the older large networks, television took over from cinema the main tasks of defining the national project. We can now see how it functioned to assimilate various working-class ethnic groups into the “melting pot” of American culture, how it promoted consumerism and disseminated information intended to normalize and regulate the practices of everyday life. The emergence of cable, satellite, and digital television, with their endless channels and choices, tends to fragment the national audience into niche markets while linking the niches of one nation to those of other nations having the same interests. This phenomenon of a transnational community defined around specific common interests is even more pronounced in Internet culture. For example, technocrats in Dublin or Milan might find that they have more in common with members of the technocratic elites in Mumbai or Buenos Aires than with some of their own fellow citizens, as the Internet makes establishing global interconnections easy. No doubt this technology will have significant future effects on the notions of national identity and national culture, affecting even the cinema. Theoretically, the concept of “hybridity” has gained ground as a possible way to understand these new global cultures, yet the extent to which hybridity manifests itself in particular national cinemas remains relatively unexplored. Perhaps the best way to end this overview is by way of a dramatic example of how new media technologies are forcing us to reconsider fundamental national questions. When Los Angeles police officers stopped Rodney King for a minor traffic violation and ended up brutally beating him, a witness with a store-bought camera managed to capture the incident on videotape. The images of the beating were quickly disseminated via television across the nation and, indeed, the world. What ensued was a vigorous national debate about the persistence of structural racism in the United States and the precarious social status of the young black male in America—issues that had been largely ignored in the official national media culture by both cinema and television. What is most instructive for film and media scholars, however, is that, although the amateur video might have had N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the quality of immediacy and urgency that characterized the neorealist cinema of resistance, it nevertheless failed to “speak for itself.” Whereas African Americans saw the videotape as reflecting a lamentable everyday fact of life, for many other viewers the videotape mobilized already existing racist fantasies surrounding black youth in the ghettoes of America. In contemporary cinema, the relevance of nation and national identity are seemingly undergoing significant changes. With Hollywood products dominating the screens internationally, localized national cinematic voices are more difficult to discern. At the same time, the “look” of commercial films produced worldwide is more homogenous than ever. In adapting to the logic of a globalizing world, the screen industry is expanding horizontally by entering new markets worldwide and vertically by outsourcing productions, working with independent producers, and forming partnerships with foreign investors to spread risks and increase capitalization. In addition, the cinematic image itself has fundamentally changed with the emergence of CGI, or computer-generated images, which have become standard elements of contemporary filmmaking practice. Not only does the computer-generated image allow for outsourcing—for example, making the shots with the movie stars in Los Angeles, then shipping them to lower-cost studios across the globe for the addition of backgrounds and effects—but it also severs the image from its grounding in a particular “location,” which was so important to the cinematic traditions of neorealism and the new waves. These simultaneous processes challenge the traditional notions of cinematic national identity. Thus, as the production, circulation, and reception of images undergo a transformation across the world, the need for film and media scholars to develop models for understanding the workings of this international flow of images is more pressing than ever. Selected Bibliography Armes, Roy. 1971. Patterns of Realism. South Brunswick, NJ: A. S. Barnes. Gunning, Tom. 1991. D. W. Griffith and the Origins of American Narrative Film: The Early Years at Biograph. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Hansen, Miriam. 1999. “The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism.” Modernism/Modernity 6, no. 2 (April): 59–77. Kracauer, Siegfried. 2004. From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lu, Feii, ed. 2005. Island on the Edge: Taiwan New Cinema and After. Hong Kong, China: Hong Kong University Press. Marie, Michel. 2003. The French New Wave: An Artistic School. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Miller, Toby. 2001. Global Hollywood. London: British Film Institute. Nichols, Bill. 1994. “The Trials and Tribulations of Rodney King.” In Blurred Boundaries: Questions of Meaning in Contemporary Culture, edited by Bill Nichols. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Nowell-Smith, Geoffrey, ed. 1996. The Oxford History of World Cinema. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Restivo, Angelo. 2002. Cinema of Economic Miracles: Visuality and Modernization in the Italian Art Film. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Rosen, Philip. 1984. “History, Textuality, Nation: Kracauer, Burch and Some Problems in the Study of National Cinemas.” Iris 2, no. 2: 60–83. Solanas, Fernando, and Octavio Getino. 1976. “Towards a Third Cinema.” In Movies and Methods, edited by Bill Nichols, 44–64. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wang, Yiman. 2005. “The Amateur’s Lightning Rod: DV Documentary in Postsocialist China.” Film Quarterly 58, no. 4: 16–26.

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Constructions of National Symbolic Spaces and Places: The State of Place in Identity Brian S. Osborne

Political independence, the implementation of centralized systems of power, the development of a military capability, and the consolidation of territory all contribute to the functional organization of people in a state. But the formation of a state nationalism requires the evocation of the ideas, myths, and dreams that comprise the nonrational core of national identity. That is, old nations and modern states alike cannot exist or function without symbolic underpinnings.

Relevance In the 19th century, young nation-states and older polities both attempted to mobilize public identification with a nationalistic mission by nurturing what Benedict Anderson has called an “imagined community.” Railways, the telegraph, and national postal systems overcame the obstacles of time and space. However, the political myopia of local geographical and historical identities required other strategies to ensure loyalty to the new structure, the nation-state. Capital-capitol complexes, imposing state architecture, inspirational monuments, and patriotic theatrics all heroically chronicled the emergence of state power. Indeed, for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, these nationalizing states deployed several devices intended to propagate memory-making and identity formation. The second half of the 20th century witnessed several trends that weakened the power of traditional national identities. These included the optimistic internationalism that followed the defeat of nationalist fascisms; the technological and economic assertions of a globalized world society, together with its cultural equivalent, cosmopolitanism; and the emergence of transnational loyalties that reflected the impact of migrations and international connections. Nevertheless, many nationalizing states still construct monolithic identities in both old established nation-states and newly constructed nation-states. To this end, connections with symbolic landscapes, reverence for impressive monuments, and extravaganzas of performed identity are still sponsored by national bureaucracies dedicated to the perpetuation of heroic, albeit often mythic, narratives. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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But there are signs of reaction. This is particularly true of plural societies that enjoy liberal democracies and open transnational connections. Here, the symbols of identity have changed because the reception and expectations are more complex. Traditional narratives are being challenged by discourses of race, class, and gender. The formality of bronze and marble memorials is being countered by new imaginations and practices. These need to be better understood in the ideological landscape of nationalism in the 21st century.

Origins Storied Places The principal initiative of nationalizing states lies in the construction of a shared collective memory. The imagery of collective memory focuses on particular people, events, and their spatial reference points: places of recollection. These are reinforced in the collective memory by acts of commemoration that structure our time and space in a mental geography. Two seminal thinkers have highlighted this: Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora. For Halbwachs, storied places provide spatial and temporal coordinates for remembering. In a similar vein, Nora seeks out the roots of French cultural identity by analyzing the events, places, and concepts that crystallized collective heritage and collective memory. For both Halbwachs and Nora, geography is more than the stage for the acting out of history: the two are intertwined throughout. Identities are constantly being reconstituted according to the needs of the present, through selective appropriation, manipulation, and even imaginative invention. The past is socially constructed through archives, museums, school curricula, monuments, and public displays. All of these propagate national solidarity, encourage people’s pride in citizenship, and promote their full participation in economic, social, and political life. Accordingly, most nationalizing states renegotiate history, memory, and identity in terms of foundation myths, sacred places, and the personification of assumed national qualities. National histories chronicle how communities and individuals want to be perceived by themselves and others. Always spatially grounded, they are associated with specific locales that become imbued with historically produced cultural meanings that can transcend into Mircea Eliade’s genius loci, or spirit of place. In particular, people’s identification with particular places is essential for the cultivation of national identity. Places become loaded with material forms that are powerful prompts for shared narratives, values, and putative hopes and fears for the future. Carefully selected because of their emotive power, they become iconic and are empowered by the careful cultivation of mythologies. In this way, the familiar material world becomes transformed into symbolically charged sites N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and events—as well as silences—that provide social continuity, contribute to the collective memory, and provide spatial and temporal reference points for society.

Dimensions Patriotic Topographies Nationalizing states have always been aware of persons’ strong bonds to place and have deployed them through landscape. Initially considered as the material expression of human impact on the land and evidence of societies’ various ways of life and cultural history, landscape has increasingly been deconstructed as a repository of symbolic meaning. In particular, it is transformed from an external phenomenon to be engaged visually to a psychic terrain of internalized symbolic meaning. In this way, particular landscapes have been appropriated as visual representations of the essence of homelands, motherlands, and fatherlands. Indeed, the German term heimat is the most nuanced expression of that profound link between identity, land, and place. The mental image of particular patriotic landscapes becomes coded with reference to golden ages, heroic deeds, and national stories that transcend the prosaic realities of geology and topography, and land and water, and become intimately tied to nationality, nationhood, and national destiny. As the dominant expressions of symbolic space and time, storyladen landscapes came to play an instrumental role in the formation of national identities. Symbolic landscapes can be challenged. Consider the case of Canada’s longpreferred national iconography of “The North.” No mere identification with nature and wilderness, it has been charged that there were strong ideological forces behind the imagery of Nordicity. That is, Canada turned its back on the St. Lawrence– Great Lakes front that united, yet divided, American and Canadian geopolitics. It rejected the shared experience of urbanism, industry, and pluralism and espoused the symbolism of the north and wilderness. Canada searched for national distinctiveness by shunning continentalism and cosmopolitanism in favor of a pristine nativism imbued with heavy doses of chauvinism, environmental determinism, and even racialism. Some contemporary Canadian artists have reacted by deterritorializing the landscape and refer to outside influences and internal differences as new tokens of Canadian identity. Similar ideologically loaded patriotic geographies may be associated with the English countryside, the American frontier, and Australia’s outback. These viewpoints are often most evocatively rendered in such patriotic songs and anthems as “Land of My Fathers,” “America the Beautiful,” “Ma Vlast,” and “Waltzing Matilda.” Artistic conventions of the picturesque and the sublime have also been appropriated to represent preferred nationalist and imperialist self-images. But there are often “dark sides” to the landscape that have to be dealt with. In some N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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cases, places of past violence and tragedy are permanently expunged from the landscape in an attempt at preventing the collective remembering of things that nation-states wish to avoid. Nevertheless, a litany of sites of war, mass murders, political assassinations, violent labor and race riots persist as sites of remembering. It is in this vein that the world’s engagement with the mind-numbing immensity of the horror of the Holocaust is ensured through the preservation of the death camps and the erection of evocative markers. Figuring Out Place Didactic sites were purposefully introduced into landscapes that have evolved organically over time. Monuments served as material signifiers for collective remembering and identity of great victories, beloved monarchs, or revered political leaders. National images were to be found in past heroes, geniuses, and messiahsaviors, who were rooted in homelands and golden ages and were advanced as surrogates for the nation’s innate virtues, past achievements, and future destiny. In particular, portrait-sculpture personalized the nationalizing state, scripted mythic histories in an allegorical visual text, and legitimized authority by consensual acceptance of an official historical metanarrative. Royalty, political leaders, military heroes, and mythic figures were presented in standard poses with an array of such predictable accoutrements as swords or crosses or books or horses or lions. The female image was particularly manipulated as an allegory of virtue, motherhood, and home. Often located in heroic pantheons in national capitals, these symbols were also symbolically placed: the Statue of Liberty in New York, Vercingétorix at Alesia, King Alfred in Winchester, Queen Boadicea at London’s Westminster, Bismark in Berlin, the Magyar chiefs in Budapest’s Heroes’ Square. In this way, portrait-sculpture joined flags, anthems, national chronicles, currency, and coins in building a sense of community, identity, and nationalism. War has had a particular role in this process. World War I stimulated a more populist and ubiquitous mode of monumental public statuary: war monuments. In fact, nation-states everywhere incorporated war into the national project by centrally coordinated programs of memorialization, commemoration, and ritualized performance. However, the very human face of suffering in the name of nationalism had much to do with the demise of monumental patriotism. But after the Great War, the elaborate visual language of monumental symbolism and allegory became incomprehensible for most people. Monumental statuary was favored only by dictatorships that manipulated pomp, gigantism, and poor taste into symbolic statements of power. Even war memorials were less popular as, after World War II, returning troops often preferred that their service and sacrifices be commemorated by “memorial” hospitals, schools, and recreation centers. To be sure, the heroic flag-raising on Iwo Jima has become iconic for both the U.S. Marine Corps and the nation, but the dramatically somber statement of Washington’s Vietnam monument is an evocative reflection of other reactions to wartime suffering. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Recently, attention has been directed to commemorating the services and sacrifices of workers and public servants in everyday society. Thus, in Canada, the “Day of Mourning Act” received Royal Assent in 1991. Since that date, April 28 has come to be recognized worldwide as the day for commemorating loss and suffering in the workplace. For others, the materialization of abstract ideas has transformed the quality of life in liberal societies. Canada recognizes such important initiatives as “Peace Keeping,” the Constitution, multiculturalism, gender rights, and immigration reform. Two initiatives stand out: the invasion of the monumental pantheon on Parliament Hill, Ottawa, by the “Alberta Five,” five courageous women activists who fought for women’s rights in Canada; and Toronto’s now highly acclaimed and internationally duplicated monument to “Multiculturalism” with its message of global links and sensitivities. These moves are echoed in the United States and elsewhere. A fine example is the role of presidential libraries as part of the civil religion of American patriotism. Critical attention has also been directed at the symbolism of “standing soldiers and kneeling slaves” as well as the discourses running through such revered icons as the flag, the Statue of Liberty, Mount Rushmore, the Lincoln Memorial, and, of course, post-9/11 memorial initiatives. While monuments are intended to foster social cohesion, they may also provoke a public redefinition of identity. This is especially true when monuments

Monument to Multiculturalism and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, erected in Toronto on July 1, 1985. (Rudy Sulgan/Corbis)

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last too long. Memorials freeze ideas in space and time as the dated messages of bronze, iron, marble, and granite structures survive into uncomprehending futures. As their original purpose is redefined, they can be sites of conflict, dissent, or—perhaps even worse—indifference. And always, iconoclasm is the handmaiden of shifting ideologies. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the “Second Springtime of Freedom,” monuments of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov went the way of an imperialist Queen Victoria before and a dictatorial Saddam Hussein later. Performing Place While some monuments are trivialized by disinterest or neglect, ritualized remembrance ensures the continued relevance of others. Such planned spectacles have always required an architecture of people that has long been part of Western political culture going back to Greece, Rome, and the Papacy. Indeed, nationstates have nurtured patriotism akin to a state religion. Formerly associated with the processionals and icons of religious ceremony, nationalizing states established a civic calendar of publicly performed ceremonials that shifted public attention from theology to patriotism. State ceremonies were orchestrated to ensure that the collective memory focused on particular events and places. They drilled into the collective memory a national ideological agenda that was reinforced by performance, mass participation, and repetitive reenactment intended to encourage collective remembering, propagate consensual values, and overcome social differences. The gross theatrics of Hitler and Mussolini have a more benign equivalent in the regal displays of British royalty and the ever-expanding trappings of the American presidency. A particularly egregious demonstration of the theatrics of power was President George W. Bush’s choreographed declaration of victory in the Iraq War in May 2003 on the deck of the USS Lincoln. Consider the script and set design: the arrival by fighter jet, the costume of a fighter pilot, the prop—a banner proclaiming “Mission Accomplished,” a supporting cast of enthusiastic military personnel, and a multimillion media audience in cyberspace. Such powerful exercises in controlled spectacle are intended to reinforce ideologies, create mythic histories, and through the involvement of large numbers of people, attempt to generate a sense of common identity and purpose. At the other extreme is the informal performance of identity, often in the context of tragedy and trauma. Be it the death of Princess Diana, the mass murders of children at schools, such as Columbine, or communities’ grief in reaction to the loss of local military in combat, spontaneous commemorations have come to have their own repertoire of rituals and material signifiers of loss. Within hours of the horror of 9/11 at the World Trade Center in New York, rescue workers and the public at large created informal memorials and sites of remembrance. In a similar vein, the recent unveiling of the Tomb to the Unknown Soldier in Ottawa was accompanied by predictable pomp and ceremony. What followed N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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was unplanned and completely spontaneous: an unknown mourner deposited a red poppy on the grave; others followed and took their own poppies from their lapels and deposited them there. Soon, a mound of red blanketed the bronze sarcophagus. It is now an annual event following the formal state service on November 11, Remembrance Day.

Consequences The Need for New Strategies and Tools Clearly, identity and sense of belonging are complex concepts affected by plural connections. Class, gender, religion, and ethnicity compete with local, regional, and national associations, as well as globalization and migration. In particular, transnational identities are challenging the liberal, nation-bound concept of citizenship and sovereignty. It follows, therefore, that the representation of national identity embraces the challenge posed by people’s nested sets of identities in a multinational and cosmopolitan world. Obviously, the preferred model for most modern democratic states is a civil nationalism based upon a rational adherence to liberal principles, rather than an ethnic nationalism characterized by emotional links to “blood and soil.” And yet, while national identity is best defined in terms of a rational assessment of rights and obligations, it must also be accompanied by a modicum of symbolic attachment to the idea for which any particular nation stands. Shared histories of difference may sometimes be antagonistic and irreconcilable and create their own counternarrative that critiques the dominant culture and the structures underpinning it. Consequently, there is a need to carefully consider future strategies for history-making, monumentalism, and commemoration in forward-looking nation-states in the 21st-century world. The idea of looking back on previous forms of national narratives and revisiting commemorative texts aids us in understanding these landscapes. Change within society also breeds new types of expression through Web-based information. As the world becomes more connected, we must also remember that nations should seek to nurture a national culture that celebrates their distinctiveness while also respecting global patterns of diversity. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1991/1983. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Appiah, K. A. 2006. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W. W. Norton. Boime, A. 1998. The Unveiling of National Icons: A Plea for Patriotic Iconoclasm in a Nationalistic Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brooks, D., and P. N. Limerick. 1995. Sweet Medicine: Sites of Indian Massacres, Battlefields, and Treaties. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

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Daniels, S. 1993. Fields of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Eliade, M. 1959. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. Translated by Willard R. Trask. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Foote, K. E. 1997. Shadowed Ground: America’s Landscapes of Violence and Tragedy. Austin: University of Texas Press. Gillis, J. 1994. Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Halbwachs, M. 1980. The Collective Memory. Translated by F. Ditter and V. Y. Ditter. New York: Harper and Row. (Orig. pub. 1950.) Hobsbawm, E., and T. Ranger. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hufbauer, B. 2005. Presidential Temples: How Memorial and Temples Shape Public Memory. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Loewen, J. W. 1999. Lies across America: What Our Historic Sites Get Wrong. New York: The New Press. Manning, E. 2003. Ephemeral Territories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Neal, A. 1998. National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Nora, P. 1996. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Columbia University Press. Osborne, B. 2001. “Landscapes, Memory, Monuments, and Commemoration: Putting Identity in Its Place.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 33, no. 3: 39–77. Osborne, B. 2006. “From Patriotic Pines to Diasporic Geese: Emplacing Culture, Setting Our Sights, Locating Identity in a Transnational Canada.” Canadian Journal of Communications 31:147–175. Savage, K. 1997. Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in NineteenthCentury America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schwartz, B. 2000. Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Spillman, L. 1997. Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vale, J. 1992. Architecture, Power, and National Identity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Verdery, K. 1999. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change. New York: Columbia University Press. Walkowitz, D. J., and M. Knauer, eds. 2004. Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation in Public Space. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism in Liberal Political Theory Christine Straehle

Albert Einstein once described nationalism as “the measles of the human race,” a disease of infancy translated onto the state. This disdain for everything nationalistic has been reflected by liberal political theory that for the longest time promoted the ideal of cosmopolitanism as the only viable way to reflect liberal values, like individual liberty and autonomy. However, nationalist movements have not died out, as cosmopolitans may have hoped, but instead are alive and well in many parts of the world. They take different forms, from national minority movements as in Canada, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom, to movements for national self-determination, as in the Czech Republic, to national movements that are motivated by principles of democratic accountability, as in the Ukraine. Are all supporters of national movements infantile or at least illiberal? To answer this question, both cosmopolitanism and its supposed converse, nationalism, will have to be examined more closely. What are the basic principles of cosmopolitanism and how is it tied to liberal thought? Why are both supposedly at odds with nationalism? Or can we conceive of a version of nationalism that encompasses liberal values?

Origins What Is Cosmopolitanism? Cosmopolitanism can be defined as that school of thought whose proponents regret the privileging of national identities in political life. Instead, cosmopolitans subscribe to the idea that we should consider ourselves as citizens of the world, rather than of particular nation-states. According to cosmopolitans, we should be concerned with the well-being of all people, not only that of our compatriots. And we should promote the idea of individual liberty through democratic government, globally, not only in the boundaries of our nation-state. These cosmopolitan convictions arise from the context in which cosmopolitan thoughts emerged, namely the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is that period in the history of ideas that initiated the slow embrace of what we now consider to be the core liberal ideas about how to decide on the shape of our lives: the freedom to reason and deliberate what life we want to lead based on our own needs and experiences, not on traditional identities and fixed social roles. Instead of being N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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locked into a religion, social class, or other identificatory group by birth, individuals were supposed to be set free from such constraints. They were to determine for themselves what identity they were to embrace, through rational deliberation. This was the great achievement of the Enlightenment. Today, not many people would be as hopeful about the prospects for a peaceful global state as, for example, the Marquis de Condorcet who believed in the ultimate establishment of a world state. However, political theorists and philosophers still take on cosmopolitan stances when making their arguments. What role does cosmopolitanism play in political theory? To answer this question, we need to set cosmopolitanism in context with its opposite, nationalism.

Relevance What Is Nationalism? Nationalism implies that belonging to a nation and sharing in its national identity carry special significance for us that other ties don’t. The meaning of the terms “national identity” or “shared nationality,” which are used interchangeably in the literature, is heavily debated. But most authors today share a core definition that can serve as the basis for this discussion. Nationality, most agree, is a way of expressing our place in the world that works like all other identities, as a framework of references within which we can define ourselves. Nationality describes a community of people bound together by history, language, culture, and, usually, territory. Nationality is thus often tied to ethnicity and a shared cultural background. We recognize each other easily among compatriots; we identify with each other and share a sense of belonging together. Moreover we identify with our common history as a nation and are conscious of being involved in the ongoing national project to the point that we would potentially die for our nation. Sharing in a national identity allows us to partake meaningfully in a larger history than that of our individual lives or immediate community. Our nationhood provides us with a collective political subject. And finally, national identity promotes the solidarity and trust among compatriots needed to sustain the institutions of the democratic welfare state, such as redistributive taxation and democratic civility. This function of national identity has been described as a stimulus or “battery” for the nation-state. How Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism Disagree To the cosmopolitan, however, any favoring of the national community over that of humanity more generally is morally arbitrary. Why, asks the cosmopolitan, should we privilege the belonging to our nation over any other kind of belonging when thinking about how we want to lead our lives? And why should we owe special obligations to conationals that we don’t owe to others? Cosmopolitans don’t N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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deny that we owe duties to others, but they deny that such obligations end at the nation’s borders. Our obligations to others hold true regardless of where we live and whether or not we share a nationality or identity or a state. This version of cosmopolitanism is related to another Enlightenment thinker, Immanuel Kant, and his idea of universal principles that we should apply when thinking about how to lead our lives. Kant articulated this belief in his “categorical imperative,” which stated that we should live according to principles that could serve as foundations for universal law. Cosmopolitans hold on to the belief that we share a common humanity. And they think that because of our shared humanity we have some obligations toward people wherever they live. Some authors defend, for example, our obligation to promote and realize international justice by fighting for a fairer system of international trade or a more global approach to social justice. So the first cosmopolitan critique of nationalism is that nationalists make claims based on national identity, which privileges compatriots, when thinking about our mutual obligations—at the expense of those obligations we have toward other humans. A second problem with nationalism, from the cosmopolitan perspective, is that the promotion of nationalism stands in opposition to ideas of individual emancipation and personal liberty. Nationalism’s critics describe it as an irrational and illiberal form of attachment, an identity ascribed to us that provides the national community with more power over the individual than it ought to have. This is a criticism worth exploring. Let’s take the example of the ultimate allegiance to our nation, the idea that we should give our lives for the welfare of our country, the call—to put it in more patriotic terms—“pro patria mori,” as the Romans rallied. What comes with this call to patriotic duty on the battlefield is the idea that, whatever our individual stance toward specific governmental policies, if need be we should be willing to die for our nation. “My country right or wrong” seems thus to go hand in hand with the duty we owe our nation. Consider a young Israeli recruit who refuses to serve in the West Bank. Some Israeli “refuseniks,” as they have been called, refuse military service because they believe that Israeli military policy goes beyond what is necessary to sustain and protect the wellbeing of the nation, even though the Israeli state may defend its actions as being necessary for its survival. The refusenik is faced with a conflict between individual belief and the call to defend the nation. Should she follow her own assessment of her duty and of the interests of the nation? Or should she suppress her misgivings and demonstrate her loyalty by doing military service despite her disapproval of the policy and skepticism as to its necessity? A “chauvinist” nationalism, as it has been called, allows for no such conflict. The nation is conceived of as an independent entity with a life and destiny of its own. It is not the sum or the collective will of its individual members. Th e nation is an organic whole, an elemental force that drives human action without those involved having much influence on it. This understanding of nationalism dates back to German Romanticism, which viewed societies as organic entities that had their natural territory and their distinct culture. According to this view, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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individuals are born into a nation and hence share certain personal characteristics with their conationals. Our national identity plays an important part in our personal identity, and moreover, we cannot escape our ties to our national identity. To come back to the example of the Israeli recruit, the welfare of the national community, in a strict application of this kind of nationalist doctrine, will and should take precedence over individual welfare or belief. What’s more, there can be no ethical limits to the pursuits of the nation if these pursuits are justified by the national interest—even to the detriment of interests of other people and peoples. This kind of nationalism is both an illiberal and belligerent doctrine—the potentially terrible expanse of which was illustrated by Nazi Germany with its territorial policy of “the homeland,” its racial and social policies, and the subjugation of individual interests to that of the Reich. But is this all there is to nationalism?

Dimensions Forms of Nationalism Some authors have suggested distinctions between different kinds of nationalisms. Some believe, for example, that we should distinguish “western,” rational nationalism, which encompasses individual rights and is profoundly liberal in its concern with individual liberty and autonomy, and “eastern” nationalism, which is seen as mystical and primordial, founded on quasi-tribal bases for the nation that would count as illiberal. Most importantly, “western” nationalism would allow for individuals to disagree with nationalist doctrines because this kind of nationalism would embrace freedom of conscience as a fundamental human right—a right, in fact, that was invoked by many of the Israeli refuseniks in their campaign against military action in the West Bank. The distinction between “western,” rational nationalism and its “eastern,” primitive counterpart has survived and has been ushered into political theory in the distinction between “civic-territorial nationalism” in the West and its “eastern ethnic-genealogical” counterpart. And in fact, some assume that this distinction helps to clarify and answer the challenge to nationalism by cosmopolitanism. If indeed civic-territorial nationalism encourages individual liberties, then surely it is helping rather than hindering individual autonomy, the goal of Enlightenment thinking? This conclusion might hold true and might answer some of the qualms cosmopolitans have with nationalist doctrines, but only if the distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” nationalism can be shown to stand up against closer scrutiny. First, let’s look at what the distinction implies. It suggests that we can differentiate between two fundamentally different types of nationalisms. The civic type promotes an understanding of what it means to belong to a nation based on civil rights: all members have democratic citizenship rights and enjoy an equal range of individual liberties, for example, freedom of expression or freedom of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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conscience and assembly. A nation thus understood, we are led to believe, is founded on a set of consciously chosen and shared principles. The example most often invoked for a civic-territorial nation is, of course, the United States. The ethnic type, on the other hand, is supposedly distinguished by its reliance on ethno-cultural traits, like customs and language, for the foundation of the nation. In such a nation, one can only belong by showing the right “bloodline” or ancestry, one that can be traced back to early days. To illustrate, the ethnic type of reference is often made to the German interpretation of national identity. Indeed, until 1998, citizenship in Germany was automatically conferred to children born to German parents, regardless of where they lived, while it proved to be all but impossible to naturalize children who had been born and bred in Germany but who were descended from Turkish immigrants, for example. On the other hand, German governments would accept ethnic Germans whose families had resided for generations in Russia as German citizens—even though they might lack any knowledge of German or of what life was actually about in Germany. Nationalism since the 1980s With the differences between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism spelled out, we can ask if this distinction helps us make sense of national movements today. Many have criticized both concepts, and for different reasons. Can we really say that the civic version is entirely “civic” and not imbued with cultural traits? Can we neglect the relevance of language, to take an obvious cultural denominator, in choosing and determining to which principles we as a nation ought to subscribe? More often than not, some authors argue, the distinction comes down to the “good” nationalists in the West, who promote liberal citizenship and individual rights, and the “bad” nationalisms in the East, who impose an ethno-cultural yoke on their members. Moreover, a division between “east” and “west” doesn’t help us understand national movements today. Regardless of antinationalist expectations long held by liberal theorists, we have witnessed ever-new nationalist movements around the globe. Some of the eastern European movements have been linked to the demise of the Soviet Union, for example, in the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Georgia, and most recently in the Ukraine. As many cases of nationalist movements—in Québec in Canada, the Basque country and Catalonia in Spain, in Indonesia, the Kurds in Turkey, and the Kashmiri in India and Pakistan—show, however, new nationalist movements are not restricted to that region. Many contemporary national movements tie national self-determination to the principles of democratic government structures and principles of accountability and transparency. Thus, beyond traditional claims, referring to the ethno-cultural heritage and traditions, they also make a case for national self-determination. By making both sets of claims, however, they transcend the division between civic and territorial nationalism. We therefore need to wonder if we can conceive—theoretically—of nationalism other than in the dichotomy of civic versus ethnic, that is, in a way that takes N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the cultural identity basis of these nationalisms into account alongside their goals that reflect democratic principles like self-determination and citizenship rights. Liberal Nationalism The theoretical challenge was taken up in the early 1990s when some liberal theorists turned their attention to questions of nationality and nationhood. Shedding previous disdain, they asked if we can conceive of a national community that would respect both the principles of individual liberty and autonomy, on the one hand, and the ethno-cultural requirements for the national community to flourish, on the other. These “liberal nationalists,” as they have been called, have advanced a case to rethink our position toward nationalism. Many political theorists now think that those who fight for national independence want to protect their national culture, their language, and their heritage through political independence because they believe that a flourishing national culture makes life meaningful for them. Let’s look at the issue of language—clearly still a strong cultural denominator in today’s world and one that is tied to our individual well-being. Just think of our daily dealings with authorities, but also of those with our immediate neighbors and the people we cross in our daily lives that require our use of language. Only if we can relate to them in a meaningful way can we actually make sense of the world and position ourselves in it. To be sure, many people will be able to learn a second or third language over the course of their lives. However, for most people, their native language will remain the one in which they will feel most comfortable. Especially when it comes to deliberating about more complicated issues, like politics, people prefer to express themselves in their native language—only then do they have a sense of good comprehension and understanding of the issues at stake. Except for an elite, most people prefer to conduct politics in their vernacular. In Catalonia and Québec, to take two examples of the Western liberal democratic world that illustrate the dynamics of many national liberation movements, people are proud of Catalán and Québécois, respectively, and would want the language to survive. It carries meaning, links them to their heritage and culture, their ancestors, the land and the history of their national culture. In short, their language represents what it means for them to be Catalán or Québécois; it expresses their national identity. This is, of course, one reason why it is vital for members of either group to be able to take pride in their language. Until recently, however, both Cataláns and Québécois had to be able to speak Spanish and English, respectively, to be economically successful. These were the languages of public life, the markets, businesses, and so on. If the Catalán or Québécois government hadn’t made strong efforts to support their languages, chances are that they would have been on a not so slow demise—with extinction being a likely outcome. Moreover, only because these regional governments made efforts to turn these formerly private languages into the language of vibrant emerging economies can Catalán and Québécois serve as a vehicle of individual pride and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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achievement today. The reason why Cataláns and Québécois value their languages, however, has nothing to do with chauvinist or “bad ethnic” nationalism, but rather with the fact that it forms a vital part of their identity. It is a social good that they are proud of and that they want to be able to teach to their children. John Stuart Mill, in the cosmopolitan vein, famously wrote that it would be far better for a Breton (and other minority groups in 19th-century France) to blend into the French nation and to participate in the progress that it would bring than to insist on his cultural heritage and the use of his traditional language. What we can learn from the example of language and the role language plays in the life of individuals, however, is that it does not necessarily help the freedom and autonomy of minority-language speakers to only have one viable language available. Looked at from this angle, then, a sense of nationality and what it is tied to could actually foster the cosmopolitan ideals of individual liberty and autonomy—rather than hinder their realization. To be able to protect these languages meaningfully, on the other hand, Québécois and Cataláns had to have strong provincial governments to make their case and implement the necessary measures in the bigger framework of the Canadian and Spanish states, respectively. The cultural identity issue of language, thus, called for a certain degree of national political self-determination. But how does this address allegations made by cosmopolitans that what Québécois and Cataláns (or Kurds or the Welsh) are concerned with is “purity” of the national culture at the expense of other values, for example, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue? Asked otherwise, how is language protection as an aim for national politics different from chauvinist nationalism? The difference, some argue, is in the motivational drive: national minorities don’t want to protect their cultures because they think it is the best one around; they want to protect the cultural background that is important for their well-being. So the first lesson liberal nationalism seems to teach cosmopolitan critics is that having and sustaining strong national cultures does not prohibit individual emancipation from ascribed identities. Rather, liberal nationalist authors argue, strong national cultures are vital for individual emancipation, if we understand emancipation to imply that we have a range of options available to us along which we can make choices about our lives. What can we make of the second claim cosmopolitans make? How does liberal nationalism address the fact that nationalism in whatever form seems to privilege members of our national community when thinking about our moral obligations rather than advocating the obligations we have toward all human beings? Some liberal nationalist authors have tackled this question head on and have proposed that we should not consider cosmopolitan ethics and the “ethics of nationality” as mutually exclusive. Rather, we should consider the nation and its political expression, the institutions of the nation-state, as the best opportunity to fulfill our obligations toward others, without, however, neglecting any international obligations we may have. Others invite us to consider cosmopolitanism N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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not as a call to tend to all the needy around the world, which would be too big and abstract a task to attempt. Instead, we should take the world we live in, our neighborhood, school or religious community, or our national community as the playing field for our moral obligations. What we should distinguish is what motivates our acts, the reasons why we act in a certain way, which can be—and from a cosmopolitan perspective, should be—universal in nature, and the realm in which we act on these reasons, which can be local or national. For example, we may try to help out at our local soup kitchen as often as we can fit it into our schedule, not because we think that our fellow nationals should not go hungry, but because we think that nobody should be hungry—but our local soup kitchen is where we feel we can make the biggest contribution. This does not prevent us from making donations to aid organizations that help people in faraway countries, of course, but neither should our monetary contributions buy us out of the obligations we have to the homeless on our street. Liberal nationalism can then be understood, in other words, to be able to assuage at least some of the cosmopolitan concerns. How does liberal nationalism fare in its other tasks? Most importantly, can liberal nationalist authors explain national self-determination movements over the last two decades?

Consequences Problems Unfortunately, the world is more complicated than liberal theorists (and maybe some others) would like it to be—and it gets particularly messy once we look at the ethno-cultural makeup of modern states. Most states today, to point to the biggest problem first, are not homogenous nation-states but are made up of different national groups, including national minorities. National minorities are now understood to be ethno-national groups that relate to a specific territory as their ancestral home and share a language and culture, but who are by now outnumbered or surrounded by a larger majority nation. Examples of national minorities are the Québécois and aboriginal nations in Canada, the Basques and Cataláns in Spain, and the Maori in New Zealand. For these groups to have a sense of security and viability, cultural minority rights may be needed to provide minority nations with safeguards against the majority. Among those favoring such rights are those who claim that we ought to provide national minorities with language rights—which, as we have seen, is an important cultural component of national identities—and other cultural self-protection rights like self-government arrangements that may be couched in federal administrative setups, like in Canada or Belgium. However, what ought we to do if a country has a multinational population without these groups necessarily being territorially concentrated, as in the case of Canada and Belgium? Dispersion of minority members N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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makes institutional accommodation of the national group problematic, of course, including any territorial federal arrangements. One prominent example of a multinational territory without clearly demarcated territorial boundaries was Bosnia-Herzegovina before attempts by all ethnic groups were made to establish such dividing lines between the different ethno-cultural groups. And in fact, as the conflict in the Balkans illustrated well, multinational countries often also exhibit a multinational citizenry, with children born to parents of different ethnonational ancestry. If we accept, as liberal nationalist authors would like us to, that national identity is a crucial part of our personal identity, it seems that we would have to identify with one national identity rather than feel comfortable in this mélange of identities that multinationality brings with it. This begs the question: Can liberal nationalism take multinational and multiethnic identities into account? Liberal nationalists don’t advocate ethnic purity or anything like it. Instead, they promote shared public cultures and public spheres in which different ethnic groups making up society can come together and create a national identity with which all can identify, to which all can subscribe. A liberal nationality, then, is supposed to constitute itself from, on the one hand, our cultural heritage and traditions—its “ethnic” components, so to speak—and, on the other hand, from the shared principles and values we can all agree on—its “civic” components. How would this work? As we have seen above, the idea that we can draw lines between the two, between our ethnic heritage and our civic principles and values, is debated. So the first lesson we can draw from applying liberal nationalist theory to the world around us is that it leaves certain questions concerning the implementation of liberal nationalism unanswered. A second criticism stems from a more inquisitive look at the potential consequences of liberal national policies. Imagine that we provide ethno-cultural minorities in our midst with chances to contribute to and shape the nature of our national identity. To what extent, we may ask, does the emerging identity still have strong ties to our national identity—which is, according to the liberal nationalist view, why we attribute value to our nationality—as an expression of our shared cultural background? To illustrate this, let’s look at the example of immigrant minorities, a prominent case study when discussing ethnic diversity as part of a liberal national identity. Assume that it is inoffensive and even enjoyable for most of us to taste foreign foods and appreciate cultural artifacts other than those produced on our home turf over the last centuries. How far can our acceptance go before, indeed, we end up having a “cosmopolitan”-tasting national identity? The criticism that we, in fact, all watch American TV, love pizza, and enjoy a bottle of French wine—in short, that we all already lead cosmopolitan lives rather than the ones prescribed by our national identity—has been leveled against those who propose to put so much value on national identity. A “reality check” based on the mandate to integrate immigrants in a public culture seems to suggest that, if we apply the idea of a diverse public culture to nationality, it may indeed change the nature of our national identity by integrating multiethnic components. This may N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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be a welcome development, but to what extent does the newly forged national identity still fit into the liberal national framework? Now, let’s look at the challenges posed by national minorities to liberal nationalism. Assume we provide national minorities with cultural self-determination rights, like jurisdiction over education, language policy, and immigration policies, as in the case of Québec. To what extent do we pave the way for minority secession justified by the ethno-national character of the minority in question—a development that was exemplified by the violent demise of the Yugoslav federation? Are we not—somewhat secretly—advocating national purity and nation-states again if the basis of rights is the national culture of a group, rather than its democratic tradition, say, or its societal project? Put differently, to what extent does the application of liberal nationalist principles let ideas of “ethnic” nationalism back into the argumentative ring? These problems have led some authors to argue that any attempts to address the complexities of today’s world with 19th-century solutions, that is, attempts to update our take on the nation-state, are doomed to failure. Instead, they argue for a broader framework of governance, as provided, for example, by the European Union, since minorities would feel more comfortable and secure in a transnational institutional framework. Should we refurbish the cosmopolitan model then? Global Governance Some authors have indeed advocated that we should start thinking about cosmopolitan governance in a more principled manner. Apart from the obvious shortcomings with the nation-state model outlined above, these authors base their recommendations on a close inspection of today’s world. The first argument comes from the sphere of economics. Politics today is dictated by the economy and, more specifically, by needs arising from the globalization of markets, media, and communication. According to some, market forces are so overpowering that the idea that we could hold on to national governments as providers of the institutional security—the things, in fact, that liberal nationalist authors praise the nation-state for, like social integration, recognition, channels of democratic decision-making processes, and so on—is outdated. All national economies participate in international trade regimes (like the North American Free Trade Agreement) or are subject to monitoring organizations like the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund, to name just a few. Furthermore, nationstates are integrated into international regimes like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, or the United Nations (UN). So instead of insisting on the continued role of the nation-state in such a context, some authors advocate a model of cosmopolitan governance, bringing Condorcet’s ideal into the 21st century. Are such calls plausible? Some argue that institutions of international trade coupled with the institutions of the United Nations and its bodies and charters, and the many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which now work on an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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international level (making them into INGOs), provide us with instances of a global or world government that would make the cosmopolitan ideal a realistic option for the first time in human history. However, if we subscribe to the cosmopolitan ideals of individual emancipation and autonomy (rather than simply accept the cosmopolitan fact of our lives), should we really embrace the global sphere, as we know it? Can we really hold that we can lead self-determined lives in such a global sphere? For liberals, self-determination is intimately tied to the political makeup in which we lead our lives, namely to the democratic nature of the polity. Democracy implies that we can actually influence the political decisions that affect our lives—and it is debated in the literature to what extent we actually can achieve this on the level of international institutions. Most international organizations are built on the nation-state model—it is national governments that agree on and ratify international treaties and resolutions. For individual citizens to actually have a voice in these deliberations is rare—particularly considering that international topics hardly ever make it onto electoral platforms of political parties, leaving citizens in the dark about their candidate’s position on international topics. So how can we have democratic input? Some believe that the existence of NGOs, like Amnesty International or Greenpeace, points to an emerging cosmopolitan civil society through which

The increasing presence of UN soldiers—such as these two patrolling the Green line in Cyprus—is an example of a developing sense of global governance. (Corel)

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citizens can achieve democratic self-determination. But to really make a difference as a member of an NGO, their representational clout would have to be significantly increased because today the organizational structure of international bodies is based, as we know, on the representation of the nation-state. To tackle this, proposals have been made to the effect that we should actually install a second chamber at the United Nations in which, for example, NGOs, INGOs, and ethno-cultural minorities could be represented. Until any such changes occur, however, the sphere of international organizations will remain dominated by nation-states and their governments. But what about the main claim? Is it true, as liberal nationalists hold, that the relevance of national identity lies in the fact that it promotes solidarity and trust among our compatriots, both feelings we need to be able to enjoy the fruits of the democratic welfare state? Do we have a cosmopolitan sense of identity, and if so, does it perform the same role as national identity? There are today, of course, genuine transnational identities that are detached from national (e.g., French) or regional (e.g., European) units but grounded in the individual sense of belonging to the global community—people who identify with global concerns like human rights and the protection of the global environment. If members of Greenpeace protest against resource exploitation in the Arctic, they don’t perceive themselves as particular nationals, but rather as members of an international movement taking issue with the destruction of our global environment. And to be sure, we can think of other issue-specific transnational identities. Even if we agree, however, that such identities exist, and as much as we would wish for more international thinking along these lines, the question remains to what extent can these identities replace the vital role played by national identity? Can we really assume that issue-specific international identities can forge a collective political subject that will enable us to sustain collective action over long periods of time? This seems to be the main challenge to cosmopolitanism. As we have seen, liberal nationalists make arguments for liberal nations based on their concern with individual identity and autonomy. This identity, so the argument goes, derives some of its value from its ties to the national project: in sharing in a national identity, we share in something bigger and potentially more worthwhile than our individual lives can achieve. In that sense, national identity provides us with the opportunity to transcend our limited personal lives. And since national identity has such a strong pull on us, we are willing to do things for our nation that we would not necessarily do for others. Put otherwise, we feel a sense of belonging to our national community that is not equaled by any other community membership we may have. Therefore, we are willing enough to pay taxes to keep the overall infrastructure of the nation intact, but furthermore, we also agree to pay taxes to support those less well-off in our midst. We show a sense of social cohesion, trust, and solidarity with our compatriots. Could we achieve this in a cosmopolitan world? The emergence of issue-specific transnational identities may explain why Greenpeace members are willing to make sacrifices for the environment around the world, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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but it doesn’t explain why Greenpeace members should be willing to make sacrifices for, say, ethno-cultural minorities around the world, particularly those, like the Inuit in Canada, who demand the right to engage in practices potentially harmful to the environment. To put this simply, why should members of Greenpeace stand up for the Inuit if they engage in whale hunting? Democracy, however, demands that we work out solutions to our conflicting interests and so works best when there is some sort of common identity, which transcends these conflicting interests. This point is highlighted if we take debates surrounding immigration as an indicator of what we feel we ought to give to our compatriots, compared to what we feel we owe to others. While most countries make distinctions between refugees and immigrants, there is a clear sense that what we owe to “our own” (in social support, healthcare, education, etc.) is different from what we ought to give to the rest of the world. This may be very much to the dismay of cosmopolitans in that it privileges those living in the national boundaries compared with those somewhere else. And nothing postulates that this is how it will remain forever. However, neglecting the realities of life in thinking about the world would be just another instance of theoretical blindness toward the facts of the world. In conclusion, nationalism has certainly led to many historical ills, which is why Einstein so clairvoyantly condemned it as a disease. However, to neglect the drive toward a communal identity entirely and to advocate instead a cosmopolitan creed seems to put us on par with Condorcet’s high-minded yet endearingly naive ideas. Instead of engaging in wishful thinking, some liberal political theorists have therefore engaged in a project to design a framework of “liberal nationalism.” Their proposals are challenged by those who, both from a normative and empirical perspective, argue that the idea of the nation and its state as the organizing principles of our world is obsolete. Both claims certainly have their merits, but both also have serious shortcomings. It remains a task for political theory, therefore, to fine-tune its analytical tools to be in a position to appropriately grasp the state of our world, with both its national and cosmopolitan forces. Selected Bibliography Archibugi, D., and D. Held. 1995. Cosmopolitan Democracy—An Agenda for a New World Order. London: Polity Press. Canovan, M. 1996. Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Held, D. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ignatieff, M. 1994. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. London: Vintage. Kohn, H. 1944. The Idea of Nationalism. New York: Macmillan. Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W., and C. Straehle. 1999. “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States and Minority Nationalism.” European Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 1: 65–88.

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Lu, C. 2000. “The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism.” Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 2: 244–267. Mill, J. S. 1991. On Liberty and Other Essays. Edited by John Gray. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, M. 2000. “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” In For Love of Country? edited by J. Cohen. Boston: Beacon Press. Plamenatz, J. P. 1976. “Two Types of Nationalism.” In Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, edited by E. Kamenka. London: Edward Arnold. Smith, A. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell. Tamir, Y. 1993. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tan, K.-C. 2004. Justice without Borders—Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, J. 2000. “What Is Cosmopolitan?” Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 2: 227–243.

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Diaspora and Nationalism Stéphane Dufoix Relevance Talking about nationalism implies drawing a line between Us and Them, the nation being a commonly shared circle of land, people, and history surrounded by a periphery composed of all the other lands, peoples, and histories. The nation is inscribed within strict boundaries separating it from the rest of the world. The inside is national; the outside is not. The more homogeneous the inside, the more united and the more true the nation. In this respect, the coincidence between the land and the people functions as an indicator of the limits of the nation. Though an ideal one, this view was fundamental in the age of nation-building: once the nation-state was established, it contained the right population on the right portion of land, with the exception of possible irredentist claims. Everything that contradicted this vision was treated as an anomaly, be it the presence of nationals abroad or the presence of foreigners within. As it could already be read in Plato’s Laws, going abroad is as dangerous to the purity of the city as letting foreigners in. In either case, any relationship with the exterior had to be seriously monitored, if not strictly forbidden, for contact with foreign people or foreign lands was seen as a kind of pollution. But there was one important exception: this contact would be favored if it could benefit the nation, for instance, by adding new territories to it. Therefore, displacement toward other lands and the presence abroad of “national” populations historically belonged to two completely different experiences: colonization on the one hand, in which the link to the metropolis was organized around the idea of empire and of domination by the state of those distant lands, as well as of the indigenous populations living there; and individual or collective emigration, on the other hand, for which the upholding of a link with the metropolis was, most of the time, subordinated to the existence of a “spirit of return” to the homeland, as though physical and temporal distance from the home territory was tantamount to affective distance from the nation itself and to the probable weakening of the allegiance to the state. In the first case, the nation expands. In the second, it loses subjects. In 19th-century German states, if a citizen emigrated and did not return before 10 years, he was considered as having renounced his citizenship and was deprived of it. This latter example was not an isolated case at the time, and we can still see traces of this national reluctance concerning distance. Most democratic countries established differences among their own citizens, depending on whether they resided on national territory or abroad. Even the countries of emigration that strived N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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to maintain a formal link with their emigrants—generally through the implementation of a strong right of blood ( jus sanguinis), which almost prevented any possibility of renouncing one’s citizenship once and for all—at the same time denied those emigrants the capacity to accomplish from abroad such important duties of citizenship as the right to vote, thus making them second-rank citizens due to their spatial distance from the homeland. Historical evidence shows that the opportunity for expatriate citizens to vote from abroad was offered rather late in some Western democracies, such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For a long time, distance and dispersion from the homeland, materialized in the form of a state or not, were incompatible with the normal existence of a nation; the scattering of a whole people was a terrible curse, while dispersed life was seen as a provisory situation until return to the land could occur. This view has only recently changed. Nowadays, expatriate populations are more and more integrated into the national landscape. Two forms of a link between the inside and the outside may be elaborated: a struggle from outside to make the land the territory of a nation or of the real nation, and actions by the authorities and/or by “national” communities living abroad to construct, transform, or maintain a link keeping together all parts of the nation. If one wants to study the relationship between the definition of the nation and the physical distance from the land considered as being precisely the crucible of the nation, one has to draw a difference between two types of situations. In the first case, the definition of the nation is at stake in a conflictual context linked to a war of independence, a war against the occupation of the land by a foreign power, or the claim by groups living outside the boundaries that the home regime is illegitimate. In those cases, as long as no significant opposition is able to develop in the country, the truth of the nation is abroad. The fight for the expected result (i.e., acceding to independence, regaining self-determination, or overthrowing the illegitimate regime) is mostly in the hands of politically active people living in foreign countries. Usually, this situation is known as exile, and we have recently described as exile polities the trans-state national political fields formed by the collaboration and also sometimes concurrence between these groups. Anti-Franco Spaniards, anticommunist East European exiles, antiCastroist Cubans, Tibetans struggling for a return to independence, Kurds, Tamils, and Palestinians advocating for the creation of a new state for a stateless people: the list could be long of all those populations for which the true spirit of the nation was living abroad for some time before it could eventually find a place, or find it again, with the establishment or reestablishment of an independent state, or a political change. True Poland, real Cuba, Tibet, or Palestine only have a political existence in the hearts and in the actions of people living far away from their national land. In the second case, there is no challenge to the political legitimacy to the regime: the expatriates are not exiles fighting from abroad for self-determination, the liberation of the country, or a political change. They are mere migrants, or N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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sons and daughters of migrants, who, despite their distance to the national territory, want to be integrated into a broader definition of the nation or become objects of such a redefinition within the framework of a state policy directed toward nationals abroad. Some recent evolutions tend to show that a de-territorialized logic is increasingly being added to the previous territorial logic of the nation. Transformations of dual nationality and dual citizenship laws, of external voting, of political representation of citizens living abroad, and more generally, of public policies directed toward national populations abroad correspond to a large process in which home states, host states, but also trans-state mobilizations by migrants are involved. Examples of such policies through which states attempt to organize their relationship to the scattered parts of the nation and to breathe life into this link are numerous all around the world: Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, India, Italy, Greece, Eritrea, Australia, Kenya, Mexico, Armenia, Nigeria, and Colombia, to cite but a few. If not always contradictory, these two forms may seem to stand at opposite ends of the spectrum. Yet, the evolution of the word “diaspora” for a few decades has encompassed them, as though they were identical. “Diaspora” is now used to describe exile polities as well as any national group away from the homeland. In a sense, this shift is logical because both phenomena ask a single question: what are the spatial limits of the nation? Yet, merging both situations may result in confusion of the issues. It is therefore compulsory to understand why “diaspora” has come to such a crucial role in the vision of a nation that is no longer confined to territorial limits.

Origins If thinking about “diaspora and nationalism” is in fact thinking about “distance and nationalism,” the word “diaspora” cannot just be cast away as though it were not important. On the contrary, the evolutions of its uses are fundamental to anyone trying to understand changes in nationalism issues since the 1960s. Diaspora is an ancient Greek word that was first used in the Greek translation (known as the Septuagint) of the Hebrew Bible in the third century BC, in which it described the divine punishment Jews would endure (i.e., their dispersion throughout the world) if they would not respect the law of God. Until the 1960s, this old word was mostly limited to the religious realm. It was most often applied to Jews, but also to Catholics and Protestants with the meaning of “religious minority.” Moreover, as it stemmed from the Jewish experience, it carried the weight of a negative reputation: “diaspora” meant exile and persecution. From the 1960s onward, new developments have occurred and the word has acquired a much more positive meaning without yet replacing the negative one. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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As compared with its earlier uses marked by religious (Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant) history, it has undergone a progressive secularization, with more and more nonreligious uses becoming acceptable in the social sciences. Another intellectual factor favored this transformation. On the one hand, scholarly works began addressing the issue of the “survival” or of the “upholding” of African cultures in the New World, thus giving the opportunity for populations who were often discriminated against because of the color of their skin to see themselves as having a history and to build bridges with Africa. Another factor in the making of a more positive vision of “diaspora” came from the evolution of the link between the state of Israel and world Jewry. Of course, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 resulted from the Zionist refusal of a Jewish existence dispersed among the nations. Yet, the fact that a million Jews refused to migrate to Israel despite the Law of Return, while at the same time claiming their “particular attachment” to the fate of this country, gave credit to the opinion that the boundaries of a nation were not necessarily the territorial boundaries. “Diaspora” became a positive notion. This possibility of an ethno-national link between a territorial center and dispersed communities combines with the increasing theoretical and empirical recognition of potentially plural ethnic or cultural identities to generate a split in the meaning of “diaspora.” From the end of the 1960s, it could be used in reference to very different phenomena. It could mean the dispersion of a people without a state (the Armenian or the Palestinian diaspora), a community of people sharing the same origin though not being citizens of the state they feel close to (the Jewish diaspora), or a broad cultural community sharing the belief in a common origin without any relationship to a center at all (the black or African diaspora). From the early 1960s onward, the original cultural identity of migrants was no longer considered something that was bound to disappear. This important change in the interpretation of identity gave rise to multicultural programs and policies in some Western states (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada) and fostered new, plural theories of ethnicity, taking into account the fact that living in a territory did not necessarily mean keeping a one-and-only relationship to its culture. Moreover, in parallel, some philosophical, anthropological, and sociological theories (post-structuralism, postmodernism, cultural studies, etc.) emerged from the late 1960s. They were characterized by the ambition to deconstruct the notions of unity and oneness to concentrate on multiplicity and to condemn the notion of center to concentrate on the periphery. By doing this, they granted a particular importance to the ideas of space and spatialization, thus making it possible for dispersion to be a different rather than a pathological mode of being in the world. This new vision quickly fitted with the discovery in the 1980s that the world was becoming increasingly global. Taking into account new opportunities to connect people and groups beyond state boundaries, the network became the key notion to understanding the contemporary world. This trend was confirmed by the irruption of new technologies for information and communication (fax machines, mobile phones, and especially, the Internet). In N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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this context, “diaspora” happened to be the right word at the right time. This new insistence on space, on link, and on the potential multiplicity of identities quite naturally met the word and made it a fundamental entry into the new world. But the process of globalization is far from being uniform in its consequences. As the political scientist James Rosenau and the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman have separately demonstrated, instead of favoring homogenization, globalization rather tends to juxtapose two opposite dimensions: a state dimension and a nonstate dimension, the dimension of travel and the dimension of origin, or to put it in the words of the anthropologist James Clifford, the juxtaposition of “routes” and “roots.” As we saw earlier, the acquired polysemy of “diaspora” authorized it to describe centered as well as centerless relationships. “Diaspora” thus became a word capable of describing the world of the past as well as the contemporary world, the state as well as the network, what is out of date as well as what is forthcoming. Finally, the affinity between the word “diaspora,” with all its stratified meanings, and the multifaceted transformations of the worlds of identity and space and their interpretation in the social sciences made it possible for the word to go beyond a mere conceptual use. Imported from the social sciences by community leaders, civil servants, journalists, and Web masters, this practical use resulted in its increasing capacity to embrace more and more populations and situations. Now having become a “global word” that fits the “global world,” it may be used without any precaution or definition. Its conceptualization made it available for politicians and statesmen; its use even became institutionalized within the framework of state policies, “diaspora” being increasingly used as the very name of national populations or populations of national origin living abroad. Whereas the notion of “ethnic group” can define the common particularities of a population living in one territory, the notion of “diaspora” made it possible to define a community all over the world. If we concentrate more precisely on the link between “diaspora” and “nationalism” in the social sciences, we can notice that it was hardly mentioned before the second half of the 20th century. If C. A. Macartney, in his National States and National Minorities (1934), described the Gypsies as a people “which, however, unlike all the others, has never attempted to found a state of its own, but has been content, it appears, to live in an eternal diaspora,” he was an isolated case before Arnold Toynbee granted a greater importance to diaspora peoples in his Study of History (1934). The study of the relationship between diaspora and nationalism really took shape in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. In an article titled “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” published in the American Political Science Review in 1976, John Armstrong was certainly one of the first scholars to seriously examine the role of diaspora, which he defined as “any ethnic collectivity that lacks a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., is a relatively small minority throughout all portion of the polity.” One year later, Hugh Seton-Watson, in his Nations and States, wrote a section devoted to “diaspora nations.” Experts in nationalism studies, such as Anthony Smith or Benedict AnderN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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son, often referred to Jewish, Armenian, and Greek attempts at building a state of their own in terms of “diaspora nationalism.” As a sign that distance was not contradictory with nationalism any more, the historian Benedict Anderson coined in the mid-1990s the phrase “long-distance nationalism” to signal the current acceleration of an older phenomenon: identification to a nation arising from confrontation with others and from the risk of seeing one’s particularity diluted. In this respect, nationalism would in some way be born out of exile. Transnationalization linked to the development of postindustrial capitalism not only favors migrations but also the organization by migrants and their descendants of some kind of relationship to their country of origin, sometimes even influencing homeland policies so that the latter may take into account their presence abroad.

Dimensions Considering the distinction that we established at the beginning between exile communities and communities living abroad, it may seem at first glance that their experiences are completely opposite from one another. Yet, the major axes of their link to the homeland belong to the same broad categories. We can identify two of them, for which we’ll show the differences for the two aforementioned subgroups: the importance of time and space, and the question of the political legitimacy of the populations abroad. Physical distance from the homeland logically implies a specific relationship to space, but, as the sociologist Norbert Elias demonstrated, space cannot be dissociated from time. Being away in space also means being away in time. In this respect, exiled polities and expatriate communities resemble each other. Away from the land, they also live in a different time, since their host countries or countries of residence possess their own national time. There is nevertheless a great difference between exile and expatriate communities as far as this relationship to time and space is concerned. Whereas expatriate communities generally have the possibility of keeping contact with both the space and time of the homeland, the exile cannot afford this contact and most often refuses it because he considers any physical contact with the territory they are fighting for to represent the recognition of the present situation. For instance, people who have fled their country for fear of persecution because of their political opinions and who have been granted refugee status must accept that they cannot go back to the homeland. If they do, they will officially not be recognized as refugees any more. That dimension of exile is fundamental. Exile polities can only develop if they organize a symbolic suspension of time and space, as though neither were linked to the homeland any more. By doing this, exiles justify a struggle that is bound to last until they return to the homeland. They also run the risk of totally disconnecting N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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themselves from the homeland, since going back will expunge that vital aspect of their political identity. In his book Imagined Communities (1983), Benedict Anderson insisted on the role that the invention of printing played in the diffusion of nationalism: identical words could then be read by different people in distinct places, thus building a bridge between them and potentially synchronizing their spirits in a single realm. The development of nation-states resulted in the formation of national temporalities binding people together: time and space coincided. During the modern period, every distance in space was therefore a distance in time, that is, a distance to the nation. The period that witnessed the rise of electronics and information science has been labeled “late modernity,” “second modernity,” or “hypermodernity” precisely because space has progressively become more and more independent of time. The consequences of such a revolution are obvious as far as the upholding of a link to the nation is concerned. It has now become possible for distant people to communicate almost instantaneously via e-mails, mobile phones, chat rooms, portals, etc. The so-called new technologies of information and communication allow migrants not to live their situation merely as a “double absence,” neither here nor there, as the French sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad put it a decade ago, but rather as a potential “double presence,” here and there, because even these words have lost part of their meaning. The Internet is obviously the most important medium for this development of potential ubiquity. Governmental sites giving expatriates as much information as possible about their rights or about the internal evolution of the country, or ethno-national portals designed by migrants or their descendents, instill continuity and instantaneity into the relationship established among state representatives and “diaspora” representatives. The creation of an Internet site devoted to this purpose is now of the very first claims by expatriates. As a matter of fact, the recent creation (2002) by the Eritrean government of a specific institution in charge of contact with Eritreans abroad was immediately accompanied by a Web site project as well as the construction of a database. Such core sites established by states like India, Armenia, Greece, Italy, and so on, cohabit with other Web sites, the purpose of which is to connect the various poles of the periphery. Similarly, exile polities, too, take advantage of the lobbying, diffusion, and connection opportunities offered by the Internet. In 1996, a Burmese militant from the University of Wisconsin campaigned for democracy in Burma on his Free Burma Coalition site, which led the U.S. Congress to put the issue of economic sanctions against the Rangoon regime on the agenda. Most exile organizations, be they Sikh, Kurdish, Tamil, or others, make these sites powerful political platforms and even, sometimes, the very place of their political alternative. Some years ago, one could read the following on the first page of the Sikh site (www.khalistan.com): “Welcome to the sovereign cyberspace of Khalistan!” Besides the relationship between time and space, the issue of legitimacy is the second important axis. Earlier, we saw that, from a traditional vision, people N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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were considered weaker and less reliable the farther they were from the land. If the legitimacy of distance is ever recognized, in the case of political struggle from abroad, for instance, it seldom survives the contact between the nation and the land again. The role of exile in the birth or in the return of the nation is often forgotten, if not denied. Algerian nationalism was born in France among Algerian immigrants during the interwar period, and France remained the crucible of nationalism even during the Algerian War. Yet, after independence in 1962, that fact was obliterated, whereas the national soil and the struggle of Algerians in Algeria was highlighted. It took almost 20 years before the real history started to be told. When the definition of the real nation was not at stake, national populations living outside the frontiers would not be considered deserving of much attention for a long time. In the 19th century, the national territory was the container of the nation, citizenship as such was only taking shape as a matter of international law, and emigrants used to be seen by the home state as lost citizens. The recognition that diplomatic protection of citizens residing abroad was part of the duties of the state only started at the end of the 19th century, but it seldom gave birth to actual positive policies directed toward them. There was a shift from indifference or abstention to the implementation of a policy of attention toward expatriates from the 1960s to the 1970s onward. Three domains are affected by these policies: dual nationality, external voting, and political representation, each one representing a further step in the recognition of expatriates’ importance for the nation. If we first look at citizenship, we can notice that a major change occurred around the 1960s, driving more and more countries to at least tolerate dual nationality. In 2001, 92 countries in the world allowed, implicitly or explicitly, some form of multiple citizenship. To take an example, only 2 out of the 19 Latin American—Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking —countries recognized dual nationality before the 1980s: Uruguay (1919) and Panama (1972). Throughout the last 30 years, 8 others voted for provisions in this domain, 6 of them during the 1990s (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico). The same acceleration process took place on all continents, often following waves of access to independence. Out of the 14 nonSpanish- and non-Portuguese-speaking countries of Central and South America, 9 of them recognize dual nationality, and out of those 9, 8 of them recognized it just after their independence (from the early 1960s until the end of the 1980s). Many of the countries that allowed their citizens to retain their nationality in the last 30 years had earlier been part of empires, and significant portions of their population had migrated to and settled in the metropolis or in other regions of the empire. Such nationality policy was therefore crucial in the national project. Contrary to a commonly held view, dual nationality and dual citizenship are different things. The latter implies full access to political rights, including voting from abroad, which is not the case with the former. Often neglected, this issue is crucial. At the end of the 20th century, only about 60 states had legal provisions allowing external voting (i.e., gave their citizens residing abroad the possibility to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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vote without going back to their home country). Interestingly, the most ancient democracies refused this possibility until recently: Australia admitted it in 1901, France just after World War II, the United States in 1975, the United Kingdom in 1985, and Canada in 1993! It seems that there is now an increasing trend, but the introduction of external voting can be explained by national peculiarities rather than by the waves of democratization of the 20th century. Finally, a few countries went so far as to allow citizens abroad to vote for their own representatives. Only three European countries have chosen to do so: France, Portugal, and, recently, Italy. The latter case is particularly interesting. The Berlusconi government formed in June 2001 included a ministry for Italians abroad. It was headed by Mirko Tremaglia who had parliament adopt the law allowing Italians to vote from abroad and notably to elect 12 deputies and 6 senators. In one of history’s frequent ironies, it was precisely the Italian vote from abroad that sealed Berlusconi and Tremaglia’s defeat in the April 2006 general elections by electing 4 pro-Prodi senators and thus giving the Unione Party a majority in the senate. “Diaspora” has certainly become the most common name used in political discourses to encompass all national, or of national origin, populations living abroad. Contrary to what is usually considered the definition of nationalism, diaspora helps to identify a group without—and not within—its boundaries. The emotional dimension implied by the opportunity to be in direct connection, more or less formally, with the homeland makes “diaspora policies” rather popular, inside and outside the country. “Diaspora” is much more inclusive than such former denominations as “citizens abroad” or “nationals abroad” for it keeps the idea alive that the nation is a family and that distance does not really matter. Giving a specific name—and especially diaspora—to populations abroad shows the particularity to create the group in question rather than only describing it. The philosopher John Austin decades ago insisted on the performative dimensions of speech: language sometimes does what it says. When we say “I swear,” we indeed do it through speech. I want here to insist on another potential dimension of speech, what I call its formative dimension. When a politician or the leader of an organization says “our diaspora numbers 2 million people,” he does not only count dispersed people but he makes them a single group; he contributes to forming the group he only pretends to describe. That dimension insisting on primordial ties is symbolically important to the general framework of nationalism, but it sometimes hides other interests, most often economic ones, as can be seen in the cases of China and India. In the 1970s, both countries shifted from a policy of abstention (even encouraging their expatriates to integrate abroad) to a policy of attention favoring financial investment from abroad to accelerate the modernization of the country. This policy has proven to be successful in China, since it is estimated that 70 percent of the foreign direct investment (FDI) in this country comes from overseas Chinese. It represented a total $26.8 billion between 1979 and 1991 (Thorpe 2002, 8–9). It reached N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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around $40–45 billion per year between 1997 and 2001, and even rose to $72 billion in 2005, thus making China the first country in the world in terms of FDI received (UNCTAD 2006, 51). The beginnings of the Indian policy follow the same path. In the late 1970s, the government created the category Non Resident Indians (NRIs) and offered facilities for investing and setting up businesses in India. The relative failure of this policy, the fact that expatriates claimed a stronger link to the homeland, and the coming to power of the nationalist Hindu party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), all account for the launching of a broader policy in the late 1990s. In 1999, this policy created the PIO (Person of Indian Origin) scheme, giving the possibility even to former Indian citizens to return without a visa. In 2001, an official report drew the lines of that new policy, insisting on an ethnic definition of the nation and on the economic importance of expatriates at the same time. However, success is not certain because the Indian population, inside or outside the country, is fragmented along four lines that still remain predominant: religion, language, region of origin, and caste. Today we see evidence of more and more nation-states trying to include expatriates and people of national origin into the definition of the nation. Also, an

Indian government ministers assemble during the fifth Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indian Conference) in New Delhi, January 8, 2007. During the annual gathering of Non Resident Indians (NRI), the government seeks to tap the Indian diaspora’s expertise, experience, and capital for balanced economic development of the country. (Raveendran/AFP/ Getty Images)

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increasing number of ethnic organizations abroad claim the creation of better links with the homeland. Yet, this trend also gives way to a few backlashes. The greatest one is the accusation of disloyalty aimed at expatriates on the grounds that they live away from the homeland. Nowadays, disloyalty is often replaced by lack of confidence. It is often estimated that expatriates would be better citizens if they lived in the country rather than abroad. So, Ireland and Greece do not have any provision on external voting, even though their rates of citizens residing abroad are certainly the highest among the countries of the European Union, precisely because they fear domestic politics could be influenced by people not living in the country. The second backlash is the risk of exaggerated primordialism. The development of policies of return that allow any returnee of national origin to recover his/her citizenship often coincides with a noninclusive nationality law in the country, thus preventing foreigners and minorities from ever being part of the national community. Such is the case in Israel, Greece, Italy, Estonia, and Germany. The primordial tie is seen as the base of the nation; “diaspora” may then be part not of a national but of a nationalist framework proclaiming the idea of a closed—as pure as possible—national identity. Logically, however, such policies may be strongly resented in countries where great numbers of dual nationals live. As a matter of fact, their loyalty to the host country may be suspected in times of military crisis (during both world wars for instance) or in times of identity crisis, an example of the latter being Samuel Huntington’s reflections on the dilution of American identity due to the rise of dual nationality.

Consequences Globalization is very often interpreted as the end of the nation-state because state boundaries cannot function as walls of the national container any more. The emergence of many flows, financial, economic, informational, and human, has made them porous. But this porosity is not necessarily to the detriment of the state, for trans-state phenomena are not necessarily nonstate phenomena. Evidence shows that states also go through a “trans-statization” of themselves. If the globalization process is an open spatialization of economic, political, cultural, and social relations, it also encompasses state capacities to go beyond their borders. The evolutions that have taken place in some countries for the last 30 years certainly point out that the relation of the state, as a historical political form, to space and distance is changing; being “out of sight” is not tantamount to being “out of mind” any more. The nation extends its limits beyond state borders, and the very definitions of nation and nationality are being transformed since not only citizens abroad, but also former citizens or descendents of former citizens, still belong to the nation. Arjun Appadurai called these new entities “transN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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nations,” but this term does not show that many nations live beyond state borders; I would rather call them “trans-state nations.” This new paradigm has certainly never been more clearly presented than by Mexican president Ponce de Leon in a discourse before the Mexican Federal Congress in May 1995: “The Mexican nation goes beyond the territory contained by its borders. Therefore an essential element of the ‘Mexican national program’ will be to promote the constitutional and legal amendments designed for Mexicans to retain their nationality” (quoted in Vargas 1996, 3–4; italics added for emphasis). One might think, considering the examples given so far, that the insistence on national “diasporas” is the prerogative of nonindustrialized and non-Western countries. That was certainly true until recently. There is recent evidence of evolution in this respect. For instance, an official Summit of European Diasporas that gathered the representatives of 24 European states was held in June 2003 in Thessalonica at the initiative of the Greek foreign ministry. Its aim was to raise awareness on this issue and “to focus attention on the importance of Europe’s diasporas, the role they can play in EU policy development, and to begin a process that will lead to stronger EU-diaspora ties” (Summit of European Diasporas 2003, 2). Moreover, the 2004 comparative study report issued by the European Confederation called “Europeans throughout the World,” sponsored by the European Commission, called for the inclusion by any European Union (EU) member state of legal provisions concerning national election voting rights for any citizen living abroad: There is a need for the Member States and the EU institutions to formally recognise in all appropriate instruments, the solidarity with expatriate European citizens, wherever they are found in the world and to fully recognise the resource: economic, cultural, educational, social, linguistic . . . which the expatriates represent for the countries and for Europe. (European Confederation 2004, 39)

For their part, Australian authorities, too, have engaged in exploring opportunities of building stronger bridges with their “diaspora,” thus slightly changing the definition of the country itself, making it not only a country of immigration but also a country of emigration. This recognition of the place expatriates occupy in the frame of the nation can even go further when people of national origin come to be included in the definition of the “diaspora.” Besides the Indian case with the PIO scheme and the enforcement of an Overseas Citizenship of India since December 2, 2005, the Irish and Armenian cases are emblematic of this trend. Mary Robinson, president of the Republic of Ireland from 1990 to 1997, played a prominent role in this acknowledgment of the “Irish diaspora,” most notably in her “Cherishing the Irish Diaspora” discourse of February 3, 1995, before the two chambers of the Parliament: Four years ago I promised to dedicate my abilities to the service and welfare of the people of Ireland. Even then I was acutely aware of how broad that term the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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people of Ireland is and how it resisted any fixed or narrow definition. One of my purposes here today is to suggest that, far from seeking to categorize or define it, we widen it still further to make it as broad and inclusive as possible. (Robinson 1995)

The current Article 2 of the Irish Constitution, modified by referendum in May 1998, specifically states that “the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.” The Armenian case is an interesting example of a shift from exile polity, as long as the Republic of Armenia was a Soviet Republic, to an expatriate community from the Armenian independence in 1991 onward. The most important feature of the diaspora policy of the Armenian Republic is the organization of Armenia-Diaspora conferences that gather representatives of the state and of the Armenian communities in the world. Three of them actually took place in 1999, 2002, and 2006. Their findings did not result in the immediate acceptance of dual citizenship, since the constitutional ban on dual citizenship was not removed before a referendum held on November 27, 2005. Yet, these conferences actually drew the spatial trans-state limits of the Armenian nation, as it is clear from the final decision of the first conference in 1999: All the components of our national entity—the Republic of Armenia, Artsakh and the Diaspora—are interdependent. . . . The Republic of Armenia and its state institutions must necessarily readdress their role in support of the Diaspora’s needs and aspirations. Armenians are Armenian everywhere, and there is no difference as to where they are. They cannot be “odars” [ foreigners] in their homeland, and the Republic undertakes to overcome the Constitutional exclusion of dual citizenship, and to allow each and every Armenian to establish a full presence in his or her homeland. (Armenia-Diaspora Conference 1999)

This short excerpt, as well as the other examples cited above, shows well how globalization and technology have transformed the relationship between those who live inside and those who live outside. The opportunity to create or restore links without taking spatial distance into account allows for original forms of community. Dispersion may not be considered a curse any longer, for the creation of trans-state networks—including states—might well be the form of being together that best fits the world we now, and certainly tomorrow will, live in. About 200 years after the development of classical nationalism that was centered on the exclusive notions of territory, peoplehood, and nationality, an alternative framework and definition of the nation emerged. In this new definition, the inside—the national territory—is intimately connected to the outside—the diaspora—thus giving birth to possible unbound, trans-state nations. This does not mean that the nation-state as such has disappeared or is bound to disappear. Recent technological and intellectual transformations have made it possible to dissociate the nation-state from its “natural” territorial borders and to include N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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kin populations living abroad. The scope of the nation and of nationalism has thus been extended, and “diasporas” are less and less considered social aberrations and have become actors and targets of national policies. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Armenia-Diaspora Conference. 1999. Final Declaration of the First Armenia-Diaspora Conference. September 22–23. Yerevan. (Retrieved June 14, 2007), http://www.armeniadiaspora. com/conference99/text1.html. Armstrong, J. A. 1976. “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas.” American Political Science Review 70, no. 2 (June): 393–408. Austin, J. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon. Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller, and C. Blanc-Szanton. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialised Nation-States. Basel, Switzerland: Gordon & Breach. Bauman, Z. 1998. Globalization. The Human Consequences. London: Polity Press. Clifford, J. 1997. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cohen, R. 1997. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: UCL Press. Curtin, P. D. 1984. Cross-Cultural Trade in World History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dufoix, S. 2003. Les diasporas. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France [to be published in English by the University of California Press in March 2008]. European Confederation. 2004. Democratic Rights of European Expatriates. Comparative Study Report. “The Europeans throughout the World,” 1–56. (Retrieved June 15, 2007), http:// www.viw.be/PDF/ettw%20voting%20rights.pdf. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Huntington, S. 2004. Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster. Jones-Correa, M. 2001. “Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and Its Consequences for the United States.” International Migration Review 35, no. 4 (Winter): 997–1029. Macartney, C. A. 1934. National States and National Minorities. London: Oxford University Press. Robinson, M. 1995. “Cherishing the Irish Diaspora.” Address to the Houses of the Oireachtas, February 2. (Retrieved June 14, 2007), http://www.emigrant.ie/emigrant/historic/ diaspora.htm. Rosenau, J. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sayad, A. 1999. La double absence. Des illusions de l’émigré aux souffrances de l’immigré. Paris: Seuil. Seton-Watson, H. 1977. Nations and States. Boulder, CO: Westview. Shain, Y. 1999. Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Sheffer, G. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Summit of European Diasporas. 2003. Summary Report & Recommendations. June 30: 1–9. Thorpe, M. 2002. “Inward Foreign Investment and the Chinese Economy.” Paper presented at the New Zealand Conference of Economists Annual Conference, Wellington, June 26–28. (Retrieved March 12, 2007), http://www.nzae.org.nz/files/%2346-THORPE.PDF. UNCTAD. 2006. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development. World Investment Report. New York: United Nations. Vargas, J. A. 1996. “Dual Nationality for Mexicans?” Chicano-Latino Law Review 18, no. 1: 1–58.

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Education and National Diversity Cynthia Joseph and Stella Coram “Everyone has the right to education” —Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Relevance This chapter examines the interplay between education and nationalism in the 20th and 21st centuries. The modern educational system emerged at the same time as the creation of the modern nation-state. The goals of the education system are to educate and socialize individuals into society and to create productive and responsible citizens. The educational system is an important social and political institution in the teaching of knowledge and the development of faithful and loyal citizens. The educational system is also a mediator in the organizing and preparation of citizens for their entry into society. During the process, citizenship can be uniform and assumed to be a unitary category as aspects of social differences in relation to class, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, and language can be overlooked in terms of educational policy and practice. In understanding the link between education and nationalism, it is necessary to consider that not all peoples within a nation-state have equal access to social, cultural, and economic resources. There is a tension between the roles of the education system as a mediator of nationalism and the dominant cultural group, on the one hand, and of democracy and cultural differences, on the other. This is an important distinction to make because it highlights the broadness and scope of expectations in education. Multicultural societies such as Britain, Australia, Canada, Singapore, South Africa, Malaysia, and other nations teach diversity and tolerance in education yet educational values are generally linked to one cultural group. For example, educational values in the Australian setting are characteristically British due to the historical context. An English-based education system can exclude citizens socialized to different linguistic and cultural values. In this way, a nationalist program may not always function as a system of unification, especially where there are different cultural and ethnic groups. Education within a nation-state must also be understood within the broader social, economic, and political forces. Significant technological changes and globalization have increased the capacity to obtain, share, or be exposed to different knowledge. Economic and social differences between and within nations also have to be considered in exploring the relationship between education and nationalism. Although there are overlapping issues in the educational policies of nations, the ways in which these policies are put into practice and their outcomes N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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are dependent on the economic and political wealth and strength of the nation both at the nation-state, regional, and global levels. Globalization plays a vital role in understanding education and nationalism in contemporary times. Globalization is generally understood as the global flows of people and goods, ideas, images, and messages, and capital and technologies. Within the contexts of global migration and capital, expanding knowledge and technological developments, the role of education with young people becomes increasingly important. Moreover, such recent events as the London bombings, the Spanish bombings, the Bali bombings, and other post-9/11 events place increasing importance on the role of the nation-state in ensuring an education system that is inclusive of people who identify as culturally different. The goal of education has been to produce disciplined, reliable, and productive citizens who contribute to the economic growth of the nation. In present globalizing times, nation-states formulate education policies and practices within the frameworks of liberalism and capitalism in addition to nationalism. The global market also plays a crucial role in shaping education particularly within Western nation-states. Education becomes associated with social and economic capital. The knowledge worker is now a goal of most nations. The knowledgebased economy, in which educational outcomes based on the knowledgeable worker are emphasized, represents the agenda of transnational agencies or corporations and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. New modes of learning, such as E learning or electronic learning that are emphasized within current education systems match the goals of lifelong learning and the development of the knowledge worker. The knowledge worker is someone who is creative, efficient, analytical, and immersed in lifelong learning. A knowledge worker is also ICT (Information and Communication Technology) savvy. Human capital is now an essential aspect of the education objectives of such transnational and global agencies as the OECD. Individualism and consumerism are also important within such an approach. Education as advocated by the OECD now operates within the global economic framework. Performance indicators are used to assess the success of an education system and that of the individual in the production of a flexible, compliant, and global workforce. At the core is lifelong learning. Workers can expect to change jobs, and to do that, they need to be technically proficient in a number of capacities. This is reflected in the employee flexibility now valued over employee loyalty in the competitive market environment. The national agenda in effect trains workers to compete in putting their skills on the global market. This is directly related to primary education, as education is now about teaching compliance in the preparation of the national and now global workforce. In terms of global market (capital) forces, education plays a central role in the creation of the high-performing professional who is attuned to market forces either as an employee or consumer of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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technologically advanced products. A uniform approach to education is seen as crucial to this process. In examining education and nationalism, it is necessary to understand the role of education nationally. The business of education in schools, colleges, and universities is to pass knowledge on to the next generation. As a major public asset, education policies tend to emphasize social justice, balance, and harmony. While education and official policies might promote such values, the ways in which education works in relation to access and success in education can be contradictory. As discussed earlier, there are tensions within education, in particular the creation of the productive and global citizen, that differ from education based on an inquiring citizen. Education systems aim to address social inequalities that exist within the nation-state so as to ensure that all citizens contribute through meaningful and creative ways that are beneficial to the individual, community, and nation. Education addresses not only national and global imperatives but also the needs of the people of a nation-state. Nationalism in education also increases in importance in the need for unification, particularly after the creation of an independent nation-state such as East Timor. A key starting point in the rebuilding of a society in the wake of political upheaval or a newly created democratic government is education infrastructure. National education systems must also emphasize ethnic or religious differences.

Origins and Dimensions Values and Practices of Education and Nationalism The values and practices of education and nationalism are very much dependent on such factors as the development of the nation, the economic and political stability of a nation, and the global standing of the nation. Global players, such as the United States, Britain, and other European nations, differ significantly in educational policies, priorities, and achievements compared with that of war and conflict-ridden nations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and developing nations, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and the newly independent eastern European nations and other nations. There has been a rise of neoliberalism in educational policies in such Western nations as the United States and Britain. These nations are two of the main players in the global economic competition. Education, in such nations, is used as a social and political tool in the development and maintenance of a highly qualified and flexible workforce to ensure the Western nations’ position in the competitive global marketplace. Education policies and practices within these nations are focused on educational credentialism with an emphasis on academic testing and standards. Schools and educational institutions are seen as market places, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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with parents and students being customers or clients. The educational institutions in these countries are also managed along the lines of commercial enterprises. Standardized curriculum and tests, school choices, and privatization of education provision are some of the characteristics of this new capitalist and competitive-market approach to education. There is also an increased level of bureaucracy that includes surveillance and monitoring with this market model of education. The main focus of education within these nations then becomes the development of skills that are required by students and young people to become economically productive members of the nation. The idea of a well-rounded liberally educated person is no longer significant within such education systems. Individuals are now responsible for their own educational and vocational choices, and the idea of a shared community is no longer important. These markets systems and the competitive examination systems result in inequalities among and within educational institutions. Governments in these Western nations argue that markets, competition, and choices are necessary to prepare students for the global economy. While these nations are the main players within the global education scenario, there are also increasing issues concerning social and economic inequalities within such a market model of education. Not all parents and students have equal access to educational opportunities and pathways. The economic and cultural capital of individuals, families, and communities become the determining factor for educational success. These powerful nations also need to address these issues of inequality amid the competitiveness of the global environment. Australia and New Zealand are Western nations located within the AsiaPacific region. In Australia, the dominant population are descendants of European, namely British and Irish, settlers. Australia is a nation of migrants originally from Europe but now more recently from Asia and Africa, including the Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Of the 20 million people living in Australia, approximately 2 percent of the population are Aboriginals or Torres Strait Islanders—the indigenous peoples of Australia. Some of the challenges of the Australian education system in present times include marketing education, the public and private divide in the schooling system, tertiary education as an entrepreneurial activity, the professionalism of the teaching force, success and access to education for indigenous peoples, and multicultural education. There is tension here because Australian educational practice is founded on diversity and multiculturalism. The philosophy of multiculturalism is reflected in the 1997 Multicultural Policy for Victorian Schools. The role of education in the implementation of multicultural policy is to ensure that racism and prejudice do not hinder individual participation and that all students are assisted to develop skills that will enable them to achieve their full potential. However, multiculturalism has been reduced to celebrations of cultural difference, which serves to strengthen the authority of the dominant culture. Multiculturalism must go beyond mere celebrations of cultural diversity and food N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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festivals, and it must consider how education is used to produce and reproduce social inequalities (Jakubowicz 2002). There is a wide gap between indigenous Australians and mainstream AngloCeltic Australians in education, health, and employment. Indigenous learners favor what is referred to as two-ways learning based on a combination of indigenous and English education. This learning approach emphasizes culturally relevant educational practice. To assimilate into the dominant education system for many indigenous peoples means to displace their values and beliefs. However, to not obtain a (white) mainstream education then limits the opportunities for indigenous people in the main economy. The Australian government and communities have developed various programs and policies to address these social issues of the indigenous communities. Some examples are the Parent School Partnerships Initiatives, focused on early childhood education, improving indigenous outcomes, and enhancing indigenous culture and knowledge in Australian higher education; the Indigenous Youth Mobility Programme; the Sporting Chance Programme (school-based sports academies); and the Indigenous Youth Leadership Programme. The need for culturally relevant educational practices for indigenous peoples is an ongoing challenge for community leaders, policy makers, and politicians. The New Zealand experience provides an example of this. Maori education was segregated. However, Maori schools were closed in 1956 with the beginning of a period of assimilation for consecutive decades where Maori were taught English curriculum. The learning of Maori was not encouraged. New Zealand is home to Pakehas (Europeans), the dominant ethnic group, Maori (the indigenous peoples) who constitute approximately 10 percent of the population, and other ethnic groups, including Indian, Chinese, Tongan, Samoan, Fijian, and more recently, refugees from the Middle East. New Zealand is a bicultural nation, which means that Maori is now an “official” language with the writing of legal documents in English and Maori. The last 20 years has seen significant change, with the integration of Maori language and learning into mainstream schooling. This is seen in the establishment of education initiatives undertaken by Maori such as Maori language nests or preschool (Kohanga Reo), Maori immersion elementary schools (Kura Kaupapa), Maori secondary schools (Kura Tuarua), and Maori tertiary institutions (Whare Wananga). The return of Maori schooling may be significant for a national approach to education in New Zealand. Although it is crucial that Maori continue to be immersed in Maori learning, there are implications for non-English-speaking migrants such that they and their children must learn English and Maori language and culture. The context of nationalism in New Zealand is specific in that it is represented through bicultural values in education. The discussion so far indicates that the cultural and historical contexts of the citizens are important aspects of nationalism and education within each nation-state. Canada is a multicultural Western nation. In Canada, education is the responsibility of each province and territory. Canada’s education system plays a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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major role in the balancing required to maintain healthy roots for the two official linguistic cultures in Canada. In 1999, the Council for Ministers of Education in Canada developed a statement in the Victoria Declaration that summarizes the scope and impact of education in Canada as a lifelong learning process. As with other nations, nationalism and the responsible, creative, and productive citizen are represented in official and education policies. However, the Canadian government places much importance on cultural diversity. Various policies and reports on ethnic groups, such as migrant youth, aboriginal education, as well as education for African Canadians, take into account the importance of cultural diversity in educational practices. There is also the Canadian Council for Multi-Intercultural Education that works on increasing the multicultural dialogue throughout Canada. Education policies and practices in multiethnic Western nations are located within multiple cultural contexts. On the one hand, education is a social and political tool of integration in the development of the responsible, loyal, and productive citizen. Yet there are also challenges in addressing cultural diversity within the education institutions. Nations in the Southeast Asian region have different cultural and historical environments. These nations also vary in their economic and cultural positioning in the global order. Singapore is seen as a globalized nation within this region. Singapore is a multiethnic nation with heterogenous ethnic composition, 76.8 percent Chinese, 13.9 percent Malays, 7.9 percent Indians, and 1.4 percent “Others.” The Singapore education system is a mix of the historical colonial British examination structure and curricula and a contemporary curriculum that focuses on the Singaporean national and cultural identity. The desired outcomes of education in Singapore are an educated citizen who is responsible to his family, community, and country. An important part of this is the Singapore Ministry of Education’s vision of “Thinking Schools, Learning Nation” that was first announced by the then prime minister Goh Chok Tong in 1997. This vision describes a nation of thinking and committed citizens capable of meeting the challenges of the future, and an education system geared to the needs of the 21st century. The Singapore government uses various educational policies and strategies (such as the Thinking Schools, Learning Nation; National Education) in the shaping of a national identity and the management of ethnic diversity. Political and economic wealth is generally within the Chinese collective in Singapore. Success and access to educational opportunities and futures vary along ethnic and class dimensions. Having stated this, there are specific programs within the Education Ministry that address ethnic underachievement. The Malays have generally been “underperforming” in educational institutions. The majority of the Malays in the labor force were concentrated in the lowincome occupations. Yayasan MENDAKI is a self-help group dedicated to the empowerment of the disadvantaged through excellence in education. This council was set up in the 1980s to involve Malay political leaders and the Malay/ N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Muslim community in partnership with the government to devise and implement solutions to assist in uplifting the social, economic, and educational status of this ethnic collective. The partnership between the Singapore Ministry of Education and the political and community leaders of the Malay community has resulted in an increase in the percentage of Malays entering tertiary institutions and in the proportion of Malays holding higher-level and skilled jobs. The proportion of Malay workers holding blue-collar jobs in production and in cleaning and laborer jobs has also declined with this education initiative. While the Singapore government ensures the dominance of the Chinese ethnic collective, there are efforts to ensure that other ethnic groups like the Malays are not disadvantaged to the detriment of the nation’s progress and global standing. Singapore’s neighbor, Malaysia, is also a multiethnic nation with 65 percent Malays, 24.5 percent Chinese, and 7.2 percent Indians. The Malays monopolize the public and government sectors, and the Chinese monopolize the business and corporate sectors. The Indians as an ethnic collective lag behind economically, educationally, and socially compared with the Malays and the Chinese. The Malaysian education system aims to give education to the masses, as is noted in the National Philosophy of Education of Malaysia. However, there is a Malay bias of bureaucracy within the Education Ministry as in all other government sectors due to policies implemented since independence in 1957. The Malaysian government also takes into account the educational needs of the other ethnic groups by ensuring that the dominance of the Malay ethnic collective within the state’s machineries and politics is never threatened. Social and educational inequalities have been created through the vernacular education system comprising government-aided Chinese and Tamil primary schools, community-funded Chinese secondary schools, the national primary and secondary schools, as well as the residential science schools and junior science colleges and the other types of Malaysian schools. These inequalities are further exacerbated at the postsecondary and tertiary education levels. The Chinese ethnic schools are thriving with the economic and cultural backing of the Chinese community. These schools are seen as a great success story both in relation to the Chinese ethnic community and nationally as well. The Tamil ethnic schools are an example of an ethnic education that is a social and educational handicap to the Indian ethnic minority group. The social and political marginalization of the Indian community does not help in the deplorable state of these schools. The small group of 1 percent of the indigenous people continues to be disadvantaged on many levels within the education system. There are also other groups, such as the non-Malay groups of Bumiputeras and the noncitizen migrant workers that are disadvantaged. The residential science schools and junior science colleges for the Malays not only create an ethnic divide but also an intra-ethnic divide, as the Malays who benefit from these well-resourced and funded schools are generally not the Malay poor. Students in these different N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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schools do not have equal opportunities in the acquisition of education and skills needed for social and economic mobility within the Malaysian society. There are also inequalities in terms of physical infrastructures and resources in these different schools. These social injustices within the current education and schooling system are further exacerbated in terms of access and future pathways at the postsecondary and tertiary education levels. Singapore and Malaysia are postcolonial multiethnic nations. The history of colonialism is evident in some of the education practices. However, these countries have successfully developed a national identity that is based on unique cultural and ethnic values and identities. There are dominant ethnic groups in these countries, and it is the agendas of these groups that are embedded within various educational policies and reforms. Minority ethnic groups are considered, but the power is still with the dominant groups. These nation-states also consider both global and national imperatives in their education policies and practices. South Africa is a relatively new independent nation in the global order. South Africa comprises 79.3 percent black Africans, 9.5 percent whites, 8.8 percent coloreds, and the rest Indians or Asians (Gilmour et al. 2006). The education system was used as a political and cultural tool for the propagation of the apartheid South African government between 1948 and 1994. This government’s ideology was that African people and other people of color had no rights or entitlements in the world of white people. There was and still are significant differences, social inequalities, and injustices that run along race, class, culture, and religious lines. One of the major educational goals when the new government came into power in 1994 was to formulate a national education policy. The new government’s priorities were the following: reconstruction of the bureaucracy, governance, and management; the integration of education and training; restructuring of school education; curriculum reforms; early childhood care, adult basic education, and special education; teacher training and education; restructuring higher education; and restoring buildings and physical resources. Education in South Africa is shaped by two major priorities: a postapartheid education providing equal citizenship to all on the basis of national liberation, and a global, macroeconomic agenda of market-led development. Education restructuring in South Africa aims to remove racial discrimination as well as emphasize the development of the skilled and global citizen. The postapartheid education system has been successful in creating elitist, capitalist, and professional groups of black South Africans through its various educational reforms. There are now more South Africans having access to educational resources and future pathways. But South Africa is also at a crossroads, with an increase in the crime rate, unemployment rate, poverty, and HIV/AIDS over these past years. In this respect, the education system has not been successful in dealing with these social inequalities and issues. China has the largest education system in the world. In 2003, there were over 240 million students and 12 million full-time teachers. The Ministry of Education N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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in its 2003–2007 Action Plan for Invigorating Education aims to use education to turn China’s huge population into an abundant human resource for fostering domestic development and international competition in the knowledge economy. Ninety-two percent of Chinese are Hans, and the rest comprise 55 minority nationalities. Ethnic minorities in China form a population of about a million. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China in 1999 stated in its policy that all members of ethnic groups are expected to share the common goals of the nation: unity, modernization, and the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Access and participation to education between these groups also vary. The white paper, National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China (1999), provides insight into the Chinese government’s approach to social, economic, political, and educational issues related to ethnic minorities at the turn of the century. Education in the Chinese context is seen as a vital vehicle in reproducing a national Chinese culture. There are still disparities in terms of social and educational indicators in China that run along lines of ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and regions. China is a nation with a rapidly expanding market economy . The various challenges that Chinese policy makers and educationalists face in present-day China include the need for proficiency in information technology (IT) and English language, the overemphasis of examinations, and heavy student loads within the schooling system. Other challenges include education for migrant children, and the “brain drain” and “brain gain” of Chinese academics. As with other nations, China also considers national and global imperatives in the interplay between nationalism and education, and it must also consider the needs of the minority groups. The Middle Eastern region of Israel and Palestine provide a different picture of the interplay of education and nationalism. Palestine has been occupied for hundreds of years. The religious culture of Palestine is largely Islamic. The Palestinian education system is located within two conflicting nations, Israel and Palestine. Education in Palestine is seen by its peoples and political leaders as being vital for nation-building and achieving a genuine and sustainable peace. Palestinians are very committed to education even though the education system has been affected by the Israeli occupation. The challenges that the Palestine Ministry of Education and Higher Education face in present-day Palestine, as indicated on the ministry’s official Web site, includes the unification of the two systems of education in Gaza and the West Bank, the expansion of school buildings to meet the enormous demand on education, the equipping of schools with needed labs and equipment, the training of teachers, and the development of special programs to meet the different needs of the population. Various educational initiatives have been developed and implemented over the years, such as the curriculum, information and communication technology, special education programs, and teachers training programs. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Israeli education system includes Jewish education (comprising statesecular, state-religious, and ultra-orthodox schools) and non-Jewish education (Arab and Druze schools). The objectives of Israeli schools are to instill national pride in Jewish boys and girls and to integrate these students into the wider society. There are also the Arab schools for mainly Arab students. These different types of schools tend to separate Jewish and Arab societies rather than being agents of social cohesion and inclusion. Some of the challenges facing the Israeli education system as discussed by Israeli educationalists include the gaps between levels of enfranchisement for different groups in Israeli society, the struggle between national unity and pluralism, and teacher training. Educationalist writings on these challenges also highlight the budgetary constraints that are due to the internal and external conflicts from the Arab world. In discussing education and nationalism in the Middle Eastern region, especially in relation to Palestine and Israel, it is necessary to consider the sociohistorical and the political aspects of this region. Different political and cultural stances results in different constructions of the educational systems. Conflict-ridden countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq are currently in war zones. The education systems in these countries are in a deplorable condition due to the lack of physical infrastructure and human resources to support a viable schooling and education system. At one time, education in Afghanistan was highly regarded and attracted students from Asia and the Middle East. However, this

Girls at Samangan School in Afghanistan. (USAID)

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changed with the Taliban regime and various global and internal conflicts that led to the demise of the country’s social, political, cultural, and educational institutions. Reconstruction of the Afghan educational system is far from complete. Issues to do with financial funding, access in rural areas, girls’ education, and the aftermath of these war conflicts continue to pose a great challenge in the nation’s efforts. The U.S.-led occupations, UN sanctions, and internal conflicts have badly affected education in Iraq. Nations located within conflict and war zones have a tremendous task in reconstructing their education and schooling system. Education priorities in such countries would focus on providing basic literacy and numeracy skills to their younger population. Education policies and practices would also focus on developing a viable working force for the nation to progress forward economically and culturally.

Consequences The discussions in the previous sections indicate that there are tensions between official values and practices of education in relation to nationalism. Education has always been a vital tool in the construction of nation and nationalism. Within this framework, it is appropriate to consider whose interests may be served and which groups may be privileged or marginalized in the shaping of a national agenda and, furthermore, the outcomes of education. These are significant issues that have to be considered in the interplay of nationalism and education. Different rates of development must be taken into account in addressing these issues. Western and advanced capitalist nations, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, clearly differ from developed nations in the East Asian and Southeast Asian regions, such as Singapore and Korea. China and India are now considered important players in the global context. Developing nations located within the African continent and eastern Europe, for example, must also be considered. The challenge to nationalism for nation-states must vary significantly, particularly for nations shaped by colonialism and by global forces, including mass migration. It is also important to consider shifting contexts in understanding nationalism. Hypernationalism refers to the increased awareness of national identity following catastrophic events, including such global events as 9/11 and such post-9/11 events as the Bali and London bombings. These events have also intensified ethnic, racial, and religious politics regionally and globally. These events are seen as threats (based on terror) to Western civilization and are linked to national security. The increased fear and insecurity that has resulted from these events have had an impact on nationalism. Corporate globalization is now part of the national objective for economic growth within Western countries and advanced capitalist states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Patriotism, nationalism, and protection of national borders are now important aspects of the U.S. response to 9/11. This form of hypernationalism has the effect of exacerbating fear of cultural and religious diversity. Education is now used as a political tool to reinforce nationalism and hypernationalism. Educational institutions provide a powerful means to maintain the status quo within and beyond nation-states. National values, interests, and knowledge are embedded in education. In turn, educational policies, structures, and processes affect nationalism. Nationalism can serve where unity is needed, yet it can also be oppressive where differences are denied. Selected Bibliography Council of Ministers of Education, Canada. 2003. Framework for the Future. http://www.cmec. ca/publications/CMECReview.en.pdf. Department of Education and Training (DEST), State Government of Victoria. 2005. Multicultural Education–Multicultural Policy: Legislation and Policy for Schools. (Retrieved January 16, 2006), http://www.sofweb.vic.edu.au/lem/multi/mpol.htm. Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DETYA) and the South Australian Department of Education, Training and Employment (DETE). 2001. The Development of Education: National Report of Australia. http://www.dest.gov.au. Dukmak, S. J. 2006. “Palestine’s Education System: Challenges, Trends and Issues.” In Schooling around the World: Debates, Challenges and Practices, edited by K. Mazurek and M. A. Winzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Gilmour, D., C. Soudien, and D. Donald. 2006. “Post-Apartheid Policy and Practice: Education Reform in South Africa.” In Schooling around the World: Debates, Challenges and Practices, edited by K. Mazurek and M. A. Winzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Gumpel, T. P., and A. E. Nir. 2006. “The Israeli Education System: Blending Dreams with Constraints.” In Schooling around the World: Debates, Challenges and Practices, edited by K. Mazurek and M. A. Winzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Henry, M., B. Lingard, F. Rizvi, and S. Taylor. 2001. The OECD, Globalisation and Education Policy. Oxford: Pergamon. Hursh, D. 2005. “Neo-Liberalism, Markets and Accountability: Transforming Education and Undermining Democracy in the United States and England.” Policy Futures in Education 3, no. 1: 3–15. Jakubowicz, A. 2002. “White Noise: Australia’s Struggle with Multiculturalism.” In Working through Whiteness: International Perspectives, edited by C. Levine-Rasky, 107–125. Albany: State University of New York Press. Joseph, C. 2006. “The Politics of Educational Research in Contemporary Postcolonial Malaysia: Discourses of Globalization, Nationalism and Education.” In World Yearbook of Education 2006: Education Research and Policy, edited by J. Ozga, T. Popkewitz, and T. Seddon. London: Routledge. Koh, A. 2004. “The Singapore Education System: Postcolonial Encounter of the Singaporean Kind.” In Disrupting Preconceptions: Postcolonialism and Education, edited by A. HicklingHudson, J. Matthews, and A. Woods. Flaxton, Australia: Post Pressed. Law, W. 2006. “Education Reforms for National Competitiveness in a Global Age: The Experience and Struggle of China.” In Schooling around the World: Debates, Challenges and Practices, edited by K. Mazurek and M. A. Winzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

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Lee, B. 2003. “Education and National Identity.” Policy Futures in Education 1, no. 2: 332–341. Ministry of Education, Singapore. (Retrieved March 21, 2006), http://www.moe.gov.sg. Smith, G. 2003. “Kaupapa Maori Theory: Theorizing Indigenous Transformation of Education and Schooling.” Paper presented at the Kaupapa Maori Symposium, NZARE/AARE Joint Conference, Auckland, New Zealand. (Retrieved September 13, 2006), http://www. kaupapamaori.com. State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Information Office.1999. National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China, white paper. (Retrieved May 15, 2006), http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper.

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Religious Fundamentalism William H. Swatos Jr. Relevance If we are to understand the current relationship between the seemingly conflicting dynamics of globalization and fundamentalism, we need to examine the culture of modernity itself. World-system theorist John Meyer notes, “Modern world culture is more than a simple set of ideals or values diffusing and operating separately in individual sentiments in each society.” Its power “lies in the fact that it is a shared and binding set of rules exogenous to any given society, and located not only in individual sentiments, but also in many world institutions.” These institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Court as well as world financial institutions that make a world economy work (embodied, for example, in the World Trade Center), involve an element of faith; that is, they rest on a belief that what they do is both right and natural (these two conditions are bound together, for example, in the phrase “human rights”). This worldview has not characterized human history taken as a whole, even into our own day. Globalization particularly flies in the face of the belief in absolute nationstate sovereignty—what Frank Lechner terms “institutionalized societalism” —which, ironically, reached its apex as the very capstone of the globalization process that now threatens its undoing. On the one hand, the globe appears as a union of sovereign states, recognized by world institutions as having transcendent integrity. On the other hand, the sovereignty of these states as political actors is circumscribed by a set of principles—a “higher law”—that in fact rests on beliefs generated by specific world orientations that are themselves metaphysical; that is, the principles of global society are generated by accepting some kinds of faith propositions and not others. In general, these propositions reflect Anglo-American utilitarian-pragmatic philosophy, which lacks absolutes and is thus subject to contradiction as circumstances change. Globalization breaks across cultural barriers through finance, media, and transport. Anglo-America is the preeminent global societal actor. English is the language of air traffic control and the Internet. The dollar, mediated by European bourses, is the measure of world economic value. These technical systems, however, do not speak to the “soul”; that is, the human personality seems to have, at some times and for some people more strongly than others, something generally called a “spiritual” dimension. This dynamic is not, however, purely psychological; spirituality involves an element of power. Although each of the Abrahamic faith traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—contextualizes divine power differently, none fails to assert that the presence of God is the presence of power. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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(Although there are also fundamentalist movements within contemporary Hinduism, these are responses to Islamic fundamentalism, which is one of the Abrahamic traditions.) In the global setting specifically, the nature of Abrahamic monotheism coupled with the hegemonic position of Anglo-American “know-how” provides a potential resource for confrontation both within our own society and among societies.

Origins Strictly speaking, the word fundamentalism refers to a specific theological movement that originated in American Protestantism at the beginning of the 20th century. A group of Protestant leaders, concerned about what they considered to be a process of modernism—initially in regard to evolution—that was shaking the foundations of the Christian religion, set forth five “fundamentals” that they considered essential to the Christian faith. People who subscribed to these were subsequently termed—first by their detractors and later by themselves—fundamentalists. When the worldwide religious resurgence of the 1970s gained attention, however, the term fundamentalist was applied in a more extensive fashion. It was now extended to all contemporary religious movements that display what Eugen Schoenfeld has demarcated “exclusive militancy.” In a definition that rivals Roland Robertson’s definition of globalization as “seeing the world as a single place” for simplicity, T. K. Oommen has similarly defined fundamentalism as “text without context.” What this means is that religious texts (or scriptures) that were originally written in a specific historical context, hence social setting, are decontextualized and held to be applicable without regard to local circumstances. At the same time, however, all other competing texts are rejected as having any corresponding claim to truth. It is important to recognize that all fundamentalisms as they are advanced around the globe today are specifically modern products and heterodox faith traditions. This claim is never made by fundamentalists themselves, but it is easily documented by historical surveys of the faith traditions they claim to represent. The majority of those who claim to be Christians do not belong to fundamentalist churches—and never have. The majority of Muslims do not belong to fundamentalist sects of that faith—and never have. The historic creeds to which the majority of those who call themselves Christians do assent are not held by most fundamentalists; the central concerns of fundamentalist Muslims are not the essential “Five Pillars” of Islam. Ultra-orthodox Jews are more orthodox than the Orthodox, which is in fact a contradiction in terms. All religious fundamentalisms as we know them today were constructed during our own time as responses to the modern world-system, which had its beginnings in the 16th century but has come to fruition in the global project that has progressed with increasing certainty since World War II. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Dimensions We will examine three encounters between “the globe” and fundamentalist agendas, none of which can be separated from the joint issues of messiahship and the state of Israel. Although the specifics are different in each case, note that in each there is a significant commonality in the direction of hostilities, whether rhetorical or corporeal, against national political leaders who favor global peace on the basis of a universal value of human worth. Such hostilities originate with people within their own countries who demand acknowledgment of a particularist view of human action based on transcendent realities. In other words, current religiopolitical crises are not so much based on different ideas about God as they are on different claims about how God expects human beings to behave. The American Religious Right “Mixing politics and religion” is not new in the United States or other nations influenced by American thinking. Not only the civil rights and antiwar movements of the recent past but also prohibitionism and abolitionism mixed heady doses of politics and religion. One of the differences between some earlier religiopolitical alliances in the United States and the contemporary Religious Right, however, is the global dimension of our experience. Exactly when this began may be debated for generations to come by historians, but we might profitably start with the 1950s and the “Communist Menace.” At the center of this religious historiography was the newly founded (or refounded) state of Israel. Marxism was laid over against the restoration of Israel as a nation-state as part of a grand theological plan to herald the end of time (the Millennium), the return of Christ, and the judgment of the world. Elaborate explanations, often with increasingly technologically sophisticated visual representations, were constructed to herald a religious end of history. Atomic and hydrogen weaponry only enhanced the cataclysmic drama that would attend Armageddon, the great final battle. Did every Christian American believe this? Certainly not. People did hear enough of the great weapons race of the superpowers, the launching of satellites, and espionage and counterespionage, however, not to dismiss all of it as pure craziness. The 1967 attack on Israel by a coalition of Muslim Arab states further enhanced the fundamentalist argument. Whether true or not, the Arabs were perceived as working with Soviet backing—both philosophically and materially. The Israeli triumph was enthusiastically received throughout the United States. A sudden alliance of good feeling and mutuality came to prevail among liberals, moderates, and fundamentalists. The victory in Israel was taken as an American victory. It justified American principles and served to give a tentative point of unity to a nation otherwise divided over civil rights issues at home and the Vietnam War N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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abroad. As the years passed, this picture changed. Further military conflict in 1973 and Palestinian problems, the dragging on of a settlement, the rise of militant Islam in Iran, battles in Lebanon, and so on, increasingly tried American patience. The fall of the Soviet empire in 1989 without any apparent resolution of the situation in the Holy Land began to make fundamentalist biblical exegesis of prophetic texts less gripping. A new American religious coalition was building over “family values,” and a new missionary thrust to the formerly communist countries had more immediate success. What is often called the Religious Right or (New) Christian Right today emerged in its present form in response to an appeal made by Richard Nixon during his presidency to America’s “silent majority.” Amid the protests of the Vietnam era, Nixon was sure that a silent majority of Americans (sometimes called the “silent generation”) agreed with him and his handling of the situation. Before too many years had passed, a Virginia Independent Baptist pastor with a simply formatted television worship service, Jerry Falwell, had formed a political action group, the Moral Majority, that attempted to move the silent generation at least to send money to allow him to lead the nation to righteousness. The formation of Falwell’s group coincided fairly closely with the election of the nation’s first bona fide “born again” or evangelical president, Southern Baptist Jimmy Carter, but in fact, Falwell’s vision was quite different from Carter’s. The Moral Majority would support tangentially Christian Ronald Reagan, not Carter, in the 1980 presidential election. Ironically, the Religious Right nevertheless gained very little of its specifically religious agenda during the administrations of favored sons Ronald Reagan and the elder George Bush. Although both presidents talked the right language on abortion and school prayer, neither was able to effect any significant changes. The fall of the “evil” Soviet empire may have been hastened by the Reagan-Bush line, but it was so entirely unanticipated in the West that this can hardly have been a major factor. Wise investors used these years to internationalize the American economy even further, rather than the reverse, and China first became a significant economic player in American markets. Reagan and Bush proved virtually powerless to resolve Holy Land crises—indeed, the worst single loss of American lives in the Holy Land, the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, occurred during the Reagan years. Also, the nation was plunged ever further into debt. At the same time, other religious groups, most notably Reform Jews and the religiously unaffiliated, advanced ahead of the Christian fundamentalists into the political-economic elites. Hence, evangelical-fundamentalist Protestants, traditionalist Catholics, and Orthodox Jews formed a loose political alliance that attempted to assert citizen control over local issues. The aim of the “stealth” candidates of the Christian Coalition in the early 1990s, for example, was to place religious conservatives on local boards of education, city councils, and county commissions. And it is certainly the case that George W. Bush’s embrace of “faithbased” programs and “charitable choice” are especially directed toward this N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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constituency rather than the historical Protestant or Catholic mainstream. All post-2004 election evidence indicates that Bush’s second-term election was squarely set upon the foundation of religious conservatism. Islamization Many Muslims would prefer, because of the historically Christian associations of the word fundamentalist, that the movement often termed “Islamic fundamentalism” be termed “Islamization” and its adherents “Islamicists.” The movement’s roots are varied, but they can probably be traced to reactions to the British colonial presence in Egypt and in that part of India now known as Pakistan. Until the Six Day War of 1967, however, these movements had little effect. Although for different reasons, they were largely sidelined, as were the U.S. Christian fundamentalists. The failure of the Arab alliance to succeed in defeating the Israelis, however, began to give new urgency to Islamic conservatives. The attack on Israel was the dream of Egyptian (later, United Arab Republic) president Gamal Abdel Nasser, largely a secularist, who enticed other secular Arab leaders to join his plan. When it failed, this began to allow an opening for conservative Muslim preachers to claim that the basis for the defeat was not Jewish military superiority but rather the failure of Muslims to immerse themselves adequately in Islam. Human pride rather than submission to Allah was at the heart of the Arab defeat. The momentum for Islamization built slowly because most secular Arab leaders were reluctant to allow the mullahs opportunities to promulgate their critiques. Economic pressures often intervened. Again, an increasing disparity between those largely secular Arabs who benefited from the oil trade and the rest of the population sent the disenfranchised looking for alternative explanations for their plight. University students, small-business people, craftsmen, and some members of the old middle class (not least those who provided men with vocations to Muslim ministry) provided fertile soil for the seeds of Islamization. Palestinians who were termed “terrorists” in the West were made heroes in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, such activities remained relatively marginal to the worldsystem until 1978 and 1979, with the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Perhaps no more perfect case of both the interaction of and confrontation between globalization and local intransigence could be imagined than Iran; indeed, in some ways, it stretched the imaginations of many social scientists, who gave inadequate weight to the religious dimension when they attempted to predict Iranian outcomes. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran’s ruler for almost four decades prior to the Iranian revolution, who ascended the throne at age 22, was a dedicated modernist. He rejoiced in U.S. political and economic support and enjoyed the Western lifestyle. He saw his vocation as bringing Iran into the forefront of global geopolitics. He claimed that “Iran could be the showcase for all of Asia. America cannot spread its assistance in every country everywhere. Here is the place with the best prospect for a great transformation.” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Perhaps the Shah was correct in his analysis, but in hindsight, we can see that he made at least three mistakes in implementation: (1) economically, he placed too much emphasis on oil and did not demand sufficient diversification of U.S. assistance to share the benefits of Iran’s oil resources and geopolitical setting adequately throughout the population; (2) socioculturally, he demanded changes that exceeded the prerequisites of the project of modernization (such as not permitting the wearing of the veil by women attending universities, reducing support for the mosques, and implementing policies to displace small shopkeepers); and (3) politically, he created a secret police force (SAVAK) that used extreme cruelty to attack those who disagreed with his policies. By the late 1970s, spiraling inflation, population pressures in the cities, and a crisis on the world oil market clearly put the Shah in trouble. That was not too much of a surprise to U.S. social scientists savvy in Middle Eastern studies. What was a surprise was the role that came to be played by the Islamicist Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini in the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Why? Preeminently because secular social science had totally overlooked the persistence of the religious dimension as a possible trajectory for the demonstration of human resentment against oppression—this despite the fact that practically every foundational social theorist, including Karl Marx, had recognized the religious dimension as integrally connected to deprivation, although not merely a reflection of deprivation. For the Ayatollah, it was not enough that the Shah was a professing Muslim. What the Ayatollah demanded was a life-world level affirmation of stability, a continuation of things the way they always ought to have been. The word ought is important to understanding the fundamentalist dynamic, because what fundamentalism protests against as much as anything in the internationalist vision of globalization is the relativization of cultural values that seems to be part and parcel of impersonal market “forces” that drive high-technology multinationalist capitalism. Only the most naive fundamentalist would claim that in some past time, “everyone” was religious or moral or both. What the fundamentalist would claim was that in the past there was a religioethical core within sociocultural systems that was generally acknowledged: sin was sin, and truth was truth. The world of the historic nation-state, whether in the Arab world or in Christian Europe, provided a buffering device that established cultural prerogatives. The Reformation principle of cuius regio, eius religio and Muslim principles surrounding the caliphate had a commonsense reality for everyday activity, particularly when language separated major cultural groups. People who “talked different” were different. Every culture knew it was right and others were wrong. Common language and common religion went hand in hand. Globalization changed this simple worldview: accommodation and compromise became the order of the day. When we look at Islamization efforts, for example, we see that with few exceptions they are directly proportional to involvement by a Muslim leader in the ethic (ethos) of globalization; that is, in that “shared and binding set of rules exogenous to any given society” of which John Meyer speaks. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The murder of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 is an excellent but not the sole example. Sadat’s case was similar to the set of values to which the Shah of Iran was at least giving lip service, and it is the basis on which a female leader, such as Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, ultimately attempted to sustain her claim to legitimacy and was also assassinated. Although Americans often see specific acts of Islamicist terrorism directed against them, the bigger picture clearly shows the primary targets to be Muslim leaders themselves. It is not “the American way of life” itself that is under attack by Islamicists but rather attempts to harmonize Islam with that way of life. Unlike the New Christian Right, most Islamicists are quite willing to let the United States go to hell if it wants to. What they resist are attempts by the global system of states, of which they see the United States as the principal economic and cultural actor, to alter their lifeworld. Nowhere do the contradictions between the global system of states and the Islamic life world become more pronounced than in the place given to the state of Israel, particularly by the United States. The state of Israel is an “offense” to Muslims, not merely because the Jews are people of a different religion—because Islam has generally been tolerant toward Jews, indeed in many cases far more so than Christianity. Rather, the state of Israel places into juxtaposition irrational and rational political policies, which themselves result from a unique religious configuration in the United States between Jews and the Christian Right. The creation of the state of Israel caused an undermining of the secular ideology of the nation-state in the Muslim world because, in a Western betrayal of its own commitments to the secular-state norm of modern political theory, a religious ideology was used to justify the creation of Israel. The establishment of the state of Israel was clearly a response to the Holocaust, but it was also intimately related to fundamentalist Protestant understandings of the necessity for the reunion of the Jewish peoples at Jerusalem prior to some form of millennial return and reign of Jesus Christ. Inseparable from this is the demographic fact that from World War II until 2006, the United States had the largest Jewish population in the world, and the fact that Israeli citizens may hold unique joint citizenship in the United States and Israel, a condition virtually unknown elsewhere in the entire global system. Muslims, thus, see a moral fissure in the ethic of globalization along these lines: The state of Israel has been established in the center of the historic Islamic world as an outpost for a new campaign to blot out the Islamic way of life. Like the crusades of old, this effort seeks to impede the practice of Islam through other standards of behavior, to which Muslims will be forced to conform or else by which they will be excluded from the benefits of global citizenship. From the Muslim point of view, by contrast, Islam itself provides a set of principles for universal world government. Here, then, is the center of the conflict between Islamization and globalization: as preeminently a system of rules, not beliefs, Islam offers an alternative to the dominant model of secular high-technology multinational capitalism that forms the basis for the global system of states in late modernity. Islamization proposes the universalization of the particular and, by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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contrast, it views the Western system as doing nothing but the same. That is, Islamicists see the Western system of globalization not as the implementation of “universal” human values but rather of specifically Western values. This observation highlights one of the central propositions of globalization theory, particularly as articulated in the work of Roland Robertson and colleagues; namely, the role of ethics (ethoses) in constructing systems of interaction. Derived from the work of both Weber and Parsons, this point of view suggests that systems of valuing, whether or not they originate in material conditions, have an influence, perhaps a determinative influence, on subsequent political and economic relationships. Peoples whose worldview continues to be shaped by Islam, which is founded on a warrior ethic, will be essentially at variance with the core values of globalization. Failure to recognize the depth to which these cultural components structure political organization leads Westerners to think that the assumptions of modern rationalism can provide a basis for “reasonable” compromise, when in fact they cannot. Instead, the warrior ethic sees standoff as a transcendent scenario in which different “strong men” contend for power. This view “came home” to Americans most dramatically in the events of September 11, 2001, with the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center—perhaps no more dramatic symbol of international capitalism could have been chosen for a Star Wars–esque scenario wherein the hub of globalization was attacked by the forces of an almost mythical strong man domiciled in one of the most remote parts of the world, governed by the most religiously reactionary regimes. It is true that, unlike the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was manifestly a religious leader, Osama bin-Laden is an entirely secular figure; bin-Laden constructs the self-image of a war lord, and as such, sees himself as much as Khomeini as restoring the rights of Islam and pursuing the international vocation of Islam as a world faith. A fascinating Weberian study of religion and political democracy by James Duke and Barry Johnson takes up a variant of Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis to demonstrate that, using four different indicators of democracy, Islamic nations appear at the bottom of five major religious groups on two of the four indicators and next to the bottom (higher only than tribal religions) on the other two. This is intensified by the fact that in the poorest nations (per capita gross national product [GNP] of less than $399) democracy is weak across the board, but states with tribal religions drop out of the picture at the uppermost end of the GNP spectrum, whereas Islamic nations do not. In addition, the undemocratic nature of Islamic regimes is unrelated to whether or not a previous colonial regime was of a more or less democratically oriented religion (e.g., English Protestantism or French Catholicism). We might turn this around and say that, from the Islamicist viewpoint, Muslim leaders who adopt the ethic of globalization as Meyer summarizes it have already betrayed the faith; that is, the warrior ethic mediates between “upstream” doctrine and day-to-day practice. This dynamic runs through the bulk of Islamic history, although the specific terms have differed across time. Ironically for the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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West, movements toward democratic pluralism on the global level have actually allowed Islamicist activities to grow in their degree of both local and international influence because the same means of communication, transport, and exchange that provide the infrastructure to globalization can be employed for the deployment of Islamicist values (much the same way, for example, as Christian televangelists in the United States use the very media of which they are hypercritical as the means for propagating their own views). The Ayatollah Khomeini himself sent audiotape cassettes to Iran while he was a refugee in France, just as bin-Laden continued to provoke his adversaries and encourage his followers through videotapes. Those societies of Muslim heritage that have most intentionally embraced Western democratic models have created the conditions for the growth of Islamicist parties, which in their extremism simply reinforce the tendencies that are already latent in the warrior ethic. Ultra-Orthodoxy For more than a quarter century, Americans have come to anticipate various forms of Palestinian-Islamicist terrorism in and adjacent to the territory now occupied by the state of Israel. Bus bombings, airplane hijackings, suicide attacks, and so on, are recurrent copy for television and newspaper headlines. Thus, it was with no small surprise that Americans learned that the assassin of Israeli prime minister and Nobel Peace Prize–winner Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 was not a Muslim, or even a Palestinian sympathizer, but a Jew who proclaimed “I did this to stop the peace process. . . . We need to be cold-hearted. . . . When you kill in war, it is an act that is allowed.” As the story developed, it became clear that there was an intimate connection between the inspiration of assassin Yigal Amir and Orthodox Jewry in New York City. Specifically, New York rabbi Abraham Hecht, leader of Brooklyn’s largest Syrian synagogue, had publicly ruled the previous June that Rabin and his colleague, Shimon Peres, were in a state of mosher, of someone who surrenders his people. As such, Hecht said, the two had committed a sin worthy of death. Hecht even credited the greatest of all Jewish philosophers, Maimonides, to the effect that someone who kills a mosher has done a good deed. This most prominent murder among the thousands who have lost their lives in the 20th-century battle for the Holy Land uniquely highlights the intersecting dynamics of globalization and fundamentalism: a local congregational pastor in one part of the world, thousands of miles from a law student elsewhere, inspires the death of a major figure not only in the Middle Eastern “peace process” but also potentially in the entire global system—thanks to media of communication and transport that brought his remarks into one of the crucial value expressions of globalization, a free press. Indeed, so much was this the case that Israelis immediately after the assassination attempted to formalize laws that would actually restrict the publication of such “opinions” as those of Hecht (who was, in fact, fired by his New York congregation shortly after Rabin’s murder). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Pallbearers carry the coffin of Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, after his 1995 assassination by right-wing radical Yigal Amir. (David Turnley/Corbis)

In the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the global norms of freedom of religion and freedom of the press, written, for example, into a whole series of world institutional documents, yielded antiglobal results, enabled by the very technologies that advance the globalization to which, for example, Islamicists object. Indeed, one might argue that from an Islamicist viewpoint, the assassination of Rabin could be taken as evidence that globalization will be its own grave digger. There is a counterargument, however—namely, that the creation of the state of Israel as it was effected by the allies following World War II, and especially by the United States, was in conflict with, and contrary to, the norms of globalization; hence, we should anticipate ongoing actual conflict over this sociopolitical fact. The United States will be especially immediately involved in this conflict because of its violation of the principles of nation-state citizenship rules—because of the unique citizenship privileges that pertain between Israeli citizens of American origin. In other words, the world systemic conflict in and about the state of Israel is the “exception that proves the rule” of globalization theory precisely because the foundation of the state of Israel essentially violates the “value-neutral” or “secular” politics that is the norm of global society. From the restriction of the papal empire within the walls of the Vatican to the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into modern Turkey, the de-deification of the emperor of Japan, and the disestablishment of one state church after another, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the entire trend of globalization has been away from the particularizing of politics by intrasocietal cultural norms associated with the historical religions. How could the state of Israel possibly be founded in contradistinction to this trend? The answer is multiplex. First, the psychodynamics of guilt over the Holocaust must be acknowledged. Although specific numbers may be debated until time immemorial, the genocide inflicted on European Jews by the Nazi regime while the majority of “liberal” politicians of all Western democracies stood largely deaf, dumb, and blind yielded in due time its legitimate emotional remorse. The state of Israel was a global irrational response to an even more overwhelming irrational system of oppression. It flew in the face of the rational politics of the world system, but those political principles were themselves still in the stage of formal institutionalization in such bodies as the United Nations. Not to be forgotten is the fact that the first attempt toward operationalizing these principles in the League of Nations failed, and perhaps one reason that it failed was the lack of membership of the United States, which as a result of the Holocaust had become the nation with the largest Jewish population in the world by 1945. Second, the Jewish people themselves were disarrayed by the Holocaust; many of the proponents of the idea of a “Jewish homeland” (i.e., the modern state of Israel) articulated the concept in secular terms. In other words, when the stateof-Israel concept was discussed in political circles, it was advanced not as a religious cause but rather as an efficient political solution to a world political problem of refugee peoples and a resolution to colonial control of a portion of the Middle East. In apparent ignorance of the actual population of Palestine, many Western politicians saw the creation of the state of Israel as an act of political selfdetermination consistent with world societal principles. The British were keen to withdraw from the region and saw American support for the state of Israel as the ideal avenue for their own exit. Third, the same infrastructural developments that have allowed the Christian Religious Right and Islamism to move from life-world conditions to system actors have allowed the development of a Jewish religious form—ultra-orthodoxy—that has been heretofore unknown in Judaism. Whereas ultraist forms of Judaism have previously been privatizations of the spiritual dynamic, the “open market” of globalization has allowed the conditions for the appearance of a public spirituality making political demands. Among the Jews especially, who have traditionally been what Max Weber terms a “pariah people,” only the free conditions of globalization have allowed the politicization of action that could result in the assassination of a world political leader. The great Maimonides may well have said that killing a mosher would be doing a good deed and meant it, but that Maimonides ever thought he was saying that killing the prime minister of Israel for participating in the global peace process was a good deed is quite inconceivable. Maimonides was speaking to a global situation in which Jews were a pariah people and not actors in the world system of states. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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This final observation brings us to the heart of globalization theory as an explanation and demonstrates its value in understanding the “resurgence of religion” in our time. It is to be found in the simple definition of fundamentalism introduced at the outset: “text without context.” What happened between Maimonides and Yigal Amir was that the context changed. Maimonides said what he said and meant what he said. In addition, in the context in which he was writing—namely, that of Jews as a pariah people—he could well be considered morally right. By contrast, Rabbi Hecht was absolutely wrong in his application of the text; he was wrong because he chose to discount context, which from a contemporary social-scientific standpoint is morally unjustifiable. The words of Maimonides are sociocultural products. This does not mean that they are not true. It does mean that all truth is mediated by context. To say this is not the same thing as saying that “everything is relative” but rather to assert that sociocultural context is integral to the truthfulness of any proposition about social relations. This is most succinctly epitomized in sociology in the phrase “definition of the situation,” coined by W. I. Thomas. Situations by their very nature have always been historically particular, hence the universalizing dynamic of globalization creates an inherently perilous setting for misinterpretation when the particular is universalized (i.e., text is taken out of context). This is precisely what led to the death of Yitzhak Rabin, and this is also what makes religious fundamentalism within the context of globalization so powerful a force for nationalisms. By appealing to religious texts from previous historical epochs as if they are of immediate contemporary applicability, nationalist partisans create contexts for political violence on a global scale.

Consequences Globalization has created a new publicization of religion (the “resurgence” of religion) that is at variance with the dominant chord of secularization theories. At the same time, however, the resurgent forms of at least the Abrahamic traditions that are at the core of nationalist conflicts centering on religious fundamentalisms throughout the world are also at the same time new forms of these religions that are discontinuous with the dominant forms of these traditions, which have actually adapted over time to changing sociohistorical conditions. The global resurgence of religious traditions in new forms is evidence for both the truth of the relation of context to religion, which is inherent to the participation of human beings in religion, and the essential error of the secularization concept as it was once advanced in Western social science. On the one hand, all religion is secular because all religion exists in relation to both system and life world; how specific religions orient and reorient themselves to system and life world will vary as systems and life worlds change. At the same time, however, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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systems and life worlds will include religious considerations in the total matrix of experience and interpretation that leads to specific action and hence to changes in patterns of action. The very processes that created the sociocultural contexts in and through which globalization has occurred also have created the contexts for the resurgent religious forms that we tend to characterize as fundamentalisms. This dialectic between material and ideal culture is inherent in all sociocultural processes, hence a complete globalization theory should anticipate countersystem tendencies by the very nature of the dynamics that create the system itself. Such a theory will explain both why the systems of religion that are rising are rising and why those that are falling are falling. It should also explain why those forms that are rising are probably unlikely to achieve their ultimate goals, and why those that may appear to be falling may not experience the “withering” that either their critics or mourners expect. Selected Bibliography Beyer, P. 1992. Religion and Globalization. London: Sage. Duke, J. T., and B. L. Johnson. 1989. “Protestantism and the Spirit of Democracy.” In Religious Politics in Global and Comparative Perspective, edited by W. H. Swatos Jr., 131–146. New York: Greenwood. Froese, P. 2005. “ ‘I Am an Atheist and a Muslim’: Islam, Communism, and Ideological Competition.” Journal of Church and State 47:472–501. Juergensmeyer, M. 2001. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lechner, F. 1985. “Modernity and Its Discontents.” In Neofunctionalism, edited by J. Alexander, 157–176. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Lechner, F. 1989. “Cultural Aspects of the Modern World System.” In Religious Politics in Global and Comparative Perspective, edited by W. H. Swatos Jr., 11–27. New York: Greenwood. Meyer, J. 1980. “The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation State.” In Studies of the Modern World-System, edited by A. Bergesen, 109–137. New York: Academic Press. Oommen, T. K. 1994. “Religious Nationalism and Democratic Polity.” Sociology of Religion 55:455–472. Parsons, T. 1964. “Christianity and Modern Industrial Society.” In Religion, Culture, and Society, edited by L. Schneider, 273–298. New York: John Wiley. Robertson, R. 1992. Globalization. London: Sage. Robertson, R., and J. Chirico. 1985. “Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence.” Sociological Analysis 46:219–242. Schoenfeld, E. 1987. “Militant Religion.” In Religious Sociology, edited by W. H. Swatos Jr., 125–137. New York: Greenwood. Swatos, W. H., Jr. 1992. “The Problem of Religious Politics and Its Impact on World Society.” In Waves, Formations and Values in the World System, edited by V. Bornschier and P. Lengyel, 283–304. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Swatos, W. H., Jr. 1995. “Islam and Capitalism: A Weberian Perspective on Resurgence.” In Religion and the Transformations of Capitalism, edited by R. H. Roberts, 47–62. London: Routledge. Weber, M. 1930. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Scribners.

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Nationalism and Globalization Victor Roudometof Origins The conventional wisdom among the scholarly community is that nations and nationalism are forces closely tied with our heritage, culture, ethnicity, and the legacy of our forefathers. Of course, scholars of nationalism still discuss whether nations are solely a force coming out from our distant past or whether they are in large part a product of 19th-century modernization. Some scholars view nations as features of our distant past with a history stretching several centuries, while others view them as having a history of no more than a few centuries. Irrespective of this disagreement, this mainstream view of nations as creatures of either our recent or distant past will be our starting point for the discussion in this chapter. In contrast to this view of nations, many, perhaps most, scholars of nationalism view globalization as something relatively recent. Many scholars and journalists think of globalization in terms of the Internet, cell phones, cable or satellite TV, ethnic restaurants bringing us exotic foods, economic restructuring of manufacturing plants, and so on. For the purposes of our discussion in this chapter, then, globalization is defined as those social processes responsible for the gradual interconnection of different places of the globe into a whole. This interconnectivity is achieved through a variety of means, such as mass media, electronic communication, economic exchanges, trade, the growth of international treaties and nongovernmental organizations, and many others. In fact, there are too many of them to provide an exhaustive list. Many scholars also accept that this interconnectivity often promotes or at the very least contributes to making the world a single place—that is, integrating the entire globe into a single network or polity or culture. To sum up the above, then, nations are creatures of our past while globalization is a force that has only recently come about. If we accept these definitions, globalization is the harbinger of two distinct outcomes. The first outcome of globalization is the end of the self-reliance or independence of the nation-state. More and more, nation-states are made dependent upon larger economic, cultural, and social interactions with the world beyond their borders. For example, most states around the globe are now signatories to international agreements for the protection of the environment, nuclear nonproliferation, extradition of criminals, removal of mines from their territories, and so on. They have to take concrete steps to honor such agreements, and they are held accountable to international organizations and other states if they fail to do so. This means that states do not N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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enjoy complete sovereignty over their actions. Sovereignty is one of the basic terms in the study of the state: it refers to the fact that, traditionally, a state’s actions within its boundaries were not subject to any external regulation. This meant that the state exercised unrestrained control over its own territory, and this is the classical definition of sovereignty. But, today, this is no longer true; sovereignty is being eroded on a regular basis, and states can no longer pursue their own national interests without taking into account how this will impact people and organizations that extend beyond their borders. Globalization brings global social integration as it tears down the walls that states have erected to protect their population. States have traditionally justified their efforts to protect their own people on the basis of serving the national interest. Serving the national interest is an expression of nationalism. Nationalism is a force that divides up the world into unique cultural units that we call nations. By tearing down the walls that protect our nations, globalization is eroding the very foundations of nations, our very sense of being different from other people who live beyond our borders. Some scholars have even suggested that in the future, the world will become united under a single world government or in the form of a global federation among nations. Such visions are clearly contrary to a key idea behind national movements, the idea that each nation should have its own, selfreliant and completely independent state. The process of Europeanization, for example, is set against the reality of modern European nations: turning French, Germans, Italians, and others into Europeans is working against the various European states’ national interests for it undermines the people’s attachment to their respective nations. Those scholars who think along these lines have suggested that, ultimately, humanity’s future lies in moving into a post-national world, a world where nations will no longer be the major reference point for individuals and communities around the world. There are numerous variations of this perspective, but all of them agree that our future trajectory is that of post-nationalism. So, the first interpretation that will be considered in this chapter is that globalization is a force that inhibits the power of nationalism worldwide. In contrast, the second interpretation suggests exactly the opposite trend: in this line of thinking, globalization can contribute to the reassertion of nationalism. In a world dominated by cultural homogenization and economic integration, people might cling to their roots in an effort to protect their communities from the negative consequences of getting too close with outsiders. As a matter of fact, most scholars—and laymen—would agree that the idea of the nation has not been superseded as a source of loyalty by other transnational ties (such as gender, class, or religion). In this respect, the increases in global communication and the ability of people to move around the globe faster and in greater numbers than ever before is an important factor for the revitalization of ethnic ties. When we look at the world from this perspective, the connections inscribed by globalization strengthen suppressed or hitherto marginalized constituencies within N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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existing nation-states. Globalization enables them to mobilize effectively to question or challenge the authority of their respective nation-state. Globalization offers to such communities the ability to speak to a global audience, thereby bypassing national channels and bringing their concerns into global institutions—such as the International Court of Human Rights, the United Nations (UN), and others. Moreover, global interconnectedness can contribute to the expression of nationalist mobilization among new immigrant communities, giving birth to long-distance or transnational nationalism. These two different interpretations are not mutually exclusive. We do not need to see them as an “either/or” choice. Rather, they are different aspects of the world as it is today. They stand for different trends that point to opposite directions. It is possible to find empirical support for both trends in the record of the post-1980 period. The following two sections briefly consider each trend and present some examples that lend support to each of the two theses. This chapter’s discussion cannot possibly be comprehensive, nor is there an attempt to present in great detail every possible case. Such tasks are better left to specialists. Instead, in the following, emphasis is placed on the analytical side, on what are the different tracks upon which each trend has been proceeding. In the chapter’s final section, an attempt is made to synthesize these trends and move conceptually beyond the dominant view on the relationship between nationalism and globalization.

Relevance Will Globalization Bring the End of the Nation-State? The growth of transnational institutions, the construction of a world culture, the voluminous international treaties, and the proliferation of major economic alliances—such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU)—have provided the backdrop for the argument that the era of the nation-state is now over. We are being told that today the growth of interregional trade among Asia, Europe, and North America has led to the denationalization of formerly national economies. Even economically powerful states, like the United States or Germany, do not have the ability to control their economic fortunes; their economies are being de-nationalized. As more and more foreign capital runs through them, many foreign investors are in control of key sectors in their economies leaving no room for state intervention. This de-nationalization is typically used as the best evidence for arguing that the nation-state no longer controls economic activities that have become increasingly transnational or regional in nature. Upon close inspection, however, we find that this argument is rather weak in the case of the economy—and specifically, when it comes to economic policy. For example, former U.S. secretary of labor Robert Reich has argued that U.S. policy N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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in an era of globalized capitalism has to promote a new economic nationalism that would allow the U.S. population to be the beneficiary of the most lucrative and highly paid jobs in the new global economy, leaving behind the rest of the world to compete against each other. This argument makes abundantly clear that the new global economy by no means brings an end to economic nationalism. Rather, public policy moves into a different terrain: its role now is to structure the rules of the international competition in ways that benefit specific countries. The above is not an abstract academic thesis: as a secretary of labor in the Clinton administration, Robert Reich himself was part of a broader policy team that emphasized the necessity for high-tech innovation and for moving into the Information Age. Former U.S. president Clinton repeatedly stressed this particular developmental model and promoted it both at home and abroad. In Europe, Ireland has provided a similar model. While in past decades Ireland was a poor country and the Irish often migrated abroad to find a better future, in the post-1980 period, Ireland’s economic fortune changed as the country successfully exploited its geopolitical position as a bridgehead between the United States and Europe. Many international companies chose it as their base of operation, and in the process, Ireland became one of the fastest growing European economies. In the course of the 1990s, it became a case carefully studied by teams of other European economic policy experts seeking to duplicate its economic miracle across Europe. Hence, while the nation-state might no longer be in a position to isolate and effectively manipulate the national economy, the end result is not the disappearance of nationalism but rather the application of the national interest into the field of economic policy. A second but more viable variation of the same line of argument pertains to the emergence of a post-national model of social relations. This argument is based on several post–World War II international trends. These trends include the erosion of state sovereignty through the multiplication of international treaties and the emergence of an international post–World War II regime of international law, rules, and related conventions. As a result, significant constraints are now in place with regard to the ability of states to do as they please. New international or global policy regimes are put into place in diverse fields, ranging from the protection of the environment to the treatment of minorities and to nuclear proliferation. States are bound by these new globally inscribed regulations and are held accountable if they fail to comply with them. Several scholars have viewed this development in a positive light, suggesting that this new cosmopolitan internationalism can improve people’s lives around the globe by making governments more accountable with respect to an entire range of social problems from AIDS to gender equality or ethnic tolerance. From this point of view, the age-old principle of state sovereignty is but a remnant of the past that is no longer useful in the post-1989 New World Order. Th e 1990–1991 Iraqi war and, later on, the international interventions in the former Yugoslavia offered good examples of international coalitions and UN-sponsored N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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interventions that coerced states to do what they did not want to. In the Iraqi case, a UN-sponsored international coalition drove the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, while in Yugoslavia, the U.S.-led international intervention led to the 1995 Dayton Accord that terminated the bloody civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Four years later, the international community intervened militarily once again, forcing the Serb forces to stop their campaign against Albanian insurgents in Kosovo. The Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo and an international peace force assumed control of the province. These examples have provided good test cases to plausibly argue that the world was now operating under a very different set of rules than in the pre–World War II era. It was along these lines that even a change in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rules was contemplated that would make it possible for NATO to intervene in violations that took place within nationstates that failed to comply with international norms. It was not accidental that the proposal was made in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. The Kosovo Crisis provided a paradigmatic case of international intervention to circumscribe the effects of Serb nationalism. The decision to forcefully alter Serb policy in the area and to create an international protectorate under UN control owed much to the strength of the U.S.-sponsored globalist thinking of the 1990s. In many respects, it provided a tangible application of U.S. debates about nationalism (and internationalism or cosmopolitanism) in the mid-1990s. Th e theme already explored in the mid-1990s concerned the degree to which a new form of cosmopolitan society was now emerging and which, if any, was the place of nationalism (or patriotism) in the New World Order. These debates have not been confined to the United States. On the other side of the Atlantic, a similar agenda was pursued in the 1990s: in the aftermath of the Amsterdam (1999) and Maastricht (1992) treaties and the evolution of the European Community (EC) into the EU, it looked as if a future united European state would be a tangible project that could supersede local European nationalisms. The EU logo “unity in diversity” was therefore tilted more toward the first of the two components. Signs that indicated the limited participation of immigrants into the local governance of the European states were hailed as signs of a move toward post-nationalism. That is, immigrants who were hitherto excluded from the benefits of formal citizenship could find informal or semiformalized ways to participate in the national or local politics of their host countries, thereby eroding the exclusive nature of citizenship. Since the late 1990s, scholars have been contemplating the possibility of cosmopolitanism as a perspective that would free people from the boundaries of their national attachments. Many view cosmopolitanism as an expression of an emerging European worldview that will transcend local European nationalisms in favor of a larger European identity. Others view cosmopolitanism as little else than the ideology of a small elite, and they suggest that the cosmopolitan worldview might be nothing more than the class consciousness of frequent travelers, business leaders, managers, and other professionals for whom local ties no longer count that much. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Flag of the European Union (EU). Formed by twelve nations in 1991, the EU is a powerful economic and political bloc promoting European unity. Entering into the EU involves meeting rigorous economic and political conditions. By 2007, the list of member states had grown to 27. (European Commission)

All of the above represent trends popular in the post-1980 period among the academic community but also in discussions in the press and the public in several countries. The tenor of such debates did not always coincide with contemporary developments. In general, over the pre-9/11 period, many academics and journalists viewed post-nationalism positively and were willing to pay less attention to trends challenging this scenario. For example, when the Austrian ultra-right-wing conservatives won the 1999 national elections, the general European and American reaction was that of surprise: great effort was put into explaining why Austria was an exception to European standards. In addition, the EU reacted by enforcing an effective and persistent embargo against the new government, and that embargo quickly led to a different coalition government in Austria. If in 1999 Austria could be explained away as a somewhat anomalous case, the post-9/11 shifts in the cultural and political landscapes of North America and western Europe cast grave doubts upon the possibility of treating nationalism as a remnant of the past. In the United States, the 9/11 tragedy was quickly nationalized and the war on terrorism soon assumed the characteristics of a national crusade to vindicate American patriotism. In the EU, popular opinion also shifted N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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toward localism amid the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid and fears of additional acts of terrorism. Such fears further accelerated and legitimized xenophobic sentiments that had been on the rise throughout the 1990s. The post-9/11 Europeans’ shift toward nationalism led to the rejection of the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands, and this was a blow to visions of a united Europe. Following its 2004 enlargement, the EU became a community of 25 (and by 2007, a group of 27) countries, and the inclusion of so many eastern European countries caused skepticism about the EU’s ability to continue to operate effectively. Fear that the national interests of smaller countries would be lost in a larger EU contributed to growing skepticism about the necessity of a politically unified Europe. At the same time, the prospect of Turkey joining the EU came to the forefront of the public debate. Needless to say, resentment toward immigrants, fear of terrorist attacks, and the growing skepticism toward the EU have all combined to produce a persistent fear of a future Turkish membership in the EU. While many European governments are open to such an eventuality, many polls across Europe have suggested that the majority of the European public is opposed to such a membership. But this issue is not really just about Turkish membership to the EU. Rather, this issue has served as a good template upon which to register resentment against immigration or mere xenophobia. It remains to be seen whether the sea change that took place in the political and cultural landscapes of North America and Europe in the wake of 9/11 will be an enduring feature of 21st-century public life. Suffice it to say that, in the first decade of the 21st century, it is clear that post-nationalism no longer captures the public’s imagination. On the contrary, new forms of localism have been revived, and among them, various local nationalisms have been instrumental in providing justification for numerous shifts in public policy and attitude. In the long run, however, things might be different. Therefore, although post-nationalism remains the least likely in the short run, it is important to stress that global post-national trends could be revived.

Dimensions The Ethnic Revival and Long-Distance Nationalism The scholarly community never uniformly accepted the post-national idea. Dissenters argued that international migration and multiculturalism do not bring about the de-nationalization of national politics, but rather they contribute to the re-nationalization of the political body by strengthening xenophobia, racism, and ethnocentrism. Others pointed out that increased cross-cultural communication is not necessarily going to bring about the erosion of the nation, and that the global culture of our times, powerful as it is, might not be in a position to upset local national traditions and their embedded mechanisms responsible N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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for maintaining and reproducing national memory. Both in Europe and the United States, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that immigration and multiculturalism—both of them excellent examples of contemporary globalization— have contributed to a backlash against people who are culturally different than the national mainstream. Such a backlash is often clothed in the costume of nationalism or patriotism. One is reminded of a slogan familiar to U.S. ears: “America, love it or leave it.” In the 1990s, persistent U.S. efforts were undertaken to curb illegal immigration, and after 9/11, new restrictions were applied in an effort to keep potential terrorists away from U.S. soil. In many European countries (France, Italy, Austria) ultra-right-wing political parties combined nationalist sentiments with xenophobic attitudes. Both in North America and Europe, populist reactions to globalization often turn to nationalism as a force that can be used to rally the people against globalization. Since the early 1980s, scholars of nationalism argued that an ethnic revival could be observed around the globe. This ethnic revival took distinct forms in different regions of the globe. In African, Asian, and Latin American countries, ethnicity was evoked as a rallying cry for the national mobilization of minorities. In global surveys of the field, the majority of post-1945 ethnic conflicts around the world are attributed to minority issues. In the post–World War II period, the protection of minorities from state-sponsored policies of cultural homogenization and economic oppression found a new, global audience thanks to the new electronic media (CNN, BBC, etc.), nongovernmental organizations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group), international agencies (such as the UN High Commission on Refugees), and the creation of a global public. The Zapatista movement in Mexico is perhaps the most widely cited example of such an indigenous movement that was quickly catapulted into the global arena. Initially, the Zapatista rebellion was staged locally but was broadcasted globally, turning what otherwise would have been a purely local event into a global symbol of revolt against NAFTA and the Mexican state’s agricultural policies. Elsewhere, armed minority movements—from Sri Lanka to Sudan and Somalia, Eritrea, or Namibia—captured both the imagination of a global audience and the attention of UN-sponsored processes of peacekeeping and/or conflict resolution. While certainly a popular theme for journalists, the nationalist mobilization of minorities has not been a feature exclusively affiliated with Third World states. On the contrary, even within the heart of Europe, peripheral nationalisms have expressed their strength by challenging the authority of the centralized state and—ironically—using the EU as a supranational agent that could legitimize their aspirations. Such movements are observed in Italy (through the creation of the Northern League), in Spain (through the Basque and Catalan movements), in France, and of course, in the United Kingdom (through the Welsh and Scottish national movements). The EU has often sought to capitalize on such developments by fostering the construction of a “Europe of the Regions,” thereby explicitly suggesting that such subnational units like Catalonia or Northern Italy or Scotland N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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could find a convenient shelter in a united Europe. Partly, the EU has promoted itself as an institution that would allow greater autonomy to such movements from their respective national centers. This has been a very clever attempt to use the substate nationalisms of European nation-states as agents that would promote the EU’s own post-national institution building. Through this coalition of local substate nationalisms and post-national European bureaucrats, it became possible to speak of several European “nations without states”—such as the cases of Catalonia or Scotland. In these instances, regional governance has been strengthen to such an extent that it can act as a canopy protecting and spearheading the construction and reproduction of national difference, albeit without full access to the resources of a national state. With the 1999 collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, many of the formerly communist eastern European nations without states were no longer content to stay within their former state or federal boundaries. On the contrary, populist nationalist activists and politicians viewed the collapse of communism as an opportunity to formalize their status as separate nations by seeking recognition as independent, sovereign states. In formerly communist Eastern Europe, three multiethnic or multinational units (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) disappeared from the map as a result of such nationalist mobilization. While in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in Czechoslovakia local statesmen were able to find amicable ways for their breakup, in Yugoslavia, this type of nationalist mobilization paved the way for the bloody warfare in Croatia and Bosnia. Of course, the nationalist mobilizations in several East European nations made ample use of preexisting territorial components. That is, the communist regimes had already provided a territorial reference point for these nations (such as Ukraine, Croatia, Slovenia, etc.) by creating state structures that existed within the context of larger federal units (such the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia). Technically, these states were in a position akin to the United States: they were states that formed part of larger federal structures. Initially, these states were meant to remain under the control of the Communist Party. In such a manner, their right to succession would remain purely theoretical. When the communist regimes collapsed, this abstract, theoretical statehood was quickly used as a means for obtaining their formal recognition as sovereign, independent states. The challenge involved in this transformation pertained to the artificiality of their borders. The borders of Ukraine or Serbia or Croatia were originally meant to be internal borders within the context of a larger federation. They were not drawn as external, international borders among truly sovereign states. The logic followed by the communists in constructing them served purposes completely different from circumscribing the boundaries of a nation-state: the inclusion of the Crimea within the People’s Republic of Ukraine is an apt example of past communist practices. It was quite predictable, then, that border disputes and national rivalries would emerge in a forceful manner. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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However, catastrophic outcomes—such as the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s— are typically born out of a more complicated situation. Such outcomes are the result of an institutional interplay among the simultaneous actions of three agents. First, there are nationalizing states set on assimilating minorities into their mainstream. Second, there are national minorities that identify with nationstates other than the ones in which they are located. Third, there exist external national homelands that these national minorities come to view as their desired or natural places of belonging. In the 1990s, the ethnic rivalries between Romania and Hungary (and Romania and Moldova) provided another similar case; yet, these states were able to deal with the situation more constructively than the former Yugoslavia. Finally, in addition to this resurrection of nationalism in the heart of Europe, contemporary globalization has brought the possibility of strengthening nationalism as a condition or a consequence of the new reality of cross-cultural and international communication and the movement of peoples across the globe. Feelings of nostalgia for the homeland and the experience of living in the midst of a culturally alien milieu can provide the context for the resurgence of national feelings. This form of long-distance nationalism, of course, is not a novelty of the contemporary era. In earlier historical periods, Polish, Scottish, Greek, and Irish immigrants to the United States all harbored dreams of liberty for their homelands. But, what sets apart contemporary trends is the massive character of population movements and routine communication between home and abroad. In this respect, it was research on immigrant communities that, somewhat unexpectedly, stressed global interconnectedness as a means for national mobilization. Research on international migration has stressed the degree to which transnational communities act as a constituency deeply involved in home society politics and as a force that is responsible for changing the political trajectory of the home country. These new transnational communities of the contemporary period are different from past immigrant communities exactly on the basis of maintaining their ties to the home country. As they are no longer forced to acculturate into the host culture and are empowered by new media of instant communication, the post–World War II immigrants have been enabled to inhabit both the world of the home country and that of the host country. In the 1990s, the example of Haiti, where expatriate communities facilitated the return of President Aristide to power, has provided an almost paradigmatic application for such long-distance nationalism. The involvement of U.S.-based Mexican immigrants in Mexican domestic politics has provided another powerful and enduring example of the same tendency. Many Mexican politicians did not hesitate to cross borders and campaign in immigrant communities that reside in the United States. From the early 1990s forward, then, researchers in other social and cultural contexts and within several disciplines have been busy researching the influence of diasporic communities in the nation-formation processes of their home countries. Examples abound, with the Irish, Palestinians, Armenians, Lebanese, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Indian, and Chinese communities providing some additional cases beyond the classic Latin American examples of the Haitians, Cubans, Mexicans, Dominicans, and others. This is a major area of contemporary research, where increasingly these two fields of inquiry (the field of nationalism and that of international migration), fields that hitherto had little to do with each other, grow increasingly interconnected. Let me refer here to one particular example of such transnational nationalism. During the post-1945 period, immigrants from the region of Macedonia in the central Balkans settled in Australia and Canada. In due course of time, these immigrants developed ethnic or national identities that mirrored the development of national identities in that region. Specifically, they adopted Bulgarian or Greek or (ethnic) Macedonian identities, while simultaneously holding to or acquiring their Canadian or Australian citizenships. These links and their interpretations of the past were cultivated through the creation of ethnic churches and communities affiliated with each immigrant subgroup as well as the proliferation of modern media (books, newspapers, talks, festivals, Internet chat rooms, etc.) that contributed to ethnic revival. However, these immigrant groups were not simply content with celebrating their own status but also fiercely claimed the Macedonian heritage for their own group, refusing to accept the claims of others and contesting even the appellation “Macedonian” as a legitimate label for the other groups. In the 1980s and 1990s, the result was a nationalist battlefield, albeit one situated mostly within immigrant communities that lived far and away from their original homeland. Such a seemingly paradoxical situation shows how it is possible in a globalized world to have nationalist disputes that are no longer contained within specific borders but operate in a de-territorialized fashion.

Consequences Understanding Nationalism in a Global Age On the basis of the cases mentioned and the arguments described in this chapter, it is fair to conclude that globalization has had a multifaceted influence upon the trajectory of various nationalisms around the world in the post-1980 period. This influence can be summed up as follows: First, the construction of larger, supranational units has provided the impetus for using nationalism to rally the public against the real or imagined negative consequences of the EU, NAFTA, and so on. In this regard, the appeal to nationalism is strongly colored by regionalism, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiment. In this instance, nationalism becomes a new form of localism. Second, the construction of supranational entities has significantly strengthened subnational units and enabled them to claim a national status even without the formal requirement of independent statehood. The cases of Scotland and Catalonia provide paradigmatic examples of this trend. Third, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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globality has contributed to an ethnic revival in several countries around the world by allowing substate nationalisms to state their claims to a global audience. Fourth, global communication and mass migration have also contributed to long-distance nationalism, whereby immigrants are able to influence developments in their home countries, albeit without having a physical presence in their country of origin. The picture that emerges from the above is that nationalism might be a vocal, grumpy companion to globalization instead of being its deadly adversary. Such a conclusion makes it necessary to rethink the conventional wisdom that these two concepts should be sharply juxtaposed. Looking upon globalization as a force inherently antithetical to nationalism is clearly a methodological strategy unsuited to account for the complex relations between the two. Rather, the multifaceted trends reviewed in this chapter suggest that globalization does not necessarily entail the displacement of the nation as a key agent in global politics and as a reference point for the cultural life of communities. While state sovereignty might be limited as a result of the regulatory power of transnational and supranational institutions, such a trend only reinforces an awareness of the problematic link between nation and state. Unlike earlier eras, the connection between nation and state can no longer be taken as a given. In turn, this means that the relationship between nationalism and globalization is one of mutual interdependence. Nationalism gains newfound strength from the use of the global media and transnational trends, while globalization reshapes national identities and makes them mobile and free of the cage of territoriality. In fact, the de-territorialization of national identities is a feature that has become quite pronounced in the post–World War II era. This trend has highlighted the dividing line between territory and belonging. Belonging is a culturally constructed property and in a globalized world it often sheds off its ties to a specific geographic setting—albeit not its connection to a symbolically constructed place. As a result, nationalisms can now become de-territorialized, as physical presence in a specific locale is no longer a necessity for having feelings for the soil and acting for a national cause. Today, many people live outside their homelands’ borders; but this does not necessarily diminish their feelings of attachment and loyalty to their nation. In this regard, examining the interplay between nation and globality provides a good illustration of the ways that the processes of globalization involve the construction or reconfiguration of already existing places of belonging. By far the most likely outcome for the 21st century is that we are going to witness the emergence or reemergence of various local nationalisms on a global scale. Most often, such nationalisms will be only minimally or symbolically connected to an ancestral land; instead, they will be felt across national boundaries and into a variety of different national contexts. Their carrier groups will be transnational communities of immigrants, refugees, diasporas, and expatriates who become considerably more empowered by the media, communication technologies, and the sheer ability of maintaining national attachments in a variety of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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locales. Simultaneously, new groups will be formed within existing nation-states to claim or reclaim the status of a nation from their respective governments. Such groups will often form alliances with transnationals who live outside state borders. In this complex web of transnational relations, globality and nationality will coexist side by side—one force uniting the world, while the other seeks passionately to divide it into unique cultures. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1993. “The New World Disorder.” New Left Review 193 (May-June): 3–14. Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller, and C. S. Blanc. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States. New York: Gordon and Breach. Beck, U. 1999. World Risk Society. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Brubarker, R. 1996. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohen, L. K. 1993. Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Glick Schiller, N., and G. Fourton. 2001. George Woke Up Laughing: Long Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Guibernau, M. M. 1999. Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global Age. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Gurr, T. R. 1993. “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945.” International Political Science Review 14:161–201. Hayden, R. 1999. Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Nairn, T. 1997. The Break Up of Britain. London: New Left Books. Ohmae, K. 1995. The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies. New York: Free Press. Reich, R. 1991. The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism. New York: A. A. Knopf. Roudometof, V. 2002. Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question. Westport, CT: Praeger. Sassen, S. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press. Smith, A. D. 1981. The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, A. D. 1995. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. London: Polity Press. Soysal, Y. N. 1994. The Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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National Identity and Immigration Anna Triandafyllidou Relevance National Identity and the Challenge of Immigration During the summer months of 2006, European television channels and the press were increasingly obsessed with the arrival of undocumented migrants on the southern coasts of Italy and Spain. Old-fashioned dinghies, the famous pateras or cayucos (in Spanish), transported African immigrants from Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar to southern Spain or from Mauritania to the Canary Islands that form part of the Spanish state. Similar boats transported North and subSaharan African immigrants from Libya to the tiny islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleria in the south of Italy. Although migrants arrived usually in the tens and not in the thousands, the media hype created an impression of European countries being flooded by economic immigrants from Asia and Africa. They were seen to threaten the public order, the public health, and the overall prosperity of developed countries. Only half a year earlier, during the last months of 2005, European media had been again overwhelmed, this time not by pictures of young sub-Saharan Africans on small boats at sea but by images of burning cars and violent street riots that took place in Paris and other major French cities. These riots were the culmination of growing social unrest among French citizens of immigrant origin. The rioters included, to a significant extent, young people of North African origin that had abandoned school early, were unemployed, and felt unwelcome and discriminated against in their own country, France. These media stories exemplify the two main challenges posed by migration for contemporary nations. The first challenge is the one related to entry: is immigration desirable for a nation? And if yes, how should immigration flows be managed to the best interest of the receiving nation? The second challenge concerns the question of immigrant integration in the host society. How can immigrants be accepted as equal members of the nation? Can they ever become truly part of the national in-group, or will they always be stigmatized as “newcomers,” “foreigners,” “strangers?” UN reports tell us that, during the last two decades, there have been a growing number of people—asylum-seekers or economic immigrants—who legally or sometimes illegally cross national borders and settle in a country different than their own. European countries and North America emerge as major destinations for immigrants and refugees from developing countries. Indeed, the United States accepts about 1 million new immigrants every year, Canada welcomes nearly N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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200,000 per year, while major European countries like France, Britain, and Germany have also accepted about 100,000 newcomers each annually in the period between 1994 and 2004. Immigration receiving countries are thus faced with the necessity of dealing with these “Others within” whose presence defies the national order. By definition, immigration involves members of one nation emigrating to a country of which they are not nationals. Abdelmalek Sayad, a French sociologist, has called this the “paradox of migration.” The phenomenon of emigration-immigration involves an absence-presence that is against the national order: the immigrant is absent from the country of which s/he is a national, while s/he is present in a different country in which s/he does not belong. In the modern world, where political organization has mainly taken the form of nations and nation-states, this absence from the country of origin and presence in a foreign land leads to the exclusion of the immigrant from both societies. When considering migration, governments and public opinion tend to forget that migration is a feature of human history that is related to the very nature of human societies. It used to be a marginal and unregulated phenomenon within empires but has increasingly become a matter of concern for nation-states during the modern era. Migration is framed as a problem in the modern world mainly because it challenges the national order, the idea that ethnic and cultural boundaries between communities should coincide with borders between states. However, the notion of the foreigner is inherent in the definition of the nation. National identity performs a double role. It brings the members of the ingroup together and at the same time it differentiates them from members of other nations or minority groups. Each nation develops its distinctive identity by valorizing its special traits: a national language, a common territory—the nation’s homeland—a belief in common ancestry, shared customs and traditions, a common political culture, a set of national symbols, myths, and heroes, shared collective memories, and a sense of common destiny. These features also become the markers of difference from other nations or minority groups and serve to emphasize the in-group’s unity and uniqueness.

