NEW LABOUR AT THE CENTRE
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NEW LABOUR AT THE CENTRE
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New Labour at the Centre Constructing Political Space
ANDREW HINDMOOR
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Andrew Hindmoor 2004 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2004 All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-927314-6 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Typeset by Kolam Information Services Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King's Lynn
To Jane Langham
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PREFACE Journalists, political scientists, and politicians routinely describe New Labour as having moved to the centre and account for its election triumphs in terms of its occupation of this position. The question I address in this book is a simple one. How did New Labour move to the centre? The conventional answer to this question is that New Labour moved by changing its policies. It moved to the right and toward the centre by abandoning its commitment to nationalisation, higher income tax, the abolition of grammar schools, and so on. Against this I contend that changes in policy cannot in themselves constitute a complete explanation of changes in spatial position. They cannot do so because there is no pre-given and fixed relationship between policies and position such that the rejection of one policy and the adoption of another moves a party from one particular position to another. Policies are not immutably leftwing, right-wing, or centrist and to the extent that the position a party is thought to occupy is a function of the policies it is committed to, this means that parties are not immutably left-wing, right-wing, or centrist either. The relationship between policy and position and thereby between parties and position is constructed and is in part constructed by parties themselves. This argument has its precursors. All arguments do. The late William Riker's work on ‘heresthetics’ and Ian McLean's recent application of it to the study of British politics raise some of the same issues this book does. The position I argue for nevertheless remains an iconoclastic one. Because what I think is most interesting about party competition, the process by which parties construct their positions, is something that the rational choice models which dominate the academic study of politics tend to assume away. What kind of audience is this book intended for? Perhaps most obviously it is meant to be read by those with an interest in British politics. I use the vague term interest because I do not want to present this book exclusively as either a research monograph to be digested by political scientists or a textbook to be scanned by undergraduates. I hope that the argument developed here is original enough to interest some of my colleagues and its application sufficiently wideranging to engage undergraduates and lay readers. In saying this I am aware of a potentially damaging analogy with New Labour itself. Critics argue that New Labour's efforts to maximise its electoral market have proven counterproductive. In trying to be all things to all people the party has ended up being no particular thing to anyone. In trying to present
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this book as being all things to all readers, I leave myself vulnerable to the same criticism. This book is however not just for aficionados of British politics. It is also meant to be read by those with a more general interest in the dynamics of party competition. For whilst the application of my argument is to New Labour, the argument itself is a more wideranging one. It is developed through a sometimes critical examination of one of the single most influential works in post-war political science: Anthony Downs' (1957) AnEconomic Theory of Democracy. Downs' theory seeks to explain and predict the behaviour of political parties in any and all democracies. My argument, that parties must construct their positions, is equally general. The junior George Bush did not simply materialise at the political centre in the run-up to the 2000 Presidential election. Under the banner of ‘compassionate conservatism’ he and his election team carefully constructed a position at the centre from which they could eventually defeat Al Gore. Following successive federal election defeats in 1949, 1953, and 1957, Germany's Social Democratic Party did not simply move to the centre in time to enter into a coalition with the Christian Democrats and Christian Social Union in 1966. Over a ten-year period which included but by no means ended with the Bad Godesberg programme in 1959, it painfully reconstructed its position. I started to write this book in September 2001 whilst a visiting fellow in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland and living at Amity Point on North Stradbroke Island. Some time around the first draft of Chapter 1, my son, Jordan, learnt to walk. Whilst trying frantically to finish Chapter 8, my daughter, Asha, was born. At the end of otherwise very dry paragraphs and in occasional footnotes it may sometimes be possible to sense how happy a time in my life this was. My colleagues at Queensland were generous in their support and encouragement and offered many suggestions which have found their way into the final text. Two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press offered detailed and incisive comments. I doubt whether I have done their considerable efforts sufficient justice. The Department of Politics at the University of Exeter and the School of Historical Political and Sociological Studies within which it is located remain an excellent place to study and discuss ideas. A number of friends and colleagues within the Department — Iain Hampsher-Monk, Oliver James, Hilary Palmer, and Keith Zimmerman — read and offered comments upon the complete manuscript. I remain enough of a rational choice theorist to hold them entirely responsible for any omissions or errors which may as a result have appeared. AH
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank the following for permission to reproduce published material: Sage (Figure 2.1), Blackwell (Table 7.1), and Cambridge University Press (Figure 7.4).
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CONTENTS Preface List of Figures and Tables 1. Introduction New Labour at the Centre Downs and An Economic Theory of Democracy Constructing the Centre The Difference Construction Makes 2. The Centre, Downs, and New Labour Introduction The Median Voter Theorem Downsian Space The Construction of the Centre Conclusion 3. Rhetoric and the Construction of the Centre Introduction Rhetorical Forms Rhetoric, Beliefs, and the Construction of the Centre The Limits of Construction Conclusion 4. Rhetoric, New Labour, and the Construction of the Centre Introduction Devolution The Minimum Wage Trade Union Recognition The 2002 Budget Conclusion 5. Innovation and the Construction of the Centre Introduction Schumpeter: Innovation and Equilibrium Downs: Innovation and Equilibrium Innovation, Rhetoric, and Spatial Competition Conclusion
vii xiii 1 1 5 6 12 17 17 19 26 33 39 41 41 43 49 54 59 63 63 65 70 73 77 81 83 83 84 90 97 103
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6. Innovation, New Labour, and the Construction of the Centre Introduction The New Deal Education Action Zones The Working Families Tax Credit Anti-Social Behaviour Orders Foundation Hospitals Conclusion 7. Framing and the Construction of the Centre Introduction Frames, Framing, and Priming Framing and the Construction of the Centre Framing Issues and Framing Dimensions Conclusion 8. Framing, New Labour, and the Construction of the Centre Introduction Framing (Valence) Issues: Europe, Tax and Spend, and Ownership Framing Events: Arms and Petrol Framing the Campaign: Issues and Dimensions Conclusion 9. Leadership and the Construction of the Centre Introduction Principals and Agents: Incentives Principals and Agents: Screening Leadership, Reliability, and Responsibility The Construction of Reliability and Responsibility Conclusion 10. Leadership, New Labour, and the Construction of the Centre Introduction The British Presidency Blair as Ballast: The 1997 Election The Politics of Promises 1997–2001 Conclusion 11. Conclusion Index
105 105 108 112 115 118 121 124 127 127 130 136 140 145 147 147 148 155 160 167 169 169 171 176 179 181 184 187 187 188 193 198 200 203 211
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 2.1 Two-Party Competition and the Centre Figure 2.2 Voters' Political Position, 1997 Figure 2.3 Left and Right and Ownership Figure 3.1 Left and Right and Ownership Figure 5.1 Left and Right and Ownership Figure 7.1 (a) Abortion: the right to choose Figure 7.1 (b) Abortion: the right to life Figure 7.2 (a) Abortion: the right to choose Figure 7.2 (b) Abortion: the right to life Figure 7.3 Spatial position and framing the agenda Figure 7.4 Slavery and the creation of winning coalitions Figure 9.1 (a) Single-shot principal–agent relationship Figure 9.1 (b) Iterated principal–agent relationship Table 7.1 Opinions towards property development byframing condition Table 8.1 Issues Primed at Prime Minister's Question Time,1994–7 Table 10.1 (a) Leadership stretch: Guardian coverage,1994–7 Table 10.1 (b) Leadership stretch: newspaper coverage,7 May – 7 June 2001 Table 10.2 Expectations about policy delivery
21 21 27 51 93 137 137 137 137 142 145 173 173 135 163 192 192 199
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1 Introduction New Labour at the Centre In the months following his election as leader, Tony Blair described Labour as a party of the centre-left. Accepting the leadership in July 1994, he argued that the country needed ‘neither the politics of the old Left nor new Right but a new left-of-centre agenda for the future’.1 Addressing the Newscorp Leadership Conference on the Cayman Islands in July 1995, he suggested that Labour offered a ‘new left-of-centre that is not simply an accommodation to the right but tries to move the political debate forward’.2 It was in a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in April 1996 that Blair for the first time presented what had by then become New Labour as ‘a party of the centre as well as the centreleft’.3 With this linguistic barrier crossed, the description of ‘today's Labour Party, New Labour, as a party of the centre as well as the centre-left’ soon became a rhetorical orthodoxy.4 Once New Labour entered office in 1997, references to the left in centre-left began gradually to fade. In interviews Blair now proclaimed that ‘I believe passionately in Labour as a modern, progressive political party in the radical centre of British politics. This is where I am. This is where I will stay’.5 In a speech delivered shortly before the 2001 election, Blair told his audience that New Labour's agenda for the coming term would be ‘radical but firmly in the centre ground, the ground we have made our own in the past few years’.6 During a television interview in May 2001, he remarked that ‘I believe
1
Tony Blair, speech, ‘Accepting the Challenge’, 21 July 1994. Reproduced in Blair, New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country (London: Fourth Estate, 1996), p. 31.
2
Blair, speech, ‘Security in a World of Change’, 17 July 1995. Reproduced in Blair, New Britain, p. 207.
3
Blair, quoted, Peter Riddell, ‘Labour is the Voice of Middle Britain’, The Times, 12 April 1996.
4
Blair, quoted, Michael Prescott, ‘End Game’, Sunday Times, 14 April 1996.
5
Blair, quoted, Peter Riddell and Philip Webster, ‘Shaken and Contrite? Not a Bit of It’, The Times, 8 May 2000.
6
Blair, speech, ‘The Government's Agenda for the Future’, 8 February 2001. Full text available via www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1579.asp .
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INTRODUCTION
passionately in the concept of New Labour…I think that a moderate sensible centre-ground Labour Party is what I believe in’.7 During his keynote address to the 2003 Labour Party conference Blair told delegates that by ‘occupying the centre ground, by modernising, by reaching out beyond our activists, we helped turn the Tories into a replica of what we used to be’.8 Blair's invocation of the centre is noteworthy not simply for what it tells us about how he views the party he leads but because it is common place of both politicians and journalists that elections are won by parties at the centre. Writing in The Times in June 1997, Matthew Parris argued that ‘without the centre ground which Labour is wooing with such skill, you will never win a general election outright’.9 Writing about William Hague in December 2000, Andrew Rawnsley suggested that his ‘failure has been his inability to fashion an approach which reaches out to the centre ground, the territory on which elections are won and lost’.10 At around the same time Jonathan Freedland of the Guardian in an article about New Labour's electoral strategy argued that Blair ‘will stay just where he is: neither left, nor right but straight down the middle. He has never wavered from the strategic calculation made years ago: that elections are won on the centre ground and whoever owns that territory owns power…the golden path runs through the middle’.11 In the Independent in July 2000, Anne McElvoy wrote of the Conservatives that they ‘continue to lack appeal to the centre ground—the territory in which elections are won and lost’.12 A year on and with the 2001 election lost, Donald Macintyre wondered whether the Conservatives' new leader Iain Duncan-Smith could, like Neil Kinnock, ‘drag his party back to the centre ground where elections are won and lost’.13 Following Duncan-Smith's appointment of a number of right-wing politicians to shadow cabinet posts, Andrew Grice wondered whether ‘a right-dominated team [can] deliver the centre ground needed to get back in the game’?14 As for the politicians themselves, Blair argued in the run-up to the 1997 election that ‘there is no doubt that if we continue to occupy the centre ground, if we become the national political party, if we attract support from the
7
Blair, quoted, Jonathan Freedland, ‘Labour is Fighting the Wrong Election: The Last One’, Guardian, 14 May 2001.
8
Blair, speech, Labour Party Conference, 30 September 2003. Full text available via www.labour.org.uk/tbbouremouth .
9
Matthew Parris, ‘What are the Tories For?’, The Times, 20 June 1997.
10
Andrew Rawnsley, ‘The Loathed Versus the Unloved’, Observer, 31 December 2000.
11
Jonathan Freedland, ‘Neither Left Nor Right’, Guardian, 14 June 2000.
12
Anne McElvoy, ‘Mr. Hague has Executed two Neat and Graceful U-Turns’, Independent, 12 July 2000, p. 7.
13
Donald Macintyre, ‘An Early Call to Make but the Indications are Pointing Right’, Independent, 14 September 2001.
14
Andrew Grice, ‘The Opposition: Right-Wing Team Aims for the Centre’, Independent, 28 December 2001.
INTRODUCTION
3
centre…that we will be able to benefit significantly’.15 Drawing one of the first of many comparisons between Blair and Bill Clinton, Peter Mandelson suggested that ‘both leaders show that a party of the left which embraces the centre ground is unstoppable’.16 For Blair's personal polling adviser, Philip Gould, Labour lost elections in the 1980s because it ‘abandoned the centre ground of British politics and camped out at the margins’.17 As for the Conservatives, Peter Lilley counselled shortly after the 1997 election that ‘the political centre ground is the key to regaining power’.18 In what many interpreted as a criticism of his successors' strategy, John Major subsequently warned that ‘the Tory party wins elections from the centre-right not the right. Without the centre, you are not a majority’.19 Commenting on the party's defeat in 2001, Michael Heseltine cautioned that ‘we have to win back the centre ground…you never win from the extreme’.20 Former Treasury Minister John Maples concurred noting that ‘elections are won and lost on the centre ground…the right strategy now is to fight [Labour] head-on for the centre, not to retreat to the right’.21 Descriptions of parties as occupying a particular spatial position offer journalists and politicians an effortless way of conveying information. We may disagree with a claim that some party has moved to the centre, toward the centre-left, or back to the far right but we at least think we know what such claims mean. The spatial metaphor offers a kind of political Esperanto, a shared political language that can be used to describe British political parties, communist generalsecretaries, American presidents, Latin American dictators, local council leaders, and trade union officials.22 The metaphor is a long-standing one. Left and right were first applied as terms of political description and evaluation during the French Revolution.23 In an Assembly
15
Blair, quoted, Anthony Bevins, ‘Blair Offers Tories a Haven’, Observer, 5 May 1996.
16
Peter Mandelson, ‘We Will Emulate Clinton’, The Times, 7 November 1996.
17
Philip Gould, The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1998), p. 4.
18
Peter Lilley, Conservative Party Deputy Leader, quoted, Ronald Watson, ‘Lilley Stakes Tories Claim to the Centre Ground’, The Times, 10 October 1998.
19
John Major, quoted, Michael Jones, ‘His Last Stand for the Tories’, The Times, 3 October 1999.
20
Michael Heseltine, quoted, Rachel Sylvester, ‘Can Anyone Lead the Party Now asks Heseltine’, Daily Telegraph, 9 June 2001.
21
John Maples, Conservative Party Deputy Chairman, ‘What Went Wrong with the Tory Campaign?’, Daily Telegraph, 14 June 2001.
22
Jean Laponce, Left and Right: The Topography of Political Perceptions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 56.
23
As general analytic contrasts, left and right were being used over two and a half thousand years ago. Within the Pythagorean table of opposites, left was associated with darkness and evil and right with light and goodness. See Geoffrey Lloyd, ‘Left and Right in Greek Philosophy’, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 82 (1962), 56–66.
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INTRODUCTION
within which voting was conducted not by roll call but by standing and sitting at required moments and in which rules barred representatives from describing each other as belonging to named political factions, individuals began to seat themselves next to like-minded colleagues on, literally, the left and right of the Assembly floor.24 It was out of this simple dyad that the idea of political space as a continuum with a centre developed. In the aftermath of the first few months of the Revolution, Mounier emerged as the leader of a group sitting at the centre of the Assembly advocating a kind of English constitutionalism as an alternative both to the republicanism of the left and the absolute monarchism of the right.25 Propelled first by the Revolutionary and then Napoleonic wars, the use of the spatial metaphor eventually spread to the rest of Europe. Today, self-styled Centre Parties continue to attract significant support in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, and Denmark. Parties describing themselves as centrist by name have never prospered in Britain.26 Yet at various times the most unlikely of politicians have described themselves as centrist. In the 1890s Joseph Chamberlain, who by then had already broken away from the Liberal Party to form the Liberal Unionists, called for the creation of a new National Party based at the centre which would exclude ‘only the extreme sections of the party of reaction on the one hand, and the party of anarchy on the other’.27 In the 1930s, Oswald Moseley sought support for his New Party by presenting himself as a ‘man of the centre’ who understood the anguish of ordinary voters.28 In more recent times Harold Macmillan, Reginald Maudling, Rab Butler, Edward Heath, and James Prior within the Conservative Party and Hugh Dalton, Clement Atlee, Anthony Crosland, James Callaghan, and Dennis Healey within the Labour Party have all described themselves or been described as centrist politicians.29 The easiest lesson to draw from this is the one that this can perhaps be easily drawn from any history. There is nothing new under the sun. In presenting itself as being a party at and of the centre, New Labour is only doing what others have done before.
24
See Laponce, Left and Right: The Topography of Political Perceptions, pp. 48–51.
25
In his account published in 1837 Carlyle talks of Mounier as leading an ‘intermediate’ or sometimes ‘centrist’ faction. Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution (London: Macmillan: 1921), p. 173.
26
A British Centre Party based in Norwich has been ‘established for the vast majority of people who believe in the centre ground’. Details not only of how to join but of how to become a candidate are available via www.Britishcentreparty.co.uk .
27
Geoffrey Searle, Country Before Party: Coalition and the Idea of National Government in Modern Britain, 1985–1987 (London: Longman, 1995), p. 34.
28
Quoted, Brian Harrison, ‘The Centrist Theme in Modern British Politics’ in Peaceable Kingdom: Stability and Change in Modern Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 320.
29
This list is taken from Harrison, ‘The Centrist Theme in Modern British politics’, p. 322.
INTRODUCTION
5
Downs and An Economic Theory of Democracy Within political science the spatial metaphor, and with it the claim that parties must be at the centre if they are to win elections, finds its most celebrated exposition in Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy.30 First published in 1957, this book, one of the founding texts of rational choice theory, has become the most widely cited research work in political science by a living scholar.31 Downs' argument, which will be outlined in some detail in Chapter 2, is assembled around the spatial metaphor. This he takes and turns into a formal spatial framework relying upon a scalar representation of political position. Voters have political preferences. These preferences can, it is assumed, be ‘ordered from left to right in a manner agreed upon by all voters’.32 Within this one-dimensional space, parties select policies, individuals then voting for the party ‘closest’ to them. Left-wing voters vote for left-wing parties, right-wing voters for right-wing parties, and so on. Given a further set of assumptions—most notably that there are only two parties—Downs uses this framework to show that parties can only maximise their vote by adopting policies that appeal to the median voter. The median voter is that person whose preferences are such that they have as many other voters to their left as to their right. There is no successful electoral alternative to this position. Parties that opt for ideological purity over compromise will be defeated. This, as it has become known, is the median voter theorem. Given a particular set of assumptions the spatial framework can be used to demonstrate that parties must move to the position of the median voter if they are to win. Over the last forty or so years this theorem has provoked endless debate. For, by altering one or more of the assumptions on which it rests, it can be shown that the incentive that parties have to converge upon the position of the median voter is circumscribed, non-existent, or relatively robust. Yet whilst the median voter theorem has been repeatedly challenged and reformulated, rational choice has remained largely faithful to Downs' underlying spatial framework and beneath that to the spatial metaphor. The one-dimensional, left to right, space of An Economic Theory has been superseded by more sophisticated models in which there are multiple dimensions of competition. But the basic idea of parties moving from one point in political space to another remains as
30
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).
31
See Bernard Grofman, ‘Introduction’, in Bernard Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 2 (footnote 5 and reference therein).
32
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democrocy, p. 115.
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INTRODUCTION
embedded within political science models as it is in politicians' speeches and journalists' articles. Because its conclusions are so intuitively plausible and derived from a presentation free of technical jargon or mathematical appendices, Downs' work has frequently been called upon to provide backing for descriptions and explanations of the behaviour and actions of New Labour. Within articles and books about New Labour, references to the more sophisticated and recently published models of party competition that now litter academic journals are few and far between. References to An Economic Theory remain plentiful. According to Pippa Norris, ‘Downsian theory’ provides ‘the most common explanation [of why] Labour moved centre-right’.33 The basic form this explanation takes is not difficult to relate. Labour moved to the right to achieve office. Labour lost in 1983 and 1987 because it abandoned the median voter, choosing instead a set of left-wing policies. It regained electoral respectability when Neil Kinnock used a formal review of policy undertaken in the aftermath of the 1987 defeat to jettison left-wing policies and move Labour back towards the median voter. Labour nonetheless lost in 1992 because it had not moved far enough. Reborn as New Labour in 1994 the party romped to easy victories in 1997 and 2001 by ditching many of its remaining policies and moving further to the right.
Constructing the Centre It would be a mistake to be too prudish about the use of the spatial metaphor, to argue simply that the terms left, right, and centre are, when they are applied to politics, meaningless. For such terms clearly do have a great deal of meaning for a great number of people. Metaphors are not simply a game we play with words, an optional rhetorical technique. They are embedded in normal thought and language. If we did not think of party competition in terms of space we would think about it in some other way: as a battle, a game of chess, or a gladiatorial contest.34 Metaphors are useful because by relating abstract concepts and ideas to immediate physical experiences with which we are familiar and comfortable, they help us understand the world we
33
Pippa Norris, ‘New Politicians? Changes in Party Competition at Westminster’, in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris (eds.), Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in LongTerm Perspective (London: Sage, 1999), p. 23. Emphasis added. A list of authors citing Downs' work is provided in Chapter 2.
34
The spatial metaphor is so pervasive that any of these apparently alternative metaphors is, at some point, likely to rely upon space in its exposition. Using the metaphor of a battle to understand party competition, Joseph Schumpeter talks, for example, about parties fighting to gain control of a hill affording a strategic advantage. More is said about Schumpeter's account in Chapter 5.
INTRODUCTION
7
inhabit.35 Without having to understand anything about economic theory, voters can, for example, know what a politician who talks about trimming a budget deficit or avoiding a run on the pound means. The spatial metaphor is an attractive and effective one because we are comfortable with the idea of there being a world around us within which we can move. The idea of a party moving leftwards to the centre is comprehensible because we can imagine moving to our left to get to the centre of a room. Indeed it is so compelling that it is easy to forget that political space is a metaphor. Language is littered with dead metaphors that have, over time, been lexicalised as literally true.36 We talk of chairs having legs, ideas dawning, clocks having faces, and bottles having necks without recognising the metaphors involved. In the same way we now talk of parties moving to the centre. But because we no longer see the metaphors here we risk losing sight of their limits, of the original and distinctive nature of the object or idea to which the metaphor is being applied.37 In the case of most of the metaphors listed above this is of little or any consequence. Reminding ourselves that clocks do not really have faces does not make it any easier or harder to tell the time. Yet, in the case of spatial metaphor, the failure to recognise the metaphor and to treat seriously the differences between political space and the space within which we lead our everyday lives has compromised theories of party competition in general and accounts of New Labour in particular. Thinking of parties as occupying points in political space encourages us to think of parties as moving from one existing point in that space to another in the same way that we think of a person as moving from one corner of a room to another. Thinking of parties as occupying points in political space encourages us to think of Labour as having abandoned and left vacant a centre it eventually returned to and reoccupied. Yet political space is not the same as the space within which we lead our everyday lives. Parties cannot move to and occupy the political centre in the same way that people can move to and occupy the centre of a room. The centre is not simply there. Parties must construct the positions they wish to occupy. The centre New Labour is now thought to occupy is one that New Labour has itself had to construct.
35
On the universality of metaphor see Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962); George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and Andrew Ortony, Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). On the way in which metaphors work by relating abstract ideas to immediate physical experiences see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 91–126; Philosophy in the Flesh (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
36
See Earl MacCormac, A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985).
37
Bernard Hibitts, ‘The Nature and Significance of Metaphors’, Cardozo Law Review, 16 (1994), 26–35.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the social sciences, constructivism offers an increasingly fashionable research programme replete with its own concepts and idiosyncrasies. Constructivists operate by showing how a category, concept, or idea generally seen as unproblematic, natural, and obvious is socially constructed. They show how our understanding of it is not simply determined by an underlying reality but forged by powerful actors, who have created particular constructions, the precise terms of which vary across time and place.38 So within, for example, sociology, constructivists have shown how beliefs about what counts as ‘scientific’ knowledge and what scientists themselves consider ‘facts’ are socially constructed.39 This book does not offer a constructivist theory of party competition. It does not use or seek to apply any terms, concepts, or methods developed within specific constructivist theories. It is certainly not constructivist all the way down. Terms like belief, party, self-interest, and competition that a constructivist would want to set about and unpack are scattered throughout the text. In developing an alternative account of the development, nature, and political trajectory of New Labour, two insights are however taken from constructivism. The first is that categories, concepts, and ideas, in this case the concept of the centre, are not natural and obvious brute facts in the same way that the tree outside my window is a brute fact.40 The second, by way of an alternative to such a view, is the metaphor of construction itself. The centre is constructed in one general and four specific ways. We will start here with the general and with the concept of the centre itself. As it is used by journalists and politicians, the centre sustains two meanings. On the one hand, parties are described as being and describe themselves as being at the centre by virtue of their popular appeal. Call this the electoral centre. Rephrasing Downs' argument, a party that is located at or near to the position of the median voter can be said to be at the electoral centre. Understood in this sense, parties are said to have abandoned the centre when they commit themselves to policies that find little support within the electorate. On the other hand parties are described as being and describe themselves as being at the centre by virtue of their moderation. Call this the political centre. The electoral and political centres are analytically distinct.
