\JNlVERSilY OF GEORGIA ltBRARIU
/~OTES
ON BOOKS
ETA AND THETA OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS
being the record
by
MYLES BURNYEAT and others of a seminar held in London, 1979-1982
i.
PREFACE
This
monograph
is
a
sequel
to Notes on Zeta,
by the Oxford Philosophy sub-Faculty.
published
The London Group,
in
1979
started by
G.E.L. Owen in 1976, and described by Christopher Kirwan in the preface to Notes on Zeta,
has continued its discussions
totle's
Metaphysics
in
the
Institute
Square,
and we were encouraged,
of
of the text of Aris-
Classical
Studies
in Gordon
by reviewers of Notes on Zeta among
others, to publish the record of our discussions of Books Eta and Theta. The
form
before. some a
in which the material
No major
of
revisions
the material
given
passage
of
so as to bring the
text
(and
the dates on which the sessions consistency
of
is
presentation;
presented is much the same as
have been made;
but
together all
accordingly
occurred),
but
some
I
have rearranged
the discussions of
deleted
and
tried
references
to
to achieve some
inconsistencies
remain
-
for
example in the transliteration of Greek words. The
majority
of
the
minutes
of
sessions
are
the work of Myles
Burnyeat, and a substantial number of others are by Bob Sharplesi others Apart from those per-
were recorded by Lesley Brown and Alan Lacey.
sons,
the meetings were
Heinaman, Lloyd,
Gerald
Malcolm
attended
Hughes,
fairly regularly by Julia Annas, Bob
Christopher
Scholfield,
Richard
Kirwan,
Jonathan
Sorabji,
Julius
Lear,
Geoffrey
Tomin,
Kathleen
Wilkes, and Michael Woodsi and most of them were presided over by Gwilym Owen. A
focus
incisive circulated this by
to our discussions was given by some characteristically
and
challenging
or
tabled
Monograph
Bob
the
Heinaman,
included course,
in
a
paper
the
full
by
Introductory
appropriate
Richard read
Notes
Gwilym Owen.
Sorabji
to
one
place, and
session
on
individual
chapters
These have been included as
Bob Sharples. by
in
have been contributions There
Sarah Waterlow,
is
also
though,
of
development of her ideas on the subject of the paper
can now be found in her Passage and Possibility (Oxford, 1982). The meetings of Metaphysics our died
took
discussions
the Group that
place of
in July 1982.
Book
between Theta
discussed
May
1979
and
were
almost
these
two books of the
November
1982.
Thus,
complete when Gwilym Owen
We should like to dedicate this Monograph to his
memory.
The debt
to him,
Group and
presided over
it
as for
the
person who established
seven years
is
only one
the London
of many that
we, like so many other Aristotelian scholars, owe to him. clay 1984
MICHAEL WOODS
ii. 111.
ABBREVIATIONS
D.K.
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz, Berlin. 1903.
Jaeger
Aristotelis Metaphysica, W.Jaeger, Oxford Classical Texts, 1957.
Kirwan
Aristotle, Metaphysics translated with notes by Christopher Kirwan, Oxford 1970.
Oxford translation
Volume VIII (Metaphysica, translated W.D. Ross) in The Works of Aristotle translated into English, Oxford 1928.
Ps. Alexander
Commentary on Z (in fact by a later hand) in Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin 1891.
Reale
Aristotelis, la Metafisica, traduzione, introduzione e commento, Giovanni Reale, Loffredo 1968.
Ross
Aristotle's Metaphysics, text and commentary, W.D. Ross, Oxford 1924.
The works of Aristotle are sometimes referred to by the following abbreviations: Posterior Analytics
An. Post. or A. PQ. An. Prior
Prior Analytics
Cat.
Categories
De Gen. An. or GA
De Generatione Animalium
De Gen. et Corr. or G&C
De Generatione et Corruptione
De Int.
De Interpretatione
DMA
De Motu Animalium
De Mem.
De Memoria
E.E.
Eudemian Ethics
E.N.
Nicomachean Ethics
Met.
Metaphysics
neteor.
Meteorologic a
PA
De Partibus Animalium
Parv. Nat.
Parva Naturalia
Phys.
Physics
Rhet.
Rhetoric
So ph. El. or SE
De Sophisticis Elenchis
Top.
Topics
Capital Greek
letters
refer
to
books
of
the
Metaphysics
The convention has usually been Greek words without inverted commas.
unless
otherwise specified. Unprefixed page numbers, as in 'l019a 10' refer to the Metaphysics.
Other references: Ackrill
Aristotle's Categories and DeInterpretatione, translated with notes by J.L. Ackrill, Oxford, 1963.
Apostle
Aristotle's Metaphysics, translated with commentaries by Hippocrates G. Apostle, Indiana, 1966.
Bonitz
Index Aristotelicus, H. Bonitz, Berlin 1870. •lr
Aristotelis netaphysica, H. Bonitz, Bonn 1848-9.
followed
of
writing
mentioned
CHAPTER
l042a 3-24
The
first
to have a summary of was it e[pT'J'ta.l.
seeks
as
placed
strongly
suggests
we
but the next jolts our expectations.
are
Where
that the object of enquiry is the causes and principles
and elements of which
sentence
Z,
substance?
(~
Not Zl
Ross).
Not El (Apostle),
and causes of 'tciiv Ov-rwv as
principles
r
substances but everything.
l-2
(cf.
including not
l003b 18)?
just
A 1-2 fits better
still, offering several parallels to what is to come in Hl. Further difficulties:
and
the
elements
(1)
1C42a 6-10 goes against Zl6 on parts
('agreed by all'
might mean
'agreed by all but
the
speaker'
but l042a 24 resumes talk of agr~ed substances as if the list
had
contained
not
stance
controversial
items).
(2)
It
seems
remarkably
fiv eTvcu. and b1toxeC~evov side by side as cases of sub-
bland to set 'tC which
are
consideration
of
established what
people
by
I
argument
will
say
which
under
are arrived at
dialectical
by
pressure.
It is going back to where we started out at the beginning of Z3, before the hard work of Z was done. genus and universal. blished
by
even by
his
genus
is
argument
( a:x:~.wQ'
opponents
more
( 1038b 7 is
1
it
is
not
arguments
in
Z.
substance
the
nearest
15
to
take
advance
cases
are
can yield
xa.e6Xou
just
one
intended, both:
plus Forms (1.
than £roo,, parallel
have to go back to B for sible
Still worse (3)
to conjoin these with
If the latter also are cases of substance estaI
For
arguments
5
universal ~ood
not
more
there
is
a
not
problem as
definability
z,
nor
particular You really
[It was thought pos-
c!6wv
two. to
than
enough).
yfvo,, 1:Wv xa.e'~,QC"'t'a. substance,
in
these do not urge that
that line of argument. "=
case of
e.g.
but
by Ar
If,
how a
so
that
14-
however,
two
single
argument
selects universal over particular,
16), but not genus over eT6o<;.
Further,
the two case
reading would break with the narrower use of x.ae6Aou as found in Zl3.] More generally, (4)
nothing is said to recall the challenge to Uxox£(-
f..l.£vov as
substance
(27-8
in
of
terms
the
in Z corresponds).
blandly
actual/potential
accepts UXn distinction
Nothing recalls Z 7-9.
h"as disappeared from memory.
with to
a
justification
which again
nothing
The hard work on essence
The conclusion of Zl7 has gone for nought.
! 042a
3
I 042a
But
now,
having
got
to
point
tile
of being ready
to consider
chat
posed
1042a 3-24 may not be a summary of Z (we even tried, without plausible to
success,
make
1042a
J-4
look
ahead
rather
than
back),
one
meets
the unmistakable backreferences L!.WpL
!6etv
(l. 20 ) .
else
the
in
Again,
The
corpus
21-2,
second
is
denying
there
that
is
especially
anything
universal
So what we seem to have is
like
or
(a)
telling
the
genus
because
discussion
is
substance,
fits
a summary of Z which (b)
(1)
conclusions: nicus
z
is
to
than
our
to
the
the
indulged
'keep
predominates
merely of
z
have
such).
next
in
all
H1
candidates
(cp.
candidate
the
a
on
but
Hay 24
list
of
proto-Z the
to
-wrong
(3)
C'1ntain? order,
put
the
equals,
overemphasizing
done
leads
Ar
off
= H:
Z
'NBS
is not
as
in
play'
essence was
without
positive
hand,
recognition
and
note,
not
so much
Note
that
l042a
some
3-24
of
is
to all candidates'
no
these longer
suggestions available
would
as
have
evidence
consequence 'be
fair
interpretation of Z.
fits
there
via H (±e) then be due
ther
evidence
that
within 23-4)
refers
as shown by a
~l!.z..:!.
cause tiXXoCu.x:r1.<; which
is
concentrates
I
the on
~).T]
model, the
not
is
as
but
such
not
redundant:
Ar's
continuity
existential worries pressed by Elea.) <./>tE'p11(Y~v
is olxYCa. because it is ~1toXeCJ.1evov (Phys.
alternative
of xCvT')CTt.~ Note that
and
model is
I
of
free
broxEC~evov
Wt;;
type bemotion, of
vUv -
~dALv
thesis
looked
be
to
wl}ile
a
concern with
substance as actuality
z.
On the other
(which itself refers forward
while HI in turn looks back to ~.
The
matter
Rose~
difficulty we
had
in
(1042b 8).
from (some of)
relating
Hl
that
Hl
is
patched
space
of
a
given the are to
z
to
to Z having been grafted on to H, with the help of
few
information
together lines we
that
substances.)
Z7-9
was
met
are
some
The with
might
people
reply
seen
in effect
objection
the
be
hold
that
(a)
in
(Fur-
the
twice
fact
(a
11-
that Forms and
H3
that
1043b the
16-18
reference
parenthetical,
(b)
that Z 1-9 are anyway to be regarded as having been pressed into
z
another
raised
context
(see Notes on Zeta p.54). The
whether the fact vocabulary
raise be
that of
question was
'substance as actuality'
Z would
prevent
Ar
using
is not it
to
also
from
part of the wor-
refer
to
his dis-
z.
suggestion was
interesting
conceived.
noted rather
questions For
the
about
more
than accepted,
but
how an Aristotelian
patching
together
of
it
seemed
'course'
material
we
to
should find,
the stronger the presumption that Ar is his own tailor.
the
in 1042b 2-3 switch
r"heir previous roles. fhe thesis at
entails
xn~a
the subject in question is not the bronze
the bronze as unshaped.
but
occurs in a passage usually thought to be highly
king
type examination of change.
this
it is conspicuously not a mark of
to M?
the
back
The
The argument is:
perhaps,
well as looking back to Hl
~-
cussions in
l042a 31-b 8
that it
have been at some time a course which went
mathematicals
and that
the
ZH9,
to
would
12,
summarizing
the
for
but
the one bit of decent Z-summary provided in Hl, viz. 1042a 17-22.
as reformulating the position he wants to start from after Z.
that
Surprisingly
to M at 1042a 22-3),
spliced
essentially designed to remove
later
Ml
Could
'.Yhat is then left
soft,
5-6,
substance as actuality later ( OOn:pov ).
is the mark of H,
line
if
the
of
the Physics,
refers
Possible
of various candidates for substance,
again on a
in
the editor got H and Z
hard work before ( 4)
in the patchwork connection. onesided
universal
Problem:
Proto-Z
213.
There was a proto-
starts
change.
types
contradict
Attention was called to M 1076a 8-10, where Ar says that the sub-
connecting work (Andro(2)
3
which would
any substance which comes to be is liable to the other
stance of perceptible things has been explained in two stages:
which adhered more closely
Z3's elimination of b1toxECI-1£VOv/\SAT')).
for
z
in
the critique of b~toxeC~evov,
without e.g.
'../hich
in
known
~ditor's
the summary is an
others,
true.
Zl0-11.
the sort of summary that a careful reader of Z would expect.
the
i.e.
nowhere
in
by
the others,
1042b 5 follow
6uot'v : it?
None
what other change is such that yEverrL<:;;/tpBopci. tloes not in Ar's
scheme
of
things,
but
the
rarefaction and
condensation of Anaximenes' air would serve.
1042 b 3-4 is not that substantial change is presupb
7-8
The
reference
to ~·
V.
I may
be
editorial,
but
perhaps
a
Jl
;!OfES ·)N ETA
1!)42b 7
<:HAPTER 2 linking
to
f._!!.~.
the
might
alleviate
some
of
the
pro h) ems of linking
Ht to Z.
analyzing what some water
it means
that
it
1042b 25
to say of a stone that it is a threshold,
is
ice,
etc.,
he would
not
need
of
a different
in each case ('Snares' p. 81). Owen's story requires not only singular subjects but also a tens,ed CHAPTER
II
e~~,
(for l042b
9-25
The
long
list
of
differentiae at under
follows:
which
,,, J<).dcx:n 'to6'twv (concluding the subsection)
~ore
than
(b) et
(c)
xp6v<Jl•
last
therefore
excess defect)
refers
in qualities
to (cf.
the
note
and
the
open-ended
This
aroms). These
list
(unlike
the
illustrated
dS
distinguish kinds
by of
Ar
the
Ar 1 s
if
discussion
he
Democritus 1
makes
letters
three
no mention of of
the
~1t
alphabet
~auld
this
geometrical
the weight
atom and atomic .:trrangments,
in
Met.
~ow,
rype
of
one
another
definition is
to make indeed
a
to
If
roll? the
A4.
he entirely relevant to
real
not,
a more
logical
the atomic constitution which makes stone, or which makes something
and lintel, breakfast and dinner, nor presumably between other, scienti'lll y more significant, examples.
perfect
hy ~he
•)•..;en
in
passage
l
Is a6't6
'Aristotle on is
giving an
in l7 the
Snares
of
if, oU66c;; r he \)).11 .
being
masculine,
But r:t6~6
can
to
Ontology',
the to
account
offered
r;he effect that
explanation of existence claims for specimen
.ingular subjects (a particular threshold. o6't6 introduces pick up
a
etc.)? a
masculine
or
Ar
the
is
no
longer
solidified'
is
not
self-
for
'The
ice
on
the
pond
exists').
Some qualms
of
his
relying
on
is generalizing over
pond
exists',
the
present
tense.
However,
the
etc., goes some way to ease both difficul-
not
singular
analyzing
the
statements such as general
statement
'The ice 'Some
ice
Thus ~xa.crtov at l043a 3 is specimen particulars, not species.
At the generalizing level there remains the problem that 'no ice exists 1 should be contingent, contradictory
in a
while
'No ice
logic which has
is
ice
1
would appear to be self-
'All A is
A'
as a theorem.
But
NB it was a main thesis of 'Snares' that in the present context neither 'The
ice
on
the
pond exists'
nor
the
generalization
'Ice exists'
is
to be rendered, tenselessly, by the existential quantifier.
l043a
2-7
It is an objection
different subject,
subject, and
if
These
lines
encapsulate
the difficulties
of
the
chapter,
difficulties which come to a head when one inquires into the reference of ~v ~o6'toL~ (a
3), 1:o61:wv (a 3), o66~v 'tOU'tWV (a 4).
Ross translated:
'We must seek in these differentiae
(lv
what is the cause of the being of each of these things (-rol>-roov hold,
an objection
pond
tense 7t£1tuxvUxr6a.L•
ties. on
to 25-l043a
analyzans
singularity
etc.).
stance 1 l'l42b
the
were felt about Ar giving no explicit indications either of his subjects'
soft enough to eat, but his story cannot differentiate hetween threshold
~-ic
on
'The ice on the pond is {now] solidified' is not a tau to-
p~pyrus
theoretical
Democritus can tell you
point.
ice
is it part of the ordi-
nary speaker's notion of a book that it is constituted by gluing to
of
so only indi-
is concerned with something closer
rhan to nominal (linguistic) definition.
sheets
'The
contradictory,
exists'.
compares with
Plutarch,
rectly microscopic types of thing,
of
less
differentiation by
and the less in Ar 1 s biology).
d.tfferentiae
to
subsumed xp~ L
are
the last section on xae'Tl 21-s summed up by Ohulc; b-xe:p·-
(e)
ox;;'!/ lA.\e:C+£L,which (rather
is structured as
O""l>v6e:cn.c; - see Ross' note), 6e:cr)..liil
(rhough xpC
(d) 't6"'J'•
15 ff.
to avoid the charge that the analysis makes 'X Err~~· tautological if
In the
•
'llake
Now none of these differentiae ( ob5£v "tol>-rwv
all
three
end we
~ol>~oLc;;) =
thresis sub-
preferred this to the alternative of trying
references
to be to the threshold
of things differentiated by the differentiae.
and
other
examples
For on the latter rea-
ding abo-Ca. (a 4) means substance in the Cat. sense of primary substance. and
it
is
hard
then
to
make
sense
of <Juv6ua1:,61J,£vov or -tO &.vtiXoyov
lv tx60""'ttp.
viz.
The attempt to_ find an alternative reading to Ross' had been moti-
Ar ~'aS
vated by a worry about its being implausible to have Ar recommend that we
look for substance tbc;; lvtpye:La lv ~oU~o&.c;;
= among the type of dif-
CHAPTER 2
l04Ja 2 ~ny ~crentiae
' 1hat
~arlier.
listed
-~ven
11..1s
c11ance
a tarted-up version
of Democritus of explaining real Aristotelian substances (living organic things),
not merely artefacts and such thin;s as the ice on the pond?
(~ate that at
l042b 31 hand and foot, which hut for their incompleteness
would be proper substances, only get ln on an abstract promise of 'other What
differentiae'.)
1 in terms of
ll-43a
would
proper
it
take
to
redo
the
For
substances?
argument
of
1042b
Ar to turn round in a
4 and say that o66Ev -to6-rwv is substance only seemed to make matters What,
worse. must
appear
admission
that
c:,,
o~o-Ca
standing
the
Ross
case,
is
the
point
of
1042b
can
be
sequence
alleviated
of
thought The
translation.
(tv 't'OU-tat.C:) seek course
finding sense
conjointly
l043a
tn
examples It
5).
-
(for
is
substances,
is
finding
laying
bare
will
put
these
proper
is at-eCa. 1'oU eTvaL
substance
'>Jhich lame
of
closer
under-
us
(a
what a
on
examples
substances).
2), in
them
is
track,
not
type
although
-
in
the
i.s
an
on
essay
(b
be
(on
the
closely
importance
relevant
to
of the
nnmbers,
see
to
substance
(a
to real
these illustrative dif-
one
of
its
theme-question
of
f)Ua-Co &>c;; tvtpye:Ln of sens~ble things?', when rhat substance ~s a('tCa. 't'OU e:lva.t. (cf. Zl7). it is clear from the earlier remarks !_hat
we
must
look:
to
these
(a 2)
the we
chapter,
~ext
(a
4)
the
saving
properly substance.
qualification:
0~;6£ tJ'1lv6~6j.!£vov
that
for
are reminded (a 2) !';ranted that (e;Lx.e:p),
the crJ1:1.
OV
'tOU erva.L
1030b
16,
(with
might
would in a
involve denial
tinuing then with (b)
(ii)
water
look
thickened
does
be
switching mid-sentence that
improve
to
the
Against (b) (i) is the conside-
the
to
concrete whole is
another
sense
o60""Ca..
Con-
(which could, if necessary, bear 'nor even': than
thickening
by itself), how do we construe ~b
somewhat
more
The sub-
is
This
is
not
analogous
to
substance
substance
tempting Jaeger to write 1:1.
but
substantial
the differentia in some specimen
it
(weakened
is
nevertheless,
by
Bonitz
to
for 1:6, but Ale enforces
says Ar,
'etwas
what
ana loges',
't6- see Jaeger's
apparatus).
Next
(a
itself,
fact
in
5-7)
that
all
actuality'.
out
of
the analogy is spelled out (no need to be disturbed
that the case of proper substances is placed first): which
other So
is
predicated
definitions
Ross,
but
also
of
the matter
it
is what
most resembles full
how does he get the idea of approximation
(not W~ eLd'XL
actuality
'as
is the actuality
It
won't
do
leave j.jd.'A..L
to
for then Ar would be saying that you get the best cases
in
the
examples
which
are
not
proper
substances.
So
in the other definitions (that which is predi-
cated of the matter is) J,!d:Ac.crta. (the actuality itself) ,i.e. as compared with
other
elements
matter which that
the
without
is
item
most in
the
idea
sum
up:
in the definition it is what is predicated of the of
all
question of
the is
actuality.
the
In context
closest
approximation having
you
to
will
come
get
into
this implies to
actuality
the meaning of
eLd'XLcrra.. To
'"e
won't
dignify
every
differentia
with
the
title
0f substance or actuality (the et'?tep clause of a 2 is not convertible),
none of these differentiae (a)
it get
of
Jf these examples, to others for that of other examples.
are
ration
of o~uCa. to
supplement as follows:
that it is to differentiae
differentiae
differentiae
chance of achieving substance proper.
l042b
is
ZS
is hard to see how cou-
chief
'What
at
Against (a}
thought
unsupplemented,
This turns out to
7-11.
for 'T60e l.v 'tii>Oe
'even') is the consideration that it
substance
below).
term
illustrative
the
in
lessons being that there are a good deal more of these than Dernocritus' three
technical
pling
the a.r-e1.ov 'toU e:!va.L of
32-3),
a
but it also applies to coupling generally.
the
The steps towards this general interpretation go as follows.
1
as
or without
other
ferentiae, but of the differentiae which are the object of our search.
l1-43a
3la 6,
by
when transferred of
function
given that
anaJogous
structure which, the
not
Nevertheless,
finding
into the definitions of Zl0-11 and those here at
does
case.
threshold
in terms of a particu-
in terms of a sort of matter such as gets
the
examples,
are
this latter to be understood either (i)
lar bit of matter, or (11)
ject is easily got from o()Otv 't'OU't'oov:
in these differentiae
these
(Ross),
l04Ja
'nor/nor even when coupled ~ith matter'
or (b)
read in accordance
the ~t'tt.ov 'ton eTv~L of these examples is not
proper
'substance'
of
a
by
2-7,
limitations
the a.f'tt.OV 'tOU erva.c. finding
substance
nf
these
4)
(a
l,
still a good way off our goal of discovering the
of example are already acknowledged by1:~6~wy a 3:
of
ll-43a
a digression if all it leads to is a
of
of sensible things (1042b 10-11)?
worries
of
the
that
we're
lvtpyELC1
These
with
in
something
coupling of them',
'nor /nor even is
:N t.TA
Jl'C::-J
but since
the
are
the
the a.r·uov tuU el'.la.L ,
threshold type of
We; lvE'pyeLa.
as is shown suffi-
example,
a.l"tCa. "taU eTva.L• we
is
must
in the differentia which a definition dis-
plays as predicate of the matter.
1043a 7-11 tions, of
of
which
13-14 and
serve
the
to
recap
grounds
are
the
grounds
indeed
of the illustrative examples.
6l
~wv
to
for
be
(threshold,
house,
ice)
reaffirm
the
relevance
but
the
Proper
General side
points
one
( 1)
takes
on
All
substances
whereby
to
are
this
can be said without prejudice to which
ll-43a
that
the
1 is about existence or the copula.
shift
to
the
notion
not to say homely,
We noted, however,
of what something is at 7-11 need be no
what we want to understand,
understand
them
is
more
accessible
to
examples like the threshold of our
house and the ice on the road outside.
it
is
for
is
is
explicitly drawn at
of
ice
what 1043a 12-14
... 'tWv 6' ..•
question whether the essay on d.pxa.C "tOU eTva.Lat
the
embarrassment to Owen's existence story. structure
familiar,
~wv ~tv
We can suppose that
gives a summary coverage of all the illustrative examples without
l042b
is an example of Ar progressing from things yvWpqJ.a. +n.itV to things
in
in the preceding analysis
That being so, methodologically no doubt the chap-
1042b 11-lda 1.
ter
us
12-
the main conclusion of
found
having to suppose that it thereby covers all the examples there are.
This doctrine is then exemplified in some specimen defini-
three
that
1tJ43a l2
and since the of>crCa. 13,
vtz. o6aCa. We;, S.vtpye:~a.,
seeking,
for of>o-Ca.
look
is
differentia
ciently clearly by
C:HAPTER l
There
So we come to the main conclusion of the chapter.
is
a
precisely
it
is
The conn2:ction between what
patch of ice to exist and what sort of
for
2:
patch of
a substantive thesis,
ice
to
thing ice as such
olxTC« displayed in a definition
the
the o('tCa. -ro1'S e!va.L,
is
a
a
exist
and moreover
what (so
it
is
you
get
when you
'Snares',
p. 82).
a
that
thesis
has
say This
to be
understood, as Ar would understand it, with some appropriate restriction is
no
one
answer
to
the
question
'What
is
substance
as
actuality?' on
(nor
a
mere
the
the differentiae
which
our
definitions
connect
with
the
equally
case
that
of
terms
On
matter.
the
variety
of
the
types
of matter,
the
for
which
it
definition of
is
claimed true.
bachelor
tells
For it
you what
it
is
is not for a
various bachelor
types
of
range
three answers as Democritus supposed), but as many as the to
exist;
a
bachelor
does
not
cease
to exist when he ceases
note that to be an unmarried man.
a lO-ll includes the high-low range of sound as matter in the definition But
of <J"U~
a
different
threshold
5,),.'X.n<;;: at
a
do
not
want
to
as
e.g.
(cf.
12
systematic
or
a
differentiae,
stop
lintel
(l042b
19).
a
the same matter
stone
Likewise,
can
a
a
is
10-11: .'te?tuxv~tvov ~- 1-1n;t.c; ~
thus
vague,
classification
but
of
1042b
31-6
differentiae
shows
under
Ar
given ~
liA.AT1
).
interested
their most
in
general
on
the
·~\\n
8. Z,
If or
defended
vague
Lmplyin~
·<Jill modes
rely 11f
that on
would
in not
another like
every definition, a
differentia
arran~ement,
tWv e:lon1Jtvwv (a
14)
etc., imply
Ar
•,o~ay
to
The
again. state
including
drawn
from
the
his
interpretation
those
conclusion
of
sensible
that?
[t
need
not.
in
contrarieties
a
by
throwing
that
H
is
to
make
if it
its
distinction to do some work in H2.
the
start
recipe make
picking
up
the
emphasis
on H1
1042a 27-
an
off
promisingly
for honey-water, actual
book,
or
is in terms of potentiality and
contribution,
one might
expect
thoughts
focussed
the
But does it?
enough,
with
out
on
or what you have to do to bits of papyrus such
natural
processes
as
the
formation
terms
proper substances,
\Ve have been working with.
began
this is to be the route whereby we will make some advance on
at least, more neutrally,
actuality
to far
chapter
potentiality-actuality distinction,
We '(~VT1.
so
The
become
such as o-6v9£cnc; or 1-1t~t.' (a 13), will admit of different
actuality,
realizations
a
presumably we
(2) with
Does 5.\A.o
and
of ice.
We seem to be thinking, by and large, in
t~rms
of the physical
affections or operations which are needed to make matter into a determinate something.
Which both makes it reasonable to start from Demo-
'tl.
l3's yd.p shows
critus
and
holds out the promise that we shall find work for
the con-
ll)41a 12
lU43a 21 r:ept
of
actuality which
could
not
be
done just as well by the notion
But it was not clear to us, at the end of the day,
of form or shape. that
he
couldn't
have
said
it
The
more
dynamic
aspect
of
the
all
with
the
matter-form distinction.
potentiality-actual! ty distinction has
not - as yet - come into play.
l043a a
14-26
A coda
definition,
side
of
one
actuality,
one
at
for
both.
That there are two elements is
the
side
of
potentiality and
illustrated
is
by
the
way
the
some
other
people
on
the
emphasize
6•6 • which is why: that
people
it
is
because
as they do (cf.
define
there
are
these
l043a
21-2
(an early
Archytas theory
surely
of
have
He
is
not
credited
definition which
featured
with a
theory of
recognized
(so Ross, Commentary p. thing
in Ar' s
prominently
surveys
of
and
due
is
6~-taA.6-rTJs 1043a 24 Hith -rO d.v~hov
<)tiginal
to
interest
st lllness
~n Eudemus),
and
d<.:!fining
lO
evenness
(cp.
then conversely uneven-
ness or indefiniteness of shape will '0xplain' motion - and the explanaof
motion
was
a
embarrassingly
little
suggestion,
any
guishing
be
matter
subject to
need
and
say
•<~hich
nn (990a
earlier
8-12).
for Archytas himself
form
(contra
Pythagoreans
had
fhere would not,
Burkart,
had
on this
to have aimed at distin47),
even
embryonically.