Origins The Historical Context and Nature of the Challenge Immigration policy and, more particularly, the issue of acceptance and integration of immigrants into the host society are legally and conceptually related to citizenship. The immigrant is an outsider, a foreigner. S/he is not a citizen of the host country. The notion of citizenship regards the rights conferred by a state to the individuals who live in the territory over which the state exerts its sovereign control. Citizenship is closely linked to nationality—sometimes the two are N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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synonymous. This is mainly because citizenship has found its modern expression in the democratic nation-state. The role of national identity in the constitution of citizenship has been primarily functional. It has helped to define the political identity of the citizen. However, citizenship needs not to be tied to national origin. Immigrants are allowed to become part of the nation, that is, to become citizens of the country of settlement, but they have first to prove that they fit culturally, socially, and economically into it. Some countries have very stringent citizenship laws requiring a long period of settlement in the country (10 or 12 years for instance) to allow for naturalization and also require that the applicant is fluent in the national language and acquainted with the national culture and political system (e.g., Germany, Switzerland, Poland, and Greece). These are nation-states in which citizenship is defined mainly through genealogical descent, putting the emphasis on blood and cultural ties. Other countries (e.g., the United States, Canada, Britain, Sweden, and France), notably immigrant nations but also countries with a long experience in receiving migrants, have rather open citizenship policies that allow for immigrants to apply for naturalization after a five-year legal stay, with loose requirements about the level of the applicants’ knowledge of the national language and culture. In these countries, national identity has primarily a territorial and civic character, while parental lineage plays a lesser role. Most nation-states combine both territorial and ethnic elements in their definition of national identity and citizenship. Most European countries and many states around the world, like Japan, China, and Russia for instance, conceive of themselves as national states, where the state is the political expression of the dominant nation. This idea implies that the culture and ethnic composition of the nation are homogenous and unique. Their presumed purity and authenticity has to be protected from the intrusion of immigrants, who are seen as alien, not belonging here, not part of us. In some countries, though, immigrant communities are integrated into the national history. The historical, cultural, territorial, or civic links between these populations and the nation are officially recognized. Thus, as happens in France, the Netherlands, and Britain, the links between the mother country and its former colonies are deemed to justify, under certain conditions, the conferral of citizenship on people of immigrant origin. Nonetheless, often the status of citizenship does not suffice to guarantee the social integration of these people. In fact, it is not unusual for individuals of immigrant origin, who have acquired by birth or residence the citizenship of the country of settlement, to be discriminated against in practice. The riots of October 2005 in France or those of the summer of 2001 in northern England are but an indication of the sometimes uneasy cohabitation between national majority and ethnic minorities. The situation is different in immigrant nations like Canada, the United States, and Australia, where immigration and settlement forms an integral part of the national narrative. Nonetheless, in these countries, too, immigration poses a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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challenge to the cohesion and self-definition of the nation. Such a challenge is, for instance, the dominance of Hispanic migration to the United States in recent decades and the related changing balance in terms of language use in public places and services. Something similar happens in Australia where the dominant national narrative of Anglo-Saxon white origins is challenged by increasing immigration from neighboring Asia, Indonesia, and the Pacific. According to the State of the World Population report published by the United Nations in 2006, international population movements have increased in the post–World War II era, partly as a result of the development of transport and communication infrastructure and because of growing disparities between the global North and the global South. Currently 191 million people live outside their country of birth, but they account for less than 3 percent of the total world population. About 41 million people have moved during the period between 1980 and 1995, whereas only 36 million have moved during the last 15 years (1990–2005). However, three-quarters of all movements have developed countries as their destination, notably North America and Europe. One out of every four immigrants lives in North America, and one out of every three lives in Europe. These general data provide for an overview of the size of the immigration challenge for national identity nowadays. Indeed, both immigrant nations (such as Canada, Australia, and the United States) and historical nation-states (such as

Girls play together at Melcombe Primary School, an inner-city school in London, where many of the students come from diverse backgrounds such as non-native English-speaking homes or hold refugee status. (Gideon Mendel/Corbis)

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most European countries) are under pressure from international immigration, which brings with it substantial cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. This diversity challenges the self-understanding of the nation. However, when considering the impact of immigration on national identities, it is necessary to distinguish between postwar and new types of migration. Post– World War II migrations involved organized, legal, long-term population movements that often followed the signature of bilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries or direct recruitment schemes of large corporations (e.g., the London Underground recruited employees abroad in the 1950s and 1960s). This took place during the period of reconstruction and industrial development of the 1950s until the 1970s. Migrants worked usually in large factories in the primary sector (in heavy industries, like coal mines, the steel industry, or car manufacturing for instance) and were covered by collective trade union–employer agreements and welfare contributions. The main countries involved in these population movements were southern European countries (e.g., Italy, Greece, Spain, or Portugal, also Yugoslavia to a certain extent) that sent workers to northern and Western Europe as well as to Canada, Australia, and the United States. Also, northern African and Middle Eastern countries (Morocco, Algeria, and also Turkey) and countries from the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent, from sub-Saharan Africa were involved in this process by sending immigrant workers to Britain, France, Germany, or the Netherlands. Workers from Africa (e.g., Ghana or Ethiopia), Latin America (Mexico, but also Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, or Peru, for instance) and Asia (China, Malaysia, Indonesia, or India, for instance) migrated to North American countries (the United States and Canada). The term “new migrations” refers to international population movements that have been taking place since the late 1980s and are typical of the last two decades. New migrations are short-term, often illegal movements and involve multiple destinations or frequent returns to the country of origin. Some migrants engage in forms of mobility that involve several repeated short-term stays, which have been called “shuttle” or “commuting” migration. These new immigrants find employment in secondary job markets, such as construction, domestic care, cleaning and catering services, or agriculture. They are usually employed in the so-called three D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and demanding), often without proper contracts or welfare contributions. These migrations are not part of a phase of economic growth but rather are attracted by structural disparities in the economies of developed countries. Contemporary immigrants take advantage of the improved means of communication and transport but are also easy prey to the economic and social forces of globalization. The challenges of postwar migration for national identity became apparent when immigrant populations began to settle in their destination countries and demanded the recognition and accommodation of their cultural, linguistic, or religious identities. Moreover, they started bringing in their families and formed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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larger immigrant communities and even ethnic neighborhoods in metropolitan cities, with distinctive cultural and religious features. They thus challenged the vision of the nation as a unitary, homogenous, and stable entity. New migrations pose less of an identity and cultural challenge to the nation because immigrants rarely establish themselves in one place to voice demands for integration. Moreover, many among the new immigrants live and work undocumented and hence are deprived of the possibility of raising any claims to the receiving state or society. They are employed in the shadow economy and live at the margins of society. Nonetheless, as time passes and the second generation comes of age, new immigrants also become settled and pose an identity challenge to the receiving country. In postwar migrations, immigrants posed a challenge through their presence, settlement, and participation in the economic and social life of the receiving countries. They were thus constructed as the outsider within in relation to their racial, cultural, or religious difference from the native population. New forms of migration are constructed as “Others” mainly because they are “invisible” in their societies of settlement. The lack of knowledge about them and their undocumented status make them easy targets for stigmatization. Media and political debates often represent them as criminal or culturally inferior, thus unfit to become part of the nation.

Dimensions Immigrant Exclusion and Ethnic Prejudice Although different countries experience in different ways and in different degrees the challenge of immigration, there is one common element in their national identity discourses: immigrants are viewed as outsiders, and often deemed threatening. However, not every immigrant is perceived as threatening or inferior by members of the nation. In Europe and North America, citizens from other developed countries may be considered foreigners but are not part of the negative stereotype usually associated with immigration. Discrimination, if experienced, is minor and certainly not the rule but rather the exception to it. The common feature that characterizes those immigrants that are constructed as the nation’s threatening Others is their subordinate position in society and the existence of ethnic, cultural, religious, or racial “markers” that distinguish them from the dominant group. Such markers are not the reason for which these groups are perceived as threatening out-groups. There is nothing intrinsically problematic in being a Muslim or being of eastern European or Asian origin. Difference acquires a negative connotation because of the context in which it is placed. Thus, anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain, France, or Germany points to religion as an important and indeed negative marker of difference for Muslim immigrants. In a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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similar vein, negative stereotypes for Albanians make nationality an important marker of difference between Greek natives and Albanian immigrants. In some cases, ethnic and religious categorizations are intertwined to mitigate or enhance the sense of difference: Thus Bulgarian or Russian immigrants in Greece, who are Christian Orthodox, are seen as less threatening than Muslim Albanians or Turkish Muslims. On the other hand, sub-Saharan African immigrants of Christian faith in Italy may experience stronger discrimination and racism than Ukrainian Catholics. This selective discrimination against specific groups has less to do with the features of these groups (racial, ethnic, or religious) and more with the identity of the receiving nation. Prejudice and discrimination against specific immigrant groups serves the interests and identity of the dominant nation. Immigrants become the negative Other in contrast to whom a positive in-group identity can be constructed and reinforced. Moreover, they provide for a flexible and cheap labor force that can be relatively easily dispensed with because they are not nationals. The construction of the immigrant’s image as inferior, negative, or threatening serves to legitimize the immigrant’s exploitation and marginalization. The relationship between power or privilege and racism or cultural prejudice has been explored from different perspectives—economic, sociological, linguistic, and ideological—by a large number of scholars. It has been shown that racial or ethnic prejudice and discriminatory discourse or behavior are related to the power structure of society and serve to maintain the privilege of one group over another. Discriminatory behavior or practices are related to race, namely skin complexion and phenotypic characteristics, culture, or a combination of both. Muslim women wearing a headscarf or black African people are thus often the victims of racist behavior and cultural prejudice. As one German African citizen put it in a research interview: “people spitting in your head to see if it sticks well in that kind of hair” (interview 63, POLITIS project, http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/ politis-europe/index.html, interviewee anonymity is protected). European media often portray young Muslim women that wear a headscarf as backward, oppressed, and unable to decide for themselves. Black African youth in Portugal were stereotyped as delinquents after the media erroneously reported about a group of youngsters who rushed through a crowded beach in the south of the country robbing people of their belongings. North Africans in France are stereotyped as lazy and uneducated; people that you cannot trust. Latinos in the United States are often labeled as illegal immigrants, while black Africans in Ireland are seen as bogus asylum seekers. In these cases, stereotyping takes place on the basis of their appearance rather than of any deeper knowledge of their nationality, origin, and reason for coming to the host country. Racism or ethnic prejudice can take two forms. One is that of overt biological racism claiming that the human race is divided into different “races” and that these are characterized by specific biological and intellectual traits. This racist N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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ideology argues that the white “race” is superior to the other “races.” This type of ideology has found its most infamous expressions in the African slave trade between the 16th and 19th centuries and in the Holocaust genocide of the Jews. Biological racism has since been discredited not only in the positive and social sciences but also in public opinion. Most citizens in Western democracies find unacceptable the use of overtly racist language. This, however, does not mean that discrimination or racism has disappeared. A second type of stereotyping and prejudice refers to cultural characteristics. This type of discourse presents differences between certain cultures as irreducible. Thus, immigrants from certain countries or ethnic groups or of specific religious faiths are said to be unable to integrate into the host society. This type of discourse has been particularly pronounced during the last few years with regard to Muslim immigrants in both North America and Europe, irrespective of their country of origin. They are represented as people who voice unreasonable demands upon their receiving societies. They are stereotypically portrayed as dangerous— potential terrorists because supposedly that is what their religion commands. The notion of race includes a variety of features, such as parental lineage, phenotype (skin color, stature, and genetic traits), as well as the combination of physical attributes with cultural features (e.g., a specific dress code, a mode of behavior, the observance of specific religious practices, customs, and mores related to family life and kinship relations). Racism is not necessarily linked to ethnicity or nationalism. What is common to the various definitions of the concept is that it is associated with natural difference: it implies that people belonging to a given race share some biological or cultural features that cannot be chosen or shed. This does not mean that racial difference is indeed natural but rather that it has been socially constructed as such. It is perceived as irreducible and, hence, threatening for the nation. Clearly, one should not equate a sociopolitical situation that allows for the perpetuation of latent racism with one in which the perpetration of racist behaviors, the organization of racist movements, and the acceptance of institutionalized racism are integrated into the system. This, however, does not mean that subtle or symbolic racism is harmless. It still treats difference as permanent because it is natural, and inherently threatening. The discourse of cultural difference has some similarity with that of biological racism because it links culture to nature. Cultural difference is seen as irreducible, because it is dependent upon ethnic descent, a presumed psychological predisposition, environmental factors, or a specific genetic makeup. Thus, immigrants are constructed as alien, unfamiliar, and less developed. In fact, nationalism brings with it the seed of discrimination against minorities. The notion of “authenticity” of the national culture, language, or traditions implies that cultural difference within the nation is undesirable. Arguments that present cultural difference as irreducible and somehow natural are racist, even if they do not refer directly to race. Of course, cultural difference N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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provides scope for fluidity and change in people’s behavior and allegiances: members of minority groups may make conscious decisions to abandon some, but hold on to other, attributes of their minority culture as they see it. Young Muslim girls in Britain or the United States, for instance, may adopt a modern way of dressing, may study, and may have a career but, at the same time, wear a headscarf to denote their religious identity. Minority groups may themselves strive to maintain cultural distinctiveness by emphasizing certain aspects of their tradition (like specific festivities, dress codes, or dietary habits) alongside full social and political integration in the society of settlement. Race, in contrast, cuts across a population without the possibility of creating nuances or changing one’s skin color. The key to understanding the importance of race and culture and their role in the relationship between the nation and the immigrant is the fact that they can both be defined as transcendental notions, linked to nature rather than nurture and, hence, irreducible. Thus, they justify the exclusion of the immigrant from the national in-group and the assertion of the national identity as supposedly authentic and pure from foreign influences.

Consequences Beyond the Nation? Transnational Immigrant Identities The previous sections of this chapter concentrate on the exclusion of immigrants from the nation and on the ways in which specific cultural or ethnic differences are used to marginalize immigrants and reinforce the national identity. This section considers how the national identity of immigrant minorities is transformed through their interaction with the receiving society. Immigrant communities usually have close symbolic and material ties with their nations of origin. “Diaspora nationalism theories” emphasize the importance of these ties for both the immigrant populations and those left behind, in the country of origin. They see the relationship between immigrants and the receiving country as one of limited integration, if not alienation. In the diaspora nationalism perspective, immigrants and natives are forced to live together mainly for economic reasons. They are both assumed to be longing for national and cultural authenticity and purity that could be achieved only through the return of the minority to the home country. Links between the country of origin and the immigrant population are important for the lives of immigrants, especially the first generation. These links help explain why sometimes immigrant communities and native populations live separate from one another and even form segregated neighborhoods. These links, however, cannot explain the process of identity transformation that takes place among second- and third-generation migrants. Diaspora nationalism approaches place too strong an emphasis on the presumed alienation (or lack of integration) N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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of the minority into the receiving society while neglecting the importance of the migration process as a human experience. They tend to overlook how immigrants change through their experiences of life and work in the country of settlement, their contact with natives, and their getting accustomed to new customs and habits, and a new language. Contemporary migrations are characterized by complex relationships between hosts, migrants, and their communities of origin within which national and ethnic affiliations are molded and redefined. Such processes give rise to such transnational political and economic activities as the twinning of Mexican and North American towns initiated by Mexican immigrants in the United States or the political activism of Iraqi or Kurdish Turks across Europe. It would be misleading to analyze such processes through the lens of national identities understood as stable and cohesive. For instance, recent studies on returning Greek Americans have highlighted the dual nature of national identity among immigrant diasporas. Young second- or third-generation Greek Americans who return to Greece realize that they belong fully neither here nor there. They experience the United States as their actual home, while Greece, which was imagined as home, too, is to a certain extent experienced as an alien culture and place. These dual or multiple identifications of immigrants of second or third generations reveal the complexity of the migrant’s situation that cannot be understood through classical definitions of national identity as stable and cohesive. Transnational identities among immigrant populations are part of the new context of intensive communications and socioeconomic globalization. It is cosmopolitan theories that have paid more attention to these issues, notably to the overall processes of social transformation in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. They emphasize the features of postindustrial societies, such as highly improved communications across the globe, better, quicker, and cheaper means of long-distance transports, media that select and cover events worldwide, all of which result in the compression of time and space. Today people may live and work in Germany, watch TV news and soap operas from Turkey, phone their relatives in Britain or Canada, and chat on the Internet with friends across the globe in an instant. Moreover, traveling between the country of origin and the place of settlement takes only several hours, less than a day, while the distance between the two places may be several thousand miles. Thus, immigrants become able to maintain frequent and intense ties with their countries of origin. In making sense of these new virtual realities of compressed time and space, sociologists have argued that individuals are today free and able to create their own individualized and flexible identities. They may be understood as free floating agents picking and choosing from different cultures and traditions the features that best suit them. Sociologists have thus argued that immigrants live in a mobile world of culturally open societies and may therefore adapt to different cultures and habits, without having any longer a sense of primary national identity. They rather negotiate choices among available options. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The cosmopolitan perspective is a useful tool in analyzing how migrants adapt their national and ethnic identity to the host society environment, negotiating emotive and cultural attachments that are both here and there. However, it neglects the fact that the use of new technologies may also lead to polarization. People may imitate consumption patterns or youth subcultures and at the same time hold on to traditional behaviors that emphasize their belonging to a given nation or ethnic group. New technologies, such as satellite TV or the Internet, may enable the preservation of immigrant identities and cultures as closed containers with direct ties between the country/region of origin and that of settlement. One important question that is also open to investigation is the extent to which new technologies have fostered new attitudes or practices among immigrant populations, or whether new technologies have simply intensified and widened the realities that existed before. Mexican or Puerto Rican immigrants in the United States for instance have led transnational lives even before the advent of new technologies. They moved regularly between the United States and Mexico or Puerto Rico, took up work in the United States, but sent remittances back home, had personal and family networks in both places, and sometimes even engaged in long-distance politics in their hometowns while residing in Texas, California, or New York City. Also, there is another facet to this that can work against cosmopolitan practices among migrants. Children born out of immigrant parents (the second generation) are sometimes ghettoized by the very policies and social attitudes in their countries of settlement. While they may feel they belong to the country in which they were born, they may be categorized by other citizens as aliens because their parents were immigrants. Thus, they are trapped in the label “immigrant,” “Latino,” “Maghrebin” (person from a North African country), “Chinese,” “Albanian,” or “Russian,” even if they personally do not identify with the national origins of their parents. Their wish for leading a cosmopolitan lifestyle can thus be hampered by the attitudes of others toward them. Socioeconomic factors should not be neglected either. Not all migrants have equal access to new technologies and cosmopolitan lives. Unavoidably, migrants with more economic resources, a higher education, and better social skills will have more access to the necessary infrastructure, thus becoming potentially more cosmopolitan than their poorer fellow nationals. Moreover, there may be a generation effect: younger immigrants are more likely to be literate in new technologies than their parents or generally middle-aged or older immigrants. Immigrants may develop multiple identities, combining their roots in the country and culture of origin and their day-to-day experiences in the country of settlement. Their mixed identities cannot be understood within a narrow conception of national identity as a static set of features that all the members of a nation share in equal terms. Transnational immigration experiences and transcultural modes of expression are a reality, and especially so in metropolitan cities like London, Paris, New York, Singapore, and Sydney. Nonetheless, in smaller places N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and also in the context of a neighborhood or small town, immigrants are part of kinship and ethnic networks that continue to affirm the significance of national identity and homeland connections. They thus reinforce a sense of difference between the national majority and the immigrant community. In conclusion, national identity and nationalism still retain a strong command over people’s sense of who they are and to whom they are related. At the same time, the power of individuals to negotiate personal identities, national cultures, and globalized economic realities is not to be neglected. Selected Bibliography Aksoy, A. 2006. “The Challenge of Migrants for a New Take on Europe.” In Transcultural Europe: Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe, edited by U. H. Meinhof and A. Triandafyllidou, 181–199. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Anthias, F., and N. Yuval Davis. 1992. Racialised Boundaries. London: Routledge. Barth, F. 1981. “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.” In Process and Form in Social Life: Selected Essays of Fredrik Barth, vol. 1, 198–231. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bogdanor, V., ed. 1987. Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions. Oxford: Blackwell. Cesarani, D., and Fulbrook, M., eds. 1996. Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe. London: Routledge. Habermas, J. 1994. “Citizenship and National Identity.” In The Condition of Citizenship, edited by P. van Steenbergen, 20–35. London: Sage. King, R. 2002. “Towards a New Map of European Migration.” International Journal of Population Geography 8:89–106. Modood, T., A. Triandafyllidou, and R. Zapata Barrero. 2006. Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship. A European Approach. London: Routledge. Riggins, S., ed. 1997. The Language and Politics of Exclusion. Others in Discourse. London: Sage. Sayad, A. 2006. The Suffering of the Immigrant. Cambridge: Polity Press. Spohn, W., and A. Triandafyllidou. 2003. Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration: Changes in Boundary Constructions between Western and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Triandafyllidou, A. 2001. Immigrants and National Identity in Europe. London: Routledge. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 2006. The State of World Population. A Passage to Hope. Women and Migration. October. http://www.unfpa.org/publications. Vertovec, S. 2003. “Migration and Other Modes of Transnationalism: Towards Conceptual Cross-Fertilization.” International Migration Review 37, no. 3: 641–666. Vertovec, S. 2004. “Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation.” International Migration Review 38, no. 3: 970–1001.

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Nationalism and Music David B. Knight Relevance Music that speaks to the hearts and minds of a particular people who accept themselves as a nation can be a powerful expression of their nationalism. Military music has long been used to lift soldiers’ spirits before and after battle, and it also speaks more generally to nationalists. Such music may remember campaigns and triumphantly recall battle successes achieved in the name of the nation. Above all, military music celebrates a sense of nationalistic pride. Some music written to accompany movies is nationalistic and, with the message of the movie, stirs the emotions of audiences. In addition, national anthems express a variety of sentiments related to the nation and inherently are expressions of nationalism. Some popular music, as expressions of “resistance,” has recently developed nationally based characteristics that reflect on the nation and state from the perspective of youthful minorities. Other music, written for orchestras and performed mostly in concert halls, can be profoundly nationalistic. This music incorporates or reflects any of the following: (1) national traditions, myths, and legends; (2) folk, popular, and military music; (3) major events—whether glorious, triumphant, or sorrowful—of significance to the nation and its people; and (4) national songs that proclaim the importance of the nation. Some of the orchestral music to be discussed was composed when the nations in question were under the control of an outside power. The composers sometimes knew they were creating music that would speak to the soul of emerging nationalism. They expressed an identification with the nation in ways that spoke powerfully to the adherents of nationalism. In time, much of this music came to have universal (i.e., extra-national) acceptance, but when composed, the music had—and generally still has—special meaning for the specific nations in question. Music that ultimately speaks to a nation takes on special meaning for listeners who identify closely with the nation. The music is held to have special value, whether to cultural elites, politicians, or the general public. Each person may have a slightly different perspective on the music’s contrasting elements, but to all who belong to a nation, the music is celebrated because it gives voice to aspects of the nation and its nationalism.

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Origins Some military music is profoundly nationalistic. The origin of military music is ancient, starting perhaps with just a ram’s horn. Trumpets and drums later were used to give battle signals and to help soldiers keep a good pace as they marched. Turkish military drums (precursors of the modern timpani, or kettle drums), cymbals, and triangles were added to European military and orchestral music in the early 18th century. National anthems have also been around for a long time. Britain’s is the oldest, having been in use since 1744. It predated other clear expressions of nationhood, thus it was centered on the ruling monarch. Verses added at later times widened its scope. National anthems elsewhere generally incorporated the idea of a people (the nation) within its special territory (the state), and referred to history and/or the future. Following on from the Romantic revolution in literature, which began in the late 18th century, a similar revolution in orchestral music emerged, led principally by Ludwig van Beethoven, Hector Berlioz, Felix Mendelssohn, and others. Their early 19th-century compositions began the process whereby clear expression of emotions, including passion, and the telling of stories was possible in music. They thereby broke the constraints of the earlier classical forms of musical composition. Some early 19th-century composers spoke to a growing sense of Germanness, including Carl Maria von Weber in his opera Der Freischütz (1821). The work thrilled German audiences, including a young Richard Wagner. He was astounded by the work, for its music and for the expression of love for Germany. From about 1840 until 1882, Wagner created numerous towering compositions that drew upon mythic stories, including the vast four-part cycle of operas known as The Ring of the Nibelung, or The Ring Cycle. Die Walküre (1870), the second opera, includes the famous Ride of the Valkyries. Wagner’s many masterful musical dramas represented the grand flowering of German cultural nationalism. Sadly, in the 1930s and 1940s, Hitler and the Nazis “adopted” Wagner’s music as their own, using it to promote their racist agenda and thus spoiled the music ever thereafter for many listeners. During much of the 19th century, Germanic forms of musical composition were dominant throughout most of Europe, Russia, and the Americas. Toward the close of the century, some composers developed styles of music that were different and that challenged this dominance. Their music was quickly recognized as being regionally distinctive in style, being unlike music found elsewhere in Europe. Further, however, their music reflected something of their people’s specific identity, love of land, stories and myths, and nationalistic dreams, whether or not they lived in their own independent state. These new forms of nationalistic expression in music became stronger as the century progressed and continued into N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the 20th century. Much of the music of this nature originated in eastern Europe, though nationalistic music also developed elsewhere, including Finland, Norway, the British Isles, and the Americas.

Dimensions War-Related Music Some nationalistic music is war based. Resistance to Napoleon’s aggressiveness provoked many composers. Franz Joseph Haydn’s Lord Nelson Mass, or Mass in the Time of Peril (1798), first expresses (in the Kyrie) Austrians’ despair as Napoleon’s armies swept across Europe and then (in the Benedictus) represents the defeat of Napoleon’s fleet in the Battle of the Nile by the British admiral Lord Nelson. Written in the classic style, its references to these events is not clear to all listeners. In contrast, Beethoven’s Wellington’s Victory (1813) is direct. Based on the 1813 Battle of Vitoria (in northern Spain), it opens with the British and French armies challenging each other before charging into battle. Rifle shots (ratchets) and cannons (bass drums) are written into the score. The blocks of soldiers advance and, with a constant rhythm played at increasing tempos, the two sets of cavalry charge. Beethoven then triumphantly signals the British victory by quoting God Save the King, to the delight of British audiences. The music also quotes the British tune Rule Britannia and the French tune Malbrouck s’en va t’en guerre. The work is thought of as either exciting or trite. There is no expression of hurt or sorrow. In another work on The Battle and Defeat of Napoleon, part of the Háry János Suite (1927), Hungarian composer Zoltán Kodály expresses in music the French emperor’s army falling over like toy soldiers. Russian composer Piotr Tchaikovsky’s famous 1812 Overture (1880) celebrates the defeat of Napoleon’s forces (La Marseillaise) by the Russians (God Preserve the People). In this patriotically joyous music, Tchaikovsky includes Moscow’s many church bells (orchestral bells) and Russian army cannons (bass drums or, on occasion, actual cannons). Today, the work is enjoyed around the world. Some war music celebrates the advance of soldiers, as in Franz Liszt’s Hungarian Attack March (1875). It is flashy, and surely still delights Hungarian audiences. In contrast, Mars, the Bringer of War, the powerful first movement of English composer Gustav Holst’s The Planets, is aggressive. The Planets is an immensely popular work in Britain, perhaps as much for later sections on, for example, Venus, the Bringer of Peace and Jupiter: the Bringer of Jollity, but it is the first movement that hits hardest. Mars is menacing and disturbing. The message is clear: war is evil, be aware, and be prepared. Written in 1914, the work seemed to be a warning of what was to come. Though thought-provoking, Holst’s music lacks the direct human impact of some music by Russian Dmitri Shostakovich. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Shostakovich, who lived in Russia when Stalin’s totalitarian regime ruled with an iron fist, walked a fine line between self-expression and meeting the state’s demand for conformity. He was in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in 1941 when Hitler’s troops attacked Russia. The German army surrounded Leningrad, but the Russians heroically held them off, though at a terrible cost. About 1 million people (one-third of the population) died from months of attacks, lack of food, and disease. Shostakovich started to write his Symphony No. 7 (called by others the Leningrad Symphony) while he was in the city, where he served as a fireman. He was evacuated to Kuybyshev (named the temporary capital of the Soviet Union due to the German army’s march on Moscow), and he completed the work there. The first movement, which he originally called War, is a haunting, increasingly angry, and very powerful expression of the relentless march of the German army toward Leningrad, and of the terror (for one hears the screams) being experienced by those in the path of the advancing troops. In later sections, the music reflects on memories—on Leningrad’s quiet streets and the bank of the River Neva at sunset—and on the moral victory of the Russian people. The 900-day German siege of Leningrad was still ongoing when the music was performed in Leningrad before a large and wearily appreciative audience. The composition still speaks powerfully to the Russian people. Shostakovich wrote another war-based work, his Symphony No. 8 (1943). The possibility exists that it (unlike the Leningrad) refers not to the external war with the Germans but to the deadly ongoing Stalinist “war” on the Russian people. Some national governments do not condone dissent. Shostakovich and other Russian composers suffered from the dictates of the state, as did Chinese composers during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. Shostakovich said in music what he couldn’t say in words. Other music related to World War II is appreciated by British audiences. It tends to be jauntily heroic, celebrating victory. For example, a concert piece was excerpted from William Walton’s music written for the movie The First of the Few (1942). Called Spitfire: Prelude and Fugue, it celebrates the famous World War II British fighter plane and its pilots during the Battle of Britain. Eric Coates took from his musical score for the movie The Dam Busters (1954) a still-popular march by the same name. Music that speaks particularly to U.S. audiences was composed by American Richard Rodgers and arranged by Robert Russell Bennett for the 26 episodes in the television series called Victory at Sea (1952–1953). The films were taken during World War II action in the Atlantic, Europe, and especially, the Pacific. The dramatic music (but without the searing pain of Shostakovich’s work) plays a major part of the storyline. Bennett later arranged the music into two orchestral suites, each called Victory at Sea. The shorter version is a “pops” concert favorite in the United States. Ultimately, Rodgers’s music is heroic, perhaps because of the desire to show the American population that their armed forces had overcome terrible odds. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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In the late 1940s and 1950s, many American and British movies were made about World War II–based stories concerning soldiers, flying crews, naval crews on ships and in submarines, and spies and code breakers. As boosters of nationalism, they had a powerful impact on young audiences. Not so incidentally, the music scores accompanying the movies were equally dramatic. A similar situation applied to a heroic and very nationalistic movie that celebrated allegiance to king and country, namely, Scott of the Antarctic (1949). It was about the 1913 British Antarctic expedition’s attempt to reach the South Pole under the leadership of Captain Robert Scott. Englishman Ralph Vaughan Williams’s accompanying music was later developed into Symphony No. 7, Sinfonia Antartica (1953). The musical exploration of the Antarctic environment is fascinating. The resulting sound pictures illustrate how music can deal with a daring feat in a landscape of extremes. Ultimately, in an eerie manner, the music conveys the defeat of the humans’ valiant effort to conquer nature. Still other music written during and after World War II gave expression to the widespread horror of what can happen when nationalisms run rampant. Many composers reacted to fascism; to the bombing and destruction of cities in Britain, the European continent, and Japan; and to the horrors of the Holocaust, when the Nazis and their cohorts imprisoned and slaughtered millions of Jews, Roma, and others. The powerful music of protest includes Frenchman Olivier Messiaen’s Quartet for the End of Time (1941), composed and first performed while he was imprisoned by the Germans, Austrian-American Arnold Schoenberg’s A Survivor from Warsaw (1947), Polish Krzysztof Penderecki’s Threnody: To the Victims of Hiroshima (1960), Englishman Benjamin Britten’s War Requiem (1962), and Canadian Robert Evans’s For the Children: No Silence of the Soul (1997). The latter work uses poems written in Terezin (a Nazi concentration camp) by Jewish children aged 8 to 15, almost all of whom were later gassed. These several composers sought to transcend nations and nationalisms. Their music mourns, surely in the hope that a better world can replace nationalistic violence. A distinctive form of war-related music that speaks to specific nations was developed by armies for their respective bands (including those of The Black Watch and Grenadier Guards in Britain, and of the armed services in the United States) and choirs (the most famous being the Russian Red Army Choir). Some of their music remembers battles fought by the armies, or regiments within them. Nationalistic Music The notion of “My Country” above all others is inherent in all nationalisms. The love for country can be expressed in epic poems, national anthems, and, too, instrumental music. This love can lead to some people getting lumps in their throats when their national anthem or some other tune special to their nation is performed. Frédéric Chopin was an early 19th-century composer who wrote nationalistic music that was inspired by folk sources. His brilliant and uniquely Polish mazurkas N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and polonaises for piano led composers elsewhere to recognize that they, too, could write music based on national folk music. One of the earliest instances of music causing audience nationalistic arousal occurred in Budapest in 1846 when the French composer Hector Berlioz (1803–1869) conducted the premiere performance in Hungary of his Rakoczy March. Hungary, part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, was dominated by the German language and culture. Berlioz’s extensive use of woodwinds and brass and punctuating percussion, including drum beats (like distant cannons) and cymbal clashes, not only enlivened the work but set an example for other Romantic composers to follow. What mattered to the Hungarians of the day, however, was the tune itself, and what Berlioz had done with it. The Rakoczy tune, Berlioz knew, would speak to the powerful patriotic feeling that Hungarians felt for themselves as a distinct people; however, its reception surprised him. As they listened, the audience first got agitated and then so excited as the work proceeded that as it neared its conclusion their cheers drowned out the music. Berlioz immediately repeated the work, and the same audience reaction occurred. Such can be the power of nationalism in music. Hungarian Franz Liszt later captured a distinctly Hungarian sound in Hungarian Rhapsodies (1850s/1880s) and Hungarian Fantasia (1852). Early in the 20th century, Hungarian composers Béla Bartók (e.g., Hungarian Sketches [1931]) and Zoltán Kodály (e.g., Galánta Dances [1933] and Peacock Variations [1938–1939]) each drew from folk songs they had gathered in the countryside, and so fed a desire among the people for music that was distinctly Hungarian. Bohemia (now the Czech Republic) was another part of the Austro-Hungarian empire where music gave voice to a growing sense of national identity (then still subnational, within the empire). Bedˇrich Smetana, born in 1824, was 19 when he moved to Praha (Prague), the leading city, where, as in most of Europe at that time, nationalistic ferment reigned. He became a famous composer. His music is recognized for its stunning representation of Czech national color and musical rhythms. He wrote several operas, including The Brandenburgers in Bohemia (it was enjoyed by patriotic Czechs but it upset the German-oriented critics) and The Bartered Bride. The latter includes well-known Czech dances. Smetana also composed the major orchestral statement on Czech nationalism; it is the most important extended example of nationalistic music. Má Vlast (composed during 1872–1879), which consisted of six symphonic poems, considers Bohemian life, the countryside, history, and legends. The first symphonic poem, Vyšehrad, refers to the imposing high rock that guards the point at which the country’s principal river, the Vltava, enters Prague. It was the site of a legendary royal fortress. The music refers to a person singing about the castle’s ancient splendor, its events such as tournaments and battles, and its eventual decline and ruination. In the second symphonic poem, Vltava (or Moldau, its German name), the river starts its flow at two springs (represented by two flutes) in southern Bohemia. The music sparkles. The sense of evolving joy is captivating. The streams soon N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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merge and become a river of growing consequence. As the work proceeds, following the river in its course, the music represents the lovely Bohemian countryside and the river flowing past a moonlit field. A hunter’s horn sounds and a joyous wedding is celebrated on the river’s bank before the river continues with a strong and steady flow, a reminder of Czech nationalism’s core strength. But then, to remind Czechs of some difficult times, the orchestra vividly depicts turbulence as the river rushes through rapids. The musical outburst soon subsides, and with a majestic restatement of the main theme, the river flows past the high castle of Vyšehrad at Praha and flows off into the distance. (Vltava is often played separately in concert programs.) Šárka follows, representing a famous Czech legend about a maiden getting revenge for her lover’s infidelity. Next, in From Bohemia’s Woods and Meadows, Smetana uses expansive melodies and a lively polka theme to describe dimly lit woods and bright open fields. Tábor represents a critically important time in Czech history: the 15th-century Hussite wars. Smetana quotes a Hussite hymn, “Ye Who Are Warriors of God.” The concluding symphonic poem, Blaník, first develops the same Hussite tune before representing the warriors retreating to the hollow Mount Blaník. There they will remain asleep until they can awaken to triumphantly ride out to save their fatherland—in Czech, Má Vlast. The work ends with the Hussite chorale linked to a joyous rendition of the first poem’s opening theme. One might imagine that Má Vlast would speak only to Czechs, for it is a powerful expression of their nationalism, but it also has great universal appeal. Antonín Dvoˇrák, another Czech, wrote Hussite Overture (1883), 16 Slavonic Dances (1878/1887), and many tone poems and nine symphonies that also spoke directly and profoundly to Bohemian audiences. Dvoˇrák and Smetana drew from the dominant Germanic style of composition, but each developed a distinctly Czech style by incorporating folk elements, history, and legends within their own respective styles of music. In the late 19th century, Russian imperialism had a firm grip on Finland. Moved by the spirit of Finnish resistance to the Russians, Jean Sibelius wrote several symphonies and tone poems based on Finnish legends and folklore that were distinctly different from anything composed by Russians. His major works include Kullervo Symphony (1891), En Saga (1892), and the four-part Lemminkänen cycle, which includes the hauntingly beautiful The Swan of Tuonela (1893). But it was Finlandia (1899) that most captured people’s attention. However, the music so stirred the raw emotions of Finnish nationalism that the Russians banned the work. As a statement in music of a people and their land, it clearly was powerfully meaningful to Finns. It is still played today, in Finland and elsewhere. A quieter form of nationalism in music was expressed by Edvard Grieg (1843– 1907). Unlike Sibelius, who drew inspiration from Finnish folklore, Grieg used Norwegian folk music and dances as the basis for much of his work, though he, too, was fully inventive in his own manner. His music became known as distinctly Norwegian, and it nourished the awakening nationalism of a people then under N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Swedish control. His most famous orchestral work, Peer Gynt (1875), in two parts, is a significant musical drama in a Romantic style. The work relates the story of a wandering Norwegian who, in time, returns to Norway. Grieg loved western Norway’s rural countryside and composed in a cabin located on a fjord, with a glacier opposite. Like Sibelius, Grieg was strongly influenced by a love of nature. Peer Gynt is filled with lovely melodies and incorporates birdsong and a shepherd’s horn at sunrise. The delightfully expressive work spoke subtly but distinctly to Norwegians. It was not deemed by the Swedish government to be threatening so, in contrast to the experience of Sibelius, Grieg’s nationalistic music was performed without interference. Composers elsewhere also sought to create their national music, not least in Russia. Mikhail Glinka’s opera, A Life for the Tsar (1836), was an early expression of a Russian style. In his next opera, Ruslan and Lyudmila (1842), based on work by Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin, Glinka explicitly founded a national style. Tchaikovsky, though famous and the composer of wonderful tunes, was criticized by some for not having the compositional skills of German composers Beethoven and Brahms. A group of composers (known as The Russian Five or “the mighty handful”: Mili Balakirev, Aleksandr Borodin, Cesar Cui, Modest Mussorgsky, and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov) sought to compose distinctively Russian music, freed of German influences. Tchaikovsky was not invited to join the group. The strongest nationalistic statements appear in Mussorgsky’s powerful opera Boris Godunov (1869), Mussorgsky’s diabolical Night on Bald Mountain (1867), Borodin’s Polovtsian Dances (1875), and Rimsky-Korsakov’s Russian Easter Festival Overture (1888). Rimsky-Korsakov, Tchaikovsky, and others used, or were inspired by, Russian Orthodox Church melodies and folk tunes. Some composers used “exotic” musical influences: Borodin included Russian and Oriental influences in his In the Steppes of Central Asia (1880), while Rimsky-Korsakov wrote a wonderful (and strongly Russian) Capriccio espagñol (1887) based on Spanish influences. French composers also were interested in Spanish music, with its distinctive rhythmic and melodic idioms, and they composed their versions of Spanish music, including Emmanuel Chabrier’s España (1883) and Maurice Ravel’s Rapsodie espagnole (1907). Spanish composers were developing their own national voice. Their works include Isaac Albéniz’s Rapsodia espagñole (1887), Catalonia (1899), and Iberia (1905–1908); Enrique Granados’s Spanish Dances (1888–1890) and Goyescas (1914), the latter inspired by the work of Francisco de Goya; Joaquín Turina’s Danzas fantásticas (1920) and Sinfonia Sevillana (1920); Joaquín Rodrigo’s Concierto de Aranjuez (1939); and Manuel de Falla’s many compositions, including the opera La vida breve (1905) and the engaging ballet El Amor Brujo (1915), from which his brilliant and hugely popular Ritual Fire Dance has been extracted. Nationalism in music was profoundly expressed in Italy. For most of the 1800s, Italy consisted of many kingdoms; the unification process took many decades. Giuseppe Verdi was born near Busseto in 1813 and lived until 1901. He thus witnessed the struggle to unite the country. He believed strongly that each nation N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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should create its own distinctive music. In his opera Nabucco (1842), set in ancient Egypt, a chorus of Hebrew slaves sing “Va, pensiero,” giving voice to a people being freed from domination. “Their” song was quickly adopted as the song of liberation by Italians seeking the end of Austria’s rule of Lombardy. Indeed, Verdi’s chorus became like an underground “national hymn” for those patriots. Verdi, staunchly pro-Italian, was a figurehead for Italy’s unification movement. In 1861, following the second Italian War of Independence, he was elected to Italy’s first national parliament. However, it was his music for which he is remembered, not his political role. He gave the ever-increasing sense of a truly Italian national identity a boost in the opera Aida (1871). It was more triumphant—some would say overbearing—than Nabucco in its nationalistic expression, though in both works strong patriotic undercurrents are evident. In Aida, Verdi sets a love story against a plot of Ethiopia invading Egypt. Though “exotic” in theme to Italian audiences, the music spoke directly to Italian nationalism, with a highlight being the famous “Triumphal March,” in which trumpets blare. The work clearly celebrates Italianness, and nothing Egyptian. Also late in the 19th century, several British composers set out to create “their” music, led by Welshman Joseph Parry (Blodwen [1878]); Scotland’s Hamish MacCunn (whose distinctly Scottish Land of the Mountain and the Flood [1887] remains popular) and Alexander Mackenzie (Highland Ballad [1893] and Scottish Concerto [1897]); and Ireland’s Charles Villiers Stanford (including Irish Symphony [1886]). Each showed in their work something of the character of their respective countries. Several British compositions stand out as statements in music that revel in national and imperial pride, including Edward Elgar’s five Pomp and Circumstance marches, especially the first, titled “Land of Hope and Glory” (1901); Hubert Parry’s patriotic hymn, “Jerusalem” (1916); William Walton’s two coronation tunes, “Crown Imperial” (1937) and “Orb and Septre” (1953); and Henry Wood’s Fantasia on British Sea Songs (1905), which concludes with a rousing rendition of “Rule Britannia” (the latter a poem by James Thomson, set to music by Thomas Arne around 1740). These works were immediately adopted by the general British listener, not just by sophisticated audiences. They are still played regularly during nationalistic celebrations, such as the Last Night at the Proms, held each summer at London’s Royal Albert Hall, when the audience enthusiastically joins in while the orchestra performs. The music feeds the sentimental attachment to a national past that is deemed still to be of value. In the United States, composers were initially strongly influenced by German music. Few composers used local influences, though Louis Moreau Gottschalk, born in New Orleans in 1829, drew upon African American and Creole influences for some of his compositions. In the 1880s, Antonín Dvoˇrák suggested to Americans that Negro (African American) and Indian (Native American) music could form the basis of a distinctly American music. Some composers took up his recommendations. Some drew upon Indian material; for example, Edward MacDowell’s Suite No. 2, Indian (1897) quotes Iroquois and Kiowa melodies. Later, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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George Gershwin used jazz idioms in Rhapsody in Blue (1924) and various African American idioms in his often-performed opera, Porgy and Bess (1935). Other composers, including Ferde Grofé in the Grand Canyon Suite (1931), drew inspiration from the American landscape. Charles Ives, born in Danbury, Connecticut, the son of the local bandmaster, sought to develop a distinctly American music. His music is either lovely, with flowing melodies, or jaggedly discordant. Central Park in the Dark (1906) describes a scene in New York he knew well. It includes a raucous middle section, representing the hustle and bustle of the street scene beyond the otherwise quiet park. Three Places in New England (ca. 1912–1921) celebrates a Civil War battle that is remembered on a monument in Boston; a Revolutionary War story in Redding, Connecticut; and a walk Ives took with his wife one Sunday morning near Stockbridge, Connecticut. These and others of his works are uniquely American in style. New Yorker Aaron Copland was the first American composer to be recognized outside the United States for his distinctly personal, and national, style. He used western themes in Billy the Kid (1938), which includes a dramatic gunfight, and Rodeo (1942). In Lincoln Portrait (1942), a speaker reads excerpts from President Abraham Lincoln’s speeches. Fanfare for the Common Man (1942) is performed widely. His most famous extended work, Appalachian Spring (1944), makes exquisite use of the Shaker hymn “ ’Tis the Gift to be Simple.” It is often performed at concerts celebrating American nationalism, such as Independence Day (July 4th). Copland’s friend Leonard Bernstein was a later composer to write in a particularly American style, though his is restrictively New York. The finger-snapping pulse of his West Side Story (originally a Broadway musical [1957], later an orchestral suite [1960]) has, however, not reached the level of public acceptance as a nationalistic epic in the manner achieved by Copland’s Appalachian Spring. Composers in many other parts of the world have intentionally created their national music. For example, Mexican Carlos Chávez, who wrote in a Mexican nationalist style, including Suite de Caballos de Vapor (1927) and Sinfonia India (1935), was influenced by indigenous “Indian” music, but he rarely quoted it directly. Brazilian composer Heitor Villa-Lobos sought to provoke nationalistic pride by using in his music rich Brazilian colors and rhythms, as in Descrobimento di Brasil (1936–1937, 1942). Argentinian Alberto Ginestera drew from the gaucho guitarists and their folk dances while developing a distinctively Argentinian nationalistic style for his Panambi (1937) and Estancia (1941). Composers elsewhere include Peter Sculthorpe in Australia (e.g., The 5th Continent [1963] and Kakadu [1988]) and Douglas Lilburn in New Zealand (Aotearoa Overture [1940]). Sculthorpe and others have used references to Aborigines in their music, and some New Zealand compositions use Maori references, including Christopher Blake’s The Coming of Tane Mahuta (1987), Maria Grenfell’s Stealing Tutunui (2000), and Maori composer Gillian Whitehead’s O Matenga (1984). Other contemporary composers who have written music that is distinctly reflective of their nations include Japanese composer T¯oru Takemitsu who, for example, has N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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composed remarkable compositions inspired by specific Japanese landscapes, as in Green (1968) and Tree Line (1988). His younger contemporary, Toshio Hosokawa, has composed Memory of the Sea (2000), about the recovered city of Hiroshima after its destruction by the atomic bomb. Some Chinese composers mix the Western orchestra with traditional Chinese instruments, as in Vanessa-Mae’s Happy Valley (1997), which is about the takeover of Hong Kong by China. Another contemporary Chinese composer, Tan Dun, is notable for his distinctively Chinese compositions mixed with Western idioms and Western instrumentation. However, he is forging something new in orchestral music; his compositions often clearly transcend China rather than referring to a Chinese nationalism. In contrast, some works by other Chinese composers are explicitly centered in China. Whereas Smetana, Sibelius, and Grieg reacted to external political control of their homelands, many Chinese composers—indeed most intellectuals, and also countless others from all walks of life—experienced immense hardship from a source within the state during the so-called Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Wang Xilin’s music relentlessly represents the persecution and censorship experienced by him and others during the Revolution. Like Shostakovich in Russia, Wang has sought to give voice in his music to criticism of the authorities while suffering from a lack of freedom of thought and action. Another Chinese composer, Sheng Bright, composed H’un [Lacerations]: In memoriam 1966–76 (1988), a mournful, dissonant, orchestral evocation of the suffering of the Chinese people during that Cultural Revolution. And following the remarkable display of defiance by students and others in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989, Chou Wen-chung composed Windswept Peaks (1990) to represent the people who stood tall against the military might and thought-controlling dictates of the state. These several composers in China, as with composers elsewhere in other times and other places, have demonstrated in their music that it is possible to challenge the state and, thus, the nation, to think afresh. Traditional Music, New Music, and Resistance African, Middle Eastern, and Asian cultures are renowned for drumming. Styles vary from one region to another, but musical traditions of independence and virtuosity exist that speak to each region’s national traditions and celebrations. In addition, hand clapping, singing and associated dancing, and the use of other instruments are employed. Instruments vary, but include the zeze (a flat-bar zither) in the Congo; the valimba (gourd-resonated xylophones) in southern Malawi; the “penny whistle” in South Africa; the tanbur (flute) and the 14-stringed Herati dutar in Afghanistan; the plucked sehtar and mallet-struck santur in South Asia (specifically India); and many instruments in Southeast Asia, including the Balinese gamelan (comprising gongs, metallophones, xylophones, cymbals, flutes, and fiddles). Some instruments are used in widely separated locations, including versions of the lyre in Crete and Kenya. These and other culturally significant instruments are used to perform music that is appreciated locally and regionally N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and sometimes is understood to represent national music, and, thus, it speaks to specific nationalisms. Fascinatingly, with recent migrations—for example, to France from various African territories and the Middle East, to Germany from Turkey, to Britain from southern Asia and the Caribbean—musical styles and instruments have been transferred and, in the new settings, have been merged with other traditions to create new styles of music. Much of this new music no longer speaks to specific nationalisms, however, and it is now generally categorized as “world music.” Some musical styles have been adopted far from the countries of origin and developed afresh. Such has been the case with rap music. Although modeled on their U.S. counterparts who originated the genre, Cuban rappers, for example, have developed rap Cubano in terms of their own style and content, content that speaks to being Cuban. Similarly, in France (notably recent immigrant minorities), Italy, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and New Zealand, vernacular forms of rap have developed that are different from one another and from the U.S. hip-hop mainstream. These “resistance vernaculars” express the desires of particular populations, mainly youths, who are seeking to preserve the “local,” which is nationally based. Music by Bands Brass, concert, and military bands can speak powerfully to nationalisms. After the French Revolution, the band of the Garde Républicaine in Paris established a pattern that was thereafter largely followed by bands in other European countries. Rather than just using brass instruments (trumpets, trombones, euphoniums, and drums and cymbals), they incorporated wind instruments (including clarinets and oboes). The bands played for parades and concerts. Since the second half of the 19th century, military and civilian band parades have been visible and enjoyed spectacles in all European countries and elsewhere. For example, in Japan, bands playing European-styled military marches date from when the late19th-century Meiji government began modernizing the Japanese armed forces. Elsewhere, tunes specific to the countries are still performed, including Russia (“Slavonic Farewell March” from World War I), New Zealand (“Invercargill” [1900]), and Canada (“The Maple Leaf Forever March” [1867]). Ties to days of empire remain, thus bands using European instruments perform in such former colonial countries as India, Kenya, and Fiji. The combination of the players’ uniforms, precision marching, brightly shining instruments, twirling sticks, and, of course, stirring patriotic music can be special. Some such music is quietly patriotic, as with Czech composer Julius Fucik’s marches, including “Entry of the Gladiators” (1900) and “Florentine March” (1910), whereas other music is more strident. The latter includes such toe-tapping marches by the American John Philip Sousa as “Semper Fidelis” (1888), “Washington Post” (1889), “The Thunderer” (1889), “The Liberty Bell” (1893), and the U.S. official march, “Stars and Stripes Forever” (1896). These and similar works are played throughout N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Elmira Cornet Band, 33rd Regiment of the New York State Volunteers, July 1861. (Library of Congress)

the United States at various national patriotic events, sports games, and during summer concerts in parks. For the British, nothing is better than the rousing marches by Kenneth J. Alford, including “Colonel Bogey” (1913), “The Voice of the Guns” (1917), “The Thin Red Line” (1925), “Army of the Nile” (1941), and “By Land and Sea” (1941). These works are often played at national events, such as the queen’s birthday celebrations and the trooping of the colors in London. They speak directly to British patriotism or at least to those who are enlivened by such music. For Scots, bagpipe music has a quickly recognizable sound (no matter what tune is being played). It spurred Scots into battle and was feared by opposing armies. Many tunes are nationally significant, including “Scotland the Brave.” National Anthems All states have a national song or tune—in English, referred to as a national anthem —that is performed on official occasions (e.g., the opening of parliament or a national service remembering war dead) or at certain times (including, in some countries, at sports events, in movie theaters, or to open and close a day’s TV or radio broadcast). It is also used at international events, such as at the Olympics and when two countries play against each other in, for example, rugby or hockey. Such a tune, like the national flag, is part of a state’s iconography that helps bind together the people of the nation. While important to the people of the state, the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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tune itself may not be memorable in terms of musical importance. Some national anthems are march-like (e.g., France’s “La Marseillaise”), others are hymns (e.g., the United Kingdom’s “God Save the Queen/King”), several are in 19th-century opera mode (e.g., El Salvador), a few are brief fanfare-like tunes without words (e.g., United Arab Emirates), and some are based on folk music (e.g., Japan and Sri Lanka). The longest serving national anthem is that of the United Kingdom, “God Save the King” (or Queen). Derived from 17th-century material, it was first used in 1744. It was played around the British empire during the 18th to 20th centuries, and it is still used in most Commonwealth countries, especially when Queen Elizabeth II is present. Interestingly, the tune was adopted by many European countries during the 19th century, using different words. It is still used by Liechtenstein. At various times following the Declaration of Independence, Americans used the tune for “God Save America,” “God Save George Washington,” and even “God Save the Thirteen States.” It is now used in the United States for “America,” with the patriotic words “My Country, ’Tis of Thee.” The oldest anthem is “Wilhelmus van Nassouwe” (words, ca. 1570; music 1626) but only in terms of origin, for it was not used until Wilhelmina became queen of the Netherlands in 1898, when it gradually replaced the earlier “Wien Neêrlandsche bloed door d’adren vloeit” (adopted in 1816 following the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands). Other old anthems include those in Argentina (1813), Denmark (1819), Bolivia (1845), and Finland (1848). France’s national anthem has had a conflicted history. Written in 1792 as a military marching song, it was published as “Chant de guerre pour l’armée du Rhin.” Shortly afterward, it was sung by a battalion of volunteers from Marseillaise during a march into Paris. It was thereafter called “La Marseillaise,” and as such, it was formally accepted as the French national anthem in a decree passed July 14, 1795. However, Napoleon banned it due to its revolutionary associations. Upon the restoration of the Crown in 1815, it was also banned by Louis XVIII. It was reaccepted following the July Revolution of 1830, but then banned yet again by Napoleon III. Only in 1879 was it finally reinstated. Now clearly the national song of France, for a time the tune was also used for “The Internationale,” the international revolutionary movement’s song. In 1888 the latter song was given its presently used tune. The tune for “La Marseillaise” has been quoted in numerous orchestral works, including Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture and Debussy’s Feux d’artifice. The words for the U.S. national anthem, “The Star-Spangled Banner,” written in 1814 by Francis Scott Key, were set to a popular British drinking song. In time, it became an American patriotic song, but it was not until 1931 that it was officially accepted as the U.S. national anthem. Numerous anthems were written in Europe after World War I and in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific during the decolonization period after World War II. Many states officially accepted their national anthems upon, or shortly after, achieving political independence. For example, Israel adopted its national anthem in 1948, India in 1950, Ghana in 1957, Botswana in 1966, and Kiribati in 1979. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The words of national anthems varyingly celebrate the “homeland” (as the place of the nation, including its physical characteristics), the nation (its people, its values, its qualities, and its future), historical events (struggles, battles, and victories), and leaders (king/queen and soldiers as heroes). A national anthem is meaningful to members of a nation, though not necessarily to anyone else.

Consequences The music that has been discussed here is regionally distinctive. The music expresses sentiments special to particular peoples who, as nations, belong, or claim to belong, to particular political territories (whether or not their particular territory was politically independent when the music was composed). Most of the composers identified above set out to create music that was distinct from the dominant (notably German) musical traditions in Europe. This occurred in two ways: (1) composers, when writing their music, drew from and sometimes directly quoted local folktales and myths, traditions, and folk music; (2) composers created their own distinctive styles of music by sometimes breaking traditional rules of form, harmony, melodies, rhythm, and tone colors. The composers’ inventiveness thus gave expression to musical “localisms” that were readily understood and appreciated by their local audiences (as in Finland and in Bohemia, for example). Some of this music clearly expressed something of the growing nationalistic sentiments of the respective nations and so helped enhance the people’s sense of nationalism. The music in question touched people’s hearts and may have impacted their souls, for it expressed something essential about the spirit of the nation. This impact continues. Nationalistic music makes the most sense to those of the nation who identify with the composer’s statements; the composer’s music becomes their music. Interestingly, some such music can also have universally accepted qualities, so it can serve as a sort of musical ambassador in other countries. Even so, the music can be appreciated most fully by referring to the national origins of the pertinent composer—to his or her local influences—and by becoming aware of the distinctiveness of the particular national styles of music. Much military music and all national anthems are quintessential expressions of nationalism in music. As identified, some of the older expressions of nationalism in music were defiant, some were suppressed, and some were quietly distinct and did not threaten then-dominant political authorities. Threats by the state still evoke reactions in orchestral music, as in China in recent times where composers have used a mix of European and traditional Chinese instruments. Some popular forms of music also express resistance and is often defiant. A number of disenchanted groups today, in various countries, have adopted rap to express their thoughts and hopes. Rather than blindly mimic U.S. styles, they have created distinctive naN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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tionally centered voices. Such music may thus be the latest expression of nationalism in music. Selected Bibliography Bierley, P. E. 1973. John Philip Souza: American Phenomenon. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Boyd, M. 2001. “National Anthems.” In The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, vol. 17, 2nd ed. Edited by S. Sadie, 654–687. New York: Macmillan. Csepeli, G., and A. Örkény. 1997. “The Imagery of National Anthems in Europe.” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 34:33–41. Hazen, M. H., and R. M. Hazen. 1987. The Music Men: An Illustrated History of Brass Bands in America, 1800–1920. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press. Knight, D. B. 2006. Landscapes in Music: Space, Place, and Time in the World’s Great Music. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Murray, D. 1994. Music of the Scottish Regiments. Edinburgh, UK: Pentland. Taruskin, R. 2001. “Nationalism.” In The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, vol. 17, 2nd ed. Edited by S. Sadie, 689–706. New York: Macmillan. Turner, G., and A. Turner. 1994–1997. The History of British Military Bands, vols. 1–3. Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount. Vaughan Williams, R. 1996. National Music and Other Essays. 2nd ed. New York: Clarendon. Whiteley, S., A. Bennett, and S. Hawkins, eds. 2004. Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Zikmund, J. 1969. “National Anthems as Political Symbols.” Australian Journal of Politics and History 15, no. 3: 73–80.

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New Social and Environmental Movements in Relation to Nationalism Joseph M. Whitmeyer Relevance “New social movements” is a term coined by Western European social theorists— Alain Touraine, Albert Melucci, and John Keane are commonly mentioned—to refer to certain types of collective action that became prominent beginning in the 1960s in Western Europe. These movements appeared to be different from the types of movements that were common earlier in the 20th century or before, in both the objectives of the movements and the social position of the majority of the participants, hence the qualifier, “new.” Theorists most frequently clarified what constituted a new social movement (henceforth NSM) by what it was not: it was not oriented to social class; it was not made up primarily of the lower classes, such as peasants or the industrial working class, contrasting with labor movements, in particular; it was not a regional or religious movement. Jan Willem Duyvendak (1994, 62–63) gives an explicit definition: “A ‘new’ movement must consist of a majority of middle-class individuals believing in post-materialist values. Other elements such as the pursuit of identity objectives, or strong universalist inclinations constitute practical aid in the identification of a new movement.” Common examples of NSMs are movements for peace, for social solidarity or against racism, for the environment, against nuclear power, for feminist causes, for gay and lesbian rights, and against free trade. It should be clear from the above that the “new” in “new social movements” is part of the label rather than a defining adjective. Some NSMs, such as feminist movements or environmental movements, existed in the late 19th or early 20th centuries and are not new; and some new movements, such as the antiabortionists, skinheads, or Islamic terrorists, would be excluded from NSMs by most theorists who use the term. Theorists of NSMs also plainly understand their political location to be on the left. The essential element of “post-materialist values” in the definition above is intended to make this clear: NSMs are hostile or, at a minimum, indifferent to the market economy and objectives of participants in the market economy. Yet, some fairly recent social movements fit almost all of the criteria for NSMs, except that ideologically they are on the right rather than the left. In the United States, these include the antiabortion movement and various conservative political and social movements, from the Moral Majority on. Rather than quibble over labels and definitions, or what constitutes a “post-materialist value,” this essay excludes right-wing movements on the grounds that most scholN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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ars would do so and accepts Duyvendak’s definition of NSMs as being a representative characterization, and more specific than most. It seems clear, then, that NSMs, as defined, will not include nationalist movements. We could anticipate, in fact, that NSMs will be likely to be antagonistic to nationalist movements, which frequently are right-wing. In affluent countries, for example, the recent conservative movements mentioned above typically are in sympathy with majority nationalism, in contrast with NSMs. When we look outside the affluent countries, however, we see that the relationship between NSMs and nationalism is more complicated. Before we delve into it, it will be helpful to clarify “nationalism.” A standard definition of nationalism has it as an ideology, such that those who hold it believe that their people, typically some sort of ethnic, regional, or language group, should be coterminous with the state. A nationalist movement then is collective action with this as its goal. This article takes “pro-nation” sentiment to be the crucial characteristic and extends the concept to cover a broader range of phenomena. Thus, it also includes anti-immigrant movements, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s in France, and pro-ethnic movements, such as ones that seek not necessarily a state but perhaps regional autonomy or more rights or privileges for a minority. Moreover, it even includes patriotism, especially as it is directed against other nations or countries. Both this and anti-immigrant movements fall under the label of “majority nationalism.” Without these extensions, we would have to exclude most affluent countries, with the exception of Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, from consideration.

Origins With these definitions under our belt, we now observe that the relationship between NSMs and nationalism varies greatly by country, or more precisely, by region of the world. This means we must turn next to looking at this relationship in different national contexts. NSMs are most easily understood in their original context, Western Europe, and more broadly, in affluent, advanced industrial societies. In that setting, the relationship between NSMs and majority nationalism ranges from indifference to antagonism. Prototypical NSMs tend to have a transnational ideology: they are for women’s rights, gay rights, peace, an improved natural environment, and so forth, everywhere. Where this conflicts with nationalistic goals in these affluent societies—which, for example, may include economic development and accompanying environmental degradation, or the advance of national interests that involves the risk or reality of war—NSMs must be antinationalist. One can think here of the support for the Kyoto treaty on greenhouse gas reduction by environmental groups, or the peace movement that galvanized Europe, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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particularly West Germany, and the United States during the early 1980s. In these cases, the NSMs were opposing positions that were plainly nationalist: the Bush administration’s resistance to a treaty that it took to be bad for the American economy, and the Reagan administration’s antagonism toward the Soviet Union as the “evil empire.” In France during the period we are considering, the most prominent of the NSMs was the surge of collective action against racism after 1983, especially in 1985 in response to the popularity and electoral success of Le Pen’s anti-immigrant Front National. Even the anti-free-trade movement that disrupted the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in 1999 was much less nationalist than old-time opposition to free trade, which was protectionist, ostensibly in the interests of the country, rather than antibusiness. The exception to the lack of sympathy of affluent country NSMs for nationalism within their borders is minority nationalism. For example, in the United States, Greenpeace and other NSMs have come to the aid and support of Native American groups seeking to preserve or obtain territorial rights and autonomy. Similarly, NSMs in Australia have been supportive of Aboriginal groups and rights. Often this support for minority indigenous groups dovetails with other objectives of the NSMs, such as environmental causes. Outside of the affluent countries, NSMs generally are weaker and their relationship to nationalism is different. Consider three groupings: the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and other places.

Riot police confront protesters during the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle. (Christopher J. Morris/Corbis)

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In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the pattern is broadly as follows. In the 1980s in many regions there was large growth in NSMs, especially environmental movements, and in popular support for them. These NSMs were more or less explicitly nationalistic, except in Russia. In the 1990s, the association between the NSMs and nationalism ended. Nationalist and nationalism-linked movements generally continued to receive popular backing, while NSMs saw their support collapse and became appendages of international NSMs, that is, NSMs based in affluent countries. As this synopsis suggests, the time line here is crucial: in 1989, largely peaceful revolutions ended Soviet control over Eastern European countries; in 1991, the Soviet Union broke up and states formerly incorporated into the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine and the Baltic countries, became independent. Thus, in the 1980s, we see NSMs that were either overtly or latently nationalist. In some places, these NSMs were clear surrogates for nationalist movements that could not manifest themselves as such. In others, they created social and social organizational potential that nationalist entrepreneurs and a nationalist populace could use when the moment became propitious for nationalist action. In the Ukraine, and other components of the Soviet Union, the NSM that mattered was the antinuclear-power movement, which arose in response to the Chernobyl disaster. This movement was at least implicitly against domination by central government, which was, of course, Russian in nationality. Therefore, outside of Russia, the movement was at least latently nationalist. In the 1990s, once the Soviet Union broke up, this became obvious, and, in fact, it became apparent that the nationalism was more fundamental than the environmental and safety concerns, for these movements disappeared completely, or nearly so, once nationalist movements could appear openly at various points in the 1990s. The antinuclear and associated movements could be strong and influential when overt nationalist movements were politically impossible, and they were important in catalyzing the nationalist movements that subsequently appeared, but as mass phenomena, the nationalist movements completely superseded them. We see a similar phenomenon in satellites of the Soviet Union and in the nations that comprised Yugoslavia. In East Germany in the 1980s, there was a strong upsurge in popular interest in environmental issues, especially following the Chernobyl disaster. Environmental movements were not linked explicitly to nationalism, but they were antigovernment, anti-regime, and played an important role in the peaceful revolution of 1989. The 1990s, however, saw an almost complete eclipse of popular support and interest in environmental causes. Croatia, likewise, had women’s groups and a strong environmental movement prior to the 1990s, but they lost much of their support during the war in 1991–1992. Generally, across Eastern Europe, environmental movements directed against the industrial and building policies pursued by the communist governments obtained much popular support by the end of the 1980s. Yet, for example, following these countries’ acquisition of independence and democracy, none has exhibited N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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a green party with any electoral success. Although they never had the popularity that environmental movements did, women’s movements show the same trajectory. Paul Stubbs tells the revealing story of how, in Slovenia, the trial of a journalist transformed a pro-peace women’s movement struggle to end compulsory female service in the Yugoslav army into a Slovenian nationalist movement. The continued existence of NSMs in places like the Ukraine, Russia, Slovenia, and Croatia, has depended on near total support by international, that is to say, outside groups. The same is true for environmental movements in the eastern portion of Germany from the 1990s, which is dependent on outside financing and support from organizations in the western portion. Across the region of eastern Europe, environmental and other NSMs have little grassroots support. They have become small, professionalized pressure groups that depend on financial support from western Europe. Accordingly, they typically are concerned more with issues of foreign elites than with those of the domestic population. In contrast, nationalist movements in this region frequently are much stronger, and often have considerable popular support. In Latin America in the period under consideration, NSMs and their relationship to nationalism display yet another pattern. This stems from the economic, political, and social conditions prevailing, albeit with great variation, in Latin America. Economically, while the Latin American countries manifest considerable differences in prosperity and production, none approaches the affluence of western Europe. Politically, these countries have not been consumed by a single dominant issue like the struggle to cope with and then break free of Soviet or Serbian domination. Socially, relevant to nationalism, for most countries in this region, ethnicity or race is an important and frequently contentious dimension of society. These characteristics of Latin American countries have produced a situation in which identification of NSMs is less straightforward and more controversial. This problem is not particularly surprising, given that the NSM concept was coined in response to the situation and events in Europe and not elsewhere. As for the relationship of Latin American NSMs—or pseudo-NSMs—to nationalism, it is more complicated and murkier. Frequently, these movements mingle typical NSM goals with older-style goals, such as land reform and land rights. There also may be a divergence between the concerns and goals of the elites who organize the movements and those of the rank and file. A movement also may appeal to international NSMs and so emphasize NSM-type goals publicly, to its global audience, even though those are not the primary focus of the membership. Moreover, here the appeal is not generally for financial support but rather for political support. Some scholars and others looking at this region have found NSMs tied to varieties of nationalism, or nationalistic movements that they see as NSMs. Wade (1997, 95–96), for example, explicitly claims strength and expansion in the 1980s and 1990s for NSMs, for which he includes “squatters’ associations, Christian Base Communities, animal rights groups, workers’ cooperatives, indigenous land rights N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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organizations, and ecological groups.” These may be considered NSMs because they do not emphasize modernization and revolution as earlier movements did; instead, they aim more at making a place for themselves in society and are more concerned with identity. Yet Latin American social movements typically have old-style objectives as well. At their core, most of the strong movements in Latin America have been about land rights, which is one of the oldest concerns of social movements, predating, for example, the labor disputes that industrialization brings. The land conflicts frequently are connected with issues of indigenous identity and rights, yet identity and post-materialist values may not be significant motivations for many of the participants in these movements. Here there may be a divergence between the goals of the leadership, more oriented toward NSM-type goals, and those of much of the membership, more oriented toward material goals, such as obtaining land. In addition, the leadership may emphasize the indigenous aspect of conflicts publicly in order to garner international sympathy and support. Similarly, some Latin American indigenous groups have taken a pro-ecology, conservationist stance as a tactic in the struggle for land rights. These movements proclaim an espousal of environmental values and pursuit of environmentalist ends, at least in part to attract support from the society around them and perhaps foreign support that otherwise might overlook them. Yet, especially when a primary goal of a movement’s membership is land rights, specifically concerning use of land for agricultural purposes, there is likely to be considerable inconsistency between what the group members do and the environmentalist values the groups announce. Moreover, rich-country observers and even the movements themselves may be tempted to shade their public portrayals of the movements for political purposes. The Zapatista rebellion launched in Chiapas, Mexico, on January 1, 1994, shows many of these characteristics. This uprising captured the imagination of many intellectuals in affluent countries who found its combination of indigenism and opposition to free trade (in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]) appealing. They also liked its postmodern style as displayed through the pronouncements and self-presentation of its leader, the Subcomandante Marcos. It seems a genuine conjunction of a new social movement and indigenist nationalism. The truth, however, is more complicated. The leaders of the Zapatistas were not indigenous; they were Marxist revolutionaries whose ultimate objective was to overthrow the Mexican government. The ordinary members seem to have been primarily motivated by the age-old goal of peasant movements: land they could farm as their own. The free-trade issue was of little importance to them, and they were not particularly nationalist. The issue of indigenous rights emerged only subsequent to the initial confrontation as part of negotiations with the Mexican government and only in response to pressure from supporters, such as the local Catholic bishop. Another complication is that, like many land-rights movements N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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in poor countries, the Zapatistas were in direct conflict with environmental objectives: a substantial proportion of the territory they wanted to farm was restricted from agricultural use because the federal government had designated it for ecological preservation. In short, the Zapatista rebellion is something of a hybrid. For its members, the struggle was mostly for land they could farm, but their landlessness was closely related to their ethnicity and social class, and the survival of their movement depended on its appeal to the post-materialist sensibilities of affluent country observers. Thus the movement evinces a nationalist dimension and some of the characteristics of NSMs, but at core is far more old-fashioned. Finally, we turn to other less affluent countries. As a populous, large, and therefore complicated country, India displays many of the same interpretive difficulties as Latin America, for similar reasons. Some Indian movements do reflect post-materialist values and, therefore, might be called NSMs—they are concerned, for example, with women’s rights, ecology, health, and civil liberties. They have little mass support, however, compared with class-oriented movements. Movements with wider appeal include farmers’ and anti-caste movements, which, being mass movements, also have attracted the support of politicians. Widespread, also, are nationality movements, which seek autonomy to a greater or lesser extent. These often protest against environmental destruction and, moreover, seek decentralization as many NSMs, including environmental groups, do. The nationality movements, however, comprise mostly farmers, and although ethnicity or nationality is important to them, an even stronger motivation tends to be land-rights issues. Moreover, while, as elsewhere, the tactical strategies of nationality movements can dovetail with the objectives of NSMs, in particular, environmental groups, this does not make them NSMs, and the alliance is likely to be temporary. In short, neither the nationality movements nor the farmers’ and anti-caste movements are manifestations of post-materialist values; they are not NSMs as defined by the theorists of NSMs. In the less affluent countries, because there is little domestic audience for its post-materialist positions, an NSM may make nationalistic appeals to nationalism to increase its support at home. This is especially likely when NSMs cannot link with foreign-based NSM organizations and therefore lack financial and organizational backing from outside. In Algeria, for example, a women’s movement arose in the 1980s that linked itself to women who participated in the struggle against the French decades earlier. In the occupied territories of Palestine, also, there has been some coincidence of a women’s movement with nationalism. As one might expect from the weakness of NSMs in less affluent places, however, the women’s movement has had a lower priority than the Palestinian cause. A century ago, in much of Asia as well as places like Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Afghanistan, there was mutual support between feminism and nationalism, which in that era was directed against colonial powers. In general, this is no longer the case. In these places, nationalist movements are in the position of strength. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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When nationalist movements declare that women are primarily responsible for the reproduction of the group, they make it difficult for feminist movements to ally with them. The preceding overview of countries makes the relationship between NSMs and nationalism fairly clear. We can identify three patterns: (1) In affluent countries in which people can and do pursue post-materialist values collectively, NSMs are indifferent or even hostile to majority nationalism. They may be sympathetic to minority nationalism, although the minority nationalist movement itself is not an NSM. (2) In countries in which nationalism is effectively repressed, NSMs offer a concealed, or perhaps even latent, means of expressing or pursuing nationalistic ends. Moreover, these NSMs facilitate the quick eruption of fullblown nationalism should the repression lapse. (3) In countries that are not affluent but do not repress majority or minority nationalism, NSMs have very weak local support. Where possible, their organizations are outposts of foreign-based, that is, affluent country–based, NSMs; they are supported by those foreign-based NSMs and answer to them. Thus, they are essentially irrelevant to their society and to any nationalisms in it. An important aspect of politically oriented collective action, such as both new social movements and nationalist movements, is their relationship to elites and leaders. In the affluent countries, NSMs and nationalist themes generally play to different audiences, sometimes in disregard of each other, sometimes in opposition to each other. Politicians who have made nationalist appeals—mainstream leaders like Thatcher in the United Kingdom with the Falklands War and Reagan and George W. Bush in the United States, and more radical individuals, such as Le Pen in France and Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands—generally have not drawn much support from members of NSMs or their sympathizers. Indeed, in some countries such nationalist movements have catalyzed the appearance of NSMs in opposition—in France and Germany, for example. Moreover, in the affluent countries, there often is a substantial political constituency for NSM objectives. This can be seen in the success of Green parties in some western European countries, notably Germany. Outside of the affluent countries, there is little political constituency for the objectives of NSMs and consequently not much in the way of ties between NSMs and political or cultural leaders. Nationalist goals and movements, in contrast, often have a substantial political presence and ties to prominent politicians and leaders. Some observers have seen the indifference or antagonism of NSMs to nationalism in these countries as a missed opportunity. In eastern Europe, for example, the international organizations on which NSMs are dependent have compelled the NSMs to be antinationalist. This has ruled out the possibility of substantial popular support. One particular instance is a proposal for a union of Croatian nongovernmental organizations (NGO), which would have increased efficacy of these NGOs in their dealings with the Croatian government. International NGOs, however, refused to allow the union. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Dimensions At this point, it should be clear that it is important to consider affluent countries and less affluent countries separately. This can be summed up in the most important subtheme: in affluent countries, NSMs are stronger and generally antagonistic to (majority) nationalism; in less affluent counties, NSMs are weaker and more likely to accommodate nationalism. We can specify this further. In affluent countries, we find enduring NSMs with mass support, and they are composed mostly of the somewhat affluent, the middle class, and the upper middle class. We are more likely to find majority nationalism, in contrast, in the lower middle and working classes. Thus, there are class and corresponding ideological differences between NSMs and majority nationalism that leaves them antagonistic. In less affluent societies, NSMs generally have little popular support. Frequently, they depend, for both resources and recognition, on foreign-based NSMs. Alternatively, they may try to piggyback onto nationalist movements or appeal to nationalist sentiments. They can be mass movements only when the government suppresses overt political opposition. The NSMs then can be surrogates for political opposition movements, and are often nationalist. One way to make sense of these themes is in terms of the post-materialist values that are the hallmark of NSMs. To have post-materialist values means to attach importance to qualities to which material production is indifferent or even hostile, such as the environment, more favorable treatment of women and minority groups, peace, and gay and lesbian rights. Only affluent countries have large numbers of people who are materially comfortable and secure enough to be able to afford post-materialist values, namely, their middle classes. People in these affluent classes in these affluent countries also are unlikely to see foreigners and immigrants as competitors for material goods or their jobs. Hence, the mass NSMs in affluent countries are not nationalistic. In affluent countries, majority nationalism exists in the less affluent classes, who are less secure in their material existence and do see other countries and peoples as a potential threat. Less affluent countries do not have a sizable portion of the population that can afford post-materialist values. Hence, what we might call the “natural state” of these countries is to have weak or nonexistent NSMs. Repression of nationalist or other social movements, such as pro-democracy ones, may divert people into mass collective action that manifests itself as an NSM, often an environmental movement. When the repression terminates, the mass support shifts away from the NSM. Thus, in the absence of repression, there are only two ways for an NSM to survive in a less affluent country. It must depend on lifelines from affluent country–based organizations, or it must compromise and take a nationalistic flavor to maintain domestic viability. It should be noted that NSMs and nationalist movements after 1980 tend to share some features simply because they are all social movements and exist at N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the same time. This is aside from ideologies, which, as described above, may be compatible in some circumstances and antagonistic in others. Th e fact that both NSMs and nationalist movements are forms of collective action directed toward changing the state or state policies inclines them toward some similarities of form and tactics. One particular area of commonality is that of communication. Both NSMs and nationalist movements have taken advantage of the considerable improvements over the past few decades in the technology of media and communication. Like NSMs, contemporary nationalism is likely to spread its message via electronic media: television, videos, and increasingly, the World Wide Web. This also facilitates linkages between people in different countries and even continents. Far-reaching, transnational networks are a typical feature of contemporary NSMs, but they have been seen also in new nationalist movements in eastern Europe, which have drawn on financial and conceptual support from the ethnic diaspora in such places as Canada. Backlashes One interesting question is whether NSMs are a unifying or fragmenting force. Within affluent countries, NSMs are a fragmenting force. This stands in contrast to nationalism, which usually embraces and correspondingly unifies the vast majority of the population. The advocacy of some NSMs for stigmatized groups in society, and their opposition to production and its agents more generally, sets them at odds with large swathes of the population. Transnationally, however, across countries rather than within them, NSMs tend to create positive ties. Unlike nationalism, which almost by definition tends to foster suspicion if not hostility toward foreign countries, NSMs have no ideological opposition to transnational bonds. Nationalist considerations are not likely to inhibit NSMs from forming such bonds, at least in affluent countries, because these NSMs are opposed to nationalism. Indeed, NSMs welcome the increase in size, reach, and power that transnational ties promise. Links of communication and coordination facilitate opposition to multinational corporations, for example, as well as to states. Technological advances make these ties ever easier. A related question is how people in power frame the relationship between NSMs and nationalism. In fact, given that people in power are a fairly pragmatic bunch, whether by circumstance or selection, their take on NSMs versus nationalism tends to be straightforward and logical. In affluent countries, they generally appeal to one or the other, to NSMs or to nationalist sentiments, but not to both. In less affluent countries, except where they are surrogates for nationalist movements, NSMs are not important enough for politicians to pay attention to them. Finally, we might ask to what extent NSMs are used to undermine authority. Social movements are by definition oppositional. Frequently, they oppose the state or at least state policies, although they are also cooperative and even supportive in the sense that typically they seek to influence and redirect the state rather than N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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overthrow it. They also may oppose powerful actors in society or even widespread cultural patterns. This all is true of NSMs. As described above, they oppose the state when they are surrogates for nationalist movements in less affluent countries, but in affluent countries primarily, they tend to fight production and its chief agent, big business. Indeed, NSMs often tend to work to bolster the power of central governments, for at least pragmatic reasons. For it is primarily through the state that they can and do get what they want, whether it be rights and privileges for some group, alterations of behavior that benefit the environment, restrictions on corporate practices, or other changes. For the same reasons, NSMs frequently support international authority. This is not true when the international organization and activity is pro-production; the opposition to the WTO and its work is an obvious example. But we can point to, in contrast, international pressure in such matters as women’s rights, human rights, and peace, exerted through the United Nations and other multistate groups, which NSMs back. Likewise they advocate international accords by governments on such matters as environmental improvement, for example, the Kyoto treaty.

Consequences Theorists of NSMs, such as Touraine, have contrasted them to older class-oriented social movements and certainly have seen them as the antithesis of nationalist movements. For example, Keane (1996) gives the enterprise of “the protagonists of civil society”—namely, NSMs—as “a continuous struggle against the simplification of the world,” and that of the nationalists as “a continuous struggle to undo complexity.” This essay, however, takes a less abstract view of the relationship, and in particular considers also NSMs’ struggle to survive and flourish. In other words, NSMs have dual motivations: to embody given post-materialist values, but also to endure and, usually, to obtain mass support. These twin motivations of NSMs are responsible for the themes concerning NSMs above and yield predictions for the future; namely, until countries become affluent, NSMs will be very small and likely look outside to foreign countries for support and recognition. If and when countries become more affluent they will begin to develop NSMs as a mass social phenomenon of the middle classes. At that point, NSMs will be opposed to nationalism, at least of the majority group. Nationalism will coexist with the NSMs, however, at least in the working classes. So if we ask how NSMs advance the cause of nationalism, we can refer back to the subthemes presented earlier. In countries in which overt nationalism and nationalist movements are suppressed, NSMs can be surrogates for them. This pattern was seen in Eastern Europe under communist governments. While the pattern has disappeared along with the communist regimes, it could reappear N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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there or elsewhere. All it would take is a conjunction between strong nationalist yearnings and strivings and governments able and willing to repress overt nationalism but less able or willing to stifle NSMs easily. A secondary story is the support NSMs in affluent countries offer for small minority nationalisms. For these minority movements, this constitutes backing along with possible organizational benefits, such as publicity and even mobilization within the majority population. Because of the weakness of small minorities in majoritarian democracies, such support from NSMs is helpful and may even be critical to achieving any nationalist aims. Finally—and this is a venture into sheer speculation—it is possible that an international environmental incident or disaster could occur that would drive NSMs and nationalist movements together. One could imagine nationalist antagonism for one or more countries toward another that is held responsible for some environmental problem, such as a nuclear event, water catastrophe, or even climate change, which therefore would dovetail with environmental movements and may even be stimulated by information and publicity by those movements. This has not happened yet, although international anger at the Soviet Union over the Chernobyl disaster and against the United States for refusing to sign the Kyoto treaty clearly has nationalist tinges. A similar coincidence of nonenvironmental NSMs and nationalist movements or sentiments is harder to imagine. For example, the Taliban government in Afghanistan was recognized widely as seriously repressive of women, and the improvement of women’s status was considered an important benefit of the removal of that government. Yet the oppression of women provoked no nationalist outrage or actions and, thus, no conjunction of women’s movements and nationalism. It took the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center to produce the nationalist reaction, particularly in the United States, that removed the Taliban regime, and the treatment of women was largely irrelevant to that reaction. Finally, let us consider how NSMs affect different groups. They affect nationalist movements and nationalist groups differently depending on the external circumstances. Within affluent countries, we can distinguish between majority and minority nationalisms. Through their support, NSMs may encourage minority nationalism. Minority nationalist groups also may try to deepen and extend the natural affinity of NSMs for minority nationalisms by avowing commitment to the causes and values of NSMs, such as protection of the environment and peace. The frequent mutual antagonism between NSMs and majority nationalism may stimulate activism on either side or both. A case in point is the sudden surge of the antiracist movement in France in response to the electoral success of Le Pen’s stridently nationalist Front National. In less affluent countries, on the other hand, any impact is likely to be reinforcing. If nationalist movements are suppressed, NSMs can provide a temporary surrogate. In addition, they establish an organization, a structure of contacts, coordination, and communication, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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which a newly possible nationalist movement may use and thus achieve a high level of effectiveness very quickly. This returns us to perhaps the most obvious question on this topic: whether NSMs weaken nationalism. The above remarks suggest that the answer is no, and perhaps often the contrary. That is, in less affluent countries, NSMs may facilitate nationalism, while in affluent countries they may support minority nationalisms and may stimulate majority nationalisms through their opposition to majority nationalist causes. We also can consider how NSMs might weaken nationalism. In less affluent countries, NSMs simply are too weak by themselves to exert much negative effect. In affluent countries, on an individual level, NSMs may attract people who might otherwise join nationalist causes. This seems unlikely, given the difference in motivations for joining the different types of movements (see the discussion of the subthemes, above). On a societal level, NSMs may be able to weaken majority nationalism to the extent that they gain enough power to influence policy enough to stop or slow nationalist movements and causes. There is some sign of this in western Europe where, for example, Green parties have achieved some electoral success and obtained executive positions in some governments. Selected Bibliography Abdo, N. 1994. “Nationalism and Feminism: Palestinian Women and the Intifada—No Going Back?” In Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, edited by V. M. Moghadam, 148–170. London: Zed Books. Burgmann, V. 2003. Power, Profit and Protest: Australian Social Movements and Globalisation. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Dawson, J. I. 1996. Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Duyvendak, J. W. 1994. The Power of Politics: New Social Movements in France. Boulder, CO: Westview. Jayawardena, K. 1986. Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Zed Books. Kaldor, M. 1996. “Cosmopolitanism versus Nationalism: The New Divide?” In Europe’s New Nationalism: States and Minorities in Conflict, edited by R. Caplan and J. Feffer, 42–58. New York: Oxford University Press. Keane, J. 1996. Reflections on Violence. London: Verso. Kopecký, P. 2003. “Civil Society, Uncivil Society and Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe.” In Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe, edited by P. Kopecký and C. Mudde, 1–18. London: Routledge. Melucci, A. 1985. “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements.” Social Research 52:789–816. Moghadam, V. M. 1994. “Introduction and Overview: Gender Dynamics of Nationalism, Revolution and Islamization.” In Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, edited by V. M. Moghadam, 1–17. London: Zed Books. Omvedt, G. 1993. Reinventing Revolution: New Social Movements and the Socialist Tradition in India. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

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Rink, D. 2002. “Environmental Policy and the Environmental Movement in East Germany.” Socialism–Nature–Capitalism 51:73–91. Stubbs, P. 1996. “Nationalisms, Globalization and Civil Society in Croatia and Slovenia.” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 19:1–26. Touraine, A. 1981. The Voice and the Eye. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wade, P. 1997. Race and Ethnicity in Latin America. London: Pluto Press.

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Nationalism and Separatism Sun-Ki Chai

The historical era following World War II is often referred to as the era of decolonization, the time when the former European powers, as well as America and Japan, gave up their overseas empires and dozens of new sovereign countries came into being. However, it could just as easily be called the era of nationalist separatism, as the sheer number of ethnic and pan-ethnic movements seeking independence from the political status quo multiplied greatly.

Relevance The relevance of these movements is clear, since they fundamentally altered the shape of the world’s geopolitical map. They brought into being dozens of new countries and changed the boundaries of dozens of existing ones. They also altered the world balance of power by creating an “unaligned bloc” of independent countries who were not willing to stand under the shadow of the United States or its great Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. Finally, they set the stage for the most recent period of post–Cold War history, in which ethnicity-based nationalism plays a major, or even dominant, role in international conflict.

Origins While there were many reasons for the origins of these various types of nationalisms, they can be attributed to two major causes: The first related to the events leading up to and following the dismantling of the colonization system, which raised numerous questions about what the basis ought to be for the resulting newly independent countries. The other major cause was the rise of cultural sentiments (particularly in Western countries) that placed a great deal of importance on cultural identity. This in turn strengthened the impetus for nationalist movements even in well-established, modern countries.

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Dimensions The separatisms and regionalisms that occurred were so varied that it is difficult to make generalizations regarding their effects on different groups. However, admittedly with some simplification, it is possible to divide them into three different major categories: the anticolonial, the postcolonial, and the modern industrialized versions. Even in each category, there are numerous dimensions of variation that cannot be completely covered in a single chapter. Moreover, because of the huge number of movements that arose and changed shape during this period, we will have to focus on discussing large cases and major trends rather than encompassing the entire picture. Decolonization While the process called “decolonization” is conveniently dated as beginning immediately after the surrender of the Axis forces in 1945, the dismantling of colonies itself started earlier and has been a long and drawn-out process. Even if we exclude Spain and Portugal’s loss of their Latin American colonies in the 19th century, there had been some earlier attrition in the Western colonial project, most notably with the nominal independence of Arab, post-Ottoman, League of Nations Mandates occurring in the 1930s and during the war itself. Mandates were territories that were given special status under Article 22 of the League’s covenant, which promised most Mandates eventual independence. And while the single largest ex-colony, India and Pakistan, gained independence in 1947, most African colonies did not do so until the 1960s or later. Even today, Western powers retain vestiges of their overseas possessions in the Pacific and Caribbean, so the process is not complete. Because of the protracted dying throes of colonialism, much of the separatist nationalism of the postwar era was originally directed against those colonial powers that remained in place, or was aimed at shaping the political configuration and boundaries of postindependence states. In British India, the focus by 1945 was on the latter. The devastation of the British economy in the aftermath of World War II led to a quickly moving consensus within Britain that the maintenance of its huge colonial possessions in South Asia, encompassing many times the population of the British Isles themselves, was unsustainable and an impediment to postwar reconstruction. The defeat of Winston Churchill by Clement Atlee’s Labour Party in the election of 1945 removed the main impediment to this divestment of what was increasingly seen as an onerous responsibility by the British public. In this atmosphere, Indian domestic politics turned into a jockeying for influence over the disposition of independent India. Most notable there was the conflict between the Congress Party, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, over Jinnah’s “two-nation” theory through which he sought to promulgate the idea of a separate independent Muslim state, Pakistan. The origins of the Congress–Muslim League conflict were long-seated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and complex, but what is important to note is that, despite the religion-based nature of their conflict, both parties were led primarily not by religious extremists but by men of quite pragmatic, and if we may say so, secular, outlooks. Nonetheless, by the last preindependence elections of 1946, there was little room for compromise, as the Congress Party was committed to governing alone and the Muslim League was equally committed to the idea that Muslims would be oppressed in an undivided India. The communal slaughter that followed the partition into independent India and Pakistan in 1947 was one of the great human tragedies of the 20th century. Whether or not the human cost of maintaining an undivided India in an atmosphere of incessant religious strife would have been greater or lesser than the cost of partition is a question that is very difficult to answer, though this has not stopped many from trying. Moreover, the debate over the “two-nation” versus unified vision of the subcontinent continues to be a boulder in the way of improving relations between the two countries, manifested in the way that each side frames the status of Kashmir (a situation that is discussed in the next section). The decolonization process in Northeast Asia, though smaller in scale than that of South Asia, was equally seen as inevitable as World War II reached its conclusion. The defeat of Japan meant that the maintenance of its colonies in Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria was out of the question. Furthermore, due to the much more constricted room for indigenous party politics that the Japanese colonial powers had allowed, there was greater uncertainty over the outcome of contestation among local politicians regarding the post-Japanese political system. The main question in the case of Taiwan, and to a lesser extent, Manchuria, was whether possession would revert to whichever Chinese government would be able to take power in the aftermath of the Japanese withdrawal. Taiwan was a peripheral domain that had only been officially incorporated into Chinese territory in the 19th century, while Manchuria, being the ancestral home of the deposed Ching Dynasty, had long maintained a separate identity from the ethnic Chinese (Han) core, despite Manchuria and China being politically unified for centuries. However, at the time, there was no movement for Taiwanese or Manchurian separatism strong enough to seriously challenge the notion held by both the Communists and Nationalists that both territories were “naturally” a part of China. Korea, on the other hand, was a historically unified state with a strong sense of common identity, hence division of the peninsula as a viable ideology was never seriously raised. This in turn made the partition into North and South that occurred upon Japanese withdrawal much more traumatic for Koreans than the division between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland that occurred a few years later. In Southeast Asia, the situation in the Philippines was the closest to that of South and Northeast Asia, with independence promised by an American government that was retreating into immediate postwar isolationism prior to the chill of the Cold War. The Dutch and British East Indies were a different situation, as various events conspired against immediate independence. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Indonesian nationalist movement for independence from the Dutch was perhaps the strongest and most sustained in the colonized world next to that of India, yet it was internally divided and faced a colonial power that was far less willing to give up power than were the British. The active collaboration of many Indonesian nationalist leaders, including Sukarno and Hatta, with the Japanese was an additional factor that reduced international pressure for Dutch withdrawal in the postwar era. Hence, although the Japanese passed power over to Indonesian nationalists as their own authority slipped away, the Dutch immediately sought to reassert their control over their erstwhile possessions. It was only after four years of protracted warfare that the Dutch were forced to withdraw and independence was achieved. In the British East Indies, the colonial power had promised independence by 1949, yet another eight years were required before that actually occurred. This was not due to the lack of any nationalist political activity within the country, but rather due in part to two factors. The first was the resistance among some ethnic Malay leaders to the idea that postwar Malaysia would be a multiethnic, secular state, with similar treatment given to Malays and to minorities of China and Indian ancestry, who had been brought in as immigrants through earlier British policies. This conflict was exacerbated by the extended revolt by the Chinese-led Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which threatened the stability of any postindependence government. It is important to note, however, that the MCP was not a separatist organization. After all, it would have been difficult to separate the Chinese population from the rest, since they were distributed throughout the Straits Settlements. Moreover, the flag-bearer of Malay ethnic nationalism, the United Malays National Organization, soon formed an alliance with Chinese and Indian political parties, illustrating the complexities of the political situation as Malaysia gained independence in 1957. In French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), the Vietnamese communist nationalist faction (Viet Minh) never allied itself with the Japanese occupation. However, it benefited from the undermining of established French authority, enabling the faction to assert its control over much of urban Vietnam soon after the end of the war. This control was only temporary, and efforts to negotiate with the French broke down over the French desire to retain its position in southern Vietnam (Cochinchina) while ceding authority to much of the North. A war of independence followed, reaching its conclusion in the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, followed by the Geneva Agreement that left the country free from French rule, but divided between the Viet Minh government in the North and the regime in the South led by the charismatic leader Ngo Dinh Diem. This division, however, did not reflect separatist sentiments in each region but, rather, was the outcome of external forces on two competing regimes, both purporting to represent the entire Vietnamese nation. Cambodia and Laos obtained independence at about the same time, but remained internally divided as the inheritor regimes to whom the French handed over power were opposed on multiple fronts by domestic opposition forces. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The toll exacted on French military and political resources by the Indochina war created an opportunity for independence movements in a major group of its colonies in a very different part of the world, North Africa. These colonies included Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. After banning the Tunisian nationalist NeoDestourian Party and imprisoning their leader, Habib Bourguiba, in 1952, the colonial government two years later freed Bourguiba, unbanned the party, and granted autonomy, effectively setting Tunisia on a clear path to independence. Likewise, they allowed the nationalist sultan Muhammad V to return to power in Morocco in 1956, setting off a similar pattern of events. In both cases the French government made major concessions to nationalist movements, choosing to avoid once again expending itself fighting a sustained insurgency. The situation was quite different in Algeria, which had a much larger European-descended population and which France had long considered an integral part of its territory. The brutal Algerian War of Independence lasted from 1954 until 1962, during which French and world popular opinion turned increasingly against the violent tactics used by both sides against civilian populations. Even independence and the ascendancy of the Front de Libération Nationale to power did not bring about peace, as a massive exodus of Europeans and reprisals against alleged collaborators followed soon after. In contrast to events in the various regions of Asia and northern Africa, independence in sub-Saharan Africa came relatively late. The first country to gain independence, Ghana, did not achieve this until 1957, while the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique had to wait until 1976 to gain their independence. There are a number of reasons for this, including the fact that, with a few exceptions (e.g., Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party), nationalist parties in the region were of relatively recent vintage and had not consolidated demands for independence during World War II in the way that parties in other parts of the world had. Furthermore, many of the newer parties were organized around ethnic lines, which made it more difficult for them to claim legitimacy for a takeover from imperial rule. This latter fact, which would come back to haunt postindependence Africa, was itself due in part to the largely arbitrary boundaries that the colonial powers had drawn around their possessions. Finally, another reason can be found in the presence of colonial powers, such as Belgium and Portugal, who had deliberately prevented the rise of an educated indigenous class that could take over the reigns of government. Hence decolonization here was a protracted process, despite the fact that both the British and French governments had by the mid-1950s publicly committed themselves to expediting decolonization in subSaharan Africa. The history of separatism and regionalism during the dying days of Western colonialism is a complex one, since in many cases political parties were simultaneously fighting to gain independence for their nations while jockeying for influence over the postindependence dispensation. Overarching these struggles were a few larger ideological forces that drove much of the process forward. Not the least of these was the very idea of nationalism itself, which was by now quite N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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familiar to the educated indigenous elites. Nationalism was an organizing principle empowered the rhetoric of anticolonial leaders and allowed them to place their aspirations in a framework that legitimized them according to universal norms familiar to the publics of the Western powers. Nor was nationalist ideology simply a pragmatic tool for gaining external support; it was a powerful force for unifying large and often disparate groups of people under a single banner (though this would serve as a double-edged sword in the postcolonial era). Hence it was an appropriate ideology for anticolonial struggles in a way that more parochial ideas, on the one hand, and sweeping class analysis, on the other, were not. Regionalism The “birth of the new states” after decolonization presented a variety of conundrums for intellectuals and policy makers, but perhaps the greatest concern to both, after economic development, was that of how these often artificially created artifacts of colonial policies would resist political fragmentation without the coercive hand of the Western powers holding them together. This concern was multiplied (at least in the West) by the advent of the Cold War, and the fact that each of these new states was seen as a potential ally, enemy, or even battleground in the battle for world supremacy. In relation to this, there was a widespread belief that political chaos would leave these new states “ripe for Communism.” Because of this, “nation-building” became the mantra of much of the political development studies, with this term referring to the replacement of parochial ties and loyalties with broader ties to larger political entities, particularly the state. Visionary political leaders sought to “activate” their populations from becoming passive subjects to becoming participants in their country’s program of transformation. Almost immediately, however, the complexities and contradictions of the nation-building exercise became clear. Once the process of national identity creation was set in place through education, media campaigns, and urbanization, there was no way to contain it within a single set of entities corresponding to existing state units. The ideas and emotions of nationalism could just as easily, and in many cases more easily, be harnessed to attract allegiance to racial, religious, linguistic, and regional identities that were larger than the traditional parochial ones, yet still incongruent with the aim of creating citizens of a unitary state. Often these various types of ethnic identities were at a level below the state, but just as often they cross-cut state boundaries, bringing into motion regional and international conflicts that themselves threatened state integrity. In South Asia, the partition of India and Pakistan did not bring an end to separatist sentiments, and indeed, it triggered a series of events that threatened the territorial integrity of both countries. The most immediate source of such threats was the accession of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority territory, to India, as a result of the acquiescence of its traditional ruling leader, Maharajah Hari Singh. This accession fundamentally went against Pakistan’s own self-proclaimed role as defender of South Asia’s Muslim populations, as well as the apparent sentiments N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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of the majority population in Kashmir itself. Because of its Muslim majority, the disposition of Kashmir has often been viewed as a crucial case for the one-nation/ two-nation ideological battle between the two countries, and has led to war between the countries on three different occasions, the most recent being the 1998 Kargil conflict. Pakistan suffered from an even greater threat to its boundaries in the form of East Pakistan, the Bengali-speaking portion of the country, separated from the West by India. Despite containing over half the population of the entire country, East Pakistanis were marginalized in the halls of power, which were dominated by Punjabis and Mohajirs (refugees from Urdu/Hindi-speaking areas of North India). This sense of repression came to a head when the Bengali Awami League under the leadership of Sheik Mujibur Rahman won a National Assembly majority in the 1970 election under the banner of autonomy for the East. This led to the imposition of martial law and a bloody crackdown against Bengali nationalist interests by the Pakistani Army. The intervention of India, however, shifted the war decisively against Pakistan and led to the creation of an independent Bangladesh by the end of 1971. It is important to note, however, that while Bangladesh to a great extent was a creation of Bengali nationalist impulses, this was more in the context of the division of power within the Muslim-majority areas of the subcontinent rather than the expression of pan-Bengali sentiment. Indeed, the merger of India’s Hindu-majority Bengali-speaking West Bengal into a greater Bangladesh was never a notion put forward by actors on either side of the border. The late 1970s saw the rise of another independence movement in India, the movement for an independent Sikh homeland, Khalistan, in the Punjab. The origins of Sikh separatism were complex, but historical causes include a combination of memories of the grand Sikh-Punjabi kingdom of Ranjit Singh in the early 19th century, anger over the division of Punjab between India and Pakistan, and discontent over the partition of Indian Punjab into multiple states. Proximate causes included an economic downturn in the 1980s, as well as the emergence of the radical Sikh separatist militant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, whose followers occupied the seat of the Sikh religion, the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Operation Blue Star, the attack in June 1984 by Indian troops on Bhindranwale’s followers, succeeded in defeating them but also set off a Sikh radical backlash culminating in the assassination of Indira Gandhi a few months later. Insurgency continued on for a few years, but eventually died down due to a combination of policies, including a violent crackdown against Khalistani supporters and a simultaneous effort by the Indian government to co-opt moderate nationalists from the Akali Dal party. Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) had always held a separate political status as a Crown colony under British rule and attained independence separately in 1947. Almost immediately, however, tension grew between the Sinhalese population, predominantly Buddhist, which held majority power in the new state, and minority Tamils, predominantly Hindu, who had enjoyed disproportionate status under British N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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rule. Under the leadership of Sinhalese nationalist leaders such as Nathan Bandaranaike a series of laws were passed enshrining the Sinhalese language and the Buddhist religion within the Sri Lankan state. Tamil political parties responded by asserting a right to autonomy for Tamil-majority areas in the north and east of the country. The most radical of these Tamil parties espoused separatism and the creation of an independent Tamil state, or Eelam. This viewpoint was soon dominated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who launched a string of increasingly successful military attacks against Sri Lankan armed forces and Tamil interests who questioned their vision of Tamil nationalism. The Indo-Sri Lankan accords brought Indian troops into the country in 1987, but they were forced to withdraw after the Sri Lankan government revoked its support. A number of uneasy cease-fires have held since the early part of the current century, but the conflict remains far from settled. In Northeast Asia, the strength of separatist activity in the postcolonial era has been far weaker than in South Asia for a variety of reasons. Both Japan and Korea have long viewed themselves as relatively homogenous states with only tiny minority populations. And while Korea is divided between North and South, this is, like the former division between North and South Vietnam, not the result of separatist politics but of a stalemate between two sides that each purport to represent the entire country. Likewise, as long as the Guomindang Party retained

Women fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) march in October 2002. (AFP/ Getty Images)

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single-party power in Taiwan, the government there viewed itself as the legitimate ruler of all China, hence did not express its opposition to the mainland Communist regime in separatist terms. And while the mainland itself was ethnically quite plural, the coercive power of the Communist state effectively squelched all but the mildest forms of Tibetan and Uygur nationalism until the end of the 1980s. Southeast Asia, on the other hand, faced a variety of separatist movements, most occurring on the peripheries of its large multiethnic peninsula and island states. Perhaps the worst hit was Indonesia, with its wide expanse of islands and almost incalculable diversity. Almost from its very outset, it faced a powerful and well-armed separatist movement in Aceh, one that had been going on continuously against the previous Dutch occupiers since the beginning of the 20th century. Active insurgency began with the rise of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in the mid-1970s, and continued without much letup until movement toward a peace agreement began in the wake of the devastating tsunami of late 2004. Another insurgency arose from Indonesia’s forcible annexation of East Timor following the sudden withdrawal of its Portuguese colonial rulers in 1977. An extended fight against the FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente) separatist group resulted eventually in the granting of independence to East Timor in 2002. In West Papua (Irian Jaya), short-lived independent status was followed by occupation and attempts by the Indonesian government to bind its predominantly Melanesian population to the state through a much-condemned so-called Act of Free Choice and a policy of transmigration. This has led to a lowlevel guerilla war by the forces of the West Papuan Liberation Movement (OPM) since the mid-1960s. In the Philippines, the postindependence government faced opposition from the Muslim populations of Southern Mindanao, which culturally had more in common with its neighbors to the south in Malaysia and Indonesia than to the predominately Catholic mainstream Philippine culture. A 1996 agreement between the government and the largest Moro nationalist group, the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF), failed to halt the conflict, as other groups continued to reject that basis for the agreement. In Thailand, a superficially similar situation exists in the south, which contains a large Malay-speaking Muslim population in a predominately Buddhist society. Yet large-scale Muslim nationalist insurgency did not start there until the mid-1990s. In North Africa, the major ethnic divide has long been seen as the one between Arab and Berber populations. Nonetheless, despite frequently expressed grievances by Berber political parties throughout the region against Arabization policies, this has rarely been expressed in separatist terms or as armed rebellion. Indeed, the longest-running separatist conflict in North Africa is outside of the Arab-Berber divide, occurring continuously in the Western Sahara since the 1960s, and since the 1970s under the leadership of the Polisario Front against Moroccan occupation of this former Spanish colony. Another long-running separatist conflict, that between the primarily Nilotic groups of southern Sudan and the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Arab north, has recently been the subject of a much-awaited peace agreement. Eritrean separatism from Ethiopia, ultimately successful, was in many ways a byproduct of the joint struggle of Eritrean, Amhara, and Tigrean forces against the Marxist government of Mengistu Haile Mariam. In sub-Saharan Africa, the ubiquity of ethnically based political parties within political boundaries set by Western imperialists had made rampant separatism seem like an inevitability. Yet while separatist movements have not been unknown, most of the conflict between ethnic groups, though often quite violent, has taken place within a larger acceptance of existing colonially drawn boundaries, as arbitrary as those boundaries may seem. The most notable exception to this rule was the attempt by Igbo nationalists to split away from the Nigerian state to form the independent state of Biafra, leading to the bloody civil war of 1967–1970. The earlier attempt by Katanga province, under Moise Tshombe, to secede from Zaire was defeated over the course of 1960–1963 with the aid of United Nations (UN) forces. Different as they were, one factor that these two cases had in common was the relative wealth of the ethnic groups in whose names separatist movements functioned. The expressed desire of the leaders of these groups was to withdraw from what they viewed as the chaos of a multiethnic state where other groups were poorer, less educated, and yet, in the majority. It can be argued with some justification that the process of decolonization, given the way that it was carried out, left behind conditions under which separatist activity was inevitable in the new states. Boundaries had been drawn in a way that reflected administrative convenience and did not reflect the geographical patterns of ethnic identities. The boundaries themselves had often been in flux during the colonial period, and their final location was often the result of lastminute compromise. Within those boundaries were left new governments that were internally divided and often lacked personnel with administrative experience. The very newness of postindependence political institutions brought in another element of instability. Hence, many postindependence governments had difficulty enforcing their authority and were often subject to frequent challenges both from within and without. Given these problems, it might seem a miracle that separatism was not even more common in the postcolonial era. Yet, in some ways, it could also be argued that the problems faced by postcolonial governments, at their most extreme, tended to limit separatist violence, though often by substituting other forms of conflict. Where governments were extremely weak and unstable, there was little incentive for opposition groups to aim for control over a portion of the country’s territory when the entire territory might be ripe for picking. Furthermore, even if a government agreed to autonomy or independence for a portion of its territory, its ability to enforce and maintain this agreement over time would be limited. The complexity of ethnic divisions also tended to mitigate somewhat against separatism. The intertwining of residence patterns among different ethnic groups made it difficult to clearly demarcate the homeland of one group from that of another. Furthermore, the sheer N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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number of possible ways in which ethnicity could be mobilized sometimes meant that it was difficult for political groups to enunciate a clearly understood demand for a political homeland, one that would not be challenged by alternative, equally appealing calls to identity among the same group of people. Separatism and Regionalism in Modern, Industrialized States Neither the preponderance of anticolonial separatist activity nor the continuation of nationalist movements within new states was a great surprise to social theorists studying ethnicity, conflict, and development. Nationalism, after all, was largely seen as a product of the “transitional stages” between tradition and modernity, as mediated by the stresses and strains caused by the passing of the old and introduction of the new. The extent of violence had perhaps been more than was generally expected or hoped for, but it nonetheless did not require a fundamental reworking of the findings of social theory. However, beginning from approximately the late 1960s and early 1970s, there took place a resurgence in nationalist separatist activity in the region of the world where it was least expected, the industrialized West, often in the very home countries of the former colonial powers. True, the West was conventionally viewed as the birthplace of nationalism and had gone through massive nationalist ferment beginning from the period of the Napoleonic wars until World War I. However, the feeling had been that, with the advent of modernity, the era of nationalism had passed, with World War II and the Cold War being the harbingers of more sweeping global ideologies, such as capitalism, communism, fascism, and socialism. The upsurge of nationalist violence in Northern Ireland, the growth of Basque separatism in Spain, and the movement for Québec independence were only some of the strong and often violent movements that arose during the 1960s and 1970s. Numerous theories have been put forward for why this occurred, ranging from those who saw no significant differences between the forces causing separatist nationalism in the industrialized world and in developing countries to those who saw these movements as a manifestation of a postmodern condition of “identity politics” found predominantly in the West. In a way, however, each of the major separatist movements in Western countries has its own dynamics, and they resist being placed within a single social change paradigm, whether it be modern or postmodern. The separatist movement by Catholic radicals in Northern Ireland is perhaps the best known case of this kind of resurgent nationalist revolt. The height of this movement, usually referred to as “The Troubles,” began during the 1960s and continued up until the mid-1990s, being brought (at least formally) to a close by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. It is hard to characterize the original causes of this conflict as postmodern, since violent disputes over the partition of Ireland date to the creation of the Free State in 1920. However, the upsurge in violence can be traced to a chain of causation, beginning with the rise of the Catholic civil N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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rights movement and its suppression by the government, which moved to violent clashes between Protestant and Catholic activists, leading to the direct introduction of British military forces. Disagreement among republicans over tactics led to the formation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1970, whose support base was greatly increased by the “Bloody Sunday” shooting deaths of 13 civilians by British soldiers during a protest march. Besides the IRA, the best-known violent separatist movement in the industrialized West is ETA (Basque Nation and Freedom), active in the Basque region of Spain and to a lesser extent France. The cause of Basque nationalism, like Irish nationalism, dates prior to the 20th century, but like the rise of the Provisional IRA, the rise of ETA was linked to social and cultural changes occurring in Western Europe, as well as in the atmosphere of repression under the postwar Francisco Franco regime in Spain. ETA began as a radical offshoot of the mainstream nationalist movement, and it gained popularity during the 1960s, as its policy of targeted violence against figures of Franco’s regime was regarded as legitimate by large segments of the Western European public. This support has dropped greatly, however, in the aftermath of democratization in 1977 and the split of ETA itself into two factions. Other major separatist and regionalist movements in the West during the post–World War II period have been generally nonviolent in nature. Perhaps the most prominent among these has been the Québec sovereignty movement, which became an active voice in Canadian politics with the birth of the Parti Québécois in 1968. The separatist message of the Parti Québécois gained the support of nearly half the province’s electorate during referendums on independence in 1980 and 1994. There is no doubt that these “new” separatisms were affected in some fashion by the political upheavals and challenges to the status quo that took place across Western Europe and North America during the 1960s. However, it is difficult to argue for a simple causal relationship between the two, since the nationalist movements in question also drew upon longer-running grievances as well as support groups that were quite different from those who supported the American antiwar movement or the European radical uprisings of 1968. Perhaps the most plausible argument that can be made is that the events of the 1960s legitimized the rights of minorities to self-determination as well as the notion of “direct action” against established authorities, and hence contributed to, even if they were not completely responsible for, the new wave of nationalisms in the West.

Consequences As can be seen, despite the clear upsurge in separatist activity that occurred during the period under our review, it is difficult to attribute this upsurge to a simple set of causes. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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It is intuitive that any force that destabilizes the existing political status quo will tend to bring to the surface conflicting demands for recognition, which would include ethnic identities based upon race, religion, language, and region. Needless to say, there were a number of events in the latter half of the 20th century that tended to lead to such destabilization. It is tempting to group the many factors that have been discussed under the broader rubrics of “modernization” or “postmodernization,” but this simply begs the question of identifying the nature of such larger processes. What is true without question is that events from the 1950s on set into motion a period of the most widespread sustained nationalist and separatist political activity in world history, one that continues to shape international politics to the present day. Selected Bibliography Ahmida, A. A., ed. 2000. Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in the Maghreb. History, Culture and Politics. New York: Palgrave. Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Brubaker, R. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Connor, W. 1994. Ethnonationalism: A Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Furnivall, J. S. 1956. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India. New York: New York University Press. Geertz, C., ed. 1663. Old Societies and New States. New York: Free Press. Hasan, M., ed. 2000. Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Hewitt, C., and T. Cheetham. 2000. Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Hodson, H. V. 1997. The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press. Horowitz, D. L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kedourie, E. 1970. Nationalism in Asia and Africa. New York: World Publishing. Khalidi, R., L. Anderson, M. Muslih, and R. Simon, eds. 1993. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Nairn, T. 1977. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. 2nd ed. London: New Left Books. Reid, A. J. S. 1974. Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–58. London: Longman. Roff, W. R. 1967. The Origins on Malay Nationalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Tiryakian, E. A., and R. Rogowski, eds. 1985. New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Towards Explanation. Boston: Allen and Unwin. Wallerstein, I. 1961. Africa: The Politics of Independence. New York: Vintage Books. Young, C. 1976. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

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Technology and Nationalism Marco Adria Relevance Technology is either central or adjunct to many current theories of nationalism. It is emphasized particularly in those accounts in which nationalism is regarded as a modern phenomenon. Histories of nationalist movements seek to explain the establishment and maintenance of the modern state in conjunction with a national community. Modern states are the product of technologically mediated communication and often use technological innovation to highlight their status and influence in relation to other states. Although nationalism is not in itself an ideology, or system of ideas, its aims are carried forward through ideology. As the sociologist Alvin Gouldner has pointed out, the alternating historical process of first generating ideas, and then deploying technology in support of those ideas, requires the continuous production and circulation of symbols using communications technologies. Ideologies give life to such large-scale social movements as nationalist projects. This is possible only through the use of the technology of mass media. For many nationalist projects, the newspaper has been the medium by which nationalist ideas have gained wide circulation. The uses of technology in relationship to nationalism may be regarded as belonging to either or both of two primary categories: demonstrational and mediating. The demonstrational use of technology involves obtaining, developing, or using technology in support of a nationalist cause. An example would be military technology, such as aircraft, tanks, and firearms, which may be used to enforce either a national unification or separation. The technology used by armed forces has always been central to the maintenance and extension of nationalist programs. Commonly used definitions of the state highlight the importance of technology in relation to nationalism. These definitions distinguish the state from other organizations or entities by pointing to the state’s monopoly on the use of violence that is approved by law. The state deploys the technology of warfare outside its borders and of criminal justice within. The mediating use of a technology involves publicly justifying state action within the national community, while transmitting messages in support of the nationalist project. In many countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Sweden, a national broadcasting agency with public funding has been established for such a purpose. The legislation establishing such agencies requires that the national character is to be reflected in and promoted by the national broadcaster. In broadcasting enterprises of all kinds, technology is a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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carrier of cultural information in the form of television shows, radio broadcasts, and so on. It is also a structuring influence in regional, national, and international economies, because it can help to create and change patterns of trade and development. Culture and power therefore exist historically in a mutual relationship of development. As the Canadian historian Harold Adams Innis (1951, 133) noted, a state’s ability to engage in “intense cultural activity during a short period of time and to mobilize intellectual resources over a vast territory assumes to an important extent the development of armed force to a high state of efficiency.” The use of technology may be both demonstrational and mediating. Radio, for example, has been used as a mediating technology in the development of national identities in many regions of the world. Radio has supported nationalist projects by promoting cultural and political events in which the glory of the national culture is celebrated. It has helped to revive folk musical traditions and lore, as well as local dialects and linguistic variants. It has also been used to demonstrate the socially progressive character of a national identity. By providing universal access to radio signals as a public benefit available to members of the nation, the national identity is enhanced and made more attractive to the population. By embracing communications technologies, the character of the national identity is promoted as being modern, along with the promise of economic and social advances. Radio’s social uses in such instances would therefore be both demonstrational and mediating in support of nationalism.

Origins The relationship between technology and nationalism has become an active area of inquiry for scholars of nationalism only relatively recently. The main reason for the slow appearance of technology in theories of nationalism may be related to the unconscious effects of technology—the fact that we use technology in many contexts without being fully aware of its influence and ultimate outcomes. The roots of the study of the relationship between technology and nationalism lie in the mediating use of technology. In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. sociologist Karl Deutsch argued that communications technologies (the printing press, newspaper, telegraph, radio, television) supported the establishment of nationalist movements by allowing for the convenient and frequent exchange of ideas within a region. Technology and nationalism in this view were brought together primarily through culture. Before the invention of the printing press and subsequent media innovations, cultural sharing occurred only in small groups. The oral traditions of speaking, singing, and, for people with basic education, writing and reading, were used to pass culture from one generation to the next. With the invention of such technologies as books, newspaper, radio, and television, the enduring preferences, values, and habits of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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culture were circulated more intensively within an emerging nation. Deutsch’s cultural argument for the varying consequences for societies of different media was built on the earlier economic work of Innis, which drew historical conclusions from the “bias” of a communication medium to either space or time. The conception of space and time as a phenomenon mediated by technology has profound implications for the genesis and extension of nationalist projects. Deutsch sought evidence for his argument in three ways. First, he used socialpsychological indicators that would measure the degree to which one medium functioned in tandem with another in a complementary fashion to allow for the gathering and passing on of values, preferences, and memories. Second, he measured the rate by which minority groups blended in with the mainstream culture, hypothesizing that this rate depended on information about experiences exchanged within elite groups and then disseminated to the larger population. Third, he established rates of social mobility by measuring shifts from rural to urban occupations. Deutsch suggested that in some cases, the use of communications technologies led to diverging cultural preferences and separate national cultures. Scholars have continued to bring social and historical perspectives to the varying influence of particular media on the development of nationalist projects. To consider one example, Mexican radio throughout the middle of the 20th century has been examined to reveal the effects of its modern form and its antimodern orientation. Radio is characterized by the intense modern characteristic of “flow.” Radio programming is continuous and irreversible, suggesting something of the rapidly changing nature of modern life. It is also a medium by which antimodern oral communication predominates. Ancient techniques, such as mnemonics (using acronyms as memory aids, for example) and formulaic phrases, are combined with modern techniques for maximizing the economic returns for owners of the broadcasting enterprise. For Ernest Gellner, the British historian, nationalism’s roots are to be found in the profound changes in society that occurred during industrialization during the 18th and 19th centuries. During this time, manufacturing, mechanization, and international commerce developed from a revolution in social communications and the universalization of standardized education. Technology has been at the heart of this revolution, allowing for the rapid exchange of ideas and for the archiving and preservation of texts. Benedict Anderson (1991) has argued that the technology of the printing press in particular allowed for the development of “imagined communities.” These communities are larger and more diverse than those that existed before the printing press. Before the printing press, communities were bound by the face-to-face transmission of narratives and other forms of cultural knowledge. An individual’s memory limited the scale of a community. Thereafter, community memory could be committed to books and other printed artifacts and disseminated to a larger population. With a common language, one which replaced a wider number of dialects and language variants, the newspaper N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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helped to create an imagined community and also a public venue for the exchange of opinions and ideas about the status and future of the nation. The number of members, land base, and diversity of the national community could grow quickly.

Dimensions Cause and Effect in the Study of Technology and Nationalism Technology for some historians and sociologists is a cause or antecedent of nationalism, but for others it is an effect or outcome. The “technology as cause” approach suggests that by creating conditions that favor the development of a recognizable national identity, technology enables nationalism to take root. For example, the standardization of a national language following the use of the printing press, and in particular the medium of the newspaper, enabled communities to consolidate their national identity. Using the common language and forum created by the newspaper, a larger, national community could coordinate economic activities that then supported and helped extend nationalist projects. Technology in this way can be a necessary antecedent of nationalism. For other scholars, technology is an outcome or effect of a nationalist movement. Technological innovation is deployed and exploited in order to show what social and economic benefits may flow from the nationalist project. The “technology as effect” approach is based on the assumption that nationalist sentiments and energies already exist within societies. They thrive and spread, in part by exploiting technology and fostering technological advances. This approach has been central to recent studies of Asian nationalist movements. The development of the Indonesian aircraft industry from 1976 until 1997, for example, was made possible by the nationalist rhetoric employed by influential bureaucrats, politicians, technologists, and engineers in that country. This rhetoric provided legitimacy to a policy of intensive research and development and the production of sophisticated aircraft. For example, it involved the public discussion of the influential idea of “technology leapfrogging.” This is the idea that a national community can pass over intermediary stages of industrial development by investing heavily in a new, technologically advanced area of research, development, and production. Causal explanations of how national identity is established, developed, and disseminated must increasingly take account of social and psychological changes introduced by the widespread use of the Internet. Many people now experience what the historian Mark Poster (1999) has called a “profound bond with machines.” This bond obscures the cause-effect relationship between technology and social movements, such as nationalism. The continuous and intensive exchange of ideas has created a new environment in which technology may be considered both a cause and an effect of nationalism. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Demonstration Effect The term “demonstration effect” in nationalism studies refers to a social event, such as a coup d’état, or popular overthrow of a government. It may be defined as a revolutionary event in one location that stimulates or influences a revolutionary event elsewhere. Although the term is often used to refer to social events, its theoretical roots lie in the theory of the diffusion of innovations, which is concerned with how and at what rate technological adaption occurs within a population. The theory of the diffusion of innovations has developed increasingly complex models of the adaptation of technologies and other innovations, including social innovations. The basic principle of the theory is that the messages of mass media alone cannot account for the adoption of a technological or social innovation. Instead, potential adopters seek interpersonal sources, such as friends and family members, as sources of expertise and experience. Diffusion of innovations therefore posits a two-step flow of, first, message receipt through a media channel, and, second, validation of the message through interpersonal communication. Following the two-step flow of diffusion of innovations theory, the demonstration effect suggests that technology “teaches” by becoming an exemplar of the benefits of nationalism. Technological innovation may be used as a means of publicly illustrating the material and social advantages that a nationalist project offers individuals and groups. By creating “news” about the innovations inherent in a nationalist project, the demonstration effect stimulates face-to-face conversations about the project. The demonstration effect is mediated through technology, and its subject is technology. The demonstration effect may in some instances be rooted in a distant part of the world. A consequence of such an event is that a nationalist movement is provided with a view of what is possible in its own part of the world. Alternatively, the demonstration effect may be found in the homeland of the nationalist project. An example of the latter is provided by a university created in an oil-rich province of Canada in 1970 (Adria 2000). The university’s mandate was organized around technology and anchored in the historical aspirations of farmers and small-business owners and, later, white-collar workers to improve their economic opportunities within the region by changing the way significant institutions operated. The new university was given a radical mandate to apply information and communications technologies intensively with the purpose of serving students by distance education. The new university contributed to the mobilization of popular sentiment for a consumerist model of education, which in turn supported a shift in state economic priorities. Before 1970, education had been a favored beneficiary of spending by an “allocation” state, that is, a state that carried out the role of redistributing economic benefits. From 1971 to 1975, a dramatic decrease occurred in the proportion of state funds directed to public education. The “production” state that emerged was associated with new state priorities to develop the domestic economy by such techniques as adding value to natural resources before export, by deploying technology throughout the region: N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Begun in 1971, the production state . . . represented an attempt to diversify the economy through industrialization, primarily through the forward linkages (adding value to the primary resource) of petroleum refining and processing. Refineries were built, for example, in an effort to “sow the oil” (use oil revenues to create new sources of economic activity) and export value-added products. (Adria 2000, 586)

The demonstration effect occurred with the establishment of this new educational institution because it illustrated the social and economic benefits that would be available through the new project of regional identity and economic development. Technological Nationalism A special analysis of the relationship between technology and nationalism is inherent in “technological nationalism,” which refers to the rhetorical use of technology for the purpose of developing a nationalist project. Technological nationalism involves the explicit use of technology as the subject of a nationalist project’s communication strategies. For example, technological nationalism in Canada has historically developed as a set of arguments and stories referring to a national culture arising out of social process, rather than product. A popular Canadian television program in the 1980s depicted an aboriginal confronted by a steam locomotive. The image of the railroad had become associated with the historical “national dream” of social unity to be accomplished through technological achievement. Such an achievement would be accomplished particularly through the development of communications technologies, like a transnational telegraph/railroad in the 19th century, a national radio and television service in the 1930s and 1940s, satellite communications in the 1970s, and, most recently, broadband Internet service for remote communities. Technological nationalism combines the ideology of technological progress with the sentiments and goals of nationalism. The state seeks legitimacy for its actions by creating, through rhetoric, a nation that mirrors its own objectives. Technological nationalism is a view of nationalism that examines the rhetorical devices and techniques within nationalist projects. Impact on Different Groups A single technology may be interpreted differently by various groups. The influence of technology on the development of nationalism has been of particular interest in the context of European-colonized communities. Rather than using military force and the deployment of a large part of its population to warfare, the European conquest of many parts of the world in the 18th and 19th centuries relied on the technology of trade and industry. Colonized peoples were conquered through the new economic and cultural technologies of train and telegraph, rather than the older methods of fortress and firepower. The adoption and deployment N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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of technology in colonial countries was followed by unintended social consequences that included the collapse of colonial empires themselves. Colonized countries were lost to their respective empires throughout the 20th century, but principally between 1905 and 1960. Technology was interpreted and used by colonizers to display their advanced capacity to administer and organize the colonized lands for the purpose of enhanced trade. It was also used to support and protect imperial culture, maintaining the native culture as a museum specimen. For colonized peoples, technology was interpreted as a means of improving living standards and reviving native ways of life, which supported independence movements. In the late colonial landscape of Dutch Indonesia, leading up to the invasion by Japan in 1942 and the subsequent independence of the country, radio had a conspicuous role in both encouraging an indigenous culture for the native population and in connecting the colonists to home. Differing metaphors for radio broadcasting were adopted by the native Indonesians on the one hand and by the colonial Dutch on the other. For the native community, radio provided a means of developing a regional musical identity, as it did in the form of the kroncong, a popular genre of Hawaiian-like song. The kroncong was favored by not only the native Indonesians but by other surrounding native cultures, including the Chinese. The medium represented casual entertainment, popular cultural development, and diversion for the native Indonesians. For the colonists, by contrast, radio was an unseen telephone cable from the colonized country to the homeland of the Netherlands. It was a means of maintaining Dutch cultural isolation within Indonesia. Radio featured news from the homeland, expressions of musical and literary tradition, and cultural uplift. A historical view of other technologies in the colony, including roads, buildings, optical technologies, and media, allows an understanding of Indonesian nationalism as a shared enterprise between the native Indonesians and the Dutch. Together, the two groups created a national identity for the country that was more modern, oriented to technological progress, and outward-looking. Asphalt roads were built following an increase in Dutch concerns about intermingling with the native population. An influential Dutch pharmacist warned against infection, which the technology of asphalt would lift drivers away from: Natives . . . were speaking and writing flesh and blood, or simply mud. Wherever the natives went, and especially as they dared to approach a modern road, they were read and pronounced as carrying that soft stuff on themselves, on their tongues, on their feet, and on their wheels. (Mrázek 2002, 27)

Technology was to provide a buffer between native and colonizer in Indonesia. Neither group recognized the essentially modernizing effect of the road, which once established became understood by both as a movement toward modernity and, by extension, an emerging national identity. The technologies of radio and road were developed as part of the industrial and cultural infrastructure by which N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the colony was governed. Eventually, with the emergence of regional cultural forms such as the kroncong, technology in Indonesia was to become a cultural wedge between colonized and colonist, thereby indirectly encouraging the development of a distinct nationalist native-Indonesian culture. Technology as a Unifying or Fragmentary Force Technology supports and extends nationalisms in some contexts but separates national groups in others. The historical differentiation of the Dutch people from the North Germans, for example, was supported by the special importance of dikes and low-lying tracts of land in Holland during the Middle Ages. The dikes kept water out of the agricultural plots but required systems of pumping and maintenance. Family farms and communities were arranged around these systems. The technological innovation of the dike therefore helped to maintain a separate way of life for the Dutch, because it required patterns of work and social life that had at their center the maintenance of distinctive agricultural methods. Technology may bolster and support the authority of elites in the promotion of nationalism, as aeronautical technology did for the Indonesian nationalist government of the 1970s and 1980s. Technology may also undermine the authority of political elites. In the European colonies, technology was at once the means by which the colony was established and the pathway to its dismantling. The advances of transportation, communication, and production that colonizing powers introduced into Latin America, the East Indies, Africa, and other regions allowed for the effective harnessing of local natural resources and human energies. The diffusion of even the most sophisticated of technologies leads to adoption, exploitation, and improvement by local populations. Native populations in colonies were employed to operate the factories, trains, and radio and telegraph transmitters. The authority of colonizing political elites was reduced as it became clear that a monopoly over the use of technology could not be maintained indefinitely.

Consequences Technology will continue to figure prominently in those historical and sociological accounts in which nationalism is regarded as a feature of modernity and in which industrialization is considered to be a key explanatory factor for the emergence and spread of nationalism. The wide circulation of new ideas about national identity within a society gives life to a nationalist project. Indeed, the spread of nationalism has relied on the increasingly mediated character of modern communications. Modern political messages are never exchanged directly between politician and the polis but between politician and mass audience, as mediated by communications technologies. Because the mass media are subject N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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to control by individuals and small groups, the spread of nationalism, too, is subject to hegemonic control. It is for this reason that Habermas points out that nationalism is “by definition susceptible to manipulative misuse by political elites” (1995, 564). The cultural context in which appeals for nationalist sentiment are made will therefore continue to be of central interest to scholars of technology and nationalism. Studies of nationalism may use both qualitative and quantitative inquiry, poetry and statistics, and firsthand accounts and theoretical reflections to demonstrate the complexity and richness of the increasingly mediated social world of emerging nationalist projects. Interdisciplinary accounts in particular help to show when and in what circumstances members of political and social elites find it possible to mobilize popular sentiment in support of nationalism and when and in what circumstances the nationalist strategy is likely actually to succeed. The most promising approaches to technology and nationalism are not likely to deal directly with the question of whether technology is primarily a cause or effect of nationalism. In social and historical research in which large-scale movements of people and ideas occur, there are too many variables that are liable to confound such an enterprise. In the case of the many nation-states established in the 19th century, there is the added barrier of using archives and sources that, even where they are accurate and reliable, must be reinterpreted by the historian. Accounts that seek to describe and explain the social construction of particular technological formations in relation to particular nationalist projects have the potential to extend our understanding of how the dialectic of ideology and technology unfolds in nationalist movements. The Internet is the most recent media innovation in history within which the relationship of technology to nationalism must be assessed. Four issues are worthy of examination in connection to this new medium. First, it should be noted that digital technologies are changing the way that individuals participate in the development of a national identity. The Internet is itself becoming a kind of national culture, and the global and the local become entwined for many people using the Internet. While analog media (LP records and tape recordings, for example) gave some priority and privilege to the original cultural object, digital media allow for endless reproduction of cultural texts at almost no cost, and with little direct controls available to monitor this reproduction. The power of the nation-state has been curtailed to the extent that digital culture has escaped the power to control it fully. If the state’s defining feature is that of the prerogative to use force legitimated by law, some part of that force has been mitigated or removed. Second, the convergent nature of the Internet has yet to be understood fully in relationship to the development and promulgation of nationalist programs. Historical media that have had a formative influence on nationalism, such as the printing press, radio, and television, are all reproduced on the Internet. Text, sound, and moving images are presented within the same communications channel. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Tibetan monks surf the net at an Internet cafe in Lhasa of the Tibet Autonomous Region, China, in 2006.

Since each converging medium is quite different in terms both of how it is interpreted by audiences as a medium and how its messages influence users, the proportionate use of various media on the Internet may determine the rate and means by which nationalist projects develop. Third, the relative impermeability, or resistance to outside influence, of distributed networks means that the Internet may potentially become less a force for global understanding, as its more optimistic proponents claim, than for incremental resistance to openness. Local and regional groups that are small, robust, resilient, and relatively closed are likely to continue to form. The Internet may in this way discourage the brokering and coordination of subnational cultures that in the past have been the precursors of an emergent nationalism. Finally, global diaspora communities, made up of emigrants from a home nation, are making use of the Internet in ways that are likely to change how national identity is developed and expressed. The creation of virtual communities by diaspora communities is occurring at a rapid rate. The Internet is used variously by prospective immigrants and new arrivals in many countries and has a function as well in assimilating new citizens. The increased ethnic churn in Western industrial democracies in the context of the creation of a large number of virtual communities with relatively impermeable cultural boundaries is likely N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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to be of interest to scholars and students of technology and nationalism in the coming years. Selected Bibliography Adria, M. 2000. “Institutions of Higher Education and the Nationalist State.” British Journal of Sociology of Education 21, no. 4: 573–588. Adria, M. 2003. “Arms to Communications: Idealist and Pragmatist Strains of Canadian Thought on Technology and Nationalism.” Canadian Journal of Communication 28:167–184. Amir, S. 2004. “The Regime and the Airplane: High Technology and Nationalism.” Indonesia Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 24, no. 2: 107–114. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. ed. London: Verso. Charland, M. 1986. “Technological Nationalism.” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 10, nos. 1–2: 196–220. Deutsch, K. W. 1966. Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Giddens, A. 1985. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1995. “The European Nation-State—Its Achievements and Limits.” In Mapping the Nation, edited by G. Balakrishnan. London: Verso. Hayes, J. E. 2000. Radio Nation: Communication, Popular Culture, and Nationalism. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Innis, H. A. 1951. The Bias of Communication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. McLuhan, M. 1963. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: Signet. Mrázek, R. 2002. Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Poster, M. 1999. “National Identities and Communications Technologies.” The Information Society 15:235–240. Rogers, E. 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press.

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Terrorism and Nationalism Virginie Mamadouh Relevance Since September 11, 2001, terrorism has been represented as intrinsically connected to the Islamic fundamentalism of Al Qaeda and similar jihadist movements; prior to that, it was more often associated with such nationalist movements as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, the Basque nationalists of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque country, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and diverse Palestinian organizations. This article deals with terrorism and its links with nationalism. Terrorism is only one of the instruments nationalist movements can use to advance their cause. Likewise, nationalism is only one of the possible ideologies used by terrorists to justify their acts. It is the overlap between the two that is the focus of this article. The review begins with conceptual issues about terrorism and nationalism. It then addresses the historic origins of terrorism and its development in modern times. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base is used to discuss the dimensions and impact of terrorism since 1980 to show that nationalist demands remain predominant motivations among terrorist movements and to show the distribution of terrorist attacks among world regions. Finally, consequences and ramifications are addressed in terms of the direct costs of the destruction and the indirect consequences in the targeted communities. Defining Terrorism and Other Forms of Violence: Terrorist or Freedom Fighter? Although it is widely understood that terrorism implies the use of physical violence (or the threat to use it), it is open to discussion when political violence is or is not terrorism. Definitions coined by policy makers, legislators, intelligence services and counterterrorist agencies, analysts, scholars, or opinion makers differ. Analyzing 109 definitions of terrorism, Alex Schmid identified 22 categories of expressions used to characterize terrorism. The most frequently named element is by far “violence” (84 percent of the definitions), followed by “political” and “fear” (see Table 1). Most definitions of terrorism share some basic elements: the political use of violence against indiscriminate targets (for example, a crowd at a station) with the aim of creating fear among the population as a way of gaining leverage on decision makers. The latter means that in terrorist campaigns, the targets of the demands (governments, media) differ from the targets of the acts themselves (often random, innocent victims). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Table 1 Frequencies of the Top 12 Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism (occurring in 20 percent or more of the collected definitions)* Element

Rank

Frequency, %

Violence, force

1

83.5

Political

2

65.0

Fear, terror emphasized

3

51.0

Threat

4

47.0

(Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions

5

41.5

Victim-target differentiation

6

37.5

Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action

7

32.0

Method of combat, strategy, tactic

8

30.5

Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints

9

30.0

Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance

10

28.0

Publicity aspect

11

21.5

Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character, indiscrimination

12

21.0

* Source: Schmid and Jongman 1988, 5–6.

Besides this common ground, several areas of contention and discussion emerge. Is the assassination of a politician terrorism? Is terrorism always the work of illegal movements, or can states also be accused of terrorism? Is armed resistance against an illegitimate regime terrorism? Is an act of violence that is not claimed publicly by an organization with articulated demands terrorism or just crime? Can an isolated individual acting alone be considered a terrorist? Let’s consider these five issues in turn. The first question concerns the destabilizing effect of murder. While a political assassination does destabilize state and society, it generally does not generate the same feelings of insecurity as “blind” attacks on crowds of civilians. Nevertheless the distinction between the two is not easy to draw: some groups will attack soldiers or policemen because the group sees them as representatives of the state agency, even if they obviously do not have a position of power in that agency; other groups will even attack any citizens of the state that they are fighting against, because they are seen as representatives of that state. The second question is key to the distinction between political violence by state agencies and by nonstate actors. Some prefer to limit the use of the word “terrorism” to nonstate actors as rebellious movements, while others underline that terrorist activities can be sponsored by states and even carried on by state agencies. The difference between regular violent activities of the state, such as war and terrorism, is their legality. State terrorism consists of uses of violence that do not respect the national and international legal frameworks that regulate the activities of police and army forces—including rules of war. Think, for example, of the bombing of residential neighborhoods, the use of torture, or the assassination of political N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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opponents. Although it is important to include state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism in a discussion of the relations between terrorism and nationalism, it is imperative to distinguish these two types of terrorism: terrorism from below (i.e., grassroots terrorism) and terrorism from above (i.e., state terrorism). The third question refers to the often-quoted paradox that someone’s terrorist might be someone else’s freedom fighter. Although some people reject any use of violence by principle, most people accept the use of violence for legitimate objectives, for example, to police the public space, to protect the national territory, and, possibly, to eliminate threats to national sovereignty. In that case, political violence can be legitimate, depending on the objectives of the perpetrators. Protagonists and their activities are therefore viewed differently. While from the one side, the acts of a group might be seen as terrorist attacks on a legitimate regime, from the other side, they might appear as legitimate acts of resistance against an abusive regime. Still, in academic writings, it is generally agreed that the targeting of noncombatants qualifies the use of force as terrorism, whatever the motives of the action are. The fourth question concerns the distinction between terrorism and crime. Limits between crime and terrorism are blurred. Terrorist groups often carry out criminal activities (bank robberies, racketeering, arms trade, drugs trade, kidnapping, trafficking, and so on) to finance their movements, and political rhetoric about self-determination might be used to cover up criminal activities, for example, to keep state agencies out of a region of drugs production or a crucial route for an illegal trade. In the absence of political motives and of the publication of these motives and demands by a terrorist organization, it is difficult to label an act of violence as terrorism. Obviously, such an act of blind violence generates fear among the population and has an effect quite similar to terrorism, but the fact that no political rationalization is offered, that violence is not an instrument to achieve political goals but an end in itself should keep us from putting it in the same category as terrorist acts. On the other hand, a political organization might choose not to claim a terrorist act to create confusion and fear among the population, while sometimes several competing groups claim responsibility for the same attack. The anthrax letters sent through the mail in the United States after 9/11 that killed five people are generally seen as a terrorist campaign, despite the fact that no information is available about the origin of these letters and the purpose of the perpetrators. The fifth and last question pertains to the idea that terrorism is an organized collective action. Single, isolated individuals (so-called lone wolves) are generally not included in accounts of terrorism, although it depends on the context. Compare the perception of the two political murders in the Netherlands, a western European country where politics has long been very boring and peaceful. Politician Pim Fortuyn was killed in May 2002 by an animal rights’ activist who was perceived as a lone wolf, and the murder was not seen as an act of terrorism. However, one and a half years later, when film director Theo van Gogh was killed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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in November 2004 by an Islamist fundamentalist, this was perceived as an element in an international terrorist threat, even if there was no reason to believe that any transnational terrorist network commissioned it. The label terrorism reflects in both cases the perception that this individual was inspired by, and connected in some way with, broader movements justifying terrorism. Nationalism as Motivation for Terrorism As definitions, typologies of terrorism are very diverse, depending on the characteristics chosen to classify terrorist incidents: the actors, the victims, the tactics, the targets, the motivations, and so on (see Schmid and Jongman 1988, 40ff ). Different types of terrorism are generally distinguished according to the political background of the perpetrators. Political arguments have several functions: they are used to analyze the situation, to name and represent problems, to present and promote specific solutions to these problems, to legitimate demands, to legitimate tactics and the use of violence in particular, and to remember to motivate combatants, to mobilize support for combatants, and to essentialize differences between opposed camps. Nationalism is only one of the many discourses that can motivate the use of terrorism. It is possible to identify terrorist activities, linked to virtually any political ideology—left or right—except those founded on pacifism. Religious justifications of terrorism have been articulated in most religions, although nowadays Islamic terrorism is the most publicized. Frequently, the distinction between nationalism and other motivations is blurred: for example, in leftist nationalist movements and when national identities are religiously defined. Nationalism comes in many guises, ranging from national emancipation movements to nation-building imposed from above by the state. Nationalist movements can use terrorism among other forms of political activism. Alternative tactics include all kinds of legal collective actions, ranging from demonstrations to petitions, from strikes to boycotts, from elections to court cases, depending on the political opportunity structure of the political arena they are operating in. Terrorism is not likely to be used when there are plenty of legal ways to organize and mobilize a national group. On the other hand, it is an unlikely tactic when repression is very harsh. Apart from local opportunities, tactical decisions are also influenced by foreign actors who might provide logistical help and moral support, and who might encourage or discourage local groups to use political violence. Liberation wars against foreign occupation or colonial rule generally involve terrorist episodes in which nationalist movements act in the name of a state that is not yet sovereign. In that case, one rather talks about a national liberation front or a national liberation army. Similarly, state revolutionaries can invoke nationalism against the state and claim to act in the name of the people against a regime that is usurping national sovereignty. Alternatively, nationalism can be invoked by the political elite to outlaw political challengers, to prevent a popular movement from access to power, and to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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exclude, expel, or even annihilate a minority group framed as a threat to national security or the territorial integrity of the state. State terrorism is also only one among various tactics available to state agencies to mobilize and control the population of the state territory. State terrorism is incompatible with liberal democracy based on the rule of law, political and civic rights, and free elections. A democratic state will try to assimilate a minority or persuade it to leave the territory, through financial incentives for emigrating or for adopting a new language, culture, or way of life, rather than eliminating it physically. States can also be involved in terrorist activities on foreign soil, supporting terrorist organizations abroad, as part of their foreign policies, for example, to destabilize a regime they would prefer to see replaced. State-supported terrorism is not compatible with international law. Accusations of sponsoring terrorism are frequently made against Iran and Pakistan but also against the United Kingdom and the United States. The Taliban regime’s support of Al Qaeda was used as the justification for the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan by a U.S.-led coalition in retaliation for the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001. The state-centered thinking that characterizes nationalism is not foreign to analysts: they distinguish between domestic and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism refers to incidents by local nationals against a domestic target. International terrorism involves the crossing of state borders. When it comes to the terrorists themselves and their organizations, crossing international borders has always been important: a neighboring country can be a safe haven for domestic terrorists—where they can recover and regroup, train and organize between terrorist strikes in their own country. Diasporas have been instrumental to many nationalist terrorist groups, supporting them with money, assistance, and new recruits. International terrorism refers instead to groups that target national targets abroad (for example, diplomats, embassies, representative businesses, or even nationals); groups that target foreign representatives in the country (for example, foreign diplomats, foreign embassies, foreign branches, or even foreign citizens); or groups whose acts or objectives are transnational (for example, hijacking a plane during an international flight or articulating grievances about an international agreement). All in all, terrorism has an outspoken negative connotation. Labeling a group “terrorist” is a way of discrediting its political objectives. The protagonists will rather call themselves militants, activists, revolutionaries, paramilitaries, soldiers, or people’s freedom fighters. This labeling is not only a matter of choosing sides; the general assessment can change over time. Once widely labeled as terrorists by the international community, Menachem Begin (Irgun against British rule in Palestine), Yasir Arafat (Fatah against Israeli occupation), and Nelson Mandela (African National Congress against the apartheid regime in South Africa) were ultimately granted Nobel Peace Prizes for their efforts to defend the interests of their nations: Menachem Begin with Mohamed Anwar Al-Sadat in 1978, Yasir Arafat with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin in 1994, and Nelson Mandela with N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Frederik Willem de Klerk in 1993. They are now widely recognized as major “freedom fighters” of the Israeli nation, the Palestinian nation, and the South African nation, respectively.

Origins Despite the impression that the numerous commentators might give on the tragic events of September 11, 2001, terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. Historical accounts of terrorism commonly acknowledge the existence of terrorist movements like the sicarri—a religious sect in the Zealot struggle in Palestine against Roman rule (AD 66–73)—and the Hashshashin (or Assassins)—an Islamic sect, killing officials (prefects, governors, caliphs) of the Abbasid Caliphate from the 11th to the 13th centuries. According to the American historian Walter Laqueur (1977, 11) systematic terrorism began in the second half of the 19th century in Europe, after the French Revolution (and its regicide) and the rise of nationalism throughout Europe. The terms “terror” and “terrorism” are modern terms, associated with the French Revolution and, more specifically, with two periods: the establishment of an exception court and massacres in prisons in Paris and other cities during August–September 1792, and the period from June 1793 to July 1794. This later period, under the leadership of the most radical faction of the Jacobins, is known as the Reign of Terror. This revolutionary government used violence to combat the “enemies of the people” at the borders and inside the national territory. Th e Jacobins used the word terreur in a positive sense and justified the use of it: “La terreur n’est autre chose que la justice prompte, sévère, inflexible” (“Terror is nothing other than prompt, severe, inflexible justice”), as goes the famous quote by Robespierre, the leader of the Jacobins at the Convention in February 1793, or “Tous les moyens sont légitimes pour lutter contre les tyrans” (“All means are legitimate against tyrants”) by Babeuf in 1792. Revolutionary courts condemned thousands to the guillotine, which became the symbol of the age (although, strictly speaking, the former King Louis XVI was executed before the start of the Reign of Terror). The period June–July 1794 is even called The Great Terror; it started with the removal of the advocate at revolutionary courts and ended with the execution of Robespierre himself on July 28, 1794. After that episode, the negative connotation of the word became widespread, as in Burke’s famous phrase about the French Revolution, written in 1795, “thousands of those hell hounds called terrorists.” Later, the word “terror” was widely used during revolutionary periods to characterize systematic political violence by either side of the revolution, such as the Red Terror and White Terror during the Russian Civil War that followed the 1917 Revolution. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Late-19th- and Early-20th-Century Terrorism By the end of the 19th century, terrorism was a widespread tactic used among revolutionaries, anarchists, and nationalists: Russian revolutionaries, Irish nationalists, Indian groups in Bengal, Macedonians, Serbs or Armenians, Polish socialists, and anarchists and their “propaganda by deed” in France, Italy, Spain, and the United States. Earlier in the United States, the Ku Klux Klan used terrorism to advocate white supremacy in southern states during the Reconstruction period (1866–1870) after the U.S. Civil War. The second Ku Klux Klan (1915–1944), inspired by The Birth of a Nation, a controversial film released in 1915, followed suit with a similar ideology and violent attacks. Finally, individual Klan groups reappeared against civil rights movements from the beginning of the 1950s onward. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the heir of the Austro-Hungarian empire, on June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist, was the famous direct cause of World War I. Paradoxically, antiwar activists also used terrorism, such as the Preparedness Day bombing in San Francisco on July 22, 1916, of a parade that was held in anticipation of the entry of the United States into that war. After the Great War, nationalism became an even more important motivation for terrorism. Next to separatist movements in Ireland and Bretagne, right-wing terrorism increased during the 1920s in many European countries. In colonized countries, terrorism was also an option for movements claiming independence, especially in the British empire: the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt in British Egypt, and Irgun and LEHI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, also known as the Stern Gang) in British Palestine. During World War II, nationalism inspired resistance movements to fascist regimes and German occupation. Terrorism after World War II After 1945, liberation movements in colonized countries often used terrorism, a noticeable example being the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). In the 1960s and 1970s, terrorism was used by nationalist/separatist and leftist movements and movements combining both orientations. The symbolic landmark of political and social mobilization across the Western world—1968—was also a watershed for the radicalization of many small leftist revolutionary groups all over the world. The most famous exponent of that movement was probably the Rote Armee Fraktion (the Red Army Faction, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group) in West Germany. In the United States, there were the Weathermen, the Black Liberation Army, and the Symbionese Liberation Army. Nationalist/separatist movements using terrorism in that period were numerous in Western Europe, especially in Northern Ireland (IRA, Provisional IRA, and their opponents the Ulster Defense Association [UDA], and the Ulster Volunteers Force [UVF]), in the Basque country (ETA), and to a lesser extent in Catalonia, Corsica, Bretagne, South Tyrol, and the like. In North America, similar nationalist movements included the “Front de libération du Québec” (Québec Liberation N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Front) in the 1960s and the Puerto Rican Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation [FALN]) in the 1970s and 1980s. In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) turned in 1961 to political violence to defend the rights of the black population against the apartheid regime. Nationalist/separatist movements in former colonies, generally unsatisfied with the territorial arrangements agreed on at independence, used terrorism against the new state. Of these many occurrences, most conflicts, up to this day, have not been solved, and terrorist campaigns are still going on: Kurdish organizations, especially the Kurdistan Workers Party (PPK, also known as KADEK and KongraGel) against the Turkish state, Palestinian organizations (Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], PDFLP, Hamas, and many others since) against the Israeli state and against Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and so on. Sometimes claims were addressed to the former colonial state, as with the terrorist campaign of the South Moluccan Suicide Commando group and other Moluccan secessionist groups in the Netherlands in 1975 and 1978, demanding independence from Indonesia. The 1970s also saw the emergence of international terrorism: terrorist groups of different countries working closely together and terrorist attacks being organized in different countries at the same time. From 1968 onward, airline hijacking increased dramatically, culminating in September 1970 when the PFLP simultaneously hijacked four planes to land them on Dawson’s Field in Jordan. In September 1972, the Palestinian group Black September took hostages and murdered Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. The Japanese Red Army is another example of a group operating internationally. Right-wing terrorist activities should not be forgotten, especially in Latin America and in western Europe, as they are also inspired by nationalist ideologies to resist leftist movements. In Italy, Ordine Nuovo (New Order) bombed Piazza Fontana in Milan (1969), the Rome-Messia train (1970), an anti-fascist demonstration in Brescia (1974), and Central Station in Bologna (1980). Terrorism since 1980 Since 1980, leftist radical movements seem to have vanished in the West and increased in the global South, for example, the Communista del Peru Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru from 1980 onward and, later, Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in Mexico. Nationalist/separatist movements and right-wing nationalist movements remained important terrorist groups, but obviously the dynamics of conflict changed. For example, in the Basque country, ETA unexpectedly continued its terrorist campaign against the Spanish state after the democratization and decentralization of the state that gave the Basque country as a region comprehensive N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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competencies. Where conflict resolution progressed, the splintering of the separatist groups could fuel new terrorist campaigns (for example, the bombing in Omagh in Northern Ireland on August 15, 1988, by the Real IRA after the Good Friday Agreement). In the case of the Palestinian cause, objectives and grievances changed with the official recognition of Israel and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and the emergence of new—religiously inspired—organizations alongside the traditionally left-wing and secular organizations united in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Tactics also changed. The major “innovation” of the late 20th century was the deployment of suicide bombers. Suicide attacks by combatants were not new in war situations but were less common as terrorist tactics, until the beginning of the 1980s when embassies and U.S. and French army barracks were bombed in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War. It has since been extensively used, mainly by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (including the assassination of the former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 near Chennai, India) and by Islamic terrorists in the Arab and Muslim world, especially in Palestine/Israel, Lebanon, and more recently, Iraq, and around the world. Newcomers on the terrorist scene include new separatist movements, which appeared with the disintegration of federations formerly held together by a centralist and monopolistic party (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia), with the enduring conflict in and around Chechnya being the most dramatic instance. In the United States, the most deadly attack before 2001 was the Oklahoma City bombing on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995, which killed almost 170 people, including 19 children. The two men convicted of the bombing, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were related to the militia movement and claimed that this attack on a federal agency was a revenge for the siege of a Davidian ranch in Waco, Texas, by a federal agency (the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) that ended with a fire on April 19, 1993, killing over 70 followers, including many children. Acting in the name of the people against the state is also a form of nationalist terrorism. Finally, the most important change in the terrorist landscape of the past decade has been the expansion of Islamic terrorism across the world, and especially its global networks, such as Al Qaeda, the organization claiming responsibility for the attacks on New York City and Washington on September 11, 2001. Originating in the jihad against communist rule in Afghanistan, supported at the time by the U.S. administration as a pawn in the U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet Union, the objectives of this network developed into a holy war against U.S. intervention in the Middle East, especially against the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. Islamic groups using terrorism generally aimed at changing state institutions into an Islamic state might also have separatist ambitions for territories inhabited by a Muslim population confronted with a secular state or a state associated with another religion, or supranational ambitions to federate Muslim populations in a new, larger supranational Islamic state. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorists crashed two commercial passenger airplanes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. Although religious groups have supplanted them in terms of injuries and fatalities, nationalist groups remain responsible for the largest number of terrorist incidents across the world. (AP/ Wide World Photos)

Dimensions To sketch the dimensions and the impact of terrorism, we can rely on existing databases registering terrorist incidents. In this section, I use the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB, available at www.tkb.org). The TKB is an American initiative supported by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DFI International, RAND Corporation, and the American Terrorism Study. It is important to remain aware of the limitations of such sources. The TKB is based on the RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968–1997 and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database (1998–present). Both are limited to terrorism incidents by nonstate actors and are based on open source materials, such as newspapers, not on secret intelligence collected by state agencies. The first source was limited to international terrorism incidents; the second also included domestic terrorism. Despite these limitations, the database provides an insightful overview of the phenomenon, registering incidents, injuries, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and fatalities. It will be used here to assess the importance of nationalism as a motivation of terrorist acts, compared with other claims, and to assess the impact of terrorism in different regions of the world. Similar data on state terrorism are not available, but reports and estimations published about the civilian victims in Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan, and, foremost, Iraq suggest much higher figures. To differentiate among the main dimensions of terrorism, we can look at the perpetrators. The TKB distinguishes 11 types of terrorist movements: anarchist, antiglobalization, communist/socialist, environmental, leftist, nationalist/ separatist, other, racist, religious, right-wing conservative, and right-wing reactionary. It is unclear how the coding went for groups with mixed motives, for example, communist and nationalist, anarchist and environmentalist, religious and right-wing conservative, right-wing reactionary and nationalist. During the period 1980–2005, nationalist/separatist religious groups accounted for almost a third of terrorist incidents (30 percent) followed by leftist groups (26 percent) and religious groups (24 percent). Looking at casualties, religious motivations ranked first with 54 percent of the injuries and 52 percent of fatalities, far above nationalist motives (36 percent each), while the numerous leftist and communist/socialist terrorist incidents caused far less human suffering. Over time, nationalist terrorism lost its predominance, while religious terrorism grew starkly, especially after 1990 (see Table 2). As for the overall impact of terrorism, the Middle East is by any account the region most affected by terrorism, with 35 percent of the incidents, 34 percent of the injuries, and 40 percent of the fatalities located there (Table 3). Western Europe ranks second in terms of incidents (20 percent), but only fifth for injuries and seventh for fatalities. South Asia ranks third in terms of incidents but is the second most affected region in terms of injuries and fatalities, while North America, the least affected region in terms of incidents, ranks third in terms of fatalities due to the unusual scope of the attacks of September 11, 2001, with almost 3,000 fatalities for one single incident. Table 2

The Declining Importance of Nationalist/Separatist Groups* 1968–1969 n %

1970–1979 n %

1980–1989 n %

1990–1999 n %

2000–2005 n %

Incidents Nationalist/separatist Religious

32 43.8 0

416 61

45.1 6.6

883 206

Injuries Nationalist/separatist Religious

163 74.4 0

1,488 65

60.5 2.6

4,078 843

57.2 5,825 25.8 13,471 38.5 11.8 15,924 70.4 18,098 51.7

Fatalities Nationalist/separatist Religious

25 71.4 0

635 24

59.6 2.3

1,715 735

60.0 25.7

39.3 9.2

668 33.0 305 15.1

1,272 34.2 1,854 49.8

2,204 38.7 1,534 27.0

5,414 32.5 9,427 56.6

* Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (accessed October 24, 2006).