38
This attempt at a definition is of course itself a construction; it suggests that there is a ‘thing’, constructivism, which is out there and which can be objectively described.
39
See Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1977); Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science (London: Routledge, 1993).
40
On the notion of brute facts see John Searle, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995). On constructivism as metaphor see Nancy Spivey, The Constructivist Metaphor (London: Academic Press, 1997). Constructivist theories are, generally, surprisingly reluctant to acknowledge construction as a metaphor.
INTRODUCTION
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There is no reason why a party that is politically extreme might not enjoy electoral support. Yet, in practice, these two are linked. Parties acquire support to the extent that they are seen as politically moderate. By constructing and reconstructing people's beliefs about which policies are moderate, parties can construct their position at the political centre. By constructing their position at the political centre, parties can appeal to voters at the electoral centre. This argument will be developed further in Chapter 2, where it will be accompanied with a more detailed account of the nature of political space and of the role of the spatial metaphor. Through a series of more specific applications it will then be played out over the rest of the book. The four more specific ways in which the centre is constructed, the four applications of this general argument, are dealt with in chapters on rhetoric, innovation, framing, and leadership. First, the centre is constructed through rhetoric. The never-ending sequence of publicly conducted argument in which parties and their partisans seek to enhance their own standing and undermine that of their opponents, provides the backdrop to political reporting on television and radio and in print. It is the substance of which politicians' speeches, debates, interviews, newspaper articles, press releases, and briefings are made. Political argument may, as George Orwell once complained, consist ‘largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness’ but it should not simply be dismissed as sound and fury which signifies little.41 It is through political argument that parties seek to establish their positions and build political support. Politicians cannot simply move to the political centre by adopting one set of policies rather than another. For, the location of policies within political space is not prearranged and fixed. Using such rhetorical tools as ridicule, comparisons, examples, authority, contradiction, and arguments about cause and effect, parties must seek to persuade voters that they are at the moderate political centre and that their opponents are politically extreme. The political centre is something which parties must seek to construct particular understandings of. Chapter 3 shows how the political centre is rhetorically constructed. Chapter 4 goes on to illustrate this argument by showing how New Labour has sought to convince the electorate of the centrist credentials of a number of its key policies and policy decisions. These include devolution, trade union recognition, the minimum wage, and the tax rises announced in the 2002 budget. Policies are not intrinsically centrist. Parties that commit themselves to devolution and a minimum wage do not simply and by virtue of that commitment become centrist.
41
George Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language’, in Collected Essays (London: Mercury, 1961), p. 123.
10
INTRODUCTION
Parties must present and defend themselves and their policies as being at the political centre. Second, the political centre is constructed through innovation. Within the spatial framework Downs develops, political position along the left–right scale is a function of policy. Parties are left-wing to the extent that they have left-wing policies, right-wing to the extent that they have right-wing policies, and so on. Parties move to particular positions by selecting particular policies. In Downs' account, there are a finite number of policies to choose between. One problem with the spatial metaphor and so with the spatial framework is that political space is not finite. For, as well as choosing between existing policies, parties can create new policies. There is a further complication here and with it a further source of party competition. The concept of innovation is itself a constructed one, the definition and particular instances of which parties can be expected to contest. A policy presented by one party as radical and innovative, as incontrovertible evidence of its modernisation, will be derided by an opponent as a retread of an old, failed, and extreme policy. There is no escaping rhetoric. Yet policy innovation clearly does occur. The policy options over which parties manoeuvre today are not primordial. All policies are at one point new policies. If position is a matter of policy, all positions, including positions at the centre, are constructed. Using an account of innovation developed by the economist Joseph Schumpter, Chapter 5 shows how innovation might be incorporated into the spatial framework. Chapter 6 goes on to illustrate this argument by showing how New Labour has presented a number of its policies including the New Deal, the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), Education Action Zones (EAZ), and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBO) as innovative. New Labour frequently claims to occupy a radical centre. Whether or not it is accepted, the best way to make sense of this claim is as its being about policy innovation. Third, the political centre is constructed through framing. Over any given issue, be it health, education, or defence, parties select policies. But they do not only select policies. They also select frames: particular ways of defining what a particular ‘policy dispute is really about, and what it has nothing to do with’.42 Parties seek to frame issues in particular ways because support for their policies will depend partly upon the frame being used to view them. For Philip Gould, momentum in political campaigns is created by ‘defining the political debate on your terms. Every political debate can be seen in two ways: one that will favour you, and one that will favour your opponents’.43 The
42
Thomas Nelson and Zoe Oxley, ‘Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion’, Journal of Politics, 61 (1999), 1040–67.
43
Gould, The Unfinished Revolution: How the modernisers saved the Labour Party, p. 294.
INTRODUCTION
11
existence of such framing effects is important because it means that parties can position themselves at the political centre by changing the frames used to view polices rather than the policies themselves. Because there is rarely, if ever, a single frame through which an issue can be viewed, the position of the political centre is not fixed. Whether or not a party is believed to be at the political centre will depend upon the frame being used to view its policies. Parties can construct the political centre by constructing the way in which voters see and understand political space. Drawing upon the literature on framing developed in political psychology, Chapter 7 shows how framing can be incorporated into the spatial framework. Chapter 8 illustrates this argument by showing how New Labour has sought to frame and reframe such issues as Europe, tax and spend, and ownership, and particular events and crises like the petrol blockades of August 2000 and the imbroglio over the arms embargo on Sierra Leone. Fourth, the political centre is constructed through leadership. Parties do not simply seek to persuade voters that their policies and ideology are centrist. They seek also to project their leader as someone who personally embodies the political centre. Politicians' values, background, formative experiences, education, interests, accent and manners, family, tastes in food, music, and football teams are all offered up as evidence of their centrist credentials, as being reassuringly normal and familiar traits and characteristics with which complete strangers can identify and empathise. Blair is clearly not an ordinary or typical person. Measured in terms of his personal abilities, he is extraordinary, a charismatic leader. Yet he is also routinely packaged as being someone who is entirely ordinary. Leadership image is constructed. This is not to say that such images are simply fabrications. Politicians are born in a particular place and go to particular schools and this kind of information is extremely difficult to bury. But image is not a simple one-to-one reflection of some underlying reality. Politicians and their advisers have room to create particular images and in doing so to attract votes. Chapter 9 shows why leadership is important and how it can be understood spatially. Chapter 10 goes on to show how Blair's image as an English middle-class family man who likes his football, an occasional pint, R.E.M., the Beatles, and ‘all the bands that everyone loves’, Gladiators, and Noel's House Party was constructed in the run-up to the 1997 election.44 Parties cannot simply move to the political centre by abandoning one set of policies and adopting another. They must construct the positions they seek to occupy. I do not however mean to suggest that any party with any set of policies can successfully construct a position for itself at the political centre.
44
Blair, quoted, John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime Minister (London: Little Brown & Company, 2001), pp. 299–300.
12
INTRODUCTION
There are, as I emphasise in subsequent chapters, limits to the possibilities of construction. At any one time voters will have particular beliefs about which parties and which policies are politically moderate and which are extreme. So at any one time it will appear that some policies just are centrist and this means that parties adopting these policies will also appear centrist. Yet, however natural and obvious they may appear, such beliefs are not hard-wired into our brains. Such beliefs have been constructed and can be reconstructed. Beliefs are not however equal in status. Some are more widely shared and deeply held and will consequently prove more difficult to reconstruct. There is no reason why a party advocating public floggings and national conscription must be seen as politically extreme. Indeed it is not that difficult to think of a world in which a party committed to such policies would be seen as being at the political centre. But at this moment we do not live in such a world and it would be extremely difficult for a party adopting such a set of policies to persuade the electorate that it was at the political centre.
The Difference Construction Makes As the party regarded as being in safe possession of the political centre, New Labour secured election landslides in both 1997 and 2001. New Labour has not moved to this centre. It has constructed it. The difference involved here may seem trivial, a matter of semantics. My argument is that the difference is a hugely important one. It is a difference around which can be assembled a distinctive account of New Labour's development, nature, and political trajectory. Four specific but related differences that follow from seeing the political centre as constructed will be identified in this section, elaborated upon in the following chapters and re-examined in the conclusion. The first difference relates to the relationship between policy and position. In Downs' account of party competition, a party's spatial position is a function of the policies it adopts. Downs asserts that ‘each party takes stands on many issues, that each stand can be assigned a position on our left–right scale’ and that a party's overall position on that scale is a ‘weighted average of all the particular policies it upholds’.45 Parties move to the right by adopting more right-wing policies. They move to left by adopting more left-wing policies and so on. Applied to the study of the Labour Party this generates a political history in which the move first to the left and then from the left back to the political centre is told as a history of changes in policy. It is a history in which unilateralism gives way to multilateralism, nationalisation
45
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 132.
INTRODUCTION
13
to privatisation, and the abolition of private schools to the use of private firms in the state education system. Yet, political space does not come so neatly packaged. Political space is unbounded, infinite, and both disarranged and changeable. It is because political space is unbounded that parties must construct their positions through framing. It is because political space is infinite that parties must construct their position through innovation. It is because political space is disarranged and changeable that parties must construct their position through rhetoric. Applied to the study of New Labour this suggests a very different political history. Policy matters. The announcement in October 1994 that Clause IV was to be rewritten; the announcement in January 1997 that a Labour Government would leave the rate of income tax unchanged; the announcement in October 1997 that Britain would not, in that Parliament at least, adopt a single European currency; and the announcement in April 2002 that taxes would be raised to pay for investment in the National Health Service (NHS) were all hugely important moments. Yet spatial position is not simply a matter of policy. The belief that New Labour occupies the political centre cannot be accounted for simply in terms of changes in policy. Policies had to be presented and defended. They had, in some cases, to be developed. The issues the policies related to had to be defined and placed in a particular context. They had to be presented and defended by a leader whose own image had to be constructed. Any account of New Labour's development, nature, and political trajectory must take account of more than changes in policy.
14
INTRODUCTION
The second difference relates to the importance of creativity. In Downs' account, politics is a matter of calculation rather than creativity. Parties confront voters who have particular preferences and must choose between a particular set of policies placed before them on a spectrum running from left to right. Parties adopt particular positions by adopting particular policies, it being the responsibility of party leaders to identify the policy package that will secure the most votes. This is a calculation in which there are wrong answers and a right answer. Only by moving to the electoral centre can a party maximise its vote. Applied to the study of New Labour this makes the party's acquisition of that centre in the run-up to and aftermath of the 1997 general election seem unremarkable, the consequence of no more than a careful reading of opinion polls and focus groups. It also leaves the party's electoral future looking assured. To triumph in the future the party has only to continue doing what it has done in the past. If it can resist the call of the ‘heartlands’ and remain faithful to the voters of ‘Middle England’, future victories will be assured. Yet political space does not come so neatly packaged. Spatial position is not simply a function of policy. Parties must construct their position. The successful use of rhetoric, innovation, framing, and leadership to construct a position at the political centre requires creativity. Applied to the study of New Labour this makes the party's occupation of the political centre seem a genuine accomplishment, something which, although now taken for granted, required considerable political skill. It also leaves New Labour's electoral future looking less certain. If it is to retain possession of the political centre, the party will need to continue to exhibit creativity. There is however no guarantee that it will be able to do so. The third difference relates to the importance of news management or spin. Ever since Peter Mandelson was first appointed Labour's Director of Campaigns and Communications in September 1985, spin and the activities of spindoctors have been a source of endless fascination. Blair's personal hold on public opinion has been attributed to his ability to coin such soundbites as ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ and ‘the Queen of Hearts’.46 At the same time some of New Labour's worst moments—the Ecclestone and Kelly affairs and the resignations of Peter Mandelson and Stephen Byers—have been attributed to an excessive and ultimately counter-productive reliance on spin. New Labour's critics on both the left and right have lined up to condemn the ‘culture of spin that lies at the heart of this Government’.47 But in Downs' account the forces driving party competition lie, like tectonic plates, far beneath this surface. Parties adopt particular positions by adopting particular policies. These positions are then offered to voters who opt for the party closest to them. There is no room for spin here, no room for parties to present their policies in certain ways, no room for arguments about the ‘real’ meaning of an issue, no room for claims that an opponent's policies are ‘really’ left-wing. Yet political space does not come so neatly packaged. Parties must convince voters that they are at the political centre, that their policies are moderate and that those of their opponents' are extreme. For this reason, spin is an essential part of the political process. The final difference relates to the amount of choice parties have. In Downs' account party leaders have no room for manoeuvre, no choice of electoral strategy. Only by moving to the electoral centre can a party maximise its vote. Parties that fail to move to the electoral centre lose. Applied to the study of British politics this suggests both a critique of and a defence for New Labour. The critique is that New Labour has done nothing to change the course of British politics, that it has embraced a post-Thatcherite consensus.
46
Although neither of these soundbites were actually coined by Blair. Gordon Brown is usually given the credit for ‘tough on crime’ and Alistair Campbell for the ‘Queen of hearts’.
47
Teresa May, Conservative Party Shadow Culture Spokesman, speech, ‘Culture of Spin Within Government’, 23 October 2001. Full text available via www.conservatives. com/news/speeches.cfm . As for critics on the left see Polly Newton, ‘Field Attacks Spin Doctors as Cancer at Heart of Government’, The Times, 4 July 1998; James Lansdale and Andrew Pierce, ‘Labour MPs Back Follett Attack on Spin Culture’, The Times, 4 July 2000; David Hencke, ‘Short Flays Blair's Dark Men’, Guardian, 8 August 1996; and Kamal Ahmed, ‘Mowlam: My Vicious, Horrible Colleagues’, Observer, 14 April 2002.
INTRODUCTION
15
The defence is that there was and is no alternative, that the failure to modernise and move to the electoral centre would only have meant further losses. As Blair told Labour Party delegates assembled to approve the text of the new Clause IV in 1995: I did not come into the Labour Party to join a pressure group. I didn't become leader of this party to lead a protest movement. Power without principle is barren. But principle without power is futile. This is a party of government, and I will lead it as a party of government.48 In the alternative account developed here, parties have some room for manoeuvre. There is no alternative to the electoral centre. Parties that do not appeal to the median voter will lose. Neither is there an alternative to the political centre. Parties that are thought of as extreme will fail to attract the support of voters at the electoral centre. But whilst there is no alternative to the political centre there are alternative political centres. Spatial position cannot be read off directly from policy. The creative ability of a party to persuade voters about the merits of its policies will shape perceptions of position. The creative ability of a party to frame an issue in a particular way will shape perceptions of its position. The creative ability of a party to develop new polices and to project its leadership in an effective way will shape perceptions of its position. The commitment to a particular set of policies does not entail a commitment to a particular position. This again suggests both a critique of and a defence for New Labour. The critique is that New Labour embraced a post-Thatcherite consensus when it did not need to do so, when it could have sought to construct an alternative understanding of the centre. The defence is that it has constructed just such an alternative understanding.
48
Blair, speech, ‘The New Clause IV’, 29 April 1995. Reproduced in Blair, New Britain, p. 54.
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2 The Centre, Downs, and New Labour Introduction Within political science the argument that parties will move to the electoral centre in an effort to maximise their vote has acquired the formal title of the median voter theorem. It is a theorem routinely linked to Downs and An Economic Theory of Democracy. When textbooks offer an account of the median voter theorem, it is Downs' name that appears in the first paragraph. When theorists provide criticisms of and alternatives to the theorem, it is Downs' name that appears in the first footnote. Academics looking to describe and explain New Labour's move to the centre refer to An Economic Theory of Democracy. That the link should have been drawn in this way is no doubt unfair both to other authors and to Downs. Unfair to other authors because Downs was not the first person to apply the spatial metaphor to the analysis of party competition; does not actually use the nomenclature of the median voter and does not list precisely the assumptions needed to sustain the conclusion that parties will move to the electoral centre. Unfair on Downs because the median voter theorem presented in his name has been reduced to little more than a caricature of the argument he actually develops. Yet the link between Downs and the median voter theorem is one that has been made and which is not now going to be unmade. The following section offers an account of the basic structure of the theorem. It is introduced by way of four separate arguments: (1) that parties and voters can be described as operating in political space; (2) that spatial position is a function of policy; (3) that parties must maximise their vote by locating at the electoral centre; and (4) that parties are vote-maximisers. In standard textbook accounts of the median voter theorem these four arguments are usually bundled together. They are however analytically distinct. It is possible to believe that parties must maximise their vote by locating at the electoral centre without also believing that parties are vote-maximisers. It is possible to believe that spatial position is a function of policy without also believing that parties must maximise their vote by
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THE CENTRE, DOWNS, AND NEW LABOUR
locating at the electoral centre and so on. It is difficult to exaggerate the amount of ink that has been spilt over the third part of the theorem, the claim that parties can only maximise their vote by locating at the electoral centre. Successive generations of theorists have argued about whether and to what extent parties have an incentive to converge upon the electoral centre. I provide a brief summary of this debate at the end of the next section. I do so because it obviously matters a great deal whether New Labour had to move as far to the right as it did in order to be elected in 1997 and re-elected in 2001. The argument in the rest of this book nevertheless follows Downs in assuming that parties must appeal to the electoral centre. I do not assume this because I believe Downs' argument to be incontestable. I assume it because closing down debate about this part of the median voter theorem allows me to focus instead upon the claim that parties can be described as operating in political space. This part of the median voter theorem has attracted far less attention. Yet the spatial metaphor upon which this claim is based is, as I have already emphasised, problematic. Parties must construct the positions they wish to occupy. The third section examines the way in which Downs develops his spatial framework, at the way in which he positions parties within political space and ties policies to particular spatial locations. Downs' determination to develop a theory that can be used to generate predictions about party behaviour is argued to have led him to construct the spatial framework in a particular and, it will be argued, particularly misleading way. Downs avoids having to confront any differences between political space and the space within which we lead our everyday lives by reducing ‘all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue’, ownership, within which political space is presented as being bounded, finite, and both prearranged and fixed.49 By focusing exclusively upon the ownership issue, Downs avoids having to treat political position as something that parties must construct. Out of this critique of Downs' account, the fourth and final section develops further my general argument that parties must construct their spatial positions and in doing so provides a more detailed account of the nature and meaning of the political centre. Overall, the chapter is, I should warn, a long one which jumps, perhaps disconcertingly, from very general discussions about the development of the theory of party competition to a very detailed examination of the minutiae of Downs' argument. In later chapters, I will, however, return to and develop more carefully many of the arguments introduced here.
49
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 116.
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The Median Voter Theorem As it is used in this and subsequent chapters, the median voter theorem is the collective name given to four arguments about party competition. (1) It is possible to conceive of party competition in terms of a one-dimensional, left to right space. This requires not only that parties can be thought of as being located on the left, centre-left, far right, and so on but, as Downs recognises, that voters' ‘political preferences can be ordered from left to right’ and that voters vote for the party closest to them in political space.50 (2) Spatial position is a function of policy. Because a party's overall position in political space is a ‘weighted average of all the particular policies [the party] upholds’, parties must change position by changing their policies.51 Parties must move to the right by adopting more right-wing policies. They must move to the left by adopting more left-wing policies and so on. Conversely, changes in policy result in changes in position. Adopting more right-wing policies means moving to the right and so on. (3) Parties must maximise their vote by moving to the position of the median voter, that is to the electoral centre. In Figure 2.1 the horizontal axis takes the form of a scale showing a series of alternative policy positions running from left to right and the vertical axis support for those positions. The median voter is that person whose preferred position along the left–right scale is such that there are as many voters to their left as to their right.52 In Figure 2.1 the line showing the aggregate distribution of preferences is drawn in such a way that the median is at X. If there are only two parties it is ‘now seen [by political scientists] as axiomatic that the policy packages offered by the parties will converge on the preferences of the median voter’.53 If there are only two parties, A and B, it is not difficult to see that if party A were to move to the left of this electoral centre, to point Z, party B would be able to acquire more than half of the vote by moving to any position between X and Z. Only when both parties straddle
50
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 115. The assumption that preferences can be expressed in terms of political space does not require that voters' preferences take the initial and underlying form of a preference for, say, right over left. It requires only that voters can translate their preferences into such terms. See Paul Sniderman, ‘Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reasoning’ in Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin (eds.), Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
51
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 132.
52
‘X is a median if ‘no majority of individuals have ideal points…to the left or right of X’. Thomas Schwarz, quoted, Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, Analytical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 33.
53
Michael Laver, Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice (London: Sage, 1997), p. 111.
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the electoral centre can neither party increase its vote by moving position. Convergence to the electoral centre is a stable equilibrium.54 What then of the political centre? This is a concept I will examine more carefully at the end of this chapter. For now, we might however equate it with that point in political space half-way along the horizontal axis. This gives us a basic and fundamental contrast between the electoral and political centres. The electoral centre is defined in terms of the distribution of preferences, that is, in terms of the vertical axis. The political centre is defined in terms of the range of policy options, that is, in terms of the horizontal axis. In this particular case, the electoral and political centres fall at the same point. There is however no reason why this must be so. There is, as I have already emphasised, no great difficulty in imagining the distribution of preferences to be such that the electoral centre is to the left or right of the political centre. Yet the electoral and political centres do often coincide. In other words, the actual distribution of preferences sometimes looks very much like that shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows how respondents to the 1997 British Election Study (BES) positioned themselves along the left–right axis when invited to do so by an interviewer. As we can see here, the political centre, point 5 along this particular scale, attracts more than three times as much support as any other position. (4) The self-interest of party leaders will indeed lead them to locate at the votemaximising position. Downs assumes that leaders ‘act solely in order to attain the income, prestige and power which come from being in office’.55 As a result, parties formulate policies to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies'.56 This assumption does not mean that party leaders can have no preferences about policy, that they must be indifferent between right-wing and left-wing policies. It does however require that they give no weight to such preferences when they come into conflict with the requirements of vote-maximisation. Party leaders will not trade off policy against votes. They will sacrifice any policy in order to gain just one additional vote. An Economic Theory is an entirely theoretical work. It makes no references to and offers no analysis of the institutional environment or patterns of party competition in particular countries. Yet in recent years it has been seized upon to provide what has become the ‘the most common explanation [of why] Labour moved centre-right’.57 As Colin Hay remarks, ‘a quite startling range of authors have…been impressed by the similarities between Labour's
54
The nature of and requirements for equilibrium are discussed in Chapter 5.
55
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 27.
56
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 28.
57
Pippa Norris, ‘New Politicians? Changes in Party Competition at Westminster’, in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris (eds.), Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in LongTerm Perspective (London: Sage, 1999), p. 23.
THE CENTRE, DOWNS, AND NEW LABOUR
21
FIGURE 2.1 Two-Party Competition and the Centre. Michael Laver, Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice (London: Sage, 1997), p. 112.
FIGURE 2.2 Voters' Political Position, 1997. Q: 227a (BES, 1997). ‘In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?’ All BES questions are available on-line via: http:// nesstar.data-archive.ac.uk/ nesstarlight
politics…and the Downsian logic of electoral rationality’.58 Hay cites Mark Blyth, Neil Gavin and David Sanders, Anthony Heath and Roger Jowell, Michael Kenny and Martin Smith, and Eric Shaw as having ‘been impressed by the similarities between Labour's “politics of catch-up”, with its studious targeting of the median voter, and the Downsian logic of electoral rationality and/or expediency’.59 To this list might be added more recent publications by
58
Colin Hay, Labouring Under False Pretences: The Political Economy of New Labour (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 76.
59
Hay, Labouring Under False Pretences: The Political Economy of New Labour, p. 76; Mark Blyth, ‘Moving the Political Middle: Redefining the Boundaries of State Action’, Political Quarterly, 68 (1997), 231–40; Neil Gavin and David Sanders, ‘The Economy and Voting’ in Pippa Norris and Neil Gavin (eds.), Britain Votes 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Anthony Heath and Roger Jowell, ‘Labour's Policy Review’ in Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice (eds.), Labour's Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); Anthony Heath and Bruno Paulson, ‘Issues and the Economy’, Political Quarterly, 63 (1992), 431–47; Michael Kenny and Martin Smith, ‘(Mis)Understanding Blair’, Political Quarterly, 68 (1997), 220–30; David Sanders, ‘The New Electoral Battlefield’ in Anthony King et al.(eds.), New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls 1997 (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1998); Eric Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation (London: Routledge, 1994).