It would even suit Ar's context better to have a pair of theory-innocent definitions which ~~ theory of definition can explain.
more
his
prede-
Or should we think of some-
229 and DK 47A2)?
mathematical
such
as
'a
line
is
Pythagorean to
believe
interest
to
some wider another
him
habit
of
defining
that.
if
the
for
their
Aristotelian
•Jf
writing E!Oo~
in
the
own sake
( .;,pe:~Ca. as
thesis.
casualness,
twoness
of
1043a
and
olxrCa.
not (a
though
2-3
by numbers
definitions
in
length'
(cf.
-
for 24)
sort
It
alone?
are his,
is
they were of
their connection with is
Ps.-Alex.
A different
instead.
duplicated ~'tL
things
cited
l043a 26-8
of
no worse took the
1043a 29-b 4
Ar records that an a1nbiguity may lurk in words like
and
:r"rl!-la.CvEL
'line':
evidence of
adduced
bricks
and
'A line is
precaution
casualness
is
seen
if we leave both in, with Ross,
cerned, (cp. is
it
Zll
two'),
reports
that
Archytas
XLvfp-eu.u;: which
was
Pythagoreanism,
47
n.
106) where
made 'tO &.6pLO"''t'ov, 'tb &_v~a:~oy 9 better
than
Plato's
and
is
(29-30) alternative
stones
like
thusly
l037a
r:teaning,
not
definitions
arranged'
reference,
'A
'A
vs.
house
house
is
is
a
'house'
since a
the
shelter
shelter'.
8
and
the
discussion
in 211 of the definition
'A line
but where it does, something needs to be said about the rela-
that
36)
On the supposition (possibly counter'animal'
ambiguous
is
between
'soul'
dnd 'soul in a body', the two kinds of thing ~alled animal are so called not
in
virtue
of
a
single
definition but Ws "'tpbc;;
are so called in relation to a single thing. was
best
construed
':tnimal'.
without
(A)
be
'Soul'
is
included in
thought to imply that
importing
~v.
~ost
a
third
The two kinds
of us agreed that thing
besides
the
Rather, one of the two definitions presupposes
ur makes reference to the other.
Eudemus
the
is
tion between the two meanings.
this
Attent1on was called to DK 23A 23 (sequel in 58B 32 - cf. Burkart, in Ancient
etc.,
two in length' vs. 'A line is two'. So far dS H3 is conis a question whether in a given case this ambiguity lurks
two kinds of
Science
ox11 ,
(a 27) corresponds to We;
CHAPTER [Il
than many
tather than excise the second with Jaeger.)
dnd
AWe;;
The search is over.
form
1043a 34), which might be represented as an improvement on the traditio-
J.l'tCa.
Archyta.s ·
calm
definition
both matter
Are subsequent examples of still weather and a calm Archytan
in them.
Lore
If
meaning 'in how many senses/ways it exists'.
cessors). but with accepting certain definitions which had both elements
hard
indicate
two
The conclusion
19-21).
at 12-13 explains this, and is thereby confirmed.
nal
might
the expense of the other when defining and others find a place
elements
would
This
VTJVE~-tCa. and yaA.fJvn.
tion
to the chapter.
on
these.
;.~hich
is which?
'soul in a body' , and 1043b 3-4 might
the use of
identifying xCv"'")'"Lc; with
l0
ll
'::lan'
to mean just 'soul'
is some-
it
,,-·iir:ary
use
of
nan'
to
h-'3
r:".t:!d.n
as
this
secondary
to
der i'.''-~d
~oubtrdClion)
(by
::.o mean 'soul in a body'. -whiCll las~ ;__;;, t.her•:!iore che ~v (B) dlld
The claim that
bnnes
a
in
animate
certaln •..Jay',
r)bjection:
stand
'.Hay'
the prt•Jr
that
'man'
un1';3S
man
'man'
is
'flesh
=
'animate
'soul'.
just
l.Jirn t~vn yuu .lo not undecstand composite
unless
nonct)mposite
as
'man',
th011gh
IOU
,;,~ed
th1.t
·..;orr:l..
F1\L-ther
give
'..lith
~qual
validity,
'flesh
dnd
us,
bqnes'?
Well,
Reply:
'man'.
look
1'l_~
dt
not
of
co;1rse ~vtll
tJroblem: third
..1
J2lh
nut thi.i line
:-:teaning
ff.:
20
understand
~
';nan'
of
flesh
and
bones
we
Can
:-;tato2ment
decide
fact
lS
tetween
l~)43a
"l.t
37-b
irreif':vant
reason t;tven is
because C{~rned
J.re
.1sklng
',,.ri~h
are
we
'man'
to
the
il.i\l
Lhe
(
about
8)
by
-Lnquiry
•neanin~
as
:.>Ubstance
mt!aning
form
tne as
or
,_,,e
lhere
was
actuality
~o
settle
for
1.:1 tdCt
J.!Ubi~UOUS
·~in~
.,nd
that '·-:an'
'..Je for
')resent
have
purposes
l_fl
a
l3
tne r,tarmer
!Jerfectly
the composite,
'C~.nimal'
,;<etcned.
~~ad
·..;ccd
ts
r,(h,;'S
Ar himself
·1~1ly
Lhin:t r-ilar
"'
he
some
because we concerned
Lnclination to
Uo
for
r:he
0r
not
'leed
any oLher Hord
LU~Jb
form,
·;o :Lc dnes :lot r:~att':r ·~-=-
'house'
that
hat ·1hat W'e
that
C:(,JTL!-'1;:-,i~e definltion of
only be con-
decision here.
·.;her:. her
.J,OIJd
indicate (a) that
shall
we
with
rnal
2-4 as explai\'iZ..
',:;oul',
.Jn occasion 'man'
1C: 1db 6 presupposes
L> ,l.'lbi guous
this
">oul
but
supposj
inn
t
(NB xa.(,
1.7
on
principles)
Zll.
the
face
what
of
it
the .1mbiguity thesis
from
term
ambiguity
is
the
H3
or
is
thesis is
of
type
-
these
(But
Yet
the
is
.1nother
4-ways ambiguous
-
sentential context ~t:l_ect~ one of
the
t::"NO
would
not
it
36-7?)
'There's a man
it can happen that a
meanings
be
whether
point of
to ~he view Lha.t
ttnless
the
is
questions about
reading
definition,
then what would be
would commit one
Or
(on Aris-
definition discussed
,,..,e face
right
is simply
another?
Platonist
in the chapter,
which
int~re"itingly
!Jy Ar
ZlO-ll.
and
ambiguous.
house'
'vhether
elsewhere
doubtful
is
the
the
believed,
between
The in
as
Here,
relation
that
it
the
thesis actually espoused than a consequence deducible
totelian
At
'dnimal'
The ~ passage remains to be considered, together
problem: is
hypothetical
a
dS
less
a
import
,md
Wuxf)again, l. 6).
so
1~43b
4-14
eluded
La L.ll
given
of the term.
This
'2xploitell in a p!lper by ~1.J. Lo•lx in !'!_ind,
approached
perhaps
its
this
with
some
bark was uorse
dismdy,
but eventually con-
than its bite.
Ar's general
purpose seemed reasonably clear; the ctifftculties were those of detailed lnterpretation.
::r6v8EO'"I.C,: nor cerned;
Ar
a
iJ,tl;1.<;
when we
of
have
seems is
11ake
to
simply a
a cr6v8e:rrt!;
or )J.t'f;i.c;
sort
(b)
fhe crUv8£crLt; or tJ.L~"c; ;nust
either
in
mixture
the mh:tt:re •,,rhicb
whose in~redients are
ingredients.
7he
two
main
points:
r:onjunction
of
the
(a)
Neither a
ingredients
con-
listed the ingredients, ·,..re have still to specify
·..;hat
point
is
is
itself
it
tntended,
e.g,
in
~.;hat
ratio.
not he treated as itself an ingredient,
the
i~ 1
a sort of
second-order
first-order mixture and
the original
s:lmildr
or
i.s
~o
;:hal '1lade 'lear the end of Z1.7
(l041.b 11 ff.), though ~e did not 9urs1te this in detatl, nor ~sk whether it bore on the relations between L.
<~nd
H.
The ;Ttain questions of r!etail that puzzled us were these:
che
1 ,-, 3 ?a 7
We
that
([) ~
h
_::~
is Ar himself wno 2ntertai~s the thought that
(A)).
v.•hy
(~B
his
is
SJLH\.'!S
false,
':;ht:lr-,er nf bricl<.s'. 1n 1
support
1 h,Jt
'Socr:tces'
37)
The
,.,r\uch :rtusc. here ;;1ean
that
shall
\ ; hird no~sibility not ;:,)nsLiered is
is
r:hink
puzzling
(·ta:n'ta.,
substance?
Or (b)
•:Jmposite?
·narry (d) •r~ith (.-\),(b) with (B).
LO
to',
Does
substance
soul?
ambi~uity
~;ensible
into
·~)clongs
~ensiole
about
in.}ependently
the
~henv~.nenon of
form and actuality.
,
asking
'man'
as
•bat
that essence or 't·r,c:
identical \.J'ith 1
'is
(,\)
i
;vho
.Jan. 1979.
n ~cnoUv.
J, \))._., \.ty£'t"O.\. XC'... ~ tO Er(sos lrd.p~
.J.mbiguous,
possiiJility is
1nd ,~ach ,;!.' snch parts i.s 6vt-c0Y, :;ATlt:Ep 't,l.L tiUv O':f...\w\1 ·rWv tv bf..~ eT6o~ f:xOv-rwv· xa.l yO.p
is
not che ..:ldim that you do nut under-
the meaning of
thought
ZlO l036a 16-17 lt
in
~tnd~cstand compos it!..'!
you
~leople'
Sf)!Tie
xa.~'s
in '0t; 1tpbc ~v.
understand
_/Otl
:1.eantng of
its use
must understand 'soul'. chat precisely shows that you must under-
stand it
cerLain
that claim is the
composite
fiJU
11f
so
from
you do n·Jt ttnderstdnd c0mposite
J.
unless you understand 'sou~,
:tan
if
in
if ,.,-e under-
'soul'
j'}St
c-an only understand -;tand
is
an ambiguity into the name
~loes
it
Does l:x first
'"'lean
have
the
sdme
'crHlsist 0f'
meaning (h
c3
5)
Jnd
throughout then
'h~
the
passage,
0r
adequately defined
1 041b
1043b 4
in
terms
of
'fhis
(b 1 )?
Litter
view enables
Again at
a reason for the one before i t . that
,10 t
either
that
but
a
threshold
reference
to
or
position
than reference to a
threshold (104lb 23,
a
incidentally,
is
more
so for say
at
any
so
far
refers
as
to
o!,O!: Ot}
1043a 7-12).
that
~ith
all
the
the
Other
cases
brou~ht
in;
~ases
understanding
bl0-4
(Christ
bl2
at
that
fail
b14,
also
as
J,
readings
we
wondered
a
misprint.
was Ross
follows
(and
in
to
the
with
some
threshold
example
to x;
a
is
first
at
1042b
15
f f ·
n olxrCo.
drops
thinks
Alexander s
text
in his
as
the
(with
seems
conjunction
at
oU'te: clause
to
Bonitz),
support
translation.
revised
the
for
was
the
preceding -11 o6o-Ca. thinks
it
to
Jaeger
mss.,
•. .mulct is
to
a
need ot
before
man animal
~wuld
find
footed) element, unly
the
new group
-
that]
are but
something -
substance,
people, We
it.
two-footed,
matter
matter.
of
as
else
somethin~
and
E
his
commentary he returns
in
of iS
referring
back to
takes l:l;a~opoUv'te::c;
br1ng
in
a
Alexander's
view
[if Ls
people needed,
which
3hould
with
reference
if
neither
these 1s
nor
suggests,
follows:
think
this (additional element:.)
in
be
stating the substance
think of animal + two-footed as
the sentence,
indicative 6e:t;
the
forced
on
anyone
The
ground
for
23
related
to
from AX\.d.
who
the
1'1.
solution
onwards,
coun-
thought
given would
man was
dnimal
be
... two-
justified such an interpreta-
to
he
it 'nor
is,
they
(animal and
two-
consists
of
an
is responsible for
treating 4-14
these
(so
lines
as parenthetical is
Ross ad 23-5);
but there may be
questions to raise about this in due course.
R. Heina-
The context of the passage was discussed in the light of man' s
of
1
paper
1
Aristotle s
taken up:
artefacts
( 1)
and
Tenth Aporia'. E !Oo,
If the
Two main theses of that paper
is perishable,
other cases not excluded,
at
then it
least
in the case
is not
the species
but the substantial form which is referred to; for Aristotelian species eternal.
(2)
the
If
el6o~
is
pecishable,
it
is
not
individual,
11niversal (general, shareable, etc.), There· was passage
does
some
question,
actually
What
assert
Heinaman the destruction of grounds that a
are
(i)
strictly
consequence
cp.
not
be
esp.
l033b
yet'
(1.
(ii)
19)
was
'{Uestion reference
Platonic and
to
whether
Platonism Platonism
agnosticim on whether l)f
perishing.
If
-::-0. 'Uvd.,
as
the
facts
is
clear
it
that
there
are
wholly
could forms
forms
be
are
are
that
this
they do
in the forms
present of
arte-
not survive His chief
says
means
to which it can be objected only
that
(ii)
could not Platonic to
eternal
hence
15
say it forms
HI,
settled. quite
not
is
that
the
the claim that the target here
(existing apart)
not
perishability
or 'M.p& -rb CJ6voXou
eternal,
Platonist Hants,
Ar the
they do
by ·reference as
of
i.e. they are perishable.
the same;
Ar
whether
these forms are not xwpLCT"t'a.( and not
passage
Zl3-16
to
l060b 23-8;
separation
challenged
of
that
as
perishability
being xwp~crt"a.C
not
20-1)
K2
with
speaking of
argues
the composite,
two things are one and could
first, the
he asserts is that
less clear.)
which such peonle would be ignoring, mentioning
So if
14-23
Wo"te
apparatus
volume)
therefore interpreted as
but
not
thought e:( 'taU6'\SXTJ perhaps
We
facts. the
people who ignore the matter; we agreed, and thought that if tt;nt.poUv't'e:c; referred
one
and
in Jaeger 1 s favour, apart
Alexander
•
two in
hut
l-::cKeon
awkwardness
irrelevant
of
'-x'
of
E's position is
All '"'e could find
support,
Ross
bl3
nccurrence
J has ob unambiguously;
Jaeger's
but
Jaeger
Alexander
mss.;
the
translation
immediate
but
Jaeger
abo-Ca.,, "tOU'to at
thoughx
traditional text.
-rt)v \5\:nv,
1043b that
goes.
(Jaeger's apparatus seems to attribute contra-
whether
1
from an
his
r..;ell,
reads
they would not does
to do
this sentence and the next
issues.
despite
but
footed.
are he
in the last two cases. dietary
Ar' s
were
textual
&xx•
dropped
requires ~XX');
drops o6
raises
not
!:.x ( = consist
need a section to themselves. (3)
himself
the matter, we wanted to make terfactual,
( 1) we can presumably
mentioned
but
511bstance,
1
introduces yet a not her kind of case, where
a genus and differentia are
is
Since Ar
it.)
the
ensuing
this
tion.
If we are right under
rate
't'Wv O:XN..uv presumably (cf.
imply
the same reason?
yes,
for
the
Eor understanding position.
says that something could:1.'t be
Does 6~oCw' (b8)
1
in
COt1515tS
and
itself'.
presumably saying
is
important
threshold is
in?) jt1st one thing without being identical (2)
1
iJOSition
b~ing,
to g~ve
che yd.p c2lause
Ar
b~
of
perishable not
could
keeping
ZB
(cf.
'not at all clear
•...;hich does One
in
since after is
suggest
with
things.
regard
the
that
a
Ar 's
present
or perishable without
process
they can ~xist
separately ~ap~
(contraposition)
exist
if ~vith arte-
separately Jtnp6. "tt\ 't'Lvd.,
in
10
l 'J4Jh
1
4
Lhose as
cases
they must
perishab1,_!, in
·~tecnal
·lOt
cannot
exist
besides
the
(the
specifies
20
l.
same
which
inference
forms
cannot
those forms cannot be sepa-
it looks to be tautological:
be xwpLcr-"ta.(,
rate '~·hich
be
the ~= clause
([f
K2).
Better.
particulars.
therefore,
to construe 15ou not as specifying lvCwv but as epexegetical to xwp ~crt"a.C: 'except that it is clear that be
separate,
that
is
to
the substance of some perishables cannot
say,
cannot
exist
besides
the
particulars,
there
were
being
and
the
to
But
the
proposition
of
the
forms
would
view
connection
with
( 1)
an Aristotelian species succeeds of
another
eternity
other
(l)
and
the
perishable
Ar
was
that
emphasized
the
eternity
is Heraclitean rather than Platonic:
without
which
it
any
here
single entity enduring.
denies It
things?
for
artefacts
may be doubted,
and
of
one man
Is this the kind leaves
yet to doubt
open
passages
other and
of
are
looked
not at
(e.g.
or
one
ZlS
come of
us
forms
to
the
be key
two
i.n
f .lnd
1039b 20-7, A3
the
above
l070a
for
that
have
can the this
of
that
and
Second, we on behalf
of individual forms. As
to
the
first,
some at
least of the opponents were anxious not
to be stuck with defending, on Ar's behalf, a tame version of Platonism. The Aristotelian principle 'A universal exists if something instantiates should not be taken to assert a mysterious biconditional connection
it'
two
universal is
its
indistinguishable
and
From this
particular
of course, nf
instantiation.
instantiation,
somewhere. in a
its
thing
it
~
forms
its
of
affairs,
the existence of
The existence
exists
point
still exist as
individual
states
of
just
insofar
view its
ceasing
as
ceasing
of
just
is
instantiated
to
be
instantiated
to exist there -
say that
except
as
is
not (in
a
difficulty
that
they
for
are
realized
those
who
predicable of
but belongs with a committed Aristotelian If
the
instance is perishable,
that is
and the form is nothing 7ta.pd.
This, of course, is compatible with
perhaps
it
be thought an objection to
will
'The
causes
lhe opponents
be required to explain how Ar can both
(universal) forms are and are not -as t:hou~h
of
different
indi victuals
[ sc.
of
~~n, while in their universal definition they are the same'.
press
hard the objection that you and I
same x LvT')a'ov
and
insist
that
Ar
does
of the various causes (as opposed to rent,
so as
he
the
a-ft,
l)J.ft
that as
to
leave
themselves
:: different x~vi;cm.v to
all
same
not
~
Opponents
may be siblings from the actually assert
that
~ach
the total causal story) is diffe-
room
to
insinuate
that
the
form may
it
is
supply
construed as
of
it.
'the
To
to explain coming
that
is
the
required causal difference.
talk of your form and mine may be admitted on condition form of you as a composite being',
identificationally posterior
needed
the
same so long as there is a different matter (note the feminine
Alternatively,
required,
the to
to
the
composite,
objection that
be,
since
i.e.
not as prior to and
form as universal is not
another
concrete
individual
is
the reply was made that the same argument would
apply to form as individual. Another
though it may,
propound the above principle for the existence of nni.versals and, compar_ibly with that,
exist
different, ~ ~€ ~ ~~~ x~\ ~o e!oo~ xa\ ~ 0 x
are
the
it
instantiated somewhere else.
should not
a universal
not
Consequently, the perishability
universal
view.
but
the
allows for eternity and being/not being to hold of
it
forms:
explanatory between
that
Talk of
As to the second, AS 107la 27-29 is a favourable text for indivi-
15-17) where forms are
been adduced
do
things
as
reconcile.
the same thing.
must sense
perish in a 5pecial way?
and
passages
forms
its realizations here and there.
it is not
First,
directions.
satisfactory
:1
perishable
Heraclitean eternity,
dual
took
(2)
individual
universals
to
and parcel with Ar • s dedication
part
for
than kinds of species.
of
difficult is
end of that realization of the form,
3pecies] Discussion
that
parcels of matter),
to dispute the truth of (1) but to agree that Ar's topic is forms rather
opponents
tasks forms
can stand as Ar's own Hithout
(2)
So what of the theses themselves?
this passage. In
of
of
these
understanding antecedent
being of
in this particular individual or that.
multiple e.g. house'.)
two separate not
,Jn
whether
passage considered was A 3 the
items
such
as
'house
l070a
13-17,
without
but we deadlocked
matter',
;tre not, were to be taken as individual or as universal. here ~np~
on
the
which are
and
So no help
preceding statement that the form of ho115e does not exist
the composite.
[7
-----------------------l(ll!!i'Ol:;-------:--------:---------------.. .-..
h·:S.otJ#'!I_.,.!;;'e~Z!fit:.~~·,"'·
l04lb 23
'.-\t- ft:;R
l0_43~2_l_~~----~r~tisthenes
28-32,
which
theory
on
was
to
once
Ant.,
In
23-32
commonly
is
to
Aristotelian
in
>.:~ertaln
2.J -d
qnly
used
father language
r_o
,\ntlSthenes.
L~a_t3tetus
the and
content
(A)
Dream
and
for
its
"lpplies.
allowing definition for composites could not be the consequence (ilx;-r',
of
28)
an d.JtopCa. about
Burnyeat 's paper to
think
defining
necessary
it
to
follow
against
'point'
Ross'
Jaeger's
from
the
accepted
from
a disinclination
emending
or
translation
'plausibility',
so
of
26-l [xa.C] •••
of xotov ~lv ~c x~X.
as
Socratic -r(-Jto'tov contrast),
for xaLp6v,
that
Ar
'timeliness'
should
not
part not
the ~~opCa.
of
a
concession
of
himself
sort.
The objection here was that 'Silver is like tin'seems a striking example which any
should
have
some
non-definitional
like tin'
part
tifully
in Cyprus', to
play.
descriptive
it
whereas
statement
(m
would
8urnyeat 's
serve.
reading
'Silver
could
be an (imperfect)
applied is
the
'silver'
H3.
The
next
question
which
specifically
'the
Antisthenians enough of a
sistent problems from can
said
out
at
definition be
and
how
Ant.
l043b
where
similarly
of
of
the
once: being
it,
two
(1)
23-8
fits
with tJ.29
persons'.
Perhaps Ant.
passages,
but
if
one
does
try,
A 29 can be read as saying that
impossible)
nothing else;
either that "X.6yo< is
'It is
32-4,
there to be no call to make a con-
only (ii)
a even
thing's
proper
if X6yoc:;
is
definition, only one X6yo.; is admitted for each thing, so: case,
l024h
H3 has the more diffuse reference
uneducated
paradox-monger for
position arise
was
names
like tin',
two
(so far
definition
broader
than
the very thing that H3 allows. 'Nhy
impossibility 0f
falsehood
in of
consequence
Any solution must be such as to explain of
contradicting
( 1024b
33-4).
his
thesis
Ant.
and
practically
was to
the
to
the
~v
Socrates,
thesis
is
8:
that
the context
roughly, su bj ec t s one description
only
f.
t~·here
in 629,
'double'
is
2.
so that
And
if
is
or because e.g.
is the
'treble'
'not double'/'treble' cannot be meaningfully
not
meaningfully,
coherence with
'Silver
the ).6yo~ of 2 (would negative de-
is not
anything?)
the
silverish' silver
by
nor
of .629
rest
falsely. spells
The
(or something of
the sort)
(A)
is
and
'Silver
trouble
incoherence
with
should be
like tin'
should
fail to say anything about silver. (B) e.g.
The
units
are
states
silver's being like tin.
not
even
like tin, which fails
falsely.
to A29,
of
(cf.
affairs
dv-rLX€yEav
nho 1t£1tove6~,
10),
would involve saying silver
to describe that state of affairs at all,
This makes the remarks about Ant.
somehwat digressive
cued by the thought (31-2, where perhaps the parentheses should
be removed)
that a false
X6yo~ is not the '\6yo<; of anything. Ar 's point
that if you take that thought the wrong way, Ant's olxet'oc;; A6yo~ the-
is
sis results.
Consistency between !129 and H3 is achieved because while
~29 excludes all false statements, leaving true ones intact, H3 excludes a
subclass
is
that
of
the
latter,
allows
(B)
an
viz.
definitional
truths.
acceptable otxe'to~ X6yot; to
One
be
as
objection
long
as
tv6£;~
(C) there
a
The units are essences
is
thing
113,
no as
fits
room a
H3
definition.
This
(A)
with 629,
rival
is
definitions,
outr_ight
nor
such
inconsistent
with
and does not yield the general
Av~LAtyeLvand falsehood indicated prima facie in the text.
Note that -vith
between
than
t
l024b 29) and the thesis is that
for ~v·nX..tyELV
false
less well
rlenial of
(cf.
you
ev
',.Jish, which was thought not to be a natural reading of the rubric
impossibility
The suggested solutions we discussed can
be distinguished by what they take to be the 11nit in J 3).
committed
silver, the
into
double'
not 2,
this
For
in the silver
which would mean excluding
a.ll other comparisons, or it is not, which would mean that &29 disallows
further,
'not
an acceptable Myo~ of
instrument for getting
to the right thing (note 6 Liidl;a.L,
In this sense it might be the nearest one can get to definition.
27).
was
name
Ant.
the X6yot; of
be
3, to
that
i.s
attach
fits
e.g. loihich
is
l:cru, but unlike, say, 'Silver is found plen-
does not say -r(
someone
to
because
X..6yo~ of
(deriving some
are
about
This
scriptions
Less dpproved was Burnyeat' s
endorse the d.xopCa. or the grounds for it. understanding
This 1vas
together with (i)
units
I ~"1.:0 Jh 2 3
2's own \6yo«;, hence something else's X..6yo<; \vhen you say '8 is double' (b 35-a l). Thus understood, Ant. allows '2 is double' and rejects '8 is double'. The impossibility of &.v-n.).tyeLv would then follow either
<6p(
anything.
in ?hronesis 1970,
The
description,
,
at
it would be compatible with (A),
all
(see
above),
\. .5yo<; longer
than
one
word,
:-teaning
Ross
ad
109la
(cf.
to
rather 7,
supposing
take \6yov ua.xp6v than
(l043b
(A) ran cope 26)
as
any
in the specialized proverbial
Burnyeat p.
113,
115)
'evasive verbiage
such as slaves tell to cover up failure to rio the job assigned to them'.
'· 9
l.Ydb L8
l04Jb 32
l043b
28's
28-32
Wo--te:
Uxrt.'
has
ted:
the
trick
clause
Bxe:L
't~v& xat.p6v,
for
which
reason
after ~ in
in
is
relate ii.xrt'
to
not
30)
Burnyeat
to
in
conjunction -..;ith
to
the
preceding sentence's
subordinate d.Jtop'a.•
the
the
the
Burnyeat's account was accep-
and
main
to
see
We--t'
comma rather than a colon
punctuates with
clarifies
a
Just
definiens. puzzles
the
the
Thus:
connection.
ture
Ar wishes
this
complexity
Antisthenians
to
and
~~opCB
Their
achieve 1ts goal.
moral
of .4-14
predicative
structure
is
makes them say a definition cannot
is timely as focussing the very struc-
The
affirm.
or
consequence
-
the
consequence,
that
( £r7!:e:p X'tX., 30-3), of this predicative structure in which one ele-
ment
stands
to another as matter to form -
right.
only
is
difficulty
the
chapter,
refers
9_tg_y to
so
remains
it
is that only complex items
that
1044a 14-23 that
The
it confirms that 14-23 is parenthetical. 14-23
is
mentioned But
11-14.
the
in
the
summary
and
to
104 3b
14-23
is
parenthetical
32ff.,
not
to
to
the
terminal
p.
1043b 4-14, chunk of
23-32,
the
text
(44a
and
'If
substances
as
not
as
(numbered
collections
or
abstract
is
not
(cf.
of &pL9J..1,6.:;
sense
is
this
complexes
it is in this
Keep J..i.Ovdbwv and
units'.
of
it
translate:
is in this way,
elements,
not
as
viz.
some say as
units.
are what we call numbers, sence
of
certain way 6.pL61J.oC,
in a
numerable)
of
in what
'If numbers are substances,
assemblages are
1):
Jaeger worries about the text of 34. Ross
231 mistranslates 33-4 as
way
(~
and this
8).
But
the Platonists) substance/es-
substance/essence
is,
as
has
been
seen
(~avtp6v and o~~w' referring back) in a certain way a number of elements
which
is
with
one
the
5).
common
same
So we nor
to
use
phrase are
the Greek <tpL8~6~ (cp. <tpL9~6~ 'tL~
of
famously
not
to
ask
seek analogies
in
'Is
the
definition of
one of the substances,
for
between substance/essence and
in
~·
time,
34
219b
instance,
e.g.