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Table 3

Terrorist Incidents (Nonstate Terrorism) by Region, 1980–2005* Incidents n %

Injuries n

%

Fatalities n %

Africa

890

3.8

8,462

10.1

3,256

9.8

East & Central Asia

215

0.9

5,324

6.4

223

0.7

Southeast Asia & Oceania

690

3.0

3,752

4.5

1,143

3.4

4,134

17.8

19,649

23.5

6,791

20.4

Middle East/Persian Gulf

8,126

35.1

28,668

34.3

13,266

39.8

Eastern Europe

1,312

5.7

5,010

6.0

1,933

5.8

Western Europe

4,623

20.0

5,096

6.1

1,157

3.5

281

1.2

4,054

4.9

3,533

10.6

2,890

12.5

3,566

4.3

1,991

6.0

South Asia

North America Latin America & the Caribbean Total

23,161

100

83,581

100

33,293

100

* Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (accessed October 24, 2006).

Unfortunately, it is not possible to generate cross-tabulations that would show whether nationalist terrorist groups cluster in certain world regions, but it is likely that the typical European pattern (relatively less casualties for relatively more incidents) is the likely result of the predominance of nationalist/separatist terrorism in that part of the world. Moreover, we can look at the most devastating terrorist attacks of the past five years, those with more than 100 casualties: • The attacks on New York and Washington (with about 3,000 casualties), • • • •

September 11, 2001 Mumbai’s train bombing (with about 200 casualties), July 11, 2006 Bali’s holiday resort bombing (with about 200 casualties), October 12, 2002 Madrid’s train bombing (with about 200 casualties), March 11, 2004 Manila’s ferry bombing (with about 120 casualties), February 27, 2004

To this list, one should add two hostage crises where high numbers of people were killed during the raid of Russian forces that ended these sieges: • The Beslan school siege (with about 350 civilian casualties), September 1–3,

2004 • The Moscow theater hostage crisis (with about 130 casualties among the

hostages), October 23–26, 2002 All these attacks were perpetrated by Islamic organizations. All attacks took place in localities where Muslims were a minority, but in very different parts of the world: North America, Western Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Russia. Many of these organizations were transnational and primarily religious, but some of them can also be characterized as nationalist/separatist: the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines (Mindanao) and the Chechen separatists in the Russian federation. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Consequences The effects of terrorism are manifold. The most obvious consequences are the direct costs of the destruction inflicted by terrorists. It includes the loss of lives and the physical injuries mentioned above, but also psychological disorders, the destruction of infrastructure (sometimes complete cities), and the lasting disruption of everyday life and economic life. Economic costs increase when a campaign lasts, because tourists and foreign investors stay away and wealthier, educated, and dynamic people leave for better places. In the case of New York City, numerous studies addressed the physical, economical, and social consequences of the destruction of September 11, 2001. But these consequences are rather limited compared to the impact of state terrorism on cities: think of the systematic destruction of British, German, and Japanese cities during World War II, or more recently, the fate of cities like Grozny, Jenin, Ramallah, Gaza, Baghdad, and Kabul. Beyond these direct costs are many indirect costs, such as the disruption of public order and the destruction of trust in society, plus the costs of counterterrorism policies and attempts to prevent further terrorist incidents. Reactions to terrorism often trigger political violence from state and nonstate actors, including the violent repressive policies of a state trying to isolate terrorist groups from their grassroots and violent action groups that decide to rescue the state against terrorism by using the same methods. This vicious circle frequently leads to civil war. In the Algerian War of Independence, the Front de libération nationale (FLN) was countered by state terrorism (including the widespread use of torture) and, in 1961–1962, by the grassroots terrorism against independence of the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS), while in the Basque country, the ETA had to face the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL, Antiterrrorist Liberation Groups) in the 1980s. Similarly, terrorism from above often generated violent resistance, as shown in the rise of bottom-up terrorism in territories under military occupation (Israel/Palestine Territories, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya). Another type of consequence consists of changes in the built environment to prevent terrorism and protect possible targets from it. Think of the hardening of potential targets to attempt to protect individuals, buildings, neighborhoods, or even complete regions. In Belfast, urban restructuring to defend the inner city against bombing attacks by the IRA took the form of a “ring of steel” in the 1980s, with security gates and sealed streets. The ring of steel in London, designed to protect the city against the IRA, also included a circulation plan, banning cars from the inner city, and regulating access to the city, and was completed after September 11, 2001, and the attacks of July 2005 to protect the city from homegrown Islamic terrorism. Another famous example is the security fence built by Israel “to keep Palestinian suicide bombers out of Israel,” locking Palestinian communities in enclaves surrounded by the wall and greatly impeding the personal mobility of Palestinians and the viability of the Palestinian economy. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Changes in policing also involved the militarization of everyday life with the increased presence of security guards on the streets, at the entrances of buildings, in stations, and on public transportation, including identity checks in public space, closed-circuit television surveillance (CCTV), registration of activities, such as library borrowings, listening to phone calls, scanning emails, and other preventive interventions that severely impinged on the civil rights and privacy of citizens. The hidden costs of such reduction of personal freedom and institutionalized fear are high, if not always directly visible. The same instruments could easily have been used to enhance state control over citizens for other purposes. Control procedures at airports, ports, and border crossings have greatly increased costs—in time and money—for millions of travelers and for freight traffic. In the United States, dramatic reforms in this field were introduced by the USA PATRIOT Act (in full, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) of 2001 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in November 2002. Counterterrorism involves different levels of government besides national agencies, as well as private actors such as security firms at offices, factories, schools, and gated communities. Numerous international (and regional multilateral) conventions deal with acts of terrorism, to begin with, the 1963 Tokyo convention regarding air safety. The hijacking of planes has long been the primary concern of international cooperation regarding terrorism. More recently, states have cooperated to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorist organizations and their activities. There are several lists of terrorist organizations, the national ones and those compiled by supranational organizations like the United Nations and the European Union. The lists are used to impose travel limitations and financial penalties on individuals connected to these organizations identified as terrorist. International terrorism has been widely acknowledged as a specific security threat of great importance. Approaches differ, however; American policies focus on rogue states, states that are suspected to support and promote terrorism (see the National Security Strategy 2002 and 2006), whereas European policies focus on failed states that are not functioning properly, that is, not controlling their territory so that it can be used as a safe haven by terrorism networks (see the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in 2003). Policy consequences of these different approaches are great. The U.S. targets a few rogue states and favors preemptive military interventions to deal with them, while most European states and the European Union are concerned with numerous failed states and try to promote security through development aid and good governance. Since 9/11, the United States has led an international campaign against international terrorism known as the War on Terror (also known as the Global War on Terrorism, GWOT). The United States could count on the support of many states, including other liberal democracies, at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, but far fewer for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Criticisms, inside and outside the United States, of the War on Terror are numerous and rising, they pertain to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the notion of preemptive war, U.S. unilateralism, the justification of the invasion of Iraq, the costs of the war, abuses on the scene, and foremost, the consequences for civil liberties. Last but not least, terrorism has a serious impact on the nationalist ideologies that it is supposed to serve or oppose. It can foster solidarity in both camps, especially in the camp of the targets. Think of the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks and the many expressions of solidarity with New Yorkers from all over the country, and other parts of the world as well (remember the “We are all Americans” heading on the front page of Le Monde on September 13, 2001). On the other hand, terrorism is often divisive because different nationalist factions generally have different opinions about the need and the effectiveness of violent tactics. This can weaken a nationalist movement, erode its support in the population, and paralyze and jeopardize its ability to negotiate with the opposite side, because the methods—terrorist tactics—discredit the goals of the whole movement. Moreover, terrorism polarizes conflicts, as its horrendous consequences generally deepen the divide between contenders. It is not easy to make a political compromise with terrorists acceptable. A final question is whether terrorism is a successful tactic. The American historian Walter Laqueur, who wrote many influential books on terrorists over the past three decades, claims it is not, with the noticeable exception of nationalist terrorism. Still, in these cases, terrorist groups are generally only one of the components of much broader nationalist movements, and then the question remains whether terrorism has been successful as a strategy, or whether the nationalist demands have been heard despite the use of terrorism. It is therefore not possible to claim that terrorism itself produced a new territorial arrangement, when in such a case, autonomy or independence is eventually granted. In conclusion, nationalism and terrorism are not necessarily allies, but they often are associated with each other. In the recent past, many occurrences of terrorism from below and from above have been justified with nationalist ideologies of various kinds. Still, in the past decades, religious groups have supplanted nationalist groups as the major perpetrators of terrorist incidents. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that nationalist grievances are often high on the agenda of these religiously motivated terrorists, be it in Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan, or Iraq. In these many cases, religious arguments supplement nationalist demands rather than supplant them. Policies that take these nationalist demands seriously might therefore be more helpful than theological discussions to avert terrorism and reduce its appeal among the discontented. Selected Bibliography Coaffee, J. 2003. Terrorism, Risk and the City: The Making of a Contemporary Urban Landscape. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. European Council. 2003. European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

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Flint, C., ed. 2004. The Geography of War and Peace: From Death Camps to Diplomats. New York: Oxford University Press. Graham, S., ed. 2004. Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Hewitt, K. 1983. “Place Annihilation: Area Bombing and the Fate of Urban Places.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 73, no. 2: 257–284. Laqueur, W. 1977. Terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Laqueur, W. 2003. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Continuum. Laqueur, W., ed. 2004. Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists from around the World and throughout the Ages. New York: Reed Press. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2002. President of the United States of America. Washington DC. www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2006. President of the United States of America. Washington DC. www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006. Newman, D. 2003. “Barriers or Bridges? On Borders, Fences and Walls.” Tikkun Magazine 18, no. 6: 54–58. Schmid, A. P., and A. J. Jongman. 1988. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Sorkin, M., and S. Zukin, eds. 2002. After the World Trade Center: Rethinking New York City. New York: Routledge. Sparke, M. 1998. “Outsides Inside Patriotism: the Oklahoma Bombing and the Displacement of Heartland Geopolitics.” In Rethinking Geopolitics, edited by G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby, 198–223. New York: Routledge. Updike, J. 2006. Terrorist. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

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Alsace David Allen Harvey Chronology 1648 Most of Alsace is annexed to France following the Thirty Years’ War. 1681 Strasbourg is incorporated into France. 1789 The French Revolution begins; Alsace is divided into Bas-Rhin (north) and Haut-Rhin (south). 1792 The French declare war against Austria and Prussia. 1798 Mulhouse is incorporated into France. 1806 Beginnings of the Continental System. 1815 Napoleon is defeated. 1848 Revolutions in France and Germany. 1870 The Franco-Prussian War begins. 1871 The Treaty of Frankfurt recognizes German annexation of Alsace and part of Lorraine. 1914 World War I begins; there is a brief French foray into the Haut-Rhin. 1918 Armistice ends World War I; Alsace is annexed to France. 1919 Triage Commissions determine the nationality of Alsatian residents. 1926 Formation of autonomist Heimatbund. 1939 War is declared between France and Germany; civilians are evacuated from border zones to the French interior. 1940 Germany is victorious and occupies northern France; Alsace is annexed to the Reich. 1944–1945 Alsace is liberated; Alsace is annexed to France. 1949 Schuman Note proposes Franco-German economic cooperation. 1953 Alsatian Waffen-SS members are tried in Bordeaux. 1957 The Treaty of Rome establishes a European Economic Community. 1968 Foundation of cultural autonomist Cercle René Schickelé. 1979 European Parliament is established in Strasbourg. 1997 Front National holds a national congress in Strasbourg.

Situating the Nation Alsace’s status as a frontier region is defined, first and foremost, by its geography. A narrow territory hemmed in between the Rhine to its east and the Vosges Mountains to its west, Alsace forms part of a broader region, running along the Rhine Valley from the Alps to the North Sea, which has historically been both a commercial and cultural crossroads and a contested frontier. Alsace was part of the ninth-century kingdom of Lotharingia, the middle state carved out of Charlemagne’s empire, caught between the other Carolingian successor states, which were to serve as the historical cores for the emergence of the French and German N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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nations. Later, Alsace, along with the Rhineland to its north, constituted the far western edge of the Holy Roman Empire. A patchwork of free imperial cities, tiny ecclesiastical and noble estates, and corners of larger fiefdoms extending beyond the region, Alsace was further divided by the Reformation, which left behind a mixed population of Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, as well as a small Jewish minority. Alsace has historically been linked by cultural and commercial ties to the other regions of the Rhine Valley, and its dialect is a form of German. Nevertheless, it was not until the French conquest of Alsace in the 17th century that this extremely heterogeneous region became politically unified as a province under a single ruler. The kingdom of France was able to annex much of the region following the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, although Strasbourg was not incorporated into France until 1681 (and Mulhouse not until 1798). From the 17th century until the present, the political destinies of Alsace have been determined not by its inhabitants but by the broader European processes of state-building, revolution, and war.

Instituting the Nation The 19th-century historian Fustel de Coulanges declared that “what made Alsace French was not Louis XIV; it was our Revolution. Since that moment, Alsace has followed all of our destinies, she has taken part in our life” (Harvey 2001, 12). The French Revolution opened an age of popular nationalism in which sovereignty derived from cohesive, self-aware communities of citizens rather than from dynastic monarchs with claims to divine right. The French Revolution ended the exceptional status that Alsace had enjoyed under the Old Regime (it had stood outside France’s tariff frontiers, was exempt from the gabelle or salt tax, and Alsatian Protestants were not subject to the discriminatory measures applied to their counterparts elsewhere in France following the 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes), divided the province into the new departments of Bas-Rhin and HautRhin, and introduced a new and deeply divisive revolutionary political culture. Alsace constituted the front line of the revolutionary regime’s war against the dynastic powers of Europe, and the French national anthem, originally entitled the “War Song of the Rhine Army,” was composed not in Marseilles but in Strasbourg. Alsatian textile industries, already expanding in the late 18th century, received a decisive boost from the incorporation of the Swiss canton of Mulhouse in 1798 and the exclusion of British goods from European markets under Napoleon’s Continental System after 1806. Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, Alsace remained an integral part of the French state, its politics and economic life dominated to a large degree by a small number of French-speaking, Protestant families whose fortunes had been made through industry and commerce. The majority of the inhabitants of the two N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Rhine departments continued to speak a Germanic dialect, but few of them questioned their status as members of the French nation, and the waves of German nationalism that swept through central Europe during the Restoration era found little echo in Alsace. Nineteenth-century Alsace was not free of social conflict, but most tensions developed along class or religious lines rather than those of language use or nationality. Until the coming of the Franco-Prussian War, few Alsatians imagined that their province would become one of the most hotly contested territories in all of Europe.

Defining the Nation One of the central paradoxes in what was known to generations of diplomats as the “Alsace-Lorraine” question is that Alsace can legitimately be seen, depending upon one’s criteria, as essentially either French or German. Being French, under the Old Regime, meant primarily being a subject of the Bourbon monarchs; it did not necessarily imply sharing a common language or culture. Under the French Revolution, it came to mean sharing in the radical restructuring of the political N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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community, ultimately making nationality, in Renan’s famous formulation, “a daily plebiscite” (Harvey 2001, 9). Being German, at least prior to the proclamation of the Second Reich in 1871, was a matter of belonging to a shared language and cultural tradition; Ernst Moritz Arndt famously declared that the German fatherland was “wherever the German tongue is heard” (Schulze 1991, 54). Later in the 19th century, as issues of race became more central to Western social thought, German identity came to acquire an ethnic/biological component as well, and one that increasingly came to include Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) throughout central and eastern Europe, and to exclude minorities, such as Jews, even when these formed part of a shared cultural community. Alsace posed a dilemma from the standpoint of 19th-century risorgimento nationalism, which sought to redraw the map of Europe along lines of nationality. Alsace had been an integral part of the French state for two centuries, and most Alsatians who gave such matters any thought considered themselves citizens of France. Only a small minority of Alsatians spoke French as their primary language, however, primarily among the upper classes and in a few enclaves in the Vosges Mountains; the majority of Alsatians spoke a Germanic dialect. French patriots, stressing historical continuity, state structures, and voluntarism, could plausibly claim that Alsace formed part of the French nation, while their German counterparts, for whom blood ran thicker than water, could just as plausibly demand the liberation of their brethren from “foreign” rule.

Narrating the Nation Historical narratives and appeals to a wide range of national pasts have long been used to invoke concepts of collective identity in Alsace. Alsatians were well represented among the military leaders of the revolution and empire, most famously François Kellerman, who turned back an invading army under the Duke of Brunswick at the Battle of Valmy in 1792; Jean-Baptiste Kléber, who led revolutionary forces against the Vendée rebels; and Jean Rapp, who served in Napoleonic campaigns and rallied to the emperor in the Hundred Days. This shared legacy of struggle and glory was often cited by partisans of a French Alsace and was reflected in the region’s urban topography: the main public square in Strasbourg has been known as Place Kléber for most of the modern era (but was renamed Karl Roos Platz under the Nazi occupation, in honor of a pro-Nazi Alsatian activist executed by the French). Those who sought to recover Alsace’s German heritage looked back to the more distant period before the French conquest, in which Alsace had formed part of the medieval German Reich. The medieval castle of Haut-Koenigsberg, perched upon a mountaintop towering over the valley below, was restored at the wishes of Kaiser Wilhelm II, as a visual memorial to link a German imperial past to the new German empire. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Reichsland From 1871 until 1918, Alsace and annexed Lorraine (the current department of the Moselle), were administered as a single territorial unit, the “imperial territory” or Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen. The Reichsland was governed by a German official, called the Statthalter, appointed by the Kaiser and answerable only to him, as well as an indirectly elected regional parliament, the Landesausschuß, with limited powers. This institutional arrangement was unsatisfactory to many Alsatians, who felt that Alsace-Lorraine had not been granted equal status to other German federal states, or Länder. A new provincial constitution, issued in 1911, created a new parliament, the Landtag, with an elected lower house, but still maintained imperial oversight over Alsatian affairs.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Since the annexation of Alsace and part of Lorraine in 1871 by the newly proclaimed German Second Reich, a variety of state actors and institutions have sought, with varying success, to mobilize the population of Alsace into the broader national community, whether French or German. The most radical means that the modern nation-state possesses to mobilize the nation is its authority to extend or deny the rights of citizenship, which forms a legal as well as a conceptual boundary between those who are accepted as part of the national community and those who are excluded from it. In response to Alsatian protests against the German annexation, Bismarck allowed Alsatians who wished to remain French citizens to do so by making a public declaration of their intent. Pro-French Alsatians used this declaration, the “option,” as a means of expressing their opposition to the annexation; however, the German state required Alsatians who wished to retain French citizenship to emigrate by October 1872; those who remained were simply naturalized en masse. Each subsequent change of rule in Alsace brought with it new official policies regarding national citizenship, which provoked mass movement of affected populations. In the aftermath of World War I, the victorious French established “triage commissions” to examine the legal status and national origins of the residents of Alsace, issuing identity cards identifying them as French citizens, foreigners from neutral nations, or enemy aliens (German or Austrian citizens). Just over 1 million residents of the province were classified as “French Alsatians” by the triage commissions, while about 500,000 were classified as “enemy aliens” and nearly 200,000 as “mixed” heritage, an indicator of the high degree of migration and integration of Alsace into Germany between 1871 and 1918. Those Alsatians identified as enemy aliens were subject to a variety of forms of discrimination, and many of them were deported to Germany, while others chose to leave of their own accord. Approximately 150,000 people left Alsace for Germany in the aftermath of World War I. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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A 1918 poster depicts a girl in Alsatian costume with a French flag draped around her (presumably the personification of Alsace). The poster reads: “March 1, 1871 to March 1, 1918. In liberated Alsace young girls willingly make sacrifices to hasten the liberation of the part of Alsace still annexed [to Germany]. Follow their example.” (Library of Congress)

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Commissions de triage The commissions de triage or “triage commissions” were established by French occupation authorities following the recovery of Alsace after the end of World War I in 1918. Alsace had formed part of the German Second Reich for nearly half a century, and hundreds of thousands of Germans had crossed the Rhine to settle in the province. While some Alsatians would later claim that Alsatians and “Alt-Deutsche” lived hermetically separate lives during this period, demographic statistics tell another story, as intermarriage was common, and opposition to German rule faded after 1890. These commissions, staffed by French army officers (often of émigré Alsatian heritage themselves) made summary classification of the entire population of the province based on national origins, and also heard tens of thousands of appeals from residents who felt they had been unfairly classified. A total of 1,082,650 A-cards (indicating Alsatian-French origins), 183,500 B-cards (mixed heritage), 55,050 C-cards (foreign nationals), and 513,800 D-cards (German or Austrian citizens) were issued. About 150,000 residents of Alsace left the province for Germany, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in the aftermath of the war.

During the “phony war” of October 1939 to May 1940, several hundred thousand residents of Alsace were evacuated to the interior of France in anticipation of a German attack on the province, and many later complained of being labeled boches (a derogatory term for Germans) by their new neighbors. Following the collapse of the French Third Republic, Alsace was reannexed to Germany, and German officials organized the repatriation of Alsatians who wanted to return home, while at the same time expelling nearly a hundred thousand undesirables (Jews, political radicals, and French newcomers) from the province. German officials actively promoted the re-Germanization of the province, symbolized by the slogan “Hinaus mit dem welschen Plunder! ” (“Out with the French garbage!”), and forbade obvious symbols of Frenchness (such as the beret, not part of traditional Alsatian attire, but popular during this period as a badge of French allegiance). From 1940 to 1945, Alsace formed part of the Third Reich, and young Alsatian men were subject to conscription to the German Wehrmacht (the army of the Third Reich). These incorporés de force, as they were called by their fellow Alsatians to emphasize the unwilling nature of their service, served on multiple fronts in World War II. The residents of Alsace were not, of course, simply the passive recipients of official nation-building efforts emanating from Paris or Berlin. Local institutions, actors, and political parties struggled to mobilize their constituencies and defend their interests in this rapidly changing environment. Perhaps the strongest bulwark of Alsatian particularism against both Lutheran Prussia and the militantly secular Third Republic was the Catholic Church, to which a majority of the province’s residents belonged. For 20 years after the annexation of Alsace to Germany, a broad anti-annexationist movement called the “protestation” dominated Alsatian politics, sweeping all Reichstag elections in the territory prior to 1890. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Malgré-nous or incorporés de force Following the German victory over France in 1940, Alsace and Lorraine were once again annexed to the German Reich. The Nazi Gauleiter (provincial leader) for Alsace, Robert Wagner, demanded that Alsatians be incorporated into the Reich’s war effort on the same terms as other Germans, but German military commanders’ doubts as to the reliability of Alsatian conscripts delayed the implementation of conscription until August 24, 1942. About 160,000 Alsatians were drafted into the German army and served primarily on the Eastern Front, where around 50,000 perished. Many others were taken prisoner and found that their Soviet captors did not recognize their claims to French citizenship or their status as unwilling combatants. Around 40,000 Alsatians either avoided the draft or deserted once in uniform. The most controversial of these malgré-nous (“against our will”) or incorporés de force (“forcibly incorporated”) were those who served in occupied France. Twelve Alsatians formed part of the notorious Waffen-SS unit that committed the massacre of French civilians at Oradour-sur-Glane on June 10, 1944. They were tried and convicted by a French court for war crimes in 1953, but, as their former commander remained in impunity in West Germany, they were subsequently pardoned.

The protestation of the 1870s and 1880s was coordinated to a great degree by the church, and many activist clergy, such as Abbé Wetterlé, were elected as deputies to the Reichstag. In the 1920s, Catholic activists again played a prominent role in Alsatian autonomism, with another priest, Abbé Xavier Haegy, serving as the spiritual leader of the Heimatbund (homeland federation) movement. Socialism, which emerged in Alsace under the auspices of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 1890s and beyond, offered another alternative to Alsatians who could accept neither German nationalism nor political Catholicism. In addition to mobilizing the province’s rapidly growing industrial proletariat, the SPD also absorbed much of the anti-Prussian protest vote that had previously gone to the autonomist movement. The autonomist movements of the 1870s and 1920s, as the term suggests, generally sought political and cultural autonomy for Alsace within the existing

Protestation The protestation, the Alsatian protest movement against annexation to the German Second Reich, began with the appeal of the deputies of Alsace and Lorraine to the French National Assembly on February 17, 1871. From 1874—the first Reichstag elections in which Alsace and Lorraine took part—until 1890, elections in Alsace were swept by candidates who rejected the incorporation of their province into Germany. The protestation was a broad, cross-class political movement in which pro-French Catholic clergy, notably Abbé Emile Wetterlé, played a leading role. Beginning in 1890, with the realization that the annexation of Alsace was not likely to be reversed in the short term, the unity of the protestation gave way to political divisions along class and religious lines.

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German or French states, well aware that national boundaries would not be redrawn without a major war that could devastate the province, and that Alsace, a small territory with just over a million inhabitants, could not hope for independence in an age of warfare between the great powers of Europe. For these reasons, there has rarely, if ever, been an “Alsatian nationalist” movement, and Alsace has seldom been imagined as a “nation” in its own right but rather has been imagined as part of the larger French or German nations. The more radical branch of interwar autonomism, which might be seen as an exception to this pattern, took an increasingly national-separatist stance in the 1930s, but this was generally no more than a cover for völkisch (racialist) German nationalist sentiments, as the wartime collaboration of many erstwhile autonomists, such as Joseph Rossé, Charles Hueber, and Jean-Pierre Mourer, demonstrate. In the years since 1945, the “Alsace-Lorraine” question has largely been forgotten, as the Federal Republic of Germany has abandoned claims to the region, which has become more thoroughly integrated into the French nation. The expansion of mass media—print newspapers, and especially radio and television— has, along with the expanded education system, made French the dominant language in Alsace for the first time in the region’s history. The role of the mass media in producing a standardized national culture has been particularly pronounced in Alsace, as nearly all programming is in the French language and is broadcast nationwide. One of the public television networks airs some local programming, including a few programs in Alsatian dialect, but the shift in language usage has been striking, as the once-dominant dialect has been almost completely displaced and is now used only by a dwindling number of elderly speakers. The political culture of postwar France has also changed significantly from that of the Third Republic, allowing Alsace to blend more comfortably into the French mainstream. The militant anticlericalism of the Third Republic, which alienated many pious Alsatian Catholics during the 1920s and 1930s, has largely faded, and “Jacobin centralization” has given way to at least limited efforts at regionalization. Similarly, the rise of a moderate, pro-republican right, in the form of the Catholic MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) during the Fourth Republic and the Gaullist RPR (Rassemblement pour la République) during the Fifth has not only stabilized democratic institutions in France but also provided a political home for many socially conservative Alsatians, who were never integrated into the culture of French republicanism during the interwar period. Perhaps the greatest factor in the resolution of the “Alsace-Lorraine” question, however, has been the end of the Franco-German antagonism and the rise of cooperation between the two former enemies, which have instead become the anchors of a new, transnational European order. It was the Lorraine-born French foreign minister Robert Schuman who first proposed Franco-German cooperation for industrial reconstruction following World War II, leading to the creation first of the European Coal and Steel Commission, and later, following the 1957 Treaty of Rome, to the creation of the six-member European Economic Community, the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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forerunner of today’s 25-member European Union. With the establishment of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Alsace’s largest city became a European capital, second only to Brussels in importance. The formerly disputed province thus became a keystone of a federalized European order. In this new international climate, Alsatian autonomism, let alone separatism, has all but disappeared as a political movement. In 1981, a handful of middleaged Alsatian veterans of the German Wehrmacht, calling themselves the “Black Wolves” (Schwarze Wölfe), bombed a Croix de Lorraine monument in the Vosges Mountains, but this gesture drew nearly universal condemnation in the province and produced no lasting consequences. Cultural autonomists remain somewhat more active, as such groups as the Cercle René Schickelé, founded in 1968 to promote bilingual education in Alsace, have focused on the preservation of Alsatian dialect and folk culture. During the 1970s, cultural autonomists in Strasbourg sponsored a folk festival called the Musauer Wacke, or “fools of the Musau” (river), which used carnivalesque imagery, marionettes, and masquerades to celebrate Alsatian popular culture and the local dialect. Such groups do not seek to redress the political allegiance of the province but rather can best be seen in the context of nationwide efforts to promote decentralization and the revitalization of the historic regions of France. Demographic changes have also impacted the ways in which Alsatians define themselves and their neighbors. As an early industrial region, with a substantial textile and machine construction industrial base in the early 19th century, Alsace has long been a magnet for immigrant labor, drawing first peasants from the Alsatian countryside, later Swiss and German seasonal migrants, and, by the start of the 20th century, Italian and Polish immigrants as well. During the postwar period, however, Alsace, like the rest of France, has increasingly attracted immigrants from the former French empire, particularly North African Muslims. Immigration has erased older cultural markers while creating new ones, as Alsatians today define themselves less against Germans or the “French of the interior” but in opposition to a non-European Other. Alsatian political culture at the dawn of the 21st century thus presents two contradictory faces. One of these is the modern, cosmopolitan, and progressive European orientation of the province, perhaps best symbolized by former Strasbourg mayor Catherine Trautmann, who went on to serve as minister of culture in the government of Lionel Jospin in the late 1990s. The other face of Alsatian political culture, however, is far less attractive, as the province has given the farright Front National and its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, some of their highest vote totals anywhere in France, in recognition of which the party held its annual convention in Strasbourg in 1997. Alsace, like much of Europe, thus finds itself on the brink between the progressive cosmopolitanism of the European Union and the resurgence of racism and exclusivist nationalism that is embodied by such groups as the Front National.

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Selected Bibliography Baechler, C. 1982. Le parti catholique alsacien, 1890–1939: Du Reichsland à la république jacobine. Paris: Ophrys. Brubaker, R. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Caron, V. 1988. Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Dreyfus, F. 1969. La vie politique en Alsace, 1919–1936. Paris: Armand Colin. Ellis, G. 1981. Napoleon’s Continental Blockade: The Case of Alsace. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fischbach, B., and R. Oberlé. 1990. Les loups noirs: Autonomisme et terrorisme en Alsace. Mulhouse, France: Alsatia Union. Ford, F. 1958. Strasbourg in Transition, 1648–1789. New York: Norton. Goodfellow, S. 1999. Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine: Fascisms in Interwar Alsace. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Harp, S. 1998. Learning to Be Loyal: Primary Schooling as Nation Building in Alsace and Lorraine, 1850–1940. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Harvey, D. A. 2001. Constructing Class and Nationality in Alsace, 1830–1945. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Hau, M. 1987. L’industrialisation de l’Alsace, 1803–1939. Strasbourg, France: Association des Publications près les Universités de Strasbourg. Igersheim, F. 1981. L’Alsace des notables: la bourgeoisie et le peuple alsacien, 1870–1914. Strasbourg, France: Nouvel Alsacien. Ketternacker, L. 1973. Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik im Elsass. Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt. Levy, P. 1929. Histoire linguistique d’Alsace et de la Lorraine. Paris: Société des Editions les Belles Lettres. Rothenberger, K.-H. 1976. Die elsass-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen. Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Peter Lang. Schulze, H. 1991. The Course of German Nationalism. Translated by Sarah Hanbury-Tenison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Silverman, D. 1972. Reluctant Union: Alsace Lorraine and Imperial Germany, 1871–1918. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Vassberg, L. 1993. Alsatian Acts of Identity: Language Use and Language Attitudes in Alsace. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. Wahl, A., and J.-C. Richez. 1993. La vie quotidienne en Alsace: Entre France et Allemagne, 1850–1950. Paris: Hachette.

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Basque Country Pauliina Raento Chronology 1876 The Basques lose their historical rights and privileges (fueros) in Spain. 1895 The first Basque nationalist party, Partido Nacionalista Vasco/Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea (PNV/EAJ), is founded in Bilbao, a center of trade, industry, and immigration. 1930 The radical nationalist party Acción Nacionalista Vasca/Eusko Abertzale Ekintza (ANV/ EAE) is founded in Bilbao, following internal disagreements among Basque nationalists. 1936 The Civil War begins in Spain between the republican government (Left) and Spanish nationalist coalition (Right) led by General Francisco Franco. 1936–1937 First Basque autonomy in Spain. 1937 Aerial bombardment of the “sacred” Basque town, Guernica. Picasso protests by painting Guernica. The republican and Basque nationalist troops are defeated in Bilbao; the Basque autonomous government is exiled in Paris. 1939 General Franco’s dictatorship and promotion of “one Spanish nation” begins in Spain. 1959 The separatist, clandestine Basque resistance organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) is founded. 1968 ETA kills for the first time. The conflict between the Spanish central government and Basque nationalists escalates. Basque nationalists face new internal ideological divisions. 1975 General Franco dies. Spain begins political transition toward representative democracy. 1978 Spain’s new constitution recognizes the country’s ethno-linguistic minorities and divides the state into 17 autonomous communities. 1979 The Basque Autonomous Community is created in Spain. 1980 The first parliamentary elections in the Basque Autonomous Community establish nationalist rule. 1982 The Foral Community of Navarra is created in Spain. 1986 Spain joins the European Community (European Union). 1995 The first formal transfrontier agreement is signed between Spain and France. 2002 The radical Basque nationalist party Batasuna and its predecessors are banned in Spain. 2006 Peace talks attempted between ETA and the Spanish central government.

Situating the Nation The Basque Country is a mountainous borderland in Spain and France. For centuries, Basques have maintained their own language (Euskara) and cultural traditions in their seven historical provinces (see map and sidebar on Multiple Territories, Names, and Boundaries). These provinces became parts of the emerging Spanish and French states at different times and through various means. For example, Álava (in Basque, Araba), Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa), and Vizcaya (Bizkaia) were subN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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jected to the Crown of Castile by the 13th century, whereas the Kingdom of Navarra (Nafarroa) was defeated and annexed in 1512. All these regions kept certain economic privileges, their own legal-political practices (codified in charters known as the fueros), and distinct identities. The drawing of the international boundary between Spain and France (beginning in the 17th century) and the French Revolution (1789) tied the three Basque provinces in France to the orbit of Paris. The Basquespeaking minority population in the distant borderland provinces of Labourd (Lapurdi), Bassenavarre (Benafarroa), and Soule (Zuberoa) thus became subjects of the French revolutionary leaders’ promotion of an ethno-culturally uniform state. In Spain, the Basques’ expertise as seafarers, shipbuilders, and clergymen earned them a prominent role in the Crown’s imperial endeavors in the Americas. This participation increased the power of Basque financial elites in Spanish national affairs and the wealth of Basque cities. Emigration supported traditional Basque lifestyle by alleviating population pressure, because the Basque farmstead (baserri) was passed on between generations as an undivided whole: while the oldest child continued farming, the siblings had to look elsewhere. These global opportunities expanded individual horizons and dispersed wealth through interpersonal networks. Not only the well educated but also shepherds and maids could make independent decisions about their lives and careers.

Multiple Territories, Names, and Boundaries The Basqueness of the seven historical Basque provinces, together known as Euskal Herria, is based on ethno-linguistic characteristics. This generally agreed definition becomes highly contested when it is equated with Euzkadi (the name given to the independent Basque country of seven provinces by 19th-century nationalists) or Euskadi (the new spelling of the same ideal, adopted by the radical nationalist youth in the 1950s). Currently, Euskadi usually refers to the three-province Basque Autonomous Community. Navarra, a historical Spanish Basque province known for its distinct identity, forms its own autonomous community, the Foral Community of Navarra. In the (radical) Basque nationalist view, Euskal Herria and Euskadi should be synonymous names of an independent state. The division of the seven provinces into two states, Spain and France, adds to this politico-administrative and identity-political complexity. The three Basque provinces in France belong to the Department of Pyrénées Atlantiques and the Region of Aquitaine, without a separate status of their own. For (radical) Basque nationalists, the international boundary and the usage of Spanish- and French-language place names represent oppression. This is challenged by a pointed usage of geographical Basque-language names Hegoalde (Southside) and Iparralde (Northside) for the Spanish and the French Basque Country or by talking about beste aldea (the other side), depending on the speaker’s location. Spain’s membership in the European Community (now the European Union) has eased exchanges across the international boundary, but politico-administrative complexity has increased. The Basque Autonomous Community has 2.13 million and the Foral Community of Navarra has 600,000 residents (2006). Together they account for roughly 90 percent of the population in Euskal Herria. Metropolitan Bilbao is the largest city in the area.

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The boundaries and administrative status of the seven historical Basque provinces in Spain and France. The grey shade indicates the core area of Euskara, the Basque language. Spanish and French place names precede their Basque counterparts because those two languages are better known among English speakers. (Map by Pauliina Raento and Kirsti Lehto)

The consolidation of Spain and France and their boundaries in the 19th century increased the economic and political distance between the four Spanish Basque and the three French Basque provinces. The latter remained peripheral and rural, with an aging population and high rates of out-migration. The Spanish side featured major urban settlements, a lucrative shipbuilding industry, powerful financial institutions, upscale tourism in such cities as San Sebastián (Donostia), and active international connections. Natural resources further supported the onset of rapid heavy-industrial development in the late 19th century. The N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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mills in Bilbao (Bilbo) and its surroundings attracted workers from the countryside and from the rest of Spain, increasing and diversifying the urban population on the Basque coast. A dramatic economic and sociocultural change, and the loss of the fueros in 1876 after the so-called Second Carlist War in Spain, provoked a defense reaction among the native middle classes and created the Basque nationalist movement in the context of rising nationalist sentiments across Europe. However, these ideals failed to take root in the French Basque provinces because of their very different societal and economic conditions. These differences within the historic Basque territory illustrate how different state policies, economic structures, and politico-administrative boundaries steer regional and local developments. These differing histories also help one understand some later developments, internal diversity, and practices of Basque nationalism.

Instituting the Nation The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV/EAJ, Partido Nacionalista Vasco/Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea), was founded in Bilbao in 1895 under the ideological leadership of Sabino Arana (1865–1903). In his writings, he portrayed Basques as racially superior to Spaniards, romanticized traditional Basque culture and rural lifestyle, and called for the restoration of the fueros and for Euzkadi, a sovereign Basque homeland of seven provinces (see map and sidebar on Multiple Territories, Names, and Boundaries). To Arana, Spanish immigrant workers and Basque financial elites embodied the enemies of the Basque nation. The PNV/EAJ was not only class specific, but also local, focusing on the interests of Bilbao and Vizcaya rather than the entire territory it claimed. Some of the critics of this bizkaitarrismo favored a more action-oriented approach, which led to countercurrents within the movement. The division of Basque politics into moderate Basque nationalists, radical Basque nationalists, and nonnationalists (Spain- or France-affiliated groups) was already in place in the early 20th century. Among the most influential radical Basque nationalist groups was the Basque Nationalist Action (ANV/EAE, Acción Nacionalista Vasca/Eusko Abertzale Ekintza). Basque nationalists achieved a short-lived autonomy during the Spanish Republic, after the breakout of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. The aerial bombardment of the town of Guernica (Gernika) in 1937, and the defeat of republican Bilbao soon afterward, marked the victory of General Francisco Franco’s troops in the Basque Country. His final victory against the republican government in 1939 established a Spanish nationalist dictatorship in Spain and led many Basques to political exile, mostly to France and Latin America. The first president (lehendakari) of the Basque autonomy, José Antonio Aguirre (1904–1960), and his government received a diplomatic status in Paris. After the fall of France N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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to Nazi Germany in 1940, however, some property of the Basque government was confiscated and Aguirre fled to Latin America. He returned to France in the early 1950s. Franco’s ideal of one Spanish nation and the oppression of minority cultures radicalized Basque nationalists. Especially the nationalist youth was dissatisfied with the cautious resistance strategies of the PNV/EAJ and the exiles. This radi-

Autonomous Communities and Political Representation in the Spanish Basque Country The Basque Autonomous Community was created in 1979 as the first of those 17 autonomous communities outlined in the Spanish constitution of 1978. The autonomy, as defined in the so-called Statute of Guernica, gives the three constituting provinces their own parliament, government, and president with broad legislative powers over the autonomous territory. The Foral Community of Navarra, created in 1982, has similar self-governing structures, which reflect the cultural distinctiveness and history of self-government in these territories. The Basque Autonomous Community and Navarra are exceptional among Spain’s autonomous communities, for they have a right to collect their own taxes. The Basque Autonomous Community also has its own autonomous police force, the Ertzaintza. The Basque language is an official language in the Basque Autonomous Community, but legally secondary to Spanish in the wording of the Spanish Constitution. Public institutions, such as the University of the Basque Country (Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, UPV/EHU), are bilingual, but the possibilities of using the minority language vary according to location and local language environment within the Basque Autonomous Community. Fluent Basque-speakers (one-third of the population in the three provinces; see sidebar on Multiple Territories, Names, and Boundaries) concentrate on the coast, especially in Guipúzcoa, whereas many who communicate in Basque with some difficulty live in Álava and the major cities. In Navarra, the legal status of the Basque language is conditioned by region due to considerable cultural differences within the Foral Community. In the northernmost third of the province, daily life proceeds in Basque. In the autonomous parliament in Vitoria, the moderate Basque nationalist coalition (PNV/EAJ and EA [Eusko Alkartasuna, Basque Solidarity]) is the largest group with 39 percent of the votes cast and 29 of the 75 available seats (election in 2005). The second-largest party is the Spanish socialist PSE-EE/PSOE (Socialistas Vascos Euskal Sozialistak de Euskadi or Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), with 23 percent of the vote and 18 seats. In Navarra’s parliament in Pamplona, the largest party is the regionalist UPN (Navarrese People’s Union), with 42 percent of the vote and 23 of the 50 seats (election in 2003). The PSOE holds 11 seats with 22 percent of the vote as the second-largest party. The Basque nationalist groups have a total of 8 seats (16 percent of the vote) in Navarra. In both autonomous communities, almost one-third of the voters abstained in these parliamentary elections, some in protest against the current practice of “Basque national self-determination.” The ban on the leading radical Basque nationalist party in Spain in 2002 left 10–25 percent of the voters without representation at the polls in the Basque Autonomous Community. Official information about the two autonomous communities is available at www. euskadi.net and www.navarra.es.

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calization coincided with another phase of industrialization and immigration, which now reached the rural inland and small towns. A new radical nationalist organization, ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Liberty), was created in 1959. It promoted an independent, Basque-speaking, and socialist Basque Country of seven provinces through active resistance strategies (such as sabotage against infrastructure and, later, through political assassinations), which raised some sympathy in France. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the French Basque provinces served ETA and other Basque nationalist activists as an operative base and a political refuge, with the help of Basque seamen’s expertise in contraband. The marginal status of the three provinces in France, ideological disagreements between the French and Spanish central governments, the Basque language, and old social and cultural contacts across the international boundary supported these exchanges. The death of General Franco in 1975 launched Spain’s political transition process toward representative democracy and brought Spain and France politically closer to one another. The Spanish constitution of 1978 recognized the rights of the country’s ethno-cultural minorities and sketched a new state structure based on autonomous communities. The first regional parliamentary elections in the Basque Autonomous Community (see sidebar on Autonomous Communities and Political Representation in the Spanish Basque Country) in 1980 established the rule of Basque nationalists in this region. However, the desire of Navarra to form its own autonomous community disappointed the Basque nationalist ideal of unity. The Basque Autonomous Community and the Foral Community of Navarra were brought under the umbrella of European cooperation with Spain’s membership in the European Community (European Union) in 1986.

Defining the Nation The creation of these two autonomous communities reflects the long history of difference and disagreement within the historical Basque territory. Under dispute are the definitions of Basque identity and territory, and the acceptable goals and methods of their promotion. For example: Can the goal of “Basque national self-determination” be satisfied with a degree of autonomy or only with independence? What and who are acceptable forms and partners of cooperation? Is political violence acceptable? How useful are referenda in solving these matters? Should the search for answers to these questions involve three, four, or seven provinces, and who should have the right to decide this? Territorial-ideological views and loyalties override the conventional ideological division into Left and Right in Basque politics. Radical nationalists have typically detested the engagement of moderate nationalists in political dialogue and cooperation with nonnationalists and the central governments. In this view, the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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seven provinces form an indivisible whole, similar to the traditional farmstead. “Basque national self-determination” thus means separation from Spain and France and full independence, but this does not imply that all radical nationalists accept the use of political violence. Moderate nationalists generally accept autonomy and the current boundaries as political realities (despite their at times fierce rhetoric and resistance) and condemn violence. In the view of nonnationalist Basques and regionalist parties within the contested territory, the Basque provinces are culturally distinctive but integral parts of Spain and France, and ETA cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. In sum, what exactly constitutes “the Basque Country,” what it should be called, and how it should be managed are strongly contested matters. Fractures within organizations characterize Basque nationalism. One extreme example of operative-strategic and cultural-political fragmentation is ETA, an offspring of the PNV/EAJ’s youth organization. Some of ETA’s numerous splinter groups have moved toward party-political or civic-organizational activities, whereas others have adopted increasingly harsh methods to promote separatism. Another rupture in the PNV/EAJ created an ideologically “mediating” nationalist party, EA (Eusko Alkartasuna, Basque Solidarity), in 1986, due to ideological, interpersonal, and regional tensions. Over the years, several radical Basque nationalist groups have appeared on, and disappeared off, the Basque political scene. To prevent reincarnations, the Spanish central government’s ban on the leading radical nationalist party Batasuna (Unity) in 2002, for the party’s alleged connections to ETA, included a ban on its two predecessors, Herri Batasuna and Euskal Herritarrok (see sidebar on Autonomous Communities and Political Representation in the Spanish Basque Country). The contested Basque territory forms a complex map of ideological centers, peripheries, and transitional zones. San Sebastián has been a radical nationalist stronghold compared to PNV/EAJ-dominated Bilbao or to prominently nonnationalist Vitoria (Gasteiz) and Pamplona (Iruña). These two capital cities are also known for their regionalist parties, which ride on the historically and culturally distinct identity of the surrounding provinces. This is nothing new, for Spanish Basque cities and provinces have historically competed with one another and have often differed in their ideological preferences and territorial loyalties. In Spain, the densely populated, urban-industrial, prominently nationalist, and fluently Basque-speaking coastal provinces stand apart from the less populous, rural, nonnationalist, and Spanish-speaking inland provinces with more recent industrialization. Álava and Navarra are further divided internally, for their northern areas are firmly in the orbit of Basque-speaking culture and nationalist politics. These areas thus form an internal cultural and political borderland within the historical Basque territory and within the two autonomous communities. The Basque provinces in France remain predominantly rural and largely Basquespeaking (despite some decline in its usage), although tourism and specialized inN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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dustrial production have developed on the coast. The modest support for Basque nationalism in France continues to favor radical nationalism. The outcome is a fragmented and highly conflictive (at times, lethal) political culture. The political atmosphere is particularly tense in areas where several ideological viewpoints and interest groups compete. Since the political transition in Spain, the conflict has focused on Basque society itself rather than on the confrontation between Basque nationalists and the Spanish and French central governments, although protests against the ban on Batasuna and the peace talks between the Spanish central government and ETA (in 2006) somewhat redirected this emphasis.

Narrating the Nation The “Basque nation” is the core of Basque nationalist loyalties despite the disagreements. The foundations of Basque nationalist identity, history, and culture come together in the symbolic power of the town of Guernica in Vizcaya. In the Middle Ages, this centrally located, thriving commercial center became a political center, where local and regional representatives gathered to manage the fueros and make political decisions. These were confirmed under an oak tree, the remains of which are preserved next to a historical Basque Assembly House. The visits by the Kings of Castile to Guernica to confirm and respect the Basque privileges under their rule enhanced the town’s symbolic value and distinct Basque identity, especially in the 16th and 17th centuries. Since the 19th century, Guernica has signified war, conflict, and resistance due to repeated conflicts with the central government. Especially, the conflictive end to the fueros and the Spanish Civil War associated Guernica with outside oppression against the Basque nation and identity. Guernica also reminds Basque nationalists of the ideological and regional conflicts within the Basque Country —those of Basque nationalists and Spanish republicans (coast) against Spanish nationalists and nonnationalist Basques (inland). Because of these conflicts, Guernica stands for resistance and heroism. This was evident in the naming of Basque nationalist military units in the Civil War after the sacred town. Through the bombardment of Guernica, through his military victory, and through cultural and political oppression during his rule, General Franco thus hit the heart of Basque nationalist identity, making Guernica a symbol of sacrifice, tragedy, and genocide. Pablo Picasso’s war-protesting painting Guernica (1937) gave global recognition to the town’s name. Numerous commercial and civic establishments across the Americas had already been named after the town and its oak in celebration of ethno-cultural origins, but now the name represented a wish for peace on Earth. All these meanings come together in the frequent usage of the name “Guernica” (or Gernika) and related symbolism in the Basque Country, where at least two N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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An old oak, the Tree of Guernica, is among the most important symbols of Basque national identity and history. The entire town of Guernica, with its multiple identity-political references, qualifies as “sacred ground” for Basque nationalists. (Pauliina Raento)

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nationalist political organizations, a pacifist group, and the Basque autonomous police force use them in their names or emblems. Guernica is the site for numerous nationalist rituals and monuments. For example, each new Basque autonomous parliament swears its oath at the Tree of Guernica. Few electoral or other political campaigns of Basque nationalists bypass Guernica. The Basque “national anthem,” other important identity-political songs, the Basque national(ist) flag (the red, white, and green ikurriña), the Basque language, and Basque folklore are prominent in these rituals.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Basque nationalists are notably active and aggressive in their efforts to maintain and attract support. The highly politicized and competitive environment, the legacy of oppression, and the ban on radical nationalist parties have steered the methods of nationalist mobilization. Information passes forward by word of mouth through private and informal spaces and networks, which involve the street, the mountains, homes, cooking clubs, taverns, and churches. In addition, each political group has more formal channels of information (such as partyaffiliated newspapers and Web sites) and organizational infrastructure (such as labor unions, women’s groups, and youth organizations). Mass power is typically exhibited in street demonstrations, for or against a particular issue or event. The contents, methods, and style of political mobilization vary according to campaign organizer, subject matter, intended audience, and location. Particularly varied—and the loudest—approach to political mobilization is that of radical Basque nationalists. Their strategies vary from persuasive celebration and promotion of Basque culture to openly propagandist political messaging, commemoration, and confrontation. Examples of the former approach include street festivals, concerts, and sports events in support of Basque language and traditions. The latter features (clandestine) painting of graffiti and murals in public spaces; commemorative and welcoming ceremonies for the fallen, imprisoned, or freed Basque nationalist “freedom fighters”; mass gatherings (which occasionally have included such acts as the burning of the Spanish flag); and acts of violence against infrastructure and political opponents. In the predominantly Spanish-speaking, nonnationalist southern borderland, persuasive tones and cultural emphases are favored over political confrontation and violence. The style is more aggressive and varied in the nationalist core areas, where the radical nationalist message needs to challenge moderate nationalist and nonnationalist views and to confirm and celebrate the identity of those who already support the promoted ideology. Sensitive to the heterogeneity of the contested territory, the emphasis of mobilization adjusts to local issues, in Basque, Spanish, or French. The preferences of age groups are considered as well: N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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contemporary Basque radical nationalist rock music, old political protest songs, and traditional poetry improvisation contests may be performed at the same festival to attract a broad audience and to show that generations unite behind “the cause.” That location, visibility, and active participation matter is well exemplified by the clandestine radical nationalist campaign of street-sign painting in centers of ideological contest—in Guernica and its surroundings, at the international border between Spain and France, and in Álava and Navarra in the transitional zones between Basque- and Spanish-language majority cultures. The Spanish (or French) spellings are erased in black paint from the signage so that only the Basque place names are left visible (or added) to promote a monolingual, Basquespeaking Basque Country and to challenge the presence of the “oppressor states” in the claimed territory. However, most of the daily nation-building proceeds quietly in administrative offices and meeting rooms despite the conflictive atmosphere, public protests, and heated political debate. The political transition and consolidation of autonomies in Spain (see sidebar on Autonomous Communities and Political Representation in the Spanish Basque Country) have contributed to the institutionalization of Basque political, administrative, cultural, and economic practices. For example, the status of Euskara in public settings has been enhanced, and education is now available in Basque from kindergarten to university. From the crafting of basic autonomous infrastructure, the attention has shifted toward broadening its scope and functions, and toward economic development and regional cooperation across politico-administrative boundaries. With the help of funding and regional policies from the European Union, the historical Basque territory has acquired characteristics of a functional borderland region. Money, people, and businesses move increasingly fluently between the two states and the two autonomous communities in Spain. The ambitious expansion and promotion of the historically important port of Bilbao, now the second-most important port in Spain, and related logistical distribution services at the international border zone have promoted the Basque coast as an international transportation hub, revitalizing many of its past global connections. Projects related to high technology, energy and the environment, the media, and tourism are among the foci of regional cross-border development and financial support from supranational and national sources. Successes have improved the Basque economy by diversifying employment options, lowering unemployment, and attracting new investments. All this has supported the transition from dramatically declined heavy-industrial production toward specialized centers of high technology and innovation. Old sociocultural contacts across the boundaries support this development and the diversification of Basque cultural expression, bringing the Spanish and French Basque regions closer to one another. Basque, Spanish, and French political histories complicate these local and regional achievements in multiple ways. One source of continuous friction between the Basque autonomous government and the Spanish central government is the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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incomplete transfer of power from Madrid to Vitoria. Suspicion, competition, and some legal limitations complicate cooperation between the Basque Autonomous Community and the Foral Community of Navarra. Cooperation has been slow between Madrid and Paris as well, for their first formal transfrontier agreement was reached in 1995. By this time, it was evident that the now open boundary between the two countries had strongly differentiated the Basque provinces in many practical matters (such as administrative procedures) despite the shared cultural and social heritage. Cross-border development projects have suffered from incompatible maps and statistics. The number of involved parties and interests has grown and represents a range of actors, from supranational (European Union) to local levels (cities and towns). Paradoxically, the current situation in the historical Basque territory both supports and complicates the process of Basque nation-building—however that is defined. Conflicts between political groups in Basque society, between cities and provinces, and between Basque nationalists and the central governments in Madrid and Paris are parts of daily life in the historical Basque territory. Each interest group in the Basque Country continues its nation-building work according to its own historically informed territorial-ideological vision. The historical Basque territory continues to be divided into multiple politico-administrative units and into distinct subregions with different profiles and interests regarding language, culture, economy, political ideology, and population development. The Basque economy as a whole continues to diversify and does relatively well in the context of integrating Europe, but especially projects that involve local, regional, national, and international actors sometimes proceed slowly. The political atmosphere in the Basque Country remains tense and sensitive to bad memories despite new forms of cooperation and signs of a peace process in Spain. Selected Bibliography Clark, R. P. 1984. The Basque Insurgents. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Conversi, D. 1997. The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain. London: Hurst & Company. Corcuera Atienza, J. 1979. Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco 1876–1904. Madrid: Siglo XXI. del Valle, T. 1994. Korrika. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Douglass, W. A., ed. 1989. Essays in the Basque Social Anthropology and History. Reno: Basque Studies Program, University of Nevada. Douglass, W. A., and J. Bilbao. 1975. Amerikanuak. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Douglass, W. A., C. Urza, L. White, and J. Zulaika, eds. 1999. Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium. Reno: Basque Studies Program, University of Nevada. Jacob, J. 1994. Hills of Conflict. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Nordberg, I. 2007. Regionalism, Capitalism and Populism. Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters. Raento, P. 1997. “Political Mobilization and Place-Specificity: Radical Nationalist Street Campaigning in the Spanish Basque Country.” Space & Polity 1, no. 2: 191–204.

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Raento, P. 1999. “The Geography of Spanish Basque Nationalism.” In Nested Identities, edited by G. H. Herb and D. H. Kaplan, 219–235. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Raento, P. 2002. “Integration and Division in the Basque Borderland.” In Boundaries and Place, edited by D. H. Kaplan and J. Häkli, 93–115. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Raento, P., and C. J. Watson. 2000. “Gernika, Guernica, Guernica? Contested Meanings of a Basque Place.” Political Geography 19, no. 6: 707–736. Zulaika, J. 1988. Basque Violence. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina Steven Oluic Chronology 12th century Bosnia’s existence begins as a series of medieval kingdoms situated between more powerful neighbors; Hungary to the north and Serbia in the east. Prior to Ottoman conquest, the majority of the population was divided among the Bosnian, Catholic, and Orthodox churches. 1463 The majority of Bosnia falls to Ottoman Turkish invaders. The Ottomans would not exert control of entire Bosnia and Herzegovina until 1527. 1878 Treaty of Berlin; Austro-Hungarian empire occupies and administers Bosnia, although it ostensibly remains part of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman state influence in Bosnia is all but extinguished. 1908 Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia. Sarajevo, Bosnia’s largest town, serves as the administrative center and capital of Austria’s new province. 1918 Bosnia and Herzegovina become part of the kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Serbian Karageorgevic´ royal dynasty becomes the ruling monarchs of the new state. To many, the kingdom is a greater Serbia. 1929 The Kingdom of Yugoslavia is established in reaction to political unrest and resistance to Serb hegemony in the state. 1941 Yugoslavia is invaded by German, Italian, and Bulgarian forces in April 1941. Shortly thereafter, Croatia is established as an independent fascist state that incorporates most of Bosnia. 1945 Liberation of Yugoslavia and establishment of a communist federal state under Marshal Josip Broz Tito. 1968 Muslims become an officially recognized nation in Yugoslavia. 1980 Marshal Josip Broz Tito dies, and a republic-based annually rotating presidency is instituted. 1991 Yugoslavia descends into chaos as Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. 1992 Bosnia declares independence in April, and civil war ensues, lasting until 1995. 1995 The Dayton Peace Accords are signed, ending the war and establishing Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state composed of two entities. 2005 The 10th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords is celebrated.

Situating the Nation The notion of a Bosnian nation is a relatively new phenomenon. Following the 15th century and prior to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s recognition as a state in 1992, Bosnia had always existed as part of other states or empires. Being a Bosnian, or Bosanac, was a regional and not national designation, the term nationality being inextricably linked to one’s religion.

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For most of the 45 years following World War II, Bosnia was a secular society. The casual religious characteristics of the population coupled with the antireligious stance of the Communist Party leadership meant that religion played little to no role in Bosnia. The muezzin’s call to prayer from the local Bosnian mosque was not a common occurrence and rarely, if ever, heeded in large towns and cities. Intermarriage was widespread; roughly 40 percent of urban marriages were mixed, and over 20 percent of urban Bosnians declared themselves “Yugoslav” or “other” in the years before civil war. A certain harmony existed between all ethnic groups, primarily within urban settings. Bosnia’s five largest towns—Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Zenica, and Mostar—accounted for barely one-quarter of Bosnia’s 4.4 million citizens in 1991. Three-quarters of the population were in rural or small town settings where attitudes were remarkably different from those in the cities. This points to a disconnection in the identities of urban and rural communities—one that would dramatically impact Bosnia and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The Bosnian rural folk and villagers tended to be much more conservative in behavior and in matters of religion and national identity. Urban Bosnians saw themselves as European, if not cosmopolitan, while the villagers kept up their religious practices. Islamic values and practices clashed with the urbanites’ secular views on life. Moreover, the urban Muslim had more in common with the urban Serb or Croat as opposed to the Muslim villager. In many, if not most, cases, entire N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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villages were made up of single ethnic communities. The true secularism of the urban centers simply did not exist in the smaller towns, villages, and countryside. This situation was endemic within all of the prewar Yugoslav republics, whether Muslim or Christian. As Yugoslavia descended into chaos, the forces of virulent nationalism radicalized all elements of Bosnian society, admittedly much less so in the urban centers. The influx of nationalists from Croatia and Serbia polarized the communities further until actual fighting began in April 1992. Religious affiliation determined on which side one would find himself. Bosnia still suffers from the ravages of the civil war that would come to epitomize the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Although the Dayton Peace Accords ended the violence in December 1995, Bosnia suffers from a weak central government, as the primary political power resides in two entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) dominated by the Bosnian Serbs and the Federation dominated by the Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks, with the Bosnian Croats being the junior member. The future of the Bosnian state is far from certain as it consists of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—not Bosnians.

Instituting the Nation Post-Dayton Debacle The post-Tito rise of nationalism, onset of war, and exceptionally brutal aspects of the Bosnian Civil War radicalized all elements of Bosnia’s people. The Bosnian Muslims were especially victimized by Croat and Serb aggression, leading to the growth and cohesion of a Bosniak nation. The internationally recognized leader of the newly independent Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovi´c , a Bosniak, came to represent primarily Muslim interests and less so the Croats who would become junior partners of the Bosniaks later in the war. As each national group fought for its own political and territorial goals, the notion of a truly Bosnian national identity representing all the people of Bosnia was lost. The end of the Bosnian Civil War, as part of the overall disintegration of Yugoslavia, brought with it international guarantees of sovereignty and external oversight. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords established two political entities within Bosnia: the Republika Srpska (RS), dominated by the Bosnian Serbs, and the Federation, overwhelmingly Bosniak with the Bosnian Croats being the junior member. The Federation itself is further divided into 10 cantons, which for the most part are politically dominated by either the Bosniaks or Croats. The Dayton Peace Accords intentionally left the Bosnian state politically weak to bring an end to the fighting and address national groups’ concerns. The entities are separated by a 1,200-km-long Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) that in most areas reflects the former lines of confrontation. The RS is N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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administratively divided into municipalities that mirror the prewar municipality structure, except in cases where the boundaries are truncated by the IEBL. The Federation is a bit more complex, divided into 10 cantons that are further divided into municipalities. As with the RS, these municipalities reflect prewar administrative organization. Bosnia has gone from 110 municipal districts to about 145, due to the winding route of the IEBL. In some cases, like Mostar, which went from 1 to 6, these new municipalities were created to accommodate the tensions between the Croat and Muslim communities, allowing them to live in their own mono-ethnic municipalities. Each entity possesses its own constitution and entity institutions, such as a judiciary, police force, health care, postal, and telecommunications systems. In the Federation, this political complexity increases with the further devolvement of institutions to the canton level. Of the 10 cantons, 5 are predominantly Bosniak, 3 Croat, and the last 2 mixed. Each canton possesses the responsibility for its police forces, education policy, social welfare administration, and so on. Partitioning of Bosnia into two entities poses great problems for state-building and the exercise of authority. Although common state structures do exist, such as the Tri-Partite Presidency (which rotates between the three national groups), a Council of Ministers, which is the executive branch, and legislative and judicial branches, their authority is limited. In fact, the state-level institutions are threadbare and wanting of any real power. The intent is to hopefully ensure that no partisan behavior by any one national group occurs in such critical positions. A common state-level Ministry of Defense was established in 2005, and the international community celebrated this institution as a clear sign of success in a bitterly fractured state. But upon closer scrutiny, the Bosnian military is still organized along national lines as each of the army’s three brigades are monoethnic, there being a Croat, Muslim, and Serb brigade stationed in its respective national territory. For all intents and purposes, the central government’s authority is limited to the conduct of foreign affairs, international commerce, and fiscal policy—all of it under the purview and control of the High Representative and the European Union (EU).

Defining the Nation Religion and Identity Bosnia and Herzegovina were settled by Slavs, beginning in the sixth century. Although the Bosnia of today is still chiefly populated by Slavs, differences exist not of race but of religion. The three primary faiths of Bosnia: Eastern Orthodox of the Serbs, Islam of the Bosniaks, and Roman Catholicism of the Croats are the critical components of national identity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Language, normally a key element of nationhood, is not a significant factor in Bosnia’s notions of nationhood. Although language dialects exist in Bosnia, religion is the source of inter-ethnic tension. While Serbs do use the Cyrillic alphabet in addition to the Latin script of the Bosniaks and Croats, it again is not a major component of antagonism between them. The notion of an “ethnicity” arrived in Bosnia during the 19th century when Bosnian Christians began to acquire ethnic and national ideas arriving from Serbia and Croatia. Some argue that this was the first time Serbs, as Orthodox Christians, and Croats, as Catholics, came to understand themselves as separate nations within Bosnia. However, the treatment of Christians as second-class citizens under Ottoman rule contributed to the development of Croat and Serb identity before the advent of modern nationalism in the late 18th century. The corrupt and failing Ottoman Empire faced significant unrest in Bosnia during the 19th century. In 1875, a major revolt by the Serbs of Herzegovina broke out, threatening to cause a major war among the Great Powers of Austria-Hungary, Britain, and Russia. The revolt ended in failure, and the overall Balkan situation was resolved and stabilized with the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, in which Bosnia was transferred to Austro-Hungarian administration although ostensibly still part of the Ottoman Empire. The transfer to Austro-Hungarian control occurred with much consternation on the part of Bosnia’s three religious groups. The Austrians imported a secular school system that found the Muslims worried that they would be compelled to convert to Catholicism—the religion of the Habsburg Empire. The Austrian administrator, Benjamin von Kallay, attempted to weaken predatory Croat and Serb nationalist ideologies by advocating that all Bosnian communities embrace the notion of bošnjastvo, or Bosniakdom. It was a failure among Bosnia’s Christian population because they looked outside of Bosnia for their identity, but it did lay the seeds of a Bosniak identity among the Muslim population. The “loose fit” or more liberally practiced Islam of Bosnia was seen as a problem by educated Muslims. The lack of a sophisticated Islam coupled with retained Christian traditions and the power of the Austrian state led many to worry about conversions. The Muslim elite involved themselves in the affairs of the villages in an attempt to stave off threats to the Muslim religion. This moderate resurgence strained the relations with Bosnia’s Christian population, which had always viewed the Muslims skeptically because of the power and privilege the Muslims possessed due to the Ottoman legacy. The 1908 annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary was followed by a period in which the Catholics received a favored position and the Muslims would, in many instances, also be in the emperor’s grace. Th e Orthodox Serbs, the majority of whom lived in the rural areas, were still in the position of second-class citizens. The position of the Serbs of Bosnia would change with the end of World War I in 1918. Bosnia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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would later become the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. The Serbian Karageorgevi´c royal dynasty became the ruling monarchs of the new state, which saw favored status transferred to the Serbs. The short-lived independent Yugoslavia was quickly overrun by the Axis forces in April 1941. Shortly thereafter, Croatia was established as an independent fascist state with new boundaries incorporating most of Bosnia. As Bosnia only had a 20 percent Croat population, the new Croatian fascist leadership of the Ustaša (term used to denote Croatian fascists) actively sought Muslim support in its plan to eradicate the Serbs, Jews, and Roma. Croatia’s plan was to kill, convert, or expel the Serbs. It was during World War II that the ethnic element of Bosnia assumed a clearly religious dimension, creating intractable hatreds that linger to this day and have been used as grounds for national revenge. The end of World War II brought the Yugoslav Communists to power under the charismatic leadership of Josip Broz Tito. In 1945, Yugoslavia was a Communistdominated state, divided into six republics, each based on a dominant ethnic group. The only exception was Bosnia, which included Serb, Muslim, and Croat nationalities. Tito recognized that nationalism posed a constant threat to the new state. He also realized that strong adherence to one’s religion correlated to a strong tie to one’s national community, which could lead to separatist nationalism. Religion was anathema to communism and Tito’s credo of “Brotherhood and Unity,” and he therefore strove through rhetoric and the secret police to eliminate these nationalist threats. Yugoslavia did progress as a country, by some accounts phenomenally well, but a policy of decentralization over the years left increasing power in the hands of the separate Yugoslav republics. By 1968, the Muslims, after realizing that they did not fit in as “Muslim Croats” or “Muslim Serbs,” became an officially recognized nation in Yugoslavia. Their label, “Muslim” (Musliman), possessed a double meaning. Similar to the Jewish community, the new, officially declared Muslim was a member of a religious community and also an ethnic group. Some scholars consider that Bosnia does qualify for nationhood and that the multiethnic character of today’s Bosnia will fuse into being a Bosnian one. Moreover, some assert that the Bosnian nation derives its being more from territory than from any other cultural characteristic. Territories are what frame national identities, and given the common history, shared place, and past commonalities, Bosnia will become “Bosnian”—not Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Serb, or Bosniak. An argument can be made that the mechanisms asserted as critical in forming a Bosnian identity are missing. The state structure was overtly left weak and unwieldy at the Dayton Peace Accords to satisfy Bosnian Croat and Serb demands addressing national survival. This, coupled with the radicalization of the recent war, inhibited the development of a true Bosnian identity as conceived in current ethnic and national identity scholarship. The state of Bosnia and the identity of “Bosnian” are perceived as the desire of the Muslims and now as a detriment to Croat and Serb identity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Narrating the Nation The Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs cherish their national heroes, traditions, history, and symbols. Tito’s legacy and the Yugoslav peoples’ national struggle against fascism in World War II no longer serve as a uniting force. Moreover, there is a wellcoordinated effort in Bosnia, especially in Croat-dominated areas, to eradicate the Communist legacy. The recent civil war created new histories and symbolic sites, especially for the Bosniak community. The siege of Sarajevo and the massacres of Bosniaks by Serbs and Croats at such places as Srebrenica and Ahmi´ci have come to define the Bosniak’s sense of self in terms of a national struggle against powerful neighbors. It can be said that the civil war created the Bosniak nation. However, Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs, through the course of the war, strengthened their identity and linkage with neighboring Croatia and Serbia. Within Bosnia, these national identities are manifested at different political levels: the state level for the Bosniaks, to which they believe they are entitled as victims of aggression, the entity level of the RS for the Serbs, and the cantonal level within the Federation entity for the Croats. There does not appear to be any near-term accommodation among Bosnia’s three national groups in adjusting their notions of a truly “Bosnian” national identity and territory. In fact, the current status quo is greatly under threat as the Muslim nationalist Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, or SDA) aggressively pushes for the revision of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and abolition of the RS. The bond between place and nation is a phenomenon that strengthens over time. Given that there are active processes conflating territory with national identity, separate national territorial spaces are developing in Bosnia. The marking and renaming of places in Bosnia is an overt manifestation of this that lends permanency to Bosniak, Croat, and Serb claims to territory in Bosnia. Coupled with ethnic cleansing and the removal of the historical trace of another ethnic group’s dominance, the supremacy of each national group within their respective spaces is assured. The renaming of place has become commonplace in all regions of the former Yugoslavia. In the capital city of Sarajevo, all place names that once bore the name of Serb heroes and historical events were changed to typically Ottoman-era historical figures and events. Each group is guilty of this activity. The role of religion and nationality is manifested across the countryside, as each group uses religious structures to mark territory. The Serbs have built new Orthodox churches in places that had prewar Bosniak majorities. There is a duality to this process: the first is the marking of one’s territory, but second, and more sinister, is the use of such symbols to prevent the return of prewar populations. In Croat-controlled areas, it is common to see war memorials and graffiti that exhibit symbols associated with the World War II Croat fascist Ustaša. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Recreating the Bosnian Cultural & Political Landscape Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia The 1991–1995 Bosnian Civil War was noted for an extreme savagery not witnessed in Europe since World War II. Ethnic cleansing, a phrase coined by the media during the war, referred to military actions that expelled enemy national groups. In many instances, both military and civilians were massacred, and all traces of their former historical presence removed. Towns and villages were severely damaged, and many homes and religious sites eradicated. The Srebrenica massacre is the most famous example in which Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN safe haven of Srebrenica, executing several thousand Bosniak males. Claiming of National Space The Bosnian Civil War left Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs segregated in the newly constructed political administrative units of entities and cantons. Each group is actively remaking its territory into a mono-ethnic place. While traveling through these regions, one cannot help but notice the construction of exclusive national edifices, whether churches, mosques, or monuments. They are meant not only as markers but as signs to inhibit the return of refugees in postwar Bosnia.

The Serbs have been overt in their dismissal of assuming “Bosnian” as part of prewar place names in the RS through the renaming of place, such as renaming Bosanski Brod to Srpski Brod and the town of Focˇa to Srbinje. All references to Bosniak, Croat, and Turkish names and historical events in the street names of Serb Banja Luka have been replaced with the names of Serb national heroes and historical events. Even the color of signs manifests a national scope; in several Bosniak-dominated areas, green is the color of choice as background for municipal signs. Green is traditionally associated with Islam. The manifestation of uniquely national symbols contradicts the longed-for notion of a Bosnian identity and unified Bosnia, illuminating the still ongoing struggle, albeit nonmilitary, among Bosnia’s Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Two institutions—the nationalist political parties and organizations and the national religious leaders—were and continue to be the primary mechanisms for mobilizing the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. As Yugoslavia disintegrated following Marshal Tito’s death, nationalist political parties filled the power vacuum left by Tito and the faltering Communist Party. Each of Bosnia’s main national groups established strong and adversarial nationalist parties and political platforms. Outside the Bosnian state and its two-entity, pseudo-state arrangement, the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, now the EU) N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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play an even larger role. The implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords clearly envisioned a dual process. The international community, through the Contact Group, oversees the political and civilian administration of Bosnia through the Office of the High Representative (OHR), while the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords are enforced by NATO and the EU. The integration of these two international bodies is limited, and their responsibilities and chain of command are separate. This was done purposefully, as the United States, primarily, had little faith in the UN being able to fulfill the military clauses of the Dayton Peace Accords. The Dayton Peace Accords brought an end to the most horrific warfare and slaughter seen in Europe since World War II. It did not, however, provide a viable concept for building a new state. The process of partition into entities has inexorably drawn the ethnic communities further apart. As such, there has been a renewed call by Bosniak political leadership and some members of the international community for a revision of the Dayton Peace Accords, a call that the Serbs vehemently oppose, as it clearly threatens their entity and perceived security. There has been little reduction in the strength of the wartime nationalist parties, and paltry evidence of local ethnic reconciliation or the elite cooperation necessary to make power-sharing work and avert a return to war in the future. The fears that Bosnia’s dominant group, the Bosniaks, will submerge the Croat and Serb identities through control of the government are real. The friction is based on the unwillingness of the Croats and Serbs to submit to the authority of Muslim-dominated Sarajevo. The inability of the Muslims to have a state that they control—that which is the internationally recognized boundary of Bosnia and Herzegovina—continues to be a source of tension among ethnic groups. The label Bosnian (or Bosniak) imparts the idea that the state of Bosnia belongs to this group. On the other hand, “Bosnian” Serb or “Bosnian” Croat only indicates their presence in Bosnia. Dropping the adjective “Bosnian” is of no concern as both peoples look to their respective bordering states for support and even identity. Only through the capacity of the Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs to “extend or modify” their national ideologies can a successful outcome be achieved. Whether Bosnia succeeds as a sovereign state or one day dissolves depends on whether the national groups can coexist within the current territorial and political framework mandated by the Dayton Peace Accords. Each group’s perception of itself and its territory was hardened in the civil war. Although it may be difficult to imagine a state like Canada, the United Kingdom, or Belgium plunging into a civil war over national ideologies, it is sadly a realistic possibility in Bosnia as it struggles to develop as a state. The notion of forging a common Bosnian national identity and territory was not achieved at the Dayton negotiating table. The Bosniaks alone associate their collective identity and interests with the development of a functional unitary Bosnian state. The presence of the High Representative (HR), NATO, and European Union Forces (EUFOR) calms ethnic tensions and compels N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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View of the famous Old Bridge in Mostar, which was rebuilt after its destruction during the country’s 1992–1995 civil war. The bridge was originally constructed in 1566 during the Ottoman Empire rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina and had been designated a UNESCO monument of exceptional artistic and structural value. (iStockPhoto.com)

“good behavior,” thereby maintaining the political and territorial integrity of the Bosnian state. This notion of a Bosnian identity is beset with challenges by the state’s citizens. The use of “Bosnian” as a regional label in the pre-1990s Yugoslav period has changed to be understood as a national identity based on Bosnia’s independence. A Bosnian state exists, so logically a Bosnian state-centered identity should exist. However, again, this is not the case among the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Current research suggests that only the Bosniaks are appropriating a Bosnian identity to maintain and, even further, their demographic and political hegemony within Bosnia. National identity simply serves as a centrifugal force in Bosnia. The Serbs wish to preserve their current level of pseudo-statehood of RS within the framework of the Dayton Peace Accords. The Croats increasingly desire a strong level of autonomy within Bosnia by maintaining the concept of cantons. Indeed, today, Croat nationalists are advocating a third entity to safeguard their national and political interests. The rejection of a Bosnian identity by the Croats and Serbs promoted Bosnian Muslim efforts in assuming it within the label of “Bosniak.” Even the interN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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national community, such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), has labeled the Muslims as Bosnian in public documents, and by assuming the title of Bosniak, the Bosnian Muslims are stressing their territorial rights. Historical events and the post-1945 communist political institutions and arrangements have strengthened Croat and Serb national ties to Croatia and Serbia proper such that any aspirations toward a true Bosnian identity will be difficult. The efforts of the Bosniak and Muslim community to demand such allegiance only adds to alienation on the part of the Croats and Serbs and animosity toward Bosnia’s Muslims. The recent civil war radicalized most elements of Bosnian society and enhanced the already strong bond between religion and identity. The current reality in Bosnia today indicates that, at most, both Croats and Serbs may acknowledge some level of a Bosnian civic identity, but not one of national identity. The issuing of uniform Bosnian identity cards, Bosnian automobile license plates, and Bosnian passports helps reinforce this civic identity but provides little counterweight to the national religions, nationalist politics, and the very real and bitter memories of the war. As such, these aspects will provide a source of tension among Bosnia’s three major national groups and will actively inhibit the establishment of a Bosnian national identity in the years to come. Selected Bibliography Allcock, J. B. 2000. Explaining Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press. Bose, S. 2002. Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. New York: Oxford University Press. Bringa, T. 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Burg, S., and P. Shoup. 2000. The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. ´ irkovi´c, S. M. 2004. The Serbs. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. C Jelavich, B. 1983. History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Malcolm, N. 1994. Bosnia: A Short History. London: MacMillan. Perica, V. 2002. Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. New York: Oxford University Press. Shatzmiller, M., ed. 2002. Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Sugar, P., and I. Lederer, eds. 1994. Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Velikonja, M. 2003. Religious Separation & Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. White, G. W. 2000. Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Catalonia Kathryn Crameri Chronology 801 988 1137 1469 1640 1714 1830s 1892 1914 1932 1939 1975 1978 1980 1992 2003

2006

Franks begin to capture the land now known as Catalonia from the Muslims. The Catalan counts rebel against Frankish rule. Catalonia is linked by marriage to the Crown of Aragón. The Crown of Aragón is linked by marriage to Castile. A Catalan peasant revolt leads to an 11-year war with Castile, which Catalonia loses, although it retains its former level of autonomy. Catalonia comes fully under Castilian control after the Wars of Succession and loses its autonomy. A renaissance (Renaixença) of Catalan language and culture begins. A group of Catalanists produce a document called the Bases de Manresa, which sets out a program for Catalan autonomy. Catalonia is granted a limited territorial authority called the Mancomunitat. Catalonia gains autonomy during Spain’s Second Republic. Franco wins the Spanish Civil War and sets about suppressing regional differences. Franco dies, and Spain begins to move toward democracy. The new Spanish constitution paves the way for all regions to have a degree of autonomy. Jordi Pujol and his party Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union, CiU) win the first elections to the Generalitat (they remain in power until 2003). The Barcelona Olympics brings Catalonia to the world’s attention and starts a tourist boom. Pasqual Maragall and his party, the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialist Party of Catalonia, PSC), head a left-wing coalition that takes power in the Generalitat after the first elections in which the CiU was not led by Pujol. A new Statute of Autonomy is approved to replace the one in force since 1978. Maragall decides not to stand for reelection, and José Montilla (PSC) becomes president of the Generalitat.

Situating the Nation Catalonia forms part of the Spanish state and is located in the northeastern corner of the Iberian Peninsula, near the French border. When Spain returned to democracy after the rule of the dictator Francisco Franco, who died in 1975, a regional layer of government was put in place that gave regions powers in specific areas, although these varied slightly from region to region. Catalan demands for self-rule had been one of the key factors in the decision to allow the devolution of power to the regions, and Catalonia has remained highly influential as one of the new autonomous communities, using its powers to promote a distinctive Catalan identity. This has happened partly as a way of correcting the suppression of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Catalan culture and identity that formed part of Franco’s plan for a unified Spain. However, Catalonia’s national identity has deep roots, and its sense of distinctiveness is not simply a product of those particular injustices. Catalonia traces its origins to the 9th century, when a drive by the Franks to stop the advancing Muslim conquerors, who had already claimed most of Iberia, led to the establishment of Frankish settlements south of the Pyrenees, around Barcelona. These settlements gradually broke away from Frankish rule and established a new relationship with the Crown of Aragón in the 12th century. Catalonia was the more active partner, embarking on forms of trade and conquest that eventually gave them political or financial power over much of the western Mediterranean. One of the most important legacies of this time is the Catalan language itself. Derived from Latin and used first as a vernacular language, then for literature, law, and philosophy, Catalan spread within both eastern Spain and southern France, even reaching outposts such as Alghero in Sardinia. Another notable factor was that, unlike the rest of the Iberian Peninsula, Catalonia developed a fully feudal social system, which has been linked with its subsequent achievements and character. However, this period of expansion and flourishing trade and culture came to an end because of internal conflict and the effect of natural disasters such as outbreaks of plague. The eventual result of this turmoil was the union by marriage of Aragón and Catalonia with the kingdom of Castile in the late 15th century. Although the two elements in this new relationship were supposedly independent from one another, power shifted to Castile, and Catalonia was sidelined. Resentment among the Catalan population grew to such a point that, during the Spanish Wars of Succession, Catalonia decided to back a different candidate from Castile, hoping in this way to regain its status and independence. Unfortunately, they backed the loser, and Catalonia’s right to self-government was removed after the conquest of Barcelona by Castilian troops on September 11, 1714. Despite measures that were designed to bring Catalonia into line with the rest of Spain, the region’s differences persisted. Catalan was still the language of the majority of the population, even if formal contexts now required knowledge of Castilian (Spanish). Catalonia’s economy also evolved along particular lines, developing a relatively strong bourgeoisie and an industrial infrastructure based on products such as textiles. In the 19th century, Barcelona was one of the key motors of Spain’s economy, and it remains so today. This period also saw social changes linked to industrialization and a revival of interest in Catalan culture and identity, which eventually led to the formation of regionalist and nationalist organizations. The fact that this renewed interest in Catalan language and culture was directed by the educated middle classes has given mainstream Catalanism a “bourgeois” tag that it has been unable to shake off, despite the fact that a wide variety of social groups have been involved in Catalanist projects over the last two centuries, especially during the period when Catalonia enjoyed a brief spell of autonomy under Spain’s Second Republic (1931–1939). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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By the mid-20th century, the question of class had taken on a new significance because of the large numbers of people moving to Catalonia from other parts of Spain. The vast majority of the incomers were working-class economic migrants fleeing the harsh conditions of the rural south, which reinforced the perception that the native Catalans were middle class. By 1970, over a third of the population of Catalonia had been born outside the region. During the Franco regime, very little could be done collectively to persuade newcomers to take an interest in Catalan identity, although some individuals certainly did. The large numbers of “new Catalans” posed a particular problem for those working for a revival of the Catalan language and culture after the death of the dictator in 1975.

Instituting the Nation The Spanish constitution of 1978 made provision for the autonomous communities to have a regional parliament and executive whose exact name, composition, and symbols would be decided by the region itself and laid out in its Statute of Autonomy. Following historical precedent, Catalonia’s governing institution is called the Generalitat de Catalunya, and the region’s flag is the senyera, which is N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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composed of four horizontal red stripes on a yellow background. The Generalitat has extensive powers and responsibilities in areas such as culture, heritage, education, media and communications, internal transport, financial planning, natural resources, and social welfare. Although Catalonia’s institutional framework is that of a regional government within the Spanish state (and not a federal arrangement), the Generalitat has plenty of scope for designing policies that directly affect the everyday lives of residents. It can also use its powers to “re-Catalanize” society through education, cultural policy, language planning, and promotional activities. The first formal elections to the Generalitat produced a narrow victory for the center-right Catalanist coalition Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union, CiU), led by Jordi Pujol. Although at this stage CiU was only able to govern with the support of other minority parties, the victory in 1980 was the start of a 23year period in power during which Pujol became the voice of Catalonia. He was able to appeal to a broad spectrum of Catalans and to convince them that he had a workable vision of a dynamic future for Catalonia and its people. Despite inevitable setbacks in his campaign to wrest more power from the Spanish state, and a few sticky moments involving allegations of corruption, Pujol retired from the presidency in 2003 undefeated. This long term in power meant that Catalonia’s development as an autonomous community has been largely controlled by one particular vision—a vision that was passionately nationalist, but not separatist. The CiU did not have it all its own way, as it was unable to take control of Barcelona City Council, which is an influential institution in its own right. Instead, voters preferred the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialist Party of Catalonia, PSC) for this task, many of them seeing a nationalist party as best suited to the regional arena, while a left-wing party would give them what they wanted at

Catalan Politics Originally a coalition, now a federation, of two “center” Catalanist parties, from 1978 to 2003 the Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union, CiU) was led by Jordi Pujol i Soley (born 1930), who had been a Catalanist activist during the Franco regime. Pujol was president of the Generalitat de Catalunya from 1980 to 2003. Since then, the CiU (under leader Artur Mas) has been the opposition party, having failed to find coalition partners to allow them back into power in 2003 and 2006. The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialist Party of Catalonia, PSC) is affiliated with the Spanish Socialist Party. Founded by Joan Reventós in 1978, the PSC has been in power in the Barcelona City Council since 1979 and the main partner in the coalition governing the Generalitat since 2003. Pasqual Maragall i Mira (born 1941) was president from 2003 to 2006 and was succeeded by José Montilla Aguilera, the first president of the Generalitat in the modern era to have been born outside Catalonia.

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the municipal level. Here, too, one man emerged as an emblem of Barcelona’s new possibilities: Pasqual Maragall, who was mayor of Barcelona from 1982 to 1997. Maragall presided over the successful Barcelona Olympics of 1992 and the regeneration of the city that surrounded the event. His popularity as mayor meant that many people saw him as the natural challenger to Pujol for the presidency, and although Maragall narrowly failed to oust his rival in the 1999 elections, he did manage to outmaneuver Pujol’s successor in 2003. Since then, the PSC has governed in a three-way, left-wing coalition. While this change has meant a redirection in the Generalitat’s approach—for example, broadening the definition of Catalan culture to include all culture produced in Catalonia, whether in Spanish or Catalan—the parameters and priorities that were marked out by the CiU still condition the terms of nationalist debate. It will be clear from this description of the two main political forces in Catalonia that there is a fine line between nationalism and regionalism in contemporary Catalan politics. Although support for independence has grown slightly in the last few years—as seen in the increased vote for Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia, ERC), which believes in gaining independence through democratic means—the majority of Catalans are not in favor of separatism, with only around a quarter seeing independence as a viable option.

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Pasqual Maragall, former president of Catalonia, speaks during an election campaign meeting in Barcelona, November 2003. (Cesar Rangel/AFP/Getty Images)

There have been few violent incidents in the name of Catalan nationalism since 1980. As we have noted, members of the CiU are not promoting independence, although they do believe in achieving the highest possible level of autonomy for Catalonia within the Spanish state. Most of their rhetoric has revolved around achieving proper recognition of Catalonia’s essential difference from the rest of Spain—the so-called fet diferencial or “fact of difference,” a term that does not in itself point particularly to nationalism or regionalism. The PSC refer to themselves as “Catalanists” and not “nationalists,” again sidestepping the question of regionalism versus nationalism. Furthermore, Catalans themselves are divided on the question of whether Catalonia is a region or a nation, despite the fact that all the rhetoric emerging from the Generalitat makes reference to a Catalan nation and urges Spain to recognize it as such. Catalan representatives such as Pujol, Maragall, and the former mayor of Barcelona, Joan Clos, have been very active in European forums and institutions that aim to strengthen the voice of regions, such as the European Union’s Committee of the Regions, and they have also taken a variety of opportunities to promote Catalonia further afield. However, they have been wary of appearing too belligerent in international circles, aware that the term “nationalism” often carries negative connotations. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Defining the Nation Rather than separatist claims, then, most Catalanist ideologies have been based first and foremost on language, culture, and the right of individuals to realize their potential through full recognition of their group identity. Language and culture were the key to the development of Catalanism in the 19th century and remain at the heart of Catalan distinctiveness. Jordi Pujol’s own words sum up the feelings of most Catalans: “The identity of Catalonia is mainly linguistic and cultural. . . . There are many components in our identity, a whole bunch of them, but language and culture are its backbone. This means that if the language and culture were badly affected the personality of Catalonia would be too” (Pujol 1995, 6; my translation). Of course, the language and culture of Catalonia were indeed badly affected by their suppression under the Franco dictatorship, and the Generalitat made it one of its primary tasks to reverse the damage. This effort meant the introduction of language planning policies designed to “normalize” the position of Catalan by making sure that everyone was able to use it and had every opportunity to do so. Catalan is now the default language of education, and surveys reflect good progress in the acquisition of the language, with 95 percent of the population able to understand Catalan, 75 percent able to speak it, and 50 percent able to write it. Although there have been controversies over some aspects of the Generalitat’s language policy, most Catalans agree with the promotion of Catalan to strengthen its position as compared with Spanish, which has fundamental advantages over Catalan. Spanish is the only language that is official in the whole of the Spanish state, although other languages can be co-official in specific autonomous communities. Catalan nationalism has only rarely been influenced by issues of ethnicity and prefers to see itself as an inclusive phenomenon. In other words, anyone who lives in Catalonia can be regarded as a Catalan, whatever their ethnic origins. However, the process of “becoming Catalan” functions in a more complex way than this pronouncement might suggest. First, there is an expectation that those who want to be Catalan will also want to speak Catalan, hence proficiency in the language is one of the surest ways to acquire a Catalan identity. Second, distinctions are still drawn between “new Catalans,” “other Catalans,” and “Catalan Catalans” when referring to people, although not usually in a negative way—just as a convenient description. However, stronger terms such as xarnego, a more pejorative term for an immigrant to Catalonia, do still circulate. Third, although the newcomers of the 1950s and 1960s had plenty of reference points in common with their Catalan hosts, the same cannot always be said of the immigrants who have made Catalonia their home since the 1980s. With democracy and economic progress have come a new influx of foreign migrants from Latin America, North Africa, and eastern Europe. The challenges posed by their cultural, religious, and linguistic differences have led to an increased awareness of ethnicity as an issue. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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As a result, some more controversial elements have found their way into debates on Catalonia’s future, including a concern that the low birth rate of the Catalans compared with that of the immigrants will endanger the continuity of the Catalan identity. Despite these issues, Catalan nationalism remains basically civic in its orientation, although it could be argued that the strong stress on language introduces an ethno-cultural element into an otherwise civic framework. Citizens are urged to participate actively and proudly in the “project” of constructing a successful Catalonia and preserving its distinctive identity.

Narrating the Nation This call to action is reinforced, as in all nations, by an appeal to historical memory, tradition, and symbols. One of the key moments in Catalan history was their defeat at the hands of the Castilians in 1714; September 11 is thus their national day. Catalans are keen to point out that this is not a “celebration of defeat” but a reminder of the brave fight put up by those who tried to defend Barcelona, of the autonomy Catalonia had enjoyed up to that point, and of the crude attempts to Castilianize Catalonia that followed. In other words, September 11 acts as a call to Catalans to continue to defend their identity. As has already been mentioned, high culture plays a major role in defining Catalan identity, and it is featured in one of the region’s best-loved traditions, the Dia de Sant Jordi (St. George’s Day, April 23). The event combines the legend of St. George, Catalonia’s patron saint, with a celebration of reading. People buy books and roses for loved ones from the many stalls that line the streets during the day. In the mid-1990s, the Generalitat joined forces with publishers and others to persuade UNESCO to declare April 23rd “World Book Day,” then used this as a pretext for a series of high-profile advertisements in foreign papers explaining the tradition and highlighting Catalonia’s economic and cultural achievements. Literature in Catalan is seen as one of the key barometers of the health of the nation and was one way in which Catalans perpetuated their language and cultural heritage during the Franco regime despite censorship and restrictions. Since the 1980s, literature has continued to have a symbolic importance but has encountered a different type of difficulty: free-market conditions are not particularly favorable to minority literatures, and it is a struggle to make publishing in Catalan viable and to persuade people to read in Catalan rather than Spanish, if they read at all. The Generalitat has therefore had to put into place a program of subsidies for publishing in Catalan, alongside aid for other cultural forms such as cinema, the performing arts, and the media. Alongside this emphasis on high culture, Catalans are also proud of their popular traditions, especially the national dance, the Sardana, and competitions N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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between towns and villages to build “human towers” or Castells. These two pastimes symbolize the ethos of participation and cooperation that characterizes Catalan society. Other character traits that have been identified by writers and commentators over the years as being particularly Catalan are pactisme—a willingness to compromise and negotiate—and seny, which is hard to translate directly but refers to a particular type of good common sense.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Most Catalans are proud of their identity and happy to support the promotion of Catalonia’s distinctiveness. However, the extent to which they are willing to be actively involved in nationalist politics varies greatly. Surveys show that the vast majority of Catalans feel a clear affiliation with Spain, even if they describe themselves as Catalan first and Spanish second. Many Catalans see questions of nationalism/regionalism as firmly secondary to worries about employment, health care, immigration, or terrorism. There is even evidence that the younger generations are beginning to feel more ambivalent about questions of language; they have been educated to be bilingual, and they will normally use either language depending on the situation, but this means that they have no particular loyalty to Catalan over Spanish. These groups have been the particular target of nationalist persuasion in recent years, especially through advertising campaigns by the Generalitat designed to reinforce a sense of community and the individual’s responsibility toward it. New residents of Catalonia are another group felt to need particular attention because of the challenge to Catalan nationalism posed by immigration. The aim here is to make new arrivals aware of Catalonia’s difference from the rest of Spain and to encourage them to learn Catalan (as well as Spanish, if necessary). Strategies have included the production of bilingual guidebooks (in Catalan and the main languages understood by immigrants) that explain Catalonia’s cultural and social makeup as well as offering practical advice on work, health care, and so on. Immigration is also one of the issues driving the current political agenda on Catalan autonomy, as the Generalitat has been pushing for more control over how many people settle there and what kinds of skills would be most useful to the region’s economy. The beginning of the 21st century saw a campaign to reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, with corresponding changes to Spanish institutions, to give Catalonia more powers in a variety of areas. However, while the current Spanish government has allowed every autonomous community to propose a new statute, it is clearly intended that they should all remain fundamentally equal. Unlike the rigidly centralist Conservative government of José María Aznar (1996–2004), the Socialists, in power since 2004, have gone some way toward N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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People create a human tower, or castell, a popular tradition that originated in Catalonia. (iStockPhoto.com)

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acknowledging the “multinational” nature of Spain, although it remains to be seen whether this acknowledgment will be enough for the Basques and Catalans. Many Catalan nationalists are pushing for a form of asymmetrical federalism or regionalism in which the “historic nations” of Spain (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country) are given more powers and status than communities with less distinctive identities. The fact that Catalonia technically exists as a region within the Spanish state has not stopped its political leaders from carrying out forms of nation-building. The institutional framework now in place performs as a kind of quasi-state in many areas directly relevant to citizens’ perceptions of their individual and group identity. Catalan is now the language of all public institutions at local or regional levels, and its presence in education and in the media is especially significant for making a direct connection with ordinary people. A wide range of cultural products is available in Catalan that employ specifically Catalan frames of reference. High-profile cultural and sporting events and international trade and political links have also made the rest of the world more aware of Catalonia than ever before. However, some Catalans worry that the emphasis on “normalization” and institutionalization obscures fundamental weaknesses in Catalonia’s position. There are still areas of life that remain situated within a deeply Spanish linguistic, cultural, and social context, including Catalan citizens’ formal interactions with the state and the most influential elements of the press, television, and mass culture. Private business has also been reluctant to adopt Catalan as its working language, often for practical reasons since the use of Catalan would complicate business relationships within Spain and abroad. A further problem arises in Catalonia’s dealings with the other main areas of Spain where Catalan is spoken: the Valencian community and the Balearic Islands. Some people refer to these areas as part of a territorial entity they call the Països Catalans or “Catalan Countries,” meaning all the areas where Catalan is spoken, including a small area of France around Perpignan. This entity has no legal existence, and even the areas within it that are located in Spain are expressly forbidden from federating by the Spanish constitution. Furthermore, relationships with Valencia and the Balearics are often strained and even hostile, for complex political reasons that have both historical and contemporary roots. Many Valencians prefer to refer to their language as Valencian and not Catalan, and some have gone as far as to deny any relationship between the two, despite incontrovertible linguistic evidence that Valencian is a variety of Catalan. This lack of solidarity among the Catalan-speaking areas of Spain has a very negative impact on efforts to promote the Catalan language and culture, and it is one reason the Catalans are demanding more powers to safeguard them within their own territory and more active promotion and recognition of them by the Spanish state. The question of whether the Statute of Autonomy approved in 2006 is nothing but a step toward a demand for outright independence is too difficult to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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answer at this point. Much will depend on the ongoing process of reforming Spain’s relationship with its constituent parts, as well as on external factors such as the eventual shape of the European Union and the effect of cultural globalization on minority languages and identities. The nationalists’ ability to mobilize the sectors of the population for whom national identity is no longer a major issue will also prove crucial. Selected Bibliography Balcells, Albert. 1996. Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. Edited by Geoffrey J. Walker. London: Macmillan. Conversi, Daniele. 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization. London: Hurst. Guibernau, Montserrat. 2004. Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition and Democracy. London: Routledge. Hargreaves, John. 2000. Freedom for Catalonia: Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya. 2003. Estadística d’usos lingüístics a Catalunya. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. McRoberts, Kenneth. 2001. Catalonia: Nation Building without a State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Payne, John. 2004. Catalonia: History and Culture. Nottingham, UK: Five Leaves. Pujol, Jordi. 1995. Què representa la llengua a Catalunya? Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. Sobrer, Josep Miquel. 1992. Catalonia, a Self-Portrait. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Woolard, Kathryn Ann. 1989. Double Talk: Bilingualism and the Politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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Germany Paul Maddrell Chronology 1990 (October 3) Accession of the five Länder (federal states) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). (December 2) A coalition of the ChristlichDemokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union, CDU), its Bavarian sister party the Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, CSU), and the Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, FDP) wins the first parliamentary elections held in the newly united Germany. The CDU’s chairman, Helmut Kohl, consequently remains chancellor. These are the first allGerman elections since March 1933 and the first fully free ones since November 1932. 1991 (September) Attack by hundreds of local people and right-wing youths from other parts of East Germany on foreigners and asylum-seekers living in Hoyerswerda, Saxony. 1992 (August) Attack by thousands of local people and neo-Nazis, who traveled to the city, on an asylum hostel in Rostock, in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (eastern Germany). (November) Murder, in a fire-bombing attack, of three Turks in Mölln, Schleswig-Holstein (western Germany). 1993 (July 1) The amendment to Article 16 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), restricting the right to asylum, comes into force. 1994 (September 1) Withdrawal of the last Russian troops from German soil. Corresponding withdrawal of the last U.S., British, and French troops from West Berlin. 1998 (October 11) Controversial speech by Martin Walser, accepting the Peace Prize of Germany’s book publishers. (October) The coalition of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD) and Bündnis 90/die Grünen (Alliance 90/the Greens) wins a majority of seats in elections to the Bundestag (federal parliament). 1999 (September) The Bundestag, the federal government, and the most important ministries start work in Berlin, having moved from Bonn. 2000 (January 1) The new law on German citizenship comes into force. 2002 (January 1) Adoption by Germany of the euro, the common currency of the European Union states, as its currency. 2003 (March) Application made to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) by the federal government, the Bundestag, and the Bundesrat (Federal Council) to ban the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD) is rejected. 2005 (May) Opening of a Holocaust memorial near the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. (September) In elections to the Bundestag, the SPD-Green coalition loses its majority there, leading to a “Grand Coalition” of CDU/CSU and SPD.

Situating the Nation Most of the German nation was united in one state, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), on October 3, 1990, when the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR’s) five Länder acceded to it under Article 23 of the FRG’s Grundgesetz. The FRG’s political structures therefore continued in existence, as did the network of alliances N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the West German governments had built up over the previous 40 years. Of the latter, the main treaties involved were the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) and the Treaty of Rome (1957). These respectively bound the Federal Republic to a defense pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and an economic and political union, the European Union (EU) (known until 1993 as the European Community). West German statesmen had entered into these and other treaties to control German nationalism, prevent Germans from again seeking to dominate Europe, and persuade the other European nations to no longer see Germany as an enemy. Indeed, a sense of being good Europeans has become, in the opinion of most Germans, an element in their national identity. The post-1990 governments have therefore sought to maintain and, indeed, increase the FRG’s integration into the West (its Westbindung); they have insisted that German reunification be accompanied by European unification. This is an expression of identity; they are European Germans, and the two identities are inseparable. In this respect, German nationalism is very different from that of the British or the French, which have laid much greater stress on national independence. Many West Germans before reunification, including the main political parties, had seen their country as progressing toward a post-national future. They anticipated that the EU would become a full European federation, of which the FRG would be one state. In fact, reunification has further stabilized the German nation-state, whereas the EU’s enlargement to include 27 states, economic difficulties, disagreements over foreign and defense policy, and controversial currency have prevented this expectation from being realized. German reunification stimulated another wave of European integration. The Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice came into effect in 1993, 1999, and 2003, respectively. By these treaties, the EU’s responsibilities were greatly expanded,

Helmut Kohl (1930 – ) Kohl, the sixth and longest-serving chancellor of the Federal Republic, grew up in a conservative, Roman Catholic household in Rheinland-Pfalz. His older brother was killed in World War II while serving in the German Army—an event that helped convince Helmut of the overriding importance of peace in Europe. His political career was marked by a longing for German reunification and by a desire to complete the reconciliation with Germany’s neighbors that Konrad Adenauer had begun, above all by creating a European federation. Kohl became chancellor in 1982; his tenure is the longest so far (1982–1998). He exploited the collapse of the German Democratic Republic skillfully, pressing for swift German reunification and winning the consent of the Soviet Union and Germany’s allies to this plan. Germany’s rush to unification in 1990 represents the greatest achievement of his long and very successful political career. Although his dream of a European federation has not been realized, it was he more than anyone else who ensured that a single European currency, the euro, was introduced in 2002.

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above all to include foreign and defense policy and justice and home affairs. A common currency, the euro, was introduced in 2002, superseding the deutschmark, previously the source of much German national pride. If the EU reform treaty signed by European leaders in Lisbon in December 2007 is ratified, the post of EU high representative for foreign affairs (essentially, the position of EU foreign minister) and an EU diplomatic service will be created. The aims of greater integration are to bind Germany more closely into Europe and to enable Europe to defend its interests in the world. German governments, by entering into the treaties, were deliberately emphasizing that German nationalism was consistent with and would promote internationalism. Contemporary German nationalism is remarkable: Germans are very willing to separate government from the nation-state and transfer it to international bodies, above all those of the EU. This international governmental network greatly reduces German national independence. The problem with it is that it weakens German democracy. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Instituting the Nation German national identity has been the subject of intense debate in the political arena. The key institutions involved in identity issues are political. The institution that represents the German nation is the Bundestag, elected by the German people. The federal states are represented by another institution, the Bundesrat (Federal Council), to which their governments send representatives. The other key institutions in the debate over German national identity are the political parties, which divide into four camps. The CDU, CSU, and FDP make up a conservative alliance. Their principal rival for power is the alliance of the SPD, a socialist party, and Bündnis 90/die Grünen, a party of liberal environmentalists. On the extreme right wing are the nationalist parties, the NPD, the Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union, DVU), and the Republikaner (Republicans). On the extreme left is Die Linke (the Left). Die Linke was known from 1990 until 2005 as the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS); from 2005 to 2007 it was known as Die Linkspartei (PDS). In June 2007 it merged with its western German ally, the Wahlalternative Arbeit & Soziale Gerechtigkeit (Voting Alternative Work and Social Justice, WASG) and became Die Linke. It is the successor party to the GDR’s ruling communist party, the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED).

Defining the Nation One challenge has been to create an all-German national identity in place of West and East German identities. The restoration of a sense of a common nationality has proved to be longer and more difficult than many expected. Common nationality is a sense of solidarity with the other members of a nation. This solidarity has proven to be incomplete. The sense of German nationality derives from the German Reich, which, for practical purposes, ceased to exist in 1945. Living for 45 years in two states with very different political, economic, and social systems created deep-seated differences between East and West Germans that have been difficult to overcome. Economic hardship in the eastern Länder has added to these difficulties, since many East Germans feel disadvantaged in the new Germany. Die Linke has been able to win seats in elections at all levels of representation (local, state, federal, and European), in part because it has been able to represent a continuing East German identity. The Bundestag election of September 2002 may therefore indicate that this East German identity is being eroded by an allGerman one, because it was the first such election since 1990 at which Die Linke (then the PDS) lost votes. The party failed to achieve 5 percent of the national vote, which meant it was not entitled to be proportionately represented in the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Supporters of Germany’s right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD) shout slogans and wave anti-foreigner placards as they gather by the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on March 12, 2000. (Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis)

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Bundestag. Its share of the vote in the eastern Länder fell from about one-quarter in 1998 to approximately one-sixth. However, it returned to the Bundestag in the election of September 2005. Another key debate has been over German national identity. Th e terms of debate in Germany are hard to express in language familiar to Americans. However, broadly speaking, the debate has been over whether German nationalism should be conservative or liberal in character. Th e view taken of national identity has reflected the broader political attitudes of the participants, who can be classified as conservatives and liberals (in actual fact, the “liberal” position is that generally taken up by the SPD and Greens and in Germany would be called “left-liberal”). First, conservatives believe that the nation should remain as ethnically homogeneous as possible. By contrast, liberals have maintained that Germany has long been changing owing to mass immigration and should accept that it is now a multicultural country. This division affects attitudes toward both citizenship and immigration. Compromises have been reached on these issues, though how stable they will prove to be is uncertain. Second, many people, conservatives prominent among them, have argued that Germany should assert its interests more strongly and play a larger international role. There has been much liberal support for this position; consequently, agreement has been easy to reach, and there was much continuity in foreign policy when the SPD and Greens replaced the CDU/CSU and FDP in power in 1998. Germany has proven more willing to assert itself internationally, even to the point of using military force. It continues to seek a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. Although it refused in 1991 to form part of the UN-backed, American-led alliance that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm), the German air force did participate in the bombing campaign in 1999 that drove Serbian forces out of Kosovo (Operation Allied Force). This was the first time that German armed forces had waged aggressive war on another state since 1945; moreover, they did so without any mandate from the United Nations. However, it is important that they intervened for humanitarian reasons; in Germany, the use of force for other reasons would have encountered fierce public opposition. Germany did not participate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, public opinion being strongly against this action. However, the country has been the “lead nation” in peacekeeping in Macedonia and gave military support to the U.S. attacks on terrorist targets in Afghanistan late in 2001. Conservatives and liberals agree on the correctness of anchoring Germany in the West and integrating it into the EU. They argue that this is established by the success of the Federal Republic between 1949 and 1990. Where they differ is in the role they see for the nation-state in the future. The conservatives see the nation-state as normal; reunification represented a German return to normality. This normality should be developed. Germany should behave more like a normal nation-state in its foreign policy by being more willing to use military force abroad and asserting its interests more strongly. A stronger line on “national” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Joschka Fischer (1948 – ) Fischer’s political career represents one of the most extraordinary journeys in modern European politics. He was born in 1948 in Gerabronn, Baden-Württemberg. He left high school before graduation and did not take a degree at university. As a young man, he settled in Frankfurt-am-Main, where he became involved in the revolutionary student movement of the late 1960s. He was involved in many violent confrontations with the police; among his friends and acquaintances were notorious terrorists. However, in the 1970s he underwent a profound change of mind, abandoning support for revolution in favor of Green politics. He is significant for German politics because he led the Greens toward acceptance of more pragmatic mainstream politics. As foreign minister from 1998 to 2005, he fused their liberalism with a more calculating assessment of German national interest, thus helping a liberal nationalism to develop. As foreign minister, he led the Greens away from their long-standing pacifism to support using military force for humanitarian purposes. He convinced the party to support German involvement in the Kosovo War of 1999, the first time since World War II that the Germans had used military force; he argued that the Serbian policy of “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo represented a resurgence of European fascism that German antifascists had to resist.

issues—such as asylum, citizenship, and immigration—is also justified at home. Encouraged by national reunification, extreme right-wing groups and individuals have gone further and committed acts of violence against foreigners. By contrast, liberals argue that Germany has an abnormal history and therefore cannot assert itself as strongly as other “normal” nation-states. Moreover, they believe that Germany still needs to work to create a post-national world in which the nationstate is superseded. Both are currently strong supporters of European integration, but liberals more unreservedly than conservatives. Extreme right-wing parties have argued that Germany should abandon its integration into Europe, withdrawing from both the EU and NATO, and seek more independence; this position harkens back to the tradition of the Sonderweg (“special path”). They also wish to restore the German borders of 1937. However, there is little popular support for these positions. Most Germans reject an aggressive external nationalism, and Germany’s governments have not pursued an aggressive foreign policy. However, domestically Germans are more willing to assert their national identity. Third, the Germans’ relationship with the past has been the subject of much disagreement. Conservatives have argued that Germans should take more pride in being German and assert their identity more strongly. Consequently, they should no longer feel such shame about the Nazis’ crimes, which now lie long in the past. However, the Holocaust still weighs heavily on the Germans, and many still feel the need to do penance for it. Indeed, the SPD-Green government in recent years has tried to ensure that the Holocaust continues to shape German N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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national identity. An example is the large memorial to the Holocaust that opened in Berlin in 2005. Citizenship, immigration, and asylum have been very divisive issues. Strictly speaking, “citizens” is the legal and political term given to those people of full age within a nation-state who exercise political rights within the nation. Some German intellectuals, Jürgen Habermas and Dolf Sternberger chief among them, have sought to fuse the concepts of nation and citizen by putting forward the idea of Verfassungspatriotismus (“constitution patriotism”). By this reasoning, a German national identity results from an individual’s support for the democratic political order created by the Grundgesetz. The citizen’s loyalty to Germany is conditional; it lasts only as long as Germany remains a democracy. This is a very liberal construction of national identity and very characteristic of the political development of West Germany since 1945. By contrast, there is a tendency within European nations to define themselves ethnically. This tendency is particularly strong among the German nation. Since the Germans did not have a national state until 1871, citizenship could not be derived from birth within a specific territory; it had to derive from ethnicity. This was called the ius sanguinis (“the law of blood”); the alternative tradition is that of the ius soli (“the law of territory”). Reunification brought with it an upsurge in popular nationalism and a huge influx of ethnic Germans, immigrants, and asylum-seekers. In the eastern Länder, there was also a severe economic crisis and mass unemployment. The result was a furious outburst of extreme right-wing violence against foreigners, who were seen as threats to the German nation because, purportedly, they undermined its identity and caused economic and social problems. The attacks have been expressions of both nationalism and racism; most of the perpetrators have been youths. The attacks have continued until the present time; in all, there have been many thousands of them. Well-organized gangs of neo-Nazis have played a considerable role in them, though others have been more spontaneous attacks. They have usually been committed by relatively few perpetrators and have taken the form of murder, manslaughter, assault, and arson. There was an increase in such violence in 1991, the first year after reunification; the two weeks surrounding the first anniversary of reunification, on October 3, 1991, were marked by an upsurge in violence. The violence in 1992 was even greater than that of the previous year. It declined following the amendment of Article 16 of the Grundgesetz (see below) but has persisted to the present. The attacks have taken place in the new eastern Länder and in the old western ones. However, there have been more attacks in the East than the West. In 2000 there were 2.21 xenophobic attacks per 100,000 population in the East, compared with 0.95 in the West. Moreover, the violence has sometimes taken a different character in the eastern Länder. Instead of being attacks by a few criminals, they have been riots involving many people. When neo-Nazi youths attacked a hostel for asylum-seekers in Rostock in August 1992, they were cheered on by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Neo-Nazi The term neo-Nazi was first coined in April 1945, when Germany was being overrun by the Allied armies, to describe the radio broadcasts of Nazi guerrilla fighters who continued to resist the conquest of their country. It has since come to be used to describe the racist and ultranationalist far right of German politics. The main political parties that unquestionably fall under this label are the NPD and the DVU. People on the far right are considered neo-Nazi because their attitudes, broadly speaking, resemble those of Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist (or “Nazi”) German Workers’ Party in the 1920s and 1930s. Intensely nationalistic, they want to free Germany of foreign influences, which are seen as damaging to the nation. Accordingly, they dislike Germany’s membership in powerful international organizations like the European Union and NATO, which limit the country’s freedom of action. They also want to see Germany expand its territory again, returning to the borders of 1937. Most of all, they are furiously racist, believing that the German nation should be ethnically homogeneous. In short, they oppose the whole modern course of German national development.

onlookers. There is also significant silent approval for such violence in the East— more so than in the West. These differences point to a difference between East and West Germans; in the FRG violence against outsiders came to be seen as socially unacceptable in a way that it did not in the GDR, where an old-fashioned German nationalism survived more intact. The East German communist regime failed to change traditional German customs, values, and prejudices as profoundly as the democratic, economically and culturally very dynamic West German state changed social customs in the West. Traditional hostility toward Poles also remained stronger in East Germany than in West Germany. This violence against foreigners led, in 1993, to the right to asylum being severely restricted. German conservatives thought that the very generous right of asylum that had existed until then had been the cause of the violence. Liberals disagreed; they considered Germany’s excessively restrictive law on citizenship to be at the root of the trouble and pressed for its reform. In their view, it encouraged antagonism toward foreigners by preventing them from becoming Germans.

Narrating the Nation The choice, in 1991, of Berlin as the new national capital indicated that Germans had pride in their past and wished to assert their identity more strongly. However, the Holocaust, and to a lesser extent World War II, continue to obstruct this assertion. Both loom large in the national memory. German politicians, particularly on the left, continue to insist that Germany commemorate the horrors of the Nazi past and make public acknowledgment of the crimes committed against N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Europe’s Jews. The reconstruction of Berlin following the dismantling of the Berlin Wall has encouraged this commemoration to take an architectural form. A Jewish Museum opened in Berlin in 2001; a memorial to the Holocaust opened there in 2005. This reflects the belief that only when the Germans have done adequate national penance for this appalling crime will they be comfortable with their identity; penance and national confidence go together. This has attracted criticism from those in Germany who feel that enough penance has been done. The distinguished novelist Martin Walser, accepting Germany’s most famous literary prize in 1998, argued that commemoration of the Nazi past was excessive, had been turned into meaningless ritual, and was being used to shape the national conscience. His argument was that the Germans were a normal people now, and each German should be left to reach his own moral verdict on the past. He spoke for many. Walser connected national self-confidence not with penance but with the lack of it—with normality, in other words.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The political parties have made great efforts to mobilize support for their contrasting conceptions of national identity. The most striking example is the CDU/CSU’s attempt to stop the SPD-Green coalition’s reform of citizenship law by mounting a petition campaign against dual citizenship in the federal state of Hessen in January 1999. The campaign did indeed mobilize much popular opposition to dual citizenship and helped the CDU win the state election in Hessen the following month. As Martin Walser’s condemnation of “instrumentalization” of the Holocaust indicated, commemoration of the past by means of museums, memorials, and anniversaries has also been used to mobilize opinion in favor of a liberal Germany. The federal government has tried to turn opinion against neo-Nazi organizations by banning them. Several were banned in 1992. However, the membership of the NPD, DVU, and Republikaner has increased since 1990. Their share of the vote has also increased, giving them significant representation in state (Landesparlamente) and local (Kommunalparlamente) parliaments. In 2001 the federal government, the Bundestag, and the Bundesrat, applied to the Bundesverfassungsgericht to ban the NPD; however, this application was rejected. In 2004 the NPD achieved 9.2 percent of the vote in elections to the state parliament of Saxony. Since 1990, the FRG has made profound changes to its law on asylum, immigration, and citizenship. These changes have been the subject of furious debate between conservatives and liberals. At the root of the debate has been disagreement over whom the nation should include. While the right to asylum has been considerably restricted (a victory for conservatives), the law on citizenship has been significantly relaxed (a victory for liberals). Both changes have been, in part, efforts to prevent further extreme right-wing violence. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Article 16 of the Grundgesetz conferred the constitutional right to asylum and hence made West Germany, and from 1990, Germany, the European country to which most asylum-seekers flocked. All the extreme right-wing parties are hostile to it. The collapse of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 caused a big increase in the number of political refugees claiming asylum in Germany. In 1990, there were 193,063 such applications; in 1991, 256,112; and in 1992, 438,191. The wave of attacks on asylum-seekers and other foreigners in 1991–1992 persuaded the mainstream political parties that the violence would only diminish if the right to asylum were significantly restricted. An amended Article 16, reflecting a compromise between differing positions, came into effect in July 1993. This amendment greatly reduced the number of those applying for asylum. Migration to Germany by ethnic Germans living in eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (the successor to the Soviet Union) was also restricted. German citizenship has traditionally been derived from descent from a German parent (the ius sanguinis). Consequently, children of non-Germans born in Germany have not become German citizens. One reason for this restriction is the opposition of German conservatives to dual nationality. If the place of birth determined nationality (the ius soli), the children of non-Germans born in Germany would not only become Germans but, very often, would inherit the nationality of their parents as well. Dual nationality, conservatives argue, obstructs full integration into the German nation. Another reason for the resistance to change is an unwillingness to change the ethnic character of the German people. The SPDGreen coalition acted quickly to change Germany’s citizenship law when it came to power in October 1998. The new law, which came into force on January 1, 2000, made it easier both for non-Germans to become naturalized and for children of non-Germans who were born in Germany to become German citizens, even if this meant that they had dual nationality. The law incorporated elements of both the ius soli and the ius sanguinis. Children of non-Germans born in Germany will become Germans if one parent has lived in Germany for 8 years and has permanent residency status. Any resultant dual nationality may be retained until the person in question reaches the age of 23, when he or she must choose one nationality or the other. Only 8 years’ of residency, instead of 15, is required for naturalization. Germans living abroad can only pass German citizenship on to their children and not to later generations. To ensure integration, the law also insisted that the new citizen be competent in German and swear loyalty to the Grundgesetz. This latter requirement, like the law itself, moves Germany closer to a political conception of nationality, though it still has a cultural component. By creating a liberal Germany—nationally inclusive, free, tolerant, democratic, and international—liberals hope to make the national question their own for the first time in almost 150 years. The problem is that the international structures to which the state belongs will weaken German democracy and may N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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stimulate a conservative nationalist backlash in the name of democracy. A key issue for Germans is whether conservative nationalist support for internationalization will continue. Selected Bibliography Berger, S. 1997. The Search for Normality. Providence, RI: Berghahn. Conradt, D. 2003. “Political Culture and Identity: The Post-Unification Search for ‘Inner Unity.’” In Developments in German Politics 3, edited by S. Padgett, W. Paterson, and G. Smith, 269–287. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Finzsch, N., and D. Schirmer, eds. 1998. Identity and Intolerance: Nationalism, Racism and Xenophobia in Germany and the United States. Washington DC: German Historical Institute. Green, S. 2003. “Citizenship and Immigration.” In Developments in German Politics 3, edited by S. Padgett, W. Paterson, and G. Smith, 227–247. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Langewiesche, D. 2000. Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa. München, Germany: Beck. Mommsen, W. 1999. “The Renaissance of the Nation-State and the Historians.” In German and American Nationalism: A Comparative Perspective, edited by H. Lehmann and H. Wellenreuther, 283–300. Oxford: Berg. Müller, J.-W. 2000. Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Panayi, P. 2001. “Racial Exclusionism in the New Germany.” In Germany since Unification, 2nd ed., edited by K. Larres, 129–148. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Schulze, H. 1998. Germany: A New History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sternberger, D. 1990. Schriften, Teil 10: Verfassungspatriotismus. Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Insel-Verlag.

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Greenland Søren Forchhammer Chronology 8,000 years ago So-called Proto Eskimos—people with a material culture and pattern of adaptation resembling the ones of the historical Inuit—live in the Bering Sea region. 5,000 years ago Small groups of Proto Eskimos migrate along the Arctic Coast from the Bering Strait to Greenland as the ice retracts. Many migrations follow. ca. AD 800 The immediate forefathers of the modern Inuit begin a migration eastward from the Bering Strait region, settling along the arctic coast. 900–1000 Inuit bands spread to Hudson’s Bay and other parts of Canada and cross the Ellesmere Strait between Canada and Greenland. Before 1000 In southwest Greenland and coastal Labrador, Inuit bands encounter Norse peasants who have migrated from Iceland and Norway. ca. 1500 Whaling commences in the North Atlantic. In the following centuries, whaling, trapping, and trade intensify in all Inuit territories and strongly influence the way of life of the Inuit. 1721 Colonization proper commences in southwest Greenland, led by private companies with a royal grant. By the end of the century, trading and mission stations, so-called colonies, have been put up all along the west coast of Greenland, and the state has taken over and monopolized the trade. 1800s The quest for a passage to the East via arctic North America, as well as numerous arctic and polar expeditions, prompts contact between Inuit and European explorers. In Greenland the state consolidates its presence, extracting substantial profits from the trade. In the middle of the century, a profitable private mining industry is initiated. All West Greenlanders have converted to Christianity, the old religion having been eradicated; literacy is widespread, and Greenlanders are being educated as catechists. Furthermore, the local population is included in political, administrative, and judicial institutions, which have been formed in all colonial districts, thus introducing the Greenlanders to a form of democracy. By the end of the century, the Danish state finally puts up a colony in the only inhabited region of East Greenland, and in 1910 a private company establishes a trading and mission station in Avanersuaq (Thule), the northernmost part of West Greenland from where numerous American expeditions aiming for the North Pole have departed. post-1945 Large military bases and warning systems are deployed all over the arctic, and substantial mineral and oil exploration and extraction begin. Southerners migrate to the arctic in an unforeseen scale. Inuit are relocated to permanent villages in a process most local populations are unable to influence. 1977 Natives all over the arctic (except in the Soviet Union) begin to organize in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1977 Inuit from Greenland, Canada, and Alaska found the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC). (The Yupigyt of Chukotka joined the ICC only a few years ago.) The aims of the organization include strengthening the unity of the Inuit, promoting Inuit rights, protecting the environment, and securing Inuit participation in political and developmental processes. 1979 Greenland acquires Home Rule but is still a part of the Danish state.

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Situating the Nation Replacing the allegedly derogatory word Eskimo in the 1970s, the term Inuit became the common designator for a number of arctic and subarctic peoples who all belong to the Eskimo Aleut language group and most of whom traditionally had a maritime adaptation pattern. Today approximately 150,000 Inuit are living in small communities and towns along more than 6,000 miles of arctic and subarctic coastline from Chukotka to East Greenland. Although some of the groups do not refer to themselves as Inuit and prefer the word Eskimo as a common designation, I will use the word Inuit in this article. Inuit (singular, inuk) is the word for human beings or people in most Eskimo languages from northern Alaska to Greenland. Variants are Yupiit (southwest Alaska) and Iit (East Greenland). Two Inuit societies stand out as being potential nation-states: Nunavut and Greenland. They have comparable geographic, demographic, linguistic, economic, and ethnic traits, and they both have experienced quite far-reaching self-rule devolved to them by the states of Canada and Denmark, respectively. In Greenland, the Kalaallit have almost 150 years of history of integration into the political and administrative system. Since the 1860s, all major disputes between the Kalaallit and colonizers have taken place inside the formal political framework established by the Danish colonial authorities. The Inuit of Nunavut have only recently been integrated into the political system in a similar way. From the mid-19th century, the West Greenlanders had representatives in small councils governing local matters such as welfare, hunting, personal disputes, and much more. In 1912 two regional councils were added, which had to be heard on all matters concerning their region before Danish authorities could take any action. Since the 1950s Greenland has also had representatives in the Danish parliament. Today the Kalaallit, or Greenlanders, are considered a people or nation, not only by themselves but also by the surrounding world, including the Danish government. However, Greenland is not a sovereign nation but a semi-autonomous part of the Danish kingdom defined by the Home Rule Act, which the Danish parliament adopted in 1978, and by subsequent bilateral agreements. The Home Rule parliament (Inatsisartut) and government (Naalakkersuisut) are situated in the capital of Nuuk. There are elections every four years in West Greenland as well as Avanersuaq (Thule) and East Greenland. The Greenlanders have the right to pass laws and to self-govern under certain restrictions defined by the Home Rule Act. The Greenlanders govern industry, environment, health care, schooling, culture, infrastructure, and much more. However, to this day Greenlandic sovereignty does not include matters as important as mineral and oil exploitation, defense, or foreign policy. These matters, crucial to any truly sovereign nation, Greenland has to address in common with the Danish parliament and government. This limitation of Home Rule has, for the entire Home Rule period, been a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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point of criticism, particularly to the more nationalistically minded political parties and parts of the population. Unlike Denmark, Greenland is neither a member of the European Union nor of NATO. However, as a result of an agreement struck between Denmark and the United States during World War II, the United States has had numerous military bases and radar sites in Greenland. Today only one radar site, in Avanersuaq (Thule), remains part of the American nuclear missiles warning system. For a number of years, negotiations regarding American military presence in Greenland have been trilateral, also due to Home Rule. Economically, Greenland is dependent on fish processing and export. In addition, Greenland also receives a substantial block grant from Denmark as an effect of the Home Rule Act. Though relatively few pursue traditional sea mammal hunting, it contributes to the informal economy all over Greenland, including the modern towns. Until approximately 1950, Greenland was more or less cost free to the Danish treasury, allowing Denmark to profit for long periods from the trade with sea mammal products. Also, both private companies and the state profited well from mining activities beginning in the 1860s. Until the 1950s, Greenland’s economy was small but stable due to a system introduced by the state that countered fluctuations on international markets for Greenlandic products. After around 1900, fishing became more and more important in the economy and eventually raised both the private and national economies to a much higher level. The Danish state, holding a trade economic monopoly in Greenland until the 1950s, was crucial in spurring this process. Fishing was a small-scale industry and was only conducted near the coast until the state began investing in a high sea fishing fleet in the 1970s. It was not until the 1980s that substantial private means were invested in the fishing sector. In colonial times, the Danish state completely dominated the economy. Today, Home Rule has taken over the dominant position. Home Rule owns the largest fish catching, processing, and exporting company, as well as the largest retail store chain in Greenland. It also owns the greatest part of Greenland’s real estate (housing) sector, which has only recently become a subject for private investment. Being a discrete island (the world’s largest), speckled with archaeological evidence of former Inuit and Proto Eskimo presence, the geographical foundation or framework of the Greenlandic Inuit nation is very clearly defined as encompassing the totality of the island of Greenland and its surrounding waters. A prerequisite to the Greenlandic claim of sovereignty over the whole island, however, is the successful exercise of the sovereignty of the Danish state through the course of history, whether in regard to foreign whaling, bartering, and fishing interests off and on the west coast, Norwegian interests in East Greenland, or American military presence in the Avanersuaq (Thule) region. In any case, it would be a much greater problem in the future to claim Greenlandic sovereignty to the island and sea territory had the Danish state not successfully done so over the past centuries. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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From the earliest times of contact and colonial history, there has been a clear sense of being a separate people. This distinctness is, for instance, expressed in a separate pan-Eskimo word for Southerners (Qallunaat) as opposed to Inuit. It is also seen in old tales of how the Qallunaat came into being: as the offspring of an Inuk woman and a dog. Numerous written sources from missionaries and trades people also tell about an Inuit identity different from the European one. However, the idea of the Kalaallit being a people or nation in the modern sense of the word only dates back to the mid-1800s, originating in a European context where ideas on the nation and democratic rule were defining the political agenda. Danish missionaries and administrators were instrumental in the dissemination of the idea of the Greenlandic nation, especially the Danish governor of South Greenland who in the mid-1800s instigated what can be seen as a national resurrection campaign. He gathered and published Greenlandic tales and customs, initiated a Greenlandic tradition of painting and drawing, and started a nationwide newspaper still in existence. He also initiated the formation of mixed European and Greenlandic councils vested with formal administrative, political, and judicial authority, which led directly to the Home Rule parliament and the legal institutions of today. In short, what happened in Greenland in the mid-1800s was in many ways similar to what happened in Europe: a national literature, art, newspaper, and national democratic, political, administrative, and judicial structures were created. Albeit the ideas and systems were European, the Greenlandic population soon adopted them and made them their own. There is ample evidence, not least from the Greenlandic contributions to their newspaper, that the ideas of a Greenlandic nation and Greenland as a national home spread rapidly to large parts of the population during this period. Probably leading that process were Greenlandic—or, as they were called, “national”—catechists, educated at the two catechist and teachers’ colleges established in the 1840s. In the beginning of the 1900s, national identity was subjected to lively discussions in the national newspaper. To some, the real Greenlander was the seal hunter; to others—such as many catechists—being in good command of the Greenlandic language was the decisive criterion. To many, Greenlanders were modern people in a modern world, with fishermen using motorboats and women processing the fish (the traditional Greenlandic hunter and his wife). From the 1970s, when nationalistic ideas were (again) given much emphasis in the political discourse, the pristine Greenlandic way of life—seal hunting and the small communal settlement—defined Greenlandicness. This idea was primarily disseminated by the educated parts of the population, many of whom had been trained in Denmark. Although the educated part of the population at times has held a key position, a broad range of the Greenlandic population participated in formulating nationalistic ideas and politics. The latest nationalistic surge, which began in the mid-1990s, has led to the election of monolingual Greenlanders to the highest political positions. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Initially, in the 1800s, nationalistic ideas were introduced in an effort to change colonial politics and to integrate the Greenlandic population into societal processes. Greenlanders were to take on more responsibility, and at the same time they were bestowed with more influence. There was a low life expectancy, and many Greenlanders lived on social welfare. Leading colonial administrators and politicians saw the integration of Greenlanders into political, administrative, and judicial processes as the only option, an idea also in accordance with the dominant political ideologies of the time. Eventually, this involvement also meant empowerment as a nation, on the ideal level as well as on the political and economic ones. In the 1960s, when new nationalistic feelings surged in Greenland, they did so in response to a global nationalistic wave that accompanied the liberation of other former colonies. The renewed focus on the Greenlandic nation, however, also came in response to Greenland’s integration as a part of the Danish kingdom “on an even footing with Denmark,” as well as to the intensified Danish investments that followed and that led to the immigration of thousands of Danish workers, teachers, and administrators. With the exception of the years between 1950 and 1964, all the important decisions were now being made in Denmark. Many Greenlanders felt they were being put on the sidelines, as mere spectators to what was going on in their country, a new sensation for them. Now leading Greenlanders claimed they were being alienated not only from the development of their country but also from their culture and language, which was being subjected to a pressure due to educational politics that emphasized Danish. Their reaction was to focus on the cultural and historical differences between the Danish way of life and the original Greenlandic one as it was, allegedly, still found in remote parts of the country.

Instituting the Nation Today the Inuit live inside the framework of four different state structures, namely Russia (Chukotka), the United States (Alaska), Canada (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Quebec, and Labrador), and Denmark (Greenland). The main groupings of Inuit are as follows: In Greenland, the self-designation Kalaallit applies to West Greenland. The East Greenlanders call themselves Iit, and those in Avanersuaq are Inughuit. Canada contains four main groups: the Nunavummiut of Nunavut in the former northeastern part of the Northwest Territories, the Nunavimmiut of Nunavik in northern Quebec, the Sikumiut of the Labrador coast, and the Inuvialuit of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region in the Northwest Territories near the Alaskan border. Their neighbors across the border to the west are the Iñupiat of the North Slope Borough in northernmost Alaska. Outside the borough, without any formally recognized political self-government, the Inuit, Yupiit, and Alutiit mostly live in settlements surrounded by non-native Alaskans. Across the Bering Strait, the Yupigyt in a similar way constitute a small minority. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Evidently, the Inuit are living under very different political and judicial circumstances resulting from historical processes. Basically there are two models: one based on the devolution of state authority, and one based on private, forprofit corporations. The Kalaallit (including the Inughuit and Iit), Nunavummiut, Nunavimmiut, Inuvialuit, and the Iñupiat of North Slope Borough enjoy varying degrees of political self-rule (including taxation rights) based on the devolution of state authority, which they execute within specified geographical boundaries. Their constituencies include the population living inside the geographical boundary, regardless of ethnicity (the vast majority being Inuit). Their authority, however, does not include subsoil (mineral and oil) rights or foreign or defense policy. In the rest of North America, all Inuit rights are derived from aboriginal land claims. Land claims have been settled between the Inuit of Alaska and the Inuvialuit of the Northwest Territories and the United States and Canada, respectively. In contrast to the Inuit of Greenland, Nunavut, and Nunavik, most of the Alaskan Inuit have very limited territorial rights (except for the Iñupiat who have borough rights).

Defining the Nation The national idea of the 1800s and early 1900s was connected to the enhancement of political self-determination. There was very little emphasis on culture and language. The focus was on educating the population—the nation—to enable Greenlanders to take over all the functions of society. This included training in the Danish language and in all other skills necessary, regardless of the Greenlanders’ cultural origin. All in all, the national idea was connected to the notion that Greenlandic culture, ethnicity, and language were all very different from the Danish. There has been, and still is, a conflict between a focus on the specific Greenlandicness on one hand and, on the other, the focus on Greenlanders as a mixed population who have much in common, culturally and historically, with other Nordic countries. In the beginning of the 20th century and in the 1970s, many Greenlanders protested the narrow definition of Greenlandicness as being identical with the way of life of the hunting communities. Many Greenlanders not only felt very little in common with that definition but they also considered it to be derogatory and detrimental to their political goals for Greenland. They considered development and modernity to be necessary for obtaining more national independence. The spatial dimension of the Greenlandic nation, by today’s definition, includes the territory over which the Danish state has sovereignty and that seems “natural”; that is, anything encompassing the whole island of Greenland, including the ice sheet (2,175,600 square kilometers) and the surrounding ocean (2 million square kilometers). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Whereas West Greenland, where the majority of the population lives, has been undivided by natural barriers and is easily accessible from the sea, East Greenland has historically been an isolated place, divided from the rest of the world by 300 kilometers of ice sheet to the west and, to the east, by the sea ice of the East Greenland Current, which wooden sailing ships were unable to penetrate. Avanersuaq (Thule) was separated from West Greenland by the uninhabitable Melville Bay. Of the three ethnically and linguistically different Inuit groups in Greenland today, the West Greenlanders or Kalaallit is by far the largest one, and their lands have been colonized for the longest time. They number approximately 50,000. The Thule people or Inughuit were not formally colonized until the 1930s and today number about 800. The East Greenlanders, or Iit, who were colonized in 1894, number less than 4,000. The two smaller ethnic groups have been more or less ignored by the West Greenlandic majority in terms of protection and development of their language and culture. The language politics under Home Rule does not acknowledge the fact that there are three different languages in Greenland. For instance, no official orthography or grammar has been developed for the two small languages. The West Greenlandic language is used in the schools all over Greenland. In addition, East Greenland and Avanersuaq are among the least economically developed and poorest regions.

Narrating the Nation In Greenlandic nationalistic symbolism, the year 1721 is crucial as the year when colonialism and missionary activities commenced. That date stands for the end of independent Greenlandic development, which some have claimed was about to lead to an autonomous Inuit state formation independent of the outside world. According to the nationalism of the 1970s and 1980s, the time before colonization was a happy one, whereas colonization has only led to misery; therefore, the original culture should be restored. Today’s nationalism does not look back to pristine times in this manner. Instead it is oriented toward the future. Greenland is viewed as a modern country with its own historic and cultural roots, and it must develop its own modernity. The most important myth of the nationalism of the 1970s and 1980s involved original commonality, or even original communism. According to this myth, original Greenlandic Inuit culture is characterized by being peaceful, nonaggressive, and in concord with nature. It is thus presented as the opposite to Western culture in what can seem to be a form of modern civilization critique. Today, Greenlandic identity is expressed in a multitude of ways. Numerous symbols express the Greenlandic Inuit or Kalaallit identity, most of them taken from the material culture of the Inuit. The kayak is probably the most common symbol, but others include tools such as the toggle head of the harpoon, the tuukN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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kaq, the semi-circular women’s knife, the ulu, or clothing such as the parka and skin boots. Sea mammals, fish, and other natural phenomena with a special bearing on the Inuit way of life are also used to symbolize national identity. More modern kinds of national symbols include the national costume, especially women’s elaborate skin and pearl embroideries, and the Greenlandic flag, designed in the early 1980s by a well-known Greenlandic artist and prominent politician of the Home Rule government. The contour of the island of Greenland is also commonly used to designate Greenland itself. There also exist symbols derived from colonial times, for example, the polar bear standing upright, a former emblem of the Royal Greenlandic Trade Department. Buildings from colonial times are often used as emblems, such as municipalities, and the Danish flag is almost as popular as its Greenlandic counterpart, even today. The church and symbols related to Christianity also play a role in defining Greenlandicness. Since the popular and national revival of the mid-1800s, art has been a vehicle for expressing the essential Greenlandicness. From the 1960s and 1970s, artists were expected to use “national” Greenlandic motifs even when they did not match the subject, such as seals and whales on stamps for Christmas instead of motifs related to church, Christmas, and Christianity. There is an old tradition of songwriting that expresses love of the country, and in the 1970s, a new nationalistic tradition grew out of the old based on rock music and the genre of protest

Emblem of the Royal Greenland Trade Company. Today the polar bear on a blue background is the emblem of Home Rule. (Wolfgang Kaehler/Corbis)

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The Greenlandic Flag In 1985 the Home Rule parliament introduced Greenland’s national flag. The flag is a geometrical composition in red and white, divided horizontally in two squares of equal size, the lower one red and the upper one white. Into the squares is embedded a circle divided into two, the upper red and the lower white. The flag symbolizes the return of the sun, rising over the ice in spring. The colors also symbolize the relation to Denmark, whose flag is a white cross on a red background. The Home Rule parliament as well as the Greenlandic population was divided over the flag issue. A majority of the population preferred a flag in green and white with a cross to symbolize the Christian religion as well as the relationship to the Nordic countries. Today some still prefer to fly the Danish flag.

Hunting, the Original Culture Although traditional Greenlandic marine mammal hunting has been on the wane from the early 1900s as fishing and industrialization took its place, it still has importance as a symbol of Greenlandic national identity. During the nationalistic surge in the 1970s and 1980s, the remote and less-developed parts of rural Greenland were dignified as being a sort of cultural treasure island where the original and pristine Greenland culture based on marine mammal hunting had survived the waves of colonization that had struck urban Greenland, the latter being considered impure and Europeanized. The Greenlandic cultural and national resurrection was to begin in the hunting communities. Probably due to this idea, scholars have taken what may seem an unproportional interest in “traditional” hunting, thus backing Greenlandic nationalism.

song. The same period experienced a wave of political poetry with obvious nationalistic and anticolonialist content. Literature has also dealt with the Greenlandic nation since the first Greenlandic novel was published in 1914. Already in the 1800s the newspaper Atuagagdliutit was broadly used for discussions of “nationalistic” issues, and this tradition continued in the 20th century.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation From the mid-1800s, the idea of an indigenous Greenlandic nation has been conveyed broadly to the Greenlandic population as well as to the Danish administration, polity, and Danish citizens in general. From the 1960s both educated and uneducated Danes as well as Greenlanders were regarded as important to the nation, but there was an emphasis on the educated parts of the populations. Educated Greenlanders were especially criticized for not being sufficiently Greenlandic, and Danes were considered to be simply colonialists and oppressors. Today, all inhabitants of Greenland have the same civil rights despite their ethnic background. No laws or bylaws favor one ethnic group over another. However, the Greenlandic language is favored both in schools and elsewhere in society. GreenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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landic is the first language of the country, and all children must learn Greenlandic from first grade regardless of their linguistic and ethnic background. But due to the large proportion of Danish speakers and the many Greenlanders who speak Danish as their first language, Danish is still the dominant language in the public and private administration and elsewhere. One of the main goals of the Greenlandic government is to replace Danish with Greenlandic. To this end, Home Rule has put much effort and economic resources into building and strengthening institutions for primary, secondary, and higher education in Greenland. The replacement of Danish with Greenlandic is proceeding steadily but not very rapidly. The trend is to homogenize the society if not ethnically, in the strict sense of the word, then linguistically. Greenland has for many years been a very homogenous society with a great deal of integration between the ethnic groups. Danish-Greenlandic marriages, for instance, are common and have been so ever since the early times of colonization. There is no outspoken hostility between the two groups in everyday life. The ultimate political goal for Greenlandic nationalism today is sovereignty. At the time of this writing, a joint Danish-Greenlandic government commission is discussing the prospects of enhanced Greenlandic self-rule inside the realm of the Danish kingdom. However, to many nationalists, this goal is not enough. For them, the ultimate goal is an independent nation-state based on the Greenlandic culture and language. It is not possible to speak about a nationalistic propaganda in the strict sense of the word. Nationalists as well as other political groups address the public by way of the ordinary printed media. Arts, music, and theater, for instance, cannot be said to be vehicles of nationalistic propaganda as such, even though nationalistic ideas are often expressed. There has always been a broadly shared agreement that the Greenlanders constitute a separate people or nation and that this nation is entitled to the land it inhabits. The Danish state legitimized its presence in Greenland by the Greenlanders’ need to be protected until they were able to “stand on their own feet,” as it was often phrased. So, in that way, the Greenlanders have never been in need of legitimizing nationalistic aspirations. Rather, the problem has been twofold: to secure finances and to secure independence (as Greenland was evidently inside the American realm as defined by the Monroe Doctrine). Both problems the nation had to meet as a member of the Danish kingdom, securing funds as well as a certain kind of limited independence. In Greenlandic nation-building, there has from the outset been an influx of ideas from the outside world, especially from Denmark, which the Greenlanders, as well as many Danes, have molded to fit the Greenlandic circumstances. Today the main goal is a greater degree of national sovereignty. Some envision an independent nation-state; others see merely enhanced self-rule within the realm of the Danish kingdom. To strengthen the nation, one strategy is to homogenize the population linguistically and culturally and to limit the influx of specialists, including teachers and administrators. Education has a high priority, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and today more Greenlanders than ever before hold university degrees and high positions in society, replacing the migrant specialists from Denmark. Regarding the formal political and judicial relationship to Denmark, the strategy seems to be a gradual increment of Greenlandic influence over foreign policy and resource development. Selected Bibliography Dahl, Jens. 1986. “Greenland: Political Structure of Self-Government.” Arctic Anthropology 23, nos. 1–2: 315–324. Dahl, Jens. 1996. “Arctic Peoples, Their Lands and Territories.” In Essays on Indigenous Identity and Rights, edited by Irja Seurujarvi-Kari and Ulla-Maija Kulonen. Helsinki, Finland: Helsinki University Press. Danker, Per, ed. 1999. This Is Greenland. Copenhagen: Greenland Resources A/S. Gad, Finn. 1970. The History of Greenland. London: C. Hurst and Company. Gad, Finn. 1984. “History of Colonial Greenland.” In Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 5, edited by David Damas, 56–77 and 556–577. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution. Kjær Sørensen, Axel. 1995. “Greenland: From Colony to Home Rule.” In Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, edited by Sven Tagil, 85–105. London: Hurst and Company. Kleivan, Helge. 1984. “Contemporary Greenlanders.” In Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 5, edited by William C. Sturtevant, 700–718. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution. Kleivan, Inge. 1991. “Greenland’s National Symbols.” In North Atlantic Studies, edited by Susanne Dybbroe and Poul Brobech Moller, vol. 1, no. 2, 4–16. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press. Langgård, K. 1998. “An Examination of Greenlandic Awareness of Ethnicity and National Self Consciousness through Texts Produced by Greenlanders 1860s–1920s.” Études/Inuit/ Studies 22, no. 1: 83–107. Nuttall, Mark. 1994. “Greenland: Emergence of an Inuit Homeland.” In Polar Peoples, 1–28. London: Minority Rights Publications. Nuttall, Mark. 2005. “Greenland.” In Encyclopedia of the Arctic, vol. 2, edited by Mark Nuttall, 778–785. New York: Routledge. Nuttall, Mark. 2005. “Inuit.” In Encyclopedia of the Arctic, vol. 2, edited by Mark Nuttall, 990–997. New York: Routledge.

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Latvia Kathleen Woodhouse Chronology 1721 Czarist Russia gains control of the Baltic region. 1850s–1880s A national awakening takes root. 1905 A revolution against czarist control fails. 1914–1918 The German army controls a large portion of the Baltic region. 1918 Independence is declared, forming the first Republic of Latvia. 1922 The first constitution is drafted. 1920s–early 1930s A series of parliaments are established and dissolved. Latvia undergoes political instability but benefits from land reforms. 1934 Ka¯ rlis Ulmanis overthrows the government and establishes his regime. Latvian enters into the Baltic Entente pact. 1940 “Year of Horror”; Latvia is incorporated into the Soviet Union. The deportation of Latvians begins, including Ka¯ rlis Ulmanis, who dies in a Soviet prison in 1942. 1941 (June 13) Soviet authorities deport approximately 15,000 Latvians to far areas of Russia, including professionals, intellectuals, religious figures, and landowners. A total of 35,000 Latvians are resettled over the course of the year. The later occupation by the German military results in some political independence; Jews living in Latvia are killed, sent to Germany, or forced into local camps. 1944 The Soviet army regains control. There is a mass exodus of Latvians to Western Europe, fearing deportation to Siberia. Deportations continue and Russians are relocated into Latvia. 1960s–1970s Scattered incidence of nationalism results in Soviet clampdown on Latvian cultural life. 1980s Glasnost initiative begins; environmental and cultural movements become openly nationalistic. 1988 Latvian Popular Front initiates independence campaign. 1989 (August) Two million people from Tallinn to Vilnius form a human chain, earning the title “singing revolution” from the global community. 1991 The Popular Front wins majority elections; Latvia declares itself independent from the Soviet Union. 1994 The last Soviet troops leave Latvia. 1999 President V ı¯k¸ e-Freiberga is elected, then reelected in 2003. 2004 Latvia joins the European Union.

Situating the Nation Latvian nationalism formed and evolved due to strong kinship ties and a quest for a cohesive national identity. For the last two centuries, this country witnessed perpetual change in its political and social structure. The present-day Republic of Latvia is situated on the Baltic Sea, with Estonia to its north and Lithuania to its N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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south. A relatively flat country, Latvia boasts a long coastline with beautiful beaches and wooded lowland. Its mysterious natural scenes and varying amount of sunlight has inspired a wealth of myths and legends over the generations. The population hovers around 2.5 million, though the growth rate is in decline. Outsiders may regard the Baltic trio as one region, but each country has its own identity. Latvia’s fertile land and access to the sea made it appealing to those involved in early trade. Originally ruled by Germans, Swedes, and Poles, Latvia came under Russian rule in 1721 as a result of the Swedish defeat in the Great Northern War (1700–1721). Historically, Latvia was comprised of the following regions: Kurzeme (Courland), Zemagale (Semigallia), Vidzaeme, and Latgale (Latgallia). Serfdom was abolished in 1819, but Latvians remained on the outskirts of political life. Russians and Germans dominated the urban areas and the political positions. Settling of different landowners along with the boundary changes caused by both world wars drastically influenced Latvia’s ethnic composition. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Currently over 57 percent of the population is considered Latvian, though they remain a minority in the capital city, R¯ıga. The tradition of a strong rural Latvian population continues even today. Russians are the most significant minority both in number (about 30 percent) and in socioeconomic influence. There are also a substantial number of Belarusians, Ukrainians (often lumped together with Russians), Poles, and Lithuanians. During Latvia’s incorporation in the Soviet Union, policies of Russification resulted in heavy migration of Russians into its lands. These policies also influenced language and culture, causing great resentment from the Latvian people. Since the country’s independence, Russians have had to adapt to policies catering to Latvian language and culture. Politically, Latvia has undergone enormous change. At the conclusion of World War I, Latvia suddenly formed as its own country. Citizens enjoyed independence during the interwar period, but forcibly became a part of the Soviet Union in 1944. During this time, Latvia provided the interior states of the Soviet Union with a large amount of crops and land for industry. Upon its independence in 1991, Latvia reinstated its original constitution and established a parliamentary democracy. Latvian nationalism closely followed these events and can be examined in different waves. The rise of the peasantry in the beginning of the 19th century marks the true start of Latvian nationalism. As the vast majority lived in rural areas as serfs, their movement was firmly anchored in a sense of land and community. After a brief revolution in 1905, Latvians abandoned their nationalist movements. It was not until the end of World War I that a renewed interest in Latvian independence surfaced. The vacuum caused by the changes in Europe afforded the country a rare opportunity, and Latvia became its own country on November 18, 1918. Never had they been in a position to truly envision independence. Then, after decades of functioning as a Soviet state, nationalism again gained strength among Latvians. From 1988 to 1991 the country made enormous changes, eventually regaining its independence. Since that time, Latvia has enjoyed more stability and economic growth than in past decades.

Instituting the Nation Several institutions aided nationalist movements within Latvia. The first to explore the ideas of nationalism were the intellectuals seeking to consolidate Latvian identity. These Latvian and German scholars formed groups that examined ways to unite the people. The involvement of intellectuals in strong displays of nationalism continued over the 20th century. In the mid- to late 1980s, literary groups such as the Latvian Writers Union also came forward as active participants in the freedom movement. They became more vocal in their displeasure over the diminishing use of the Latvian language and censorship. Poet Janis Peters emerged as the leader, making speeches and writing about Latvian frustrations. Sometimes grouped with these intellectuals were the environmentalists. Many Latvians began N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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showing their concern for the pollution caused by Soviet industrial initiatives. In the 1980s, Moscow allowed for some discussion between local authorities and those concerned. This opened the door to a nationalistic agenda as the environmentalists could claim that “their Latvia” was being polluted by outsiders. Earlier, other types of small nationalist groups had been able to voice their displeasure with Russian control. The later years of the 19th century brought about new groups heavily voicing their displeasure over the socioeconomic condition of the rural communities. Groups such as the jaun stva¯nieki, with their newspaper Dienas Lapa began protesting Moscow’s policies. While Alexander I was previously willing to promote ethnic awareness, he began enforcing Russification policies. These types of policies would emerge during every span of Russian or Soviet control. In 1899, after an impressive protest, 87 Latvians were arrested and tried. In 1905, however, the Latvian people began to change their tactics. Latvians banned together more openly, protesting violently both German and Russian authority. By the year’s end, about 2,600 revolutionaries were executed, with thousands more exiled to Russia. This marked the first sweep of Latvians fleeing westward for Europe and North America, which would recur in the decades to follow. Other such groups formed during the Soviet era, including the famous Forest Brothers or Meža Bra¯ li. About 12,000 nationalists took to the forests, hiding and showing signs of resistance whenever possible. By 1956, however, they were disbanded, as the Soviets made it a priority to imprison or kill this threatening group. Latvian political parties were extremely important to nationalistic movements. On November 18, 1918, leaders of different Latvian parties assembled to create the first national council. The provisional government was led by Ka¯rlis Ulmanis, the leader of the Agrarian Union. Many of these parties, even in the contemporary context, have made rural issues one of their top priorities. This goes beyond helping Latvian farmers maintain their way of life. Latvian identity’s roots are in the physical land and the tradition of respecting the earth passed down through the generations. Respecting the land also means believing in hard work and dedication to mother Latvia. Political parties have used these ideas to draw in members. During the Soviet era, the Latvian Communist Party was the only truly recognized group, though others did exist. Currently, nationalism finds a home in many parties including the Latvian National and Conservative Party (LNNK), For the Fatherland and Freedom (FFF), Democratic Centre Party, and the Latvian Peasants’ Union. Strong ties among the three Baltic nations also remained a priority from 1918 to the present. Latvia’s foreign policy after World War I retained a sense of neutrality, but a treaty of understanding was signed by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As all three were experiencing similar trials and successes, a unified front provided some security. During the Soviet era, the countries maintained their rapport and banded together in the fight for independence. While each country dealt with Moscow in their own manner, they looked to one another for support. Today the Baltic trio continues its strong diplomatic ties. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Defining the Nation Past and present Latvian nationalism relies on a number of ethno-cultural factors to foster a sense of cohesiveness among the people. Latvian identity formed itself around language and the rich art forms of folk songs (particularly the dainas), myths, and fairytales. The original four Latvian regions all included tribes with their own variations of language and culture. Originally, these groups were considered “non-Germans,” as landowners were unable to label them. Latvian and German intellectuals of the 19th century were the first to seek a manner in which to unite the “non-Germans.” Most of these intellectuals were educated in Estonia or Russia and returned to the region with a thirst for understanding the culture. Developing a unifying language became the first priority. This proved difficult as each region drew on Danish, German, Polish, and Russian influences. They needed a method in which to convince Latvians that their language was not a peasant dialect but a steppingstone to create a national consciousness. Furthermore, the vast majorities of these “non-Germans” were uneducated and had little hope of a structured education. There were, however, important similarities among these groups. The folk tradition of songs, poetry, and stories surfaced as a strong bridge between the regions. Each group exhibited a wealth of songs depicting everyday life. Atis Kronvalds and Krišj¯anis Barons, along with others, began working with songs and poetry to develop the language. The dainas folk songs allowed Latvians to relate their experiences with the land, water, and sky. The culture proved to be very rich, with celebrations of daily life and the different deities associated with natural elements. Once language and a sense of culture developed, Latvians began to see themselves as a united people. The biggest test came when Latvia found itself on the brink of independence. Although the initial years were chaotic, the people rallied

Dainas Dainas are a type of Latvian folk song or poetry that expresses important aspects of national identity. Themes usually include natural elements important to pre-Christian tribes— showing respect to land, sea, and sky. Unlike other cultures, Latvians did not create heroes but rather developed deities such as saule (sun). Songs also examine life journeys, including birth, marriage, work, and death. Thousands of these songs exist, emerging from all corners of the country. Krišja¯ nis Barons, known as the father of the dainas, was the first to consolidate many of these songs into published text. They served as a means of bringing Latvians together during its initial waves of national awakening during the 19th century. This would remain an important manner in which to show nationalism while under Soviet control. Latvians came together in singing protests, demanding their rights to their culture and land. Large communities living outside of the homeland also held song festivals as a means to teach their children and keep their identity alive. Song festivals continue today as touring groups from both within and outside of Latvia celebrate their roots.

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easily around the notion of a unified nation. This feeling of Latvianness became stronger over the years as events challenged the newfound freedom. The Year of Horror, starting in 1940, provided many events for rallying the national identity. The night of June 13–14, 1941, was the bleakest moment in Latvian history. The Soviet state security, the NKVD, rounded up and deported 15,000 people, sending them to working camps and special settlements in eastern provinces of the Soviet Union, mainly in Siberia. This night became a key event on which nationalism could rest. Russification policies, including the resettlement of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians within Latvia, became increasingly difficult to bear. Language policies made Russian the official language for almost everything including commerce, education, street signs, and law enforcement. Latvian risked disappearing from their lives entirely. Outspoken politicians such as Edvards Berkl¯aus attempted to point out the pitfalls of Russification. He and 2,000 of his supporters were eventually sent into exile. These events created yet another important issue for nationalists to address. In the wake of the Soviet Union, the Latvian government made the reinstitution of the Latvian language its first priority.