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Richard Heffernan, Pippa Norris, and Charles Pattie.60 It is not difficult to describe the basic form this application takes. Neil Kinnock and then Tony Blair pushed the Labour party to the right and towards the centre. This movement increased Labour's vote in 1992 and 1997. The expectation that it would have precisely this effect provided the motive for the action. Neither is there any particular difficulty in marshalling evidence to support this analysis. In his detailed account of the Labour Party during this period, Eric Shaw shows how Labour came to use opinion polls and other quantitative research to identify ‘the degree of proximity between aggregate voter opinion and the electorate's perceptions of where the parties stood’ with the intention of ‘re-aligning…the party's overall policy package as closely as possible to the views of the median floating voter’.61 Blair himself repeatedly and carefully denied that he sought office for the sake of achieving office. ‘With my class background if all I had wanted to do was exercise power I could and would, let's be blunt about it, have joined another party’.62 Yet, in the run-up to the 1997 election New Labour also emphasised that there was nothing to be gained from remaining pure in opposition, that victory was worth making compromises for. Here, clear lessons appear to have been drawn from the United States. Blair and Brown visited Clinton's election team in January 1993, only a few months after the Presidential election. Peter Mandelson and Philip Gould returned to America in December 1996 in the aftermath of Clinton's re-election.63 According to John Rentoul, the
60
Richard Heffernan, New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain (London: Palgrave, 2000), Pippa Norris, ‘New Labour and Public Opinion: The Third Way as Centrism’, in Stuart White (ed.), New Labour: The Progressive Future? (London: Palgrave, 2001), Charles Pattie, ‘New Labour and the Electorate’, in Steve Ludlam and Martin Smith (eds.), New Labour in Government (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001).
61
Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, p. 60. Although highly critical of the median voter theory, Colin Hay makes a similar point. Downs' theory is worth taking seriously because New Labour ‘has come to accept many of the assumptions which inform [this] theory’. Hay, Labouring Under False Pretences: The Political Economy of New Labour, p. 94.
62
Blair, quoted, Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle, The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver? (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), p. 32.
63
Michael Jones, ‘Clinton's Gunslingers Show Labour how to Shoot a Line’, Sunday Times, 27 April 1997. During the 1992 Presidential campaign the Home Office appeared to make available to the Republicans the contents of the file kept on Bill Clinton from his time as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. Such was the Democrats' anger that New Labour found itself pushing it an open door when it asked for electoral advice.
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23
lesson Blair and Brown learnt from their American adventure was ‘a banal but important one—that all politics is a battle for the centre ground’.64 In 1996 the lesson remained the same. At the behest of his prophetically named political adviser, Dick Morris, Clinton had pursued a strategy of ‘triangulation’: positioning himself between, whilst attempting to rise above, the Republican and Democrat parties.65 It was a concept which found instant favour with New Labour and was only abandoned in the aftermath of the 2001 election.66 New Labour's strategy in 1997 and 2001 was not onedimensional. Whether presented in the guise of ‘Essex man’ or ‘Worcester woman’, ‘Sierra man’ or ‘Galaxy guy’, New Labour searched long and hard for the centre-ground votes of Middle England. Yet, it balanced this with the promise to activists that it would remain faithful to policies like the minimum wage and devolution and would be more radical in office than most expected. To activists, soft-left MPs, and those who eventually came to be known as ‘heartland’ voters, the mantra of traditional values in a modern setting was repeatedly intoned. Seizing upon such ambiguities, the Conservatives attempted to present New Labour as no more than an exercise in slick marketing and clever spin. John Major warned the electorate that Labour remained on the left, that ‘the language is new but the prejudices familiar’.67 The electorate did not appear to be listening. In 1997 New Labour attracted, as might be expected, 75 per cent of the vote of those who, when asked by interviewers working for the BES, placed themselves on the most left-wing decile of a ten-point scale. Yet it also attracted around 45 per cent of the vote of those who placed themselves at the political centre: in the fourth, fifth, and sixth deciles.68 As Colin Hay observes, it is ironic that a forty-year-old book has been seized upon to explain the behaviour of a party which has gone to such
64
John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime Minister (London: Little, Brown & Company, 2001), p. 197.
65
Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office: Getting Re-elected Against All Odds (Washington: Renaissance Books, 1996). Morris was forced to resign shortly before the 1996 Presidential election when details of his affair with a prostitute appeared in the press.
66
In May 2002 the new Education Minister, David Miliband, was reported as having concluded that triangulation worked as a strategy of opposition but not of government. Andy McSmith, ‘Miliband: Ministerial Material After a Year’, Daily Telegraph, 30 May 2002. Much the same point was made in a thoughtful speech by Peter Mandelson the following year. Peter Mandelson, speech, Swedish Social Democratic Party, 14 May 2003. Full text available via www.petermandelson.com/ssap.shtml .
67
John Major, House of Commons, 24 January 1995, Hansard, Col. 136.
68
Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice (eds.), The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 121.
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lengths to proclaim the virtues of modernisation.69 Within political science, An Economic Theory remains a hugely influential book. It has, however, become a starting-point rather than an end-point in the debate about the nature and logic of party competition. Much of this debate has focused upon the third part of the median voter theorem: the claim that parties can only maximise their vote by moving to the electoral centre. This is a conclusion successive generations of theorists have challenged. Downs bases his argument upon the assumption that there is only one, left-to-right, dimension across which parties compete. Against this, Richard McKelvey, has shown that when there are two or more dimensions in political space, that there is rarely a stable equilibrium: that there will always be at least one other point in political space that is preferred by the majority to status quo.70 In recent years, this argument has swung back. It is now usually argued that parties still have an incentive to move if not to the electoral centre then at least to positions in its immediate vicinity.71 Downs bases his argument upon the assumption that there are only two parties. Gary Cox has shown that when there are three or more parties there is ‘no clear and consistent’ incentive for parties to converge.72 Downs bases his argument upon the assumption that parties only care about the votes they receive: that they formulate policies in order to win elections. In a series of path-breaking articles on ‘probabilistic voting’, James Enelow and Melvin Hinich have shown how candidates with preferences over policy will avoid moving to the electoral centre, if voters care about the character of a candidate, have an underlying identification with any party, or form any judgement about its probity or competence. If voters care about any of these attributes they may not vote for the party ‘closest’ to them. In this case, parties can remain on their preferred side of the
69
Hay, Labouring Under False Pretences:The Political Economy of New Labour, p. 76.
70
Richard McKelvey, ‘Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control’, Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976), 472–82. The basic terms of this argument had already been established by Kenneth Arrow and Charles Plott. Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: John Wiley, 1951); Charles Plott, ‘A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule’, American Economic Review, 57 (1967), 787–806.
71
See Gary Cox, ‘The uncovered Set and the Core’, American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987), 408–2; and Nicholas Miller, Bernard Grofman, and Scott Feld, ‘The Geometry of Majority Rule’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4 (1989), 379–406. Gordon Tullock made much the same point in ‘The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem’, Quarterly Journal of Economics', 81 (1967), 256–70.
72
Cox, ‘Multicandidate Spatial Competition’, in James Enelow and Melvin Hinich (eds.), Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 182. See also Cox, ‘Electoral Equilibrium Under Alternative Voting Institutions’, American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987), 82–108; ‘Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems’, American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 903–35. Downs' discussion of multi-party competition can be found in An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 125–7.
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electoral centre and still (probably) win. How far they will stray from the electoral centre depends upon the strength of their policy preferences and the strength of the voters' attachments.73 Downs bases his argument upon the assumption that party members have ‘exactly the same goals’ and that parties can, consequently, be viewed as having a ‘single, consistent preference-ordering’.74 Against this, it can be shown that when activists or elected party representatives have the power to select and re-select their leadership, that leaders may avoid moving to the electoral centre.75 Finally, Downs bases his argument upon the assumption that voters select the party ‘closest’ to them in political space. One alternative here are ‘directional’ theories of voting in which it is argued that voters select the party on their ‘side’ of an issue and in which parties, therefore, have little incentive to move to the electoral centre.76 I have not attempted to provide a detailed review of the literature on party competition as it has developed since the publication of An Economic Theory.77 Even this limited review is, however, sufficient for the simple point I want to make. For the last forty or so years theoretical interest has been focused upon the third part of the median voter theorem: the claim that parties must move to the electoral centre to maximise their vote. Other parts of Downs' theory have been brought into the light in so far as they bear upon this claim. The grip of the spatial metaphor upon our thinking is however such that the claim that it is possible to conceive of parties as operating in political space has remained largely unchallenged.
73
James Enelow and Melvin Hinich, ‘A General Probabilistic Spatial Theory of Elections’, Public Choice, 61 (1989), 101–13; ‘Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition, Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115–30; James Adams, ‘A Theory of Spatial Competition with Biased Voters: Party Policies Viewed Temporally and Comparatively’, British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), 121–58.
74
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 26–7.
75
John Aldrich, ‘A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism’, American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 974–90.
76
George Rabinowitz and Stuart McDonald, ‘A Directional Theory of Issue Voting’, American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 93–121. The same argument was offered by Steven Matthews, and, from outside of the directional theory of voting, by David Robertson and Steven Matthews, ‘A Simple Directional Model of Electoral Competition’, Public Choice, 34 (1979), 141–57; Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition (London: John Wiley, 1976), pp. 58–60. In recent years it has been argued that ‘mixed’ models in which voters care about both proximity and direction are best equipped to predict election results; Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
77
Accessible and detailed reviews are provided by Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, Analytical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Peter Ordeshook, ‘The Spatial Analysis of Elections and Committees: Four Decades of Research’, in Dennis Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and ‘Spatial Theories of Electoral Competition’ in Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (eds.), Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
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The assumption that this space is one-dimensional has been set aside. The assumption that parties can be represented as moving between and occupying particular points in political space has not. Indeed, so fundamental is this link that the theory of party competition has actually become known as the spatial theory of voting.78 Having examined the basic terms of the median voter theorem and of the ways in which it has been developed over the last forty or so years, I will now more carefully examine the way in which Downs presents parties as operating in political space.
Downsian Space In an article first published in 1929, a professor of mathematics at Chapel Hill University, Harold Hotelling, offered a spatial analysis of the behaviour of entrepreneurs.79 The model depicted profit-maximising businesses as having to locate themselves along a one-dimensional space over which customers were equally divided. This space, Hotelling wrote, ‘may be the Main Street in a town or a transcontinental railway’.80 Hotelling's question was about where businesses would be located. His answer was that they would be located at the centre of the street, that is, at the point half-way between the left-hand and right-hand edges of the scale.81 In what is little more than a footnote to the main body of his argument, Hotelling then extended his discussion from economics to politics. So general is this tendency that it appears in the most diverse fields of competitive activity, even quite apart from what is called economic life. In politics, it is strikingly exemplified. The competition for voters between the Republican and Democratic parties does not lead to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two strikingly contrasted positions between which the voter may choose. Instead each party strives to make its platform as much like the other's as possible.82 Hotelling did not use the terms left and right to describe the position of parties in political space and did not seek to represent the position of parties
78
See, for example, the titles of the relevant chapters by Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice: A critique of applications in political science, pp. 147–78 and Ordeshook, ‘The Spatial Analysis of Elections and Committees: Four Decades of Research’.
79
Harold Hotelling, ‘Stability in Competition’, Economic Journal, 39 (1929), 41–57.
80
Hotelling, ‘Stability in Competition’, p. 46.
81
Hotelling also argues that businesses will not differentiate their products. Entrepreneurs will end up offering the same product at the same location. For the development of Hotelling's ideas within economic theory see Claude Ponsard, History of Spatial Economic Theory (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983); Stephen Brown, ‘Retail Location Theory: the Legacy of Harold Hotelling’, Journal of Retailing, 65 (1989), 450–70; and B. Curtis Eaton and Richard Lipsey, ‘The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: New Developments in the Spatial Theory of Competition’, Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1975), 27–49.
82
Hotelling, ‘Stability in Competition’, p. 54.
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using a scale. Nevertheless it is this basic argument that Downs sees himself as ‘borrowing and elaborating’ upon.83 The eighth chapter of An Economic Theory starts with the assumption that political preferences can be ordered from left to right’ and that these preferences can be represented using a linear scale.84 Notice that the left and right being invoked here are a left and right in metaphorical political space. Yet, to illustrate his argument and make it ‘more plausible’, Downs goes on to give the left–right scale a non-metaphorical foundation.85 He does so by reducing ‘all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue’: the degree of private ownership.86 Private ownership can, Downs suggests, range anywhere between 100 per cent of the economy and 0 per cent. As Figure 2.3 shows, these options can be mapped on to a linear scale running from the left (0 per cent) to the right (100 per cent) with each point in between representing an additional 1 per cent private ownership. It is this version of the left–right scale that is then used by Downs in his subsequent diagrams.87 Only towards the end of the chapter with the last diagram drawn and the argument about convergence to the electoral FIGURE 2.3 Left and Right and Ownership.
83
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 115.
84
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 115.
85
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 116.
86
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 116.
87
By using the ownership example Downs can show how parties choose between various policy options without having to use the terms left and right in their political and so metaphorical senses. The policy options in Figure 2.3 run not from ‘most left-wing policy positions’ to ‘most right-wing policy positions’ as they do in Figure 2.1, but from 0 % to 100 % private ownership. The labels left-wing and right-wing used in their political and so metaphorical sense are added to the left-hand and right-hand ends of Figure 2.3 and this looks perfectly innocuous because we are used to the idea of left-wing parties favouring nationalisation and right-wing ones privatisation. But if these labels were removed it would make absolutely no difference to the representation. Removing left-wing and right-wing from Figure 2.1 would render it incomprehensible. What then would the horizontal axis be measuring? Removing left-wing and right-wing from Figure 2.3 would leave a diagram still depicting the level of private ownership. The left and right over which policy options are being arranged in Figure 2.3 is a literal left and right. 0 % private ownership is, literally, on the left-hand edge of the scale and 100 % private ownership is, literally, on the right-hand edge of the scale. Yet, if we wanted to, we could arrange exactly the same information in such a way that 0 % private ownership was on the right-hand side and 100 % private ownership on the left. It would make no difference. Or we could, alternatively, dispense with the horizontal ordering altogether and place 0% private ownership at the top of a vertical line and 100 % private ownership at the bottom.
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centre made does Downs return to an abstract conception of the left–right scale. Eliminating the assumption that politics is entirely a matter of ownership, he suggests that ‘each party takes stands on many issues, that each stand can be assigned a position on our left–right scale’ and that a party's net position is a ‘weighted average of all the particular policies it upholds’.88 At this point, and as in Figure 2.1, the ends of the horizontal axis are now simply marked right and left, a left and right in metaphorical political space. It is this version of the left–right scale and not the ‘more plausible’ ownership one that appears in texts summarising Downs' arguments and in the models of party competition which have appeared over the last forty or so years.89 That Downs develops his argument in this way may seem entirely unimportant, merely a matter, as Downs suggests, of illustration. That textbooks jump straight to the use of a left–right scale relying upon notions of metaphorical political space may also be seen as reflecting little more than a matter of style. It will be argued not. The use of the ownership example is significant because it allows Downs to proceed without having to address the limits of the spatial metaphor and without therefore having to consider the possibility that political position is constructed. Chapter 1 suggests that the spatial metaphor is an attractive and effective one because we are comfortable with the idea of there being a world around us within which we lead our everyday lives. In terms of our common sense experience, we attribute particular properties to this everyday space.90 In the first place, we think of it as being bounded. When we walk into a room we think of the space in that room as being contained within a set of walls and doors. We also think of it as being finite. When we walk into a room we think of that room as having a particular amount of space in it, a space that we could, if we wanted, measure. Finally, we think of the objects in a room as being arranged in a particular way such that when, for example, we enter a room, there is a table to our left and to the left of that a chair. Ownership is a useful example for Downs because it is an issue to which can be attributed the same
88
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 132.
89
In addition to Laver's Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice, see Joe B. Stevens, The Economics of Collective Choice (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 177; Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 119; and Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 119.
90
This common sense conception of space is one in which space is just space, something that provides an unnoticed backdrop to the events and dramas of our lives. Such a conception was most obviously celebrated in Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica in the seventeenth century. This Newtonian conception has however been supplanted first by Einstein's special and later by his general theories of relativity. That Einstein has shown our commonsense attributions to be mistaken does not however mean that we find it any more difficult to walk from one side of a room to another. It has not, in other words, undermined the force of the metaphor.
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properties as common sense space. So as it is characterised by Downs, ownership is an issue the policy options for which are bounded. It is not possible to have a proportion of private ownership lower than 0 per cent or greater than 100 per cent. As a result, the one-dimensional scale on which Downs represents the issue in Figure 2.3 has clear ends. As it is characterised by Downs, ownership is also an issue for which there are a finite number of policy options. If we restrict ourselves, as Downs does, to whole numbers, then there are a maximum of 100 policy options. As a result, the one-dimensional scale on which Downs represents the issue of ownership in Figure 2.3 contains a set number of components. Finally, as it is characterised by Downs, the sequence of these policy options is prearranged and fixed. Fifty-nine per cent private ownership is placed to the right of 58 per cent private ownership and so on.91 There is no room for any disagreement here about where a particular policy option should be placed along the one-dimensional scale used to represent the issue. Yet the ownership example is atypical. It is far from clear that other issues can be arranged in this way. It is not even clear that ownership need be or should be arranged in this way. Who is to say that the issue of ownership must be about the overall level of private ownership rather than, say, the particular mix of industries that should be publicly owned? Chapter 7 argues that the ‘ends’ of political space are not bounded in the same way as they are in Downs' example. Chapter 5 shows that there are not a finite number of policies over which parties must choose. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the sequencing of policies from left to right should not be seen as being prearranged and fixed. Whether one policy is more right-wing than another is not simply a matter of counting. It is a matter of political argument. The spatial metaphor is problematic because political space does not share the same properties we attribute to the space within which we lead our everyday lives. By reducing ‘all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue’, Downs avoids having to confront the limits of the spatial metaphor and with this the possibility that spatial position is constructed. That, Downs equips himself with a spatial framework which allows him to represent political space in a particular and, I have argued, particularly misleading way is not a simple coincidence, a quirk of the text. The use of the ownership example needs to be understood and explained in the context of Downs' more general methodological commitments. An Economic Theory is noteworthy not simply for the conclusions it reaches about party competition but for being one of the first attempts to apply the techniques of
91
Measurements within the scale are not simply ordinal but cardinal. That is, it is not only possible to place 59 % ownership to the right of 50 % ownership but to show by how much 59 % ownership is to the right and left of all other policies.
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economics to the study of politics in a method now known as rational or public choice.92 As a work of rational choice, Downs' argument is underpinned by a particular set of general assumptions. Foremost amongst these are the assumptions that individuals are utility maximisers whose preferences are, in the short-term at least, fixed. Utility maximisation means that individuals can be relied upon to ‘move toward [their] goals in a way which, to the best of [their] knowledge, uses the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued output’.93 The ends or preferences which individuals pursue or have are fixed. In the case of the electorate this means that ‘every citizen has a fixed conception of the good society and has already related it to his knowledge of party policies in a consistent manner’.94 In the case of party leaders this means that each seeks election and so seeks to ‘formulate policies to win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies’.95 These assumptions, Downs goes on to argue, are valuable because they make individuals' actions and thereby eventual outcomes predictable. If a theorist knows the ends of some decision-maker, he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows: (1) he calculates the most reasonable way for the decision-maker to reach his goals, and (2) he assumes this way will actually be chosen because the decision-maker is rational.96 Although An Economic Theory closes with a list of twenty-five ‘empirically testable propositions’ derived from the book, Downs' work is an entirely theoretical one.97 Yet he is adamant in seeing the capacity for rational choice theory to generate testable predictions as valuable and as marking the key difference between his own work and that of its predecessors.98 Predictions are valuable because they allow hypotheses and claims to be tested against
92
Bernard Grofman lists the other founding texts of rational choice as being Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley 1951), Duncan Black's The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge; Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), and William Riker's The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). See Bernard Grofman, ‘Introduction’, in Bernard Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 1.
93
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 5.
94
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 47.
95
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 27.
96
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 4.
97
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 295–300.
98
On the importance of prediction within rational choice see Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Application in Political Science; Morris Fiorina, ‘Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, And the Scientific Enterprise’, Critical Review, 9 (1995), 85–94; Cox, ‘The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply to Green and Shapiro’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11 (1999), 147–70; and William Riker, ‘The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay in the History of Political Science’, American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), 753–66.
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the ‘real’ world. Predictions allow political scientists to test their claims in the same way as economists and natural scientists. Downs' theory is one that can tell us something about how the world actually is rather than simply how it should be. The few [existing] analyses of government activity as a whole are mostly normative, i.e., they deduce the types of actions which a government should undertake from some basic ethical principle about its proper function. Our analysis is likewise deductive, since it posits a basic rule and draws conclusions therefrom. However, it is also positive, because we try to describe what will happen under certain conditions, not what should happen'. (emphasis in original)99 It is Downs' argument that utility maximisation and fixed preferences are necessary and sufficient conditions for making predictions. I agree that they are necessary conditions. Predictions about behaviour cannot be generated if it is assumed that individuals do not seek to maximise their utility or if their preferences are constantly changing. Yet these are not sufficient conditions. Downs' argument in the extract just quoted is incisive and reveals another necessary condition. Individuals must also be calculative decision-makers. Calculation is not the same as utility maximisation. Utility maximisation refers to behaviour: that of selecting the option valued most highly. Calculation refers to a capacity: that of being able to recognise the most valuable option. Calculation is necessary for prediction because it reduces the problem of choice to a mathematical problem all can deal with and all deal with in the same way. If decision-making is calculative then individuals, who have the same preferences and are faced with the same options, can be relied upon to make the same choices in just the same way that different pocket calculators can be relied upon to provide the same answer when asked the same question. Rational choice means that all make the same choices and because all make the same choices, individual choice can be predicted. I can predict how you would behave in a given situation because I can predict how I would behave. There is plenty of evidence that people are not very good at calculation. They overestimate the likelihood of improbable events and underestimate the likelihood of probable ones. They fail to take baseline probabilities into account and are easily misled by sometimes subtle changes in the wording of a question.100 People's calculative shortcomings are starkly revealed when they are matched against computers. These are not only quicker but also far more accurate.101 Yet my objection here is not that calculative decision-
99
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 14.
100
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provide the most frequently cited work here. See ‘Choices, Values, and Frames’, American Psychologist, 39 (1984), 341–50; Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); ‘On the Psychology of Prediction’, Psychological Review, 80 (1973), 237–51; ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, Science, 211 (1981) 453–8.
101
Robyn Dawes, David Faust, and Paul Meehl, ‘Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgement’, Science, 243 (1989), 1668–74.
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making is simply wrong. It is rather that it is insufficient. What is missing from it is any sense of the possibility of individual creativity: of novel ideas and solutions being generated to familiar problems. People are not simply calculators who choose carefully and precisely between available options. People often act creatively. In showing imagination, flexibility, expressiveness, and openness, they sometimes ‘discover’ previously unrecognised opportunities and options.102 Computers may be better calculators than people are but this does not mean that they are better decision-makers. Computers lack creativity. A creative person can look at the same data as a purely calculative person but will see in them different things. Creative decision-making is not inconsistent with the assumptions of either utility maximisation or fixed preferences. Creativity does however threaten the capacity to make predictions. If only some individuals are creative then different individuals with the same preferences will behave in different ways when confronted with the same options. Even if it is assumed not only that all individuals are creative but that they are equally creative, prediction will still remain elusive unless it is also assumed that all have exactly the same creative ideas. And ideas that everyone has are not creative. Creativity cannot be predicted.103 In order to make calculative decision-making possible, Downs must assume that individuals are calculative decisionmakers. He must also assume that political space shares the same properties we attribute to the space within which we lead our everyday lives. If parties confront a political space within which there are a finite number of prearranged and fixed policy options with clearly defined boundaries then they can calculate which position will generate the most votes. In Figure 2.1, parties will calculate (without any great difficulty) that they must position themselves at the electoral centre to maximise their vote. This calculation is also a prediction about how parties will behave. When a particular set of assumptions hold, parties, any party, will move to the electoral centre. The assumption of calculative decisionmaking dovetails with and indeed requires the assumption that political space is bounded, finite, and both prearranged and fixed. For reasons we have already outlined, this, in turn, requires Downs to reduce ‘all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue’, ownership, in which the limits of the spatial metaphor are obscured. To see this
102
On the Concept of Discovery, see Israel Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); How Markets Work: Disequilibrium, Entrepreneurship and Discovery (London: IEA, 1997); Discovery, Capitalism and Distributive Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
103
To make the same point, John Elster quotes Humphrey Lyttleton as saying that ‘if I knew where jazz was going, I'd be there already’. Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 9.
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link again, consider the alternative position to be developed here: that position is constructed through rhetoric, innovation, framing, and leadership. These are, as we will see, activities that require creativity. They envisage parties as formulating new ways of persuading voters, new policies and new ways of understanding policies. Yet with this creativity is lost the possibility of prediction. Downs must treat political position as being something a party moves to rather than constructs because he wants to see in politics a science within which predictions are possible.