8,
but
to appreciate that one may, with some justice, say that o~Ca is &pL9~6~
summary
(puzzlingly enough)
or ~b 't( ~Y e!vnL
(l0-1)
being compared to ~pL9J..~,6.:;?
8?'
can be defined. I f this is
to
understood
that we must recognize a certain complexity or predicative structure
what
is
be
the e:r~ep clause 30-3 (which shares the same consequent with
that
is
to
of 23 and its reference to 4-14.
-
provided
one
takes it in the right sense of &.pc.6~6,,
Platonists' sense of '(abstract) number'.
has
made
it
clear
(q>a.vEpov 6~ xn\ OLo'tL
why
not
in the
For the preceding discussion
32-3)
substance
is
in
a certain way a number of elements.
into which it is sandwiched.
We
further
discussed Burnyeat 's contention that Aristotle is here
maintaining that substance is a numbered collection of elements, rather than
What
are
the Kpoi't
can say (as with Wittgenstein) comes
6.
to
Perhaps
(cf.
all we
Definition
is that there must be some.
an end somewhere (and not usually with a category)
-
cf.
35-
Of this we can be certain even if we cannot give examples of inde-
finables.
concerned
to
draw
an
(i)
analogy
between
substance
and
number
Of the four analogies he states (ibid. p. 4), (3), that a principle
of unity is required (1044a 1-9)
l!
something which he asserts elsewhere
of !!umber, not in the sense of a numbered collection (Metaph. A 9 992a l;
l043b 32-44a 11
The points of analogy between ob
(1)
Both are divisible
will
suffer
Both
stand it
is
as that by which we number.
is
until
subtraction in
need
of
or a
you
come
addition
principle
to indivisibles;
without of
unity,
loss
of
(2)
Neither
identity;
something
in
(3)
virtue
of
Ev l.-x. -n:oA.XWv (text of 1044a 3 hard hut sense clear); (4)
:ieither admit of more/less.
We are speakin~ of +J xa"t'i\ -rO
eTboc; abo-Ca.
he
low);
should
but
he
assert
this
apparently did,
We agreed that we found it paradoxical
even of number-by-which-we-number and,
it was maintained,
(see be-
there is no evi-
dence that he asserted it of numbered collections (where also we found it
difficult
to
see
in •.1hat
way
a
principle of unity could plausibly
he required). (ii)
Analogies (2)
elsewhere t.27
20
1082a 15 ff., 20 ff.).
M
that
which
Against this it was argued that Aris-
that by which we number.
totle
to
number
1024a 12 ff.
(l043b 3ft.1044a l) and (4) rather
and Cat.
than
to
6a 21 ff,
2l
numbered
(l044a 9-11) are applied collections.
respectively.
at
Metaph.
It was agreed that
l043b 32
.e;TES ON ETA
this
point
numbered
was
weaker,
collections
in
(and
that
these
indeed
analogies
of which one is no more three than another But
(iii)
dicussion
context
of
the
'.vould
apply
the point was raised:
collections, what are they?). in the
l!l44a 2
(C~t.
in
also
to
present
if the threes
6a 22) are not numbered
H3
as
a
whole,
the
point
the
distinction between numbers
important
point
about
the
analogy
and
coll~ctions.
numbered
between
substances
not the ~ber of elements in a given essence,
but
and
Difficulties
to
awkward
numbered
were
that
first
collections
is
against
this
the fact that there
interpretation.
It
was
·nc:.
and
in
e:r-xep
33
not
felt
to
l5ff.
the
•)nly
a
<:lllswers
possible
from
could
the
not
operation
could
do
principle counting
the
if
exist
of
were
(as numbered
counting
counting;
there
(Hhether
of
unity
is
presupposes
needed
the
for
Aristotle
souls,
110
not
unities
pointed
out
question
express much of
that,
..rhat
virtue since
unifies
1
~auld
as
in
of
ever But
numbers
numbers
.::tre,
them co11ld
[s
count
is no help as
outside
The first
be
t hemse 1 ves.
case,
discussed
the
the number seven
for Aristotelian forms,
i.n any
not
may
other
actually
this
themselves,
number-series.
anything
so
things) unless there tvere they
of numbered things 0r not).
these alternatives is not paradoxical,
are
the
none of '.>~hich
a unity in virtue of itself or in virtue of something else?
The analogies between sub-
was
derived time
particuJ ar set
oi
of
that substances ~ numbers in 1043b 33-34, even though this is quali-
by ·i'l'.oH;
be as
that
\.Jhere
analogy (1043b 34-36) applies "!!re easily
than to numbers.
l 1 V~2a
!17
help.
that,
this
stance and number were felt to be rather weak to justify the assertion
fied
could
act
r<'lised
the
11uch
souls
is something that unifies them.
felt
At
numbered things could not exist
The
numbers
•;eems unity hold
that a principle of unity is needed for substances is of more importance than
passage.
Platonists are allowed are ~.J.~8£E;~c;. -'r·pf], uC~LS and ?to-Le;,
too,
lt
was
,1bstractions,
the
in
the
same
terms
more
and
less,
apply to concrete things.
a qualification, especially as it is followed up by the non-hypothetical statement in 34. 1044a -~-=-!.1. 1043b ~ forward
it was argued that q>a.ve:p6v in 32 and oU~wc; in 33 referred
rather
than back,
l044a 7 being advanced as a parallel in the
case of the latter.
1044a 2-9
The
(e.g.)
sense
given by the various corrections in a 3 is conIt would in any case be odd to say that the number
was
a
Ihe Platonists
principle of referred
to
and so can't,
for
unity
have his
principle an
own
l045a 7f.
answer in
of to
order
this
(cf.
demand,
to make
the
unity in
standing of number, a
ff.,
33
more
of
composite
substance
may
admit
and
,,....hich
less.
si.mply
fhe
This
:t.sserts
that
the
nf
appears
to contradict
~ubs~-~~-~ does
suggestion was made that
not
admit
the present passage
might be explained by the doctrine of tl1e 1mperfect mastering of matter
firmed by 1044a 7. seven
3b
':'a...'::...
The
substance xa~& ~b El&o~ cannot.
although
M7
among
l043b
34
the have
a
l082a
20
ff.);
but
it
numbered.
different
in Aristotle's view,
under-
meet his demand does
he himself
and does he have to have an answer of objection against
refers to the problem again,
but
might
even
22
be
the
Platonists?
H6
the discussion that follows
is concerned with substances rather than numbers, that xa.t .~~:e:pt ~oi;c; dpL8uo6<;;
things
and it was suggested
gloss
inspired
by
the
hy
form
is
no
It
was
(de
objected
constitutes 1\ristotle form
Gen.
a
4.
168
f.
that
the
767b 8ff.);
cit.)
•.;hat
a
suggestion
that
woman
though less so as a o-UvoAov.
distinction between male and female scarcely
lesser
is ~nimal,
argues
the
i..s
but IJ.aXXov ".
scale;
(lac.
produces
tissa
An.
less Clv8pW7to<; in form than man is,
'that
degree
but
'llale
need
still
of
not
imply
mastery
not J]uman at
all.
[Alex.
female
not
differ
and
1o
that.
of
For
matter Aphr.
by
man-
in e!Ooc;
-
which means species, but also form, since it is contrasted with accidental
differences
o:;uggested d
3b
passing 33
here.
ff .•
due
to
matter,
that e:r:rte:p should reference
to
snme
not
168. be
minor
33
f.l
pressed, obiection
an objection which Aristotle
fe-t
Alternatively, and to
this
tnat
the
need
doctribe
not
be
it was
clause of
spelled
was ~·
out
~OTES
l044a 13
1044a 13
E(t; 'tbv &.p~e!-J.,~>V d.vayUJYi'lc: refers to the view of Aristotle's
l"fi(,;
opponents
ON ETA
(1043a
33
cf.
f.,
Zll
1036b
12);
Aristotle
Reservations
is not claiming
meaning
that he himself has achieved, or even proposed, such an d.vny~.
both
and
usages
in meaning
6,
Meta.
definitions: l043a
14-18,
l064a
l033a
l-5,
b24-26,
~·
19-28;
194a
Z
lO-ll,
1-7,
l025b
De Caelo
277b
30-278a
usages that
in
whether
De
the
et
Corr.
l076a
321b
13-25,
19-22;
l037a
!1eta.
7-10,
I035a
l033b
6-9,
17-18,
1035b
l035a
l-3,
l0-17
l043a
29-
(cru:l.:l.aj)-f)
);
De Caelo 278a 13-15.
18,
b
9,
l033a
l032a 18, 23,
10 (
33,
l037a
l036a
l034b
7-8,
ll,
l035a
l033a
(x61tl>.o~),
l
De
ll
27-28, Caelo
(cf.
l036a
9 (>.hl>.ou),
l035a
278a
14-16),
this
13-15;
cf.
De
1035a Gen.
et
indicate
the
either
issue
the
form
of
the
or
the
ambiguity of composite
certain
terms
and Heinaman' s
that
can
contention
that this is parallel to Aristotle's usage elsewhere and not in itself anything this of
It
unusual.
position
through
predication,
and
Aristotle's point at tinguishing is
not,
many
but
cases
the
where
suggested
concern
that
difficulty
the beginning of
cases
rather
was
the
where
the
it
-
that
Aristotle
substance of
should
applying
this
'snub'.
not arise
But
in
the
had
arrived
at
be
the
subject
to
the
form.
H3 is not the difficulty of dis-
sharp
the
referring
distinction
grounds
to
the
that.
house,
between
even
the
if
in
difference
what
is
house
form
the
to
1043a
understanding
it
soul)
was
the
two
its
form,
involve understanding
contended,
saying that the term -
that
(though there were problems as to
But,
composite
37
was conceded on all sides
included
for
below).
in
It
in some cases (e.g.
see
opposed
claim
it
even in
as
the
primary.
(e.g.)
not,
too;
on
is
which he
this
'house'
scarecly
can mean the
certainly does
say,
and
took him to be expressing his own view; still less, therefore, would
Is Aristotle
saying
(I)
that a shelter made of bricks and stones
is a house because a shelter (a permanent shelter, is;
or (II)
and
stones
to exclude cloaks?)
that a shelter is a house because a shelter made of bricks is?
(1)
any
seemed
suggestion
excessively
of
Platonist
transcendent
forms
to
some,
The point was made that in ordinary usage
tainly applies to the composite,
rather than to the form;
totle
order
necessarily
usage? that
It was
'shelter'
composite, form
of
exist
bound
suggested
appears
house
in
in
the that
the
of
priority
point
apart
from
'house'
cer-
but is Aris-
implied
of 7tp0<;; Ev might
by
normal
simply be
in the definitions both of the form and of
the matter appears o~ly in that of the latter.
while
only
by
though not
existing
any case differs
one
sort
from
of matter,
the
soul
in
that
former
in
several
the
latter -
the
The can
though we
is ambiguity from those where there
debated how far
this ~as Aristotle's view; does xaC in l043a 32 express
an alternative,
or does a house generally, for Aristotle, involve stone
the
only counter-examples
to us being 'soul' and, in a non-substance category, to
a
on
not to be misled by the ambiguity in the
there
need
exists
which
case,
individuals.
Further discussion of beginning of H3 to
~v
this did
involving
returned
concentrated
~Ot;
matter
17,
Corr. 32lb 22-23, 33.
We
about
ff.,
it justify his regarding this meaning as the primary one.
A term refers to form alone: 29,
is
justifies Aristotle
we
l033a
29
by concern with definitions does involve a refe-
indicated
are
A term can refer to form or composite. Gen.
a
(e.g.)
understanding
i.e.,
4,
'house'
Discussion
30-l026a
6, 23-25, De Anima 403a 29-b 16.
b
expressed in
rence in the one case to the form, in the other to the composite.
List of passages supplied by R. Heinaman fwo
were
reference
that
occurred
'hollow' as opposed
context of first philosophy the problem does
( l043a 37) as we are clearly concerned with form rather than
with the composite (i.e. (b) on p.l2).
(for
the
foundations)
and
bricks
(for
made entirely of wood a house for him? in
several
<me
a
alternative
could ~efine
brick house
~he
form
or
the a
sorts
of
composite
stone
housei
the walls)?
matter,
'house' such
it
15
a
seemed
at all,
structure c~
doubtful
exist
whether
as opposed to defining
a definition would perhaps
'a shelter made of suitable matter',
24
Is
If the form of house
but
'suitable'
take
is redun-
:JOIES iJN
l044a 29
~TA
ctant as otherwise it wouldn't be a shelter, so we're left with
a shel-
ter made of matter'.
might indeed speak of the specific form 0r
~SS•:!nce
(henceforth:
speaking
universal*),
individual*
in
the
.:Is
sense
opposed
uf
to
including
peculiar
hence differing not only numerically).
The
difficulty
was
raised
that,
in
the
case
of
soul,
the
form
-
individual*
contrast
that
I
will
of man as
It
be
of
'l!niversal'
forms
that
1.<1ere
characteristics
(and
is not with the universal*
concerned.
The question must
(not only had to exist in a particular sort of matter, flesh and bones,
remain open for
but) could not be defined without reference to matter;
that can also be given to the universal -individual contrast.
the definitions
the moment whether there
is any other meaningful sense
of perception and most of the other soul-faculties would involve refe-
rence to matter, 403a
to resist
undue
vice-versa. for
not
to
etc.
have
(I) be
a
(de Anima 1. 1
it was maintained, was concerned not only
emphasis on matter to the exclusion of form,
We differed
this was have
as for example in the case of anger Aristotle,
ff.).
l6
above; the
in
the
matter
formal
our
view as
reference of
the
as well as
a
to
same
to
but also
how great a difficulty
matter is indirect, it does individual,
material
element
and
flesh,
(de Gen.
bone,
3.
In view of
(2),
while
the
view for
which I
shall be arguing may
derive support from the identification of the form of a living creature with its
soul
a
of
number
and
the
creatures
problematic
support
fact is
that
we
concerned,
for
any
speak of
a
it
not seem to provide un-
doctrine
would of
the
number of souls where
survival
of
individual
souls when their bodies have perished.
et Corr.
32lb 20 f.).
4.
Individual forms (which are however universal* rather than indivi-
dual*, since they differ only numerically) will, it is argued, be posteForms in Aristotle - Universal or Individual?
(Note by R.W. Sharples)
What follows is an attempt to clarify some points relating to the
l.
claim
that
we
may
Aristotle 1 s
represent
speaking not of form as universal,
thought
more
accurately
by
possessed by all members of a given
natural kind, but rather of individual forms in each member of a natural kind
forms
1
may appear
identical from what
in
kind
and
follows that
differing
only
numerically.
the difference between this and the
opposed view is one of terminology rather than of substance; case
the
question
becomes one of
Aristotle,
~
of
rather
than
with
of the view which I
nominalism,
for
which
terminology is
in which
the more
true
My primary concern is with the interpretation
to Aristotle's thought. of
It
the
philosophical
am attributing to him;
example,
may well
be
more
merits or demerits ~
a Stoic type
satisfactory than Aris-
rior to
to
matter,
in
that
they can only
be
individuated
the matter in which they are embodied.
here,
however,
seems
misleading.
precisely themselves
principles
The
of
by
reference
To refer to individuation forms
of
individuation;
concrete it
things
are
is only by refe-
rence to the form of man that we can say that a certain amount of matter here
constitutes
three,
course,
Aristotle's
unities
that
are
to
substances
and
viduals:
so
two
it
or
should
have
four be
essences
men
things in
(and
hence,
of
which are
real
primary
sense
the
The role of matter is not so much to individuate
pluralize.
However,
to universal form,
than
that
- Metaph. Z4, Zl6). as
rather
concern
it may be argued that it is by reference
rather than to individual forms, that we count indi-
that,
while universal form will be prior to the concrete
individuals, individual forms will be posterior to them and to matter.
totle's position however interpreted.
2.
~othing
in what
follows
is
intended to suggest that
individual men (for example) differ other than liar
characteristics,
rather and
than
outside
such as Socrates'
essential, the
scope of
attributable (scienti.fic)
numer~cally;
snub-nosedness,
to
matter
knowledge.
the forms of their pecu-
5.
I his
however
else
over
and
and
individual
rather
than
r.~ore
Aristotelian
Ln
t_!!_i_~
form,
sense one
to
suggest
and simply
say
forms; to
that
that
the
dispense there
We do not
question
form
are
tYith three
whether
universal
(not
men
'7
is
something
which is cer-
need both universal forms
remains
instances of the form 'man' in Lhis matter.
26
universal
the collection of individual f0rms,
tainly not Aristotle's posit ion.
are accidental to
seems
above
it
would
universal*)
not
be
forms,
here because there are three
NOTES UN C:TA
1044a 29
6.
forms
Specific
universal*,
are
or
not
The definition of sesses,
and
existed. the
form is
essences,
themselves
in
would
It
is
argued,
universal
while
rather
admittedly
than
rally
speaking) numerically different
duals
(even
individual.
be any
exemplified least
the
less
accidental, in more one
if
and
than one is
it
if
applicable dependent
only one man
on matter,
wheter
the
have
case of
existed
the
instance (though it must be
to
at
exist
past
for
this
individual
all.
Of
to exist;
course.
for
by
define
Alexander
of
Aphrodisias
to represent Aristotle 1 s
accurately
individuals
as
such is
exemplified on one or
many
(Quaest o lo
thoughts;
but
this
is
This is the position
still a dodo even if it is the only one left.) argued
and
3),
it
seems
one reason why we cannot
a definition may equally well
that
occasions
(Zl5
l040a
ff.).
33
be
But this
state of affairs seems best represented, not by speaking of a universal form 1 or
but
may
by saying that there is an individual form of man which may
not
Aristotle
be
repeated
ever
refer
in an
to
indefinite
forms,
in his
number
of
own view,
instances·
Does
as 'universal' (rather
Knowledge,
always
mind
of the
an
builder,
house,
form of
of
Aristotle 1
individual
is
if
~
house -
he
the
(Metapho
of
MID
is
the
l087a
already actually
universal,
15
but
ff o) o
This
form of house in the planning the building
form of house,
but an instance of
not indeed brought to actuality by being embodied
but
that
considering at
is
potentially
universal
in matter, he
is
even before a house is built 1 the
that, the
of
the
for
actually
suggests
individual nonetheless in that it is the form of house this
time.
Universal
form,
this
line of
8. At Z7 l032a 24 Aristotle speaks of the efficient cause, case of begetting, as -/i <'L'tll. 'tb eTboc; l>.eyO!JlVT]
t0r
must he
to the
continues a.\S-rn
reference spring;
refer
to a
but
to
form,
Ot lv
rather ~"''Mf·
form which is refer
to
it
as
than
to
identical
this
seems
to
be
a
in kind with that of the off-
This suggests
l071a 27 should be taken in a strnng sense,
rts
the
same
of
a
single
species
are
two
indivi-
individuals ~.
~
lt certainly seems more
different
(numerically
though not
But will the individual forms not be posterior to matter,
0
their being (above [4])?
the
sense
of
was
Parmenides
being: 1
existence,
rather
individual
form in
for
its
talk about
to
(~.
mistake than of this
dependent
Here it seems necessary to examine
1.
being,
simply,
186a
3
24
being-something,
is misleading and
ff.),
talk of
mere
may be anachronistic.
and
The
man certainly will not be dependent on matter
being an instance of the form man,
rather than horse;
nor yet
for its being the form of Socrates in the sense of including his individual
peculiarities,
pends
on matter
that,
though
identical
instance of
rather were
than
no
more
the
that,
matter
of man here;
it,
it is not individual* in that sense.
in kind;
form man
is
here
this
but
that
to
~
it
is
the It
form a man,
It de-
purely accidental to
form of
this individual
is
that,
true
there
would
be
if
there
no
form
this is to speak as if spatial distinctions were
characterisations
which I
since it
problematic?
suitable
but (i)
fundamental
occupy
for
for its being the form in this individual rather than
take
is
not
of
matter
Aristotle's
than are position;
the
forms
and
(ii)
that it
is
equally true,
on any view, that if there were ~~ matter anywhere suit-
able
a man,
to
form
the
form man would
not
exist
at all,
which does
not seem to be felt as problematic. In
conclusion,
it
should
be
stressed
that
nothing
in what
has
preceded implies any form of nominalism; the distinction between essence (form)
and
accident
is
a real one~
of a species with only one member. Quaest.
l.
3,
and
is
present
even
in the case
This is Alexander's position (cf.
already cited) and Aristotle's too (cf. ;-1etaph. 215 1040a
29-320 Tony Long of
suggested I
individuation',
Mind
79
consult A.C. ( 1970)
Lloyd's
519 ff.,
indi-
eating that all the causes - material, formal and efficient - are (gene-
28
of
individual).
on it for
(only) in kind suggests that
it is different in another respect, namely, numerically. that ~~Epa in AS
the
<j>(xnc;
the concrete individual,
Consequently
identical
in
and
i.n the <:ase qf different
causes
even though the third, the form, is the same'.
!Oo
thought would suggest, exists only potentially, not actually.
here
members
any
than 'universal*')? 7.
one
efficient
in kind), in that one and possibly two of them are different numerically
perishable individuals others of the same species must
in
be
the
natural to read 107ta 27 in this way, rather than as saying 'the causes of
9 in
though
states the essence that an individual man pos-
not
purely
exemplified in at
be
accidens,
'man'
it
may
it
29
'Aristotle's principle
which I did not previously
Professor
know.
in individuals of numerically holds
!lnd
27
ff.
as
not
Lloyd
expresses
that
Aristotle
strictly
are
which case
indeed
jg
accurate
in
it
is
is
with the form,
speaking
firstly,
(522):
either
always
and,
the
the
the particular matter of
dual
speaking
of
the
forms
this way at AS 107la
ln
But he brings two nbjections against this approach
()21-523).
forms
of
'it L; a useful as well as a plausible way of speaking'-
form and the ~~ universal, rent
approval
involves
secondly,
matter
same
it
-
of
flesh
confusing
the
the matter that J.iffe-
man and
taken bones
universally, ··
or
else
in
it
is
as
to
bones
Gen.
et
after
Carr.
even
if
above
-
universal*
if we assert that the distinc-
the
and
universal
accidents
(t:J.Ot
the
are d~e to
which
universal*)
is
post
between
form
the
all 321b
with
the
have
a
20
h_as
soul,
::~ay
,1nd
cf.
as
well
above),
',..:hich is
earlier than
in
the
a
dS
and
the
not
mav
form,
rather
and
frwm.
in a certain t.vpe
be
universal*
former
xo~v6v
the
to
spoken Clbove
formal
f.,
note,
latter.
they
of
the
the being this
material
though
he
Flesh (~
eLement are
material
by contrast with the purpose they serve, they can stiLl be distinguished
the
actual we
form,
material
think of
may
-
must?
and earlier in this
embodiment,
'man' -
the
involving
concept
include
material flesh and bone.
think be met
a
of which I've
identified
and
where
case with human
cf.
is
their
is
the
the individual,
when
form which
is
of
be
distinguishes
ff.
in cases
case with house,
all,
.!__!!_~,
is
-
the distinction between form and mdtter in ~~~ indivi-
'3oth objections can I
matter
matter
31
that
from
being secondary to the existence of this individual as a composite
between
suspect
each individual, in whtch case it is identical
and the result of abstraction.
tion
l043a
HJ
the same species as the same in species but differing
the
•,;hich
flesh
And if the
and
'form'
accidents.
enters
our
bone,
After intellect,
but
not
actual
of which I've spoken here
note is equated with Aristotle's
~ot.v6v
here,
this
leaves me free to support (II) of the alternatives stated in the minutes, rather
than
for
(I)
which
I
actually
argued,
in
cases
where
a
thing
1.=._~!!!_; accidents which differentiate this matter, ~~~_!lence this instance
necessarily
of
the formal and the material element in the xot.v6v (which still excludes
the
(This
form man
stances
of
rem.es;
but
~.g.,
If
of
or
the
that
your
vther,
is
Jre
Aristotle
3pecific not
essence,
you
even
the
to
to
be
the
contrasted with
the form.
indiscernibility o£
form without
even any
perhaps so implausible,
above
p.
two in-
accidental
diffe-
if accidents include,
it
the
is
h·r
i'lnother
~tccidents,
•..Jhich
realise.
from
chc
168.
24 ff.; --De
of the
(Alex.
same
your
not
is
being what you are, does not
do
your being,
so
either;
simply human,
or
female
essential
not
in the sense
in other
words,
snub-nosed
same
characteristics,
species,
individual':; Aphr.
seed to argue
human,
not
the
and
growth
it
and
is
the
development
the argument
that
they do r..ot difier 1.-n form,
:6/b 24 ff.)
of
not
the
endeavours
uses
characteristics
matter
for
to
be
this for
of
purposes type
this
of
an of
individual, analysis
matter
purpose.
if That
-
this the
and
the
accidents)
will
particularly for showing purpose
is
importance
to of
be
still
w~__y
fulfilled
soul,
as
be
1t has -
but
opposed to
universal* man, should be reduced to this ls not perhaps very surprising in the context of Aristotle's view of it.
accidental
form,
that mar1 and woman come
though Aristotle's doctrine of heredity does
ueculiar
actual use
the distinction between
This may not be so
human.
in the doctrine of the production of one indi-
the
the of
only
to matter,
does
male
2)
of
due
Aristotle,
which are involved
'lidual
cause
presumably
for
(cf.
the
accidents
are,
~re,
you
Lmplausible:
·,f
same
any of
what
nnes,
to
any
commitG
spatial and temporal relations.)
include
what
from
presumably
involves a certain type of matter,
individuals,
too,
~n._antiss~
take account
~~~~·
4,
l044a
15-25
We were dis inc 1 ined to follow Ross
to prime matter, ( 16)
have
Second,
Ar
be
excised
( 2 3) .
for
the
First, la··n :rtpW-tTJ U\11 reason
to mean olxE(a., the neclrest leaves
in seeing a
reference
traditionally cc,ncelved , 1n tx 't'oU a.O't'o\3 ••. :rtpW-rou
or Tf!V
undoubtedly here
as
.LH~ger
not
~ives,
the furthest
it open whether what you would
point in the series is one or several (several
in
should
1.-n the series.
find at
h~cause
18
that 1tptirtT) would
the
furtl1est
the disjunction
'>
14-l
l
10 Lt:S
0 )
.:cttdd he
rhtts t'•ut
tdutological
there cannot be
LLall·!
if
16 ~tpW'tou must
in
~:pt:O'ta.
rhe
have
:TA
()l'J
CHAPTER 4
could
several prime matters
conceived.
is
Ar
be
saying:
many
as
as
you
il.kc):
in '!Wv a.b'tWv We: n;;t:nU'twV.
L:te same sense as
prime matter is traditio-
dS
suppose
evBrything derives
in
the
end frr1m some one originative 'first' stuff, e.g. water, or from several
such,
~arth
e.g.
explanation (cf.
the
Lmportant
32 ff.) is the oCxe(a.. UAn ~xtio-rou.
air
He does
himself
to
either
cr,ncern
is
to
fire
version of
insist
that
xo":ri
1n Presocratic
style
~tc.
,
give
but
should
;'ht>
of Jtptlrnw \J\.nv
sense
rnU-ra.
lx
l(~vel
\!.1~·2)
.. uJ{·d
in :\
',)n
u1e
1',\n,
one
il:'Vel
and as
that
·.vlnch
should
not
answer
for
since his
the question 't( lcJ'tL
'Like everything else,
it's earth, ,.;rater,
specific
matter
the
be
bile
or
proximate
(cf.
and
properly
maker is
of
due
~ell,
to'
level
X -
d'.Jwn
sweet
\Ve
off
(
l~-19)
the
in
because
box
and
of
efficient
the
sphere
course
bed.)
In
cause.
of
the
(3)
carpenter
(29-32)
searched
We
natural
same
case
things.
could
he
the
the sameness also
in vain for a
type
( l)
Natural things would seem
all to come under case (2) (27-9), where some specific matter is necessary for the product in question, as e.g. metal for a saw, and so limits what
the
cases
efficient
(1)
and
cause
can do.
Even
the olxe:Ca. \S).Tl
(3),
is
here,
not
but
most
sufficient
evidently in
on
its
own
to
determine (explain) the product.
1044b
Ly
16,
as
Lo·w<:
Ls
l•13tter.
15
!.t
whether
(the
the
.~<;reasy
immedi.ately
in
the
case
elements,
!5-Jl.
nor
15
having
on
the
for
are two sense
Th~re
the
its
no lower
exampl:::s,
despite the suggestion
ts
into
whole
parallel
which
of
preceding olxt:Ca.
phlegm),
In the seco11d are
a
lower
s~nse
1)r
Y. has
then reconstituted as X.
the xpUn11 UXTJ or
&pxTi
here than the
cf. 18-20.)
three
l044b
resolved
back
into
Lhem
(1075a
and con23-5).