Narrating the Nation Many individuals, nonpolitical and political, have been critical to the survival of Latvian nationalism. Krišj¯anis Barons worked with other intellectuals during the mid-1800s to develop a basis for Latvian identity. Aside from language, Latvians also had folk songs, specifically the dainas, in common. Impressed by their cultural richness, Barons began to compile and publish these songs. This legacy provided Latvians something to claim as their own, apart from any other influence. Barons continues to be revered today as a cornerstone of Latvian nationalism and even has a museum dedicated to his work in R¯ıga. The importance of culture grounded Latvian nationalism, but actors were needed to take the cause forward. Prime Minister K¯arlis Ulmanis remains the most prominent figure of Latvia during its initial years of independence. Ulmanis fled Latvia after his involvement in the 1905 revolution and studied agriculture in western Europe, eventually moving to the United States. Upon his return to Latvia in 1913, he became active politically and served as a founding member of the Latvian People’s Council. Political instability afforded him an opportunity in 1934 to eventually dissolve the government and become president in 1936. Though Ulmanis fashioned a dictatorship, he led his country through difficult times with no violence and little displeasure from the people. His focus on Latvia’s rich history and strong values of hard work and connection to the land won him respect. In 1940, the Soviet Union began sending troops to Latvia. President Ulmanis urged the people to avoid violence, realizing their military inferiority. He was deported and died in a Soviet prison in 1942. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Though Latvia regained its independence in the 1990s, many nationalist figı¸ke-Freiberga, elected in 1999 ures continue to emerge. Current president Vaira V¯ı¸ and 2003, has played an enormous role in helping Latvia gain a foothold in Europe. Journalists compare her to Margaret Thatcher—Latvia’s Iron Lady. She is noted for her direct approach in dealing with the Kremlin, gaining her both support within her country and enemies within the Russian government. She openly discusses possibilities of Russian military attack and stands firm on issues (such as language) that promote Latvian identity. Having fled Latvia at seven years old in fear of deportation, President V¯ı¸ ı¸ke-Freiberga eventually became a professor of psychology at the University of Montreal. Her life work included studying Latvian identity, particularly folk tradition. After spending 55 years outside of Latvia, she returned to lead a small institute, which surprisingly led her to the presidency. She not only supports policies to strengthen Latvian culture but spearheaded initiatives to build strong ties within the Baltics and pushed to join the European Union in 2004. Many symbols also help demonstrate Latvian nationalism. Over the years, symbols have hearkened back to the “real” life and have served as ways to keep the people together. Strong ties to the land and nature are expressed in the form of symbols, art, and holidays such as Midsummer’s Eve. In the past these have

Mother Latvia stands at the top of the Freedom Monument in R¯ıga, Latvia. The monument commemorates the fallen soldiers of the Latvian War of Independence (1918–1920). (iStockPhoto.com)

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Midsummer’s Eve or Janu Naktis Midsummer’s Eve is a celebration of the summer solstice. This originally pagan holiday allowed Latvians everywhere to show their appreciation of the sun (saule). Rural communities built bonfires, drank, and ate cheese with caraway seeds. This celebration included jumping over the bonfire and singing folk songs all night long. Men sported oak crowns, and young girls wore flower halos. All of these symbols illustrated the devotion of the Latvian people to their land. When the Christian church took its roots in the region, both Catholic and Latvian Lutheran congregations included this holiday, renaming it St. John’s Day. Until the annexation by the Soviet Union, Janu Naktis was a nationally observed holiday. As part of the Soviet Union, observing the day became difficult because Moscow discouraged this very Latvian display. Those living in the diaspora held their own Janu Naktis events, showing their respect to their ancestors. In present-day Latvia, one can still see the flower halos, bonfires, and cheer associated with this day.

helped people remember when the land was their own and life was good. The image of a Latvian woman, dressed in traditional clothing in a nature scene, helped reinforce this idea. The Freedom Monument is possibly the most important physical site within the capital city. The base shows the struggle of the people, and the top of the column serves as a pedestal for mother Latvia holding three stars. These stars represent the three regions united with the independence of 1918. A restricted area during the Soviet regime, Latvians began placing flowers and Latvian flags there during the 1960s and 1970s. Though some were punished, people continued to show their support, growing bolder. Soviet leaders encouraged a certain amount of cultural freedom, and Latvians celebrated their holidays with folk songs and dances. While ethnic Latvians of the diaspora rallied around the world for global involvement, things in the homeland had to move slowly. Perhaps the most awe-inspiring representation of nationalism during this time was on August 23, 1989, when 2 million people from Tallinn to Vilnius joined hands to create a human chain. This nonviolent act of solidarity and protest earned it the title of the “singing revolution” in the rest of the world. Many protests followed, including a nonviolent protest with 300,000 participants marking the November 18 Independence Day in 1990.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The overarching themes of Latvian nationalism have always included the cultural values of dedication to nature and work, belief in a common origin, and a right to land. While nationalist movements surfaced over the decades, it was not until the 1980s that things truly began to change. The once quiet people began to grow N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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restless under the Soviet thumb. Mikhail Gorbachev’s ideas of perestroika and glasnost opened the door to many questions about how willing the government was to loosen its policies. During the mid-1980s, the government began squeezing out any blatant forms of anti-Soviet behavior. This repression, however, opened the door to more subtle nationalist groups. The first to emerge in June 1987 was Rebirth and Renewal founded by the Latvian Lutheran Church. The group’s main goal was to examine how life in the Soviet Union hindered the exploration of Christian beliefs. Environmentalist groups also began to surface throughout the Baltic States. Their expressions of nationalism were closely tied to the earth and how industrialization affected its health. Latvians easily sympathized with these groups as their identity closely linked them to nature. The first major triumph ensued after a protest of a planned hydroelectric complex, which the Soviet government then agreed to abandon. The victory inspired other groups to come forward. In 1987 three different demonstrations showed that Latvian nationalism had not vanished. These protests remembered the June 13 deportations, the signing of the Molotov Ribbentrov Pact, and the November 18 Independence Day. Folk song festivals and other celebrations of Latvian culture remained a delicate and effective manner in which to show resistance. In 1988 Janis Vagris was appointed head of the Communist Party, the first Latvian to hold such an influential role since 1959. LNNK held its first congress in 1989, shortly after that of the Latvian Popular Front. During this time, leaders from the three Baltic nations began meeting to discuss secession from the Soviet Union. Celebrations of Independence Day and the flying of national flags did not appear to affect the Soviet government. Timidly, the Baltic States saw this as their time to act. They joined forces and presented a united front to Moscow, sending leaders to represent their regional concerns. In March 1990, an election resulted in the Popular Front gaining 134 of the 170 government seats. Lenin’s statue was removed from the museum. The Soviet government began to pay closer attention to the Baltic States, threatening to implement economic sanctions. Negotiations ensued, and Gorbachev agreed to grant Latvia special status within the Soviet Union. Yet on May 4, 1990, Latvians and many Russians overwhelmingly voted to reinstate the Republic of Latvia. That year, the folk song festival included choirs consisting of members from the Latvian diaspora, opening the country to the global community. Since the inclusion of Latvia in the Soviet Union, members of the Latvian diaspora had constantly worked toward involving the global community. By the end of World War II, an estimated 1.6 million Latvians had fled their homeland. Many, however, did not forget their roots, keeping the memory alive in their new homes. These communities did a tremendous amount for their homeland and continue to contribute funds and resources to help rebuild Latvia. In 1991, the Soviet Union threatened Latvia with severe punishment if nationalists did not quiet down. In January of that year, several Lithuanians were killed and 150 were wounded by Soviet Black Berets outside a radio station. In N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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response to this event, 700,000 Latvians left their homes to guard various important buildings in R¯ıga. Several were killed later that month when the Black Berets raided the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Yet a major crackdown never occurred. In March, Moscow allowed the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic to once again be called the Republic of Latvia. The leader of the Latvian Communist Party, Alfr¯eds Rubriks, was one of the few anti-independence supporters who wished to fight the growing majority. His arrest in 1991 marked the political transition of the country as the Latvian nationalists were able to gain a greater foothold in his wake. During his trip to accept the Nobel Peace Prize, Gorbachev threatened to reinstate economic pressures to prevent more separatist nationalism. In response, the Latvian leaders insisted they would charge the Soviet Union real prices for all agriculture exported from their country. The government also began privatizing land, creating a new monetary system, and devising ways in which to define Latvian citizenship. Soviet vice president Gennadii Yanaev was then slated to overrule the Latvians and become acting president. Yet again, these threats never yielded results. Latvia continued its fight for freedom and was eventually recognized by the deteriorating Soviet Union. Latvia joined the European Union in May 2004, an important step in its journey toward stability. Attempting to regain its footing, the government passed many laws regarding reinstating the Latvian language. One of the biggest issues faced by the Latvian government since 1991 has involved Russia and the local Russian community. Recent border disputes over land have increased the stress in the already tense situation between the two governments. Latvia also demanded an apology for the treatment of Latvia by the Soviet Union. Russia, in turn, has demanded better treatment for Russians living in Latvia. Language policies made Latvian the official language in all realms of Latvian life. Many Russians never felt the need to learn the language and are now suffering the consequences. Protests ensued after the government demanded that all schools teach in Latvian. Many local Russians find life more difficult, though they are adapting by creating their own communities. The future of Latvian nationalism remains uncertain as the tension at home continues. Right-wing groups have emerged, voicing their displeasure of an ethnically “impure” state. Joining the European Union and working toward a more European identity will most likely change how Latvia views itself. Nonetheless, its strong sense of belonging to the Baltic region and celebration of Latvian culture will undoubtedly continue. Selected Bibliography Commercio, Michele E. 2004. “Exit in the Near Abroad: The Russian Minorities in Latvia and Kyrgyzstan.” Problems in Post-Communism 51, no. 6: 23–32. Dreifelds, Juris. 1996. Latvia in Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eksteins, Modris. 2000. Walking since Daybreak: A Story of Easter Europe, World War II, and the Heart of Our Century. New York: Mariner.

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Gordon, Frank. 1990. Latvians and Jews between Germany and Russia. Stockholm, Sweden: Momento. Lieven, Anatol. 1994. The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Melnika, Iveta. 2003. Tale of the White Crow: Coming of Age in Post-Soviet Latvia. Granite Falls, MN: Ellis Press. Nesaule, Agate. 1997. A Woman in Amber: Healing the Trauma of War and Exile. New York: Penguin. Palmer, Alan. 2006. The Baltic: A New History of the Region and Its People. New York: Overlook Press. Plakans, Andrejs. 1995. The Latvians, a Short History. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Rudenshiold, Eric. 1992. “Ethnic Dimensions in Contemporary Latvian Politics: Focusing on Forces of Change.” Soviet Studies 44, no. 4: 609–639. Wyman-Moz, Mark. 1998. DPs: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945–1951. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Romania George W. White Chronology 1945 (March) Petru Groza becomes the leader of a new Communist-dominated government. 1946 (November 19) The Communist Party of Romania wins the national elections. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej becomes general secretary. 1947 (December 27) King Michael abdicates his throne under pressure from the Communists. 1948 (April 13) The Romanian People’s Republic is declared and a new constitution is adopted. 1953 Following the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, Gheorghiu-Dej seeks a greater path of autonomy from the Soviet Union. 1957 Gheroghiu-Dej convinces the Moscow government to withdraw the remaining Soviet troops from Romania. 1965 Gheroghiu-Dej dies and is replaced by Nicolae Ceaus¸ escu, who declares Romania a Socialist Republic and oversees the writing of a new constitution. Ceaus¸ escu also creates a cult of personality around himself and builds a highly repressive dictatorship. 1989 (December 25) Nicolae Ceaus¸ escu and his wife Elena are executed by a firing squad after having tried to flee the country amid political unrest, massive demonstrations, and riots. 1990 Following free elections, Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman of the National Salvation Front (FSN), formerly low-ranking Communists, become president and prime minister, respectively. 1991 A new national constitution is adopted. 1992 Ion Iliescu (having formed the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN]) is reelected president and Nicolae Va˘ ca˘ roiu (FDSN) becomes prime minister. The coalition government includes three extremist parties: the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR), Great Romania Party (PRM), and Socialist Labor Party (PSM). 1996 Following dissatisfaction with slow reform and corruption, Ion Iliescu loses the presidential election to Emil Constantinescu of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) Party. 2000 Following the dissatisfaction with the pace of reforms, Ion Iliescu of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR) returns for his third term as president, and Adrian Nastase (PDSR) becomes prime minister. 2003 The national constitution is amended. 2004 Traian Ba˘ sescu of the Democratic Party (PD), former mayor of Bucharest and former Communist, wins the presidential election. Ca˘ lin Popescu-Ta˘ riceanu of the National Liberal Party (PNL) becomes prime minister.

Situating the Nation Prior to 1878, the various Romanian territories were under the control of the Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires. With the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Romania achieved independence but was primarily comprised of only Wallachia, Moldavia, and part of Dobrogea. Emerging on the victorious side after World N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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War I, Romania gained Transylvania, Maramure¸s, eastern Cri¸sana, the eastern two-thirds of the Banat, Bucovina, and Bessarabia. Following Romania’s involvement in World War II, it lost southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria and northern Bucovina and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union in 1945. Northern Bucovina and southeastern Bessarabia became part of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, and the majority of Bessarabia became the Soviet Republic of Moldova. A thin slice of land on the eastern bank of the Nistru (Dnestr) River in Ukraine was added to the newly created Moldovan Soviet Republic. At the same time, Romania effectively became a Soviet satellite until 1989, when it then became a truly independent country. It joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and the European Union (EU) in 2007, both organizations requiring the Romanian government to launch democratic reforms. The challenge of the Romanian government has been to weld together territories with peoples who have been ruled by differing governments through history. As possessions of various empires for much of modern history, most Romanian territories languished economically, remaining largely agricultural with little modernization. Industrialization only began at the end of the 19th century and then was inhibited by lack of investment monies, technical expertise, markets, the two world wars, and the intervening economic depression. Romania’s economy stabilized after World War II but was operated according to the Soviet model until 1989. The Communist government made all the economic decisions and emphasized heavy industrial production. Romania transformed from a country that primarily exported raw materials such as grain, timber, animal products, and petroleum in 1939 to one producing industrial goods. Despite the requirement to pay the Soviet Union more than $1.7 billion in war damages, Romania’s industrial production grew by an average of almost 13 percent between 1950 and 1977. Following an economic downturn in 1976, Romania was in deep economic crisis by 1981, with a huge foreign debt. Determined to repay the national debt, Nicolae Ceau¸sescu launched a severe austerity program. By 1989, the foreign debt was repaid, but Romania had sunk to one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. Electricity, for example, was not available throughout most of any given day. Following the ouster of Ceau¸sescu in 1989, Romania began moving toward a free-market economy. Dilapidated industry, corruption, and a burdensome bureaucracy have inhibited economic growth. However, beginning in 2002, Romania embarked down the pathway of increasing economic growth, recording some of the best growth rates in Europe. The major territories of Romania are Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania. Wallachia’s major city, Bucharest, serves as the country’s capital. Moldavia’s capital, Ia¸si, also serves as a major political, economic, cultural, and educational center for the country. Transylvania’s major city is Cluj-Napoca, but other cities like Alba Iulia, Blaj, and Bra¸sov are major cultural centers. For example, the first leader to unite Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania was Michael the Brave in 1599. He had himself crowned in Alba Iulia. Th e city was chosen again in 1918 by the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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“Nation Assembly of the Romanian Nation” when it proclaimed the unification of all Romanian territories. King Ferdinand built a coronation church there in 1922 and had himself crowned the first king of a united Romania. In 1990, following the end of the Communist regime, the government changed the national holiday from August 23 (the day Romania abandoned Nazi Germany in 1944 and allowed Soviet troops to peacefully occupy its territory) to December 1, the day Romania was proclaimed united in 1918. The ceremonies were held in Alba Iulia. Blaj was an important center of the national movement in the 19th century, particularly the 1848 revolution. Timi¸soara in the Banat was an important center of the 1989 revolution. In democratic elections since 1989, definite urban-rural differences exist. The urban areas tend to support the parties advocating greatest reform. The rural areas have been more cautious, supporting such parties as those run by the former Communists. Along with this political geography, Wallachia and Moldavia have supported the former Communists such as Ion Illiescu and the political parties known as the National Salvation Front (FSN) and its successors, the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN), the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR), and the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSD). As can be gleaned from the above chronology, the people of Wallachia and Moldavia have deterN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Governing Political Parties The Romanian Communist Party governed from 1946 until 1948 when it merged with one branch of the Social Democratic Party to create the Romanian Workers’ Party (PMR). In 1965, the PMR was renamed the Romanian Communist Party (PCR). Following the end of Communist rule in 1989, more than 200 political parties emerged. The National Salvation Front (FSN), made up of many formerly low-ranking Communists, won the first election in 1990. In 1992, an internal dispute led hard-liner Ion Iliescu to break with FSN and found the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN), which was victorious in the 1992 election. In 1993, the party’s name was changed again to the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR). In 2001, the PDSR merged with the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR) and together became the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSD). Three extremist parties formed a coalition government with the FDSN in 1992. The Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) and the Great Romania Party (PRM) were both right-wing Romanian nationalist parties. In 2005, the PRM became more moderate and changed its name to the Great Romania People’s Party (PPRM). The other party in the 1992 coalition was the left-wing Socialist Labor Party (PSM). In 2003, the PSM merged with the more moderate PSD. The wing of the party that wanted to stay Marxist formed the Socialist Alliance Party (PAS). From 1992 to 2000, a coalition of political parties known as the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) formed to challenge the FSN. Following the 1996 election, it formed a governing coalition with the Democratic Party (PD) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). Following the CDR’s loss in the 2000 election, the UDMR formed a government with the PDSR. The FSN changed its name in 1993 to the Democratic Party (PD) and was led by the more reform-minded Petre Roman. In 2003, the PD allied itself with the center-right liberal National Liberal Party (PNL) in a coalition called Justice and Truth (DA) (whose abbreviation also means “yes” in Romanian). Following the 2004 election, the DA formed a coalition government with the UDMR and the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR) (known as the Conservative Party [PC] after May 2005).

mined the winners of most of Romania’s post-1989 elections. However, beginning with the 1996 election, Transylvania’s stronger support for more reform-minded parties put such parties into power. Parties centered in Transylvania have also been part of the governing coalitions, whether liberal or conservative. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) is the most notable example. Involvement of Transylvania’s ethnic minorities (the largest in the country) in governing coalitions most likely led to the constitutional reforms of 2003, which broadened the rights of ethnic minorities and others. Prior to World War II, most Romanians were agricultural peasants. After the war, communist ideology worked not only to industrialize the country but also to create an industrial working class. Communist elites governed the country, promoted the virtues of the industrial working class, and determined the cultural characteristics of Romanians. Though Romania’s Communist leaders steered Romania N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Constitution During the Communist period, the constitution of Romania was rewritten three different times: 1948, 1952, and 1965. The 1952 constitution guaranteed all citizens the right to work, and full equality was granted to national minorities. Private ownership was possible, though major industries were nationalized. While the 1952 constitution emphasized Romania’s close ties to the Soviet Union, the 1965 constitution omitted all such references. Private ownership was also sharply reduced. In 1974 the constitution was amended to create an office of the president, which became the most powerful office in the country. A new constitution was adopted in 1991. Of its many features, it declared that Romania was a republic and “the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin.” The right to vote for any political party and the right to privately own land was guaranteed. The term of the president was set at four years. The constitution was amended in 2003. Many changes were made, including the lowering of the number of citizens able to promote a bill from 250,000 to 100,000, the lowering of the age limit of candidates for the Senate to 33 years of age, and the extension of the term of the president from four to five years. National minorities were given the right to officially use their languages, and private property was protected.

on a course as independent as possible from the Soviet Union, they still had to accept Russian influence. For example, the Soviets put Russian words into the Romanian language and classified the people of the neighboring Soviet Republic of Moldova as Moldovans and not Romanians. In addition, the Soviets only approved histories that depicted Russians as liberators of Romanians and generally as culturally akin to Romanians. Following the changes in 1989, democracy allowed for a greater expression of Romanian identity, from socialist to ultra-conservative opinions. Despite the range of views, Romanians of most social classes have generally turned westward away from Russia, as exemplified by Romania’s new membership in NATO and the EU. Russian influence on the Romanian language has been reversed, and closer ties with Moldova have been pursued.

Instituting the Nation During the Communist period, no separation existed between executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The main organ of government was the Grand National Assembly (GNA), which met twice a year. The State Council was in permanent session and assumed the powers of the GNA when the GNA was not in session. The Council of Ministers was the supreme body of state administration, overseeN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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ing all levels of government. The Communist Party was the dominant political party, meaning that the general secretary of the Communist Party also effectively led the Romanian government. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was the general secretary from 1946 to 1965, and Nicolae Ceau¸sescu held the position from 1965 to 1989. After 1989, Romania became a democratic republic with separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The head of the executive branch is now the president, who is elected by popular vote every five years (four years until 2005). The president appoints a prime minister, who heads the government and appoints the other members of the executive branch. The legislative branch is divided into two chambers, a 137-member Senate and a 332-member Chamber of Deputies. Members of both chambers are elected every four years. Since 1989, former Communists generally have been elected president. For example, Ion Iliescu won the 1990, 1992, and 2000 elections, and Traian B˘asescu won the 2004 election. Only in 1996 did a more reform-minded candidate win the presidency, in this case, Emil Constantinescu. During the Communist period, governmental institutions promoted the idea of a fraternal brotherhood of communism, which argued that all Romanians and peoples in other countries were united by their communist ideology. After 1989, numerous political parties have advocated differing concepts of what it is to be Romanian. On the far right is the Great Romania People’s Party (PPRM) (simply the Great Romania Party [PRM] until 2005), which has been very nationalistic and likewise very anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian, and generally xenophobic. However, ethnic political parties such as the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) argue for a more multicultural definition of the Romanian nation that would allow ethnic minorities to use their languages officially. Though the PPRM and other nationalist parties receive many votes in elections, Romania has moved in a more multicultural direction. The combination of years of Communist influence that downplayed nationalism and the significance of cultural differences, the political activism of a number of ethnically based political parties such as the UDMR, and the desire to join the EU, which requires respect for multiculturalism, has pushed the Romanian nation to be more inclusive. Ironically, these same three factors have also encouraged a more intolerant, ethnic Romanian nationalism among some segments of Romanian society.

Defining the Nation Romanian nationalism first emerged in the 19th century under the influence of Romanticism, which stressed ethnicity and language as the basis of nationhood. The Transylvanian School played a major role in defining the characteristics of Romanian nationhood in these terms. With Transylvania in the Austria-Hungarian empire until 1918, members of the Transylvanian School were connected to and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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influenced by Vienna and Rome. With such influence, the Latin alphabet was adopted for the Romanian language, though Orthodox Christians like the Romanians normally use the Cyrillic alphabet. The Transylvanian School also advocated the use of the term Romanian rather than Wallachian to emphasize their nation’s western connections, as the former term, which meant “land of the Romans,” implied that the nation’s inhabitants were descendents of Romans. While under the influence of the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1989, the Soviets attempted to reorient the Romanian nation toward the Slavic east. In the Moldovan Soviet Republic, which the Soviet Union annexed from Romania in 1945, Soviet authorities changed the script from Latin to Cyrillic, the alphabet used by Russians, and also encouraged the use of Russian. At one point they even insisted that no Romanians lived in Moldova. In Romania, Soviet policy makers insisted that Romania be spelled Rumania, with the root rum meaning Eastern Orthodox Christian, an identity that both Romanians and Russians shared. In 1953, Soviet authorities went a step further and insisted that the letter â be replaced with the letter î. Consequently, Rumânia was then written Rumînia, further distancing the word from its implied Roman origins. After 1968, Ceau¸sescu reversed some of the language changes. De-Sovietization of the Romanian language and history continued after 1989. The government of Moldova changed the alphabet of their language back to Latin in 1989. The spatial dimensions of the Romanian nation are most directly defined by a combination of natural features and ethnic distributions. Numerically, ethnic Romanians clearly dominate all of the territories that comprise the Romanian and Moldovan states. These territories are primarily bounded by natural features. For example, Wallachia is between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube River in the south. Moldavia is between the Carpathian Mountains and the Prut River, and Moldova lies between the Prut and Nistru (Dnestr) rivers. Transylvania lies within the arc of the Carpathian Mountains. Romanian nationalists have tended to argue that these territories, bounded by such natural features, naturally belong to the Romanian nation; therefore, ethnic minorities are unnaturally present in these regions and have no right to claim these territories. It could be argued that the Carpathian Mountains are a barrier within the country that inhibits transportation and communication networks within the country, in turn inhibiting Romanian unity. However, Romanian nationalists frequently see the Carpathians as a fortress and a refuge where their ancestors escaped to in times of crises. They also see Romania as ringed by a series of rivers that act as moats for national defense. Romanian nationhood is subdivided into a number of regional identities with corresponding dialects of the Romanian language: Moldavian, Muntenian (Wallachian), Transylvanian, and Banation, and so on. The regional dialects and cultures are very similar. Transylvanians and Bucovinans have been influenced by Hungarian and Austrian cultures, respectively. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Narrating the Nation Roman and Dacian history are still very important to modern Romanians who see themselves as a product of these earlier cultures, which were also great civilizations. Replicas of the she-wolf in Rome depicting Romulus (the founder of Rome) and Remus serve as common statues, as do statues of Dacian leaders. Notable medieval leaders who fought for independence were Basarab (Wallachia), Stephen the Great (Moldavia), Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), and Iancu de Hunedoara (the latter two of Transylvania). However, Romanian ancestors did not build another great united civilization or completely rule themselves again until Michael the Brave united Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania in 1600. Monuments and place-names associated with Michael the Brave are also common. The national revolutions that swept across Europe in 1848 also occurred in Romanian territories as well. This event is particularly important to modern Romanians, who see this revolution as an expression of their ancestors’ desire for national selfdetermination at a time when no Romanian territory was independent. Avram Iancu was one of the key leaders at the time. Mihai Eminescu is a cherished poet of the late 19th century. December 1, 1918, is celebrated with more spirit because it marked the unification of all Romanian territories into a Greater Romania. The Romanian flag is comprised of three vertical colors: cobalt blue, chrome yellow, and vermilion red. The royal coat of arms was replaced by socialist symbols (e.g., wheat and a red star) during the Communist period. During the revolution of 1989, people literally cut the socialist emblem out of the flag. “Three Colors,” which describes the flag, was the national anthem until 1989. Lyrics were changed from the original version written in the 19th century to reflect communist philosophy. “Awaken Ye, Romanian!” was originally written during the 1848 revolution, banned during Communist times, spontaneously sung during the 1989 revolution, and became the national anthem after 1989. It was also adopted in neighboring Moldova until 1994 when it was replaced with “Our Language.” The Romanian coat of arms consists of a golden eagle on a blue shield holding an Orthodox Christian cross in its beak. On the eagle’s chest is another shield with the five symbols of Romania’s five territories: the golden eagle of Wallachia, the auroch (ancient ox) of Moldavia, the lion of the Banat, the dolphins of the coastal lands of Dobrogea, and the eagle over the seven fortresses of Transylvania. The neighboring country of Moldova also uses the auroch as its symbol.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Romania is about 90 percent ethnic Romanian. Of the remaining 10 percent, Hungarians are the largest ethnic minority, followed by Roma (Gypsies), Ukrainians, Saxon Germans, Russians, Turks, Tatars, and a number of other smaller groups. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Romanian coat of arms. (Vector-Images.com)

During Communist times, ethnicity was seen as irrelevant and was de-emphasized; yet ethnic minorities were seen as having rights and, therefore, protected. For example, the Hungarians of Transylvania were given an autonomous region. However, though Communist philosophy de-emphasized ethnicity, it also advocated the homogenization of the population. Thus the belief in equal protection under the law was often contradicted by other policies that aimed to eliminate difference N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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among the people. For example, in 1968, Ceau¸sescu abolished the Hungarian autonomous region in Transylvania that the Soviets had insisted on creating after the war. Many ethnic Romanians see ethnic minorities as an internal threat, although others do not. Jews were heavily persecuted during World War II. During Communist times, Jews were often targeted during purges. Ethnic Hungarians have been frequently accused of collaborating with the Hungarian government to return Transylvania to Hungary. The strong desire for democracy after 1989 led to a freer society for ethnic minorities, many of whom have their own political parties. The participation of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) in governing coalitions has helped to ensure the rights of minorities. However, the ethno-nationalist Romanian Great Romania Party (PRM) receives great support from ethnic Romanians. Historically, ethnic Romanians have been concerned about gaining and then preserving their independence. Since 1945, they have seen external forces as the greatest threat, particularly the Soviet Union, which took away Bessarabia (now Moldova) and northern Bucovina. Hungary is also seen as a threat because it possessed Transylvania and other western territories before 1918 and annexed northern Transylvania during World War II. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, many Romanians are still wary of the succeeding Russian Federation. They blame the presence of the 14th Russian army in Moldova and Moscow’s meddling for preventing Moldova from uniting with Romania and for Moldova’s inability to bring ethnic separatists under control. The perceived Russian threat led Romanians to join NATO and the EU as a means of preserving their independence. Conclusion Romania emerged after World War II as a Soviet satellite and with a Communist government. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1946–1965) and Nicolae Ceau¸sescu (1965–1989) were the two leaders of the country during the Communist period. After 1989, Romania became a democratic republic holding free elections. Though former Communists have since won many of the elections, Romania has become a more pluralistic society where ethnic minorities enjoy greater rights. Discontent with former Soviet control, which also led to the loss of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, Romanians tend to prefer links with western Europe. Selected Bibliography Bachman, Ronald D., ed. 1991. Romania: A Country Study. 2nd ed. Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Carey, Henry E., ed. 2004. Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society. New York: Lexington Books. Constitution of Romania. 1991. (Retrieved June 29, 2005), http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/constitutie_ en.pdf.

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Deletant, Dennis. 1991. “Rewriting the Past: Trends in Contemporary Romanian Historiography.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 14 (January): 64–86. Deletant, Dennis. 1999. Romania under Communist Rule. Portland, OR: Center for Romanian Studies, in cooperation with the Civic Academy Foundation. Fedor, Helen, ed. 1995. Belarus and Moldova: Country Studies. Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Fischer-Galati, Stephen. 1978. “The Continuation of Nationalism in Romanian Historiography.” Nationalities Papers 6, no. 2: 179–184. Gallagher, Tom. 2005. Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation. New York: New York University Press. “Major Provisions of the Law for the Revision of the Constitution of Romania.” 2003. (Retrieved June 29, 2005), http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=336. Matei, Sorin. 2004. “The Emergent Romanian Post-Communist Ethos: From Nationalism to Privatism.” Problems of Post-Communism 51 (March–April): 40–47. “National Symbols.” 2004. (Retrieved June 29, 2005), http://ue.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en& id=210. Roper, Steven D. 2003. “Is There an Economic Basis for Post-Communist Voting? Evidence from Romanian Elections, 1992–2000.” East European Quarterly 37 (March): 85–100. White, George W. 1998. “Transylvania: Hungarian, Romanian, or Neither?” In Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory and Scale, edited by Guntram Herb and David Kaplan, chap. 12, 267–287. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. White, George W. 2000. Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Russia Grigory Ioffe Chronology 1991 The Soviet Union disintegrates; 15 republics, including the Russian Federation, become independent nations. Boris Yeltsin is elected president. 1992 Yeltsin ends the supremacy of the Communist Party, privatizes state-run enterprises, and guarantees a free press. Mobsters begin to take over the economy. 1993 Standoff between the pro-reform government and the largely Communist Supreme Soviet (parliament) resolves forcibly in favor of the government. The Supreme Soviet is renamed the Duma. 1994–1996 The first war in Chechnya, a breakaway province of Russia. The federal army withdraws with heavy casualties. 1996 Yeltsin is reelected president. 1998 The Russian stock market crashes. 1999 Resumption of economic growth. The beginning of the second Chechen war. Yeltsin resigns, and Vladimir Putin is appointed acting president. 2000 Vladimir Putin is elected president. 2004 Vladimir Putin is reelected president in a landslide.

Situating the Nation Present-day Russia, officially called the Russian Federation, dates back to the breakup of the Soviet Union (December 1991). The Russian Federation was the Soviet Union’s largest republic with three-quarters of the entire Soviet Union’s land area and half of its population. The official declaration of Russia’s sovereignty (June 12, 1991) predated and facilitated the Soviet Union’s disintegration. Following the 1989 elections to the Russian legislature (at the time called the Supreme Soviet, renamed the Duma in 1993), many in the new Russian political elite sympathized with the Baltic States’ quest for independence. They also considered Russia to be the financial donor of most, if not all, union republics, hence getting rid of them was viewed as potentially benefiting Russia’s development. This idea coexisted with the short-lived but pronounced prevalence of the Westernizing geopolitical vision of Russia (discussed below) of the intelligentsia and political elite in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. According to this vision, once Russia adopted principles of Western-style democracy and did away with central planning, it would soon become part of the advanced West. The abortive coup of August 19–21, 1991, by which the staunchest Communists planned to undo Gorbachev’s reforms, reinforced the Westernizing vision and precipitated the Soviet breakup. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Instituting the Nation Among the principal actors in Russia’s reemergence as a country stripped of much of its long-time empire was Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the Russian legislature and soon to become its first president. Yeltsin co-signed the Belavezh agreement of December 1991 with Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine and Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus, the agreement that did away with the Soviet Union. Other prominent figures shaping the post-Soviet future of Russia early on were Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and the architect of the privatization schemes that transferred most lucrative industrial assets into the hands of new entrepreneurs, Anatoly Chubais. All of these politicians are now considerably discredited in the eyes of most Russians, and only Chubais retains a highpower position as head of Russia’s state electric grid monopoly. By 1993, the political division within the Russian legislature between the allied forces of communists and ethnic Russian nationalists, on the one hand, and the Westernizing liberals, on the other, became so bitter that it was resolved only through an armed standoff. The Westernizing block won, but it now looks like

Boris Yeltsin The first democratically elected president of Russia (1991–1999), Boris Yeltsin was formerly a regional Communist Party boss. He quit the party in 1990. In December 1991, together with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus, Yeltsin co-signed the Belovezh agreement, which did away with the Soviet Union and created the Commonwealth of Independent States in its place. As president of an independent Russia, Yeltsin moved to end state control of the economy and privatize most enterprises. However, economic difficulties and political opposition, particularly from the Supreme Soviet, slowed his program and forced compromises. In 1993, Yeltsin suspended the parliament and called for new elections. When the parliament’s supporters resorted to arms, they were crushed by the army. In foreign affairs, Yeltsin greatly improved relations with the West and signed the START II nuclear disarmament treaty (1993) with the United States. In 1994, Yeltsin sent forces into Chechnya to suppress a separatist rebellion, forcing Russia into a difficult and unpopular struggle. In 1996, Yeltsin ran for reelection against a number of other candidates and won the first round, garnering 35 percent of the vote to Communist Gennady Zyuganov’s 32 percent; Yeltsin then won the runoff election. In the late 1990s, however, a series of economic crises, frequent cabinet reshufflings, and his own deteriorating health cast doubt on his ability to rule; charges of corruption in his family and among members of his inner circle also became prominent. In 1999, Yeltsin survived an impeachment attempt spearheaded by the Communist opposition. A second invasion of Chechnya (1999), prompted by a Chechen invasion of Dagestan and related terrorist bombings in Russia, proved popular with many Russians, and pro-government parties did well in the 1999 parliamentary elections. On December 31, 1999, the long-ailing Yeltsin suddenly announced his resignation; Prime Minister Vladimir Putin succeeded him as acting president.

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that victory will be its last for quite some time. The pendulum then began to swing in the opposite direction: toward ethnic nationalism of the Eurasian (as opposed to Westernizing) brand and profound disillusionment with the West. The ensuing steep economic decline of 1991–1998, privatization and the development of crony capitalism, loss of a sense of economic security by many, and a far-reaching social stratification discredited the Westernizing vision in the eyes of many Russians, as did the country’s loss of superpower status. Nevertheless, the new geopolitical reality of a Russia separated from the rest of its former empire had been irrevocably established. “The new delimitation happened quickly and without deep reflection or real debate” (O’Loughlin and Talbot 2005, 26).

Defining the Nation As the multifaceted consequences of this new delimitation sank in, Russians had to “re-conceptualize their country within a territory for which there are few historical antecedents” (O’Loughlin and Talbot 2005, 23). To a significant extent, the borders of today’s Russia are not associated with established ethno-cultural frontiers. This is especially true of the borders with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Even borders with Estonia and Latvia, the countries that are not perceived by most Russians as culturally close, cut across the areas currently populated by a Russian-speaking population. Ironically, some of Russia’s internal division lines, especially those in the northern Caucasus, are more distinctive in an ethno-cultural sense than much of its external borders. Throughout much of the Soviet Union’s existence, the ethnic nationalism of Great Russians was discouraged, whereas that of other ethnicities was tolerated to a larger extent. (Here, “Great” fits the historic designation practiced in the Russian empire and used to distinguish Russians proper from Little Russians or Ukrainians and White Russians or Belarusians.) The theoretical foundation for such a differential treatment was invariably justified by the article “About the National Pride of Great Russians” by Vladimir I. Lenin, who described Russian nationalism as chauvinism by the colonizer and argued that the ethno-national pride of ethnicities oppressed in the Russian empire deserved sympathy. Thus the Russianness of the Soviet power was to be toned down in exchange for conciliation of the minorities. Indeed, there were Communist parties of Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and so on, but there was no Russia-based Communist Party; there, the rank-and-file communists were members of the Communist Party of the USSR. It was quite obvious for all those initiated that, in Moscow, the citywide and allUnion tiers of the Soviet government were more influential than the intermediate Russian Federation tier, whose ministries enjoyed more modest premises than their counterparts in other union republics. Of considerable importance is the fact that the ethnic Russian countryside, a wellspring of folk traditions in all the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Old World countries, became much more neglected and depopulated under the Soviets than the countryside in all the other republics. Designed to compensate for ethnic pride was the promotion of civic identity, whose subject and rallying point was defined as the Soviet people. Ethnic Russians embraced this identity more vigorously than did all other groups, with the exception of Belarusians, residents of eastern Ukraine, and some Russified urban intelligentsia of Central Asia. It has thus been all the more painful for most Russians to reconcile with the new post-Soviet reality. From the perspective of many Russians, their country was dispossessed of its inalienable parts. The formal separation from Ukraine, Belarus, and northern Kazakhstan, which Aleksander Solzhenitsyn calls southern Siberia, has been perceived as particularly unnatural. Some 25 million ethnic Russians living in former Soviet republics sometimes face ethnic and linguistic discrimination, another source of trauma. Within Russia proper, ethnic Russians account for 82 percent of the entire population. The largest concentration of non-Russian ethnicities is in the North Caucasus, and the second largest is between the Volga River and the Urals, where most Tatars, the second-largest ethnic group of the Russian Federation (4 percent), live. Altogether, there are 21 ethnic homelands known as republics within the Russian Federation. During the Yeltsin presidency (1992–1999), these republics enjoyed some fiscal advantages over ethnically Russian regions, including a lower rate of corporate tax transfers to the federal budget. Just as in the Soviet Union at large, whose breakup was in part conditioned by ethnic nationalism, so in the Russian Federation ethnicity became a rallying point in the 1990s and sparked separatism ranging from armed guerilla movements (Chechnya) to vocal assertion of fiscal autonomy, to requirements that all public officials learn the local language, and so on, as is the case in Tatarstan and some other republics. Even among the more Russified groups that never entertained separatist ideas (e.g., Udmurt, Mordva, or Mari), ethnic pride and ethnically tainted grievances are on the rise. In the Russian Federation, ethnicity thus provides a crucial identity challenge to civic nationalism, which continues to be weak. Formally, the idea of an allRussian civic identity is not dead; it is conveyed by the adjective “Rossiisky” as opposed to “Russky.” While both adjectives are rendered in English as “Russian,” they have a different connotation in Russia, with Rossiisky being statewide and inclusive and Russky being a marker of ethnic Russianness. Russia’s civic identity is more vigorously embraced by the intellectual Westernizers, whose leading position in Russian society has been shattered by the traumas of post-communist development. The Westernizers believe that Russia is in essence a European cultural entity, just being vast and having absorbed Asiatic influences. Russia can reclaim its European self by following in the footsteps of West European developments in political, social, and economic areas. The opposite flank of the political spectrum, which commands at least as large a following, is represented by the intellectual heirs to the Slavophils. In the tradition of the eponymous school of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Vladimir Putin A shadowy KGB agent stationed in East Germany, Vladimir Putin assumed a position with the International Affairs section of Leningrad State University in 1990. He rose through the political ranks and in August 1999 was appointed prime minister of the Russian Federation. Putin benefited from an image of toughness, bolstered by his hard-line approach to the renewed crisis in Chechnya. On December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned and appointed Putin the second president of the Russian Federation. Putin won the office in his own right three months later. Upon his election, Putin undertook measures to restore the primacy of the Kremlin in Russia’s political life. One of his first acts was to restore a strong central state and to minimize the rejection of the Soviet era. He retained many Soviet-era symbols, including the trademark red military flag, the “Soviet Star” crest, and the Soviet national anthem (although with revised lyrics). He placed most Russian TV stations, newspapers, and other media under Kremlin control. And he reined in some of Russia’s leading business tycoons.

thought in the Russian émigré circles of the 1920s and 1930s, those heirs now prefer to call themselves Eurasianists. For them, Russia is neither Europe nor Asia; it is, in the words of Vladimir Lamansky, “the middle world of Eurasia,” a unique civilization that should not by any means imitate the West. Rather, it should oppose and challenge it. The Eurasianists draw inspiration from the works of the late Nikolai Gumilev and to some extent from Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Some of the most radical personalities in this movement fan the flames of antiAmericanism. Alexander Dugin, for example, claims that “the desire to see in America a democratic partner would be equivalent to an appeal to collaborate with Hitler after World War Two began. According to this calendar, now is July 1941” (Dugin 2005). Identities overlap in contemporary Russia. For example, “ethnic Tatars may view the region as homeland to Tatars dispersed throughout the Russian Federation and even beyond, or may see Kazan’ [the capital of Tatarstan] as a special historical center not just for ethnic Tatars or residents of Tatarstan but those in the entire Volga-Ural region” (Bradshaw and Prendergrast 2005, 103). Although civic Russian identity remains weak, much has been done to bolster it under President Vladimir Putin, whose second and last (according to the Russian constitution) term expires in 2008.

Narrating the Nation Because of multiple and competing identities, there is no single brand of national mythology that appeals to all or most citizens of Russia. Even the ethnic Russian N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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majority is torn between several competing brands. Perhaps their sole unifying thread is a feeling of inferiority with respect to the West, particularly to the United States, the sole remaining superpower. Westernizers claim that Russia can successfully bridge the gap with the West by consistently emulating Western economic and political solutions on Russian soil. The inferiority feeling is deeper and more painful, however, for the Eurasianists, who declare that economic and political comparisons with the West are an intellectual taboo of sorts because Russia is a different civilization that “cannot be understood in European terms” (“Rossiya–Yevropeiskaya strana?” 2005). They brand the United States as Russia’s principal geopolitical and civilizational rival. Spiritual and averse to egotism, Russians are described as gaining strength exclusively from collective, not individual, mobilization and pursuits. Alexander Block’s stanzas from his 1918 verse “Scythians” can be considered a manifesto of the Eurasianists and a message that they believe Russia ought to send to the West: You are the millions, we are multitude And multitude and multitude. Come, fight! Yea, we are Scythians, Yea, Asians, a slant-eyed, greedy brood. For you the centuries, for us—one hour. Like slaves, obeying and abhorred, We were the shield between the breeds Of Europe and the raging Mongol horde. (Translated from the Russian; Yarmolinsky 1949, 167)

The third brand of Russian nationalism, its neo-Soviet brand, is receding but still commands a significant following, hence the long and acrimonious public debate about the Russian anthem. The debate ended in 2000 with the restoration of the Soviet anthem’s music, for which Sergei Mikhalkov wrote new lyrics just as he had a couple of times under the Soviets, first preaching up Stalin and then purging him from the anthem’s lyrics. From 1992 to 2000, Mikhail Glinka’s “Patriotic Song” was the Russian anthem, but the nostalgia of the Soviet glory days embraced by too many Russians prompted President Putin’s decision to resuscitate the Soviet anthem despite many protests by Russian Westernizers. However, Russia’s current flag and its national emblem are replicas of those of pre-1917, czarist Russia. Until 2004, November 7 was one of the main national holidays in Russia. Though no longer devoted to celebrating the anniversary of the 1917 Revolution, the holiday remained, as Russians had been used to it. In 2005, the decision was made to move the national holiday to November 4, the day when patriotic Russian militia under the guidance of Kuz’ma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky expelled Polish-Lithuanian invaders from Moscow in 1612. The Russian Orthodox Church, whose role in Russian society is on the rise, lobbied for this move. Now, it is habitual for Russian authorities, including the president, to attend church and to be pictured in company with its supreme leaders. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The church positions itself as the custodian of Russia as a godly nation averse to Western materialism. The Orthodox Church also cultivates the sense of victimhood in relation to Catholic and other Western missionary invasions of its traditional domain. Although much of the alleged invasion took place in western Ukraine, Russian Orthodox hierarchs still consider these acts treachery and resist the normalization of interdenominational relationships. The late pope John Paul II was unable to visit Russia despite invitations by two Russian presidents because the Orthodox Church did not endorse the invitations. Since the late 1990s, there has been a steady effort to revert to a glorification of Joseph Stalin. Eurasianists and neo-Communists are behind this effort. Already in some cities and towns, monuments to Stalin have been re-created, and many petition the government to restore Stalingrad as the name of the city (renamed Volgograd in 1961 by Nikita Khrushchev) where the famous battle took place in 1942. Although an ethnic Georgian, Stalin comes across to many in Russia as the leader with whom the most glorious accomplishments and victories of Russia are associated. Most importantly, during his reign Russia inspired awe in her detractors. It is also remembered that in his famous speech of July 3, 1941, following the commencement of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalin openly appealed to the national pride of ethnic Russians and sought support of the Orthodox Church after two decades of its brutal oppression. The Soviet Union lost 25 million lives in that war. Most probably, close to half of all the victims were residents of Russia. The number of casualties from Stalinist purges was even higher. Ironically, this does not prevent quite a few Russians from rallying around the dictator’s name.

Joseph Stalin (1879–1953), Soviet leader from 1922 to 1953. (Library of Congress)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Officially, the goals of post-Soviet Russia are to create a vibrant market economy and democratic forms of governance. For the Westernizers, these goals, as well as elevating living standards, maintaining the human dignity of Russia’s citizens, and fostering entrepreneurial initiative, indeed reign supreme. For the Eurasianists and neo-Communists, however, the utmost goal is restoration of Russia’s faded glory and its superpower status. They also talk about dignity, but for them it is not the individual but the entire community of Russians that would once again inspire awe and outright fear in its neighbors and potential offenders. The Eurasianists also view the privatization of the 1990s as outright robbery from the state (a stand with which many agree) and demand nationalization, particularly of those assets that accrued to ethnically non-Russian “oligarchs.” Given the multiplicity of national blueprints and visions of Russia, there is no single way to shepherd the nation. Cognizant of this problem, President Putin and his powerful administration send conflicting messages mobilizing different and mutually conflicted sections of the Russian populace in ways attuned to their cherished political and economic goals. On the one hand, the all-too-powerful owner of the most successful Russian company is persecuted for alleged tax violations (committed by the vast majority of those who seized the most lucrative assets in the early 1990s), independent TV channels are muzzled, and interference in close neighbors’ (e.g., Ukraine) elections campaigns is financed and orchestrated. On the other hand, close cooperation with the United States and NATO is sought, economic liberals are kept at the helm of executive power, liberal economic reforms continue, and the period during which privatization deals can be legally questioned gets diminished from 10 to 3 years to appease the entrepreneurial class. One more area of disagreement in Russia conducive to different ways of national mobilization is the ongoing population decline. While all political camps bemoan it, different actions are advocated. The Westernizers claim that, because the excess of deaths over births cannot be undone in the foreseeable future, even under the most favorable scenario for Russia’s economic growth, the necessity of large-scale immigration must be openly acknowledged and a foreign labor force ought to be welcomed. Moreover, because much of Europe is going to compete with Russia for the better-skilled immigrants, changes in legislation and in attitude toward immigrants ought to occur without delay, lest it be too late. In contrast, the Eurasianists believe that banning abortion and fostering fertility are the ways to go and that immigration is a national threat. As of now, immigrants from Asia and Africa to Russia face discrimination from xenophobic skinheads and their sympathizers and often risk their lives. Among the Russian minorities, for a long time Jews were the least welcomed group, but now people from the Caucasus (whether from the North Caucasus region of Russia or from N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Armenia, Georgia, or Azerbaijan) and from Central Asia seem to draw more enmity. There is also widespread fear of a creeping Chinese invasion of the Russian Far East. Rumors circulate about millions of Chinese illegally settling in that region, although professional demographers do not believe their number exceeds 400,000 in the sparsely settled and steadily depopulated Russian Siberia. Given a long tradition of state paternalism and a weak civic society, a tradition that dates back much further than the 1917 Communist Revolution, the most important nation-building strategies employed are top-down. They derive from the political initiatives of the top executive, not from grassroots initiatives and not even from those of the parliament. Under President Putin, who came to power following the 1999 resignation of Boris Yeltsin and was then popularly elected in 2000 and 2004, one of the principal slogans became the strengthening of the entire system of vertical subordination (the so-called vlastnaya vertikal’ ), from the president to the regional and then local administration. Yeltsin’s slogan, “Grab as much sovereignty as you can digest,” directed to the leaders of ethnic republics, is now viewed as undermining the integrity of the Russian nation. Consequently, Putin did away with preferential treatment of those republics in the fiscal area. He subsequently initiated the end of the short-lived (1992–2004) practice of electing regional leaders through a popular vote, and the Duma rubber-stamped this change. Although this was done in the wake of the Chechen terrorist attack on the school in Beslan (a town in North Ossetia, just one out of 21 ethnic homelands established in the Russian Federation) and was motivated by the necessity to strengthen public security, most analysts interpreted the move as a longcherished element in the top-down nation-building strategy designed to preclude the potential disintegration of Russia along the lines of the Soviet Union’s breakup. Now, each regional leader is proposed by the president, and the local legislature —not the citizenry at large—votes for or against the proposed candidate. While this change faced mixed reactions from the Russian elites and outright censure by the West, no grassroots protests took place. A spiritual authority has been reclaimed by the Russian Orthodox Church, both in Moscow and in the ethnic Russian regions, while mosques have mushroomed in Muslim regions. The role of the Orthodox Church in particular can be seen as a nation-building factor, integral to czarist Russia’s defining triad of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Russian ethnicity. The rebuilding of the Cathedral of Jesus Christ the Savior (blown up by the Soviet government in 1931) in Moscow and its opening for worship services in 1997 was one of the most important steps in this regard. Efforts are being made to prevent the penetration of the “wrong” kind of Islamic teachings into the areas with compact Muslim settlement. The joint effect of ethnic separatism and of highly centralized nation-building efforts has been the much publicized war in Chechnya and tensions in the adjacent Muslim and non-Muslim regions in the North Caucasus. To a significant extent, poverty and the accelerated growth of the Muslim population against the backdrop of the overall population decline in Russia provide a nourishing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Cathedral of Jesus Christ the Savior in Moscow, Russia, was built over a period of 44 years and was completed in 1882. It was destroyed in 1931 to make way for a socialist monument, but was rebuilt and reopened in 1997. (Vitt Guziy)

environment for these tensions. However, despite much attention to ongoing conflicts, many multiethnic areas remain calm, as available institutions effectively promote an “integrative diversity” (Zuercher 2000) vital for Russia. Russian leaders have been adamant in asserting their sovereign right to maintain the territorial integrity of Russia by all means, including military. The growing and often well-documented aid to Chechen rebels by some foreign Islamic centers legitiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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mizes Russia’s claim that it is waging a war with international terrorism, much like the United States does. Overall, comparisons with America permeate the entire discourse on national and virtually all other issues of public concern. On the one hand, such comparisons are instrumental in unmasking the double standard that the American administration allegedly resorts to when it criticizes Russia’s war in Chechnya and Russia’s departures from democracy. On the other hand, comparisons with America are called for to pinpoint and rectify Russia’s own shortcomings in maintaining public order, responding to citizens’ needs, safeguarding private property, and so on. Related to the painful loss of a superpower status, Russia’s identity crisis is far from over. Selected Bibliography Bradshaw, M., and J. Prendergrast. 2005. “The Russian Heartland Revisited: An Assessment of Russia’s Transformation.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 46, no. 2: 83–123. Chudodeyev, A. 2005. “Proletarii vsekh stran.” Interview with Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya. Itogi, no. 14 (April 16). Dugin, A. 2005. “SSHA pribirayut k rukam postsovetskoye prostranstvo.” Izvestia, April 13, www.izvestia.ru/comment/article1583000. Koch, Alfred. “K polemike o yevropeiskosti Rossiii” [Is Russia a European Country?]. (Retrieved December 29, 2007), http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2005/07/11/koh.html. Lamansky, Vladimir I. 2001. “Tri mira Aziisko-Yevropeiskogo materika” [Three Worlds of the Asian-European Continent]. Vestnik MGU, series 12, Politicheskie Nauki, no. 1. (Reprinted from the 1892 edition.) Lenin, V. I. 1914. “O Natsional’noi gordosti velikorossov.” Sotsial Demokrat (Saint Petersburg). (Retrieved December 12, 2007), http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/prado/574/ works/26–3.htm. O’Loughlin, J., and P. Talbot. 2005. “Where in the World Is Russia? Geopolitical Perceptions and Preferences of Ordinary Russians.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 46, no. 1: 23–50. “Rossiya–Yevropeiskaya strana?” 2005. Izvestia, April 22, www.izvestia.ru/comment/article 1662081. Solzhenitsyn, A. 1990. Kak nam obustroit’ Rossiyu. Moscow: Komsomolskaya Pravda, http:// teljonok.chat.ru/nam/kak.htm. Yarmolinsky, A., ed. 1949. A Treasury of Russian Verse. New York: Macmillan. Zuercher, C. 2000. “Multiculturalism and the Ethnopolitical Order in Post-Soviet Russia.” Russian Politics and Law 38, no. 5: 6–24.

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Sami Jouni Häkli Chronology 1542 Groups of Sami people have inhabited northern Scandinavia since time immemorial. The king of Sweden, Gustav Vasa, decrees that all lands without a formal proprietor belong to the Swedish Crown, causing the Sami to lose most of their land to the state. 1553 Gustav Vasa decides that the Sami must pay taxes directly to the Crown. 1600 The Swedish Evangelic Lutheran Church starts to make inroads into “Lapland.” 1613 Russia, Denmark, and Sweden lay claim to the Finnmark area and the northern Norwegian coast. The Sami have to pay taxes to three countries for many years. 1673 The colonization of the Sápmi homeland begins as the Lappmark Proclamation encourages non-Sami settlers to move into the area. 1685 States take oppressive measures toward indigenous Sami religion and culture. 1700 The siida system of villages, with boundaries as the basis of the Sami political society, is gradually replaced by administrative bodies and divisions imposed by the Nordic states. 1751 The Swedish-Norwegian border is redrawn. The Lapp Codicil allows the Sami to cross the border with their reindeer regardless of national boundaries. 1809 Finland becomes the autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia, furthering the territorialization of the Scandinavian north. 1826 The border between Russia and Norway is determined. 1852 The border closes between Norway and Finland, causing problems for nomadic Sami who revolt in Norwegian Kautokeino. The revolt is suppressed by the Crown. 1905 The union between Norway and Sweden is dissolved by the Karlstad Convention, pushing the nomadic mountain Sami to choose their country of residence. 1917 First pan-Sami conference in Trondheim. 1918 First national conference for Swedish Sami in Östersund. 1944 Finland’s border with the Soviet Union is revised, causing deportations of Skolt Sami to more western and southern areas. 1948 United Nations declaration of human rights. 1952 Radio broadcasting in Sami language starts in Sweden. 1956 The Nordic Sami Council is established as a cooperative body among the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish Sami political organizations. 1973 The Sami Delegation is set up in Finland, which later becomes the Finnish Sami Parliament. 1977 The Swedish Parliament recognizes the Sami as an indigenous people in Sweden. 1980 The Alta conflict in Norway over the construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Alta River; the Sami are mobilized to protect their environment. 1986 The Sami flag is adopted. 1989 A Sami parliament is set up in Norway. 1990 Norway ratifies the ILO 169 decree on rights for indigenous peoples. 1993 A Sami parliament is set up in Sweden. 2000 The Sami Parliamentary Council is established as a Nordic cooperation forum. 2004 Finland passes the Sami Language Act to ensure the rights of the Sami to use their own language before courts and other public authorities.

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Situating the Nation The Sami are a northern European indigenous people with their own history, language, culture, livelihoods, ways of life, and self-reflected identity. They inhabit a homeland that reaches from central Norway through the northernmost parts of Sweden and Finland and into the Kola Peninsula in Russia. The term indigenous people has no fixed definition. A widely accepted formulation includes cultural groups who have a continuous historical connection with a homeland, originating from the time before its colonization or annexation by a nation-state. Furthermore, the group should have maintained some of its distinct linguistic, cultural, and organizational characteristics and must self-identify as an indigenous people. The designation as an indigenous people has played an important role in the emergence and politicization of the modern Sami identity. The Sami have been living in northern Scandinavia well before it was settled and colonized by Norwegians, Swedes, Finns, and Russians. Over their history, the Sami have faced problems and challenges similar to many other indigenous groups. Among the most critical issues have been the preservation of Sami culture and language, as well as its material foundation—the land title rights. The size of the Sami population can only be estimated because the states’ assimilatory and oppressive policies have forced many to hide or reject their Sami identity. In addition, interethnic marriages have blurred boundaries such that many Sami have ancestors from groups other than Sami. According to a recent estimate published by the Finnish Ministry of Justice, there are more than 50,000 Sami in Norway, some 20,000 in Sweden, 8,000 in Finland, and 2,000 in Russia. In total, this amounts to more than 80,000 Sami. The Sami policies of Norway, Sweden, and Finland officially recognize as Sami those who claim Sami identity and use, or have used, Sami as their home language. Moreover, people with at least one Sami-speaking parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent are considered Sami. This definition is used for voluntary registration for the right to vote in elections for Sami parliaments. No other records of who are Sami exist in Sweden or Norway. In Finland the enfranchisement decision has been partly based on old land or tax registers, hence most Sami have not had to register themselves. Aspiring Sami may apply for registration, but all claims are carefully considered because of a fear that people of Finnish origin will seek individual benefits from participating in Sami politics. In Russia the number of Sami is somewhat uncertain because people with mixed ethnic background have often chosen not to declare Sami as their nationality. The traditional foundation of the Sami livelihood, based on a hunting culture, was greatly harmed by the exploitation of the most important game animals— beaver and wild reindeer. As game decreased, many Sami resorted to more nomadic sources of livelihood, such as reindeer herding, which demanded mobility according to the reindeer grazing areas. These Sami used their land less intensively, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and their connection to land as property weakened considerably. Consequently, the Sami were removed from the states’ land registers, and their land title rights were no longer recorded. The right to own, not merely use, land is one of the most pressing issues in current Sami politics and is a key factor in Sami mobilization. The revival and politicization of Sami identity are connected to the increased visibility of various ethnic groups in international organizations working to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. Among the most prominent are the United Nations (UN), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, and the European Union. These institutions have launched several policies, charters, and forms of economic aid that have enabled the Sami to become politically active, along with other ethnic and indigenous groups all over the world.

Instituting the Nation As with all nations or ethnic groups, the idea of the Sami as one people with a shared collective identity is a relatively modern phenomenon. However, historical records of “Phinnoi” or “Finns” living in northern Scandinavia predate the Christian period. The emerging Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, and Russian states used N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the term Lapp to denote various northern populations with shared characteristics, ones that later have adopted a pan-Sami identity. Between 1251 and 1550, Sweden (including Finland), Norway, and Russia (Novgorod) agreed on borders and taxation rights in the “Lappish” area, which includes the contemporary Sami homeland. The czars of Russia had the right to tax areas all the way to the Norwegian Lapland, known as Finnmark. In return the Sami were granted letters of protection for lands, waters, and taxation on the basis of land registers and land ownership. Sweden’s geopolitical position in northern Scandinavia strengthened in the mid-16th century, and the Sami fell under the rule of the Swedish judicial system, administration, and church. In terms of rights and duties, the Swedish Crown treated the Sami like any other peasants until the late 18th century. The siida system of Lapp villages was acknowledged as the basis of Sami land ownership and “Lapp taxes” to the state. Siidas were a form of practical cooperation among several family groups, primarily regarding management and sharing of natural resources and game. The individual siida, led by a council, had a collective right to hunting and fishing within its area. In 1602 the Sami were even granted representation in the diet, making the Swedish Crown also the king of the “Lapps of Norrland.”

A Sami sleigh driver in traditional dress poses with a reindeer in Lapland, Finland. (Jorma Jaemsen/zefa/Corbis)

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The Siida System Traditional Sami society was based on a system of Lapp villages, or siidas, that covered most of northern Scandinavia. The siidas usually had established borders defining both the siida community and the area it was entitled to use. Hence, although the Sami were nomadic, they moved only within their own siida. The siida had common lands and waters that were divided into usufructuary areas for each clan and family for whom their use was an exclusive right. A village meeting was the central administrative body of the siida, defining and controlling its usufructuary rights, justice, and other common affairs. The meeting also sanctioned marriages and admitted new members to the village. Everyone who lived in the village had the right to vote in the meeting. The Nordic states recognized the siida system until the early 1700s. After that point, this traditional Sami structure gradually eroded under the states’ colonizing practices. For contemporary Sami politics, the siida system is important as a basis for claims to land title rights in the Sápmi.

With the rise of national romantic thought, which emphasized ethnic purity in Sweden, Norway, and Russia, the Sami were subjected to increasingly assimilatory and oppressive policies. From the end of the 18th century until the rise of the Sami movement in the mid-20th century, the Sami had mainly duties but no rights. To start with, they were discharged from the Swedish diet in 1760. Moreover, in 1808 Russia conquered Finland from Sweden, thus pushing the states of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia to demarcate their territorial borders and thus divide the Sami homeland into parts of four states. Finally, in 1917 Finland became independent from Russia, which sealed northern Scandinavia’s territorial division. The period from the mid-19th century to World War II has been called the century of Sami assimilation in Scandinavia. The northern Sami were subjected to governmental assimilation policies aimed at forcing the Sami to relinquish their language and culture. In the more southern areas, the key issue was the threat to reindeer herding caused by non-Sami agricultural expansion. Few explicitly political responses arose from the Sami minorities before the early 20th century, however. Only around 1900 did the Swedish and Norwegian Sami begin to establish organizations for securing their interests during the land use conflicts caused by the Swedish and Norwegian settlers who had moved into the Sami living areas. These conflicts were typically related to differing interests and needs between the permanently settled agriculturalists and the nomadic Sami. The state authorities were reluctant to protect the rights of the Sami, and this recalcitrance activated mobilization based on ethnic identity. Also, the repeated attempts to linguistically and culturally assimilate the Sami eventually provided incentive for organized resistance. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The first organized forms of mobilization had their roots in the Sami newspapers Sagai Muittalaeg je (1904–1911) and Waren Sardne (1910–1913 and 1922–1927) in Norway. Several assemblies were held, and attempts were made by the Sami activists to organize a movement to counter the policies of the authorities. An attempt was also made to establish a nationwide organization in Norway to coordinate the actions of local Sami associations. This attempt failed, however, and by 1930 the first wave of Sami mobilization had dried up. In Finland, school education was key in the policies of Sami enculturation and ideological assimilation. It was typical to forbid children to use Sami language in the school area, and teachers were strongly encouraged to promote Finnish language throughout. Those Sami teachers who objected were often replaced by non-Sami. The first concrete step toward Sami mobilization was taken in 1932 when Lapin Sivistysseura (Society for the Promotion of Lapp Culture) was formed in Helsinki. A number of Sami participated, but most of the members were non-Sami. The society was active primarily in publishing books and a newspaper in the Sami language, as well as increasing ethnic awareness among the Sami people. Some attention was also directed at concrete social problems of the Sami.

Defining the Nation Despite awareness of common ethnic origins and the similar problems caused by assimilatory policies by the different Nordic states, the early Sami movement had difficulties formulating common goals that would politically unite the different Sami groups. There are several geographical, economic, and cultural factors that divided the Sami internally. First, the traditional sources of livelihood and the concomitant ways of life among Sami range from reindeer herding and hunting to fishing, agriculture, trade, small-scale industry, and handicrafts. These differences can be seen as functions of the local resources and natural conditions in arctic and subarctic areas. This economic system is exemplified by the changing between agriculture and fishing as sources of livelihood in Sami coastal societies. The Sami have also adapted to the prerequisites for production in specific ecological niches by strongly integrating production, culture, and family. Resources in the Sami areas have seldom given sufficient economic nourishment for single occupations, and therefore combinations of jobs are typical. Over time, however, the Sami sources of livelihood have become closer to those of the majority populations. Second, some of the dialects of the Sami language have so little in common that they could be considered independent languages. Some 70 percent of Sami speakers use the northern Sami dialect, whereas others use some of the remaining nine dialects. The six main dialects are North Sami, Lule Sami, South Sami, Enare Sami, East Sami, and Kildin Sami. This linguistic diversity is doubled by N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the fact that most Sami actually speak Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, or Russian instead of using their native languages. This is the consequence of assimilation policies that encouraged the Sami to relinquish their language in favor of the official language of the respective nation-state. However, since the 1960s teaching in Sami has been allowed in schools located in Sami homelands. These internal divisions partly explain why Sami mobilization took off slowly during the first half of the 20th century. World War II, and especially the hardships it brought to the Sami, was a crucial watershed for Sami nationalism in Scandinavia, and particularly in Finland. Some of the Sami were forced to fight against other Sami in the war because they lived in different nation-states. Moreover, the Skolt Sami living in Petsamo had to resettle when Finland ceded the area to Russia. The war marked the politicization of the Sami culture and stands out as a period during which Sami identity was first given a discursive form, which was later territorialized in the context of claims for their rights to cultural autonomy and land titles. For pan-Sami identity to overcome internal differences, the ethno-cultural history of the Sami had to be emphasized. In the definition of Sami identity, two dimensions were important. First, reindeer herding and traditional costumes became uniting symbols, even though they have been part of everyday life only for a diminishing number of the Sami. In addition, the Sami language, despite its various dialects, together with the traditional yoik singing, gained importance as “objective” signifiers of Sami identity. The Sami national dress is a uniting symbol even though the types of costumes vary in different parts of the Sami homeland. The national anthem common to all Sami is called “Same soga lavla” (“Song of the Sami Family”). It was written by Isak Saba as early as 1906 but recognized as the official anthem by the 13th pan-Sami conference in Åre, Sweden, in 1986. The official Sami flag was also adopted in the 1986 conference and is now acknowledged in all parts of the Sami homeland. The flag symbolizes the moon and the sun and uses colors of the traditional Sami costumes. Finally, the Sami national day is the 6th of February, which commemorates the first congress for Swedish and Norwegian Sami held in Trondheim in 1917. The Sami identity was firmly connected to the Sápmi, the territorial homeland inhabited by the Sami since time immemorial and characterized by relatively harsh northern landscape. Stretching across four contemporary nation-states, the Sápmi represents a strong statement about the distinctive and original nature of the Sami as a unified nation. In the Sami language, the term Sápmi refers to the Sami homeland but also to the Sami people and their spirit, underlining the historical connection of the Sami with a particular territory and cultural landscape. However, the legal status of the Sami homeland remains vague. From the legal point of view, the Sami live as ethnic minorities in countries exercising sovereignty over Sápmi. Of the Nordic countries, only Finland officially recognizes that the Sami have a particular authority over the Finnish part of the Sápmi, mainly in issues related to cultural autonomy. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Narrating the Nation The Sami have strong oral traditions that carry an understanding of the people’s origin. Storytelling used to be the task of Sami noaide, a person with strong mental and spiritual powers. The traditional Sami yoik chants have contained beliefs and teachings, tales and stories of the Sami society from the remote past to the present day. Yoiking is based on a special vocal technique where the melody, rhythm, and scanty words are used to describe or “sing” a person, an animal, or an event. Since the mid-20th century, these oral narrative forms have been complemented by modern means of communication, such as newspapers, literature, visual arts, handicrafts, music, and theater. The traditional cultural forms have, however, had great importance to the emerging pan-Sami identity. The written Sami language originates from as early as the 17th century. Sami poems were published in 1673 in Johannes Schefferus’s work Lapponia. The 20th century saw the birth of indigenous Sami literature. However, a uniform way of writing Sami was not established until 1978. As yet, the amount of Sami literature is small, and only some of it is fiction. Representations of Sami life and history have first concentrated on the hardships the people have been subjected to by the states colonizing the Scandinavian North. This history of oppression has functioned as a significant symbol uniting the different Sami groups. More positive expressions of Sami identity have been connected with the rise of global concern for indigenous peoples since the 1960s. A new and more global dimension in the narratives on the significance of being a Sami gained foothold in the Sami movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The Sami began to view themselves as part of the movement of indigenous peoples fighting for their rights and cultural survival in the international arena. New narratives of Sami history and identity reflected the Sami involvement in intercultural affairs, such as participation in indigenous peoples’ conferences and festivals. Simultaneously, the indigenous people’s perspective gained importance at the local level and in the organization of Sami politics. The Sami status as an indigenous people was brought into play in issues such as education, the construction of Sami kindergartens, or encroachments upon the natural environment perceived as harmful to Sami forms of livelihood. The understanding of Sami as an indigenous people has now become conventionalized among the population. This view has stimulated a new selfunderstanding that has expanded from the narrow elite in the Sami movement to a number people in more popular arenas. Especially important voices have arisen from amid the producers of contemporary Sami culture, those journalists, authors, actors, and musicians who have contributed to the revitalization of Sami identity. In the space of merely four decades, the Sami have progressively turned away from self-understanding as a subordinate population scattered in four states. Instead they have come to realize that the Sami constitute a people with Sápmi as their homeland, an indigenous people who have much to gain from political visibility and recognition on the global scale. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Sami movement began after World War II. This mobilization was largely a response to the hardships the Sami experienced during and after the war. Still functioning today in Norway, the Sami Reindeer Herders’ Association (NRL) was established in 1947. It was followed by the National Association of Norwegian Sami (NSR) established in 1968, and the Norwegian Sami Union (SLF), founded in 1979. These organizations have aimed at improving the living conditions and protecting the rights of the Sami. In Finland the war caused considerable damage to the Sami as the German army withdrew from Finland through Lapland; many Finnish Sami lost their homes because of the German scorched earth policy. Moreover, some 650 Skolt Sami were displaced from their native homeland in the Petsamo area when Finland ceded the area to the Soviet Union in 1944. The Skolt Sami were resettled by the Finnish government in the northeastern part of Inari. These events served to accentuate the deteriorating situation of the Sami, who began to organize in 1945 when Samii Litto (Sami Union) was founded. The political weight of this organization, however, never reached the level of its Swedish and Norwegian counterparts. More successful in this respect was the Sami Delegation, organized by the Finnish state as a committee for advisory purposes. However, the Delegation was not able to make decisions in matters concerning the Sami people but could only make recommendations, or it could respond to proposals by the Finnish state. The Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish Sami wanted to establish Nordic cooperation early on. Important steps in this regard were pan-Sami conferences in

The Sami as Politicians The growing pan-Sami activism since the 1970s was an international movement led by several prominent Sami politicians in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. These elites came from a wide range of fields and typically had political experience as leaders and representatives of Sami parliaments, their secretariats, and various Sami associations. The pan-Sami movement has strong parallels with the politics of ethnic revival and regionalism in other parts of Europe. It has been led by educated protagonists who have worked to fashion a public Sami identity based on symbolic differentiation of the Sami from their respective national majority populations. In the process, reindeer herding has become an essential symbol establishing historical legitimacy for the Sami culture and identity. Many Sami politicians are strongly associated with this “traditional Sami livelihood,” even though the majority of the Sami work in other occupations. This notwithstanding, the Sami politicians are active in spheres ranging from the local to the international. They work in Sami parliaments and participate in the politics of their respective nation-states, but are also an international political force. In their capacity as an indigenous group, the Sami are lobbying for international recognition and rights together with other indigenous peoples.

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Jokkmokk, Sweden, in 1953 and in Karasjok, Norway, in 1956. The latter conference voted to launch a Nordic Sami Council as a cooperative body among the national Sami political organizations of Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The Nordic Sami Council proved instrumental in the internationalization of the Sami movement as it provided a platform for Sami participation in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) until its dissolution in 1996. The most important bodies defining the Sami as a political community have been the Sami parliaments in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. It has been through the national Sami parliaments that the Sami have really been able to voice their demands for recognition as a national minority, as well as for a greater cultural autonomy and, perhaps most importantly, for Sami land title rights. The last of these demands has given the traditional Sami conception of territory a more consciously political tone, while also allowing for nonterritorial solutions to be sought. The three Sami parliaments have had some common meetings and made statements on important common questions for the Sami people. They also made a statement for “Common Objectives and Joint Measures of the Sami Parliaments” as part of the UN international decade of indigenous peoples. International recognition for the Sami as an indigenous people has been vital for the Sami movement’s political visibility. With the support of the international movement of indigenous peoples, the Sami have gained political strength vis-àvis their respective state governments. The international presence of the Sami has grown significantly since the 1960s. In the last 10 years, this presence has become a major force as the Sami have interacted with other indigenous groups on all national and international levels. The Sami have utilized the international organizations’ support perhaps more effectively than any other indigenous nation or ethnic minority. One watershed in the Sami nation-building was the 1980 Alta movement against the harnessing of the Alta River in northern Norway. This external threat to the Sami sources of livelihood mobilized the Sami across national borders to reassert their identity as an indigenous people. The Alta movement also gave new strength to the demands of the Sami for self-determination and cultural autonomy. Although this pan-Sami movement lost its fight over the dam, it spawned a national awakening, especially among younger Sami and Sami artists. It gave impetus for a collective Sami identity, increasing cultural vitality, and a sense of affiliation with other indigenous peoples of the world. Currently the Sami participate in and sponsor many transnational conferences and alliances. The Sami have also become increasingly active on the international scene, both at UN meetings and as founder members of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. The Sami also work closely with the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAPON), and other indigenous groups. Moreover, manifesting the rise of pan-Sami activity at the level of international cooperation, the first Sami Parliamentarian Conference gathered in Jokkmokk, Sweden, in February 2005. The conference was an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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historical event bringing together for the first time representatives from the Sami parliaments of Finland, Norway, and Sweden with representatives for the Sami in Russia. Although a small event as such, the conference is a step toward a more visible unified political agency for controlling and governing issues pertinent to the Sápmi, the Sami homeland area. The Sami have never been a cohesive ethnic group. As is the case with many dispersed ethnic groups, the pan-Sami movement was created out of an ethnic artificiality. Prior to the 1960s there were only minor indications of a pan-Sami culture. The Sami movements of the early 20th century were attempts at collective action, but they withered because of the internal divisions of the Sami and the negative attitude of the authorities. Hence, the Sami elite found it necessary to create an historical case that would legitimate and authenticate their claims for land, resources, and cultural survival. By creating such an historical narrative, the Sami movement has been able to increase its presence and political elbow room vis-à-vis the Nordic state governments. Especially the realization of the Sami as an indigenous people has emerged as an effective tool for presenting a cohesive front in the struggle for cultural autonomy and political self-determination. Selected Bibliography Aikio, Samuli. 1994. “The History of the Sami.” In The Sami Culture in Finland, edited by Samuli Aikio, Ulla Aikio-Puoskari, and Johannes Helander, 21–47. Helsinki: Lapin Sivistysseura. Haetta, Odd M. 1996. The Sami: An Indigenous People of the Arctic. Karasjok, Norway: Davvi Girji. Häkli, Jouni. 1999. “Cultures of Demarcation: Territory and National Identity in Finland.” In Nested Identities: Identity, Territory, and Scale, edited by Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, 123–149. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ingold, Tim. 1976. The Skolt Lapps Today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jones, Mervyn. 1982. The Sami of Lapland. Minority Rights Group, Report 55. London: Minority Rights Group. Korpijaakko, Kaisa. 1993. Legal Rights of the Sami in Finland during the Period of Swedish Rule: A Survey of the Past, Thoughts on the Future. Ottawa: DIAND. Lehtola, Veli-Pekka. 2002. The Sámi People: Traditions in Transition. Inari, Finland: KustannusPuntsi. Pietikäinen, S. 2003. “Indigenous Identity in Print: Representations of the Sami in News Discourse.” Discourse & Society 14:581–609. Salvesen, Helge. 1995. “Sami Aednan: Four States—One Nation? Nordic Minority Policy and the History of the Sami.” In Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, edited by Sven Tägil, 106–144. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.

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Ukraine Taras Kuzio Chronology 1929 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) is established. 1942 OUN creates the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) guerrilla force to fight for an independent state. The UPA conducts a decade-long guerrilla struggle against Nazi and Soviet occupations. 1957 and 1959 Émigré leaders of OUN are assassinated by the Soviet KGB secret police. 1960s–1970s Dissident nationalist groups are established in Soviet-occupied Ukraine (i.e., the Ukrainian Nationalist Front, Ukrainian Helsinki Group). 1988 Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring (Rukh) is formed by cultural intelligentsia and former dissidents. 1990 Republican parliamentary elections leads to the entry of Rukh into parliament with 25 percent of seats. Rukh takes control of western Ukrainian councils after local elections. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union adopts a nationalist platform of Ukrainian independence. The Ukrainian parliament declares sovereignty. Rukh adopts a nationalist platform seeking Ukrainian independence. 1991 The Gorbachev all-Soviet referendum on “renewed federation.” Ukraine holds two additional polls, one on independence and another seeking a confederation of sovereign republics. A hard-line coup fails. The Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly votes for a declaration of independence. Independence is supported by 92 percent in a referendum. Leonid Kravchuk is elected president. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil comes in second with 23 percent of the vote. 1994 Parliamentary and presidential elections are held. Leonid Kuchma is elected president on an “anti-nationalist” platform. 1998 Parliamentary elections are held. Centrist parties enter parliament for the first time. 1999 Rukh leader Chornovil dies in a suspicious car accident. Kuchma is reelected for a second term. Viktor Yushchenko is appointed prime minister. 2001 Yushchenko’s government is removed. Yushchenko leads the national democrats in opposition to Kuchma. 2002 Yushchenko’s national democratic Our Ukraine bloc wins parliamentary election with 24 percent of the vote. Our Ukraine has the largest faction in parliament. 2004 The presidential election is won by Yushchenko after the Orange Revolution forces authorities to hold a repeat of round two of the elections. 2005 Yushchenko is inaugurated president. 2006 The Anti-Crisis Coalition wins election. Viktor Yanukovych, leader of the left-leaning Party of Regions, assumes the post of prime minister. 2007 Preterm elections won by Orange Revolution parties who create orange coalition and Tymoshenko government. Party of Regions goes into opposition.

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Situating the Nation Ukrainian nationalism began in the 19th century as local non-Russians began to seek their own identity. Language and culture consistently played an important role in the self-definition of this group. Changes to the country’s political boundaries during the 20th century incorporated many ethnic Ukrainians as well as other ethnic groups. The country first gained independence in 1918 but suffered during the many attempts to gain control by the Stalinist government. Since gaining independence in 1991, the Ukraine has seen a number of changes among its population, along with changes in local and the national government. Border conflicts with Russia, tension among ethnic groups, and struggles toward finding a voice in Europe all play an important role in current Ukrainian nationalism. Though referred to as “little Russians” over the last century, Ukraine is a diverse and fascinating country. It is touted as the first Slavic state and serves as the gateway between Europe and Asia. Influences from Scandinavians, Mongols, Tartars, and Turks formed the early tribal identity of Ukrainians. Historically Ukrainians look to the Cossacks as their ancestors. Arising from rural areas in the

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15th century, they were known as hard, independent fighters who felt a strong connection to their land. During the Soviet era, many looked to their perceived Cossack roots as nationalist guides. Since the 17th century, Russia has maintained an interest in Ukraine due to its access to the Black Sea and large amount of fertile land. Currently, it borders seven different eastern European countries, including Russia. The country has a varied landscape, with the Carpathian Mountains in the west and the plains toward the east. As the largest country fully in Europe, Ukraine houses a diverse population. The two largest groups are ethnic Ukrainians who make up about 78 percent of the population (with about 2.5 percent from the Diaspora) and ethnic Russians who number about 17 percent. The Russians are mainly found in the eastern portion of the country, where most of the industry is housed. Many other ethnic groups reside within the country, scattered throughout the landscape. The Tartars, however, are almost exclusively found in the Crimea region.

Instituting the Nation The national democrats have coexisted in an uneasy alliance with centrists and shared similar views with them on the definition of Ukraine in inclusive, civic terms. This definition has never been a point of discussion. The authorities also delegated educational policies and history teaching to national democrats, who dominated the Academy of Sciences, academia, and cultural institutions. The only major area of disagreement between national democrats and the authorities rested over language policy. National democrats and Communists-Russian nationalists were polar opposites on this issue, with the former supporting rapid Ukrainianization and the prioritization of the Ukrainian language while the latter sought to place Russian on an equal par with Ukrainian. Under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, nation-building policies were divided between centrist political parties (who dominated language policies) and national democrats (who dominated education and history teaching). This division led to moderate language policies but more radical policies in the educational domain, where Ukrainian language usage rapidly advanced. This result contrasted with the Soviet era when Russification policies had been promoted. In the 2004 elections, the authorities’ candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, was seen to be weak on core issues central to nationally conscious Ukrainians. These perceived deficiencies were deepened when he supported making Russian a second state language. Raising the language issue brought Yanukovych more Communist votes, but his support for this policy negatively affected his popularity outside his home base of east Ukraine. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Defining the Nation Ukraine has two competing national identities and visions of nation-building: a national democratic “ethnic Ukrainian” view and a centrist “eastern Slavic” one. These two visions of nation-building dominated discourse and policy making in independent Ukraine under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma. The 2004 presidential election brought into the open the competition between these two definitions of the nation, as represented by the two leading candidates, Yushchenko (“ethnic Ukrainian”) and Yanukovych (“eastern Slavic”). Kuchma was able to balance Ukraine’s ethnic Ukrainian and eastern Slavic identities throughout his decade in office and therefore satisfied both camps at different times. The victory of Yanukovych in the 2004 elections meant the coming into power of a more avowedly eastern Slavic identity, a step too far for many Ukrainian voters and members of the ruling elites. Yanukovych’s background in the Donbas and his views on nationality issues also turned nationally conscious Ukrainians against him, further fueling pro-European, civic nationalist mobilization against him. The choice between building Ukraine around an ethnic Ukrainian core or around an eastern Slavic core would influence the country’s foreign policy orientation. Yushchenko’s ethnic Ukrainian identity was in favor of the coun-

One in five Ukrainians participated in Europe’s largest nonviolent protest of election fraud in the 2004 presidential elections. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)

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try’s rapid integration into NATO and the European Union. Yanukovych’s eastern Slavic identity favored a more gradual integration into the European Union, close ties to Russia, and opposition to joining NATO. Yushchenko’s ethnic Ukrainian identity is associated with democratic reform and “returning to Europe.” Joining NATO and the European Union requires a certain amount of democratic and economic reforms. The Yushchenko administration supported the definition of the nation in inclusive, civic ways that would ensure Ukraine’s position within Europe. This position would be accompanied by the greater prioritization for Ukrainian language and culture that existed during the Kuchma era. The ethnic Ukrainian force was far better at mobilizing the population and giving a “fire in the belly” energy, thus creating the Orange Revolution. This pro-Yushchenko, proEuropean nationalism was a crucial mobilizing factor in the revolution that followed the election fraud in round two of the 2004 elections. A strong link had always existed in Ukraine between national identity and civil society, and this connection was clearly confirmed in the Orange Revolution. The two major contending issues of the nation surround language and region. Historical legacies of former czarist Russian, Soviet, or Austro-Hungarian occupations have played a major role in creating strong regional identities. These regional identities, in turn, influence attitudes toward the use of language. Both Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups maintain that their language is important to the country. In eastern and southern Ukraine, the dominant language is Russian, whereas in western and central regions, the main language used is Ukrainian. These linguistic differences have not only caused divisions on a local level but also inspired changes in policy. Under Yushchenko’s presidency, regional councils in eastern Ukraine have adopted resolutions in support of the Russian language. The Party of Regions, which dominates eastern and southern Ukraine, included in its 2006 election program the elevation of Russian to a second state

Viktor Yushchenko (1954 – ) Becoming president of Ukraine following the Orange Revolution of November through December 2004, Yushchenko had been chairman of the National Bank throughout the 1990s until he was promoted to become prime minister in December 1999. Yushchenko’s term as prime minister lasted 16 months, until a parliamentary vote of no confidence removed him. Yushchenko created the Our Ukraine bloc of political parties for the 2002 elections and transformed it into Ukraine’s main opposition force. Our Ukraine united center-right national democratic parties. In the 2004 elections, Yushchenko was the main candidate of the opposition facing the authorities, who sought to impose Viktor Yanukovych as Leonid Kuchma’s successor. During the elections, Yushchenko was poisoned in an attempt to remove him from the election race. Yushchenko was elected with 52 percent of the vote following the widespread protests against election fraud that became known as the Orange Revolution.

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language (alongside Ukrainian). The Party of Regions, led by defeated presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, came first in the 2006 elections with 32 percent of the vote.

Narrating the Nation Nationalists in the late Soviet era devoted little attention to different elements of nation-building, as their main preoccupation was how to mobilize Ukrainians to support an independent state. All political groups, except the radical right, defined Ukrainians in a territorial, civic manner as all those living in Ukraine, regardless of ethnic origin. This view granted automatic citizenship to all residents upon independence in January 1992, following the “zero option” policy employed by other former Soviet republics. Ukraine, however, consistently opposed the introduction of dual citizenship. While the idea of dual citizenship was unpopular, only the radical right supported an ethnically exclusive definition of Ukrainian. This ethnic idea more closely followed the Estonian and Latvian models. According to this view, only ethnic Ukrainians would have been eligible for citizenship. Such a view never found broad support, even in the western territory, the Ukrainian heartland. Radical-right ethnic Ukrainian nationalists also never influenced domestic policies. Their views in support of ethnic discrimination, hostility to national minorities, anti-Semitism, and strident anti-Russianism proved to be unpopular among Ukrainian voters.

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was established in 1929 as a radicalright political force aimed at establishing an independent Ukrainian state. OUN’s ideology moved close to fascism in the 1930s when it undertook terrorist attacks against Polish and Soviet targets. Ukraine was then divided between Polish and Soviet occupations. In 1940 the OUN split into two groups: a moderate faction led by Colonel Andrei Melnyk and a more radical group led by Stepan Bandera. During World War II, the Bandera wing of OUN created a guerrilla group titled the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) that fought against Nazi and Soviet occupiers. The UPA continued to fight against the Soviet occupation after World War II, until the early 1950s when it was crushed. The Soviet authorities were concerned about the lingering influence of the OUN and targeted its exiled leaders living in Germany for assassination in 1957 (Lev Rebet) and 1959 (Bandera).The OUN divided into three groups in 1940, between followers of Andrei Melnyk (OUNm) and Stepan Bandera (OUNb), and in 1952 between Bandera (OUNb) and Lev Rebet (OUNz). From the 1960s through the 1980s, dissident groups drew on the OUN nationalist tradition. OUNb was the only wing of the three OUNs that established a political party in Ukraine in 1992: the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN). OUNb and KUN were led by Slava Stetsko until her death in 2003.

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Their views were also unpopular within academic and media discussions, which were dominated by political groups from the democratic camps. Ukraine has pursued moderate nationality policies throughout its existence as an independent state. Affirmative action for Ukrainians has been gradual, primarily targeting the educational system by changing the language of teaching from Russian to Ukrainian. Government support has been provided to national and Jewish minorities to pursue cultural and religious revivals. Eastern Ukrainian elites were given the option of a “voice” in the Ukrainian political system that gave them a stake in the newly independent state. The option of “exit” (i.e., separatism) was therefore not considered. The election of Kuchma in 1994 led to an influx of officials from his home region of Dnipropetrovsk in eastern Ukraine. While the national government battled out the issues of citizenship, each region saw changes in its political structure. The eastern Ukrainian Donbas region was permitted a degree of self-rule through Free Economic Zones, allowing local elites to enrich themselves into oligarchs. Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarch, Renat Akhmetov, emerged in Donetsk. The entry of the Donbas into the Ukrainian parliament did not take place until 2002 when Yanukovych was made prime minister. The use of different languages also came into play on local levels. In 1989 the Ukrainian language was made the “state language,” while granting Russian the right to be used locally, which was later reinforced in the 1996 constitution. Language policies have always been moderate and applied differently across regions. For instance, in the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) and in the Crimea there has been little attempt to introduce Ukrainian but, rather, a desire to make Russian the official language. Since independence in 1992, many have predicted that interethnic and regional conflict was imminent in Ukraine. That no conflict has taken place suggests that these fears were based on incorrect assumptions. Ethnic tension in the Crimea, the only Ukrainian region with an ethnic Russian majority, proved shortlived. In 1994–1995, Russian separatists there briefly took control of the presidency and Supreme Soviet. Since 1996 the Crimea has returned to its 1991–1993 political configuration wherein pro-Ukrainian centrists have remained in control and the Communist Party plays the role of the main opposition force.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Nationalism is a multifaceted concept that incorporates many different definitions. Although the tendency among scholars has been to define nationalism in Ukraine as one continuous process from the second half of the 1980s until the present, this approach has serious flaws, for nationalism can manifest itself in various ways during different periods of history. Nationalism prior to independence sought to establish a newly independent state (e.g., Ukraine from the former Soviet Union). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Nationalists after independence seek to build an independent nation-state, and they can differ as to how its cultural component can be structured (e.g., one or two state languages). Several groups have emerged over the years, all playing important roles in how Ukraine defines itself. The Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring (Rukh) became a key player in Ukrainian politics. After it was established in 1988, Rukh declared its support for self-determination, becoming de facto a nationalist movement at its October 1990 congress. The civic nationalist approach adopted by Rukh was a product of three factors. First, the dissident political prisoner wing of Rukh had a long tradition dating back to the 1960s of support for human rights. Second, the conservative Soviet Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Shcherbytsky ruled the republic from 1972 to 1989, and Rukh only developed into a mass movement after he left office. Finally, the large number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians influenced Rukh’s adoption of an evolutionary and nonradical program. Alongside the evolution of Rukh, the Communist Party Ukraine began to divide into three groups. The first group was the Democratic Platform, which included the young, democratic wing of the Communist Party of Ukraine that then broke off and formed the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine. Being more inclined to political reform, the Democratic Platform often leaned closer to the democratic opposition. Communists who supported Ukrainian sovereignty and the Democratic Platform wings of the Communist Party of Ukraine both became nationalists after the collapse of the hard-line coup in August 1991, when they moved to a position of supporting Ukraine’s independence. The second group was the sovereign communists (often mistakenly dubbed “national communists”) led by Leonid Kravchuk, ideological secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and parliamentary speaker from 1990 to 1991. The third faction of the Communist Party of Ukraine was the “imperial communists.” As the ideological heirs of hard-line Communist Party of Ukraine leader Shcherbytsky, they detested both

Rukh and Our Ukraine The Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring (Rukh) was established in 1988 by former political prisoners and the cultural intelligentsia as a popular front. In 1989–1990 Rukh moved toward support for Ukraine’s independence from the USSR. After Ukraine became independent in 1991, Rukh went into decline with some leaders co-opted by the new state structures while others, grouped around Vyachslav Chornovil, went into constructive opposition. Yushchenko’s entry into opposition politics in 2001 led to the creation of the Our Ukraine bloc of which Rukh was a central party. Other political parties in Our Ukraine aside from Rukh included national democratic and nationalistic parties. In the 2002 elections Our Ukraine came first with 24 percent of the vote but then declined in support to 14 percent in the 2006 and 2007 elections. Our Ukraine was one of three political groups that supported Yushchenko’s candidacy in 2004. Our Ukraine’s current leader is Vyacheslav Kyrlylenko.

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the Democratic Platform (which leaned toward Rukh) and the sovereign communists (led by Kravchuk and Kuchma). After the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned for supporting the August 1991 coup, the hard-line remnants of the Communist Party of Ukraine re-formed, becoming the Communist Party, legalized in October 1993. The Communist Party of Ukraine had the largest faction in the 1994–1998 and 1998–2002 parliaments. Therefore, throughout 8 of Ukraine’s 14-year history, the largest party in parliament has been antinationalist, opposed to the very concept of an independent Ukrainian state. Nationalism postindependence has changed aspects of these political groups. National democrats, such as Rukh, occupy a center-right niche and cannot be classified as nationalists in the post-Soviet period, even though Rukh was certainly a nationalist party for self-determination in 1990–1991. National democrat and centrist political parties were allied against internal and external threats to Ukraine’s statehood and on most issues pertaining to how to formulate the national idea. Because centrists dominated Ukraine’s presidency from 1991 to 2004, their view inevitably moderated the contours of how nation-building was to be implemented and over what timeframe. Radical-right nationalists grouped in the Ukrainian National Assembly (previously the Inter-Party Assembly) have a less defined view of the state. Ethnic Russian and Soviet nationalists always argued that Ukraine had no right to exist as an independent state but only to abide in a vaguely defined eastern Slavic union or in a revived Soviet Union. The homeland for Russian nationalists in Ukraine is an eastern Slavic union, revived Soviet Union, or czarist empire. Russian nationalists in Ukraine have difficulty accepting Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state. They vacillate between a belief that the three eastern Slavs are merely regional branches of one Russian nation or recognizing that a Soviet Ukrainian republican identity now exists that has harmed the “natural” unification of the three eastern Slavic “Russian” peoples. Russian nationalism in Ukraine has other defining attributes, many of which are jointly held with Soviet nationalists. These include defining liberal values as “un-Russian.” They tend to be anti-Western (especially anti-American), anti-NATO, and often anti-Semitic. Russia is looked up to as the “natural leader” and “big brother” of the eastern Slavs. Finally, they oppose affirmative action for Ukrainian culture and language and accuse the authorities of “discrimination” in policies aimed at upgrading Ukrainian culture and language. The Russian language, they believe, is a “higher” language and should be placed on a par with Ukrainian as a second state language. Ukrainian ethnic nationalists share one idea with their ethnic Russian counterparts: the rejection of post-Soviet Ukraine as the homeland for Ukrainians. Both groups want to expand the borders of the state to its “ethnographic borders.” As with Russian nationalists, Ukrainian nationalists seek to unite all those they define as belonging to one ethnic group within one state (an eastern Slavic union). Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists seek to incorporate territory in Poland, Slovakia, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Moldova, Belarus, and Russia into a “greater Ukraine.” Ethnic Russian and Soviet nationalists, however, would like to see Ukraine included within the RussianBelarusian union or in a revived Soviet Union. Toward the end of the Kuchma era, the authorities increasingly relied on radical-right groups to undertake policies they themselves did not want to be associated with. These groups included the co-opted Ukrainian National Assembly, which had grown out of the late Soviet Inter-Party Assembly, Bratstvo (Brotherhood) led by the former Ukrainian National Assembly leader Dmytro Korchynsky, Rukh for Unity led by a splinter Rukh faction that had been co-opted, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Ukraine. These four groups were assigned set tasks during the 2004 elections. The Ukrainian National Assembly provided street parades wherein participants wore Nazi-style uniforms and proclaimed their support for Yushchenko, thus dubbing him in the state-controlled media as a “nationalist extremist.” The leaders of the other three parties registered as candidates in the elections; as candidates, they had the right to allocate a certain number of their supporters to the election commissions. These “technical candidates,” as they became known, supplied additional election officials who could then assist the authorities in election fraud. In the 1994 and 1998 parliaments, Rukh and allied national democratic parties had the second largest factions after the Communists. These proportions only changed in the 2002 parliament when Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc ensured that national democrats became the largest parliamentary faction, with the Communists in second place. After Kuchma was reelected in 1999, national democrats gradually evolved from “constructive opposition” to the authorities to being in outright opposition. Two factors propelled this evolution. The first factor was the removal of the Yushchenko government in April 2001 following the Kuchmagate scandal. The Kuchmagate scandal erupted on November 28, 2000, when tapes that had been illicitly made in the president’s office were released. The tapes revealed the president ordering the journalist Georgiy Gongaze (killed in the fall of 2000) to be “taken care of. ” The second factor was Kuchma’s growing reliance upon, and alliance with, corrupt oligarchs attempting to build an authoritarian state. The victory of Yushchenko in the 2004 elections and the Orange Revolution transformed nationalism in Ukraine. Soviet nationalists are in a terminal decline from their heyday in the late 1990s. The 20 percent they obtained in the 2002 elections dramatically declined to 3.5 percent for the Communist Party of Ukraine in the 2006 elections. The Communist Party of Ukraine’s peak of popularity was 120 seats in the 1998 parliament, a figure that halved in the 2002 parliament. The Communist Party of Ukraine has only 21 deputies in the 2006 parliament. Yushchenko established a presidential party in 2005 entitled People’s Union– Our Ukraine that is more liberal in its orientation than the traditional nationaldemocratic orientation of Rukh, for it is dominated by pro-Western liberal and business groups. The participation of Yushchenko’s People’s Union–Our Ukraine in the 2006 and 2007 elections has crowned the emergence of a new, liberal civic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko became an opposition leader in 2000–2001 after she was arrested on fraudulent corruption charges as deputy prime minister in charge of energy in the Yushchenko government. Her opposition hardened during the 2000–2001 Kuchmagate crisis where her political force called for President Kuchma’s impeachment. Tymoshenko was instrumental in establishing the Forum for National Salvation in 2001 and her eponymous bloc entered parliament in 2002 with 7 percent of the vote. Tymoshenko was a key organizer in the 2004 Orange Revolution and was awarded with the position of prime minister in 2005. The Tymoshenko bloc increased its support in the 2006 and 2007 elections where it obtained 23 and 31 percent of the vote respectively, eclipsing Our Ukraine as the largest orange political force and with the second largest parliamentary faction. Tymoshenko returned to government in December 2007 following the creation of an orange coalition when orange forces won the 2007 elections.

nationalism. The traditional romantic nationalism of Rukh that dominated the Ukrainian center-right from the late Soviet era and throughout the 1990s is no longer a political force. The People’s Union–Our Ukraine is dominated by liberal, civic nationalists and has a liberal, center-right ideology. In the 2006 elections, the People’s Union–Our Ukraine joined with other national democratic parties in an Our Ukraine bloc. In the 2007 preterm elections they established the Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense bloc with nine center-right parties, including Yushchenko’s People’s Union–Our Ukraine. In both the 2006 and 2007 elections, Our Ukraine and the Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense blocs received 14 percent, down 10 percent from the 2002 elections. Most of their support was taken by the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc led by Prime Minister Tymoshenko (from 2007). Pro-Orange Revolution parties won the 2006 and 2007 elections but only managed to create a parliamentary coalition and government following the 2007 elections. The Tymoshenko bloc unites Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party, the Reforms and Order and Social Democratic parties. The People’s Union–Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc are members of the European People’s Party, a center-right political group in the European Parliament. Through all these changes, the Ukraine continues to find a political and social balance within its large territory. Defining itself both geographically and ethnically has raised issues over the years, especially due to regional differences. The country will undoubtedly see further developments both on local and national levels as it strives to find its place in greater Europe. Selected Bibliography Arel, Dominique. 2005. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election in Ukraine.” Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine, University of Cambridge. www.ukrainiancambridge.org/Images/Arel_Cambridge_ english.pdf.

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Armstrong, John A. 1980. Ukrainian Nationalism. Littleton, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press. Fournier, Anna. 2002. “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine.” Europe-Asia Studies 54, no. 3: 415–433. Janmaat, Jan G. 2000. Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. Kubicek, Paul. 1996. “Dynamics of Contemporary Ukrainian Nationalism: Empire-Breaking to State Building.” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 23, nos. 1–2: 39–50. Kuzio, Taras. 1998. Ukraine: State and Nation Building. London: Routledge. Kuzio, Taras. 2006. “Post-Soviet Ukraine. The Victory of Civic Nationalism.” In Nationalism after Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States, edited by Lowell Barrington, 187–224. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Kuzio, Taras. 2008. Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism: New Directions in Cross-Cultural and Post-Communist Studies. Hannover, Germany: Ibidem-Verlag. Kuzio, Taras, and Paul D’Anieri, eds. 2002. Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine. Westport, CT: Praeger. Magocsi, Paul R. 1996. A History of Ukraine: Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Magocsi, Paul R. 2002. The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine’s Piedmont. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Molchanov, Mikhail A. 2000. “Post-Communist Nationalism as a Power Resource: A Russia– Ukraine Comparison.” Nationalities Papers 28, no. 2: 263–288. Shulman, S. 2002. “Sources of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18, no. 4: 1–30. Shulman, Stephen. 2005. “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine.” Slavic Review 64, no. 1: 59–87. Subtelny, Orest. 2000. Ukraine: A History. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Yekelchyk, Serhy. 2007. Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Andrew. 2000. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wilson, Andrew. 2005. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Wales Rhys Jones Chronology 1263 Creation of the first Welsh principality by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the so-called last prince of Wales. 1282–1283 Edward I’s conquest of Wales, which led to the majority of lands within Wales being controlled by the English Crown. 1536–1542 Acts of Union, which formally incorporated the remaining independent areas of Wales into the kingdom of England. The Acts of Union led to the systematic extension of English law into Wales. 1588 Translation of the Bible into Welsh by Bishop William Morgan. 1886 Formation of Cymru Fydd (Young Wales), which argued for Welsh Home Rule. 1925 Formation of Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party, which sought to defend the Welsh language and promote political independence for Wales. 1962 The broadcast of “Tynged yr Iaith” (“Fate of the Language”) by Saunders Lewis, which acted as a source of inspiration for Welsh linguistic nationalism during the 1960s. 1966 The election of Gwynfor Evans as the first Plaid Cymru member of Parliament in a south Wales constituency. 1979 A failed referendum on the devolution of power to Wales. 1982 The first broadcasts by S4C, the Welsh-medium television channel. 1993 The formation of the Welsh Language Board, the statutory board with responsibility for the Welsh language. 1997 The successful referendum on the devolution of power to Wales. 1999 The opening of, and first elections for, the National Assembly for Wales.

Situating the Nation For much of its history, the fortunes of the Welsh nation have been tied closely with that of England and a broader Britain, forming as it does part of the Celtic fringe discussed by Hechter in his famous account of internal colonialism. Wales, since the Middle Ages, has existed in an ambiguous political, cultural, and economic position with regard to England/Britain. It is this relationship between Wales and a broader British state that has contributed to certain political and cultural tensions within the Welsh nation. Until the formation of the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW), the Welsh nation did not benefit from the protection that would have been afforded to it by a Welsh state. The political formations that have existed in Wales, especially since the 16th-century Acts of Union between England and Wales, have been based N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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on those of the English state and most notably its shires and legal system. Th e existence of a powerful neighboring English state has also shaped Welsh cultural identity, which has led to certain tensions within the country. We notice this most clearly with regard to the Welsh language. Although, at certain times, the patronage of the English has played an important role in supporting the Welsh language (e.g., through its support of the translation of the Bible into Welsh), it has also undermined its use within Wales. The so-called “treachery of the Blue Books,” for instance, refers to the denunciation of the Welsh language by the British state’s education inspectors during the mid-19th century. Although acting as a clarion call for many Welsh nationalists, this episode confirmed in other people’s minds the need to jettison the Welsh language in favor of the more cosmopolitan and powerful English language. Wales has also enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with England/Britain in more economic terms. Wales has been blessed with a variety of natural resources: coal, slate, iron ore, tin, and water in particular. The presence of these raw materials within Wales and their exploitation as part of a British state have contributed to divisions within Welsh nationalist politics. The use of Welsh water by English municipalities, for instance, has acted as a raw nerve within mainstream Welsh nationalism, since it illustrates the exploitation of Welsh resources by external bodies. Welsh coal, on the other hand, was proudly viewed by certain sections of the Welsh population as the raw material that sustained much of Britain’s world domination. As well as sustaining many of its indigenous industries, the coal resources of Wales helped tie the country more closely to a British sense of identity, as well as a broader British empire.

National Assembly for Wales The National Assembly for Wales represents a devolved form of government created to govern Wales in 1999. The Labour Party was elected to power in the United Kingdom in 1997 in a landslide victory. One of the party’s stated aims was to modernize the governance of the United Kingdom through concerted governmental devolution of power. Wales, along with Scotland and Northern Ireland, was in the vanguard of this process. A referendum was held in 1997 wherein the opportunity to create a National Assembly for Wales, possessing secondary legislative powers, was offered to the Welsh public. The result of the referendum hung in the balance until the final votes had been counted. The support of nearly 51 percent of the Welsh population on a turnout of approximately 50 percent was not particularly inspiring, but it provided enough legitimacy for the U.K. government to propose a Government for Wales Act, which became law in 1999. The first elections for the National Assembly for Wales were held the same year. The formation of the National Assembly for Wales has opened up a new space for political dialogue in Wales and, furthermore, has led to the promotion of a more civic vision of the Welsh nation, which is said to apply to the whole of the population of the country and not just its Welsh-speaking constituents.

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But in addition to this important British political, cultural, and economic context, we also need to focus on the geographic variables that have contributed to the development of Welsh identity. Wales’s location next to a politically and economically dominant English/British state has already been noted. Other important geographic themes have impacted the Welsh nation. Certain landscapes, for instance, have been deemed of crucial importance to the Welsh nation. Gruffudd (1995) has shown how Plaid Cymru has traditionally glorified the rural and mountainous areas of Wales as being the true core of the Welsh nation. During the interwar period, for instance, the party argued that the Welsh people would have to “return to the land” if they were to gain their rightful place as a moral nation, since it was here that they could avoid Anglicized metropolitan values. In another context, certain places within Wales have played a crucial role within the development of the Welsh nation. Recent work has shown, for example, that the university town of Aberystwyth has contributed to the development of Welsh nationalist ideology since the 1960s as a result of the mixing of people and ideas that has taken place there. In terms of its social makeup, the Welsh nation has drawn on a number of different classes and groups of people. The established nationalism of Plaid Cymru, for instance, has traditionally been led by an educated, Welsh-speaking, and largely religious elite. It is thus notable that the party was far more concerned with

Plaid Cymru Formed in 1925, Plaid Cymru is an organization that has been concerned with securing the political, linguistic, and moral future of the Welsh nation. Gruffudd has argued that for much of the early period of its existence Plaid Cymru was more worried about the linguistic and moral well-being of the people of Wales than it was with overtly political or nationalistic issues, and, as a result, its main area of support tended to be the Welshspeaking rural areas of the west and north. This underlying connection between Plaid Cymru and the Welsh rural landscape is highly symbolic. Even today, Plaid Cymru’s motif comprises a Welsh dragon emblazoned across three stylized mountains. By the 1960s, Plaid Cymru’s political ambitions had increased, and these were fulfilled in 1966 with the election of its first member of Parliament, Gwynfor Evans, to the seat of Carmarthenshire in south Wales. Further election success followed, with the party, at its peak, supplying four Members of Parliament to the Westminster Parliament. It is significant that this electoral success, however, has been focused solely on the more western parts of Wales, where the highest percentage of Welsh speakers are located. Plaid Cymru’s connection with the more rural and Welsh-speaking parts of Wales has given the impression of a party that is centered on ethnic rather than civic concerns. The party sought to address this issue in the late 1990s by re-branding itself as Plaid Cymru, the Party of Wales, and attempting, at the same time, to reach out to the mainly English-speaking south Wales valleys. The rebranding has led to certain internal divisions within the party between traditionalists in the north and west, for whom linguistic issues are paramount, and members and supporters in the south and east, who espouse more socialist ideals.

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securing the linguistic and moral future of the Welsh nation than it was with political independence as such during its early years. Plaid Cymru, as similarly done by a number of other nationalistic movements, also made considerable ideological use of a largely working-class Welsh folk—the gwerin—as the repositories of age-old Welsh customs and traditions.

Instituting the Nation Within this broad context, it is possible to outline a number of key institutions that have contributed to the evolution of the Welsh nation. The significance of Plaid Cymru as the critical driving force behind a politicized Welsh nation for much of the 20th century has been noted. But other organizations, too, have promoted different visions of the Welsh nation at different points in time. The Welsh Language Society (Cymdeithas yr Iaith), for instance, was formed during the 1960s as a pressure group especially tasked with promoting the status of the Welsh language within Wales, although it also contributed to a broader political project of creating a Welsh nation in which the Welsh language was of equal status to that of English. In more recent years, the pressure group Cymuned (Community) has attracted considerable support, especially among Welsh speakers. Its aim is to secure the future of Welsh as a community language, since it is only this living language, they argue, that can testify to Wales’s distinctiveness as a nation. In addition to these political and linguistic groups in civil society, there is no N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg The Welsh Language Society was formed in 1962 as an offshoot of Plaid Cymru. The context for its formation was the perceived collapse in the number of Welsh speakers within Wales and the subsequent impact of that decrease on the distinctiveness of a Welsh cultural and political identity. The immediate impetus for the formation of the society was a BBC radio broadcast by Saunders Lewis, who had been a key figure within Welsh nationalist circles for much of the 20th century. His account of the “Fate of the Language” provided considerable inspiration for the formation of Cymdeithas yr Iaith as well as for a series of acts of civil disobedience carried out throughout Wales during the 1960s. Today the Welsh Language Society still campaigns on linguistic issues and calls for a stronger Welsh Language Act and a Property Act, which would alleviate the lack of affordable housing for Welsh speakers in rural Wales. Some of Cymdeithas yr Iaith’s thunder has been stolen in recent years, however, by the new pressure group Cymuned (Community). Formed in 1999, the latter has sought to preserve the use of the Welsh language within the communities of the Welsh “heartland.”

doubt that the major institution currently involved in shaping the future of the Welsh is the NAfW. Formed in 1999 under the U.K. Labour government, it has brought issues to do with political representation, democracy, and the Welsh language to the center stage of Welsh politics. The NAfW, for instance, has published a number of documents that outline specific policies and strategies that can enable Wales to remain a bilingual country. It has also promoted broader visions concerning the need for an open, vibrant, and forward-looking Welsh nation. In this respect, there is some tension among the philosophical foundations of these different institutions involved in the reproduction of the Welsh nation. While pressure groups such as Cymdeithas yr Iaith and Cymuned have advocated an ethnic vision of the Welsh nation, Plaid Cymru in more recent years, as well as the NAfW, has emphasized a more inclusive and civic conception of Wales and Welshness. There is no doubt that these different perspectives on Welshness could lead to political debate and divisiveness within Wales over the coming years. Finally, attention should be drawn to the Welsh television channel, S4C, formed in 1982 as a direct result of political agitation in Wales and, most notably, a hunger strike by Gwynfor Evans, long-term president of Plaid Cymru. Part of S4C’s output is in the Welsh language, thus ensuring that the language gains a certain credibility through its presence within a key contemporary cultural medium.

Defining the Nation These alternative visions of the past, present, and future of the Welsh nation have led to certain divisions within Welsh civil society. The Welsh language, in particular, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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has been viewed by many as a divisive force within the Welsh nation. The established nationalism of Plaid Cymru, Cymdeithas yr Iaith, and Cymuned has, in the past, tended to conflate the ability to speak the Welsh language with membership in the Welsh nation, but this equation of linguistic ability with national identity has been problematic. This conflation of language with national identity is difficult to sustain since only approximately 20 percent of the population of Wales now claim a mastery of the Welsh language. Other dissenting voices have attempted to delineate the Welsh nation in alternative ways and have drawn on broader cultural themes as well as those of social justice. Ethnic minorities and feminist groups in Wales, too, are increasingly trying to articulate different versions of Welshness that take into account the plurality of peoples living within Wales. The formation of the NAfW has further cemented this growing civic and inclusive conception of the Welsh nation, and, indeed, there are increasing signs of a more open definition of the Welsh nation by organizations such as Plaid Cymru. Its recent re-branding as Plaid Cymru, the Party of Wales, for instance, points to a far more inclusive take on Welsh nationalism that appeals to both Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers. In general terms, the process of defining the Welsh nation has proceeded relatively smoothly when compared with a number of other nations. The geographic definition of the Welsh nation, for instance, has been characterized by a relatively high level of agreement. The Acts of Union between England and Wales during the 16th century were highly significant in this respect. Although the acts led to an administrative homogeneity between England and Wales, most clearly with regard to the extension of the shire system throughout the whole of Wales, it also emphasized the boundaries between the two countries through its precise definition of English and Welsh shires. Furthermore, the fact that Wales’s other three boundaries are defined by the Irish Sea has, undoubtedly, helped quell any nationalist conflict concerning the definition of the Welsh national territory. In a similar vein, there are few geographic features within Wales that have served to divide the nation. Although traveling between the north and the south of the country can be relatively arduous, there has been little sense of the need to surmount any internal physical divisions. The only geographic debate taking place with regard to the contemporary Welsh nation has revolved around its linguistic geographies. Cymuned—the recently formed political pressure group discussed above—has sought to define a Welsh “heartland” in its political rhetoric in which Welsh is used as a community language. Cymuned’s focus on the preservation of this geographically delineated language “heartland” stresses the existence of important internal borders within Wales. Here, a strong link has been forged between the Welsh language and identity and a geographically restricted Welsh territory. This claim has provoked a strong reaction from Cymdeithas yr Iaith and Plaid Cymru. For these latter groups, it is the Welsh territory, considered as a whole, that should form the basis for political action and language policy. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Narrating the Nation The use of the Welsh nation’s past has also been subject to debate. Contemporary Welsh nationalism draws much succor from the struggles of the Welsh people against an English state that took place during the medieval period. Certain heroic figures stand out in this respect, most notably Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and Owain Glyndw ˆ r, who led a major revolt against the English at the beginning of the 15th century. Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s struggle against the English Crown was characterized by considerable highs and an equally ignominious end. Llywelyn’s brief success and his subsequent death have acted as a source of inspiration for Welsh nationalists, especially with regard to his efforts to create the first Welsh proto-state. Today, his deeds are remembered in a ceremony that takes place annually in Cilmeri, the remote village where he was killed. The other historic hero for the Welsh nation is Owain Glyndw ˆ r, a nobleman from northeast Wales who led a revolt against English rule between 1400 and 1415. During this period, Glyndw ˆr was able to carry out a successful guerilla campaign against English forces in Wales and succeeded in capturing many of their castles, boroughs, and military leaders. Once again, Glyndw ˆ r’s efforts have cast an important shadow over more recent nationalist ideologies in Wales, most infamously in the form of the extremist organization Meibion Glyndw ˆ r, which carried out a series of fire-bombings of holiday homes located in Wales during the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the importance of these two historic figures for recent Welsh nationalist rhetoric, the actions of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and Owain Glyndw ˆ r can only be used to a certain extent as an inspiration for the contemporary Welsh nation. After all, the forces arrayed against these two alleged leaders of the Welsh nation were full of Welsh soldiers. Indeed, it has been argued that there were far more Welsh soldiers in the army sent out to subdue Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s bid for independence than were in his own army. There is a clear sense in which the Welsh nation’s remembrance of these historic events is highly selective and comprises what Anderson has described as “remembering-forgetting.” In addition to the use of these historic figures as a way of narrating the Welsh nation, other key symbols for expressing the identity of the Welsh nation include the use of the daffodil and the leek as its national symbols; the cultural festival of the Eisteddfod; the strong tradition of choral music; unique musical forms such as Cerdd Dant (in which a vocal melody is dovetailed in complex ways with a countermelody played on a harp); folk dancing, particularly in clogs; the national sport of rugby union; and the landscape art of painters such as Kyffin Williams and Aneurin Jones. Although these symbols are significant reminders of the distinctiveness of the Welsh nation, there is some doubt as to their impact on the totality of the Welsh nation. Far higher numbers of people watch and play soccer in Wales than rugby union, for instance, yet the latter is still considered to be the national sport. Similarly, it is noticeable that some of these symbols of Welsh N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Bilingual sign in Wales with information in both Welsh and English: note the order. (iStockPhoto.com)

nationalism possess relatively short histories and may well represent what Hobsbawm and Ranger have termed an “invention of tradition.” Some of the traditions associated with the cultural festival of the Eisteddfod, for instance, were literally invented by a laudanum addict named Edward Williams (more commonly known as Iolo Morgannwg) during the late 18th century. In this respect, it may be more useful to think of the symbolic significance of banal indicators of the national distinctiveness of Wales, such as the presence of bilingual road signs throughout the whole of its territory. As Billig has noted, these banal symbols are extremely powerful reminders of the distinctiveness of particular nations. There is no doubt that the physical imprint of the Welsh language on the landscape in the form of road signs helps reinforce the existence of the Welsh nation in the minds of inhabitants and visitors alike. The political struggle over bilingual road signs during the 1970s in particular illustrates the significance of such banal reminders of the distinctiveness of the Welsh nation.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation These historic and other symbols have helped mobilize different sections of the Welsh nation over time. But the majority of these symbols have been of more relevance to the traditional middle-class, white, and Welsh-speaking core of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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nation. Efforts have been made in recent years to mobilize different types of social and ethnic groups into being members of the Welsh nation. The driving forces in the process, as noted above, have been the attempts by Plaid Cymru to rebrand itself into a nationalist party that is relevant to all sections of Welsh society and the formation of the NAfW. The latter development, in particular, has been associated with a sustained attempt to rearticulate the character of Welshness by extending its relevance to all social, ethnic, and linguistic groups within Wales. Significantly, as part of this change, the NAfW has drawn on the more neutral language of citizenship rather than the politically loaded language of nationalism. Despite these attempts to broaden the appeal of the Welsh nation to more varied social groups within Wales, however, it is clear that the NAfW and other groups are facing difficulties achieving these aims. There is a general apathy with regard to the more civic form of nationalism being promoted by the newly devolved organization. Part of the problem is linked to the communication of these new national ideals to the mass of the population. Wales is perhaps unusual, in this respect, since only a low percentage of people within the country read Welsh newspapers and watch Welsh television programs. This is especially the case when compared with other U.K. national territories such as Scotland. Only 13 percent of Welsh households take a daily morning newspaper published and printed in Wales; in Scotland, the figure is 90 percent. In a similar context, a large number of households on the eastern border of Wales cannot—or choose not to—receive television transmissions that emanate from Wales and instead tune into the television transmissions emanating from England. Despite these difficulties, it is important to emphasize the success stories within regard to the mobilization of the Welsh nation. Particular attention should be paid to the efforts to mobilize the young people of Wales into a Welsh nationalism. Urdd Gobaith Cymru, or the Welsh League of Youth, has been an important organization since its formation at the beginning of the 20th century. Its emphasis on enabling young Welsh people to socialize through the medium of Welsh and on perpetuating key aspects of Welsh culture, especially the cultural festival of the Eisteddfod, has been a significant contributor to the reproduction of a Welsh-speaking nationalism among the youth of Wales. In total, these efforts to mobilize the Welsh population have centered on a mixture of political and more cultural goals. Admittedly, certain organizations have been more concerned with the cultural future of the Welsh nation (e.g., the Urdd’s emphasis on the need to preserve important aspects of Welsh culture), while others have focused on more political goals (e.g., Plaid Cymru’s political campaigning and electioneering). At the same time, it would be unwise to attempt to distinguish too firmly between these different goals. Indeed, it would be better to think of the various mobilizers of the Welsh nation as a kaleidoscopic mix of organizations whose goals are overlapping. Moreover, the exact nature of the proposed political and cultural futures of the Welsh nation advocated by these various organizations is constantly evolving. Plaid Cymru in recent years, for instance, has demonstrated a lack of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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consistency with regard to its stated aims for the future of the Welsh nation. It has oscillated between full independence and a more extensive devolution of power within a federal United Kingdom. Two final considerations should be mentioned with regard to efforts to mobilize and build the Welsh nation. The first is that these attempts have progressed along peaceful lines. Apart from some fire-bombings during the 1980s and 1990s, Welsh nationalism has never engaged in the political violence that has been a feature of other insurgent nationalisms. Second, it is possible to discern a trend from more ethnic interpretations of the Welsh nation, which have highlighted linguistic and cultural themes, to a more civic articulation of Welshness. A major contributing factor within this change of emphasis has been the creation of the NAfW. Although dissenting voices—promoting alternative, more ethnic takes on the Welsh nation—continue to exist, there are clear signs of a growing engagement with this Welsh civic nation. This shift has been apparent in both the political structures of the NAfW and in Welsh civil society. Whether this growing engagement with civic notions of Welshness will lead to the creation of a more united Welsh nation or will, alternatively, undermine the distinctiveness of a Welsh identity is uncertain. What is certain is that this shift in the essence of Welshness will be the subject of considerable political debate and study by social scientists of all kinds over the coming years. Selected Bibliography Bowie, F. 1993. “Wales from Within: Conflicting Interpretations of Welsh Identity.” In Inside European Identities, edited by S. MacDonald, 167–193. Oxford: Berg. Davies, C. A. 1999. “Nationalism, Feminism, and Welsh Women: Conflicts and Accommodations.” In Nation, Identity and Social Theory: Perspectives from Wales, edited by R. Fevre and A. Thompson, 90–108. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press. Dicks, B., and J. van Loon. 1999. “Territoriality and Heritage in South Wales: Space, Time and Imagined Communities.” In Nation, Identity and Social Theory: Perspectives from Wales, edited by R. Fevre and A. Thompson, 207–232. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press. Gruffudd, P. 1995. “Remaking Wales: Nation-Building and the Geographical Imagination.” Political Geography 14:219–239. Hechter, M. 1975. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536–1966. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Jones, R., and C. Fowler. 2007. “Placing and Scaling the Nation.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25:332–354. McAllister, L. 2001. Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party. Bridgend, UK: Seren. Osmond, J. 2002. “Welsh Civil Identity in the Twenty-First Century.” In Celtic Geographies: Old Culture, New Times, edited by D. Harvey, R. Jones, N. McInroy, and C. Milligan, 69–88. London: Routledge. Richter, M. 1978. “The Political and Institutional Background to National Consciousness in Medieval Wales.” In Nationalism and the Pursuit of National Independence, edited by T. W. Moody, 37–55. Dublin, Ireland: Appletree Press.

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Taylor, B., and K. Thomson, eds. 1999. Scotland and Wales: Nations Again? Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press. Williams, C. 1999. “Passports to Wales? Race, Nation and Identity.” In Nation, Identity and Social Theory: Perspectives from Wales, edited by R. Fevre and A. Thompson, 90–108. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press. Williams, G. A. 1985. When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh. London: Penguin.

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Turkey Aygen Erdentug Chronology 1923 The proclamation of the Republic of Turkey; Ankara becomes the capital. 1924–1925 The caliphate is abolished, together with religious courts and orders. The international calendar and system of time is officially adopted. 1926 New civil, penal, and commercial codes are adopted. They are based on the Swiss, Italian, and German codes, respectively. 1928 The Latin alphabet is adopted. 1934 Extension of suffrage to women; adoption of family names. 1938 The death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 1942 The Wealth Tax is enacted, which leads to impoverishment or displacement of mainly non-Muslim citizens. 1950 The Democratic Party wins the 1950 general elections, ending the monoparty rule of the Republican People’s Party, which had been in power since 1924. 1952 Turkey becomes a full-fledged member in NATO. 1955 Anti-Greek riots take place in three major cities. 1960 Officer coup d’état to stop corruption and unconstitutional acts. 1969 The Nationalist Action Party is formed. 1970–1971 The first pro-Islamic party is formed but is closed down due to antisecular activities. (A religious party eventually becomes a member of the coalition government in 1996 but is also closed down in 1998.) 1971 The Labor Party is closed down for separatist and communist propaganda. (In 1989, the Communist Party is legalized in Turkey.) 1974 Turkish forces enter Cyprus to prevent further massacre and to protect the rights of Turks on the island. 1980 A coup d’état by Turkish armed forces to reestablish law and order. 1987 The Nationalist Action Party is accused of ultranationalist activities; the chairman is imprisoned. A national referendum lifts the ban against former political leaders. Turkey recognizes the right of its citizens to apply to the European Human Rights Commission. 1991 A bill revoking the ban on the spoken use of Kurdish passes in parliament. 1993 Sunni Muslims set fire to a hotel in Sivas; 37 Alevis are burned to death. 1999 The outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—PKK) leader, Abdullah Öcalan, is captured, tried, and convicted of treason. (Capital punishment is abolished; his death sentence is not carried out.) 2000 The Court of Appeals decides in favor of freedom to use Kurdish names. 2001–2002 Economic crisis and recession forces coalition governments to generate new economic programs and reorganize financial institutions. 2003 Suicide bombings, allegedly Al Qaeda attacks, of two synagogues in Istanbul. 2004 In accordance with the integration negotiations with the European Union (EU), Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) begins limited broadcasting in the Kurdish, Bosnian, Arabic, and Circassian languages.

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2005 The EU opens accession negotiations with Turkey for full membership. 2006 The court cases of writers charged with “insulting Turkishness” are publicized in the mass media, spurring various forms of aggression from the ultranationalists against the defendants. 2007 (April 14) The Republic Protests—huge, peaceful mass rallies in support of secularism ˙ in Turkey—take place successively in Ankara, I˙ stanbul, Manisa, Çanakkale, Izmir, Samsun, and Denizli.

Situating the Nation Turkey has its roots in the semi-theocratic Ottoman Empire that lasted for 600 years. At its zenith in the 16th century, its borders stretched from central Europe to North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in the south, and to Persia in the east. ˙Istanbul (Constantinople) became the capital in 1453. The modern Republic of Turkey emerged, with Ankara as its capital, in 1923. It is the only completely secular Muslim nation-state that has a legal system based on codes adopted from European nations. Ankara was at the core of the Turkish struggle for independence during World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was divided by European powers. Mustafa Kemal was the national hero who led the liberating resistance and became the head of the countergovernment in Ankara. In recognition, the Turkish parliament later awarded him the surname Atatürk (the father of the Turks). The nationbuilding process consisted of a series of sweeping reforms aimed at modernizing the country and transforming Ottoman subjects into Turkish citizens. This process was carried out during the first two decades of the republic by Ankara’s political elite, who had emerged from Ottoman bureaucracy and from the military. However, the target of this modernizing, also known as the “revolution from above,” was not only the civil bureaucracy but also the illiterate and tradition-bound peasantry, who constituted about 83 percent of the republic in 1927. Atatürk defined this group as “the true masters of the nation” during his opening speech of the Grand National Assembly in 1922 in which he also drew attention to the importance of rural development. Turkey is in southeast Europe, next to Greece and Bulgaria, and it bridges the continents of Europe and Asia. It is located in the Anatolian peninsula in southwest Asia, with a small portion of its territory (Thrace) stretching into the Balkan region of southeastern Europe. The fertile coastal regions are densely populated, particularly in the northwestern provinces. As one of the countries bordering the south shore of the Black Sea, Turkey is a neighbor to Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia. Its territory is flanked by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Iran in the east and by Syria and Iraq in the south. Turkey is at the crossroads of politically active and economically viable areas, and its geopolitical importance has invited both alliances and hostilities throughout history. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Ottoman economic legacy of a weak industrial base, coupled with a decline in agricultural production, had led to an impoverished population. During the Ottoman era, non-Muslim minorities monopolized urban economic life and commerce. In the mid-1920s, when a considerable number of these minorities became victims of war or emigrated, an economic vacuum emerged. Neither economic liberalism nor the succeeding statist era (1930–1950) improved the backward, agriculture-based economy, and the growth of a middle class was postponed until later. In the 1950s, the introduction of a multiparty system generated another set of political, economic, and social changes in Turkey. Since that time, the regions to the northwest, west, and south of the capital have become more developed and modernized. In contrast, the east and southeast regions remain relatively underdeveloped and conservative; tribal traditions and sectarian ties are still decisive. It was only in the 1960s—after the first coup d’état in the republic and a new constitution ratified by national referendum in 1961—that planned development with broader economic and social goals was possible. Yet, the confrontations between the Marxist, the ultranationalist, and the Islamic fundamentalist groups led to student unrest and a military coup by memorandum during 1971–1973. The ensuing numerous coalition governments, shortages due to deteriorating economic conditions, and an inflation level reaching the triple digits brought instaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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bility to the country by the late 1970s. The 1975–1978 American arms embargo on Turkey, which was imposed as a result of Ankara’s Cyprus operation of 1974, also had economic repercussions. Foreign financial/economic institutions moved slowly on aid and credits and refused to reschedule Turkey’s debts. The concomitant political instability and clashes between student groups, complemented by nationwide strikes of leftist unions and bloody anti-Alevi reactions in two cities, resulted in another military intervention in 1980–1983. Political parties were dissolved. The backlash was another constitution ratified by national referendum in 1982 that was more restrictive with regard to civil liberties than the previous, liberal one had been. Between 1983 and 1991, imports were greatly liberalized and an exportoriented economic policy placed a greater emphasis on international competition. Succeeding governments from 1991 to 1999 tried to improve the persistent gap in income distribution and managed to control inflation to some degree. However, in 2001, an unexpected devaluation of the Turkish currency plunged the country into a serious financial crisis. This crisis brought back political bickering, unpunished corruption, rampant inflation, and soaring unemployment. Political stability was possible in 2002, when an Islam-based party that had turned conservative came to power alone with the support of about 35 percent of the electorate. This party was able to initiate the accession negotiations of making Turkey—with a population of 70.5 million in the year 2007—a full member of the EU.

Instituting the Nation The Young Turk movement in the last decades of the 19th century was a turning point in the Ottoman Empire. It was the voice of opposition dedicated to replacing an absolute monarchy (i.e., the autocracy of Abdulhamid II) with a constitutional one. This movement also laid the foundation of the nationalistic official ideology of the republic. The Young Turks first had the utopian dream of binding all by “Ottomanism”—a patriotism that would disregard religion or ethnicity, contrary to the reality of the Christian-Muslim dichotomy and the multiple ethnicities of the empire. With the secession of the Balkans and Greece (Christian territories) after the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), they turned to Turkish nationalism; they did not want to embrace pan-Islamism, an identity based on religion. Hence another political movement, pan-Turkism, emerged and was aimed at uniting the Turkic-speaking peoples under one state. It was adopted by the younger generation of Turks who had been drawn to the idea of cultural nationalism, an identity and loyalty based on “Turkishness.” A concomitant movement was Turanism, or pan-Turanism, that embraced the unity of Ural-Altaic peoples together with those of Finno-Hungarian stock (i.e., the union of Eurasian peoples stretching from Hungary to the Pacific Rim; “Turan” was the region from which these peoples had originated). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, ethnic nationalism gave way to territorial nationalism, a patriotism seeking allegiance only to Turkey. Atatürk expressed this identity transfer with the popularized statement that ended his address to the nation on the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish republic: “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk!” One crucial component of Atatürk’s nation-building strategy was to make citizens of the new nation proud of being Turks. Their self-image had been battered by the demoralizing shrinkage of the grand Ottoman Empire and by Western prejudice. However, Atatürk’s quote was to be challenged in later decades by ultranationalists and Kurdish separatist groups who felt his words demonstrated the ethnic hegemony of citizens of Turkic origin. The campaign to restore self-respect to the Turks embraced their bio-cultural origins and included their language and history, cornerstones of the official agenda. The zeal of some Turkish scholars of the time went to extremes, resulting in research of dubious scientific merit that served political ends; it created the Anatolian movement that, by the 1930s, had become the official ideology. The movement came to an end with the death of Atatürk, in 1938, when its proponents abandoned the cause. The primary factors in sustaining national identity in Turkey have been Atatürk, a pro-nationalist education policy dating to the 1930s, the Turkish flag (red with a white crescent and star), and the military. The citizens of Turkey and the Turkish diaspora are proud of the fact that Atatürk has become a universally recognized Turk. He remains a unifying figure for all age categories and culturally or politically disparate groups, through an emphasis on or an embracement of

Early Ethnocentric Theories (The Anatolian Movement) During the 1930s in Turkey, research of dubious scientific merit produced theories arguing that all history and languages had a basis in Turkish history and language, since they originated from Central Asia, “the cradle of human civilization.” This was the homeland of the Turks, who had migrated in waves to different parts of the world. In this respect, the “Turkish Historical Thesis” maintained that the history of Turkey went beyond the history of the Ottoman Empire to that of Central Asia; for example, the Sumerian, the Hittite, the Chinese, the Roman, and the ancient Greek histories were all derivatives of the Turkish one. Likewise, the “Sun Theory of Languages” claimed that Turkish was the first language spoken, and hence was the foundation for all human languages like Latin and the Romance languages, classical Greek, and even Anglo-Saxon. Though these theories were abandoned in later years, they remained in the national curriculum in schools. They have also affected the configuration of the presidential seal. The radiating sun at the center of this red seal represents the Republic of Turkey, while the circle of 16 stars around this sun signifies the 16 Turkish states in history (the number of these states has been a contentious issue). Recently, a similar theory has linked the Turks—through those who crossed the Bering Strait—to the early American Indians on the basis of their artifacts and language.

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Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: The Eternal Leader (1881–1938) Primary school children begin their day by taking an oath in which they express what it means to be a Turk, their dedication to the Turkish existence, and their allegiance to Atatürk’s principles (i.e., republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, and revolutionismreformism). Atatürk rests in his eternal abode at the Atatürk Mausoleum in Ankara. He is omnipresent in Turkey. His busts or statues are seen in the yards of all institutions of education and in at least one square in urban settlements. Practically every city has a main street, if not a stadium or a cultural center, named after him. His portrait hangs on office walls in public buildings, private enterprises, and homes, and it is also seen on postage stamps and bank notes. Law 5816, passed in 1951, states that the defamation of Atatürk or the disfiguring of his images is a criminal offense, the punishment of which is imprisonment up to three and five years, respectively. The sentence can be increased if coercion or the media is involved. To outsiders who are not familiar with the Turkish psyche, Atatürk may be seen as a cult figure. There is a lucrative market in Atatürk memorabilia, similar to the one for the icons of the Western world.

different facets of his identity and accomplishments, such as “a national hero,” “a secularist and republican,” “a nationalist,” “a father figure.” The military is the only institution that enjoys the complete faith of the majority of Turks, whether during war or in peace. In retrospect, the military has taken on three roles. One of these roles has been as the self-proclaimed guardian of secularism, persistently vigilant against Islamist retrogression. In its second role, as the protector of an idealized version of democracy, the military has intervened in Turkish politics when the governments were incapacitated or when extreme political activities threatened the regime. Its third role has been an assimilative one; mandatory military service for men has served as a catalyst, enhancing patriotism and emotional attachment to the Turkish flag. Martyrdom, dying in military action for Turkey, is an exceedingly honorable status, and slighting the Turkish flag is a criminal offense that can provoke outbreaks of violence against perpetrators and trigger the nation to rally around it.

Defining the Nation In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne determined the initial territory of Turkey. In 1926, the border with the new state of Iraq was redrawn to create the present southeastern frontier. By 1939 the province of Hatay was ceded from Syria to join Turkey, finalizing the boundaries of the country. Th e official doctrine at the time was to create a homogenous Turkish-speaking nation, as stated in the successive constitutions of the republic. This meant that any threat to national unity and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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“Turkishness” was suppressed, persecuted, or prosecuted. At present, article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which limits freedom of speech and prosecutes anyone insulting the Turkish state or its citizens, has become a stronghold for ultranationalists. It is also a matter of contention between Turkey and the EU. The only minorities that were officially recognized were the preexisting nonMuslim communities (usually understood as Jews, Greeks, and Armenians, although there were other groups), whose protection and rights had been determined by the Treaty of Lausanne. In practice, governments violated these rights through restrictions on their education and curriculum, free expression, and charitable institutions. Particularly in the 1930s, the Greeks in ˙Istanbul were barred from entering a large number of professions. The population of non-Muslims in Anatolia decreased with World War I as a result of forcible relocation, repatriation, or population exchange, followed by emigration to Western nations in later decades. A considerable number of those remaining have penetrated the affluent professional groups or established businesses in Turkey. Following World War I, with the Armistice of Mudros (1918) that marked the defeat and commenced the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, ˙Izmir (Smyrna) was occupied by Greek forces. What the Greeks referred to afterward as the “Asia Minor Catastrophe” was set in motion when the Greeks left ˙Izmir, after the city was taken back by Turkish forces in 1922. An agreement between Turkey and Greece to exchange populations took effect in 1924, leading to the deportation of Greeks from Anatolia (i.e., Asia Minor) and Muslims from Greece. Only the Muslims in western Thrace and the ethnic Greek communities in ˙Istanbul and on the Aegean islands of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Gökçeada (Imbroz) were exempt from this reciprocal expulsion. Some of the ethnic Greeks in ˙Istanbul emigrated after a violent incident in 1955. The distorted reports in Turkey on a glass-shattering bomb attack on the Turkish consulate in Salonika (Greece), near the house where Atatürk was born, triggered wholesale anti-Greek riots in ˙Istanbul, Ankara, and ˙Izmir and ended with the destruction of commercial property belonging to ethnic Greeks and the desecration of Greek religious sanctuaries. Yet another evacuation of thousands, and the confiscation of their property, occurred in the mid-1960s. This time, it was in retaliation to the stalemate in discussions on the rights of the systematically intimidated and murdered ethnic Turks in Cyprus. The agreements in 1960, which created the Republic of Cyprus, made Turkey and Greece (together with the United Kingdom) guarantor powers of the constitutional rights of their respective communities in Cyprus. During the Caucasus Campaign (1914–1918), the loyalty of the Ottoman Empire’s Armenian subjects became unclear; Armenian nationalists collaborated with the Russian armies, and separatists staged rebellions and raided Turkish villages. The Young Turk government decided to relocate the Armenians outside of the war zones with the objective of dispersing them; however, many Armenians— artisans and civil servants, families whose men were serving in the Ottoman armies, Catholic and Protestant Armenians—were exempt from this resettleN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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ment. Nevertheless, the Armenian experience during World War I, referred to as the “Great Calamity,” has led to the most controversial and highly politicized issue in Turkish history. Some historians and the Armenian diaspora claim that the Great Calamity was genocidal, considering the thousands who became victims of atrocities during this forced relocation in 1915. Their opponents argue that it was not annihilation and that the death toll was an unfortunate consequence of the mismanagement of resources and the austere conditions that prevailed during the war. Some of the groups being transferred contracted contagious diseases or were attacked and murdered by marauders along the way—a common risk for travelers at the time. Today, historians continue to search the Ottoman archives in an effort to find the truth. It is considered offensive to speak or write in support of the claim of the Armenian diaspora, since that viewpoint is seen as “insulting Turkishness.” Many scholars and authors, including Orhan Pamuk, the 2006 Nobel Laureate for literature, were taken to court and faced imprisonment for this offense; however, all were acquitted. Relationships with the Jews in Turkey—the majority of which are Sephardic— have comparatively been more peaceful. Jews expelled from Spain in the 15th century took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. This was followed by waves of Jewish refugees during the 19th century, who were escaping the harassment, oppression, or ethnic cleansing in Europe and the Balkans. Jews fleeing Nazi Germany again found sanctuary in Turkey. In 1933, Atatürk invited professors of Jewish origin to contribute to intellectual progress in the country; the German school they represented had an impact on the development of the university system, scientific institutions, fine arts, and performing arts in Turkey. Between 1940 and 1950, many Turkish Jews migrated to Palestine, which became the State of Israel as of 1948, out of a desire to return to their millennia-old homeland. Anti-Semitic activity in Turkey has been restricted mainly to news in the mass media; Islamists or ultranationalists have demonized Israel and the Jews in their reports to produce a negative image. Most of these have ended up at court. Recent instances of violence have included tomb desecrations by Islamic fundamentalists and suicide bombings (allegedly by Al Qaeda) of two synagogues in ˙Istanbul. Anthropologically, outside the non-Muslim communities, there are innumerable subcultures in Turkey—as reflected in the variations of local traditions, folklore, and costumes—all contributing to the greater national culture. Though the influx of migrants from villages to metropolises and the ensuing acculturation has somewhat homogenized this cultural diversity in the urban environment, the new urbanites still identify more with their native villages or hometowns than with their city of residence. Regionalism or hometown-based social networks are important frames of reference in supporting or eroding nationalistic sentiments. There are hundreds of hometown associations in metropolises that maintain economic and emotional ties with an Anatolian town or its administrative unit. Each association aims to sustain its culture among its emigrants by organizing picnics and annual outings, and by providing events and courses for the younger N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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generation that promote their ethnic characteristics such as local food, folklore, crafts, and even dialect or language. The definition of a Turk has come to mean one who is Sunni Muslim and speaks Turkish as the native tongue. Factions within Turkish society claim that this definition places others in a secondary position. New terms like “citizen of Turkey” and Türkiyeli (someone originating from and/or a resident of Turkey)— as opposed to “Turkish citizen,” which had overtones of ethnicity—were recently coined to unify the citizens of the republic. These terms generated further discussions but failed to produce a consensus. In Turkey, historical and environmental circumstances have produced different cultural groups within the population identified as “true Turks” (ethnic Turks). The Anatolian Turks are the most widely dispersed and most numerous, showing significant variations in cultural patterns; they were the group targeted for the republican reforms. Another entity, known as the “Balkan immigrants,” are ethnic Turks (Sunni Muslims) and their descendants from the Balkans, who resettled primarily in the Thrace and Marmara regions starting in the 1870s and continued in sporadic waves until the early 1990s. Other Turkic-speaking immigrants and their descendants from southern Russia (e.g., Crimean Tatars) and Central Asia (e.g., Turkomans), along with groups from the Caucasus (e.g., the Laz, the Circassians, the Muslim Georgians), can be lumped together into a third group. Their communities have been scattered all over the country due to settlement policies at the time of their immigration. Muslim refugees, such as the Bosnians and the Afghans, are a more recent addition to the population. Due to the liberal atmosphere of the 1961 constitution, the 1965 census registered population details according to ethnic, linguistic, or religious distinctions; however, since then it has not been possible to correctly enumerate the citizens according to this information. The Kurds have been the biggest and most significant group to challenge the image of a homogenous nation. In fact, like the ethnic Turks, they show regional and sectarian differences (most are Sunni Muslims, the rest are Alevis of the Shiite sect), as well as class distinctions. They are estimated to constitute at least 10 percent of the population and live predominantly in the southeast, with some groups in the eastern provinces. Within the last two decades, many Kurds have migrated to cities in the west. Governments first labeled them “mountain Turks,” then “eastern Turks,” not only rejecting the existence of a Kurdish language, but also failing to distinguish between the different Kurdish groups. However, since the 1990s, and particularly as of the turn of the 21st century, most of their cultural and political rights—with some assistance from the EU—have been granted. Arab-speaking communities are not uncommon along the Syrian border of Turkey. Most are Alevi (Alewite) though there are also Assyrian (Christian) communities among them. Discriminatory administrative practices, along with the terrorism of the late 1980s, forced the village-based Christian population to immigrate to nearby cities or even seek refuge in Western countries. Though the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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border of 1939 divided Arab Alewite lineages, their members in Turkey have maintained their ties with kin and with Syria.

Narrating the Nation In spite of projects to educate and develop peasant communities, the republican reforms created a two-tiered Turkish society: a Western-oriented and secular elite contemptuous of the masses that are heavily under the influence of traditions and religion. The political affiliations in later decades perpetuated this polarization, setting off political and economic turmoil. The nation is still haunted by the unwarranted leveling mechanisms that took place in the 1970s; long queues for staple goods, shortages of industrial and intermediary goods that led to facility failures, and the regional PKK terrorism of the 1980s that spread nationwide in the 1990s. Atatürk frequently bolstered the self-respect of his citizens—as he did in his address on the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish republic—with statements such as, “The Turks, as a nation, are intelligent!” and “The Turks, as a nation, are industrious!” The achievements of his period made the public proud, as summarized in the lyrics of the “10th Year March.” For each year after his death, until the 1990s, the nation was in a state of mourning on November 10. Since then, the commemoration of Atatürk during this occasion has stretched to a week of various activities that are named after him. The goal of these activities is to help the nation better understand his reforms. Turkish ethnocentrism became somewhat eroded due to the crippled economy, the corruption, and the political unrest of later decades, causing some Turks to question their self-esteem. This state of morale was reflected in the popular expression, “We will never grow up.” However, their pride in Turkish hospitality and communal traits, such as solidarity in the face of adversity, was persistent and remained. Public protests during this period included blowing tin whistles, hitting pans, and turning out the lights at home for one minute each evening. One of the popular mass media cartoons of this pessimistic period depicted the republic as a young woman draped in the Turkish flag, prey to the sinister intentions of men surrounding her. A chain of events occurred that began to restore confidence and kindle nationalist sentiments. In 2001, the gratifying performance of Turkish soccer teams and the national basketball team’s participation in international matches created euphoria and triggered an upsurge in Turkish flag sales. “Turkey is the greatest / There is none other greater!” was chanted for almost every following occasion. Another development was the anxiety over increasing threats to secularism. This concern incited droves of prosecular citizens to organize demonstrations of national unity during which hundreds waved the national flag and chanted in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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support of secularism. They wore Atatürk badges or carried his portrait. Even preschool children wore red headbands with the words ATAM I˙ZI˙NDEYI˙Z (“We walk your path Atam”; Atam is a popular possessive form of address and reference to Atatürk) in white letters. The headbands were in response to the green headbands with Arabic inscriptions observed during the demonstrations of the Islamists. Since the 75th anniversary of the republic in 1998, the republican spirit has been revived with a popularized version of the “10th Year March” that is now sung spontaneously by prosecular citizens of all ages and classes when they are in a jubilant mood. Ethno-political confrontations also created a surge in nationalism. The twists and turns of foreign intervention on nationally sensitive issues—such as the Cyprus issue, the PKK, the Armenian question, U.S. policy in the Middle East and Iraq, and EU accession—infuriated the nation, causing it to close ranks. Turks are predisposed to react promptly, even aggressively, to any provocation involving an insult to their national icons, to their pride, or to Islam. They mount nationwide protests with hate demonstrations or campaigns boycotting the commodities of the foreign countries concerned, sometimes publicly destroying these goods. At the very least, they will protest by placing a black wreath at the gate of the embassy of the country involved.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Standard Turkish, taught and maintained through state channels, was essential in the establishment of a national identity and central to the assimilative strategy. Mandatory military service and intercultural marriages have been other channels of integration and assimilation. The adoption of the Latin alphabet, a secular national curriculum, and compulsory, free, primary school education have increased access to schooling. These measures have proven to be effective: children of immigrant groups have assimilated into the national culture, partially maintaining parental traditions yet ignorant of their parents’ native tongue. In the years 1925 and 1940, another assimilative strategy involved giving Turkish names to villages with non-Turkish names. Though this renaming process covered all of Turkey, the percentage of renamed villages has been particularly high in the eastern Black Sea region and east and southeast of Turkey. These were villages originally inhabited by Christian groups or people of Tatar (Crimean), Circassian, Laz, Arabic, Persian, and Kurdish origin. Over time, the older generations —who communicated in the local dialect or tongue—have ignored and left the usage of these imposed names to the younger generations attending school. Apart from the proclamation of the republic—which has become a national holiday attracting increased participation since its 75th anniversary when it was unofficially claimed by civil society to activate solidarity against antisecular N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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movements—official public holidays are dedicated to certain groups. The anniversary of the first opening of the Turkish parliament honors the children. On that day, designated children sit in the seats of power and act like the incumbents of those posts. The anniversary of the beginning of the national liberation movement is set apart for youth and for commemorating Atatürk (in addition to November 10, the day he died), and the day celebrating the victory of the War of Independence is dedicated to the armed forces. National celebrations used to be instigated by the state and consisted of gymnastics, marching bands in stadiums, and military parades in the streets. Since the late 1980s, local administrations have taken the initiative to also organize street parties, including pop concerts and fireworks. The Turkish flag and images of Atatürk are an integral aspect of these celebrations. In spite of the equality of citizens decreed by the constitution of the republic, there is still a Muslim–non-Muslim cleavage that overrides national citizenship and impinges upon the psyche of the ethnic Turks with provincial roots. More often than not, the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey are uneasy about the prejudice and interpersonal (and sometimes institutional) discrimination of fanatical Turkish nationalists and Islamists. This apprehension has been justified with the 2007 assassination of a prominent Armenian-Turkish citizen and journalist who had been conciliatory in the Armenian question of whether there was an Armenian genocide in 1915, during the Ottoman period; those who misconstrued his views made him a victim of article 301 and an open target. New or amended legislation has somewhat relaxed the tensions caused by factions, but three cultural fault lines have emerged: secularists versus Islamists, Sunni versus Alevi, and Turks versus Kurds. Each group is adamant in its stance and ready to look for ulterior motives in any steps taken by its opponent; they usually disagree over major issues. Since the proclamation of the republic, the city-based political elite, and later the middle class, have become secularists and die-hard proponents of the tenets and reforms of Atatürk, practicing a form of ancestor worship. However, religion is no longer a matter solely of private conscience. The provincially based Islamists, proud of Turkey’s Islamic heritage, were traditionally confined to the lower strata of Turkish society. They have gained ground in the past decade and infiltrated the cultural mainstream through upward mobility; some entrepreneurs have penetrated into the upper economic class. They accept Atatürk as a national hero for “saving the country from the infidels [the Christians],” but they reject his antireligion and pro-Western stance. Some fanatics, when not in quest of an Islamic state, have sporadically defaced Atatürk busts or statues. Women in clothes that conceal all but their face and hands are perceived as a symbol of the rejected Islamic traditionalism. This has become a divisive issue because covered women are banned from institutions of education and from working in public office, and they are overlooked in some state functions—all of which are bastions of prosecular women in Western clothes. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The tug-of-war between prosecular citizens and political Islam came out into the open in April 2007, prior to the election of a new president by parliament. There were mass rallies against the Islamic-rooted government to prevent its candidate from taking the post. The protestors flooded streets and squares, creating a sea of red Turkish flags and chanting, “Turkey is secular and secular it will remain.” The “Republic Protests” of the prosecular were a show of strength that had previously not been seen in the republic; the Western press reported the protests as an indicator of the cultural and political cleavage in the country. The main concern of those who participated—the majority being women from every region of Turkey and from various backgrounds—was the possible concentration of power in the hands of the Justice and Development Party, the Islam-based party that had turned conservative and already controlled parliament. Subsequent parliamentary tinkering with the legislation in question ended in an early general election in 2007. However, the same party again came to power— the electorate proved to be also concerned about prolonging political and economic stability— and their candidate was elected as president. Alevi is a blanket term referring to the heterodox religious communities of Anatolia, which are estimated to make up 15–20 percent of the total population. Some of these groups are also Kurds. The directorate of religious affairs, looking

Turkish people shout slogans in support of secularism as they hold a huge Turkish flag at the Mausoleum of Ataturk, founder of modern Turkey, during the “Republic Protests” in Ankara in April 2007. (Tolga Bozoglu/epa/Corbis)

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upon the Alevi communities as Shiite (Shia) Muslims, has always imposed Sunni practices on them; for example, undertaking the building of mosques in their villages and paying the salary of the Sunni imam (Muslim cleric) appointed there, and requiring their children to attend Sunni religious and ethics courses at school. This offensive attitude toward the Alevis has increased their alienation from the state and forced them ultimately to contest this religious discrimination in court. Until recently, they were not allowed to open a house of gathering or communal building (cemevi), which is a place of fundamental importance for their rituals. Starting in the 1950s, Alevis gradually left their isolated villages in the highlands to immigrate to urban centers, usually creating distinctly Alevi quarters and refusing to mix with Sunnis through marriage. Their integration into the cultural mainstream by practicing the profession of their choice brought them into direct contact and competition with the Sunnis and fueled the overt and covert antagonism between them. Because Alevis have identified more with the left in Turkey, extremist right-wing Sunni citizens have fallen easily into bloody SunniAlevi clashes. During the politically and economically unstable period of the 1970s, anti-Alevi activities in some cities resulted in violent incidents and mass murders. For decades, official policy undermined Kurdish identity, but in the 1970s, Kurdish nationalism began to challenge this view. The measures taken during the military regime of 1980–1983 to repress this movement backfired and alienated even more Kurds; they became sympathizers or supporters of the PKK, a separatist group fighting with brutal violence for the liberation of the Kurds. The PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured, tried, and convicted of treason in 1999. The PKK took on another name, opting to defend its cause politically. Empathy for the PKK still lingers today, and some of the Kurds in southeast Turkey are known to take offense when PKK is categorized as a terrorist group. The first half of the 1990s witnessed a bill that lifted the ban on speaking in Kurdish. Later, Kurds were free to celebrate the Kurdish New Year (Newroz), though displaying the Kurdish tri-colors (green, red, and yellow) of independence was considered suspect. The 1990s was also the period for ill-fated Kurdishbacked political parties. They were closed down due to separatist activity, and some Kurdish members of parliament were imprisoned for backing the PKK. As of 2000, however, people were permitted to give Kurdish names to their children and, more recently, Kurdish was among the courses offered at private language schools. Nonetheless, PKK terrorism—which lasted from 1987 to 2000 and still continues sporadically—did take a toll both in the high number of casualties and in the nonstop out-migration that left some towns and villages depopulated. These developments made the Turks in western locations more conscious and anxious about the Kurdish presence in their midst. At the same time, the Kurdish pockets in the metropolises developed a heightened ethnic consciousness that had previously been confined to their rural brethren. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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In spite of a ravaging earthquake in 1999 that hit an industrial belt in the northwest and a crippling economic crisis, Turkey has been experiencing an economic progression since the turn of the 21st century. Though its geopolitical importance is an asset in the accession negotiations for the EU, the same is not true for the majority of Turkey’s young population. In spite of some highly qualified bilingual or multilingual university graduates in demand by high tech industries, the inadequate and overcrowded state education system continues to neglect vocational training; the system generally fails to equip youth with the range of skills required in the secondary and tertiary sectors. There have been radical legal reforms prompted by the EU, but the human factor in Turkey’s judicial and administrative systems is in need of urgent attention. A new mentality must be adopted and internalized for the democratic implementation of this legislation that will sustain a tolerant and culturally diverse society. Selected Bibliography Andrews, P. A. 1989. The Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey. Wiesbaden, Germany: L. Reichert. Grigoriadis, I. N. 2006. “Upsurge amidst Political Uncertainty: Nationalism in Post-2004 Turkey.” SWP Research Paper 11, Berlin. Heper, M. 2002. Historical Dictionary of Turkey. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press. Kazancıgil, A., and E. Özbudun, eds. 1997. Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State. 2nd ed. London: C. Hurst & Co. Landau, J. M. 1994. “Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism in Turkey and the Ex-Soviet Republics.” Migration 28:67–84. Lewis, B. 2002. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Mango, A. 2004. The Turks Today. London: John Murray. Poulton, H. 1997. The Top Hat, the Grey Wolf, and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic. London: Hurst. Tocci, N. 2001. “21st Century Kemalism: Redefining Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era.” Working Document No. 170, Brussels, Belgium: Centre for European Policy Studies. van Bruinessen, M. “Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey.” (Retrieved August 30, 2006), http://www.uga.edu/islam/alevivanb.html. Zürcher, E. J. 2004. Turkey: A Modern History. 3rd ed. London: I. B. Taurus.

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Angola Norrie MacQueen Chronology 1575 Port and settlement of Luanda is founded by the Portuguese. 1600s and 1700s Angola provides a major source of slaves for Portuguese plantations in Brazil. Luanda becomes a major point of embarkation. 1891 Borders of colonial and postindependence Angola are defined. The territory includes the coastal enclave of Cabinda between the French Congo and the Belgian Congo. 1915 Effective Portuguese control of Angola is established in all but the remote southeast and mountain areas in the north. 1926 The authoritarian corporatist “New State” (Estado Novo) is established in Portugal. 1955 The Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola (União dos Povos do Norte de Angola, UPNA) is formed and later becomes the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA). 1956 The leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA) is established. 1961 (February–March) MPLA attacks prisons and police posts in Luanda. UPNA uprising takes place in northern Angola. This is followed by brutal suppression by the Portuguese. 1966 The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA) is formed. 1972–1973 Struggles occur within MPLA factions. 1974 (April) A military coup takes place in Lisbon, and Portuguese withdrawal from Africa becomes inevitable. 1975 (January) The Alvor Agreement is signed between Portugal, MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, and the three nationalist factions agree to share power after Angola is granted independence. (April–July) Civil war breaks out between the three movements; FNLA and UNITA enter into alliance against the MPLA. (November) Portugal transfers sovereignty to “the Angolan people.” MPLA holds control of Luanda. 1979 President Agostinho Neto dies and is succeeded as head of state and party by José Eduardo dos Santos. 1985 U.S. military aid for UNITA begins to arrive through Zaire. 1991 (April) MPLA formally abandons its Marxist ideology. 1992 United Nations (UN) certifies that elections are free and fair, but in September UNITA resumes civil war. 1994 Government and UNITA sign peace accord. A large-scale UN peacekeeping operation is deployed, but the war continues. 2002 (February) UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is killed by government troops.

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Situating the Nation Angola’s five centuries as the joia da coroa do imperio portugues (“jewel in the Portuguese imperial crown”) has been the dominant element shaping Angolan nationalism in the 20th and 21st centuries. Nationalism has thus principally surrounded the anticolonial struggle, though this struggle has been fragmented by different regional, ethnic, and ideological interests. At the time of independence from Portugal in 1975, the Marxist-oriented MPLA victory over competing nationalist factions marked the beginning of a long period of one-party rule. MPLA dominance was fiercely opposed by the rival nationalist movement, UNITA, which was supported by various external interests—mainly from the Western side in the Cold War. Meanwhile, the MPLA regime relied on the presence of about 50,000 Cuban troops to help maintain its position of power. In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the transition to majority rule in South Africa, external involvement ended, and the war became almost entirely internal for Angola. There was a widespread view held even by expert commentators abroad that this outside interference was the reason for the war lasting so long, so there was hope that the war would end with the withdrawal of external support. However, by this point the struggle had become deeply rooted in Angola’s

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MPLA recruits training in Cabinda enclave in the closing phase of the liberation war. (Keystone Features/Getty Images)

regional and ethnic divisions and despite continuous diplomatic efforts to find a solution, it was not until 2002—with the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi— that the war finally came to an end. Angola’s international identity is expressed through its active membership in a range of international organizations that reflect both its geographical location (e.g., the African Union and the Southern African Development Community) and its history (e.g., Lusophone African Countries and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries). Up until the 19th century, the colonial economy in Angola was based on the trading of slaves, particularly with (Portuguese) Brazil. Later, a plantation economy developed that produced rubber, followed by—particularly in the northern part of the country—more profitable produce like cotton and coffee. Also, Angola’s railway system and its location on the Atlantic seaboard made it a major transport route for the export of the produce of bordering countries, in particular copper from the Belgian Congo (later called Zaire). During the 20th century, Angola developed its own extractive industries. Iron was important for a time, although this product was overshadowed by the discovery of large-scale offshore oil deposits. Diamond mining also developed in the northeast section of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Nationalist Movements MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola): a leftist group formed in 1956. It drew its support from the Mbundu people of the Luanda area and from the industrial workers of the coastal cities. FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, or the National Front for the Liberation of Angola): a northern-based movement that was popular among the Bakongo ethnic group. UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, or the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola): a breakaway faction from the FNLA formed in 1966. Its power base was among the Ovimbundu people of the central plateau. FLEC (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, or the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave): formed in 1963 to press for the independence of the fragment of Angolan territory on the coast between the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

country. Oil and diamonds continued to fund the postindependence civil war long after external supporters lost interest. Government control of oil concessions allowed it to equip and re-equip the national army throughout the struggle, while UNITA’s control of much of the diamond mining areas bankrolled its apparently endless rebellion. The three main nationalist movements that emerged to resist the Portuguese —and which then fought among themselves for “possession” of the postindependence state—drew their support in broad terms from distinct geographical regions. The MPLA had its primary power base among the Mbundu of the Luanda area, the urbanized mestiço (mixed race) and white radicals of the central coastal cities. The FNLA drew its main support from the Bakongo of the north. The Bakongo people, who make up about 15 percent of Angola’s population, straddle the border with the modern-day Democratic Republic of Congo, where it is the largest single ethnic group. The geographical base of UNITA was among the Ovimbundu people of Angola’s central plateau. All three movements, however, claimed to have a “national” following. No such claim was/is made by the nationalist movement in the Cabinda enclave, a small fragment of Angolan territory that lies between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the separate (former French) Congo Republic. Cabinda was “given” to Portugal by agreement among the European imperialists in the 1880s. Since 1963, a separatist movement there—the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC)—has fought for the separation of the territory from the rest of Angola. The geographic bases of the three main Angolan nationalist movements reflected different social conditions, which in turn shaped their respective “national N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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visions.” The Marxist orientation of the MPLA was largely determined by the fact that its support lay among the urban working class and the “non-tribal” mixed race population of the coastal cities. This mestiço element was a distinctive feature of nationalism in Angola (as well as in Mozambique, Portugal’s other large African territory). So, too, was the presence of European activists, attracted by the MPLA’s commitment to Marxism and the prospect of a revolutionary project in Africa grounded in non-racial “internationalist” ideals. In contrast, the mainly Bakongo plantation workers who provided the power base of the UPA/FNLA represented a quite different “style” of nationalism. The Bakongo’s cross-border presence qualified its “Angolan” nationalism, while both the MPLA and UNITA were wholly “internal” in terms of their ethnic and regional bases. Small farmers and traders were prominent among the Ovimbundu of the central plateau, who were the basis of UNITA’s support. The Ovimbundu are Angola’s largest single ethnic group—constituting about 37 percent of the total population—and had a reputation for both a strong work ethic and obedience to traditional authority. These qualities may have contributed to the persistence of UNITA through the many troughs and setbacks it faced from the time of its formation. The internal “culture” or “personality” that developed within the FNLA and UNITA was influenced by a long history of local resistance to the Portuguese in the areas from which the parties drew their support. Angola was not “pacified” by the colonial power until well after World War I. In contrast, the MPLA’s “modernism” and its declared commitment to revolutionary internationalism meant that its historical reference points were more diverse. Its heroes and models for action came from beyond Angola. Indeed, they frequently came from beyond Africa. The MPLA saw itself as a component of the global resistance to imperialism and neo-imperialism; however, the MPLA was also happy to point to the historic role of the Mbundu (from the Luanda area)—from the earliest days of the colonial presence in the 16th and 17th centuries—in the forefront of resistance to the Portuguese.