The Construction of the Centre Chapter 1 explains that the centre is constructed in one general and four specific ways. The four specific ways, the four applications of this general argument, are dealt with in separate chapters on rhetoric, innovation, framing, and leadership. In the rest of this chapter, I, therefore, want to develop more carefully my general argument about the relationship between the electoral and political centres and relate this to the argument in An Economic Theory. As we have already seen, the median voter theorem rests upon a particular set of assumptions: that parties are votemaximisers; that there is only one, left to right, spatial dimension; that there are only two parties; and so on. A further and crucial assumption can however be identified: that of perfect information. Figure 2.1 provides us, the reader, with a spatial representation that allows us to locate the electoral centre and judge the position of parties in relation to it. Using Figure 2.1 we can see whether voters at any one point along the horizontal scale are closer to party A or party B. Yet the information given to us here is also information that it is assumed voters and parties have. If parties are to move to the electoral centre they must know where that centre is. If individuals are to vote for the party closest to them, they must know where the parties are. Perfect information is the lubricant that keeps this part of the median voter theorem running smoothly and predictably. In the introduction to this chapter it was claimed that the theorem presented in Downs' name is often reduced to little more than a caricature of Downs' actual argument. For Downs actually dismisses the assumption of perfect information as being simply implausible.104 Uncertainty—which he defines as ‘lack of sure knowledge about the course of past, present, future or hypothetical events’—is argued to be a pervasive and important phenomenon.105 It is pervasive because, as we will see in the next
104
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 13. Indeed the second of the four parts of the book and the one in which the discussion of the median voter theorem can be found is called ‘The General Effects of Uncertainty’.
105
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 77.
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paragraph, ignorance is rational. Important because it can be used to explain why parties might not always converge to the electoral centre. Here, Downs actually anticipates many of the arguments subsequently presented as criticisms of his argument. Uncertainty means that parties might not know where the electoral centre is and so might calculate incorrectly the vote-maximising position.106 Uncertainty means that voters need to be able to trust parties to keep their promises once elected and this means that parties must seek to acquire a reputation for being responsible, for not simply changing their policies in response to fluctuations in the most recent opinion polls.107 Uncertainty means that voters will struggle to keep track of what parties are saying and doing. This means that parties can try to maximise their vote by being deliberately ambiguous.108 Finally, uncertainty means that parties can seek to persuade voters that their policies are the right ones for them, an exercise which, because it is costly, requires parties to sell policy promises to wealthy interests. ‘Rationality under conditions of uncertainty leads government to construct policies often aimed at the good of a few voters than at the good of all, or even of a majority’.109 Each of these arguments suggests obvious lines of applied research. Accounts of how in its determination to correct the mistakes of its past, New Labour overshot its target and moved to the right of the electoral centre. Accounts of how it tried to create the impression of being all things to all people. Accounts of how it has been led into political difficulty by donations from Formula One tycoons and shady businessmen. Downs' arguments about persuasion and responsibility are discussed in Chapters 3 and 9 through the analysis of rhetoric and leadership. This section focuses upon the way in which Downs links uncertainty to ideology. Out of this link can be teased my argument about the nature and significance of the political centre. Downs suggests that every voter has a particular and fixed view of the ‘good society’, their own political philosophy.110 Within the terms of the model set out in the second section, voters can be imagined to derive from this philosophy their preferences over policy options. Yet individuals will have little incentive to acquire the information needed to form such judgements. People will acquire some politically relevant information in the course of watching news broadcasts and having occasional conversations
106
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 100–1.
107
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 109.
108
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 135. See also Kenneth Shepsle, ‘The Strategy of Ambiguity, Uncertainty, and Competition’, American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 551–68. Hotelling also talks about parties coming to adopt deliberately ambiguous strategies; ‘Stability in Competition’, p. 54.
109
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 93.
110
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 98.
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35
with friends. It will not however make sense for individuals to invest time and money in a deliberate effort to acquire information about public policy. For, individuals will realise that their vote is almost certainly not going to make any difference to the election result and that any such investment would therefore be wasted. As restated here by Samuel Popkin, the health of the national economy may in fact have a greater effect on voters than whether their next vacation is fabulous or merely good, but time spent deciding where to travel leads to better vacations, whereas time spent evaluating…policies tends not to lead to better policies but only a better-informed vote.111 The result is a great deal of uncertainty. Many voters will know relatively little about policy, certainly not enough to form the kind of fine-grained preferences required by the median voter theorem. It is at this point that ideology, defined as ‘a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society’, enters Downs' argument.112 Knowing that many voters will know relatively little about policy, parties develop ideologies that offer to voters a kind of shorthand summary of their position. Ideologies are cost-saving devices that free voters from the ‘need to become informed upon a wide range of issues’.113 Voters can learn how close they are to a party by looking at its ideology. It is one of the four components of the median voter theorem presented in Downs' name that spatial position is a function of policy. Yet Downs actually emphasises limits to the significance of policy.114 The basic structure of Downs' argument at this point is simple enough. Yet, strangely, Downs never actually provides his readers with any discussion about or examples of ideologies. He tells us about the function ideology performs but, beyond this, does not tell us what an ideology looks like. One obvious possibility here is to think of ideologies as ‘isms’. Parties provide voters with information about what they stand for and will do if elected by defining and presenting themselves as socialists, liberals, conservatives,
111
Samuel Popkin, ‘Information Shortcuts and the Reasoning Voter’, in Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective, p. 17. Downs' argument can be found in An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 241–5.
112
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 96.
113
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 98
114
Downs does argue that voters will only care about ideology if they believe that ideology tells them something about policy. ‘In order to be rational short cuts, ideologies must be integrated with policies closely enough to form accurate indicators of what each party is likely to do in the future’. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 102. Policy is not rendered irrelevant. Yet in arguing that voters approach politics through ideology, the importance of policy is being down-played.
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and so on.115 Yet this is not the only possibility. For the spatial metaphor presents parties with an alternative form of shorthand. Parties can provide voters with information about what they stand for and will do if elected, by defining and presenting themselves in spatial terms. Left-wing, centre-left, right-wing, and so on are not simply labels applied to parties by journalists or political scientists. They are ways in which parties describe themselves. By describing itself as a party of the centre-left, then of the centre and centre-left, and, finally, of the centre, New Labour provided voters with information about what it stood for and the kind of things it would do if elected. Party competition clearly has an ideological aspect to it. Politics is not simply about policy. But party competition is not simply ideological. Policy does matter. For it is through policy that parties construct, defend, and contest ideological descriptions. Parties do not simply say that they are at the political centre. They argue that they are at the centre. They argue this with reference to the policies they are committed to. In suggesting that policy matters, we do not need to assume that voters have perfect information about policy. For although he himself chooses not to extend it in this way, Downs' general argument about the effects of uncertainty can be played out at the level of policy as well as ideology. Precisely because information about policy is imperfect, parties will offer summaries, particular presentations, of their policies. Parties don't just ‘have’ policies. They ‘spin’ policies. An argument that a particular policy shows a party to be at the political centre will be supported by a particular presentation of that policy. An argument that a political opponent's policies leave them far from the centre will be supported by a particular presentation of those policies. Policy does not map on to spatial position in a prearranged and fixed way. A commitment to some particular policy does not put a party on the political right in the same way that, in Figure 2.3, a commitment to 2 per cent private ownership puts a party on the left-hand edge of the horizontal scale. Equally, a change in policy does not result in a particular change in political position in the same way that, in Figure 2.3, a change from 59 per cent to 60 per cent private ownership entailed a move of a particular distance to the right. This ‘gap’ between policy and spatial position is sustained by uncertainty. Because voters do not know all that there is to know about a policy, they can be led to think about policies in different ways by being exposed to different summaries of it. These summaries will vary across a number of dimensions. Different summaries will contain different accounts of the terms left, right, and centre.
115
For just such an account see Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 105. Here, socialism, market socialism, welfare capitalism, and capitalism are laid out along a scale the ends of which are marked as left and right.
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One presentation may encourage voters to think of a policy as being left-wing because it will lead to greater equality. Another may encourage voters to think of a policy as being left-wing because it will require greater government intervention.116 Different summaries will provide different accounts of how terms like equality should be understood. One presentation may encourage voters to think of equality in terms of equality of opportunity. Another might encourage voters to think in terms of equality of outcomes.117 Finally, different summaries will sketch differing accounts of the relationship between a policy and a particular concept. In one presentation it will be suggested that a particular policy is likely to generate greater equality. In another it may be argued that the same policy will have exactly the opposite effect. Spatial position is constructed. Parties do not take a particular representation of political space and their own positions within it as fixed data to which they must adjust themselves. They argue about how political space should be configured and where they are within it. They do so by constructing summaries of their policies that tie them to a particular spatial location in voters' minds. Parties are not inherently left-wing. They are constructed as being leftwing. A party that wants to present itself as being left-wing will promote a definition of that term and a corresponding presentation of its policies that best supports such a description. A party that wants to present its opponent as being right-wing will promote a definition of that term and a corresponding presentation of its opponents' policies that best supports such a description. In the same way parties are not inherently centrist. A party that wants to present itself as being at the political centre will promote a definition of that term and a corresponding presentation of its policies that best supports such a description. A party that wants to present its opponents as having vacated the political centre will promote a definition of that term and a corresponding presentation of opponents' policies that best supports such a description. Having now started to use the term so liberally, we need, finally, to say more about the political centre. In Figure 2.1, the political centre was characterised as falling literally at the centre of the horizontal scale. Having spent so long arguing that political space cannot be thought of as bounded, finite, and both prearranged and fixed, this now appears somewhat strained.
116
On differing conceptions of left and right see Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), Samuel Brittan, Left or Right: The Bogus Dilemma (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968), and Jean Laponce, Left and Right: The Topography of Political Perceptions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
117
On the contested nature and possible definitions of equality, see Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality: Part One, Equality of Welfare’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1981), 185–246.
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The political centre cannot simply be associated with particular policies, for it has been argued that policies are not inherently left-wing or right-wing. At any one time, the electorate may believe a particular policy to be at the political centre but this belief will be a constructed one. So what then is the political centre to mean? In subsequent chapters it will be argued that New Labour has tied itself to the political centre by presenting itself as a moderate party with moderate policies and has contrasted its own moderation with the extremism of both a Conservative Party on the political right and an Old Labour faction on the political left.118 Moderation is, so to speak, the common coinage of New Labour's policy summaries. In the nineteenth century, Walter Bagehot claimed that ‘moderate’ and middling government was the ‘normal and natural government of the English people’ because it reflected their ‘loathing for extremes and their love of moderation’.119 A hundred years on and moderation remains a politically appealing virtue. As the proportion of the electorate believing Labour to be an extreme party fell from 49 per cent in 1987 to 29 per cent in 1992 to just 16 per cent in 1997, the party's vote correspondingly rose from 31 per cent in the 1987 general election to just over 43 per cent in 1997.120 Moderation has been interpreted in a number of different ways. It has been interpreted in such a way as to be synonymous with balance and compromise.
118
The argument here is about policy. It is however worth noting that Blair has (i) defined himself as being a ‘moderate’ politician (see, for example, his press conference on 25 July 2002. Full text available via www.number-10/gov.uk/output/Page3000.asp ), that he has (ii) routinely invited ‘moderate’ Conservatives to join New Labour (see Anthony Bevins, ‘Blair Offers Tories a Haven’, Observer, 5 May 1996; Michael White, ‘Join Us, Blair Tells Tories’, Guardian, 30 September 1999); and has (iii) talked repeatedly of the ‘moderate, middle-income majority’ whose votes New Labour needs to retain office (Blair, quoted, Jonathan Freedland, ‘In Search of Middle England’, Guardian, 18 June 1998).
119
Walter Bagehot, ‘Not a Middle Party but a Middle Government’ in Norman St John-Stevas (ed.), Collected Works of Walter Bagehot (London: The Economist, 1974), p. 199. For a similar but far longer account see Thomas Macaulay, A History of England (London: Longman, Brown & Green, 1849). For a more subtle account see Vincent Starzinger, Middlingness: Juste Milieu Political Theory in France and England, 1815–48 (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1965).
120
The material cited here is taken from the on-line British Election Survey archives available at http://nesstar.data-archive.ac.uk .
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New Labour has sometimes presented its policies as restrained compromises between unsavoury extremes. At other times it has been interpreted in such a way as to mean mainstream. New Labour has sometimes presented its policies as reflecting an underlying consensus of views and as promoting a set of shared values. At other times it has been interpreted to mean conservative. New Labour has sometimes presented its policies as being either consistent with or entailing only the slightest of departures from the established status quo. At other times it has been interpreted to mean reasonable and pragmatic. New Labour has sometimes presented itself as a party of ‘practical ideas’, that believes that ‘what counts is what works’.121 New Labour has not only constructed its own position at the political centre, it has contested the Conservatives' claims to be the party of the ‘mainstream majority in the centre’.122 John Major, William Hague, Iain Duncan-Smith, and Michael Howard have all been presented as having led the Conservatives away from the political centre. In the aftermath of the 1999 conference season, Blair suggested, for example, that the past two weeks have defined the political landscape. Both main parties have emerged from their party conferences clear about where they stand. The Labour Party has finally come to terms with the idea of New Labour. We stand firmly and confidently in the centre. The Conservatives have taken a fundamental decision to vacate the centre and move to the right of anywhere they have been for at least twenty years.123 New Labour has presented the Conservatives as an extreme party with extreme policies and an extreme leader. The Conservatives have been presented as a party that has eschewed compromise and embraced extremism. The Conservatives have been presented as a party that has abandoned the mainstream, turned in on itself, and started talking about issues that are of little or no interest to most voters. The Conservatives have been presented as being committed to policies that would transform the economic and political landscape. Finally, the Conservatives have been presented as a party that places ideological purity and dogma before a genuine concern with the public interest.
Conclusion New Labour is routinely described as being at the centre. The centre being invoked in such descriptions can however mean two very different things. The electoral centre refers to the vote-maximising position of the median voter and is defined with reference to the distribution of voters' preferences. The electoral centre is the ‘territory on which elections are won and lost’.124 The political centre refers to a particular spatial position and is defined with reference to the range of available political positions. The political centre is the centre New Labour once occupied as ‘a party of the centre as well as the
121
Blair, quoted, Philip Webster, ‘There's no Going Back for Party, Blair Tells Voters’, The Times, 11 March 1997.
122
William Hague, quoted, Roland Watson, ‘Portillo Targets Centre Ground as Vital to Win’ The Times, 28 November 2000.
123
Blair, ‘Centre Forward’, The Times, 11 October 1999.
124
Andrew Rawnsley, ‘The Loathed Versus the Unloved’, Observer, 31 December 2000.
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centre-left’.125 The electoral centre can either be on the political right, left, or centre. New Labour has however operated on the assumption that the political and electoral centres coincide, that ‘opinion on most issues [tends] to peak at the centre and [that] therefore a vote-maximising strategy [requires] occupying the middle-ground’.126 In an effort to position itself at the political centre, New Labour has presented itself as a moderate party that has transcended the extremes of both the old Left and the new Right. Parties must move to the electoral centre if they are to maximise their vote. But this alone is to underestimate the importance of the centre within party competition. Uncertainty means that voters must rely upon shorthand summaries of policy positions. Uncertainty means that some voters will vote for parties whose policies they consider to be at the moderate political centre. What policies are believed to be moderate will depend, at least in part, upon the way in which parties present policies. Parties do not simply move to the electoral centre. They fight over the political centre.
125
Blair, quoted, Peter Riddell, ‘Labour is the Voice of Middle Britain’, The Times, 12 April 1996.
126
Eric Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, p. 60.
3 Rhetoric and the Construction of the Centre Introduction Rhetoric, defined here as ‘the art of persuasive communication’, is a subject political scientists have, strangely, turned their backs on.127 The term rhetoric is sometimes used, as most of us use it in our everyday lives, to denote empty declamation or dishonest artifice, but little or no effort is now made to define the different kinds of rhetoric or to explore its applications within politics. Interests and institutions are routinely invoked to explain political events and outcomes. The possibility that they are formed through and modified by rhetorical argument is largely overlooked. There is one important exception here. Coining the term ‘heresthetics’, the American political scientist William Riker has shown how politicians who expect to lose one election can divide the majority they expect to beat them by constructing and placing on the agenda new issue alternatives. Riker has applied this basic argument to the study of two key moments in American political history: the creation of the constitution and the outbreak of the Civil War.128 Jack Nagel has applied the same argument to the study of party competition in New Zealand and Iain McLean to the study of British politics.129 Riker's argument bears a number of obvious similarities to my own. I will, however, postpone
127
Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 1. Aristotle defines the function of rhetoric as being to ‘find out in each case the existing means of persuasion’; Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1926), 1355b. On the connection between rhetoric and persuasion see George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Joseph Wenzel, Three Perspectives on Argument, in Robert Trapp and Janice Schuetz (eds.) Perspectives on Argumentation (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1990), p. 13, James Herrick, The History and Theory of Rhetoric (Scottsdale: Scarisbrick, 1997), pp. 8–11.
128
William Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); ‘The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787’, American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 96–111; The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
129
Jack Nagel, ‘Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalisation in New Zealand’, British Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998), 223–67; Iain Mclean, Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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a detailed discussion of it until Chapter 8. Riker relates his argument to the creation of new dimensions of conflict. By contrast, in this chapter, I focus on the construction of voters' beliefs about the position of policies within an existing dimension. That rhetoric has been pushed to the back of the political science stage is curious, because rhetoric is very obviously a pervasive feature of politics generally and of party politics in particular. Claims about the existence of ‘an axis of evil’, about there being, in Margaret Thatcher's formulation, ‘no alternative’, and about Britain being a ‘beacon of hope’ are rhetorical claims used to attract attention and secure support.130 Within parliamentary democracies politicians do not seek to subdue their opponents with guns or bribes. They use arguments. In their speeches, debates, interviews, newspaper articles, press releases, and briefings, politicians, their supporters, and advisers try to persuade the media, the electorate, pressure groups, and each other that their own positions, decisions, and policies are all that might be hoped and their opponents' all that might be feared. Developing a specific application of the general argument outlined in Chapter 2, this chapter will examine the significance, forms, and limits of political rhetoric and in doing so will show how the political centre is rhetorically constructed. For nearly two thousand years rhetoric has been divided, mainly for pedagogical convenience, into five parts: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.131 The rhetoric to be examined in this chapter will be the rhetoric of invention. The focus will be on the kinds of arguments politicians use to persuade audiences. Furthermore, and to use a distinction drawn by Aristotle in The Art of Rhetoric, the focus will be on rational arguments appealing to audiences' reason and understanding rather than their emotions or ethical values.132 Rhetoric will be equated not simply with efforts to persuade but with efforts to persuade using reasoned argument. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first documents the kinds of rhetorical argument politicians' employ. Ten different ‘argumentative schemes’ are identified and illustrated using a register developed by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New Rhetoric.133 The second section returns us to and develops further the argument of Chapter 2. Politicians construct the political centre by constructing voters' beliefs about the configuration of political space and the location of policies and parties within it. Beliefs about what and where the political centre is and
130
On Britain as a beacon of hope see Tony Blair, ‘We Can be a Beacon to the World’, Guardian, 30 December 1999.
131
Edward Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 22–8.
132
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1356a.
133
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 188.
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about whether some policy or party is at it are not immutable. Neither, however, are they entirely plastic. Rhetoric can be used to change beliefs but it cannot be used to persuade voters of just anything. In the third section the limits of rhetoric are accounted for in terms of the beliefs an audience already has. Persuasion is, in the jargon of economics, path-dependent.134 The beliefs an audience has today are not necessarily those it will have tomorrow. Rhetoric can be used to change beliefs. But rhetoric persuades an audience on the basis of the beliefs it already has. What an audience believes tomorrow will depend upon what it believes today. What it can be persuaded to believe will depend upon what it already believes. Political position is constructed but there are limits to the process of construction.
Rhetorical Forms At a first glance, politicians' arguments are hugely if not infinitely varied. One of the achievements of and recurring themes within the study of rhetoric has therefore been the identification of a more limited number of subject matters underpinning specific arguments as they relate to particular issues and events. These ‘common places’, ‘topics’, ‘building blocks’, ‘argumentative schemes’, or ‘lines of attack’ were first classified and used as prompts to be memorised by orators developing their own arguments.135 Today, they are more likely to be used to classify and identify the subject matters of others’ arguments. Aristotle, Anaximenes, Cicero, Quintilian, and Vico all offer different accounts of the common places.136 Without necessarily claiming any superiority for it, this section will adapt a register developed by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrecths-Tyteca (1969) in The New Rhetoric to identify ten common subject matters for political arguments.137 These different kinds of argument will be illustrated with examples drawn from British politics, these examples serving also to indicate the salience of rhetoric within party competition. Because the register they develop is a lengthy one, it will take some time to present and illustrate it. The arguments introduced here will,
134
On the concept of path-dependency within economics see Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 93–8 and references therein.
135
See George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, pp. 100–2. The spatial metaphor is a pervasive one. Topics comes from ‘topoi’ meaning places.
136
See James Herrick, The History and Theory of Rhetoric; Corbett, Classical Rhetoric, pp. 539–78; Otto Bird, ‘The Tradition of Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 23 (1962), 307–23; Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, pp. 100–4.
137
It should be emphasised that Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca see themselves as providing an account of the common forms and types of argument, not simply of political argument. I adapt it by shortening Perelman and Olbrecht-Tytecha's register considerably.
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though, provide a basis for examining a number of New Labour's policies in Chapter 4. First, contradiction and incompatibility.138 Politicians can try to persuade audiences by pointing to contradictions and incompatibilities in the arguments, claims, and behaviour of their opponents. This is not simply a matter of logical inconsistency, of identifying gaps between the premises and conclusions of an opponents' argument. Rhetorical argument of this kind comes loaded with more aggressive charges of hypocrisy, deceit, and treachery, of contradictions between opponent's promises and actions, between their words and deeds. In January 1996 it was revealed that Harriet Harman and her partner had decided to send their son to a selective grammar school. Because David Blunkett had, at the Labour Party conference, only recently pledged ‘no selection, either by examination or by interview, under a Labour government’, the decision, although a personal one, left the party vulnerable to charges to hypocrisy.139 In the following Prime Minister's Question Time, John Major was asked a series of questions about the decision by Conservative MPs. His replies, although temperate in their language, were pointed. I believe that the view of most people in the country is that the honourable Member for Peckham [Ms. Harman] was right to exercise choice in favour of her own child. No one objects to that. What is wrong is that the Labour Party would deny those same choices to other parents throughout the country.140 Second, politicians can try to persuade audiences that their opponent's arguments and claims are ridiculous.141 In the nineteenth century, Bishop Whateley ridiculed arguments doubting the existence and possibility of miracles by applying the same set of pragmatic and scientifically-inspired tests to the life and achievements of Napoleon. Just as others had doubted whether one man, Jesus, could be responsible for so much, Whateley doubted whether one man could ever have conquered Europe, concluding that he must have been a figment of journalists' imaginations.142 Here, the atheists' arguments were not simply challenged but ridiculed. In a part of the speech immediately preceding that quoted below, Blair ridicules John Major's policy on Europe by mentioning various statements made by his Employment Secretary and Chancellor and by then asking whether he agrees with them.
138
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 195–205.
139
David Blunkett, Shadow Education Spokesman, quoted, Patrick Wintour, ‘Hattersley Loses Fight over Grant Schools’, Guardian, 5 October 1995.
140
John Major, House of Commons, 23 January 1996, Hansard, Col. 144.
141
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 205–10.
142
Bishop Richard Whateley, Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bunoparte (London: Hatchard & Son, 1819). For a discussion see Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1212.
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He ends that by speech making an initially unattributed remark about monetary union as not being a step in the ‘direction of a federal Europe’. Can the Prime Minister agree with that? I can; can he? Shall I tell the House the author of that statement? It was the Prime Minister. That is the position to which he has reduced the government. I find it odd that he cannot agree with his Chancellor, I find it strange that he cannot agree with his Secretary of State for Employment, and I find it unbelievable that he cannot agree with himself.143 Third, definitions.144 Because there is rarely, if ever, only one possible definition of an idea, value, policy, or object, politicians can gain advantage by developing and using particular definitions. This is a point that has already been made in Chapter 2. The terms left, right, and centre do not have fixed and unambiguous meanings. A party that wants to present itself as being at the political centre will promote a definition of that term and a corresponding account of its policies that best supports such a description. Politics throws up plenty of other examples of ways in which arguments can become arguments about definitions. In 1991, Peter Mandelson was credited with having almost single-handedly won a crucial by-election in Monmouth with an argument that hospitals seeking to acquire trust status as, at that time, the hospital in Monmouth was, were opting-out’ of the NHS. By defining trusts as a form of privatisation rather than, as the Conservatives preferred, a decentralisation of power, considerable advantage was gained.145 But what goes around comes around. Ten years later the Government unveiled plans to create ‘foundation’ hospitals freed, at least in part, from central control. Much to its intense irritation, critics defined the proposal as one which would lead to the break-up of the NHS and as being tantamount to privatisation.146 Fourth, politicians can seek to persuade an audience by ascribing either to themselves or their opponents the virtues or failings of one part of a group to the whole of that group, or of the whole of a group to one part of it.147 Such arguments are, at least in part, arguments about definitions. What will be thought of as a group will depend upon the way in which a group is defined. In his address to the 1999 Labour Party conference, Blair spoke of the ‘forces of Conservatism’ that ‘chain us not only to an outdated view of our people's potential but of our nation's potential’.148 Included in the forces
143
Blair, House of Commons, 1 March 1995, Hansard, Col. 1057.
144
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 210–14.
145
Donald Macintyre, Peter Mandelson and the Making of New Labour (London: Harper-Collins, 2000), pp. 250–2.
146
Frank Dobson, ‘Health is Now Blair's Second Front’, Guardian, 14 March 2003; Allyson Pollock, ‘Foundation Hospitals will Kill the NHS’, Guardian, 7 May 2003.