(!mphasized
the
need
to
f<~r
g;o
5-8
earlier earth, of
( 1)
same :llatter
~ase
~1)
a
illustrated.
man,
but
The XO.'ta.f.J."f!vl.a. are
given as
no help is offered with the problem
The
at
etc.,
course
(.25-7)
(.J)
the differencA
to
the
'kinetic'
Hl
l042b
6,
in
the
as
still
a
matter
cf.
of
also
cases
(special)
the
heavenly bodies
l069b
26,
It
talking
we
have
been
kind
of
stuff
ob
is
about,
~
(not
for change), with properties such as visibility.
has
come
up
-roL0.6'tT!V, not
a
but
it
is
potentiality
Perhaps the heavenly
change
is
to
be
restricted
just
to
local
movement.
Powers
do
not define or determine a kind of stuff (since we all possess the capacity
for
local movement),
but
they
limit
what
it
can
be,
as
tn case
( 2) above. This led to a digression on what Ar means by saying that Socrates and
Cal lias
the
same
differ
in
the
potentialities
matter.
for
change
For just
surely as
they
~b
initio
have
the
they
have
same
form.
a
single
the 0Cx£Ca. Ut..TJ, Ar
ciitferent
1:tr-•rent l'li:ttter necessitating different products; ln
of
bodies have to be made of a special kind of stuff if their potentiality
!<now talking practical chemistry.
cases:
Explanation cause
bones composing the final product.
Admittedly, L
5
of how that can be the same as or continue as a part of the flesh and
for Can anything be got from anything?
from the four elements on Ar's scheme, when
32-b
material
in
ln the ftrst sense Y is situaled
this a promise of alchemy?
to
as
23-5.
case of phlegm).
>?;O
l044a
from bile, becdU3e that 1s Lube under-
the
n•~ed
no Jl)uht he
:, 44a
determined
in
cveryth1ng comes
, rihutes
then
uf CaxWt:; yO.p x-rA..,
light
resolved
I3
is
And they remain such,
derive from Y
sw~~t-anJ-che-~itter-
,lJ\o.'
so,
both
to
example
the
start
it were.
rudd
(the
in 23
phlegm might Jerive
m,JV
r t-'lJssibly
:·ut
thing
not commit
'taU cd.noU 19-2(1.
Phlt~gm
>fl.m>-.•
to
the
still
the ultimate derivation story,
you by
water,
does, for as 31 shows he is thinking of the form as the efficient cause,
The Presocratic style of reply is not sufficiently explanatory.
)-]),
t
and
:044a 25
products;
(2)
different matter-
is due to the effi·tor:n'!
thing, But
here
proposed has
to
not
all
which means the
the
potentialities
unavoidable
reference
explanation circular. explain
is
can
be
realized
by
Socrates and Callias must realize them differently.
how Socrates
to
What
'by
and Callias
13
a
single
thing'
'difference in matter' are
two
rather
:nakes
the
precisely than
one.
: .44b )
U'44b R So the problem is not solved by taking matter as potentiality for change, :1ence
Is
difference
it
solved
in matter
by
taking
two parcels of matter, this
[f
r.wo
if
if
one.
have
'.i'~ere :1 f
are
trick,
knows
Partial
in
potentiality
matter
distinct.
why
fixate
French and reply:
as
the
for
that
already
we
left
one
os
picked
it,
but
~
Objection:
on material
that doesn't,
difference
composition?
they
are
two
E.g.
persons,
this is red-haired/ snubnosed/ 5'
not)
out NB
presuppose
the this
subject whole
for
as
their
tall/
ascription
one whole
discussion
that
efficient
human
wondering whether
8-20
We
an eclipse.
the
they
are
one man or
:3uffers
the
us \JXT} to
move
to
(what
There
is
no matter
eclipse.
the
rawc; (Ross:
So
it
we would call) which
i.s
(Elsehwere Ar
attributes.)
natural
the
events,
presumably)
there
is
prefers
to
let
such as
substance
no
final
cause
analyze ob<JCa. We; lvlpye::l.a.
presumably
to
be
i~fining
(an important
where
the
'hy
the
subject
but
it
must
is
interposition of
be
specified but
unclear the
unless
Earth'.
you Why
not add
put into the the
unclear?
efficient That i t
sufficiently illuminating for explanatory purposes seemed more thanthatit issimplyincomplete.
With sleep
he dispelled concerns which is the first ~leep.
Or rather, which is the first under~o
something
-
what?
the
unclarity
to
bit of the animal to undergo
bit of
the animal (perhaps the
( 't'C 't'O xd.8oc;
18-19),
H2
began
by
why
So
go
back
saying so
that
that
to \5ATJ
it in
there was remained H4?
duce a PS, which in the case of H3 is explicitly said not to be relevant to the main project ( l043a 38-b l).
Perhaps some relevant connections
thing
to
could
have
alert
us
be
done,
to
them.
the
that
the
but it cannot be said that Ar does anyE.g.
he
fails
matter we are
specified ol"XeCa \SAT).
correctly
that Ar context.
is
patching also
We
in material thought
it
to
Bonitz only in
say,
as
he so easily
We
had
the
now familiar
originally put noteworthy
express.ion va.(• dX\6. occurs
otherwise according
to
comparing with actuality has
twice
the
together
that
here
for
the
brightly
(16-17,
19) but
~gna Moralia three times,
and that such examples of va.C as Bonitz 1 ists are all from early works plus Z9 10J4a 17.
text
You can say 'An eclipse is a deprivation of light'
formula?),
4
H3 and H4 both begin by telling us not to forget something, as if to intro-
CHAPTER FIVE
With the formal cause there
by the moon - did Ar notice that this is an instance of the 'snub'
likely
as well,
count
( sc.
not
sought
the Earth.
complication.
phenomenon,
chap,
to
feeling another
matter of 3.n eclipse.
is an efficient cause,
There
the limits ofAristotelian teleology).
cause
be
is
is a
·4as
to
about :Jfxr-(a. J>~ 'b1toxe::C1-1.E\1Tl xa.t ill<:;. \S),:n.
dispute
to
two.
contribution of
no
use
There is a ~~O'XEC!-1.£Vov, but it is a full substance, viz. the moon which
for
has
will emerge by the end of H6,
being.
presupposes
9eneral
conversational .!._Q_~b
cause
that
questi..on of matter deciding what is a man and what is not.
0
the
incorporated into the formal.
distinctness of
criteria on the side of form to identify the parcels of matter dbout
·.;hich we are •1 nt
But
change.
many distinguishing characteristics
think to cite (e.g.
carpenter,
we
difference
in
given that each of them is living a human life?
parcels
that
parcel
one might a
the
perform
this
not
difference
parcel here is human and that parcel there is human, you have
humans
~vould
as
heart)
to
~~rtain
stillness - in virtue of which the whole animal undergoes sleep?
perhaps
a
l044b
are
21-29
not
'Since
without
some
genesis
things, and
such as
phthora ... '.
points
and
forms,
Comparison
are
and
with
earlier passages, especially 85 1002a 32-5 Tn~ b~ ~~y~O~ xat ~nc; ypa~c; xat
f')(Het• OU'<E y(yvwBa• OU'rE q>8E!pEcr8a•. o<e ~l:v OWn~
O<e Oe
obx OUOU.<;.
EJ l027a 29-30 ~,.
o'
d8etp'riL CtVEU '
yCyvEcr8et• xal q>8E(pEetVEp6v. H3
l043b
14-16 dvd.yxT] 07)
tTlY oroCa.vj
n
<:Lt0.ov Elva•
i\
·,p8a.p-rt]v tlve:u -ro'U !J16E Cpe:rr8a.L xa.t ye::yov~va" 5:veu -roU yCyve:ai3a.L 'Tiakes it time ...
clear at
that
dnother
wjth time'.
'are and are not' we must understand Aristotle
l4 l5
is
not denying that
the
'at nne rhings
1'\fl',·-1
..., c '!
d''
. •
.
t ..
>11'.1!
~
D[0
f'SS
l·:;trlier r IH;
.
has
no douht
!·d' ') "'"T ~ '• ' '
about .Jl
~~ ;
j
~
r
tho•
·~ ..\m
"
1 <11•1'
1_<;
,.hC'm
,, ..,
.nade
ln
135
Ar.
held
matter
Ls
it
to he
1,
, "·
,
' - •' i.
Implication.
tw·o-',¥
as
cornll3cl,
ct
i.:~ :>urclv :tn
it
lnt"gra.l
part of the posHion sketched in ~h!': prect;riin)'!; linPS.
f•\[
'f
~
1_
"''
,' i_
2
t !) (~ ~-
l ,
~ '
fl I
t'
K. t ~
·ntr
i
I
•!
t..'Il'.itlc.:s v..•itt
tt·
~
'
upposites.
The
theme of
!..::~!::___~~.~
X ht1dy, A healthy,
v ·~ ,-
r,
, lL
•':\'/0
• ·.'
f
-1 ._ t
1::\,)':~~hr
<·~ll''''t
ot~''''
·:d~ns.
e . .,.
the
~ •
~lattt=!T
('l:~rl
ot
une half
dnd
pruvidcs
ttt<Jt'ber
the chapter.
l'>
'{
there-
:;ic k
wine.
vi
1~e~a
r.
l'he
12~4 whcrn a dist.inction is dr<Jwn i.n
li.ne:•s
IJotentiality
rnalrer,
as well as 5uvd.fJ-E4 A?
:..JZJ.ter,
1 ' ' 1 1 ' '·
about
Ou\IO.j..LE~ A, and B L_; the kva.v1:Cov ot -\,
If X is
&uvn~E"
2 examples: · •Hl\1\
dp11ri.1i
oppnsitcschauging into
- s.Jmewhat tenuous- cor.nection wit~ the first
the
foro
~
a
i.ntr(Jduced
..
l I ! '\
-, ' · r
(_()1\'.<::rse
been
therefor.~
~~Lv xut xntU 'tO
E[&oc,
So X is potenti.ally B,
dso Ouvfi~EI.)
' l t i 1.'Il
the
/\
wa)·._, l)
and
and ::ta.'tO. O"'tEprl(nv v.at
ln
in
•.hiLh
X
t<.:-;pe( tLvely:
1s
•he
x.a.8'
~enpCtv ·riw nnpO. ~6crt.v.
but onlv with rhe quaL.fi.ctr ion given.
:·r·. •i,
l..:r
l.n?~ap~J_r_~'!_·
'\
~lC"<'l.lth
i._.
because
this,
The
'l'-1'1
··;rl<••ii:--; fn: .-pAopd).
he
lnt
tl-tl
.111
,m,__,
;·f regress
apori.a
L \.ally,
B,
\¥e
nol
1c;
do
stri.ctl·; ich
5
C'Jntinues
t·Ji,:-
i.s:
wine~vinegcir but
like
process,
f!TSihle
•; r •in
v .. -4~a
1()44b
with
the
a
point
to
be
Why do we not say
ke
t·•l
made,
hut
'3Clll!!ne,
hPalthy sick.
V.'i.th<•ut
that A
X-A-R
thita~-c,npse
example ts dropp€!d i.n f::1vnur of X--li•;i.JJW:
is
an
qudllficatton, 'Jf,
Lrre-
later).
r;r
potcn-
(fUu(:h:~nxOc, nl ~tlopnC.
Th;~
i:.;
the md.tter
the
(presumably
given that Sdy
this
spedking
en
vU
.1 rpBor)n
:~:inc ()Ui--J.SE~T1XE,
rJ36)
nDr
l'
1,t
xa.-ta.
-IS·)
tioe
'.-,'lll<',
'·Ill
d
tht~
water
h·~n-
\_\'
. .. .
~
t-
,-, • •
J
nt t h<"lt
f
rhe
L_·'i.lnilr1
,(Jn is
!Jt"Psum-
NOTES ON ETA
:045a 2
i
night is potentially day?
And what is the
UAT} (X) here?
O.f}p
presumably).
_1~)-~~a
We
3-·6
took
changes A-B and
the
point
here
require
B-A,
a
to
not,
be,
as per Ross,
'return to \SA:n',
that both
but that only the B-
A change does (i.e. vinegar to wine, corpse to living thing). o~ o~~w ~e~~~XXeL eC~ ~XXnX~:
Bou
XQ\
mean
'one
back
to
refer A's
104~::11. implying
into
the
other'
the day-night
back
change
since
changes,
B is Xa.'t'& ,eopd.v
that
and
B' s
It
can't
.!:._! symmetrical.
the
change
point would be to A,
refer
It
must
that
when
if at all possible,
must be via the \f~'TJ.
bodies
(Apostle),
or
are
a
particularly
an
~045a
12-14
unitary.
its
Does
tr.,
(Ross Ox.
unity),
unity
of
the
now
general
in
'in bodies
bodies
thesis.
something unified
cf. ~·
is
e.g.
Honeywater
by stickiness.
For
227a 15·17.
enters
as a species of
unitary
thing,
the
being that it is the definition Q_f something
unity
Ar
cause of
the
instance
Definition
explanation of
examples of
Perhaps better is thdt it should emphasize
example of
~• ~d6o~ ~~epov ~oLou~ov,
even in hodies'
wedkest
simply that
evident
offered as
say
11
the
contact (Ross ed., p. 237)?
was
does oU-tw mean?
what
example,
to Xa."tlz. cp6opd.Y to
but
we agreed that eC~ [XXnX~ could
too'
Does the xa.C in l.
that
always
run
the explanation this way round or does
he sometimes explain the unity of the definiendum by that of the definiGeneral comments on HS no ;:o
A bitty and unstatifactory chapter containing
new material of any great interest. continue H4' s
the
of>c--ea.
discussion of bXLx-t,
discussion of
things
are
which
tion?
Zll l037a 18-20 is indeterminate on the issue.
Z12
The first half could be said
and
looks or to connect with H3 via
are not without genesis.
whether :i.t presupposed Z, we thought yes; at
On
least that it presupposed
more
threatening,
but
can be
read
as
stating that
1037b 24-7
the unity of
the definiendum is a necessary requirement for the unity of the definition
(cf.
Notes on
Zeta
ad
loc.),
lvhich would
not
reverse
the
order
of explanation.
28 on form not being generated.
Ar then asks for the explanation of the unity of ~bv !vBpw-
l045a 14-20 CHAPTER SIX
Is
1tov.
Ross
1045a 7-8
The backreference:
of
and
numbers
However,
(Ross).
llllity :wt
that
of
of Zl2
definition
because
the
first
HJ l044a 3-6 suffices for both the unity
l038a
problem,
34-5 concludes a implying
responses: Z17
~econd
(1)
answer
will
be
a
Notes on Zeta ad lac.).
34,
on
the
puzzles
of
Zl3
1039a
answer and ZH are after all a unity; impugning
:1ote
l042a
on
'first'
there
to
the
second:
Possible
look for the second answer within Z (e.g. second half
following
•,;ithout
if
that
is tentative but because it deals only with de-
finition by division ( l037b 28,
,,f
No need to bring in 212 as well
definition.
the
31-b 8
H pre-existed
chronological ad
and Ar
the problem outstanding at
fin.:
z
thought
H6
(3)
3-23);
(2)
H6
is
H6 can have this role
hypothesis discussed earlier could a
18
(cf.
be written with an eye to H
satisfactory enough
the end of Zl2.
the
solution to
has
thing
this (a),
man
(the (b).
in question will
Animal
that
and
the
Twofooted
Theory
man + animal, that
(a)
Apostle
on
si~nify
the
of
but
be
form)
or
(b)
~L
especially i f
especially
( 15-20).
Forms makes
jeopardized
Admittedly
xa\
~v~
(15-16),
t•..m
things
single
B6
thing
Man,
generalizes this:
one
posits
9-12
things,
Forms
does
viz.
argue
himself
and Twofooted, that
'man'
and
'animal'
in
17:
+
each
someone decided that
17-19 makes better sense with (a):
individual men are
Animal
if
1003a
Socrates many
individual)?
the unity of the
Whereas the H6 problem is supposed to arise not only if, there are Forms. c.Jote also the
the right answer is (a). that
(the
that consequence is drawn from the explicit premise
reading a.6'tod.vSpW7t.oc; for a!>'tb. 0' &:v6puntoc;
thing
man
Theory of Forms the general terms
't'66E
the
a
The first clue is that
supposed it
will
be
to
participate
these
two
individual men participate in.
in,
things, 19-20
Man will not be one thing but more than one.
if Man, is the not
a
simply
Perhaps
U~'5a
7
J ·,
i
1.
\ '•
l(J 1~5a
(as
hoped
>•lme
man a
nakes
both
here
l.1cer J
dr,.J
dtL::>wer
r::ne
co
quc::.t1on Hhat
Lhe
case of things that come to he' (so Ross Ox. tr., Apostle). It is only in the case of generable individuals that there is a moving cause to be set aside. This case is then illustrated (31-3): there is
unity will also -;hm; ,,;hat makes ..1n individual man a unity,
but that aspiration
~eed
~hu:.sing
not rely on
o~er
lb)
la) here.
I,.Jhy is it so nnfortunate that man should fall fipart into a conjunct
l._Vfi?
~lo
This
doubt
into
Ar's
that
the
chapter
full
a
belh:fs
about
essential
another?
assumes
the
j'lstificdtion
unity the
of
essence.
predicates
a
of
~~~a
-~0-9 1 ~ss
3 eems
[he
ul
criticism
;.;auld might
~eai.t,
way
the
he
bt::co,·~e
:-\ll
we,ll
i.s
~.:l~del
~enus
so
.Jef1-ned on
•)f
each
Ze~
(~~specially
1
hat
cJr
as
one
.-\r
we
~·tick,
by
nf
c...o·\e
rl.eleting
,
nur
he.
At
first
-with
a
Gut
H2
4'Jallt~es.
?or
sight
choice
to
be,
~nove
a
earlier
the
Continu1ty
comma
original
uf
But· does everything distinction
fhe
is
made?
to the simple
28-9,
four
envisaged
'dements
more discussion see
are
Note~
~xplanation
'ell 1on
"lS
to
an·1
lS
of what
as
to
the ~n
in
however,
3l.
l~iven
aext question the
cdu.se
of
by
foregoing, individuals
playing down
tne potentiality/ is,
L:nity
becomes,
What
pair
is
required the
than
moral,
the
potential-actual
though
the
Alexander),
to
which
he
objects
that
the
example
sphere
just
is
to
be
the
actualization
of
a
just
another way
of
putting Ar 's
point
to
say
that
';()
the
to
actual.
.nonng cause
Which in
Lhe
Should it is perhaps
in
the
end there
The above treatment of 31-3 as slightly digressive was challenged by reference to 1075b 34-7. There the unity of the compound of matter and
form
and
the
not
want
is
as
much
efficient
in
an efficient
7 can be read:
the
cause may cause
centre seem of
of
focus
less
the
as
the unity of numbers,
detachable.
unity
of
But we
still do
numbers.
So I075b 36nor is it possible to say (sc. what makes these one),
unless you say, as the moving cause.
we
do
(sc.
in
the
There ~ nothing
appropriate to
say
in
cases),
that
it
the other cases,
is and
nothing more to say in the case of examples with a moving cause. Still, It
might
be
perhaps better
'digressive' to regard
the
is
the
wrong
ball/sphere
label as
for
l045a
31-3.
a nicely perspicuous
concrete illustration from which to extract (by setting aside the moving
rela7:.ed
potent1al
33
is really only one essence, that of ball.
pose
f!'nm
1.
potential one.
cause) a general answer to the general question of
as
relation of
of man occurs
we have qualms about both these items having an essence,
applying to the components of definition
'a,ide
construing
·far back (in any case the example was man, not a potential man); the potential ball and the actual ball, i.e. to be a potential sphere just is to be potentially an actual sphere and to be an actual
0r better per-
is potentially something be1.ng so actually?
~uestion,
other
rescued,
the to
~b))
in a definition but
unity
-ro'ih' seems to pick up a.L't'I.0\1: no cause is needed for the cause (explanatory factor) is just the essence of each. Ross offers two references for 'each': ( 1) the potential ball and the potential man (so
~b
of
This is clearly presented problems:-
too ( 2)
t042b 24,
over
(d)
explanation itself.
bt
...
a ·1uestion '..ltlich is irrelevant
to
arter Jtod'taa.v
question
JlPrfectly general
1'.l..:st
idea
viz. the i5A., •••
this chapter does,
cdses.
lctuality .1 nalysis of rtefinit:ion,
; 5
the
definitions
~b ~tv
6u~.Hij.J.£L,
the
sor1e
potentiality und actuality not
ltaps,
Jo
tl$Ually
The second
unce
as
differentia.
f)3ir
'l
c laj_ms
tor
deep
separate (bttt of course equivalent)
:\s
differentiae
of
us
ad Zl2.
l o4 5 a -.lQ::J_
,lbnul
long
plus
plural1.ty
•1
clear
dS
J;,tike
no other cause (sc. than moving cause) of a potential sphere/ball being an actual one. Sc. and not even a moving cause in the sort of case we are interested in. Cp. I045b 22 '
for it.
take
independent one of
be
d.Lstinction or t".·.JO cutllpon::!nts WLtlli.n a definition. 1·,::oally
account
did not?
people
'•)ne vf these is
is Suvd1-1E1. ••• ', marking a
co
would
absurdly, that one essen-
anoth~r
H2 1041a 14 tf.
charitable than
23-4
,_,f
What
~hile
tlal predicate would cease to huld
louks
thing
uld he wonder whether that
1,.,1 0
dnd
'lssun-.ption
a
ball
or
bronze
sphere
(suggested
would be better than a mathematical sphere.
30. For this purby 0 O'tpoyyul,.o~ xacl..x6~of 26)
3U
1045a o3 L\P l'FR A
iG~'5~
moral
the
UX.n a.la6Tl't'ft
the
definition.
other
~he
If lJATJ von't'Tt is
the
just mentioned, in
the
generable \S'~:n
Each
component.
genus
There
Ross)
(S(J
transferring
the
these
role
compound
to
of
the
lines spell out
potentiality generic
from
element
in
plays potentiality to the actuality of the
is
an
analogy between genus
and
matter,
hut so far no more. is
'VOT)'t'fJ
mathematical
dimensionality
(as
at
1036a 9).
o!ov 6 X1ix).o<;
it,
a
gloss
stronger
thesis
finition
is
by
someone who
kind
of
vo~~~
bronze).
:·larjorie Rorty)
H2
that
The
Grene
really 14-16
come
to
Ar
genus
(a
reads
of the definiendum
(as a circle is such and such a plane
question
kind
this
Biological
Messrs
not
view,
just
but
Balme,
A.C.
analogous
will
all
Lloyd
that
embryo
horses
generic
equine
matter,
the
and embryo donkeys but
can we
and
<S1tep lv
one.
is
as
opposed
is one, cundum).
is the
to
accidentally,
these
items?
from
all
one
that
thing
just
~·
(cf.
the
categories
categories are 0-xEp Ov ·u
the
categories if b 1 reads
the
The sequel
maintains
chat :~ny
just
5 is
option a
'none
close of
the
l86b if
~-xep
so
to
17,
31-4).
b 1 reads
the
~enera
fact
that
Zl2
What
considers
and
seems
to
parallel
be
required
between
~v
by and
The only This
to defining the categories (Ross says really they
the
case
of
two-footed
participation, a'UvoucrCa. and
categorie-s
nre
It could be, rather,
immediately €v and
animal. the
rest
Similarly, come
up
we
Ov
explains
thought,
in H6
not initially as answers
to Ar's question about the unity of definition, but as answers to ques'What is it for there to be a 0 (a case of knowledge/
tions of the form health/a
bronze
triangle,
etc.)?'.
Thus the question to which Lyco-
phren answers <:ruvoU
Cp.
question,
is "
'what
tuxi'lt; is 'What is l7tL.CJ"tftiJ.TJ ? '
I byLa.(v&Lv?
Especially revealing formulations are ~( ~b Tbv
'What is it
for
and TC "
(14-17).
there to be something white?'
tion of something in white is recognisably an answer,
the
the participa-
using participa-
tion in the ordinary Platonic way, as earlier at 1045a 18, as a relation between
particular and
because
people
is
that
don't
their
universal.
answer
it simply raises,
Ar 's
point
is diagnostic:
to
the
stated
question
to the question it
is
participation.
is intended for
(8-9).
is
It
because
and the Platonists cannot solve, the further questions
'Well, but what is the explanation of participation? tion?'
it
think about the unity of definition in the right
an unsatifactory answer
responses
'each
just as it
categories'.
latter are not part of any definititln:
you ca11 extend it to the pro-
to explain how a white man is one thing, blematic
As at
confirms
his
the end of H2, own.
lcrt'a.L.
What is participa-
Ar 's diagnosis of other people's at
13 shows he
is elucidating not
reporting.)
(no comma after ·a se'each is one,
no definitions, but cf. Notes on Zeta, p. 6).
tnese
lv ·u
essentially,
where the scope ~i!Y broaden is the 0L6 sentence in b 2-3. refer
in
second
1,
~lace
not
definition.
xov eTva.q - ~6v6e~L<; hL'I><:wda..; xa.l ).eux6"tTJ"to<;
S0 o(,ee:v\. -t06'twV
~ave
of
answer?
in
r'Sv . need
participation
examples
start
Perhaps also:
the
that
does
xa.).xov eTva.L -
It may be
suppose
number
as
also !'5xep Ov ·n fact
one
Not
the
Just
iust
beginning of the chapter and unity
H2
There is even less of a problem about the unity of items
immediately
are
the the
7-8)
it.
to
examples are another issue.
'exactly what some unitary thing is'.
-~bich
at
an d.xopCn about
unity
xa.l 6yLdn.; (11-14).
after
matter,
is
1
about
is
1974,
of)
which do not have a material component to be unified with an actuality. are
29
rejects participation by genus in differentia as an answer to the unity
way
They
25,
(9-11).
lie behind the present text?
1045a 36-U
The
7-17
1045a
this view (christened the B-1-R thesis by
nicely on
heel?
same
on
Synthes~
in is
thought
the
;;md
instances
or a.[aihJ'tfJ (as ice is frozen water or a ball a spherical piece
figure)
1043a
In that case a
view.
the generic element in a de-
0£ which
matter
are composed, whether it be
of
took this
could be in the offing:
the
1045b at
of definition, but the issue there is whether, having used participation
Alternatively, \SXTl
may be
l 1J45b 7
Thus what people don't see is that you do not need an explanation for
the. unity of
this,
they
potentiality and
postulate,
for
the
actuality
cases
hold the two together (participation, of
their
answers
potentiality firms
that
and
confirms actuality
no explanation
case Ar is asking about),
the needs is
they
(b
are
rruvo~C~
Aristotelian
16-17).
, etc.). thesis
no explanation.
needed
for
the
not
asking about,
unity
that
a
seeing bond to
The inadequacy the
unity
of
Which in turn conof definition (the
once definition is seen in terms of actuality
and potentiality.
they are not ultimate
heynnd the categories (1.6).
43
l(l45b 1
, 1
Whereas nents
a
problem
to
explain
nothing
ts
said
issue,
6e:O).I.oc;, cruvoiJO"Ca.
~o
eLc, !~B
own inadequacy.
doubt
tiality.
is
Lycophr0n eliminate
further
the
between subject
and
just
one
~nd
actuality.
debate , oi>v-
a
r.o display their
they are thou,sht
discussed in
th~rnsclves
f~·
at
differen-
l85b 25 ff.:
his
favour of e.g. 0 ~v6pwxoc; ).e~as
idea that his worry whjch
the ~eneral
case of
ts
philo~ophical
of critici.sm of rrUvde::cn.c;
implying
copula lcrt&.
predicate,
that its propo-
and
actuality
is a
one. thing
the
are
has
one
answer
No
to
be
explanation
of
fF.R r,
with asking is
added the
for
no
to
account
the
thing
is
at
from Ar's
issue about
textual problems
signal rus
suffered
about the bond
present
point
the unity of
of
view
potentiality
~~onclusion
that n.
H6
2,
Our This
as
We a
apparatus
feeling was is
the
concluded with a
whole
is
brief
criticus ad
Met.
1037a
E 2 Ab).
Suggestions
differentia',
in
fact
this
satisfy
Hho
'tl.
Ja~ger
in the
Much more
included:
their
search
where
the
gives in his appara-
is A.6you tvoxo1.bv
puzzling
xal I>Laq>op6.•
(i)
means
'i.e.
the
for
a
way of
potentiality and
unifying
The words were added in text or margin by someone
lv1:£Xtxe1.a.