Instituting the Nation The character and personalities of the leadership of the three movements were critical elements in their individual development and political fortunes. Agostinho Neto, who emerged as leader of the MPLA in 1962 and who was president of Angola from independence in 1975 until his death in 1979, was a poet and physician. Like the leaders of the nationalist movements in other parts of Portuguese Africa—such as Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique—he had studied in Lisbon and had close contacts with both fellow nationalists from the other colonies and with the Portuguese resistance to the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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authoritarian regime. Neto’s Marxism (and more generally that of the MPLA) was therefore shaped by the political culture of continental Europe. This may have contributed to the MPLA’s tendency to ideological factionalism, an ailment typical of the European left. Both before and after independence, Neto’s leadership was challenged by other factions within the MPLA that were led by such figures as Mário de Andrade and Daniel Chipenda. Holden Roberto of the FNLA was in many ways an unlikely “nationalist” leader, having spent most of his life outside of Angola. He had lived almost all of his life in the Congo to the north; first when it was a Belgian colony, and then when it became the independent state of Congo after 1960. As a result, he spoke better French than Portuguese. This cross-border identity was underlined by his relationship through marriage with the Congo/Zairean dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. These transboundary politics in northern Angola were intensified by the fact that about a half million Bakongo had fled across Angola’s northern border after the 1961 uprising to escape Portuguese reprisals. Roberto commanded considerable loyalty from the Bakongo who looked to him to defend their traditional interests against those of the central coastal “elite.” Jonas Savimbi, the founder and leader of UNITA, was a charismatic leader who commanded an almost religious devotion from his Ovimbundi supporters. In the later phase of his life, however, he proved to be an unpredictable, brutal, and despotic figure. In the years before his death at the hands of government forces in 2002, he had come to dominate his movement as much through fear as through positive support. Nevertheless, in an earlier period, the extent of his leadership powers was evident in his capacity to repeatedly lead UNITA back to war. He succeeded in reigniting the national conflict when the temptations of peace

The Nationalist Leaders Agostinho Neto (1922–1979): Leader of the MPLA from 1962 and president of Angola from 1975 until his death in 1979. Jonas Savimbi (1934–2002): Founder and leader of UNITA until he was killed by MPLA government forces in 2002. Of Ovimbundu parentage, he was educated in Portugal and Switzerland. Holden Roberto (1923– ): Leader of the FNLA who, though born in Angola, spent most of his life across the border in Congo/Zaire. Mário de Andrade (1928–1990): A founding leader of the MPLA and one of its dominant intellectuals. He split with the movement in 1973 to form the “Active Revolt” (Revolta Activa) faction. Daniel Chipenda (1932–1996): Once a famous national soccer player, he led the “Eastern Revolt” (Revolta do Leste) from the MPLA in 1973. José Eduardo dos Santos (1942– ): Soviet-educated MPLA leader who became head of state in 1979.

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must have been all but irresistible to the rank and file of the movement. If nothing else, the collapse of UNITA’s war effort after Savimbi’s death can be considered a measure of his personal power, regardless of how it was exerted. The MPLA’s “capture” of postindependence Angola initially meant that the country became a one-party state with a typically communist institutional structure. The MPLA ceased to be a “liberation movement” and became a “vanguard party.” Party and state were largely indistinguishable from each other. The “political bureau” of the MPLA overlapped with the government and its ministries. The legislature was “elected” from MPLA candidate lists. Constitutional changes in the early 1990s—driven partly by local attempts to settle the war with UNITA and partly by broader transformations throughout the African continent as a whole— created the necessary conditions for multiparty democracy. However, continuing civil war meant that the new structures’ effectiveness was yet to be tested by postconflict elections, which did not take place until the first decade of the 21st century.

Defining the Nation The MPLA’s Marxist internationalism led postindependence Angola into a close relationship with the Soviet Union and more directly with Cuba. Depending on the perspective, this relationship either caused the catastrophe of the first phase of Angolan statehood, or it was the sheet anchor that permitted a vulnerable, independent Angola to establish itself. The “national idea” of the MPLA was one based on concentric circles of internationalism. Beyond Angola lay the other Afro-Marxist states of Portuguese-speaking Africa: Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Cabo Verde. Beyond Africa were the revolutionary countries of the Third World more generally. Cuba had a central place here, but the communist states and revolutionary movements of Latin America and Southeast Asia were also included. Finally, there were the Soviet Union and “socialist” states of Eastern Europe. In the 1990s, this revolutionary socialist vision evaporated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of Marxism in Angola. Since that time, particularly after the civil war ended in 2002, Angola (under the post-Marxist MPLA) has tried to define itself as a key player in the southern region of Africa. Its claims to this status, despite the many problems of postwar reconstruction it confronts, are based on its military and economic power (the first actual and the second potential). The FNLA’s view of the Angolan nation was never coherently expressed. The FNLA was essentially an ethno-nationalist movement, whose appeal was based on Bakongo identity rather than on a truly pan-Angolan vision. An FNLA-dominated Angolan state—which seemed to be a possible outcome in the chaos immediately prior to independence—would have been subject to extensive Zairean influence. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Ethnic Dimension Ovimbundu: the largest of Angola’s ethno-linguistic groups, constituting about 37 percent of the country’s total population. Its main concentration is on the country’s central plateau. Mbundu: the second largest national ethnic group, constituting about 25 percent of the population. The Mbundu dominate the Luanda area and the adjacent interior. Bakongo: the dominant ethnic group in the north of Angola and the third largest in the country as a whole, constituting about 15 percent of the national population. Mestiços: Angola’s mixed-race (Euro-African) population. Large by African standards, it comprises about 2 percent of the population. White Europeans: Large settler population that was unusual in 20th-century colonial Africa in its commitment as an active minority to the nationalist cause.

UNITA was more successful than the FNLA in extending its appeal beyond its immediate ethnic base. In the preindependence period, UNITA had flirted with Maoism, though more as a means of acquiring Chinese aid (as Beijing sought to counter Moscow’s influence over the MPLA) than as a genuine ideological commitment. Later, UNITA positioned itself as an anticommunist, pro-Western movement that was ready to challenge the pro-Soviet MPLA regime. UNITA’s reliance on the support of apartheid South Africa, however, fatally compromised it (in the eyes of most African states) and also undermined its nationalist credentials. To other Africans, UNITA’s Angola would have provided a Trojan horse for South African interests and a base for neocolonial interference in the continent as a whole.

Narrating the Nation Angola’s national “narrative” takes on different forms depending on the varying political ideologies and ethnicities that have competed in recent times. In the north, for example, the tradition of Kongo kingship—dating back to before the first Portuguese incursions—remain immensely important. Also important is the tradition of anti-Portuguese resistance in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the divisions in the anticolonial struggle during the second half of the 20th century show that there was no unifying narrative in the guerrilla war leading up to independence. Although for outsiders an armed struggle began in 1961, from the Angolan perspective two separate uprisings took place that year and subsequently followed different trajectories. For the Bakongo and the FNLA, the key event, which took place in March, was the major rebellion on the northern plantations. For the MPLA, the true armed struggle began in February with its attacks on prisons and police posts in Luanda. The MPLA’s domination of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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government since independence has given this partial view an official status; however, it is questionable how much of the nation shares this same viewpoint. In the postindependence period, the officially celebrated national milestones are also partite; for example, the defeat of the northern advance against the MPLA by South African forces at the beginning of 1976 and their expulsion from Angola. The complicating factors here are that the feat was only performed with the assistance of other foreign forces (i.e., Cuban forces), and that South Africa was in Angola in support of UNITA. With the arrival of long-term peace, however, and with the evident consolidation of MPLA power, it is likely that the MPLA narrative will gradually become the nationally accepted one. Moreover, Angola’s dominant cultural, literary, and intellectual traditions are associated much more with the MPLA traditions than with those of its rivals. This linkage is perhaps to be expected given the MPLA’s urban, cosmopolitan, and leftist foundations. Almost exclusively, it is the work of pro-MPLA authors such as a Luandino Vieira (president of the Angolan Writers’ Union) that has won a wider international readership.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In the years immediately following independence, the MPLA regime tried actively to downplay, if not suppress, ethnic and regional differences. It sought to do so while still celebrating the “African” identity of the state. Inevitably, this agenda led to some contradictions. While cultural activities—usually in the form of music and dance—were to be celebrated as markers of postcolonial identity, emphasis on their specific local origins risked encouraging antinational regionalism. The official objective was the construction of a new national consciousness based on the concept of the homen novo (“new man”), an idea borrowed from the Cuban revolution. This new Angolan would be free of the inferiority complex engendered by colonialism, aware and proud of the nation’s cultural heritage but not trapped by its divisive and obscurantist aspects. Initially, Bakongo, Ovimbundo, and Cabindan supporters of the MPLA benefited from a kind of unofficial affirmative action within the party and state; however, the continuing pressures of war and a natural reassertion of traditional patron-client forms of rule against “imported” Marxism changed the situation. The dominance of an urban Mbundu and mestiço elite in party and government became increasingly obvious. This situation was brutally underlined after the bloody suppression of a leftist coup attempt within the MPLA in May 1977. By the late 1990s, due to this imbalance, Angola had established a reputation as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The means by which the MPLA state asserted its national vision were typical of other communist states in the 1970s. Political propaganda was strongly N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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influenced by Soviet-style socialist realism. In contrast to other African states, Angola inherited a relatively sophisticated communications infrastructure at the time of decolonization (a product of the large preindependence white settler population). For example, Angola had a functioning television network. With foreign help, the state proved to be adept at exploiting this medium for propaganda purposes. Despite this, the MPLA, and therefore its distinctive national idea, faced real difficulties in legitimizing itself. In the early phase of independence, the MPLA struggled both internally and externally to validate its right to rule. At the time of decolonization, the doctrine of “revolutionary legitimacy” defined the transfer of power from Portugal to the new regimes in its former possessions. In essence this doctrine stated that the very fact of protracted armed struggle bestowed the “right” for nationalist movements and their objectives to rule. It was a philosophically questionable stance, but one which served the interests of all sides. It permitted the liberation movements to dodge questions about the real level of their popular support. It also provided Portugal with an exit strategy without the requirement to organize and then implement democratic settlements; however, while the doctrine addressed the circumstances of Portugal’s other African territories, the Angolan situation was more complicated. Here, three separate movements claimed revolutionary legitimacy. Faced with a civil war that had spun out of control by the date fixed for independence (November 1975), Portugal produced a pragmatic constitutional formula to cover its withdrawal. Power was transferred not to a particular regime or government—which would have involved Lisbon in anointing a successor from among the competing movements—but rather to the Angolan people. Both the MPLA and a quickly arranged FNLA-UNITA alliance claimed legitimacy, but it was the MPLA that controlled the capital (due to the location of its power base). Although diplomatic recognition quickly followed from the communist bloc and from the majority of African states, Western acceptance of the MPLA regime’s legitimacy was withheld for some time (e.g., the United States did not recognize its legitimacy until the 1990s). Since the end of the war in 2002, reconstruction has been the main focus of national consolidation. This focus is viewed by Angolan leaders as both a vehicle and a prerequisite for nation-building. Of course, the expansive, ideology-driven programs of the late 1970s have long been abandoned, but one characteristic of the Marxist project still remains: a high degree of centralization. Although there are signs that the regime is willing to accommodate its former enemies in new political structures (mostly the result of abortive peace plans from the 1990s), real political authority resides in Luanda, and power remains in the hands of the successors (often family members) of the previous MPLA elite. The economic base for nation-building certainly exists in Angola with its extensive oil reserves and additional mineral wealth. Direct foreign investment has flown freely since the end of the war. A major constraint, however, is Angola’s now deeply rooted corruption. This delivers a double blow to the nation-building N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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process: it deprives the country of the proper return for its trade in oil and other natural resources and engenders a culture of cynicism. Today, nation-building on the basis of its external standing and image is less of a problem for Angola. Its size and wealth make it a major participant in its own southern African region and beyond. Angola is one of Africa’s leading military powers. This status, of course, is a consequence of the years of civil war; but although military capacity has been sharply reduced since 2002, it still remains considerable. Angola was one of a number of regional states that intervened in the chaos of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. The previous year it had sent troops to support the government of the Congo Republic (i.e., the “other Congo” on its borders). In the late 1970s, an invited Angolan intervention had stabilized a dangerous situation in the fellow Portuguese-speaking island state of São Tomé e Príncipe. All of these actions helped Angola develop a reputation as a strong nation capable of regionally projecting its power. The military, moreover, acts as a unique agent of nation-building in contemporary Angola. Under successive peace plans, it is committed to integrating former antigovernment fighters into its ranks. In this way, the military could potentially become a model for the larger national project. Selected Bibliography Anstee, M. 1996. Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angola Peace Process, 1992-93. London: Macmillan. Birmingham, D. 1992. Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique. Oxford: James Currey. Bridgland, F. 1986. Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. Edinburgh: Mainstream. Guimarães, F. A. 1998. The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict. London: Macmillan. Heimer, F.-W. 1979. The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: An Essay in Political Sociology. Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales. Henderson, L. 1979. Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Heywood, L. 2000. Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Library of Congress Federal Research Division. 1989. “Angola: A Country Study.” Edited by Thomas Collelo. (Retrieved January 3, 2008), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/ cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0000). MacQueen, N. 1997. The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire. London: Longman. Marcum, J. 1969–1978. The Angolan Revolution. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Somerville, K. 1986. Angola: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Pinter. Wright, G. 1997. The Destruction of a Nation: United States Policy towards Angola since 1975. London: Pluto.

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Rwanda and Burundi Helen Hintjens Chronology 1350s–1500 Dates of first kingdoms in regions now known as Rwanda and Burundi, based on oral traditions. 1894 First Germans set foot in Rwanda and speak with the king. Coffee becomes the first cash crop some 20 years later. 1923 Belgium becomes responsible for Ruanda-Urundi under the League of Nations (Trusteeship). 1933 Belgians introduce administrative reforms, including identity cards with fixed, paternally inherited markers according to “ethnicity” (i.e., Hutu, Tutsi, Twa). 1945 Ruanda-Urundi becomes a United Nations (UN) Trust Territory under Belgian control. 1957 The Hutu manifesto is published in Ruanda. 1958 The rise of anti-Belgian sentiment in Burundi. 1959 Rwandan King Rudahigwa dies under suspicious circumstances. Tutsi are killed and others flee. 1961 The monarchy is abolished in Rwanda. More Tutsi flee Rwanda for Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. 1962 Independence of Rwanda and of Burundi. 1972 An estimated 100,000–200,000 Hutu are massacred in Burundi. There is a retaliatory purge of Tutsi in Rwanda. 1973 Following his involvement in purges of Tutsi, Major Juvenal Habyarimana ousts Gregoire Kayibanda and declares a new Republic. 1975 Rwanda becomes a one-party state. 1986 The world price of coffee plummets, damaging the economies of Rwanda and Burundi. 1988 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) is created in Uganda. (October) After the massacres in Burundi in August, President Buyoya creates the National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity. 1990 Reforms for multiparty elections in Rwanda. In Burundi, President Buyoya rejects multipartyism. (October) The RPA invades Rwanda. At the same time, structural adjustment starts in Rwanda. (November) President Habyarimana promises elections in Rwanda. (December) Military rule in Burundi ends; democratization begins under the National Unity Charter. 1991 (February) Habyarimana agrees that Rwandan exiles in Uganda have the right to return. The National Unity Charter is supported by over 89 percent of Burundi voters in a referendum. (August) New Rwandan political parties are created: MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Republicain), PSD (Parti Social Démocrate), and PL (Parti Libéral). (November) There are antigovernment demonstrations in Kigali. 1992 (February) “Practice” massacres of Tutsi in Bugesera, Rwanda. (July) A cease-fire with the RPA is negotiated under the Arusha Accords, with Tanzanian mediation. (August) Violent demonstrations by militias start in Kigali. (April) A new cabinet is nominated in Burundi; half the seats are for Hutu.

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1993 (February) The RPA is at the outskirts of Kigali. (April) The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) warns of famine in Rwanda. (June) There are elections in Burundi. Melchior Ndadaye, the Hutu leader of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, or FRODEBU), wins two-thirds of the vote and becomes president. (June–October) UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) is created in Rwanda; General Dallaire is appointed as commander. (October) Ndadaye is killed by soldiers in Bujumbura barracks. Mass refugee flight from Burundi to Rwanda. (December) Diplomats in Kigali learn of genocide plans. 1994 (January) The United Nations is warned of genocide plans; Dallaire is not allowed to seize weapons. (February) Opposition (southern) politicians are being assassinated in Rwanda. Willy Claes, Belgian foreign minister, visits Rwanda and warns of the need to respect the Arusha Accords. (April 5) The Security Council threatens to pull out the UNAMIR if the Arusha Accords are not implemented. (April 6) President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaiyamira of Burundi are killed when their plane is shot down above Kigali. Genocide starts within the hour, with Tutsi blamed for killing the president. Prominent Tutsi and opposition Hutu leaders are the first to be killed. (April 7) Ten Belgian peacekeepers are killed; four days later, foreign nationals leave Rwanda; Belgian troops and 90 percent of the UNAMIR troops withdraw; it takes the United States until July 15 to acknowledge the genocide as reality. (July 5) The French establish a “safe zone” in the southwest of Rwanda, and 1 million people flee toward Zaire, including 13 members of the Interim Government. On August 16, Dallaire leaves Rwanda. (November) The UN Security Council creates an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try crimes of genocide.

Situating the Nations The present borders of Rwanda closely resemble those of the precolonial kingdom of the mwamis (“kings”), except in the northwest, where Hutu kingdoms were annexed in the early 20th century. Burundi has never been centralized in the same way as Rwanda, and in the precolonial era, it was made up of many princely kingdoms. They feuded, paid tribute, and rebelled against the Ganwa, a royal caste that oversaw this messy, shifting assemblage. Rwanda, by contrast, was a unitary system of obligation, allegiance, and tribute, with an overarching and complex system of chiefdoms, stratified into regions, localities, and hillsides. The Burundian capital, Bujumbura, located on Lake Tanganyika, became the major urban, administrative, and commercial city of Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian Trusteeship from the 1920s onward. Here, the East African trading language, Kiswahili, started to be spoken alongside French and Kirundi, which is the sister language of Kinyarwanda, spoken in Rwanda alongside French and, since 1994, alongside English as well. The main regional connections of Rwanda and Burundi are with the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Kivu region in particular, and there are road links with Tanzania and Uganda. Principal international air links are with Nairobi, Brussels, and Paris. In both countries, Tutsi are estimated at around 14 percent of the population, Hutu at 85 percent, and the minority Twa at just 1 percent. Mixed N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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marriages, particularly common in northern Burundi and southern Rwanda prior to the genocide, are less common now, at least according to anecdotal accounts. They hardly ever happened in the Rwandan northwest. In 1959 a popular “revolution” against the Rwandan aristocracy was supported by Belgium, and many Tutsi were killed, especially those associated with the monarchy and the colonial administration. When Prince Rwagasore was assassinated in Burundi shortly before independence in 1962, his death ended hopes of a cross-communal democracy in that country. In both countries, independence followed in an atmosphere of fear and distrust, because the process of “national self-determination” involved killings and pogroms that were almost always onesided. The Catholic Church did nothing to reduce Hutu and Tutsi divisions, and it took different sides at various times. Rather than reconciling Hutu and Tutsi among themselves, the church and its offshoot, the schools, and the colonial administration tended to feed a highly divisive version of history. In both Rwanda and Burundi, economic life is now in deep crisis. The main reasons are long-term structural poverty, physical violence, and growing insecurity. Pockets of affluence exist in Bujumbura and Kigali, but the benefits fail to “trickle N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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down” to most ordinary Rwandans and Burundians. This was not always the case; from independence onward, there was a period of relative economic stability, if not exactly prosperity. Now, however, things are getting steadily worse. Since prices for coffee slumped in the mid-1980s, the main source of state revenue and cash income for farmers has evaporated. Farmers have been sucked dry, and Rwanda and Burundi became heavily indebted at the same time, coming to resemble their neighbors Tanzania and Uganda in this respect. Prior to the late 1980s, Rwanda in particular was known in aid circles as well managed, a model developing country, relatively free of graft and highly organized. It was the mid-1980s’ coffee price collapse that started the process of economic decline. Steady growth in the 1970s and 1980s gave way to a negative growth rate, minus 6 percent for Rwanda in 1989, and zero growth in Burundi in the same year. Economic conditions have improved slightly for Rwanda since the disaster of the genocide, but things have deteriorated further for Burundi. By 2000, the growth rate (a pretty crude indicator of success) was 3.1 percent in Rwanda and −1.6 percent in Burundi. In this intensively farmed part of the world, complex and sophisticated croprotation systems are needed to maintain soil fertility and prevent erosion. Such systems have all but collapsed under the combined pressures of war, insecurity, refugee departures and returns, and growing poverty among the rural population. Soil is cultivated right up to the summits of the hills. Terracing, which extends acreage and reduces erosion, was abandoned for some time in the late 1980s and early 1990s. State extension services have been cut because of privatization. The result is that food crops, including beans, bananas, rice, and other grains, are in decline, and more and more basic foodstuffs now have to be imported from Uganda and further afield simply to ensure food self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, coffee and tea are not viable for small farmers to grow. Around 90 percent of the population in each country is still engaged in subsistence farming, and famine has become a recurrent threat. Both Rwanda and Burundi are small, landlocked, and densely populated; people live cheek by jowl. As social bonds have been split through war, genocide, retribution, and mistrust, it has become more and more difficult to mobilize people for voluntary public works. Apathy is a new problem, especially in Rwanda since the genocide, which has left a society traumatized and many socially excluded. With more than 200 people per square kilometer in Burundi, and 250 in Rwanda, even the flora and fauna of the region have proven difficult to protect. Constant movements of internally displaced people and refugees have all but destroyed what little game or natural reserves there were in this area, undermining the potential for long-haul tourism. After 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became a major focus for both Bujumbura and Kigali because of continued warfare and refugee movements into and out of the Congo, a situation to which both regimes have contributed, especially Rwanda (and also Uganda), through interventions and documented pillage of mineral and other resources. Retaliatory raiding parties follow crossN ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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border incursions from forces hostile to both the Burundi and Rwanda governments, confirming this as the “wild west” of the Great Lakes region. The lure of mineral wealth, lawlessness, and impunity go hand in hand, with DRC being one of the “softest” states anywhere in the world.

Instituting the Nations After independence, the relationship between nationalism and the state in Burundi and Rwanda were like mirror images of one another. Official Burundi nationalism claimed to be blind to ethnicity and race; Rwandan nationalism was explicitly racialized in favor of the “majority population,” who were presumed to be entitled to rule from the time of independence. The Tutsi, 14–15 percent of the population in both countries, were dominant in Burundi, including in the administration and especially in the army (where a subclan known as the Bahima were heavily overrepresented). In Rwanda, the Tutsi were suppressed by quotas in higher education and largely kept out of the top ranks of the army and civil service. Many were exiled, and their main routes for social promotion were in business, law, and the professions rather than in government. Forming a marginalized and beleaguered minority, the Twa in both countries were treated as an underclass and were occupationally confined to pottery and related activities. They were all but invisible and voiceless in public debate. The task of state leaders in Rwanda and Burundi since the early 1990s has been to rework the sense of nationalism inherited from the postindependence era. After the 1994 genocide, state-led nationalism in Rwanda has officially removed ethnic and race labels, like Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, from Rwandan political identity (and also from identity cards). It is noteworthy that the backbone of the post-1994 regime is formed by returnees from Uganda, many of whom speak English. They have elaborated a form of what Robin Cohen terms “victim diasporic” nationalism, akin to that of Israel, where genocide is similarly central to national identity formation. This type of nationalism was born out of the experience of exile and the long-lived hope of eventual return to Rwanda. To ensure that their own conception of the Rwandan nation is the dominant one, the new political elite of Rwanda has introduced a raft of institutional changes since 1994. These include new laws against divisive language, special gacaca (“village”) courts to try genocide crimes, solidarity camps where an authorized version of national history is taught to young and old alike, and a National Reconciliation Council and Genocide Survivors’ Fund. In the brave new Rwanda, shared national Rwandan identity is supposed to override all other forms of political identity. This Herculean task is far from being achieved. Instead of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa, new terms have emerged: survivor (i.e., surviving Tutsi), suspected genocidaire (assumed to be Hutu), old caseload (Tutsi), and new caseload (Hutu) refugees (returnees). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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These terms are now more widely used that the overt race labels of the past; in a sense, politically correct terms have replaced the “tribal” labels of the past. The genocide of 1994 has become the point of origin of official nationalist ideology in postgenocide Rwanda. Official Rwandan nationalism has also come into line with the official nationalist line in Burundi since independence, namely, that all citizens are equal, and that any remaining conflicts among them are just the psychological projection of divisive attitudes inherited from the colonial past. Race divisions are seen not as a reality, or as based on unequal living conditions, but as a hangover and evidence that decolonization is still incomplete. So when the first popularly elected Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, was swept to power in early 1993, it seemed the prospects for peace were greatly enhanced for the entire region. Just four months later, he was murdered by the army, in the Bujumbura barracks. Tragically, this event ended “Burundi’s gradual but brave and determined progress towards democracy and power sharing” (Melvern 2004, 71–72). Ndadaye’s killing ended hopes for peaceful coexistence in both countries and immediately prompted mass retaliatory purges of Tutsi in many parts of Burundi. As an estimated 350,000 Burundian refugees fled to Rwanda in a heightened state of tension and fear, their presence helped fuel intergroup tensions inside Rwanda. Meanwhile, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) crossed the Ugandan border into

Refugees wait for water at a distribution center on their way back to Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. (U.S. Department of Defense)

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Rwanda in October 1990. The rebels did not seek compromise, nor did the Rwandan government. The RPA invasion fueled militarization in Rwanda and prompted the diversion of resources into arms spending. Inside Rwanda, politicians advocating Hutu Pawa (“Hutu power”) used the killing of Ndadaye as they would later use the killing of Habyarimana, to convince Hutu Rwandans that Tutsi planned not only to rule over them once more, but even to massacre them en masse, starting with their leaders. Political democratization in Rwanda and Burundi has had a bumpy ride over the past two decades. In Rwanda’s case, political opposition has barely been tolerated during any period. Each successive regime acts with impunity where its perceived enemies are concerned. Since 1994, RPA soldiers have committed atrocities both inside Rwanda and in neighboring countries, especially in the DRC, and hardly anyone has been prosecuted. Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were elected in 2001 and 2002, in part by intimidating, and even imprisoning, opposition politicians. The key institution in both countries today seems to be the intelligence services, with which Kagame has been closely associated. The army and intelligence services are able to operate throughout Burundi, for though the country’s administrative, judicial, and criminal justice systems have come to a virtual standstill. In terms of international relations, Rwanda does marginally better than Burundi. During the postgenocide era, as prior to 1994, the Rwandan government

Hotel Rwanda This 2005 film depicts the true story of Rwandan assistant hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina, who sheltered more than 1,500 people fleeing the genocide outside the hotel walls. The director, Terry George, worked with Paul on the film, which was shot in South Africa rather than Rwanda. The hero now lives in quiet exile in Brussels and denies he is a hero at all. Don Cheadle stars in the lead, and Paul’s wife is played by Sophie Okonedo. When it was released in February 2005, the film was shown at film festivals internationally, winning several awards and Oscar nominations. Shown in Kigali in April, on the 11th anniversary of the genocide, the film was criticized for not depicting the real horror of the genocide. However, the director defended his decision to leave the scale of the slaughter implicit, as he wanted Hotel Rwanda to be accessible to high school audiences, especially in the United States, as an educational device. Since then Rusesabagina has published his own version of the story. The official film Web site (http://www.hotelrwanda.com/main. html) has many clips and commentaries. Sometimes in April, a film directed by Raoul Peck, was also released in early 2005 and was much more explicit in its depiction of the genocide, and much more direct in accusing Westerners of indifference to the genocide, indicting the media’s excessive attention to more trivial matters. Unlike Hotel Rwanda, which was filmed in South Africa, Sometimes in April was shot inside Rwanda. More recently, there have been efforts by Rwandans themselves to create a Rwandan film industry that can produce films in Kinyarwanda, moving beyond genocide themes to produce comedies and dramas.

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managed to mobilize considerable international support for its policies from Western donors. Postgenocide reconstruction and justice systems have been partly underwritten by foreign aid budgets. The danger is that the country’s “genocide credit” may inadvertently lead to the continuance of impunity, with the covering up of human rights violations by the current regime, both inside Rwanda and in the DRC. By contrast, Burundi’s government has been almost abandoned by the international community as civil war has raged on and on. Postconflict systems of criminal justice in Rwanda are managing to end certain kinds of impunity related to the genocide itself, but the war crimes of those in power are still being ignored or denied. Rwanda’s genocide has acquired a high profile through the media, and has even been converted into a successful Hollywood movie, Hotel Rwanda. As political repression continues in both countries, more and more refugees leave to seek safety elsewhere. According to Filip Reyntjens (a leading Belgian expert on the region), increasing numbers of these exiles are Tutsi rather than Hutu.

Defining the Nations Since independence, Rwandan and Burundian nationalists have been divided into three kinds: (1) those who think the majority has the right to determine what happens to the minority; (2) those who think a minority has the right to rule over the majority; (3) and those who believe in inclusive, cross-cutting Rwandan and Burundian political identities. For all three categories, the state is the main center of power, with the means either to undermine or to shore up separate ethnic and racial identities. Forget tropical images of chaotic filing systems, lazy fans, flies, and large-bellied corrupt officials snoozing while secretaries file their nails; these do not work in Rwanda or Burundi. Bureaucratic structures, when they work, give an impression of precision and machine-like precision, especially in Rwanda. Far from having collapsed during or after the genocide, the Rwandan state has proven to be a remarkably resilient and formidable structure, able to gain the passive, as well as active, consent of most ordinary Rwandans. In Rwanda, channels of state power are everywhere present and obvious; officials monitor and control the people through a whole host of complex regulatory mechanisms. Tight top-down political control is a tradition; prior to 1994, every Rwandan needed official permission from the local authorities before being allowed to move to another village or town. Record keeping at the local level has generally been immaculate, something that greatly facilitated genocide in 1994. The importance of authority was clear in the way Tutsi victims fled to municipality buildings, schools, and churches during the early days of the genocide itself, seeking safety. They sought protection. But these three major institutional sites of state power—the church the more informal, the state the most formal, and the education system a meeting point between the two—delivered the fleeing citizens into the hands of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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killers, and many teachers, priests, and local officials also took part in the killings themselves. Although the army and state employment are also important in Burundi, the control of the state over its citizens is less clear-cut than in Rwanda. The consent of ordinary Burundians is harder to obtain, and so is control over their movements. The counterpart of this growing distance between states and citizens is that Burundians are largely being left to their own devices in terms of their daily life and survival. Public services like transport, health, and education are either costly, chaotic, or largely unavailable outside major towns and settlements. A few years after independence, in what remains the major comparative work on Rwanda and Burundi, Rene Lemarchand noted major differences between social structures in the two countries. What he says is worth quoting in full: In Rwanda one notices an almost perfect coincidence of social stratification and ethnic divisions; in Burundi, on the other hand, social stratification and cultural or ethnic pluralism were anything but “consistent” in the sense that one automatically replicated the other. (Lemarchand 1970, 474)

The relative complexity of social stratification in Burundi has been used to explain why national and ethnic identities in that country have been more localized, less systematic, than in Rwanda. In Rwanda, the relative simplicity of the fabric of social differentiation has proven highly dangerous; it both integrates and includes Rwandans into a single, centralized system of controls and provisions and can fatally divide them, as during the era of preparation and implementation of the genocide. But systematic, state-directed genocide is not confined to Rwanda. Both Stephen Weissman, the Holocaust historian, and the British philosopher Bertrand Russell termed the killing of 100,000 to 200,000 Hutu people in Burundi in 1972 a “genocide” at the time. After independence, official Burundi nationalism claimed not to see ethnic or racial differences among Burundian citizens. Meanwhile, the army periodically massacred any educated Hutu who might aspire to transform the dominant political order at local or national levels. Official Rwandan nationalism was more ambiguous, since it explicitly or implicitly rested on the notion of a Hutu majority. In Burundi, violence was more sporadic, less controllable, and eventually involved violent conflict between two sides. It resembled a festering sore, a “nightmarish sequence of terrorism and counter-terrorism,” involving an “ever larger segment of the peasantry” in violence (Lemarchand 1970, 483). In Rwanda, by contrast, until the RPA invasion of 1990, violence was almost entirely in one direction, was clearly targeted, and was quite carefully managed by the state; it could almost be switched on and off. The Rwandan Revolution involved violence that resulted in one set of officials being replaced with another—Tutsi with a new class of Hutu leaders. For the ordinary Rwandans, there was no escape from their utter reliance on authority in their everyday lives, and they remained locked into complex, and occasionally deadly, ties of dependency and subordination with dominant local elites. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Rwanda’s national unity has been disputed from the start. In the northwest, as already noted, a distinctive system of Hutu kingdoms survived well into the 20th century that was fiercely resistant to encroachment by Rwandan structures. The elites of this region retained a certain distance from the rest of Rwanda, from Hutu southerners and from Tutsi elites. This region provided the base for President Habyarimana, who ousted President Gregoire Kayibanda, a southerner, in a coup in the early 1970s, after himself being involved in massacres of Tutsi civilians, ostensibly as “reprisals” for killings of Hutu by the army under Micombero in Burundi. Most of those who propagated the Hutu Pawa ideology of the early 1990s, which facilitated genocide in 1994, also came from the northwestern region of Rwanda, the first to be affected when the RPA invaded from Uganda in 1990. Their reaction was to mobilize resistance to the Arusha Accords that sought to bring about peace and integrate the RPA into national military structures. Instead, the northwestern elite worked hard to avoid peace, and indeed decided that the killing of Tutsi on a massive scale should be organized and implemented. The efficacy of state structures is less obvious in Burundi, where unity and order have broken down under the pressure of prolonged civil war, massacres, and political stalemate. Here political violence initially took the form of periodic cycles of repression of educated Hutu, often on a regional basis. The Tutsi elite are increasingly living like internal exiles within Bujumbura, and many have left the country. Educated Hutu are attacked periodically because they are seen as potential leaders of a political opposition. Educational institutions, church missions, and other institutions that have sought to protect Hutu have also been targeted by the army during these massacres, the worst being in 1972 and 1988. Until 1993, massacres in Burundi were a means of defending the status quo, by eliminating leadership among the Hutu majority population. Tutsi were completely dominant in Burundian politics and the army. Since 1993, however, the situation has changed, as the opposition Palipehutu movement has been able to mobilize and arm large numbers of Hutu to retaliate, with widespread anti-Tutsi massacres. A full-blown civil war has been the result, and the army no longer sees itself as restoring or maintaining social order but now claims to be fighting “terrorism.” Throughout its history, there has arguably been little sense of shared Burundian national identity. Yet successive governments have all claimed to be in favor of one, inclusive Burundian identity. This is not unreasonably regarded by many Hutu as propaganda, and now persuades almost nobody.

Narrating the Nations The histories of Rwanda and Burundi are still deeply debated today. Not only are different versions of the past used to justify present policies, but recent history is also understood through the images of the more distant, and even mythical, past. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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These different versions of history need to be part of the picture to explain why recurrent political violence has marred national life in both countries over the past few decades. Colonial ideas of race were constructed along scientific lines, taking height and facial features into account. The Belgians allied themselves with the Tutsi elite, strengthening their dominance and making it something new, something colonial. The inequalities inside Burundian and Rwandan society, which were inherited from the precolonial era, were thus remolded to suit the colonizers’ purposes and interests. Since independence, recurrent political violence and persecution have become tied in with different stories about the past. Generally speaking, where one chooses to “start” the massacres and cycles of killings will reveal where one’s sympathies lie. Deep-seated psychological tensions among Rwandans and Burundians themselves persist in relation to the past and its relationship with the present. Complex religious and cultural notions of the self and the other can to some extent explain how killings proceed, but only to some extent. There were also local variations, and one single commune even escaped genocide (Giti). More than 10 years after the genocide, more complex understandings of its causes and dynamics started to emerge. Both in Rwanda and Burundi, precolonial myths of origin combined with European ideas of race to create a strange offspring: the Hamitic hypothesis. This ideology of racial difference between Hutu and Tutsi is still important today. According to this story, Tutsi were interlopers from the Nilotic North, and Hutu were the indigenous Bantu people who already lived in the Great Lakes region (the Twa do not figure in this story, as they would have to be even more indigenous than the Hutu). This particular reading of the past was echoed in church teachings and in mission schools, ad nauseam. Initially, such ideas sanctioned the control of the Tutsi elite over Rwandan society. Later, the Hamitic hypothesis became, particularly in Rwanda, an excuse for denying Tutsi the status of authentic Rwandans, true sons of the soil. History is still spoken about in lively terms by Rwandans and Burundians alike, and stories about the past affect people’s daily perceptions profoundly. Race can seem to come into everything. When foreign tourists were killed by Rwandan Hutu interahamwe militia (genocide militia) in Camp Buhoma in southern Uganda in 1999, Anglo-Saxons were specifically targeted racially for having betrayed their Bantu (i.e., Hutu) brothers by allying themselves with the Tutsi. With ideas of race so prominent in people’s minds, democratization has proved very difficult in Rwanda and Burundi and remains all but blocked. Moves toward more democratic forms of politics have been accompanied by genocide and massacre, in Burundi’s case, and by full-blown genocide in Rwanda. It is hard to be hopeful in such a context. The years 1989–1991 marked the start of an experiment in democratization in both countries, largely at the behest of Western donors, who sought democratic reform after the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, the push for democratic political reforms coincided with the hardened resolve of the armed forces to retain tight control over the population as a whole. With the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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shattering of the old economic order, the 1990s became a time of “state collapse, ethnic conflict, economic disintegration, ecological destruction, health crises and political turmoil” (Rugumamu 2004, 157). This applies not only in Rwanda and Burundi but also in other economically devastated and war-torn regions. Democracy has had its enemies in both countries. In Rwanda, both the RPA, invading from Uganda, and the northwestern elites, dominant in the army, were determined that peace and free and fair elections would not prevail. In Burundi, the army prepared to override the decision of the majority, and massacred Ndadaye. In Rwanda, the genocide plan was also intended to put an end to any hopes of democratic politics, and the war with the RPA was used as a cover for making plans to target civilians through militias of armed killers. Real reforms were taking place at the same time, and there were mass demonstrations against the Rwandan government in early 1992. This frightened the military, who feared power-sharing with the RPF (the political wing of the RPA). In Burundi, race politics and militarization have played a large part in delaying the long-awaited return to democratic politics. In the Great Lakes region generally, in the past decade, refugee politics, and the forces that displace people, especially serious human rights abuses and the fear of massacres, undermine local and international moves to consolidate peace and a transition to power-sharing. In such a climate, fear has become endemic, and massacres have become a form of “preventative” political action, intended to avert massacres of one’s own group. It seems strange to define whole countries by the violence that has taken place there rather than by their language, history, and cultural attitudes, but something like this has happened for national identity in both Rwanda and Burundi. Historical memories of political disaster, whether of genocide or massacres, can create a strong sense of cohesion among an ethnic group but result in a fragmented sense of national identity when divisions of race cut across the citizenry, as they are thought to in Rwanda and Burundi. The genocide of 1994 is for some the culmination of a legacy of persecution in Rwanda that dates from the fall of the monarchy and the chasing of tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees out of the country in the early 1960s. Several studies have recently looked at the stories Rwandans and Burundians tell themselves about the past, and how these help one understand what has happened in both countries since independence, and how Burundi and Rwandan identity could have become synonymous with violence and killing.

Building and Mobilizing the Nations It is important to remember that the mobilization of the national populace in Rwanda and Burundi has not always been lethal—far from it. National mobilization for the purposes of peaceful “development” was prevalent during the first N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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few decades after independence. This mainly involved Rwandans and Burundians in unpaid work on public infrastructure projects, including road building, terracing, weed clearing, and construction of public buildings. For some critics, like Peter Uvin, this kind of involuntary mobilization had its history in the colonial era, in forced labor and compulsory taxation, all operated through tight central controls. The mechanisms of mobilization periodically worked in different, more lethal ways, by the time of the genocide. Where the postindependence regimes, especially in Rwanda, mobilized peasants for collective works, during the 1990s, the population was increasingly mobilized through arms and militarization. The development era of the 1970s and 1980s involved mobilizing people to build schools, clinics, roads, and terrace fields, often through ostensibly community-based labor. Mutuality on the local level could involve weed clearing and preparing fields and harvesting. But collective work mobilized through official state structures was generally compulsory, as it had been during the colonial years. At times of violence, including the 1994 genocide, terms normally associated with collective development work came to be used to mean something different, namely preparation for the killing of Tutsi. Organized slaughter of Hutu also took place in Burundi, albeit in different, more secretive, ways than in Rwanda. What is remarkable about nation-building in both Rwanda and Burundi is the way it has not happened, in spite of promising beginnings in both cases. Burundi seemed to have the advantage of a complex social structure, as identified by Lemarchand. Rwanda seemed to have the advantage over many other African nations of postindependence state borders that almost matched the precolonial Rwandan kingdom. Yet today in Burundi and Rwanda, the nation and the state are as mismatched as they were at the time of independence; perhaps more so. The main reason for the disintegration is a history of violent conflict and genocide in both countries since independence in 1962. These two countries are now almost defined by the lack of any continuous peace, since this is a marked feature of their recent national history. For Rwanda, the role of the genocide of 1994 is now akin to that of the Holocaust for Israel. It is a collective national tragedy and also a divisive wound used as an excuse for continuing repression of any opposition. In neighboring Burundi, the role of past massacres and the 1972 genocide in particular is more akin to the Armenian genocide in Turkey; it is a festering, officially unacknowledged sore, and its denial continues to destroy trust and prevent national reconciliation. Of course, the genocides of the past will never happen again, in the sense that history will not be repeated. But neither Rwanda nor Burundi has overcome the roots of the problem of violence. Government impunity, a lack of political dialogue, and the imposition of a market economy on subsistence economies are among the problems that continue to undermine the prospects for long-term peace in the future. As long as conflict continues, and as long as human rights violations remain a daily reality, the movement of the population in cycle after N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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cycle of refugees throughout the Great Lakes region will continue. Resource scarcity will be exacerbated, and the fruits of past growth and development squandered on fighting and weapons. The only hope of a safer future for Rwandans and Burundians lies in their own efforts to overcome the roots of conflict. They must rely on themselves, because there is little chance that the international community’s indifference to events in the Great Lakes will change in the foreseeable future. Selected Bibliography Adelman, H., and A. Suhrke, eds. 2000. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Bloomfield, S. 2007. “Welcome to Hillywood: How Rwanda’s Film Industry Emerged from Genocide’s Shadow.” The Independent (London), August 30. Eltringham, N. 2004. Accounting for Horror. Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. Goyvaerts, D. 2000. “About Bantu and Nilotes.” In Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa, edited by D. Goyvaerts, 301–304. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa. Jose, A. M. 2004. “Sustainable Agricultural Development and Environment: Conflicts and Contradictions in the Context of Rwandan Agriculture.” In The Quest for Peace in Africa. Transformations, Democracy and Public Policy, edited by A. Nhema, 379–402. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: International Books/Ossrea. Lemarchand, R. 1970. Rwanda and Burundi. New York: Praeger. Lemarchand, R. 1994. Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mamdani, M. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Melvern, L. 2004. Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide. London: Verso. Reyntjens, F. 2004. “Rwanda Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship.” In African Affairs 103:177–201. Reyntjens, F., and C. Legum. 1998a. “Burundi towards Power Sharing: A Brave Experiment in Democracy.” In Africa Contemporary Record 1990–92, B272–275. New York: Africana. Reyntjens, F., and C. Legum. 1998b. “Rwanda: The Roots of Genocide.” In Africa Contemporary Record 1990–92, B357–362. New York: Africana. Rugumamu, W. 2004. “Understanding the Link between Post-Conflict Environmental Management and Peace in the African Great Lakes Region.” In The Quest for Peace in Africa: Transformations, Democracy and Public Policy, edited by A. G. Nhema, 157–171. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: International Books/Ossrea. Rusesabagina, P. (with Tom Zoellner). 2006. An Ordinary Man: The True Story behind “Hotel Rwanda.” London: Bloomsbury. Straus, S. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Taylor, C. 1999. Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Oxford: Berg. Third World Institute. 2003. The World Guide 2003/2004: An Alternative Reference to the Countries of the Planet. Oxford: New Internationalist.

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United Nations. 2002. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Extraction of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. UN Reference No. S/2002/1146, submitted October 16. (Retrieved December 21, 2007), http://www.security councilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/DRC%20S% 202002%201146.pdf. Uvin, P. 1998. Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Vlassenroot, K. 2000. “Identity and Insecurity. The Building of Ethnic Agendas in South Kivu.” In Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region, edited by R. Doom and J. Gorus, 263–288. Brussels: VUB University Press. Burundi Government. Burundi : site portail des institutions République du Burundi [in French]. (Retrieved December 21, 2007), http://www.burundi.gov.bi/. Rwandan Government. Official Website of the Government of Rwanda [in English, French, Kinyarwanda]. (Retrieved December 21, 2007), http://www.gov.rw/. [The best Web site for current news is AllAfrica.com, as it uses African and international media sources and digests them, updating daily. News bulletins for Burundi and Rwanda can be found at http://allafrica.com/burundi/ and http://allafrica. com/rwanda/.]

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Afghanistan Conrad Schetter Chronology 1747–1773 Ahmad Shah of the Pashtun Durrani (Abdali) tribal federation establishes the Durrani empire. 1879 (May 26) Treaty of Gandomak. Afghanistan becomes a half-autonomous protectorate of British India. 1888–1893 Abdur Rahman subdues the Shiite Hazaras in atrocious wars. 1893 (January 12) The Durand Treaty determines the border between Afghanistan and British India. 1919 (August 8) A provisional treaty regulates the independence of Afghanistan. 1923 (April 10) Amanullah proclaims a constitution. 1929 (January 16) Habibullah II overthrows Amanullah. (October) Nadir Shah terminates the rule of Habibullah II. 1934 Afghanistan joins the League of Nations. 1948–1975 The Pashtunistan claim is raised by Afghanistan. 1964 (September) A constitution that contains the first signs of Western parliamentarianism is adopted. 1973 (July 17) Mohammad Daud Khan carries out a coup d’état and proclaims the “Republic.” 1978 (April 27) In the April Revolution (inqilab-i sawr), the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrows Mohammad Daud. Mohammad Taraki is appointed president and Afghanistan becomes a “Democratic Republic.” 1979 (December 24–27) Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Beginning of the Afghan war. 1989 Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. 1992 (April) Overthrow of Najibullah by the Mujahideen. Afghanistan becomes an “Islamic Republic.” 1996 (September) The Taliban capture Kabul. The other parties merge into the Northern Alliance. 2001 Fall of the Taliban and the appointment of the interim government under Hamid Karzai. 2002 (mid-June) A loya jirga (large tribal assembly) confirms Karzai as president of the Afghan interim government. 2004 (January 4) Adoption of the new Afghan constitution by a loya jirga. 2005 (October 9) Hamid Karzai is elected president in democratic elections.

Situating the Nation In the historiography, Afghanistan is often described as the “Highway of Conquest” or the “Crossroad of the Conquerors.” Indeed, the region has served as a bridge for migrations, conquests, and the dispersion of religions (e.g., Buddhism, Islam) among Persia, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent for a long time. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Although Afghanistan is often traced back to early ancient times, the Afghan nation-state can be considered a product of modernity, since it was created artificially after the long-running colonial confrontations between British India and Russia in the 19th century, which went down in history as the “Great Game.” At the same time, the geographical term “Afghanistan” underwent a spatial metamorphosis: whereas in the 18th century, “Afghanistan” had been a very loose term used by the Persian-speaking population to refer to the area settled by Pashtun tribes, the colonial powers demarcated the entire area between Persia and their empires as Afghanistan, an area characterized by an opaque and changeable distribution of power. Advances by British Indian troops into the eastern Pashtun tribal areas had made tribal or ethnic borders with neighboring Afghanistan obsolete. Afghanistan was no longer understood to refer “ethnographically” to the Pashtun tribal areas but rather to refer “politically” to the ungoverned buffer zone between Russia, British India, and Persia. Between 1887 and 1893, British India and Russia delineated Afghanistan with precisely defined territorial boundaries (Durand Treaty) and created a kingdom under the rule of Abdur Rahman called Afghanistan within this territory. It remained a semiautonomous protectorate of British India until its independence was achieved by King Amanullah after a short war in 1919. Interestingly, this newborn state was located much further north of the area that had been termed Afghanistan at the beginning of the 19th century.

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Abdur Rahman (1844 –1901) Abdur Rahman can be regarded as the founder of the modern Afghan nation-state. In 1879, when the British government decided to create the state of Afghanistan, it placed Abdur Rahman, who lived for about 10 years in exile in Bukhara, on the Afghan throne. Abdur Rahman ruled Afghanistan from 1879 to 1900. Abdur Rahman’s most impressive, but also most questionable, effort was establishing a monopoly of violence and ending tribal and regional autonomies. This is why he earned the nickname “the Iron Amir.” In numerous wars, he subjugated a myriad of sovereign regional and tribal leaders. The Shiite Hazaras, especially, were subjected to a protracted and extremely brutal war. The submission of the Kafiris (unbelievers) of the Hindu Kush was conveyed by their conversion to Islam and renaming to Nuristani. Abdur Rahman’s rule was based on a dense network of police spies, and he answered any moderate resistance with rigorous repression. The traditional elites, especially, including Islamic dignitaries and tribal leaders, lost power under his rule. Abdur Rahman also laid the groundwork for the development of a modern state. Thus, he reformed the army and the tax system. However, his reform agenda remained limited. Therefore, he maintained the isolation of the country and rejected any technical modernization (e.g., building a railway or telegraph system). Abdur Rahman was, furthermore, the first Afghan ruler who used the term “nation,” although his concept of “nation” was blurred. He used the term “nation” for the Afghans as well as for particular ethnic groups, such as the Kafiris or the Pashtun Durrani tribe. Despite, or because of, his iron rule, Abdur Rahman is one of very few Afghan rulers who died a natural death.

Perhaps the most striking feature of this artificial character of the Afghan state is its geographical surface. The Afghan landscape is dominated by the Hindu Kush, a high mountain range stretching from the Pamir Mountains in the east of the country to the deserts in the west, and thus subdividing the country into several parts. This rough terrain was not only a severe obstacle for the building of an infrastructure but also for the creation of an overarching national identity. In addition, this delineation of borders took no account of cultural or ethnic homogeneity. Afghanistan is characterized by a high diversity of cultural patterns, ethnicities, languages (Pashtu, Dari [Persian], Uzbek, etc.), and ways of life and economy (e.g., pastoral nomadism, farming). Even Islam, which is followed by about 99 percent of the approximately 30 million (2005) Afghans, is marked by heterogeneous trends (Sufism, Islamism) and sects (Sunna, Shia, Ismailia). It is equally difficult to distinguish the multiple ethnicities. According to different scientific sources, the number of ethnicities ranges from 50 to 200. Likewise, figures on the members of the respective ethnicities are highly contested. The most important ethnic categories are the Pashtuns (40–60 percent), the Tajik (20–35 percent), the Hazaras (7–20 percent), and the Uzbeks (8–15 percent). Furthermore, patronage networks constitute important references of identity and action that are based on local, tribal, or religious bounds. Accordingly, even today, the elite of the country is made up of clan chiefs, tribal leaders, and religious dignitaries who hold power, especially in the rural regions. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Instituting the Nation Even though Afghanistan was only founded at the end of the 19th century, its roots lie in the 18th century. At the time, Ahmad Shah merged the Pashtun tribal federation of the Durrani and formed a great empire, including today’s Afghanistan. Although the royal dynasty devolved from the Popalzai to the Barokzai tribe in the mid-19th century, the Pashtun Durrani ruled the royal house from 1747 to 1973, which is one of the few fundamental national continuities. The only interruption was caused by the politics of Amanullah in the 1920s, who attempted to lead Afghanistan to modernity. This modernization provoked the objection of the population, culminating in the eviction of Amanullah by the Tajik Habibullah II in 1921. He only held power for a few months before being overthrown the same year by Nadir Shah, who belonged to a branch of the royal family. In the 20th century, Afghanistan first was a kingdom with a rudimentarily developed state apparatus. The majority of Afghans perceived the state as an alien, even hostile entity. A fundamental reason for this perception was the fact that Abdur Rahman subdued all local potentates, clans, and local communities at the end of the 19th century in countless wars. Particularly, the Shiite Hazaras living in central Afghanistan underwent a brutal subjugation. The national politics of

Loya Jirga The loya jirga can be seen as the only national political institution that is accepted by all inhabitants of Afghanistan without any reservations. The term jirga is of Mongolian origin and is used in Pashtu for tribal gatherings. Usually, a jirga is a temporary body that is created for solving disputes among tribes, subtribes, clans, families, or individuals. Loya is Pashtu and means “big” or “grand.” Thus the loya jirga is the national assembly, which decides about national affairs of great interest. Afghans tend to understand the loya jirga as a democratic forum, where the representatives of the Afghan people decide upon the future of country. Furthermore the loya jirga is seen as an ancient institution that was introduced by the Aryans in ancient times. However, historical research shows that the loya jirga is a relatively young phenomenon and was established during the 20th-century statebuilding project. A first loya jirga took place in 1915. Also, the loya jirga never worked in a democratic way. Most loya jirgas solely served the enforcement of the rulers’ interests. Under the Bonn Agreement of 2001, the loya jirga experienced a revival to legitimate the political process: the emergency loya jirga in June 2002 decided on the transitional administration; the constitutional loya jirga in December 2003/2004 approved the new Afghan constitution. However for both loya jirgas, it turned out that the general rules of how these gatherings should function were nonexistent: while in the emergency loya jirga, an election about the head of the transitional administration took place, in the constitutional loya jirga, Hamid Karzai solely proclaimed the new constitution without any voting. Although traditional loya jirgas were all male, women have progressively made their way into this decision-making body, often with special seats reserved for them.

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Rahman’s successors were marked by the strategy of equilibrating the relations between the local potentates and the bureaucratic elite of Kabul by distributing benefits in a clientelistic manner. The sole national institution that could develop as an integrating force was the loya jirga, the large tribal assembly, which was summoned for important political decisions. In 1963, King Zahir Shah (1933–1973) established a constitutional monarchy with a modern constitution and a bicameral parliament. The political parties that mushroomed in Kabul in the 1960s mostly had a communist or an Islamic background; only very few ethno-nationalist parties were founded (e.g., the Pashtun afghan mellat). Parliamentary elections were held in 1965 and 1969 but hardly found any resonance within the population. In 1973, Zahir Shah was expelled in a coup d’état by his cousin Mohammad Daud Khan (1973–1978). The Communist Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) finally seized power in 1978 under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin and Mohammad Taraki. When the party was increasingly confronted with rebellions in the country, due to drastic and overhasty implementation of reforms, and on the verge of collapsing, Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, to maintain the Communist rule, leading to a further intensification of the conflict. During the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan was subject to a radical destruction caused by the fighting between the Soviet occupants and the Mujahideen resistance fighters operating from Pakistan and Iran. Approximately 6.5 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, leading to the largest mass exodus worldwide since World War II. Th e action radius of the Communist government of Babrak Karmal (1979–1986) and Najibullah (1986–1992) was confined to Kabul and a few provincial cities. With the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, which was completed in 1989, and the Mujahideen seizing power in 1992, Afghanistan collapsed into petty empires that were ruled by a myriad of warlords and local rulers. Even national borders lost their function as barriers for political and economic actors: while crossborder trade and smuggling (e.g., drugs) to and from neighboring countries flourished, internal trade almost came to a standstill. After seizing power in 1996, the Taliban succeeded in bringing around 90 percent of the country under their control and driving away the specter of Afghan fragmentation. The ouster of the Taliban by the military intervention of the Coalition against Terrorism in autumn 2001 led to the reconstruction of the country. In this regard, the national institution loya jirga played a decisive role in the establishment of an interim government and the approval of a constitution.

Defining the Nation Since the founding of Afghanistan, every ruler has tried to pin down certain power and interest groups through the alignment of the Afghan national ideology. Among N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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these interest groups are the Sunni clergy (ulama), the Pashtun tribes, and the urban elite. According to these three power groups, the Afghan national ideology was based on religious, ethnic, and demotic references. In most cases, rulers strove for hybrid forms. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the national self-perception was grounded in a religious interpretation. Sunni-Hanafite Islam was suitable as a national force since it not only enabled the dissociation from the colonial powers of British India and Russia but also from the Shiite Iran, even though this meant factoring out about 20 percent of the Shiites living in Afghanistan. This religious notion of millat (“nation”) provided a clear understanding of the state with which the population could easily identify. Nonetheless, the significance of the state was restricted to its function as guardian of the religion in the eyes of the Afghans. So the compliance with the Islamic system of values was the sole leveling rule for state activities. The right to exist of both state and ruler was always questioned whenever doubts were cast on their ability to fulfill their function as defender of the religion. This was clarified in particular by the expulsion of Amanullah (1929), whose reforms were denounced as un-Islamic, as well as by the uprisings against the Communist Amin-Taraki regime (1978–1979). During the 20th century, the Islamic alignment continuously lost significance due to the increasing modernization of the urban intellectuals and the creation of the state of Pakistan, which also legitimized its existence by referring to Islam. It was only after the capture of Kabul by the Mujahideen (1992) and in particular since the rule of the Taliban that Islam regained its role as the constitutive interpretation of the national ideology. The Afghan national ideology was also grounded ethnically. Already the state labeling of “Afghanistan” implies a Pashtun reference, as Afghan is the Persian term for Pashtun. The nine-month-long rule of the Tajik Habibullah II, who subdued Amanullah in 1929, marked the signal for a Pashtun interpretation of the national ideology, as the Pashtuns saw their “natural” supremacy jeopardized for the first time. The Pashtun definition of the Afghan nation gained significance after the reestablishment of Pashtun supremacy under Nadir Shah and advanced as the political guideline until the outbreak of the Afghanistan war in 1979. The idea of a nation-state—that the borders of the national territory should conform precisely to ethnic boundaries—was the ideological starting point for the explosive Pashtunistan dispute. Similarly, the Pashtun perception of the nation, in line with the zeitgeist of a racial interpretation of the Afghan nation, gained ground among Afghan intellectuals during the 1930s until the 1950s. The notion of Afghans being Aryans was supported by a scientific substantiation ranging back to early history. Even more, the spatial location of the antique Aryans was equated with that of the young nation-state of Afghanistan. The artificial geopolitical product Afghanistan was in fact elevated to an imagined Aryan homeland. By emphasizing the common Aryan descent, the discrepancies among some ethnic categories, such as the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Pashtunistan Claim The Pashtunistan claim emerged after the displacement of British India by India and Pakistan. Since 1948, the Afghan government had challenged the legal validity of the Durand line, once established as the border between Afghanistan and British India, and wanted to turn Pashtunistan into reality. Hereby, the Afghan government perceived the state of Afghanistan as encompassing the imagined homeland of the Pashtuns. Despite the demarcation of the entire region, which lay on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, up to the Indus is regarded as part of Pashtunistan, the Pashtun territory of dominion. The Afghan government—especially under Mohammad Daud Khan (1953–1963 and 1973–1978) —attempted to organize a national mobilization on this issue from the early 1950s until the 1970s. Moreover, the Afghan government endeavored to incite tribal unrest in the uncontrollable Pakistan border area. Subsequently, the Pashtunistan claim defined much of the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan from the 1950s to the 1970s and brought both countries several times to the brink of war. However, in Afghanistan, the interest in this topic remained restricted to the urban elite, and it failed even to produce a lasting echo in the Pashtun tribal areas.

Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Nuristanis, could be revoked. The Aryan notion was so popular among the Pashtuns that the old belief in the derivation from the lost tribes of Israel became less and less significant. After the Soviet invasion, the ethnic interpretation of the national ideology underwent a paradigm shift at the beginning of the 1980s, as the nationality politics were based on the Soviet model. The fundamental goal of these politics was to win over ethnic minorities (in particular Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras, Baluchis, Nuristanis) to the Communist regime by producing positive self-perceptions of these minorities and promoting them on the cultural as well as political level. Ultimately, the nationality politics negated the existence of a unified nation “Afghanistan” and tinkered with the idea of dissolving the state due to a lack of national integration. The largely anti-Pashtun alignment of these politics was mirrored in the calls to rename Afghanistan to Khorasan, Bactria, or Azadistan. During the Afghanistan war in the 1990s, the ethnic heterogeneity of the country was particularly highly explosive in nature, since the different parties used ethnicity as a means of political and military mobilization. A demotic perception of the nation was already propagated by Amanullah in the 1923 constitution, defining every citizen of the country as Afghan. This interpretation, however, was rejected by the majority of the Afghan population, as it was diametrically opposed to the religious millat perception. Only in the middle of the 20th century did the urban elite emerge as a decisive power factor that had to be taken into account for a demotic interpretation of the national ideology. With the consent of Zahir Shah, the constitution of 1964 extended the term Afghan to every citizen of the country, albeit emphasizing the “exceptional position” of the Pashtuns. Likewise, democratic and parliamentary elements were N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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strengthened, including minority provisions for non-Muslims. The demotic moments witnessed a verbal up-valuation under Daud and later under the Communists’ rule—for example, the renaming to the “Democratic People’s Republic”—but the respective governments neglected to acknowledge democratic aspects in their political action. After the fall of the Taliban, the nation-building project experienced another boom. The current government follows an integrative approach in which the different perceptions of the nation are taken into account. This approach, however, has led to a set of serious contradictions. For example, Afghanistan has become an “Islamic Republic” since the constitution adopted by a constitutional loya jirga on January 4, 2004, states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam” (Article 3). Likewise, the constitution attempts to meet a demotic approach by determining that “the word Afghan applies to every citizen of Afghanistan” (Article 4, Sentence 4). The same article (Sentence 3) also acknowledges the ethnic diversity of the country and provides a number of privileges to religious and ethnic minorities (e.g., freedom of religions and language). There is no explicit Pashtun reference. It remains equally contested just how Islamic the Republic of Afghanistan is. Thus ethnic and religious minorities as well as women are still subject to discriminations in everyday life.

Narrating the Nation According to the different notions of the Afghan nation, there are different historical points of reference and personalities for narrating the nation. A fundamental myth that plays a role in all of the aforementioned nation concepts is the styling of Afghanistan as a “freedom-loving country”—an idea that is omnipresent. It is argued that none of the great powers—whether the Moguls and Safavids in the early new age, British India and Russia in the 19th century, or the Soviet Union in the 1980s—was able to control Afghanistan for a long period. Even the military operations of the Coalition against Terrorism in autumn 2001 were influenced to a large extent by a tremendous respect for the Afghans’ “love of freedom.” As a result, the United States and its allies preferred to leave the fighting of the Taliban to their Afghan allies rather than deploy their own troops and thus risk offending the sentiments of the Afghan population. However, it has to be stressed that it was not the national unity of Afghans, but their diverging particular interests that rendered an external conquest difficult. Well-known heroes of this freedom myth, for example, are Khan Khushal Khan Khattak in the struggle against the Moguls, Mir Wais in the struggle against the Safavids, or Abdul Haq and Ahmad Shah Masood in the struggle against the Soviets. Maiwand, where the Afghans defeated the Britons on July 27, 1880, advanced as the topographical symbol for this resistance, while Gandomak, where the Afghan ruler Yaqub Khan agreed on the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Afghan protectorate status on May 26, 1879, marked the negative counterpart of this myth. Moreover, Gandomak was the starting point of a trauma that most notably played a role in the Pashtun definition of the nation. The Treaty of Gandomak set the seal on the loss of the eastern Pashtun tribal areas and the royal summer residence Peshawar, which laid the ground for the Pashtunistan issue. Historically, these territorial claims were substantiated with the expansion of the empire of Ahmad Shah, who Afghans often titled as father of the Afghan nation, in the middle of the 18th century. The myth of the loya jirga is also closely connected with Ahmad Shah. He was the first ruler to convene a loya jirga for his own legitimacy. Kandahar, where this assembly was held, is thus regarded as the birthplace of Afghanistan by many Afghans and as the secret capital of the country by many Pashtuns. Yet there also are two historical points of reference that question the Pashtun interpretation of the Afghan nation. On the one hand, the brutal subjugation of the Shiite Hazaras in central Afghanistan by Abdur Rahman at the end of the 19th century marked a trauma for the Hazaras, which advanced as a basis of a collective identity and explains the often surfacing animosities against the Pashtuns. On the other hand, the takeover by Habibullah II in 1929 challenged the Pashtun dominance. Accordingly, there are two coexisting myths regarding Habibullah II: the first insists on the legitimacy of his rule, while the second considers him a bandit of low descent and derogatively calls him Bacha-ye Saqqao (“son of the water carrier”). Finally, the reference to former empires plays a crucial role for the narration of the nation; for example, the glamorous Islamic empires of the Ghaznavids with Ghazni as the capital in the 10th century, and the Timurids with Herat as the center in the 15th century. Bactria and the Kushan empire are two important examples for the pre-Islamic epoch. The destruction of the 2,500-year-old Buddha statues of Bamyan by the Taliban is an example of the incommensurateness of diverging notions of the nation. In the traditional Afghan historiography, Bamyan exemplarily stands for the deep historical roots of Afghanistan, while the Taliban were keen to eradicate all reminders of the pre-Islamic time because of their religious concept of the nation. Even though the Pashtun narration of the nation was dominant throughout, non-Pashtun symbols also influenced the national ideology: the loya jirga and the east Pashtun dance atan, the Uzbek equestrian game buzkashi, and the statues of Bamyan evolved into constitutive symbols of the Afghan nation.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Until the outbreak of the Afghan war in 1979, nearly all Afghan rulers regarded the cultural heterogeneity of Afghanistan’s territory as an annoyance from the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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outset and considered it an obstacle for the development of a national ideology. For this reason, the state policy was marked throughout this time period by efforts to homogenize the population through forced resettlement and the redistribution of land. This policy was primarily characterized by Pashtun-tinted nationalism, which meant that in general Pashtuns profited from it most: Pashtun settlers received the irrigated land originally possessed by Uzbek landlords in the oases of northern Afghanistan, and the pastures in central Afghanistan were handed over from Hazara farmers to Pashtun nomads. This process was accompanied by a religious nationalism that was reflected in a number of proselytizations. Under Abdur Rahman, for example, the animistic Kafiri (“Unbelievers”) were Islamized at the end of the 19th century and renamed the Nuristani (“inhabitants of the country of light”). Conversion of the Shiite Hazaras yielded little success. Thus, the victims of religiously or ethnically legitimized national mobilization attempts were population groups differing from the national norm. Hindus and Sikhs, who together made up less than 1 percent of the Afghan population, underwent social exclusion time and again and were barred—for example, under the Taliban—from practicing their religion. Particularly, the Shiite Hazaras were subject to discriminations and persecutions. The Shia is considered heresy by the Sunni majority of the population. The Shiite Hazaras experienced a racially motivated exclusion due to their predominantly Mongolian physiognomy. As the alleged descendants of the Mongolian troops of Genghis Khan, the Hazaras are at times even made responsible for the destruction caused by the Mongolians and the backwardness of the country. To level out the ethnic heterogeneity of Afghanistan’s territory, and to thwart any attempts at secession, a redefinition of spatial units took place during the course of the 20th century. Geographical terms that carried any ethnic or particularistic perceptions, such as Kafiristan/Nuristan, Khorasan, Turkistan, Qataghan, or Hazarajat, were replaced by administrative terms that often referred to provincial towns (e.g., Herat, Kunduz, Bamyan) or rivers (e.g., Kunar, Hilmand) and did not imply any ethnic connotations. The administrative reorganization that took place in the course of the introduction of the constitution in 1964 also gerrymandered territorial administrative units with the intention that they should be dominated by a Pashtun majority wherever possible. Another moment of this Pashtunization was the promotion of Pashtu as the sole national language in 1936, which had previously been on an equal footing with Dari. The Pashtunization of the state apparatus failed due to the refusal of the predominantly Persianspeaking civil servants to attend Pashtu language courses. It was only in 1964 that Persian was put on par with Pashtu again. Moreover, the ruling politics regulated the access to state goods and posts by means of an ethno-religious horizontal stratification of the Afghan society. While both the Pashtuns, as such, as well as prestigious spiritual families (e.g., Mojadiddi, Gilani) were favored and controlled key positions within the state and the military, the Tajiks made up the bulk of the middle class, which dominated the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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economy, the state administration, and the education apparatus. The Uzbeks had very little influence altogether and were largely confined to their settlement area in northern Afghanistan. Due to their alleged Turko-Mongolian looks and their Shiite confession, the Hazaras were marginalized and by and large excluded from participation in social resources. The members of smaller ethno-religious categories (e.g., Qizilbash, Nuristanis) occupied either economic or administrative niches. This ethno-religious stratification experienced major changes during the course of the Afghanistan war. For example, today the Tajiks dominate the military, while many entrepreneurs are Pashtuns. Overall, in Afghanistan, national ideologies played an inferior role. This was largely the result of a lacking infrastructure; most Afghans paid attention solely to their village, their tribe, or their valley community but seldom to the incidents in distant Kabul. This changed with the outbreak of the Afghan war. Thus, the war accounted for a national mobilization by the Mujahideen under the banner of Islam against the Soviet occupying forces. Hereby, the religious interpretation was essential for the understanding of the nation by the Mujahideen. Nonetheless, during the war, there were considerable differences between the various and often contrary currents within Islam that were concealed by the proclamation of the jihad against the infidel Communists. It also has to be emphasized that many Mujahideen were not primarily interested in religious matters, but rather in the protection of the traditional local independence that had been impaired by the Communists. This religious mobilization was contrasted by the nationality politics of the Communists that aimed to promote ethnic groups as sociopolitical points of reference and thus to base the Afghanistan conflict on ethnicity. With the fall of the Communist regime in 1992, the Mujahideen got the upper hand, but at this stage, the “ethnicization” of the war had already come to light. Although the Mujahideen established an “Islamic Republic” in 1992, the religious interpretation of the war lost significance and fights broke out within the Mujahideen (e.g., between Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masood) along ethnic fractures. However, it has to be mentioned that the ethnicization of the war did not lead to an ethnicization of the masses. Interestingly, it was precisely in parallel with the ethnicization of the war, the erosion of state structures, and the appearance of countless petty empires that a national self-confidence emerged within the population in the 1990s, whose only goal was the integrity of the national territory of Afghanistan. However, this Afghan identity could hardly be anchored to any common values, traditions, or experiences, since any definition of national values inevitably failed against the cultural heterogeneity of Afghanistan and the various existing models of ethnic origin or religious community. This tremendous significance of the national territory as a frame of reference for the Afghan identity is the main key to an understanding of the initial sympathies and also the subsequent growing dissatisfaction the population had with the Taliban. At first, a large part of the population hoped the Taliban would bring about a territorial reintegration of the country, which N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Ahmed Wali Karzai (left), the brother of Afghan president Hamid Karzai, meets with tribal leaders on August 28, 2002. Though centralized government is a goal for Afghanistan, local problems are still resolved by traditional tribal leaders, and violence between ethnic groups is on the rise. (AP/Wide World Photos)

was in a process of disintegration. Their aspiration was that the once fixed territorial delineation of Afghanistan should endure. The Taliban came close to fulfilling this desire, as they brought around 90 percent of the country under their control and drove away the specter of Afghan fragmentation. However, the Taliban rule also made it clear that spatial integrity did not necessarily bring about social integration. The erecting of a Sunni orthodox order named “Islamic Emirat of Afghanistan,” in which the sharia (or Islamic law) formed the legal basis for the entire population and in which every deviation from the norm was punished draconically, led to an exclusion and suffering of large parts of the population. This in turn caused disappointment within the population with the Taliban’s radical policies and in particular their treatment of women and minorities. After the collapse of the Taliban, the international community followed the strategy to create a broad-based government, which included members of the largest ethnic groups as well as religious dignitaries, technocrats, and warlords. Despite the constitution of 2004, which attempted to balance ethnic and religious, as well as demotic perceptions of the Afghan nation-state, ethnicity, played an especially important role in everyday politics. In the first years of the new government (December 2001–January 2003), Tajiks had an above average representation in the government. Tajiks controlled core ministries, such as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the Interior, Foreign, and Defense ministries, and staffed them with their own clientele. The ethnic awareness also caused the mushrooming of new provinces and districts: Day Kundi (formerly part of the province Uruzgan), mainly inhabited by Hazaras, was the first province to be established. The Panjshir Valley, the stronghold of Tajik Panjshiris, also received the status of a province. Furthermore, in nearly every province, disputes about the creation of new districts arose, mostly stipulated by ethnic antagonisms. The presidential elections in October 2004 were tinged by ethnicity. Hamid Karzai (with 55.4 percent) won the ballots in the Pashtun belt; Mohammad Mohaqeq (with 11.7 percent) in the Hazarajat; Rashid Dostum (with 10 percent) in the Uzbek settlements in Northern Afghanistan; and Yunus Qanuni (with 16.3 percent) in the Tajik settlements of Northeastern Afghanistan. Thus, the results of the presidential elections coincided roughly with the ethnic identities of the country. With his reelection, Hamid Karzai has brought about a rebound that aims for participation of ethnic elites under a Pashtun claim to leadership, similar to Zahir Shah. Selected Bibliography Anderson, E. W., and N. H. Dupree, eds. 1990. The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism. Oxford: Pinter. Fröhlich, D. 1969. “Nationalismus und Nationalstaat in Entwicklungsländern. Probleme der Integration ethnischer Gruppen in Afghanistan.” PhD diss., Cologne. Grevemeyer, J.-H. 1988. “Ethnicity and National Liberation: The Afghan Hazara between Resistance and Civil War.” In Le fait ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan, edited by J.-P. Digard, 211–218. Paris: Ed. du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Hyman, A. 2002. “Nationalism in Afghanistan.” In International Journal of Middle East Studies 34:299–315. Nölle-Karimi, C., C. Schetter, and R. Schlagintweit, eds. 2002. Afghanistan—A Country without a State? Frankfurt: IKO Verlag. Orywal, E. 1986. Die ethnischen Gruppen Afghanistans. Wiesbaden, Germany: Reichert. Pstrusinska, J. 1990. Afghanistan 1989 in Sociolinguistic Perspective. London: Central Asian Survey Incidental Paper Series 7. Roy, O. 1986. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rubin, B. R. 1995. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Schetter, C. 2003. Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag. Schetter, C. 2005. “Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the Afghan War.” Geopolitics 10, no. 1: 50–75. Shahrani, M. N. 1986. “State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective.” In The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, edited by A. Banuazzi and M. Weiner, 23–74. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

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Armenia Razmik Panossian Chronology ca. 860 BC Urartu emerges as a powerful state around Lake Van. ca. 782 BC The Fortress of Erebuni is built by Urartians (currently in Yerevan, capital of Armenia). ca. 585–200 BC The Yervanduni Dynasty rules over Armenia, either as vassals or as independent kings. ca. 520 BC First mention of Armenia and Armenians in history, on Behistun Rock, by King Darius I of Persia. 188 BC–AD 10 Artashesian Dynasty. 95–55 BC King Tigran II “The Great” establishes a short-lived Armenian empire, stretching from the Caspian to Mediterranean seas. ca. AD 66–428 Arshakuni Dynasty. ca. 301–315 Armenia adopts Christianity as the state religion; the population is converted to the new religion. 387 Armenia is partitioned between Byzantine and Persian (Sassanid) empires. 405 The Armenian alphabet is invented by Mesrop Mashtots; beginning of the “golden era” of Armenian literature. 451 Armenian rebellion against Persia and the Battle of Avarayr. Armenians lose the battle but maintain Christianity as the state religion. Also, the Council of Chalcedon, the decisions of which the Armenian Church eventually rejects to maintain its independence from the Byzantine church. 484 Treaty of Nevarsak between Persia and Armenia, granting Armenians certain rights, and allowing them to remain Christian. 640 Beginning of the Arab invasions of Armenia. 884–1045 Bagratuni Dynasty. 1045 Ani, the capital of the Bagratuni Dynasty, falls to the Byzantines (followed by the fall of Kars in 1064). 1071 Battle of Manzikert. The Seljuks defeat the Byzantines after conquering Armenia. 1080s The establishment of Rubenian and Hetumid principalities in Cilicia, on the Mediterranean coast. A kingdom is eventually established in 1199. 1236 Mongol invasions of Armenia begin, leading to century-long domination. 1375 The last Armenian kingdom, in Cilicia, falls to the Mamluks of Egypt. 1386 Timur (Tamerlane) invades Armenia. 1400s Consolidation of Ottoman rule over Armenia. 1453 Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. 1512 The publication of the first Armenian book (in Venice), and the beginning of Armenian printing. The Bible is published in Armenian in 1666 (in Amsterdam). The first comprehensive dictionary is published in 1749 (in Venice). Father Mikayel Chamchian’s History of the Armenians is published in 1784 (in Venice). And in the 1770s, the first political tracts calling for the liberation of Armenia are published (in Madras, India).

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1514–1639 Ottoman-Safavid (Iran) wars over Armenia. 1722–1728 Rebellion led by Davit Bek (in Eastern Armenia) against local Muslim rulers and Ottoman conquest. 1722–1828 Frequent wars in or around Armenia among Russian, Persian, and Ottoman empires. Russia advances into South Caucasus and gains control over eastern Armenia. The borders delineated by the Treaty of Turkmenchai (1828) between the Russian and Persian empires eventually become the borders between present-day Iran, Armenia, and Turkey. 1839–1876 Tanzimat (reform) era in the Ottoman Empire. Armenian millet constitution is adopted in 1863. 1877–1878 Russian-Ottoman war, and expansion of Russian control of Armenian provinces. 1840s–1890s Height of the Armenian national “renaissance,” particularly in culture. 1885 The establishment of the first Armenian revolutionary political party in the Ottoman Empire, followed by revolutionary activities. 1915 The genocide of the Armenians from Ottoman lands. 1918–1920 Establishment of an independent Armenian republic in the territories of Eastern (Russian) Armenia. 1920–1921 Sovietization of the Armenian Republic. 1988 The beginning of the popular national movement in Armenia, demanding the unification of Gharabagh with Armenian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic). Major earthquake in northern Armenia. 1991 Independence of Armenia, as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics collapses. 1994 Cease-fire agreement in the war with Azerbaijan (but no peace agreement). 1998 Forced resignation of first post-Soviet president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, through a “constitutional coup.” Robert Kocharian, the prime minister of Armenia (originally from Gharabagh) becomes president. 2007 The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs approves a bill (HR 106) that recognizes the Armenian genocide, bringing a total of 25 countries that have passed resolutions or laws on the Armenian genocide in the preceding decade as a result of diaspora advocacy.

Situating the Nation The first recorded reference to the Armenians and their country dates back to ca. 520 BC when the king of Persia, Darius I, etched his victories over conquered peoples on the Behistun Rock (presently Bisitun in western Iran). Armenians had already emerged as a distinct people from the Urartian tribal confederation, a dynastic state (ca. 870 to ca. 590 BC) centered around Lake Van. Greek author Xenophon wrote about the Armenians when the Greek army, retreating from Persia, passed through Armenia in 401–400 BC. In the Anabasis, he recorded his observations about the social habits and economic life of a people known as Armenians. The historic territory of the Armenians is often referred to as the “Armenian Plateau” and more recently as the “Anatolian Plateau,” largely in eastern Turkey. Until 1915, most Armenians lived in these historic territories: between the Kur River to the east, the Pontic mountain range to the north, the Euphrates River to the west, and the Taurus Mountains to the south. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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This vast land was composed of mountain ranges, valleys, and rivers. Such geographical features had political consequences: the physical composition of the territory mitigated against the emergence of a strong central political power throughout much of Armenian history. Consequently, various regions and enclaves, at different times, could maintain a degree of autonomy from the centralizing tendencies of both domestic and external (imperial) sources of political power. In addition to the geographic divides, Armenia was often partitioned between rival empires, being the scene of long and bitter wars involving the Persians, Romans, Arabs, Byzantines, Ottomans, and Russians. Such divisions had profound impacts on Armenian ethno-national identity. While an overarching sense of “Armenianness” always remained, deep divisions emerged within this identity and were—and still are—manifested through politics, culture, and language. Armenian identity has evolved in a multilocal manner, with the diaspora often playing an important (and at times even central) role in its formulation, particularly in the modern period. The boundaries of the contemporary Armenian Republic reflect these geographic and imperial divisions and are roughly the same as the boundaries among the Persian, Russian, and Ottoman empires of the 19th century. The republic is situated in what used to be Eastern Armenia; its southern border with Iran and the western border with Turkey follow the Arax and Akhurian rivers. To the east N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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is Azerbaijan, and to the southwest is the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan. To the north is Georgia. The republic constitutes a small portion of historic Armenia, with a population of approximately 3 million people. There are another 5 million or so Armenians living in the diaspora, with particularly large communities in Russia, the United States, and France. Western Armenia no longer exists as a separate political, social, and demographic entity, having been integrated into eastern Turkey. The 1915 genocide eliminated Armenians from these territories and destroyed Armenian culture.

Instituting the Nation Three sets of institutions have been the “backbones” of the Armenian people: dynastic kingdoms (until AD 1375), the Armenian Apostolic Church (since the fourth century) and, in the modern period, diasporan organizations, including merchant communities. Five major dynasties ruled over Armenia: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Yervandunis (a.k.a., Orontids), ca. 585 to 200 BC Artashesians (a.k.a., Artaxiads), 188 BC to AD 10 Arshakunis (a.k.a., Arsacids), ca. first century AD to AD 428 Bagratunis, 884 to 1045 Rubenians and Hetumids in the “diasporan” kingdom of Cilicia, on the Mediterranean coast, 1199 to 1375.

The fortunes of these dynasties were closely tied to geopolitical dynamics, imperial rivalries, and conflicts among various Armenian ruling families based in specific regions of the country. The borders of Armenia expanded or retracted accordingly (reaching their greatest extent in the first century BC). During periods of relative peace, Armenia prospered. Medieval kings and princes (nakharars) supported the arts, culture, and the construction of churches, strengthening the foundations of a unique identity. The 4th and 5th centuries AD, as well as the 10th and early 11th centuries, were periods of particular innovation. Maintaining state unity under one ruler has been a persistent challenge for Armenians, as evidenced by the gaps in the succession of dynastic kingdoms. In such periods, Armenia was ruled through various fiefdoms or direct imperial rule through “governors.” However, leading families continued to provide the institutional basis of collective identity. As the Mongol invasions ravished Armenia in mid-13th century, and as the last kingdom fell in 1375, dynastic rule came to an end; the leading families eventually disappeared. They were either eliminated, fled to exile, or assimilated into the imperial elites. Armenians refer to the period between the 1400s and the 1800s as the “dark centuries.” The one institution that played a central role in maintaining an ethno-religious collective identity during these difficult centuries was the Armenian Apostolic N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Church. Partly because of its internal administrative independence, and the Ottoman millet system (based on the Muslim tradition of granting limited communal autonomy to “peoples of the Book”), the “national” church came to play a decisive role in maintaining a unique Armenian identity. The formal adoption of Christianity as the state religion of Armenia took place sometime between AD 301 and 315 (the oft-cited date is 301), making Armenia the first state to formally become Christian. The new religion cemented the distinctiveness of Armenian identity in the classical period and remained the anchor of collective identity until the 20th century. The conversion to Christianity by Armenians was a response to Sassanid Persian pressure to accept Zoroastrianism as part of the Persian empire’s drive to centralize and assert its control over neighboring territories. The Armenian elite wanted to maintain local religious-cultural traditions and the political control of its territory. In this context, King Trdat III “The Great,” who was educated in Rome, embraced the Christian faith as the official religion of his kingdom, as did many of the other Armenian noble families. Trdat, along with St. Gregory “The Illuminator” (the first patriarch of the Armenian Church), set out to convert all subjects under his domain. In a period when religion was a central element of identity, such a conscious decision to convert en masse to a new faith so different from that of their neighbors already indicates a sense of distinctiveness that Armenians sought to maintain through institutional mechanisms that were available to them at that point. Later, when the Roman Empire itself embraced Christianity, Armenians held on to tenets of the faith that were different from the other major churches. They rejected the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon (451) on the nature of Christ and subsequently seceded from the “Universal Church”—i.e., the Byzantine branch of Orthodoxy. As such, despite the loss of statehood, wars, and much political turmoil after the fall of the last Armenian kingdom, the church remained a bedrock institution preserving and enhancing collective identity. Its head, the Catholicos, was recognized as the “leader” of all Armenians. In addition to the Apostolic Church, the small Armenian Catholic brotherhood of Mekhitarians, founded in the early 18th century and based in Venice, played a crucial role in the modernization of Armenian identity through the preparation and publication of dictionaries, national histories, philosophical treatises, and translations of European religious and secular texts. The third set of actors who were instrumental in instituting the nation was diaspora-based Armenian merchants, particularly from the 17th century onward. In the absence of a state and a secular political elite, merchants and other wealthy Armenians (e.g., amiras) played a key role in financing the spiritual, cultural, and social needs of the community. Never a very large group, merchant families were nevertheless spread throughout the world with nodal centers in Persia, India, and Constantinople. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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They traded from the Far East to Moscow and Amsterdam. These merchants and amiras contributed large sums of money toward the running of the Armenian Church (in addition to building churches in their far-flung communities), they commissioned the writing of manuscripts and later set up or sponsored printing presses and published books and journals, they financed schools and hospitals and provided scholarships to young Armenians to study in Europe, and they engaged in other community support activities. In short, they played a role similar to that of an Armenian state in the absence of one. However, most of the Armenian “business” elite remained steadfastly outside of formal politics and, moreover, were almost exclusively situated in diasporan communities, including Constantinople/Istanbul, Tiflis/Tbilisi, and Moscow. As will be outlined below, the institutionalization of the nation continued into the 20th century with the Soviet and post-Soviet Armenian states, as well as with diasporan mobilization. In both cases, the institutional foundations of the Armenian nation were strengthened through governmental and communal actions (e.g., the establishment of schools, printing presses, community structures, etc.).

Defining the Nation The Armenian nation can be defined through nine main characteristics. Four of these are from the classical period, and five are from the modern period. The Classical Period A national church. From its very inception, the church focused on the Armenian people. After the initial proselytizing zeal in the fourth and fifth centuries within Armenia, the church turned inward to protect its flock rather than convert others. This was particularly the case after the emergence of Islam in the region. Hence, church and ethno-national identity came to be infused, and remained so until the modern era. To this day, to be Armenian means to be (at least nominally) Christian. The Armenian Apostolic Church belongs to the Orthodox branch of Christianity, being closer to the Monophysite doctrine, but it is completely independent of external authority, that is to say, it is autocephalous; it rejected the authority of the patriarchate of Constantinople in 554. The church service was—and still is— conducted in Armenian. A distinct language and alphabet. Armenian is a separate branch of IndoEuropean languages, with its own literary tradition dating back to the fifth century AD. There is evidence that it was the spoken language of the region in the fifth century BC. Around AD 405, a distinct alphabet was invented specifically for the language by clergyman-scholar Mesrop Mashtots, under the auspices of the King Vramshapuh and Catholicos Sahak of Armenia (it was subsequently N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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propagated as a God-given revelation). Soon after, the Bible and other texts were translated into—and original works written in—Armenian, beginning in the fi fth century, the “golden age” of Armenian literature. A deep sense of history. As an ancient people, Armenians have a very deep sense of history. They began writing their own history in the fifth century AD. The most significant author is Movses Khorenatsi, who was purported to write in the second half of the 400s, although some scholars place him a few centuries later. Despite arguments about his dating and errors in some of the factual basis of his history, Khorenatsi was instrumental in giving Armenians a sense of belonging that stretches back over two millennia or more. He was the first to write the entire history of the Armenians—from the beginning to his purported present time—in a systematic manner, with a long and continuous sense of history that was integrated into world civilization and into the biblical narrative. What is fascinating is that he did this consciously a thousand years before the “age of nationalism.” Khorenatsi’s work was read and reread, used and abused, by national historians from the 18th to 20th centuries, and it was internalized by Armenians. In addition to history, Armenians also wrote texts on law, philosophy, the sciences, and religion. A connection to territory. The Armenians’ connection to the land is ingrained in the national myth of origin (as written down by Movses Khorenatsi). It asserts that Armenians are direct descendants of Noah, through his son Japheth. Haik, the father of Armenians, comes from this lineage. He rebelled against Bel, the evil leader of Babylon. Haik, a righteous man, moved from Babylon back to the land of the Ark, where he settled along with his family and followers. But Bel pursued Haik to subjugate him. In the subsequent battle, good won over evil, and Bel was slain. The roots of the Armenian nation were thus established in the same location as where Noah’s Ark landed, on Mount Ararat, the national symbol of Armenians. Of course, in addition to the myth, Armenians had also very tangible connections to the land, as peasants, as landowners, and as builders who had

Mount Ararat The twin peaks of Mount Ararat (or Massis in Armenian) is one of the “core” symbols of Armenians, situated at the heart of historic Armenia. The majestic sight of the mountain (5,165 meters or 16,945 feet) is clearly visible from the Armenian capital, Yerevan. According to the biblical narrative, Noah’s Ark landed on Mount Ararat, making the region the “cradle of civilization” and Armenia a “chosen land.” The image of the mountain is a national symbol, appearing on everything from the republic’s coat of arms to the living rooms of many diaspora Armenians. Mount Ararat also has a special place in Armenian nationalism. It is a daily remainder of Armenian irredentism and claims against Turkey. Clearly visible from Armenia, it is nevertheless on the Turkish side of the border and therefore inaccessible to Armenians.

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continually constructed innumerable churches, cathedrals, and forts on the Armenian Plateau. The Modern Period The characteristics from the classical period remained but were augmented or transformed by other features that came to define what it meant to be Armenian in the modern period. Between the 18th and 20th centuries, Armenian collective identity changed profoundly, from a traditional ethno-religious sense of belonging to a modern national identity based on ethnic roots. This transformation is referred to as the zartonk by the Armenians (i.e., the awakening or renaissance). National rights. The demand for national rights became an important part of Armenian identity. The cultural and political movement that emerged had two overall objectives: the modernization of the nation (along the lines of European enlightenment), and its emancipation from Ottoman and Russian rule (i.e., political rights, the betterment of social conditions, land and tax reform, etc.). The ethno-national collective was a “given”—Armenians were a distinct people—but they now demanded modern rights. This process of liberation became an important defining moment for modern Armenians. Some of its constituent elements were the adoption of the Polozhenie law (decree) by the Russian empire in 1836 that gave the Armenian Church certain autonomy and rights, the establishment of schools with modern curricula, the writing of vernacular literature, the enactment of some church reforms, the establishment of political and revolutionary parties, the dissemination of nationalist and progressive ideologies, and so forth. In short, the demand and mobilization for national rights transformed an ethnoreligious community into a modern nation. A divided nation. The Armenian renaissance was a pan-national process, but there was a schism within the nation because the nation was divided between empires. The east-west division of Armenia (between Russian and Ottoman empires) affected the evolution of modern national identity. For example, two vernaculars emerged (eastern and western Armenian), two literary traditions (romantic and realist), two sets of political ideologies (radical and liberal). This pattern of duality has come to define “Armenianness” in the modern period, and some of its elements are currently manifested in Armenia-diaspora differences. The formation of a vernacular language. By the beginning of the modern era, classical Armenian was not used as a daily language. It was the language of the church, and known by a few intellectuals. Ordinary people mostly spoke their local dialect or Turkish in the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of a common vernacular thus became an important objective of intellectuals. By the end of the 19th century, a modern vernacular Armenian had emerged and was being taught in schools and used in publications. However, this vernacular had two branches, eastern and western. They were mutually comprehensible and used the same alphabet, but certain grammar rules, declinations, and pronunciations were different, and remain so to this day. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The central role of the diaspora. As one of the “paradigmatic” diasporas, Armenians outside of the homeland played a central role in the reformulation of modern national identity. Be it the merchants in India or the Catholic monks in Venice, diasporans not only contributed to but shaped the definition of the nation. Diasporan communities acted (and still act) as filters through which new ideas entered national consciousness, as “representatives” of the nation, and as nonstate actors who defined nationality in ways that were community or culture centered as opposed to state centered. Currently, more Armenians live in the diaspora than in the homeland. The genocide. The 1915 extermination of practically all Armenians from their historic homeland in the Ottoman Empire constitutes the most important defining characteristic of modern Armenian identity. Armenians had fled into exile for centuries at moments of severe persecution (e.g., at the fall of kingdoms in AD 1045 and 1375), but the 1915 genocide was the total elimination of the nation from most of its land. Some 1 to 1.5 million Armenians were killed, and the few hundred thousand survivors became refugees with no possibility of return. A deep sense of loss, of being uprooted, of injustice, and of anti-Turkishness entered Armenian collective identity. Moreover, the genocide became a paradigm through which politics was and is understood, conflict analyzed (especially over Gharabagh), and identity shaped. Most Armenians today would define their nation as a “genocided” people.

The Genocide There were some 2 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1914. By 1923, only some 70,000 remained in what became the Turkish Republic. The Young Turk regime of the empire had decided to eliminate the Armenians from their historic territories. The result was the murder of 1–1.5 million Armenians. The few hundred thousand that survived in the deserts of Syria eventually became the backbone of the modern Armenian diaspora in the Middle East, Europe, and North America. The genocide itself became a central marker of Armenian national identity. Armenians were eliminated for various reasons: the Young Turk ideology of creating a homogenous empire, fear of Armenian separatism, resistance to Ottoman (mis)rule, usurpation of Armenian lands and wealth, wartime contingencies, and so forth. Experts continue to debate these and related issues, but the genocide is an accepted fact in mainstream historiography. However, successive Turkish governments and a small group of Western academic sympathizers deny that the elimination of the Armenians constituted a genocide. Currently, the recognition of the Armenian genocide and its denial have become a political issue. The Armenian diaspora advocates for its recognition by various governments —and some 25 countries have formally recognized it—while the Turkish government and its supporters abroad counter these efforts. Genocide recognition will remain an important issue for both Armenian and Turkish nationalism in the foreseeable future, especially in light of negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

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Armenian orphans board barges bound for Greece at Constantinople, ca. 1915. The genocide of Armenians under Ottoman rule during World War I left thousands of orphans, many of whom eventually left Turkey through international humanitarian aid programs. (Library of Congress)

These 9 characteristics define the Armenian nation at the beginning of the 21st century. For part of the 20th century, a 10th characteristic was notable as well: being a Soviet nation (from 1921 to 1991). With the emergence of the nationalist movement in the late 1980s and the subsequent collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, this characteristic is no longer prominent, although the effects of Soviet rule persist in Armenia. A nation of some 8 million people, about 3 million of whom live in the newly independent post-Soviet state, Armenians are constantly battling not to lose their distinct culture, identity, and the newly established independent statehood. A powerful sense of ethnic identity permeates most Armenians, giving them a clear overarching sense of nationality despite many internal divisions.

Narrating the Nation The Armenian nation is “narrated” through a rich web of historical and contemporary “stories.” These can be divided into four categories. First, the historical narration evolves around key moments in Armenian history and the geographical locations associated with them (mountains, valleys, ancient towns, etc.). The mythical founding moment of the nation is the story of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Gharabagh Conflict Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), Gharabagh, or Artsakh, in Armenian, is an Armenian-populated region (4,400 square kilometers) that was put under the authority of Azerbaijan in 1923 (as an autonomous oblast) by the Soviet regime. Beginning in the late 1920s, Armenians demanded that the region be transferred to the Armenian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic). Their arguments were based on historical considerations, population figures (Armenians were an overwhelming majority in the region), economic maldevelopment, and cultural persecution (lack of Armenian schools, newspapers, and churches in NK). Moscow and Baku rejected all such claims. In the context of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, Armenians in the republic— and subsequently in the diaspora—mobilized en masse to support the transfer. The spark that ignited the movement was the NK Soviet’s vote in February 1988 to join the Armenian SSR. Within days there were million-strong demonstrations in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, in support of NK, and counterdemonstrations and riots in Azerbaijan. Soon violence erupted between the two communities, leading to the expulsion of Armenians from Azerbaijan (except in NK where there was resistance) and Azerbaijanis from Armenia. The violence became a full-scale war after the two republics became independent in 1991 upon the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A cease-fire was signed in 1994, which still holds. However, there is no peace agreement despite various attempts and international mediation (mostly by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE). Armenians won the war as they took complete control of NK and territories around it, including the Lachin corridor that links NK to Armenia. Armenian forces have expelled all Azerbaijanis from these lands, displacing hundreds of thousands of people. The current population of Gharabagh is estimated to be around 100,000, nearly 100 percent Armenian. The Gharabagh movement heightened both Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalism and swept from power the Communist leadership in both countries. The leaders of the Gharabagh movement became the leaders of post-Soviet Armenia.

Haik and Bel, as told above. Some people go as far as dating the story as a historical fact (2492 BC). This is followed by the conversion to Christianity in the early 4th century. “Being the first Christian nation”—a fact proudly asserted by most Armenians —gave Armenians a powerful claim to be a “chosen people” (the textual basis of this notion was already set in the 5th century by the Armenian historian Agathangelos, who wrote that Armenia was “where God’s grace has been manifested”). The “revelation” of the Armenian alphabet in the 5th century is another important narrative. More recently, the narrative included the works of the radical intellectuals of the 18th and especially the 19th centuries who advocated liberation (e.g., Raffi), and revolutionary heroes who fought and died for the nation. Armenian political parties founded in the 19th century have their respective “pool” of heroes whom they celebrate and whose deeds they commemorate. Finally, the most important narrative since 1915 is the genocide itself—more specifically, the injustice suffered, the losses endured, and the will to survive. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The second category of narration is the Soviet one, emanating from the Soviet Republic. In this case, the overarching story is one of building the nation, materially and culturally. Modernization and industrialization were an intricate part of this narrative, as well as the cultural heights attained by Soviet Armenian intellectuals and artists, especially after Stalin’s death. These included the musician Aram Khachaturian, the painter Martiros Saryan, the poets Yeghishe Charents, Paruir Sevak, and others. This “nation-building” narrative articulated by the Soviets was eventually accepted by almost all Armenians by the 1970s. The former first secretary of Soviet Armenia, Karen Demirchian put it thus (in an interview with the author): The Communists first saved Armenia from guaranteed destruction in 1920. They took it out of the mouth of the lion or the crocodile and saved it. . . . We [i.e., the Communists] prepared the country for independence, to be a strong republic. Hence, we did two things: (a) kept national identity unique and developed it further, and (b) built a strong economic base; we developed the country.

This had become a widely held view, part of the national narrative, by the 1980s, and still persists. The third category is the narrative within the postgenocide diaspora. It oscillated between the narrative of exile, persecution, and assimilation, on the one hand, and defiance, the will to survive, and a vague conception of “return,” on the other. It included the notion of “building up” communities—churches, community centers, and schools—and the necessary mobilization for this. The diasporan narrative celebrated past greatness, the inalienability of the “lost lands” in Turkey, and the drive to seek justice for the genocide (which even included certain terrorist acts against Turkish diplomats and interests between 1975 and 1985). It also included pride in the success of Armenians around the world, particularly emphasizing the Armenian heritage of famous individuals (e.g., Charles Aznavour in France, Kirk Kerkorian in the United States). Finally, the post-Soviet narrative has been one of survival in the face of hardship. The 1988 earthquake, which killed at least 25,000 Armenians, the 1990–1994 war against Azerbaijan over Gharabagh (an Armenian-populated enclave—formally known as Nagorno-Karabakh—within the Azerbaijani SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) that voted to secede from Azerbaijan in 1988), the economic collapse, and the political turmoil fed into the Armenians-as-victims narrative. But this coexisted with a new narrative that emerged, one of Armenians-as-victors. The military triumph in the Gharabagh war, sustaining and then building up the country despite economic blockades, and maintaining a relatively stable and a semi-democratic political system contributed to this narrative of success. Historians, intellectuals, public figures, and cultural workers play a key role in the articulation of narratives. They tie the various “stories,” ideas, and belief systems into a “coherent” whole. What is incredible in the Armenian case is the historical depth of this process and the remarkable stability of many aspects of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the “master narrative.” Some 1,500 years ago, Movses Khorenatsi wrote, “Even though we are a small people, limited in numbers and weak in power, frequently subjugated by others, nevertheless great acts of courage have taken place in our land that are worthy to be recorded in writing and remembered.” This thinking still guides the narrative of Armenians and gives them the impetus to remain distinct and to survive as a nation. The section below further explains the historical bases of these narratives.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In the modern period, there have been four distinct episodes of mobilizing the Armenian nation. These mobilization efforts provided new foundations for instituting the nation, in line with modern conceptions of nationhood. The first is the mobilization efforts of the 18th and 19th centuries. The aim of these efforts was to transform a traditional ethno-religious identity into a modern nationality, free to rule itself. It included much intellectual and organizational work, as well as limited revolutionary activities. In the latter part of the 19th century, Armenians started to establish political parties and various other secular institutions to advance and protect national rights and identity. For example, three important national political parties were established in this period: the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), the Democratic Liberal Party (Ramkavars), and the Social Democrat Hnchakian Party (Hnchaks). After Armenia’s Sovietization in the early 1920s, these parties became exclusively diasporan bodies, playing an active role in the institutionalization of Armenian communities in many parts of the world. They are still active in the diaspora and “returned” to postSoviet Armenia in 1990–1991 (Dashnaks being the most influential among them). The second episode is the Soviet mobilization to create a Soviet society in what used to be Russian Armenia. It entailed forced modernization and industrialization, ideological indoctrination, but also—ironically—the strengthening of national identity through the reinforcement of Armenian culture. The Soviet federal constitution formally institutionalized republics based on nationality, Armenia being one of the 15 SSRs. This meant that the Armenian SSR could develop “national” institutions within the confines of the Soviet system, particularly after Stalin. Hence, the usual Soviet mobilization instruments (mass media, propaganda drives, education, youth engagement, historiography, cultural production, political debate, policy making, etc.) took place within a specific national context, and mostly in the Armenian language. Importantly, in the mid-1960s, Soviet Armenia also established a distinct institution to manage relations with the diaspora—the Committee for Cultural Relations with Diaspora Armenians. Needless to say, instituting national identity had to be done within the overall dynamics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Third, a parallel process of mobilization was taking place in the diaspora throughout the 20th century, except, in this case, instead of creating a Soviet society, a diasporan nation was being forged with its own institutions and intellectuals, mostly cut off from the Sovietized “homeland.” The diasporan stateless nation-building emphasized the maintenance of identity and the strengthening of community structures—and it produced some very tangible institutions: churches and schools in cities where there were sizable Armenian communities, media outlets (newspapers, radio, TV programs), and more recently, significant Web-based virtual “communities.” These formal institutions, along with informal networks, were both the result of diasporan mobilization and contributions to it, further strengthening national identity (of course, this is only one side of the equation; modern diasporas by their very nature are also malleable entities, constantly in flux, subject to the policies of host states, and prone to assimilation). In terms of politics, once some diasporan communities reached a certain level of political stability internally, they began to mobilize—on the whole successfully— for the recognition of the Armenian genocide by the world community. After 1988, the diaspora also mobilized significantly in support of Armenia and Gharabagh. The final mobilization episode is that of the nationalist movement in the Armenian SSR and the post-Soviet politics it led to, including the massive mobilization to win the Gharabagh war. This episode began in earnest in February 1988, when close to a million Armenians protested in the streets of Yerevan in support of Gharabagh’s unification with Armenia. In the ensuing turmoil, the Communists were swept from office, and power was assumed by nationalist leaders. When the conflict became a full-fledged war (fought within Azerbaijan, Gharabagh, and some border regions of Armenia), practically the entire population in Armenia, and a good part of the diaspora, mobilized to support the military defense of the enclave. The aim of this mobilization was to unite Gharabagh with Armenia. Armenians defeated Azerbaijan and took control of Gharabagh, as well as land around it. Gharabagh has become part of Armenia de facto, but not de jure; it is a self-declared (but internationally unrecognized) independent republic of some 100,000 people. One of the important consequences of the 1990s mobilization was the expulsion of all Azerbaijanis from Armenia and the further homogenization of the republic—from being 90 percent Armenian in the late 1980s to 98 percent Armenian by the mid-1990s. The 1988 mobilization refocused Armenian nationalism from the “lost lands” of historic Armenia (in eastern Turkey) to the Gharabagh conflict. Genocide recognition and claims against Turkey remained important—particularly in the diaspora —but the more pressing problem of Gharabagh’s security and the strengthening of Armenia’s statehood took center stage. Real, immediate, and even grave military, political, and economic problems had to be addressed, and Armenians everywhere rallied to overcome these difficulties. Armenia acquired independence in 1991 when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics collapsed due to its internal contradictions, most notably the tensions N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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emanating from its “nationalities problem,” including the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The republics that emerged from the defunct Soviet Union inherited institutions that were far from perfect, nearly bankrupt, and fraught with inefficiencies if not dysfunctional. Nevertheless, these Soviet state structures did provide some sort of an institutional framework around which the post-Soviet nation and state could be built (or at least sustained): the Armenian Supreme Soviet became the parliament, the function of the first secretary was assumed by a presidency, communist institutions were transformed into national ones, and the military was built relatively easily with the assets left behind by the Soviet Army. The Academy of Sciences, universities, and schools all went through transformations but continued to function within Armenia, retaining their nation-building roles (minus the communist ideology). However, in addition to the “normal” problems of post-Soviet societies, Armenia faced serious additional challenges associated with war, blockades, severe energy shortages, and near-total economic collapse. Post-Soviet challenges had to do more with survival than with nation- or state-building, at least in the early 1990s. But once the Gharabagh war came to an end in 1994, collective efforts could be directed toward nation-building goals: maintaining a strong military to defend the security of Gharabagh, economic growth based on market-oriented policies and foreign investment (much of it from or through diaspora Armenians), a political system based on democratic principles, the reinforcement of national culture, and a balanced foreign policy. Of course, important challenges remain: a structurally weak economy, prevalent corruption, and a political elite whose legitimacy is questioned due to election fraud and informal power relations. As an independent state, Armenia has managed to maintain very good relations with Russia; the two countries are particularly close in their military cooperation (Russia has military bases and border guards in Armenia). Similarly, good relations are maintained with Iran (in the early 1990s, Armenia’s only open land border was with Iran), and there is brisk trade between the two countries. Relations with Georgia, in the north, are friendly and cordial despite certain differences in the strategic visions of the two countries—relations between Russia and Georgia are often tense—and despite the occasional flare-up of tensions between the Armenians of the Javakh (a region in southern Georgia on the Armenian border) and Georgian authorities. Armenia has also maintained very good relations with the United States, particularly in the domain of foreign aid and economic ties; the role of the Armenian diaspora in the United States has been particularly important in the evolution and maintenance of this relationship. Relations are antagonistic with Azerbaijan, and their improvement is not very likely in the short term; in fact, the resumption of hostilities remains a possibility in the absence of a peace agreement. Relations with Turkey are frosty—formally nonexistent. Armenia’s borders with these two countries are closed, even though Armenia has made it clear that it would like to have an open border and normal relations with Turkey. Because of Armenia’s N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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closed eastern and western borders, South Caucasian economic integration has been difficult. Important economic initiatives, such as the oil pipeline between Azerbaijan and Turkey, have consequently bypassed Armenia. Armenia-diaspora relations have been generally positive since independence (with the exception of a few years in the mid-1990s due to political tensions). As mentioned, the diaspora has played a crucial role—formally and informally (e.g., foreign investment and family-to-family transfer of funds)—in the sustenance of Armenia’s economy; in some communities (e.g., the United States and France), it has also been a critical factor in the political mobilization in favor of the republic. In conclusion, the Armenian nation has been in the making for millennia. The roots of the modern nation go back at least 2,500 years, when Armenians were first mentioned. Major “moments” of nation-building have occurred in the 4th and 5th centuries, in the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as at other key junctures throughout history. Nation-building continued in the 20th century, and still continues—both in Armenia and in the diaspora. After Armenia’s independence in 1991 and the cease-fire in the Gharabagh war in 1994, the intensity of Armenian nationalism somewhat dissipated, as Armenian politics entered a period of “normalcy” with predictable dynamics and patterns. Three important elements constitute contemporary Armenian nationalism. The first is the strengthening of the statehood of the Armenian Republic and Gharabagh (i.e., their institutions, economic development, military capacity, and political impact). The second is the maintenance and strengthening of national identity in the diaspora, and building up diasporan institutions where these are weak (e.g., in Russia). The third is the continuing advocacy for the recognition of the Armenian genocide by the world community, and ultimately by the Turkish government. These three overall elements encapsulate the dynamics of Armenian nationalism in the first decade of the 21st century. Of course, the balance between the three elements shifts based on circumstance and need. Finally, it should be noted that the above nation-building processes and dynamics are taking place outside of historic Western Armenia, where the bulk of the Armenian population lived up to 1915. On those lands, the nation has died. Selected Bibliography Bakalian, A. 1993. Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Bournoutian, G. 2006. Concise History of the Armenian People: From Ancient Times to the Present. 5th and rev. ed. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Chorbajian, L., ed. 2001. The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Dadrian, V. 1995. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Oxford/Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. Hovannisian, R., ed. 1997. The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times. 2 vols. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Kévorkian, R., and P. Paboudjian. 1992. Les Arméniens dans l’empire ottoman à la veille du génocide. Paris: Les Editions d’Art et d’Histoire ARHIS. Libaridian. G. J. 2004. Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Malkasian, M. 1996. “Gha-ra-bagh!” The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Mouradian, C. 1990. De Staline à Gorbatchev. Histoire d’une république soviétique: l’Arménie. Paris: Editions Ramsay. Panossian, R. 2006. The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars. New York/London: Columbia University Press/Hurst. Redgate, A. E. 1998. The Armenians. Oxford: Blackwell. Suny, R. G. 1993. Looking toward Ararat. Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Walker, C. 1990. Armenia: The Survival of a Nation. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Azerbaijan Shannon O’Lear Chronology 1918 The independent state of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic is established following the collapse of an independent Transcaucasian democratic federative republic. 1920 The Soviet authority is established; Azerbaijan becomes a member of the Soviet Union in 1922. 1988 Karabakh Armenians seek to have authority over their autonomous region shifted from Azerbaijan to Armenia. When that effort fails, they vote by a majority to secede from Azerbaijan as an independent region altogether. Tensions between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan increase. 1990 Tensions between Azeris and Armenians in several locations in Azerbaijan increase to the point that Gorbachev declares a state of emergency and sends troops in to the area. These events become known as Black January. 1991 Azerbaijan regains independence when the Soviet Union collapses. 1992 Abulfaz Elchibey is elected as Azerbaijan’s first new, post-Soviet president and focuses on his ambition of creating a single, unified state for the Azerbaijani people. Several hundred Azerbaijani civilians are killed during a one-night massacre in the town of Khojali, where Armenians took over the only airport in the region and thereby gained a stronghold in the NagornoKarabakh region. 1993 Heidar Aliyev, the deputy speaker of the parliament and Communist leader of Azerbaijan during the Brezhnev era, is elected president. 1994 President Aliyev signs the “Contract of the Century,” creating opportunities for international investment in Azerbaijan’s oil sector and allowing the long-established oil industry to expand. 2003 Ilham Aliyev, Heidar Aliyev’s son, becomes president in elections that international observers declare as flawed; public protest and violence erupt following these elections. 2005 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, constructed by an international consortium and supported by the United States, officially opens. There is speculation that this pipeline is likely to influence geopolitics by shaping relationships among different countries and interests in the region.

Situating the Nation Since its independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has maintained a secular Muslim identity, expanded international links in its oil industry, and fostered a national identity that reflects multiple layers of history in a complex place. Azerbaijan is located along the Caucasus Mountains that form an east-west bridge between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Previously a southernmost border area of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and its Caucasus neighbors, Georgia N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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and Armenia, now look westward toward such European organizations as the Council of Europe while adjusting relationships with still-powerful Russia. Azerbaijan is also one of five countries that border the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea basin area has proven to be rich in petroleum and natural gas. Azerbaijan’s situation could allow Azerbaijan to take advantage of this resource wealth as long as it is able to export oil. Despite this potential resource wealth, Azerbaijan’s future is far from settled. The notion of an Azerbaijani national identity first emerged during a brief period of independent statehood for Azerbaijan in 1918. In less than two years, the Soviets overtook Azerbaijan and, with some adjustments to its territorial borders, incorporated the land of Azerbaijan into the Soviet Union as one of 15 nationality-based republics. Azerbaijan became an independent state once again when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Geopolitically, Azerbaijan has been at the heart of the historical “Great Game” of territorial rivalry among Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Within the Caucasus land bridge, Azerbaijan is part of a crossroads between north and south, and between east and west. Azerbaijan is on the periphery—both geographic and figurative— of Russia’s realm of influence and is at the edge of post-Soviet identification as a superpower. Although there is not a large population of ethnic Russians in the Caucasus, economic and geopolitical factors continue to attract Russia’s attenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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tion to this region. Azerbaijan’s oil wealth, Azerbaijan’s possible role as an entry way for radical Islam in the region, and Azerbaijan’s ongoing territorial conflict with Armenians who themselves are fellow ex-Soviet citizens, place Azerbaijan squarely on Russia’s geopolitical map. Although Azerbaijan returned to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) following a brief withdrawal, Azerbaijan strives to assert a distinct national identity from its former colonizer.

Instituting the Nation Legacy and Leadership Even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the threat of territorial loss to an Armenian population in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict inspired nationalistic cohesion among Azerbaijanis, particularly in the late 1980s. Responding to such nationalist sentiment, the first elected president in Azerbaijan following the Soviet collapse, Abulfaz Elchibey, promoted a political platform that included a refusal to join the Russian-led CIS and a refusal to surrender any of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the Armenian-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Although Elchibey’s government did not last very long, territorial integrity in regard to Nagorno-Karabakh remained a priority for Heidar Aliyev’s administration, which came to power in 1993 and lasted for 10 years. Aliyev had experience as a former KGB officer and as the Communist Party head of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) under Brezhnev. Aliyev and his New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azerbaycan) wielded strong control over the government, the oil industry, and other key sectors of the economy. President Aliyev’s strategy for building stability and independence centered on forging strong links with the West. Most significantly, in 1994, President Aliyev enacted the “Contract of the Century,” which opened up opportunities for international investment in Azerbaijan’s oil sector. Under Aliyev’s presidency, Azerbaijan boosted its presence in the international oil industry, privatized its economy, and joined organizations, including the CIS, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace Program. Yet Aliyev’s centralization of personal power put in place a simultaneous obstacle to democracy-building. The enduring legacy of Aliyev’s concentration of power raises questions about how much progress Azerbaijan is making toward becoming a democratic state. In October of 2003, amid election-day riots that captured world media attention, Heidar Aliyev’s son, Ilham, became president of Azerbaijan. Although it is too early to assess how much this administration will alter the course of the country, there is yet little evidence that Ilham Aliyev is challenging the regime that his father established, and there remains some concern about how much the material and political lives of the Azerbaijani population will change under the current leadership. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Current Social Issues in Azerbaijan Internally Displaced Persons Internally displaced persons from the Gharabagh conflict with Armenia are a concern for Azerbaijan, as well as for the international community, since they depend directly on state and donor assistance. A result of the ongoing territorial dispute between Azerbaijanis and Armenians is that one in seven Azerbaijani citizens is an internally displaced person. Most of these people are surviving in makeshift camps, railroad cars, and other difficult conditions. A serious issue for Azerbaijan’s future is the fact that many of these people are children who have no access to regular schooling and education. Islam in Azerbaijan Over 90 percent of the population of Azerbaijan is Muslim (Shia), and there is a growing number of mosques. Azerbaijan’s approach to Islam, however, is predominantly secular. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site: Walled City of Baku with the Shirvanshah’s Palace and Maiden Tower Recognized as treasures of a part of present-day Baku, inhabited continuously since the Paleolithic period, the ancient Walled City shows evidence of successive Zoroastrian, Sasanian, Arabic, Persian, Shirvani, Ottoman, and Russian cultures. At risk from the effects of an earthquake in 2000, urban development, and limited conservation policies, the Walled City and the Maiden Tower represent a rare representation of multiple urban architectural styles (http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=31&id_site=958).

Defining the Nation Language and Identity Before 1918, the place currently referred to as Azerbaijan was called CaspiaAlbania by the Romans and Arran in Persian. Other names that people have called the area include Caucasian Albania and Shirvan. The people of Azerbaijan represent several ethnic groups, including Airums, Karapapakhs, Padars, Shahsevens, Karadags and Afshars. Turkic immigrations into the area contributed to present-day Azeri identity, and Mongol and Indo-European influences shaped Azeri language and culture. When the Soviet Union annexed Azerbaijan’s territory, Soviet leaders took a dual approach to Azerbaijan’s identity. On the one hand, Soviet ideology promoted internationalist education and the virtues of socialism in their construction of the “Soviet man” identity. On the other hand, the Soviets claimed that their government comprised a voluntary union of independent, nationality-based states. For this reason, the Soviet leadership needed to create specific national identities to fill the republics that it was establishing. Additionally, Soviet leaders aimed to distinguish and distance the subjugated peoples from each other while increasing their dependence on a centralized Soviet state. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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One author has argued that Soviets generated national “myths” as a foundation for several national groups identified within the Soviet Union, and that such myths have played an essential role in shaping Azerbaijan’s view of its history (Hunter 1994). One such idea is that Azerbaijan, the birthplace of Zoraster, is a 5,000-year-old country rooted in the ancient kingdom of Albania. Another key ingredient of Azeri identity, according to Hunter, is that between 1813 and 1828, negotiations between czarist Russia and Iran (a Persian empire at the time) led to a joint conspiracy to divide Azerbaijan into two parts to prevent Azerbaijan’s Turkic culture from flourishing. Hunter argues that this is an artificial myth created by the Soviets to serve their political agenda. However, other scholars offer alternative perspectives. One view is that a shared Azerbaijani identity gained momentum in the early 1900s as a result of economic cohesion and the rise of an intelligentsia that was brought about by Russian influence. Simultaneously, Islamic, Persian, and Turkic aspects of the shared identity reinforced a desire for political autonomy. Another view suggests that common, albeit differentiated, Azeri identity on both sides of the Azerbaijan-Iran border provides strong evidence supporting the reality of an ethnic identity shared by people in both countries. Whether or not national “myths” are rooted in historical fact, interpretation, or invention is a question that has led to much academic debate. However, various strands of stories and belief that weave together the fabric of identity and the relationship of that identity to a particular place are important and valuable in their own right for any national identity. The strength of a national identity lies most significantly in its very persistence, maintenance, and promotion by various interests. Language, usually a key element of a nation, is particularly complex in the case of Azerbaijan. The Azeri language is of Turkic origin and, together with other Turkic languages, is part of the Altaic branch of languages. Persian remained the common language in the countryside, whereas people in urban areas spoke in Russian and Azeri prior to Soviet incorporation of the area. Following Soviet-era Russification and the dominant use of the Russian language in education and official business throughout the Soviet era, Russian remains a common language in Azerbaijan, particularly in urban areas. In recent years, the government of Azerbaijan declared that Azeri, and not Russian, is the official language of the government, thus challenging many government officials to enhance their Azeri language skills. However, Azerbaijan blends its Soviet past with its own national identity in other ways. For example, official state holidays include such Soviet-era holidays as Women’s Day (March 8) and Victory in World War II Day (May 9), along with holidays specific to Azerbaijan identity: Novruz Bayrami (Holiday of Spring) (March 21), Republic Day (May 28), and Day of Solidarity of Azerbaijanis throughout the World (December 31). Language is often a cohesive feature of national identity, so it is important to recognize that the alphabet of Azerbaijan has changed four times in the last 100 years. At the beginning of the 20th century, people used the Arabic alphabet to write the Azeri language. Then, in 1929, the government of the Azerbaijani SSR N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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introduced a Latin alphabet. Within 10 years, the Soviets forced the use of the Cyrillic alphabet, bringing about another alphabet change. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Azerbaijani’s independence in the early 1990s, the government of Azerbaijan reintroduced a Latin alphabet for the Azeri language. These frequent and dramatic changes in alphabet effectively rendered large groups of people illiterate at particular times and limited the potential for communication through mainstream newspapers, books, government forms, and public signs on the landscape. The discontinuity of alphabet usage in Azerbaijan has challenged a sense of shared identity and distinctive culture among generations. However, the government’s current promotion of the Azeri language suggests a renewed sense of identity and a sense of place.

Narrating the Nation The Role of Nagorno-Karabakh It would be remiss to assess present-day Azerbaijani nationalism without recognizing the role of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, similar to other conflicts throughout the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, involves several contentious factors, including religion, ethnicity, and a legacy of Soviet borders and institutions. Azerbaijanis and Armenians construct and communicate public narratives of the conflict based on different elements. The predominant Armenian view emphasizes a struggle for national survival justified by a claim to a shared history of genocide during World War I. The Armenian focus tends to be centered on the Armenian people. The mainstream Azerbaijani perspective of the conflict centers, instead, on the importance of abiding by international standards of territorial integrity. The scale of focus for Azerbaijanis is the state. Azeris claim that Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and in surrounding areas are occupying between 14 and 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory, depending on the source. From the Azerbaijani standpoint, Nagorno-Karabakh is a matter framed in terms of sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. There are differing accounts of when Armenians came to be in the region known as Nagorno-Karabakh, but the Soviets drew the borders of present-day Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1920s, when they forcibly annexed both independent states into the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union drew the boundaries of the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs such that Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, officially part of the Azerbaijani SSR, were separate from the main population in the Armenian SSR. Similarly, the Azeris of Nakhchivan, also officially part of the Azerbaijani SSR, were separate from the main population in the Azerbaijani SSR. This interlaced demarcation of boundaries and division of peoples gave the Soviets leverage as the central authority over both groups. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Soviets granted the area of Nagorno-Karabakh the special status of Autonomous Oblast (region) within the Soviet Union to recognize the Armenian majority there. The Karabakh Armenians’ declarations, first of their desire to be united with Armenia and then of their move toward independent government in 1988, are generally recognized as the first of several events, including violence in Sumgait, Baku, and elsewhere, that led to the disintegration of relative stability. At no point during this conflict has Armenia formally been at war with Azerbaijan, but the involvement of Armenian troops renders the Nagorno-Karabakh situation an international armed conflict by the standards of the Geneva Convention. Viewed by some as a third party to the conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh identifies itself as an independent state, has an elected president, and claims that it should be included in the resolution negotiation process. The international community, including Armenia, has not recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. Azerbaijan’s leadership is reluctant to bestow any legitimacy on NagornoKarabakh’s claim to Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory by accepting Nagorno-Karabakh as a viable player in the negotiation process. Since the 1994 cease-fire, the death toll from this conflict has declined significantly, but the conflict remains unresolved. The conflict has led to negative economic impacts, displaced persons, and troops killed on all sides. The critical obstacle to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is that each side views the problem in absolute, territorial terms, yet territory does not hold a universal meaning. Each party to the conflict values the physical territory differently through associations with political, historical, and even future meaning. For Azerbaijan, the conflict represents a challenge to sovereign control over territory and, as such, is a threat to the well-being of the Azerbaijani state. The frozen Karabakh conflict maintains a presence in mainstream media, and the presence of internally displaced persons (IDP) in cities, towns, villages, and IDP camps sustains public awareness of the unresolved situation. One faction favors reclaiming Karabakh militarily. These different forms of attention paid to IDPs and to the frozen conflict serve to unify a sense among Azerbaijanis that one of the most significant issues they face as a nation is overcoming the threat to their national territorial integrity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Oil in Azerbaijan Since its independence following the Soviet collapse in 1991, Azerbaijan has rapidly expanded its oil industry and is poised to continue to do so. However, the simultaneous unfolding of oil development and modern state-building pose a particular challenge for this young state. Although its oil wealth has allowed Azerbaijan to make some significant political headway in strengthening contact N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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View of the port of Baku in Azerbaijan, 1998. (Remi Benali/Corbis)

with other countries, the domestic emphasis on oil development has been detrimental to other parts of the economy, since the oil sector does not appear to draw from, build on, or spill over to most other economic sectors. On September 20, 1994, President Heidar Aliyev signed the “Contract of the Century,” which welcomed the investment and technology of major oil companies from other countries to help exploit Azerbaijani oil. This arrangement was a symbolic recognition of Baku as the historical birthplace of the international oil industry and suggested the possibility of post-Soviet political and economic reform in Azerbaijan. President Aliyev himself referred to oil as “the main and richest national wealth of the Azerbaijan Republic and Azerbaijani people.” A significant aspect of Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” is that nonAzerbaijani signatories of the contract, many of which are in western Europe and the United States, are to divide 20 percent of the profits among themselves. It was important to President Aliyev that strong links be established with other countries as a way of legitimizing Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. A second significant point of the contract is that, at the time the contract was enacted, all five states surrounding the Caspian Sea had not yet come to agreement about how aspects of the resource, such as offshore oilfields, would be shared or divided. By welcoming contracts for exploration and development of oil reserves, most of which are offshore, Aliyev was establishing a claim to those offshore fields as part of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory. Since then, Azerbaijan’s oil exports have increased in N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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value and have led to increased income for the country, but the long-term benefits that this income may have for the people of Azerbaijan are not yet certain. Selected Bibliography Altstadt, A. L. 1997. “Azerbaijan’s Struggle toward Democracy.” In Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, edited by K. Dawisha and B. Parrot, 110–155. New York: Cambridge University Press. Croissant, M. P. 1998. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. Westport, CT: Praeger. de Waal, T. 2003. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press. Helsinki Watch. 1992 (September). Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Escalation of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. New York: Human Rights Watch. Herzig, E. 1999. The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers. Hunter, S. T. 1994. The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict. Washington DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Minahan, J. 1998. Miniature Empires: A Historical Dictionary of the Newly Independent States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. O’Lear, S. 2001. “Azerbaijan: Territorial Issues and Internal Challenges in mid-2001.” Post Soviet Geography and Economics 42:305–312. Shaffer, B. 2002. Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Smith, G. 1999. The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition. London: Arnold. Swietochowski, T. 1985. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van der Leeuw, C. 2000. Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Indonesia Michael Wood Chronology 1800 1910 1926–1927 1928 1930 1933 1942 1945 1945–1949 1950 1955 1957–1959 1957–1965 1962–1963 1963–1965 1965 1968–1998 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004

The Dutch government takes over the Dutch East India Company’s colonial possessions. Sarekat Islam, the first mass nationalist organization, is formed. Communist-inspired uprisings in West Java and Sumatra fail. (October 28) Youth Pledge calls for “one people, one language, one nation.” Sukarno gives a famous speech defining Indonesian nationalism and history. Sukarno is exiled to Flores and subsequently to Bengkulu, Sumatra. Japan invades the Dutch East Indies. (June) Pancasila is formulated. (August 17) Indonesian independence is declared by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. (November 11) The Battle of Surabaya starts. The Indonesian Revolution is waged against Dutch rule. Indonesia becomes a unitary state. The first general elections are held. Rebellions break out in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Guided Democracy period. Sukarno rules as semi-dictator and engages in a struggle for power with the army and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Campaign by Indonesia for Irian Jaya, which becomes part of Indonesia in 1969. Konfrontasi (“Confrontation”) aimed at the newly formed state of Malaysia, part of a larger anti-Western campaign. An attempted coup associated with the “September 30 Movement” leads to the destruction of the PKI, large-scale massacres, and the removal of Sukarno from power. Suharto is president of Indonesia; he emphasizes economic development and political control. East Timor is invaded and eventually annexed by Indonesia. The fall of Suharto; B. J. Habibie becomes president. Referendum leads to violence and eventual independence for East Timor. Abdurrahman Wahid becomes Indonesia’s fourth president. Wahid is replaced as president by Megawati Sukarnoputri. The Bali bombing, the work of Islamic militants, kills over 200 people. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is elected president of Indonesia in a direct vote.

Situating the Nation On August 17, 1945, Indonesia was declared independent of Dutch colonial control. This proclamation was the culmination of the work of a group of Indonesians who had been developing the concept of the nation and agitating for independence for decades. Indonesians had the common experience of colonial rule, but this was not a uniform experience. Some peoples and territories were taken over by the Dutch East Indies Company 350 years earlier, while such areas N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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as Bali and Aceh had only been conquered at the turn of the 20th century. The Dutch did not relinquish control of their colony without a struggle; they tried to regain authority over the archipelago through a variety of means, including negotiation and armed intervention. They also tried to co-opt nationalist sentiment through setting up a series of nominally independent Indonesian states that would in fact be beholden to the Dutch Crown. The federal United States of Indonesia, granted sovereignty in December 1949, would in under a year become the unitary Republic of Indonesia. Since that time, federalism has been viewed with suspicion. Indonesia as a unified entity remains perhaps the central element of Indonesian nationalism. The new nation operated under severe economic constraints. Indonesia was subjected to the successive blows of the Great Depression, the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian Revolution. In addition, the colonial system itself had not been run for the benefit of Indonesia’s native population. The Dutch had exploited the colony’s great natural resources but had left little behind in the way of infrastructure. Economic problems remained a constant throughout Indonesia’s years of independence. One could in fact argue that Indonesia’s biggest challenges were in fact economic. Two were of particular note: the absolute poverty of much of the population and the fact that, while natural resources were concentrated in the Outer Islands, political power and population were concentrated in Java. It could be argued that the political disputes of succeeding decades were basically over how to reform a deeply troubled economy. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) offered a radical Marxist solution. Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, saw a continuous nationalist revolution as a solution, while the New Order regime of President Suharto tried market-oriented development coupled with political repression. Currently Indonesia continues to try to attract foreign investment in a competitive globalized world while trying to foster a democratic society based on respect for individual rights and the rule of law. Beyond economic challenges and opportunities, keeping the Indonesian nation together has been a difficult task. By population, Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world (currently around 220 million). Indonesia is a huge archipelago with many ethnic groups, religions, and languages. The nationalist movement developed in the cities of colonial Java and the independent Republic of Indonesia clearly has had Jakarta as its focus. This has caused a great deal of resentment in other regions. At the same time, the movement was not one of Javanese nationalism. Nationalist participants included many from other islands, in particular the Minangkabau from Sumatra. The leadership of independent Indonesia has tended to be Javanese and Muslim, but other groups have not been totally shut out from positions of authority. The nation’s motto, bhinneka tunggal ika, translates as “unity through diversity.” It is assumed that all of the many ethnic groups that inhabit the archipelago contribute to the nation. The Javanese language itself is not dominant in Indonesia. In fact, it has little presence in the media even though it is the first language of about 60 percent of the population. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Instead, Indonesian (a dialect of Malay) has become the common language of the population. This again points to Indonesian nationalism being distinct from Javanese nationalism. The Indonesian nation is held to encompass all other ethnic groups; during the New Order, celebration of such identities was restricted to selected nonpolitical spheres, such as dance and the visual arts. Various social classes were involved in developing Indonesian nationalism. The nationalist movement was dominated by “new type nationalists” who looked for inspiration to Western methods of political organization and hoped in the future to build a viable independent society. This approach stood in contrast to that employed by earlier resistance figures who had aimed to overturn Dutch rule and resurrect traditional kingdoms. Indonesian nationalists tended to be educated, the sons of minor aristocrats, and trained as lawyers, doctors, economists, engineers, and journalists. Because of the nature of Dutch colonial society, they seldom achieved positions of power and prosperity. Aristocratic rulers tended to work with the Dutch, and those few Indonesians who had found employment in the government of the Dutch East Indies advanced the nationalist project in only a minor way. The social composition of the nationalist movement changed after independence was declared. Political activists, such as Sukarno, remained prominent. They formed and led political parties and took over the bureaucratic machinery inherited from the Dutch. But the armed struggle to expel the Dutch brought forth new actors, who would contribute not just to the development of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia but would also help to define the content of Indonesian nationalism. Military officers trained by either the Dutch or the Japanese rose to prominence. The military remains an important institution in Indonesia to this day. Suharto, who served as Indonesia’s president for over three decades, was a career officer, as is Indonesia’s current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Religious figures and youth also gained some authority. The latter in particular would be long identified as the embodiment of the importance of self-sacrifice on behalf of the nation, whether in confronting the Dutch or in 1998 helping to end the rule of Suharto. Postindependence nationalism is a clear extension of the nationalist movement that emerged in Indonesia at the beginning of the 20th century. It is difficult to really note an Indonesian identity earlier, although nationalists make frequent references to the 14th-century Majapahit empire, seen by some as a “proto-Indonesia,” and to the activities of a pantheon of national heroes who battled the Dutch. The nationalist movement initially focused on winning political independence. Postindependence leaders took up the task of defining a national identity and fostering national unity through the powers of government and through the mobilization of Indonesia’s citizens.

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Instituting the Nation A key institution in the history of nationalism was the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence, which in 1945 drafted a provisional constitution. The body ultimately rejected the Jakarta Charter, a supplementary clause that proposed to make it obligatory for Indonesian Muslims to follow Islamic law. Instead the nation was to be run according to the state ideology of Pancasila, a set of five broad principles that have been at the core of Indonesian nationalism to the present day. Throughout the postindependence period, Indonesian nationalism dominated politics, in parliament and at the party level. Leaders, such as Sukarno and Suharto, presented themselves as the embodiment of the nation’s destiny. The Indonesian military, which played a key role in Indonesian political life, also saw itself as the main protector of the Indonesian nation. However, Indonesian nationalism has never been simply a political project. Political goals included independence, unity, stability, prosperity, justice, and development. But many of these goals are connected to and were achieved through the creation of an Indonesian identity. Indonesian nationalism was transmitted to the people through whatever media were available. Before the revolution, it

Pancasila The Pancasila forms the centerpiece of Indonesian state (and nationalist) ideology as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Belief in one God A just and civilized humanitarian Indonesian unity Popular democratic sovereignty Social justice

The “five principles” were formulated by Sukarno during preparations for independence in 1945 (there is still some controversy over whether he was the sole author). They were subsequently incorporated into Indonesia’s 1945, 1949, and 1950 constitutions. During the Guided Democracy period, Pancasila was identified with Sukarno’s radical plans for the nation. The interpretation of the ideology was even more restricted during the New Order. An official take on Pancasila was propagated as a specific component of the school curriculum and in mandatory workshops for state employees. The requirement to believe in one God, originally intended to placate Muslim opinion, was used against alleged supporters of the “atheistic” Indonesian Communist Party. All organizations had to agree that Pancasila was the “sole basis” of their groups’ thinking and actions. Government opponents were labeled “un-Pancasila.” This heavy-handed approach has to some extent discredited Pancasila during the post-Suharto period. But most Indonesians still see the basic ideas as integral to their sense of nation and a good example of their tolerance for diversity.

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was spread through mass rallies and speeches. Nationalist leaders showed their love of the nation through the example of courting arrest and exile. During the Japanese occupation, Indonesian leaders conducted radio propaganda under the sponsorship of the Japanese to advance the ultimate goal of national independence. Independent Indonesia employed the full tools of the state, such as official pronouncements and the education system. During the Guided Democracy and New Order periods, debate was severely curtailed. Indonesian nationalism was defined by the state, and the population was expected to follow the official interpretation. Since the fall of Suharto, debate has continued over the nature of Indonesian nationalism and over how it is to be understood and implemented. Appeals to nationalism have generally been to the historic unity of Indonesia and to the heroism of the Indonesian people in resisting foreign occupation. To a lesser extent appeals were to a modern, progressive future, which could be built if Indonesians succeeded in achieving and preserving their independence. Indonesian nationalism was not noted for an extensive group of writers who dealt with the implications of nationalism on a philosophical level. Pancasila, for example, was clearly a functional tool designed to achieve the unity of the nation, rather than a means to explore the definition of Indonesian and what an independent Indonesia should actually look like. A few figures did examine the basic tenants of Indonesian nationalism. They tended, however, not to delve too deeply. Sukarno synthesized perhaps incompatible elements—nasionalisme, agama, komunisme (nationalism, religion, and communism)—into the single concept of NASAKOM. Muhammad Yamin, a journalist and politician, was a key figure in the

National History There is a great reverence among many Indonesians for the 14th-century Majapahit empire. Such writers as Muhammad Yamin (1903–1962) looked on Majapahit as a “protoIndonesia” and celebrated Majapahit’s great statesman, Gajah Mada, as the nation’s great unifier. The New Order in particular looked to Majapahit for inspiration; the Suharto regime, with its fondness for central political control, hierarchical structures, and Javanese mannerisms, could be seen as a “new Majapahit.” Majapahit was Hindu in orientation. This did not sit well with some in a majority Muslim country. Indonesian nationalists also venerate various pahlawan nasional (“national heroes”) who fought the Dutch. These men and women were representative of all of Indonesia’s regions, religions, and ethnic groups. Although they fought long ago for their own kingdoms, religions, and ambitions, they have been viewed as fighting for the Indonesian nation. Current history also provides a powerful set of images. The Indonesian Revolution represents triumph over foreign domination. The involvement of the Indonesian Communist Party in the September 30, 1965, coup attempt and the subsequent violent suppression of the party can be seen as the “founding myth” of the New Order. The collapse of the Suharto regime in the face of student protest may provide Indonesia with a new set of heroes.

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construction of a “national history.” He tended to assume that a Javanese identity was also an Indonesian one. This line of thought was to some extent also followed by the New Order regime of President Suharto. Others believed that local traditions would simply recede into the background as Indonesia developed as a modern country.

Defining the Nation Indonesia was not really defined in ethnic terms, although there were some historical elements that could form a basis for an Indonesian nation. These include the Malay language, spoken across the archipelago. Majapahit provided a precedent for a unified though Javanese-dominated Indonesia. But the objective argument for the validity of Indonesia was that a modern state could be built to replace the Dutch East Indies. The colony was to be seized by Indonesians through political action and an act of will. The act of will involved the realization that they had a common history and identity. There was some conflict between different cultural orientations within nationalism. Some looked to the West, some to China or Japan, some to a wider Islamic world. Around 85 percent of Indonesians are nominally Muslim. Islam apparently arrived in Indonesia around the end of the 13th century, spread through trade and missionary activity rather than through outside invasion. Muslim institutions and individuals have all contributed to Indonesia’s development; the republic’s fourth president was both an Islamic scholar and the head of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization. There is a great deal of variety among Islamic practice in Indonesia today, ranging from the integration of pre-Islamic customs to a militant fundamentalist approach. Indonesians have largely resisted the urge to equate an Indonesian identity with an Islamic one. Recent attempts to adopt Islamic law have failed, although some provinces and municipalities have moved in that direction. Indonesians are proud of their relative tolerance toward religious minorities. However, recent attacks on churches, sectarian violence, and terrorist attacks indicate that some Indonesians are sympathetic to a radical Islamic message, perhaps questioning the whole concept of Indonesia as a separate nation. However, militants generally have had limited success in interesting Indonesians in their agenda. Indonesian nationalism did not really favor one ethnic group, although the Javanese dominated its development and implementation. Indonesian nationalism is also not specifically identified with Indonesia’s dominant religion, Islam. Instead, there have been attempts to “tame” Islam through Pancasila. Indonesian nationalism has not, however, been totally inclusive. Not all inhabitants of the archipelago are automatically Indonesian. There have historically been two problematic minorities. The first of these consisted of Eurasians, who had mixed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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European and indigenous heritage. Some members of this group were very involved in the early nationalist movement, while others were very much opposed to Indonesian independence. Most Eurasians either left Indonesia after independence or have been assimilated into the larger population. The second group consists of ethnic Chinese, many of whom in fact speak no Chinese and have roots in Indonesia that go back centuries. Nevertheless, many Indonesians identified the Chinese with the colonial authorities, with whom they were seen as working closely. The apparent reluctance of many Chinese to fully engage with the nationalist project led many to question their loyalty. The perceptions were also held that many Chinese were sympathetic to Communist China and unfairly dominated the economy. The Chinese minority was subject to various legal disabilities. The status of Chinese-Indonesians probably hit its lowest point during the final years of the New Order. A few wealthy Chinese businessmen were allowed access to President Suharto, while the majority of Chinese were subject to petty indignities, discrimination in terms of employment and education, and the real threat of communal attacks. The situation has certainly improved in recent years, with some members of the community achieving positions of authority in the government, for example. Chinese customs and culture are now more or less openly celebrated and there has been some attempt to see the community’s history as integral to that of the Indonesian nation as a whole. Steps in this latter direction are still, however, rather tentative. Immigrants to Indonesia, beyond a few Dutch military deserters and artists, have until recently been quite few in number. In the last couple of decades, however, some foreigners have moved to Indonesia, particularly to Bali. While in general these newcomers have been well received by local people, the government has not facilitated this form of immigration, nor has it helped the Indonesian spouses of such foreign residents. Overseas, the Indonesian population has earned a reputation for friendliness toward foreign visitors. Indonesia receives millions of visitors a year, both tourists and businesspeople. Indonesian nationalism is not seen as something intrinsically xenophobic. However, not all Indonesians share this, perhaps stereotypical, attitude toward outsiders. The government has on occasion hampered visits by foreign journalists. Terrorist attacks, such as the October 2002 Bali bombing, point to a few Indonesians being very uncomfortable with a foreign presence on their soil. The boundaries of Indonesia were held to be both natural and political. Indonesia was to include most of island Southeast Asia, but only those areas that had been under Dutch control. Some attempts were made to include parts of Malaysia within an independent Indonesia, but these were dropped at an early date. Indonesian nationalism was also in some sense ethnic, in that only those who had the common experience of fighting for the independence of the Dutch East Indies were part of the nation. East Timor, never part of the struggle against Dutch colonialism, could not be successfully integrated into an independent Indonesia. Schemes to unite all of island Southeast Asia were doomed to fail, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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despite common culture motifs across the region. Indonesia has no revisionist attitudes toward national borders, and disputes with neighbors, while often heated, involve specific political problems.

Narrating the Nation In narrating the nation, Sukarno employed a model using three stages of history. Indonesia had experienced an ancient “golden age.” The coming of the Dutch initiated the current “dark age,” despite heroic Indonesian resistance when the colonial authorities consolidated their power. In doing so, the Dutch both exploited Indonesia and pushed it off its ordained path of development. Sukarno felt that once the Dutch were expelled, Indonesia would enter a bright future of progress, prosperity, and justice. This historical analysis was embraced by subsequent Indonesian nationalists. Debate was restricted to at what point the bright future was to begin. Postindependence Indonesia was beset by a myriad of problems; many, including Sukarno himself, felt that the revolution and the construction of Indonesia were still very much a “work in progress.” For the New Order, the dark ages had in fact continued for the country until the communists were suppressed during 1965–1966. The sustaining myth of Indonesian nationalism involved that of a unified nation resisting colonialism and building a bright future. The related concept, that the Dutch in fact “created Indonesia” through bringing disparate regions and peoples together, was definitely rejected. Independent Indonesia is a very centralized country. Both Sukarno and Suharto constructed political structures where power was concentrated in the capital. Post-Suharto governments have begun to devolve some powers to the provinces and municipalities, but a national identity remains paramount to most Indonesians. Indonesian nationalism can be described as having definite and limited goals involving national independence and internal development. An exception involved the Sukarno period, during which Indonesian nationalism presented itself as in the vanguard of a larger revolution of the Third World against Western powers led by the United States. Sukarno rejected Western-style democracy as being incompatible with Indonesian norms. Instead he was in favor of new authoritarian structures that he felt were necessary to protect the Indonesian Revolution against internal and external enemies. Sukarno gave lengthy, impassioned speeches and built grand monuments to remind the population that they were all part of a continuous revolutionary struggle that was leading the nation forward. This course of action was tied in with a sharp move toward the political left involving open sympathy toward Communist China. The PKI gained a great deal of political influence, and many of its ideas and even its slogans were incorporated into the accepted interpretation of Indonesian nationalism. This approach stood in sharp contrast to that of Sukarno’s successor. Suharto’s Indonesia was a military-dominated and hierarchical society with a deeply N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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conservative worldview. A particular version of Indonesian nationalism that included a reverence for the ancient Majapahit empire and the incorporation of many Javanese cultural elements was presented as the norm. The government’s interpretation of Pancasila was the only accepted one. Communism was seen as a latent threat to Indonesia’s stability, prosperity, and even existence. Communism was portrayed as intrinsically “un-Indonesian.” Although the New Order regime was interested in attracting foreign investment and was involved in such groupings as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, it was basically inward looking. An exception may have involved the 1975 invasion of East Timor. The occupation of the former Portuguese colony, like the previous Sukarno-era campaign to annex Irian Jaya, could be viewed as a nationalist project intended to fully integrate Indonesia within its “natural borders.” However, other factors, such as the fear of a power vacuum in a neighboring state

Sukarno addresses a crowd, September 1950. An anticolonial activist and the first president of Indonesia, the controversial Sukarno contributed to the country’s political development and to building its national identity. (Bettmann/Corbis)

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in an environment of “spreading communism” in mainland Southeast Asia may have been seen as a more important motive. Certainly, East Timor was never seen as historically part of Indonesia. Post-Suharto Indonesia has taken a rather cautious approach to the nation’s identity and its place in the world. Political liberalization has led to an abandonment of a rigid interpretation of Pancasila and even to the questioning of whether the state ideology is still relevant. Some Indonesians have pushed for the nation to adopt a more Islamic identity, a move rejected by many other Indonesians. For many Indonesians, issues of national identity retain little interest as the country tries to recover from dictatorship, economic crisis, and a series of natural disasters. Certainly no current Indonesian leaders have put forward a coherent, passionately felt national vision in the manner of Sukarno and Suharto. Indonesian identity has been expressed through a variety of media, such as the national anthem, the flag, and various symbols. The latter include the Garuda, the magical steed of the Hindu god Vishnu, now the name of the Indonesian national airline and an element of the nation’s coat of arms, and the 8th-century Buddhist shrine of Borobudur. Some symbols were given a very long pedigree (Yamin refers to the Indonesian flag having been used for a full 6,000 years). The territory of Indonesia itself is seen as a symbol, embodied in the phrase tanah air kita, “our land and water.” Other powerful images for Indonesian nationalism involve those connected to the revolution. The city of Surabaya was the site of a battle between Indonesian youth and British forces. Indonesians believed that the British were facilitating the return of Dutch authorities. The start of this battle on November 10, 1945, the embodiment of the Indonesian will to resist, is still celebrated as Heroes’ Day. Sukarno put up numerous monuments to the national struggle, including a notable one in Jakarta to celebrate the return of the western half of New Guinea to Indonesian control. The slogan “Sabang to Merauke” was common during the Sukarno era and reflected a firm commitment to a united Indonesia, stretching from Sabang in Sumatra to Merauke in (then) Dutch New Guinea. The national cemetery at Kalibata, Jakarta, is a reminder to the population that independence was won at a considerable price in lives lost. The New Order regime of Suharto was able to transform the latter site into a monument with its own take on the Indonesian Revolution through the burial at the cemetary of the military officers slain during the September 30, 1965, incident. These reported victims of the radical PKI were made into “Heroes of the Revolution.” The Indonesian Revolution was thus not just against the Dutch but also against those who would hijack it for their own selfish purposes. Lubang Buaya, a disused well on the outskirts of Jakarta where the generals were slain, became for the New Order the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism. A lavish monument and museum at the site presented the New Order as the main defender of the Indonesian nation. In the wake of the death of the generals, hundreds of thousands of suspected communists were also killed. There are no monuments or memorials to these deaths, and the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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massacres of 1965–1966 still remain a taboo subject. They are not part of the official, or even popular, national narrative. National symbols for post-Suharto Indonesia have yet to really emerge. One potential symbol might involve the selfsacrifice of students on behalf of the nation. This symbol, however, is still treated rather tentatively, despite the clear parallels with politically active youth in the earlier national struggle. Only a modest monument has been erected to the students slain in May 1998 at Trisakti University, Jakarta, while demonstrating against the Suharto regime.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The mobilization of the people of Indonesia to construct the Indonesian nation was facilitated by a variety of catalysts. Such external events as the Japanese occupation, the Cold War, the rise of the “Asian model of development” of the 1970s to 1990s, and serious problems with this model at the end of the 1990s all caused Indonesian nationalism to take on certain characteristics. It is unlikely that Indonesia would have gained its independence when it did if it were not for the fact that the Dutch were defeated militarily in 1942. They were forced to, in a sense, “reconquer” their colonial possessions after the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Indonesia won its independence and maintained its unity in a Cold War context. Matters were complicated by the existence of a large, powerful, indigenous Communist Party and the armed conflict in nearby Indochina. After the suppression of the PKI during 1965–1966, the Suharto regime tried a local variant of the Asian model of export-oriented development. This approach to the economy and politics was judged less nationalistic by many outside commentators. Certainly it was more interested in attracting foreign investment than the previous regime, which had actively courted conflict with outside powers, at least on a rhetorical level. But perhaps the single-minded pursuit of economic progress could itself be seen as a nationalist project. One sees similar strategies, coupling economic growth with the strengthening of a unified national identity, in Singapore and Malaysia. The Asian economic crisis during 1997–1998 destroyed much of the economic advancement made by the New Order regime and may thus have removed its nationalist credentials, leaving it simply a tired, corrupt dictatorship. The political goal of Indonesian nationalists was originally the obtainment of independence from the Dutch. During the Indonesian Revolution, the debate was over whether the struggle should be simply a political fight for independence or a true social revolution involving the total transformation of the nation, perhaps on radical or populist lines. Later, the argument was over whether the revolution was indeed finished or was in fact still an ongoing process. Sukarno favored the latter interpretation, seeing the granting of independence as simply the first step in a larger Indonesian, if not world, revolution. Suharto and his New Order, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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concentrating on economic development, definitely saw the revolution as over, although it continued to employ revolutionary symbols and language. Many Indonesians apparently felt that such terminology was still important; some of the popularity of Megawati Sukarnoputri (Indonesia’s fifth president) may have stemmed from nostalgia for her father as a revolutionary figure. To obtain the goal of independence, the Indonesian nationalist movement employed a diversity of tactics, including mass mobilization and noncooperation with Dutch authorities. Interestingly, much more effort seems to have been expended in the early days on creating Indonesians than on expelling the Dutch (although after the failure of the 1926–1927 armed rebellions and subsequent Dutch repression, this latter approach may have simply been unrealistic). The Youth Pledge taken by a gathering of Indonesian nationalists in Jakarta in 1928 called for “one nation, one people and one language.” Violence was only resorted to after it showed some hope of success in the wake of the Japanese defeat. Even then, it was always tempered by attempts to negotiate and to gain international support. The debate is still open as to whether it was negotiation or armed struggle that was decisive and over the relative importance of outside diplomatic pressure in winning independence. After independence, the government employed such tools as textbooks and monuments to solidify the identification of the citizenry with the Indonesian nation and to foster loyalty to the Indonesian state. During Sukarno’s time as president, force was used to keep the national territory intact (although regional rebellions were more concerned with defining power at the center than with actual independence from Indonesia). Force was also used during the New Order in Irian Jaya, East Timor, and Aceh, but these were all regions that possessed unique histories. All had come into Indonesia under different circumstances. East Timor was originally a Portuguese colony, Irian Jaya was brought into Indonesia through diplomatic maneuvers in the context of the Cold War, and Aceh was voluntarily part of Indonesia but fiercely proud of its resistance to any outside attempts at domination. Propaganda tended to refer to an agreed upon “national history.” The national ideal was legitimized by the struggle for independence. After the latter had been achieved, a variety of threats were identified, including neocolonialism during the Guided Democracy period and the possibility of a resurgent PKI or at times an “un-Indonesian” militant Islam during the New Order. Finally, appeals were made to success: economic development meant that Indonesia was a viable and legitimate nation. With the end of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in May 1998, some predicted the “breakup” of Indonesia; comparisons were made to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Such sentiments seem now to be misplaced. Indonesia’s unity, based on a common Indonesian nationalism, seems quite strong. The winning of independence from the Dutch was followed by the construction of a common national identity acceptable to a very diverse population. Possible divisive issues involving the place of Islam in Indonesian society, the dominance of Java, and regional disN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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parities have been downplayed. Instead, Indonesians are held to have a common history and, through cooperation, a bright future. The central feature of Indonesian nationalism, of a common national identity based on the unity of the diverse peoples of the Archipelago, has remained remarkably resilient despite the many political, social, and economic changes of recent decades. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1990. Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bourchier, D., and V. R. Hadiz, ed. 2003. Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Feith, H. 1962. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Feith, H., and L. Castles, eds. 1970. Indonesia Political Thinking, 1945–1965. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Friend, T. 2003. Indonesian Destinies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kahin, G. M. 1952. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Legge, J. D. 2003. Sukarno: A Political Biography. 3rd ed. Singapore: Archipelago Press. Ramage, D. E. 1995. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance. New York: Routledge. Ricklefs, M. C. 2001. A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200. 3rd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Sukarno. 1970. Nationalism, Islam and Marxism. Introduction by R. McVey. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project. Sukarno. 1975. Indonesia Accuses! Soekarno’s Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930, edited, translated, annotated, and introduced by R. K. Paget. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press. Weatherbee, D. E. 1966. Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies. Wood, M. 2005. Official History in Modern Indonesia: New Order Perceptions and Counterviews. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill.

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Iraq Tareq Y. Ismael Chronology 1915 Britain invades Iraq to safeguard Iranian oil during World War I. 1916 The Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire begins under the leadership of Sharif Hussein. 1917 Britain consolidates its rule over Iraq, proclaiming itself a liberator. 1919 At the Paris Peace Conference, as per Article 22 of the League of Nations, the Iraq mandate is given to the British; the modern borders of Iraq are created. 1920 Iraqis revolt against British mandatory rule, encompassing the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds; the revolt is largely quashed by the end of the year. 1921 (August) To create a façade of an independent state, Faisal bin Hussein (Faisal I) is proclaimed king of Iraq by the British. 1930 The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty is signed, giving the British both military and commercial rights in Iraq; this treaty is particularly important given the discovery of oil in 1927. 1932 The British mandate officially ends in Iraq, and Iraq is nominated to the League of Nations. 1933 (September 8) King Faisal I dies and is succeeded by his son Ghazi (d. 1939), a panArab nationalist. 1940–1941 Nationalist Rashid Ali al-Kaylani gains power and tilts toward the Axis powers. 1941 (April 18) British forces put down the Rashid Ali coup. (May 31) A pro-British government is reinstalled. 1948 (January) Al-Wathba—the Leap—is the most formidable mass insurrection in the history of the monarchy; it forces the monarchy to shelf the proposed Portsmouth Treaty of 1948, a revised version of the 1930 treaty. 1952 (November) The Al-Wathba of 1948 continues in the form of an intifada, in which the social, economic, and political policies of the monarchy are challenged. 1954 (April 21) “Military Assistance” understanding between Iraq and the United States. 1955 Iraq joins the “Baghdad Pact,” an anti-Soviet security bloc. 1958 The “Free Officer” coup brings Brigadier General Qasim to power; he initiates a progressive program and withdraws Iraq from the Baghdad Pact. 1963 The first Ba’ath coup, with U.S. backing; the Ba’ath (Arab Socialist) Party and its army allies take over the reins of the state; an army countercoup replaces the regime nine months later under the leadership of Abd al-Salam Arif, who is proclaimed president of the country. 1968 The second Ba’ath coup, again with the support of the United States and army allies, declares Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr president of the republic. 1973 Iraq nationalizes its oil industry. 1979 al-Bakr resigns, and Saddam Hussein assumes power as president. 1980 Iran-Iraq war; an immensely costly war, it drags on for eight and a half years. 1990 (August 2) Iraq invades Kuwait; four days later, the United Nations imposes economic sanctions on Iraq.

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1991 (January 17) Operation Desert Storm begins; it ends six months later with devastating effect to Iraq. The UN-sanctioned regime continues and erodes Iraqi infrastructure and society over the next decade. 1992 The United Kingdom and the United States impose a “no-fly zone” over northern Iraq (Kurdish region). 2001 (September 11) Terrorist attacks against the United States in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania; these attacks provide a political pretext to the invasion of Iraq. 2003 (March) Anglo-American forces invade Iraq. (April) The invading forces complete the occupation of Iraq.