147
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 231–41.
148
Blair, Labour Party Speech, 28 September 1999. Full text available via www.guardian.co.uk/lab.99 .
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of Conservatism were not only the Conservative Party but also those who had voted against female suffrage, those who had imprisoned Nelson Mandela, and those who had assassinated Martin Luther King and murdered Stephen Lawrence. The whole, the forces of Conservatism, included within it a part, the Conservative Party, which, it was being implied, could be thought of as having the same attitudes and values. Fifth, comparisons.149 Politicians can try to persuade audiences by comparing either their own actions or record, or those of their opponents, to those of past, present, or possible future alternatives. Politicians often conjure up images, whether negative or positive, of entire governments with which their own record can be compared. Throughout the 1980s and also the 1990s, the Conservatives defended their own record in government by comparing it with that of the previous Labour administration; an administration defined in terms of the winter of discontent, the sacking of nurses, and borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Here, for example, is Major replying, in February 1995, to a question from Blair about a rise in mortgage rates: I have to say to the right honourable gentleman that he has a cheek to deny history in the way in which he just did. The level of interest rates that we have reached today is the level that was the lowest achieved at any stage under the previous Labour Government in five years of government. The average was far higher. They also had negative interest rates and were robbing savers of their savings by devaluing the currency. It is because of that sort of irresponsibility that no one will ever again trust the Labour Party to run the economy.150 Sixth, sacrifice.151 Politicians can try to persuade audiences of the merits of a particular course of action or the sincerity of their own motives with reference to the sacrifices that have been made by themselves or others in its pursuit. So politicians are likely to defend what they will present as their pursuit of world peace with reference to the sacrifice made by soldiers in previous generations. A government, taunted about a fall in its support in opinion polls, might well respond that it should be trusted and supported precisely because it has shown itself willing to make tough and unpopular decisions, because it has been willing to sacrifice its popularity. Here, and three years after leaving office, is Major's response to criticisms that he had broken promises he had made about taxation during the 1992 campaign.
149
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 242–7.
150
John Major, House of Commons, 2 February 1995, Hansard, Col. 1213. During the same month of Prime Minister's Questions, Major was led to draw comparisons with the record of the previous Labour administration on 9 February (Col. 454), 14 February (Cols. 793 and 795), 16 February (Col. 1127), 21 February (Col. 152), and 23 February (Col. 483).
151
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 248–55.
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I have said before and I repeat: we did put up taxes. We put up taxes in a recession to help protect individuals and our national accounts from the economic downturn…it was right. It was very painful. Conservative Governments do not like to put up taxes. They do not wish to. They did not intend to, but the social requirement of protecting people in that recession was necessary.152 Seventh, cause and effect.153 Politicians can try to persuade audiences by linking and explaining events using particular arguments about cause and effect. Working backwards from effect to cause, they might argue that some undesirable state is attributable entirely to their opponents' actions or that some desirable state is due to their policies. Working forwards from cause to effect, they might argue that their opponents' policy proposals will generate unemployment and misery and that their own policies will bring happiness to all. Such arguments are sometimes very general, and rest on and invoke differing conceptual models. Inspired by the doctrine of monetarism, the Conservatives started to argue in the late 1970s that inflation was caused by expansion in the money supply. At other times, arguments can be more specific. During the 1992 election campaign, the Conservatives, whilst claiming to have detected the first signs of economic recovery, acknowledged that the country had undergone a severe recession. Labour argued that this recession had been caused by John Major. The Conservatives argued that it was a world recession that had been caused by events outside of their control and that it was being prolonged by uncertainty about the election result and the fear of a Labour Government.154 Eighth, and in a variant of more general arguments about cause and effect, politicians can seek to explain and predict actions on the basis of underlying personality traits.155 Rather than presenting particular decisions as the result of particular constellations of pressures, politicians will instead argue that a decision or action reveals something more general and enduring about a person. In the case of a political friend, a previous act of bravery, honesty, or prudence will be presented as evidence of their likely future behaviour. The person who commits a brave act becomes a brave person who will be equally brave in the future. In the case of a political opponent, past mistakes and misdeeds will be argued to be effective guides to future behaviour. In this way personality becomes a crucial political resource, requiring, as we will see in Chapters 9 and 10, the careful construction of image. Citing his past
152
John Major, House of Commons, 13 December 2000, Hansard, Col. 688.
153
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 263–73.
154
This was an argument the Conservatives won. In April 1992, 48 % of those polled blamed the world recession for Britain's recession and only 4 % John Major's administration. See David Sanders, ‘Why the Conservatives Won — Again’, in Anthony King et al. (eds.), Britain at the Polls 1992 (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1992), p. 200.
155
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 293–304.
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membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and opposition to trade union reform and privatisation, the Conservatives argued, in the run-up to the 1997 general election, that Blair could not be trusted to be Prime Minister. In September 1994, Michael Heseltine asked, why should you believe a man who has got all the major judgements wrong in the first half of his life, when he tells you he is going to get them all right in the second half of his life?156 Ninth, authority.157 Politicians can try to persuade audiences by citing the judgements, opinions, and beliefs of other people and groups whose views are considered authoritative. When pressed to defend a policy or action, politicians will invoke either the support of others for it or even account for their decision to introduce it in terms of the support that policy received. The blessings of business leaders, international organisations like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations, pressure groups like the British Medical Association (BMA), assorted celebrities, and even, albeit occasionally, academics are sought out as offering authoritative backing for policies. Although it is a particularly risky strategy, politicians can also invoke their own authority, their own reputation for competence or honesty. In November 1997, New Labour was forced to admit that it had accepted a sizeable donation from an entrepreneur, Bernie Ecclestone, who had subsequently benefited from a decision not to ban cigarette advertising at Formula One races. Within a few days, Blair was interviewed on the BBC. Apologising for the way the issue had been handled, he nonetheless denied any impropriety, calling upon his own authority as evidence in his defence. I hope that people know me well enough and realise the type of person I am, to realise that I would never do anything either to harm the country or do anything improper. I never have. I think most people who have dealt with me think I’m a pretty straight sort of guy and I am…now I’m sorry about this issue. I should have realised that it was going to blow up into this type of importance before, but I honestly have done what I thought was best for the country.158 Finally, examples.159 In an attempt to persuade their audience of the virtues or dangers of a particular policy or course of action, politicians will pepper their arguments with examples and illustrations. A suggestion that a rival party is hopelessly divided will be illustrated with an example of some
156
Michael Heseltine, quoted, John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime Minister, pp. 251–2.
157
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 305–10.
158
Blair, Interview, On the Record, 16 November 1997. Full transcript available via www.bbc.uk/otr (follow the link to archives).
159
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 350–62.
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particularly public act of dissent. A claim that a policy will be a panacea for all problems will be escorted with an account of its successful implementation in another country. An assertion that the economy is recovering will be accompanied with a reference to a particular survey, investment decision, or economic statistic. The deployment and manipulation of examples is a staple of political argument. Arguments about the best way to define a subject, about the relationship between cause and effect, and about a person's underlying personality will all be accompanied with the use of examples.160
Rhetoric, Beliefs, and the Construction of the Centre Operating from within the rational choice paradigm, Downs develops a simple but powerful account of individual decision-making. Voters have complete and transitive preferences over policy options.161 These preferences are derived from voters' underlying desires, from their ‘fixed conceptions of the good society’.162 Preferences can be ‘ordered from left to right’.163 Voters calculate which party is closest to them in political space and vote for this party. So when asked to explain why a person voted for party A rather than party B we might say that they did so because they were ‘closer’ to A. But when asked to explain why they were closer to A we might say that they voted for A because A was committed to policy pX and because pX was most consistent with that voter's conception of the good society, cX. The argument here looks cut and dried but depends crucially upon the assumption of perfect information. Perfect information means that voters have no difficulty in relating their ‘conception of the good society to…[their] knowledge of party policies in a consistent manner’.164 That is, in conditions of perfect information, voters will know with absolute certainty which policies and thereby which party to favour given their conception of the good society. Yet the assumption of perfect information is, as I have already emphasised, one Downs distances himself from. Uncertainty is a pervasive and significant feature of political life. It not only creates a need for ideology. It makes persuasion possible. For in an uncertain world
160
Analogies offer a particular kind of example. An analogy is being drawn when a comparison or correspondence between two things is made on the basis of a third element they are said to share. So politicians argue that rail privatisation will be like a ‘poll tax on wheels’ or that failing to confront Saddam Hussein will be like appeasing Hitler.
161
For any given set of options (A, B, C), preferences are complete if an individual is capable of ranking each option against all other options and are transitive if the resulting ordering is consistent in such a way that if and then .
162
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 55.
163
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 115.
164
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 55.
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roads leading toward the good society are hard to distinguish from those leading away from it. Thus, even though voters have fixed goals, their views on how to approach those goals are malleable and can be altered by persuasion.165 Voters' desires, their underlying ‘conception of the good society’, may be fixed but parties can change voters' beliefs about how these desires can be best realised. There is no pre-given and fixed relationship between the conceptions of the good society voters have and the policies they will thereby support such that support for conception cX translates into and only into support for pX and party A, whilst support for conception cY translates into and only into support for pY and party B. By persuading voters to revise their beliefs about policies, parties can effect a change in voters' preferences between parties. That is, by persuading voters that pY rather than pX is most consistent with their conception cX, they can induce a voter to vote for party B rather than party A. The third part of the median voter theorem presented in Chapter 2 maintains that vote-maximising parties must move to an electoral centre, the location of which is determined by the distribution of voters' preferences. But if parties can persuade voters to change their beliefs about policy and so about their spatial position, parties can increase their electoral support without necessarily changing their policy. Downs suggests that vote-maximising requires parties to ‘formulate policies to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies’.166 Yet if
165
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 87. Emphasis added.
166
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 28.
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political parties are, together with interest groups and the media, ‘obviously’ persuaders, then this would imply that parties can also win elections by persuading voters to change their beliefs about their existing policies.167 I am not suggesting here that parties deploy rhetoric in order to change the distribution of preferences across political space.168 Voters, I have argued, prefer policies at the political centre. What parties can, however, change are voters' beliefs about which policies are at the political centre. There may be no alternative to the electoral centre but there are alternative political centres. Downs, however, draws back from any such conclusions. Having opened up the possibility of persuasion he rather meekly concludes that political parties are followers, as well as leaders, for they mould their policies to suit voters so as to gain as many votes as possible. Having done this, they attempt to lead all voters to believe their policies are best for them.169 Why? We have already seen how in an effort to make his argument appear more ‘plausible’, Downs reduces ‘all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue’, ownership.170 Figure 3.1 reproduces the relevant diagram from Chapter 2. Within this framework, space is bounded, finite, and both prearranged and fixed. The significance of rhetoric follows from the implausibility of assuming that political space is prearranged and fixed. We will run through this argument again. In Figure 3.1 policy options are laid out from 0 per cent private ownership on the left-hand edge of the horizontal scale to 100 per cent private ownership on the right. The sequencing of policy options is prearranged and fixed. Once the ends of the scale are fixed, we cannot, without violating established mathematical conventions, rearrange the policies in such a way that 20 per cent private ownership is to the right of 30 per cent private ownership. Downs is committed to the use of this example because it makes the assumption of calculative decision-making plausible and so predictions about behaviour possible. It is, however, an example within which there is no room for parties to persuade voters to change their beliefs. Why would the inclusion of rhetoric preclude calculative decision-making and prediction? In the immediate post-war era, social psychologists assumed that there were clear and enduring relationships between argument and persuasion which they could, with sufficient research, discover.171 Knowledge of these relationships would, it was thought, allow them, the psychologists, to predict when and where an argument would prove persuasive. Two psychologists looked forward to a world in which a person would be able to stipulate to the researcher the effects he desired, and the researcher, now a mere technician, would need only to work out the mathematics to stipulate in turn the requisite content that should be disseminated over specific media to specific people in order to achieve the desired effect.172 FIGURE 3.1 Left and Right and Ownership.
167
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 84.
168
In Patrick Dunleavy's ‘preference-shaping’ account, parties in power can shape the aggregate distribution of preferences through, for example, social engineering. By selling council houses and privatising industries, the government can shift the aggregate distribution of preferences. This is not the same argument. Through rhetoric, parties shift not the electoral centre but the political centre. Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
169
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 88.
170
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 116.
171
The following draws upon Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, pp. 81–111.
172
Joseph Klapper and Leo Lowenthal, ‘The Contributions of Opinion Research to the Evaluation of Psychological Warfare’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 15 (1951), 651–62.
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If such great expectations had been realised, Downs would have been in a position to both have his cake and eat it. That is, he could have pursued his insights about persuasion without having to sacrifice his predictive ambitions. But such hopes have been almost entirely dashed. Forty years of research and tens of thousands of experiments have resulted in ‘an accumulation of largely contradictory and inconsistent research findings with few (if any) generalisable principles of effective communication’.173 The problem here is not that there are no discernible relationships between argument and persuasion. In controlled experiments social psychologists have been able to show that there are enduring relationships between such variables as, for example, the content of an argument, the way it is ‘framed’, the manner of its delivery, the character and reputation of the person delivering an argument, and the attentiveness of the person listening to an argument and the persuasiveness of that argument.174 But social psychologists have been unable to identify any overarching relationships between these variables or general rules, allowing them to establish the significance of these variables in particular cases. The most social psychologists can say is that it ‘all depends on the situation’ and this qualification is not followed by an extensive list of situations, which definitively distinguishes those occasions when one sort of message is effective from those when it is not. Certainly, much of the social psychological research is devoted to discovering such situations in the hope of then formulating the general rule by which situations can be classified. However, attempts at formulating general rules about situations are themselves subject to the same qualifications as are the simpler messages.175 The problem here is not simply one which afflicts plodding social psychologists and other academics. Politicians and pressure group leaders can be no more certain about the persuasive effect of the arguments they deploy in particular circumstances. It is possible that this problem is an epistemological one. That is, it is possible that there are such overarching relationships and general rules but that they have not yet been discovered. In this case it is possible that more appointments and experiments will be enough to overcome the problem and provide politicians and pressure groups with exceptionless laws of persuasion and clear-cut rules about how to apply them. But given the number of appointments and experiments that have already been made it is perhaps more likely that the problem is an ontological one. That is, it is possible that the relationship between argument
173
Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, ‘Acceptance, Yielding and Impact: Cognitive Processes in Persuasion’, in Richard Petty et al. (eds.), Cognitive Responses in Persuasion (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), p. 340.
174
For an overview of such research see Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor, Social Cognition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), pp. 462–509.
175
Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, p. 101.
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and persuasion is inherently ‘complex’: that there are no such relationships or rules that can be used to comprehend the relationship between argument and persuasion.176 Voters do not have perfect information. For this reason parties have an incentive to develop shorthand summaries of their policies. The spatial metaphor presents parties with one possible form of shorthand. Parties that want to present themselves as being at the political centre will present their policies as being centrist. Policies are not inherently rightwing, left-wing, or centrist. They are constructed as being right-wing, left-wing, or centrist. Voters' beliefs about policies can be changed. It is through rhetoric that parties can attempt to tie particular policies to particular spatial locations in voters' minds. Parties will try to persuade voters that their policies are politically centrist by presenting them as moderate. A claim that a policy is moderate because it is a balanced compromise will be accompanied with reference to the favourable and authoritative judgement of a respected political commentator or pressure group leader. A claim that a policy is moderate because it is one that will preserve the status quo will be accompanied with a particular definition of both the policy and the status quo. A claim that a policy is moderate because it is one that will promote shared values will be underpinned by a particular account of the likely causal effects of the policy. A claim that a policy is moderate because it is one that has widespread backing will be accompanied with examples of other parties and pressure groups who support the policy and with examples of other countries in which the policy has been implemented. Political position is not only constructed. It is contested. Parties not only argue that their own policies are politically moderate. They argue that their opponents' policies are politically extreme. An opponent who claims that one of their policies is politically moderate will have thrown back at them earlier speeches or statements in which they or one of their colleagues appeared to argue the opposite. An opponent who claims that one of their policies is politically moderate will find their policy being unfavourably compared with their past policy positions. An opponent who claims that one of their policies is politically moderate will find their argument ridiculed, their past misjudgements and inconsistencies being called in evidence against them. Political arguments about position are endless. There does not come a time during a campaign when one party throws up its hands and agrees, after all, that its policies are ‘really’ left-wing. Every argument can always be met with a
176
On the concept of complexity see Michael Scriven, ‘Complexity and Social Scientific Laws’ reproduced in Michael Martin and Lee McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). For a critical application to rational choice theory see Colin Hay, ‘Theory, Stylized Heuristic, or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: The Status of Rational Choice in Public Administration', Public Administration, 82 (2004), pp. 39–62.
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counter-argument and every counter-argument with a countering counter-argument and so on.177 Yet some parties are more successful than others in persuading voters to believe one thing of a policy rather than another. Some policies are believed to be at the political centre and others are not. To understand why one policy and, by extension, the party espousing that policy is believed to be at the political centre, it is not enough to describe that policy or party as simply being centrist. Policies are not intrinsically centrist. It is necessary to look at the way in which the policy has been rhetorically constructed as centrist.178
The Limits of Construction Beliefs about which policies are at the political centre are not fixed. Because beliefs about the location of policies within political space are not fixed, beliefs about the spatial location of parties are not fixed. But this should not be taken to mean, as the previous section might also be taken to imply, that beliefs are entirely plastic, that politicians can persuade anyone of anything; that any policy or party can be persuasively argued to be at the political centre. Practitioners have sometimes claimed such powers for rhetoric. Protagoras is recorded as having boasted of his ability to ‘make the worse case appear the better’.179 Gorgias, who declared that he could persuade anyone of anything, maintained that he had persuaded the Athenians to build a statue in his honour at Delphi, an honour usually reserved only for those born Athenian citizens.180 In the Gorgias, Plato has his hapless rhetorician, Callicles, present rhetoric as conferring upon those who learn its art ‘the power of ruling [their] fellow countrymen’.181 Yet such claims—
177
The claim that every argument can be met with a counter-argument and that rhetoric is endless is usually associated with the Sophist Protagoras. ‘Diogenes Laertius and Clement of Alexander refer to [Protagoras] in similar terms: ‘Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other’ and ‘the Greeks claim, following Protagoras, that for every speech there is one that is opposed to it’. Jacqueline De Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 75–6.
178
I have so far followed Downs in assuming that political space is one-dimensional. The argument that position is rhetorically constructed in no way depends upon this assumption. Imagine that there is, in addition to left and right, a second dimension of libertarianism versus authoritarianism. More will be said in Chapters 7 and 8 about how such dimensions are defined and distinguished and how they might be constructed by parties. For the moment though we will simply assume that the dimension is a given one. A party's overall position on this second dimension will be a function of the ‘particular policies it upholds’. Yet the position of policies along this dimension will not be fixed and unambiguous. Whether a policy is believed to be libertarian, authoritarian, or centrist will depend upon the way in which it is rhetorically presented and defended.
179
Cited, De Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 33.
180
Herrick, History and Theory of Rhetoric, p. 18.
181
Plato, Gorgias (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960), p. 452.
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which, as teachers dependent upon their students’ fees, the Sophists had good reason to make—seem exaggerated. Politicians might successfully persuade many of us that some particular policy is at the moderate political centre but this does not mean that they will be able to persuade us that any policy is at the centre. In the run-up to the second Gulf War, New Labour invested huge amounts of time, effort, and political capital in the effort to persuade voters that its policy was, in the absence of formal United Nations approval, nevertheless a moderate and reasonable one. Yet so flimsy was the evidence for the existence of weapons of mass destruction and so intense the opposition of, amongst others, Germany and France, that, even on the eve of the war itself, the policy was still regarded by many if not most voters as an extreme one.182 Downs uses the ownership example to suggest that the location of policies within political space is prearranged and fixed. The argument in the previous section may have implied that because policy is disarranged and variable that any policy and any party can be constructed as centrist. What is needed here is a middleground in which beliefs are neither fixed nor entirely plastic. In this section such a middle-ground will be sought in Aristotle's discussion of the nature of enthymemes and his argument that audiences determine the ‘end and object’ of speeches.183 A syllogism is a sequence of three propositions such that the first two entail the third, the conclusion. A categorical syllogism contains three terms: the major term, which is the predicate of the conclusion; the minor term, the subject of the conclusion; and the middle term which appears in both premises but not the conclusion. ‘All men are mortal, Socrates is a man: therefore Socrates is mortal.’ Here, the conclusion, that Socrates is mortal, is valid because it follows logically from the stated premises. If these premises are true then the conclusion will also be true.184 This is the syllogism of ‘strict logic’.185 Rhetoric is, however, a subject dealing not with what is certain but with what is probable or, rather, with what ‘seems probable to men of a given type’.186 Premises in rhetorical arguments will not be clear facts but what is believed to be ‘usually true’.187 Arguments using premises that are only
182
George Jones, ‘Polls Shows Most Britons Still Against’, Daily Telegraph, 13 February, 2003; Alan Travis, ‘Support for Attack Jumps but Opposition Still in Majority’, Guardian, 18 March 2003.
183
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1358a. On the importance of the audience see Herrick, History and Theory of Rhetoric, pp. 10–12.
184
If the premises are not true then the conclusion will be valid but false. All men are made of cabbage, Socrates is a man: therefore Socrates is made of cabbage is valid but not true.
185
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1354a.
186
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1356b.
187
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric. See Edward Madden, ‘Aristotle's Treatment of Probability and Signs’, Philosophy of Science, 24 (1957), 167–72; Mary Nichols, ‘Aristotle's Defence of Politics’, Journal of Politics, 19 (1987), 657–77; Barbara Warrick, ‘Judgement, Probability and Aristotle's Rhetoric’, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89 (1989), 299–311.
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usually true generate conclusions that are also only usually true. When they take the same deductive form as a syllogism, such arguments are called enthymemes and Aristotle suggests that they are the ‘substance of rhetorical persuasion’.188 George Kennedy offers the following example, ‘Good men do not commit murder, Socrates is a good man: therefore Socrates did not commit murder.’189 This argument appears persuasive because the premises underpinning it appear reasonable ones. Yet the conclusion is nonetheless a ‘contingent’ one.190 Good men sometimes do commit murder. So even if Socrates is a good man, he may have committed murder. Having outlined their basic structure, Aristotle suggests that enthymemes ‘consist of only a few propositions’ because ‘if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself ’.191 The following example is offered: Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say ‘for he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘and in the Olympic games the prize is a crown,’ a fact which everybody knows.192 Or, as Kennedy restates his own example, the orator will argue that ‘it is inconceivable that Socrates who is a good man, could have committed this murder’, the underlying premise, that good men do not commit murder, being left implied.193 The speaker does not formally lay down premises in an enthymeme but allows the audience to supply them.194 As put in rather meandering fashion by Roland Barthes, the enthymeme has the pleasure of progress, of a journey: one sets out from a point which has no need to be proved and from there one proceeds toward another point which does not need to be proved; one has the agreeable feeling of discovering something new by a kind of natural contagion, of capillarity which extends the known (the opinable) toward the unknown. However, to produce all its pleasure, this progress must be supervised. The enthymeme is not a syllogism truncated by defect or corruption, but because the listener must be granted the pleasure of contributing to the construction of the argument; it is something like the pleasure of completing a given pattern or grid.195 The ability of an audience to understand an argument and the likelihood that it will find that argument persuasive will depend upon its knowledge of and
188
Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 97.
189
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1357a.
190
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1357a.
191
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1357a.
192
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1357a.
193
Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 97.
194
Lloyd Bitzer, ‘Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited’, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 45 (1959), 399–408.
195
Roland Barthes, The Old Rhetoric: An Aide-Memoire (New York: Hill, 1988), p. 125.
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agreement with these underlying and unstated premises. If an audience does not understand what premise an argument is being based on, the argument will seem incomprehensible. A reader who is used to Olympians being awarded with a gold medal and a urine test may, for example, struggle, at least for a moment, to follow Aristotle's example. If an audience understands but does not agree with the premise being used, the argument will be unpersuasive. Returning to Kennedy's example, a person who has, for example, lived through a brutal civil war and seen friends and neighbours commit horrible crimes might not agree with the premise that good men do not commit murder. They might not therefore agree with the argument that Socrates could not have committed murder because he is a good man. What audiences will find persuasive will depend at least in part upon what that audience already believes. The ‘social knowledge’ an audience possesses, the ‘mosaic of commonplaces, conventions, and provisional interests’ it shares, will create limits to the kind of arguments it can be persuaded to believe.196 To further illustrate the nature of enthymemes we can return to some of the argumentative schemes previously outlined. Take, for example, the tenth category of authority. Politicians sometimes persuade audiences by invoking either their own authority or the authority of others. Yet, in any particular audience of ‘men of a particular type’, there will be an existing set of beliefs about whose judgements and opinions are to be considered authoritative.197 An argument that a particular policy should be supported because it is favoured by a leading businessman is likely to be considered more persuasive at a Confederation of British Industries (CBI) conference than at a Trades Union Congress (TUC) one. What an audience can be persuaded to believe will depend upon what it already believes. As another example consider the ninth category, that of personality. A politician may seek to persuade an audience that a rival will behave in some way in the future because they have behaved in the same way in the past. Whether such an argument is considered persuasive will depend upon the beliefs a particular audience has about the possibility of drawing inferences from particular circumstances. If it is the argument that a politician will be a left-wing prime minister because he/she was a left-wing junior opposition spokesman, the argument will be unpersuasive if the audience believes that junior spokesmen have no alternative but to accede to the established party line. Finally, consider the second category, that of ridicule. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define it,
196
Thomas Farrell, ‘Aristotle's Enthymeme as Tacit Reference’, in Alan Gross and Arthur Walzer (eds.), Rereading Aristotle's Rhetoric (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), p. 99.