(17)
is no problem, as it occurs already H3 i044a 9.
l(J!~Sb
<m
17-23:
l04'5i1
C"0ntent
dpTJ1:ClL
established. used
and
hi?re
pt<)X.imate
h~s
it
i,een
said~
same
11atter
and
the
in
Ross
ad
(see
compares
thing,
sens~
lac.)
note
on
asklng
'proximate
l069b 36, 1044a
t1Jr
i.e.
an
the chapter has
but not in the terms
understand 'ta.6"tb ~al. ~v
view of
1'.:1-20
([8): we
occurs
,:ere.
l!J45a 30-3; on 25 <5ee note
the
~<.r'(
the
note (ln
one
are
in
see
provided
-'l.nd matter
1
21 ~z,
On
[hese are straight summa:ry of Hhrtt
30-b 7.
time
the
unity
itself,
an
of
because
explanation of
to
mattert
at
while H4 115ed
15-2~).
mean
that
thC'Y constitute a
So
explanation
no
1035b
serious
of 'Nhy
form
unity. 30
:!:pW't'Tt for
discussion of Jaeger's thesis
20;
distinction
special brackets which
that X.6you tvcnto(ov si~nifies the genus.
thought
same
of
thing
(cf.
Aristotle
p.
cp. Notes on Zeta p.
199 95).
between
potentiality
and
the work we have been expecting it to do since H2 (See
being what Ar hi.rnself uses in H2 and so Hhat would
(ii)
actuality.
account the
that without chapter 6 H would amount to very little.
chapter
cf. 'ILo.cpo~• ~.
but
the
of
a later addition by Ar
no more than that the end of the papy-
tattering.
a tl_~ in Ar
(
~how
'added by Aristotle'
roll
The grounds
for enclosing €<J"'ts.. •• ~v
crit.icus
separate
its being one.
actuality does
i045b 17-23:
an explanation of why anything
needed,
note on 1043a 12-14 ad fin.).
tus
l045b l/
not hands betT~~~~en actuality and poten-
fits well enough the
'X.e:6xurra.1.
~rounds
crUv9e:cYI. c; and 6lO).I.oc; in t£2 were 1045a 13),
to
it.
by "t-Jay
tiae/actualities (cp.
proposal
'.~lAP
(·:TA
tii~
participation is u1;missed on the
have
the
)TI
r::s
and non-
problem
pot~ntiality
45
'\L
,,
300K THETA 'r.'~lil..Ld·l
- \J!Sh/desire for
~0~ 2
wish/desire pleasant?
CHAPTER
the 50uJ ,;:>d tile j.Jl!:dsant \1Zr1b lrl-19)
the ~60d E_,:~r the ,t.:,ent
for
l235b 25-26,
l'_hl.~g 3 - wish/desire
for
(.:~.nd
conditionally
30
i2 -15) the_il_8_~ (and so seemingly
the pleasunt for
/lOOd, 1235b 26 -29)
by G.E.L. Owen
Note
The formula of r._hilia e_as~~
Metaphysics
1
~).
6uva:r6vt56va;n~ in
As
in
some
1022a
1-3),
appearance
5 uva/t6v,
other so
6 12
late
and
of 6
(4.
1015a 13-17,
(l019b 35-20a 6)
almost
as a
and here too does not
11.
1019a 11-14,
16.
focal meaning makes an express
postscript in the account
of 06vet~Lt;/
provide complete coverage of uses mar-
shalled in 1019a 32-b 14 (cf. Kirwan ad locc.). But the model seems clear: Dunamis
1
- source of change in another or (in the same thing) qua other (l019a
15-16: ll£-tal>oA-t'i
includes
stopping
something,
1019a
34-35)
sion
2
'having ~unamis ' i
1 2 3
phra~;e as
tn ~naton _
ries.)
Wi.thout
understood
1
(implied at
l020a
2;
cf.
1019a 33-35,
to
something
else
having
dunamis
1
over
3
and
or ( 1020a 3, 1 2 1019b 5-10, 10-11,
b 6-10 if
theias 8-10
developed where
earlier
homonymy is
of
2
- source
4
1046a
13;
1046a
introduction
- having dunamis inspire
us,
of
31-35
on
stereseis,
in
1019a
stereseis; apophaseis
1 but
in
some
only
special
on
way
Fridays?
(1020a No,
the
in
Rather,
in
or
hexis apa-
and
1003b ~
and
3-4.
not
dunaton-definitions
in dunaton
'llodifications.
4
where
Dun<:~mis
3
But
in
another
of
change
or
the
(in
patient other
( 1046a
are to be
appear
in
the
!J.
12,
same
thing)
qua
effected by another or
11-13.
wh·~re
Hut
the
tn EE VII, esp. 1236a 7-33:
case
1
is
(by
is
(by it-
riunamis
1
in
parallel
1
is subject to
the
14·-15),
by
another
~unamis
or
1
itself) 13-15:
of
4_6
another
the worse or dest-
other, the
viz.
last
by
what
complement
As in dunamis _ bllt adding 'well' (in some grammatically 1 3 ·1ppropr1ate form) to exPresslon5 of acting/being acted on
viz.
philia
qua here
'These dunameis'
precedin~
the
Lo
.dl
;,e
introduced
three:
in 1046a 16 seems to refer
but
to unspecified
analysis
vther' .
'by
supply 'viz. by a source of change
(by
(1046a
qua
after
(something which is/has dunamis )'.) 1 state of not being affected for
( l046a 16-19. not,
or( ... itself)
(1046a
ts >!xplicit) ~unamis
in
dunamis
3 itself) qua other'
Ls/has
can
intact
change ... another in
as
-settled
example
see below on 9 1)
(or its formula) turns up 1 when spelt out, dunat~ does
the having of dunamis
He
prime
It may seem that, while dunamis
the
not
2 4 corresponding to dunaton 2 ._ 4 in 91 builds its account (l046a 4-19).
that
'source ... of
26-
royed
is 'well', 1019b 13, 1046a 16-19:
all
'pleasant'
does
.
change
qua
first
threatened
a steresis cannot be a positive hexis;
at for
1
and
other (l046a 10-11)
in focal analysis of onta) Dunaton
phili~
'good'
'h.~LO's'
but
We are not to extract, monkeying with an inflection,
- not dunaton 33
7-10),
There is no sequence of ~namis _
1046a
the
to
66v«;H<;(Ouvo.-t6v in 9 1
P.t!.~~
- subject
expressions,
to the whole expres-
in neither cas~ js it an cxtenlal governing
but
(1236a
recurring formula of
is
or the definitions of ~ in subordinate catego-
such 'lUalifications
haplOs
1 4
- having dunamis
..::omponent
(TfJ
the qualification in ~naton
( 1020a 2-3) Dunaton
qualifications.
dlrect
;ource
1
r-e..tppears tn the other (1..;'0 (l236a 20-21, reading 1 et omn. post.; cf. l046a 15-16, 18-19, 1077b 3-
hut it is on ~-namis _
20-21) punaton
Sus.
t<~hereas
Hence
Dunaton
Bz.
•..;ith
but
be ..;ure,
chapters
in 612
with
.1tfected l<:stnJyed ~~
refers
,·,)vBrs
wtthotlt
for
well by
a
back
~!2~.1,c1mis _
the
·,o\lrc~
to
1 3.
:J.bsurdity
l046a
v,o0d
can
the
riunamis ? -"---3 affected for
worse', or
h1)W
qualification
tn
·:hange'?
15-16.
1.Jhere
Perhaps rewrjte
'Not
The the
being
the
worse
k.1i
in
1_~_!_
or
l046a
ev1dently
€~~.; 'taU l(a,).c]c:;
IJ.il 1td.cr-
:(ELV 'X""t\.r0 mark a SpP.cial1y ;;
104'Sb
l>jOT r:S UN
~I
fH ETA ~I)~
fl~namisl~4 (5, 6) correspond of 1::.12.
1046a
primary cases
6-9
is
(Contrast
nymy.
J,
which
insists
more
meaning without
that
tn
the
~un~ton 1 _ 4
:.,horthand
the relation between derivative and
EE
VII
l236a
'.~hich
7-33
similarity
and
similarity without
EN
explains \'Ill
using
focal
p_~ilia
by
1156b 19-21, meaning;
focal
35-1157a
and
explain
What is the str0nger relation bP.tween primary and deri-
as you will.)
A case
(1) ~~
of
sense
1, of
in
(e.g.
in a
ousia.
h.')
derivative sense coincides directly with A case
(ii)
requires
(iii)
servative others
~
of
viz.
seemingly
viz. iatros.
but
of
iatrikon
in
a
derivative
not coincide wi.th one of !~ 1 '
need
A case of hugieinvn in one derivative sense ('pre-
requires
and
h.')
'sign of
coincide
may
rloubtful.
with
(iv)
one
hugieinon 1 ,
of
A case of
philia_ in (v)
a derivative sense does not expressly require one of philia 1 . cases .\~d
of
may
if
the
is
no
dunaton coincide
and
dunamis
qualification regular
some
with
in
of
'partly'
requirement,
derivative
senses
logical
priority
does
rz
did
not
here at
into
Notes
46a
( i.s
something, 24-8,
I+Sb becoming)
and
that
b 29-34a 5;
on Zeta, of
lv 271
not
that
something
(ii)
6)
p.
the
1
ZH
in
asserted
entail
natural
the
back in
general, lv "tott; ( 1028a
35-6),
as
that the account of substance
derivative
cases,
-rO.~ 1t€p\ -ri'\~ o!xrCn.; }.t\yoL~
l..s
everything
that
from
~omethlng
same
in
form',
as
implied
is
to ZH in 8:
(i)
[cf. •ep\ -roil
6
do,
In
in
becomes
{is
becoming)
and
the
agency
by
referring to ZB
ni.ng
32
16.
in
the
first
34,
taken
from
H6,
esp.
until with
6. Zl
1 i045b 35-46a 1, "'hat is most useful
l045a
that
20-33:
All this suggests that
(tv
"tat'~
~s
what
we
expect to
1(p!j.rto~c;
A6yo~Q,
ZH
l7-9
existed as a unit, "ueginbe in~
already
a
proper
part of Z; which is compa(ible Y-'ith the hypothesis of H's pre-existence, us discussed earlier.
the
10,
b
17.
the
same
contrast and
14,
21,
in
b 6,
uses
chapters
(2),
11.
27,
26-7
general
9.
Llrsl
of
49b
'!2:1namei in 87
2).
connection
In
with
94
he
by
the
later
at
the
both
dunamis,
scope
at
i.n ~16
(thus
49a
37,
in
the
dunamei 1,
second
l050a 3,
0,
5,
at 8-
6,
occurs:
(e.g. In '.:18
9).
to
of dunamis
sections dunaton
~~_naton
of
is about
dominance
l048b
l047a 24-47b 2 (note 0-~namei
enlarges
l
r. o be m<1de about ener-
16, 49a 4) in connection with ~E~~-~-
14,
section at 93
sequent
to
expression for '"hat he mar-kerl
and
16,
2 l,
is
riu~"!_mis
di::;cnss
'I)
reference
l,as
!046a 2-4 promises, secondly,
r akes over as a general ter-m ( 1049b 5, first
1048a
~'._lnamts
But in the
1047b l) and the con-
in
anticipation
nf
the
second section.
We
li 12 is fairly straight~
had before us Owen's comparison of 6 12 and 91. offers a
It
focal analysis of dunaton,
in each derivative
case.
on
the basis of ~l..ln~-~!!2-4•
he
had
distinguished
the
chapter
(33
ff.).
allowing
(1019a
In 8t,
to
all
of
6 12 1020a 3-4. He are
rme
may
calk ll\12
the
corresponding
15-33) by
with dunamis
One could p;o on to define
occur-
?~amis?_
4
but Ar does not actually do so, even though senses
0f
dunamis
earlier
in
had defined senses of Q~naton therefrom
and
contrast,
verb ~unasthai
the
A new development
of
l033a
have discussed, which is why Ar warns us the discussion is to be posttJ<JOed
1048a
earlier
the
applies
for the business ~ in hand is evidently the notion of dunamis - patentiality
j)!"\ T'llses
which
seemingly require
Other backreferences
15-16).
this
z1
particular.
account
'It was said
l'l:p
in
the
(cp.
31-2
1049b 27--9
Zl
to
(pace
enter
to
backreference: e:tpma.r.
The
.-\["
~""hat
viz.
to treat nther sorts of dt1n_~~-··t!.!~ in distinctions geia;
forward.
1045b 27-32
~E..:.~"l_!"!!~·
sense,
25-6 he says he has done this.
l048a
ring
xpcirtor.c;; "X.6yor.t;
<.+:
strictest
dunar:on , dunamis ~save with dunaton 4 1 1 or inadequately is allowed). So here
priority.
will
34-1~6a
the
l048a
vative?
one
~045b
in
than m:J:re similarity, which '.-muld produce homo-
invoking
invokes
.., 11 ffi,:ic;ntly
he
( l046a 5)
proceeds
from
the
noun dunamis,
and the adjective to tag along.
the suggestion ( 16-17) that the xa\Wc;; modification
is
~unami~i-~ and
is
not
j11st a case on its own as at
fh..i.s gave rise to some discussion:-
first
deny
that
introduced to the case as the sense of 'can' in which
a
·lrunk
1019a 24-6),
man
Ihe
staggering
rhoHght
lS
that
and
slurring can wa~k
and
ther-e is a sense in which
it may be said that he can do these thin!<;s (for there he is doing them) therefore,
Ln the
a
different sort.
i..f
it
sense
rhus
the
is
of
also
correct
can ,
adverbial
viz.
to denv that 'can
h8 can,
properly'
nr
lt must be
something of
aodifier xa.AWc;, xa.-tl\ ~poaCpEO"'Lv, etc.
1
)h 14
,~OILS
1046a 4
occur
in
analyzanst
in
not
1:N THETA
ordinary language analyzandum.
the
The
drunk's walking and talking is an example of a denial of dunamis
/J.
fied.
12
e.g.
level
success I'.
on
it
'This
16
example
before, that
it
thus
in
and
be
with
of a
land
But
can be
'"'heredS 1:!.12
1019a
91
26,
deals
with the
reverses
this
before
going
order in such a way
to think that ~~1.c; &.xa.BeCao::; is included among these
is hard not
buvd.J..!£1.<.; at an
perhaps
~.; .. , &.xa.eeCa.c; at
to
that
1 can be similarly 2 cultivated [sc. with a fair
1019a 26 .already indicates that dl1namis
modified,
of
modi-
covered an
ll.Od'}OU.I. f} ·1ta.8e!v at
by
17.
What
modified ~~"c; O.m6e;(a.~?
adverbially
and imposslble not
being
'Tletry
'this
plant
is dead in the morning but
can't
stand
feast'
it
is
(it
does
not
die),
but
that
between
it
can
stand
'combustible'
(can
We
be
also
burned)
thought
and
of
the
'tnflammable'
the
mathematical
is
a
question
(dunamis _ ), an adverb in 4 6 distinct sense of 'can'.
the
for
and
you
[ sc.
a
real
man]'
whether,
paraphr.:tse
Perhaps
they
should
be
for
is
any
not
in
distinction (can
easily
of
these
cases
sufficient
proof
of
belong with explained
'There's
in
terms
in virtue ot
but
being or
22-33.
But
the
~-----!:.2.£.
Kirwan
On
discussion (a),
note
itself
that
the
full
of
likeness
is
in
sense
is
not
derived
via
likeness
or
metaphor
from
19-29
of
On
a
question tvhether the
dunamis
of
poiein
and
cor-
tion whether the kinesis in teaching-being taught is the same or diffeThe
latter,
after
familiar
paradoxes,
is
solved
by
arguing
~hat the change is the same but under different descriptions appropriate to
the
two
parties
change •
involved (202b 19-22:
however,
is
located
in
the
i..e.
not
identical kuriO's).
patient,
whereas
the
active
dunamis 0f our present chapter remains in the agent. \S\11
a
man
the
related paschein is the same or different, cf. ~· III 3 on the ques-
This it
capacity
as
be burned). Nevertheless,
a
a non-mathematical one.
plant which still looks fresh and bloo-
frost.
of
terms of which it is explained rests on the ~thematical use of 6Uva.crea.,;
rent. ming
virtue
the manner discussed - with an example from geo-
l019b
see
not
that it does not look at all happy;
one sense it can stand frost
the sense in which we say of a
1n
would
Start, -
at t::. 12
-
difficulty:
1046a
denial:
not
the case in
as O.px-ri 't'~C::
(23)
does
not
mean
it
is
an
agent
but
that
it
is a passivity.
what
a speaker can do with the ordinary sense. Another
doubt
reference to dunamis
abnut
Ar' s
or,
if
present
need be.
1 helped to elucidate dunamis
project
or dunamis
whether dunami~·t
adding
put
that into the definition
fhe cases 'Which are excluded to avoid homonymy can scarcely
be understood except by reference to 4 12, (a)
seem to be envisaged. explained 0!-10<6-rmC nv< [Alex.
~n
in Plat. "<.'l.t
liet.
Theaet.
394, 27,
the geometer's
(46a
34-6: 31
ff .}.
it
just alluded
is (b)
a.OUva.'ta. 'tif e:Tva.t ?tWc; 11 ).Jh e:Tva.l.,
0
to.
Two cases
:se of 66vau~c; for
or xa.-riJ. L<ETO.q>op
7)
66va.'fal.
1612
f1 11::\.eupd.,
'square',
10l9b
33-4)
similarly
Anon.
certain things we say are Ouvo't& which
l:.l2 1019b 14 calls Ouva:tl'L o6 xn'tO. 06vn.~Hv:
we
first
thought
it
better
to
l040b
seems
Lo
refer
t0
what
C
15,
in
view ofA 3
transpose~ O""Uf.1q>6
1070a
afterq>6a'et.
10-11, ,
as
heLonging to natural formations (Aquinas supplies complantatio, grafting, which seems neutral);
but editors recur toGA 773a 2, where 0"1.)J.!~Eq>1JX 'ta
6
are connected with 't'tpa.'ta (773a 3-4)
of the capacity to undergo or to resist change?
1046a 6-9
216
at
a
actually
Being changed is of neces-
.
3 but why
2 sity being changed by some agent,
was
the account of
JS
evident
ilt
l040b
moved of
to
( 77 3a
13).
15-16 ailuq>IJO"'I.c; could excise )Jl]
malformation,
at
and
1070a this
and with some non-evident as well
This be
10).
with A
would
lead
us
taken as xT!poxnt:. Here may
make
ln 8
there
the
to
believe
is
no suggestion
transposition at
15 (nnt recorded in the Notes on Zeta) persuasive.
!G46a 19-35
Incapacity.
that
(But we were not
To be compared with i.\ 12 l019b 15-21.
l0 4 0b
i l
'tL-\i'iER
in its power to do or not l046a
36-46b
them will
of h
Ross
introduce
logvs/ logon 14-15,
17,
.!..Q_g_~
with
(1102a
the
l102b
the
annotate
Cumpare
chapter.
13
EN
(a)
echon:
24-28)
not
also
marion
14-15)
familiar
on
0ccurrences
~~
contrasts
pages
(1102a 30,
with
another
element
in
the
soul,
to
of
(lt02b
soul
the
28-31)
(1102a
34,
of
b
which
1-3),
is
considered
dunamis
enkrates
terms
of
is
but
tOn
enantiOn, akrat€s
provides
as
are
the
there
equally
praised
for
h~xis
of
in ~let. 8 2
is
l~
(l.OI16b
and
a rete
as providing
4-24).
~~gos
the it:
~~~~.
opposition is
both in its
~r-~ktikon ( 1103a
the obedient
gunamis
and
( 1102h
(b)
It may lJe
that
prompts EN VI
of
of opposites);
(or at
to
one
of
course
the !..0~
,:1
If this ~2
is
types
health. or
for
the
This does
doctor).
parts of a logos,
dunam.:i_~
of
the
first
can
be
any more than the
channelled
into
wtth orthos
oi
J:l~xeis;
C?Sis t '.~·o
as
factors
dunamis
13
later
logos which is embodied in
EN
tOn
phronesis
and
VI
!._g~
tmchannel1·~d
ll44b
in 95
which
direct ions.
t!"lat
the
in r:N VI but
logou
This
recalls
the
insistence
of
:~3-21~,
the
determine LJ
che
by
but
ethik€!
arete
rational
earlier
contrast
proposes qrexis or prohai~~~amis
on the other hand does n("_
enantion;
meta logou
the
9 2 does not indeed speak
27-28.
1048a 13-15 Ar.
c!_~nameis
implied
in VI
respectively
12
1144a
make
the
in
one
of
"'-peak of 6-11 means
its h_1_2_8.Q§_
Ar
says
and
EN
VI
13
that
l.OJ>.211 (ll44b 26-27,
30).
It does
not merely conform to, it C!mbodies,
the right logos.
So in 8 2 rational dunameis have logos as an essential
component.
subsequently
logon;
But
and
this
in AS
similarly
at
he
A2
uses
l046b
kata
22-23
logon
Ar
as
reverts
well
not
mark
the
greater sophistication of
Ln both 02
and Rs Ar is careful to use ~eta logou of
as
to
meta
kata logou
i_.;_ata
of
logon
the
dunata
possessed
of
EN VI
the
13.
For
the dunameis but
such dunameis.
The
logos is
a defining component of the rational dunamis but not so, or not directly so,
of what has
:nay
subsequently
versa
('by
qf
~unamis.
the
l<)Se
This may be because •.-Jhat is now dunaton
the_dunamis
forgetting,
or
some
and
therewith
accident,
the ~unamis cannot
a man
'...rhich
:>usia: 32);
ps.
that
or
the
the
logos,
lapse
is
is
Alex.
supplies handier examples,
of
colour,
the
surface.
dunaton enantiOn
the
dunamis
the
primary_ dunaton,
16 'lre .q5
this
may
be
tOn
met
Thus
is the logos or
is But
enantiOn.
themselves
_logon
vice
Alternatively, conthat in virtue
statue and man,
414.
31-
by
5-10,
echon,
described or
the
(c)
it
(a) referring
in
or
language
recalling
that
in
virtue
the
Ls to
of
which
a
logon echon which primarily
It may he objected
since
(property an
1048a
or
time', 93
is the good itself (here called the eidos and
good
houses not
lose the logos.
of
in virtue of which a thing is coloured is the natural primary
possessor thing
unrestricted
both are
a ~xis not merely kat a ton orthon logon but meta tou or thou
is
1); but
two
so,
ts
the
<1~
the examples of kath' ho given in 6 18 1022a 14-17:
(e.g.
and
But at one point 82 may seem less sophisticated than EN VI 13:
l047a
hexis of the second. (;:)
scheme,
->ider
13 insists on the orthos which turns the
opposite
the
same
~ogos
imply
healer:
the
13; l048a 3) in discussing the operation of rational dunameis.
·:;kill in hurting-or-healing is a different sk.ill from that of the dependable
imply
least a well-directed piece of rPasoning) confined
so EN VI
into a hexis
and
does
V 1 ll29a
in Met. 9 2 1046b 7-14 ~pisteme is
as
compatible
(l048a 2,
reflection on this lumping of all logos under good logos
opposites (just
producing
are
sophisticated in their account of ~~ than EN I 13.
But
ll-13 has already pointed out that ~~name is and ~pistemai, unlike hexeis,
not
Net. 8 2
14-
t.he horma.!_ which
13 to stress orLhos log(JS (1144b 23-28).
The other three parts in this con-
The
defeat prohairesis (1102b 16-21).
are
and more
alogon
a dunamis
To logon echon,
4-5).
not
first
So there is no consideration here of
and
what
in
the
to Jo.
- epistemonikon, 12..s.ist iko_!! and o~~~ikon - are therefore by cont rast rational dunameis in the sense given in 92. So EN VI 12-13 text
meta
orektiko~
(!lOla 9-10).
16);
some
two
and to logon ech•Jn (1102a 28, apparently identified
prime sense and in its derivative use of
a
Lut
lines,
26-28).
and
11)
does
the
the dunamis.
good-itself
in
to
agents,
interchangeability
latter
hein.g
evidently a
_1~~
Ln EN
I
possessor
1022a 14-
the ~unameis
(b) observing that appropriate
the l_~
that
rather than has
0f
e.g.
at
\~ and
of the
relevant
(~namis.
dim (}rtha, and then says that of the fo'J.rth part of the soul. the tJ1rep-
-:_!--ls:_O_f.!.•
there
iS
!10
such
a._!"~-~.
for
this
part has nothing Which it
iS
_!:__Q_~6b 1-2.,
':-"ltional
:2
etc.:
princlple',
doubt
13 Ross consistently translates ~ogos dVotding
o3
'reason'
<:~s
part
of
the
old
l\J46b 1
'10TES ON THETA
debate
he
cites
VI
he
translates
13
in his
logos
and orthos
note
it
on
'rule
'right
the or
rule'
tr.
·Jf
(l141•b
23,
plural,
(1144b 29),
keeps to Lhe singular
but Ar.
tr.
logos
'rational
29-30),
logos
in EN I it
is
'about ... '
or for
exhibit
mark it
the
off
of)
g~nitive,
saying A.Oyoc; never
it
does
mean
formula
doesn't
here
(b
e.g. in identifying ~let.
In
lr.
loe>on
9 2 and 95 Ross
echon
at
1046b
1
not
it is natural
with
the
possible
in 92
e.g.
to translate addition of
1046b 8-13.
It is
a
though
different
b
Alexander
reads 1tOLll'Hxa.t xa.l
does X6yo~
Thert?:
are
thought
We
main
views,
that
On
be
in the
main with Owen's
simply
the
one
note,
about Xct-rd,
subject
(see
end of Owen's
specified We
note).
as
being
preferred
about
the
a
certain
1 at ter.
might ask how a power of reasoning about something could &TJA.oiiv (1046b 8,
14):
doesn't Ross have the advantage here,
One things
not
without
to oppose doing
(b 2: j..l£-rd,
though we
unlike 1-lE'td.,
1920]) that Nic. Eth. says not that
[CQ,
sometimes
(xat
,
b
22: xa-cd )
thought not
the
point
applying
to
a
We noted noncommittally
the view of Hardie (Ar's Eth. Theory, pp. 236-9, preceded by J.A. Smith
than x.a.-cd.,
reasoning,
it
0:\Ao lv U\Xql cases, and also the 7tpax-r~xcd. txc.
xa.-rn \.Oyov I ~e-rO. A6you question
the
or
of
t'tLO"'ti';~
11t
are concerned to oppose doing to not doing,
it means rational principle or rule (Ross), and that it means reasoning power
which
distinction
Ar didn't bring in 7tpax-rc.xat l7tLO"'t"-r,)..la.c. here because
he was concerned with
health must remain
two
formula,
significant
it
but •..;hen
being epexege-
tic.
agreed
mean?
where
the standard 7t:Jt..TJTLxat l:7tc.cr"t1;~a.L, with the preceding xnC
defining component, so that 618 wasn't needed. What
no
2-6, form);
We preferred
mj_ght
36-b}_
mean
a!: recc.), which separates the crafts from the sciences.
the basic idea (92 l046b 10-15).
l046a
1032b
to
17
b
Of course
£'X£LVa
between t:7t6q:Kl.O'LC: and d.1tocpopd.).
something to doing its opposite.
its enantion or ~teres is,
(at
seems
saw
opposite;
from
formula it
incidentally we
f.lO..L
health which must
means
an 61t6(pcunc; gives
13:
(or 'rule' or 'principle') which uses denial and removal it is reasoning about e.g.
\.Jith \6yov Exov,
interchangeable
are
13,
reasoning',
a dependent
not a 'formula' to
'(power
often
again associated with opposites,
a footing with threptikon-phutikon-orektikon
on
is
i D4fla
--rijl \6yot:; Eiva.c. as easily as -rq, A6yov
had
is
At
put
13 and with phronesis in EN VI
'reason'
have
we
as simply 'rational'. If
since A.Oyo~
In fact,
could
13 logos is
In VI
hims~lf,
he
In EN
(l144b
in reporting Socrates' views
1144b 27-2&. though
1U95a 10.
'3
principle'
26-28).