Situating the Nation Iraq, the ancient Sumerian name meaning “country of the sun,” is a relatively modern state—admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state in 1932—that is situated on a historically ancient land, largely contiguous to the ancient borders of Mesopotamia. Iraq, centered between the Tigris and Euphrates, has a preeminent place in Arab and Islamic history and has long functioned as a coherent cultural and economic entity. Modern Iraq is marked by cultural plurality, with Arab Shiites, the majority, living alongside substantial Arab and Kurdish Sunni populations, as well as smaller groupings of Turkmen, Chaldean Catholics, Mandaeans, and more esoteric sects. Notwithstanding this diverse population, modern Iraq is largely defined by a shared cultural and political experience that has impressed itself on all its peoples. In the history of Islam, Iraq served as a backdrop for early religious drama, notably in the events that gave rise to Shiism; the shrines of Najaf and Karbala leave a lingering testament to the country’s preeminence in Islam. Baghdad, under the Abbasid Dynasty from AD 750 to 1258, was the seat of Islamic power and presided over the resurrection of neo-Platonic thought and various innovations in philosophy and the sciences. Historically, the Shiite Twelvers denomination was concentrated in southern Iraq, from Basra to the middle Euphrates. In Baghdad and its outlying areas, Sunni Muslims have historically made up the majority. In Mosul and farther north, the Kurds have inhabited the rugged mountainous terrain for centuries. By the process of urbanization in the 20th century, these populations have become increasingly mixed, particularly in the capital Baghdad. With the Ottoman conquest of the Arab-Muslim lands in the 16th century until the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate after World War I, the Iraqi provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul were administered from Baghdad as a periphery of the Ottoman Empire. The incorporation of Iraq into the world capitalist system occurred in the 19th century. Private property in the late 18th century was almost nonexistent in Iraq; it could be easily confiscated, and where it existed, it existed in rudimentary

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form and did not acquire political overtones. The incorporation of Iraq into the world capitalist system brought on highly disruptive changes. Communal property was expropriated by a relatively powerful few, leading to concentrations of private property. Expanding monetary transactions, real estate speculation, and the introduction of land laws between 1858 and 1932 resulted in an increase in state power. In parallel, there was a spread of modern communication technologies, a diffusion of European ideas and techniques, and a breakdown in the selfsufficiency of the traditional tribes. River steamships were introduced in 1859, the electric telegraph in 1861, state schools in 1868, and, critically, the public press in 1908. It is important to note that the territory of Iraq, as it was constituted following World War I under British rule and later as it became independent, was not an invention of Western statesmen. The boundaries adopted, though modeled upon Ottoman design, were remarkably similar to those that have been in existence since the time of the Early Dynastic Period, which originated during the reign of the Sumerian king, Sargon. Archaeologists and historians now trace the line of Sumerian kings further into antiquity than 2700 BC and entertain the legend of Gilgamesh, King of Uruk, taking that date as a provisional starting point

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for the history of ancient Iraq. Its boundaries, through bonds of culture and the administrative allure of Baghdad, and despite the various disruptions of succeeding invaders, has remained largely intact until the present day.

Instituting the Nation A historical sense of “Arabness” was a natural attribute of both Sunni and Shiite populations of Iraq, and Islamic heritage forged social and psychological ties among Sunni and Shiite Arabs as well as the Muslim Kurds. Hence, this cultural plurality in Iraq has historically been a dynamic rather than divisive force. In the formative and early periods of Iraqi history, there existed a complex hierarchy that involved several principles: a pyramid structure of religion, of sect, of ethnicity, and of power. In parallel, there existed a hierarchy of status that compromised the Ottoman ruling Pasha, military officers, and civil servants, descendents from the Prophet’s lineage (Sadah), Sufi orders, public religious scholars (Ulama), and wealth-based groups. Submission to structure and hierarchy did not bring, however, practices of strident racism or systemic discrimination. Nascent notions of Arab nationhood began to take substantive form in the period starting in 1908 and into World War I. In 1908, the Young Turks seized power in Turkey, initiating a program to create a modern nation-state along European lines; the modernization program of the Young Turks was accompanied by a Turkish ultranationalism that inevitably alienated Arab populations. Consequently, many Arab nationalists joined opposition movements, including the Ottoman Decentralization Party and the Young Arab Society (al-Fatat), and aspired to institute an independent Arab nation-state. In World War I, this Arab nationalism erupted in the “Arab Revolt” of 1916. The leader of the revolt, Sharif Hussein, entered into alliance with the British and the French, anticipating that the end of the war would see these powers recognize an independent and unified Arab state. The British and French meanwhile, as per the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, had instead designated themselves, not the Arab nationalist, as heirs to the liberated Arab provinces. In 1920, the League of Nations granted the British mandatory rule over the new state of Iraq. Following the imposition of British mandatory rule in Iraq from 1920 onward, diverse social actors and institutions converged to express an Iraqi nationalism. This expression of Iraqi nationhood suppressed religious and social divisions, bringing Arab nationalists, the Shia clerical leaders, and even the Kurds together in revolt against British rule in Iraq; notable in this nationalist revolt was the Haras al-Istiqlal (Independence Guard), which was a Shiite-led anticolonial group. The British would reestablish control by early 1921 and retain mandatory rule until 1932, when Iraq became nominally independent. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Defining the Nation Iraq’s collective identity emerged historically in relatively isolated communities over a large geographical expanse despite poor or inadequate transportation. Increased Iraqi attendance at Ottoman institutions of higher learning and a spread of Arab clubs and societies, as well as newspapers, coalesced to raise interest in Arab history and formulated early theories of Iraqi nationhood. The collective identities of Iraqis underwent further refinement as intensive interaction within and among communities softened traditional kinship ties (tribe, religion, etc.) and encouraged the emergence of new identities and national interest. Noted histories of the late 19th century show that the collective identities of Iraqis were tolerant of diversity; the reader discovers, for instance, correspondences of warm relations between a Shiite Muslim and a Catholic trader in premodern Iraq and Greater Syria, respectively. Social distinctions, such as sectarian backgrounds or ethnic origins, were in constant flux; the literature of this period shows no rigid racial, social, or even economic biases. In other words, the sectarian and ethnic divisions have not been natural or inherent facets of the Iraqi historical experience. Furthermore, some of the writings of the late 19th century show proto-nationalist references indicating that a sense of an Iraqi nation existed even in preindustrial and pre-mass-literacy Iraq. There were frequent references to the “Iraqi” frontier, delimiting tribes and towns within Iraq. Life events in early Iraq show that, at the individual level, a person can depart from his/her communal or ethnic roots through interaction with the larger community. Such was the documented case of an Iraqi Jewish physician, Dr. Naji, who felt more integrated into the life of provincial, Muslim functionaries and was detached from his Jewish communal connections and networks. Mohammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, an Iraqi poet known as “the greatest Arab poet,” who was from a wellknown Shiite family from Najaf, would likewise become known for his emphasis on nation not defined by sect or ethnicity. By the turn of the 20th century, these fluid relationships among Iraq’s diverse populations set in motion a process of national transformation, which was witnessed in the 1920 revolt, as the diverse Iraqi communities united under the banner of Iraqi nationalism and anticolonialism. And while Iraqi nationhood proved to be uneven, and occasionally contradictory, it coalesced as a genuine phenomenon. In the monarchical period, a deliberate process of state-building sought to inculcate an Iraqi identity, incorporating Sunni and Shiites alike. This process found its climax under the short-lived Qasim regime, where the regime worked to contain Arab chauvinism and formulate a multicultural Iraq by way of a progressive program. This process met its end with the Ba ’ athi coup of 1963, after which the repressive regime worked to redefine Iraq in official party terms. The secular ideology of Ba ’ ath pan-Arabism was conceived and written by non-Iraqi intellectuals like Michel Aflaq; on a theoretical level, it is foreign to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Iraq’s collective and shared experience. Consequently, pre-Ba ’ ath civil society was brutally suppressed during 1963–1964. Civil society was re-created in the following years when all cultural forms of expression were put under Ba ’ ath control. The chauvinistic core of Ba ’ ath ideology is regional leadership of the Arabs. Given Iraq’s material resources, human infrastructure, and rich civilizational history, the Iraqi Ba ’ ath regime pressed hard for its candidacy to Arab leadership after 1979, when Egypt made peace with Israel and, thus, relinquished its leadership position. But pan-Arabism did not resonate with the historical memory of modern Iraq. This contradiction gave rise to the two-pronged policy of authoritarian statism and the Ba ’ ath Project of Rewriting History, both textually and culturally. Social and cultural associations were subject to state apparatus control, and the education system became a tool for propagating pan-Arabism. For this goal, the Ba ’ ath regime sought to co-opt, through intimidation and rewards, the prominent intellectuals among the intelligentsia to rewrite Iraqi history from the vantage point of pan-Arabism. Some agreed for the tempting rewards, like Dr. Nuri Ali Hammudi al-Qaysi and his book al-Shir wa al-Tarikh (Poetry and History). He became the regime’s spokesman in Arab intellectual forums from early 1980 to mid-1990. Others, like Kamal Mazhar Ahmad, cooperated out of fear but challenged the regime’s project by inserting subtle messages that undermined the regime’s ideology, as in his book, al-Tabaqa al-‘Amila al-Iraqiya: al-Takkawun wa Badiyat al-Taharruk (The Iraqi Working Class: Its Formation and Early Activities). The regime’s apparatus of kinship ties culminated with the political dominance of Saddam Hussein’s Tikriti clan, which severely undermined the rhetoric of panArab Iraqi identity. To compensate for this apparent contradiction, the Ba ’ ath regime resorted to more measures of repression. The staff of Saddam’s security apparatus was chosen on the basis of loyalty; therefore, almost equal numbers of Sunni and Shiites were in service to Saddam’s cultic politics. The loyalty-driven rule of Saddam Hussein exacerbated latent subnational tendencies. Shortly before the end of the Iraq-Iran war, and following the imposition of economic sanctions, Saddam’s regime transformed into a cultic-based political system as the social sector collapsed, and power, thereafter, was increasingly leased to traditional groupings. Among the Shia, traditional bonds reasserted strength and gave rise to religious revival, a notable case in point being the rise of the Sadr movement, which exploded in prominence following the Anglo-American invasion of 2003. Likewise, ethnic minorities within Iraq, such as the Assyrians and Turkmen, have countered the Arab particularism of late Ba ’ athist state-building with their own ethnic particularism. The Kurdish population, since the early times of modern Iraq, have demanded cultural recognition and a degree of administrative autonomy within the Iraqi nation. Successive governments have contemplated redressing policies. Under the repressive Ba ’ ath, however, the Kurds took up arms and rebelled against the central Baghdad government. As contemporary history has sent Kurdistan on a sociopolitical trajectory apart from larger N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Iraq, further alienating it from the Arab majority, national reconciliation now seems unlikely.

Narrating the Nation The modern history of Iraq begins with the British invasion of Iraq. British forces began by taking Basra, in the south, in 1915, to safeguard Iranian oil during World War I. The British forces expanded progressively northward through Iraq until they occupied Baghdad in 1917, and Mosul a few months later. On conquering Baghdad, the British commander, Sir Stanley Maude, announced the advent of his army as a liberator of the Iraqi people from Ottoman rule. The intention of the British administration, in any event, was to establish British direct rule through a hierarchy of councils under British control. The British project was intended to squeeze maximum revenue from the Iraqi resources to boost the war-exhausted British Exchequer. For the Iraqis, even those who were considered pro-British, this restructuring meant an assault on their lives and their social practice. Consequently, nationalist sentiment exploded. On July 2, 1920, British administrator A. T. Wilson met with 14 nationalist delegates and 40 invited community leaders, including Jews and Christians who were known to be pro-British to water down the nationalist claims for independence. Nevertheless, both the nationalists and some of the 40 chosen members demanded the election of a national assembly. The continued British military presence, and a failure to respond to nationalist demands, drove the Iraqi people into armed resistance. Both Shiite and Sunni took up arms in the revolt, and even Kurds rose up against the British. Unsurprisingly, the superior British firepower quelled the revolt in a few months. But Iraqi nationalism became a political nightmare for the British, who attempted to pacify it by installing a Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, under King Faisal I, as a façade of a process toward Iraqi independence. Following the reign of Faisal I, the Iraqi monarchy staggered and sputtered, hopelessly attempting to mitigate the rising current of Iraqi nationalism while maintaining its pro-British posture. The failure of the monarchy to build a genuine national constituency brought about its demise, culminating with the “Free Officer” coup of Brig. Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim. With the coup of 1958, a new constitution was proclaimed, declaring the equality of Iraqi citizens, regardless of race, language, or religion. Qasim—of mixed Sunni-Shia parentage and part Kurd —established a progressive political compact that limited the power of traditional pan-Arabism, instead emphasizing a multiethnic and ecumenical Iraq; a significant portion of his ruling council would in fact be Kurdish and Shia. Qasim’s organizing efforts for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 and the nationalization of 99.5 percent of the oil concessions precipitated the doom of his regime, when the United States saw N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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present and real danger to its hegemonic role in the Middle East. A Ba ’ ath coup ended Qasim’s regime in 1963 and reversed the nationalist policies. A high-ranking Ba ’ athist, Salih al-Sa’di, repeatedly said, “We came to power on the CIA train.” The prospects for state-building on nationalist principles of equality, unity, and equal opportunity thus ended. Iraqi society, following the Ba ’ athist coup of 1968, though having seen initial gains in education and wealth, developed painful fissures as the regime’s cynical rule subjugated all social organization to the prerogatives of the party. Because the regime was loyalty-driven, it proved to be indiscriminately brutal, and in its rule, bloodied the hands of each of Iraq’s communities. The megalomaniac mindset that defined Saddam Hussein and suffused his era was exemplified with the invasion of Iran in 1980. The eight-year war with Iran, which cost billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands in human lives, was succeeded by a catastrophic war with Kuwait. Following its defeat in Kuwait, Iraq suffered under the dual burden of Saddam Hussein’s cruel dictatorship plus the suffocating measures of United Nations Resolution 687, the economic sanctions regime. This sanctions regime not only impoverished the Iraqi people but also shepherded in a return of traditional social associations (sect, ethnicity) and weakened the coherence of the Iraqi national idea. These difficulties were exposed and made raw with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent dismantling of the state.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Following independence, and throughout modern Iraqi history, the institution of the state acted as a preeminent force for shaping Iraqi political culture, an inculcator of Iraqi national identity. The institutions of the education system and the military, in particular, have served throughout Iraqi history as “schools for the nation.” Early in Iraq’s modern history, education was used to integrate the Shia population into Iraq’s national vision. During the latter part of the monarchical regime, Shia enrollment in secular schools saw a dramatic rise, as did enrollment in teacher colleges. This process continued even into the Ba ’ ath era, though in perverted form. In the formative period of the modern Iraqi state, King Faisal I faced three emergent visions of the country. One centered on pan-Arabism, which traced the origins of Iraq to the pre-Islamic era and the greatness of the Islamic civilization when Arabs were united; in other words, Arab unity was a prima facie condition for the greatness of modern Iraq. The second vision proposed Iraqi nationalism as a celebration of Iraq’s ancient civilization, which predated Arabs and Islam without renouncing its Arab-Islamic heritage. In this vision, Sunnis, Shiites, and other minority groups could partake of the historical memory of Iraq. The third was a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Iraqi soldiers patrol Baghdad following a coup by the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party in 1963. Abd al-Karim Qasim, the founding leader of the Iraqi Republic and deposed prime minister, was executed. (AFP/Getty Images)

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Shiite vision of unconditional independence, with a clergy-based Islamic government. The Shiite demand alarmed Britain, which along with the king rejected such a vision. The various nationalist visions were eventually institutionalized in political parties, different professional organizations, and social clubs, as well as a proliferating press that disseminated nationalist and anti-British discourse. Between 1920 and 1929, no less than 109 newspapers were in circulation, and Shiites and Sunnis worked along with non-Muslims in journalism, propagating national sentiments. Among Iraqi nationalists, ethnic divisions and religious differences were less pronounced than among the higher rungs of Iraqi society, which local elites and Britain manipulated to their own advantage. Prominent among the Iraqi nationalists were the Iraqi Communist Party and the National Democratic Party, which called in their program for social justice and cultural pluralism. The political community envisioned by pan-Arabism had many parties and organizations, including the quasi-fascist, like al-Muthanna Club and its youth wing, al-Futuwwa; the most important political party was, however, the Arab Socialist Ba ’ ath Party, founded in Iraq in 1952. King Faisal (1921–1933) sided with the Iraqi nationalist vision to counterbalance Britain’s heavy weight. Thus, the king, or for that matter the state, became a social agency for building a nation-state, and Britain, the foreign factor, was a catalyst accelerating the process. The king was aware of the importance of the Shiite constituency in domestic politics, but British constraints left very little room for maneuvering, which resulted in underrepresentation for the Shiites in the cabinet. Conscious of the complexity of the situation, King Faisal began building schools and state-sponsored education to nurture national sentiments, common feelings, and common purpose, thus adding to the middle-class intelligentsia, the carrier of national ethos. Between 1921 and 1940, elementary students increased from 8,001 to 89,482, and secondary students, from 110 to 13,959. Toward the project of building a nation-state, Faisal placed the promising youths among the Shiites into an accelerated training program to afford Shiites high positions in the government; he gave the Kurds an appropriate quota of public positions; and by 1933, he had raised the number of the military from 7,500 to 11,500 men, because he considered the army to be the backbone of nation-state building. In 1934 the army became based on conscription, thus weakening tribal/urban divisions through intermingling. Faisal’s sociopolitical projects aimed at containing the power of the tribal chiefs by building a responsive state with a strong army and neutralizing the Shiite religious leadership by building modern education. Successors to Faisal were, however, less politically astute. The monarchy, as a social agency for integration, changed with the coming of Abd-ul-Ilah in 1939 until the outbreak of the Qasim Revolution in 1958. Power was distributed narrowly within family and kin, the army became highly politicized, and the monarchy alienated Iraqi nationalists by identifying more closely with the British; hence, the urban uprisings of the Wathba in 1948, the two intifada in 1952 and 1956, and finally, the July 1958 Revolution of General Qasim. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The regime that General Qasim instituted was secular-progressive and aimed to counterpoise reemerging reactionary and traditional forces. Toward that goal, Qasim initiated progressive policies, such as land reforms, cutting rent rates, raising the minimum wage, raising taxes on the rich, raising tariffs, and building housing, schools, and medical centers for the poor, as well as legal reforms that introduced the Personal Status Law 188/1959, which emphasized the unity of the Iraqi people under the fairness of one law. Qasim’s ideological politics eliminated recruitment on sectarian bases. Recruitment into the government machinery and the army emphasized “Iraqiness,” not religion or ethnicity. The sociopolitical landscape at the time witnessed a thriving civil society of journalists, educators, artists, businesspeople, traders, and others. Qasim’s nationalist progressive policies and his anti-imperialist platform led Iraq to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact, posing a threat to Western interests in the region. Consequently, Qasim’s regime would be toppled by the Ba ’ ath, with strong indications of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backing. The rule of the Ba ’ ath, particularly following the ascension of Saddam Hussein, was tyrannical and parasitic. Whereas previous state-building had progressively strengthened the organic bonds among Iraq’s communities, under the national logic of Saddam Hussein, Iraq became one of unflinching loyalty to the party, enforced by violence. And with the huge wealth that accrued from the skyrocketing prices of oil revenue after 1973, the Ba ’ ath state was able to incorporate different classes and professions into state-sponsored projects in industrial, financial, and service sectors. By the end of 1977, about one-fourth of the Iraqi people became dependent on the Ba ’ ath government for their livelihood. In Iraqi towns, the government employed more than one-third of employable people. In spite of the repressive rule of the Ba ’ ath, the Iraqi impulse largely remained, and in the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi Shiites fought against their Iranian coreligionists under the Iraqi flag. As a consequence of this war, there was reallocation of much of the peasant-human resource to the battlefield, which jeopardized agricultural production. Peasants from Arab countries, particularly Egypt, were offered lucrative incentives to fill the widening gap of human input. Near the end of the war, many Iraqi conscripts returned home to find their plots and dwellings occupied by fellow Arabs. The Iraqis, on many occasions, killed the Arab peasants, whom they considered foreign usurpers, and the Ba ’ ath government did not intervene. Subsequent to the 1990–1991 Gulf War, Iraq was placed under a crippling sanctions regime that impoverished its people and encouraged the reemergence of traditional bonds. This process of national unraveling was solidified with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and its dismantling of Iraqi society. In conclusion, the United States, in its invasion of Iraq in 2003, proclaimed itself, much like the earlier British, as a liberator bringing freedom and democracy to the people of Iraq. The progressively escalating resistance was a response to U.S. dismantling of the state, the de-Ba ’ athification of government employees, and the disbanding of the large Iraqi army, which deprived about 500,000 famiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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lies of their livelihoods overnight. The disappearance of the state created a sociopolitical vacuum that was necessarily filled by remnants of traditional forces; the tribe replaced the state in providing services and security, and Shiite religious authority occupied the moral-legal domain. The constitution of 2005, drafted under the oversight of the occupation, sanctified religioethnic communities in articles 39 and 41; the present government is constituted along the same divisive segmentation, and the Iraqi cabinet cannot make a decision without consulting the Shiite religious establishment. It is ironic that it was a Western military action in the 1920s that first propelled Iraqi nationalism, and it is now another Western military action that designs to vanquish Iraqi nationalism and its modern nation-state. Contemporary Iraq is a social incinerator plagued by party militias, rampant criminality, and foreign occupation. Furthermore, the nucleus of what could form a national movement—the educated, the technically trained, and the middle class—have all but been destroyed or expelled. Iraq was once not only viable but forwardlooking; now, however, the future of Iraq and Iraqi nationhood looks immensely bleak. Selected Bibliography Abdullah, T. A. J. 2006. Dictatorship, Imperialism and Chaos: Iraq since 1989. London: Zed Books. Batatu, H. 2000. The Old Social Classes and New Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. London: Saqi Books. Davis, E. 2005. Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press. Herring, E., and G. Rangwala. 2006. Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy. London: C. Hurst & Company. Ismael, J., and W. H. Haddad, eds. 2007. Barriers to Reconciliation: Case Studies on Iraq and the Palestine-Israel Conflict. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Ismael, T., and J. Ismael. 2004. The Iraqi Predicament: People in the Quagmire of Power Politics. London: Pluto Press. Khalidi, R. 2004. Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East. Boston: Beacon Press Books. Jabar, F. A., and H. Dawod. 2007. The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics. London: Saqi Books. Jwaiden, W. 2006. The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse National Press. Marr, P. 2004. The Modern History of Iraq. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Nakash, Y. 1994. The Shi’is of Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Shahid, A. 2005. Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War. New York: Henry Holt.

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Japan Takashi Yamazaki Chronology 1868 1894–1895 1904–1905 1910 1914–1918 1931 1941–1945 1945–1952 1946 1949 1952 1955–1974 1964 1972 1985

The Meiji Restoration. The Sino-Japanese War. Japan colonizes Taiwan. The Russo-Japanese War. Japan colonizes Korea. Japan enters World War I. Japan’s military invasion into China begins. Japan enters World War II (defeated). Japan is occupied by the Allied Powers (U.S. military forces). The new constitution of Japan is proclaimed. The Chinese Revolution initiates the Cold War in Asia. Japan’s sovereignty is restored; the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty becomes effective. High economic growth. The Olympic Games are held in Asia for the first time, in Tokyo. U.S. administrative rights over Okinawa revert to Japan. The patriarchal Nationality Law is revised so that children with a Japanese mother are given Japanese citizenship. 1986–1991 There is a drastic increase in stock and land prices (the Bubble Economy). 1989 The Showa emperor dies (the end of the Showa era). 1991 The demise of the Soviet Union. 1999 The National Flag and Anthem Law is legislated. 2001 Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) provide logistic support for the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan. 2003–present SDF supports the rehabilitation of Iraq following the U.S.-U.K. attack on the country. 2006 The Fundamental Law of Education is revised.

Situating the Nation The sociocultural uniformity of the Japanese is high, with two factors promoting it. Geographically, Japan is an island country surrounded by ocean. Historically, it adopted an isolation policy from the 17th to 19th centuries. The basis of the uniformity was established in near-modern times. However, the expansion of Western imperial powers into Asia during the 19th century forced Japan to open itself to the world. The Meiji Restoration in 1868 was a kind of coup d’état in which the feudal Tokugawa shogunate was replaced by a new government aiming to reconstruct Japan as a modern nation-state ruled by the emperor (Tenno). The restoration was the beginning of Japan’s industrialization and military build-up, to make N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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an underdeveloped state comparable to the West. The new government promoted the drastic centralization of the country, which had been divided into various feudal domains. As Japan was incorporated into the competitive modern world, the construction of the Japanese nation through public education and the print media was also initiated. From the late 19th to the mid-20th centuries, Japan colonized Taiwan, Korea, and part of China through repeated wars. Such colonization made the “new” Japanese nation multinational. However, resistant movements by colonized people, such as Koreans and Chinese, took place. An imperialist attempt to integrate East Asians against the West was an utter failure, leading to Japan’s defeat by the Allied powers in World War II. As a result, Japan lost its colonies and accepted occupation by U.S. military forces until it restored sovereignty in 1952. Due to the loss of its colonies and the suspension of nationality for the colonized peoples, the Japanese became socioculturally uniform once again. The new constitution of Japan, which was drafted by the U.S. occupation force and proclaimed in 1946, declares that Japan is a pacifist state and has prevented the rise of aggressive nationalism. After the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the Cold War developed in East Asia between such capitalist countries as Japan, South Korea, and the United States and such socialist countries as China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union. For this reason, U.S. military forces continued to be stationed in Japan. These conditions enabled Japan to focus on economic recovery without significant defense spending. The resulting economic growth from the late 1950s to the early 1970s succeeded in narrowing the income and information gaps among Japan’s localities. Unlike Europe and the United States, Japan achieved high economic growth in part by absorbing not foreign immigrants but the rural population within Japan. Although the number of foreign nationals has been increasing since the late 1980s, Japan’s strict immigration policy contributed to postwar national uniformity. Due to an absence of international conflicts and the maintenance of national uniformity, large-scale nationalistic movements have rarely taken place in postwar Japan. A few exceptions include leftist resistance to the U.S. military presence within Japan from the 1960s to 1970s and rightist historical revisionism for the reconstruction of national identity since the 1990s. Article 9 of the new constitution stipulates that Japan must forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the state and the threat or use of force as the means of settling international disputes. Instead, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (effective in 1952, revised in 1960) provides that U.S. military forces be stationed within Japan to protect the country. Along with the postwar democratization, led also by the U.S. occupation force, antiwar pacifism embodied in the constitution was favorably accepted by the Japanese public. Leftist intellectuals and workers, who had been oppressed by the prewar government, first welcomed the U.S. occupation. However, realizing that Japan would be incorporated into the U.S. military strategy against the Communist bloc, they organized protests against the Japan-U.S. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Security Treaty. Although anti-U.S. movements such as this did not necessarily address the socio-historical contents of the Japanese nation, they regarded the antiwar pacifism, based on the common memory of the war, as a new element of Japanese national identity. After Japan achieved high economic growth in the 1960s, the positive reevaluation of the Japanese nation repeatedly appeared in the domestic and international media. Japan’s success story tended to be ascribed to several attributes believed to be socioculturally unique, such as its cultural uniformity, group orientation, diligence, consensus building, and so forth. Until the second peak of economic growth in the late 1980s, Japanese national identity was not so threatened as in the following decades. One of the reasons for this is that, under the Cold War and the U.S. nuclear umbrella (i.e., protection) over Japan, Japan’s international role was easily defined as a capitalist growth pole in Asia. However, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the increasing economic globalization elsewhere in Asia necessitated the redefinition of Japan’s relationship to the United States and Asia. This structural change over Japan’s political economy in the region gave rise to the rightist historical revisionism that attempts N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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to positively reevaluate Japan’s imperialist past so that the Japanese can be proud of themselves. This nationalistic movement was first organized by a group of university professors who aimed at revising school history textbooks. It not only promoted broader public debates over the future of Japan but also attracted governmental and public criticism from South Korea and China. The reestablishment of Japan’s subjectivity in the increasingly competitive international arena has now become one of the crucial agendas in Japan’s foreign and domestic policies. The Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni (War) Shrine, which enshrines class-A war criminals from World War II, may be accepted in Japan as an action to redefine the collective memory of the war. However, such an action has induced strong opposition in South Korea and China, since their postwar nationalisms have been formed as resistance against Japan’s imperialism. The (re)construction of national identities in East Asian countries does not stand alone but can be closely related to others’ memories and interpretations of the war. Thus, how to situate the Japanese nation in Asia is not limited to the matter of Japan itself.

Instituting the Nation The institutional core of the Japanese nation has been the emperor (Tenno) since the Meiji Restoration. The historical roots of the imperial family trace back to 585 BC. The emperor/empress ruled Japan until the 12th century when the shogun came to power. Upon the Meiji Restoration, modernist politicians reinstalled the emperor system into the new regime to transform Japan into a unitary nationstate. The deification of the emperor contributed to national integration and the rise of aggressive nationalism until the end of World War II. Dying for the emperor constituted part of Japanese attitudes toward wars. The idea of the Japanese nation under the emperor, therefore, was a political project promoted by elites. However, the concept of the Japanese nation-state sometimes appeared in premodern textual materials, and the imperial family has its origin in the ancient period. From the late 19th to early 20th centuries, Japan attempted to create a multinational empire consisting of Japanese and colonized people, which was a serious failure. The slogan of fighting against Western colonial powers did not generate any shared values between colonizing Japan and colonized Asia. After World War II, the Allied powers questioned the status of the emperor as one of the sources of Japanese militarism. However, General MacArthur, who led the U.S. occupation force, considered the survival of the emperor system as the means for a smooth occupation and postwar reform. The emperor was finally exempted from his responsibility for the war, and the new constitution was drafted to limit the roles of the emperor to symbolic (nonpolitical) ones, such as participation in national ceremonies. In this sense, the emperor system has worked to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Postwar Emperor System Unlike the emperor before World War II, the current emperor is neither a sovereign of Japan nor the living God of the divine nation. According to the new constitution, the emperor is the symbolic figure representing Japanese citizens, and the sovereign power of Japan exists in Japanese citizens. The roles of the emperor are regulated by the constitution. It limits the official functions of the emperor to 12 national ceremonies, such as the formal appointment of the prime minister selected by the National Diet. However, when the Showa emperor died in 1989, most Japanese, whether positively or passively, went into mourning for him. The media report on the lives of the imperial family on a daily basis. They gain public attention and popularity. The birthday of the emperor has been designated as a national holiday.

help integrate the Japanese. As mentioned above, the loss of former colonies also contributed to the reintegration of the Japanese. It pushed back the boundaries of the Japanese nation to those in the precolonial periods, which promoted a public sense of national uniformity at the existential level and discrimination against foreign nationals within Japan. Political parties have promoted politics over nationalism. The new constitution drafted by the U.S. occupation force regulates the rebirth of aggressive nationalism by protecting individual rights and prohibiting the possession of aggressive military forces. However, dissatisfied with the contents of the constitution, two major conservative parties united themselves into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. The objective of this union was to occupy more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Diet so that the constitution could be amended. Since then, the LDP has been a dominant party potentially in favor of the promotion of nationalism and the amendment of the constitution. Leftist parties, such as the Japan Socialist Party (currently the Social Democratic Party of Japan) and the Japan Communist Party, support the constitution and its pacifist contents. As the leftist parties declined after the 1990s, the conservative politics supported by the LDP came to the fore. The legislation of the National Flag and Anthem Law in 1999 and the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education in 2006 aimed to cultivate patriotism among younger Japanese. In addition, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were dispatched to provide logistic support for the U.S.-led military campaigns after 9/11.

Defining the Nation It is not easy to define “the Japanese nation” objectively. Its commonsensical definition may be ethnic Japanese that share a common language, culture, and history. Currently, all children born to a Japanese parent are given Japanese citizenship. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The nation may be called Yamato minzoku (Yamato nation), which is distinguished from minority ethnic groups, such as Ryukyu minzoku (mainly Okinawans) and Ainu minzoku (Ainu). These ethnic groups were included into Japan as it expanded beyond its three original islands (Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu). Near the end of the 19th century, the current territorial and ethnic boundaries of the nation were settled. As mentioned above, however, prewar Japan was a multinational empire in which Japan ruled the Asia-Pacific region. After World War II, the loss of the former colonies and the denial of Japanese citizenship for colonized people (even those living in Japan) helped the Japanese define themselves as a uniform nation. Due to such postwar national uniformity, mainland Japanese (i.e., native Japanese in Japan proper) tend to believe that the boundary of their nation is selfevident and neglect that there have been ethnic minorities in Japan. Foreign nationals living in Japan total not more than 2 percent of the total population. Almost three-quarters of them are Asian nationals, such as Koreans and Chinese. Both the strict immigration law and the blood-based nationality law have also contributed to the exclusion of foreign nationals from the range of the Japanese nation. On the other hand, postwar intellectuals have tended to describe Japanese sociocultural uniqueness in comparison to the West, not necessarily to Asia. Since the Meiji Restoration, one of Japan’s political economic goals has been Westernization as modernization. The postwar occupation, democratization, and economic rehabilitation of Japan were led by the United States. The relationship to the United States promoted, rather than hindered, the goal of Westernization.

The Ethnic Composition of Postwar Japanese Society The boundaries of the Japanese nation are difficult to determine. Because the national census excludes any questions about ethnic origin (it is argued that the existence of any would promote ethnic/racial discrimination), the actual ethnic composition of Japan cannot be known. The blood-based nationality law and the strict immigration law contribute to the reproduction of a racially uniform society. The rough numbers of ethnic Okinawans and Ainu are 1 million and 25,000, respectively. Approximately 15,000 foreign nationals (two-thirds of whom are Koreans) are naturalized every year. Since naturalization is the result of long-term residence and/or international marriage, applicants tend to assimilate themselves into Japanese society. The ratio of international marriage was over 5 percent of the total marriages in 2004, which means a racial/ethnic mix is very gradually underway in Japan. The rate of foreign nationals has been increasing and exceeded 1.5 percent of the total population in 2004 but is still significantly low. The biggest group of foreign nationals living in Japan in 2004 was Koreans (30.8 percent) followed by Chinese (24.7 percent). Many of those Koreans are second and third generations fully integrated into Japanese society but excluded from citizenship due to the strong feeling of a mono-ethnic society. Statistical data on foreign nationals can be obtained from the Immigration Bureau of Japan.

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Therefore, the postwar self-definition of the Japanese nation has still been wandering between the West (or the United States) and Asia. After the war, the northern and southern fringes of Japan’s precolonial territory were occupied: the Northern Territories by the Soviet Union, and the Amami and Ryukyu islands by the United States. The movements aimed at the return of the territories have continued but have not grown nationwide. Unlike the territories from which Japanese were evacuated during and after the war, Japanese (mainly Okinawans) remained in the southern islands. Before the islands reverted to Japan proper, there were a series of irredentist (reversion) movements for national reunion in the islands, despite the fact that people in these islands are ethnically different from mainland Japanese. The rise of such irredentist nationalism was caused by the U.S. (foreign) control over the islands. The same can be said with Japan proper. The occupation of Japan by U.S. military forces ended in 1952, but Japan has since been dependent on U.S. forces for territorial security. This has become one of the reasons for anti-U.S. sentiments among Japanese. Such sentiments have been constructed against the new constitution drafted by the U.S. occupation force. Leftists regard the constitution as a basis of postwar pacifism against U.S. military hegemony. Rightists consider it a hindrance to Japan’s complete independence with its own constitution and military power. However, generally speaking, anti-U.S. sentiments as a form of Japanese nationalism have not been strong among the Japanese public. This is probably because many Japanese still believe that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is necessary for Japan. Instead of historical revisionism or disputed territories (i.e., Takeshima Island and the Senkaku Islands), Japanese nationalism might be stimulated by anti-Japanese sentiments among South Koreans and Chinese.

Narrating the Nation Japan’s defeat in World War II had a tremendous impact on the nation’s memory. Most notably, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been referred to as fatal lessons of a totalitarian militarist state. The ground zeros of the bombed cities have been preserved as memorial sites for Japanese antiwar pacifism. Due to the postwar complete transformation of the Japanese value systems, the prewar achievements by victories and heroes in wars are not necessarily admired. Instead, a number of war monuments and memorial sites are dedicated to victims of the war. For many Japanese, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent not only the lessons of the war but the possible outcomes of future nuclear wars. The memory of the war has constituted a basis of postwar pacifism that swears not to repeat the disasters. Yasukuni (War) Shrine in Tokyo has played an opposite role. The shrine used to be the national center of state Shinto (the native religion of Japan) and enshrines N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Prewar Japanese military officers visit the Yasukuni Shrine, a war memorial in Tokyo, Japan, in this undated photo. (Library of Congress)

not only fallen soldiers since the Meiji period but also class-A war criminals during the war. The ideology represented by the shrine is a positive evaluation of Japan’s imperial past, which contradicts the international consensus condemning it. Former prime minister Koizumi justified his visits to the shrine as a way to express respect for war victims for the state. His statements brought up diplomatic issues with South Korea and China, both of which consider his conduct insulting to their nations. Before the end of the war, the emperor attended religious ceremonies at the shrine. According to the old constitution, he was to be respected as a sovereign of the Japanese empire and to be treated as a living God. Even after the war, the new constitution maintains his symbolic role and leaves room for him to act for national unity. For rightists, his ideological role for the Japanese nation is not negligible. Even though the modern status of the emperor is an invention by political elites, the ancient origin of the imperial family, which traces back more than 2,000 years, strengthened the emperor’s political legitimacy as a national sovereign. Discourses regarding the historicity of the imperial family have contributed to the creation of a patriarchic state and affected the Japanese people’s popular consciousness about their national origin. Japan’s postwar economic success has added group orientation and diligence to the resisters of Japanese national traits that used to be recognized by N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Flag of Japan. (Corel)

Westerners through Zen, Bushido, Noh, or Ukiyoe. However, as mentioned above, Japanese intellectuals have tended to describe Japanese sociocultural uniqueness in comparison with the West. Western intellectuals have also represented the uniqueness as something absent in their own cultures. Such a mutual recognition actually constitutes part of Japanese cultural identity. At the symbolic level, the national flag (Hinomaru or “rising sun”) and anthem (Kimigayo or “your era”) are most frequently used to express Japanese national identity at public ceremonies and international events today. However, the reflection on the war has long suppressed the overt expression of national identity or nationalism among the Japanese public. On the other hand, ethnic minorities, such as Okinawans and Ainu, are actively attempting to express their ethnic identities through unique cultural activities.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Under the U.S. nuclear umbrella during the Cold War, Japan faced few dangers of military conflicts and felt little necessity to mobilize the nation. Thus, there have been no large-scale national movements. Rather, antiwar pacifism and antinationalistic sentiments themselves constituted part of the postwar Japanese colN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Hinomaru and Kimigayo Although the Japanese national flag (Hinomaru or “rising sun”) and anthem (Kimigayo or “your era”) was not officially institutionalized until 1999, the official use of them began in the Meiji period. They have also been widely used for ceremonies and international events, such as the Olympic Games. However, since the flag and anthem became the symbols of Japan’s militarism before World War II, there has been strong opposition (mainly by leftists) to their use in such public spaces as schools since the end of the war. The Ministry of Education attempted to obligate public schools to use them for ceremonies in 1996. This caused heated public debates and serious conflicts between school principals and opposing teachers, students, and parents. To settle this issue, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)led cabinet presented to the National Diet the bill of the National Flag and Anthem Law in 1999. The bill passed by more than a two-thirds majority. The law does not obligate their use but actually legitimizes it. The emperor himself commented in 2004 that it was better not to impose their use.

lective identity. Through the media and public education critical of World War II, the Japanese had been socialized as such. However, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements caused nationwide anti-U.S. movements in the 1960s and 1970s. These movements can be categorized as national protest against U.S. military hegemony over Japan and Asia. In relation to them, the irredentist movements were initiated locally in Okinawa. The movements were also nationalistic protests against the U.S. military presence (Okinawan movements later shifted toward the preservation of their ethnic identity). After the demise of the Soviet Union, some rightists began to argue that a lack of national consciousness among Japanese politicians and citizens could become a serious problem, and others suggested that school education attempted to weaken the national pride of children by overemphasizing the negative aspects of prewar (and wartime) Japan. Since the late 1990s, grassroots movements to revise school history textbooks have prevailed nationwide and promoted historical revisionism aimed at reconstructing Japanese national identity. The rise of such revisionism was in parallel with the decline of leftist parties and has seemingly contributed to the formation of a series of LDP-led coalition cabinets. These cabinets have promoted neoliberalism (market economy) and neoconservatism (national unity and active diplomacy). During the 1990s, the Japanese economy experienced a serious recession and faced increasing competition with emerging economies in Asia. Under such circumstances, the Japanese nation may need to be mobilized for national interests. Neoconservative politics promoted by the cabinets included the overseas dispatch of SDF to logistically support the U.S. military campaigns after 9/11 and tougher diplomacy toward China and South/North Korea. Military cooperation with the United States against terrorism, nuclear tensions with North Korea, and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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territorial disputes with South Korea and China are all new political agendas for Japan in the 21st century. Given that sociocultural uniformity has been kept high in Japan, external threats such as these may mobilize the Japanese nation against them. In light of the deepening human and economic interaction among Asian countries, including Japan, a more multicultural or civic sense of nation needs to be cultivated within Japan. This chapter begins with the statement, “The sociocultural uniformity of the Japanese is high.” As shown above, however, such uniformity must be understood in relation to its geo-historical contexts. The uniformity of the Japanese nation is socially constructed and tends to conceal the reality that Japanese society has included various minority ethnic groups. As the international environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly competitive, the myth of mono-ethnic Japan is reconstructed and tends to be reinforced. As shown in the case of the former prime minister’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, an attempt to reconstruct Japanese national identity through historical revisionism may have serious conflicts with identities of other nations in Asia. Such conflicts may not be contained within the realm of national identities but may develop further into political economic issues in Asia. An attempt to know the origin of a nation can become an opportunity to realize that the geo-historical construction of the nation’s nationality cannot be separated from the existence of other nations. Selected Bibliography Constitution of Japan. (Retrieved January 4, 2007), http://list.room.ne.jp/~lawtext/1946CEnglish.html. Dower, J. W. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York/London: Norton. Field, N. 1991. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor. New York: Pantheon Books. Immigration Bureau of Japan. (Retrieved January 4, 2007), http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/ english/index.html. Ishihara, S. 1991. The Japan That Can Say No. New York: Simon and Schuster. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (Retrieved January 4, 2007), http://www.kantei.go. jp/foreign/index-e.html. Sakai, N., B. de Bary, and T. Iyotani, eds. 2005. Deconstructing Nationality. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program. Shimazu, N., ed. 2006. Nationalisms in Japan. New York/London: Routledge. Yoshino, K. 1992. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry. New York/London: Routledge.

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Jammu and Kashmir Vernon Hewitt Chronology 1846 Treaty of Amritsa. 1931 Riots in Srinagar highlight the plight of Muslims in state-run factories dominated by the Dogra Rapjut Hindus. 1932 The Glancy Report calls for educational reform and setting up some form of representative government inside the Princely State. 1932–1933 Sheikh Abdullah forms the Muslim Conference (MC). 1942 Split occurs between the MC and Abdullah, who forms the National Conference. 1944 Abdullah publishes The New Kashmir, in which the concept of Kashmiriyat figures prominently, and he calls for a socialist Kashmiri identity free from narrow religious identities. 1946 Abdullah calls upon the Dogra Rajput ruling house and its maharaja, Hari Singh, to “Quit Kashmir.” 1947 (August) The British grant independence to the dominions of India and Pakistan. (September–October) Muslim tenants involved in a long-standing rent strike against the Dogra Rajputs in the Poonch Jagir resist the maharaja and begin a rebellion. (October 27) Sheikh Abdullah is released from prison. The maharaja signs the Instrument of Accession joining India. Correspondence from the governor general and from Indian prime minister Nehru conclude that, once the state settles down, the maharaja’s decision to join India will be ratified by a plebiscite asking the people of the former Dogra Kingdom whether they wish to stay with India or join Pakistan. (October–November) Afridi Muslim tribal members begin to cross from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in the newly constituted state of Pakistan to help “liberate” their fellow Muslims in Kashmir. This “invasion”—perceived as a Pakistani ruse to force Kashmir to join with Pakistan—leads to chaos in the summer capital of Srinagar. 1948 (December) A cease-fire is mediated in Kashmir by the United Nations. 1952 The Delhi Agreement between Nehru and Abdullah limits Indian and Union state rights versus the state over communications, foreign policy, and economic taxation. 1953 Sheikh Abdullah is arrested by the Indian authorities for “entering into a treasonable correspondence” with foreign powers. Allegations of communalism are also made against him. 1956 The Srinagar state government ratifies Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian state subject to the provisions of Article 370. The Sino-Pakistan Border Treaty alters the status of the territory in the former Dogra state. 1962 The Indochina War leads to fighting in the vicinity of Ladakh. 1964 Theft of the Holic Relic in the Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar leads to Muslim riots and agitations throughout the Vale. 1965 Pakistan launches Operation Gibraltar in which Kashmiri operatives from Pakistan infiltrate the cease-fire line. Second Indo-Pakistani War. 1968 Sheikh Abdullah is released from jail. He has formed the Plebiscite Front while in prison.

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1971 Sheikh Abdullah is rearrested after giving an “inflammatory” speech in Srinagar. (October) Pakistan makes a preemptive strike in the western sector as India prepares to invade east Pakistan. Heavy fighting in Kashmir. 1972 The Shimla Conference produces an apparent settlement in which the cease-fire line is moderated into a line of control. Pakistan and India agree to resolve their differences “bilaterally and in accordance with the UN charter.” India sees this agreement as taking the Kashmir issue outside the orbit of the United Nations and of replacing New Delhi’s earlier commitment to a plebiscite. 1975 Mrs. Gandhi declares a national state of emergency. Abdullah is released from prison and signs an agreement with Indira Gandhi. Abdullah is “inducted” as the chief minister of a Congress-run state party. 1977 Mrs. Gandhi declares national elections and is defeated by a coalition of parties at the political center. Sheikh Abdullah wins a state election as head of a National Conference government, having spurred a congressional offer of a coalition. 1982 Sheikh Abdullah dies. His son, Farooq Abdullah, is sworn in as chief minister. Protests in Srinagar occur over the nepotism and corruption of the National Conference government. 1984 Mrs. Gandhi dismisses the Farooq government under Article 356 of the Indian constitution. (October) Mrs. Gandhi is assassinated by her Sikh bodyguard. Farooq is reinstalled as chief minister. 1985 Rajiv Gandhi undermines Farooq Abdullah’s control of the National Conference and installs G. M. Shah as chief minister. Widespread unrest spreads throughout the valley. Formation of the Muslim United Front. 1987 Rajiv Gandhi announces an electoral pact with Farooq Abdullah for the forthcoming Jammu and Kashmir state elections. They face a coalition of Muslim parties. The electoral victory of the Congress/National Conference coalition is greeted with widespread cynicism in Kashmir. 1988–1989 Widespread unrest, including bomb explosions and the targeting of National Conference politicians and Hindus in the Vale itself. 1989 The Kashmiri state government is dismissed. Widespread violence occurs. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) kidnap the daughter of the home minister of the new non-Congress national coalition government of V. P. Singh, the daughter of the prominent Kashmiri politician Mufti Sayed. 1990–1994 These years witness widespread insurgency with a sudden growth in militant organizations with various political wings and fronts, including the formation of Hurriyat. The Indians deploy large numbers of security forces and military personnel. 1994 State elections are held, but there is a low turnout. Farooq Abdullah is returned to power but is increasingly confronted by Bharitya Janata Party (BJP) (Hindu)-led coalitions at the center of Indian politics. 1996–1997 The Farooq government responds to various initiatives by the center to engage in talks over Article 370. 1999 (May) Pakistan assists and supervises an attack by Afghan militants from the Kashmiri town of Kargil, 12 miles inside the Line of Control. Heavy fighting ensues. 2000 State autonomy bill is presented, which seeks a revamping of Article 370. It is criticized by the center and is seemingly unable to convince people in the Vale that it will be able to deliver the goods. 2002 State elections; Faroog Abdullah is defeated by Munsi’s Muslim Popular Front. 2003 An Indo-Pakistan peace process is initiated.

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Situating the Nation There are three main variants of Kashmir national identity. The first emphasizes a territorial “language of belonging” that charts Kashmir across shared cultural and linguistic understandings, regardless of religion. This view stresses the similarities and familiarities among ostensibly differing faiths that have, over the longue duree, contributed through conversion and coexistence to a so-called Kashmiriyat, a form of nationalism associated with Sheikh Abdullah and wider concepts of secularism and socialist emancipation. The second is a shared conception of Kashmiri identity and culture premised on Sunni interpretations of the Muslim faith but that does not seek to be a theocratic stance. The third emphasizes the importance of religion, expressed through the language of Urdu, and potentially excludes other religious minorities by imagining and narrating an Islamic state. Within the territorial rivalries of South Asia, these differing routes to nationalism have been mostly demonstrated by the standoff between India and Pakistani nationalism that has shaped the subcontinent since independence in 1947. The ideas of the Kashmiriyat support a secular project that lies close to official Indian nationalism, as well as the idea of a separate but secular Kashmiri state. The centrality of Muslim Sunni identity for the second supports in theory the inclusion of the Muslims of Kashmir into the state project envisaged by the Muslim League and Pakistan, whereas the third demands a separate Islamic state, or the incorporation of the state into a “properly” theocratic Pakistan. This latter version leaves unanswered the difficulties of integrating Hindus and Buddhists and “tribal” Kashmiris, as well as the considerable variation within and between Kashmiri Muslims themselves given the small Shia population situated around Kargil.

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah (1905–1982) Abdullah was one of the principal Kashmiri nationalists and instigator of the Quit Kashmir campaign in 1946. Cofounder of the Muslim Conference and then the National Conference, Abdullah was profoundly impressed by his experiences at Aligarh, in the United Provinces of India, where he studied chemistry. Upon his return to the valley, he came to believe that the most successful way of opposing the maharaja’s rule was not through a narrow appeal to Muslim religious grievances but through a socialist and secular agenda that targeted land reform and promised employment. His vision of Kashmir was close to Nehru’s project of a secular and progressive India, but he never abandoned the idea of an independent Kashmir, “the Switzerland of Asia,” a bridge between India and Pakistan. Known as the Lion of Kashmir, he spent 1953–1968 imprisoned by his old friend and ally, emerging in the 1970s as a key ally of Mrs. Gandhi. Toward the end of his life, however, he was criticized for presiding over an increasingly moribund and authoritarian party that ignored a new generation of Muslims and failed to accommodate the growing ethnic differences within Kashmir itself.

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The territory at the heart of the present dispute is historicized as the former Dogra Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir. This area consists of approximately 223,000 kilometers of land situated in the northeast region of the South Asian subcontinent. Since December 1947, the former Dogra state has been divided between India, Pakistan, and China, 78,000 square kilometers in Pakistan, 101,000 square kilometers in India, and 44,000 in China; 45 percent of the former Princely State is administered by India and contains a majority of the population. The area has seen several wars (1948–1949, 1965, and 1971), with a serious Indo-Pakistani incident in 1999. Kashmir was integrated into Hindu and Muslim kingdoms emanating from India and with Buddhist kingdoms linking the Vale into Tibet and across into northern China. Kashmir remained within the Moghul empire until incursions by the Afghans cut off and surrounded the Vale toward the middle of the 18th century. Eventually the Afghans were driven out by the emergent Sikh empire in 1819, until eventually the area was ceded to the British in the wake of the Anglo-Sikh wars under the Treaty of Amritsa in 1846. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Defining and Instituting the Nation Kashmiri nationalism is a “modern force” emerging from British colonial reforms made in the middle of the 19th century, especially in the realm of education. The British administered the South Asian peninsula through direct annexation and by coopting existing Princely States through treaties, a general principle known as paramountcy. The legacy of education reform was crucial for later nationalism. In part it created the first generation of Muslim leaders, people such as Sheikh Abdullah, Gulam Abbas, Mirza Beg, and G. M. Sadiq, who were exposed to the idea of mass-based politics and, through ideas such as the Khalifat Movement, saw Muslims as a “community” regardless of their territorial location. It allowed Muslims in Kashmir to see themselves as both part of and, later, different from their brethren throughout the British empire. Yet Western ideas of education brought concerns about the role of Islam and the need to ensure religious identity separate as much from “other” Muslim practices as from “other” religious groupings. The ruling house of Kashmir, the Dogra Rajputs, were Hindus closely aligned with the Sikhs and were of ethnic Punjabi stock. While still submitting to the Sikh empire, Maharaja Gulab Singh had pressed on with a policy of annexation and conquest that had brought Ladakh and parts of Baltistan into his jagir, increasing the multiethnic, multicultural dimensions of his state. However, a majority of the maharaja’s subjects were Sunni Muslim and, in comparison with the Pandit Hindus who worked closely with the Dogras, were desperately poor. Mass education encouraged political thought, which shifted toward ideas of mass representation and a demand for jobs. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, these ideas began to consolidate into religious, communal identities as well as exposing differences in language, script, and social practice within these apparently homogenous groupings.

Khalifat Movement (1919–1924) A campaign organized by Indian Muslims, the Khalifat Movement was founded in the provinces of British India to protest British war aims against Turkey and the abolition of the sultan, who was recognized as the caliph of Islam. Muslims then worked alongside the Gandhian-run Quit India Movement, which involved a large majority of Hindus and was successful in bringing together India’s two main communities as well as the Congress and the Muslim League, which had been formed in 1906. In retrospect, the Khalifat Movement is significant because it shows the complex positioning of Islamic “pan-national” symbolism alongside political parties aiming to capture a share of national power. Although Congress supported the movement, it was unhappy at the degree of Islamic activism it encouraged in support of the sultan. In Kashmir, the Khalifat Movement was an important reminder for how close the language of nationalism comes to the language of religious revivalism.

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Sheikh Abdullah, an educated Muslim, returned to Srinagar in 1930 from Aligarh, where he had been deeply influenced by the political ferment throughout India led by the Indian National Congress Party and the Muslim League. In 1931, riots broke out in the state jail over apparent slurs against Islam by officers of the Dogra police force (a Hindu in this case), and strikes and agitations aimed at improving the conditions of Muslim workers occurred. Sheikh Abdullah used these incidents to launch the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (the Muslim Conference) in 1932 to open the Dogra state to political reform. The British assisted in this process by recommending, through the Glancy Commission, that the maharaja introduce a legislative assembly—the Praja Sabha—containing 75 members, 35 of which would be voted for from communally defined constituents on a limited franchise (about 3 percent of the population). In 1932, Abdullah’s party took 11 of the 35 elected seats. These early participatory politics revealed divisions within the Muslim elite and among Kashmiris of differing religious belief, class, and language. Abdullah soon felt that his political ambitions were constrained by what he saw as the narrow communal platform of the traditional Urdu-speaking Sunni Muslims who, he felt, due to their religious conservatism, were reluctant to embrace reform. They, in turn, were concerned about Abdullah’s populism and his attempts to propagate ideas of the Kashmiriyat, as well as his commitment to socialism. Eventually the differences between Abdullah and his former ally, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, led to a split within the Muslim Conference and the formation of a rival party in 1939, significantly known as the National Conference. Abdullah’s use of the Kashmiriyat to stress his secular credentials attracted the attention of Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National Congress, but Kashmiriyat disguised the extent to which Abdullah was careful to articulate in his political speeches concepts of the homeland that were profoundly Muslim and potentially independent of India. In 1946, as the pace of colonial reform quickened in New Delhi on its way to independence, Sheikh Abdullah called upon the Dogra Rajputs, the maharaja, and the flunkies of the Princely State to “Quit Kashmir.” He was immediately imprisoned for challenging the maharaja. By early 1947, Britain’s attempt to retain a weakly federated, three-tiered system of government for a united India had failed. In June of that year, the British committed themselves to partition and insisted that the Princely States join either India or Pakistan, premised mainly on geographical location and several other illdefined factors. Because of its position, Kashmir could join either state, and it signed temporary treaties with both. By August 15, 1947, the maharaja Hari Singh had not signed the Instrument of Accession—the legally binding document—and was complaining of Pakistani pressure. Matters became immensely more complex by two interrelated events: a rebellion in the Poonch district by Punjabi Muslims, who had long-standing grievances of their own, and a tribal incursion from the North West Frontier Province along the Jhelum Valley, which, by October 1947, threatened the capital of Srinagar. Both pressured the maharaja to join Pakistan. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Jawaharlal Nehru (1889 –1964) (years in office, 1950 –1964) One of India’s leading politicians, and closely associated with Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the leading congressmen from the 1920s to the 1960s. Imprisoned by the British on and off between 1921 and 1944 (for 18 years in total), Nehru intellectualized and articulated a version of Indian nationalism that was both multicultural and secular. He took the territorial outlines of the former British Indian empire and sought, through parliamentary government, to construct a federal system premised on liberal democracy in a society that was profoundly hierarchical and communalized through British colonial practice. In 1947 he reluctantly conceded to the partitioning of South Asia and the creation of Pakistan as a state for the Muslims of South Asia, but he categorically rejected that Congress was a Hindu organization and that Muslims would face systematic discrimination in a united India. His friendship with Sheikh Abdullah was critical in ensuring that India’s initial policy toward Kashmir was popular in the valley. He was himself of Kashmiri descent.

Punjabi Muslims had long-standing ethnic and kinship ties with Muslims in Poonch, and the widespread communal killings in British India had incited feelings against the maharaja and the Hindus. The Muslim Conference, by supporting the Muslim League and Pakistan, aligned itself with the Poonch rebels as well as the tribal groups, although again they were seen as “outsiders” by Muslims as much as by other non-Muslim Kashmiris. By October 1947, the maharaja was forced to flee Srinagar, and he signed the Instrument of Accession on October 27 en route to Jammu, committing his state to join with India. Correspondence in the public domain reveals that the imminent fear of a Pakistani attack forced the maharaja’s hand such that he joined with India to obtain Indian forces to take on the rebels. The documents also reveal that, at the suggestion of the governor general (the former viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten), the Indian government committed itself to holding a plebiscite “once normality had been restored” to ascertain whether the peoples of Kashmir wished to join India or Pakistan.

Narrating the Nation The Indian authorities ensured that Sheikh Abdullah was freed and made de facto chief minister of the Praja Sabha. Members of the Muslim Conference, however, now situated outside the valley in the town of Muzaffarabad, favored the Pakistani demand to include the former Dogra Kingdom within the new state created for the Muslims in South Asia. By November and December, Pakistani regular troops were fighting the Indians, and on the last day of December 1947, the matter was referred to the United Nations by India under Article 35. At the signing of a cease-fire in late 1948, the former Dogra Kingdom was itself partitioned. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Although given their own constitution, Azad Kashmir remained administered by the central Pakistani government, with the Northern Territories being hived off from Muzzaffarabad. Like Abdullah, leaders of the Muslim Conference continued to hold a vision of an independent state along the lines of the former Dogra territory. From the mid-1970s onward, this vision of a “third way”—the call for a separate Kashmiri identity and nationalism free of both Delhi and Islamabad—was to emerge as an explicit option. Ultimately, the remaining territory—Jammu and Kashmir—became part of the Indian union. Beginning with the Delhi Agreement of 1952, Abdullah sought to preserve Kashmir as a “unique” state within India’s federal setup. A detailed federal constitution for India devolved some financial and legislative powers to a Kashmir assembly, elected through a noncommunal, universal franchise, and Kashmir was given seats in the national parliament (six as of 2004). For its part, the Muslim Conference sought to establish Azad Kashmir as an autonomous zone within Pakistan. In this regard, in part because of the greater institutional capacities of the Indian state, Abdullah seemed to be more successful, and yet by 1953 he had been arrested under Nehru’s orders. The sudden deterioration in the relationship between Nehru and the leader of the National Conference probably resulted from India’s growing cold feet over the thought of a plebiscite, as well as due to disagreements over the eventual status of Kashmir within Indian federalism. Following Abdullah’s removal, New Delhi imposed Gulam Mohammad Bakshi as state leader, and in 1956, he led the National Conference in a vote for the inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian constitution under the ambit of Article 370, which granted Jammu and Kashmir extraordinary rights—among them the ability to prevent Hindu immigration into their territories, to show and display the Kashmiri flag, and to refer to its leader as prime minister. Yet Nehru saw Article 370 as temporary, as marking a process of transition, whereas Abdullah and others saw it as a permanent recognition of Kashmiri difference. However special, Article 370 sat uneasily within the Indian constitution, which was in many senses covertly centralist. The constitution retained a series of emergency clauses that would enable central intervention into the workings of a state government (including nomination of powerful governors). Despite specific rights laid down in the agreement, state governments in Srinagar could be—and frequently were—dismissed by a Congress-run center. India’s financial structures gave all vested powers to the center. In prison, Abdullah formed a new party—the Plebiscite Front—and corresponded further with former colleagues in Azad Kashmir, who were growing disenchanted with their own relationship with Pakistan. His new party was banned in 1953. In 1968, Abdullah was released but was rearrested in 1971 by Indira Gandhi, the daughter of Nehru. The cause of the arrest was a provocative speech given by Abdullah in Srinagar in which he seemed to question the long-term future of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. He implied not so much a shift of loyalties to Pakistan but an assertion of the idea of an independent nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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From 1953 onward, Kashmir was ruled through the local Congress state party in close coordination with New Delhi, or through manipulating the factions within the National Conference. In 1965, during the second Indo-Pakistan War, Kashmir was directly involved in an attempt by Pakistan to infiltrate the ceasefire line with Kashmiri operatives. In 1975, ironically during the Internal Emergency (which saw the collapse of Indian democracy for a time under Mrs. Gandhi), Sheikh Abdullah was released and led a Congress state government, a move seen by many former allies as a betrayal. Then, in 1977 following the restoration of Indian democratic rule, Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the leader of a National Conference administration for the first time since 1953. This period, until his death in 1982, was marked by growing corruption within the state government and a shift toward populist authoritarianism within the party. Social and cultural differences within the former Dogra Kingdom had also began to emerge, with Buddhist demands in Leh for greater regional autonomy within the state and from the Jammu region, which desired autonomy within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. On his death in 1983, his son, Farooq Abdullah, inherited the National Conference.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Following India’s unilateral cease-fire in the wake of Bangladeshi independence, New Delhi moved to make good some territorial gains in the west, and at the former British summer residence in India—Shimla—Mrs. Gandhi and Zufika Ali Bhutto for Pakistan concluded a treaty. There were no Kashmiri representatives present, and this treaty converted the cease-fire line into an apparently “soft” Line of Control (LoC). This was, on the whole, a novel move that would eventually “merge” the former Dogra Kingdom into India and Pakistan but allow Kashmiris to travel relatively easily within their former kingdom. The attempt to convert the LoC into the new international border failed because of general Kashmiri outrage over not being directly consulted and a lack of clarity within the Shimla Accord itself over the status of the “soft border.” Still in jail at that point, Abdullah opposed the Shimla Accord, believing that it undermined the wider Kashmiri cause; he insisted on the commitment to a plebiscite and the treatment of the former Princely State as a whole. India saw Shimla as removing, once and for all, the Kashmir dispute from the remit of the United Nations by committing Pakistan to treating the matter bilaterally, and as burying its earlier commitment to holding a plebiscite. The United Nations had, despite a series of resolutions and reports, long ceased to be an effective vehicle through which to arrive at a settlement. Between 1972 and 1983, relative peace reigned in Kashmir. Yet, in the wake of Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 and the rise of Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress, New Delhi reverted to directly and shamelessly intervening in the state. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi orchestrated a “coup” within the National Conference Party that replaced N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Farooq Abdullah by installing his brother-in-law, G. M. Shah, as chief minister. Such moves alienated popular opinion from a belief in the viability and desirability of Indian democratic practice. Marred with growing corruption, the political institutions of the state and their ability to provide for the expectations of a new generation of Kashmiris declined. There was a growing sense that Kashmir had been ill served both by its own elite and by Article 370. Cultural and religious identities were also changing. These changes were partly a consequence of poor governance and partly in response to changes throughout the Islamic world in the wake of the Iranian revolution, occurring throughout the Gulf states generally and in India itself. They were also due to influences emanating from Azad Kashmir. In the early 1980s, the Farooq Abdullah government allowed up to 20,000 Azadi Kashmiris to resettle in the Vale before the process was delayed by the intervention of the Indian Supreme Court. These refugees were religiously orthodox, reflecting the experience of Pakistan’s own growing Islamic identity. Generational changes and a wider dissemination of religious tracts and ideas led to a growth in religious foundations and seminaries. Linked to local issues such as low levels of employment and corruption, these institutions deepened social and cultural change. India itself witnessed the growth and emergence of Hindu nationalism, which quickened its pace during the Rajiv Gandhi years. It enhanced the concerns of Kashmiri Muslims, as the ideology of Hindutva sought to influence Indian ideas of secularism through Hindu cultural revivalism. The growth of overt religious symbolism from 1985 onward alarmed Delhi as well as the National Conference at a time when the old party structures were in decline. Once again, the old opportunist tendencies between Kashmiri leaders and the center created a spectacular show of cynicism. Despite the 1985 coup, Rajiv Gandhi formed an electoral pact with Farooq Abdullah for the forthcoming state elections. They confronted a coalition of Muslim politicians—the Muslim United Front—that were closer in their use of Muslim identity to the old Muslim Conference. The Gandhi-Abdullah pact sought to manipulate Islamic imagery to capture political power—especially in the Vale—but ended up merely consolidating the power of Islamist groups as legitimate vehicles of concern and anger against years of misrule. Such blatant opportunism by Congress also alienated other religious identities, especially the Hindus, and Jammu and Ladakh became concerned about potential domination by Muslims. In the years that followed, the increase in Islamic identity within the valley further differentiated religious and cultural identities. The 1987 elections produced a Congress/National Conference victory amid widespread allegations of rigging and corruption. The defeat of the Muslim United Front was widely (if inaccurately) believed to have been the result of a conspiracy. Into this growing controversy sprang other parties and other social movements— the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Islamic student organizations, and several Islamic parties and movements, most principally the Jamaat, linked to Pakistan (although increasingly critical of Pakistan’s own social and religious N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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policies). Other groups were home-grown militant outfits or entirely foreign and increasingly linked not so much with Kashmiri politics but with international Islamic revivalist movements. By 1989, the JKLF—a separatist, secular movement —had gained popular support in the Vale and had, in combination (and competition) with other organizations, brought law and order to its knees. Political violence and assassination had escalated rapidly by 1989; prominent National Conference politicians and businesspeople—especially Hindus—were being targeted. In 1989, the state government resigned. This resignation took place against the background of a weak national coalition government in India as a whole. By 1989–1990, Muslim demands had breached the willingness of India to tolerate concessions for fear of encouraging Pakistani intervention or outright separatism. The release of four JKLF militants by the then Indian government of V. P. Singh (in response to the kidnapping of the new Indian home minister’s, Mufti Sayeed’s, daughter in Kashmir) sealed the fate of the Kashmiri Pandits, who believed they were no longer safe. They fled to Jammu where, well over a decade later (2004), they remained, having fled on the apparent advice of the state governor, Jagmohan. Only in 2003–2004 did a newly elected government in the state try to persuade them to return. From 1989 until 1994–1995, the political process of Indian-administered Kashmir was suspended. The political structures of the National Conference and the Congress, and many other regional parties, disintegrated as the area was directly administered from Delhi, and the territory became the scene of a large-scale deployment of Indian security forces and the widespread use of preventive detention ordinances. Contributing to, but not initially creating, the insurrection, the Pakistani state covertly supported the activities of various Islamic militant outfits, especially the Jamaat and its militant wing, Hizbullah. Pro-Pakistan outfits, allegedly trained inside Azad Kashmir, fought with the JKLF to gain popular support, while a loose coalition of parties formed the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to pressure India into allowing Kashmiris to choose their future as a part of India, part of Pakistan, or an independent state (either secular or Islamist, an issue the Hurriyat left open). By 2002, the APHC consisted of over 26 political organizations and parties of a bewildering variety of views. Between 1989 and 2003, over 40,000 Kashmiris died in the violence, and the Indians have deployed up to 60,000 troops and paramilitary outfits in the state. A majority of the deaths have been civilian. Hindu organizations in Jammu, in part invigorated by the rise of Hindu nationalism throughout India in the 1990s, became determined to press on with the “integration” of Jammu and Kashmir into the mainstream political fabric of India, believing that Article 370 had been to blame for fanning Muslim aspirations. Amid alleged human rights violations by Indian security forces and militant outfits, and allegations of Pakistani infiltrations over the LoC, the 1990s became the vortex of a separately articulated Kashmir nationalism, a result that ironically neither India nor Pakistan was prepared to accept. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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A Pakistani soldier stands along the Line of Control near Chakoti in Pakistani-held Kashmir in August 2002. (AP/Wide World Photos)

In 1996, the Indian state normalized the political situation and held state elections under the Indian constitution. The APHC boycotted these elections, in which Farooq Abdullah returned to power after a low turnout amid widespread intimidation of voters. The National Conference was committed to reworking and reinvigorating Article 370 as a basis to calm the Kashmiri situation and restore it to India under its special status. Yet Farooq found himself paradoxically sharing power at the center with a Hindu, nationalist-led coalition government, hostile to the continuation of Article 370 and, by the late 1990s, apparently contemplating talks with the APHC and even the reorganization or partition of the state. In 2000, aware of his failing popularity, Farooq Abdullah sponsored an autonomy bill that sought to entrench Kashmir’s status while restoring it to the outlines of the Delhi Declaration of 1952, afraid that New Delhi would actually make an overture to the APHC. The sticking point appeared to be the insistence by the APHC that any talks with Delhi include trilateral talks with Pakistan. Eventually the APHC was to split over this issue in 2003, with the pro-Pakistani elements being purged, but this happened only after the National Conference itself was widely discredited. In state elections in 2002, Farooq Abdullah was defeated and replaced by a Muslimbased party known as the People’s Democratic Party and led by the former home minister, Mufti Sayeed (whose daughter had been kidnapped in 1989). This govN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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ernment shared power with a revitalized Indian National Congress. This change in regional government was matched with a later defeat of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance in New Delhi and the return to power of the Indian National Congress. The Sayeed government remains committed to protecting Kashmiri interests within the Indian constitution. The crisis is less acute than in the 1980s but is still evident. Recent peace overtures between India and Pakistan (August 2005) appear to be gathering momentum, but it is too early to tell whether this latest round of initiatives will break the regional deadlock and open a space for some form of settlement. Profound differences still exist between India’s answer of making the LoC the permanent but porous border between the two parts of the former Dogra Kingdom and Pakistan’s hope that the borders will be redrawn, giving it a significant stake in the valley itself. Many Kashmiris now want an independent state but are exhausted by over a decade of violence. The political and institutional renewal of state and national parties may, however, prove adequate for maintaining the current peace process and leading to some sort of solution. Selected Bibliography Ganguly, S. 2001. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. New York: Columbia University Press. Hewitt, V. M. 1995. Reclaiming the Past? The Search for Political and Cultural Unity in Contemporary Jammu and Kashmir. London: Portland. Lamb, Alastair. 1991. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990. Hertingfordbury, UK: Roxford. Schofield, V. 2003. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. London: I. B. Tauris. Wirsing, R. G. 1994. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Zutshi, C. 2004. Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir/ Chitralekha Zutshi. London: Hurst.

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Korea Dennis Hart Chronology First millennium BC Old Choson Period. The oldest recorded period on the Korean peninsula. 57 BC–AD 668 Three Kingdoms Period. Control of kingdoms that extends throughout the peninsula and includes almost all of modern-day Manchuria. 668–935 Unified Silla. Cited by South Korea as the “start” of a unified Korea. 935–1392 Koryo Dynasty. Cited by North Korea as the “start” of a unified Korea. 1392–1910 Choson Dynasty. The final Korean dynasty, destroyed by foreign imperialism. 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War. Japan defeats China in Korea to become the dominant Asian power. 1910 Korea is colonized by Japan. Japan begins to destroy Korean society and culture. 1919 March First Movement. Koreans display modern national identity and stage a nationwide protest against Japanese colonialism. 1945 Korea is liberated from Japan and divided at the 38th parallel into North and South by the United States and the Soviet Union. 1948 The Republic of Korea (South) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North) is established. The division of the peninsula continues through today. 1950–1953 Korean Civil War. More than 2.8 million Koreans are killed as the United States, China, and the United Nations (UN) wage war on the peninsula. 1961–1979 General Park Chung Hee stages a coup; he becomes president of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK undergoes capitalist industrialization. 1987 Civil Democratic Movement in the ROK. Dictatorship in the ROK ends and formal democracy arises. Mid-1990s The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) economy collapses. Kim Il Song dies in 1994 after leading the DPRK since 1946. Leadership is assumed by his son Kim Jong Il.

Situating the Nation Korea is a divided nation and has been for over half a century. This division is more than a line on a map. It is a division made by rival regimes, opposing ideologies, and global politics. Korea is also a nation divided by rival forms of nationalism. There have been, and are, a variety of nationalisms. These nationalisms are varied and complex, reflecting the various histories, polities, ideologies, classes, and genders experienced by Koreans. That Korea is one nation with two rival political systems is a result of the global struggle between superpowers from 1945 to 1948 during the Cold War. During this time, the global and ideological aspirations of the United States and Soviet Union clashed in a Korea that itself had N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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social and political divisions. This set the stage for the rise of two different polities, the division of the nation, and the beginning of rival national identities. The people on the Korean peninsula have a recorded history of over 2,000 years. During this time, they were largely independent from foreign rule. However, from 1910 until 1945, Korea suffered under a brutal and repressive colonial rule by the Japanese. Much of the land and wealth of Korea was put under Japanese control, and the Japanese attempted to eradicate the Korean people’s national identity by a series of harsh policies. Most Korean political movements were banned, and patriots were put into prison, tortured, and often killed. It was a dark and terrible time for the Koreans, as the Japanese worked hard to remove all traces of Korean national identity from existence. When Japan surrendered to the Allied forces at the end of World War II, the American and Russian military forces occupied the Korean peninsula, divided it at the 38th parallel, and accepted the surrender of Japanese forces located there. Though this division was originally designed to be temporary, by 1948, the politics of the Cold War gave birth to a civil war and more than a half century of division. In the southern part of Korea, the Americans viewed the actors and events in Korea through the lens of the Cold War. They believed that, unless strong action was taken, communism might emerge victorious in Korea. The Americans worked with a collection of right-wing groups, which included well-to-do landlords, Koreans who had collaborated with Japan, and Koreans who had lived outside the peninsula during the colonial period. An American occupation, headed by General John R. Hodge, ruled over Korea in the late 1940s and was determined to maintain order and control during a time of great change. As part of their policy of control, the American military actively helped suppress indigenous popular movements, such as people’s committees who did not support the right-wing groups favored by the United States. A series of widespread rebellions and strikes occurred during 1946–1950, which the American military helped South Korean president Rhee Syngman put down. Koreans clashed with American soldiers as well as South Korean police forces, and tens of thousands of Koreans died while hundreds of thousands were imprisoned. In the North, very different events took place under the Soviet occupation from 1945 until 1948. Similar to the Americans in the South, the Russians eventually came to see events in Korea in terms of the ideological rivalry of the Cold War. Early on, the Soviet forces lacked a coherent policy, other than disarming the surrendering Japanese forces in Korea. They quickly discovered that a coalition of nationalists led by Cho Man Sik, indigenous leftists, and returning communists lead by Kim Il Sung, who became leader of the provisional government in February 1946, desired a social and political revolution that would rid Korea of Japanese influences. An interim government approved by the Soviets and headed by Kim Il Sung began a series of radical reforms that included a land reform program, equal pay for women, an eight-hour workday, and social security insurance. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) was officially established on August 15, 1948, and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) on September 9, 1948. This formalized the divisions already put in place by global superpowers.

Instituting the Nation One early form of nationalism occurred in Korea from 1894 to 1895, during the Tonghak Rebellion. It was perhaps the first organized step by Koreans in a movement that simultaneously questioned the traditional polity and ideas and was a form of resistance to foreigners. This movement appealed to many Koreans suffering under heavy taxation, government corruption, and economic troubles brought on by foreign merchants. The Tonghak did not envision the creation of a modern nation-state and was more a reaction to the Korean government’s inability to deal successfully with foreigners. Ironically, one result of the rebellion was to spark the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and set the stage for the Japanese takeover of Korea in 1910. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The next major event that helped Koreans define their nation was the March First Movement in 1919. Seen within the context of the Japanese seizure and colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945, it is an event that is generally considered by most Koreans as being the “true” beginning of Korean national identity. For the people in both Korean states, this movement is considered the first time when all Koreans had to confront their identity both within and through the context of modern nationalism. Oppressed by the Japanese, who served as the national Other, contemporary Koreans used this movement to reify a widespread sense of being Korean that was born of the ideals and constructions of the 20th century. In the wake of the protest, Japan briefly granted considerable latitude to Koreans during the 1920s. In the 1930s, however, hypermilitarization in Japan and the outbreak of war between China and Japan resulted in a reversal of these policies. The Japanese government began an extensive top-down mobilization of the Korean people to serve in the war effort. More insidious was a series of oppressive policies aimed at eliminating Korean identity. These policies forbade the use of the Korean language, compelled Koreans to adopt Japanese names, and forced them to worship in Shinto shrines. The desired end, for the Japanese government, was the total assimilation of Koreans into Japanese culture. During this period, some Koreans collaborated with the Japanese. Other Koreans resisted both outside and inside the peninsula. This ultimately helped set the stage for the rise of rival ideological groups among the Korean resistance. The Japanese set up such an extensive and effective police state that many Koreans were forced to flee the country to escape capture. Those Koreans who fought for Korean independence from abroad fell into two basic groups—the Korean Provisional Government, which operated out of Shanghai, and Communists who fought a guerilla war in Manchuria during the1930s and 1940s. From these two groups would eventually come the leaders of the South and North Korean states, respectively. During these hard times, to simply be a “Korean” was a form of resistance toward Japanese imperialism.

Defining the Nation Nationalism in Korea is best defined as resistance. Since the intrusion by foreign powers in the late 19th century, Koreans have had to confront their identity in ways that contrasted them against foreigners, against tradition, and even against themselves. The result has not been a single or simple form of nationalism. Koreans have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions; but all have been some form of resistance. Nationalisms in Korea should also be classified as Third World nationalism. Third World nationalisms are fundamentally different from First World nationalisms, seen in such nations as the Unites States, England, France, and other former colonial powers. First World nationalism by its nature carries with it assumptions N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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of privilege and entitlement, and often is imperialist. Third World nationalisms, by contrast, rise in the nations that have been colonized and exploited. The nationalisms of these nations were forged in a furnace that required resistance to (neo)colonial domination in order to survive. Korea is among these nations.

Narrating the Nation If Koreans share a single past, then why do North and South Koreans today have differing narratives on national identity? Within the twin social and political settings since national division, a challenge for each regime has been to win the hearts, minds, and memories of its own people while simultaneously creating fear and loathing for their rival across the 38th parallel. That is, making citizens into good North or South Koreans became more important than making them into Koreans. The problem for each state has not been to generate nationalism out of thin air. Instead, the challenge has been to first create narratives that support the claim of being the only legitimate government and, second, to delegitimize the rival attempting to do the same thing. For nationalism in the North and the South, it is not enough to teach citizens how fortunate they are to live in their respective nation-states; it is also necessary to make a national Other out of their rival. Each regime’s vision of nationalism assumes that each system is mutually exclusive. To be a follower of one regime, a person cannot be part of the other. If a Korean claims allegiance to North, he or she is automatically seen as an enemy of the South, and vice versa. At the same time, each Korean state commonly uses its rival as an enemy to generate fear and insecurity among its own citizens so that they will seek the protection and safety offered by their own state. Interestingly, the North and South Korean governments often speak of unification, but they need each other as a key source of their own legitimacy. To this paradoxical end, each state narrates a history that reconstructs the national memory in a way that serves its own needs and interests. These memories are communicated through the media, campaigns of mass mobilization, legal systems, and education, to name a few. Among these, perhaps none is as widespread or effective as public education in ensuring that young children eventually become old patriots. Each state has created a centralized, universal, uniform educational system and pays close attention to the lessons contained in the schools and textbooks. This provides a uniform set of narratives on the nation. Starting in the 1950s for South Korea, the control of education was concentrated in the Ministry of Education. By the late 1980s, the ministry was responsible for administration of schools, allocation of funds, certification of schools and teachers, and curriculum development, including the textbook guidelines. In North Korea by 1959, state-funded universal education was established and centralized instruction, educational facilities, textbooks, and uniforms were provided to students without charge. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Students in each country receive assurances that their own state is the natural product of Korean historical forces. For the South Korean state, the history provided through the national education system justifies the existence of the South Korean polity, as well as economic and social systems. For example, textbooks teach that its export-led capitalist economy is natural. School lessons laud the existence of many foreign influences and praise capitalist growth. Lessons teach southern school children how to properly greet foreign tourists, who bring both money and “progress.” The textbooks repeatedly demonstrate how Korea, for centuries, engaged in commercial activities with a wide variety of other countries, and how such exchanges have helped Korea become modern. In the North, where a belief in juche (self-reliance) is firmly in place, foreigners are shown as threats to national independence and that the Korean people have long resisted any foreign intrusion. Foreigners do not serve as equals or as friendly bearers of material improvements. Korea’s march to modernity is not, therefore, a cooperative effort with foreigners; instead, it is an indigenous movement conducted by Koreans for Koreans. The textbooks also show how the ordinary people actively resisted foreign invasion; however, say the school lessons, without the brilliant leadership of Kim Il Sung, they would not have been able to succeed. For decades, the school lessons in the both Koreas have taught children to loath the rival regime, but feel sorry for Koreans living there. In the South, the northern state and its agents are shown as a monolithic threat to the lives and to the safety of the South. The textbooks contain many stories of northern spies and guerrillas who follow a foreign ideology (communism) and routinely kill South Korean children and their families. Yet, in other stories, southern children learn how their northern cousins are poor, starving, and suffering under communism. This prompts the children to feel pity and superiority at the same time. At one level, southern students learn to feel unity and sympathy for their northern brethren. Yet, at another level, fear is used to help secure the power of the southern regime since it offers protection from the northern regime. In the North, similar narratives appear. Students learn to feel sympathy for southern children who are starving, in rags, and even “sell their eyes” to get food. At the same time, foreigners are held up as a constant danger, and only continued allegiance to the state and the ideology of juche can save the children. The North’s ideology voices a need to exorcise the demons of foreign influence while working toward completing liberation of the people in the South and establishing socialism throughout the Korean peninsula.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The question addressed here is how the rival states of North and South Korea mobilize their people in support of their respective different national and ideological N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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visions of Korea in the world. To answer this, we need to see how Koreans live their daily lives, since that is where nationalism is manifested. The South envisions the nation in competition with the North and its people as tied to exportled capitalist industrialization that requires them to be “citizens of the world.” The need for foreign trade requires the South to invite in foreign influences and products and to live life in a way that supports a market economy. Th e North adheres to juche, which teaches economics and political self-reliance as a nation and as a people. The basis for national identity and strength is seen as emanating from the Korean people, and foreign intrusion is regarded as a threat. The North’s desire to defend against foreign aggression has combined with the juche ideology to produce a militarized society. Thus, at the fundamental level of how Korea is to be located within the larger global community, the two regimes are at odds. However, both regimes also feel the need to mobilize their people in the name of the nation. Following Park Chung Hee’s 1961 coup d’état, South Korean state policies orchestrated a march toward capitalist industrialization that eclipsed traditional society and gave rise to urbanization, new forms of labor, and a consumer culture. The goal of the authoritarian rulers was to create a society that was socially disciplined and economically advanced so as to be able to defend against the Communist North. One famous mobilization campaign was the Saemaul Movement, instituted in the fall of 1971. The movement was an intensively administered campaign to improve the quality of rural life, and it eventually reached into 36,000 villages. Emblematic of larger policies, this movement evolved into an extensive ideological campaign that mobilized the entire country in support of “nation-building.” It also helped mark the end of a rural Korea and ushered in widespread industrialization, which in turn changed the nature of life in South Korea. By the 1980s, these policies brought a number of unexpected social changes that have promoted the emergence of a more materialist, consumer society. They also redefined everyday life and generated a need for production and consumption to bolster economic development, which resulted in the creation of the middleclass family. As a result, the activity of consumption is central to everyday life today and, for most South Koreans, is part of a national identity that separates them from tradition. The typical Korean in Seoul might feel more comfortable in New York City, Tokyo, or London than in rural Korea of 200 years ago. These changes have not been easy, nor have they been peaceful; but for many Koreans, they have raised the key question of “Who are we?” There have been contesting answers to this question by a variety of groups within South Korean society, and no consensus has emerged. The democracy movements and events surrounding the June 1987 protests serve as one example of how modern identity has been highly contested. Economic growth and consumerism eroded traditional sources of political legitimacy —Confucian morality and hierarchy. Instead, political legitimacy became linked N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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more to economic performance and an abundance of material goods. Prior to the 1980s, the focus of dissenting discourses addressed (1) the end of authoritarian state oppression, and (2) how to stop capitalism’s erosion of Korean society. By the late 1980s, protesters still waged a battle against the authoritarian state; however, instead of seeking to end the effects of capitalism, protests argued over the best ways to continue capitalist growth. This shift marked a de-radicalization of political demands as popular discourses accepted the aims of capitalism. Having grown up within a capitalist society, people’s identity as Koreans and their vision for the nation diverged sharply from that of the Korean Civil War generation. As an example, in 1985, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung revised his decadeslong opposition to capitalism and agreed with the government to end his ties with radical leftist forces. He later remained silent in 1986 during a government crackdown on radical university students, a group who theretofore he had counted as political allies. For South Koreans, the nation increasingly meant a capitalist nation capable of satisfying the consumer demands of its people. North Koreans define the nation quite differently. Juche mandates self-reliance from foreign powers and requires extreme and disciplined unity throughout society. One part of this was a level of hero worship rarely seen. Kim Il Sung was

Student demonstrators wear police riot gear as they walk with a banner during a protest in Seoul, South Korea, on June 23, 1987. Resistance and protest are integral parts of Korean national identity, and rallies all over South Korea eventually brought the authoritarian regime of President Chun Doo Hwan to an end. (Patrick Robert/Sygma/Corbis)

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Leaders, Parties, and Political Tension Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) Kim Il Sung was the ruler of North Korea from 1946 until his death in 1994. He was born near Pyongyang, and he joined the Korean Communist Party in 1931. He was a legendary leader of the anti-Japanese guerilla army in Manchuria, and he became the center of an extensive and lavish personality cult. Kim Jong Il (1942– ) Kim Jong Il is the son of Kim Il Sung. He succeeded his father as president of North Korea in 1994. Korean Civil War (1950 –1953) In 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union divided Korea. In 1949, both powers withdrew, leaving behind two separate and opposing Korean regimes. On June 25, after a series of border clashes, the North Korean military moved south to unify the peninsula. The United States and the United Nations soon intervened in the civil war, which later drew in China. Japanese Occupation of Korea (1910 –1945) Following the imperialist lessons learned from European nations, Japan colonized Korea officially in 1910. During this time, Japan attempted to replace Korea’s national identity with Japanese nationalism. Juche Socialist North Korea’s guiding ideology is juche, which means self-reliance, literally. It has two main principles: (1) a person is the master of his or her destiny, and (2) he or she should remain free from outside influences. This ideology was used to legitimize the rule of Kim Il Sung and later Kim Jong Il. March First Movement On March 1, 1919, Koreans rose up and protested Japanese colonial rule and oppression while proclaiming independence for Korea as a nation. The events were widespread and peaceful. The responses of the Japanese were severe and violent. More than 2 million Koreans took part in the movement. The Japanese killed over 7,500 of the participants, tortured thousands of others, and imprisoned another 46,000 men, women, and children. Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) President of South Korea from 1962 until his assassination in 1979. Park Chung Hee served in the Japanese military during World War II. Later, as a general in the South Korean military, he led a coup over a democratic government. He oversaw the industrialization of South Korea. Rhee Syngman (1875–1965) Rhee Syngman was the first president of South Korea, from 1948 until 1960. He was an early member of the Korean independence movement. In 1960, he was forced to flee the country due to corruption and an election-rigging scandal. The Tonghak Rebellion (1894–1895) The Tonghak Rebellion was a religious peasant uprising based on ideals drawn from different traditional thoughts, including Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. It opposed foreign intrusion into Korea and preached social egalitarianism.

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not merely the “iron-willed, ever-victorious commander” or the “respected and beloved Great Leader,” he was “the supreme brain of the nation.” From 1946 to 1958, North Korea faced national division, removed the legacy of colonial exploitation, overturned a traditional class system, conducted the most successful land reform program in history, repelled invasion by the United States and the United Nations, and rebuilt its economy after a devastating civil war. Until 1975, its standard of living was second in Asia only to that of Japan. Without “iron-willed” discipline and national unity, it is doubtful if the North would exist today, let alone have accomplished any of these. Regardless of how they are viewed by outsiders, North Koreans believe themselves members of a nation that is the envy of the world. During those halcyon days, North Koreans enjoyed modest material wealth and a safe society. They participated in state and local political meetings on a daily basis, and enthusiastic participation was mandatory. Public parades of nationalist pride, private rituals honoring Kim Il Sung, workplace meetings on the brilliance of juche, schoolyard assemblies lauding the nation, and media broadcasts soaked in state-approved propaganda permeated every facet of life. Never before has a nation so mobilized and orchestrated the daily lives of its citizens. By all accounts, the vast majority of North Koreans, if not fully convinced of the “Great Leader’s” brilliance, at least were comfortable enough to give him the benefit of the doubt. In the mid-1990s, life got worse in a hurry. The internal limitations of juche combined with years of natural disasters to push the economy and the socialist paradise into virtual collapse. Since then, nearly 200,000 North Koreans have fled their homeland to China in hopes of food and survival; though once there, they often suffer discrimination, abuse, violence, torture, human trafficking, and rape. However, interviews show that the North Korean refugees still deeply support the North’s current political and ideological system and hope to return in the future. They are food refugees and not political refugees. In North Korea, a generation is virtually wasted by malnutrition and lack of medical care. Yet, its citizens remain loyal to their ideology and nation. Selected Bibliography Armstrong, C. 2004. The North Korean Revolution: 1945–1950. New York: Columbia University Press. Cumings, B. 1997. Korea’s Place in the Sun. New York: W. W. Norton. Cumings, B. 2004. North Korea: Another Country. New York: W. W. Norton. Eckart, C. 1991. Offspring of Empire. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Hart, D. 2003. From Tradition to Consumption: Constructing a Capitalist Culture in South Korea. 2nd ed. Edison, NJ: Jimoondang Press. Lee, C.-S. 1965. The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Lee, K.-B. 1988. A New History of Korea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Nelson, L. C. 2000. Measured Excess: Status, Gender, and Consumer Nationalism in South Korea. New York: Columbia University Press. North Korea. Library of Congress. (Retrieved 1/15/08), http://countrystudies.us/north-korea. Pratt, K., and R. Rutt. 1999. Korea: A Historical and Cultural Dictionary. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press. Schmidt, A. 2002. Korea between Empires. New York: Columbia University Press. South Korea. Library of Congress. (Retrieved 1/15/08), http://countrystudies.us/south-korea.

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Mongolia Christopher P. Atwood Chronology 1206 Premodern Mongol ethnie (ethnic group) unified by Chinggis (Genghis) Khan. The traditional Mongolian script is adopted. 1871 Injannashi’s Köke Sudur (“Blue Chronicle”) envisions a more secular Chinggis Khan and laments the degraded state of the Mongol people. 1892–1901 Russian and Chinese officials begin abolishing traditional Mongol autonomy and encourage peasant colonization of Mongol grazing land. Widespread resistance by aristocrats, herders, intellectuals, and bandits follows. 1911–1913 Khalkha Mongolia declares independence from China and establishes a theocratic regime; unsuccessfully tries to free Inner Mongolia from Chinese control. 1919 Chinese troops reenter Mongolia, officials and soldiers of the theocratic regime organize revolutionary cells. 1920–1921 The revolutionary cells merge, forming the Mongolian People’s Party (later the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party); they appeal to Soviet Russia and help the Soviet army establish a revolutionary government. Mongolia becomes a magnet for panMongolists in Russia and China. 1924 Mongolia declares a people’s republic; the first Inner Mongolian nationalist party is organized. 1931–1945 The Japanese occupy Inner Mongolia. 1932 D. Natsugdorji pens Mongolia’s most famous patriotic poem, “My Homeland” (“Minii nutag”). 1937–1940 Stalinist purges in Mongolia nativize the elite and destroy Buddhist institutions, as border clashes with Japanese stimulate xenophobia. 1945–1946 Mongolia joins the Soviet attack on Japan and is formally recognized as independent by China. 1947 Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government is formed by the Communists in China’s civil war. 1962 The commemoration of Chinggis Khan is criticized by Mongolia’s pro-Soviet ruler, Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, as a nationalist. 1968–1969 Tens of thousands of Inner Mongols are killed in China’s Cultural Revolution for allegedly supporting a secret pro-independence organization. 1981–1982 Large-scale Mongol nationalist demonstrations by students in Inner Mongolia, demanding justice and reparations. 1989–1990 Demonstrators criticizing the ruling party’s subservience to Russia force out the ruling Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party.

Situating the Nation The Mongolian people today exist in a divided state. In one sense, this division is between three contiguous states: people of Mongol ancestry are found not only in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the independent state of Mongolia (Mongol uls), in the center of the Mongolian plateau, but also in the People’s Republic of China to the south and the Russian Federation to the north. In another sense, this division is over the definition of the Mongol nation: Are those people of Mongol ancestry in China and Russia truly Mongols? Or are they independent, albeit related, peoples with their own destiny? Or are they people losing their Mongolian identity entirely, as they are assimilated with the Chinese or Russians? The State of Mongolia (before 1992, the Mongolian People’s Republic) is a relatively homogenous nation-state of about 2.75 million people. Of these, about 95 percent are of Mongol ancestry, broadly speaking, and 81.5 percent are of the Khalkha Mongol people, the dominant subgroup within the Mongolian nation. Once the Soviet Union’s most loyal satellite state, Mongolia today is a multiparty democracy with a strongly nationalist political climate. To the south of Mongolia is the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in the People’s Republic of China. This autonomous region is tightly integrated into China, politically and economically, but has an official policy of multiculturalism, including preferential policies for Mongol students and cadres, subsidized Mongolian-language education, and an increasingly commodified Mongolian “tradition.” While Mongols make up only 17 percent of the autonomous region’s population, they total 3.4 million, and about 65 percent live in compact communities in the autonomous region’s drier areas. The Inner Mongols see themselves as part of the core of the Mongol nation and harbor considerable separatist sentiment, despite strict repression. China also has a number of smaller autonomous prefectures and counties for isolated Mongol populations in Manchuria, the Tibetan plateau, and Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan). Within the Russian Federation, the Buriat Republic of southern Siberia and the Kalmyk Republic far to the west along the Caspian Sea both have their origin in Soviet-era autonomous republics. Until recently, there were also two small Buriat autonomous areas near the Buriat Republic. The Buriat and Kalmyk areas were incorporated into the Russian empire in the 17th and 18th centuries and today use Cyrillic-script versions of the local language (Buriat and Kalmyk). The Buriats (421,000 persons) and Kalmyks (174,000 persons) have strong local identities but also see themselves as part of a larger transnational Mongolian cultural sphere. Traditionally the Mongol peoples have identified their lifestyle with nomadic pastoralism. In the center of the Mongolian plateau, this was the overwhelmingly dominant way of life in premodern Mongolia, although in southeastern Inner Mongolia and in northwestern Buriatia a semi-sedentary or sedentary agropastoral economy has been practiced for centuries. The settlement and colonization by Chinese farmers from the 18th century on, and Russian peasants from the late 19th century, provoked both local rebellions and nationalist movements among the intelligentsia, who in the early 20th century frequently extolled the Mongols’ tradition of public ownership of pasture as a precursor of socialism. In Mongolia proper, Khüriye (today Mongolia’s capital Ulaanbaatar) was an important urban N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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settlement, but the Mongol people became involved in significant industrialization only after the success of the various revolutions, first in Russia in 1920, then in Mongolia proper in 1921, and then in Inner Mongolia in 1949. Thus, Mongolian nationalism took its first steps in an overwhelmingly rural economy with only a tiny class of officials and teachers. Geographically, Mongolian nationalism developed in two basic areas: first along the periphery of Chinese or Russian settlement and then in the traditional capital Khüriye (Russian Urga; modern Ulaanbaatar) in the Mongolian heartland. Along the frontier of Chinese settlement—the Kharachin, Kheshigten, and Khorchin districts of southeastern Inner Mongolia, the Daur Mongols of northeastern Inner Mongolia, and the Chakhar area of south central Inner Mongolia —all became early cradle areas of modernizing, often anticlerical, nationalism. In Buriat lands, Russian education created a similar modernizing nationalist intelligentsia. In Mongolia proper, however, isolated from direct Chinese colonization, the high lamas and aristocracy based in Khüriye broke away from Qing Chinese rule in 1911 and established a theocratic state, devoted to preserving the traditional culture, religion, and social order. The bureaucracy and schools of this new state nurtured a small urban and commoner-based intelligentsia that resisted the reimposition of Chinese rule in 1919 and with Soviet support formed a new revolutionary government in 1921. Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, Khüriye, renamed Ulaanbaatar (“Red Hero”) in 1924, attracted expatriate Buriat and Inner Mongolian nationalists. Increasing international tensions from 1929 on, and the Stalinist Great Purges from 1937 to 1940, annihilated this cosmopolitan, expatriate nationalist intelligentsia, as a new generation of purely native-born, mostly Khalkha, intelligentsia was trained to take its place. Up to 1950, the Inner Mongolian nationalist movement drew in Chineseeducated sons of wealthy rural herders and farmers (often landlords of immigrant Chinese tenant farmers), and the petty nobility (the taiji class). The Buriat nationalist movement before 1920 similarly drew on wealthy Buriat ranchers, junior members of the nobility (taisha), and those enrolled in Cossack regiments. In reaction against official czarist pressure for Christianization, Buddhist lamas played a significant role in early Kalmyk and Buriat Mongolian nationalism. In Mongolia proper, nationalist resentment of Soviet domination from the 1950s on grew among younger urban Mongolians, even within the party apparatus, and played a major role in the 1990 democratic revolution that established a multiparty democracy. Today in Inner Mongolia and Buriatia, the Mongol population has rates of education as high or higher than the local Chinese or Russian population. The Mongol peoples of China and Russia also have a similar occupational profile: overrepresented in agriculture (herding and farming), government service, education, and culture and arts, but underrepresented in commerce, industry, and manufacturing occupations. Since the local economies are still dominated by state-owned enterprises with Russian or Chinese staff, the source and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Chinggis (Genghis) Khan and Mongolian Nationalism Central to Mongolian identity is Chinggis (Genghis) Khan. While known outside Mongolia primarily as an empire builder, his Mongolian image was much more as a ruler, culture founder, ancestor, and tutelary spirit, traditionally worshiped in a number of shrines throughout Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. In the 20th century, increasing knowledge of 13th-century Islamic, European, and Chinese sources on Chinggis Khan secularize and democratize his image. From being the literal ancestor of the Mongol nobility, Chinggis Khan has become the symbolic ancestor of the nation as a whole and proof that at least once in its past Mongolia has been in the forefront of world history. In the 19th and 20th centuries, European, Chinese, and Mongolian philologists rediscovered the Secret History of the Mongols, a Mongolian-language biography of Chinggis Khan written ca. AD 1252. The Secret History of the Mongols created a third image of Chinggis Khan, as a unifier of the Mongols with human failings but a divine destiny and a compelling and charismatic personality. The Secret History of the Mongols (whose language is about as archaic as that of Chaucer in English) is now one of the foundations of Mongol identity, paraphrased several times into modern Mongolian. It has been translated into the related Buriat and Kalmyk languages spoken by Mongol peoples in Russia as well.

audience for Mongol nationalist dissidents is the white-collar intelligentsia, often Chinese or Russian speaking. The origins of the modern Mongol nation (or nations) lie in the premodern ethnie (ethnic group) unified by Chinggis (Genghis) Khan in AD 1206. The ensuing world conquests dispersed much of the Mongol people, however. In the 16th century, Dayan Khan (1480?–1517?), a descendant of Chinggis Khan, and his empress Mandukhai reunited the Mongols and enfeoffed their sons and grandsons. The nomadic shrine and relics of Chinggis Khan (now placed in southwestern Inner Mongolia) became a powerful talisman of Mongol unity and military success. By 1700, most of Mongolia was divided between literally thousands of descendants of Dayan Khan and, through him, of Chinggis Khan. The traditional UighurMongolian script and chronicles focusing on the legendary tales of Chinggis Khan and how Dayan Khan reunified the Mongols solidified an aristocratic national consciousness. The conversion of the Mongols in 1581 to an unusually militant and intolerant form of Buddhism, the Gelugba (“Yellow Hat”) order presided over by the Dalai Lama in Tibet and China’s Manchu emperors, further unified the Mongol ethnie. Yet the Buddhist sangha (clergy) in Mongolia was not placed under any centralized administration. The central or Khalkha Mongols saw themselves as the shabi (disciples) of the great incarnate lama lineage of the Jibzundamba Khutugtus, residing in Khüriye, but his prestige was not nearly so great in Inner Mongolia or Buriatia. In the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Mongols of today’s Mongolia and China fell under control of China’s Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty, ruled by a Manchu emperor. The Qing, however, left the Mongol areas under a number of autonomous N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Scene depicting the capture of a Chinese town by Genghis (Chinggis) Khan, from a 14thcentury manuscript of the Persian history of the Mongols, Jami al-Tavarikh. Known in the West, Middle East, and China as a ruthless conqueror, Genghis Khan is honored by the Mongols as their unifier and national founder. (Corel)

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The Manchu Yoke The Mongols were ruled by China’s last dynasty, the Manchu Qing Dynasty, from the 17th century to 1911. Under the Manchus, the traditional old regime of a Chinggisid aristocracy and a vast and wealthy Buddhist sangha (monastic community) reached its height. Despite the considerable artistic and cultural efflorescence, clerical and aristocratic privilege came under criticism by the Inner Mongolian writer Injannashi in the later 19th century. After the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, Mongolian nationalists in both independent Mongolia and Inner Mongolia (still part of China) excoriated the “Manchu yoke” as the nadir of their history. Mongol nationalists accuse the Qing of pursuing “divide and rule” strategies, deliberately isolating the Mongols from world progress, propping up the corrupt nobility, allowing Chinese commercial exploitation, and artificially promoting an out-of-control monasticism that led to a declining population and rampant venereal diseases. This distorted negative picture is still common in school textbooks. The 20th century is thus seen as a revival from benighted ignorance and foreign oppression.

banners (or fiefdoms) each ruled by a hereditary nobleman who was a descendant of Chinggis Khan or one of his brothers. There were 86 such banners in Khalkha (Outer) Mongolia, 49 in Inner Mongolia, and scores more of Oirat or Western Mongols scattered through western Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Qinghai. Although movement between banners was strictly limited, the Qing did enforce a uniform administrative culture over all the Mongols that promoted cultural homogeneity. At the same time, in the 19th century, Mongol writers often conceived of their people as part of a multinational pan-Buddhist commonwealth, loyally serving the Manchu Qing emperor. Only with the reversal of Mongolian autonomy and the imposition of aggressive Sinicizing policies in 1901 did the Mongolian clergy and aristocracy turn and abandon their Qing loyalism. When the Eighth Jibzundamba Khutugtu (1870–1924) declared Mongolia independent of the Qing in 1911, he sought to rally all of the rulers of the Mongol banners in Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, and points west. Despite considerable support—a number of Mongol noblemen outside Mongolia proper led their subjects to migrate to Outer Mongolia—Russo-Chinese diplomatic moves prevented the formation of a pan-Mongolian state and ratified the separation of Outer Mongolia, under Russian protection, from Inner Mongolia, part of the new Chinese republic. Those Mongol people in southern Siberia fell under Russian rule from the mid-17th century. Called Buriats by the Russians, they differed significantly in dialect from the Mongols of Mongolia, lacked the Chinggisid aristocracy, and were only partially converted to Buddhism. The western Buriats remained shamanist or else converted to Russian Orthodoxy and never used the traditional UighurMongolian script, being literate only in Russian. The border between the Qing and Russian empires was tightly policed, allowing little interaction with Mongolia. By the mid-19th century, Buriat chronicle writers expressed czarist loyalism, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Mongol ancestry, and a growing sense of the Buriats being one people, closely related to but distinct from the Mongols.

Instituting the Nation Suiting its dispersed state, no one institution or person has defined modern Mongolian nationalism. In Mongolia proper, the 20th century’s chief nationalist institution was the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. Founded in 1920 as the Mongolian People’s Party by merging two circles of young dissident officials, translators, and army officers, who had served Mongolia’s theocratic government from 1911 to 1919, the group opposed renewed Chinese rule and sought Soviet Russian intervention. During the course of the 1921 revolution, this party turned against the old aristocracy and much of the high clergy, while adopting many modernizing and populist reforms. The party also received an influx of Buriat members, who sharpened its radical edge and strengthened its original pan-Mongolian goals. In 1925, however, the party, renamed the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, was forced by Soviet pressure to abandon the pan-Mongolist plank in its program. The Soviet Union found certain forms of nationalism in Mongolia to be a useful ally in excluding Chinese or Japanese influence, but at the same time, they began to develop a suspicion, which turned into a raging paranoid fear in the 1930s, of “pan-Mongolist Japanese spies.” The Mongolian revolutionaries early began to purge their own ranks. By 1924, all the original leadership troika were dead, two executed by their former comrades. The third member, General Sükhebaatur (1893–1923), had been popular among his troops and slowly became the posthumous icon of the Mongolian revolution. After 1936, when Marshal Choibalsang (1895–1952) rose to unchallenged power as Stalin’s man in Mongolia, the portraits of Choibalsang and Sükhebaatur became ubiquitous images of the 1921 revolution and hence of Mongolia’s independence. In Inner Mongolia, the nationalist movement traces its origin to the iconoclastic writings of the southeastern Inner Mongolian poet and romance writer, Injannashi (1837–1892). His work, especially the Köke Sudur or “Blue History,” exposed for generations of young intellectuals the Chinese stifling of Mongol talent, the corruption of the nobility, the obscurantism of the Buddhist lamas, and the shining value of Mongolia’s ancient accomplishments under Chinggis Khan. In the 20th century, leading icons of Inner Mongolian nationalism included the multitalented Daur intellectual Merse (1894–1934?), the banner official Gada Meiren (1893–1931), who led a doomed revolt against a Chinese colonization scheme in Khorchin in 1929, and especially, Prince Demchugdongrub (1902–1966). The Chinggisid nobleman Prince De (as his name was respectfully abbreviated) led a Mongol autonomous movement in central Inner Mongolia and eventually headed N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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an autonomous government of Mongolia under Japanese protection from 1937 to 1945 and again on his own in 1949. His betrayal by the government of the Mongolian People’s Republic and his imprisonment in China from 1950 to 1963 has made him a martyr for dissident Inner Mongolian nationalists. More ambivalent is the role of Ulanfu (also known as Ulanhu, Wulanfu, and Ulaankhüü; 1906–1988). A loyal member of the Chinese Communist Party, Ulanfu helped co-opt left-wing nationalist governments in Inner Mongolia during 1945–1947 and became the head of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region from 1949 to 1966. During this time, he was criticized for toning down class struggle in Mongol regions and staffing the region’s government with his own landsmen. Attacked, demoted, and forced to recant during the Cultural Revolution, he was rehabilitated in 1979 and made China’s vice president until his death. While rejected as a model by dissident nationalists, he is seen as an honest defender of ethnic Mongol interests in China by moderate nationalists.

Defining the Nation Under the Qing dynasty, the Mongol bannermen were defined by language (Mongolian was the local administrative language of the banners), religion (all banners had an official Buddhist temple and local cults), dress (court dress was regulated by sumptuary laws), and endogamy (Chinese men were forbidden to marry Mongol women). The nobility were almost all descendants of Chinggis Khan or his brothers. Local resources were collectively owned by these banners. In the 20th century, this ethno-cultural definition became the basis for arguments of self-determination. In 1911, the Jibzundamba Khutugtu argued for Mongolian independence both in public and in private letters to foreign governments on the basis of Mongolian ancestry, language, religion, and customs, all of which differed from the Chinese. In 1919, as Mongolian autonomy was threatened by Chinese warlords and Buriats were caught in the Russian Civil War, a panMongolian independence movement was organized at Dauriia Station. Composed of Inner Mongolian and Buriat representatives, the movement sent an appeal to the Paris Peace Conference explicitly demanding a pan-Mongolian state on the basis of American president Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination. This focus on objective factors defining the Mongolian nation continued into the 1940s. As Communist influence increased, however, the Buddhist religion was eliminated as part of the national culture, while the descent from Chinggis Khan, previously a marker of class status (only the taiji aristocracy were really descendants of the national founder), was generalized to include all the Mongols. The establishment of official nationality identifications first in Russia and then in China at first reinforced the tendency to treat ethnicity as purely objective, while creating additional complications. In Russia, the Kalmyks and Buriats were clearly N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Ambiguous Heroes: Lamas and Legends The heroes of the Buddhist conversion of the Mongols in the 16th and 17th centuries have had a somewhat divisive effect on Mongol nationalism, since none are honored by all the Mongols. After the 1911 restoration of independence, Mongolia’s theocratic government instituted regular offerings at the relics of Abatai Khan (1544–1588), the khan of the Khalkha Mongols who first accepted the new strict form of Buddhism. The great Buddhist incarnate lama Zanabazar (1635–1723), the first of the Khalkhas’ Jibzundamba Khutugtus, was a revered religious leader, artist, designer of the soyombo symbol now on the Mongolian flag, and an astute political leader. Although he is still revered as a Khalkha Mongolian national hero, his decision to lead the Khalkha into submission to the Qing Dynasty is viewed ambivalently. For the Kalmyk Mongols, the great Buddhist cleric Zaya Pandita (1599–1662), who designed a new script for the Oirat or western Mongolian dialect, has been seen as a patron saint of cultural revival and learning. From the late 17th century to 1755, the Zunghars, a branch of the Oirats or western Mongols, led a resistance against the Qing Dynasty based in Xinjiang (East Turkistan). The Zunghar rulers are naturally seen as heroes by the Oirats in western Mongolia and Xinjiang. For the Khalkha, they are more ambiguous figures, since they also made war on the Khalkha. In Inner Mongolia, the Zunghars are seen by Chinese historians as “rebels” conspiring with czarist Russia to attack Qing China, yet Inner Mongolian historians writing in Mongolian often treat them as nationality heroes fighting against the Qing Dynasty’s “feudal nationality oppression.” Fictional heroes of epics have been particularly important for Buriat and Kalmyk national feeling. Geser, the main Buriat epic hero, is the only figure shared by all the Buriats, Buddhist and shamanist alike. Jangghar, the only Kalmyk epic hero, has likewise been a noncontroversial unifying figure. Buriat history lacks a direct association with the great figures of Chinggis Khan and other Mongol rulers. In recent decades, the memory of previous figures who led the doomed Buriat resistance to Cossack incursions in the 17th century have been cultivated as important historical figures in the Buriat past. The most revered heroes of Buriat nationalism today are the brilliant and multitalented nationalists of the early 20th century who were slaughtered in Stalin’s purges during 1937–1940.

defined not only as separate from each other but also from the Mongols of Mongolia. In Inner Mongolia, the Mongols were still termed Mongols, but the separation of the Daurs, a small but highly educated and influential ethnic group of 121,000 (1990 figure) in northeast Inner Mongolia, was controversial. In 1982, the Chinese government allowed anyone with one Mongol grandparent to switch their ethnic registration to Mongol. At present, almost 15 percent of those officially designated as Mongols are such newcomers to the ethnic group that they have little or no affiliation with the Mongol community. Meanwhile in independent Mongolia, the awareness of such state-controlled manipulation of identities in Russia and China has strengthened their consciousness of themselves as being the only “pure” (tsewer) Mongols left in the world. In China and Russia, widespread loss of Mongolian language in the cities created the ironic situation of cadres and intellectuals, who benefited most from N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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official multicultural policies, finding their children unable to speak their ancestral language. Such acculturated urban youth were important leaders in the ethnic revivals that swept Inner Mongolia, Buriatia, and Kalmykia from the 1980s on. As a result, many urban, educated Buriats, Kalmyks, and Inner Mongols view their identity not in objective ethno-cultural terms, but rather as having a heart for their people, political activism on their behalf, and a love for their ancestry. In Russia, the obvious racial difference between Buriats and Kalmyks and the Slavic population has kept race and ancestry at the foreground of national definition. Similarly, religion (Buddhism in Kalmykia, Buddhism and shamanism in Buriatia) remains a major aspect of national identity for Mongol peoples in Russia. It is much less salient in Inner Mongolia, where nationalism has a long anticlerical tradition and where the majority of Chinese are also Buddhist (albeit of a different tradition). Many Mongols in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia believe Buddhism was harmful to the Mongols’ national development, by encouraging celibacy and pacifism. Given the territorial divisions among the Mongols and the competing empirebuilding of China, Russia, and Japan, the spatial dimensions of the Mongolian nation have always been a divisive issue. When the Eighth Jibzundamba Khutugtu declared independence in 1911, it was at first his own 86 banners of the Khalkha whom he called on to support him. From the beginning, however, he hoped to rally all of the Qing Dynasty’s Mongol banners, whether in Inner Mongolia, Qinghai (Kökenuur), or Xinjiang (East Turkistan) to his new state. In 1913, he invaded Inner Mongolia to vindicate this claim, but was defeated when the Russians, wary of conflict with other powers, threatened to cut off support. Likewise, the Mongolian People’s Party, in its first program of 1921, included pan-Mongolian unification as its ultimate aim. One area of conflict was the Turkic-speaking Tuvan Republic, northwest of Mongolia. Traditionally under the Khalkha nobles and with a heavily Mongolian religion and high culture, Tuva had been carved out as a separate puppet state by Russia. In 1925, the Mongolians were forced by Soviet pressure to delete their party’s pan-Mongolian plank and recognize Tuva as independent. Mongolian financial support to Inner Mongolian nationalists continued, however, until 1933. In 1945, Mongolia’s dictator Marshal Choibalsang again tried to rally Inner Mongolia for pan-Mongolian unification in the wake of the fall of the Japanese empire. He was, however, blocked by the Sino-Soviet treaty of that year. Forced to sacrifice his pan-Mongolian ambitions, Choibalsang turned instead to securing China’s formal recognition of Mongolian independence, which he achieved in 1946 and confirmed in 1949 with Mao Zedong’s new Communist government of China. Since then, Mongolia’s government has rigorously renounced any support for pan-Mongolism. Although Inner Mongolians supported Mongolia’s pan-Mongolian ventures in the 1910s, the 1920s, and in 1945, outside patrons and allies of Inner Mongolia’s nationalists, whether Soviet, Japanese, or Chinese revolutionaries, always blocked N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the realization of these pan-Mongolian plans. After these defeats, the unification of Inner Mongolia, which was divided among seven Chinese provinces, as a single autonomous region in China gradually became a kind of substitute for panMongolian unification. Inner Mongolia’s East Mongols—populous, well-educated, partially agricultural, and significantly influenced by Manchu culture—and the sparsely settled western Mongols—partly deeply conservative nomads and partly almost completely Sinicized Mongol farmers—were finally unified in 1954 when the People’s Republic of China’s Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region under Ulanfu was extended west. The resulting sprawling autonomous region is, however, overwhelmingly Chinese in population, which has led contemporary dissident nationalists to propose abandoning either the eastern or western half in any projected independent Inner Mongolia or pan-Mongolian state. In the early 20th century, Buriat nationalists, such as the lama Agwang Dorzhiev (1853–1937) and the Buddhist socialist folklorist and intellectual Tsyben Zhamtsarano (1881–1942) proposed either a pan-Mongolian state or else a panBuddhist state including Tibet. Since this state was to be created under Russian patronage, the Buriat nationalists generally saw their role not as a nucleus or “Piedmont” for a new Mongolian state, but as outside mentors. Only in the 1919 Dauriia Station movement, led by the Buriat secular nationalist Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino in the middle of the Russian Civil War, did Buriat nationalists seriously consider joining a pan-Mongolian state separate from Russia. Buriat nationalists have generally rejected secession. Rather their focus is on overcoming the differences between the shamanist, semi-agricultural, Cyrillic-script-using west and the more Buddhist, nomadic, and Mongolian-script-using east. Buriatia was unified as an autonomous republic in 1923 and was later strengthened by the imposition of a single Cyrillic script, but Buriatia was dismembered again in 1937 at the height of the Stalin purges. The 1923 name of the Buriat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic expressed the Buriats’ ambivalent relationship to their Mongolian identity. In 1958, the word “Mongolian” was removed from the republic’s name. Today, pan-Mongolism has little if any constituency in Buriatia, unlike in Inner Mongolia. Even the reunification of the Buriat areas sundered in 1937 is seen as impractical by most Buriat nationalists.

Narrating the Nation The most important national myth of the Mongolian peoples is the steppe and the nomadic pastoral lifestyle. The steppe is the source of the classic images of Mongolian life: the yurt, the horse and rider, the vast herds of horses, sheep, cattle, and camels, and the big blue sky. It is also seen as the repository of Mongolian values of straightforward honesty, lack of guile, reverence for tradition, physical hardiness and manly skills, kindness to domestic animals, and contact with nature. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Finally it is the ideal site for ritual activities, such as the complex and beautiful wedding ceremonies, the “three manly games” of wrestling, horse racing, and archery, and worship of local spirits at oboo (cairns), all of which are still widely practiced. For city Mongols and students abroad, the thought of one’s old mother and father left behind on the steppe embodies nostalgic patriotism. Even Mongols from eastern Inner Mongolia, western Buriatia, or the cities of Mongolia proper feel that the steppe Mongols are the most truly Mongol Mongols. This national feeling is expressed in poetry, painting, and sculpture, in which traditional and steppe themes are particularly common. Traditional songs also express the ambiance of the steppe. Patriotism has been a major theme in Mongolian poetry and music. The 1932 poem “My Homeland” by D. Natsugdorji (also spelled Natsagdorj, 1906–1937) became a classic of Mongolian patriotism, as did the poem “Born in Mongolia” by Kh. Perlee (1911–1982). Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, intellectual dissidents, such as the scholar B. Rinchen (1905–1979) and poet R. Choinom (1936–1979), became the voices of nationalist resentment of the compulsory kowtowing to Russian culture. In narrative forms, especially novels and movies, the most popular theme is historical romance about figures and episodes when Mongolian independence was under threat. Modern pop and rock music have incorporated traditional Mongolian poetry and throat singing (a rare form of singing originating in northwest Mongolia and now popular in world music). In the 1989–1990 democracy movement, the folk-rock band Soyol Erdene (Culture Jewel) and the lyrics of D. Jargalsaikhan expressed the Mongolians’ feeling of their culture being neglected and suppressed. This role of challenging the conformist and pragmatic adaption to foreign pressures has been continued in the new market-oriented democracy by such figures as the radical traditionalist poet O. Dashbalbar (1957–1999) and the rock band Hurd (Speed). In the 20th century, memory of political persecution has played a crucial role in nurturing nationalism among the Mongol peoples in China and Russia. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) when Chinese anti-Soviet xenophobia reached its height, Mongols and their Han sympathizers were tortured into confessing membership in the fictional “New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party,” supposedly controlled by the “revisionist” (i.e., pro-Soviet Communist) Ulanfu. From 1968 to 1969, 20,000 or more were killed and hundreds of thousands arrested. Although the case was pronounced completely groundless in 1978, only one of the leading perpetrators has been punished, and justice and restitution for the victims remains a major cause for Inner Mongolian nationalists, both dissident and mainstream. The Kalmyks on the Volga were too geographically isolated from the larger body of Mongols to nurture pan-Mongolist movements. The Russian Civil War (1918–1920) led to thousands of Kalmyk Cossacks fleeing to Europe, where they maintained a strong anti-Communist, Kalmyk revivalist movement. In 1943, the remaining Kalmyks were exiled to Siberia and Central Asia by the Soviet governN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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ment in 1943 for supposedly supporting the Nazi German invasion. Even though they were allowed to return in 1957 and had their autonomous republic restored, full exoneration and even partial restitution only came after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The experience of flight and exile still defines Kalmyk identity today. The Buriat Mongols of Siberia also nourish the memory of great Buriat thinkers killed in the Stalinist purges.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In independent Mongolia, the mobilization of the Mongolian nation began in the center, Khüriye, soon to be renamed Ulaanbaatar, and proceeded outward from there. The 1911 restoration treated only the titled nobility and the high Buddhist clergy as part of the political nation, but created a new class of officials, teachers, and army officers. In the 1921 revolution, the Soviet Red Army placed the People’s Party in charge of Khüriye, forming a new government representing an intelligentsia numbering a few hundred at most. The challenge for this government was to gain secure guarantees of Mongolia’s independence abroad and at home to mobilize the entire Mongolian nation around their new vision of a secular, progressive nation. Recognition of Mongolia’s independence was long stymied by international refusal to recognize any changes in China’s pre-1911 borders inherited from the Qing empire. The czarist government reduced Outer Mongolia’s status to that of autonomy under a kind of Sino-Russian condominium in the Kiakhta Trilateral Treaty of 1915, and even the Soviet Union conceded a theoretical Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia. In 1946, however, the Chinese Nationalist government recognized Mongolia’s independence, a recognition confirmed by the People’s Republic of China in 1949. At first, only Communist bloc countries recognized Mongolia, but Mongolia joined the United Nations in 1961, and recognition by non-Communist powers followed. Without Russian patronage, the Khalkha Mongolian national movements of 1911 and 1921 could not have succeeded. Russian desires to expand their influence also led to an off-again-on-again Soviet Russian sponsorship of Inner Mongolian nationalism from 1925 on. Due to this Russian patronage of Mongol nationalism in the 20th century, the Mongol peoples of Russia—the Buriats and Kalmyks— never seriously considered secession. Instead, Buriat and Kalmyk intellectuals advocated autonomy for themselves and a forward Russian policy of liberation for China’s Mongols. Throughout the 20th century, Mongolia’s traditional Russian-allied nationalism has most often seen the Asian powers to the south—Japan or China—as the main danger. From 1931 to 1945, the Japanese threat led to the bloody border battles of Khalkhyn Gol (1939). Despite Nationalist China’s 1946 recognition of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Mongolia, border clashes broke out in 1947. After 1949, the Sino-Soviet alliance pacified Mongolian hostility to China until the Sino-Soviet rift in 1960. From 1966 to 1984, movies, articles, academic books, and speeches focused on the dangers of Maoism to Mongolia’s borders and the oppression of minorities (including ethnic Mongols) in Mao’s China. Since 1984, state-to-state relations with China have been normalized, but there is still widespread anxiety about excessive openness and foreign investment possibly causing Mongolia to lose its hard-won independence and become a Chinese satellite. From 1921 to 1990, overbearing Soviet control sometimes also generated resentment, even among basically pro-Russian Mongolians. A number of political figures were dismissed from party leadership from 1924 to 1936 for their resistance to Soviet tutelage. By contrast, the young Soviet-educated apparatchiks that took power after the purges in 1940 were at first so pro-Russian they proposed on several occasions to join the Soviet Union as a 16th republic. In the 1970s and 1980s, a massive Soviet presence in Mongolia and the continued servility of this aging post-purge cohort again generated resentment among youth. With the democratic revolution of 1989–1990, Russian control disappeared, and the rather shallow current anti-Russian nationalism soon evaporated. Today, Russia is the country most often chosen by Mongolians as their most reliable friend, with the United States second. The restoration of the Mongolian state in 1921 opened the way for new government strategies of nation-building. From 1921 to 1925, the new regime was largely occupied with basic legislation involving elimination of clerical and aristocratic privilege, step-by-step secularization, and the reform of administration. After 1923, an economic upswing increased government revenues, generating funds to implement conscription in 1925, rapid expansion of party and youth league membership, and a slow but steady expansion of public schooling. The developing public education system was solely in Mongolian, based on standard Khalkha, and did not use Russian or Chinese language as the medium of education. Citizenship was only slowly extended to non-Mongols, or even to expatriate Buriats and Inner Mongolians from outside Mongolia proper. From 1929 to 1940, the Mongolian government, under pressure from the Soviet Union, pursued a number of radical campaigns that, while ostensibly focused on class struggle, had a profound effect on national integration. The destruction of the aristocracy solidified the idea of the Mongols as a single, egalitarian national community in which all, not just the favored few, were descendants of Chinggis Khan. The immensely violent campaign against the Buddhist sangha (monks) removed what many radicals feared as a state within a state and imparted a secular, strongly statist cast to Mongolian nationalism. Border clashes with imperial Japan, culminating in the Khalkhyn Gol battle of 1939 and massive purges of thousands upon thousands of supposed “pan-Mongolist Japanese spies,” nurtured both xenophobia toward Asian powers and dependence on Soviet aid and advice. It also stimulated a deep suspicion toward ethnic Mongols beyond the frontiers N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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as potential stooges of foreign ambitions. The Khalkha Mongols’ ethnic identity became closely fused with the Mongolian People’s Republic’s national culture and historical identity. This fusion was only amplified by the tendency of the purges to hit highly educated Buriat and Inner Mongolian expatriates particularly hard. Programs of cultural and educational construction proceeded during this period as well, but were hobbled by the shortage of funds (amplified by the economic isolation brought on by xenophobic policies) and personnel (amplified by the wholesale murder of much of the educated class during 1937–1940.) After World War II, education for the booming population was gradually made universal. The curriculum was based on a new view of history that replaced the pre-revolutionary focus on the Chinggisid aristocracy and the spread of Buddhist doctrine. This viewpoint was epitomized by the first edition of the History of the Mongolian People’s Republic (1954), produced by a team of Soviet and Mongolian scholars. Mongolia, roughly within its modern frontiers, was treated as a self-evident national community passing through the requisite stages of Marxist social evolution. Perhaps as a reflection of the old genealogical focus of the nobility and the common ownership of pasture in the banners, folk conceptions of the Mongolian nation revolved very much around the ideas of purity of blood and national ownership of natural resources. The national heroes of Choibalsang and Sükhebaatur were celebrated in poetry, song, and rewritten folklore. The games at the old Buddhist danshug ceremony offered to the Jibzundamba Khutugtu each summer were recast as the national games (naadam), timed to commemorate the July 11 entry of the revolutionaries into Khüriye (Ulaanbaatar). The completion of a national ceremonial space shortly after 1945, in the form of Sükhebaatur Square in front of the government palace and the tombs of Sükhebaatur and Choibalsang, created a public stage and symbolic center for the nation. These nation-building efforts successfully assimilated the urban Chinese and Russian immigrants and the far-western Oirat Mongols. The non-Mongol Kazakh immigrant community in the far west has not been assimilated, however. In the 1920s, about 20,000 Chinese and Russian urban immigrants in Ulaanbaatar and a few other cities formed most of Mongolia’s few proletarian or at least semi-proletarian elements. Due to the ideological and economic importance of this proletariat, Chinese and Russian workers’ clubs were allowed through the 1940s, although social pressure for assimilation was strong. Due to xenophobia, the Great Purges devastated the Chinese communities, and urban development in the 1940s broke up Ulaanbaatar’s “Chinatown.” Since children of intermarriage almost always identified as Khalkha Mongols, by the mid-1950s, Russian and Chinese communities had virtually disappeared. A new population of Chinese guest workers, numbering in the several thousands, settled in Mongolia in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but their numbers were only a tiny percentage of Mongolia’s then vastly larger urban population. The Oirat Mongols of the far west were native Mongols, but had a somewhat more egalitarian social structure and a less specialized pastoral economy than N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the more feudal Khalkhas, along with a separate history rooted in the 18th-century Zunghar confederation. While generally supportive of the independent Mongolian state, the Oirats occasionally pursued separatist agendas, such as during the radical attack on Buddhism in 1932. At times, even party leaders supported the Oirat demands for separation from the Khalkha. After World War II, however, when an Oirat, Yu. Tsedenbal (1916–1991), became Mongolia’s supreme dictator, many Oirats relied on his patronage to achieve high positions in government. This development, along with subsequent linguistic, economic, and social integration and mobility, has made Oirat separatism obsolete. The Turkic-speaking Muslim Kazakhs are Mongolia’s only major remaining unintegrated ethnic minority. Numbering 103,000 or 4.3 percent of Mongolia’s population (2000 figure), the Kazakhs began migrating from northern Xinjiang (eastern Turkistan) into current Mongolian territory in the 1880s. In 1912, Mongolia’s theocratic government granted citizenship to many Kazakhs. The border between Mongolia and Xinjiang (under loose Chinese administration) remained undefined until 1949, with Kazakhs moving in both directions and numerous frontier clashes between Mongolia and the Chinese authorities. Mongolian government policy toward the Kazakhs followed the model of Soviet nationality policy. In 1940, the Mongolian government created a majority Kazakh province, Bayan-Ölgii. Education was allowed in the Cyrillic Kazakh script, based on that used in Kazakhstan. Kazakhs were also imported into a number of mining towns in the Mongolian heartland. Despite the considerable integration of Kazakhs into national life, the independence of Kazakhstan sparked an emigration of up to 60,000 Kazakhs from Bayan-Ölgii back to Kazakhstan. More than half have moved back to Mongolia, however, unable to adapt to the Russified life of Kazakhstan. Education in Bayan-Ölgii continues to use Kazakh. Despite the democratic revolution of 1990, the basic features of Mongolian nationalism in Mongolia proper have remained remarkably constant. The largest change has been the reembrace of Buddhism as a vital aspect of national identity, particularly as a bulwark against evangelical Christianity mission activity that flourished in the 1990s. The state and the concept of nation remain, however, highly secular. The basic perception of safety from the north and danger from the south remains, although the concept of the “third neighbor” (a collective term for powerful countries apart from China and Russia), abortively proposed in the 1920s, has returned to favor as a key plank of foreign policy. Chinggis Khan has been returned to his position as the great progenitor of the Mongol state, but the statues and monuments to Sükhebaatur and Choibalsang are still honored. Figures purged in 1937 have been returned to the national pantheon, but no significant figure has been subtracted. Privatization has weakened the link of national unity to common resource ownership, but continuing anxiety over foreign control of natural resources testifies that this link has not disappeared. Finally, despite the renewed people-to-people connections among Mongolians, Inner Mongolians, and Buriats, Mongolian nationalism in the state of Mongolia remains N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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deeply suspicious of the purity and authenticity of ethnic Mongols outside the Mongolian state. As a result, the thawing of international tensions has exposed not only the strength of the new secular and commoner-based nationalism in Mongolia proper, but also the persistent divisions within the ethnic Mongol family of nationalities. Selected Bibliography Atwood, C. P. 1999. “A Romantic Vision of National Regeneration: Some Unpublished Works of the Inner Mongolian Poet and Essayist Saichungga.” Inner Asia 1, no. 1: 3–43. Atwood, C. P. 2002. Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia’s Interregnum Decades. 2 vols. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Bulag, U. E. 2002. The Mongols at China’s Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ginsburg, T. 1999. “Nationalism, Elites, and Mongolia’s Rapid Transformation.” In Mongolia in the Twentieth Century, edited by S. Kotkin and B. A. Elleman. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Hangin, J. G. 1973. Köke Sudur (The Blue Chronicle): A Study of the First Mongolian Historical Novel by Injannasi. Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz. Jagchid, S. 1999. The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchugdongrob, 1902–1966. Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University. Jankowiak, W. 1988. “The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia.” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 19, no. 20: 269–288. Kaplonski, C. 2004. Truth, History, and Politics: The Memory of Heroes. London: Routledge/ Curzon. Lattimore, O. 1955. Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marsh, P. K. 2005. The Horse-Head Fiddle and the Cosmopolitan Reimagination of Mongolia. London: Routledge/Curzon. Rupen, R. A. 1964. Mongols of the Twentieth Century. 2 vols. Bloomington: Indiana University. Zen-Sun, E-tu. 1952. “Results of Culture Contact in Two Mongol-Chinese Communities.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 8:182–210.

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Nepal Nanda R. Shrestha and Dev Raj Dahal Chronology 1769 In 1768, Gorkha ruler Prithvi Narayan conquers Kathmandu, one of the three mini states in the Kathmandu Valley; by 1969 he completes the conquest of the entire Kathmandu Valley, thus laying foundation for unified kingdom and Nepali nationalism. 1814–1816 Anglo-Nepal War; political boundaries are established; Nepal becomes a semicolony of Britain. 1846 Kot Parba (“courtyard massacre”); the rise of Jang Bahadur Kunwar (Rana) as prime minister. 1923 A treaty with Britain affirms Nepal’s sovereignty, but does not change its semicolonial status. 1950 Anti-Rana forces based in India form an alliance with the monarch and launch attacks to overthrow the Rana regime. 1951 End of Rana rule; the sovereignty of the Crown is restored and anti-Rana rebels in the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) form a government. 1955 Nepal joins the United Nations. 1959 A multiparty constitution is adopted; the NCP wins the national elections; B. P. Koirala becomes Nepal’s first elected premier. 1960 King Mahendra’s coup suspends the democratically elected parliament, constitution, and party politics, and imprisons party leaders, including Prime Minister Koirala. 1962 A multitiered nonparty system known as “Panchayat” instills sole power to the king. 1980 Agitation for reform; the king agrees to allow direct elections to the national assembly (Rashtriya Panchayat), but on a nonparty basis. 1990 Agitation inspired by NCP and leftist groups, resulting in deaths and mass arrests; King Birendra forms a coalition government and a new democratic constitution. 1991 NCP wins the first democratic elections since 1960; Girija Prasad Koirala becomes prime minister. 1994 Koirala’s government is defeated; new elections lead to first popularly elected communist Asian government, which is dissolved months later. 1996 Maoists begin an insurrection (Maoist Movement or People’s War) in rural areas that is aimed at abolishing the monarchy. 1997–2000 Instability and frequent government changes. 2001 Maoist strikes bring life to a virtual standstill in much of the country; King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya, and other close relatives are killed in a shooting spree by drunken Crown Prince Dipendra, who then shoots himself; Prince Gyanendra is crowned king of Nepal; a state of emergency is declared due to Maoist violence; there are more than 100 deaths. 2002 Parliament is dissolved in May, fresh elections called amid political confrontation over extending the state of emergency. Sher Bahadur Deuba heads interim government, renews emergency; in October, King Gyanendra dismisses Deuba and indefinitely puts off elections set for November. Lokendra Bahadur Chand appointed as prime minister.

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2003 (January) Maoist rebels and the government declare a cease-fire. (August) Rebels end a seven-month truce; there is a resurgence of violence. 2004 Nepal joins the World Trade Organization (WTO). Maoist rebels blockade Kathmandu for a week. 2005 Rebels announce a three-month, unilateral cease-fire, the first truce since peace talks in 2003. 2006 The opposition alliance ends strikes and protests after the monarch agrees to reinstate parliament; Maoist rebel leader Prachanda and Prime Minister Koirala participate in talks, agree that Maoists belong in the interim government. Parliament strips the king of his command over the army; the government and Maoists sign a peace accord ending a 10-year rebel insurgency. 2007 In January, Maoist leaders enter parliament under the terms of a temporary constitution. In April, they join the interim government . Violent and deadly protests erupt in southeastern Tarai; demonstrators demand autonomy for the region and greater representation in parliament. In September, Maoists quit the interim government to press their demand for abolishing the monarchy. As a result, November’s constituent assembly elections are postponed. In December, parliament approves the abolition of the monarchy, and Maoists agree to re-join the interim government.

Situating the Nation The ancient history of Nepal is largely based on literary chronicles going back to the origin of the Kathmandu Valley. These chronicles inform us that the valley was once a lake that was later drained by goddess Manjusri for human habitation by cutting a deep gorge in the mountain. Then a muni (Hindu sage) named Ne (Nemuni) appeared on the scene as the pala (protector) of the valley. So, in early times, the country or state, if it could be defined as such, was called Ne-pala, the land protected by Ne. Subsequently, the name was vernacularly shortened to Nepal. In other words, Nepal and the Kathmandu Valley are synonymous. Today’s Nepal is much larger in its geographical size than the valley named after Nemuni. It constitutes three major ecological regions. More than 4,800 meters above sea level, the Mountain (Himalayan) region lies to the south of the transHimalayan zone of Tibet. It is relatively sparsely populated, and its economic activities are limited because of its harsh climate and topography. Pastoralism and seasonal trade are two important economic activities. Historically, its arduous mountainous topography has served as a natural barrier against large-scale military advances from the north. From a nationalistic perspective, it is plausible to argue that the sense of nationalism in this region and among its population has historically been a lot more subdued than in other regions, with the possible exception of the Rai and Limbu ethnic groups in the east. Culturally, Tibetan influence is noticeable. The Tarai region represents a sharp contrast to the Mountain region; it is an extension of the Gangetic Plain in north India. It is a subtropical area along the Nepal-India border, occupying more than 60 percent of the total farmland. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Tarai was subjected to land resettlement to enhance the national treasury and has always been heavily influenced by India. As a result, the Tarai residents of north Indian origin were suspected of being more loyal to India than to the Crown, historically the principal symbol of Nepali nationalism. Not surprisingly, therefore, systematic attempts were made in the 1950s and 1960s to populate the Tarai with hill migrants through land resettlements to establish a hill population majority and ensure the dominance of Nepali nationalism. Situated between the two extremes, personified by the Mountain and Tarai regions, is the Hill region that includes the Kathmandu Valley, the hub of Nepali art, culture, and civilization. The valley is the most urbanized area in the country, featuring three adjacent cities: Kathmandu (national capital), Patan (Lalitpur), and Bhaktapur (Bhadgaun). The region demonstrates centuries of human impact on its physical environment with its terrace farming and dense population. Despite its relative isolation, inaccessibility, and limited economic potential, the region has always been the political and cultural hearth of the country. To talk about Nepali nationalism is to talk about how the hills and hill-based or hill-focused rulers managed to assume political centrality despite the region’s geographical drawbacks in terms of natural resources, transportation, communication, or industrial base. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Instituting the Nation National unification of Nepal required the conquest of the city-states of the Kathmandu Valley, a valley rich in agriculture, trade and commerce, and other civilizational achievements. It was, after all, the embodiment of Nepal. In addition, its geographical centrality gave an advantage of economic strength and military might. Prithvi Narayan, of the Gorkha raj, wasted no time. After several unsuccessful attacks, his ambition was finally fructified. A surprise attack in September 1768 resulted in his victory over the city-state of Kathmandu, his biggest rival. Soon after that, he managed to seize adjoining Patan unopposed and then moved against Bhaktapur, subjugating it the following year. The conquest of the entire valley and its indigenous inhabitants, the Newars, was completed by 1769, thus unleashing the dynastic Shah rule as a rallying cry and symbol of Nepali unification. In essence, the year 1769 signified the birth of a new nation. Prithvi Narayan moved his capital to Kathmandu. Not only did the country come under a new ruler, it also acquired a new identity. It was transmorphed into a Nepal increasingly distanced from its original valley identity as the hearth of its indigenous Newars. Prior to the Gorkha conquest, the identity of the Newars and Nepal was one and the same. But the new Nepal emerged as the central domain of the Parbatiya (hill) ruling class, from which Prithvi Narayan was to project his imperial

Nationalist Leaders Prithvi Narayan Shah (1722–1775) embarked on the path of national unification through territorial annexation and expansion. His campaign continued even after his death, until Nepal surrendered to British India in 1816 and signed a treaty reducing the country’s territorial boundary to its present size. He can be seen as the father of Nepali nationalism, for it was his campaign that led to its birth in 1769. Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah (1920–1972) was perhaps the most cunning of the Shah rulers. He is not only best known for his infamous palace coup against the B. P. Koirala government in December 1960 but also for establishing the Panchayat system that lasted until 1990. He elevated Nepali nationalism to a greater height in terms of scripting its most coherent narrative and socializing it at the mass level. However, this nationalism was mostly carried out under a monarchical dictatorship that regarded any form of opposition to his rule and regime as antinational. B. P. Koirala (1914–1982) was a prominent founder of the Nepali Congress Party, a party described as the voice of democratic nationalism that is more inclusive of various cultural and ethnic identities in the country. Although Koirala can hardly be viewed as a typical nationalist—and he was an ardent advocate of democratic socialism—he was committed to Nepal’s sovereignty and identity in the international arena. In addition, his successful leadership role in bringing down the house of the Ranas laid the foundation for King Mahendra to fashion the narrative of Nepali nationalism in his own image.

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Nationalist Movements The successful territorial annexation and expansion campaign that Prithvi Narayan Shah set in motion in 1769 can be characterized as a nationalist movement that led to the creation of a unified Nepal. The campaign that was carried on by Prithvi Narayan’s successors even after his death in 1775 came to an unceremonious end in 1816, but Nepal’s territorial boundary/sovereignty was clearly defined. By then, Nepali nationalism was firmly grounded as a national identity. In late 1950, the Nepali Congress Party launched armed attacks against Rana autocracy with the aim to establish democracy in the country, ultimately dismantling the regime. Although the revolution against the Ranas was not a typical nationalist movement in a traditional sense, it led to the restoration of the Shah rule. Since the fall of the Panchayat system in 1990 and the subsequent realignment of monarchical rule from absolute to constitutional, the current of what is known as the janajati (ethnic, minority) movement has been swelling. The most notable incident within this movement occurred in early 2007 when the Tarai residents of north Indian origin (commonly identified as Madhesi) undertook mass protests demanding regional autonomy and numerically greater political representation in parliament. Those protests, which are now described as the Madhesi movement in some quarters, resulted in violence, claiming many lives.

vision of territorial expansion. Even after Prithvi Narayan’s death in 1775, his successors stayed the course, reaching far beyond the nation’s current boundaries. Initially, however, Nepal was not the preferred name for the new nation. In fact, the Gorkhali nobles and soldiers despised it, perhaps because it was synonymous with the Newars whom they had defeated but who were perceived to be culturally far more advanced than the Parbatiyas in all areas of production technology. In their eyes, retaining Nepal as the name of the new nation would symbolically mean that the victors were assimilating into the culture of the vanquished, thus tacitly legitimizing the Newar “cultural superiority.” Prithvi Narayan himself openly expressed his racist or ethnic sentiment and contempt toward Nepal and its Newar residents, stating: “This three-citied Nepal is a cold stone. It is great only in intrigue. With one who drinks water from cisterns there is no wisdom; nor is there courage” (quoted in Burghart 1984, 111). In the victory quarters, the name of choice apparently was Gorkha, which personified the glory of Gorkha as well as the Shah roots and, hence, was a most fitting tribute to the Shah dynasty and its Parbatiya heritage. In short, a distinct nationalist ideology, firmly grounded in the Parbatiya superiority and supremacy, was already being hatched. Although they eventually chose Nepal as the official name, there is no denying that Nepali nationalism at once exudes a great sense of pride in some quarters and apprehension in others, born from the womb of Gorkha conquest and molded in accordance with the Parbatiya ideology and Hindu polity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Defining the Nation It is argued that the monarchy, Hinduism, and the Nepali language form Nepali nationalism. Missing from this triad is the role of territoriality. The issue of territoriality goes much deeper than its key role as a boundary marker. To be specific, the Gorkhali imperial ambition did not cease with the death of Prithvi Narayan. By 1814, Nepali army forces had marched as far as the Satlej River to the west and the Tista River to the east, covering a total land area about twice as big as today’s Nepal. But the Gorkha raj’s very territorial success proved to be its greatest military liability, as it eventually drew the ire of the British raj. Like all imperialist powers, Gorkhalis were foolishly blinded by their own success, paying little attention to the question of when and where to draw the line of their ambition vis-à-vis the British. However, the Anglo-Nepal war broke out in 1814, and Nepal was forced to sign the Treaty of Sagauli after their 1816 defeat. Consequently, the country lost virtually all of its hard-won territorial gains, thus confining it to its current boundary. Ironically, the humiliating defeat pushed the ruling class to consolidate its national power, and authority centered on the narrative of Nepali nationalism rather than territorial expansion. The British-imposed territorial boundaries ended Nepal’s outward ambitions and caused the nation to develop an inward-looking orientation. The ruling circle became intently focused on protecting national sovereignty and Parbatiya cultural heritage from external forces (British), on the one hand, and consolidating disparate territories (rajyas) within the national boundary, on the other. However, the two went hand in hand, for protecting the national sovereignty required internal consolidation of diverse groups, whether defined geographically or ethnically. After all, during the march of imperial expansion and unification, it was not easy to bring those rajyas under one flag. To appease them, the Gorkhali rulers granted them a substantial measure of local autonomy. Given the conquered rajyas’ relatively relaxed ties to the central authority, unification looked vague rather than like a Gorkha nation with a dominant national identity. It was a rather unsettling scenario for the Gorkha rulers, particularly at a time when their power and authority had been greatly shaken (weakened) in the wake of their defeat. The grandeur of the Gorkha army’s invincibility was gone. Any miscalculation on their part could readily trigger a wave of cessation from the loose federation, reverting the country back to its preunification days. So, from the Gorkhali rulers’ vantage point, protecting the sovereignty of the newly demarcated territory was the demand of the postwar time: (1) to safeguard the national sovereignty and integrity from further erosion, and (2) to preserve their political interest and authority from becoming disintegrated. Achieving these entwined goals required creating one nation with one national identity, a prerequisite to constructing a metanarrative of Nepali nationalism. Obviously, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the externally oriented national identity formation and nationhood of Prithvi Narayan was defunct under the realities of the British imperialism of the Indian subcontinent. The only viable and most logical alternative open to them was to become internally focused, turning Gorkha federation into one Nepali nation through systematic consolidation of the previous rajyas and their diverse ethnic groups. It was at this juncture that Nepali nationalism gradually grew into a larger narrative. Although Prithvi Narayan was long gone, his historical role was central to all of this. Heralded as a great, far-sighted leader and nation-builder, he was the ultimate epitome of the Crown. Ever since his rise, the Crown was projected as the axis of national unity and bir (heroic, brave) history (lore). In addition, regarded as the reincarnation of the Hindu God Vishnu, the king was a religious symbol with his authority divinely ordained and, hence, just and beyond public reproach. So at the core of such emerging nationalist narrative was the message that only under the Crown’s stewardship could the country remain unified and defend its national sovereignty against the ever-present British imperial shadow.

Narrating the Nation As history informs us, few issues light the nationalist fire among the general populace faster than the existence of an external enemy, whether real or perceived. Projection of British India as a bogey man, an external enemy, went beyond national sovereignty. It was also a matter of preserving the national (religious) purity of Nepal, the last preserve of what King Prithvi Narayan Shah had proudly pronounced asal Hindusthan (“the pure land of Hindus”). In other words, the sanctity of national sovereignty was also fundamental to maintaining Nepal as a pure domain of Hinduism, free of any ritualistic pollution caused by the cow-killing, beef-eating British and Mussalmans (Muslims) whom the Hindus called mlakshas or the polluted. Subjected to the Mughal (Muslim) and British (Christian) empires as well as their cultures and religions, India was, by implication, no longer pure and sacred. In fact, so strict was the policy of national purity that those who returned from Mughal and British India were required to undergo purification, for they were considered contaminated. In all likelihood, such a Hindu orthodoxy found wide reception across the new Nepal territory, clearly demarcated from “impure” British India. After all, the Hindu social order was quite prevalent in the country. First, heritage Hindusthan was already present dating back to ancient Nepal, and, later, Hindu immigrants who fled Mughal India to find safety and shelter in the Nepal hills acted as active agents of its diffusion in the country. While the Crown-centered, Hinduized narrative of nationalism was still on the rise, the country underwent a tectonic shift in its political landscape. In 1846, some 10 years after the political demise of Prime Minister Bhimsen Thapa, who had controlled the country’s political maN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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chinery for 31 years, Nepal witnessed an epochal event: the Kot Parba (a massacre at the palace courtyard). In its aftermath, one bhardar (courtier) from one of the Parbatiya clans named Jang Bahadur Kunwar (Rana) orchestrated his appointment as prime minister and, subsequently, inaugurated his dynastic Rana premiership for the next 104 years. Despite its strong foundation, Nepal’s fledgling nationalism still faced some issues. First, regionally, the southern Tarai and northern trans-Himalayan borderlands, both inhabited by non-Parbatiya people, remained largely out of its reach and influence, thus confining it to the hills and making it an exclusionary narrative from the very outset. Second, Nepali nationalism had yet to mature, with all of its preconditions in place, and diffuse down to the mass level and become socialized among the masses as a cultural identity and patriotic ideology. Two critical barriers were the lack of transportation/communication infrastructure and underdevelopment of a literary foundation. The Rana regime’s policy of isolation as a means to protect national sovereignty prohibited Nepal from advancing technologically. The first time Nepal saw mechanical transportation was in 1928. In essence, Nepal was merely a composite of localized pocket economies with practically no interactions with others. Opportunities or the diffusion of nationalist ideology and culture from the center to peripheries was naturally limited. Another obvious and critical anchor of Nepali nationalism missing from the scene was a national language with a well-developed literary foundation to provide nationalists with a voice. Language is a necessary vehicle of nationalism in terms of its literary formation, cultural development, and demographic socialization through mass education. It was only after the rise of Bhanubhakta Acharya, a Parbatiya Bahun (a commonly used Nepali term for Brahman) from the central hills, in the mid-19th century that Nepal set the early foundation of its national language—Nepali—along with its literary tradition. Later, through the determined and diligent efforts of the Nepali diaspora, specifically in different parts of India, the language and its literary foundation became strengthened, thus allowing the narrative of Nepali nationalism to find a wider voice and appeal in the form of Nepal’s national identity at home and abroad. However, Nepali nationalism experienced its great leap forward after the downfall of the Rana regime in 1951, particularly during the Panchayat raj (1960–1990). In December 1960, King Mahendra launched a palace coup against the first democratic government of Prime Minister B. P. Koirala, elected in 1959. After jailing Koirala and decapitating democracy, the king instituted the Panchayat system. Although sold to the public as a home-grown partyless system, Panchayat was basically a one-party system: the king’s party, as he directly controlled it and guided all of its apparatus. The king actively pushed Crown-centric nationalism to the forefront of his national agenda to deflect any criticism for his antidemocracy coup, on the one hand, and to legitimize his Panchayat raj, on the other. In terms of its triumvirate configuration, Nepali nationalism under the Panchayat raj was little different from its previous manifestations. What was different, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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however, was that unlike in the past its public production and propagation was now openly directed by the king himself. Activist King Mahendra was in full gear. Some of the public mechanisms that Mahendra unleashed and that his son King Birendra later pursued to spread the fire of nationalism across the nation included their omnipresent visibility, both physically and through various media outlets. In addition, public education was made universal with a royal twist and bias. It received a great deal of push, at least in the media, as being fundamental to social progress and economic development. Textbooks were produced in Nepali for all grades, and the king’s pictures were included in virtually every textbook, along with his glorification and that of Nepali nationalism. Their pictures and posters were also produced commercially for wider distribution. In every sense, everything that was done had his stamp and his deification. Mahendra also pushed for literary advancements, but again, the official direction was Crown-centric. He made efforts to entice writers to use their skills to promote Panchayat utopia and Nepali nationalism centered on the Crown. The king set topics for the poetry competition organized by the Royal Nepal Academy. Themes, such as “honesty and patriotism” and “be a native, sing of the nation, and save the nation,” to mention a few of the 25 or so topics given to the poets, are significant indications of the direction that the poets were expected to take. Not surprisingly, nationalistic/patriotic themes became quite common in Nepali literature, and the king himself wrote poems and songs along these lines. Nationalism was overflowing everywhere. But the nationalism that the king promoted had a kaleidoscopic effect. While it looked like civic nationalism, inclusive and participatory, it was all monarchical in its makeup. Empty slogans go only so far to keep the public pacified. With each passing year, the veneer of the Panchayat raj that King Mahendra had carefully crafted as a symbol of Nepali nationalism and as a foundation of national development unraveled. As poverty grew and the socioeconomic disparity between the rich and poor magnified, the nakedness of Nepal’s failed development was openly exposed. The monarch’s promise of progress and prosperity for the people increasingly came into question, and opposition to his Panchayat raj escalated, eventually leading to its collapse in 1990. With the collapse of the Panchayat raj and simmering but growing doubts about the efficacy of the monarchical institution as a unifying symbol, Nepali nationalism as a metanarrative has increasingly come under a new microscope, as ethnic and regional forms of nationalism (i.e., ethno-nationalism) are demanding their own voices and spaces in the national discourse. For example, in the Tarai region, ethnic inhabitants commonly known as the Madhesis—who are of north Indian origin and who constitute roughly a third of Nepal’s total population—are now demanding rights and autonomy after years of neglect. In essence, they are rejecting Nepali nationalism as a metanarrative that is designed to subsume all other narratives of nationalism that have their roots in Nepal’s diverse ethnic or regional identities. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Since 1990, Nepali nationalism has arrived at a critical crossroads in its historical evolution. Specifically, the democratic movement of early 1990 succeeded in restoring parliamentary democracy, which King Mahendra had suffocated 30 years ago in 1960. Subsequently, the new constitution rendered the institution of monarchy into a constitutional form. The institution suffered a severe blow in 2001 when King Birendra and his immediate family were gunned down in the palace by his own son, the crown prince who later shot himself and died. As the whole family was wiped out, the royal lineage was passed on to Birendra’s brother Gyanendra with a severely stained public reputation. As a result, the deified view of the Nepali monarchy and its image of benevolence were damaged; the king as a divine entity was neither invincible nor benevolent. The aura of the monarchy as the central axis of Nepali nationalism was, therefore, visibly clouded in the public eyes. In fact, the interim government (parliament) has recently approved a bill to abolish the country’s monarchical institution. In essence, Nepal will soon be declared a republic. The point is that restoration of democracy, combined with the diminished stature of the monarchy, opened up a brand-new space for suppressed voices and views to be expressed openly and loudly. In a way, what is transpiring in contemporary Nepal is not much different from the drama of identity (cultural) politics being staged in many Western countries, sometimes with a deep racist undertone. Ethnic identity tends to peak in times of crisis, such as political uncertainties and economic downturns, a scenario that typifies contemporary Nepal. Not surprisingly, Nepal has witnessed a rising tide of what is commonly known as the janajati (ethnic, minority) movement, a form of ethnic nationalism that is increasingly cutting into the heart of the national political and cultural alignments and the structure of governance, including civil society. As a result, the question of Nepali nationalism has surfaced as a hot topic of debate. The issue has gained momentum because of the global awareness and emphasis on minority rights and adverse consequences of globalization, which generally tend to fall disproportionately on the lower sociodemographic layers of society. The ongoing crisis of political authority has proven to be an opportune time for the “suppressed” voices to rise and appropriate their own spaces in the national arena, the outcome being the janajati countercurrent to the modernist state; nationalism has come face to face with the postmodern politics of culture, identity, and ethnicity. Because the janajati advocates regard prevailing Nepali nationalism as a hegemonic ideology, rooted in the Bahun-Chhetri axis of power and authority (i.e., almost absolute control of Nepal’s political power structure and leverage by Bahuns and Chhetris [kshatriyas]), they accuse its proponents (primarily Bahuns and Chhetris) of relegating janajati cultures and identities to the margin with little N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Nepalese prodemocracy demonstrators celebrate in the streets of Kathmandu after King Gyanendra announced the reinstatement of the nation’s parliament on April 24, 2006. The king succumbed to pressure from a coalition of prodemocracy groups and Maoist rebels demanding a return to democratic rule. (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)

space to grow. For instance, ever since the Shah dynastic rule began in Nepal in 1769, the Parbatiya Bahuns and Chhetris have enjoyed an absolute monopoly over the country’s prime ministerial post, with one aberration in the late 1980s when it went to a Newar. In addition, they enjoy a huge share of civil service (bureaucratic) employment, although they constitute only about 30 percent of the total population of the country. In the meantime, there is little doubt that the janajati rhetoric is at times filled more with doses of sweeping polemics than with evidentiary documentation. The proponents of prevailing Nepali nationalism seem almost paranoid or at least deeply disturbed by the janajati movement, as they see it as a direct threat to their privileged position. Irrespective of how this raging debate ends, if it ever does reach that point, the political and cultural landscape of Nepali nationalism is destined to undergo significant transformation. Recently, Nepali nationalism has suddenly become further compounded. The intense power struggle involving the king, political parties, and the Maoist movement has basically come to an end. Specifi cally, two history-making developments have dramatically transformed Nepal’s political landscape. First, in 2006, the interim parliament stripped the king of his command of the Nepal army. In 2007, the Maoists officially joined the current interim N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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coalition government, becoming a player in mainstream democratic politics. In addition, the present parliament eliminated any “Royal” and “His Majesty” designation that previously existed. For instance, it is now the “government of Nepal,” not “His Majesty’s Government of Nepal.” And, as noted above, the parliament has now passed a bill to abolish the whole institution of monarchy, which means it will soon be history. The janajati movement is on the rise, the Bahun-Chhetri nexus is on the defensive, the national economy is coming apart at its seams, and globalization is causing many a rupture in Nepal’s sociocultural fabric and political governance, and, therefore, Nepali nationalism finds itself surrounded by internal and external forces that are beyond its control. Now that the Maoist threat has subsided, there is now, as indicated above, a new regional nationalism threat surfacing in Nepal to challenge its Parbatiya narrative of nationalism. This threat comes from the Tarai residents of north Indian origin (with close cultural and family ties to India), who claim to have been peripheralized by the central government and now demand regional autonomy. If the Tarai goes, Nepal will be left with a hollow sense of nationalism, with its economic base severely undermined. For the foreseeable future, the Parbatiya dominance of politics and bureaucracy will continue, the Hindu polity will still carry its clout—although the caste rigidity may wither away—and the Nepali language will remain as the lingua franca. But these are less likely to define and determine the future course of Nepali nationalism and its core identity, at least not to the natives. Whatever transpires in the near future, there will be a new narrative of Nepali nationalism, one that is noticeably different from the current version. Selected Bibliography Bista, D. B. 1987. The People of Nepal. 5th ed. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. Burghart, R. 1984. “The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in Nepal.” Journal of Asian Studies 44:101–125. Dahal, D. R. 2004. “Nepal: Conflict Dynamics and Choices for Peace” (unpublished manuscript), 14–31. Kathmandu, Nepal: FES-Nepal. Gellner, D., J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, and J. Whelpton. 1997. Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood. Gurung, H. 2003. “Nepali Nationalism.” In Nepal Tomorrow: Voices and Visions, edited by D. B. Gurung, 1–13. Kathmandu, Nepal: Koselee Prakashan. Joshi, B. L., and L. E. Rose. 1966. Democratic Innovations in Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press. Onta, P. 1996. “Creating a Brave Nepali Nation in British India: The Rhetoric of Jati Improvement, Rediscovery of Bhanubhakta, and the Writing of Bir History.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 1:37–76. Panday, D. R. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the Maladies. Kathmandu, Nepal: Nepal South Asia Centre. Regmi, M. C. 1978. Thatched Huts and Stucco Palaces: Peasants and Landlords in 19th-Century Nepal. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

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Shrestha, N. R. 1997. In the Name of Development: A Reflection on Nepal. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Reprint with a new preface and foreword by Devendra Raj Panday, Kathmandu, Nepal: Educational Enterprise, 1999. Shrestha, N. R., and K. Bhattarai. 2003. Historical Dictionary of Nepal. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. Stiller, L. 1973. The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal 1816–1839. Kathmandu, Nepal: Sahayogi Prakashan.