197
Perelman and Olbrecths-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 208.
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a ‘statement is ridiculous as soon as it conflicts, without justification, with an accepted opinion’.198 Yet different audiences will have very different ideas about what is to be accepted as an accepted opinion. An argument that a particular policy is ridiculous because it will, when pursued to its logical conclusion, result in the privatisation of health care will not appear ridiculous to someone who supports private health care. An argument that a policy is ridiculous because it is racist may itself appear ridiculous to a racist audience. If politicians are to persuade an audience of one controversial claim they must call upon other shared beliefs. If they are to change their audiences' beliefs, politicians must find common ‘starting-points’ from which they can proceed.199 Politicians who start a speech with a blanket denunciation of their audience and of its audience's beliefs will be unpersuasive. When Gorgias wished to reproach the Athenians for their warlike attitude he did not simply denounce their military campaigns. Instead he praised Athenian victory over the Medes, thereby implying that only victories over foreigners deserved praise ‘whilst victories over Greeks call for dirges’.200 When, in the sixteenth century, entrepreneurs wished to secure legitimacy for a set of economic activities then frowned upon by religious authorities, they did not reject the claims of religion itself. They instead suggested that the ordinary criteria for applying the strongly commendatory term religious could be found in their actions, that they were, essentially, acts of piety.201 When, several hundred years later, Blair sought to persuade those in the party he had just been elected to lead that Labour needed to change, he did not do so by arguing, in public at least, that the party needed to be entirely reconstituted. He instead suggested that Labour's traditional values of community, opportunity, responsibility, and equal worth needed to be placed in a ‘modern setting’.202 Rhetoric is path-dependent. The beliefs an audience has today are not necessarily those it will have tomorrow. Beliefs can be changed and can be changed through rhetoric. The beliefs an audience has tomorrow will however be affected by those it has today, because the beliefs it has today will partly determine which arguments it finds persuasive. Beliefs are not entirely plastic. Politicians, however rhetorically skilled, will be unable to persuade an audience to believe anything they want it to believe. To change some of an audience's beliefs, it will be necessary to call upon others, to find common ‘starting-points’.
198
Perelman and Olbrecths-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 66.
199
Perelman and Olbrecths-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 66.
200
Cited, Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, p. 225.
201
Quentin Skinner, ‘Language and Social Change’ in James Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
202
Michael White, ‘Blair and Schröder Share a Vision’, Guardian, 9 June 1999.
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It is in precisely such terms that Plato attacks rhetoric. Alarmed by the importance of oratory within Athenian democracy and stung by the success of the Sophists as teachers, rhetoric is ridiculed as being the equivalent of cookery and cosmetics.203 For, rhetoric, like these skills, consists of learning routines and acquiring the knack of guessing correctly what it is that a person wants and then giving it to them. Rhetoric involves persuasion but the persuasion involved is superficial and limited. It often means no more than persuading people to give in to desires they already have. If they are to persuade an audience of anything, the rhetorician cannot stray too far from the beliefs and desires their audience already has. Plato has Socrates respond to Callicles' intemperate claims about the power of rhetoric cited at the start of this section in the following way: Wherever the occasion arises that for all your cleverness you are unable to contradict any assertion made by the object of your love [democracy], but shift your ground this way and that. This happens in the assembly; if the Athenian democracy denies any statement made by you in a speech, you change your policy in deference to its wishes.204 When it rests upon rhetoric, politics is a servile and menial art, its practitioners petty traders who must always give the customer what they want. For Plato, this is profoundly wrong. Responsible citizens and politicians should not pander to their audience but like doctors seek to improve them. Rhetoric is culpable because it teaches nothing about justice and because it results in persuasion without knowledge. Whether or not we accept Plato's underlying arguments about the purpose of politics, we are now left with a very different view of rhetoric. If a party is to persuade the electorate that its policies are at the political centre, it must use comparisons, definitions, examples, authorities, and arguments about cause and effect, sacrifice, ridicule, and contradiction that will be recognised and considered plausible. Rhetorically skilled politicians can persuade an audience to change some of their beliefs. But they cannot persuade everyone of anything.
Conclusion In the third section of Chapter 1, it was argued that seeing the political centre as constructed makes four differences to the way in which party competition should be understood. These can now be briefly reviewed as they offer a way
203
Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, p. 86.
204
Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.
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of summarising the argument in this chapter. (1) Policy and position. Possession of the political centre is not simply a matter of adopting particular policies. The location of policies within political space is not prearranged and fixed. Whether a policy is thought to be on the left or right, whether it is thought to be moderate or extreme, is a matter of belief. Voters' beliefs are rhetorically constructed and can be reconstructed. A change in policy does not necessarily entail a change in position and a change in position does not necessarily require a change in policy. Position is constructed. Parties must attempt to persuade voters that the policies they are committed to are at the political centre. There are limits to the possibilities of such construction. But persuasion is possible. (2) Creativity. If they are successfully to persuade an audience that some policy is at the political centre, politicians must identify common starting points with their audience and discover which kinds of arguments that audience will find most persuasive. Rhetoric is not simply a matter of calculation. It may be that ‘common places’ or ‘lines of attack’ can be memorised and students taught about the circumstances in which particular kinds of argument are likely to be most effective. It may be that politicians can be coached on how to change their tone during a speech or to read naturally from an autocue. But rhetoric is not simply a matter of calculation. Rhetoric also requires imagination, flexibility, and openness. All politicians have the ability to argue. The ability is not however equally distributed. It is through the discovery of new and persuasive arguments some politicians excel. (3) Spin. The argument here is perhaps the most obvious. Policy does not simply happen. It is presented. Beliefs about spatial position do not simply appear. They are argued over. News management and spinning are not activities discovered and practised by a handful of professional party functionaries since the appointment of Peter Mandelson in 1985 being an example. All politicians are and always have been spin-doctors. There is nothing beneath this spin. Whatever the temptations of the analogy, political arguments are not like boxing matches, for boxing matches can be ended by a referee stepping in and declaring one side the winner by a technical knockout. At various points commentators will pronounce one party to have the better arguments, one party to be at the political centre. But such pronouncements themselves become part of the rhetorical process. In order to persuade voters that they are at the centre, one party will cite the authority of that commentator. Another will then ridicule that judgement with reference to past claims the same commentator has made. Rhetorical argument and spin is endless. Every argument can always be met with a counter-argument and every counter-argument with a countering counter-argument and so on. (4) Choice. Voters' beliefs about the spatial position of policies are constructed and can be reconstructed. Because a party's overall position is a ‘weighted average of all the particular policies [the party] upholds’, overall spatial position is not
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fixed.205 A party that wishes to position itself at the political centre is not constrained to adopt any one particular set of policies. No one set of policies is at the political centre. Rhetoric brings with it choice. There may be no alternative to the centre but there are alternative centres.
205
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 132.
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4 Rhetoric, New Labour, and the Constructionof the Centre Introduction Policies and parties are not inherently centrist. They are constructed as being such. A party that wants to present itself as being at the political centre will promote a definition of that term and a corresponding account of its policies that best supports such a description. Rhetoric offers parties one way in which they can tie policies to spatial positions. New Labour has positioned itself at the political centre by presenting its policies as politically moderate. This, as we will see, has meant presenting its policies either as balanced compromises, part of the political mainstream, reasonable and pragmatic, or as being consistent with the status quo. Labour's move towards the electoral centre following first Neil Kinnock's election in 1983 and then Tony Blair's election in 1994 can be described in terms of a list of policy changes. Indeed if we follow the median voter theorem in treating spatial position as a function of policy and in regarding the position of policies within political space as being prearranged and fixed, there is no other way of describing it. So, on this account, the story of Labour's move to the right becomes the story of how, on ownership, Labour went from promising to take a ‘significant public stake in electronics, pharmaceuticals, health equipment…building materials’ and ‘other industries’ in 1983, to acknowledging that ‘the market is potentially a powerful force for good’ in 1986, to touting the possibility of privatising Air Traffic Control during the 1997 campaign.206 It is the story of how, on the issue of industrial relations, Labour went from promising to repeal all Conservative legislation in 1983, to accepting the principle of ballots before strikes and for leadership elections by 1987, to assuring voters of a ‘fair framework of
206
The first quotation is taken from Labour's 1983 Manifesto, The New Hope for Britain. The second is taken from Neil Kinnock, Making Our Way (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 42. The full text of the manifestos cited in this chapter are available via www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area.uk/man.htm .
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law…but no return to the trade union legislation of the 1970s’ in 1992.207 It is the story of how, on the issue of defence, Labour went from a commitment to end ‘the nuclear pretence’ in 1987, to abandoning unilateralism at its 1989 conference.208 It is the story of how, on the issue of education, Labour went from the promise to end all selection in all schools in 1983, to the more limited promise to phase out grammar schools in 1992, to the wafer-thin promise to offer parents the possibility of a ballot on the future of grammar schools in 1997. It is the story of how, on the issue of taxation, Labour went from promising to increase income tax by two pence in 1987, to the unqualified and absolute promise to leave income tax untouched in 1997. Yet one implication of the argument developed in Chapters 2 and 3 is that position is not simply a function of policy. The relationship between policy and position is not such that parties can move to the political centre by committing themselves to particular policies. To understand why one policy and, by extension, the party committed to that policy is believed to be at the political centre, it is not enough to describe that policy as centrist, or to contrast it with policies that are believed to be left-wing. It is necessary to look at the way in which the policy has been rhetorically constructed. In this chapter, New Labour's efforts to rhetorically construct the political centre are examined through its policies on devolution, the minimum wage, trade union recognition, and the tax rises contained in the 2002 budget. The choice of examples is significant. In the run-up to and in the aftermath of the 1997 election, the Conservatives argued that ‘New’ Labour was an exercise in slick marketing and clever spin. Labour had not really changed. It remained a left-wing party because it remained committed to left-wing policies. New Labour was practising a form of ‘karaoke Conservatism: signalling right whilst turning left’.209 During this time, devolution, the minimum wage, and trade union recognition were singled out for attention because these were all policies that Old Labour had also committed itself to. Devolution and the minimum wage had, after all, featured in Labour's 1983, 1987, and 1992 manifestos.210 Trade union recognition was identified as a policy priority in both 1987 and 1992. Tax rises of the sort unveiled in April 2002 had featured prominently in and been blamed for the 1987 and 1992 election losses.211 As we
207
It's Time to Get Britain Working Again, 1992 Labour Party Manifesto.
208
Britain Will Win With Labour, 1987 Labour Party Manifesto.
209
Peter Lilley, Conservative Party Deputy Leader, quoted, Roland Watson, ‘Lilley Stakes Claim to the Centre Ground’, The Times, 10 October 1998.
210
In 1983 Labour promised only to ‘discuss with the TUC the possibility’ of introducing a minimum wage. The New Hope for Britain, 1983 Labour Party manifesto.
211
In 1992 only 30% of voters thought that they would be better off with Labour's tax proposals. 49% thought they would be worse off. Of this latter group three-quarters voted Conservative. David Sanders, ‘Why the Conservatives Won—Again’, in Anthony King et al., (eds.), Britain at the Polls 1992 (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1992), pp. 206–7.
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will see, New Labour did not leave these policies untouched. Devolution was only to be pursued after it had been approved in referenda. The minimum wage was set at a lower level than had been envisaged in 1992 and small firms were exempted from the legislation on trade union recognition. Yet there is more to this story than incremental policy adjustments. For, the position of policies within political space is not prearranged and fixed. Polices are not ‘really’ leftwing because policies are not ‘really’ anything. The belief that some policies are left-wing and others centrist is constructed, and can be rhetorically reconstructed. New Labour's leadership used definitions, comparisons, ridicule, authority, and arguments about cause and effect, contradiction, and sacrifice in an effort to persuade voters that its policies were at the moderate political centre.
Devolution During the final few days of the 1992 election and to the apparent protest of his advisers and colleagues, John Major focused the Conservative campaign on Labour's devolution plans. At a rally in Scotland he told his audience that ‘if I could summon up all the authority of this office I would put it into this single warning. The United Kingdom is in danger’.212 Devolution was an extreme policy that would lead to the break-up of the country. With Labour's commitment to devolution if anything increasing following John Smith's election as leader, it was no surprise that Conservative MPs returned time and again to this same argument in the following years. Believing this to be an issue on which their opponents were vulnerable, the Conservatives assailed Labour's ‘constitutional meddling’ and proposals for a ‘tartan tax’. Tony Blair, who was, it has always been claimed, personally unenthusiastic about devolution, responded in June 1996.213 To the surprise of most in his party, he announced that a future Labour Government would hold pre-legislative referenda on the creation of a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly and that Scottish voters would also be asked about giving their Parliament limited tax-raising powers. This shift prompted the immediate resignation of one of Labour's frontbench spokesmen and was interpreted and denounced as a softening in the party's commitment to devolution and a sop to the voters of Middle England.214 Michael Heseltine spoke of a ‘policy sell-out’ that had taken place ‘at the first whiff of anxiety in Middle
212
John Major, The Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 303.
213
On Blair's personal attitude toward devolution see John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime Minister, (London: Little, Brown & Company, 2001), p. 287.
214
Joanne Robertson, ‘Labour's Tartan Retreat’, Sunday Times, 30 June 1996; Patrick Wintour, ‘One Eye on Middle England’, Observer, 30 June 1996.
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England’.215 New Labour responded by arguing that the change was one of tactics rather than policy. Referenda, it argued, would make it harder for the Conservatives to oppose devolution legislation and, in the longer term, to abolish the Parliament and Assembly if re-elected.216 It is difficult now not to have some sympathy with this argument. New Labour vigorously campaigned for a ‘yes–yes’ vote in the referenda eventually held in September 1997. The Conservatives did not then seek to derail devolution as it passed through the House of Lords and had apparently reconciled themselves to the existence of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly by the time of the 2001 election. Yet the focus on policy and changes in policy is too narrow. In the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the 1997 election, New Labour also sought to reconcile the voters of Middle England to devolution by presenting and defending it as a moderate, politically centrist policy. New Labour sought to construct devolution as moderate policy by defining it in such a way that the policy implied only the slightest of departures from the status quo. Blair, for example, often spoke of ‘decentralisation’ rather than devolution, a term Conservative administrations had used to describe their policies on health, education, and local government.217 Arguing that ‘decentralisation is right and proper’, Blair could, on this basis, argue that there was a contradiction between the Conservative's ‘saying yes to subsidiarity in Europe but no to it in the United Kingdom’.218 In the aftermath of the 1997 election New Labour's Secretary of State for Scotland and future First Minister, Donald Dewar, spoke of devolution as being a policy that would ‘forever’ change the face of Scottish politics and result in an ‘unprecedented’ transfer of power.219 When Blair spoke about the same policy before the 1997 election he referred to the far more humble-sounding creation of a ‘subsidiary’ body which would ‘exercise certain functions in one part of the United Kingdom’.220 At one point he even appeared to define devolution by way of a comparison between the powers of a future Scottish Parliament and those of a parish council.221 Above all,
215
Michael Heseltine, quoted, Jon Hibbs and Robert Shrimsley, ‘Devolution Backlash Hits Blair’, Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1996.
216
Tony Blair, ‘Tomorrow's Socialism’, Guardian, 19 September 1996.
217
New Labour's 1997 manifesto spoke of meeting ‘the demand for decentralisation in Scotland and Wales’. New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better, 1997 Labour Party Manifesto.
218
Blair, House of Commons, 20 February 1997, Hansard, Col. 1069.
219
Donald Dewar, Secretary of State for Scotland, House of Commons, 12 January 1998, Hansard, Col. 21.
220
Blair, speech, ‘Devolution’, 28 June 1996, reproduced in Tony Blair, New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country (London: Fourth Estate, 1996), p. 270.
221
George Jones, John Hibbs, and Rachel Sylvester, ‘Blair in Tartan Tax Storm’, Daily Telegraph, 5 April 1997.
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devolution was defined in such a way that it carried no implications for the sovereignty of Westminster: By devolving power, Parliament will be deciding that some parts of the United Kingdom should be governed in a distinct manner. The sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament will of course remain undiminished.222 The ‘of course’ here is precisely what was disputed. The Conservatives argued that devolution would diminish the sovereignty of Parliament. New Labour, seeking to position its policy at the political centre, defined it otherwise. The Conservatives also argued that devolution was an extreme policy that would destroy the status quo of the Union. Devolution was a slippery slope and would ‘split this country more irrevocably and fundamentally than all Hitler's armies could possibly have done’.223 New Labour argued that this was simply to misjudge the likely causal effects of its policy. Devolution would preserve the status quo. Indeed it would, if anything, strengthen it by undercutting support for separatist parties. Conservative policy would have exactly the opposite effect from that intended. It would breed greater resentment and political alienation and so increase support for the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. Devolution was the only policy that would preserve the status quo. Invoking his own authority, as well as a particular account of cause and effect, Blair pleaded: let me be absolutely clear about one thing. I would never agree to anything which threatened to break-up the United Kingdom. I believe in the United Kingdom. Scotland is a vital part of it in every way—economically, socially, politically, historically. To us, devolution is essential if the unity of Britain is to be maintained and strengthened. The real threat to the Union comes from a government that will not face up to the clearly stated desires of the people of Scotland.224 New Labour also sought to tie devolution to the status quo by comparing its own policy to that of past administrations. Whatever the Conservatives' rhetoric, devolution was not a threat to a thousand years of constitutional stability. For successive governments, Labour and Conservative, had already devolved to the Scottish and Welsh Offices the powers New Labour was suggesting should be exercised by the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. Devolution would mean placing the ‘substantial and extensive powers at present exercised’ by two Secretaries of State under ‘democratic control’.225 But the principle of devolving power, of recognising the economic and cultural distinctiveness of Scotland and Wales, was far from revolutionary.
222
Blair, ‘Devolution’, p. 274.
223
Dame Jill Knight, House of Commons, 11 May 1995, Hansard, Col. 880.
224
Blair, speech, ‘The New Nation–State’, 30 November 1995, reproduced in Blair, New Britain, p. 261.
225
Dewar, House of Commons, 21 May 1997, Hansard, Col. 716.
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The Secretary of State for Wales, Ron Davies, defended devolution in such terms: What we can do is to look back, we can look back at the way since 1964 that powers have accrued to the Welsh Office. We can certainly do that, and it is interesting you know that the governments of both political persuasions, Labour and Conservative, have allowed this process of devolution to continue. The last Conservative government put new policies into the Welsh Office, albeit under the control of the honourable member for Reading and for Richmond in Yorkshire. But they allowed this process of devolution to go forward.226 New Labour also sought to construct devolution as a moderate policy at the political centre by presenting it as a part of the political mainstream. One strand of this argument rested on comparisons between Britain and other countries that had successfully devolved power; In Europe, too, more and more countries have gone down the road of devolving power—not just Germany but traditionally centralised countries like France and Italy. In Spain, a successful system of devolution has been in operation since the late seventies. Only in Britain does it seem that the government argues change is impossible.227 The comparison here was not just with other countries that had devolved power but with countries that had previously had centralised systems of government. If all these countries could devolve power without threatening the integrity of the state how could the Conservatives reasonably argue that devolution was an extreme policy? At other times, rhetorical examples were drawn closer to home. Confronted with the argument that devolution was alien to the British political system, Blair observed that, until the imposition of direct rule in 1972, power had been devolved to the Stormont Parliament without this resulting in the fracturing of the Union.228 Devolution had precedents. As the peace process rolled forward, this argument developed a new relevance. Blair was now able to ask why, as part of an overall peace settlement, the Conservatives were prepared to devolve power to a new legislature in Northern Ireland but not to Scotland and Wales.229 Devolution was also tied to the political mainstream through an argument that there was, in Scotland at least, a broad consensus already in favour of it. Of great assistance here was the Scottish Constitutional Convention. Created on a cross-party basis in the aftermath of the 1987 general election, the Convention met for the first time in March 1989. Its work, which culminated in the
226
Ron Davies, Secretary of State for Wales, interview, On the Record, 29 June 1997. Full transcript available via www.bbc.uk/otr (follow the link to archives).
227
Blair, ‘Devolution’, New Britain, p. 272.
228
Blair, ‘Political Sense’, Guardian, 9 September 1996.
229
Blair, House of Commons, 20 February 1997, Hansard, Col. 1071.
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publication of a report containing detailed proposals for the creation of a Scottish Parliament, attracted support from a range of parties and civic organisations. This support gave New Labour the opportunity to present devolution as entirely uncontroversial: What the Labour Party, the Liberal Party and many other non-party forces in Scotland—like the trade unions, many of the churches—a whole range of public opinion in Scotland has come together to make a very reasonable proposal for a sensible improvement in the government of Scotland. The real danger of fuelling the fires of separatism is if Government in London continues to say no: we are not going to listen to that sensible requirement.230 The Convention at times posed problems for New Labour. Opponents challenged the decision to hold pre-legislative referenda with reference to the Convention's earlier agreement that devolution was the ‘settled will of the Scottish people’.231 The Convention nonetheless offered, in the longer-term, an authoritative shield: a seal of moderation. Devolution was, finally, tied to the mainstream by way of a comparison with past Conservative policy. Here New Labour cited the authority of the Conservatives' own past arguments. For, as New Labour never tired of observing, critics like Ian Lang and Malcom Rifkind had once been in favour of devolution. Attacked during PMQT for supporting a policy that would lead to greater ‘centralisation’, Blair ridiculed the Conservatives by observing that their 1974 manifesto said that ‘devolution is our policy’ and that it was the opposite of centralism. It said that it would free Scotland from the rigours of centralisation and went on to say that it was the opposite of centralism. If it was right in 1974, surely after this passage of time it is right now?232 Finally, and perhaps most obviously, New Labour sought to construct devolution as a moderate policy at the political centre by presenting it as a balanced compromise between the unpalatable extremes of independence and constitutional inertia. For Ron Davies, devolution represented a middle way, but there's nothing wrong with a middle way if you know the extremes on either side are unworkable, and the extremes we are being offered are between… continual rule by John Redwood or whoever, or, on the other hand, complete independence and what we’ve managed to do is construct a very balanced set of proposals.233
230
Robin Cook, Shadow Foreign Secretary, interview, On the Record, 9 March 1997.
231
Edward Clouston, ‘Blair Accused of Devolution Fix’, Guardian, 21 September 1996.
232
Blair, House of Commons, 12 January 1995, Hansard, Col. 275.
233
Davies, interview, On the Record, 29 January 1997.
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The Minimum Wage During the 1992 election, Labour campaigned for a national minimum wage set at half of male median earnings, then calculated as being £3.40 an hour. The Conservatives argued that this would dramatically increase employment costs and result in anywhere between one and two million job losses. Labour was a left-wing party that was committed to a left-wing extremist policy that businesses opposed. Only a few weeks after acquiring the leadership, it was rumoured that Blair was going to abandon the minimum wage. Instead, and at the 1994 Labour Party conference, he announced that whilst a future Labour Government would indeed introduce a minimum wage he would not commit himself in advance to any particular hourly rate for it or formula for calculating such a rate.234 A policy paper subsequently issued in May 1995 suggested that consultation with and co-operation between employees and employers would be necessary to ensure the successful implementation of any wage policy.235 On this basis it was then announced that an incoming Labour Government would create a Low Pay Commission on which both sides of industry would be represented. This body would be asked to set a figure for the national wage and to decide whether there should be regional variations in it and or a lower rate for younger workers. As formally unveiled in July 1997, the Low Pay Commission was chaired by an economist, George Bain, and included three trade unionists, two industrial relations experts, a personnel manager, and a representative of Scottish grocers. After a year of representations and deliberations it announced that it had settled on a national figure of £3.60 an hour and a lower figure of £3.20 for those aged between eighteen and twentyone. Provoking the further ire of trade unions, one of whose leaders had described the Low Pay Commission's recommendation as a ‘disgrace’, the Government subsequently announced a lower figure of £3 an hour for younger workers.236 The Low Pay Commission allowed New Labour to make use of a number of rhetorical stratagems in its efforts to present and defend the minimum wage. Firstly, authoritative backing for the policy itself. The Commission allowed the Government to defend both the general principle of a minimum wage and the specific figure of £3.20 an hour with reference
234
Patrick Wintour, ‘Labour Leaders Aim to Dodge Wage Issue’, Guardian, 29 September 1994.
235
Michael White and Patrick Wintour, ‘Blair Pledged to Minimum Wage’, Guardian, 9 May 1995.
236
The figure was described as a ‘disgrace’ by the General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Ken Cameron. Quoted, Ewan Macaskill and Seamus Milne, ‘£3.60 Minimum Wage Row Looms’, Guardian, 28 May 1998.