1 i.ke episteme,
formula',
J
EN
r<J.tional
indeed put into the
phronesis with ortho~ at
llAPTF:R 1.
one
which
but is
the
reverse,
and
that
both -.:a.'td and iJ.E"td ,
and
j..J.E't"d..
gives a stronger condition
there
are
one
which
two i.s
types
of
virtue,
merely ;...i£'t
the
\l_rthos logos.
since a formula
could already 'exhibit' something, without needing to be put into words? But
to
exhibit
and
tt
seems
such
and
to
seems
say
the
to
need
disease,
which
a
single
rather
of
power
Similarly reasoning
bunch.
a
health
opposites
better
about
by
the
thought to
sound odd: about
formula
an
with \.6yot; as
formulas,
exhibits
couldn't,
as
them
exhibit it
via both
have
a
etiolated
i.e.
a
power sense)
specific
like rpp6vry:nc; 1'1 a.b't""ft
of
reasoning powers
of
(b
of
17)?
reasonin~
1046b
13:
'PO~ov
knowledge of,
''va
X~,& rru~e~~x6,
signifies
the
way
in
which
say, health also involves knowledge of diseases.
rioesn't,
'reasoning'. A6yoc; 6 a.i>'"r6t;;
exercise
1046b 3-24
Nor need we be troubled at
b 8
which would
b 7-8 shows a shift from reasoning as a power to reasoning
something,
knowledge (in
that,
be replaceable by something
bunch of
health could
so to speak, carry its negation in its pocket.
ought
a
reasoning
the
power.
Well, about
it a
How could could
giv~n
'have'
subject.
1046b this
15
The
chapter.
premise But
introduced
it
is
by lxe:( doesn't
relevant
in 9 5,
where
seem
to
be
used
in
the thread is taken
again from after a diversion in 93 and A4, and it is effectively repeated at 1048a 9. The point there is that somet.hing is needed
up
to decide which way the rational potencies act. and 5p£;;L c; and JtpoaCpe::are offered.
This could have been said in q 2, and could per-
'5
------------------~----------------------~~~--~~~
36
lQip')b
1aps have just
deny
b
and
17
been
11sed
against
that
any
deciding
b
doesn't
21
tl)e
if
doesn't
analogous
•,;hat
raise
the
triggers
external, {Indeed
~,.:hen
as the
a
per
produces
heat. both
the
to
elaborating
the
in
too
rational
the
the
opposites
seems
that
the
of
simply
A" 2 also
nonrational potencies:
trigger
may be
something
can be
potencies
of
opposites,
rather
unfair example of hot gas especially Greek healing,
the
heating 5'6vn)JLC:: is
triggered
it
a cational potency when triggered should
opposites,
which,
which doesn't potenci~s
are
united
by
the l:xsC
clause
potencies
too,
if
nonrational cold
to be
reference.
at
as
b
b
15
ff.
20
says,
till 95,
come
One
a
single A6'(oc::
which
for opposites are pvssible despite the l1teC clause. out
might
as when healing,
Anyway when
needed,
same
about
here
and
they
C.pxh x L v'licrf;wc;;
is absurd.
as well
as
hot,
is in
relevant so
far
at
all the
as
albeit per accidens.
shows
should
how
powers
affect
heating 66vnf. Hc;
b 15 f f.
involve taking o~x ~1-1oCwc:: as obx t'f!-la, which would seem to require something how
l:v )JfpEL rather than o-uv
like the
even granting
that
between 'the also
( o~x 6jJ.oCwc;
asymmetry
a
lot
Also to
(i)
doesn't
explain
itself
(b
the A.6yoc;
themselves
into 7tp6<;;,
(t~ n6't~ for 1tp0c; -,;0 a~-r6).
(blackening
and We
one
would
therefore
and
whitening).
expect
rather
inclined
( i)
the
towards
dative
(ii),
for o6x 6~oCw<; to b 9-10 (f.'ll"l-"l.ov) and b 12-3 (~p61
ferring
20),
there is an asymmetry in the sense of a difference
processes
reads
applies
re-
HVIL ••• );
the asymmetry there will be that, whatever it may be, which is involved in cr>tlpr~nc;;.
( (ii) might read more easily if CL)J
a-uvd.+-a..aa., xLvf,o-eL the clause
having
an awkward
no
expressed
structure.)
object;
but
this
would
give
We noted en passant that at b 22
EJAb read 'pb<; 0-6~6 for "Pb <; ~b 0-6~6.
suggestion was
But it was pointed it
l046b 2l
while 82 turns
itself provides a role for the l1teC clause by answering it:
b 20
the
has
Lhough
The
is heated by being pushed towards a fire.
as
relevant
is
b 24
quest1on
Analogously
Something more
in 9 3,
rl.one. trlck,
though
or
be
the
potencies
accidens,
refrigerator, hurting.)
that
-
something
involves
produce
off?
nonrational
though only working
them
to
do
L')
the A.6yoc; itself,
cHAPTER 2
'1egarians
had
seem
THETA
IJ~
'WTES
l:)
the
covers
would anyway be
awkwardly expressed if the above suggestion lay behind it.
l046b 22-3
similarly evoked
above,
the
says
(a),
two views.
rational Ouva.'td. do
opposite
in
the spirit of (i)
things to the nonrational
Ouva:td. (taking 'totc; ••• Ouva:totc; with 1tOLEt'), while (b) says the rational 6uva't0. do the opposite to what the nonrational 5uva'td. do (taking 'tote;; ... (a)
Ouva:toi:'t:; with 'td.vav'tCa.). as
passive Ouva'td.
nonrational that
(if
passive
and
not
powers
seems
indeed that
treats
committed
vice-versa);
seem to be
the
object
of rational action
to calling all it
passive Ouva'td.
deals with this
rational
(e.g.
by
saying
the ability to be
taught by one method in preference to another) are really active powers. What 1\n
object
are
a
The soul,
starting from one and the same ~px-fJ,
\6yoc;, sets
the
processes
in
of
suggestions:
black or white.
opposite
piece
Two
on,
both
e.g.
to?
operating
ro~ether
we
does 1tpbc; 'tO nb't6 refer
paper we
motion,
with a view to putting now one now another
are making
connecting (or:
( i)
i.e. them
putting one
or the 0ther) of the alternatives (black and white) into the same piece ,1f
':he
paper.
(ii)
equivalence
The same thing as of 1tp0c; ttv
aJ
and d~'tvdc;
,·onnections between 1tp6' and &~6).
~i'io
in
focal
~t
nne
:Jlternative
other
-:::onnecting them with
only not symmetri~ally (o6x 6J....l.o(wc;:
to that same d.p):'..,C, or )..6yot;
c\1oo<>es
and
The soul, starting from the \6yoc;
(.as above) sets the opposite processes in motion, r~spect
meaning,
rathr!r
than
the
other).
( i)
seems
to
(a)
perhaps
naturally,
has
the
the
subject
advantage
that
the fJL9-
of 1tEpLfxe:'tac.
being
clause the
follows
on more
nonrational Ouva.'td.,
if we can think of them as being encompassed in their capacity as passive 5uva.'t({
by
rational,
different
are
a
united
whiten
or
by to
phrase for
(b)
differently'.
the ).6yoc; (the power
being both blacken). -
power
from
subject
of being whitened is, being non-
that
of
being
blackened,
but
they
to a A.6yoc; which decides whether to
Also 1tO~Ei: 'td.vnv't'Ca seems
a
rather
strong
though perhaps it is just a stock phrase meaning 'acts For (b) the subject
of 1{£pLtXE'tal.
is
the
rational
Ouva'tci, which is awkward unless one can taken the 6 L6 clause as parenthetical
with
the yd.p referring
back across
it.
On
the
other
hand
(b) fits the chapter as a whole better for the nonrational powers must ~urely
be being thought of as active because of uta
)6
57
tv6'
at b 6:
this
:;JTES ON THETA
l_l)'t6b 22
won't as
apply
to the
whitened, y~
,...Cn
passive
(We
d.pxt].)
We
did all
not
24-28
In
thE:
however,
can be
blackened
nominative that
Ar
reading of
is
showing
64,
as well AbJ:
that
106.
13-14 sub
~
But Diodorus may rear a head on one interpretation elf 1047a infra,
in
first
clause
(24-26) d.xo)...ov8E! can be
obx &.e:C, 26) this seems difficult -
in most cases it isn't
l046b 29-30
X
f.
For values of verb
(i)
can F only when
that
the
it
ability
well;
to do doesn't
it
accompanied by it. a) .:ixo~ou8£!
something doesn't ~
it
at
always
all,
We considered four
imply
though
it
when
F;
cf.
kinesis
kai
genesis at
l047a 14.
In other words
just seeing)
not F X cannot
they include not
although 93 begins
of ~/energeia
in R 1-2, as a whole it covers all forms belongs with A4. As takes up from 92.
sometimes be
1
that would suit the account of dunamis
the ability to
may
does
X
1047a 28-29:
and these were introduced at l047a 11~13 together with the quite general
with examples (building, do
does
X
'F'
only kineseis and staseis but einai and gignesthai and their negations,
taken
'is implied by' , but in the following clause ('ta.U't";J 6'
in the sense of ~xe:Cvn
the
paper
if
discuss
agreed,
s()me sense there is the same
l046b
powers
11)46b 29
and
so
possibilities:
= 'accompanies' throughout, and ri£ C is
Notice
(ii)
to be understood
that Ar is interested only in the form
'cal>'jdoes',
not in 'does"'*-an', which is not in question.
in the first clause. b) &.xaA.ouBe:;t
""
'is implied by'
in the first clause,
(iii)
but is understood a
possible
X can F at time t ...... X does F at
ambiguity,
between can
jump-at-t
time t:
this brings out
and can-at-t
jump.
(a)
only as meaning 'accompanies' in the second. (c) at
Aristotle all does
is
thinking of
imply being able
The
cases where to be able to do something to do
it
well.
arguments
seem
But in such cases the
to
because
need he
in
l046b
only
the
33-47a
10 about
second
formula:
cannot-now house build.
qualification 'well' is redundant. (d)
with
It was pointed out that, in ordinary speech, 'isn't always implied'
might
be
natural
enough,
though inexact,
for
against
sometimes is the case'. But what are these remarks doing at this point in any case? to
relate
in 92.
to
e1
pephukenai
formula,
'isn't ever implied, but
l046a 16-19, but not, apparently,
1
the
They seem
to anything earlier
X can
an answer to a point
at
idea
the
of
The
seems
F-at-t.
not
now a
housebuilder construction
rather
(c)
etc.
comparable At
to want
l047a
the
first
12-17 Ar
can-now F-in-the-future;
when X has the power, time. Confusing the
that
thesis,
and
at
time'
that
that
given
uses the
time',
the confusion to
is
not
met
it
is
threatens
power
by amending
'doing what X could do (sc.
which
the
of doing what
two may be one source of their
circularity or
'doing what
X does
has the power to do) at
regress,
So concurrent
activity is entailed by capacity . I)
Note by G.E.L. Owen
Q
l046b
34-36
•~i~s~a~h~o~u~s~e~b~u=i=ld~e~r~--~X~ca~n~~ho~u~s~e~b2u~i~l~d (and so for all
~)
l046b33-34, The Megarians: ·~hich
below)
Megarians
F-at-t:
X does
CHAPTER THREE
(to
!.
under
to
made by one of Aristotle's audience?
from
!'.
and
g:
X is a housebuilder only when X is house-
building
school
Sedley, Proc.
(see
naturally apt
X is
(b)
seeing
choice between ~ and can-now F, this is more naturally an application of the second, But the Megarians can surely not allow the distinction: for them X can-at-t F stands in mutual implication with
We concluded that they are a note which had been placed here
for want of a more appropriate place; or, perhaps
is
house building and
Camb.
it
now appears Philol.
Soc.
that cciii
Diodorus Cronus (1977)
74-120;
I N_~cessi!:._y_,
did
not
belong:
so Sorabji,
l046b 36-47a 2:
(i)
X has an a r t ; X has learnt and acquired that art
Cause and=-__t
58 59
l '::tob
\f)
not ~2'~~~-t
X does
(ll)
~ X has
lost
the art,
(sc.
pathos ~~.l.9J~..:~. .~---2.!_ time, bi:!caus~~s
'.·.'hat
ubject?
t:-:ey
if
The
The form
ot
Alex.
the
art
g_!..
concede
j
s
6-11
of
but
Z
will
proposes
are
upon
us.
but
these
he
(re)acquire
l,:arning occur?
unl.-~ss
~
implies
35.
(and
\.Jith
not
( i),
g_,
jib at
(i)
where
only present
eternal
does
~QI13I~ton
has
ment
Ar
does
menon
the
1.vill presumably
~
22,
ur
or
( i) e.g.
Jnless
either?
;.lot
Perhaps
(b)
1047a ll~l2,
from~:
wholly
in
perceptibles,
e.g.
(A)-~thesis echein e.g. ~.!!_=can perceive, e.g.
10~7~-~:
X Joes not have sight,
.1nd •Nhen it
it,
ht?.~weet,
cold,
then
(Presumably accepted by the Megarians.)
is naturallY apt
1046b 36.
taking '!_
as
a
Or
either
and
~.
his
-
for
tdunaton genes-
in !J. 12
r 81
0
But,
l046a 29-
(c)
two-way
of
it
that adunaton :
is
16~17;
and
Q.'.:!.
far the argu-
50
~.
apart
is that ~unato~
it
implication:
~
cf.
from
12
a
estere-
-==
1019b15-
Cut neither (b) nor (c) is important to the argu~ s_tere"sis
or
a"?.:!!!amia is
1;1hich ~legarians
any
:Jill
illicit 1 v
event
reject
1 mported
\.Jhere
on
will
grounds
as
im-
Aristotle
given
under
(an _!_047a ll=J_?_.L_ll_J._?_, from~ and\'!:
see)
thol~S natu~gy_ apt_to have
to have it,
tird
be
seems sufficient.
then
terms
In
There_~e
'..Jill
is that
l047a
cf.
.~i-~t_!:letr-m = what can be perceivr.>d)
L!}_!~J_~.
nor
non-performance to have Logical connections
adunaton?
1 l046a 29-35. 1
intcnd~d
1s
said
conducted
duname'Os,
is
( i i)
gives us Dindorus;
implied at
Leen
nclt:her
why should the Hegarians accept either, when they Hant
different ~ at
•,..1here
Perhaps •..;hat
performance or
<J_u_~~r:_~.9_!!,
not
has
Secondlyt
ment,
only when perceiving is going on. [][)
they
(a)
either
'the
housebuildi~ he
from
Viz.,
it?
~·1egarians,
and where?
Ps.-
are
udunaton genesthai
\~hat
Ross proposes theory?
is
thai
the
~_.)
reiect [[)
(The
'adunaton' ;neant
( ii)
1~a_v_~.:_-~h8 art; whenever he starts ;:,gair~ he (~~il· How Lhen does
What
firstly,
'st~ll survive' v.:ithout reduplication)·
',Jheneve..£_~ stops
l~~L:ia 12-14 this is what
even
The !!c·use in house-
l1egarians accept
brick~~.
the
surviving
obJeCt
i•;r the Hegar·ians this,
But
particular.
7-9 the
a_<:_~~ cannot be reduced to ~~~.:_.-~ from ~ and ?._:
and
the
eternal_
building?
troubles
house',
571.
of
temporary
w
aheady a.v{uir<::d)
bv forgetfulne"?_~_::>r some
112_":?_~
What -~-S____!2_?_':_~~1.~~!__!)__~?.!~
!ien~ __ there is no__ chan~.
in th~~~~
tut ~X is blind. (i)
For
CJ.i.>;ht
have
hon
t r~
Lited
in
1022b
104 7a JO,
9
1046
J.1egera
cites
13-34.
104 7b
l048a
29,
Othepvise
the
1,
'and
~
fnr
Li)
\1~31;
:t.
pephuke
cf. [llZ
10l9b 17-18,
rhe second passage explains
c:ery
1t
hate
d~e,
tiere
though
tht!
in
general
r~mporal
·'·~-e~':!~~n-~~~- belongs
that l.t
12
l012b Zl-29, 9[
to lack 3ight
is natural
qualification
I"~~ t:han to the !)_~2.:..~.-t~ (cf.
seems
the ~J.e at
to
for
is
the dnimal
attach
l046a
not blindness
rather
to have r,o
:l.~y.
L01.9h 18); the ·.mqualified
C.~~
from
P
and
U:
The
same
man will__ .S:_ill_,~d
rnany
times
~ack:!-ng capacity ( P.ster;menon dUl}-ameOs) -) adunaton
1 l046a 29-10.
a
in at
valent),
w;~s
1047a
the
We had before us Owen's notes; '"hat follows should
conjunction
if*
\.Jhether
x
29
with
f.:
is
not
them.
The
thesis
x can only 1p if* he
x
cannot
'P.
(The
position of )..L6vov in 30 was not
under
is .:p-ing,
discussion and
quest ion was
rather odd,
is
(the equi-
hut
raised
the sense
in any case clear.) Six possible interpretations of this thesis were distinguished:
l.
X dnesn't
the
have
ability
to
not
(I{) while
r.p-ing),
Contradiction.)
all (Jges; what does not belong is e_<::2__hukenai
lThe Xegarians may re1ect 1_: as ill-formed or false.)
l~J_·::J.G!__lg__::J.J_:
read
the
;)c~!"_1...~~.:rephos-on.
:·~~7_-:~ 1
be
stated
··: still ~xists'.
Hegarians.
The
and
banal
2.
If
,)f
~-ing
'1e
Interpretatione
n0t,
x
is at
not '-ing t.
at
(the
at t, able to
9 i.p
19a
time
t
he
has
'irrevocability 23.
Perhaps:
thrown of
the Lf
away
the
l'r8~>ent';
11pportunity ,_f,
x does not 4' at
perhaps t,
x is
at t.)
?erhaps needlec;s, but see 1,n L•J47a 13-14 below. ~,\rlstotle ')!1
11)4/a
has
10~14.
not
'tf'
hut
'•..Jhenever:
ct.
f"Jrther
h·~low,
und
'\ l a
,;!-'fA
1-'•
L :
'.PS
x
at
xis
4.
ff
the
ability-
h•..1ild a
r_he
he ~":.~_£ held
in
·..Jhich
learns
But
abillty to
ttw
d·~t·::rr:unism.)
he 1ar_ks r:he al)11i.:--y
way
he
abl J it) Lo .;> ·n 0ther times.
:-h·~
tir'les,
<-o
'.~'h:;
someo!le
b:Jild,
(u~:il
·;
s~e
not tp-i.ng
sitting
rhJ:.·,
he
h•:o.
can't
now,
W'~aker
intend
3·
until
[':'his
now),
It
s~mt:~lY
chan :., C11t is d·-::rually stronger.
has
'if
the
also
foisted
former
whoever
it
(1-3),
remarked
are
you
'you
themselves -
Aristotle
it
on
cannot
that
sitting,
in stating
cannot
be-standing-if-you-are-sitting'
infers
bility,
or
that
it
derives
a
from
particular
guity
;_mplies
ledves
1-Jut
that
I
the
1nr:ac.:t
5 hrJ'•iev<:!r
lo.::;t.
get 1.1p
can't
t:l~~n
rhe
rlivi~ibiL.ty
infinite
moments',
mi~ht
one
th~
c.Jn't p;et up dt
cf
ar~ue
Lndeed
abilitif:'s
tf];;1t
'lldY
._ht:!n'
he
simply
shows
that
the
( L. e.:
)[
these,
many
~r'.tel
now
he
1:1.
fhe
does
;1•:-mselves lorced
on
vit h olOr-,
lntend
to
l:Je
~:;o
Rtter tilat, ,:nd
the sonsequenL 6
i3
'h~re
not
av0ided
rrn.
Given
absence ot hecduse,
th,em
lll!tidl
">'-"t\Se
sLdlement
and in
3
this
!,,
ts
'next
there
~·
lack that
sEems
<1
_st
1
th~n
a thesis of
all
l047a
10)
first
(fr,Jm
<.!ith
,:cm.r':F.lble
is
a11y
c)[
131.
rs,
tf
or
in
order
is
it to
'1n
i.ntecpr, :A.ru:n
d~..:mol.L·.h
i.-?
(1-i above).
at t, not-p:nsible-at.··t not-ltl (4-6 above),
Lts
or
you
24
ff.,
Diog.
LliJ:-
t
h':' Hegarians
Arisrotle
tmplic.dti.on:; are ,,.-Jt
SJ:'Pll~d
o2
states
aren't. of with
Laert.
of
one
the
above;
latter
for
to
here
is
it
formulation,
1-2
leaving
suggested, was that at any one moment
affairs
that
may obtain; either you are
So no room is left for
the
'Reaper'
no
statement
25,
7.
44
paradox, as
to
(interest
given
its of
'possibility'.
by Ammonius
origin,
Zeno
and
and
also
Stoics
This
in de Int. mentioned
generally
in
Sedley links it with Diodorus' Dialectical
school; PCPS no. 23 (1977) 98 and n. 135). are
most
naturally
stated
in
terms
of
possibility,
rather
than of potentiality or ability, unlike 4; cf. further below. It was remarked that, or
2,
this
could
have
if
3 was intended in the
been made
explicit
thesis rather than had 5uvT)8~va.c.
if
we
had
of senses
1-5
(though it may be
rather than 6uva.m>
DFi
4,
by
point, it was
two
it; also Lucian, SvF 2. 287.
felt
has
4,
the
has
that
because
of
Aristotle
thesis?
can
be
taken
in
any
the example at b 30-32 is already tilting the balance towards
Or
the
most
added is
the
his
natural way own,
sense
of
of
loaded,
taking
'cannot
example to the
ability,
rather
build a
initial
shift
to
sense
4 comes at
33
ff.,
builder is being able to build'
house'; Me gar ian
than possibility,
leads towards 4, already implied by 66va.m>cu in b 29-30?).
a
~
only
reminiscent
'',
that
:f 'Plitt, not-p05Sible not-tp-;:;!;t-r 'D
are
further
r:-·-er wil.l
chapter
and
lmbiguit? ·Jf t!le r:hesis may reflect confusion Llett...'een
; f
ll·~
that
dl_~Y.2_~~..!..!_
and
l_q T·,
tr.uLsms,
i_:l
the
from
covered
alive
[This ambi-
stand/be standing.]
The Megarians'
starting
~~equires
and now'
ncJssible
\ri.'-itotle
thesls
different
naturally
is
3 as well as 4-6 to be covered by the formulation 'if you are sitting,
l-3
to
most
he
a.
you cannot
th:;,.',_
1.<::
slightly
are
school;
12 281 b
'f!G:nent',
one
ahility
maintaj ned. ;-.tegrtrian
r•or-
h'Jt
(
the
':tppe-'l.r
the
lmulying
'if'
1--2
have
pr.et
·, t
lacks
it
the 166a
moment',
expression
now,
4
'11<.~Xt
C E • t)e 1 ow on 1U ~ 14 • )
1.bili ty.
':.hat
notf.P--ing
js
and
at ~·
'rwxt
by
x:
f£
distinction
standing'
in Ll.e
(?
ana 1 ys is . fi.
is
that
But
this
\vhich leaves
the
be sitting at- the,
c~.nd
time
;iew
(bel o•.,.J';
'th(o!re ,1nrt
1...f there were such a thing) I musL U' •..Jhich case I
aor'Tlal
implies
this
as an example of the fallacy of composition (and cf. ibid. 20 177b
at
(jf
make
22 ff ·) • without suggesting that it makes a special point about possi-
the ambiguity both there and in ~ 1.
present.
them;
discusses
stand/be
U1e absence of the ability at present from !"rqrperformance of the .:1cti8n
d'.:qu 1 red
-
If they did only noted that 1 and are so
Aristotle
you
they were
them?
was
there seems little interest
was
between
seems
Megarians
themselves
24, ~nd
here
up
the
or
truism
~et
did
confusion,
obvious that
builder can't
a
i:H1 t
'ne recr)verq
blind man c,m't
.1:
r)r
:'l
t-J se:: is restorer!),
is
is
'='at
The tlwsis nC
in
first sight
at
certa1n
house until
lf x
man
a
times, :"" L1cks
not
nr)C •,;.-jng nmv,
ab~l1ty
lns
cerca~n
does ~imes.
those
dL
IJ)
x
if
[f
~Or
·..,ith the additional premiss ("'
'l'lt 1 •
b3
which
A definite 'being
'if one is not able to build one
104 7a 4
;
where lltl"t
34
(ur
Cl:l.Swer•;d in
be
,""j
..
builder') b
a
,1't
'ability'
foas
force
the
it
preferred oUO'
as
has
~~.
in
N. B.
doesn't
ou't
seem
follows).
•.o~hat
perceived as hot is hot, or is
perceived as
converse
of
Howevert,
\f!Ehl , which
)f
also
may
characteristic
,'IS
a
"t
time
loss
of
(in
··.1i.
hy the
some
capacities
1f 3.n art by failure Greek'!)
n·Jtural
immediate;
to
disasters
with
old
to practise refer
-
but
j
age;
not
is
species
to
an
inrerval
forgotten;
(iv) xp6v!f refers
(iil.)
to
loss
t, where i t ,,1ight not always be natu-·
to .f.9..E_gett.l!!ai this
refers
expected to l!avR
tr~
'i
forgetfulness
)..flAT)
<_ii)
individuals, xp6vql
which anyone mi'Sht
'lfter
vo6v~
of
he
refers to
xp6v~
(·,·)
tbe loss of arts thrClugh her~,
relevant
where
it
loss
is
individual that is in questl.on.
~4_?.2__
?:
point
The
of
this
~xclude
to
some
other way
in
,.1hich one might no longer have an drt: but '.vhat is the ·;n;piiyua.? ~ ~)
The
form of
house
(quite generally).
Aristotle introducing his o...,-n
forms
which
Hfficultv nf
r 1.) .r. !
No
probl~m
wRs felt over
the
-1rt
ts
mind
nf
it, 1•
'l)t
r!i.s:~sters
ts
in
of existence;
(•:f.
natural
dint
to
tn
(ii)
But
disasters
else)? of
The
general,
t:here wo11ld be
tnr~
ri-te
builders.
eternal.
anywhere
1ther
of
building
tnr a. t.ime. •'r.
n"tl~ral
in and out
but there
is also the
below).
the art nf building; the form of house ln the mind of this builder, in
he
pass
what and n~
as of
Me~ar'ians
opposed
mtght ~'!!_!..§_
to
Aristotle's
their
\..rel 1 man's
belief
subsequ0nt
A.ccept that possession
in the
rediscovery.
loss so
hei.ng
fnrm of h0use in the mind of nnv builder
'Need-for-shelter'
might
still
'shelter-made-of-stonec;-and bricks'.
nnly
to
contrast
of
that,
exist, even
the
relative
permanence
if
But we inclined
the v1.ew that such loss of the art:=.; is irrelevant here.
ilL.~ "lao's
argument
!he
P.Xtra
premiss
•' 11r' hIe
ct.
-
!>S~w·:
1n
a
is
hot,
it
is
hot,
and
'not
perceiving
follows
from
(II)
cold.
that,
as
it
is
hot'
if a thing
(IV)
We noted, though, that
hot. 'per-
~_!lis
reduc-
the refe-
and we
contrasted
a 7-10.
at
it
in this respect with the subsequent
2 426a 20 Aristotle argues that
At de Anima 3.
it is not correct to say that a thing is not perceptible if it is not being perceived; but that turns on the distinction between potentiality and
actuality,
~047a
which is what is being denied in the Megarian position
nf
required
'if
·-=ometh.i.ng
7-10
Why
so
blind many
times
day?
a
whenever
one
blinks,
we
But there is no analogous process in the case of deafness;
one will
be deaf,
perhaps
1
whenever
there
are
no
sounds
to
hear.
We agreed in preferring Ov <1:p6'xov> in a 9. How would
ded
either
the
first
the Megarians reply?
(i)
by
claiming
place
(cf.
above),
Their position can only be defen-
that or
they
(ii)
never
intended
by defining
pnsition
'blind'
in
4
in
such a
way that not all 'incapacity' to see involves blindness (and analogously, in a 33 ff., to build ready
(f.22
defining
involves
ruled out,
'..Jho wouldn't l022b
'builder' in such a way that not all 'incapacity'
not being a builder). however,
in a 9.
see even if ...
26),
etc.
etc.'.
and if ... We
Some qualifications are al-
A blind person will be and if ....
agreed
that
it
'a person
but ·.o~ho isn't a mole would
be
legitimate
for people who maintained position 3 to employ counterfactuals in this way, and even for those who maintained position 6.
the art with L047a 10-14
be being perre1ved dS
is
perceived as
thing
it
~
thing
the
loss of it; d.£C is cl.n exa,Q;~eration for 81:~.
1naoie nf
it
a
a
'not-hot', then
if
position seems to require the
rence to Protagoras apparently being thought sufficient without further explanation,
0 1 .~~-~~~_!_
not-hot',
(II)
Prot agoras'
tic-argument does not have its conclusion spelt out clearly,
:1tere t:tight be difficulties if the only forms that there are are indivi·hal
if
(III)
'cold'=
is perceived as cold,
decided.
in argument l'!.gatnst the t1egarians.
b~liefs
equivalently
But
as represented here.
clearly
is
(II),
if
ceiving as (i)
hot.
is
ho-c
Lt
j
above). blind;
This introduces a new point, the denial of change (position It
wasn't
and N.B.
envisaged
l:S'ta.v in
1046b
in a
7-10
29-JJ.
s
not'.