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Tibet P. Christiaan Klieger Chronology 1000 BC 560 BC AD 604–650 1247 1357 1578 1642 1644 1652 1909 1911 1913 1940 1947 1950–1951 1959–present 1980 1989 1989

Ch’iang tribes settle in Tibetan river valleys. Siddhartha Gautama Buddha is born in Nepal. King Songtsen Gampo introduces Buddhism to Tibet. Sakya Pandita becomes the first monk ruler of Tibet under Mongol sponsorship. Tsongkhapa, founder of the Gelugpa sect, is born. Altan Khan invites Sonam Gyatso to Mongolia, proclaiming him “Dalai Lama.” The Great Fifth Dalai Lama unifies Tibet. The Manchus capture Beijing and establish rule over China. The Fifth Dalai Lama visits the Shunzhi emperor in Beijing. Thubden Gyatso, 13th Dalai Lama, flees to exile in India due to the Manchu invasion. The last Manchu emperor abdicates in Beijing. The 13th Dalai Lama declares Tibetan independence. The 14th Dalai Lama is enthroned in Lhasa. The Communists defeat the Nationalists in China. China invades Tibet. The 14th Dalai Lama goes into exile in India. Hu Yaobang introduces reforms in Tibet. Major Tibetan uprising in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama receives the Nobel Peace Prize.

Situating the Nation The Tibetan nation, for the last seven centuries, has been constrained by the Chinese empire and its successors, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These bonds, whenever weakened, allow a measurable amount of Tibetan independence, the last appearing after the fall of the Manchu Qing Dynasty (1911) and extending to the occupation of the region in 1951 by the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC. Since this occupation, Tibetan nationalism has primarily been enabled by the action of thousands of Tibetan refugees that live in the West, Japan, India, and Nepal. Transnational organizations articulate the message of Tibetan self-determination, often in conjunction with the widespread establishment of Tibetan Buddhist centers throughout the West. The Qinghai-Tibet plateau is an extremely isolated geographic form, a fact that had undoubtedly contributed to the development of an independent national consciousness. It is an area of roughly 1.2 million square kilometers, bordered by the world’s tallest mountains: to the west the Karakorum, to the north N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the Kunlun Range, and to the south the Himalaya, whose highest peak, Mt. Everest (Chomolungma in Tibetan), straddles the border of Nepal and Tibet and reaches to 29,011 feet (8,848 meters). Tibet is two-thirds the territory of the Indian subcontinent, or about twice the size of the state of Texas, and the average altitude of the plateau is 14,000 feet above sea level. Erosional processes have carved out deep valleys and gorges in the rock of the highlands, allowing for human habitation in one of the most extreme environments in the world. These river valleys are the core of Tibetan civilization. Because of the great height of the Himalaya, most of the moisture-laden, South Asian monsoon rains fall on the southern slopes of the mountains in India and Nepal, leaving Tibet a high, cold desert. Thus, contrary to popular belief, Tibet is not a land of great snowfall. Nevertheless, Tibet contains over 15,000 natural lakes, which like the Great Salt Lake of Utah, are features left over from the wetter Pleistocene period. The plateau is also the headwaters of most of the continent’s greatest rivers: the Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo), Salween, Mekong, Yellow (Huang Ho), and the Yangtze. The waters flowing from Tibet nourish 85 percent of Asia’s population—47 percent of the world’s total population. Therefore, environmental issues in Tibet are not inconsequential, as they affect much of the earth. Were it not for the great lack of infrastructural development (roads, railroads, etc.), the strategic location of Tibet would have been a great asset in Asian affairs. Archaeologists and Tibetan historians surmise that people have lived in Tibet for at least 3,000 years. According to legend, about 2,000 years ago, a sacred monkey (an incarnation of the God of Compassion) mated with a rock demon. Their offspring were the progenitors of the six tribes of Tibet. These tribal groups, known as the Ch’iang, slowly expanded their territory, at one time reaching as far south as central Nepal and as far west as Pakistan. Early settlement centered along the broad Tsangpo River Valley, particularly the Yarlung Valley branch, or “Valley of the Kings,” named after the early Tibetan kings (300–400 BC), who built fortresspalaces (dzong) atop small peaks along the river flood plain. Most people in Tibet have historically resided in the southern valleys of the Tsangpo and Indus rivers. The higher rainfall and lower elevations allowed for intensive agricultural and urban development in these areas. Lhasa and Shigatse are the two largest cities. The Changtang plateau, a high, arid desert plain that occupies half of Tibet, is home to a half million sparsely distributed seminomadic herders. Amdo, in the northeast, is by far the most developed and urbanized portion of the plateau. Tibet was historically divided into three provinces: U-tsang, Kham, and Amdo. Today, U-tsang—the central part of the plateau in which the Tibetan capital of Lhasa lies—has been designated the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) by the PRC. It may also be referred to as Xizang (XAR). Both Kham and Amdo are considered separate jurisdictional units encompassed within four distinct Chinese provinces: Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. The TAR itself is home to roughly N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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2 million ethnic Tibetans. The Tibetan people in general have a strong sense of national and cultural identity apart from China, but much of this has developed during the occupation. Prior to 1950, the Tibetan state was greatly decentralized, with individuals often identifying themselves with the three large provinces, semi-sovereign principalities, and feudal monastic estates associated with the various sects of Tibetan Buddhism. The Tibetan language belongs to the Tibeto-Burman family, its script developed from a North Indian Sanskrit script during the seventh century AD, under the direction of King Songsten Gampo—undoubtedly the most famous of the early Tibetan kings. Not surprisingly, Tibetan and Burmese languages are somewhat mutually intelligible.

Instituting the Nation For over a millennium, Tibet organized its governmental institutions around the idea of the Buddhist state, which was originally established by the Indian emperor Ashoka about 250 years after the death of the Buddha (ca. 250 BC). Ashoka was a “religious king” who used the popular new religion as an attractive force in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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the conquest of a vast South Asian empire. Tibetan kings of the seventh- to ninthcentury Yarlung Dynasty converted to Buddhism and used the imagery of the Ashokan model of sovereignty to consolidate their rule. These religious kings, of whom Songtsen Gampo was perhaps the most celebrated, became great secular patrons of the Buddhist priests who maintained religion for the sake of the state and all sentient beings. In this role as protector, the kings of Tibet became associated with the God of Compassion, Chenrezi (Avalokiteshvara in Sanskrit). This dual form of government, with secular and religious arms, became the ideal structure for Tibetan society for over 1,000 years, until the Dalai Lama went into exile in 1959. The system of government can be conveniently referred to as a “patronpriest” form of rule, where a secular patron provides military protection and material aid to the monastic class, who in turn legitimize and sanctify the rule of the patron. The system existing in old Tibet was quite similar to the early days of the Holy Roman Empire in the West, where the pope and the emperor formed the “twin swords of Christendom” to lead the Western world. And as in the West, with the pope often at odds with the emperor, the grand patron and high priest of Tibet were often not working harmoniously together. Over the centuries, Buddhism developed to such an extent in Tibet that religious officials eventually became the government. Monasteries, temples, and hermitages were built in every village and town, and every home had its altar for prayer. In the 13th century, envoys of the Mongol ruler Chinggis (Genghis) Khan demanded the submission of Tibet to their empire. Under this threat, the abbot of Sakya Monastery in central Tibet was offered the rule of the entire country, under

Tenzin Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama Perhaps the most popular Tibetan of all time is the current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. He is considered the reincarnation of all 13 of his predecessors, plus the founding religious king of Tibet, Sontsen Gyatso. This lineage is also considered the reincarnations of Chenrezig, the God of Compassion, who additionally was the legendary father of all Tibetan peoples, the Tibetan godhead, represented in the first human, the line of Tibetan kings, and all the Dalai Lamas—all incarnations of Chenrezig. The current Dalai Lama was born in Amdo province in eastern Tibet in 1935. The previous Dalai Lama had died in 1933, and Tibet was under the regency of Reting Rinpoche until the little boy was brought with his parents to Lhasa. There he was enthroned with great pomp. When Tibet was annexed by China in 1951, the teenaged Dalai Lama attempted to negotiate with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai for greater freedoms for his people. This was ultimately unsuccessful, and the Dalai Lama and his government went into exile in India in 1959. In 1989, in recognition of his nonviolent quest for respecting the self-determination of the Tibetan people, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Dalai Lama remains in exile in Dharamsala, India—and is now a very revered world leader.

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Mongol patronage. He accepted, turning Tibet into a feudal theocracy ruled by a high priest within the Mongol empire. Whereas the Sakya high priest lineage was hereditary (uncle to nephew succession), the celibate Gelugpa sect reproduced their authoritative lineages through the system of reincarnation. This so-called Yellow Hat sect was founded by the reforming saint Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). Through this system, a young child would be discovered, in the country, that bore a strong resemblance, in personality or in physical characteristics, to his predecessor. This was proof of his reincarnation. He would be raised to assume the position of the departed monastic head or governmental official. The system reached its zenith with the monastic lineage of the Dalai Lamas, who beginning in the 17th century, held the highest position in both the secular and priestly realms. This is the core institution upon which modern Tibetan nationalism is based. The Dalai Lamas, ruling from Lhasa, became the kings and high priests of Tibet under the patronage of the Mongols. Altan Khan of the Tumet Mongols proclaimed the lama Sonam Gyatso and his two predecessors the “Ocean of Wisdom Teacher” (dalai lama in Mongolian). Each succeeding Dalai Lama, as reincarnation of his predecessor, was considered an emanation or reincarnation of Chenrezig, the God of Compassion and fatherguardian spirit of Tibet.

Defining the Nation Being generally a profoundly Buddhist people, the profession of the faith has long been a defining feature in the establishment and maintenance of Tibetan national identity. In fact, the term nang mi or “interior people” simultaneously refers to Buddhist practitioners as well as Tibetans, in opposition to foreigners. Showing affinity on the basis of common language, physical/genealogical heritage, and ties to the local soil are also important, but not as significant as the practice of Buddhism. Within Lhasa is a sizable community of Muslim Tibetans, and throughout are significant numbers of Bonpos, adherents of Bon, the pre-Buddhist shamanistic religion of Tibet. All are, nevertheless, Tibetan. While Tibetans generally respect other forms of Buddhism, the land of Tibet is seen as a special place of revelation, pilgrimage, and sacredness. As a holy land, Tibet is seen as the holder of the complete tradition of Buddhism, whereas India, where the doctrine was first developed, has lost it. This divine aspect of the landscape and the holders of the Buddhist traditions strongly contribute to the raison d’état of Tibet. The state of Tibet, as defined by the recent Dalai Lamas (13th and 14th), is essentially coextensive with ethnic Tibet and is perhaps one-third larger than the current Tibet Autonomous Region. References are sometimes made to the larger Tibetan empire of the first millennium AD that included the tributary states of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan, Assam, and parts of Nepal, the people of which generally no longer identify with the Tibetan state. The Sherpa people of Nepal, for example, speak a dialect of the Tibetan language and adhere to Tibetan Buddhism but generally do not consider themselves ethnically Tibetan. Concomitant to the nation-building activities of the state in the early 20th century was the uneasy relationship among the imperial powers of China, Russia, and Britain. In the last incidence, Tibet was envisioned or programmed to become a border state separating perceived Russian and Chinese adventurism from British interests in India. Britain forced the dialogue of an “Outer Tibet” that remained radically different from Chinese claims of sovereignty and Russian designs, and was also at odds with homegrown concepts of national development.

Narrating the Nation The Great Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, unified the three provinces of Tibet and moved the capital city to Lhasa. In 1645, he began construction of the magnificent Potala Palace in Lhasa atop the ruined fortress of King Songtsen Gampo, the everlasting symbol of the Tibetan nation, now given the poetic name of the Land of the Snow Lion. Also in the mid-17th century, another nomadic society to the north, the Manchus, had developed imperial ambitions in Asia. As they conquered China and established the Qing Dynasty, they found the old patron-priest relationship expedient to establish their rule in Tibet and Mongolia. The Manchus favored the new sect of Dalai Lamas. In 1652 the Fifth Dalai Lama was welcomed by the imperial court in great state at Beijing, with each leader granting titles to the other. For the next 260 years, the emperor in Beijing looked to the Dalai Lama as the high priest of Buddhism but viewed the country as a protectorate of the Chinese empire. The Dalai Lama and the government of Tibet, however, considered Tibet to be an independent country. This is the core of the Tibetan issue today. The abdication of Emperor Xua¯ nto˘ng (Hsuan-tung; Pu Yi) in 1911 brought an end to the patron-priest relationship between the Manchu empire and Tibet. It was fitting, then, that the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubden Gyatso, took the occasion to proclaim Tibetan independence. Mongolia similarly left the empire. Currency, stamps, passports, and other symbols of the Tibetan nation were circulated during this era. A Tibetan flag was designed, depicting a Himalayan mountain peak, a rising sun with alternating blue and red rays, and the royal seal of two snow lions holding a Buddhist emblem. Coins were minted in Lhasa of silver and copper, and paper currency and stamps were printed from woodblocks. All depicted the two snow lions and Buddhism symbols. The image of the Dalai Lama was never used until the period of exile (post-1959), when a series of commemorative “stamps” was issued by the government-in-exile in the early 1970s that depicted the 14th Dalai Lama. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Potala, one of the largest palaces ever built, is the traditional home of the Dalai Lama. It was spared the widespread destruction that followed the invasion of Tibet by China in the 1950s. (PhotoDisc, Inc.)

However, from 1912 to the present, the Chinese Republic, both the Nationalist (Guomingdang) and Communist (People’s Republic), has viewed Tibet as a renegade province that needs to be brought back into a reconstituted “Chinese” motherland. Tibet, backed by the powerful British empire to the south in India, resisted until the end of the Indian raj in 1947. (Mongolia was supported by the Soviet Union, and remains independent today.) China itself remained weak until after World War II, when Mao unified China under the communist banner in the late 1940s. Considering it a part of China since the days of the Yuan Mongol Dynasty, China invaded Tibet during 1950–1951, forcing the government of the Dalai Lama to sign a 17-point agreement for the “liberation” of the region from “feudal monastic rulers” and foreign “imperialist” influence. To Chairman Mao, Tibet had finally been returned to the Chinese motherland. The teenaged 14th Dalai Lama lived uneasily under this arrangement in Lhasa until 1959. On March 10, suspecting that the Chinese were planning to kidnap the Tibetan ruler, the people of Lhasa rose up and encircled the Norbulingka Summer Palace, where the youth was living. On advice from his ministers and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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State Oracle shaman, the Dalai Lama escaped under cover of darkness. After several grueling weeks on the road, the Dalai Lama and his party arrived at the Indian border. Here he repudiated the 17-point agreement and went into exile in India. They were given asylum by Prime Minister Nehru. Over the next months and years, over 85,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama into exile. Many died en route. Thousands in Tibet were killed by the People’s Liberation Army of China. After the 1959 Lhasa uprising, Tibetan culture and nationalism were actively suppressed. Buddhism was prohibited, and the Tibetan language was no longer taught in schools. Further assaults on ethnic Tibetans raged during Chairman Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a time throughout China when all old traditions and conservative ways were attacked. During this period, hundreds of thousands of Han Chinese also perished. The Cultural Revolution is one of the most brutal periods in China’s history— for Tibetans and Chinese alike. In Tibet, religious persecution was the most brutal aspect of this period. Hundreds of monasteries were razed; monks and nuns killed, jailed, and tortured. Evidence of these ruined temples dot the hillsides throughout Tibet today. The government banned the private practice of religion and used its military to enforce it. A policy known as “destroying the four olds” —culture, ideas, customs, and habits—prevailed. It is estimated that over 87,000 Tibetans were killed in the first 18 months following the 1959 uprising and up to 1.2 million Tibetans have perished since the occupation—perhaps one-sixth of the total population. Tibetan culture, representing one of the last ancient civilizations still extant, was being destroyed. Most of Tibet’s 6,000 temples and monasteries were completely ruined. Golden statues were melted, and sacred books were burned. Items associated with Buddhism— but most especially with the Dalai Lama, who the Chinese labeled a “splittist”— were prohibited. It is not uncommon today for private homes to be searched for photos of the Dalai Lama; it is still illegal for anyone in Tibet to possess such photographs.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The 14th Dalai Lama was not the first ruler of Tibet to flee into exile and ask for assistance in securing complete independence from China. In the early 20th century, the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubden Gyatso, went to India to seek asylum from the excesses of the tottering Manchu Dynasty in China. He also sought recognition from the British empire that Tibet was an independent country, not just an amorphous buffer state that the raj projected. After a time in exile, he was urged to return to his country. Following the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, the Dalai Lama declared independence in 1913. The country was left unoccupied by China until 1950. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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When Chinese troops arrived in Tibet in 1950, the young Dalai Lama and his government tried to work out a compromise with Mao that would preserve considerable local autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the PRC. This was known as the “17-Point Agreement.” The Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama (second ranking lama in Tibet) even flew to Beijing to hold meetings with Mao, Zhou Enlai, and other Communist leaders. Initially, Beijing agreed to keep Buddhism and the monastic ruling order together. Eventually, however, it became clear that the object of the Chinese occupation was to make Tibet a province of China and to dismiss its unique system of governance. The populace was greatly bereaved when the Dalai Lama fled into exile to India in March 1959. Many thousands of Tibetans gave up everything to follow him, and many died on the perilous journey over the high Himalayan passes. About 10,000–15,000 Tibetans settled in the kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan. Several additional thousands were settled in Switzerland and other Western countries. In the first few weeks and months of exile, the Indian government generously provided land for transit camps for the thousands of Tibetan refugees streaming over the border. The most immediate need was for simple housing, food, and medical care. Foreign aid helped provide Tibetans with these necessities. Nevertheless, many immigrants died from diseases not often found on the high Tibetan plateau (such as tuberculosis), but common in the tropical environment of India. During the 1960s, armed resistance to the Chinese occupation was met by Khampa tribesmen from eastern Tibet, who were covertly sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States as part of its Cold War foreign policy. But what the Dalai Lama and his many followers found in India was a chance to reestablish their Tibetan identities and engage in a public discourse about the Tibetan cause to an international audience. Once some of the basic needs were attended to, the Dalai Lama was settled in the old hill station of Dharamsala, about 200 miles north of New Delhi and about 60 miles southwest of the Tibetan border. Here, the Dalai Lama was given the freedom to erect a government-inexile—the Ganden Phodrang—which is now responsible for establishing schools to teach Tibetan language, music, and the fine arts. Perhaps most importantly, the Dalai Lama and his subjects were allowed to practice Buddhism freely. Within a few years, Tibetans had reestablished many temples, monasteries, and nunneries in India, the original homeland of Buddhism. Key to the formation of a Tibetan identity is the acceptance of the Dalai Lama as Tibet’s spiritual and political leader. To the Tibetan people, he has a special significance. The 14th Dalai Lama is not only considered the reincarnation of his previous 13 predecessors—as Bodhisattva of Compassion, he is the guardian of the Tibetan people—he is considered a reincarnation of King Songsten Gampo, the founder of the Buddhist kingdom of Tibet. It is not difficult to understand why, despite many attempts by the Chinese to denounce the Dalai Lama and remove him from rule, the Tibetan people both in the homeland and in exile generally N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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refuse to relinquish him. The Dalai Lama forms the link between the secular and the religious. The importance of this dual role is magnified as those still living in Tibet are forbidden to learn of their history and are prohibited political freedom to support the Ganden Phodrang; those living in exile cling to the Dalai Lama as the embodiment of the homeland they were forced to leave. The exile community has been hugely successful in establishing a tie with their unattainable homeland, outside the political boundaries of Tibet. Th e agricultural settlements in the Himalayan foothills of India are generally prosperous in comparison to their Indian neighbors, and Tibetans have succeeded in promoting crafts, industry and education, hospitals, and other institutions. The system of monasteries survives as it had in Tibet. Indeed, the Indian government, while not officially accepting the Dalai Lama as head of a government-in-exile, has recognized him as the leader of Tibetan communities within India and other refugee areas. The present government in Dharamsala includes a council of ministers, an elected assembly of legislators, a supreme justice commission, and departments of information and international relations, religion and culture, health, home, finance, education, and security. Notable cultural and educational institutions in Dharamsala include the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts, Tibetan Children’s Village, the Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, and even an accredited college, the Norbulingka Institute. Through the assistance of the Indian government and generous aid from foreign organizations in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, refugees have thrived. In Nepal and northern India, Tibetans have been active weaving woolen rugs for the export market and leading thousands of people on treks throughout the Himalayas. In the southern parts of India, many Tibetans are productive farmers. In New Delhi and other cities, many Tibetans have now earned a college education and are active in business, health care, and engineering. To represent the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan people, Dharamsala has established several offices around the world, including Tibet House in Delhi and offices in Kathmandu, New York, London, Taipei, Tokyo, Moscow, and others. These centers serve as unofficial “embassies” representing the independent government of the Dalai Lama that existed in the homeland prior to the Chinese invasion in 1950. It has been nearly 50 years since Tibetans left their homeland with the Dalai Lama. Throughout the exile communities, Tibetan national identity remains strong. All along, the 14th Dalai Lama has maintained that the struggle for Tibetan freedom must be nonviolent. Like Martin Luther King Jr., the Dalai Lama was strongly influenced by the nonviolent political actions of Mahatma Gandhi, the architect of Indian independence. Nonviolence is also a major religious precept in Buddhism. In 1989, in recognition of his nonviolent campaign for the human rights of his people, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. While Tibetans within the occupied TAR lack access to international media, education, and economic development, they engage in resistance to the PRC N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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occupation in more subtle ways. Of course, the more direct means of protest— street demonstrations—do occur, both in large cities and in the hinterlands. The most notable of these protests occurred in 1987, when an uprising of monks, nuns, and students led to massive demonstrations in the streets of Lhasa. In the late summer of 1987, with the city of Lhasa full of Western tourists and journalists, a small group of monks and others were arrested by the police for demonstrating for Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama had just presented a Five-Point Peace Plan to the U.S. Congress, and the world’s attention was currently on Tibet. The demonstration in the streets of Lhasa quickly escalated, and the crowd set fire to the police station. Journalists took photographs of horrifying scenes of people being shot and arrested. Many people died, and many more were taken to prison. Tourists were told to leave immediately. Over the next two years, several other demonstrations were held in Tibet. The revolt, the first major one since 1959, was brutally suppressed by the Chinese. As a result, tourism was halted, and local Tibetans were forbidden from displaying photographs of their exiled leader. Even today, tourism is only permitted in groups under careful supervision by Chinese authorities. And the Dalai Lama remains China’s most embarrassing persona. Aside from direct protest, many Tibetans engage in a quieter form of passive resistance to Chinese rule, simply by continuing to engage in Buddhist ritual. The simple act of burning incense or displaying a photo of the Dalai Lama can be seen as an assertion of Tibetanness and as a way of retaining their rights to religious freedoms. In addition, religious acts, such as pilgrimage, are also a way of maintaining autonomy under the watchful eye of the PRC. Often the pilgrims’ journeys are related to the cycle of mountain agriculture and pastoral activities and reflect a plurality of traditions in the most marginal of geographic areas. Pilgrimages are seen as a means to link concrete geographic places with the world of the gods. Whether in exile or living in the homeland, whether Bonpo, Muslim, or Buddhist, Tibetans maintain a strong notion of nation. The Tibetans in exile have continued to reproduce their key institutions and maintain a powerful notion of Tibetanness, whether living in Europe, the United States, or India. With history on their side, the cycles of change may again favor a free people living in the Land of the Snow Lion. Selected Bibliography Goldstein, M. C. 1989. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951. Berkeley: University of California Press. Grunfeld, A. 1987. The Making of Modern Tibet. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Klieger, P. C. 1992. Tibetan Nationalism. Meerut, India: Archana Press. Klieger, P. C. 2006. Tibetan Borderlands. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Academic Press. Lehman, S. 1998. The Tibetans. New York: Umbridge Editions. Lopez, D. S., Jr. 1998. Prisoners of Shangri-la. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Brazil Anne Marie Todd Chronology 1822 Brazil proclaims independence from Portugal; King Pedro I begins his reign. 1831 Pedro I abdicates the throne as a result of violent protests, leaving the crown to his five-yearold son, Pedro II. 1888 Slavery is abolished. There is an influx of European immigrants over the next decade. 1889 The monarchy is overthrown; a federal republic is established. 1902 Brazil produces 65 percent of the world’s coffee. 1930 Revolts bring Getulio Vargas to power. 1937 Vargas leads a coup, then rules as a military dictator. There is state control of the economy. 1945 Vargas is ousted in a military coup. 1951 Vargas is reelected president, but faces stiff opposition. 1954 Vargas commits suicide after the armed forces and cabinet demand his resignation. 1956 Juscelino Kubitschek is elected president. Development and openness to the world economy create an economic boom over the next five years. 1961 Janio Quadros assumes the presidency, then resigns; he is replaced by Vice President Joao Goulart. 1964 Goulart is ousted in a bloodless coup. Castelo Branco is elected president. 1967 General Costa e Silva is inaugurated president. 1974 General Ernesto Geisel becomes president; he introduces political reforms. 1977 Brazil renounces a military alliance with the United States. 1982 Brazil halts payment of its main foreign debt, which is among the world’s biggest. 1985 The military steps down from political power. Tancredo Neves is the first civilian president elected in 21 years, with inflation at 300 percent. 1988 The “citizen constitution” reduces presidential powers. Chico Mendes, rubber tapper, union leader, and environmental activist, is murdered. 1989 The first direct presidential election since 1960 is held. Fernando Collor de Mello is elected president and introduces radical economic reform, including importations and privatization. His efforts fail to improve the economy. By 1991, inflation reaches 1,500 percent. Foreign debt payments are suspended. 1992 The UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), known as the Earth Summit, is held in Rio de Janeiro. Collor resigns over corruption charges; he is later cleared. 1994 Fernando Henrique Cardoso is elected. A new currency, the real, is introduced. Brazil signs the Treaty of Tlatelolco, declaring itself free of nuclear weapons. 1995 Brazil joins the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). Cardoso redistributes 250,000 private acres to more than 3,600 poor families. 1996 Cardoso decrees that governments, companies, and individuals can challenge indigenous land claims in the Amazon. The National Defense Policy (PDN) is announced. Police kill 19 Amazon peasants in the town of Eldorado dos Carajas. 1998 Cardoso is reelected. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides a rescue package for the Brazilian economy. 1999 Foreign investment in Brazil reaches $30 billion.

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2000 Indigenous Indians protest Brazil’s 500th anniversary celebration. 2001 The government expects to spend $40 billion on development in the Amazon. 2002 Brazil wins the World Cup. Currency hits an all-time low. Lula da Silva is elected president, promising political and economic reforms; it is the first leftist government in over 40 years. 2004 Brazil applies for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil successfully launches its first space rocket. 2005 (February) Missionary campaigner for Amazon peasant farmers, Dorothy Stang, is murdered. (March) A death squad kills at least 30 people on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro.

Situating the Nation The largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil borders every national state in South America except Chile and Ecuador. Brazil established independence from Portugal in 1822. In 1889, the monarchy was overthrown and a federal republic established. For nearly a century, Brazil was largely run by military dictators with varying degrees of political reforms. The military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers in 1985. A mostly tropical region, deforestation in the Amazon basin destroys the habitat and endangers a multitude of plant and animal species indigenous to the area. The Amazon jungle is a center of national politics, as the government attempts to compromise between environmental protection and the economic needs of the fifth largest population in the world. Brazil’s economy outweighs that of all other South American countries and is expanding its presence in world markets. Like many in the region, in the 1970s and 1980s, Brazil’s economy suffered greatly from runaway inflation and the global collapse in oil prices. In the 1990s, Brazil’s foreign debt was $100 billion and grew to more than $200 billion by 2003. While economic management has been good, there remain important economic vulnerabilities. The government is challenged to maintain economic growth over a period of time to generate employment and make the government debt burden more manageable. With a large labor pool and vast natural resources, Brazil pursues industrial and agricultural growth and development and is an emerging economic powerhouse. Considering the dues of a multiyear International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, $30 billion in foreign investment, and a grossly unequal income distribution, Brazil’s economic interests influence the country’s politics and national identity.

Instituting the Nation The vast majority of Brazilians speak Portuguese, which differentiates them from their Spanish-speaking neighbors. Most Brazilians are Roman Catholic, which N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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provides a general set of ideologies and beliefs held by Brazilian citizens. Brazil is a multicultural nation: a product of the very first wave of globalization, which was prompted by Europe’s expanding trade. Brazilian national identity is even more “mixed” than is commonly understood. Notions of Brazilianness are continuously contested and negotiated. Brazil remains a country where hyphenated ethnicity is predominant yet unacknowledged. Since the colonial period, racial and ethnic groups have intermingled and intermarried creating a large mixedrace population. Since many individuals are therefore difficult to classify in racial terms, color, rather than ancestry, largely determines racial identity. Most of the population is considered ethnically “Brazilian.” The country’s population exhibits various racial backgrounds but resists ethnic subdivisions. In the 2000 census, 55 percent of Brazilians self-reported as white, 38 percent self-reported as mixed or brown, and 6 percent self-reported as black. Indigenous tribes comprise less than 1 percent of the population. Brazilian national identity remains highly problematic. While official Brazilian culture emphasizes Afro-Brazilian cultural forms like samba music and capoeira N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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(martial arts), Brazilian mass media frequently portray Brazilian society as largely white. Furthermore, while Brazil has been touted as a racial democracy, there is a strong correlation between lighter skin color and higher socioeconomic status. Ideas of difference threaten universalist ideas of Brazilian nationalism, particularly in an international economy, where the government emphasizes development as the means to boost Brazil’s global standing. Today, Brazilian nationalism is centered on economic issues, which have political, environmental, and cultural effects. Development efforts tend to privilege industrial and corporate interests at the expense of impoverished or indigenous communities. The expanding gap between rich and poor exacerbates such problems as homelessness, hunger, and environmental destruction. Economic instability breeds insecurity as Brazil’s territorial borders and natural resources are perceived as vulnerable. These discussions are not new. Debates about to what degree Brazil’s markets should be open to the global economy have characterized presidential, state, and municipal elections for decades.

Defining the Nation Generally understood as a deep love for one’s country, nationalism is “a group consciousness that attributes great value to the nation-state, to which unswerving devotion is tendered. The individual closely identifies with the state and feels that [his or her] well-being depends to a large extent, if not completely on its well-being” (Burns 1968, 3). Contemporary nationalism is generally thought of as an agreement of a nation’s citizens “to maintain their unity, independence, and sovereignty and to pursue certain broad and mutually acceptable goals” (Burns 1968, 3). From 1935 to 1980, Brazilian nationalism took the form of military activity and expansion. With developing economic crises and domestic and international pressure for global trade, contemporary Brazilian nationalism stems from the widely held view that Brazil’s size and potential mean that it should not relay on foreign money but can compete on equal terms. Nationalism is the result of converging factors: security, economics, and resources. A leading producer of minerals, coffee, oranges, sugar, and beef, Brazil’s nationalism is tied to its resources. Nationalism takes the form of reluctance to relinquish domestic control of the country’s resources by opening up the country to foreign trade. This extends to protection of the country’s greatest natural resource: the Amazon rain forest. International human rights and environmental groups have protested Brazil’s development of the Amazon basin and have led the call for international protection of the Amazon. Nationalist tendencies in Brazil have responded by pushing for Brazil’s sovereignty rights over the Amazon. Fear of the internationalization of the Amazon has emerged as a security concern, so the military has been deployed to protect Brazil’s borders of the Amazon. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Deforestation in the Amazon rain forest of Brazil. (iStockPhoto.com)

Environmental nationalism has led to the establishment of national parks to protect the country’s resources. Ethnic tensions have emerged because indigenous peoples are implicated in the plight of the Amazon as they make sovereignty claims to land that is of interest to loggers, ranchers, and urban developers. Economic nationalism has responded to the liberalization of trade barriers by pushing to protect national interests. Environmental nationalism has manifested in indigenous sovereignty claims over environmental resources to protect against ranching and logging. While there are similarities in these types of nationalism (for example, the military wants to protect Amazonia as a key area of national interest), there are often competing claims of nationalism. Tensions emerge over how to best exploit natural resources; indigenous tribes, such as the Yanomami and Seringueros, fight the development of land for logging and ranching purposes.

Narrating the Nation Brazil’s military and economic nationalism was demonstrated from 1930 to 1980. From the mid-20th century, Brazilian and international environmental organizations have pressured the national government to curb damage to the Amazon rain forest. Brazil’s economic policy in the 1970s and 1980s aimed to pay off foreign debt, which was the impetus for Brazil to increase exports. The military N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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government, which held power until 1985, used foreign loans to build new industries and improve the country’s infrastructure. Although Brazil made economic gains under the military, the country’s economy stagnated during the “lost decade” of the 1980s, with a burgeoning foreign debt and runaway inflation. Brazil turned to the IMF following Mexico’s banking crisis to establish economic stability. This meant liberalization: opening up to foreign trade. Such IMF demands were seen as loss of sovereignty because privatization and foreign investment meant the government’s control over the economy declined, which fueled economic nationalism. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s economic stabilization policies of the 1990s and the deepening integration of Brazil into the world economy poised the country to assume a greater role in the world economy and in international affairs. After the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, Brazil and other countries issued a joint plan for protection of the rain forest. The

Chico Mendes Born in Brazil on December 15, 1944, Chico Mendes grew up in a family of rubber tappers (seringueiros). Rubber tapping is a sustainable agricultural system that impedes profits of cattle ranchers and miners. Mendes organized seringueiros to resist development of the forest through political nonviolent protests. He encountered a great deal of opposition and in 1988 was murdered at the order of a rancher, an act that increased the power of his grassroots movement.

Lula da Silva Born in 1945, Lula da Silva won Brazil’s 2002 presidential election on his fourth attempt, leading a coalition of parties behind the Partidos Trabalhadores (PT, the Labor Party). A former shoeshine boy, Lula had a long history with Brazilian labor unions and was a cofounder of the PT. After he was elected president, Lula vowed to end hunger in Brazil.

Amazon Rain Forest The size of the United States, the Amazon rain forest is the largest remaining tropical forest in the world. Most of the Amazon rain forest is in Brazil, but it also reaches into eight other countries. The Amazon rain forest supports 60,000 plant, 2,000 fish, 1,000 bird, and 300 mammal species. In Brazil, the Amazon is home to 20 million people who rely on this ancient forest for food, shelter, tools, and medicines in addition to playing a crucial role in people’s spiritual and cultural lives. Scientists predict planned developments will lead to the damage or loss of between 33 to 42 percent of Brazil’s remaining Amazon forest. The forest continues to attract ranchers, miners, and loggers who want to profit from this natural resource.

International Monetary Fund The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization of 184 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty.

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recent presidential electoral victory of “Lula” da Silva, raises questions of how the election of a working-class leader to the presidency will affect the balance of power between Brazil’s classes, the role of the military, and the fate of the Amazon resources.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The need to preserve Brazil’s identity and viability is inextricably linked to control over its economy. Intellectuals, politicians, and military commanders formulate nationalist doctrine. For this reason, Brazil’s nationalist discourse is found in economic treatises, military policy, and environmental advocacy. Nationalism has become an ideological response to globalization pressures, which are perceived to undermine state security. Economic globalization threatens the traditional core values of the Brazilian military and is thus unpopular among military officers. Nationalism is central to the Brazilian military’s desires for greater Brazilian autonomy in the international environment. Civilian government attempts to liberalize the economy are at odds with Brazilian military goals. The Brazilian military largely supports developing the Amazon. Environmental pressures to protect the Amazon basin are seen as strategies to internationalize the Amazon, which is seen as a threat to national resources. Nationalism is framed as the politics of the national interest. It is an ideology that affirms that Brazil’s national interests may coincide with other countries, but are often contradictory. Socially liberal Brazilian economists argue that Brazil’s economy is key to maintaining national strength so that it may compete with richer, more developed countries. Economic nationalists perceive an asymmetry of economic power as responsible for regional disparities and insecurity. Brazilian military officers tend to express nationalistic views. Military commanders emphasize territorial sovereignty as essential to maintaining Brazil’s integrity and power. Statements by military officials suggest that environmental nongovernmental organizations are perceived as little more than lightly disguised instruments of richer countries seeking to undermine the sovereignty of developing countries without damaging international relations. Military officials argue that due to the region’s rich natural resources, other countries instinctively covet Brazil and Amazonia. In this way, Brazilian military nationalism is tied to environmental sovereignty, which is tied to economic growth and development. Nationalist discourse is found in economic and military texts, which are used to persuade citizens and policy makers to protect the country’s natural resources and territorial sovereignty. The concept of national security that prevailed during the Cold War has given way to growing preoccupation with sovereignty and the integrity of national territory. As environmental issues prompt the international community to seek N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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protection of the Amazon as a source of global biodiversity, the threat of internationalizing the Amazon region will likely represent the central Brazilian military concern of the next century. In this way, the development of Brazil’s foreign policy is based on national autonomy. Brazil’s gradual transition to democracy has made the country’s foreign policy vulnerable to pressure and negotiation. In 1985, the first civilian president saw democracy and economic reforms tied together. The nonauthoritarian regime had to implement reforms to maintain economic vitality. In this way, as the national bureaucracy responds to economic challenges, political and economic nationalism is inextricably linked. As economic decisions are made regarding Brazil’s resources, environmental and economic sovereignty are the two emerging forms of contemporary Brazilian nationalism. Brazilians, regardless of their educational background, overwhelmingly list the natural environment as their greatest source of national pride. Natural conservation has been deemed the charge of the state and a matter of national defense. Natural parks and preserves symbolize the power and strength of the state to control its own lands and important biological treasures. Environmental and military concerns converge on the Amazon, an area of international importance. The perceived threat to the Amazon comes from industrialized countries and environmentalists. The sovereignty and integrity of territorial Amazonia have become strategic concerns in the view of the Brazilian military and national developing interests. In 2005, Brazilian president Lula da Silva highlighted his support for the Brazilian military. Lula’s socialist roots dovetail with traditional Brazilian nationalism, which is particularly strong in the armed forces. Brazil’s politicians and military officials perceive the country’s borders with nine neighboring countries as potentially vulnerable in the face of continental competition for resources and international environmental pressures. Brazil’s environmental protections reflect the ongoing recognition of the economic and nationalist importance of environmentalism. As Brazilians emphasize their nation’s territorial sovereignty, such social issues as poverty and hunger remain problems within the country’s borders. While estimates vary, poverty affects at least one-third of Brazil’s population (almost 60 million people), while another 30 million are considered at risk. In the poorest parts of the country, nearly half of all families live on a dollar a day. In Brazil, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few. The country’s income distribution is one of the most unequal in the world and remains at the heart of Brazil’s poverty problem. The expanding rich-poor gap ensures that the majority of Brazilians continue to completely lack or have inadequate access to food, healthcare, and education. Hunger is the most extreme manifestation of Brazil’s poverty problem. Widespread malnutrition and chronic food insecurity perpetuate a cycle of violence and crime, particularly in industrial areas, such as São Paulo, and in urban slums, such as those in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil’s nationalist pursuit of economic growth has not addressed the poverty problem. For example, Brazil’s industrial agriculture economy has grown in the last two decades, but has not translated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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into a strong subsistence-farming sector. Brazil’s small farmers have suffered, remaining on small plots of land with which they cannot compete with largescale industrial farms or migrating to cities in an effort to escape rural destitution, only to remain chronically food insecure. As the world’s 10th-largest economy, Brazil’s inequality inhibits the country’s domestic economy and its international standing. Social democrats in Brazil evoke the disparity between Brazil and countries like the United States, which set high standards for developing countries but, in the eyes of Brazilians, do not do enough to aid development. Such economists see Brazil pursuing global interests to the detriment of national economic interests. Economic nationalists see multinational, supranational, or international governing bodies as responsible for the loss of Brazilian autonomy. In this view, the global economy is replaying Brazil’s colonial history through foreign investments. Such nationalists take care to note that Brazil cannot live in total isolation of the world markets. While globalization is a threat, it is also a chance and a challenge for developing countries. How Brazil engages the global economy is at the center of contemporary nationalist trends. This is the new nationalism that economists and politicians support. Frustrated that the world thinks of Brazil as only a country of soccer and carnival, new nationalism represents the chance to recoup Brazil’s standing in the world through economic prosperity. This new nationalism responds to runaway globalization and is a call for Brazil to defend its values and respect its national identity. New nationalism sees globalization as a threat to the national interest, and the only way for Brazil to meet the superiority of the rich countries is to protect national interest and not open up too much to international pressures. To accomplish this in the coming decades, Brazil will need to perform a balancing act to stimulate investment while maintaining competitiveness. Contemporary Brazilian nationalism is about a vision of the country whose interests are protected by territorial sovereignty and strengthened by economic growth. Brazilian nationalism has emerged as a military doctrine supported by economic interests based on environmental resources. The convergence of these often-conflicting interests in the nationalist doctrine reveals Brazil’s rich history of pride in its territory and the hope in its future as an economic powerhouse. An economically and militarily strong Brazil is the cornerstone of contemporary Brazilian nationalism, which recognizes such natural resources as the Amazon basin and is committed to protecting such interests with economic and military policy. Selected Bibliography “Brazil’s Backlash.” 2000. The Economist, February 24. Bresser-Pereira, L. C. 2000. “New Nationalism.” Folha de S.Paulo [Leaf of S.Paulo], May 3. (Retrieved January 9, 2007), http://www.bresserpereira.org.br/ver_file.asp?id=460. Translation by Babel Fish, http://world.altavista.com. Burns, E. B. 1968. Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

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Castañeda, J. 2005. “New Arms Race Taking Shape in Latin America. Miami Herald, March 27. (Retrieved January 9, 2008), http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/Week-of-Mon-2005 0328/014895.html. Desch, M. C. 1998. “The Changing International Environmental and Civil-Military Relations in Post-Cold War Southern Latin America.” In Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America, edited by F. Agüero and J. Stark, 323–344. Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press. Faria, V., and E. Graeff. 2001. Progressive Governance for the 21st Century: The Brazilian Experience. Paper no. 1. University of California at Berkeley Center for Latin American Studies. (Retrieved February 20, 2008), http://repositories.edlib.org/clas/wp/1/. Filho, J. R. M., and D. Zirker. 2000. “Nationalism, National Security, and Amazônia: Military Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil.” Armed Forces and Society 27 no. 1: 105–129. Garfield, S. 2004. “A Nationalist Environment: Indians, Nature, and the Construction of the Xingu National Park in Brazil.” Luso-Brazilian Review 41, no. 1: 139–168. Gordon, L. 2001. Brazil’s Second Chance: En Route toward the First World. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Green, J. N. 2003. “Top Brass and State Power in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Politics, Economics and Culture.” Latin American Research Review 38, no. 3 (October): 250–260. Hirst, M. 1996. “The Foreign Policy of Brazil: From the Democratic Transition to Its Consolidation.” In Latin American Nations in World Politics, 2nd edition, edited by H. Muñoz and J. S. Tulchin, 197–223. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Lesser, J. 1999. Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Canada Jeffrey J. Cormier Chronology 1605 Port Royal is settled by Samuel de Champlain and Pierre du Gua de Monts. 1608 Québec City is settled and is largely French, Catholic, and rural. 1759 New France falls to the British in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, as part of the Seven Years’ War (1756 –1763). 1763 A royal proclamation provides the “province of Québec” with a formal constitution and establishes a variety of political institutions, all modeled after British ones. 1774 Close to 11 years later, the Québec Act replaces the Proclamation of 1763, in the process increasing the territory of the province of Québec to include the Great Lakes Region, Labrador, the Magdalen Islands, and the Ohio Valley. The Québec Act was also generous politically, returning to the French-speaking colony French civil law, official recognition of the French language, and the Catholic religion. It also allowed for the participation of Canadians of French origin in colonial administration. 1776 The 13 American colonies declare independence from Britain, which ends in the Treaty of Paris of 1783 and the official recognition of the United States of America. As a result, a huge influx of former American colonists heads north to join the nowestablished British colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the province of Québec. The United Empire Loyalists settle along the Upper St. Lawrence and along the northern banks of Lake Ontario and Lake Erie. 1791 The Constitutional Act divides the former province of Québec into two parts: Upper Canada (Ontario) and Lower Canada (Québec). 1837 A contentious year of insurrectionary activity in both Lower and Upper Canada. In Upper Canada, the rebellion is lead by William Lyon Mackenzie, in Lower Canada, by Louis-Joseph Papineau. Both rebellions are unsuccessful. 1841 The result is the Act of Union that brings the Canadas together as the Province of Canada. 1867 The United Province of Canada (Canada West and Canada East) and the Maritime colonies compose a loose-knit amalgamation of British settlements spread across British North America until the 1860s. Between 1861 and 1865, the United States is involved in violent civil war. As well, a group of Fenians, Irish Catholics who want to free Ireland by attacking British colonies and who fought for the North in the Civil War, threaten to attack many of the British North American colonies. Between September 1864 and July 1, 1867, a series of conferences takes place between the Maritime colonies and the Province of Canada. Eventually an alliance is struck, and Queen Victoria signs the British North America Act (BNA Act) that unites New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Québec, and Ontario into the Dominion of Canada, with John A. Macdonald as the first prime minister. 1870–1999 Westward expansion later includes Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871), and Prince Edward Island (1873) into Confederation. The vast expanse of what was then the Northwest Territories is eventually divided into the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta (1905). Finally, after a bitter battle and an almost evenly divided referendum result, the British colony of Newfoundland joins Confederation in 1949. Canada also has three territories, the Northwest Territories (1870), the Yukon Territory (1898), and Nunavut (1999).

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Situating the Nation A unique combination of history and geography has conspired against Canadians having a clear understanding of themselves as constituting “a nation” in the classical sense. If by a nation one means a homogeneous entity composed of individuals sharing a common culture, language, history, and traditions, then clearly the realities of Canadian history are evidence enough against the notion of a single Canadian nation. Nor would it be completely correct to speak about “Canadian nationalism,” at least in the sense in which Ernest Gellner defines it: namely, one nation striving for one state. Since the formal signing of the British North America (BNA) Act in 1867, and more recently, Pierre Trudeau’s repatriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, Canada has had a relatively stable political state system, composed of a central federal government and relatively autonomous provinces, working together in a context of conflict and compromise. Rather than being a nation without a state—which is the case with Québec—one could best describe Canada as a state without a nation. It is a modern democratic multinational state. Most would agree that the idea of a Canadian national identity is at best a fragile one. In its efforts to develop a coherent sense of national identity, Canada has had to struggle with—and sometimes against—a variety of very powerful influences. Externally, it has been caught between its colonial past with close enduring attachments to the British empire and, certainly after 1945, its geographically closer (proudly proclaimed “the longest undefended border in the world” by Canadians) and extremely powerful southern neighbor, the United States. Th e extent of Canada’s pre-1945 colonial ties to Britain is easy to demonstrate. Canadians fought in defense of the British empire in World War I and again in 1939, during World War II, even before the arrival of the United States into the conflict. It must be recalled as well that before the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1947, Canadians were British subjects and not Canadian citizens. It was not until 1965 that the red maple leaf flag became Canada’s national flag, replacing first the Union Jack, then the Red Ensign (with the Union Jack a prominent symbol). Plus, the majority of the population of Canada was of British, and historically Loyalist, Scottish, English, and Irish extraction, who had strong sentimental attachments to the idea of the British empire. After 1945, the Canadian struggle for a national identity was largely in opposition to the United States. Canada and the United States share so much in common: geography and a border that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific, language (both are majority English speakers), history as colonies of the British empire, and religion (both are majority Christian). The political, economic, social, and cultural links that have developed as a result threaten, many Canadians believe, any uniquely independent Canadian identity from emerging. There is little dispute that the United States is a political, economic, and military powerhouse N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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that therefore dominates not just North America but the world. Prime Minister Trudeau’s metaphor of the mouse sleeping next to an elephant aptly describes the U.S.-Canada relationship. Consider just one point of comparison: Canada’s population in 2001 was roughly 31 million, while in 2000, the U.S. population was 281 million, more than nine times in size. Consider also the fact that California’s population was over 33 million at the time, and therefore greater than the whole Canadian population. Clearly a key element to understanding any form of Canadian identity is to be found in this struggle against the colossus to its south. The search to define a Canadian national identity has also had to confront enormous internal diversity. Three dynamics are worthy of special note. The first is between English-speaking Canadians, French-speaking Canadians concentrated in Québec, and the First Nations. The history of French-English relations in Canada is a long and complex one. While historically there had always been tensions, from the 1960s on, a nationalist movement grew in strength in Québec, threatening in 1980 (40.5 percent of Québecers voting “Yes” to proceeding with sovereignty negotiations) and 1995 (49.4 percent of Québecers voting “Yes”) to break up the country. The place of the Québécois nation and its relationship to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Canada is a perennial open question. Added to this has been the strength of First Nations’ claims for self-government, also an important challenge to the development of the ideal of a homogenous Canadian national identity. Finally, immigration and regional diversity have plagued the formation of a clear Canadian identity. Continuous waves of immigration, beginning with early colonization, including the expansion of the West after Confederation to the postwar boom during the 1950s and, more recently, with the influx of peoples coming from Asia, Canada has been and continues to be a society of immigrants. The United Nations has declared Toronto the most ethnically diverse city in the world, with 41 percent of its population born outside Canada and composed of more than 80 different ethnic groups and speaking more than 100 languages. In addition, the enormous historic and geographic differences that exist among the provinces in Canada have acted as a centrifugal force against any efforts by the federal government to impose a homogeneous national identity. Regionalism has always been and continues to be strong in Canada, with individual provinces having distinct histories, identities, and economies and being extremely protective of them. Yet despite these many obstacles, there have been and continue to be attempts to define a Canadian national identity. Many of these attempts have occurred since the 1960s and contain institutional as well as elite efforts to set out what it means to be “Canadian.”

Instituting the Nation The Canadian federal government has historically taken the lead in instituting and implementing nationwide economic and cultural policy. Outside the initial act of union in 1867, Prime Minister Macdonald’s “National Policy” stands out as one of the first comprehensive efforts to draw up and realize a national policy for Canada as a whole. The twin pillars of this policy were economic tariffs and aggressive westward expansion. In 1879, Macdonald’s Conservatives implemented a tariff on many goods produced in the United States. The idea was that a tax on foreign goods would force Canadians to purchase Canadian-produced goods and thereby strengthen Canadian industries. The completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in November 1885 first encouraged colonization of the prairies and, second, linked Halifax to Vancouver, encouraging an east-west trade orientation rather than a north-south one. Another example was Pierre Trudeau’s introduction in 1980 of the National Energy Program. The program forced western provinces, Alberta in particular, to sell their oil to eastern provinces for less than what they would have received on the open market. The idea is that this would strengthen east-west links and make Canada self-sufficient. Perhaps a more important element in the development of a Canadian national identity has been the federal government’s involvement in culture. This N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Multiculturalism On March 15, 1990, the federal government lifted the ban on Canadian Sikhs wearing turbans while on duty for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). This was a crucial ruling for two reasons. First, it demonstrated the Canadian government’s commitment to an inclusive multiculturalism, and second, it challenged one of the most traditional symbols of Canada: the RCMP officers’ trademark flat-rimmed Stetson hat.

George Parkin Grant (1918–1988) In 1965, Canadian philosopher George Grant published what instantly became a classic: Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism. Three years earlier, John Diefenbaker’s Conservatives were defeated by Pearson’s Liberals. Grant admired Diefenbaker’s form of Canadian nationalism and his ability to withstand encroaching U.S. imperialism. With the election of the Liberals, Grant believed Canada’s independence would be eventually sacrificed to greater political and cultural control from Washington. Ironically, Grant’s lament for Canada served to rally nationalists to fight harder for Canadian sovereignty in the late 1960s and 1970s.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1919–2000) Much could and has been said about Canada’s enigmatic and charismatic 20th-century prime minister (1968–1979, 1980–1984). Perhaps his greatest legacy was the 1982 repatriation of the Canadian Constitution and a new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. All provinces except for Québec were signatories to these documents. Trudeau was a firm believer in a strong central federal state, was no fan of Québec nationalism, and therefore spent much of his political career battling Québec separatists. He held to this vision of the Canadian political system even after the near breakup of the country after the Québec Referendum in 1995. Whether or not this vision will hold in the future is an open question.

involvement has usually taken one or a combination of three forms: subsidy, regulation, and protection. In 1948, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent was informed that he might lose the upcoming election if he did not do something to strengthen a “national culture” in Canada. His response was to establish a Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, headed by Vincent Massey, to develop a national cultural policy for Canada. Massey’s final report was one of the first to recognize the influence and impact of U.S. popular and mass culture on Canada. It suggested that the government establish a national television service, controlled by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), before granting licenses to private broadcasting companies. The Commission also encouraged the government to strengthen national cultural institutions with subsidies and grants, while creating new ones as well. Although not all of Massey’s recommendations were immediately implemented, over the years, new cultural institutions were established in Canada with an overarching agenda to develop Canadian culture. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The Massey Commission established that the federal government had a strategic role to play in developing Canadian culture. In 1955, a second Royal Commission was established, this time to look into the problems associated with the rapid shift from radio to television. The Fowler Commission found the majority of primetime television programs watched by Canadians were from the United States. Fowler wondered if a Canadian national identity could withstand such a powerful cultural influence. From Fowler’s recommendations, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker enacted the Broadcasting Act of 1958, which sought to “regulate” the content of both public (the CBC) and private broadcasters by establishing a Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG). Ten years later, this regulating body was changed to the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), which began setting Canadian-content quotas on programming. The CRTC in 1970 set out content rules stating that 60 percent of television programming had to be Canadian and 30 percent of music played had to have some Canadian involvement. The CRTC still acts to regulate radio and television programming in Canada. Finally, the Canadian government has also threatened outright protectionism when it came to U.S. magazines and Canadian advertising in those magazines. Originally brought to the attention of Diefenbaker by the O’Leary Commission in 1961, the government attempted to ban such imports as Time and Readers Digest and disallow tax exemptions to those Canadian advertisers advertising in such magazines. Diefenbaker’s strategy was largely unsuccessful. During the late 1990s, Liberal Heritage minister Sheila Copps attempted a similar strategy, trying to limit the number of “split-run” U.S. magazines on the Canada market. The implementation of the 1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement made such protectionism almost impossible to implement, however, especially with certain cultural products, such as magazines.

Defining the Nation In 2004, the CBC ran a television series modeled after a British contest that had people vote for the greatest Briton. Canadians voted Tommy C. Douglas the greatest Canadian, over Canadian politicians with arguably greater international presence like Pierre E. Trudeau and Lester B. Pearson. Why would Canadians consider a once provincial premier (of Saskatchewan of all provinces), who, even though he was the leader of the national New Democratic Party (NDP), was never prime minister? Part of the reason is the fact that many of the values Douglas held are integral to what Canadians now understand to be essential to their identity. Heading that list would be progressive social values. In 1944, Douglas and the Co-operative Commonwealth Party (CCF) in Saskatchewan became the first socialist government in North America. For 18 years, he and his government introduced some of the most progressive legislation at the time: public sewage and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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electricity, paved roads and labor reform, and, perhaps his most important achievement, universal public health care. Pearson’s Liberals would later introduce a national system called Medicare, a universal or socialized system of health care, but it was Douglas who began the process provincially. Today, national programs like Medicare are what Canadians point to as embodying key Canadian values: universal public access to essential social services. A 1963 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the B&B Commission) provided the impetus for two other defining features of the Canadian nation. The B&B Commission was mandated to examine the situation of “the two founding peoples” of Canada, narrowly defined as the French and the English. The commission discovered that French speakers in Canada were basically “second-class citizens,” unable to receive essential services in their first language. The commission’s finding eventually led to the 1969 Official Languages Act, recognizing French and English as Canada’s two official languages. All federal services were to be provided and all government business was to be conducted in French and English. A second and perhaps unintended consequence of the B&B Commission was the realization that the notion of “two founding peoples” of Canada was inadequate. Aboriginal groups, who were clearly present at the founding of Canada, as well as “other ethnic groups” claimed they were excluded from the original mandate of the B&B Commission. The result was that in 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau encouraged a policy of multiculturalism, the encouragement and development of ethnic pluralism in Canada. In 1982, it became law, and six years later Bill-C-94, the Multicultural Act, was passed. Other than holding progressive social values, multicultural and bilingual, Canadians tend to define their role internationally as peacekeepers. In 1957, then External Affairs minister Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his proposal to establish a UN Emergency Force to help end the hostilities during the Suez crisis in 1956. During the Cold War, Canada sought to define itself as a “middle power” working toward compromise and conciliation when international tensions like the Vietnam War broke out. While Canada has gone to war and may well do so in the future, Canadians commonly see themselves largely as a peacekeeping nation.

Narrating the Nation Truly national myths are difficult to construct in Canada given the diversity of Canada’s history and population. Constructing a national myth around the 1759 Battle of Québec, for instance, and the victory and ultimate death of the English general James Wolfe, would serve only to exclude the French contribution to the founding of Canada and reinforce the idea that Québecers were a conquered people. The mythologizing of James Wolfe as “the great conqueror of New France” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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would expose deep rifts in the Canadian national psyche. Perhaps it is for this reason that many of the national myths that Canadian artists—whether painters or writers—have constructed revolve around nature (i.e., The North) and sports (i.e., hockey). The landscape and hockey are by and large neutral arenas that tend to transcend ethnic and linguistic differences. No group of artists managed to break free of older European styles of landscape painting to create a clearly unique “Canadian style” more than the Group of Seven. Officially formed in 1920, the Group of Seven included founders J. E. H. MacDonald (1873–1932) and Lawren Harris (1885–1970), Franklin Carmichel (1890–1945), A. Y. Jackson (1882–1974), Frank Johnston (1888–1949), Arthur Lismer (1885–1969), and F. H. Varley (1881–1969). Tom Thompson (1877–1917) and Emily Carr (1871–1945) were also important members of this style of painting and contributed to the general myth of the Canadian North. The Group of Seven painters intentionally left the urban centers of Canada—ironic, since the majority of Canadians live in large urban centers clustered along the U.S.-Canada border—to seek and capture the isolation, wildness, majesty, and grandeur of the Great North. Their paintings have come to represent the Canadian myth of the North. In 1972, a young Canadian author named Margaret Atwood completed a similar task by distilling the patterns of Canadian writing. Her reading of Canadian literature (called CanLit) revealed an overwhelming struggle for survival; survival against a hostile natural environment and survival against oneself.

Members of the original Group of Seven, a collection of renowned Canadian landscape painters, in Toronto, 1920. Clockwise from left front: A. Y. Jackson, Fred Varley, Lawren Harris, Barker Firley (not a member), Frank Johnston, Arthur Lismer, and J. E. H. MacDonald. (Arthur Goss)

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Most Canadians over the age of 10 in 1972 remember where they were when Paul Henderson scored the game- and series-winning goal in game eight of the Canada-Russia hockey series. In the heart of the Cold War, this sporting event, understood by most as more than just a hockey game, has become embedded in the Canadian imagination like no other event. Hockey is considered “Canada’s game” by most Canadians. Every loss by a Canadian team at the international level leads to several months of accusations and recriminations of the “state of our game.” Many Canadian national heroes—Maurice “Rocket” Richard, Mario “The Magnificent” Lemieux, and Wayne “The Great One” Gretzky—are hockey players, known internationally. In a sense, hockey transcends many of the divisions that exist in Canada. Roch Carrier’s classic short story, “The Hockey Sweater/ Le chandail de hockey,” exploits the hockey rivalry between the Montreal Canadiens and the Toronto Maple Leaf but also the French and the English. Ultimately the love of the game of hockey unites both sides in mutual respect that transcends linguistic differences.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Nationalism in Canada has never been a mass movement. Other than political scientist Philip Resnick’s 1977 Marxian analysis of the links between social class and Canadian nationalism, most commentators agree that Canadian nationalism has largely been elite driven. In his book Canada, Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism, historian Ramsay Cook argues that it is usually the intelligentsia —individuals who produce and disseminate ideas, including journalists, university professors, writers, and artists—who have been at the forefront in promoting various forms and manifestations of Canadian nationalism. Similarly, historian Jack Granatstein makes an argument in his classic Yankee Go Home? (the question mark at the end intended to express irony) that Canadian elites, politicians as well as professors, have used an integral component of Canadian nationalism, namely “anti-Americanism” to further their careers. The fact that the two most influential expressions of Canadian nationalism in the 20th century, one cultural and the other economic, were led by political and cultural elites demonstrates the truth of this claim. During the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. economic and cultural power became a concern to many in Canada, especially those working in universities. Political scientists Kari Levitt and Melvin Watkins began documenting the devastating impact that U.S. direct investment was having on the Canadian economy. Especially in areas such as natural resources, U.S. companies were setting up branch plants in Canada to extract and exploit Canada’s resource wealth. Led by federal Liberal finance minister Walter Gordon, a movement to protect Canada’s economic independence from the United States grew during this time. On the culN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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ture end, the rapid growth of universities, as a result of the baby boom generation’s entrance into postsecondary institutions, led to the hiring of many U.S. professors. While not exclusive to the university, a cultural nationalist movement developed around Robin Mathews and James Steele in 1968, two professors of English at Carleton University in Ottawa, to increase the employment opportunities of Canadians in culturally sensitive institutions. It is clear with these two examples, however, that Canadian nationalism was confined to a relatively elite group of individuals, even though the debates and discussions of Canadian culture and economy often spilled out into the public. Canada is a growing, modern multinational democracy that continues to redefine itself and its place in an increasingly global world. One of its greatest internal threats has been, and continues to be, successive waves of Québec nationalism and its struggle for sovereignty. Much depends on the ability of the Canadian federal system of government to address ever-increasing demands for provincial autonomy. Culturally, the metaphor of the mosaic is used to describe Canada. With a population composed of immigrants, and where population growth comprises waves of new immigrants, this will most likely not change. Canada has been a place that allows a variety of ethnicities and cultural groups to flourish. Diversity, whether ethnic, sexual, religious, or cultural is key to how Canadians see themselves. Whether or not diversity can be balanced with some indefinable quality that unites is not just a Canadian question, it is also a global question. Selected Bibliography Atwood, M. 1972. Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature. Toronto: Anansi Press. Azzi, S. 1999. Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism. Montreal: Queen’s-McGill Press. Bumsted, J. M. 1992. The Peoples of Canada: A Post-Confederation History. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Cook, R. 1995. Canada, Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism. 2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Cormier, J. 2004. The Canadianization Movement: Emergence, Survival and Success. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: University of Cornell Press. Gillmor, D., and P. Turgeon. 2000. Canada: A People’s History, vol. 1. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Gillmor, D. 2000. Canada: A People’s History, vol. 2. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Granatstein, J. 1996. Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism. Toronto: HarperCollins. Grant, G. 2000. Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism. Quebec City: McGillQueen’s University Press. Levitt, K. 1970. Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada. Toronto: Macmillian. Morton, W. L. 1973. The Canadian Identity. 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Resnick, P. 1977. The Land of Cain: Class and Nationalism in English Canada, 1945–1975. Vancouver, BC: New Star Books.

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Pan-Aboriginalism in Australia John Maynard Chronology 1788 1837 1860 1883 1897 1905 1909 1911 1924 1937 1938 1962 1965 1966 1967 1969 1971 1972 1975 1977 1980 1985 1987 1988 1990 1992 1993 1995

1998 2000 2004

British invasion and occupation of the Australian continent. British Select Committee recommends Aboriginal protection. Victorian Central Board for the Protection of Aborigines is appointed. Aborigines Protection Board (New South Wales [NSW]) is established. Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act (Qld). Aborigines Act (Western Australia [WA]). Aborigines Protection Act (NSW). Aborigines Act (South Australia [SA]). The Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA) is formed in Sydney. NSW Parliament holds a “Select Committee Inquiry” into administration of the Aborigines Protection Board. Aboriginal activists hold the symbolic “Day of Mourning Protest” to coincide with the 150 years of settlement celebration. Aboriginal people are given the unrestricted right to vote in federal elections. Charles Perkins and university students emulate the U.S. civil rights movement’s “Freedom Rides.” Gurindji walk-off at Wave Hill. Referendum grants Aboriginal people citizenship in their own country. The Aborigines Welfare Board’s abolished responsibilities are transferred to the Department of Child Welfare and Social Welfare. Aboriginal Legal Service is formed. The Whitlam government introduces a policy of self-determination. Aboriginal Medical Service is established at Redfern in Sydney. Aboriginal “Tent Embassy” in Canberra. The Racial Discrimination Act is passed. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam hands back Gurindji land in a symbolic gesture. The Anti-Discrimination Act is passed. Link Up (NSW) Aboriginal Corporation is established. Uluru is handed back to the traditional owners. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody begins. Aboriginal people in a great show of unity converge on Sydney to protest the 200 years of Australian settlement bicentennial celebration. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) is formed. The Mabo decision. Prime Minister Paul Keating delivers the “Redfern Address.” Native Title Act is passed by the Commonwealth government for determining Aboriginal land right claims. A national inquiry into the Stolen Generations is undertaken. This heart-rending inquiry explores the consequences of generations of Aboriginal children being separated from their families. Wik Decision. Corroboree Reconciliation Walk across Sydney Harbour Bridge. The federal government abolishes the ATSIC.

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Situating the Nation To understand the aspirations and tensions of Aboriginal nationalism, one must recognize that Aboriginal people are a nation trapped within a nation—a minority group without genuine representation or recognition—and that the continued impact of invasion and dispossession ensures that colonial oppression has not been lifted. There is no real indigenous governing body, no council of elders, and no recognition in law of prior Aboriginal sovereignty. The single most important issue for indigenous nationalistic endeavor is selfdetermination. As a concept, this is central to indigenous people reclaiming control of their lives and directives. Evidence indicates that where indigenous people have been placed in control of their own directives the most positive and beneficial results have been achieved. Examples include the establishment of Aboriginal Medical Services (AMS), Aboriginal Legal Services, and Aboriginal and Islander child care. There is a misconception that the concept of self-determination for Aboriginal Australia was introduced by the Gough Whitlam–led Labour Party during the 1970s. In fact, it was first promoted by an all-Aboriginal political organization, the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA), in Sydney in 1924. Self-determination is firmly tied to the ongoing struggle for a signed treaty that recognizes both indigenous sovereignty and the past injustices inflicted upon the Aboriginal population. However, such a treaty remains a remote, perhaps unattainable dream. The Australian government is not prepared to negotiate over a treaty through fear of imagined repercussions associated with recognizing prior indigenous sovereignty. Since 1788, Australian history and legal understanding has ignored, obscured, or erased any concept of prior indigenous sovereignty, unlike the United States, where the signing of treaties was insisted on for the recognition of indigenous nation-states (although in most cases these were blatantly abused). An earlier attempt to establish a treaty in Victoria in 1835 by John Batman, who exchanged blankets, tomahawks, and various other items for the acquisition of some 243,000 hectares of land, was not recognized by the colonial authorities, and the purchase was declared void. Since the invasion and occupation of the Australian continent in 1788, the indigenous population has buckled under the weight of dispossession, disease, violence, and cultural destruction. After the initial impact, Aboriginal people were subjected to generations of imprisonment on government-controlled reserves and institutions. In these concentration camps, they suffered decades of oppressive incarceration. They were forcibly removed out of towns and onto reserves and were under the control of managers who oversaw every aspect of Aboriginal life. During this period, measures were taken to not only restrict the movement of Aborigines but also to prevent general contact with the white populace. The reserve managers had the right to search Aborigines, their dwellings, and their belongings at any time; they could confiscate property, read their personal mail, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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order medical inspections, confine children to dormitories, and exert control over mobility of movement. They held power over food and food distribution, clothing, education, employment, and even the right of people to marry. They could expel Aboriginal people from reserves or remove them to another altogether and break up families. Therefore, they had absolute control over the children. Such unabated power took on an increasingly sinister nature. Both off and on reserves, Aboriginal people, until recent times, were not entitled to paid employment and were largely exploited in areas like the stock industry and domestic service. The era of blanket, sugar, and clothing handouts was followed by a benefits and welfare system, which did not encourage or inspire Aboriginal people to endeavor. A previously independent and self-sufficient huntergatherer society, the Aboriginal people were driven to a state of welfare-dependent imprisonment. No genuine or uniform policy to escape the enforced tentacles of despair and hopelessness had been implemented. Until the 1960s, the push for indigenous national identity and political mobilization was largely led by southeastern Aboriginal activists located in urban and rural centers. The 1966 Gurindji Central Australian revolt against severe employment inequalities established a broadened agenda for land rights. This moment signaled a major shift in focus away from urban to remote Aboriginal political activism and the establishment of the Northern Territory Land Rights movement. This relocation of political thrust can be viewed as both a positive and a negative shift because the federal government now largely directs all of its political consul-

Charles Perkins (1936–2000) Arguably the most charismatic and recognized Aboriginal leader of the 20th century, Charles Perkins was born at the Aboriginal reserve near Alice Springs in the Northern Territory. His parents were Arrente and Kalkadoon people. He was taken from his mother at the age of 10 and placed in a home for Aboriginal boys in Adelaide, South Australia. Perkins enrolled as a student with the University of Sydney and was only the second Aboriginal person to graduate from an Australian university. In 1965, he led a group of students, emulating the U.S. civil rights movement’s “Freedom Rides.” The Australian “Freedom Rides” will remain forever one of the pivotal moments in Aboriginal history, and it provided the perfect political and public launching pad for Charles Perkins. The students, in visiting outback towns in New South Wales, used the media to draw attention to the deeply segregated inequality of Aboriginal existence. Aboriginal people were denied access to hotels, swimming pools, and in some cases even the streets of these towns. From that point and for the remainder of his life, Perkins was at the forefront of Aboriginal political activism. He played a role through the Foundation of Aboriginal Affairs in the campaign that led to the overwhelming “yes” vote in the 1967 referendum that resulted in the federal government taking power over Aboriginal affairs from the states. Throughout his dynamic and often turbulent political career, Perkins was compared to such individuals as Martin Luther King Jr. and Nelson Mandela. He died in 2000, leaving a space that is impossible to fill.

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tation and impetus toward a remote (and preferred) vision of Aboriginal Australian authority.

Instituting the Nation Prior to the last century, the concept of an indigenous sense of nationalism residing across the Australian continent was nonexistent. The indigenous population of Australia before 1788 consisted of over 500 differing language or tribal groups with their own spiritual ties to well-established areas of country. Although diverse, the indigenous groups operated universally under an intricate egalitarian system that was bound and governed by tight social and environmental controls. Kinship is the central core of the egalitarian Aboriginal extended-family system. There are no chiefs, kings, or headmen. In traditional Aboriginal society, all Aboriginal adults have ongoing commitments to one another. However, the past century has witnessed a dramatic change of understanding, particularly in the shared experiences of dispossession, frontier violence, cultural destruction, children taken away, confinement on debilitating reserves, and neglect of governments at all levels. The combined impact of these events has affected the well-being of Aboriginal Australians, who hold the worst health statistics within the country—with a general life expectancy that is 20 years shorter than nonindigenous Australians. This is combined with the highest rates of incarceration and the worst employment, housing, and education opportunities. These horrific statistics are embedded in past neglect, but indigenous people have fought politically to alter these appalling numbers, and on those occasions when a general sense of unity and strength evolves, a significant impact is achieved. Nationalism in its most basic form has close ties to the indigenous “tribal” kinship and extended-family structure of belonging and connection. The concept of belonging to place and family was and remains the core belief within Aboriginal

The Aboriginal Tent Embassy (1972–Present) In 1972, the establishment of an Aboriginal Tent Embassy was a powerful symbol in the fight for social and political change. Frustration with the lack of progress following the 1967 referendum was the catalyst for young Aboriginal activists establishing the Aboriginal Tent Embassy on the lawn of Parliament House in Canberra. These activists unknowingly followed the path of the 1920s activists before them in seeking influence and inspiration from African Americans, particularly Malcolm X and the Black Panther movement. These young activists were supported by a large base of nonindigenous student supporters. Eventually the police were called in to dismantle the protest. The violent response by the police led to international media exposure. To this day, the embassy remains a beacon of inspiration and protest for Aboriginal people.

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Charles Frederick Maynard (1879–1946) Fred Maynard was one of the great Aboriginal patriots and organizers of political activism. He was instrumental in forming the first unified and long-lasting politically motivated and organized Aboriginal movement, the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA). Maynard’s mother was a Worimi Aboriginal woman from northern New South Wales; his father, an English laborer. After his mother died, giving birth to twins who also died, his father deserted the family, and the six children were all placed with people in the local community. Fred and his brother Arthur were taken in by a Presbyterian minister at Dungog. The boys were cruelly treated and lived in the minister’s stable. As a young man who held a variety of jobs, Maynard was well traveled and witnessed firsthand the hardship and conditions his people had to endure. These early experiences were of major significance in shaping his later political agenda and beliefs. He was a drover and at one time operated a nursery in Sydney. He remained an avid and skilled gardener throughout his life. He spent time as a photographer, worked as a timber-getter on the north coast of New South Wales, and he finally gained work as a wharf laborer on the Sydney docks, where the trade union movement made an important impact on his political beliefs. It was through his work on the docks that Maynard came into contact with African American influences that had such an impact on the political rhetoric of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA). For white Australians, the most unsettling aspect of the AAPA was the fact that it was led by a self-educated and indeed well-educated Aboriginal man with a great command of both the spoken and written word. Maynard spoke and wrote passionately and insightfully about the injustices and atrocities committed against Aboriginal people. He spoke of things that either many white people did not know or were not aware of or simply did not want to know. The power of the message that Maynard so defiantly expressed some eight decades ago has not been diminished with time, nor can his grasp of the realities of the Aboriginal situation be at all underestimated. Today his letters and petitions are, in every sense, strangely modern in tone and still as relevant as when they were written.

culture and society and, prior to 1788, was the one upon which survival depended. It is therefore understandable that the galvanizing concept of connectedness has on several important occasions been at the forefront of Aboriginal political mobilization against colonialism. So the modern move to Aboriginal nationalism is arguably an organic development. Recent decades have produced such notable Aboriginal leaders as Charles Perkins, Pat and Mick Dodson, Michael Mansell, Lowitja O’Donoghue, and Noel Pearson, to name but a few, who have in their own way forged a strong sense of indigenous identity and nationalist directive. There have been a number of indigenous national bodies that have attempted to speak on behalf of all Aboriginal people. These groups include the Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), various state departments of Aboriginal Affairs, the Council for Aboriginal Affairs, the National Aboriginal Consultative Group, and the Aboriginal Provisional Government. Significantly, all of these groups (apart from the Aboriginal N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Provisional Government) have been government initiatives and have suffered because the decision-making process has required a rubber stamp by the Australian government. Nevertheless, the establishment of the ATSIC as an elected indigenous body overseen by the government was a brave step and supported by the majority of indigenous Australians. The ATSIC Act of 1989 established the ATSIC, and operations commenced on March 5, 1990. Eighteen elected indigenous commissioners sat on the ATSIC Board, which until June 30, 2004, was the Australian Government’s principal policy-making and advisory body for indigenous affairs. ATSIC and its elected indigenous commissioners were constantly targeted by the media for any perceived wrongdoing in indigenous affairs. Over the years, there have been some problems with ATSIC at the national, regional, and community levels, and the problems inherent with ATSIC and many other Aboriginal organizations have constrained the hopes of Aboriginal nationalism and unity. Nevertheless, ATSIC was performing well in the majority of Aboriginal communities, assisting in the improvement of their social conditions. Despite an inquiry into the operations of ATSIC instigated by the federal government and to include a report to be conducted by Bob Collins (a parliamentarian) and Jackie Huggins (an Aboriginal spokesperson), the government did not wait for the findings of its own report. In March 2005, the Australian Parliament passed the ATSIC Amendment Bill repealing provisions of the ATSIC Act, in effect abolishing ATSIC. The legislation was proclaimed, and the government transferred responsibility for ATSIC programs and services to mainstream agencies from July 1, 2004. The federal government then sought to install an indigenous advisory committee of handpicked Aboriginal members. The success or failure of this body remains to be seen, but it does not have the support of the wider Aboriginal community.

Defining the Nation Aboriginality does not impose specific barriers to inclusion as part of its national fabric. It does not matter what region you come from, urban, rural, or remote. The Torres Strait Islanders are very much a part of this indigenous national cultural identity and commonality of experience. There is no specific cultural insistence: you can be Aboriginal and not speak your language, you do not have to continue with your cultural practices and spiritual beliefs and may well be a practicing Christian or Muslim, you can be dark, or you can be light with blonde hair and blue eyes. The single most important commonality is that all Aboriginal people have suffered the family experience and impact of dispossession. The “Stolen Generations” experience is another crucial area of shared suffering. It has been expressed that nearly all Aboriginal groups or families can trace to a family member that was removed or taken away at some point. This shared grief in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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national tragedy exposes the central core to belonging as an Aboriginal person to this Aboriginal nation. One very important Aboriginal nationalistic moment occurred in 1974 when Harold Thomas designed the Aboriginal flag. Its colors of red, black, and yellow (black for the people, yellow for the sun and life giver, and red for the earth and blood of Aboriginal people spilt since 1788) have become the single most important symbol of Aboriginal unity and strength. Two important days also signify national Aboriginal unity. National Aboriginal and Islander Observance Committee (NAIDOC) Week is celebrated each July and reflects the long history of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander efforts to force change upon government policy and wider public thinking. Similarly, Aboriginal people on January 26 each year do not celebrate Australia Day, which commemorates the raising of the British flag on Australian soil, but have since 1988 mobilized their own anniversary, “Invasion Day” or “Survival Day,” marking both a point of great sadness and loss with the resilience of people to survive. The first “Survival Day” concert was staged at La Perouse in 1992.

Narrating the Nation Aboriginal attempts to invoke a sense of Aboriginal nationalism as a source of empowerment dates at least to the 1920s. The AAPA (the all-Aboriginal political organization) was inspired by Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Garveyism was universal in its message and appealed to an astonishing variety of nationalities and groups. The Aboriginal activists shaped and remodeled Garveyism to their own needs. They based their platform on Aboriginal rights to land, protecting their children, claiming citizenship in their own country, and defending a distinct indigenous cultural identity; it “was an association, which suggested that they must pull together for the good of all.” The AAPA demanded that the New South Wales (NSW) state government Aborigines Protection Board be abolished and replaced by an Aboriginal Board of Management. It would be a further several decades before such an indigenous body, ATSIC, would be established by the federal government to oversee and advise on indigenous issues. It has been said that the AAPA emblem, an image of an Aboriginal man encircled by the words “Australia for Australians,” was a distinct reference to Aboriginal nationalism. The memory of success and the hope that both the UNIA and AAPA instilled in their people was recognized as a dangerous threat by the United States and Australian governments, and was therefore systematically obliterated. There is no shame from an Aboriginal perspective in that acknowledgment; it reflects the power devices that the government and its agencies had used with great deliberation to silence and break down the resolve of the AborigiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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nal population in both its actions and also its memories. The erasure from memory was so complete that notable and high-profile Aboriginal activists of the 1960s were unaware of the existence of the 1920s movement. Aboriginal political mobilization again came to the fore in the late 1930s, but inexplicably, none of the earlier activists from the 1920s were visible. The most notable activists of this era were William Cooper, William Ferguson, Pearl Gibbs, and Jack Patten. This new generation of activists established alliances between Victoria and NSW and made representations in their platform for more remote Aboriginal people, including the Northern Territory. Their most significant achievement was the highly symbolic “Day of Mourning Protest” held in Sydney in 1938. The protest attempted to tarnish the sesquicentennial celebrations of British settlement and highlight the impoverished and neglected state of Aboriginal Australia. The beginning of World War II was responsible for the Aboriginal political movement and agitation disappearing from wider public consciousness for nearly two decades. Recent decades have witnessed a number of significant moments in Aboriginal unity and sense of nationalistic pursuit. In 1965, Charles Perkins led a group of white university students in emulating the U.S. civil rights movement’s “Freedom Ride.” The exposure this radical approach achieved was far-reaching in both the indigenous and nonindigenous communities. Perkins, for his part, would achieve legendary status as one of the great Aboriginal leaders of the 20th century. In the campaign to grant Aboriginal people citizenship in their own country, the 1967 referendum on amending the Australian Constitution united indigenous peoples from an astonishing number of areas. In 1972, young Aboriginal activists established the Aboriginal Tent Embassy on the lawn of Parliament House in Canberra. These activists unknowingly followed the path of the 1920s activists before them in seeking influence and inspiration from African Americans, particularly Malcolm X and the Black Panther movement. The sense of growing or rebirth of Aboriginal nationalism was firmly underway. The 1988 bicentennial again witnessed a surge in Aboriginal unity and protest. Thousands of Aboriginal people from across the continent converged on Sydney to demonstrate and highlight the injustices forced upon Aboriginal Australia since first settlement and draw international media attention to the inequality of Aboriginal life. On January 26, over 40,000 Aboriginal people from all parts of the country, and their supporters, marched from Redfern Park to a public rally in Hyde Park and from there to Sydney Harbour. The High Court Mabo decision recognized prior indigenous ownership of the Australian continent, acknowledging that Native Title continued to exist over particular kinds of land: unalienated Crown land, national parks, and reserves. Importantly, the concept that Australia never was terra nullius or “empty land” was overthrown. However, despite the decision bringing widespread joy to many, it opened wide fissures of media-fueled division and ignorance in the wider community. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Crowds fill the Sydney Harbour Bridge as part of the “Corroboree 2000” Reconciliation March in support of Aboriginal Australia on May 28, 2000. (John Van Hasselt/Corbis Sygma)

Since the 1980s, there has been an increased rise in adopting Aboriginal culture as a major signifier of wider Australian nationalism. Aboriginal art has achieved worldwide attention and has been vigorously incorporated into the sense of Australian nationhood. Arguably, Aboriginal art has become one of the nation’s most powerful symbols. In 2000, more than a half million Australians chose to walk in support of Aboriginal Australia in the Corroboree Reconciliation Walk across Sydney Harbour Bridge. It must be understood, however, that many Aboriginal people chose to boycott the event, seeing it as nothing more than a staged propaganda exercise to demonstrate to the gathering international media contingent in Sydney for the up-coming Olympic Games that Australians were all reconciled with the past.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Aboriginal political activists across several decades have demonstrated great initiative and understanding for the importance of mobilizing a nationalistic platform. The movements of the 1920s and 1960s successfully infused a sense of Black nationalism and cultural pride into their agenda. Aboriginal activists have become skilled and articulate operators within the media and employ it for their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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own propaganda agenda, within both the wider Aboriginal and white communities. During the past decade, there have been several significant developments, including the Mabo decision, Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Inquiry, Corroboree 2000 Reconciliation Walk across Sydney Harbour Bridge, Bringing Them Home Inquiry, and Native Title. However, of these developments, only the Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and Bringing Them Home inquiries have had the majority support among the wider Aboriginal community. Intense individual trauma (such as the death of Joe Pat in a Western Australian jail in 1976) galvanized public Aboriginal protest and anger and is widely recognized for the Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Inquiry. Despite a widespread belief that indigenous Australians are a united people with a shared history of culture and survival, Aboriginal nationalism is now at a crossroads. Recognition does need to be made, despite many significant moments, that Aboriginal people have not achieved a true sense of nationalism and unity. Inequality and suffering remain a large part of Aboriginal life. Major issues like domestic violence and alcohol and substance abuse continue to fester within Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal nationalism is still very much in the struggle stage of development. The current indigenous leadership is divided and remains largely headless, with varying groups and leaders vying for center stage without any genuine cohesion, collaboration, or consultation. This in effect maintains the status quo and inequality of Aboriginal suffering and experience. The abolition of ATSIC has taken away the one national body with which indigenous Australia identified. The Corroboree 2000 Reconciliation Walk across Sydney Harbour Bridge did demonstrate that Aboriginal Australia can depend on a large nonindigenous body of support, but this support needs to be further nurtured and inspired by committed and united indigenous leaders. Knowledge that continues to be revealed from the past, particularly instances from the 1920s’ Aboriginal political movement, can be a platform for the future—challenging the encouraged divisions and factions within the wider Aboriginal community by promoting the rights of a united people. Only when indigenous people acknowledge the legacy of the past can they truly become “one voice.” Selected Bibliography Attwood, B., and A. Markus. 1999. The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights. Sydney, Australia: Allan & Unwin. Broome, R. 1982. Aboriginal Australians—Black Response to White Dominance 1788/1980. Sydney, Australia: Allan & Unwin. Gilbert, K. 1994. Because a White Man’ll Never Do It. Sydney, Australia: Angus & Robertson. Goodall, H. 1996. Invasion to Embassy—Land in Aboriginal Politics in NSW, 1770–1972. St Leonards, Australia: Allan & Unwin. Horner, J. 1994. Bill Ferguson: Fighter for Aboriginal Freedom. Canberra, Australia: privately published. Maynard, J. 2002. “The 1920s’ Aboriginal Political Defence of the Sacred ‘Ancient Code.’ ” Cultural Survival Quarterly 26, no. 2: 34–36.

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Maynard, J. 2003. “Vision, Voice and Influence: The Rise of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association.” Australian Historical Studies 34, no. 121 (April): 91–105. Maynard, J. 2005. “ ‘In the Interests of Our People’: The Influence of Garveyism on the Rise of Australian Aboriginal Political Activism.” Aboriginal History 25: 1–22. Reynolds, H. 1996. Aboriginal Sovereignty: Reflections on Race, State and Nation. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Reynolds, H. 2003. The Law of the Land. Camberwell, Australia: Penguin.

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Maori Nationalism Toon van Meijl Chronology 1642 Discovery of New Zealand by Dutch explorer Abel Tasman. 1769 The British discoverer James Cook establishes the first European contacts with the indigenous population, the Maori. 1814 Arrival of the first missionary, Samuel Marsden. The beginning of European settlement. 1840 Signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, in which Maori people cede “sovereignty” in exchange for the possession of their lands, forests, and fisheries. 1858 Crowning of the first Maori king and set up of a Maori monarchy, the first nationalist movement in Maori history. 1860–1864 Wars between several Maori tribes and the New Zealand government over the access to land and control of the country. 1864 Confiscation of large tracts of Maori land. 1892–1902 A Maori Parliament is set up to present Maori grievances to the New Zealand government. 1897 Founding of the Te Aute College Students’ Association, in 1906 renamed the Young Maori Party, advocating pride in Maoritanga or Maori culture during the first decades of the 20th century. 1930 Beginning of large-scale Maori urbanization. 1970 The emergence of modern Maori protest movements in cities. 1975 Passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act, instituting the Waitangi Tribunal for the examination of violations of the historic covenant. The Maori renaissance is partly inspired by cultural campaigns initiated by the Young Maori Party. 1985 The passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act, backdating the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal to 1840. More than 1,200 Maori claims are submitted to the Waitangi Tribunal in the following years. 1987 Recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi by the Court of Appeal, which opens an avenue for the settlement of Maori grievances about violations of the treaty. Reorganization of many Maori tribes in light of their negotiations with the government about their claims. 1995 First major compensation agreement signed between the New Zealand government and the Waikato-Tainui Maori tribes, still supporting the Maori monarchy set up in 1858. The Waikato-Tainui tribes receive a formal apology, some land, and some money.

Situating the Nation Maori society was made up of independent tribes when the British explorer James Cook established the first European contacts with the indigenous population of New Zealand in 1769. Maori nationalism did not emerge until the Maori people N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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were beginning to lose control of the economic and political situation as a result of increasing numbers of settlers arriving in New Zealand from the 1820s. From the outset, the discourse on Maori nationalism has been centered around the concept of sovereignty and its implications for contemporary political circumstances in New Zealand. This discussion follows the principal position of the notion of sovereignty in the Treaty of Waitangi, a covenant between the British Crown and numerous Maori chiefs that was signed in 1840. The interpretation of this treaty, however, is hampered by the existence of two different versions in English and Maori, which also explains why both signing parties have different understandings of key aspects. Under the English version of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Maori chiefs ceded “all the rights and powers of Sovereignty” over their respective territories to the queen of England. The Maori version does not use the nearest equivalent of sovereignty, which is probably mana, but uses the term kawanatanga, a transliteration of “governorship” improvised by the missionaries. Moreover, the second article of the treaty guaranteed to the indigenous population “the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties.” For the British, the agreement signed at Waitangi legitimized the migration of massive numbers of Europeans to New Zealand, which, in turn, accelerated the disastrous transfer of vast tracts of Maori land to European settlers. The dispossession of Maori land given the impact of the Treaty of Waitangi caused Maori tribes to disavow intertribal rivalries and discuss their common interests. A desire for intertribal unity thus emerged in defense of Maori sovereignty. It marks the beginning of a discourse on Maori nationalism, which historically has been characterized by a continuous search for intertribal unity.

Instituting the Nation The first nationalist movement that had an impact beyond its regional origin was the Maori King Movement. In the 1850s, several Maori tribes began tracing out a common strategy to protect themselves from European interference and to make a ban on land sales effective. At first, the meetings of what became known as the movement for kotahitanga or “oneness” were aimed at developing a more coherent political organization, but soon the idea of a Maori king came up. Ultimately, this movement for intertribal unity eventuated in the crowning of the Waikato chief Potatau Te Wherowhero as the first Maori king in 1858. Initially Potatau was supported by 23 tribes, but the unfurling of the flag of the Kingitanga or kingship could only reduce, rather than resolve, traditional tribal rivalries. Nevertheless, the Maori king provided a focus for Maori discontent regarding the government’s land purchase policies, which had been implemented to appease disenchanted settlers. The dispute between the government and the Maori about access to land degenerated into a series of wars in 1860. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Kingitanga The Maori King Movement or Kingitanga is still very active in contemporary New Zealand. Over the years the monarchy may have lost support from other tribes, but in the Tainui confederation of tribes, from which the first king was elected, the current head of the movement still holds royal status. From 1966 until 2006 the Kingitanga was led by the charismatic Maori queen, Dame Te Atairangikaahu. Her funeral was attended by more than 100,000 people, which illustrates the important role of the Maori monarchy in Maori attempts to achieve unity and to reestablish Maori sovereignty in contemporary New Zealand. On the day of her funeral the Maori queen was succeeded by her oldest son Tuheitia, who is of the sixth generation descending from the first king. Nowadays, Kingitanga activities are mainly characterized by two types of ceremonial gatherings, the poukai or loyalty gatherings, and the coronation anniversary celebrations. Every year, 28 poukai are held at traditional ceremonial centers or marae within the monarchy. Poukai primarily provide a communication platform at which old people reestablish links among Tainui tribes in ceremonial speeches. The coronation celebrations, in contrast, attract many visitors from beyond Tainui. Groups from around New Zealand take part in the sports and cultural competitions organized during this gathering, which is important for maintaining unity within Maori society.

These lasted until the end of 1864, after which the government moved to confiscate 3 million acres of Maori land, most of which belonged to the tribal confederation of the Maori king. After the wars, the then Maori king concentrated his activities on seeking redress for the confiscations, but, as a corollary, his own tribal interests soon became identified with the goal of the Kingitanga. This impression confronted the Maori king with great difficulties in acquiring support for his attempt to make the kingship a politically effective institution. Many tribes could not accept his self-constituted claim to rule over the entire North Island of New Zealand. Toward the end of the 19th century, the dissension among Maori tribes regarding the Maori King Movement sparked off a new movement to achieve Maori unity. In the 1890s, the size of the Maori population reached an absolute low, and some form of cooperation among Maori tribes was deemed necessary to offset the threat of total assimilation. The Maori members of Parliament therefore revived the kotahitanga movement of the 1850s and set up a Maori Parliament in June 1892 to present tribal and intertribal grievances to the government. The story of the Maori Parliament, however, does not amount to one of the most successful episodes in Maori history. European society was by now so well established that it could afford to neglect what it considered a separatist movement, and, even more problematic, many Maori people were scarcely interested in the Maori Parliament. Most people were looking for other avenues to solve their problems of poverty rather than the protest meetings of the Maori Parliament, which often stalled in bickering about tribal differences. The Maori Parliament was finally disbanded in 1902. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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The lack of motivation to participate in intertribal protest movements against European domination in the 1890s is intertwined with the emergence of a desire to transcend tribal differences. Throughout New Zealand, massive numbers of Maori people had entered paid employment after they lost their land. Many Maori people were thus meeting fellow Maori people from other tribal districts at work. This situation contributed to the emergence of an unprecedented strain of Maori nationalism, not in intertribal but in pan-tribal form.

Defining the Nation In the beginning of the 20th century, Maori political aspirations shifted from desires for the return of sovereignty toward equal rights for the Maori people as New Zealand citizens. The great advocators of the new political strategy were members of a students’ association from a Maori Anglican Boys College, the Te Aute College Students’ Association. The organization is commonly referred to as the Young Maori Party, although it never formed a political party. It was rather a group of educated individuals who operated politically, although some of them took up parliamentary seats. The Young Maori Party pleaded, first and foremost, for socioeconomic equality. At the same time, however, it aspired to retain a distinctive culture and identity within the boundaries of a society in which Maori and Europeans were to hold an equivalent status. The latter aim has become known as the policy of biculturalism. It involves a complementary—cultural—distinction between different nations within the same state. Thus, the Young Maori Party rephrased the previously political desire for a sovereign Maori nation in which each tribe was to

Sir Apirana Ngata Sir Apirana Ngata was arguably the first Maori leader who showed statesmanlike qualities. He was born in 1874 and became the first Maori to complete a university degree in 1893 and the youngest Maori to be admitted to the bar. In 1897 he was the most prominent speaker at the inaugural conference of the Te Aute College Students’ Association. Soon he entered the national scene, where he helped prepare the act that provided for the establishment of local Maori councils. In 1905 he became a member of parliament. He maintained his seat for 38 years. In 1908 he was elevated to the cabinet, and in 1928 he became “Native Minister.” As such, he became known for the introduction of land development schemes that set up incorporations, consolidated fragmented land titles, and developed unused land. These schemes gave a tremendous impetus to Maori farming. Ngata was also behind the establishment of a Maori School of Arts and Crafts at Rotorua, and he encouraged the construction of carved meetinghouses. This interest initiated a widespread revival of respect for traditional culture, for which he is probably best remembered.

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retain its own autonomy into an aspiration for a pan-tribal, predominantly cultural nation with a relatively autonomous status within the overarching European society. The new vision of Maoridom is most clearly exemplified by the innovative concept of Maoritanga. The term Maoritanga, or “Maoriness,” was coined to express the new creation of a Maori identity in the modern world. Initially the term Maoritanga was interpreted as a call for separatism, but it was meant to be applied in a context of “biculturalism.” The leader of the Young Maori Party, Apirana Ngata defined the term as an emphasis on the continuing individuality of the Maori people, the maintenance of such Maori characteristics and such features of Maori culture as present day circumstances will permit, the inculcation of pride in Maori history and traditions, the retention so far as possible of old-time ceremonial, the continuous attempt to interpret the Maori point of view to the pakeha [Europeans] in power. (1940, 176–177)

Maoritanga thus underpins a form of Maori nationalism that differs from 19thcentury tribal and intertribal initiatives to reacquire Maori sovereignty in that it appeals exclusively to pan-tribal sentiments. In the 20th century, it dominated Maori discourses of nationalism until the 1980s.

Narrating the Nation Understanding the meaning of Maoritanga is important for comprehending Maori nationalism in the 20th century. It should be realized that the very idea of the “Maori” as one people is of postcolonial origin. Before the arrival of European explorers and traders, the Maori had no name for themselves as a people, only a multiplicity of tribal names. Colonial interaction brought about the abstraction known as the Maori. Around 1800 the word maaori was first recorded as an adjective of taangata, meaning “usual,” “ordinary,” or “normal” people. Only after the 1850s did the word Maori become commonly used as a noun. From then on, Europeans were referred to as Pakeha, derived from the adjective paakehaa, meaning “foreign.” During the course of the 19th century, the concepts of Maori and Pakeha became gradually accepted, although as a political category Maori was not adopted until after the Young Maori Party had advocated pride in Maoritanga. For that reason, too, it is not surprising that the members of the Te Aute College Students’ Association were referred to as the Young Maori Party. Benedict Anderson (1983, 109) has commented that in nationalist discourses concepts of “young” and “youth” do not necessarily refer to age but signify instead “dynamism, progress, self-sacrificing idealism and revolutionary will.” In (post-)colonial circumstances, young and youth invariably refer to “the first generation in any significant numbers to have acquired a European education, marking them off linguistically and culturally from their parents’ generation” (ibid., author’s emphasis). In New N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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Zealand, too, the Young Maori Party consisted of individuals who without exception had been educated at a European school, which also explains why their campaigns for the improvement of Maori welfare were initially far from successful. The impact of European education on the political objectives of the Young Maori Party was controversial, and their innovations for promoting a pan-tribal concept of Maoritanga raised suspicions among tribal leaders. Forty years later, a well-known Tuhoe leader, the late John Rangihau expressed this widespread feeling as follows: There is no such thing as Maoritanga because Maoritanga is an all-inclusive term which embraces all Maoris. And there are so many different aspects about every tribal person. Each tribe has its own history. And it’s not a history that can be shared among others. . . . I have a faint suspicion that Maoritanga is a term coined by the Pakeha to bring the tribes together. Because if you cannot divide and rule, then for tribal people all you can do is unite them and rule. (1977, 174–175)

Thus, an influential tribal leader criticized the ideal of a pan-tribal nation as situated within a nation-state that aims at assimilating Maori nationalist thought. Indeed, the aspiration toward a pan-tribal Maori nation is inherently contradictory. However, the very contradiction in the pan-tribal conception of Maori nationalism also creates the possibility for divergent interpretations and representations of nationalist paradigms. This also explains why tribal conceptions of nationalism emerged again in the 1980s, when once again Maori protests against the subordinated position of the indigenous population within the liberal-democratic nation-state of New Zealand became more vocal. At the same time, however, the reemergence of tribal organizations at the vanguard of Maori struggles to regain sovereignty was paralleled by a renaissance of “traditional” Maori culture and language, partly inspired by the campaigns of the Young Maori Party. Many educational programs were introduced to revitalize the Maori language, and currently the language is being taught again in many schools and can be studied at all New Zealand universities. This new interest has also led to a growing corpus of Maori literature and a revival of the traditional arts. The performing arts, in particular, have resurged in many areas of New Zealand society, and Maori ceremonial protocol often plays an important role in public events in the country. Indeed, the Maori people have recently become very proud again of their culture, which enhances their nationalist aspirations.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Whereas the 19th century in New Zealand might be characterized as the period during which the Maori were dispossessed of their land, the 20th century could be characterized as the era of urbanization. The proportion of Maori people living in cities and boroughs increased from 10 percent in the 1930s to more than N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 4 (1989–PRESENT)

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80 percent in the 1970s. Maori began moving to urban environments in search of employment during the Great Depression, but they only qualified for the lowerskilled jobs. Maori therefore became an urban proletariat, which was hit the hardest when New Zealand moved into a long-term recession in the early 1970s. For that reason, too, a protest movement emerged in the cities calling for the recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi. The government responded in 1975 with the Treaty of Waitangi Act, which established the Waitangi Tribunal. This act enabled Maori to submit claims on the grounds of being “prejudicially affected” by any policy or practice of the Crown that was “inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty,” although “anything done or omitted before the commencement of [the] Act” was excluded from the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In spite of this limitation, the act vindicated Maori faith in the treaty and encouraged them to reinforce their protests. In 1985 the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal was eventually backdated from 1975 to 1840 when the treaty was signed. This amendment opened up an important avenue for Maori people to seek redress for past grievances. Soon after the expansion of its jurisdiction, the Waitangi Tribunal received some 1,200 Maori claims, most of which were submitted by tribal organizations. Although it is possible for any Maori, tribal or nontribal, to submit a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, most claims concern lands, forests, and fisheries, the ownership

Maori protestors are still demanding the recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi, which was signed between the British and the Maori in 1840. The treaty is crucial for Maori people since it protects their proprietary and civil rights, but it has been continuously violated by the New Zealand government. (Phil Walter/Getty Images)

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of which is claimed exclusively by tribes. In consequence, tribes dominate the debate on redressing violations of the treaty. And since this issue has become more topical over the past 20 years, it may be argued that the pan-tribal protest movement that emerged in the cities in the 1960s and 1970s sparked the reemergence of tribes in contemporary New Zealand. Most claims were triggered by the government’s move to transfer lands held in Crown ownership to semiprivate state-owned enterprises in the mid-1980s. Several tribes argued that this action prejudiced their possibilities to resolve long-standing grievances about their dispossession. The New Zealand Maori Council therefore filed an injunction to stop such transfers. This resulted in a judgment by the Court of Appeal, which on June 29, 1987, declared that the transfer of assets to state-owned enterprises would be unlawful without considering the policy in light of the Treaty of Waitangi. It was the first time in New Zealand history that the legality of the treaty was recognized. This judgment made it possible for Maori tribes to seek redress of their long-standing grievances and thus to regain sovereignty, at least to some extent. After years of negotiations between different Maori tribes and the New Zealand government, the settlement process was finally started in the mid-1990s and has made great progress since. In 1995 the first major compensation agreement was signed with the Waikato-Tainui tribes, the groups upholding the Maori monarchy since the crowning of Potatau in 1858. The deal included a formal apology from the Crown, acknowledging that it acted unjustly in dealing with the Kingites (supporters of the Maori monarchy) in the 1860s, and it provided for the return of 3 percent of the lands originally confiscated and a significant sum for compensation. Since the mid-1990s, several other compensation agreements have also been signed, notably with the Ngai Tahu on the South Island. All settlements have so far been reached with tribes. The returned lands, forests, and other natural re-

Foreshore and Seabed Controversy In recent history, Maoridom was most united in its opposition to legislation about the foreshore and the seabed. The saga began with a Court of Appeal ruling in June 2003 that enabled Maori to submit claims to the foreshore and seabed to the Maori Land Court. This decision raised the possibility that private titles might be issued, prompting fears that New Zealanders could be denied access to some beaches. Within a few days, the government announced its intention to remove the Maori Land Court’s jurisdiction to investigate Maori customary title over such areas and to legislate Crown ownership of the foreshore and seabed. In December 2004, the government passed an act into law in accordance with this policy. Maori people were united in their stance against this act, and a historic protest march was held. A professor of Maori studies from Auckland even suggested that the controversy could lead to a civil war. The Maori minister Tariana Turia resigned from the government and set up a new political party, the Maori Party. The future will tell whether this party may prove successful in surmounting Maori tribal differences.

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sources are used for tribal development programs that aim at restoring sovereignty in rural areas. The ultimate aim is to persuade urban Maori to return to their tribal homes. Notwithstanding the progress being made with redressing long-standing Maori grievances, the settlement process remains controversial since the government negotiates settlements only with tribal organizations, whereas 80 percent of the Maori population is currently living in urban environments in which tribal connections have lost a great deal of meaning. The debate about the settlement process for tribes versus pan-tribal organizations in the cities reflects the differences in the meaning of Maori nationalism for different sections of the population. Maori tribes are currently seeking redress for their loss of sovereignty in the 19th century, and when they manage to negotiate a satisfactory compensation agreement with the government, their aspirations to achieve Maori nationalism may be partly fulfilled. Maori people in cities, however, have been shaping their pan-tribal identities since the beginning of the 20th century, and they continue their demand for participation in the negotiations over grievances on the history of Maori dispossession and the associated loss of sovereignty. Their struggle for a Maori nation within the state of New Zealand is reinforced by the cultural renaissance initiated by the Young Maori Party. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London/New York: Verso. Awatere, Donna. 1984. Maori Sovereignty. Auckland, New Zealand: Broadsheet Publications. Cox, Lindsay. 1993. Kotahitanga: The Search for Maaori Political Unity. Auckland, New Zealand: Oxford University Press. Fitzgerald, Thomas K. 1977. Education and Identity: A Study of the New Zealand Maori Graduate. Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Council for Educational Research. Kawharu, I. H., ed. 1989. Waitangi: Maaori and Paakehaa Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi. Auckland, New Zealand: Oxford University Press. King, Michael. 2003. The Penguin History of New Zealand. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin. Meijl, Toon van. 1993. “The Maori King Movement: Unity and Diversity in Past and Present.” Bijdragen tot the taal-, land- en volkenkunde 149: 673–689. Melbourne, Hineani, ed. 1995. Maori Sovereignty: The Maori Perspective. Auckland, New Zealand: Hodder Moa Beckett. Ngata, Apirana. 1940. “Tribal Organization.” In The Maori People Today: A General Survey, edited by I. L. G. Sutherland, 155–181. Wellington, New Zealand: Whitcombe & Tombs. Orange, Claudia. 1987. The Treaty of Waitangi. Wellington, New Zealand: Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson. Rangihau, John. 1977. “Being Maori.” In “Te Ao Hurihuri,” The World Moves On: Aspects of Maoritanga, 2nd ed., edited by Michael King, 165–175. Auckland, New Zealand: Longman Paul. Walker, Ranginui. 1990. Ka Whaiwhai Tonu Matou: Struggle without End. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin. Williams, John A. 1969. Politics of the New Zealand Maori: Protest and Cooperation, 1891–1909. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press.

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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold indicate a main entry for that subject, and numbers in italic refer to the sidebar text on that page. Aasen, Ivar, 226 Abacha, Sani, 1188 Abayomi, Kofo, 1180 Abbas, Ferhat, 1099 Abbas, Gulam, 1763 Abbas, Mahmoud, 1142 Abbas II (Egypt), 261 Abbas the Great, Shah, 1108, 1113 Abd-ul-Ilah, 1745 Abdallah, King (Transjordan), 728, 729 Abdelkader, Emir, 1098, 1099, 1102 Abduh, Muhammad, 731 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman Empire), 764, 765 Abdullah, Farooq, 1767, 1768, 1770 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 1142 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, 1761, 1761, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766–1767 Abiola, Moshood, 1188 Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 1847, 1851 Aborigines, Australian, 932. See also Pan-Aboriginalism Abrams, Lynn, 53 Abyssinia, 736–737, 739 Aceh, 954, 1468, 1734 Achebe, Chinua, 913, 914, 917, 920, 921, 925 Acton, Lord, 687 Adams, Abigail, 50 Adenauer, Konrad, 947, 973–974, 1549 Adivar, Halide Edib, 770 Afghanistan, 1683–1695, 1684 (map) and education, 1388–1389 Germany and terrorists in, 1554 invasion of, 1497 and music, 1440 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Soviet Union, 954 and terrorism, 1488 and women, 904, 1457 Aflaq, Michel, 731, 732, 733, 981, 1740 Africa and colonialism, 890 education in, 39–40, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 431 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence/separatist movements in, 1461, 1464, 1468–1469

literature/language in, 919–920, 925–927 and music, 1440 and religion, 108 and socialism, 980–981 supranational organizations and, 962, 965 See also specific African nations African Americans, 493–494 Afrikaner nationalism, 1144–1153 Afzelius, Arvid August, 73 Agathangelos, 1706 Aghulon, Maurice, 49 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 1245 Aguirre, José Antonio, 1515–1516 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar, 1741 Ahmad Shah, 1686, 1691 Ahmadinejad, Mahmmoud, 1117 Ahmed, Imam, 739, 743 Aho, Juhani, 605 Aidoo, Ama Ata, 927 Aizawa Seishisai, 810–811, 813–814, 814, 815 Akbar, 802 Akçura, Yusuf, 766, 770, 771, 773 Akhmatova, Anna, 1074 Akhmetov, Renat, 1625 Aksakov, K. S., 692 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 261 al-Alayili, Shaykh Abdallah, 732, 733 al-Azmah, Yusuf, 728 al-Azmeh, Aziz, 725 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hasan, 756 al-Banna, Hassan, 984, 985 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 731, 981 al-Bustani, Butrus, 731 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1139 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim, 1136 al-Husri, Sati, 730, 732–733, 751 al-Jawahiri, Mohammad Mahdi, 1740 al-Jazairi, Amir Abd al-Qadir, 727 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 753 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman, 727 al-Miqdadi, Darwish, 734 al-Nashshashibi, Raghib, 1136 Al Qaeda, 986–987, 1484, 1488, 1492 and Pakistan, 1232 al-Qaysi, Nuri Ali Hammudi, 1741 Al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, 1488–1489

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I-2 al-Said, Nuri, 753 al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Adb, 984 Alamán, Lucas, 352 Albéniz, Isaac, 1437 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 275, 276 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 840, 840 (illus.), 841, 844, 845, 846 Alem, Leandro, 281 Alevi, 1650–1651, 1653, 1654–1655 Alexander I, Czar (Russia), 20–21, 209, 211, 1576 Alexander I (Bulgaria), 578 Alexander II, Czar (Russia), 210, 598 Alexander III, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Alford, Kenneth J., 1442 Alfred the Great, King (England), 165 Algeria, 1094–1105, 1096 (map) and colonialism, 48 diaspora population of, 1371 and France, 1050–1051 and independence, 1464, 1490 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1496 and women, 903 Ali, Monica, 927 Ali, Muhammad, 258–259, 263 Aliyev, Heidar, 1715, 1720 Aliyev, Ilham, 1715 Allende, Salvador, 331 Almirall, Valentí, 703, 710 Alsace, 475, 1501–1510, 1503 (map) Althusser, Louis, 486, 1052 Amami Island, 1754 Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 1684, 1686, 1688, 1689 Amazon basin, 1827–1831, 1829 Ambedkar, B. R., 802, 1204–1205 Ambrose, Stephen, 905 American Revolution, 21 and Canada, 299 and education, 32 gender roles and, 45–46, 50 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 Americanization, and Puerto Rico, 841 Americas and language, 478 and music, 75–76, 1432 nationalism and gender in, 44 See also Central America; North America; South America Amharanization, 739, 741, 742 Amin, Hafizullah, 1687 Amir, Yigal, 1400, 1403 Amrane-Minne, Daniele Djamila, 903 Anatolian movement, 1646, 1646 Andersen, Hans Christian, 228 Anderson, Benedict, 25 and diaspora populations, 1368–1369, 1370

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and the “imagined political community,” 475, 481, 912, 1342 and Latin America, 826 and national symbols, 122, 900 on print technology, 129, 485, 1475 on the realistic novel, 923 on “young” and “youth,” 1859 Andic, Helmut, 545 Andrade, Mário de, 1662, 1662 Angell, Norman, 532 Anger, Carl, 228 Anglo-Boer Wars, 198, 204, 449, 490, 1146 and Canada, 305–306, 306 Anglo-Burmese wars, 776 Anglo-Chinese war, 27 Anglo-Nepal war, 1805 Angola, 968, 1657–1667, 1658 (map) and Cuba, 1285 and independence, 1464 Anjala Conspiracy, 223 Ankara, Turkey, 770–772 Anthem, national, 68, 116, 117, 1430, 1431, 1442–1444 and Basques, 1521 and Belgium, 145 and Brazil, 294 and Burma, 782 and Canada, 303 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and the EU, 1042 and France, 175, 1502 and Germany, 619 and Indonesia, 1732 and Japan, 1756, 1757 and Mexico, 354 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 1184, 1186–1187 and Poland, 211, 215 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 230, 230 and the United States, 1308 and Uruguay, 401 Anthias, Floya, 902 Anti-Catholicism, and England, 163, 166 Anti-free-trade movements, 1448 Anti-Semitism, 439, 447, 517, 520–521, 907 and Bulgaria, 582 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and France, 179 and Hungary, 639, 645 in Turkey, 1649 and Ukraine, 1078 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Zionism as reaction to, 1121, 1128 Antiabortion movement, 1446

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Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism, 912–928, 957–970 and Algeria, 1095, 1100 and Angola, 1658, 1664 and Burma, 777, 779, 780–781, 782, 783 and China, 1191, 1193, 1196, 1198–1199, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157–1158, 1163 and Gandhi, 1203 and India, 131, 796, 800–801 and Iran, 1110, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 753, 1739, 1740 and Malaysia, 1216 and nationalism, 26–27, 47–48, 486–487, 1461–1465 and Nigeria, 1178–1179 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 840 and Vietnam, 1269 and women’s rights, 457 Anticommunism, 520, 1310, 1394 Anticosmopolitanism, 415 Antinuclear-power movements, 1449 Antiracist movements, 1457 Antislavery, 161, 163 Antwerp, Belgium, 200 Apartheid, 1151–1153 Appadurai, Arjun, 136, 1374–1375 Aquino, Benigno, 1242, 1242 Aquino, Corazon (Cory), 1242, 1242, 1244 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 729, 1125, 1129, 1135, 1136, 1139–1140 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 1137, 1394–1395 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 1039 Arab League, 726 (map) Arab nationalism, 724–734, 726 (map), 965, 981 and Iraq, 751–752, 753, 754, 754, 757–758, 1739 Arabs, in Turkey, 1650–1651 Arafat, Yasir, 1136–1137, 1141, 1142, 1488–1489 Aral Sea, 882 Arana, Sabino de, 704, 709, 710, 1515 Arason, Jón, 228 Araucanian Indians, 323, 324–326 Arcand, Denys, 1294 Arce, Mariano José, 317–318 Architecture, 30, 37, 407–408, 409, 413, 414–415 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Brussels, 144 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1024 and Malaysia, 1224 and Russia, 692–693 and Turkey, 770–771 Arena y Goiri, Sabino, 1294 Argentina, 268–281, 270 (map) and film, 1335 immigration and national identity in, 492 and music, 1439, 1443 national identity and education in, 39 Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 755 Arif, Abd al-Salam, 754–755 Aristocracy, 5–9

Aristotle, 529 Armageddon, 1394 Armenia, 1696–1711, 1698 (map) and Azerbaijan, 1719 and diaspora populations, 1376 and the Soviet Union, 946 Armenian Apostolic Church, 1699–1700, 1701 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 1718–1719. See also Gharabagh conflict ethnic cleansing/genocide of, 438, 523 and the Ottoman Empire, 764, 765 and Turkey, 1648–1649 Arminius (Hermann), 618 Armstrong, John, 1368 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 187, 1504 Arne, Thomas, 1438 Arnim, Achim von, 73 Arnold, Matthew, 915 Árpád (chief), 643 Art, 16–17, 49, 405–409, 412–417 and Australia, 859–860 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1522 and Canada, 305, 1841 and Finland, 605 and France, 177 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569 historic paintings of Denmark, 154 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127 and the Maori, 1860 and Mongolia, 1794 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Poland, 212, 216, 682 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 402 and Wales, 1637 See also Culture; Landscape Artigas, José Gervasio, 397–398, 401, 402 Asbjørnsen, Peter C., 228 Ashoka, Emperor (India), 802, 1815–1816 Asia and education, 39–40, 428 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence movements in, 1461–1463, 1465–1468 and language, 478 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Asian countries Asquith, Herbert, 868 Assimilation, 29, 522, 931–932 and Australian Aborigines, 858 and China, 1196, 1199 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 and Ethiopia, 744–746

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Assimilation (continued ) and Hungary, 644 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 866 and Poland, 685 and the Sami, 1612–1613 and Turkey, 768, 1647, 1652 and Ukrainians, 716 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Education Asylum and the EU, 1042 and Germany, 1556, 1557, 1558–1559 See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Atahualpa, 373 Atatürk. See Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) Atlee, Clement, 1461 Atwood, Margaret, 1841 Auber, Daniel, 144 Audubon, John James, 389 Augustina of Aragon, 51 Aung San, 784, 785 (illus.) Aung San Suu Kyi, 784 Austin, John, 1372 Australia, 849–860, 851 (map) and Aborigines, 932, 1844–1853 communication in, 1473 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1375 and education, 1379, 1382 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigration, 883, 1420–1421 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 Macedonians in, 1415 and music, 1439 and new social movements, 1448 and New Zealand, 865 Austria, 539–554, 543 (map) education and, 33–34, 35, 36, 429 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 442 fascism in, 516 and German unification, 192 and Hungary, 638 and Poland, 210 politics and political philosophy in, 535, 1410 Austro-Hungarian empire. See Habsburg empire Autonomy, 899, 939–940 and Armenia, 1698 and Basques, 1516, 1517, 1522 and Catalonia, 1536, 1544–1547 and China, 1200 and the EU, 1041–1042 and Greenland, 1562–1563 and minorities, 1357–1358 and Nepal, 1805 and Pakistan, 1232 and Poland, 679 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 843, 845–847 and Spain, 707, 707–708, 708, 711, 1084–1085, 1088, 1090–1091

Avellaneda, Nicolas, 280 Awolowo, Obafemi, 1180, 1182, 1182, 1183 Ayala, Julio César Turbay, 833 Ayubi, Nazih, 734 Azaña, Manuel, 705 Azerbaijan, 469, 1713–1721, 1714 (map) and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1078–1079 and Turkey, 769 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 1180, 1180, 1183 Aznar, José María, 1544 Aznavour, Charles, 1707 Aztecs, 345–346, 351–352 Ba Maw, 779–780, 785 Ba’ath Party, 731, 981 and Iraq, 753, 754, 756, 1740–1741, 1743, 1745, 1746 Babangida, Ibrahim, 1188 Babenberg monarchy, 539–541 Babenco, Hector, 1334–1335 Babeuf, François-Noël, 1489 Bache, Otto, 228 Bachyns’kyi, Yulian, 722 Bacon, Sir Francis, 61 Bagehot, Walter, 162–163 Bahais, 1113, 1118 Bainimarama, Frank, 1324, 1325 Bakongo, 1660–1664, 1664 Bakshi, Gulam Mohammad, 1766 Baku, 1716 Bakunin, M., 38 Balakirev, Mili, 75, 79, 80, 82, 1437 Baldorioty de Castro, Román, 839 Balearic Islands, 1546 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 1183, 1185 Bali, 1440 Balkan nations, 435, 436 Balkan Wars, 437 and Bulgaria, 572, 580 and Turkey, 1645 Baltic states, 555–568, 559 (map), 1573 (map) independence, 503 and new social movements, 1449 racism in the, 518 and the Soviet Union, 946, 955, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1581–1582 Bancroft, George, 389 Bandaranaike, Nathan, 1467 Bandera, Stepan, 718, 1624 Bandung Conference (1955), 958–962, 964–965, 1206 Bangladesh, 1201, 1234, 1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1466 Bano, Shah, 1209 Bao Dai, 1264 Barassi, Ron, 857 Barbosa, José Celso, 839, 841 Barceló, Antonio, 840 Barcelona, 1539–1540

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Barker, Ernest, 531–532, 535 Baron, Beth, 264 Barons, Krišj¯anis, 564, 1577, 1577, 1578 Barrès, Maurice, 416 Barrios, Agustín (“Mangoré”), 365, 365 Barruel, Abbé, 45 Barry, Brian, 97 Barry, Sir Charles, 408 Barthes, Roland, 1052 Bartók, Béla, 1435 Basanáviˇcius, Father Jonas, 567 Basarab, 1592 Basedow, Johann, 34 B˘asescu, Traian, 1589 Basques, 1512–1524, 1514 (map) concessions to, 932 and cultural survival, 878 and the ETA, 1090, 1091–1092 and language, 477, 482 and the mixing of ethnic and civic nationalisms, 938–939 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1470, 1471 and Spain, 702–711, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1496 Batavian Republic, 197, 198 Batista, Fulgencio, 1276, 1277 Batman, John, 1845 Battle of Kosovo (1389), 100 Battle of Maysalun, 728 Battle of Yungay, 327–328 Battle y Ordóñez, José, 403 Bauer, Otto, 535, 1071 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1368 Baumer, Gertrude, 453 Bavaria, 621, 631 Beatrix, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Becker, Nikolas, 189–190 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 16, 117, 185, 186–187, 1431, 1432 Beg, Mirza, 1763 Begin, Menachem, 1488–1489 Bejarano, Jorge, 830 Belarusia, 1079 Belaúnde, Victor Andrés, 373, 375 Belgian Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Belgium, 137–146, 141 (map) colonialist policies of, 958, 968, 1464 and Congo/Zaïre, 437, 1156–1158, 1160 fascism in, 517 and language, 472 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1678 secession from the Netherlands, 197 Bello, Ahmadu, 1182, 1185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 1099, 1100 Ben Bouali, Hassiba, 1099 Ben-Gurion, David, 953, 1123, 1128 Bendjedid, Chadli, 1099 Beneš, Edvard, 587, 588, 588, 596, 596 (illus.), 1017 and World War II, 595, 1019

Bengalil, 1466 Benkheddda, Benyoucef, 1100 Bennett, Louise, 913, 921 Bennett, Robert Russell, 1433 Bentham, Jeremy, 19, 855 Berbers, 1101 Berg, Christian, 153 Berkl¯aus, Edvards, 1578 Berlin, Isaiah, 97 Berlioz, Hector, 1431, 1435 Bernstein, Leonard, 1439 Berra, Francisco, 402 Betances, Ramón Emeterio, 839–840, 841 Bethlen, Count István, 638 Bhabha, Homi, 914, 927 Bhanubhakta Acharya, 1807 Bhimsen Thapa, 1806–1807 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 1466 Bhutto, Benazir, 1231, 1398 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 1231, 1767 Biafra, 1469 Biblical texts, 473–474 Biculturalism, and the Maori, 1858–1859 Biehl, Janet, 882–883 Bierstadt, Albert, 65, 389 Billig, Michael, 121, 479 bin-Laden, Osama, 986–987, 1399, 1400 Bingham, George Caleb, 389 Biogenetics, 883 Bioregionalism, 879 Birendra, King (Nepal), 1808, 1809 Bismarck, Otto von, 24, 150, 192–193, 436, 611 and Alsace, 1505 monuments to, 410–411 and Poland, 678 Bjørnson, Bjørnstjerne, 78, 228, 230 Blake, Christopher, 1439 Blanc, Louis, 239 Blest Gana, Alberto, 329 Block, Alexander, 1602 Bluetooth, Harald, 226 Boer Wars. See Anglo-Boer Wars Boers. See Afrikaner nationalism Bohemia, 584, 1022 and Hussitism, 1023 and music, 1435–1436 Boland, Eavan, 926 Bolger, Dermot, 927 Bolivar, Simón, 16, 272, 370, 825, 831 Bolivia, 371–372, 1443 Bolognesi, Francisco, 377 Bolshevik Revolution, 436, 520, 593 Bolsheviks, and religion, 106 Bonald, Louis de, 178, 179 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 16, 26, 34, 175, 176–177, 474 as father figure, 51 and the French national anthem, 1443 and Haiti, 336 and Switzerland, 248

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Boniface, Pope, 100 Bonifacio, Andres, 1245–1246 Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José, 287–289, 290, 292 Borden, Robert, 306 Borders, 460–461, 966, 967, 968 and Afghanistan, 1684–1685, 1689 in Africa, 1464, 1469 and Algeria, 1096 and Armenia, 1697–1699, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 562–563, 1582 and Basque Country, 1513, 1514 (map) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 289, 1831 and Bulgaria, 574 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 298 in Central America, 316 and the collapse of communism, 1413 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Denmark, 152 and Egypt, 262 and Ethiopia, 740, 742 and the European Union, 1042 and Fiji, 1318 and Finland, 598 and France, 175 and Germany, 187–188 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 639–640 and Indonesia, 1729–1730 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1738–1739 and Ireland, 655 and Israel, 1124–1125, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1771 and Japan, 1753 and language, 471, 474–475, 477 Mexican, 353 (map) and Mongolia, 1792 and Nepal, 1805 and the Netherlands, 199 and Paraguay, 359, 362 and Peru, 368, 371 and Poland, 212–213, 685 and Romania, 1591 and Russia, 1599 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669 and Scandinavia, 225 and Scotland, 236 and South Africa, 1145 Spain/France, 1513 and Taiwan, 1255 and Turkey, 768, 769, 1647 and Ukraine, 713–714, 719, 1620 and the United States, 390, 1390 and Uruguay, 395 and Wales, 1636 and the War of the Pacific, 376 (map)

after World War I, 514, 524 See also Expansionism Borglum, Gutzon, 65, 411 Borneo, 1218–1220 Borodin, Aleksandr, 78–79, 82, 417, 1437 Bosanquet, Bernard, 534–535 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 806 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1358, 1409, 1525–1535, 1526 (map) Bosse, Abraham, 62 Botero, Fernando, 832 Botev, Hristo, 573, 576–577 Botha, Pieter Willem, 1152 Botswana, 1443 Bouchard, Lucien, 1292 Boudiaf, Mohammed, 1099 Boudicca, Queen (England), 165 Bouhired, Djamila, 1099 Boumaza, Djamila, 1099 Boumedienne, Houari, 890, 1099, 1100, 1100 Boundaries. See Borders Boupacha, Djamila, 1099 Bourassa, Henri, 306, 1289, 1293–1294, 1296 Bourassa, Robert, 1291 Bourbon reforms, 350, 371 Bourgeoisie, 12, 585, 626. See also Elites Bourguiba, Habib, 1464 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 1099, 1100 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 333, 337, 340, 342 Bracken, Thomas, 868 Bradley, F. H., 531 Bradman, Sir Donald, 857 Brahms, Johannes, 117 Brandt, Willy, 976 Brathwaite, Kamau, 917, 921 Brazil, 282–297, 284 (map), 1824–1832, 1826 (map) and the Amazon, 876 and the arts, 1334–1335, 1439 and colonialism, 889 and Uruguay, 396–397 Brazilian Portuguese, 478 Brentano, Clemens, 73 Bretagne, 1490 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1026, 1076–1077 Brinker, Hans, 204 Bristow, George, 76 British North America Act, 300, 300 Britishness, 159, 162, 167 and Scotland, 233 Britten, Benjamin, 1434 Brock, Sir Isaac, 304 Brooklyn Bridge, 128, 134 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom, 164 Brussels, 144 Buddhism and Asian political identity, 972 and Burma, 779, 780 and Japan, 106 and Mongolia, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1798

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and politics, 983, 988 and Tibet, 1815–1817, 1821, 1822 Buenos Aires, 395–396, 397 Buhari, Muhammadu, 1187 Bulgakov, M. A., 697 Bulgaria, 437, 570–582 Bull, John, 117 Burghers, Thomas, 1150 Buriats, 1784, 1785, 1788–1795, 1791 Burke, Edmund, 89, 162, 1489 Burlington, Lord, 62 Burma, 776–785, 1370 Burnley, I. H., 883 Burns, E. Bradford, 292 Burns, Robert, 73, 238 Burschenschaften, 187 Burundi. See Rwanda and Burundi Bush, George H. W., 1306, 1395 Bush, George W., 1306, 1347, 1395–1396, 1453 Bushnell, David, 834 Bustamante, Carlos María de, 350, 352 Byron, Lord, 631 Cabero, Alberto, 330 Cabinda, 1660 Cabral, Amílcar, 1661 Cáceres, Andrés A., 377 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth, 53, 57 Cakobau, King (Fiji), 1318 Calhoun, John C., 390 Caliphate, 760–761 Cambó, Francesc, 706, 710 Cambodia, 1463 Camden, William, 61 Camphausen, Wilhelm, 408 Canada, 298–307, 301 (map), 1289 (map), 1372, 1834–1842, 1836 (map) communication in, 1473 education and, 424, 428, 429, 1383–1384 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigrants/immigration, 1415, 1418–1419, 1420 and indigenous groups, 1566 and music, 1441 and national symbols, 1344, 1346, 1347–1348 and natural resources, 884 and Nunavut, 1562 and Québec, 1288–1297 railroad in, 127 and sports, 993, 1000–1001 and technology, 1477–1478 Canal, Boisrond, 338 Cannadine, David, 1009 Capitalism and Korea, 1778–1779 and Social Democrats, 976 See also Economy; Globalization Captaincy General of Guatemala, 310, 314 Carbó, Eduardo Posada, 834 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 1829

Carducci, Giousè, 671 Carey, Henry, 117 Caribbean, 838 (map), 1274 (map) Carmichel, Franklin, 1841 Carnegie, Andrew, 239 Carpathian Ukraine, 716 Carr, E. H., 23, 536–537 Carr, Emily, 1841 Carrera, José Miguel, 326 Carrera, Rafael, 315, 318 Carretero, Luis, 711 Carter, Jimmy, 1395 Cartier, Georges-Etienne, 1288 Cartography. See Maps Castile, 1083, 1537 Castilla, Ramón, 372 Castillo, Florencio, 317 Castro, Arturo, 830 Castro, Fidel, 834, 942, 952, 1276, 1278–1279, 1278 (illus.), 1279, 1286 Castro, Raúl, 1279, 1286 Catalonia, 1413, 1415, 1536–1547, 1538 (map) and language, 477 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1091 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and Spain, 702–711, 708, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1490 Catherine the Great, 19–20 Catholicism. See Eastern Orthodox Church; Roman Catholicism Caupolicán (chief), 326 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 669, 673 Ceau¸sescu, Nicolae, 952, 1585, 1589, 1591, 1594 Cederström, Gustaf, 228 ˇ Celakovský, František Ladislav, 73 Celis, Carlos Uribe, 832 Celman, Miguel Juárez, 280 Celtic languages, 471, 472, 477 Celts, 236–237 Central America, 309–321, 312 (map), 838 (map), 1274 (map) Central American Common Market, 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 896, 1746, 1821 Ceremonies, 1347–1348 and Burma, 782 and France, 176 and Iran, 1114–1115 and nationalistic art, 411, 417 See also Holidays/festivals Cervantes, Ignacio, 76 Césaire, Aimé, 488, 917, 919 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de, 1275, 1282 Chabrier, Emmanuel, 1437 Chaco War, 360, 363, 365 Chadwick, George, 76 Chamberlain, H. St., 41 Channing, Edward Tyrell, 389 Charents, Yeghishe, 1707 Charles III (Spain), 350

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Charles V (Habsburg), 196 Charles XII (Sweden), 226 Charrúas Indians, 394 Chartists, 161, 164 Chatterji, Bankimchandra, 800 Chaudhry, Mahendra, 1323, 1324 Chaves, Julio César, 364 Chávez, Carlos, 76, 1439 Che Guevara, Ernesto, 942, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1286 Chechens, ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 441 Chechnya and Russia, 897, 1080, 1597, 1605–1607 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 Chen Duxiu, 789, 793 Chen Shui-bian, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1259 Chenrezig (God of Compassion), 1816, 1817 Chernobyl disaster, 954, 1078, 1457 Cherono, Stephen (Saif Saeed Shaheen), 1001 Chiang K’ai-shek, 791, 792, 794, 1250, 1251, 1251 (illus.) Chibás, Eduardo, 1282 Chile, 39, 323–331, 325 (map) and Peru, 377 China, 787–795, 788 (map), 1190–1200, 1192 (map) and Angola, 1664 anticolonialism in, 27 and the Cold War, 942–943 and colonialism, 890 and communism/Maoism, 952, 977, 978 and diaspora populations, 1372–1373 education and, 426, 1386–1387 and film, 1339 and India, 1210 and Indonesia, 1729 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762 and Japan, 809, 815, 1749, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 and Korea, 1780, 1781 and language, 472, 478, 481 and Mongolia, 1784, 1785, 1786–1788, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1794, 1795–1796 and music, 1440 and population transfers, 876 and religion, 108 separatism within, 1468 and the Soviet Union, 948, 979 and Taiwan, 1251, 1252–1253, 1256, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1462 and Tibet, 1813, 1814–1815, 1818–1821, 1823 and the United States, 1395 and Vietnam, 1263, 1266 Chinese in Japan, 1753 in Malaysia, 1215, 1216, 1385, 1463 in New Zealand, 867 See also Singapore Chipenda, Daniel, 1662, 1662 Cho Man Sik, 1773

Choibalsang, Marshal (Mongolia), 1789, 1792, 1797, 1798 Choinom, R., 1794 Chopin, Frédéric, 74, 81, 212, 214, 216, 686, 1434–1435 Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 1078, 1626 Chou Wen-chung, 1440 Choueiri, Youssef, 730 Christian III (Denmark), 226 Christian IV (Denmark), 226 Christian Coalition, 1395 Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International, 973–975 Christianity and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1706 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and Fiji, 1318 and fundamentalism, 1392, 1393 and the Philippines, 1239 and South Africa, 1148–1149 See also specific Christian religions Christophe, Henry, 337, 340 Chrysanthemum Revolution, 638 Chubais, Anatoly, 1597 Church, Frederic Edwin, 65 Churchill, Winston, 950, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1034, 1461 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 1283 Cinema, 133, 417–418, 497, 1327–1340 and Algeria, 1102 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and France, 1053 and Mongolia, 1794 and Québec, 1294 related to World War II, 1434 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1675 and the Soviet Union, 1075–1076 and the United States, 951–952 See also Theater Cintrón, Rosendo Matienzo, 841, 845–846 Citizenship, 930, 934–936 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 1851 and the Baltic states, 568 and Brazil, 293 and Canada, 298, 1835 and Central America, 320 and Czech Republic, 1027 and Denmark, 154–155 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1366, 1371–1372, 1374, 1376 and the EU, 1041, 1042 and forms of nationalism, 488, 1354 and France, 171, 1050 and gender/sexuality, 444, 446, 909 and Germany, 188, 620, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559 and globalization, 1409

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and Haiti, 335, 338 and immigration, 1419–1420 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 669 and Japan, 1752, 1753 and Malaysia, 1216, 1217, 1223 and Mongolia, 1796, 1798 and Peru, 371, 372–373 and Poland, 207 and Puerto Rico, 836, 843 and Ukraine, 1624 and the United States, 1398, 1401 and Uruguay, 400–401 and Wales, 1639 ˇ Ciurlionis, Mikolajus Konstantinas, 565 Civil rights movement, U.S., 124, 944, 965, 1300–1303, 1304, 1305, 1310 Civil war and Angola, 968, 1658–1659, 1663, 1666 and China, 790 and collapse of communism, 895, 896 and Colombia, 829, 833, 834 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Iraq, 757 and newly independent states, 968 and Nigeria, 967, 1185, 1185 and Palestine, 1142–1143 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and Spain, 707, 711, 1088 and the United States, 382, 391 See also Conflict/violence Civilis, Gaius Julius, 203 Class, 1–12 and Afghanistan, 1692–1693 and Angola, 1661 and Argentina, 280 and Brazil, 285 and Bulgaria, 571 and Catalan nationalism, 1537–1538 and Central America, 311 and Chile, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330–331 and China, 1194–1195, 1195, 1196, 1197 education, nationalism, and, 423, 427, 431, 478–479, 481 and Egypt, 265 and ethnic conflict, 892–893, 895, 897–898 and Finland, 601 gender, nationalism, and, 55–56 and Germany, 611 and Great Britain, 163–164 and Greece, 625 and Haiti, 334, 339 and Hungary, 644–645 and India, 131, 1204–1205 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 755, 1739 and Italy, 669–670 and Mongolia, 1795 and Québec, 1292–1293 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222

and social movements, 1452, 1454, 1456 and Soviet ideology, 693–694 and Spain, 709 and the United States, 1305 and Uruguay, 397, 403 Clavigero, Francisco Xavier, 350, 351, 351 Clay, Henry, 388–389 Clientelism, Iraq and, 750, 750–751, 755, 755, 756 Clifford, James, 1368 Clinton, William, 1408 Cloots, Anacharsis, 86 Clos, Joan, 1541 Coates, Eric, 1433 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 516 Cohen, Leonard, 1296 Cohen, Robin, 1672 Cohn, Roy, 908 Cold War, 525, 942–956, 975–979 and Angola, 1658 and Austria, 550 and Canada, 1840 and Eritrea, 1174 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 442 Europe and the end of the, 1043–1044 and Great Britain, 1012 and Indonesia, 1733, 1734 and Italy, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750 and Korea, 1772, 1773 and the Philippines, 1241 and separatist movements, 1465 and sexuality, 907–908 and sports, 994 and Tibet, 1821 and the United States, 1039, 1303, 1310 See also Nonaligned movement Cole, Thomas, 389 Collins, Bob, 1849 Colombel, Noel, 338 Colombia, 39, 824–834, 827 (map) Colonialism/imperialism, 25, 26, 489, 530, 958, 1301, 1303 and Algeria, 1098 and Angola, 1659 and Arab nationalism, 728–729, 734 and Australia, 855 and Basques, 1513 and Brazil, 283–285 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 299 and Chile, 323–324 and China, 1190 and Congo/Zaïre, 1156–1158, 1160 and diaspora populations, 1364 education and, 419, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 430, 431 and England/Great Britain, 161, 165–167, 490–491, 1005–1007 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737–740

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Colonialism/imperialism (continued ) and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889, 893 and European nationalism, 513–514 and Fiji, 1314–1316 and France, 178, 1050–1051, 1056 and gender, 54–55, 447–448 and Germany, 621 and Greenland, 1566, 1568 and Haiti, 339 and indigenous cultures, 1337 and Indochina, 1264 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1730 and Iraq, 749 and Italy, 665, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 815, 821–822, 1749, 1751 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language/literature, 479–480, 912–913, 914–917 and the Maori, 1859 and the Netherlands, 197–198 and Nigeria, 1178 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 and sports, 992 and Taiwan, 1253 and technology, 1478–1480 and terrorism, 1490 and Third World nationalisms, 1776 and the United States, 1310 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Expansionism Comenius, Jan Amos, 1028 Commonwealth Games, 996–997 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1079, 1715 Communication, 1473–1476 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 279 and Australia, 852 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and Basques, 1521 and Central America, 311, 315 and Colombia, 833 and globalization, 1414, 1416–1417 and ideologies, 972 and immigrants/diaspora populations, 1370, 1427 and India, 800 and Iraq, 1738 and Mexico, 354, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and New Zealand, 865 and Paraguay, 364 and Peru, 368

and the Philippines, 1238, 1247 and Polish nationalism, 216 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavian nationalism, 229 symbols in, 112, 122–123 technological advances in, 127–128, 129, 132, 135–136 and the United States, 388–389, 390 and Wales, 1639 See also Media Communism, 468–469, 944 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1689, 1690, 1693 and Angola, 1663 and anticolonial nationalism, 964 and Armenia, 1706, 1707 and Burma, 780 and China, 789–790, 791, 792, 793, 1190–1200, 1191, 1197 and the Cold War, 947–948, 976, 977–979 collapse of, 1413 and Cuba, 1276–1277, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020, 1022–1026 and France, 1053 and Indonesia, 1727, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 and Iraq, 753, 754, 755–756, 1745 and Korea, 1773 and Malaysia, 1216, 1223 and Romania, 1587–1588, 1589 and Singapore, 1218 versus socialism, 975–976 and Ukraine, 718 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1266, 1267, 1269 Companys, Lluís, 708 Compromise Agreement of 1867, 638 Conder, Charles, 859 Condorcet, Jean Marquis de, 53, 86, 370, 1351, 1362 Conflict/violence, 14–28, 436, 888–898, 929 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Algeria, 1095 and Basque nationalism, 1518, 1521 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527 and Brazil, 1831 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and competition among nation-states, 1032–1033 and education, 1388–1389 and Eritrea, 1172–1173, 1174–1175 and Finland, 606–607 and gender roles, 50–52, 449–450 in Germany, 1555, 1556–1557, 1559 and Gharabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh), 897, 1706, 1707–1709, 1711, 1715, 1718–1719 and ideological differences, 943–944, 977, 988–989 and India and Pakistan, 804–806, 950, 987, 1201, 1203, 1228, 1234–1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1461–1462, 1762, 1769

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and Indonesia, 1734 and instability in postindependent nations, 1469 and Iraq, 1742, 1746–1747 and Ireland/Northern Ireland, 649, 651–652, 662, 1058, 1059, 1060–1062, 1068 in Italy, 665 and the loss of optimism, 935–936 and Malaysia, 1216, 1220–1221, 1223 and minority issues, 939–940, 1412 and Mongolia, 1795–1796, 1796–1797 and natural resources/territory, 523–524, 883–886 in New Zealand, 1856–1857 and Nigeria, 1185 and the Ottoman Empire, 763–764 Palestinian/Israeli, 1129–1130, 1141 and the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 985–986, 1403 and rituals of belonging, 499, 503 role of diaspora populations in, 1365, 1415 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1673–1674, 1676–1677, 1679, 1680–1681 and separatism, 1460, 1465–1470, 1470–1471. See also Separatism/secession and South Africa, 1152–1153 and the Soviet Union, 1075, 1078–1079 and sports, 995 and Taiwan, 1256, 1256 and Tibet, 1823 in Turkey, 1649, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 722 and Vietnam, 1463 See also Civil war; Genocide; specific conflicts and wars; Terrorism Confucianism, 1270 Congo and Zaïre, 962–963, 1155–1165, 1156 (map), 1667, 1671–1672 and Angola, 1662 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and music, 1440 and separatist movements, 1469 Congress of Berlin, 578 Congress of Tucuman, 272, 273 Connolly, James, 652, 654 Connor, Walker, 931, 933 Conrad, Joseph, 489 Conscience, Hendrik, 145, 145 Constantinescu, Emil, 1589 Constantino, Renato, 1245 Consumerism and education, 1380 and image technology, 1339 and Korea, 1778–1779 and sports, 1001–1003 “Contract of the Century,” 1720–1721 Cook, James, 1855 Cook, Ramsay, 1842 Cooke, John Esten, 494

Cooper, James Fenimore, 389 Cooper, William, 1851 Copland, Aaron, 1439 Copps, Sheila, 1839 Copts, 265 Corbin, Margaret, 50 Cornejo, Mariano H., 374 Corradini, Enrico, 515 Corruption and Angola, 1665, 1666–1667 and Armenia, 1710 and the collapse of socialism, 895–896 and Congo/Zaïre, 1160 and Cuba, 1275, 1277, 1283 and Iran, 1111 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1768 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Palestinians, 1140, 1142 and the Philippines, 1243, 1244, 1247 and Québec, 1290, 1292 and Russia, 955 and the Soviet Union, 1076, 1079 and Spain, 704, 705, 1088 and Turkey, 1645, 1651 and Ukraine, 1628 Corsica, 1490 Cortés, Hernán, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 86–88, 97, 1350–1362 and Alsace, 1510 challenging cultural, 416 and Chile, 330 and globalization, 1409 and immigration, 1427–1428 versus national identities, 1342 and Russia, 82 Cossacks, 1620–1621 Costa, Emília Viotti da, 292 Costa Rica, 318, 321 Costa y Martínez, Joaquín, 705, 705 Coubertin, Pierre de, 991 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1502 Council of Europe, 1715 Counterterrorism, 1496–1498, 1757 Cowan, Charles, 235 Cox, Oliver, 1301 Coyer, Abbé, 32 Creole patriotism and Chile, 324, 326, 329 and Mexico, 349, 351, 351–352 and Peru, 369–370 Crete, 1440 Crime and Brazil, 1831 and Colombia, 834 and Iraq, 757 and Mongolia, 1797 and Pakistan, 1232 and the Philippines, 1243 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675

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Crime (continued ) versus terrorism, 1485, 1486. See also Terrorism and women, 904–905 See also Corruption Crimea, 1078, 1625 Crispi, Francesco, 737 Croatia borders of, 1413 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440, 524 fascism in, 516, 518 and language, 481 and new social movements, 1449, 1453 Croats, in Bosnia, 1527–1535 Cromer, Lord, 261 Cross, James, 1291 Cuba, 1273–1286 and Angola, 1658, 1663, 1665 and film, 1335 and music, 1441 Cui, Cesar, 82, 1437 Cultural diversity, 877–879. See also Multiculturalism Cultural revivalism, 407 Culture, 88–90, 92–93, 405–418, 506 and Alsace, 1509 and Argentina, 276, 277–279 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 854–856 and the Baltic states, 558–560, 558–561, 1578 and Basques, 705 and Brazil, 291–295, 296, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 575–577 and Canada, 1837–1842, 1843 and Catalonia, 706, 1537, 1542, 1543–1544 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Danish folk high schools, 151 education and standardization of, 420. See also Education and Egypt, 260, 264 and Ethiopia, 741, 742 and Finland, 599, 600 and France, 1050, 1052–1053 geopolitics and national, 461 German versus Austrian, 542–543 and Germany, 184, 186–187, 617–620 globalization and world, 1407. See also Globalization and Greece, 628, 629 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1728 and Ireland, 657–659 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 671–673 and Korea, 1778 and Malaysia, 1223 and the Maori, 1858, 1860 and Mongolia, 1790, 1793–1794, 1797 music in establishing national, 72–73, 76–83

and nationalism, 31, 47, 53, 129–130, 485–487, 1355 and Nepal, 1801 and the Netherlands, 205 and Nigeria, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Paraguay, 358, 362, 365, 365 and Peru, 369–370, 373, 378 and Poland, 212, 214–216, 217 and Puerto Rico, 841–843, 846–847 and Scandinavia, 226–228 and Scotland, 237–239 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 692–696 and technology, 132–134, 1474–1475 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 400, 402 See also Art; Folk culture; Language; Literature; Music Currency and Austria, 552 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 1039 the euro, 1039, 1043, 1044, 1549, 1551 and Finland, 598 and globalization, 1392 and Tibet, 1818 Cuthbert, Betty, 857 Cygnaeus, Fredrik, 601 Cyprus, 1648 Cyrus the Great, 1107, 1113 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 211–212, 213 Czech Republic, 446, 584 and music, 82, 1435–1436, 1441 See also Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, 583–596, 1016–1028 breakup of, 1413 and communism, 977 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441, 442 and geopolitics, 465 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 215 Dahl, C. J., 228 Dahl, Jens Christian, 67 Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso), 988, 1816, 1816, 1819–1820, 1821–1823 Dalin, Olof, 227 Damas, Léon, 488 Dame Te Atairangikaahu, 1857 Dance, 81, 114 and Angola, 1665 and Catalonia, 1543 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Peru, 378 and Wales, 1637

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Danevirke, 152–153 Dangarembga, Tsitsi, 913, 926–927 Danilevski, Nikolai, 93, 94 D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 489, 670 Darcy, Les, 858 Darius the Great (Persia), 1107, 1113, 1697 Darwin, Charles, 40, 462, 532 Dashbalbar, O., 1794 Daud Khan, Mohammad, 1687, 1689, 1690 David, Jacques-Louis, 177 Davis, H. O., 1180 Davitt, Michael, 451 Dayananda, Swami, 798–800, 802 Dayton Peace Accords, 1527, 1530, 1533 D’Azeglio, Massimo, 665 de Gaulle, Charles, 949, 1038, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1053–1054 de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 1151, 1152–1153, 1489 de Maistre, Joseph, 178, 179 De-Stalinization, 1077 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 245 de Valera, Eamon, 655, 657, 660–661 Deakin, Alfred, 853, 859, 859 Deane, Seamus, 488, 925 Debray, Regis, 61–62 Declaration of Arbroath, 233 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 173 Decolonization and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Eritrea, 1168 and Fiji, 1316, 1320 and Great Britain, 1006–1007, 1012, 1012 and Malaysia, 1216–1217 and the United States, 1303 See also Colonialism/imperialism Decommissioning, 1063 Dehio, Georg, 415 Delacroix, Eugene, 49 Delgado, Matías, 318 Delors, Jacques, 1040 Demchugdongrub, Prince (Mongolia), 1789–1790 Demirchian, Karen, 1707 Democracy, 66, 1360–1361, 1362, 1399–1400, 1488 and Afghanistan, 1686, 1687, 1689–1690 and Angola, 1663 and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Argentina, 275, 276, 281 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 853, 854 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Brazil, 1831 and Canada, 1843 and Central America, 314–315, 318 and Chile, 328–329 and China, 789, 791, 794 and the Cold War, 944–945 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England/Great Britain, 163, 1008 and Eritrea, 1175 in Europe, 419

and Germany, 190, 613, 614, 620–621, 1556, 1559–1560 and India, 981, 1208, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Mongolia, 1784 and Nepal, 1809 and the Netherlands, 199, 206 and Nigeria, 1188 and the Philippines, 1248 and Poland, 214, 215 and Romania, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1594 and Russia, 1596 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1678–1679 and Spain, 1082, 1084, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 248, 249, 250 and Taiwan, 1253–2354, 1259 and Turkey, 1647 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 385, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1311 See also Voting franchise Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Demonstration effect, 1477–1478 Deng Xiaoping, 1200 Denmark, 147–156, 220–222, 226–228 education and, 429 and the European Union, 1038 flag, 229 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1566, 1572 language and, 225, 472 national anthem/music of, 68–69, 230, 1443 Derrida, Jacque, 1052 Desai, Anita, 923 DeSica, Vittorio, 1334 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 336–337, 340, 342 Determinism social, 127–128 technological, 126–127 Deutsch, Karl, 1474–1475 Devolution, and Great Britain, 1013–1015 Devoto, Juan E. Pivel, 399 Dewey, John, 422, 425 Dialectical materialism. See Marxism Diamonds, 968 and Angola, 1659–1660 and South Africa, 1145–1146 Diaspora populations, 1364–1377 and Algeria, 1097 and Armenians, 1698, 1699, 1700–1701, 1703, 1704, 1704, 1707, 1708–1709, 1710, 1711 and discrimination, 1426–1427 and homeland politics, 1414–1415 and India, 1211 and the Internet, 1482–1483 Jews, 1125–1126 and Latvians, 1581 and Nepal, 1807

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Diaspora populations (continued ) and new social movements, 1455 and Nigeria, 1179 and Russians, 698 and supporting terrorism, 1488 Díaz, Porfirio, 355 Diderot, Denis, 102, 171 Die Degenhardts, 133 Diefenbaker, John, 1838, 1839 Diego, José de, 839, 841, 846 Diego, Juan, 347, 349 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 1264, 1264–1265, 1271, 1463 Diffusion of innovations theory, 1477 Dion, Céline, 1296 Discrimination/prejudice and Afghanistan, 1690, 1692 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 858 and Czechoslovakia, 1022, 1027 and Ethiopia, 741 and Fiji, 1316 against immigrants, 1420, 1423–1427 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1729 and Iran, 1113, 1118 and New Zealand, 867 and Nigeria, 1179 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Turkey, 1653, 1655 and the United States, 1304 See also Racism Dixon, Thomas, 1328 Djaout, Tahar, 1100 Djebar, Assia, 1100 Dmowski, Roman, 436, 682, 685 Dobson, Andrew, 877, 880 Dodge, Mary Mapes, 204 Dodson, Mick, 1848 Dodson, Pat, 1848 Dollard des Ormeaux, Adam, 303, 1294 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 516, 546 Domingue, Michel, 338 Dominican Republic, 339. See also Santo Domingo Donskoi, Dmitrii, 696 Dontsov, Dmytro, 718 Dorrego, Manuel, 273 Dorzhiev, Agwang, 1793 Dostoyevski, Fedor, 93, 105–106 Dostoyevski, Mihailo, 93 Dostum, Rashid, 1695 Douglas, Stephen A., 390 Douglas, Tommy C., 1839–1840 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 718 Drake, Sir Francis, 164 Du Bois, W. E. B., 965, 1179, 1301, 1303 du Toit, Daniel, 1149 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 978, 1022, 1026, 1028 Duchy of Warsaw, 209

Dufour, Guillaume-Henri, 253 Dugin, Alexander, 1601 Duke, James, 1399 Duplessis, Maurice, 1290, 1294 Durand, Asher, 389 Dürer, Albrecht, 415 Dürich, Jaroslav, 588 Durkheim, Émile, 5, 99, 111–112, 120, 908–909, 1054 Duruy, Victor, 178 Dutch Antilles, 197 Dutch Reformed church, 1145, 1148, 1149 Duyvendak, Jan Willem, 1446 Dvoˇrák, Antonín, 75, 1436, 1438 Dyer, Reginald, 804 Eagleton, Terry, 922 East Germany, 1449. See also Germany East Slavic nationalism, 716 East Timor, 1381, 1468, 1729, 1731–1732, 1734 and Christianity, 1239 Easter rising of 1916 (Ireland), 651–652, 652 Eastern Europe and communism, 977 development of nationalism in, 26 ethnic conflict and, 888, 895–897 and new social movements, 1449, 1456 Eastern Orthodox Church, 946 and Eritrea, 1171 and Greek independence, 627 and national identity, 103 and politics, 983 and Russia, 105–106, 1080, 1602–1603, 1605 and Serbs, 1529 and Slavic peoples, 972 Ebbesen, Niels, 153–154 Ecologism versus environmentalism, 877, 880–881, 883 Economic liberalism, 19 and Argentina, 276 and Central America, 316 and India, 1211 and Peru, 368, 372 and Turkey, 1645 See also Liberalism Economy, 18–19, 433, 895–896, 1359, 1380, 1407, 1474, 1496, 1939 and Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1095–1096 and Alsace, 1502, 1510 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Arab nationalism, 729 and Argentina, 269–271, 279, 280 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 850–851 and Austria, 545, 553 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1719–1721 and Basques, 1513, 1522 and Brazil, 296, 1825, 1827, 1828–1832 and Burma, 777

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and Canada, 302, 1477–1478, 1837, 1842 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 310–311, 315 and Chile, 324, 330 and China, 1198, 1372–1373, 1387 and Colombia, 826 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Denmark, 149 and Egypt, 257, 258, 259 and the European Union, 1044 and Fiji, 1322–1323 and France, 172, 175, 1047, 1054 and Germany, 191–192, 611 and Greenland, 1563, 1568 and Haiti, 333, 337, 342–343 and India, 1206, 1211 and Indonesia, 1723, 1733 and Iraq, 756, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 653, 660–661 and Israel, 1130 and Italy, 665, 669, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755–1756, 1757 and Korea, 1778–1779, 1781 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 and Mongolia, 1784–1785, 1796 and Nepal, 1801, 1808, 1811 and the Netherlands, 205 and New Zealand, 863 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1059–1060 and Pakistan, 1227–1229 and Paraguay, 358–359 and Peru, 368, 377 and the Philippines, 1247–1248 and Poland, 217, 678, 679, 680 and Puerto Rico, 837, 847 and Romania, 1585 and Russia, 692, 1597, 1599, 1604 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670–1671 and the Sami, 1609–1610, 1613 and Scandinavia, 221 and Scotland, 233 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1077 and Spain, 706, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1644–1645, 1651, 1656 and the United States, 388–389, 1395 and Uruguay, 396 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Economic liberalism; Globalization Edelfelt, Albert, 605 Edgerton, Lynda, 903 Education, 9–10, 29–41, 81–82, 130, 419–433, 461, 464–465, 478–479, 482, 504–505, 1379–1390 and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Arab nationalism, 731

and Argentina, 276–277, 279 and Armenia, 1703 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 287, 289, 293, 296 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 303, 1477–1478, 1843 and Central America, 315 and China, 1193, 1198, 1199 and Colombia, 833 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 746 and Finland, 608 and France, 178, 409, 1049 and Greek independence, 627 and Greenland, 1566, 1571–1572 and Haiti, 342 and India, 796, 798 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 751–752, 755, 756, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1745 and Italy, 675, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 811, 816, 1749, 1757 and Korea, 1776–1777 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1785, 1796, 1797, 1798 and Nepal, 1808 and the Netherlands, 197, 198, 199–200, 205 and New Zealand, 865–866 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Paraguay, 362 and Poland, 217, 688 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and the Sami, 1613, 1615 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 and Scotland, 234 and Singapore, 1225 and Slovakia, 587 and South Africa, 1148–1149 and the Soviet Union, 696, 1073 and Spain, 708–709 and Switzerland, 250, 254 and Taiwan, 1254 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1646, 1652, 1656 and Ukraine, 714, 1621, 1625 and the United States, 1305–1306 and Uruguay, 400, 401, 403 and Vietnam, 1271 Eelam, 1467, 1491 Egypt, 256–266, 257 (map), 982 anticolonialism in, 26 and Arab nationalism, 725, 728, 729–730, 734

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Egypt (continued ) and gender, 446, 450 and new social movements, 1452 and religious fundamentalism, 984–986, 1396 and terrorism, 1490 Eicher, Carolyn, 56 Eiffel, Gustave, 134 Eiffel Tower, 134 Einstein, Albert, 1350, 1362 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 697, 700, 1330 El Salvador, 318, 321 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 1715 Elgar, Edward, 1438 Elias, Norbert, 1369 Elites and Afghanistan, 1689 and Angola, 1665 and Belgium independence, 142–143 and Colombia, 826–827, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 of Ethiopia, 739–741 and Finland, 598, 600, 601 in Hungary, 637–638 and Iraq, 749, 750–751 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 1751 and new social movements, 1453 and Peru, 368, 371 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Russia, 690, 692–697 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672, 1676 and Spain, 707 and sports, 999 technology and the authority of, 1480 in Turkey, 1651, 1653 and Vietnam, 1269 and Wales, 1633 See also Intellectuals Elizabeth I, Queen (England), 164–165 Elizabeth II (Great Britain), 870 Ellison, Ralph, 1303 Emecheta, Buchi, 927 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 59, 389 Emigration and Afghanistan, 1687 and Algeria, 1095, 1097, 1102 and Alsace, 1505, 1507 and Basques, 1513 and Cuba, 1277 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1365–1366, 1371 and Fiji, 1325 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Ireland, 649, 660–661 and Korea, 1781 and Mongolia, 1798 and Poland, 212 and Puerto Rico, 847

and Turkey, 1648 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Diaspora populations; Immigrants/ immigration Eminescu, Mihai, 1592 Emmet, Robert, 649 Enculturation. See Assimilation Engels, Friedrich, 217 England, 158–167 constitution of, 162 and counterterrorism, 1496 economic liberalism and nationalism in, 18–19 education and, 423 and Greek independence, 631 and music, 1432 nationalism in, 5–6, 502 nationalistic art in, 408, 410 and Uruguay, 395 See also Great Britain English language, 480, 483 Enlightenment, the and the American Revolution, 21 erosion of religious power in the, 102 and France, 171 and liberalism, 1350–1351 and organicism, 462 and origins of nationalism, 9–10 and romantic nationalism, 406 Enloe, Cynthia, 901, 904 Ensor, Robert, 425 Environment and Brazil, 1825, 1827–1831, 1832 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and Haiti, 343 and Latvia, 1575–1576, 1581 and the Sami, 1615 and Tibet, 1814 See also Environmentalism/environmental movements; Natural resources Environmentalism/environmental movements, 875–886, 1446–1458 Eötvös, Jószef, 96 Epicurus, 476 Erben, Karel Jaromír, 73 Ercilla, Alonso de, 324–326, 329 Eriksson, Magnus, 226 Eritrea, 1167–1175, 1168 (map), 1469 diaspora population of, 1370 and Ethiopia, 742 Erk, Ludwig Christian, 73 Erkel, Ferenc, 79 Erskine, David Stuart, 239 Erslev, Kristian, 227 Escher, Hans Konrad, 254 Eskimo. See Inuit Estonia, 1078, 1374. See also Baltic states Ethics. See Morality Ethiopia, 736–746, 738 (map) and Eritrea, 1171–1172, 1174, 1175, 1469