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to the independence of the Commission and the integrity and wisdom of its members. More specifically, the range of interests represented on the Commission allowed the Government to construct its policy as a balanced and so a moderate one. Because the Commission's report had been a unanimous one, New Labour was also able to argue that there existed a ‘consensus between business, unions and government’: that a minimum wage was a part of the political mainstream.237 Although depending upon a sleight of hand, through which members of a Commission appointed by the Government became representatives of industry, this argument was regularly deployed. Business had agreed to the minimum wage. Nothing was being ‘imposed’ on it.238 Anticipating this strategy, the Conservatives denounced the Commission as ‘unbalanced and unrepresentative’, as being ‘stuffed with trade unionists and academics’.239 They argued that far from there being a consensus, business was overwhelmingly opposed to a minimum wage. When not relying upon the cover provided by the Low Pay Commission, New Labour sought to immunise itself from such claims with reference to occasional surveys interpreted as showing some business support for or at least resignation to the minimum wage.240 With legislation pending, the Government was also able to point to examples of large and, by implication, respectable firms like ‘Burger King, McDonalds, Thomas Cook [and] Whitbreads’ which had, without complaint, apparent difficulty, or redundancies, managed to comply with the terms of the minimum wage.241 New Labour also sought to construct the minimum wage as a mainstream and so a moderate policy through a claim that ‘every other developed nation’ or ‘every modern industrial country’ already had one.242 The example, most frequently cited here was that of America where long-standing and bi-partisan support for the minimum wage was frequently cited in parliamentary debate. The use of this particular example rested on two usually unstated premises. The first was that America was the wealthiest economy in the world. The second was that it was the economic embodiment of neo-liberalism. If
237
Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, quoted, ‘Hewitt Says Business Will Remain at Heart of Government’, Department of Trade and Industry Press Release, P/2002/127, 27 February 2002. Full text available via www.nds.coi.gov.uk .
238
Stephen Byers, Shadow Spokesman for Training and Employment, ‘The Minimum is Victory’, Guardian, 13 September 1996.
239
John Redwood, Shadow Spokesman for Trade and Industry, quoted, Seamus Milne, ‘Packing of Low Pay Body’, Guardian, 26 July 1997.
240
Richard Thomas, ‘Minimum Pay Push by Labour’, Guardian, 24 June 1996.
241
Byers, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, interview, On the Record, 28 March 1999.
242
‘Every other developed nation’, Margaret Beckett, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, House of Commons, 16 December 1997, Hansard, Col. 171; ‘Every modern industrial country’, New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better, 1997 Labour Party manifesto.
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the American economy had not been damaged by a minimum wage why would Britain's? If Ronald Reagan could support a minimum wage what did this say about the political position of the Conservative Party? In the run-up to the 1997 election, John Major's opposition to the minimum wage was also made to appear extreme by contrasting it with past Conservative support for the minimum wage and wage councils. In his first Question Time as Chancellor, Gordon Brown responded to a series of questions about the minimum wage by referring to ‘the traditions of Winston Churchill, Harold Macmillan and [Edward Heath] in supporting a minimum wage’.243 The Conservatives sought to present New Labour's commitment to the minimum wage as heralding a sharp break with the status quo. By pointing to the Conservatives' support for wage councils, a small number of which, including the Agricultural Wages Board, had survived into the 1990s, New Labour could present itself as restoring the status quo.244 In the 1992 election Labour's commitment to a specified hourly wage allowed the Conservatives to make specific predictions about the number of jobs that would be lost. The decision to give responsibility for setting the minimum wage to the Low Pay Commission denied the Conservatives such an opportunity in 1997. The Conservatives' more general argument that a minimum wage would cost jobs nonetheless remained.245 The minimum wage was an extreme policy because it would destroy the status quo of low and falling unemployment. In an effort to counter this argument, Blair sought to define the minimum wage in a way that allowed him to distinguish between a ‘sensibly set’ minimum wage and, presumably, a foolishly set one.246 A minimum wage could cause redundancies but set ‘sensibly and flexibly’ it would do no harm.247 By drawing this distinction and by then defining the Low Pay Commission's suggested wage as a sensible one, New Labour sought to deflect some of the criticism of its policy. New Labour's policy was a balanced one, falling between the New Right's unqualified and extreme opposition to any minimum wage, and the Old Left's commitment to a wage set at a level that would increase unemployment. Set at a sensible level, a minimum wage would actually be good for the economy: The national minimum wage will help raise the quality and output of British companies and enable them to compete more effectively in international markets…it will help reduce staff turnover, encourage investment in training and improve staff
243
Gordon Brown, House of Commons, 12 June 1997, Hansard, Col. 1262.
244
On the operation of the Agricultural Wages Board see Ian McCartney, House of Commons, 22 March 1995, Col. 413.
245
Major, House of Commons, 16 July 1996, Hansard, Col. 939.
246
New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better, 1997 Labour Party manifesto.
247
Blair, quoted, Keith Harper, ‘Blair Backs Sensible Minimum Wage as Battle Rages over Level’, Guardian, 4 October 1994.
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morale—driving up standards and improving competitiveness. The overwhelming majority of businesses welcome this.248 Offering this very different account of policy cause and effect, New Labour argued that a minimum wage would be no threat to the status quo of falling unemployment. Attached to this argument was an effort to characterise and ridicule Conservative policy for its attempt to turn Britain into the ‘sweatshop’ of Europe: Increasingly in recent years, the Conservative Party has argued that Britain can only and should only seek to compete by aiming to be the cheapest at all costs; aiming to be the bottom of the heap; aiming for the lowest wages and the worst working conditions…the underlying thrust of the policy of the previous government was to try to turn Britain into the sweatshop, certainly of Europe, if not of the world.249 Here and quite unambiguously, New Labour was seeking to present itself as offering an alternative to the status quo. Yet this was a status quo defined in such a way as to make Conservative opposition to a minimum wage appear extreme and unreasonable.
Trade Union Recognition In its 1997 manifesto New Labour stated that ‘people should be free to join or not to join a union. Where they do decide to join, and where a majority of the relevant work-force votes in a ballot for the union to represent them, the union should be recognised’.250 Upon entering office, it soon became apparent that this commitment would lead to a significant political problem. The TUC, who of course strongly approved of the principle of recognition, argued that the manifesto should be interpreted to mean a majority of those voting in any ballot. This would mean that a 51 per cent vote in favour of recognition in a ballot with a 40 per cent turnout would be sufficient to trigger recognition. The CBI and other employers' organisations opposed the general principle of enforced recognition, arguing that it would be divisive and impose unnecessary regulatory burdens on business. In so far as they were prepared to concede the inevitability of some legislation, they argued that the manifesto should be interpreted to mean a majority of the workforce. This would mean that a 70 per cent vote in favour on a ballot with a 70 per cent turnout would be insufficient to trigger recognition. The dilemma for the government was that it did not want to alienate either one of these
248
Peter Mandelson, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, quoted, ‘Death Knell for Poverty Pay’, Department of Trade and Industry Press Release, P/98/619, 31 July 1998.
249
Margaret Beckett, House of Commons, 16 December 1997, Hansard, Col. 162.
250
New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better, 1997 Labour Party manifesto.
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groups. Having laboured to establish its pro-business credentials, it did not want, during its first few years in office, to impose legislation upon business. Blair reportedly told his Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Margaret Beckett, that he ‘did not want this to be a choice between the CBI and the TUC’.251 In the immediate aftermath of the election, and in the hope of avoiding the need to make such a choice, the Government therefore encouraged the CBI and the TUC to find ‘common ground’ through private talks.252 In order to leave room for these talks it was announced that an expected White Paper on industrial relations would be delayed and that any deal struck between the CBI and the TUC would be respected and set in law.253 The Government presumably hoped that these talks would result in an agreement that would allow recognition to be constructed as a part of the moderate mainstream. Talks did lead to eventual agreement on a number of largely technical issues relating to the timing of ballots and procedures for arbitration in the event of a dispute. Yet the claim made by one Minister that there was ‘more about which the CBI and TUC agree than disagree’ was disingenuous.254 Talks did not reconcile the CBI to the principle of recognition and left unresolved the argument about the appropriate meaning of majority. With talks having ground to a halt, the Government's political difficulties appeared to be increasing. Knowing that legislation could not be delayed indefinitely, the CBI sought to strengthen its position by publicly questioning New Labour's understanding of and sympathy toward business. The unions responded by floating stories about possible cuts to Labour Party funding and by mobilising sympathetic MPs to lobby the Government on its behalf.255 The Secretary-General of the TGWU, Bill Morris, warned that there was ‘simply no room for compromise’.256 Yet, in the end, the strength of the disagreement between the CBI and the TUC provided the Government with an opportunity to present itself as a moderating force. For, it soon became clear that the new Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry, Peter Mandelson, was determined to forge a compromise which, by virtue of it being a compromise, could be described as ‘reasonable
251
Blair, quoted, Patrick Wintour and Andy McSmith, ‘The Battle for Recognition: United we Stand’, Observer, 24 May 1998.
252
Beckett, speech, CBI Annual Conference, 11 November 1997. Full text available via www.dti.gov.uk/ministers/archived .
253
Philip Basset, ‘CBI in Talks with TUC Over Union Recognition’, The Times, 5 August 1997.
254
Ian McCartney, Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry, House of Commons, 6 April 1998, Hansard, Col. 36.
255
Tom Baldwin and James Hardy, ‘Labour MPs Mutiny on Union Rights’, Daily Telegraph, 8 February 1998.
256
Bill Morris, General-Secretary of TGWU, quoted, Seumas Milne, ‘Trade Union Recognition: Will Tony Blair Pay His Dues?’, Guardian, 17 March 1998.
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and balanced’ and so positioned at the political centre.257 On the key issue of voting, this compromise meant legislation requiring the positive votes of at least 40 per cent of those entitled to vote and a blanket exemption for firms with fewer than twenty-one workers. This 40 per cent figure was to be reviewed after a ‘reasonable period’ and, for the unions, was to be further sweetened by an increase in the maximum payouts available to workers in cases of unfair dismissal.258 The compromise was one that left each side with less than what it had hoped for but just enough to secure their acquiescence.259 It also left the Government touting a new era of ‘partnership’. This was a term that became difficult to avoid during this period. Not only did Ministers pepper their speeches with paeans to partnership, the then Minister of State at Trade and Industry, Ian McCartney, took to calling himself the ‘Minister for Social Partnership’.260 Like stake-holding, the third way, and modernisation, partnership was a term easily derided as being vacuous.261 Yet it offered useful political cover. It allowed Ministers to emphasise that legislation was the product of partnership, of ‘detailed and lengthy consultation with employers, unions, and others lasting nearly three years’.262 It also offered a framework within which the likely impact of legislation could be assessed. Far from being likely to provoke endless and bitter disputes between employers and employees, as the Conservatives argued, partnership would mean that ‘99.99 per cent of ’ recognition disputes would be resolved amicably and without recourse to a ballot.263 The causal effect of legislation would actually be to encourage partnership and conciliation: The legal framework that we have proposed will come into play only when employers and employees cannot reach agreement on recognition; but, by ensuring that a clear procedure is in place and known from the outset of discussions, we believe that
257
Ian McCartney, House of Commons, 6 April 1998, Hansard, Col. 34. For references to the policy as ‘balanced and fair’ see Peter Mandelson, House of Commons, 25 November 1998, Col. 212 and as ‘scrupulously balanced’, Peter Mandelson, speech, CBI Annual Conference, 2 November 1998. Full text available via www.dti.gov.uk/ ministers/archived .
258
George Jones and Joy Copley, ‘Cabinet Extends Rights of Unions’, Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1998.
259
The CBI's Director-General, Adair Turner, said that ‘we have worked hard to make this legislation as workable as possible, and believe we have made considerable progress’. Hardly a ringing endorsement but sufficiently short of condemnation. Adair Turner, quoted, John Hibbs, ‘Mandelson Lets CBI Pressure Tell on Rights at Work’, Daily Telegraph, 18 December 1998.
260
Chris Ball, ‘Partnership Principle is New Labour's Big Idea to Sweeten Relations at Work’, Guardian, 8 August 1998.
261
See, for example, Andrew Lansley, House of Commons, 6 April 1998, Col. 33.
262
Alan Johnson, Minister for Competitiveness, quoted, ‘Trade Union Recognition Procedure Begins’, Department of Trade and Industry press release, P/2000/365, 5 June 2000.
263
Margaret Beckett, interview, On the Record, 24 May 1998.
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voluntary agreement is more likely to be achieved and industrial action to be avoided. Neither employers or employees gain from the current arrangements, and the protracted disagreements that can occur only damage future relationships.264 The compromise imposed on and eventually accepted by the CBI and TUC averted a major political crisis. Yet it still left New Labour vulnerable to the Conservatives' argument that trade union recognition was an extreme policy which showed how the party remained on the left. During the 1997 campaign, Michael Hesetline warned that talk of recognition would ‘send a shiver down the spine of every businessman’ in the country.265 In its aftermath, John Redwood continued to warn that New Labour's plans would ‘send us back to the bad old days of the 1960s and 1970s’.266 The CBI's grudging acceptance of legislation afforded New Labour some protection against such charges. The Government also countered them by placing recognition in a more general policy context. New Labour was a moderate party at the political centre that posed no threat to the status quo. Recognition was defensible and important but would not lead to resurgence in trade union power. There would be no slippery slope. In his foreword to the Fairness at Work White Paper, Blair wrote that there will be no going back. The days of strikes without ballots, mass picketing, closed shops and secondary action are over. Even after the changes we propose, Britain will have the most lightly regulated labour market of any leading economy in the world.267 The Government also sought to downplay the radicalism of its proposals by presenting them as entirely uncontroversial. Legislation was intended only to ensure the ‘smooth spread of best practice’.268 For ‘forty-four of the Financial Times (FT) top fifty companies [already] recognise trade unions’.269 Legislation would not disrupt the status quo. Working practices in most firms would be left unchanged. Legislation was directed not at the majority of businesses but at a tiny minority of employers who ‘believe solely in the principle of hire and fire’.270 Defined in this way, New Labour could present Conservative opposition to its policy as amounting to a positive endorsement of such practices. The Conservative Party was not the party of business. It was the party of a handful of businesses who paid ‘sweatshop’ wages and denied their
264
Beckett, House of Commons, 21 May 1998, Hansard, Col. 1105.
265
Heseltine, quoted, Robert Shrimsley, ‘Business Leaders Knock Labour's Union Payback’, Daily Telegraph, 25 March 1997.
266
John Redwood, House of Commons, 9 February 1999, Hansard, Col. 154.
267
Blair, ‘Foreword’, Fairness at Work. Full text available via www.dti.gov.uk/er/fairness/fore.htm .
268
Byers, House of Commons, 9 February 1999, Hansard, Col. 133.
269
Ian McCartney, speech, General Federation of Trade Unions conference, 12 May 1997. Full text available via DTI archives.
270
Ian McCartney, House of Commons, 6 April 1998, Hansard, Col. 33.
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workers any representation. The Conservatives were the extreme party not Labour.
The 2002 Budget Gordon Brown's sixth budget was delivered on 17 April 2002. It included announcements about the introduction of a Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit, a cut in the starting rate of corporation tax, an increase in the Working Families Tax Credit, and a freeze on road fuel duties. Political and media attention focused however on a proposed rise in National Insurance Contributions and a freeze on personal income tax allowances to fund additional NHS expenditure. New Labour had previously been accused of raising ‘stealth’ taxes. In 2002 there was no attempt to conceal the budget's impact. On Gordon Brown's own figures, taxation would, for a person on the median income, rise by £3.70 a week. An additional £24 billion in revenues would be used to fund a 40 per cent rise in real, inflationadjusted, health expenditure.271 This would, ministers reported, mean 35,000 more nurses, 15,000 more doctors, forty new hospitals, and 500 primary care centres.272 In its immediate aftermath, many commentators suggested that this was a budget ‘suffused’ with the values of Old Labour and that the party was moving back to the left.273 In his post-budget reply, Iain Duncan-Smith denounced a return to an ‘old-style tax and spend’ previously practised by Old Labour.274 Notice here that the issue of tax and spend can, like ownership, be spatially represented as bounded, finite, and both prearranged and fixed. Bounded in that, there can be no rate of taxation higher than 100 per cent or lower than 0 per cent.275 Finite in that, between these extremes there are exactly ninety-eight other policy options. Prearranged and fixed in that, once 100 per cent is placed on the left-hand edge of the scale and 0 per cent on the right, 58 per cent taxation must be placed to the left of 57 per cent taxation and so on. In terms of such a scale it is not difficult to see how Labour's tax rises can be argued to have moved the party to the left. But the location of policies within political space is not prearranged and fixed. Position is rhetorically constructed. In the days following the budget, New Labour sought to persuade voters that its policy was a moderate one. In
271
Brown, House of Commons, 17 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 591.
272
Jeremy Laurence, ‘Thousands More Doctors and Nurses to be Recruited’, Independent, 19 April 2002, p. 3.
273
Larry Elliot, ‘NHS Prescription Amounts to Kill or Cure’, Guardian, 18 April 2002.
274
Iain Duncan-Smith, House of Commons, 17 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 598.
275
Once the impact of the benefit system is taken into account it is however possible to have a marginal rate of taxation higher than 100 %.
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a series of television and radio interviews and in a letter to all Labour MP's, Blair immediately denounced as ‘nonsense’ the claim that New Labour had, once again, become a tax-and-spend party.276 Eschewing the rhetoric of those on the left of the party, Blair repeatedly refused to describe the budget as ‘redistributive’.277 Instead, and in an effort to reassure the voters of Middle England by constructing his Government's policy as one that did not threaten the status quo, Blair sought to draw a comparison between his own record on taxation and that of Margaret Thatcher's: No one ever likes paying tax, but even after these changes the tax burden under this Government will be lower than in many of the Thatcher years, lower than the European average, lower than any of our major, comparable, European competitors.278 New Labour also sought to dispel fears that it had moved to the left by forging a clear link between the tax rises and the target of its expenditure. New Labour sought to make the argument not a general one about tax and spend, but a specific and more politically palatable one about raising taxation to fund the NHS. In the year prior to the 2002 budget, reports surfaced indicating that the Government was going to introduce a hypothecated tax to fund the NHS.279 In his budget speech, Brown admitted to having considered such a possibility but argued that hypothecation would destabilise long-term funding.280 Hypothecation was however unnecessary. Without having to introduce a ‘health tax’, Gordon Brown nonetheless managed to persuade commentators and the electorate that the policy choice was not between tax and spend but between tax and spend on the NHS. A political hypothecation was achieved in the absence of a fiscal one. New Labour also sought to construct its policy as a reasonable and so moderate one by placing its tax rises in the context of its other policies and more general record. Tax and spend was defined in terms of a more general economic philosophy of boom and bust, of reckless profligacy. Invoking his own authority and reputation for prudence, Gordon Brown presented his budget with reference to the ‘steady hand’ he had always kept on public finances:281 One of the key differences between this budget debate and budget debates that we used to have years ago is that my right honourable friend the Chancellor set out his
276
Blair, quoted, Andrew Sparrow, ‘Blair Refuses to Rule Out Further Tax Rises’, Daily Telegraph, 22 April 2002.
277
Blair, quoted, Andrew Sparrow, ‘Blair Refuses to Rule Out Further Tax Rises’.
278
Blair, quoted, Andrew Grice and Jeremy Laurence, ‘Blair Warns Unions: Don't Undermine my NHS Reforms’, Independent, 22 April 2002, p. 4.
279
David Smith, ‘Health Tax May Boost NHS Funds’, The Times, 21 October 2001.
280
Gordon Brown, House of Commons, 17 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 589.
281
Gordon Brown, House of Commons, 17 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 580.
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budget proposals yesterday from a position of almost unprecedented strength and stability in the British economy…we took the necessary tough decisions right at the start of that Parliament and we took more necessary decisions yesterday.282 When still Leader of the Opposition, Blair had sought to change the existing debate about tax and spend into one about the direction of expenditure. In his first Labour Party conference as leader, he told delegates that ‘I don't mind paying taxes for education and health, and the police. What I mind is paying them for unemployment, crime and social squalor’.283 Rejecting the ‘intellectually lazy idea’ that tax should be a ‘virility symbol of the left’, Blair argued that New Labour would manage the economy in such a way that spending could be switched from subsidising the ‘costs of economic failure’ to ‘investing for the future’.284 Albeit in the context of a rise in taxes, New Labour returned to this argument in 2002 with a claim that most of the increase in health expenditure was being paid for by falling unemployment and lower interest payments on public debt.285 New Labour also constructed its policy as being politically moderate by virtue of it being politically balanced, as drawing from the right as well as the left. To do this, the Government placed its expenditure plans in the context of its on-going and, in established though not immutable political appearance, more right-wing reforms to the health service. These, it was argued, would mean that ‘this is not money for more of the same [but] more money for a different sort of health service’.286 Here, New Labour defined ‘old-style’ tax and spend in terms of inefficiency and its own proposals with value for money. This meant appropriating a political language developed by and associated with the Conservatives. Expenditure was to be overseen by a new ‘watchdog’ that would identify and expose examples of poor practice.287 Patients were to be given a ‘choice’ of which hospital to be treated at.288 New freestanding ‘foundation’ hospitals were to be created and ‘incentives’ restructured so that more efficient hospitals capable of treating more patients would receive more money.289 Finally, more use was to be made of private
282
Alistair Darling, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, House of Commons, 18 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 742.
283
Blair, speech, ‘New Labour, New Britain’, 4 October 1994, reproduced in Blair, New Britain, p. 37.
284
Blair, ‘Labour's Agenda for Social and Economic Advancement’, Guardian, 23 November 1996.
285
Darling, House of Commons, 18 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 743.
286
Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health, interview, On The Record, 21 April 2002.
287
Brown, House of Commons, 17 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 588.
288
Kamal Ahmed and Gaby Hinsliff, ‘Turning Point for Labour as Brown Reinvents the NHS’, Guardian, 21 April 2002.
289
‘Lobby Briefing’, 10 Downing Street Press Secretary, 18 April 2002. Full transcript available via www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page793.asp .
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firms to improve standards and ensure greater competition.290 In the aftermath of the 2001 election, Blair angered many on the left by outlining his plans for the greater use of private firms within hospitals and schools. These were characterised as being ‘more responsive to the immediate needs of demanding customers’.291 By tying higher expenditure to a style of public management associated with the Conservatives, New Labour sought to assure voters that there is ‘a world of difference between old style tax and spend where money went into unreformed systems and New Labour's invest and reform’ programme.292 Finally, New Labour sought to construct its policy as a moderate one at the political centre by presenting funding increases as a part of the political mainstream. This mainstream was defined partly in terms of the authority of an independent report, that the Government had commissioned, into the long-term funding of the health service in March 2000. This report, prepared by the former Group Chief Executive of the National Westminster Bank, Derek Wanless, was published on the day of the budget. Wanless, whose task it had been to ‘examine the technological, demographic and medical trends over the next two decades that may affect the health service in the United Kingdom as a whole’, recommended large increases in health expenditure to be funded out of general taxation.293 Wanless' report was originally intended to be fed into the Comprehensive Spending Review that was scheduled to begin once the 2002 budget had been completed. The report was however immediately accepted and was repeatedly cited in Brown's budget speech.294 For, what it offered was an impartial and so authoritative justification of policy. Beyond this, the Government claimed that there was a deeper and underlying agreement between the parties and within the country about the need to increase NHS expenditure. Gordon Brown, Alan Milburn, and Peter Mandelson all spoke of a ‘consensus’ about the need for greater expenditure.295 Far from pursing immoderate policies, New Labour was being led by this consensus. This claim about the existence of a cross-party consensus was important because it allowed the Government to present the ‘real’ debate as being about the best way of funding the NHS rather than being about tax and
290
Jeremy Laurence, ‘New Labour Reinvents the Tories’ Internal Market’, Independent, 19 April 2002, p. 7.
291
Blair, speech, ‘Reform of the Public Services’, 16 July 2001, full text available www.number-10. gov.uk/output/Page1579.asp .
292
Blair, ‘A Battle Half Won’, Guardian, 14 April 2002.
293
Celia Hall, ‘Wanless Calls for Doubling of Spending on Health Service’, Daily Telegraph, 18 April 2002.
294
Brown, House of Commons, 17 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 589.
295
Brown, House of Commons, 17 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 589; Milburn, interview, On the Record, 21 April 2002; Peter Mandelson, ‘If Middle England Wants Better Services, Middle England Has to Pay’, Guardian, 18 April 2002.
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spend. Here, and because it was reaffirming the principle of an NHS funded out of general taxation, New Labour presented itself as the guardian of the status quo: We are continuing the principle established in the 1940s of raising resources towards the cost of the NHS through National Insurance Contributions. The Bill will allocate those resources to a modern health service, building on the Beveridge principles to provide a system of comprehensive care…an NHS free to all at the point of need has been the subject of a consensus that has endured for the past fifty years. It is the fairest and most efficient way of funding health care.296 Exploiting their reluctance to give an unequivocal commitment to a NHS funded out of general taxation, New Labour portrayed the Conservatives as the extreme party who had abandoned the centre-ground. The Conservatives ‘real’ and agreed policy was, it was claimed, to dismantle the NHS and introduce a ‘pay as you go’ system of private insurance.297 Such a possibility allowed ministers to conjure up the bogeyman of an American system in which many would be left without cover. The choice for the public was between ‘taxation or the American’ system’.298 New Labour's position at the centre was created through a construction of its opponent's policies.