').
65
that
the men would always
6 is implausible if stated
NOTES ON THETA
:, 10
i
\.:i 11
in
!:erms
of
ability
1 ng
now doesn't
why
not?
bility;
it
have
would
the
be
ability
required
that
to and 'Hill
a
isn't
man who
never
recover
but
it;
But it is implausible enough tf stated in terms of impossitf p is
ahility, ll.
-
or
impossible,
rather
Aristotle's
its
it ,.jill never happen.
absence,
to
And the shift from
impossibility
conclusion here,
is expressed at
it was suggested,
10-
results from his
illegitimately importing a tenseless type of impossibility (it is impos-
I H~ ' ?
but,
lt
l i ngerlL
false
is
to
say
that
the
interpretation of ~·
one
Sl'u-hattle that
it >von't
diagonal
it
')
isn't
will
lle
measured,
true ro say of a C<.)n-
occur tomorrow.
But this won't work,
pr~cisel:v because, with such a view of truth-v.'llues, 'not true' doesn't ir•lply 'LJlse'. (Boethius, in d~. 2 215. 6 ff., refers to people tr,uk Aristotle
\.Jhn
t•nnorruw'
and
to be saying that both
'there
be
won't
a
'there will be a sea-battle
sea-battle
tomorrow'
-1re
false,
but
r<-:J<:>.cts this interpretation.) sible,
11,
In
to be
statement
x does not
we
in
(now)
c0me
tensed
~'
not •-ing
not
that x will •
tenselessly,
·negan with a
~
potentiality or
isn't
is
the
argument
of coming to he'.
In
obviously false ~
now come to be because it
ability
t
already.
requiring
12-13,
'what
is
that what cannot
it might be that it cannot
'is'
is therefore being taken
'has come to be' (eternal existents not being in ques-
The reference to rence to the past, There
are
three
'being or being-about-to-be', excluding any refe-
in 13 recalls Diodorus'
possibilites:
(i)
nccepted
tlly
at
this
Diodorus'
in
-
unlikely on grounds
of
chronology,
though not,
be
entirely excluded on those grounds alone.
t0
identify Diodorus as a Megarian ( c f. Owen's notes).
had
this
passage
of Aristotle
in mind
in
we thought,
formulating
( i i)
Diodorus
his definition.
(iii) The similarity is not a matter of influence in either direction, but
simply
reflects
.1nd unchangeable. say
the
fact
that
the
past
is
in a
sense
necessary
It would be implausible, in some contexts at least,
that a thing was possible because it had happened in the past,
is Rut
to
But there is no reason
\ei:ld5
Compare
the
the
hy
Aristotle of d:.06va."t'ov
were
not,
that
had
premiss
of
than a
tram
~v
of
1~ronus'
Diodorus
Master
the sense of rixo'A'Jt7e:tv
lQ,_, and
S'o""'tUL
temporal future.
Aristotle
has
is
the latter being
-
Having stressed that ind1cate what ::.u.;u':6v
to
to
the
need
for
a
definition
of
'impossible',
and
tor this we are in danger of being forced down a Hintikka-
type
road,
chapter
the
proved
to
(104/b
9-12;
impossible being what never happens.
we
be
have
an example
impossible
cf.
of
because
of it
ps.-Alexander 575.
what never happens.
;:enerality
1f it '.Jas certain it would never happen again.
if
this meant as a definition of 'possible'? If so, it simply
immediately
next
\lt
second
combination
rather
different ls
looking
u1
easier
implication
dO
6uva."!~ d.OUva/tOY IJ.i-1 &xo\:.lu9c:t'v;
expressed
t -;\.
mind
been
introducing
definition of the possible·
Aristotle has
have
question in what preceded.
infr~tential,
.JH
the imperfect lmiJJnLvt:v indicating a gene-
that
would
point,
1~4_7~
:\t gument,
L:.,.
here
truth
very
~~ been in
here
tion), and 'cannot come to be' means 'cannot come to be at any time'·
was pointed out
lr
(if x is
have the ability to q>) •
preferred "(Lyv6)J£\IOV
process
as equivalent to
at any time) into an argument which
about
1047a
the
impossible,
leads
to
a
4 ff.).
However.
logical Not
in the
that which can be contradiction
there
just a matter
Anxiety was never expressed about the extreme
25-26;
but
we decided
that
this was
quite
right
the possible cannot have ~..!!.}:'_ impossible consequences, hm.;ever remote. The _·'c::)4'-'7'-'a'-=.c13,_--'1c:.4 renee back,
The
tense of lofu.;.a.LYEV we felt,
doesn't indicate a refe-
but is analogous to that of "tO "t'C ~v erva.L.
'implies', rather than expressing an equivalence,
if
1:ve
It must mean are
to
escape
tr.e position that whatever doesn't and won't happen is ipso facto impos~Lhle.
·~tll
be',
Could but
this be
rather
avoided
'that
if "t'OU'to = not
'what
neither
is
nor
of which it is false to say that it is or
against
,r
J''
general
question
'.vas
raised,
far
Aristotle's
protests
in l046b 29) were motivated by anxiety about possible deterministic
Lmplications
of
his
own
position;
cf.
'necessary'
in
l01~8a
6,
14.
n:; separates the possible from the actual by introducing qualifications (a fJ-7, .1nd
a
14-21);
the actual
there is a similar concern to separate the potential
in A3,
[s (he Megarian thesis
07
66
how
the !1egarians in this chapter (and N.B. that it is only a vague
interpreted in the ex-
!)4/a 1 J
}
I
llAPTER 3
I
)4
(/-~.)
lorms
tt·me
and
Ls
distinct
(cf. p.hL <Wove
(6)
~ristotle
.e.'
tram
~ake
LO
easier to dis-
it
may relnforce his own view that potentiality
actuality,
t)y
implying
(in
(6))
that
denial of this
preme take
of ~vEpyet.n
example care
of
this
last
(Ross
l04/b 2
thinks Coxe:t
point )
in
The argument,
32
is
intended
in any case,
to
turns on
popular usage; N B. the 3rd person plural &~o6~&6nrr~ in a 33.
1n·.0lves the denial of all change.
1~~ l~~?a 20-h2
Explanatiun
·.nth lv-re:)..lx_~=:~a., .c;•1l.
o~lso)
(=
in
nf
term tvfpye~a. connected
how
ur1_ginates;
link
hetween
3li
that
there
implies
({)UV't't6E!llv'Tl)
tv!.I)YELa. and xCvwtc;.
are
other
N.B.
examples of XLv1)crE.tc:
,_hat are 8v£pye: ~a.L (perhaps in non-technical sense?) but not lv'te:)..txe: La.t
~rine
ln
example of
If it as
Lhe 6~7>
carried
is
nver
predicated
r-o
::~ccept
this
'
·~nts
t
n
in
rather
'~..nked
hut
~-:onfined
the
If line
that
2-33
in
man of
is
32,
now is
to
be
on
that
it
is
linked
so, of
there
the
~
thought not
but not
more
admissible for
not part
that it
many
more
other
And
like
those
that
follow
in 30-35 as a whole seems
to Ov""tu,
awkward
predicates,
and
recognised
the
here;
in
the
Principle
things
previous
of
that
sentence.
Plenitude,
are
not
and
that cannot
only be,
explai-
(But
note,
two
cases
and
things
that can be and will be - in this case, or in some case?)
THIE AND MODALITY IN DE CAELO I 12 by Sarah Waterlow
be
a
well
as
is
'What always is cannot not be' ger
positions,
that
is
not
is
is
actual
demonstrate he
as
the
the
at
first
some of
entirely satisfied with
to doubt
its
ludicrously
fallacy. I
am
I
right,
the
I
12
he purports to
that
there
can be
no doubt
proof.
He
unfolds
it
that
there with
To modern
eyes
this
is
incomprehensible,
The reasoning seems not merely inconclusive
inept.
shall
In !_Je Caelo and
and there is no sign elsewhere that he ever
force.
not to say embarrassing. but
time.
these,
an air of total assurance, came
This is one of Aristotle's stran-
associated doctrine that nothing is possible
it appears to turn on one or another puerile
argue here
that
this
is
a false impression.
If
the De Caelo argument is more subtle and also more cogent
than is generally supposed.
Ov'tct to l:v-re-
'in particular'
would as
the term
because SvtpyELo
lv-c.s\EXEta
necessary v.·e suppose the
with
to
non-exis-
just the origin of
{~~icular?)
argument, are
to
actuality'
a
being
but he isn't blind.
predicates,
(Is J0-31 explaining, ~
are
motion _h!!
Aristotle's
picture is brown,
of
connection
building~
intended
~.particular
should motion
is walking,
mental
in
the doc-
things; 1.16\LO"'t'a.
Readiness
this
connection
to xCvr~nr,, x(vT)(Tt.t;
r his
why
non-existent?
Centaur
this
non-existent
But
Brentano
be
if the force of yO.p in 32 extends
are the predicates that
so,
loose.
·\,~r;yELa,
32-33.
house
implication might
on
given
But the implications for other art-forms will be diffe-
fact If
the
have
in Aristotle than does
consequence
i.e.
playing Oedipus
in 33;
1'd
31 -
well-
the
a
~.... fluld
34
'the
givLng
predicated
the
man
"1 B. "tt.\lat;
n
of
galloping?
:1-:nt;
aS
not
that
1047a objects
also
by
reason for
from
l>e
cf.
32-33,
a
that
intensional
cla11se
r'd~_~cular
is.
of
perception;
Z7-9.
·~upport
r~marked
'..tas
Tt
hetter
in
Only some of the things that are not, are potentially:
~ill
ning
to be
concession motion,
in
Comment
has
mostly
centred
cular
criticism directed
cused
of
at
on the passage 28lb 2-32, with parti-
lines 18-23.
Aristotle is regularly ac-
that a
fallacy
here of division,
to wit of illicitly transferring
so
'It
.to not apply to non-existents.) the it
~ds
pu1nted out
that
modal
operator
as
to
always be and ever not be' l!an of perceiving, only real objects being perceptible. de an
not t
the
', han~o~;e,
only
things
that
convert
is
impossible
that
X should
the examples in 34 are of thinking, rather
c3.n 't
move
(change):
find nor can the !:nmoved Hover,
Hon-existents
points
and
which is in fact
forms
X should is
true
ever (as
I
not
be'.
shall
into
'If X always is, it is impossible that
This simple diagnosis is unconvincing.
argue)
that
he
does
here
perform
It
a move that is
the :;ueasy to misconstrue as a fallacy of the above pattern; but it can hardly
69
te tne fallacy in
17),
of
ttseif.
ror in the
w~Lh
connection
a
pr::::cisely this lype of mistake
be
ring
standing,
L'Tlpossible this
that
part
an
he
the
of
difference
but
this
should text
is
between
the
time'
(here
infinite
example,
,\ristotle's
avoidance
.o~.mount
Is so deliberate as to
almost
is impossible that a man should ,.;hen sit-
It
to an explicit warning.
lillmeuiately preceding passage ( 15-
different
rioes
be
not
entail
standing.
clear,
it
that
he
Fttrthermore,
sits
it
is
if anything in
is that for Aristotle the crucial
two cases turns on the treated
'..Jhen
terms
'always'
and
'for
as equivalent), whose absence somehow
leaves rofJm for an assertion of possibility which their presence seems The of
~ffairs
:.ite 1
is
that
for
him
the
presents a special bar against
left
unexplained
the
by
omnitemporality ..1f
a
state
the possibility of 1ts oppo-
hypothesis
that
the
trouble
here
is
To
speak,
here;
to
as
have
although
I
is
'~
trouble'
inappropriate
perhaps
to whether Aristotle
not
here
is
I
one
hope
j_n
with the argument will the view to be proposed
on
altogether the
(:.:~s
He for one
·1f his critics.
of
just did,
been rtui.te
it
It will be clear later that 6uva:t6v is more suitable context,
the
inapproprtately ambiguous trouble,
rather than some
to make plausible) knows what
and
ls
dning,
And
a
the
he
is
che
'~l0<>c;
oassage
seems
knowingly
by
however
much
to discern.
engaged
principles the
the only lapse of that sort
not
smoothness
us from attending to them singly.
~ntitled
is
this qu1te
governed
Lndependent. \.u:!ep
at
here
performance
formal nr analytic
a
r 11 1~
...,Mch
hy
1 hl e':
Lhe
_l c<:>.s) assume to
rurP"nt b~
is
r::eaning
115
of
Hy point
a
somewhat
only
different
of
Ar.istotle 1 s
he
applies
but
logically
'.;hlch
(for
one
a
24-28
important
c>equences'. l1:vov,
tn
and but
J,
iVhich
properly
but
because
of
it
Analytics
is
as
a
it
figures.
De Caelo I
12)
are
the
criterion
be
useless
for
criterion that
end
to be
The
is required in the context. have
to
be
able
to
able
straightaway
in
something
else.
tell from
touchstone explicit the
of
at
(cf.
(whatever it
were
that
is merely
might look like)
also
a
a
28lb
impossibilities criterion.
least
some
criterion, still do
impossibility the
same
22-23) .
thing
(the
impossible
I
is
whether
12 the
both
the
something
self-evident
entailment is
Whether Aristotle
and
is
means
(or
leave
aside.
Nor
I
shall
of
an
not
dt
his
even ideally) to take just this form is a question I
always
and what
We also have to be
cases
In De Caelo
non-self-evident
time
is concerned to distinguish and
some
off without
self-contradiction:
same
in a number
However, for the criterion to be effective,
straight
1
than
then matter,
include Metaph. 9 3 and
proper definition will
recognise
consequences) to
rather
not
is impossible and what
unless
a
criterion
(which
he
possibility
that
fails
a
that Aristotle needs it These
passages where
A definition of
as
circularity does
the distinction between what
false.
we
statement
only because
passages where
support
a
not
formal rule for
rule shall
here consider what sort of modalities are
blished
by use
overall
account
of
of Aristotelain modality,
the
rule).
present
task of
identifying
This is an important question for any
principle, the
term
L1ck of other
f11Jalification,
this
rule
is
the
nne
but
it
will
not
affect
the man ingredients in the proof of
the
'What
always is, cannot not be'.
34a 104/h
25
ff.,
which
l0-11.
reappears
at
e.g.
!1etaph. 9 3,
'The possible is that '.Vhich is not
if we supp0se
it
the case has
I
12
•)f
special
feature
of
the
rule
no impossible con-
-r'> 6uvr:t"t6v, and in 93 he uses the terms
proof
is
an
That
cf. is
standing,
it
true
at
is
explicit
is, a
false
possible
another
time.
reference
to
statement,
iff nothing
'possible' 'another
as
it appears in
that
time'
(281b
17-19;
X (actually sitting)
impossible follows
We may find
from supposing
this addition perplexing;
but
this, I suggest, is because we are accustomed to thinking of possibility and
its modal
fellows as absolute.
71 70
for
frlmiliat
(In the An. Fr. passage Aristotle '3peaks of 't'O lv6sx6~_aelo
logic.
ftxei by its use in accordance with the rule.
13,
•nrus-;ary,
Prior
definition,
that i~47a
of
involved in the statement of the rule itself (as opposed to those esta-
withholds
T shall
reasons
It is more useful
the
execution may
met~physical)
nnd
is that
for
simply facilitates
regard
the
elaborate
Of these, the one most
(as opposed t0 a
tells
he
in
that
not
'posssible'
to
wording of
The With
although
12 depends on a mataphysical principle concerning 5uv~L<;,
at least to the extent 0f avotrling any text-book fallacy
the fallacy of division is not
quick glance
..;hat
Caelo
the assembly of these two elements of the argument.)
'follows he
De
proof in I
would
simple fallacy of division.
turn out
15
fact
interchangeably. for
The
contrast is with
'relative',
CHAPTER 3
t.-:(1
::i~fcrence
'rh-·
is
just tiy
,;; 1 hili r y*.
But what There
truth
'r~·
of
Lrue
at
t:vely .Jny
(false
•.Jere
and
in
the
r;xa1n1ne ~ether
the
Nith
passiblP..
p0int
is,
follow
case one
if)
we
consequences
not
we
9.',
proving
are
,:~>nsequences
sumpt1on.
take of
".Jhtch
another
test
is
:tlsn he :-hat r.he
pUt
E actual
1le
'.e.'
(For if nothing supposing
'E'
time
rather than
~s
not
otiose
if
Aristotle
is
telling us
to
but
of
'E'
is false:
co sidered to-
in other words,
of
'g' describes the state of af-
'e_' is possible or im-
is false (or taken to be so),
need
to ask that question.
mentioned may
are
would
that
it
is
test
false)
that
alone but of
assigned
inevitably
The
be.
assuming,
'.e.'
the supposed
possible just as effec-
time-references
time:
impos-
is,
to
entail
has
no
unless
relevant
Rut
at
state of
t
SiVen that
what
1
E_
(impossible,
things
at
we
want
the essential 1
iS
that That
!:_).
is
a
real
~~
an
any
qo':ern
rhe
first
'is not',
and
is
phrase
relativelyto,
is
not
is
'What-
1
~~Am,
-e/~.
it
the consequences
are at !_,
when
'_e'
is false
false at ~ that some absurdity fol-
'E'
present,
it
tense)
possible
that
is
(present
at
some other time.
at
some other time,
(not
~
with the supposition
When there is no absurdity, it is pos-
the
!_ is
!
that E.l~.*.
Hence if,
is possible now that E./!.*. X (now sitting)
E.g.,
says at
for
it
should be standing
But i f there is the possibility of his standing there
is the
possibility of his standing as such
only of his realizing that general possibility now). 281b 15-16 that X
h.••
torical state of affairs. to,
says
or at,
'tt)v 66v<J.I.LLV of standing,
Aristotle
and according
quite literally.
Moreover, what is possible/impossible rela-
one time may not be so at another.
that
Thus at !_ is is
the man in our example be standing at !_ (though not
that he be standing or at some time or another).
Thus at !_ it is im-
possible that the man in our example be standing at !. (though not that he be standing at
some time or other); but at some other time !_+ (it
is most natural to think of it as prior to !_) it may have been possible that he should stand at !_ (whether or not he actually does so then). There is more to be said about the concept of possibility as relato
the
fact and temporalized. light
immediately
thrown
But here I on the
shall only call attention
accusation that
of De Caelo I 12 rests on the fallacy of division. sort
of
modality a
case
We have Sl: Sl
Sl
a move
of
'It
entails S2:
possibility •Fnr
if
the state of affairs relative-to-which.
to the way things are at
sembles
'!lhen it
of
instance,
could
it is not'.
the
that
sible relative
impossible
and
time:
'E.i!.*' ,provided that !* • ~·
'E.'
criterion
'.e_'.
given that
(or the impossibility of 'e/~') is rela-
lows from conjoining a description of things at
to
for
'-e/~'
Now it is not the case for all
is,
holds
is: sense
tive to that state of affairs, it is reasonable to assign to the necessity itself a
tive
or
says how things
For i f the necessity of
false at _.r:., it iS impOSSible given,
have
This makes
vetted in the suppositional test are deduced from a conjunction
tive
rn rhe last quotation I take (claiming no originality) 'necessarily' ~}
be
in which one conjunct
chance
point
·...·nat o\ristotle has in mind when he says at De Int. 9, 19a 23-24: r.>ver ts not. !wcessarily is not
to
What we
-E./!.
to this interpretation he means the present tensed
On that as-
logical
necessary at !_ that
The literal sense is appropriate if the modality is relative to a his-
That is one way of putting the matter, when
necessity obtains
is
'.e.'
that the relevant
·~·.
when the
The
is not a test (the game is lost in advance) unless
foll.Ol..IS:
true
~refer
ask whether
(given
and
reference
alone,
'E'
possibilities.
3-
the case for this
mention any
that
'E'
to
just what
those of
especially
!01Jbtful
f<)r
it
don't
times at"e differentiated.
~he
not
is when 'E.'
we
possible
are not
the
need
different
~atter
'e.'
at
~"rue
::;JJnonsPct
true
conjunction no
full
'e'
'other-time'
prompted
unless
any
and
at
believe, a relativized
t
in
counterfactually
'g' with 'g_', where
rhink it
rhe
from
situation in which
that
distinction
possibility
this ts the argument:
only
iiJlpossibility, 0f
to develop
That, of course,
if
,J.nd
justified is,
The
in which we
since
of
surely that would prove
conjHnct.ion of
fairs
assertions
thus
to
that
the
1
latter
soace
Answer:
think,
'categorically asserted' the
.r:_) to a time other than !]_
at
found
othet".)
1..and,
not
Briefly,
:_ itself, -
(ci~\Wc:)
is
is
lnterpretation.
impossible
!Tlakes
Lt clear 1.n 9 ff. that his rule i.s primarily intended
categorical
rnrJdality.
i.Jetween
Aristotle
IJI3' -1ls0 makes lO
~.hat
not
',,n-,ln-hypothesis'.
that is
'If also
is in general fallacy,
but
impossible that
E./.!.
then not
entails
what
dS such used in another relevant contrast, see below. '2
73
argument
admissible which verbally re-
which in
those
E.l!. and -E_/!_'.
-E./!'· we
the
In terms of this
cannot
But get
terms
in terms in
is valid.
In any system
jllSt
of
relative
any system,
· ~TT~:)
is
;_n
S3
exactly
modality
·~
'If e/t then it is impossible at !:_that -e.J~'.
namely S3: ranee
THETA
(}N
of
an
impossibility-operator
what
..... e
should
to
generate
expect
from
the
the
as
part
logic
of
Sl.
premiss
of
the
The appea-
may be the operator
consequent
proposition
temporalized
But
what
relative
the
one which appears
resembling S1
says simply
in
It
operator.
'impossible',
Aristotelian
context
as
or
timeless
as
it
middle
53
is
at
!:. ', while the one in
a
different though
9,
De Int.
better
omnitemporal
to
I
think
shan't
of
this
consider
strong
S1 we should have not S3 but S4: -e/~'·
Lhat
there
is
no
at~
not nnly impossible Aristotle
warns
is
possible.
Thus,
ness
to not
fallacy
always
·Nhat
we
the
commit
it
is,
in
in
confusing S3 with S4
at
De
Int.
it
harmonizes
(see
below).
confident
in
allowing
ro
the
there us
ahd
from
51
falls
as
to
that
the
However,
in
say
who
reveals
'Nhen he
under
the
is
t
from One
term). occurs
L.e.
when
This
temporal
its
is
case
of who
he
it
X' s
the
are
Caelo I
the
can
standing
(sc.
at
some
the difference
to 53,
for is
failure
instance,
guilty of
to
some
other
time).
between S3 inferring an error
distinguish restriction
the
and
with'a' various
non-restriction
is
without
temporal
possible
that at
in
the
of
'e'
the is
awareness
S3,
that
way,
which is
can be
temporal
read
seen
to
be)
the move is not replaced
'If e./~_.
restriction
'X is sitting'
on
modality.
'it is impossible
wrongly
then it
from
by
S4.
is im-
impossible
(or:
'-.e.',
and for
'X is
12 Aristotle is denying
parallel
mistake
od moving
parallel only when we
work here,
Aristotle's
same way as
what would ference
as
It
from
realize
Sl
that
to
S4.
relative
is not parallel if regarded simply as
as
him
inference by S3
to
the
the Megarians in Met~. 9 3 re-
inference
from
S1
(innocuously
presenting
from
to
Sl
the
54
(and
never
has
reached
analytically
from
temporally Sl
been)
aspects
is
impossible.
the
Megarian
fact
is wrong When both
51),
distinguishable
of
(via
possible this.
restricted
S3)
yields
that Thus,
and
S6:
then
they
effects
--e_ ever'. e.g.,
unrestricted. 'If
if
e./!:_,
S4
of
X
is
This view
which has
that
whatever
fact
of
that often
happens
change.
But
is
one
only seemed has
to
of
Under it
never
sitting now,
it is
Hence change
the paradoxes Aristotle derives from
the
actual
puzzling; be
then
and SS are merely
for ever excluded that he should ever do other than sit.
a
54
to SS would be.
in fact have been a block refusal to bother about the dif-
between
different
objections for
an
mediated
viewed
'a,'
e.g.
Seen
via
without
For
the view that
restriction'.
instances:
-.e.
it
refusal,
~emporal,
that
awareness
relative
Hence I conclude that he is unlikely, in the same
block
of
particular
'it is impossible at ; ' with
goes
made
this
(where'a.' is
are
but
and
that
use
given
no
temporalized
a fallacy of division, as is usually done.)
be
consistent
(and
of
it is clear that in De Caelo I
have
see
modality
One
(although still quite general) case of this
turn has
(We
inforces
!_ is
such requires logic
restriction'.
that
and
to
seen
use qualified by
restriction
chapter,
passages if he
as
the
-.E_ ever).
standing';
are
sitting at
_t.
at
!:. that
reasons why two
also
direct,
possible
can
overlooks
heading:
of
is
move
S4
12, he could have been
actually
his
independent
of
temporal
to
that logic supports common sense
carelessness by,
confused in
trying to demonstrate that
thinking
it
part
that Sl yields S5.
19a
His alert-
is difficult to see how,
t2e
is
only l!ntitled
special
when
'a.'/!:.
his
general
~· simeliciter
fact
that
A person
any
"':rror
There
he.
granted
possibility at
explain.
S4,
12 while
in a mood to commit it in
so
•.;ith
not
for
9,
that
at
is
passage does not of course prove that he
Caelo I
cannot
take
had been
that
De
cannot
it
in another in the same con-
Another wrong substitute for 53 would be SS:
(given that £/l), but always was impossible.
against
26 (except that there he makes the point with 'necessary').
did
then from
e.g.,
But
S1
'If .E_/!_ then it i.s impossible without
'-.e./!.'
diagnose
critic's
without
point
This entails (if it does not actually mean)
time when
To
the
an example of confusing
operator The
here.
to avoid it
Now the wrong move from 51 to S4 is not only a fallacy of clivi-
sion.
Whether in the
19a 26).
i.s that if by fallacious division it were being transferred,
restriction that
text.
'impossible without temporal restric-
(cf.
is
of
'impossible
i.e.
or 'impossible cbtA.Wc:;'
tion',
the
says
and it may be a non-modal
I make the asumption that someone who avoids
(although not of course bound)
generated is the transference of the operator that introduces Sl itself. For
'it is impossible that',
'E' or '-E'.
the temporal restricted/unrestricted confusion in one instance is likely
not thereby
is
-\PTF.R
as
Aristotle's
75
it
10
ff.),
the modern determinist
is
holds
is,
criticism
possible
but
he
is apt
( l047a
does if
not
deny
the
the Megarians,
. \F fER 3
like n 1 m,
are think.tng
1n
inference
tram
the
ab0ut to
temporal
terms of
must
return to
that
e!~.
from
'q/~ & -E./!:_*'
have
I
is
it
is
argued
unlikely
any
more
tr..te
at
r.
be
always.
tanding
(')
then get
straight it seems
with
!:_
Aristotle's rule is:
'q'
this
Given
-.e_ iff nothing impossible follows
that
represents the facts at governing
his
~and!.=!_*). that
reasoning,
reasoning
it
'-E'
entails
that
Lime.
In fact,
answered is
it
by means
possible
of
that
is
concerned
g~ven
or
another
to
is it
possible
the
at
extend
·Jne it
to
a
if
it
only
100
to
the
'Here
absent
have
been
extending
lor;!;ical in
complexities
the original
a
little
the
rule
more to
the
crj.terion
Given
is:
But the criterion as
poss~bilities
with
relative
seems that Aristotle is
given
is
(and
cover
this
term
',.Je may •..1ell feel
example.
t~mpor.:-~1 tt
may
sttting man's
explanatory apparently
on
'(l'
that
it
talse
~J')fl
'Ji
'-p_'
the
-~)
·~ffect
of
tacts
is
given as)
'always'
that
legitimacy
different
very
standing
which
relative as
Lhev
also
possibility are
the conjunct1on of
-
is
referred
shows
sort
if
it
'q ah1a.ys'
is
not
sian
works.
For
the supposition
a time not included thus
referred,
This
not
This
feeling
has
treat
to
to
the relativity entails that ~~en
shape
as
the modalities are
is wrong.
-e.
(given
The answer
has
That is to say, to reach his conclu-
the
given all
take
is it impossible that
The question shows what
actually
begins
omnitemporal
at
a
blow.
fact
For
as
only
if so
it
were,
can
he
so
argue
that there is no time beyond the time of the given to which the supposition of token,
its
opposite
there
is
true -E·
result given
totally
is
that
the
When all
referred.