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Ethnic cleansing, 435–442, 522–523 and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1507 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530, 1531, 1532 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 596, 1020 and Germany, 617, 622 and Hungary, 645 and Jews in Iraq, 756 and Poland, 681 and Turkey, 1648–1649 in Ukraine, 722 See also Conflict/violence; Genocide Ethnic conflict. See Conflict/violence Ethnicity, 931, 1354 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688–1689, 1693, 1694–1695 and Angola, 1660, 1664 and Argentina, 276, 277 and Armenia, 1703, 1709 and Austria, 543–544 and Azerbaijan, 1716, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528–1530, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 580 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 1836 and Catalonia, 1542–1543 and Central America, 311, 314 and China, 1193–1197, 1196, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1020–1021 and education, 35, 36, 39, 40, 1379 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 741, 742–743 and Fiji, 1314 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1412–1413, 1415, 1416 and Greece, 633 and Greenland, 1570–1571 and Hungary, 644 and immigrants, 1424 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 672, 673 and Japan, 1753 and Latvia, 1574–1575 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1213–1215, 1225 and Mongolia, 1790–1791, 1797–1798, 1798–1799 and music, 1431–1432 and nationalist movements, 10, 11, 27, 46, 1460, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1469–1470 and Nepal, 1808, 1809–1810 and the Netherlands, 199 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 967, 1178, 1185, 1186

and Northern Ireland, 1063 and the Ottoman Empire, 101–102 and Pakistan, 1231–1232, 1236 and Paraguay, 362 and the Philippines, 1243–1244 and Poland, 209, 212, 213, 214, 216 in political philosophy, 88–90, 95, 461, 464 and Québec, 1296–1297 and religion, 103–105, 107–109 and Romania, 1592–1594 and Russia, 1079–1080, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669–1670 and Scotland, 236–237 and South Africa, 1144, 1145 and the Soviet Union, 1076 and Taiwan, 1254, 1257–1258 and Turkey, 1650 and Ukraine, 712–713, 1621 and the United States, 1309 See also Minorities; Religion Eto Shin’pei, 820 Eurasianism, 466 Europe borders after World War II, 581 (map), 591 (map), 616 (map), 668 (map), 684 (map), 1018 (map), 1550 (map), 1590 (map) borders from 1914 to 1938, 170 (map), 184 (map), 540 (map), 556 (map), 579 (map), 586 (map), 612 (map), 624 (map), 636 (map), 656 (map), 666 (map), 680 (map), 762 (map) borders in 1815, 139 (map), 148 (map), 182 (map), 208 (map), 246 (map), 610 (map), 664 (map) colonialism and, 420–421 and cultural identity in, 445 development of nationalism in, 26, 31 education and, 33–36, 38–39, 422, 427 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 437, 441–442 and gender/sexuality, 44, 908 and immigration, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1425 imperative and imaginary forms of nationalism in, 501–503 and landscape art, 64 and language, 472, 477 and music, 73–75, 1432 nationalism and class in, 4, 11 nationalism and conflict in, 16, 23–26 and new social movements, 1447 perversions of nationalism in, 512–525 revolutions of 1848 in, 24–25, 47, 52 supranational bodies in, 948–949, 974 systems of governance in, 419 and terrorism, 1494, 1495, 1497 and transnationalism, 1509–1510 women’s suffrage in, 453 and xenophobia, 1412 See also European institutions; specific European countries and organizations

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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1034–1035, 1037 European Convention on Human Rights, 908 European Court of Justice, 1035 European Economic Community (EEC), 1010, 1036, 1038, 1049, 1509–1510 European institutions, 1034–1036, 1039, 1040 and Great Britain, 1007, 1010 See also European Union (EU) European Parliament, 974, 1035, 1039 European Union (EU), 948–949, 1021 (map), 1030–1046, 1032 (map), 1532–1533, 1551 (map) and Algeria, 1095 and Alsace, 1510 and Armenia, 1704 and Basques, 1517, 1522 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528 Committee of the Regions, 1043, 1541 and Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1028 education and, 432 flag, 1410 (illus.) and France, 1048 and Germany, 1549–1551, 1555 and globalization, 1407, 1409, 1410–1411 and indigenous groups, 1610 and Ireland, 1060 and Latvia, 1582 and minorities, 1412–1413 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Spain, 1092 and Turkey, 1645, 1648, 1650, 1656 and Ukraine, 1623 Europeanization, 1406 Evans, Gwynfor, 1633, 1635 Evans, Robert, 1434 Evatt, H. V., 858 Evolutionary theory. See Social Darwinism Exhibitions, 412–414. See also Holidays/festivals Exile and diaspora populations, 1365, 1369, 1370 Expansionism affect on Hungary of, 639 and Brazil, 283–284 and Canada, 300–302, 1837 and geopolitics, 459 and Germany, 617, 621 Herder on, 88 and Italy, 665–667 and manipulation of ethnic autonomy claims, 940 nationalism as justifying, 40 and Nazi Germany, 518 and perversions of nationalism, 523–524 Soviet, 945 and the United States, 22, 37, 39, 465, 1308 See also Colonialism/imperialism Expedition of the Thousand, 672, 674 Expressionism, 491

Fabianism, 471 Factionalism and the Maori, 1857 and nationalist movements, 940–941 See also Conflict/violence Factory, 129–130 Faehlmann, Friedrich Robert, 561 Fairhair, Harald, 226 Faisal I, King (Iraq), 727, 728, 728, 749–750, 750, 1742, 1743, 1745 Falkland Islands, 275, 1009 Falla, Manuel de, 1437 Fallersleben, Hoffmann von, 117 Falwell, Jerry, 1395 Fanon, Frantz, 963, 1100 Færoe Islands, 220–222, 225, 231 Fascism, 515–517, 525, 973, 1301 and gender, 454–456 and Hungary, 638, 639 and imperative nationalism, 502 and Italy, 419, 667, 670–671, 674–675, 675–676 and Japan, 817 and nationalistic art, 413–415, 417 and the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 and race, 672 See also Nazism Fashoda Incident, 460 Fatah, 1137, 1142–1143 Faulkner, William, 495 Favre, Louis, 254 Federal Republic of Central America, 310, 313, 316 Federalism and Australia, 850, 852–853 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1171–1172 and India, 1205–1206, 1766 and Indonesia, 1723 and Malaysia, 1216, 1218 and Nigeria, 1183, 1185 as solution to minority demands, 933 and Ukraine, 721–722 and the United States, 383 Feminists, 451–453, 454 versus nationalists, 902, 907 See also Women’s rights Fennoman movement, 598–599, 600, 601, 601 Feraoun, Mouloud, 1100 Ferdinand, Franz, 1490 Ferdinand, King (Romania), 1586 Ferdinand of Aragon, 709 Ferdowsi, 1107, 1113–1114 Ferguson, Adam, 234 Ferguson, William, 1851 Fernández, Emiliano R., 364 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 400 Ferry, Jules, 178 Festival of Britain, 1011 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 17, 34, 90–92, 186, 475, 533

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Fidelis, Malgorzata, 53 Fiji, 1313–1325, 1315 (map), 1441 Film. See Cinema Film noir, 1333 Finland, 220–222, 597–608, 599 (map) education and, 429 and gender, 54, 450 and independence, 223, 231 language and, 225 and music, 1432, 1436, 1443 national identity and culture of, 226–228, 466 and national symbols, 230 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1614, 1616 Finno-Russian War, 607 Firley, Barker, 1841 (illus.) First Schleswigian War, 149, 152 Fischer, Joschka, 1555 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 489 Fitzpatrick, Brian, 857 Flag(s), 112–113, 116–117 Australian, 855 Basque, 1521 Belgium, 145 Brazilian, 294 and Burma, 781 Canadian, 1835 Catalonian, 1538–1539 and Central America, 318–319 Chilean, 327 Colombian, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 Egyptian, 265 and the European Union, 1042, 1410 (illus.) French, 175 German, 619 and Greenland, 1569, 1570 Indonesian, 1732 Irish, 659 Japanese, 1756, 1756 (illus.), 1757 Maori, 873 and New Zealand, 866 Nigerian, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 Polish, 686 Puerto Rican, 842 (illus.), 844 and Québec, 1294 Romanian, 1592 Russian, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 229–230 Swiss, 253 and Tibet, 1818 Turkish, 1646, 1647, 1653 and the United States, 1308 Flemings, 144–145, 146, 200, 413 Folk culture, 406, 462, 530 and Alsace, 1510 and the Baltic states, 561, 563–564 and Cuba, 1280

and Finland, 599, 604 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 Haiti and folktales, 342 and Hungary, 643 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1797 and music, 73, 76, 77, 80–82, 417, 1434–1435, 1436, 1437, 1444 and Paraguay, 364 and Poland, 212, 216 and Russia, 693 and the Sami, 1612, 1614–1615 and Scandinavia, 226, 228, 229 and Switzerland, 251 and Turkish folklore, 774 and Ukraine, 721 and Wales, 1634 See also Culture; Indigenous groups Food insecurity and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Peru, 378 Ford, John, 1337 Foreign intervention and Angola, 968, 1658 and China, 793 during the Cold War, 943–944, 945, 947–948, 977 and Cuba, 1275, 1277 and globalization, 1408–1409 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117 and Turkey, 1652 and the United States, 1305 See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign policy and Armenia, 1710–1711 and Brazil, 1831 and China, 1200 and Cuba, 1285–1286 and the European Union, 1040, 1042 and geopolitics, 458 and Germany, 1554, 1555 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1751, 1757–1758 and Latvia, 1576 and Mongolia, 1798 and New Zealand, 871 and post-World War II Europe, 974 and the Soviet Union, 979 and sports, 994–995 terrorism as, 1488 and Ukraine, 1622–1623 and the United States, 955–956 Forster, E. M., 490 Forster, Georg, 86 Fortuyn, Pim, 1453, 1486 Foster, Stephen, 389 Foucault, Michel, 1052 Four Freedoms, 972 Fourier, Charles, 423 Fowler, Robert, 1839

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France, 102, 169–179, 172 (map), 502, 1047–1057, 1048 (map) and Algeria, 1097, 1098 and Alsace, 1502–1504, 1505, 1507 and Arab nationalism, 727–728 aristocracy and nationalism in, 5–8 and Basques, 1513, 1513, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Belgium, 140–141 and Canada, 298 colonialism and, 424–425, 958, 1463–1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the Dreyfus affair, 520 education and, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 423 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1034, 1038 fascism in, 515 and film, 1336 and gender, 43, 48–49, 448 and geopolitics, 468 and Greek independence, 631 and Haiti, 333, 335–336, 340 and Indochina, 1263–1264 and Iraq, 1739 and language, 420, 480, 482 and the Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities/immigrants, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1424 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1437, 1441, 1443 and national identity, 461, 465 national symbols of, 134 nationalistic culture/art in, 407, 408, 409–410, 413, 415, 416 and new social movements, 1448, 1457 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and political philosophy, 14–17, 475 and the Rhine crisis of 1840, 189–190 and the Suez War, 266 and Syria, 728 and Uruguay, 395 See also French Revolution Francia, José Gaspar de, 361, 364 Franco, Francisco, 705–706, 707, 709, 973, 1088–1089, 1089 (illus.), 1471, 1515, 1519, 1536 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 409, 412, 465 Francophonie, 1056–1057 Franklin, Benjamin, 21 Franko, Ivan, 720 Franks, 1537 Fraser, Dawn, 857 Frederick I (Holy Roman Empire), 619 Frederick II (Denmark), 226 Frederick William IV (Prussia), 191 Frederik, Christian, 224 Freinet, Célestin, 425

French Canadians and the defeat at Québec, 299 and duality in Canada, 303, 306 identity and, 302 tensions over political control in, 299–300, 303 See also Québec French Revolution, 34, 174 and Alsace, 1502 and the aristocracy, 7 and Basques, 1513 gender and symbols in the, 45–46, 49, 50–51 and Germany, 185–186 impact on Haiti of the, 334–335 influence in Brazil of, 293 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 and popular sovereignty, 15–16 and terrorism, 1489 French West Africa, 424–425 Friedrich, Caspar David, 67, 463 Friel, Brian, 917, 925 Fröbel, F., 36 Frost, Robert, 392 Fry, William Henry, 76 Fuad, King (Egypt), 263 Fucik, Julius, 1441 Fugner, Jindrich, 594 Fukuyama, Francis, 988 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 9 Furnivall, J. S., 783 Furphy, Joseph, 857 Gagarin, Yuri, 951 Gaidar, Yegor, 1597 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 833 Gaitskell, Deborah, 904 Galicia, 209, 210, 1088 and Ukrainians, 715, 716, 718 Gallen-Kallela, Akseli, 605 Gálvez, Mariano, 317 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 1079 Gance, Abel, 1328 Gandhi, Indira, 1207, 1207–1208, 1466, 1766, 1767 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), 798, 801, 802–804, 803, 805 (illus.), 950, 963 and gender issues, 451 and India’s social structure, 1205, 1208 and nonviolent resistance, 976, 1203, 1822 Gandhi, Priyanka, 1207 Gandhi, Rahul, 1207 Gandhi, Rajiv, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1492, 1767, 1768 Gandhi, Sanjay, 1207 Gandhi, Sonia, 1207 García, Calixto, 1282 García Calderón, Francisco, 375 García Márquez, Gabriel, 832 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 502, 672, 673, 674, 674 (illus.) monuments to, 410 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Garnier, Charles, 134

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Garrigue, Charlotte, 585 Garvey, Marcus, 494, 1179, 1850 Gasperi, Alcide De, 973–974 Gaudí, Antoni, 706 Gay, Peter, 613 Gediminas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Geffrard, Fabre, 337, 339 Gégoire, Abbé, 34 Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 73, 228 Gellner, Ernest, 130, 461, 476, 479, 1475, 1835 Gender, 43–57, 444–457, 899–910 and colonialism, 926–927 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Uruguay, 401 Genocide, 435–442 and American indigenous groups, 893 and Armenians, 765, 1699, 1704, 1704, 1706, 1709, 1711, 1718 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Hungary, 645 and Kurds in Iraq, 756 and Nazi Germany, 517, 622 and perversions of nationalism, 522–523, 524, 525 and Rwanda and Burundi, 968, 1671, 1672, 1674, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679, 1680 and Tibet, 1820 See also Conflict/violence; Ethnic cleansing; Holocaust Geoffrin, Madame de, 7 (illus.) Geopolitics, 458–469 George, Lloyd, 468, 593 George, Terry, 1674 George V (Great Britain), 132, 870 Georgia, 897, 1071, 1079, 1080, 1710 German Confederation of 1815, 149–150, 189, 191 German Customs Union, 191–192 German National Society, 192 Germanization, 617 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 594–595, 595 Germany, 181–194, 525, 609–622, 1548–1560 and Alsace, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1508 anti-Semitism in, 520 and Austria, 544, 546–548 citizenship in, 1354 and colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and democracy, 946–947 education and, 34, 35, 36, 38, 419, 421, 422–423, 426, 429–430 and the environment, 882–883 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and the European Union, 949 and expansionism, 524 and film, 1330–1331 and France, 1051 and gender, 448, 453 and geopolitics, 458, 459, 462–464, 466–467, 468 and immigration, 1419, 1424

and language, 472 and minorities, 1374 and the Moroccan crises, 514 and music, 1431, 1432 and national identity, 465 National Socialism/Nazism in, 133–134, 517–519 nationalism and political philosophy in, 9–10, 17–18, 90–93, 474–475, 491, 502, 533–534 nationalistic art of, 408–409, 410–411, 413–414, 415–417, 418 and new social movements, 1450, 1453 and Poland, 678 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 and rituals of belonging, 507–508 Soviet advancement into, 950 symbols in, 49, 114, 117 unification of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 512 and World War II, 1309 See also East Germany; West Germany Gershwin, George, 1439 Geser, 1791 Gettino, Octavio, 1335 Gezelle, Guido, 145 Ghana (Gold Coast), 962, 964, 980 and independence, 1464 and music, 1443 Gharabagh conflict, 897, 1078–1079 and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1716, 1718–1719 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 1589, 1594 Gibbs, Pearl, 1851 Gilgamesh, 1738 Ginestera, Alberto, 1439 Gladstone, William E., 241–242, 651, 654 Glaize, Léon, 409 Glinka, Mikhail, 75, 78, 79, 694, 1437, 1602 Global institutions and globalization, 1412 for governance, 1359–1362, 1406, 1456 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 sports, 991 and transnationalism, 1407 and values, 1392 See also United Nations (UN) Globalization, 1405–1417 and Brazil, 1826, 1830, 1832 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1374, 1376 and education, 1380, 1389 and the environment, 877 and global governance, 1359 and image technology, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1427–1428 and India, 1211 and Japan, 1750 and the loss of optimism, 936 and minorities, 1547 versus nationalism, 1392

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Globalization (continued ) and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and religious fundamentalism, 1397–1404 and sports, 999, 1000, 1001–1003 technology as facilitating, 135–136 and Vietnam, 1271 Glyndwr, ˆ Owain, 1637 Gobineau, Arthur, 40 Gocar, Josef, 594 “God Save the King,” 117 Godard, Jean-Luc, 1336 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 1332 Goh Chok Tong, 1384 Gökalp, Mehmet Ziya, 766, 766, 770, 774 Gömbös, Gyula, 638 Gómez, Máximo, 1282 Gonçalves, Gomide, Antônio, 283 Gongaze, Georgiy, 1628 Gonne, Maud, 451 González, Juan Natalicio, 365 González Prada, Manuel, 373, 374 González Vigil, Francisco de Paula, 377 Good Friday Agreement, 1062, 1062, 1063 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 946, 979, 1039, 1079, 1581, 1582 and the Baltic states, 1078 Gordon, Andrew, 815 Gordon, Walter, 1842 Gorodetskii, S. M., 700 Görres, Joseph, 92 Gothicism, 223 Gottschalk, Louis Moreau, 76, 389, 1438 Gottwald, Klement, 1019, 1024 Gouges, Olympe de, 173–174 Gouldner, Alvin, 1473 Gounod, Charles, 117 Government(s) and Afghanistan, 1686, 1686–1687, 1692 and Algeria, 1099 and Angola, 1663 and Argentina, 272, 275 and Armenia, 1699 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 282–283, 284, 287, 289–290, 296 and Bulgaria, 578 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 302–303 and Catalonia, 1538–1539 and China, 795, 1192–1193 and Colombia, 828 and Czechoslovakia, 590 and England, 162, 163 and Ethiopia, 740, 741 European systems of, 419 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1317, 1317, 1321, 1323, 1323 and Finland, 598 and France, 169–171, 175, 176, 1048–1049, 1053–1054 German, Italian, Japanese postwar, 946–947

and Germany, 609, 611–613 and Great Britain, 1007–1008 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1565, 1567 Haiti and instability in, 336–338 and India, 1204 instability of postindependence, 1469 and Iran, 986 and Iraq, 750, 1747 and Ireland, 648 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1766 and Japan, 812 and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and Nigeria, 1183, 1186 and Northern Ireland, 1059, 1063 and the Ottoman millet system, 761 and Palestinians, 1142 and Romania, 1588, 1588–1589 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Scotland, 234–235 and Spain, 702–703, 1084–1085, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 247–250, 249, 254–255 Tibetan exile, 1821, 1822 and the United States, 383–387, 391 and Uruguay, 398–399 and Vietnam, 1270–1271 and Wales, 1632 See also Democracy; Federalism Govineau, Arthur, 415 Gowon, Yakubu, 1185, 1186 Goya, Francisco de, 1437 Grabski, Stanisław, 685 Gracia, Gilberto Concepción de, 845 Gramsci, Antonio, 486 Granados, Enrique, 1437 Granatstein, Jack, 1842 Grant, George Parkin, 1838 Grant, James, 235 Grant, John, 235 Grau, Miguel, 377 Grau San Martín, Ramón, 1276 Great Britain, 236 (map), 1005–1015, 1006 (map), 1061 (map) and Arab nationalism, 727–728, 729 and Argentina, 269, 275, 279–280 and Australia, 850–851 and Brazil, 289 and Burma, 776–777, 781, 783, 783 and Canada, 299–300, 300, 307 and Central America, 318 and colonial divestment, 1461, 1464 and colonialism, 27, 490–491, 889, 958 communication and technology in, 128, 132, 1473 and Denmark, 150 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 36, 38–39, 426, 429, 432, 1381–1382 and Egypt, 259, 260–261, 262–263, 265

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and Eritrea, 1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1036, 1038, 1040 fascism in, 516 and Fiji, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1317, 1319 and film, 1337 and gender, 447–448, 450 and geopolitics, 468 and Haiti, 335, 340 and immigration, 1419, 1420 and India, 55, 131, 797, 798, 804–806, 1203 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 749–750, 752–753, 1739, 1742, 1745 and Ireland, 915 Irish in, 654 and Israel/Palestine, 1123, 1125, 1129, 1133, 1134–1135, 1140, 1402 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762, 1763, 1764 and landscape art, 61, 62–64 and language, 472, 480, 482, 912 and Malaysia, 1213–1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and the Maori, 1856 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities, 1412 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1442, 1443 national anthem of, 117, 1431 and natural resources, 885 and Nepal, 1805 and New Zealand, 863, 868, 872 and Nigeria, 1178, 1181, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1058–1068 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and Pakistan, 1227, 1231 political philosophy in, 534–535 and Québec, 1288 and rituals of belonging, 507 and Scotland, 233–242 and South Africa, 1145–1146, 1150 and sports, 992, 996–998 symbols of, 114 and terrorism, 1488 and Tibet, 1818 and Uruguay, 396, 397 and Wales, 1631–1633, 1632 Great Depression and Burma, 777, 777 and Canada, 302 and Japan, 810, 821 Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 (Peru), 370–371 Greece, 623–633, 626 (map) and diaspora populations, 1374 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437–438 and the European Union, 1040 independence of, 46, 53, 464 and language, 477 and minorities, 1424 and Turkey, 1648

Greeks ethnic cleansing of, 438 Greek independence and diasporic, 627, 632 in Turkey, 1648 in the United States, 1427 Greenfeld, Liah, 938 Greenland, 220, 1561–1572 Greenpeace, 1361, 1362, 1448 Grégoire, Abbé, 173, 178 Gregory, Lady Augusta, 918, 922 Grenfell, Maria, 1439 Gretzky, Wayne “The Great One,” 1842 Grieg, Edvard, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 228, 417, 1436–1437 Griffith, David Wark, 1328 Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm, 67, 406 Grímsson, Magnus, 228 Grofé, Ferde, 1439 Grotius, Hugo, 203 Groulx, Abbé Lionel, 1290, 1293, 1294 Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap, 1637 Grundtvig, N. F. S., 151, 151, 228, 429 Guantánamo Bay, 1280 Guaraní Indians, 358, 395 Guardiola, Santos, 315 Guatemala, 318, 319, 321 Guernica, 1515, 1519–1521 Guerrier, Philipe, 337 Guindon, Hubert, 1293 Guiteras, Antonio, 1282, 1283 Guizot, François, 177 Gulf War (1990–1991), 756, 952, 1408–1409, 1746–1747 and Germany, 1554 Gumilev, Nikolai, 94, 1601 Gustav I Vasa (Sweden), 226, 230 Gustav II Adolf, King (Sweden), 223, 224 (illus.), 226, 565 Gustav III (Sweden), 223 Gyanendra, King (Nepal), 1809 Haakon IV (Norway), 226 Habermas, Jürgen, 97, 1481, 1556 Habibullah II, 1686, 1688, 1691 Habsburg empire, 512, 541 and Austria, 539, 541, 543–544 and Belgium, 138–139 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Czechoslovaks, 584, 587–588 and the formation of Austria-Hungary, 512 and Germany, 189, 191 and Hungary, 407, 637 and language, 472 and Mexico, 350 nationalistic philosophers from the, 96 and the Netherlands, 196 and Poland, 679–681 and Switzerland, 252 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 1677

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Hadj, Messali, 1097, 1099 Hadjiiski, Ivan, 577 Haegy, Xavier, 1508 Hagemann, Karen, 52 Haider, Jörg, 553 Haile Selassie, 740, 742, 743 Hailu, Kasa (Emperor Tewodros), 739, 743, 744 Haiti, 26, 174, 332–343, 334, 1414 Halbwachs, Maurice, 1343 Hallgrímsson, Jónas, 228 Halonen, Pekka, 605 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 394 Hals, Frans, 203 Hamas, 972, 978, 986 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1142–1143 Hambach Festival, 190 Hamilton, Alexander, 22, 386, 387 Hamilton of Gilbertfield, 239 Hamitic hypothesis, 1678 Hammershaimb, Venceslaus, 225 Hansen, H. P., 156 Hanson, John, 386 Haq, Abdul, 1690 Harb, Talat, 729 Harlem Renaissance, 494 Harris, Lawren, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Harris, Leonard, 1008 Harry (Scottish minstrel), 239 Hasan, Zoya, 902 Hashshashin, 1489 Hatta, Mohammad, 1463 Haushofer, Karl, 460, 466, 467 (illus.), 491 Havel, Václav, 1026, 1027, 1028 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 117, 1432 Hayes, Joy Elizabeth, 132 Hazaras, 1693 Hazelius, Arthur, 229 Head, Bessie, 927 Health, and the environment, 882 Health care and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Canada, 1840 and New Zealand, 871, 871 and Pakistan, 1228 Heaney, Seamus, 925 Hebrew, 477 Hecht, Abraham, 1400, 1403 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17, 92–93, 187, 534 Hegemony Anglo-American, 1393 and Baltic nationalism, 558, 562 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1534 of Buenos Aires in Argentina, 275 and Chilean identity, 327 and Ethiopia, 738, 741 and Finnish nationalism, 605, 608 and gender issues, 445, 906 of German music, 80, 82

and Germany, 611 Germany and French, 186 and Great Britain, 397, 490 Japan and U.S., 1754, 1757 and literature, 486 and Mexican identity, 349, 352 nationalism in maintaining, 898, 1481 nationalist music as reaction against, 79 and Nepali nationalism, 1809 and Peru, 374 of political ideologies, 512 Prussian, 544 and Spain, 702, 711 technology as undermining, 136 and Turkey, 1646 and the United States, 837, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1310, 1742-1743 and World War I, 713 Heidegger, Martin, 533–534, 534 (illus.) Heidenstam, Verner von, 228 Heimat, 611, 883, 1344 Heimatbund, 1508 Heimatkunst, 417 Hein, Piet, 203 Heine, Heinrich, 501 Helfferich, Karl, 613 Hellenism, 623 Helvetic Republic, 248–249 Henderson, Paul, 1842 Henlein, Konrad, 595, 595 Henry, Paul, 659 Heraclitus, 533 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 17, 30–31, 73, 88–90, 89 (illus.), 185, 406, 529, 533 and the Baltic states, 561 and organicism, 462 Hernández, José, 278–279 Herndon, Angelo, 1303 Heroes/heroines, 446, 504, 1345 and Afghanistan, 1690 and Algeria, 1098–1099, 1099, 1102 and Armenia, 1706 and Australia, 857, 857 of the Baltic states, 564–565 and Bulgaria, 576, 577 and Burma, 782, 784 and Canada, 304–305 and Central America, 318 and Colombia, 831, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164 and Cuba, 1282, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England, 164–165 and film, 1331, 1332, 1333 and Finland, 604–605 and Great Britain, 1012 and India, 1209 and Indonesia, 1725, 1727 and Iran, 1113–1114, 1115, 1116 and Ireland, 658, 659

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and Korea, 1779–1781 and Latvia, 1578–1579 and Mongolia, 1786, 1789–1790, 1791, 1797, 1798 and New Zealand, 870 and Nigeria, 1187 and Palestinians, 1137 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 377 and the Philippines, 1245–1246 and Poland, 211, 214 and Québec, 1294 Russian, 1074 Scandinavian, 226–227 and Scotland, 232–233 and the Soviet Union, 694, 695, 696, 700, 951 and sports, 995 and Switzerland, 253–254 and Syria, 728 and Turkey, 1643, 1646–1647, 1653 and Uruguay, 402 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637 See also Leaders; Symbols Herrera, Bartolomé, 377 Herrera, Enrique Olaya, 830 Herries, William, 869 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 1148 Hervé, Gustave, 515 Herzl, Theodor, 1121, 1123, 1127 Hezbollah, 986 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 350 Higgins, H. B., 859 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 1693 Hilden, Patricia, 56 Hilty, Carl, 252 Hindenburg, Paul von, 613 Hinduism and fundamentalism, 1393 and India, 107, 797, 803, 803, 987, 1204–1205, 1208–1210 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Nepal, 1806 Hindutva, 107, 108 Hirata Atsutane, 815 Hispanophilia versus hispanophobia in Mexico, 352–353 and Puerto Rico, 841 Historiography, 121, 406, 477, 880, 1343 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Algeria, 1098–1099 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 733–734 and Armenia, 1702, 1705–1708 and Australia, 855–858 and Austria, 551 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 564 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531 and Brazil, 292–295

and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 303–305, 1840 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 320 and China, 1195–1197, 1199–1200 and Colombia, 831–832 and colonialism, 917, 923–924 and Congo/Zaïre, 1162, 1163–1164 and Cuba, 1277–1278, 1281–1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1022–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Ethiopia, 742–744 and Fiji, 1318 and film, 1327–1328, 1336–1338 and Finland, 604 and France, 177–178, 1051–1052 and Germany, 188–189, 614, 617–619 and Great Britain, 1010–1011, 1011 and Greece, 629 and Greenland, 1568 and Haiti, 341 and India, 802–803, 1209 and Indonesia, 1727, 1728, 1730 and Iran, 1107, 1107, 1113–1116 and Iraq, 752–754, 757, 1741 and Ireland, 658–660 and Israel, 1125–1127 and Italy, 673–675 and Japan, 1750–1751 and Mexico, 354, 355–356 and Mongolia, 1788 and New Zealand, 864–865, 868–870 and Nigeria, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and Palestinians, 1139–1140 and Paraguay, 362–364 and the Philippines, 1244, 1245–1246 and Poland, 212, 214, 685–686 and Puerto Rico, 843–844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and Romania, 1592 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1677–1678, 1679 and the Sami, 1618 and Scandinavia, 223, 223, 226–228, 228 and Scotland, 234, 237–239 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 700, 1076 and Spain, 708–709, 1086 and Switzerland, 247, 251, 252–254 and Taiwan, 1252, 1255–1256 and Turkey, 771, 773–774, 1646 and Ukraine, 721, 721 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637–1638 Hitler, Adolf, 413, 611, 613 and anti-Semitism, 517 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and Austria, 545, 546, 547

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Hitler, Adolf (continued ) and Czechoslovakia, 1019 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438, 439 and gender, 450, 454 and Hungary, 638 and music, 1431 ties with Mussolini, 516 Hiwet, Addis, 737 Hjärne, Harald, 228 Hlinka, Andrej, 585, 590 Ho Chi Minh, 952, 962, 963–964, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1267 (illus.) Hoad, Lew, 857 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 (illus.) Hobsbawm, Eric, 19, 23, 132, 473, 476, 478, 481 Hobson, William, 863 Hodge, John R., 1773 Hofmeyr, Jan, 1149 Hogg, James, 238 Holberg, Ludwig, 227 Holidays/festivals, 116, 504, 1346 and Australia, 855–856 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 567 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 295 and Bulgaria, 575–576 and Burma, 782 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 319 and Chile, 327, 328 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1025 and France, 1053 and Germany, 620 and India, 800, 1204 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 754 and Israel, 1129 and Japan, 1752 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 and the Maori, 1857 and Mexico, 347–349, 354 and the Netherlands, 204 and New Zealand, 869, 873 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1067–1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 211, 216–217, 685–686, 688 and Romania, 1586 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 and South Africa, 1150 and the Soviet Union, 695 and Spain, 709 and Switzerland, 244, 254 and Taiwan, 1256 and Turkey, 1651, 1652–1653, 1653

and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637, 1638 Holly, James Theodore, 340 Holocaust, 439–440, 517–518, 523, 524 and Austria, 546 and Czechoslovak Jews, 1020 and German guilt, 1555–1556, 1557–1558 guilt and the foundation of Israel, 1402 and immigration to Israel, 1121 and legitimacy of Zionism, 1128 as reconstituting ethnic borders, 617 remembrances of the, 1345 See also Genocide Holst, Gustav, 1432 Holstein, 147, 149, 150, 220, 222 Holy Roman Empire, 183, 186, 543, 619, 1816 Homosexuality, 907–908, 909–910 Honduras, 318, 321 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1304 Horowitz, Donald, 989 Horthy, Miklós, 638 Hosokawa, Toshio, 1440 Hotel Rwanda, 1674, 1675 Hou Hsaio-hsien, 1338 Hoxa, Enver, 952 Hozumi Yatsuka, 816 Hrushev’skyi, Mykhailo, 721, 721 Hsaya San, 777, 782 Hu Shi, 789, 793 Hua Guofeng, 1200 Hueber, Charles, 1509 Huggins, Jackie, 1849 Hugo, Victor, 177 Humanism, 41, 86, 87 Humbert, Ferdinand, 409 Humboldt, Alexander von, 34, 64, 65, 423, 462 Hume, David, 18, 234 Hume, John, 1062 Hunedoara, Iancu de, 1592 Hungary, 635–645, 640 (map) anti-Semitism in, 520, 521 and the Austro-Hungarian empire, 24 autonomy and, 407 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441 and expansionism, 524 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and music, 1432, 1435 and nationalistic art, 412 and Slovakia, 587 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Huntington, Samuel, 929, 988, 1374 Hurston, Zora Neale, 494 Hurt, Jakob, 563–564, 567 Hus, Jan, 592, 1023 Husayn, Imam (Iran), 1115 Hussein, Saddam, 756–757, 758, 952, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Iran, 1115–1116 Hussein, Sharif, 727, 749, 750, 1739

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Hussitism, 1023 Hutton, C. M., 481 Hutus, 1669, 1675, 1677, 1678 Hyde, Douglas, 654–655, 657, 918 Hypernationalism, 1389–1390. See also Xenophobia Hyppolite, Florville, 338 Iancu, Avram, 1592 Ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 1113 Ibn Taymiyyah, 725 Ibsen, Henrik, 228 Iceland, 220–222, 226–228 and the environment/natural resources, 875–876, 885 independence and, 231 and national symbols, 230 reading and, 229 Icelandic Sagas, 227 (illus.) Idealism, 534–535 Identity, 27, 405, 528, 537, 930–932, 1351, 1418–1429 and Afghanistan, 1693–1695 and Algeria, 1100–1101, 1105 and Alsace, 1504 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 276–279 and Armenia, 1698, 1699–1700, 1701–1705, 1704, 1708 and Austria, 550, 551, 554 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1716–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 558, 561–562, 563, 563–565, 1576, 1577, 1577–1578, 1581 and Basques, 1519–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527, 1528–1530, 1531, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 283, 285–287, 288, 292–295, 294, 1826–1827 British versus English, 159–161, 162, 163, 167 and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 780–781 and Canada, 298, 302, 303–305, 1835–1843 and Catalonia, 1536–1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Central America, 313, 319–321 and Chile, 324–326, 327–329, 328 and China, 1198–1200 civic versus ethnic, 933–936 and Colombia, 832, 833, 834 and communications, 1474 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160–1165 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1282–1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1025 Dutch, 197, 198, 204 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 265 and the environment/landscape, 875–876, 879–880, 883, 884, 886 and Eritrea, 1174 and Ethiopia, 741–743, 744–746 European, 974, 1045–1046 and film, 1327, 1338–1340

and Finland, 598–605, 608 and France, 1056, 1057 and gender/sexuality, 43–45, 444–447, 909–910 and geopolitics, 458–459, 464–466 and Germany, 183–187, 190, 192–193, 611, 613–620, 621–622, 1549, 1552, 1555–1556, 1558 globalization and de-territorialization of, 1416 and Greece, 630, 633 and Greenland, 1565, 1567–1568, 1570 and Haiti, 341–342 and Hungary, 639–644, 645 after independence, 1465 and India, 797, 803 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726–1728, 1732, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 757, 758–759, 1740, 1743 and Israel, 1124, 1127–1130 and Italy, 665, 670–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and Japan, 809–810, 813, 815, 820, 822, 1750–1751, 1755–1756, 1757–1578 and Korea, 1773, 1775–1776, 1778–1781 and landscape art, 59, 60–71 and language/literature, 482, 486, 492–495, 922–923 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1225 Maori, and intertribal unity, 1856, 1858, 1859–1860, 1863 and Mexico, 345, 347, 347–350, 351–356 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788–1789, 1792, 1793–1794, 1797, 1798 and music, 78–83 and national symbols, 113, 122–123, 1342–1348 in nationalist political philosophy, 97, 473–476 and Nepal, 1803, 1804, 1805–1806, 1807, 1811 and New Zealand, 863, 864–870 and Northern Ireland, 1065–1066 and overdetermination, 121 and Palestinians, 1133, 1134, 1138–1139 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1849 and Paraguay, 360, 362, 365–366 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 209, 213, 682, 686–688 and Puerto Rico, 839, 841–843 and Québec, 1293–1294 and religion versus ideology, 972–973 religious, 99, 103, 109, 983, 988–989. See also Religion and rituals of belonging, 499, 509. See also Rituals of belonging role of education in, 29–41 and Romania, 1589–1591 and Russia/Soviet Union, 690–701, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672–1673, 1677, 1679 and the Sami, 1614, 1615, 1617 and Scandinavia, 222–225, 226–228 and Scotland, 233, 234

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Identity (continued ) and social class, 1, 3–4 and South Africa, 1149–1150 and Spain, 1083, 1085–1087, 1092 and sports, 995, 996, 997–998, 1002–1003 and Switzerland, 251, 251–252, 253 and Taiwan, 1253–1255, 1257–1260 and technology, 134–135, 1476, 1481 and Tibet, 1815, 1817–1818, 1821–1823 and Turkey, 761–763, 764–765, 766, 768–770, 1645–1647, 1650 and Ukraine, 718–721, 720, 1622–1623 and the United States, 389, 392, 1307, 1307–1308 and Uruguay, 400, 401–402, 403 and Vietnam, 1266–1269, 1271 and Wales, 1636, 1640 Ideology, 971–989 and China, 794–795, 1193, 1194–1197, 1195, 1197 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1280–1281 globalization, disillusionment, and, 936–941 and Iraq, 752 and Malaysia, 1223 and nationalist movements, 940–941 and Russia, 692–697 and the United States, 1307–1308 and Vietnam, 1269 See also Communism; Fascism; Nationalism; Philosophy, political Igbo, 1469 Iglesias, Santiago, 839 Ileto, Reynaldo, 1245 Iliescu, Ion, 1586, 1587, 1589 Iliolo, Ratu Josefa, 1325 Immigrants/immigration, 1418–1429 and Alsace, 1510 and Argentina, 276, 277, 279, 280, 492 and Australia, 850 and Basques, 1517 and Burma, 777, 783 and Canada, 304, 1837 and Catalonia, 1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Colombia, 833 and cosmopolitanism, 1362 and Cuba, 1275 and Denmark, 155 education and, 420, 423–424 and the European Union, 1042 and France, 1055–1056, 1056 and gender, 448 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1409, 1411–1412, 1415 and Great Britain, 1007, 1009, 1013 and Greenland, 1566 and homeland politics, 1414–1415, 1416 and Indonesia, 1729 and Israel, 1121, 1129, 1130 and Japan, 1749, 1753, 1753 and language, 482, 483–484

and Latvia, 1575 and Malaysia, 1215 and Mongolia, 1797 and nativism, 883 and the Netherlands, 202, 206 and New Zealand, 864, 867, 868, 1856 and Pakistan, 1237 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Québec, 1296–1297 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Scandinavia, 231 and sports, 1000 and Turkey, 1650 and the United States, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1311 and Uruguay, 402 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnicity; Minorities; Refugees Imoudu, Michael, 1181 Imperialism. See Colonialism/imperialism Incas, 367–368, 370–371, 373 Income distribution and Australia, 853 and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Iran, 1111 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 955 and the United States, 1307, 1308 Independence and Afghanistan, 1684 in Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1098, 1099, 1100 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 728 and Argentina, 269–273 and Armenia, 1709–1710 and Austria, 542, 548–550, 552–553 and the Baltic states, 556–557, 562, 568, 1575, 1577–1578 and Belgium, 140, 142–143 and Brazil, 282, 287, 289, 295 and Bulgaria, 573–574, 578–580 and Burma, 777, 782–785 and Central America, 313, 319 and Chile, 326–327, 328 during the Cold War era, 949–950, 960, 969 and Colombia, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1161 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1277 and developing countries, 980 and Eritrea, 1173, 1173–1175 and Fiji, 1316–1317, 1320 and Finland, 223, 231, 605, 606 and Greece, 46, 53, 623, 625–631 and Greenland, 1571 and Haiti, 336 and Hungary, 638 and Iceland, 231 and India, 804–806, 889–890, 1201–1203 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1725, 1727, 1733–1734

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and Iraq, 750, 752–753 Latin America and, 46, 272 and Mexico, 349–350 and Mongolia, 1790, 1795 and New Zealand, 872 and Nigeria, 1181–1183 and Norway, 223–225, 231 and Pakistan, 1229–1231 and Paraguay, 359, 360–361 and Peru, 370, 371 and the Philippines, 1240–1241 and Poland, 681, 687–688 and popular nationalist movements, 503 to protect national culture, 1355 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 841, 843, 844–847 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Santo Domingo, 332–333 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and Taiwan, 1256–1257 and technology, 1479 and Tibet, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 767–768 and Ukraine, 722, 1626, 1626–1627 and Uruguay, 397 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Separatism/secession; Sovereignty India, 796–806, 799 (map), 943, 949–950, 1201–1211, 1202 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and colonialism, 48 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1373 education and, 424, 429 and gender, 446, 451, 902 government in, 981 and Great Britain, 889–890 and independence, 963, 1006, 1461–1462 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1771, 1765 and the Khalifat Movement, 1763 language/literature in, 920, 922, 923, 927 and music, 1440, 1441, 1443 and Nepal, 1802 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 967–968, 1229–1231, 1234–1235, 1235 politics in, 976–977, 987 railroad in, 131 and religion, 107 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 and terrorism, 1495 and the Tibetan government-in-exile, 1821, 1822 and water, 885 Indians, in Malaysia, 1215, 1216 Indigenismo, 352 Indigenous groups and Argentina, 277, 280 and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 283, 285, 293, 1826, 1828

and Canada, 303, 1837, 1840 and Central America, 310, 311, 317 and Chile, 324–326, 327 and Colombia, 829, 830 colonialism and, 889, 893, 912–913, 914–917 and education, 1383, 1385 and the environment/natural resources, 879, 883–884 and Fiji, 1314–1325 influence on music of, 1438–1439 Inuit, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 and language, 472, 482 and Malaysia, 1213–1215 and Mexico, 345–346, 351 and new social movements, 1448, 1451–1452 and Peru, 370–371, 372–375 and Québec, 1297 and Taiwan, 1252 and the United States, 1309 and Uruguay, 394–395 See also Maori; Pan-Aboriginalism; Sami Indo-Fijians, 1314–1325, 1318 Indo-Pakistan War, 1767 Indonesia, 1722–1735, 1724 (map) aircraft industry in, 1476 diversity and government in, 953–954 and independence, 1462–1463 and Malaysia, 1220 and the Netherlands, 197, 204 political tensions in, 938 radio hobbyists in, 128 separatist movements in, 1468 and technology, 1479–1480 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and transmigration, 876 Industrial Revolution, 161 Industrialization and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Basques, 1514–1515, 1517 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 317 and class, 55–56 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and England, 161 and Eritrea, 1169 and the European revolutions of 1848, 47 and Finland, 598 and geopolitics, 461 and Germany, 611 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 648, 661 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 424, 1748–1749 and Korea, 1778 and Mongolia, 1785 and nationalism, 1475, 1480 and Pakistan, 1228 and Poland, 209, 679, 681 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Québec, 1293–1294

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Industrialization (continued ) and Romania, 1585, 1587 and Russia, 699 and Scandinavia, 221 socialism and, 205 and the Soviet Union, 1075 and Spain, 703–704, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Ukraine, 714–715 and the United States, 1309 See also Economy Inequality and education, 1382, 1385–1386 and gender, 901–902, 903–904 and globalization, 936 and oil revenues in the Middle East, 1396 See also Income distribution; Rights Infrastructure and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 296, 1829 and China, 1193, 1200 education, 1381 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1169 and Indonesia, 1723 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 205 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1680 and Spain, 706, 708 and technological advances, 127–128, 131–132 and Tibet, 1814 and the United States, 389–390 Ingrians (Ingers), 557 Ingush, 441 Injannashi, 1788, 1789 Innis, Harold Adams, 1474, 1475 ˙Inönü, ˙Ismet, 768 Inoue Nissho, 816–817 Intellectuals, 1707 and Algeria, 1100 and Arab nationalism, 725, 730–733, 734 and Armenia, 1706 and Bulgaria, 571–572, 573 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1842 and China, 789–790, 792, 793, 793 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and France, 1052 and Germany, 183–185 independence and Greek, 626–627, 629–630 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 1741, 1745 and Latvia, 1575, 1577 and Mongolia, 1785–1786 and Nigeria, 1180 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222, 223

the Soviet Union and disciplining, 1074–1076 and Ukraine, 718 Young Ottomans/Turks, 763, 763, 764–765, 767, 771, 774 See also Elites International institutions. See Global institutions International Labour Organization (ILO), 1610 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1229, 1829, 1829 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 1359–1361 Internationalism, 536 and Angola, 1663 and Germany, 1551, 1559–1560 and globalization, 1408–1410 issue-specific, 1361–1362 versus nationalism, 418, 1342 and sports, 991 See also Post-nationalism; Transnationalism Internet and Armenia, 1709 and diaspora populations, 1370 and national identity, 1476, 1481–1483 and transnationalism, 1339 Interpellation, 486, 489–490 Intervention. See Foreign intervention Intifada, 1141 Inuit, 879, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 Ioann, Metropolitan, 106 Iqbal Lahori, Muhammad, 1229–1230, 1230, 1233 Iran, 1106–1118, 1108 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714 and gender, 446 and Iraq, 758, 1743 and Islamic fundamentalism, 986 and new social movements, 1452 and Palestine, 1142 and religious fundamentalism, 1396–1397 and terrorism, 1488 and the United States, 952 See also Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 756, 757, 952, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1746 Iraq, 747–759, 748 (map), 1736–1747, 1738 (map) borders of, 966 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1389 and Iran, 1115–1116 U.S. invasion of, 954, 955, 1497 water, 884–885 See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ireland, 647–662 Celtic revival in, 407 and colonialism, 915 and diaspora populations, 1374, 1375–1376

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economy of, 1060, 1408 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 112–113 and gender/sexuality, 452, 908 and immigration, 1424 and independence, 166, 1006 language and literature in, 488, 913–914, 918, 919, 920, 922–925 and Northern Ireland, 1060–1062, 1062, 1068 and sports, 997–998, 999–1000 Irian Jaya, 1734 Irish National Land League, 653–654 Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, 1185 Irving, Washington, 389 Isabella of Castile, 709 Islam and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1694 and Arab nationalism, 731, 733 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and the caliphate, 760–761 and India, 797 and Indonesia, 1728, 1734 and Iraq, 755, 1737, 1743–1745 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and national identity, 103–105 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763, 764 and Pakistan, 1236 and the Philippines, 1239 and politics, 983–987 in Russia, 1605–1607 and Turkey, 768, 1653–1654 See also Islamic fundamentalists; Shiism/ Shiites; Sunnis Islamic fundamentalists, 984–987, 1392, 1393, 1396–1400 and Algeria, 1101, 1102–1103 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1769 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1141–1143 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 in Turkey, 1649 Islamization, 1397–1400 Ismail, King (Egypt), 259, 260 Israel, 953, 1120–1130, 1122 (map) and counterterrorism, 1496 and diaspora populations, 1367 and education, 1387–1388 and environmental nationalism, 880 and minorities, 1374 and music, 1443 and Palestinians, 1133–1143 and religious fundamentalism, 1394, 1398, 1401–1402 and the Suez War, 266 symbols of, 114, 116 and water, 885 Isto, Edvard (Eetu), 603 (illus.) István, King (Hungary), 643

Itagaki Taisuke, 820 Italy, 663–677 and democracy, 946–947 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 426, 429, 432 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737, 740, 740 fascism in, 419, 514–516, 518–519 and film, 1333–1334 form of nationalism in, 502 and gender, 448–449 and language, 472 and the Libyan war, 514 and minorities, 1374, 1412, 1424 and music, 1437–1438, 1441 and nationalistic art, 410, 413, 414–415, 418 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and terrorism, 1491 unification (Risorgimento) of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 468, 512 Ivan the Terrible, 700 Ives, Charles, 1439 Iwakura Mission, 818–820 Izetbegovi´c, Alija, 1527 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev (Vladimir), 1123 Jacini, Stefano, 669 Jackson, A. Y., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jacobitism, 175, 233, 238, 238 Jacobsen, J. C., 154 Jacobus, Stephanus, 1149 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 92, 186 Jakobson, Carl Robert, 562 Jamaica, 495 James, C. L. R., 992, 1301 James VI (Scotland)/James I (England), 61 Jamieson, John, 239 Jammu and Kashmir, 1462, 1759–1771, 1762 (map) conflict in, 1203–1204, 1234–1235, 1235, 1465–1466 Jang Bahadur, 1807 Jangghar, 1791 Jannsen, Johann Voldemar, 562 Japan, 808–822, 811 (map), 819 (map), 821 (map), 1748–1758, 1750 (map) and Burma, 777, 784–785 and China, 791, 792, 795, 1190 colonialism and, 1462 and democracy, 947 education and, 38, 40, 424, 426 and gender, 445, 450, 456 and India, 806 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language, 472, 478 and the Meiji Restoration, 27 and Mongolia, 1792, 1795, 1796 and music, 1439–1440, 1441 nationalism and literature in, 491–492 origins of nationalism in, 9

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Japan (continued ) and politics, 988 and religion, 106–107 and sports, 1001 and Taiwan, 1250, 1251 and terrorism, 1491 Jargalsaikhan, D., 1794 Jarl, Birger, 226 Järnefelt, Eero, 605 Jefferson, Thomas, 22, 32, 65, 211, 370, 387, 388 Jesuits, 350–351 Jews and Austria, 546 in the Baltic states, 563 in Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and the Diaspora, 1366, 1367 as discredited sexuality, 907 and Egypt, 265, 266 and establishment of Israel, 1402 ethnic cleansing and genocide in Russia, 438 and Germany, 188, 193, 430 and the Holocaust, 439–440, 523 and Hungary, 644, 645 in Iraq, 755–756 in Macedonia and Thrace during the Holocaust, 582 and the Netherlands, 199 and pogroms in Ukraine, 722 and Poland, 207, 209 in Romania, 1594 and Switzerland, 249 in Turkey, 1649 in the United States, 1398, 1400 See also Anti-Semitism; Israel; Judaism Jibzundamba Khutugtu, Eighth, 1788, 1792 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 804, 976, 1229, 1230, 1230–1231, 1233, 1461 Joergensen, A. D., 152, 154 Jogaila (Lithuanian prince), 564 John, King (England), 165 John Paul II, Pope, 948, 988 Johnson, Barry, 1399 Johnson, James, 73 Johnson, Lyndon, 944, 1310 Johnson, Samuel, 60 Johnston, Frank, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jones, Aneurin, 1637 Jones, Inigo, 61 Joseph II (Austria-Hungary), 138, 140 Jospin, Lionel, 1510 Joubert, Piet, 1146 Joyce, James, 489, 658, 914, 923, 924 Juan Carlos I, King (Spain), 1087 Judaism and fundamentalism (Ultra-Orthodoxy), 1124, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1400–1403 and national identity, 103 See also Jews Juliana, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Júnior, Caio Prado, 292

Kabila, Joseph, 1165 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 1165 Kagame, Paul, 1674 Kalaallit. See Greenland Kalevala, The, 227, 228, 406, 599, 602, 604 Kallay, Benjamin von, 1529 Kalmyks, 1784, 1790–1791, 1792, 1794–1795 Kamenev, Lev, 520 Kamil, Husayn, 262 Kamil, Mustafa, 261 Kangxi, Emperor, 1252 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 17, 86, 87–88, 533, 1352 Kaplan, Robert, 929 Karaites (Karaim), 557 Karamzin, Nikolai, 94 Karavelov, Luben, 573 Karel IV, king of Bohemia, 592 Karelia, 599, 600, 608 Karlsbad Decrees, 187, 189 Karmal, Babrak, 1687 Karnaviˇcus, Jurgis, 560 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 638 Karzai, Ahmed Wali, 1694 (illus.) Karzai, Hamid, 1686, 1695 Kasavubu, Joseph, 1158 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kasparov, Gary, 951 Katanga, 1158, 1469 Kaunitz, Chancellor (Austria), 33–34 Kayibanda, Gregoire, 1677 Kazakhs, 1798 Kazakhstan, 1079, 1798 Kazimierz (Casimir) III (Prussia), 214 Keane, John, 1446, 1456 Kedourie, Elie, 474, 533 Keller, Ferdinand, 413 Kellerman, François, 1504 Kelly, Edward “Ned,” 857, 857 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 451, 633, 767–770, 1643, 1646–1647, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653 and Turkish identity, 766 Kemal, Namik, 763, 763, 766, 770, 774 Kemboi, Ezekiel, 1001 Kennan, George C., 945 Kennedy, John F., 944 Kent, William, 62 Kenya education and, 429 and literature, 919–920, 925–926 and music, 1440, 1441 Kenyatta, Jomo, 965 Kerber, Linda, 50 Kerkorian, Kirk, 1707 Key, Francis Scott, 117, 1443 Keyser, Rudolf, 228 Khachaturian, Aram, 1707 Khalifat Movement, 1763 Khan, Abatai, 1791 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 1236 Khan, Altan, 1817

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Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 1786, 1786, 1791, 1798, 1816 Khan, Dayan, 1786 Khan, Ishaq, 1232 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1232 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 801 Khan, Yahya, 1232 Khan, Yaqub, 1690–1691 Khan Khattak, Khushal, 1690 Khatami, Mohammad, 1117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 952, 986, 1111, 1114, 1396, 1397, 1399, 1400 Khomiakov, A. S., 692 Khorenatsi, Movses, 1702, 1708 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 948, 952, 979, 1076, 1077, 1603 Khutugtu, Jibzundamba, 1790 Khyvliovyi, Mykola, 718 Kidd, Benjamin, 532 Kierkegaard, Søren, 228 Kim Dae Jung, 1779 Kim Il Sung, 952, 1773, 1779–1781, 1780 Kim Jong Il, 1780 Kincaid, Jamaica, 924 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 123, 938, 1203, 1304 King, Michael, 869 King, Rodney, 1339 King, Sir Frederic Truby, 871 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 306 Kireevskii, I. V., 692 Kiribati, 1443 Kissinger, Henry, 458 Kivi, Aleksis, 602 Kjellén, Rudolf, 460, 463, 491 Klaus, Václav, 1027, 1028 Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 1504 Klingler, Werner, 133 Knudsen, Knud, 225–226 Kochanowski, Jan, 214 Kodály, Zoltán, 81, 1432, 1435 Kohl, Helmut, 1549 Kohn, Hans, 23, 392, 474 Koidula, Lydia, 564 Koirala, B. P., 1803, 1807 Koizumi, Prime Minister (Japan), 1755 Kolberg, Oskar, 216 Köler, Johann, 564 Kolettis, Ioannis, 632 Kollár, Jan, 592 Kołła˛taj, Hugo, 211 Kollontai, Alexandra, 453, 454 Konovalets, Yevhen, 718 Kopernik, Mikołaj (Nicholas Copernicus), 214 Korais, Adamantios, 626, 628, 628 Korchynsky, Dmytro, 1628 Korea, 1467, 1772–1781, 1774 (map) education and, 424 and independence, 1462 and Japan, 809, 810, 815, 818, 1749 and sports, 1001

Koreans, in Japan, 1753 Körner, Theodor, 73 Korppi-Tommola, Aura, 54 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 96, 211, 211, 214, 686 Kosovo, 1409, 1554, 1555 Kossuth, Lajos, 638, 643 Kossuth, Louis, 239 Kostecki, Platon, 716 Koyama Eizo, 822 Kozyrev, Andrei, 1597 Kracauer, Siegfried, 1330–1331 Kramáˇr, Karel, 590 Krasicki, Ignacy, 214 Krasi´nski, Zygmunt, 212, 214, 216 Kraszewski, Józef Ignacy, 216–217, 685 Kravchuk, Leonid, 1078, 1597, 1621, 1622, 1626 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhard, 564, 567 Krieck, Wilhelm, 426 Kronvalds, Atis, 1577 Kruger, Paul, 1146, 1150–1151 Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 453, 454 Kuchma, Leonid, 1080, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1628 Kun, Béla, 520 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 1079 Kunchov, Vasil, 580 Kurds and European partition, 891–893 and Iraq, 752–753, 755, 756, 1737, 1741–1742, 1745 and terrorism, 1491 and Turkey, 769, 885, 1646, 1650, 1653, 1655 Kushner, Barak, 822 Kutuzov, Dmitrii, 696 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 1074 Kuwait, 1743 Kuyper, Abraham, 200, 1149 Kymlicka, Will, 97, 931 Kyoto treaty, 877, 1447, 1456, 1457 Kyrlylenko, Vyacheslav, 1626 Labor/employment and Australia, 852 and Burma, 777, 781 and England, 164 and Fiji, 1314–1315 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Iraq, 1746 and the knowledge worker, 1380 and migration, 1422, 1424 and Nigeria, 1181 shortages and ethnic cleansing/genocide, 441 slavery, 889. See also Slavery and South Africa, 1145–1146 specialization of, 130 and the United States, 1304, 1309 Ladulås, Magnus, 226 Lagarde, Pierre, 409 Lagerbring, Sven, 227 Lahiri, Jhumpa, 927 Laicism, 769

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Lal, Brij V., 1322 Lalli (Finnish hero), 604–605 Lamanskii, Vladimir, 1601 Lamas, Andrés, 402 Lamming, George, 913, 917, 924 Land ownership and Australia, 1851–1852 and Fiji, 1314, 1322 and Haiti, 338, 342 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Ireland, 648, 653 and Japan, 811–812 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1861–1863, 1862 and Paraguay, 358 and Puerto Rico, 845 and South Africa, 1151 Land rights/claims and Afghanistan, 1692 and the Baltic states, 568 and Burma, 783 and the Inuit, 1567 and new social movements, 1450, 1451–1452 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846 and the Sami, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1617 Land sacralization, 100, 103 Landes, Joan, 49 Landsbergis, Vytautus, 1078 Landscape, 59–71 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Canada, 1841 and Denmark, 154 and England, 162 and Finland, 599, 604 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127–1128, 1129 and music, 78–79 and national identity, 875–876, 1342, 1344–1345 and Russia, 698 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 228 and Switzerland, 251, 252 as symbols, 114–115 and Turkey, 770 and Ukraine, 1621 and Wales, 1633 See also Environment Lange, Christian, 228 Language, 471–484, 912–928 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1692 and Afrikaner nationalism, 1147 and Algeria, 1095, 1101 and Alsace, 1502–1503, 1509, 1510 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 733 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703 and Austria, 542 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 560, 561, 562, 563 and Basques, 704, 710–711, 1092, 1512, 1514 (map), 1516, 1522

and Belgium, 138, 141–142, 144–145, 146 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 289, 1825 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Canada, 303, 307, 1840 and Catalans, 706, 1537, 1542, 1544, 1546 and China, 1199 and cultural survival, 878–879 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1021 and Denmark, 154 dictionaries and standardizing, 477 education and, 420, 424–425, 427 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1170, 1172, 1173–1174 and Ethiopia, 741, 746 and Europe, 1031 and Fiji, 1320 and Finland, 598–599, 601, 601–602, 605–606 and France, 34, 178 and Germany, 185 and globalization, 1392 and Greece, 629–630 and Greenland, 1565, 1566, 1568, 1570–1571 and Haiti, 339 and Hungary, 641 and immigration, 1420, 1421 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723–1725, 1728 and Ireland, 657, 660 and Israel, 1124, 1127, 1129 and Italy, 665, 671 and Japan, 813 and Latvia, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1582 and Malaysia, 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 345, 346 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1796, 1798 and national boundaries, 461 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 16, 533, 1355–1356 and nationalistic music, 78, 80 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 199 and New Zealand, 1383 and Pakistan, 1233, 1235–1236 and Paraguay, 358, 364, 365 and the Philippines, 1247 and Poland, 217, 679, 688 and political philosophy, 88–89, 91 and print technology, 1475 and Puerto Rico, 841, 845 and Québec, 1291, 1293, 1296 and Romania, 1588, 1589–1591 and the Sami, 1613–1614 and Scandinavia, 225–226 and Singapore, 1224–1225 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Spain, 707

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and Switzerland, 245 and Taiwan, 1258 and Tibet, 1815, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 772–773, 1646, 1646, 1652, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 719, 719, 720, 721, 1621, 1623–1624, 1625, 1627 and the United States, 389 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 and Wales, 1632, 1634–1636, 1635, 1638 Laos, 1463 Lapage, Robert, 1294 Laporte, Pierre, 1291 Laqueur, Walter, 1489, 1498 Larrazábal, Antonio, 317 Larsson, Carl, 228 Laski, Harold, 981 Lassale, F., 38 Lastarria, José Victorino, 329 Latin America development of nationalism in, 8, 9, 16, 26, 46 and film, 1335 and language, 472 and nationalistic music, 76 and new social movements, 1450–1452 See also specific Latin American countries Latvia, 1573–1582, 1573 (map) fascism in, 517 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, 399 Lavater, Johann Kaspar, 251 Lavin, Mary, 925 Lawson, Henry, 854 Laxman, Adam, 810 Le Carre, John, 951 Le Corbusier, 1206 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1054, 1056, 1447, 1453, 1510 Le Republicain (L’Union), 341, 342 Leaders and Africa, 890 and Angola, 1661–1663, 1662 anticolonial nationalist, 962–964 and Arab nationalism, 730–731, 732, 732–733 and Argentina, 277–278 and Armenia, 1699 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532 and Canada, 306, 1837 and Central America, 317–318, 320–321 and China, 790, 794, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158, 1160 and Denmark, 153 and Egypt, 258–259 and France, 1051, 1052 and Germany, 189, 190 and Haiti, 336–337, 338 and India, 1206–1207, 1207, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1726, 1727 and Iraq, 758 Islamic attacks on Muslim, 1397–1398

and Islamic movements, 984–985 and Israel, 1121, 1123, 1123, 1128 and Japan, 818–820, 1751–1752, 1752 and Korea, 1775, 1780 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1857, 1858 and Mongolia, 1789–1790 monuments to, 410–411 and national identity, 1345 as national symbols, 114, 116 and Nepal, 1803, 1806 and new social movements, 1453 and Nigeria, 1180, 1180–1181, 1182, 1187 and Pakistan, 1230 and Palestinians, 1134, 1136–1137, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1848, 1848, 1851, 1853 and Paraguay, 364 and the Philippines, 1241–1242, 1242, 1244 and Poland, 210–212, 681–683, 682 and Puerto Rico, 839–840 qualities of, 982 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1597 and the Sami, 1616, 1616–1618 and separatist movements, 1464–1465 and Singapore, 1221 and South Africa, 1150–1151, 1152 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1075 and Taiwan, 1253 and Uruguay, 398 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Heroes/heroines League of Arab States, 729 League of Nations failure of the, 1402 and Iraq, 750, 1739 and Israel, 1123 Mandates, 728, 1461 and New Zealand, 872 Lebanon, 728 Lechner, Frank, 1392 Leclerc, Charles, 336 Leclerc de Buffon, Georges-Louis, 351 Lee, Richard Henry, 385 Lee Kuan Yew, 1220, 1221 Lee Teng-hui, 1253, 1253–1254, 1255, 1256, 1258, 1259 Legal system/institutions and Central America, 314, 315, 319 and France, 174, 176 and the Netherlands, 202 and Scandinavia, 227 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 254 Legitimacy and Angola, 1666 and Chinese communists, 1196, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1370–1371 and ideologies and religions, 972–973 and Iran, 1109

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Legitimacy (continued ) and modern nation-states, 930 and national sports, 998–999 and North versus South Korea, 1776, 1778–1779 and the Qing Dynasty in China, 788 Legitime, Francois, 338 Leino, Eino, 605 Lej Iyasu, 740, 740 Lelewel, Joachim, 212, 214, 692 Lemarchand, Rene, 1676 Lemieux, Mario “The Magnificent,” 1842 Lemkin, Raphael, 436 Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov), 436, 697, 978, 981, 1072 and ethnicities, 1599 and film, 1330 on nationalism, 1071 León y Gama, Antonio de, 351, 351 Leopold I (Belgium), 142 Leopold II (Belgium), 1156 Lepeletier, L. M., 34 Lerroux, Alejandro, 710 Lesage, Jean, 1290, 1290 Lespinasse, Beauvais, 341 Lester, Richard, 1337 Lévesque, René, 1290, 1290, 1291, 1291 (illus.), 1294 Levitt, Kari, 1842 Levski, Vasil, 573, 576, 576 Levsky, Vasil, 96 Levy, Andrea, 928 Lewis, C. S., 971 Lewis, Geoffrey, 773 Lewis, Saunders, 1635 Liberalism, 14–15, 23–28, 535–536, 537 and Australia, 854 and Brazil, 1830 as detached from democracy, 1306 and European nationalism, 512–513 and Finland, 598 German, 17 and Indonesia, 1732 and Italy, 669 versus nationalism, 1350–1351. See also Nationalism, liberal and Paraguay, 364–365 and Puerto Rico, 841 and Spain, 704 See also Economic liberalism Liberties. See Rights Liborio, 1283 Libyan war, 514 Liebermann, Max, 416 Liebknecht, Karl, 520 Liechtenstein, 1443 Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 Lijphart, Arend, 206 Lilburn, Douglas, 1439 Lincoln, Abraham, 382, 391

Lindeman, Ludvig Mathias, 73 Lindsay, A. D., 536 Linguistic internationalists, 471 Lippmann, Walter, 950 Lira, Luciano, 401 Lismer, Arthur, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Lisson, Carlos, 374 List, Friedrich, 18, 191, 192, 463 Liszt, Franz, 74, 81, 1432, 1435 Literacy rates, 495–497, 496 (map) and Pakistan, 1228 Literature, 465, 485–497, 912–928 and Argentina, 278–279 and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703 Austrian, 543 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Brazil, 285, 287 and Bulgaria, 576–577 and Canada, 1841 and Catalonia, 1543 and Chile, 329, 330 and Colombia, 832 and Finland, 602, 604, 605 and France, 177, 1052 and gender, 49 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and India, 800, 1209 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1740 and Ireland, 657, 658–659 and Mongolia, 1789, 1794 and Nepal, 1807, 1808 and the Philippines, 1244–1245 and Poland, 682, 685 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavia, 228 and Scotland, 238–239 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 1075–1076, 1077, 1077 and Spain, 708 and Turkey, 763, 770 and Ukraine, 720 and the United States, 389, 951 See also Poetry Lithuania, 561 and gender/sexuality, 908 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Livingston, David, 164 Livs, 557 Localism and globalization, 1411 nationalism as, 1415 and subsidiarity, 881 See also Regionalism Loggia, Enrico Galli della, 676 Lomonosov, M. V., 694 Lönnrot, Elias, 228, 406, 599, 602 López, Carlos Antonio, 362, 363, 364

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López, Narciso, 1282 Lopez, Vicente Fidel, 276 López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 830–831, 832 Louis-Philippe, 408 Louis XVI, King (France), 1489 Louis XVIII, King (France), 1443 Louisiana Purchase, 390 Lower, Arthur, 305 Loya jirga, 1686, 1687, 1690, 1691 Lu Xun, 793 Lubbe, Marinus van der, 119 Luce, Henry, 1309 Ludendorff, Erich, 613 Lumumba, Patrice, 962–963, 1158, 1158, 1159, 1159 (illus.), 1160–1162 heroicizing of, 1164 Luther, Martin, 188, 618, 983 Luxemburg, Rosa, 520 Lyngbye, Hans Christian, 225 Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 718 MacArthur, Douglas, 1751 Macartney, C. A., 1368 Macaulay, Hebert, 1179–1180, 1180 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 165, 912 MacCunn, Hamish, 1438 MacDonald, J. E. H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Macdonald, John A., 1837 MacDowell, Edward, 76, 1438 Macedonia and Bulgaria, 580, 582 and diasporic communities, 1415 Germany and peacekeeping in, 1554 Maceo, 1275, 1282 Machado, Gerardo, 1276 Maˇciulis, Jonas, 565 Mackenzie, Alexander, 300, 1438 Mackinder, Halford, 460, 468 Maclennan, Hugh, 307 Macpherson, James, 462 Mada, Gajah, 1727 Madison, James, 386, 387, 388 Magna Carta, 165 Magnus, Olaus, 223 Magnus VI (Norway), 226 Magsaysay, Ramon, 1241, 1242 Magyarization, 644 Magyars, 587 Maharaja (of Jammu and Kashmir), 1764–1765 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, 1803, 1807–1808 Maimonides, 1402, 1403 Maistre, Joseph de, 92 Majoritarian nationalist movements, 940 Makarenko, Anton, 425, 429 Malan, Daniel François, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1151 Malawi, 1440 Malay(s), 1213–1215, 1217, 1219, 1225 as dominant culture in Malaysia, 1220–1222 and education, 1384–1385 and the Philippines, 1243

Malaysia, 1213–1225 and education, 1385–1386 and independence, 1463 and Indonesia, 1729, 1733 and natural resources, 884 Malcolm X, 965 Mâle, Emile, 415 Malthusianism, 518 Mamluks, 257–258, 259–260 Mammeri, Mouloud, 1100 Manchester, England, 161 Manchuria and independence, 1462 and Japan, 810, 818 Manchurian Incident (1931), 810, 821 Manchus, 1818 Mandela, Nelson, 995, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1488–1489 Mandukhai, Empress, 1786 Manifest destiny. See Expansionism Mann, Horace, 37 Mann, Thomas, 617 Mansell, Michael, 1848 Manzanilla, Matias, 374 Manzoni, Alessandro, 671 Mao Zedong, 948, 952, 977, 1191, 1816, 1819, 1821 economic and political programs, 1198–1199 ideology of, 978, 1194–1197, 1197 influence of, 1192–1193 Maoism, 978–979 and Angola, 1664 and Nepal, 1810–1811 Maori, 866, 1855–1863 and education, 1383 and music, 1439 and New Zealand, 873 population, 864 and the Treaty of Waitangi, 863 and the world wars, 869–870 Maps, 465 and Central America, 319–320 and Finland, 602–604 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 640 and Japan, 810 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1320, 1324 Maragall i Mira, Pasqual, 1539, 1540, 1541 (illus.) Marcinkowski, Karol, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 1241–1242, 1244, 1246 Marcos, Imelda, 1242, 1244, 1245 Margalit, A., 97 Marginalization, 935–941 Maria Theresa (Austria-Hungary), 138 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 1469 Maritz, Gerrit, 1150 Markievicz, Countess, 654 “Marseillaise,” 175 Marshall, George C., 948 Marsland, David, 114

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Martí, José, 1275, 1276, 1282, 1283 Martin, Henri, 177 Martins, Wilfred, 975 Marure, Alejandro, 319 Marx, Karl, 1–3, 17–18, 217, 1195 and gender roles, 56 and religion, 1397 on socialism versus communism, 975 Marxism, 1–3, 12 and Angola, 1661, 1662 and Arab nationalism, 730–731 and culture, 485–486 and the environment, 881 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 471 See also Communism Mas, Artur, 1539 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 585, 585, 587–588, 589, 589 (illus.), 592, 593, 1017, 1028 Masculinity, 900–901. See also Gender Mashtots, Mesrop, 1701 Mason, Lowell, 389 Masood, Ahmad Shah, 1690, 1693 Massey, Vincent, 1838 Massey, William, 869 Masur, Gerhard, 834 Matejko, Jan, 682 Mathews, Robin, 1843 Matto de Turner, Clorinda, 374 Maude, Sir Stanley, 1742 Maupassant, Guy de, 134 Maura, Antonio, 707 Maurits of Orange (the Netherlands), 196 Maurras, Charles, 533 May, Glenn, 1246 May Fourth movement, 793, 793 Mayer, Gustav, 611 Maynard, Charles Frederick, 1848 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24, 90, 94–95, 468, 502, 673, 673 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Mbundu, 1660, 1664, 1665 McCarthy, Joseph, 907–908, 944 McCubbin, Frederick, 859 McDougall, William, 530, 535 McKay, Claude, 494 McLuhan, Marshall, 129 McVeigh, Timothy, 1492 Meˇciar, Vladimir, 1026–1027 Media and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Alsace, 1509 and Armenia, 1709 and Azerbaijan, 1719 and the Baltic states, 567 and Brazil, 287 and Bulgaria, 573 and Burma, 783 and Canada, 1839 and Central America, 316, 320

and China, 1193, 1199 culture and forms of, 1474–1475 education and, 422, 433 and Egypt, 261, 262 and Eritrea, 1172 and Ethiopia, 746 and globalization, 1412 in Haiti, 341 and immigration, 1427 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iraq, 1738, 1745 and Korea, 1781 as maintaining psychological stability, 123 manipulation of, 1480–1481 and national identity, 30, 31, 38, 464–465, 486, 1473 and Nepal, 1808 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1853 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 217 and Québec, 1296 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 technological advances and, 129, 132–134, 135–136 in Turkey, 1649 and the United States, 390, 1308 See also Cinema; Literature; Newspapers; Print technology; Radio; Television Megali Idea, 632–633 Mehmed V (Ottoman Empire), 765 Mehmed VI (Ottoman Empire), 767 Meiji Restoration, 818, 1748, 1751 Meiren, Gada, 1789 Mekhitarians, 1700 Melgar, Mariano, 373 Mella, Julio Antonio, 1282, 1283 Melnyk, Andrei, 718, 1624 Melucci, Albert, 1446 Men and gendered role in conflict, 449 nationalist imagery and, 445–446 See also Gender; Masculinity Mendelssohn, Felix, 1431 Mendes, Chico, 1829 Mendes-France, Pierre, 1054 Menelik II (Ethiopia), 737, 737–740, 744 Mercantalism, 18–19 Merchants. See Bourgeoisie Mercier, Honoré, 305, 1288–1289 Merse, 1789 Mesopotamia, 748, 757–758 Messiaen, Olivier, 1434 Mestiço, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1665 Mestizaje, 349, 349, 356 Mexican-American War, 347, 352, 354, 390 Mexico, 344–356, 346 (map), 353 (map) and communications, 1475 and music, 1439 national identity and education in, 39 national radio of, 132–133

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and politics, 1414 and terrorism, 1491 Zapatista movement in, 1412, 1451–1452 Meyer, John, 1392, 1397 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 117 Michael the Brave (Romania), 1585, 1592 Michelet, Jules, 102, 177, 177–178 Mickiewicz, Adam, 212, 213, 214, 216, 686, 692 Micombero, Michel, 1677 Middle East and education, 428, 1387–1388 and European colonization, 891 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Mier, Servando Teresa de, 350, 351, 352 Migration and consolidating sovereignty, 876 globalization and international, 1414–1415 and sports, 1001–1002 See also Emigration; Immigrants/immigration Mikhalkov, Sergei, 1602 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 722 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 683 Military and Algeria, 1100 and Angola, 1667 and Armenia, 1710 and Brazil, 1827, 1828–1829, 1830–1831, 1832 and Burma, 781 and China, 790 and Ethiopia, 740 and Fiji, 1314, 1324 and gender/sexuality, 903, 910 and Germany, 620, 621 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726 interventions and terrorism, 1497 and Iraq, 751, 753, 1743, 1745 and Ireland, 661 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1748–1749, 1752 music, 1430, 1431 and New Zealand, 868–869 and Nigeria, 1185, 1188 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Russia, 955 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1679, 1680 and Spain, 703, 705, 706 technology, 1473 and Turkey, 1646, 1647 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 57 Mill, John Stuart, 19, 57, 85, 95, 527 and cosmopolitanism, 1356 Miller, Ferdinand von, 416 Mindaugas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Minghetti, Marco, 669 Minin, Kuz’ma, 700, 1602 Minorities and Afghanistan, 1689–1690, 1692–1693, 1694 in the Baltic states, 557

and Basques, 1516–1517 and Bulgaria, 580–582 and Burma, 781 and China, 1193, 1199–1200 and citizenship, 1374 and Colombia, 833 and concerns about cultural survival, 878–879 cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and, 1356, 1357–1362 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and demands for rights, 932–933, 936–941. See also Rights and discrimination, 1420, 1425. See also Discrimination/prejudice education and, 419, 422, 427, 429–430, 431, 432 and the environment, 882 and Ethiopia, 741 and Germany, 617 globalization and mobilization of, 1412–1413, 1414 and Hungary, 639, 644 and India, 976, 1203 and Indonesia, 1728–1729 and Iran, 1112–1113, 1117–1118 and Iraq, 1741–1742 and Israel, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and Japan, 1753, 1756, 1758 and Latvia, 1575 and the legacies of colonialism, 894 and Malaysia, 1463 marginalization in modern states of, 931–932 and Mongolia, 1798 and nationalist ideologies, 513 and Nepal, 1804, 1809–1810 and new social movements, 1448, 1453, 1457, 1458 and New Zealand, 866–867 and Nigeria, 1182–1183 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and Poland, 683, 685, 687 and Romania, 1587, 1591, 1593–1594 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672 and state terrorism, 1488 and Turkey, 1648–1651, 1654–1655 and Ukraine, 1625 and the United States, 1307, 1308 and Vietnam, 1271 and Wales, 1636 See also Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Genocide; Language Missionary activity, 480 Mistral, Frédéric, 477 Mitre, Bartolomé, 276, 279 Mitterrand, François, 458, 1051–1052, 1054 Mixed race descent and Brazil, 293 and Central America, 311 and Paraguay, 358

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Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga), 1158–1159, 1160, 1161, 1162–1165 Modarres, Hassan, 1114 Modernization and Afghanistan, 1686, 1688 and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Australia, 853–854 and China, 792, 1191–1192, 1197, 1198–1199, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1372 and Ethiopia, 740–741 and film, 1337 and Greece, 625, 630 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Italy, 669–670 and Japan, 1753 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 as necessitating the nation-state, 930–932 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Spain, 705, 705, 706 and Turkey, 771 Moe, Jørgen, 228 Mohammad, Mahathir bin, 1223–1224 Mohammed, Murtala Ramat, 1186, 1187, 1187 Mohaqeq, Mohammad, 1695 Moldavia/Moldova, 469, 1414 Molina, Felipe, 319 Molina, Pedro, 315, 316 Molotov, Viacheslav, 1077 Moluccans, 1491 Monarchy and France, 169–171 and Great Britain, 1007–1008, 1008 Mondlane, Eduardo, 1661 Mongolia, 1783–1799 and independence, 1818, 1819 Mongols, and Tibet, 1816–1817 Moniuszko, Stanisław, 74, 216, 686 Monnet, Jean, 1034 Montcalm, Louis de, 299 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, 62–64, 171, 529 Montevideo, 395–396, 397, 402 Montgomerie, Archibald William, 235 Montilla Aguilera, José, 1539, 1541 Montúfar, Manuel, 319 Monuments, 117–120 and Algeria, 1102 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 294–295 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 594, 1024–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Germany, 618, 619 and Indonesia, 1732, 1733, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Ireland, 659 and Japan, 1754–1755

and Latvia, 1580 and Mongolia, 1798 and national identity, 1342, 1345–1347 and nationalism, 408, 409, 410–412, 414–415, 417 and Nigeria, 1187 and rituals of belonging, 502, 504 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1603 Scottish, 239 and Turkey, 774 Mora, José María Luis, 352 Mora, Juan Rafael, 315, 318 Moral Majority, 1395, 1446 Morality and cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, 1351–1353, 1356–1357 and Cuba, 1283 and gender and sexuality issues, 447, 899, 908–909 and national character, 531 U.S. idealistic, 944 See also Values Moravia, 584 Morazán, Francisco, 318 Moreno, Manuel, 398 Moro, Aldo, 676 Moroccan crises, 514 Morocco, 1096–1097, 1464 Moros, 1243 Moscow Declaration, 548 Moscow metro, 134 Mosley, Oswald, 516 Mossadegh, Muhammad, 1109, 1109, 1111, 1114 Mosse, George, 905 Motoori Norinaga, 815 Mott, Lucretia, 53, 57 Motz, Friedrich, 191 Mount Ararat, 1702 Mount Rushmore, 134 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 1765 Mourer, Jean-Pierre, 1509 Mozambique, 968, 1464 Mubarak, Hosni, 985 Muhammad V, 1464 Mujahideen, 1687, 1688, 1693 Mukhtar, Mahmud, 264 Mulgan, Alan, 868 Müller, Adam, 92, 463 Multiculturalism and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 1826 and Canada, 1838, 1840, 1843 and education, 1379, 1382–1384, 1386 and Fiji, 1325 as a form of nationalism, 934, 935 and globalization, 1411–1412 and Great Britain, 1011–1013 and immigration, 1367

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and India, 1765 and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 1784 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and the Netherlands, 206 and Poland, 685 and Romania, 1589 and Singapore, 1224 as solution to minority demands, 933, 939 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 1306 Multilateralism, 877, 881 Multinationality, 1358 Munch, P. A., 228 Munich Conference, 595 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 840, 841, 845, 846 Muñoz Rivera, Luis, 839, 841 Museums, 31 and the Baltic states, 560 and France, 1053 in Germany, 1558 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Latvia, 1578 and nationalistic art, 412–414 and Scandinavia, 229 Musharraf, Pervez, 1232 Music, 72–83, 1430–1445 and Angola, 1665 Baltic folk songs, 561, 567 and Basques, 1522 and Brazil, 1826 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Finland, 600, 605 folk songs and nationalistic, 417 and France, 1053 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569–1570 in Indonesia, 1479 and Israel, 1127, 1128 and Italy, 671 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and national identity, 31, 132–133, 407 and Paraguay, 364, 365 and Poland, 214, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 songs in Denmark, 154 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637 See also Anthem, national Musical instruments, 1440–1441, 1442 Muslim Brotherhood, 984–986, 1396

Muslim League, 801, 804, 806, 976, 1761 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171 and Pakistan, 1230, 1231 Muslims and Egypt, 265 and India, 801, 803, 804, 806, 1203, 1209 and the Netherlands, 202 See also Islam Musset, Alfred de, 177 Mussolini, Benito, 448–449, 514–516, 518, 667, 670, 676 and Roman history, 674 Mussolini, Vittorio, 1334 Mussorgsky, Modest, 75, 75 (illus.), 78, 82, 1437 Nadim, Abdullah, 261 Nadir Shah, Mohammed, 1686, 1688 Nagorno-Karabakh. See Gharabagh conflict Naguib, Muhammad, 266 (illus.) Nagy, Imre, 978 Naipaul, V. S., 924 Nairn, Tom, 933 Naji, Dr., 1740 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1687 Napier, Theodore, 242 Napoleon, Louis, 197 Napoleon III, 407, 1443 Napoleonic Civil Code, 174, 176 Napoleonic wars, 463 and Central America, 317 and Germany, 186, 618–619 music and resistance in the, 73 as stirring nationalism, 14, 16, 26, 46 Nariño, Antonio, 831 Naruszewicz, Adam, 214 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 687 Nassef, Malak Hifni, 450 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 265–266, 266 (illus.), 730, 890, 964, 1396 and the Bandung Conference, 962 and pan-Arabism, 965, 982 Nation-building, 929–941 National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), 235, 235, 241 National character, 527–537. See also Culture; Identity National Socialism, 419, 422, 513, 514, 517–519. See also Nazism Nationalism defining, 4–5, 85, 1351 ethnic-genealogical versus civic-territorial, 1353–1354 forms of, 5–12, 934–935 and geopolitics, 458–469 as an ideological political project, 875 imperative and imaginary forms of, 501–503 and language, 473, 482–484. See also Language as a legitimating ideology, 436 liberal, 488–490, 1355–1359, 1362

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Nationalism (continued ) and masculinity, 900–901 origins of, 473–474 particularistic, 90–94 versus patriotism, 45 perversions of, 512–525 religious, 100–101. See also Religion technological, 1478 transnational, 1407, 1414–1415 universalistic culture-based, 88–90 See also Identity; Philosophy, political; Politics Nativism, 883 Natsir, Mohammed, 965 Natsugdorji, D., 1794 Natural resources and Azerbaijan, 1714 and Brazil, 283, 1827–1828, 1832 and Canada, 1842 and conflict, 883–886 and India, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 877 and the Philippines, 1247 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1671 and Scandinavia, 221 and Wales, 1632 Nau, Emile, 341 Naumovych, Ivan, 716 Navarra, 1516, 1517, 1523 Nazism and Austria, 545, 546, 550, 552 and Czechoslovakia, 592 education and, 426 and the environment, 882 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438–440, 523, 622 and expansionism, 621 and film, 1331 and gender, 454–456 on German national character, 533 and Iran, 1110–1111 and language, 481 and music, 1431 nationalism of, 1353 propaganda of, 133–134 and rituals of belonging, 505, 507–508 and sexuality, 907 Ndadaye, Melchior, 1673, 1679 Negritude movement, 488, 918–919 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 981, 1207, 1461, 1761, 1764, 1765, 1766 and the Bandung Conference, 961, 962, 1206 and the Dalai Lama, 1820 economic policies of, 1206 and Indian federalism, 1205 and the nonaligned movement, 982 Nehru, Motilal, 1207 Nejedlý, Zdenˇek, 1023–1024 Nekrasov, N. A., 694

Nelson, Lord Horatio, 164 Neo-fascism, 525, 974 Neo-Nazis and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557, 1558 and the Soviet Union, 1078 Neo-Stalinism, 1077–1078 Neoliberalism, in education, 1381–1382 Neorealism, 1333–1335, 1336, 1337 Nepal, 1800–1811, 1802 (map) Netherlands, the, 195–206, 201 (map), 202 (illus.) and Belgium, 141–142 and Brazil, 283–284 and colonialism, 1479 education and, 34, 429 fascism in, 516 and immigration, 1420 and Indonesia, 1463, 1723, 1733, 1734 and Japan, 809, 810 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 and music, 1443 national anthem, 117 and Taiwan, 1252 and technology, 1480 and terrorism, 1486–1487, 1491 See also Afrikaner nationalism Neto, Agostinho, 1661–1662, 1662 Nevskii, Aleksandr, 696, 700 New France, 1288 New Guinea, 852 New Zealand, 862–873, 864 (map) and education, 1382, 1383 and the Maori, 1855–1863 and music, 1439, 1441 and sports, 993 Newspapers and Algeria, 1103 and Arab nationalism, 752 and Australia, 854 and Colombia, 833 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and Iraq, 1740, 1745 and Irish resistance, 918 and Japan, 816, 817 in Latvia, 1576 and nationalism, 1473, 1475–1476 and Nigeria, 1179, 1181 and Québec, 1296 and the Sami, 1613 and Wales, 1639 Ngata, Sir Apirana, 1858, 1859 Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, 1818 Ng˜ ug˜ı wa Thiong’o, 913, 915, 919–920, 925–926 Niagara Falls, 134 Nibelungenlied, 406 Nicaragua and national identity, 321 symbols of, 319 and William Walker, 318

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Niceforo, Alfredo, 672 Nicholas I, Czar (Russia), 210, 690–692 Nicholas II, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Nicholls, David, 341 Nichols, Terry, 1492 Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn, 214 Nietzsche, F., 10 Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 205 Nigeria, 1177–1189, 1178 (map) Biafran secessionist movement in, 967 education and, 424 and literature, 920 Nightingale, Florence, 164 Nitze, Paul, 950 Nixon, Richard, 1039, 1395 Nkrumah, Kwame, 962, 964, 965, 980, 1161 Noble, Paul, 734 Nolan, Sidney, 857 Nolte, Ernst, 515 Nonaligned movement, 961, 969, 982 and Algeria, 1095 and Cuba, 1285 and India, 1206 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 944, 1359–1361, 1412 and Brazil, 1830 and Fiji, 1322 and new social movements, 1453 Nora, Pierre, 121–122, 1343 Nordau, Max, 416 Nordraak, Rikard, 230 North America and immigration, 1421, 1425 and terrorism, 1494 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1294, 1407, 1412, 1451 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 943, 974, 1532–1533 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Germany, 1549, 1555 and international interventions, 1409 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Russia, 1604 and Turkey, 774 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 1303 North Borneo (Sabah), 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 North Korea, 977, 1757. See also Korea Northern Ireland, 1014–1015, 1058–1068 conflict in, 1470–1471 and counterterrorism, 1496 symbols in, 113 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1492 Norway, 220–222 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 229–230 and gender, 450 independence and, 223–225, 231 and language, 225–226, 472, 477

and music, 1432, 1436–1437 national anthem, 230, 230 national identity and culture of, 226–228 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1617 Notari, Elvira, 1327 Nourrit, Adolphe, 144 Novalis, 92 Nuclear weapons/energy and India, 1210, 1236 and Iran, 1117, 1117 and Pakistan, 1235, 1236 Nunavut, 1562 Núñez, Rafael, 828 Nussbaum, Martha, 97 Nyerere, Julius, 890, 962, 964, 980–981 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 1186, 1188 O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth, 133 Öcalan, Abdullah, 1655 Oceania, and language, 478 O’Connell, Daniel, 658, 920 O’Connor, T. P., 654 O’Donoghue, Lowitja, 1848 O’Dowd, Bernard, 853 Oehlenschläger, Adam, 67–69, 70, 228 O’Faolain, Sean, 925 Oge, Vincent, 335 Ogi´nski, Michał, 215–216 O’Gorman, Edmundo, 354 O’Higgins, Bernardo, 272, 326 Ohmae, Kenichi, 929 Oil/gas and Algeria, 1095 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Armenia, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1715, 1719–1721 and Canada, 1837 and Egypt, 729 and Iran, 1109, 1111 and Iraq, 755, 756, 1742, 1746 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 Oirat Mongols, 1797–1798 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 1185, 1185 Okinawa, 1757 Olav II (Norway), 226 O’Leary, Juan, 365 Olympic Games, 991, 994 O’Neill, Onora, 97 Onn, Hussein, 1223 Oommen, T. K., 1393 Opera, 79–80 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 Oral traditions, and the Sami, 1615. See also Folk culture Orange Free State, 1145 Organicism, 462–464 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1033, 1380, 1706 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 1095, 1742

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Oribe, Manuel, 275, 399 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 667 Ortega y Gasset, José, 704, 705, 707, 707 Orwell, George, 995 O’Shea, Katherine, 651 Oslo Accords, 1137, 1141 Ossian, 237 Otero, Mariano, 354 Otto of Wittelsbach, Prince, 631 Ottoman Empire, 760–767 and Algeria, 1097 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 734 and Armenia, 1704, 1704 and Armenian genocide, 522–523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Bulgaria, 571, 573, 577 collapse of the, 891 and Egypt, 258–259 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 436, 437–438 and Greece, 623–625 and India, 801 and Iraq, 748–749, 1737, 1739, 1742 and language, 472, 482 religion and the, 101–102 and Turkey, 1643, 1645 Ottomanism, 761–763, 764, 766, 768 Overdetermination, 120–121 Ovimbundu, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1664 Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 682, 682, 683, 683 (illus.) Padmore, George, 1179, 1301 Page, Thomas Nelson, 494–495 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 952, 986, 1109, 1111, 1114, 1396–1397 coronation ceremony of, 1114–1115 and minorities, 1113 Pahlavi, Reza, 986, 1110–1111, 1114 Paine, Thomas, 162, 370 Paisii, Father, 571 Paisley, Ian, 1065 Pakistan, 976–977, 1227–1237, 1228 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1689 creation of, 1201–1203, 1461–1462 and India, 950 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1767, 1768–1769, 1771 and religion, 107 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 and terrorism, 1488 and water, 885 Palach, Jan, 1026, 1028 Palacký, František, 96, 587, 594 Palais de Justice, Belgium, 143 (illus.), 144 Palestine, 1132–1143, 1134 (map) and Arab nationalism, 729 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1387

and Israel, 1120–1121 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1492 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 1137, 1140–1142 Palestinians and European partition, 891–893 and Israel, 1125, 1129–1130 Pamuk, Orhan, 1649 Pan-Aboriginalism, 1844–1853 Pan-Africanism, 965, 1161, 1179 Pan-Arabism, 965, 981, 982 and Iraq, 1740–1741, 1743 Pan-ethnic identities, 939 Pan-Germanism, and Austria, 544, 545 Pan-Islamism, 965 and Egypt, 261 and Turkey, 1645 Pan-Mongolian nationalism, 1790, 1792–1793 Pan-nationalist movements, 964–965, 980 Pan-Slavism, 93–94 and Russia, 20 and the Soviet Union, 946 Pan-Turkism, 764–765 Panama, and Colombia, 828, 829, 830 Pancasila, 953, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1731, 1732 Panchayat system, 1803, 1807–1808 Panchen Lama, 1821 Pandita, Zaya, 1791 Pankhurst, Christabel, 453 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 453 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 300, 306, 1288, 1292 Paraguay, 358–366, 359 (map) and Argentina, 275 Paraguayan War, 296, 359–360, 360, 362, 363 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 472, 1790 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and Hungary, 640 Parizeau, Jacques, 1201, 1297 Park Chung Hee, 1778, 1780 Parkes, Henry, 852 Parlacen, 316 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 649, 649 (illus.), 651, 651, 653–654 Parry, Hubert, 1438 Parry, Joseph, 1438 Parsons, T., 1399 Pashtuns, 1688–1689, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1693 Pasternak, Boris, 1074 Pastoral ideal, 251 Pat, Joe, 1853 Patel, A. D., 1318, 1319 Paterson, “Banjo,” 854 Pátria, and Brazil, 285–287, 288, 295 Patriarca, Silvana, 52 Patriotism and Austria, 553 and China, 1195 and France, 172 Iraq and local, 752

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and Mongolia, 1794 and national symbols, 1347 versus nationalism, 45 and Nigeria, 1186–1187 and political philosophy, 86, 91 and the Soviets, 945 and sports, 997 and the United States, 1308 Päts, Konstantin, 560, 565, 568 Patten, Jack, 1851 Paulin, Tom, 925 Pauw, Corneille de, 351 Paz, Octavio, 345–346 Peace movements, 1447–1448 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 183 Péan, Pierre, 1052 Pearse, Padraic, 449 Pearse, Patrick, 652, 918, 919, 922 Pearson, Karl, 532 Pearson, Lester B., 1838, 1839, 1840 Pearson, Noel, 1848 Peck, Raoul, 1674 Peckinpah, Sam, 1337 Pedro I, Emperor (Brazil), 289, 290, 294, 296 Pedro II, Emperor (Brazil), 290–291, 291 (illus.), 293, 296 Pelletier, Gerard, 1290 Penderecki, Krzysztof, 1434 Peres, Shimon, 1400, 1488–1489 Performance, and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 Perkins, Charles, 1846, 1848, 1851 Perlee, Kh., 1794 Perón, Juan Domingo, 278, 281, 942 Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita), 278 Perry, Matthew, 809 Persia, 1106–1107, 1700. See also Iran Peru, 367–379, 369 (map) and Colombia, 830 independence and, 272 and terrorism, 1491 Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 371–372 Pestalozzi, J. H., 34, 36 Pétain, Marshall, 1052 Peter the Great, 8, 20, 105, 696, 700 Peterloo Massacre, 163 Peters, Janis, 1575 Petion, Alexandre Sabes, 337, 340 Pham Van Dong, 963 Philip II (Netherlands), 196 Philippines, 1238–1248, 1240 (map) and gender, 450 and independence, 1462 separatist movements in, 1468 and terrorism, 1495 Philips, Caryl, 927 Phillips, Jock, 869 Philosophy, political, 85–97 and defining national identity, 474–476 and fascism, 514–517 and France, 171–172

and geopolitics, 460–464, 466–467 and Lenin, 1072 and national character, 527–537 and post-World War II France, 1052 postcolonial nationalist, 957–970 and Scotland, 234 See also Cosmopolitanism; Ideology Phuc Anh Gia Long, 1263 Picasso, Pablo, 1519 Pierrot, Jean Louis, 337 Pikul, Valentin, 1077 Piłsudski, Józef, 681, 682, 682, 683, 685, 687 Pinochet, Augusto, 331 Pinochet Le-Brun, Tancredo, 330 Pius IX, Pope, 665 Place names and Afghanistan, 1692 and Basque Country, 1513 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Turkey, 1652 Plato, 529 Platt Amendment, 1277, 1282 Poetry Chilean, 324–326 and Finland, 599 and forming national identities, 31, 32 and Greenland, 1570 and Japan, 491–492 and landscape, 67–69 and language, 78 and Latvia, 1577 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and Nepal, 1808 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 213, 214, 686 and Uruguay, 401 Pogge, Thomas, 97 Pogroms. See Genocide Poland, 207–218, 210 (map), 678–688, 679 (map) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and gender, 53 hostility toward German-speaking minority in, 522 Kingdom of, 209–210 and Lithuania, 558, 561, 562–563, 563 nationalism and literature in, 492–493 partition and, 21–22, 207, 209 and the Soviet Union, 948, 950 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716 uprisings against Russia in, 46 Poland-Lithuania, 207, 209, 212–213 Poles in the Baltic states, 563 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440 and Germany, 617, 1557 Political participation and Finland, 601 and France, 174

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Political participation (continued ) and gender, 46, 49–50, 53 and Germany, 620–621 and Japan, 812, 813 and Nigeria, 1188 and Northern Ireland, 1059 See also Voting franchise Political power and Afghanistan, 1685, 1686, 1686–1688 and Angola, 1666 and Armenia, 1710 and the Baltic states, 560 and Chile, 324 and China, 792 collapse of socialism and struggles for, 895–896 and Fiji, 1317 and Finland, 606 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iraq, 756–757, 1739, 1741, 1745. See also Clientelism, Iraq and and Malaysia, 1220–1223 and nationalist movements, 940 and newly independent states, 966, 967–968, 969 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Spain, 707 and the United States, 385 and Uruguay, 399 Political system. See Government(s) Politics and Afghanistan, 1686–1687, 1689–1690 and Algeria, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101 and Alsace, 1507–1509, 1508, 1509, 1510 and Angola, 1660, 1661, 1665–1666 and Arab nationalism, 728–731 and Argentina, 271, 275, 280–281 and Armenia, 1703, 1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711 and Austria, 544–546, 548–553 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1515, 1516, 1517–1519, 1521–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1535 and Brazil, 1827 and Burma, 777–780, 783–785 and Catalonia, 1539, 1539–1541 and Central America, 316–317 and China, 791–792, 793, 794 and Colombia, 827–828, 832, 833 and communications technology, 1480 and Cuba, 1275–1276, 1277, 1285–1286 and Czechoslovakia, 1017–1019 Danish, 150–151 and Egypt, 260, 261, 265 and England, 161, 162–163 and the environment, 876–877, 882–883 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171, 1172–1175 and Fiji, 1319, 1320–1322 and Finland, 605–606 and France, 178–179, 1054

geopolitics and legitimizing, 465 and Germany, 190–191, 611, 613, 620–621, 1552–1557, 1555, 1557, 1558 and Great Britain, 1011 and Greece, 628–629 and Haiti, 337–338 and Hungary, 638, 639, 641–644, 643 and hypernationalism, 1389 and the ideology of nationalism, 875 and immigration, 1427 and India, 798–802, 987, 1206–1207, 1207, 1208, 1209–1210, 1461–1462, 1763 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726, 1730 and international migration, 1414–1415 and Iran, 1109–1112, 1117 and Iraq, 754, 755, 1745–1746 and Ireland, 649–657 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 667–671, 676–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764–1765, 1768–1771 and Japan, 988, 1751, 1752, 1757 and Korea, 1780 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 and Malaysia, 1216–1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1857, 1858–1860, 1862 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1789 and Nepal, 1810–1811 and the Netherlands, 205–206 and new social movements, 1446, 1453, 1455–1456, 1458 and Nigeria, 1179–1183, 1185 and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1062–1063, 1064–1065, 1066, 1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, 1850–1853 and Peru, 372–373 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 213–214, 681–685, 687 post-World War II, 973–976 and Puerto Rico, 837, 839–840, 844–847 and Québec, 1288–1289, 1290–1292 and religion, 982–989, 1064, 1112, 1394, 1395–1396 and Romania, 1586–1587, 1587, 1589 and Russia, 1597, 1597–1599, 1604, 1605 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678–1679 and the Sami, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616 and Scandinavian nationalism, 228–231 and Scotland, 241–242, 1014 and South Africa, 1147–1149, 1148, 1152–1153 Soviet, 979 and Spain, 702–703, 709–711, 1086 and Switzerland, 250 and Turkey, 1645, 1654 and Ukraine, 718, 1621, 1622–1629, 1623, 1624, 1626, 1629 and the United States, 387–388, 389, 391, 1304, 1306

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and Uruguay, 398–399 and Wales, 1014, 1633, 1633–1635, 1639–1640 See also Government(s); Ideology; Leaders; Political power Pomare, Maui, 869 Ponce de Leon, Ernesto, 1375 Poniatowski, Józef, 211, 686 Poniatowski, Stanisław August, 210, 215 Popławski, Jan Ludwik, 681, 683 Popper, Karl, 534 Population and Algeria, 1096, 1098 and Argentina, 269, 277, 280 and Armenia, 1699 and Australia, 851–852, 1382 and Brazil, 1825, 1831 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 1836 and Central America, 311 and Colombia, 829 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Fiji, 1314 and France, 1054–1055 and Germany, 190 and Gharabagh, 1706 and Haiti, 333, 336 and Indonesia, 1723 and Israel, 1121 and Latvia, 1574 and Mexico, 346 and the Middle East, 885 and Native Americans, 893 and New Granada, 826 and New Zealand, 864, 865, 868 and Nigeria, 967 and Paraguay, 360 and the Philippines, 1247 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Russia, 1604 and the Sami, 1609 and Turkey, 1645 and Uruguay, 402 U.S., 1836 See also Ethnicity; Immigrants/immigration; Migration Population transfers. See Migration Populism, 281, 643 Porter, Jane, 239 Portugal and Angola, 1666 and Brazil, 282, 283–285, 287–289, 293 and colonialism, 889, 1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 and geopolitics, 465 and immigration, 1424 and language, 472 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397

Post-nationalism and Germany, 1555 and globalization, 1406, 1408–1410, 1411 See also Multilateralism; Transnationalism Poster, Mark, 1476 Potatau Te Wherowhero, 1856 Potocki, Ignacy, 211 Poujade, Pierre, 1054 Poverty and Brazil, 1831 and Fiji, 1322 and Pakistan, 1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 and the United States, 1308 See also Income distribution Powell, Adam Clayton, 962 Powell, Enoch, 1013 Power. See Political power Pozharsky, Dmitry, 700, 1602 Prague, 584–585 Prague Spring, 1025, 1026 Prat de la Riba, Enric, 706 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Premchad, 923 Press. See Media Pretorius, Marthinus, 1146 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 516, 705, 706, 709 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 516 Primrose, Archibald Philip, 242 Print technology, 127, 129 and Armenia, 1701 and diaspora populations, 1370 and India, 796 and Japan, 1749 and language, 479, 485 and national identity, 1474, 1475 See also Newspapers Prithvi Narayan Shah, 1803, 1803–1804, 1804, 1806 Pro-natalist policies, 878 Propaganda and Angola, 1665-1666 the arts and, 83, 176 and Australia, 1852-1853 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306 and China, 952, 1193, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 1020, 1025 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and ethnic cleansing, 441 and Germany, 186 and Greenland, 1571 and Indonesia, 1727, 1734 and Iran, 1115, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 758 and Italy, 667, 674 and Korea, 1781 and the Jacobins, 31 and Japan, 817, 818

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Propaganda (continued ) and Nazis, 133, 455 (illus.), 456, 614, 621, 1332 and Nigeria, 1181 and the Philippines, 1246 and Puerto Rico, 846 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and the Soviet Union, 508, 694, 696, 696 (illus.), 697, 699-701, 1074, 1708 and Switzerland, 255 and terrorism, 1490 and Yugoslavia, 896 Protectionism, 25, 316 and Amazonia, 1827–1828, 1831 and Argentina, 271 and Canada, 1837, 1839, 1842 and film, 1331–1332 and natural resources, 886 and new social movements, 1448 and Peru, 368 Protestantism and Czechoslovakia, 1023–1024 Dutch, 199, 200, 200–202 and fundamentalism, 1393, 1398 and Germany, 188–189 and politics, 982–983 Proust, Marcel, 489 Provençal, 471, 477 Prussia, 611, 617 and Denmark, 150 and education, 34 and German unification, 186, 191, 192 national anthem of, 117 and Poland, 210 resistance to Napoleon and women, 52 Puerto Rico, 836–847 colonialism and, 425 literacy rates in, 495 and terrorism, 1491 Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de, 273 Pujol, Jordi, 1539, 1539, 1541, 1542 Pumpurs, Andr¯ejs, 564 Punjabi Muslims, 1231, 1236, 1764–1765 Purcell, Henry, 117 Pushkin, Aleksandr, 78, 213, 694, 1437 Putin, Vladimir, 1080, 1597, 1601, 1602, 1604, 1605 Qanuni, Yunus, 1695 Qarase, Laisenia, 1324–1325 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 754, 754, 1742, 1746 Québec, 478, 1287–1297 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and separatism, 306, 307, 1470, 1471, 1836–1837, 1843 and terrorism, 1490–1491 Québec City, 299 Quezon, Manuel, 1241 Quinet, Edgar, 177 Rabin, Yitzhak, 1141, 1400–1401, 1488–1489 Rabuka, Sitiveni, 1321, 1321, 1323, 1323

Race and Afghanistan, 1688–1689 and Alsace, 1504 and Arab nationalism, 732 and Argentina, 277 and Australia, 850, 851 and the Bandung Conference, 961 and Basques, 710 and Brazil, 290, 293, 297, 1826 and Central America, 314 and Colombia, 826 and colonialism, 958 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1281 and Darwinism, 480 and Fiji, 1317, 1319, 1321, 1323, 1325 and France, 179 and gender, 47–48, 54–55, 447–448 and Haiti, 333–336, 337–339, 341 and India, 131 and Italy, 672 and Malaysia, 1222 and Mexico, 349 and Mongolia, 1792 and nationalist ideologies, 415–417, 513, 517 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 866–867, 869 and Peru, 373–375 and Puerto Rico, 837–839, 843–844 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and South Africa, 1151–1153 and the United States, 391–392, 894, 1300–1303, 1307 and Völkisch nationalism, 614, 614, 622 See also Ethnicity; Minorities Racism and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1510 and anticolonialism, 958 and Colombia, 829 education and, 429–430 and Egypt, 263 and film, 1328 and France, 1056, 1097 and gender, 447, 452–453 and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557 and Great Britain, 1013 and Hungary, 645 and immigration, 1424–1426 and imperative nationalism, 502, 510 and India, 798 and nationalism, 533–534 and Nazism, 426, 517–518 and new social movements, 1448 and Nigeria, 1179 and perversions of nationalism, 518–521 and Puerto Rico, 837 and the United States, 1310, 1339–1340 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnic cleansing; Genocide

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Radio and Canada, 1839 and Colombia, 833 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and Indonesia, 1727 in Indonesia, 1479 in nationalism, 132–133, 1474, 1475 and promoting nationalistic art, 418 and Puerto Rico, 846 Rahman, Abdul, 1218–1219, 1222 Rahman, Abdur, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1691, 1692 Rahman, Mujibur, 1466 Railroads and Argentina, 279–280 and Canada, 302, 1837 and Central America, 315 and Ethiopia, 740 and Germany, 192 in India, 131, 796 and Mexico, 355 and New Zealand, 865 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Rainis, J¯anis, 560, 564 Rakovski, Georgi, 573 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 164 Rangihau, John, 1860 Rao, Raja, 914, 921, 922 Rapp, Jean, 1504 Ras Tafari Mekonnen, 740 Rasputin, Valentin, 1077 Ratzel, Friedrich, 460, 461, 463, 488–489 Ravel, Maurice, 1437 Rawls, J., 97 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 351 Razak, Tun Abdul, 1222, 1223 Reagan, Ronald, 945, 946, 1039, 1244, 1310–1311, 1395, 1453 Rebet, Lev, 1624 Reddy, Jai Ram, 1323 Redmond, John, 651 Reeves, Sir Paul, 1322 Reformation, 618, 1502 Refugees and Europe, 1044 and the Gharbagh conflict, 1716, 1719 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Korea, 1781 and Pakistan-Indian violence, 1234 Palestinian, 1135, 1140 Sahrawi in Algeria, 1096–1097 and Taiwan, 1257 and Tibet, 1813, 1821–1822 See also Asylum; Immigrants/immigration Regionalism, 407 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 271 and Australia, 852 and Austrian provincialism, 551–552

and Basques, 1518–1519 and Canada, 306–307, 1837, 1843 and Central America, 311–313 and Chile, 324 and Colombia, 828–829, 834 education and, 432 and the European Union, 1043, 1044 and Finland, 608 and France, 1056 and Germany, 611 and globalization, 1413, 1415 and India, 1205 and Italy, 665, 672–673 and language movements, 482 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1808, 1811 and Nigeria, 1181–1183, 1185 and Romania, 1591 and Scandinavia, 225 and Spain, 1083, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 245 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 1623 and Vietnam, 1263 See also Separatism/secession Reich, Robert, 1407–1408 Reichsland, 1505 Rej, Mikołaj, 214 Religion, 971–989 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1692, 1693–1694 and Algeria, 1095, 1102–1103 and Arab nationalism, 725, 731–732, 733 and Armenia, 1700, 1701 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Basques, 710 and Belgium, 140, 142 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1525–1526, 1528–1530 and Brazil, 289, 1825–1826 and Bulgaria, 573, 580 and Burma, 781 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1280–1281 and Czechoslovakia, 1020 and discrimination against immigrants, 1423–1424 education and, 424, 428 and Egypt, 265 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 736, 741, 742, 746 and Europe, 1031–1032 and Fiji, 1314, 1315 and France, 176 and gender, 902 and Germany, 188–189, 618 and Greece, 627 and Haiti, 339–340 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1203, 1461–1462 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728

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Religion (continued ) and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 657–658, 1470–1471 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1768 and Japan, 813–814 and Malaysia, 1217, 1223 and Mexico, 346, 347, 347–350, 356 and Mongolia, 1785, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1792 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 99–109, 519–520 and Nepal, 1806 and the Netherlands, 196, 197, 199–202, 200, 202 (illus.), 205, 206 and Nigeria, 967 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233, 1236, 1461–1462 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1243 and Poland, 216, 686 and Québec, 1293 ritualism and nationalism as substitutes for, 500–501 and Russia, 1603, 1605 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 245, 250 and terrorism, 1487, 1494–1495, 1498 and Tibet, 1816–1817 and Turkey, 769–770, 1653–1654 and Ukraine, 720 and Uruguay, 403 and Vietnam, 1270 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 See also specific religions Religious fundamentalism, 1392–1404 and the United States, 1306 Rembrandt, 203 Renan, Ernest, 95–96, 415, 475–476, 477, 501, 528–529, 1504 Renner, Karl, 542, 542 Repression and Afghanistan, 1685, 1694 and Australia, 1845–1846 and Congo/Zaïre, 1165 and counterterrorism, 1496–1498 and Eritrea, 1172 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Korea, 1773, 1775 and Latvia, 1576, 1578, 1581 and the legacies of colonialism, 893–894 and Mongolia, 1784, 1794 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Russia, 690–692 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675, 1680 and the Sami, 1615

and the Soviet Union, 1074–1075, 1075 and Spain, 708, 709, 1089, 1092 and Tibet, 1820 and Turkey, 769 and Ukraine, 722 and the United States, 1310 and women, 904 Republic of the United Provinces, 196 Republicanism, French, 409 Resettlement, forced. See Ethnic cleansing Resnick, Philip, 1842 Retief, Piet, 1150 Reventós, Joan, 1539 Revueltas, Silvestre, 76 Reyntjens, Filip, 1675 Rezanov, Nikolai, 810 Rhee Syngman, 1780 Rhodes, Cecil John, 1151 Ricasoli, Bettino, 669 Richard, Maurice “Rocket,” 1842 Richard the Lionheart, King (England), 165 Riche, Jean Baptiste, 337 Richler, Mordecai, 1296 Riefenstahl, Leni, 1332 Riegl, Alois, 415 Riel, Louis, 301, 305, 1289 Rights, 14, 129, 444 Argentina and political, 272 and Armenia, 1703, 1708 and Australia, 852, 855 Brazil and political, 290 Central America and political, 316 Colombia and human, 834 demands for, 499–500 and diaspora populations, 1371 England and political, 161, 164 and the European Union, 1041 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1325 and forms of nationalism, 1352–1354 France and, 34, 173–174, 176, 179 free speech and the United States, 387–388 Greenland and civil, 1570 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 812 and the Maori, 1858 minority verus majority, 932–933 and Nepal, 1809 the Netherlands and political, 199 and New Zealand, 873 and Nigeria, 1183 Rwanda and Burundi and human, 1675, 1679, 1680–1681 and the Sami, 1612 Switzerland and political, 249, 252–253 and Turkey, 1648, 1650 Ukraine and human, 1626 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Liberalism; Minorities Riguad, Andre, 335 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 82, 417, 1437

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Rinchen, B., 1794 Rinchino, Elbek-Dorzhi, 1793 Risorgimento, 663–665, 669, 672, 673 culture and identity and the, 671, 673–674 Rituals of belonging, 499–511. See also Ceremonies; Symbols Riva Aguero y Osma, José de la, 373, 374–375 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 355 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 272, 273 Rivera, Fructuoso, 399 Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 320 Riviere-Herard, Charles, 337 Rizal, Jose, 1245 Robert I, the Bruce, 233 Roberto, Holden, 1662, 1662 Roberts, Hugh, 1101 Roberts, Tom, 859 Robertson, Roland, 1393, 1399 Robertson, William, 234, 351 Robespierre, 175, 1489 Robinson, Mary, 1375–1376 Robles, Mariano, 317 Roca, Julio A., 280 Rodgers, Richard, 1433 Rodrigo, Joaquín, 1437 Rodrigues, José Honório, 292 Roma. See Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies) Roman, Petre, 1587 Roman Catholicism and Alsace, 1507–1508, 1508 and Belgium, 140 and Brazil, 1825–1826 and Central America, 317 and Colombia, 827, 828, 829, 832, 833 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1023–1024 and France, 179 and Germany, 189, 192, 193, 618 and Haiti, 339–340 and Ireland, 654, 661 and Mexico, 346, 347–350 and the Netherlands, 199, 200, 200–202, 202 (illus.), 204, 205 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 686 and politics, 982–983, 987–988 and Québec, 1292 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Spain, 703, 705, 707 and Uruguay, 399 Romania, 1584–1594, 1586 (map) anti-Semitism in, 521 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Romantic nationalism, 31, 406, 463, 474–475, 476 German, 10, 92 Romanticism, 527, 882, 1352–1353 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 950, 1276, 1277 Roosevelt, Theodore, 448

Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 273–275, 274 (illus.), 276, 277–278 Rosenau, James, 1368 Rosenberg, Alfred, 416, 417 Rosewall, Ken, 857 Rossé, Joseph, 1509 Rossellini, Roberto, 1333–1334 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 15, 22, 30–31, 86–87, 171, 501 and the collective will, 1054 and organicism, 462 and sovereignty of the people, 530 and Switzerland, 251 and the Terror, 174 Rozent¯als, J¯anis, 565 Rubin, Marcus, 227 Rubinstein, Anton, 82 Rubriks, Alfr¯eds, 1582 Rudbeck, Olof, 223 Runeberg, Johan Ludvig, 228, 601, 605 Rusesabagina, Paul, 1674 Rushdie, Salman, 913, 920, 921, 927 Russell, Bertrand, 1676 Russia, 689–701, 691 (map), 1596–1607, 1598 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714–1715 and the Baltic states, 562, 567–568 and the Bolshevik Revolution, 436 and Bulgaria, 575 and Denmark, 150 education and, 423 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438 and Eurasianism, 466 and Finland, 598, 605 and Greek independence, 631 and Hungary, 638 and indigenous groups, 1566 intelligentsia and nationalism in, 8 and Iran, 1110 and Japan, 815 and language, 472 and Latvia, 1576, 1582 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790–1791, 1791–1792, 1796 and music, 82, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1441 national symbols, 134–135 and new social movements, 1449 and Orthodoxy, 105–106, 983 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and Poland, 209–210, 679 and political philosophy, 93–94 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1594 and Russian nationalism, 1079–1080 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 and Scandinavia, 220 Slavophilism versus Westernizers in, 19–21 and terrorism, 1489, 1495

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Russia (continued ) and Tibet, 1818 and Ukraine, 714, 1621 See also Soviet Union Russian nationalism, 1074, 1076–1078 Russians in Latvia, 1575, 1582 in Ukraine, 1627–1628 Russification, 946, 955 and Finland, 605 versus Germanization in the Baltic states, 561–562 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), 810, 816, 820 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 574, 763, 764 Rustaveli, Shota, 694 Rustow, Dankwart, 929 Ruthene-Americans, 589 Ruyter, Michiel de, 203 Rwagasore, Prince (Burundi), 1670 Rwanda and Burundi, 1668–1681, 1670 (map) genocide in, 968–969 Ryan, Claude, 1296 Ryckman, Pierre, 1157 Ryklin, Mikhail, 135 Ryukyu Island, 1754 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 1080 Saba, Isak, 1614 Sadat, Anwar, 266 (illus.), 985, 1398 Sadiq, G. M., 1763 Šafàrík, Pavol Jozef, 592 Safavid Dynasty, 1107–1109 Saget, Nissage, 338 Sahak, Catholicos, 1701 Said, Edward, 915, 924 Saigo Takamori, 820 Saint-Domingue. See Haiti Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 410 Sakharov, Andre, 951 Salanga, Alfredo Navarro, 1245 Salazar, Antonio, 516 Sale, Kirkpatrick, 879 Salisbury, Lord, 460 Salnave, Sylvain, 338 Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 338 Salvarrieta, Policarpa, 831 Samarin, Iu. F., 692 Sami, 225, 231, 1608–1618, 1610 (map) Samper, José María, 829 Sampson, Deborah, 50 San Martín, José de, 271, 272, 277 and Peru, 370, 371 San Stefano Peace Treaty, 575 Sánchez, Miguel, 347, 349 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 354 Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 372 Santander, Francisco de Paula, 826, 827, 831, 831 (illus.) Santo Domingo, 332–333

Santos, José Eduardo dos, 1662 São Tomé e Príncipe, 1667 Sarawak, 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 Sardà, Joan, 706 Sarmatian ideology, 213–214 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino, 276, 277, 278, 279 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1052 Saryan, Martiros, 1707 Saudi Arabia, 984, 1492 Saussure, F. de, 482 Savage, Michael Joseph, 871 Savimbi, Jonas, 1659, 1662, 1662–1663 Savoy, 175 Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1370, 1419 Sayeed, Mufti, 1769, 1770–1771 Scandinavia, 219–231, 221 (map) languages of, 471–472 Schaepman, Herman, 205 Schefferus, Johannes, 1615 Schelling, Friedrich, 67 Schieder, Theodor, 501–502 Schiller, Friedrich, 188, 251 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 7, 415 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 67, 92, 415, 1110 Schleswig, 147, 149, 152, 155–156 Schmid, Alex, 1484 Schoenberg, Arnold, 1434 Schoenfeld, Eugen, 1393 Schöning, Gerhard, 227 Schumacher, John, 1245 Schuman, Robert, 190, 1034, 1509 Scotland, 166, 232–242, 1413, 1415 and communication, 1639 and devolution, 1014 and music, 1442 Scott, James, 903 Scott, Robert, 1434 Scott, Sir Walter, 238 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 241–242, 242 Sculpture. See Monuments Sculthorpe, Peter, 1439 Second Schleswigian War, 150, 152, 153 Secularism and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Azerbaijan, 1713 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527 and France, 175, 409 and globalization, 1401–1402 and India, 1765 and Iraq, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1761, 1769 legitimacy and, 973 and Mongolia, 1796 and the Netherlands, 206 and Pakistan, 1233 and Palestinians, 1139, 1141–1142 and Québec, 1292, 1294 and religious fundamentalism, 1403

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role of symbols in, 115 and Turkey, 769, 1647, 1651–1652, 1653–1654 and Uruguay, 403 Seddon, Richard John, 868, 870 Sedition Act (U.S.), 387–388 Segregation and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1064 and South Africa, 1151–1152 Séguin, Maurice, 1294 Seipel, Ignaz, 551 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1662 Self-determination and Austria, 544–545 and the Baltic states, 558 ethnic conflict and denial of, 888 and ethnicity, 464 and Fiji, 1317 and forms of nationalism, 1354–1355 and Israel, 1402 and Mongolia, 1790 and the Napoleonic wars, 474 and nationalistic philosophy, 476, 524 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1845 in political philosophy, 536–537, 965–966, 969 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 as a precondition of rights, 972 See also Independence; Sovereignty Self-government. See Autonomy Selim III (Egypt), 258 Sella, Quintino, 669 Senegal, 963 Senghor, Léopold, 488, 919, 963, 980–981 Separatism/secession, 1460–1472 and Angola, 1660 and Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and Burma, 780–781 and Catalonia, 1540–1541 during the Cold War, 949 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and cultural distinctiveness, 461 and gender and sexuality issues, 899 and Georgia, 897 and global governance, 459 increases in, 929 and India, 800, 804, 806 in Iran, 1112 and Ireland, 649–657 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764, 1766, 1769 and Latvia, 1581–1582 linguistic, 477 and Malaysia, 1222 and minorities, 933, 1359 and Mongolia, 1784, 1798 and New Zealand, 866 and newly independent states, 966–967 and Nigeria, 1185 in the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 844

in Russia, 1600 and Swedish speakers in Finland, 606 and Taiwan, 1259 and terrorism, 1487, 1490–1492, 1494–1495, 1494 (table) in Turkey, 1655 and Ukraine, 716, 1625 See also Civil war; Independence Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 119, 955, 1399, 1410, 1457, 1488, 1492, 1493 (illus.), 1496 casualties, 1495 Serbia, 437, 481, 1413 Serbs in Bosnia, 1527–1535 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440, 524 Sergeev-Tsenskii, S., 697 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1368 Setus, 557 Sevak, Paruir, 1707 Sexuality, 446, 899–910 Sha, Mirwaiz Yusuf, 1764 Sha’arawi, Huda, 450 Shagari, Shehu, 1187 Shah, G. M., 1768 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 732, 733 Shakespeare, William, 474, 915–917 Sharif, Nawaz, 1232 Shatterbelts, 942 Shays, Daniel, 386 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1626 Sheng Bright, 1440 Shepstone, Theophilus, 1145–1146 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei, 718 Sheridan, Jim, 927 Sheridan, Richard, 915 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1080 Shevchenko Society, 718, 719 Shiism/Shiites differences from Sunnis, 983–984, 986 and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112, 1115–1116 and Iraq, 748, 752–753, 755, 755, 757, 1745, 1747 and Pakistan, 1236 Shinto, 106–107, 108 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 1074, 1432, 1433 Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 718 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 1597 Sibelius, Jean, 79, 228, 417, 600, 605, 1436 Sidgwick, Henry, 527, 531 Sidqi, Bakr, 752 Siebenpfeiffer, Philipp Jakob, 190 Siemiradzki, Henryk, 682 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 493, 682, 683, 685 Sierra, Justo, 355 Sieyès, Abbé, 172 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 350 Sikhs, 1466 Sikorski, Władysław, 683 Silesia, 584

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Sillars, Jim, 997 Silva, Lula da, 1829, 1830, 1831 Simeon I the Great, 574 Simms, William Gilmore, 389 Simon, Claude, 1052 Simpson, L. P., 494 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 1246 Sinai peninsula, 262 Sinclair, Keith, 870, 872 Sindici, Orestes, 828 Singapore, 1218–1219, 1220–1221, 1221, 1224–1225 and education, 1384–1385, 1386 and Indonesia, 1733 Singh, Gulab, 1763 Singh, Hari, 1465, 1764 Singh, Manmohan, 1207 Singh, V. P., 1769 Sinhalese, 1466–1467 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), 810, 820, 1774 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 795, 810, 817, 822 Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies), 440, 517, 521, 523, 1022, 1027 Skalagrímsson, Egil, 226 Skoropad’kyi, Pavlo, 716 Skötkonung, Olof, 226 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 718 Slanský, Rudolf, 1020 Slave rebellions, Haitian, 335–336, 340 Slavery, 1301 and Brazil, 283, 289, 292, 293 and colonialism, 889, 890, 893 and Cuba, 1275 and the development of nationalism, 47 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 262 and France, 174 and Haiti, 333, 334–336 and Mexico, 345 paternalistic justifications of, 54 and Peru, 371 and the United States, 383, 385, 388, 390–391 and Uruguay, 401 Slavophilism, 20, 213, 692 and religion, 105, 108 Slesvig, 220, 222, 225 Slovakia, 584, 1017, 1021–1022, 1026–1028 and separatism, 590, 594 See also Czechoslovakia Slovenia, 1450 Słowacki, Juliusz, 212, 214 Smart, Mary Ann, 671 Smetana, Bedˇrich, 74, 74 (illus.), 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 417, 593, 594, 1435–1436 Smetona, Antanas, 560, 565, 568 Smiles, Samuel, 531 Smith, Adam, 19, 234, 855 Smith, Anthony D., 113–114, 400, 473, 929, 931, 1368–1369

Smith, Dennis Mack, 674 Smith, Zadie, 927–928 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 1151 Smyrna, 633 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 601 Social Darwinism, 437, 439, 518, 532–533 and gender, 447, 452–453 and language, 480–481 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Social Democrats, 149, 975–976 Social mobility and ethnic minorities, 931 and nationalism, 5–6, 11 and technology, 1475 and the United States, 1305 See also Class Social movements and Finland, 600–601 new, 1446–1458 and the United States, 1303–1304, 1305 Social policy education reform as, 421–422, 428–429 and gender, 448–449 and women’s rights, 446–447 Social structure and Eritrea, 1170–1171 and France, 1050 and India, 1204–1205 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1676, 1680 See also Class Socialism and Alsace, 1508 and Arab nationalism, 732, 733 and Canada, 1839 and China, 789 versus communism, 975–976 and developing countries, 980, 981 disillusionment and discredit of, 936 and Egypt, 266 and France, 179, 1054 and gender, 453, 456 and Great Britain, 1011 and Iraq, 754 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and the Netherlands, 205 and Poland, 212 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Communism; Marxism Socialization and Finland, 600, 607–608 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 See also Assimilation Sokol, 594 Solanas, Fernando, 1335 Solano, Armando, 830 Solano López, Francisco, 362, 363, 363 (illus.), 364 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 951, 1077, 1601 Somalia, 949

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Somaliland, 459 Sonam Gyatso, 1817 Songtsen Gampo, King (Tibet), 1815, 1816, 1821 Sonnenstern, Maximilian von, 320 Sontsen Gyatso, 1816 Sorel, Georges, 514 Soulouque, Faustin-Elie, 337 Sousa, John Philip, 1441 South Africa, 1144–1153, 1146 (map) and Angola, 1664, 1665 and apartheid, 890 and education, 1386 and language, 478 and music, 1440, 1441 and the Netherlands, 198 and sports, 995 and terrorism, 1491 South America and language, 478 national identity and education in, 35, 37, 39 See also specific South American countries South Korea and Japan, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 See also Korea South Tyrol, 1490 South-West Africa, 437 Southeast Asia, 778 (map), 1214 (map), 1262 (map), 1724 (map) Southern Mindanao, 1468 Sovereignty and Australia, 855 and Brazil, 1830–1831 and the environment, 886 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1718, 1719 versus globalization, 1406, 1408 and Greenland, 1571 and Japan, 814–815 and the Maori, 1856 nationalism and popular, 5, 15 and Nepal, 1805 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 and Québec, 1291–1292 See also Independence; Self-determination Soviet Union, 699 (map), 714 (map), 1070–1080, 1072 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Angola, 1663 and Armenia, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709–1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714, 1716–1717, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 563 breakup of the, 888, 895–897, 972, 1413, 1596 and China, 1197 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Cuba, 1276 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 education and, 419, 426, 430 and the environment, 881–882 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440–441

and film, 1330, 1332 and gender, 449, 450, 454 and geopolitics, 459 and Japan, 822, 1754 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780 and language, 482 and Latvia, 1575, 1576, 1578, 1581–1582 and Mongolia, 1785, 1789, 1794–1795, 1795–1796 and national identity, 693–701, 880 nationalistic art of the, 411 nationalities policy, 468–469, 946, 1599 and new social movements, 1449 and Poland, 681 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1588, 1591 and Siberia, 876 and sports, 993 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716, 719, 722 See also Russia Soyinka, Wole, 925 Spain, 702–711, 703 (map), 1082–1092, 1085 (map), 1540 (map) and Argentina, 269 and authoritarianism, 973 and Basques, 1514, 1517, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Catalonia, 1536–1537, 1544–1547 and Central America, 311–313, 314, 317–318 and Chile, 323–327 and Colombia, 825 and colonialism, 889 education and, 36, 432 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 interventions in Haiti by, 335 and Mexico, 345–346, 350, 353 and minorities, 1412 and music, 1437 and the Philippines, 1239, 1243 resistance to Napoleon, 51–52 and Santo Domingo, 332–333. 339 separatist movements in, 1471 and sports, 997, 999 symbols in, 49 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397 Spanish-American War, 1086 Speight, George, 1323–1324 Spencer, Herbert, 532–533 Spengler, Oswald, 70 Spenser, Edmund, 915 Spinoza, Baruch, 203 Spivak, Gayatri, 926 Sports, 991–1003 and Australia, 852, 857 and Canada, 1841, 1842 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and England, 165

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Sports (continued ) and Ireland, 657 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 870 and Peru, 378 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 soccer and Brazil, 295 and Turkey, 1651 and Wales, 1637 and war, 901 Sri Lanka, 1466–1467 and terrorism, 1484, 1491, 1492 St. Erik (Sweden), 226 St. Gregory, 1700 St. Laurent, Louis, 1838 Stalin, Joseph (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), 945, 1075, 1603, 1603 (illus.) and China, 978 and the Cold War, 977–978 cult of personality, 952 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 440 and gender, 449 and nationalism, 1071, 1076 nationalities policy of, 469 and Russianness, 693, 694, 697, 700–701 and Yugoslavia, 948 Stambolov, Stefan, 578 Stanford, Charles Villiers, 1438 Stanley, Henry Morton, 1156, 1160 “Star-Spangled Banner,” 117, 118 (illus.) Starˇcevi´c, Ante, 96 Statue of Liberty, 119 Steele, James, 1843 Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 587, 588, 1017 Stefano, Alfredo Di, 1002 Steffens, Henrik, 66–68, 69–70 Stein, Freiherr von, 34 Stephen the Great (Moldavia), 1592 Sternberger, Dolf, 1556 Stetsko, Slava, 1624 Stoilov, Konstantin, 578 Strasbourg, France, 1510 Stratification. See Class Streeton, Arthur, 859 Strindberg, August, 228 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 237–238, 238 Stubbs, Paul, 1450 Štúr, L’udovit, 96, 592 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 589 Subsidiarity, 881, 1042, 1045 Sudan, 263, 1468–1469 Sudeten-Germans, 595 Sudetenland, 595, 1017–1019, 1025 Suez Canal, 259, 265–266 Suez Canal crisis, 1012 Suffrage, women’s, 446 and Australia, 853 and Germany, 620 and nationalist movements, 450

and New Zealand, 870–871 and transnational movements, 452–453 and Turkey, 770 See also Voting franchise; Women’s rights Suharto, President (Indonesia), 954, 1723, 1725, 1726, 1728, 1730–1731, 1733 Suhm, P. F., 227 Sukarno, Ahmad, 953–954, 964, 1463, 1725, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1734 and the Bandung Conference, 960–961, 962 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1734 Sükhebaatur, General (Mongolia), 1789, 1797, 1798 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala, 1318 Sullivan, A. M., 658–659 Sultan, Ibrahim, 1171 Sun Yat-sen, 789, 789 (illus.), 790, 791, 794 Sunnis differences from Shiites, 983–984 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 748, 751, 754, 755, 755, 757 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1764 Suriname, 197 Suvorov, Aleksandr, 696, 1074 Švec, Otakar, 1024 Svecoman movement, 599 Sweden, 220–222 communication in, 1473 and Finland, 598 and language, 472 national anthem and holidays, 230 national identity and, 223, 226–228 and Norway, 224–225 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 Swildens, J. H., 198 Swiss army, 253 Swiss Confederation, 245, 247–248 Switzerland, 244–255, 248 (map) education and, 429 flag of, 114 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 national identity and education in, 35 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 Symbols, 111–124, 1342–1348 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Armenia, 1702 and Australia, 856, 860 and the Baltic states, 565 and Basques, 1519–1521 and Belgium, 144, 145 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Brazil, 285, 286 (illus.), 294–295 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 305 and Catalonia, 1543–1544 and Central America, 318–319, 320–321 and Chile, 327–328, 328 and Colombia, 825, 831 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 and Cuba, 1283–1284

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and England, 163 and Ethiopia, 744 and the European Union, 1042 and Finland, 600, 602, 604 and France, 175 gender and familial, 43–45, 46, 48–50, 54, 445–446, 449, 904–905, 907 and Germany, 618, 619 and Greenland, 1568–1569, 1570 and Hungary, 641–644 and Indonesia, 1732–1733 and Iran, 1114–1115 and Iraq, 757 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 1752, 1757 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 in literature, 917, 926, 927 and Mongolia, 1786, 1793–1794, 1797 and national identity, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 465 and national self-invention, 900 and Nepal, 1803 and the Netherlands, 204, 204 and Nigeria, 1184 and Northern Ireland, 1066–1067 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847, 1850 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 215, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844, 846 and Québec, 1297 religious, 99, 102, 115–116 and rituals, 500. See also Rituals of belonging and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and Scandinavia, 229–230 and Singapore, 1225 and South Africa, 1150 and Spain, 709 and Taiwan, 1258 technologies as national, 128, 134–135 and Tibet, 1818 transnational, 115 and Turkey, 766, 770, 774, 1646–1647 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 1308 and Wales, 878, 1633, 1637–1638 Syncretism and Mexico, 347–350, 349 and Paraguay, 358 Synge, John Millington, 918, 920–921, 922 Syngman, Rhee, 1773 Syria and Battle of Maysalun, 728 and Egypt, 982 as French Mandate, 728 water, 884–885 Syrian Arab Kingdom, 727–728 Szálasi, Ferenc, 516, 638 Széchenyi, Count István, 637, 643

Tacitus, 64, 617 Tagore, Rabindranath, 918 Taine, Hippolyte, 415 Taiping Rebellion, 101, 108 Taiwan, 1249–1260, 1250 (map) and film, 1337–1338 and independence, 1462, 1468 and Japan, 810, 818, 1749 Tajiks, 1692–1693, 1694–1695 Takemitsu, T¯oru, 1439–1440 Taliban, 986–987 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1691, 1692, 1693–1694 and Pakistan, 1232, 1233 Tamils, 1385, 1466–1467, 1492 Tamir, Yael, 97 Tammsaare, Anton Hansen, 565 Tan Dun, 1440 Tanzania, 962 Tarai, 1801–1802, 1804, 1808, 1811 Taraki, Mohammad, 1687 Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 1290 Tarnowski, Count Stanislaw, 493 Tartars, 1621 Tatars, 441, 469 Tawfiq, King (Egypt), 260, 261 Taylor, Charles Wood, 328, 989 Taylor, T. Griffith, 851–852 Tchaikovsky, Piotr, 82, 1432, 1437 Technology, 126–136, 1473–1483 Cold war and weapon, 944 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1370, 1376 as enabling ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and the Holocaust, 524 and ideologies, 972 image, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1428 and Iraq, 1738 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and promoting nationalistic art, 417–418 See also Internet Tegnér, Esias, 228 Telegraphy, 127–128 and Central America, 315 and Germany, 192 and Mexico, 355 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Television and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Angola, 1666 and Canada, 1838 and Catalonia, 1546 education and, 422, 433 versus film, 1336, 1339

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Television (continued ) and India, 1209 and language in Italy, 671 and Québec, 1296 and Wales, 1635, 1639 Tenzin Gyatso. See Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso) Terre’Blanche, Eugène, 1148 Territory and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532, 1532 and Israel, 1125 See also Borders; Expansionism Terror, French (1793–1974), 174–175 Terrorism, 1484–1498 and Armenia, 1707 and the Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and hypernationalism, 1389, 1410–1411 and India, 801 and Indonesia, 1728, 1729 and Italy, 676 and Japan, 821 and Pakistan, 1232 and religious fundamentalism, 986–987, 1400 and Russia, 955, 1607 and the 1970s, 1939 and Turkey, 1651, 1655 in the United States, 955 and Wales, 1637 See also Conflict/violence Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), 1493 Thailand, separatism in, 938, 1468 Thakin Soe, 780 Than Tun, 780 Thatcher, Margaret, 1013, 1040, 1453 The Birth of a Nation, 1328, 1329 (illus.) Theater and the Baltic states, 559–560 and France, 176–177 and Ireland, 918 and Québec, 1294 See also Cinema Theweleit, Klaus, 904 Thibaw, King (Burma), 782 Thiers, Adolphe, 177 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 115, 183, 188, 592 Thomas, Harold, 1850 Thomas, W. I., 1403 Thompson, Tom, 1841 Thomson, James, 32, 1438 Thorarensen, Bjarni, 228 Thorbecke, Johan, 198, 201 Thrace, 580, 582 Thubden Gyatso, 1818, 1820 Thyra, Queen (Denmark), 153 Tibet, 988, 1468, 1813–1823, 1815 (map) Tidemand, Adolph, 228 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 800 Tiso, Jozef, 1019 Tito, Josip Broz, 948, 978, 982, 1530 Tokugawa Nariaki, 814, 815

Tokugawa Narinobu, 814 Tokutomi Soho, 813 Tolstoi, A. N., 697 Tone, John, 51 Topelius, Zacharias, 228, 604, 605 Toronto, Canada, 1837 Totalitarianism education and, 429–430 and Europe, 419 and gender, 454–456 and imperative forms of nationalism, 501, 502, 510 Touraine, Alain, 1446, 1456 Tourism, 1028 and Cuba, 1285 and Iran, 1115 and Tibet, 1823 Tours, Georges Moreau de, 409 Toussaint-Louverture, 332, 335–336, 335 (illus.), 340, 341, 342 Toynbee, Arnold, 1368 Trade Argentina and, 269–271, 280 and Brazil, 285, 287 expositions and Scandinavia, 229 and Peru, 368 Transjordan, 728 Transnationalism and diaspora populations, 1369 and globalization, 1407 and identity among immigrants, 1427–1429 and ideologies, 972 and image technology, 1339 and literature, 927–928 versus national identities, 1348 and new social movements, 1447, 1455 and sports, 1001–1003 and women’s rights, 451–453 See also Cosmopolitanism Transportation and Argentina, 279–280 and Colombia, 833 and immigration, 1427 and Iran, 1112 and Malaysia, 1224 and Nepal, 1807 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 technological advances in, 127, 131, 136 and the United States, 388–389, 389–390 See also Railroads Transvaal, 1145–1146 Transylvania, 472 Trautmann, Catherine, 1510 Trdat III, King (Armenia), 1700 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1549 Treaty of Kiel, 220, 223 Treaty of Lausanne, 437–438, 768, 1647, 1648 Treaty of Maastricht, 1549

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Treaty of Nice, 1549 Treaty of Rome, 669 Treaty of St. Germain, 542 Treaty of Trianon, 638–639, 645 Treaty of Utrecht, 299 Treaty of Versailles, 459, 468, 476, 513–514 and Bulgaria, 580 and Czechoslovakia, 595 and Germany, 613, 617, 621 Treaty of Waitangi, 863, 873 Tremaglia, Mirko, 1372 Tremblay, Michel, 1294 Trimble, David, 1062 Troels-Lund, F., 227 Trofimenkoff, S. M., 1294 Tromp, Maarten, 203 Troost, Paul Ludwig, 413 Trotsky, Leon, 520 Trubetskoy, Prince, 94 Trubetzkoy, N. S., 94 Trudeau, Pierre, 1291, 1835, 1836, 1837–1838, 1838, 1840 Truman, Henry, 950, 1309 Tsai Ming-liang, 1338 Tschudi, Aegidius, 252 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin, 1798 Tshombe, Moise, 1469 Tsongkhapa, 1817 Tubin, Eduard, 560 Tucholsky, Kurt, 111 Tucker, George, 494 Tuheitia, 1857 Tunisia, 1464 Tupac Amaru II, 370, 371 Turanism, 641, 773–774, 1645 Turgenev, I. S., 694 Turia, Tariana, 1862 Turina, Joaquín, 1437 Turkey, 760–775, 767 (map), 1642–1656, 1644 (map) and Armenia, 1704, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1714 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438, 442 and the European Union, 1411 and gender, 446 and new social movements, 1452 water, 884–885 Turkish-Greek war (1919–1922), 522 Tutsi, 1669, 1670, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1678 Tuvan Republic, 1792 Twa, 1669, 1672, 1678 Twelve Years Truce, 200, 201 (map) Ty-Casper, Linda, 1245 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 1629, 1629 Tyrs, Miroslav, 594 U Chit Hlaing, 779 U Nu, 783 U Ottama, 779 U Saw, 780, 782

Uhde, Fritz von, 416 Ukraine, 712–722, 715 (map), 1619–1629, 1620 (map) borders of, 1413 and new social movements, 1449 and the Orange Revolution, 1080 and the Soviet Union, 1071, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1079 Ulanfu, 1790, 1794 Ulmanis, K¯arlis, 560, 565, 568, 1576, 1578 Unifications, national, 464 Union of Utrecht, 196 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Monarchy of Denmark, 147 United Nations (UN) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1533 and Canada, 307 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171 and Fiji, 1322 and Germany, 1554 High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1535 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 and interventions, 1469 and Iraq, 756, 1743 and Israel, 1121, 1125, 1135 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1765, 1767 and Korea, 1780, 1781 membership, 957 and Mongolia, 1795 and new social movements, 1456 and the nonaligned movement, 961–962, 969 and peacekeeping, 1412 and the self-determination doctrine, 972 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 510 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 273 United States, 381–392, 384 (map), 1299–1311, 1302 (map) and Afghanistan, 1690 and African Americans, 493–494 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 275 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 850 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1533 and Canada, 305, 307, 1835–1836, 1842 and China, 1191 and the civil rights movement, 938 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Colombia, 829, 830 and colonialism/expansionism, 22, 1462 and counterterrorism, 1497–1498 and Cuba, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1280 Czechoslovaks in the, 588–589 and decolonization policy, 1320 and diaspora populations, 1372 economic policy and globalization, 1407–1408, 1409 education and, 32–33, 35–39, 420, 422–426, 429, 433, 1381–1382

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United States (continued ) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and European integration, 1033 and film, 1328–1330, 1332–1333, 1337, 1339–1340 and France, 1050 and gender and sexuality, 447, 448, 450, 452, 901, 902, 907–908 and Greenland, 1563 and Haiti, 340 and immigration, 1412, 1418–1419, 1420–1421, 1424, 1428 and indigenous groups, 1566, 1845 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117, 1117 and Iraq, 1742–1743, 1746–1747 Irish in the, 654–655 and Israel, 1398, 1401 and Japan, 810, 822, 1749–1754, 1756–1757 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780, 1781 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 and landscape art, 64–66, 70 and language, 472, 482 and the League of Nations, 1402 and Mexico, 353–354 and minorities, 894, 935 and Mongolia, 1796 and music, 76, 117, 118 (illus.), 1433, 1438–1439, 1441–1442, 1443 and national identity, 465, 930, 931 nationalistic art of the, 411 and new social movements, 1446, 1448 and New Zealand, 872 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Pakistan, 1229, 1235, 1236 and Palestine, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 372 and the Philippines, 1239, 1240–1242, 1243, 1248 and Puerto Rico, 836–837, 837, 845, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1394–1396, 1400 and rituals of belonging, 509 and Russia, 1604, 1607 and Southern identity, 494–495 and sports, 994, 1000–1001 symbols of the, 114, 119, 124, 128, 134, 1346, 1347 terrorism and xenophobia in the, 1410, 1488, 1490, 1492 and Vietnam, 954, 1264–1265, 1265 and Yugoslavia, 896 See also American Revolution Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 972 Unterhalter, Elaine, 904 Urabi, Ahmed, 263–264 Urabi Revolt, 260, 263–264 Urbanization and Argentina, 278 and Basques, 1515

and Central America, 311 and Denmark, 149 and France, 1055 and Iraq, 753, 755, 755, 1737 and Korea, 1778 and language, 479 and the Maori, 1860–1861 and Scandinavia, 221 and Turkey, 772 and Ukraine, 714–715 Urquiza, Justo José de, 275, 279 Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 829, 830 Uruguay, 393–403, 395 (map) and Argentina, 275 Argentine-Brazilian war over, 273 and Brazil, 289 and Garibaldi, 672 Utilitarianism, 531 Uvarov, S. S., 692 Uvin, Peter, 1680 Uygur, 1468 Uzbekistan, 1079 Uzbeks, 1693 Vaculík, Ludvík, 1026 Vagris, Janis, 1581 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 987, 1208 Vakatora, Tomasi, 1322 Valdemar IV (Denmark), 226 Valdemar the Great (Denmark), 153 Valdem¯ars, Krišj¯anis, 561, 562 Valdivia, Pedro de, 323, 326 Valencia, 1546 Valera, Eamon de, 1294 Valle, José Cecilio del, 315, 316 Valle-Riestra, José María, 76 Vallejo, José Joaquín, 329 Valois, Georges, 515 Values and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 1830 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1839 and Cuba, 1283 in education, 1381 exporting U.S., 944, 955–956 and Great Britain, 1008 and India, 797 and Iran, 1116 and Japan, 1754 and Latvia, 1576, 1580 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mongolia, 1793 and national character, 528–529, 530–531, 537 and nationalism, 901 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847–1848 and Poland, 686 post-materialist, 1454 and Puerto Rico, 844 and religion versus ideology, 971

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and religious fundamentalism, 1397, 1399 and rituals of belonging, 504–506 See also Morality; Religion Van der Noot, Henri, 140 van Gogh, Theo, 1486–1487 Van Thieu, Nguyen, 1265 Vanessa-Mae, 1440 Varikas, Eléni, 53 Varley, Fred H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Varnhagen, Francisco, 292 Vasnetsov, V. M., 694 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1180 Vazov, Ivan, 576–577 Velestinlis, Rigas, 626, 631, 631 Velvet Revolution, 1026, 1028 Verchères, Madeleine de, 303 Verdi, Giuseppe, 75, 77, 79, 80, 671, 1437–1438 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 197, 203 Vermeer, Johannes, 203 Vertov, Dziga, 1330 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch, 1152, 1152 Vian, Boris, 1052 Victoria, Queen (England), 164, 237 Vieira, Luandino, 1665 Vienna Congress of 1815, 46, 197 of 1819, 35 Vietnam, 963–964, 1261–1271 and France, 1050 and gender, 446 and independence, 1463 Vietnam War, 944, 952, 954, 1265, 1265, 1310 and the United States, 1304 Vigneault, Gilles, 1294 Vigny, Alfred de, 177 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 1579 Vikings, 228 Vilde, Eduard, 565 Villa-Lobos, Heitor, 76, 1439 Villarán, Manuel Vicente, 374 Vilnius, Lithuania, 563, 563 Vinnen, Carl, 416 Violence. See Conflict/violence Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 415 Virgin of Guadalupe, 347, 348 (illus.), 349–350, 356 in Peru, 376 Visconti, Luchino, 1334 Vivekananda, Swami, 802 Vizcardo y Guzmán, Juan Pablo, 370 Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), 1592 Vodou (Voodoo), 340 Vogel, Sir Julius, 865 Volhynia, 716 Völkisch nationalism, 613, 614, 614, 622 Voltaire, 14–15, 370 Voluntarism, 1196, 1197, 1198–1199 von Flüe, Niklaus, 253 von Metternich, Klemens, 671

von Ranke, Leopold, 41, 101, 227 Vonk, Jean Francoise, 140 Voting franchise and Argentina, 275 and Australia, 853 and diaspora populations, 1365, 1366, 1371–1372 and England, 161, 164 and Finland, 605 and Germany, 611 and Haiti, 336 and Italy, 669, 670 and the Netherlands, 199 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 250 and Uruguay, 401 See also Democracy; Suffrage, women’s Vramshapuh, King (Armenia), 1701 Vytautas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Wade, P., 1450 Wagner, Richard, 74, 77, 79, 406, 463, 1431 Wagner, Robert, 1508 Wais, Mir, 1690 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 863 Walcott, Derek, 914, 921 Waldheim, Kurt, 550 Walensa, Lech, 948 Wales, 166, 1631–1640, 1634 (map) and devolution, 1014 nationalism and environmentalism in, 878, 881 Walker, William, 313, 318 Wallace, Henry, 1303, 1309 Wallace, William, 232–233, 238–239, 240 (illus.) Wallot, Paul, 408 Walser, Martin, 1558 Walton, William, 1433, 1438 Walzer, M., 97 Wang Xilin, 1440 War of 1812, 388 War of the Pacific, 327, 330, 376 (map), 377, 377–378 Ward, Russel, 854 Warren, Robert Penn, 495 Warsaw Pact, 945 Wartburg Festival, 187 Washington, George, 387 Water, 884–885 Watkins, Melvin, 1842 Weber, Carl Maria von, 73, 74, 117, 1431 Weber, Eugen, 9, 102, 179 Weber, Max, 3–4, 40, 982, 1399, 1402 Webster, Noah, 32–33, 389 Weimar Republic, 613, 613, 620–621 and film, 1330–1331 See also Germany Weissman, Stephen, 1676 Weitz, Margaret, 905 Weizmann, Chaim, 1123, 1123

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Welfare state and Canada, 302–303, 306, 1290 and New Zealand, 870–871 and the United States, 944, 1300, 1309 See also Socialism Welhaven, Johan, 228 Wellington, Duke of, 164 Werner, Abraham, 67 Werner, Anton von, 409 West Germany, 976, 1448, 1490. See also Germany West Papua, 1468 Western, the ( film), 1332–1333, 1337 Western Sahara, 1468 Westernization and India, 1211 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Russia, 692 Wetterlé, Emile, 1508, 1508 Whitehead, Gillian, 1439 Whitlam, Gough, 1845 Wielopolski, Aleksander, 212 Wilhelm I (Germany), 619 Wilhelm II (Germany), 416, 621 Wilhelmina, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Willems, Jans Frans, 145 William I of Orange (the Netherlands), 141, 142, 196, 197, 203 William II (the Netherlands), 199 William III (the Netherlands), 201 Williams, Edward (Iolo Morgannwg), 1638 Williams, Kyffin, 1637 Williams, Ralph Vaughan, 1434 Wilson, A. T., 1742 Wilson, Woodrow, 464, 1328 Fourteen Points Speech, 436, 972 and Iraq, 749 principle of self-determination, 1790 Winter War, 607 Wirth, Johann Georg August, 190 Wislicenus, Hermann, 408 Wolfe, James, 299, 303, 304, 1840 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 416 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 53 Women and Afghanistan, 1457, 1690, 1694 and Algeria, 1105 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 264, 265 Eritrean, 1173 and fascism, 454–456 and France, 1047, 1050 and Germany, 620 and India, 1209, 1210 and Ireland, 661 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1065 and the Philippines, 1246 and postcolonial gender roles, 926–927 and social policies, 448–449 as symbols, 445–446, 926, 1345

and Turkey, 769, 770, 1653, 1654 and the United States, 901, 1304 and Wales, 1636 and war, 449–450 See also Gender; Women’s rights Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 453 Women’s movements, 1449, 1450, 1452–1453 Women’s rights, 53–54, 57, 446, 450–451 and France, 173–174, 176 and Germany, 620 and Greece, 53 revolution and, 46, 50–52 social policy and, 446–447 and socialism, 56–57 and Switzerland, 249 transnationalism and, 451–453 See also Suffrage, women’s Wood, Henry, 1438 World Bank, 1610 World divided. See Cold War World War I and Arab nationalism, 727–728 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and assassination of Habsburg heir, 1490 and Australia, 855–856 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529–1530 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306, 1835 colonialism and the causes of, 514 and the Czechoslovaks, 588–589, 593 education and, 426 and Ethiopia, 740 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 438 and fascism, 515 gender roles and, 449 and Germany, 613, 621–622 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 638 and India, 804 and Iraq, 1739, 1742 and Ireland, 651, 660 and Italy, 667, 670 and New Zealand, 868–869 and the Ottoman Empire, 765 and Poland, 682, 682–683 results of, 419, 436, 527 and South Africa, 1150 and statuary, 412 and Turkey, 1643, 1649 and Ukraine, 713 World War II and Alsace, 1507, 1508 and Australia, 857 and Austria, 547–548 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Bulgaria, 582 and Burma, 781, 784–785 and Canada, 302, 1835 and China, 1197

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Yassin, Ahmad, 1137, 1138 Yeats, William Butler, 487–488, 487 (illus.), 489, 654–655, 657, 659, 914, 918 Cathleen ni Houlihan, 922 Yeltsin, Boris, 946, 1079, 1080, 1597, 1597, 1605 Yohannes, Emperor (Tigray), 739 Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 281 Yrjö-Koskinen, Yrjö Sakari, 601 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 1725 Yugoslavia civil wars of, 525, 896, 1044, 1413–1414 common language versus religious difference in, 529 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and international interventions, 1408–1409 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Yushchenko, Viktor, 1080, 1622–1623, 1623, 1626, 1628 Yuson, Alfred A., 1245 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 902

and Czechoslovakia, 594–596 and Eritrea, 1170 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 435, 437–441. See also Holocaust and expansionism after World War I, 524 and Fiji, 1318–1319 and France, 1051–1052, 1052 and gender roles, 450 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 645 and India, 804–806 and Indonesia, 1733 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 667, 674–675 and Japan, 817–818, 822, 1749, 1751 and Malaysia, 1215–1216 music related to, 1433–1434 and nationalism, 509–510, 1490 and New Zealand, 869–870, 872 and Nigeria, 1181 and Palestinians, 1135 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1851 and Poland, 681, 683, 688 role of religion in, 106–107 and Russia, 1603 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and sexualized imagery, 905–907 and the Soviet Union, 1073, 1074, 1075 and Taiwan, 1250–1251 and terrorism, 1496 and Ukraine, 713, 722 Woronicz, J., 692 Worringer, Wilhelm, 415 Wright, Erik Olin, 2 Writing/alphabets, 481, 577, 1529 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703, 1706 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1798 and Romania, 1591 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Tibet, 1815 and Turkey, 773, 1652 Wybicki, Józef, 215 Wysłouch, Bolesław, 681, 685 Xenophobia, 1411–1412, 1415. See also Hypernationalism Xenophon, 1697 Xu¯ant˘ong, Emperor, 1818 Yacine, Kateb, 1100 Yamin, Muhammad, 1727, 1727–1728 Yanaev, Gennadii, 1582 Yang, Edward, 1338 Yanukovych, Viktor, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625

Zaghlul, Saad, 262–263, 263 Zaghlul, Safiyya, 263 Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 1687, 1689 Zaïre. See Congo and Zaïre Zanabazar, 1791 Zavala, Lorenzo de, 353–354 Zealots, 1489 Zeroual, Liamine, 1099 Zetkin, Clara, 453 Zhamtsarano, Tsyben, 1793 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1075–1076 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 1078, 1079–1080 Zhou Enlai, 962, 1816, 1821 Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 1232 Zimbabwe, 1441 Zimmers, Oliver, 244 Zinnermann, J. G., 41 Zinovief, Grigory, 520 Zionism, 103, 104 (illus.), 1120–1121, 1121, 1123–1125, 1126 and agricultural settlements, 1122 and Arab nationalism, 730 and the arts, 1127 and forming national identity, 1127–1130 and language, 477 and Palestinians, 1133 Žižka, Jan, 1023 Zografos, Panagiotis, 632 (illus.) Zola, Emile, 134 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1074 Zta-Halein, Kathinka, 52 Zulus, 27, 1150 Zurayq, Qustantin, 732, 732 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1079–1080, 1597

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About the Editors

Guntram H. Herb, Ph.D., is associate professor of geography at Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. In addition to peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, his published works on nationalism include Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945 and the collection of essays co-edited with David H. Kaplan, Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. David H. Kaplan, Ph.D., is professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio. He is an editor of the journal, National Identities. His six books include Boundaries and Place (with Jouni Häkli) and Nested Identities (with Guntram Herb). He has also published over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters, many of them in the field of nationalism.

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