Conclusion It has not been the aim of this chapter to provide a comprehensive list of the arguments used to defend or attack the four chosen policies, let alone to assess their relative importance or effectiveness. Many of the Government's more positive arguments have been either brushed over or ignored. The arguments, that devolution would allow for the expression of a distinct political identity, that a minimum wage would protect dignity and equality, that trade union recognition would protect workers from exploitation, and that tax rises to pay for core public services were fair and just, have been neglected. Instead, this chapter has focused on the way in which New Labour promoted particular accounts of its policies that allowed it to tie those policies to the political centre. The position of policies within political space is not prearranged and fixed. Policies are tied to particular points in political space through rhetoric.
296
Andrew Smith, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, House of Commons, 1 May 2002, Hansard, Col. 956.
297
Darling, House of Commons, 18 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 750.
298
Darling, House of Commons, 18 April 2002, Hansard, Col. 752.
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5 Innovation and the Construction of the Centre Introduction In the Downsian framework introduced in Chapter 2, parties choose between a finite number of policies ranging from 0 per cent to 100 per cent private ownership. Policies appear to the parties as a brute fact over which they have no control. Policies are just there. What is missing from this account is the possibility of innovation, of the creative development of new policy options. Parties can react to but are not simply constrained by existing policy options. They can also create new policies. Political position is constructed. One way in which it is constructed is through innovation. This chapter will examine the concept of innovation, argue that it is an important one, and show how it can be understood in spatial terms. Innovation is a concept developed in economics and still used primarily by economists. So it is to economics that the following section turns with a review of Joseph Schumpeter#x0027;s theory of innovation. Schumpeter is an interesting character who was born in Austria in 1883 and took a doctorate at the University of Vienna. After working for a time as a lawyer, he drifted back into academe in 1909. After a series of university appointments, Schumpeter was, in 1919, appointed Austria#x0027;s Minister of Finance where he prevailed over a period of hyperinflation before being sacked. After becoming the President of a bank which collapsed, Schumpeter returned, once more, to university life and became, in 1932, a professor at Harvard, an appointment he retained until his death in 1950. Schumpeter was not the first economist to write about innovation. Nicholas Baudeau (1730#x2013;92), Jeremy Bentham (1748#x2013;1832), Johann von Thunen (1783#x2013;1850), Karl Marx (1818#x2013;83), Gustav Schmoller (1838#x2013;1917), and Max Weber (1864#x2013;1920) had all previously written about the way in which economies are driven forward by the economic application of inventions.299 It is, however,
299
For an account of the work of each of these, see Robert Herbert and Albert Link, The Entrepreneur (New York: Praeger, 1982). Of these it was Marx who had the greatest influence upon Schumpeter#x0027;s work. See Yuichi Shionoya, Schumpeter and the Idea of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 78#x2013;83.
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Schumpeter who has provided economics with its #x2018;single most influential#x2019; analysis of innovation.300 There is a second reason for making Schumpeter the focus of this chapter. In his account of the origins of An Economic Theory, Downs credits Schumpeter#x0027;s #x2018;profound analysis of democracy#x2019; with providing #x2018;the inspiration and foundation for my whole thesis#x2019;.301 Yet, strangely, innovation is a concept entirely missing from Downs#x0027; theory. Downs#x0027; failure to allow for the possibility of innovation is explained in the third section in terms of his more general methodological commitment to the general equilibrium theory. Returning to and building further upon the argument initially developed in Chapter 2, it is argued here that the assumption of calculative decision#x2010;making makes prediction, and so the attainment of equilibrium, possible but leaves no analytical room for innovation. The implications of allowing for innovation are then explored in terms of Downs#x0027; arguments about party competition. Tying the discussion of innovation to that of rhetoric, it is argued that innovation gives politicians a choice of electoral strategies, that innovation is uncertain, and that beliefs about innovation are themselves constructed and contested.
Schumpeter: Innovation and Equilibrium Within political science, Schumpeter is best known for his #x2018;elite#x2019; or #x2018;competitive#x2019; theory of representative democracy in which democracy is defined as that #x2018;arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people#x0027;s vote#x2019;.302 Schumpeter develops his theory as an alternative to and as part of a critique of a #x2018;classical#x2019; theory in which democracy is defined in terms of a kind of direct decision#x2010;making of the sort usually associated with Ancient Greece where major decisions were made by the Assembly, or Ecclesia, which met maybe fifty times a year and at which every citizen
300
Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 112.
301
Anthony Downs, #x2018;The Origins of an Economic Theory of Democracy#x2019; in Bernard Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 197.
302
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen #x0026; Unwin, 1942), p. 269. For discussions of Schumpeter#x0027;s model see David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), pp. 182#x2013;91; Richard Bellamy, #x2018;The Transformation of Capitalism, Liberalism and Democracy#x2019;, Government and Opposition, 26 (1991), 500#x2013;19; Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (London: University of London Press, 1969); and John Medearis, #x2018;Ideology, Democracy and the Limits of Equilibrium: A Schumpeterian Critique#x2019;, British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), 355#x2013;388.
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was entitled to speak and vote.303 Setting up a straw man he then has no difficulty in knocking it down; Schumpeter argues that this theory has no relevance to the modern world. Democracy has been transformed into a system of governance in which the participation of most citizens is limited to a periodic choice of #x2018;accepting or refusing#x2019; those who are to rule them.304 In their efforts to stitch together winning coalitions, politicians are, he suggests, motivated by the prospect of power.305 Politicians deal in votes in the same way that businessmen deal in commodities. In crediting Schumpeter with providing the inspiration for his own work, Downs was particularly taken in with this account of politicians#x0027; motives and with Schumpeter#x0027;s argument that policy emerges as a by#x2010;product of the competitive struggle for votes.306 Yet Schumpeter#x0027;s work on democracy really amounts to little more than a footnote to the main body of his work. It was with the Theory of Economic Development (1911) and the two#x2010;volume Business Cycles (1939) that Schumpeter established his reputation as an economist.307 The recurring theme within these two works is innovation. What Schumpeter means by this term and why he believes it to be of such importance can be best understood in terms of a contrast he draws between the stationary state or static economy in which innovation is absent and the dynamic economy of which innovation is the defining feature.308 In its purest form, the stationary state economy assumes all economically relevant factors#x2014;including population, tastes, and methods of production#x2014;to be fixed and for perfect competition to prevail.309 The key characteristic of
303
For a more careful analysis of the role of the Ecclesia than that attempted by Schumpeter, see Mogens Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
304
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 285.
305
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 282.
306
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper #x0026; Row, 1957), p. 29. There are nonetheless a number of important differences between Schumpeter#x0027;s and Downs#x0027; theories. Schumpeter does not use the spatial metaphor in the sense of talking about parties or voters as being on the left or right. He instead thinks of parties as armies fighting for control of a #x2018;stretch of country or a particular hill#x2019;; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 279. Schumpeter does not present parties as maximising their vote by accommodating themselves to the preferences voters have. For such preferences are, Schumpeter argues, unstable and malleable. Parties can manufacture public opinion. In this respect, Schumpeter#x0027;s argument is closer to that developed in Chapter 3. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between the two theories see David Miller #x2018;The Competitive Model of Democracy#x2019;, in Graeme Duncan (ed.), Democratic Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
307
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1934 [1911]); Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process (New York: McGraw#x2010;Hill, 1939).
308
Allen Oakley, Schumpeter#x0027;s Theory of Capitalist Motion: A Critical Exposition and Reassessment (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), p. 54.
309
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 39.
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such an economy is, Schumpeter argues, equilibrium. In the stationary state economy, the behaviour of consumers and producers will be optimally adjusted to the prevailing conditions. Markets will clear and price, demand, and supply will be unchanging because no one will have any reason to alter their behaviour. The economy will be stationary. Schumpeter claims that the idea of the stationary state economy is one used by #x2018;absolutely all economists of all schools of all times#x2019;.310 It is certainly true that David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and Adam Smith all make use of the notion of a stationary state economy.311 Yet Schumpeter#x0027;s account owes its greatest debt to Leon Walras#x0027; Elements of Pure Economics (1874); a work he describes as #x2018;the Magna Carta of economics#x2019;.312 In this, Walras uses techniques for treating systems of simultaneous equations to construct a mathematical model of perfect competition in which productive factors, products, and prices automatically adjust in equilibrium. Schumpeter#x0027;s account of the stationary state economy and his argument about equilibrium is really a more accessible, non#x2010;mathematical, version of Walras#x0027; work. Given the very obvious implausibility of assuming population, people#x0027;s tastes, and methods of production to be fixed, of what value is this account?313 In part, the value is academic. The equilibrium model is useful because it most perfectly illuminates #x2018;the pure logic of interdependence between economic quantities#x2019;.314 Yet Schumpeter, again drawing on Walras, also held that there could be seen #x2018;in the reality around us#x2019; a #x2018;tendency#x2019; toward equilibrium.315 This is, he suggests, a matter of #x2018;common sense#x2019;.316 As such, the equilibrium model is valuable because it tells us something about how economies actually operate. When equilibrium is, for example, upset by a sudden and unexpected change in population, markets will no longer clear. In some places there will be excess demand and profits and, in others, excess supply and losses. These profits and losses will, however, act as a signal about the way in which resources need to be re#x2010;allocated. By responding to these signals and by pushing
310
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 36.
311
On the history of the stationary state economy, see Richard Clemence and Francis Doody, The Schumpeterian System (Cambridge, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1950), pp. 25#x2013;30.
312
Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 242. Indeed Schumpeter did much to bring Anglo#x2010;American economists#x0027; attention to Walras#x0027; arguments which were not available in English until 1954 when a translation was prepared by William Jaffe and published by the American Economic Association and the Royal Economic Society.
313
For Schumpeter#x0027;s analysis of the implausibility of the assumptions in Walras#x0027; work see Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, pp. 50#x2013;5.
314
Schumpeter, Preface to the Japanese Edition of The Theory of Economic Development, quoted Medearis, #x2018;Ideology, Democracy and the Limits of Equilibrium#x2019;, p. 359.
315
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 47.
316
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 47.
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more resources into more profitable sectors, the economy will slowly be pushed back towards equilibrium. Because of further changes in economic variables, equilibrium might never actually be reached. But there is a constant movement towards it. The economy is a #x2018;cosmos and not a chaos#x2019;.317 Schumpeter is generous and unstinting in his praise of Walras. Yet he is equally clear that economies cannot be analysed exclusively in static terms. The defining characteristic of the stationary state economy is equilibrium or, rather, the existence of or a tendency towards equilibrium. The defining characteristic of the dynamic economy is the #x2018;creative destruction#x2019; of equilibrium through innovation.318 By innovation Schumpeter has in mind a number of different activities: (1) the introduction of a new good or service with which consumers are not familiar; (2) the introduction of new methods of production; (3) the opening up of a new market; (4) the conquest of a new source of supply; and (5) the carrying out of a new organisation of any industry.319 What all these activities have in common is the #x2018;setting up of a new production function#x2019;, the development of a new way of doing things. Innovations are that which: forever alter and displace the equilibrium state previously existing#x2026;[such that the new equilibrium] cannot be reached from the old one by infinitesimal steps#x2026;add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby.320 Innovation results in the destruction of equilibrium rather than a movement toward it. It is but common sense to recognise that the economic function of deciding how much wool to buy for one#x0027;s process of production and the function of introducing a new process of production do not stand on the same footing.321 At this point, Schumpeter#x0027;s argument is open to misinterpretation. For, innovation is not just a matter of the spectacular. When offering examples of innovations with which to illustrate his argument, Schumpeter returns time and again to epoch#x2010;making products like the railway and motor car. It is not
317
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 40.
318
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 83.
319
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 84. Having gone to such lengths to identify different kinds of innovation, Schumpeter only makes use of the first and, to a lesser extent, the second categories during his subsequent discussion.
320
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle, p. 64.
321
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 102.
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difficult to see why. Such examples allow him to maintain the reader#x0027;s interest and to draw most clearly the distinction he requires, between movements towards equilibrium in the stationary state economy and the destruction of that equilibrium in the dynamic economy. Yet beyond the headline examples, Schumpeter is more subtle. #x2018;We must try to divest ourselves of the idea that innovation necessarily means something spectacularly important#x2019;.322 Innovation consists not only of the spectacular but of #x2018;innumerable#x2019; modest advances such as #x2018;making a success of a particular kind of sausage or toothbrush#x2019;.323 Innovation means introduction of new products and methods of production and this results in the creation of a new equilibrium. Differences between the old and new equilibrium need not be that great. It is the movement away from an existing equilibrium and not the extent of that movement which defines innovation. Schumpeter is determined to secure recognition of innovation as a distinctive economic process because he believes that capitalism itself can only be fully understood as a dynamic system in which equilibrium is being forever destroyed by the introduction of new goods and methods of production. Innovation is the #x2018;outstanding fact in the economic history of capitalist society#x2019;.324 In capitalist societies, the economic process that most affects most individuals#x0027; lives comes not with the steady adjustment to an existing equilibrium but through the destruction of that equilibrium as new goods and methods of production are introduced, adapted, and diffused. As an economic model, the stationary state account is inadequate because it is completely unable to deal with or account for this innovative process. The fatal flaw in Walras#x0027; equilibrium model is that it is #x2018;rigorously static in character#x2019;.325 He [Walras] would have said#x2026;that of course economic life is essentially passive and merely adapts itself to the natural and social influences which may be acting upon it#x2026;I felt very strongly that this was wrong, and that there was a source of energy within the economic system which would of itself disrupt any equilibrium that might be attained.326
322
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 92.
323
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 132.
324
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 86.
325
Schumpeter, Preface to the Japanese edition of The Theory of Economic Development, quoted Medearis, #x2018;Ideology, Democracy and the Limits of Equilibrium#x2019;, p. 362.
326
Schumpeter, Preface to the Japanese Edition of The Theory of Economic Development, quoted Medearis, #x2018;Ideology, Democracy and the Limits of Equilibrium#x2019;, p. 363. The argument here hints at a second way in which Schumpeter distinguishes between the stationary state and dynamic theories. Change within the stationary state is exogenous to the model. It is caused by, for example, changes in population, but these changes are not part of and are not explained by the model. Changes within the dynamic economy are caused by innovation, an endogenous factor.
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Innovations, whether spectacular or modest, are undertaken by entrepreneurs. In Schumpeter#x0027;s writings, entrepreneurs are portrayed as creative, heroic, and exceptional individuals who, in the search for the #x2018;spectacular prizes of success#x2019;, drive economic development and generate prosperity.327 Entrepreneurs are however a source of economic instability as well as development. Innovation is cyclical. Spectacular break#x2010;through innovations like the motor car or computers are, over time, refined and adapted. Yet, eventually, the possibilities of any particular innovation are exhausted. At this point, a period of profitability and economic boom gives way first to stagnation and then recession. Only with the emergence of new innovations does recovery begin. In this way, Schumpeter leaves innovation underpinning the business cycle. At a narrower level, the sheer difficulty of innovation also makes it a source of instability. Ninety per cent or more of entrepreneurial ventures fail.328 When operating within the stationary flow, the manager of a firm can judge the likely future demand for a product by looking first at current demand for it. Operating within the dynamic economy, the entrepreneur cannot enjoy this luxury. He#x002F;she cannot calculate in advance what the demand will be for a certain product because there cannot be any demand for a product until it exists and the public is made aware of it. An innovation for which there is already an established demand is not an innovation.329 If the entrepreneur is to succeed, this means that they will need, above all other qualities, imagination: #x2018;the capacity of seeing things in a way which proves afterwards to be true, even though it cannot be established [as such] at the moment#x2019;.330 The possession of such an imagination is, together with good luck, the trait that distinguishes successful entrepreneurs. Yet imagination is fallible and is a trait individuals cannot know in advance whether they possess. The numbers of factors that shape the future are huge. Even those entrepreneurs with good imaginations and impressive past records will frequently fail. Such is the difference between idle speculation about an entrepreneurial venture and the experience of actually developing an
327
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 73. Schumpeter is also prepared to concede that entrepreneurs are motivated by such non#x2010;pecuniary gains as the will to succeed, the desire to form a dynasty, and the joy of competition, so giving his work, in this respect as well, a broader base than the Walrasian equilibrium approach it sought to supplant; The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle, pp. 92#x2013;4.
328
Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, p. 117.
329
Schumpter#x0027;s argument here should not be pushed too far. There may not be a demand for a particular product until that product exists but there may be a demand for that kind of product. There could not be a demand for trains until there were trains. But there was a demand for mobility.
330
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle, p. 85.
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innovation that a person cannot know whether he#x002F;she possesses the required abilities until he#x002F;she becomes an entrepreneur. Hence #x2018;failure will threaten or actually overtake#x2019; 90 per cent of ventures.331
Downs: Innovation and Equilibrium During the years in which Schumpeter was honing his critique of the stationary state economy, Walras#x0027; model was being refined and extended.332 In 1920, and kick#x2010;starting what was to become known as the Socialist Calculation Debate, the American economist Fred Taylor argued that centrally planned economies could be as efficient as capitalist ones because central planners could solve the sets of simultaneous equations that Walras had demonstrated to be the key to achieving equilibrium. Responding to criticisms that no planner could be expected to solve these equations without making errors, Oskar Lange then argued that planners could adjust prices through a process of trial#x2010;and#x2010;error until equilibrium was attained.333 Then, in 1939, John Hicks published Value and Capital, in which, for the first time, a complete economic equilibrium model with aggregated markets for commodities, factors of production, credit, and money capable of dealing with multiperiod analysis was developed.334 Finally, and in the post#x2010;war years, Kenneth Arrow and Gerald Debreu gave the general equilibrium theory its #x2018;most precise statement#x2019;.335
331
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 75. There is a twist to this particular part of Schumpeter#x0027;s story. As capitalism develops, innovation is eventually routinised and the kind of swashbuckling entrepreneurship Schumpeter lauds is rendered obsolete. In a giant corporation, innovation becomes #x2018;depersonalised and automated#x2019;. The implication is that the process of innovation becomes more certain. At this point, and with the entrepreneurial strata endangered, capitalism crumbles and gives way to socialism; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 133.
332
For a detailed history of the development of the general equilibrium framework during this period, see Bruno Ingaro and Giorgio Israel, The Invisible Hand: Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1990).
333
Fred Taylor, #x2018;The Guidance of Production in a Socialist State#x2019; and Oskar Lange, #x2018;On the Economic Theory of Socialism#x2019;, in Benjamin Lippincott (ed.), On The Economic Theory of Socialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938). Lange#x0027;s argument about trial#x2010;and#x2010;error planning also drew directly upon Walras#x2019; work. Friedrich Hayek, who argued that the general equilibrium model simply failed to say anything about how capitalism really worked as a competitive process, attacked the market socialists#x0027; arguments. See Friedrich Hayek, #x2018;The Use of Knowledge in Society#x2019; and #x2018;The Meaning of Competition#x2019; in Individualism and Economic Order (London: Routledge #x0026; Kegan Paul, 1945). It is strange that Schumpeter, whose criticisms of the equilibrium model might have led him to side with Hayek, actually offered, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, a defence of the economics of socialism. For general discussions of the socialist calculation debate and of the place of general equilibrium theory within it, see Don Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
334
Sir John Hicks, Value and Capital: An Inquiry into Some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939).
335
John Stigltiz, Whither Socialism? (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 5.
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Building with the #x2018;most consistency and logical rigour on the foundations of the equilibrium model#x2019; developed by Walras, Arrow and Debreu constructed a model which postulated large numbers of profit#x2010;maximising firms with rational, utility maximising consumers in an economy with a complete set of perfectly competitive markets for all goods in all periods.336 The resulting paper, #x2018;Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy#x2019;, was published to instant acclaim in Econometrica in July 1954.337 These and other theorists developed and refined the general equilibrium model. They did not however address Schumpeter#x0027;s fundamental criticism of Walras#x0027; model: that general equilibrium excluded innovation. Indeed in their history of the #x2018;invisible hand#x2019;, Bruno Ingaro and Giorgio Israel suggest that Arrow and Debreu offer no more than a #x2018;mathematical formalisation#x2026;of the fundamental concepts of the theory [first] formulated by Walras#x2019;.338 Arrow and Debreu were, like Walras, concerned with the possibility of achieving equilibrium. The contrast with Schumpeter, who defined innovation in terms of the destruction of equilibrium, remained sharp. Yet, by this time, Schumpeter was dead and Schumpeterian economics was dying. Although his own contributions to economics had been lauded, Schumpeter did not have disciples willing to develop his ideas. His work, which lacked the mathematical exposition already taken as the hallmark of scientific knowledge, was increasingly neglected.339 Schumpeter#x0027;s insights about the importance and nature of innovation had been presented in a series of brilliant essays. Emphasising, as they did, the importance of unpredictable individual creativity, they could not be developed into a rival model complete with formally stated assumptions, derived conclusions, and predictions.340 When compared with the rigours of the general equilibrium approach, Schumpeter#x0027;s arguments were easily dis
336
Ingaro and Israel, The Invisible Hand: Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science, p. 274.
337
Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, #x2018;Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy#x2019;, Econometrica, 22 (1954), 265#x2013;90.
338
Ingaro and Israel, The Invisible Hand: Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science, p. 298.
339
Schumpeter had, ironically, studiously promoted the use of mathematics within economic theory and, at one point, played a leading role in the newly created Econometric Society. His widow, Elizabeth, reported that he, Schumpeter, had hoped one day to develop a mathematical version of the dynamic theory; Shionoya, Schumpeter and the Idea of Science, p. 39. This never came about. In the 1970s Schumpeter#x0027;s arguments about innovation were, however, given a formal make#x2010;over by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, #x2018;Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Economic Capabilities#x2019;, American Economic Review, 63 (1973), 440#x2013;9; An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Esben Anderson, Evolutionary Economics: Post#x2010;Schumpeterian Contributions (London: Pinter, 1994).
340
Although it might be noted that the general equilibrium approach developed by Arrow and Debreu does not make any predictions either and may not have any explanatory value. See Daniel Hausman, The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 54#x2013;6.
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missed as #x2018;supremely intelligent after dinner conversation#x2019;.341 So by the time Downs came to write An Economic Theory as a graduate student at Stanford University in 1955, general equilibrium was the only economic show in town. Although yet to receive their Nobel prizes, Hicks, Debreu, and Arrow were prized professors in three of the world#x0027;s leading universities.342 The general equilibrium model was feted as providing a proof of Adam Smith#x0027;s arguments about the invisible hand and so with establishing the economic superiority of capitalism over its rivals. It is therefore not surprising that Downs, whose doctoral work was being supervised by Kenneth Arrow, conceived of An Economic Theory as an exercise in the application of the general equilibrium model to the study of democracy.343 At the very start of the book, Downs laments that: little progress has been made toward a generalised yet realistic behaviour rule for a rational government similar to the rules traditionally used for rational consumers and producers. As a result, government has not been successfully integrated with private decision#x2010;makers in a general equilibrium theory. This thesis is an attempt to provide such a behaviour rule for democratic government and to trace its implications.344 In Downs#x0027; work, the influence of the general equilibrium framework can be most clearly seen in the emphasis given to equilibrium. The discovery of a vote#x2010;maximising equilibrium at the electoral centre is an essential component of the median voter theorem presented in Downs#x0027; name and one that has, as we have seen in Chapter 2, preoccupied rational choice theorists for the last forty or so years. In Schumpeter#x0027;s terms, Downs offers a stationary state model of political competition. Starting with the assumption that voters#x0027; preferences, politicians#x0027; maximand, the number of parties, and the left#x2013;right dimension are fixed, it proceeds to the identification of an equilibrium vote#x2010;maximising position. The influence of general equilibrium framework can also be seen in the neglect of innovation. In a 300#x2010;page book, this is a term Downs never once uses. In his concluding chapter, Downs describes it as being the #x2018;main thesis#x2019; of his book that #x2018;parties in democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit#x2010;seeking economy#x2019;.345 Yet, whatever the purported influence of Schumpeter upon his work, entrepreneurship is never
341
Lionel Robbins, quoted, Elster, Explaining Technical Change, p. 112.
342
At this time Arrow was professor at Stanford, Debreu was located in the Cowles Commission at Yale, and Hicks was professor at Oxford. Hicks and Arrow received the Nobel Prize for their work on general equilibrium theory in 1972. Debreu received a Nobel memorial prize in 1983. It should be remembered that the Nobel Prize for economics was only first awarded in 1969.
343
Downs, #x2018;The Origins of an Economic Theory of Democracy#x2019; in Bernard Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective, p. 198.
344
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 3.
345
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 195.
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linked to innovation. This is not just an oversight, a simple omission that can be easily rectified. Downs#x0027; spatial framework leaves no room for innovation. To see why, we must return to the analysis laid out in Chapter 2. Downs, it will be recalled, introduces the spatial framework with the assumption that #x2018;political preferences can be ordered from left to right#x2019;