But,
omnitemporal
time
is
over,
to
be
always
£!
to
by
given, then
the same
considered
it
is
given,
But it is only when it is given that the impos-
that
it
is
never
is
the
Hence that logic's
(no-when)
What he wants,
justify,
but
relative
impossible
that
(as it now appears)
is
'-.e'
at
impossibility of
Qi time, as distinct from its pseudo-impossibility
relative).
'-.e'
which
which his logic seeks to prove,
each and every moment
absurd,
coherently be
time at
given.
seems
unable
(likewise
may
not
sibility obtains
In any case,
could be
shown
if
possible
such a pseudo-moment were not
now by coherently
referring
its
truth to the pseudo-moment. Even
!:_,
at
pseudo-moments these
it
is
entails
case
that
show that
the
.e.
anq
to
that
-pJ'-*
cannot
be
Aristotle or,
(b)
with a
there
is
a
that
-E·
t*
here.
we
prefer,
'the given'
such that the
facts
it is always the
Aristotle's
One
-= t
description of
That is to say:
true.
if
For every moment or period
E/!:. and
possible
not
help
only moments,
together
impossible.
always
might
successive bit, times'
case
that
nothing
this
time
considering
Q.f time, we can say this:
supposition t
beyond
now and
periods,
(a)
the
logic
cannot
is taken bit by
there can be seen to be an infinite abundance of 'other
which
to
refer
the
negative
supposition without
incurring
contradiction or any other apparent absurdity.
then
which case the
the modality here is relative to fact,
trick.
that
:e)?
Aristotle
speak,
finite
omni-
any
when the given is given.
of
with the supposiIf
r-1me within "J.Lways",
7()
the
contradiciton.
at
We are entitled to ask:
to be:
to
recall
always
Forgetting
For a moment
this
this can lmly mean
absurd; to a
that
of
·..;hich ~othesi
facts
implies an i:npossibility.
'another time',
''allvays"'. 1n
terms
the
c~rtainly
referred to
•:nrl.er
in
'->tates
'llilke
i~;
of
dated.
that he might
the
being's !..._fi!.pOssibility uf not heing (or ceasing). seem
(-...-rhere
possibility
we
a
en bloc,
above
straightforward
allow that
sense
no-when at all.
introduced by the
helpfully
as
we
we
thus
Hut without demur he declares that the suppositional test which ;-he
.r.ows
Even if ahsolute,
i.e.
It
time.
case •..1here
a
entails
rate is Aristotle's argument (2Blb 18-25).
The ques-
is interested·
It also seems that in proceeding thus he pays no attent
conjunction
is not at all clear how it
(ever)?
-E_
~ only
at
on the basis of Aristotle's treatment of the sitting/
illustration,
facts
hoping
By itself the rule certainly does not entail
to the case in which Aristotle
1 t1dve stated it. 3
they
care
be marred by the so-called fallacy of division usually
some other
to
now
LOTI
that
case
to
soon
3t
(where
than
even ilpplies t
that
like him,
refuse
t1im,
is
the main argument.
his desired conclusion.
i~
unlike
lt is, however, another ~uestion whether the rule can sustain
alleged.
it.
but,
~as.
pos.:>ible
that
to
relatlve modality (hence,
S2)
ln
thls
that Aristotle thought it I
to
rcstr .tctiuns.
l<.'hether or not
S6.
Sl
Thus ·,;ays'
none
the but
argument of I a
collective,
12 proceeds as if the author sees in 'alor
perhaps
77
[
should
say holistic sense.
'!!APTER 1
But of
how could anyone which
the
be oblivinus of
proof
gets
chose to ignore this,
che Or
nowhere?
rlJ:stribut ive
if
for
his
sense in terms
(Remem-
how could he expect readers to connive?
ber that his immediate audience would have come to this passage undistracted
by morages
to develop I
that
of
the
aspect
fallacy of division.)
of
Soon I
~.;hich
Aristotle's position
shall begin
answer
with a
to
this
general
question.
But let me first
less the
equivocation over muddle
alleged
been mentioned.
by
Prof.
Briefly,
would
fall
Hintikka,
under
the
fallacy
criterion for
possibility as Hintikka does
time.
this
not
yet
Hintikka is rightly dissatis-
he sees it
used
not
It is not that he denies
as
in
the
symptomatic of
metaphysical
pressure
'-E.'
supposing
context
say with any
view gives rise to difficulty.
from
as would
whose explanation has
it is this.*
but
head,
something
The underlying problem, he suggests, lies in the suppositional
else.
of
occurs,
Sheer thought-
this
emanating
of
Aristotle's
precision what
from
of
criterion proves
rationallY. frame reconstruct in
the
he
himself
if
it
the
the sort
of
thinking
is
eventually
For
true,
asserting the possibility; lows
that
position of denying himself recommends.
is
a waste of
time:
if
be
Thus inhibited, Aris-
false.
but because he cannot sha 11
tested. might
conceivably
not
land someone
the use of the very criterion that
wait
to
'-e'
know of
is possible only the
truth before
thus supposing it true and seeing what fol-
it
is
to
this
position
which i t holds. interpretation of tr.)
and
Stocks
graphs,
is
open
thought
faces
of a
Aristotle's
inference
from
common difficulty.
difference it
between
to be so; or,
supposing
something to
for that matter
right~ on
be
the varying to draw his
the
field
for
Thus,
for instance, we should reject the existential
'what
is,
cannot since
not be',
this
is
to
a
serious
favoured by Guthrie (Loeb
far
too
difficulty.
-.e.
if it is possible that
q.
narrow.
We
need:
The
proposition entails
then -eat some time.
But this conflicts with one of Aristotle's plainest (e.g. ~· 9, 19a 9 ff.), to the o::!ffect
it
is
also
logic,
since
This is not only
in some cases
if one of a set
of contraries is true no other member of the set can ever be. for instance. it is possible that this coat be cut to pieces, fact
mean to
I
Thus,
that g) then --9. (or g) at some
that some possibilities may go for ever unrealized. common sense,
keep
it
until
it
wears
out:
and even if I
Thus, but
in
don't,
it
1s still possible that I shall.
Hintikka hopes to resolve the conflict
(inevitable
the
on
his
account
of
modal-temporal
connections)
with
the idea that it is only general possibilities that have to be realized in
one. or
another
instance,
but
not
in any particular.
Thus,
possibility of my being murdered fortunately requires not that only
cannot
that
clearly arguing e g • is
78
the
(Oxford),
that for all _E,
but
views
Aristotle's
But this formulation, which for convenience I have several times used in the preceding para-
this
publicly expressed
that
if always E. then not possibly -_e'.
'For all E_,
But
Aristotle's
intended as an objection to
forces of the word 'all' - then Aristotle ought by crazy conclusion universally, without restriction
be,
from
or
asserting
However,
enough to say here that only a very confused thinker could have Lerl
'possible' i case and
it is an insufficient guide to possibility
before the truth is known, and an unnecessary one afterwards.
heen
try to
not
account
expressed elsewhere
one holds that
one must
Hintikka 's
possibly not'
for any
it impossible,
supposition to
'not
time,
totle cannot even entertain as possible what he takes to be never true, because his
rate'
to
views
(Hintikka's phrase) when he knows or believes that the actual
not
any
inhibits Aristotle
quarter
that
'-.e.'
is
maintaining
'in the actual history of the
this
facts
moment would render
from
if it is possible that --9. (i.e.
an obscure
universe' at
This
far
e.g.,
He holds simply that
true at some moment
view
aspect
time.
very
If it is due to confusion about such topic-neutral matters as his own criterion for
field with the 'fallacy of division' verdict. that
At 'always'
the
'always'
ts
Perhaps indeed we should expect from him rather more than Hintikka seems to,
to any diagnosis that locates the
the passage we have so far considered, namely 28lb 2-25.
nature of who
about time and modality are wholly clear and coherent.
in some fallacy or confusion occurring within
observation relevant
mechanism of the argument
prepare the ground
the
Hintikka,
provides him (so
shall argue) with a respectable, even if to us not particularly agree-
able,
about
reasons Aristotle
28lb
be that
32-33):
poss1ble,
the
some
creature
somewhere
meets
reconciled with pJ':._ Caelo if any
individual
which entails possibility
is
that
always if
realized
79
I
the in
with
a
the
I shall
sticky end.
12. since Aristotle is is,
g_ cannot be (see,
individual's
that
\'ery
not-being
same case.
Til ETA
<~r~ne
Jhall
:s
that
below
r~striction
1
P'Ji.nc
of
chat
D~.
i.n
""
(see
the
inmediate
c~nsidered
this
9
not
l3
also
qr.ope
of
the
tmportance
,Jf
JHt
is
proof that
wlch
ltne
3),
Metaph in
in
statements
s1nce
there
De Caelo I
the
passage
have
if
nothing
else,
justifies
ns
in
steptJin)l;
has
a
~~e
have
lot
to
only .say
r.he ~arne terms, may be,
it
:1ny
to
the
this
v,enerable'
in the hope
because
that
he
is
is
at
Here Aristotle
entirely
the
same
ignored
time,
and
talking about what we should call'capacities':
are at present
rate,
preceding Lhapter.
possibillty
is
from what
Aristotle
and
turn he
being -lnd
and
not
of no great
stJrt'3
by
'imperishable',
:::ubject
being,
being,
and
again
'1eanwhile,
p< 1 int
"immediately then
ment toned
.Suvriu.£~<;,
various
and
the
until
vjc~
versa
senses
of
possibility and the
'in-
These
impossibility of not After this,
(28la 1··6).
beginning
impossibility thereof,
of
Chapter
12
as
for
lifting
is
an
far
as
Aristotle
inherent
and
for
limit
to
is
·.;alking, thP.
concerned,
( 28la
where
28
for fhe
exercise. is
that
being
fullest
realization
"O
much concept•1al hy
(28la
analysis
cnmmon
8; as
10-12;
11+-15;
such
·,'hen
they
the
each
man
lift
who
the
can
lift
unly a
same '.Jei.ght.
hundred
We might
any
given
essent tal
This
although
is
not
not un-
and
fifty
-
even
say that the millie-
•aire's rlonation of a mite is indeed a c;pecifically different act from r-
hat
'lOt
nf
'iepend
nig~t t
the on
pauper a
•.Yidow,
and
i.t
is
worth observing
difference in the agents'
he the same.
Jt1e :-o nrrJcPed,
intentions,
that
this
does
tn
ipply his
mances?'
-
he
is
concerned with is
and whatever the agent, namely for
'being'
but in
and 'not
seeing that he is engaged in a general discussion of possi-
bility or
capacity,
and
for many capacities the question of a maximum
logically cannot arise. with this point. in
the
Aristotle, however, has no reason to disagree
For he says here not that all capacities, but capa-
principal
with reference
('tO xuplws 6uva.'t6v. 28la 19), must be de-
sense to
the maximal
principal sense is for him, is
also being
tp falling
of
in the
exercise.
12
of
he
principal
resumes
being
possibilities or
and
sense,
i.e.
complement
,.,)nstrurtion to cases \>Jhere
as
being,
he
(and
takes
their
copulative
functioning
being q:>
for
some value of
the discussion of possibilities and impossi-
not
capacities
understood
capacity in the
Accordingly, when at the start
care
to
opposites)
'!' for some categorizable '!' (28la 30-33).
be
Now,
presumably, capacity for being, where being
under one of the Categories.
Chapter
bilities
say for
that
he means
being
1l or
not
Nor does he signal any diverHence
'is' and
'is not'
throughout, with the omission of the
positively
as
the existential translation is wrong;
a
complement-variable •
Thus
but so also is the propositional
translation which equates 'being' with 'being the case' or 'being true', since not everything that is the case can be expressed by a predication in an Aristotelian Category. earlier be;
on the
and
it
possibility
E 3).
scope
with
never
realized
(and
Possibilities
(or
being not), be
for
and
Here,
the doctrine
perfectly
up
to
of
fits
cut
a
coat) but
for
the
then,
De
to be
the
and
presuppose
possibilities
are
be
not
to
the restriction sought
what always is,
Interpretatione
also with
coming
is
that
remarks
ceasing of
cannot not
example of
a
in Metaphysics be
(as
being
being and
to
not
being
classed amongst them,
since coming
ceasing are themselves not ways of categorizable heing (al-
though, again, they presuppose them).
which after all
So it is not on that account unreasonable of Arisas he does,
What
kind
must
·ired pounds is tu be thought of :ts exercising a specifically different from
part.
gence from this in the rest of the chapter.
The man who can lift up to two hun-
intuit~uns.
no
whatever
are not
possibilities
18-19).
concept-cr.nstruction,
of
ff.).
1r caiJacities ought to be defined with reference to the limit or maximum )r
power,
being'.
fined
ending up with a pair of master-senses
as :neaning the
of
particular with one general sort of power,
city
interest to the formal l\)gician.
introducing
spells out
there
apacity
extent
by
Aristotle takes an apvarently sideways look at certain other such
as
~'lpportPd
the
in
which,
·iefined in terms of the impossibilitY of beginning and ceasing. t.n
far
to this and other problems is near at
go to the
about
Perhaps
iHnt ikka.
:\t
The answer
v~ew.
hetter
hand:
so
intention and volition play
Now one might well ask 'Why this sudden interest in maximal perfor-
aside
. 1ne . might call the logical nucleus nf Aristotle's argument a
But the
12. ·.,·e
such
indeed
(28lb 2 ff,) no grounds for restriction appear.
This,
of
is
Thus and to
it
central be
is for
specified
those
capacities
Aristotle's Ln
terms
of
or
logic a
possibilities
and
maximal
his
that
metaphysics
exercise.
The
are
primary
that
require
plausibility
_____ ______________________________________ 81
-.;
___
..
.,.,_
.IOTES ON THETA CHAPTER J
of
this
as
a Category,
~laJ:"t
position depends 1n and
so often) with
(Jn wh.-1t
this we are not
'etcetera'
is
nere prepared to count
At
Jl-33 he tails off (as
he
.:.old.
after mentioning che traditicnal first three.
able
for
it
to
be
fully
displayed.
In most
pe~:haps
though
not all
cases such natural patterns develop through series or cycles of empiri-
At any rate, by now the discussion has moved to a high level of abstrac-
cally distinguishable stages.
tion
with the overall unity precisely because it is more than mei"ely consis-
where
logical
these
primary
pattern.
cases
are
'..Je
are
no
gathered
longer
to
together
under
a
single
concerned with different
be
types of limit such as he was at pains to point out in the preliminary
7-27,
illustrative passage 28la in some cases
(e.g.
that
the magnitude
measures
and
only
where,
categorizable
of
for
instance, he explains that
being q>
for
If,
capacity,
being,
the
now,
only dimension so
apply in every case is, of course, ties are
for
vis.i.on) it is the degree of minuteness of objects we
consider all
universal as
to
Thus his primary possibili-
time.
In other words,
some maximum duration.
it
belongs to the very essence of what it is for a given thing to be categorizably q> at
least
<.p-ness be
a
that
it
should
in principle be
is
what
it
possibility
duration
terms
is
be
so for
specified:
the
essence of (For
~-
to qualify
the
some definite and the
this
not Ouva.'t6v but
viability of
tts
taking
complement,
the
refer
to
C.J.F. Williams, Religious Studies I, 1965, pp. 95 ff. and 203 ff.). shall
not
dwell
on
the
'Iletaphysical
Aristotle make this a solid starting-point. despite
his
sometimes
almost
obsessive
the universe and of natural kinds, ties
and
be
from
we
may
processes,
Aristotle
is
considerations
far
removed
'metaphysical
\.Jhate"er
inertia'.
on
by
an
lnternal
princtple
3ameness
whose
Indeed
one
continuity might
unity
that
finds
is
than simply
expression not
freedom
in :1ny
suppressed or
from
interruption.
say that the absence of interruption is not even its
~~
interrupted
identity was
unless
bounded
as
to
its
duration.
condition is its contribution to
then that to
condition must
its successor
be
so
to
after whatever
The actual mount of time, whether for stages
will depend
on
the
object
sets
the
scene;
but
for
his
prop which even the most
is
indeed
a
kind
of
premiss claims
(28la
positives,
that
and
concerned
current
arrantly
a
not
being ~ would
it
is
(cf. De Gen.
purpose Aristotle
teleological metaphysics
totally schematic
them.
For what
lifting?
by
the
requires,
negatives
nothing more
its
as
for
to a maximum.
treated as
sophistry of
and
as well
by reference
being not-cp are
symmetry.
the
identical.)
argument.
In
than the verbal appeal of
The original analogies of walking and
help here:
indeed,
it
is
best
to forget
about
on earth could be the limit of my capacity for not-
What does
distinct
and
argument
for
be defined
locate
secured
His
capacities
both alike
weight-lifting cannot
as
logical mime. 28-31),
anywhere
(Throughout,
from
it
the
is excluded when I
even mean to speak of ?___ capacity
various capacities
for
am engaged in lifting?
only paper-concept-construction.
positives whose
for
this,
exercise
This, we have to say,
is
Teleology will not make intelligible
the proposition that ~omething is intrinsically times as to the duration of
its
not-tp-ness
irrespective
of
what
that
positive
might be from which it eventually returns to being
characteristic
not-not-~.
But it is on just this eventual return either way from one limited
there
has already emerged some project whose
contradictory to
~he
sudden removal of the conditions suit-
sumed,
intact despite
consistent
cannot really provide, and all he can do is mime it into being by what
necessary condition either, since there is nothing of a definite nature to
this
one
respect
but in an inherently hounded pattern of actimore
All needs
this
is
is
et Corr., II 10, 336b 9 ff).
the eternity of
going on .Jnd on indefinitely until
redirected from without, vity
of
sequences,
these
pattern, whatever it may be,
inherently any one
to bow out
is the appropriate time. or whole
of
It follows that each stage, no less
necessarily successive whole,
if
substantially is,
is
speak spontaneously ready
Here
as it is possible to
sequence,
raison d •etre of
for
for J1im governed throughout its spatial and temporal beings and doings
repetitive
some
whole
the
that
those who would explain these and any other phenomena by what call
the
$3Y
as well as of s0me particular entias
than
For if
diversity
is actually necessary, if that
that
It is enough r.o
insistence
it
is to succeed in being produced.
period which can
temporally determinate
corresponding possibility to
linguistic
tent:
The
also
of
it
the
follows
other
that
being not-11 will
that Aristotle's proof depends.
whatever
has
the
inevitably realize
83
possibility whichever
of of
That asbeing
tp and
these is cur-
i{ \fTI':R 3
That
rently unrealized. bilities,
but
this
is
Aristotle
has
nothing
that it ~2tains oorh its possi-
presupposes
never to
Another
questioned.
say
here
concerns
the
question
status
of
on which the
'it'.
cease
or
ot" the subject of change as an individual substance, and the alternation
has
be
supposed
locus be
of
the
endless,
since
where ~
is
must
thought
be
q>-thing
as
a
continue
to
contradictory not
all
for
as
long as
substantial
such-
the
to
the
(so
man
that
the
individual man would
as
a
But
possibilities for being (sc. categorizable)
are
not
eternal,
it
The
matter.
reason
perish simpliciter)
only if
it can not-be a man (or be a not-man); but the possibility of not being man here means a capacity, and actually not being a man means exerci-
il
sing
that
sense
to
other
than
is
not
We
capacity. say that a
such a
it
man;
therefore
wi 11
and
the
thing
subject
eventually exercise
Where
subject.
the
as
of
which it makes
its capacity for being
distinct
from
substance concerned
his matter
is a portion
's0mething'
the
capacity to be first
would
be
no
empirically
fire,
knowable
then not-fire, etc. Thus
stuff.
it
-:.eems that the position of pe Caelo I 12 commits Aristotle to the postulate
of
rtny
rate
'prime matter' the
cyclic
in
However,
somethin~
like
transformations
of
the the
scholastic four
At
sense.
2mpirical
elements
it
object must
be
that
true
for
him
that
the
dut
-1s
tt
now what
stands.
theJ.r contradictories. is
not-fire •..mulct
>~lm
of
presumably be
roughly
not-fire
for
an
its periods of being the other
But even so r-he negative period is only timed ~
in turn.
s•1m of positives, not
':annot not be?
'something'
this being the
it
per-~.'-
about
the
aimed-for conclusion that what alHays is,
It may seem that this does not fallow from the position For
'llthou~h
e_~hY..P?_1J.:.~si
something al-wavs
(I)
rines not
~
far uncovered.
are, he says, essentially
something is always q>,
then it is tp:
that
hence
Hence in its case too there must
But it cannot be a finite period, since then
become not-cp,
exercises
tp
anything
a
which contradicts the
assumption.
It
'greater than any that might
(28la 33-b 1).
Since time is inSince anything
capacity for a temporally determinate exercise, ~
is always q> is
temporally determinate.
The
in a mode both temporally infinite and exercise fills a period, whose peculiar
property is that neither the whole nor any part of it can be repeated. It is not merely that Aristotle's argument will require this amazing concept; inferred its 10-12 283a
and
the very presence
18-19.
ff.
4
proves
But
is of
for
it
indisputably
present.
even more decisive evidence occurs
be
or
not-
(in which case even if
infinite stage
text
have
from 28la 33-b 2 taken in conjunction with 28la later,
at
Here Aristotle is arguing against the possible view that
something might only
moment
regular~
contained in that position is
'for always' entails 'for an infinity of time'.
is
as
parallel wi.th
if
suggested and lesser than none'
finite,
the
is
notice as
must then be an infinite maximal period -
-:..1.nce
ln
But
be a temporal maximum. the
'-;tates
sequence
now to
has and exercises a ,-capacity.
there
mutational
have
more extraordinary than anything so
a maximum.
for
provides him with a rare example where lt Ls not absurd to ·:iew negative intrinsically timed
what we
claim yet
then since these are subject to transfor-
corresponding substance-predicate pr~sumably holds of some-
possessed of
That
a
evidently Callias
of one of the four elements, mation
need
The question of interference is one that Aristotle
handled as effectively as he might from his present position.
not
are eternal.
to cease within
Nothing has been said to rule out interruption ab extra,
seems.
need
is that, by Aristotle's construction, the subject can cease to be e.g. a
not
intrinsically geared
exists
instances
therefore,
it
being
substance
as applying to something other than the individual
presumably,
so
of
this hardly entails that it might not cease through some
alternation
individuals
substance-predicate whose of
the
Thus
phases.
be on account
other cause,
Where ~ is a predicate 1n a Category uther than substance we may think
may
to
a given time,
at
least
time). in
one
the
time
infinite
in one direction
always
been and
always will be
possibility of
Aristotle direction
anything's
a
it has
is
rejects not to
its
not
this
on
rleterminate,
occupy,
since
being so as the
ground
hence t.n
not
from
that a
every case
is for a determinate time. 'Each thing has the capacity to do or to suffer, to be or not be, for a determinate time, either infinite or of a specifiable amount. In the case of infinite [in the strict sense, i.e. both ways] time there is such a capacity because infinite time is in a sense determinate, 'lS being that than which none is greater. But the nne-way infinite is neither infinite nor determinate.'
!p
some
a time
suitable being
~
'TOTES ON THETA
\P fi:R
The last calling
the
even more shows
sentence infinite
unwilling
why:
if
and meaningful,
shows
that
he
'determinate'; to withhold
the
first
is
this
true,
is the
not
altogether· happy
second
to
last,
title altogether;
then the second
since otherwise nothing
he
the
too must
could be said
about
that
and
provides
an
be
to
the
question
'For a minute',
'For how long?'
that
'For a decade', etc.
no
less
By contrast,
is
'For
on lJToceses
c.J.nd
true
'Always'
happen afterwards,
although of
course
they
do.
Some things.
~ut perhaps not all things, depend causally on pre-existing conditions
to be or to do
what supports Aristotle here is the fact that
answer
definite that
chln~s
is
first
etc. for always. Logically,
1
bound
to
outlast
them.
But where
there is no such
causal dependence, so that what occurs requires no temporal environment, the absence of such an environment would not in itself affect the inner determinacy of the temporally uncontained condition, whose time can therefore be seen as the time it takes to ~_f?_!!lplete itself, This is .1 time which, when compared against the periods of transient conditions,
a time infinite in one direction' covers any number of different lengths
can nnly be said to be 'greater than any and lesser than none'.
of
it
time,
inasmuch as more time will elapse counting, say,
ever
from
the
less
time
stretches
the latter.
Battle of Marathon than from the death of Socrates, from
the
infinite past
to
the
battle of Marathon onwards'
1.ndefinite length, and phrases than
cannot
'the
former
event
and than
If it were not so, how could one happening to be earlier
or later than another in the infinity of time? the
forward for
begin
week
(It is true that 'from
unambiguously specifies one particular
'from the death of Socrates' another: to be considered as
beginning
last
Thursday'
names names
of
any more
(as distinct
from
'a week'). His
totle's (which for
metaphysics
too
allows
a
foothold
for
the
notion of Always
The basis of this lies,
as a period of totality in time.
suspect,
I
argument
t:oherent or not,
by
the
maximum,
certain time,
thus, for
govern
he
says,
not
clear
about
the distinction,
significance here. if
in
general
the
But period
and
I
something that of
a
with the
time
of
some-
Aristotle is certainly
shall not
try to
explore
its
can be briefly said is this:
state's duration is
prescribed by an
'/ariable
is
Sllggests that
temporal
it
'external'
include
consisting of
states
is
that
it
is
not
independent the
of
temporal
external
circumstances.
'environment'
of
a
state,
long' time.
something else comes after
an inherently bounded state finishes when it finishes.
is
The point
finite
that precede and states that follow.
simply because
Under
it
that
After a given
logically and
'Finitely' (the
sentences
the
on
maximum
necessary (Cf,
281a
hEpoxT)v TTjv 56v"'J.i'v;
We may now spell
x
is '4>
(or not--<+') for
or for-that-time-not-,,
and
'always'
complement
of
constructed
qualify
'possible'),
with
first
and
and only deri-
unqualified
predicates.
(But
this
is
a misleading comparison if it
functions like a universal quantifier.
the
same
rest.)
Throughout,
Now,
leve] for
X
as to
variable-fillers be
ltke
al•..1ays. -r.p takes
the same capacity is heing exercised,
Rather, 'month-
time:
all
just as the
man lifting a hundred pounds exercises his one limited capacity on every pound
he
lifts,
things.
it
is
not because other
'tTJV
~.;re should not say simply that
'always'
every moment,
because !_! finishes,
quantitative maximum the
capacity concerned.
but that X is for-that-time-r.p,
incomplete,
J.t
finishes
a
this is Aristotle's position.
predicate
stretch its time is up, whether or not the time is not yet up for other A symphony
the
not still
It might even be better to say that the duration-adverbs occur in the first instances as parts of predicates or complements otherwise incomplete, thus in the sense in which an expression containing an unbound
inner principle, an Aristotleian 'nature', then that state has a certain bounded ness
is is
Since capacities and their exercises are specified
units).
vatively
as
it it
e.g., it is always -r.p or finitely-r.p (I use 'finite' as a variable specific
abstract 9
but,
realizat.ion of
it (;Ut as follows.
the
time,
but
Mov 6p(~w1la.< ~pbc; ~ xctl see also 18-19.)
ioremost
'universal'
True,
meaningless);
complete
in the fact that he is not in this context concerned with time in the
thing's doing or suffering, being or not being.
requires,
be
11~12:
a
This,
be objected, does not make it a ~, which is what Aris-
would
the
but these
periods,
one
might
always-(fl,
Hence it
ls
It
throughout true
is
of
always
t._:eding the whole of time to do.
e'Jer:y
X not
finite
merely
engaged
that
period it
in doing what
of
time,
is
but
and that
defined
as
fhis is a v~ry Jpecial kind of always
:_;t~~S
:!ling
the
same
,\ristotle' s
thing,
refusal
then how could Formally, part
of
its
it
it
be
is
true
put
predicate
'~')
that
scopes of However, re
theory
'all' which the word
3
entitled to
~·
X is always
in
the
say that
legitimize 'always'
3ny one short time that X is
from a
'always'
temporal quantifier
on
one cannot bring to bear the apparaportrays
so beautifully the varying
does also have a place, since
'always'
at .!:n,
and
~n+l,
at
and indeed at every
~ole
Thus even if
omnitemporal.
take it bit by bit,
•...±_a._~ is thus successively given is a truth that covers in a sweep the '..Jhole
of
;_hat to
whatever
reason,
it,
Hence
time.
uutside
an
finite
the
it
covers
bit we
situation
absurdity
at
follows
take
This case
the
arises which be
those
parts of
every
from
moment
supposing
is
such
that
when this
the mainspring of
we
consider
in
reasoning was to
the
exercised at
all.
concrete
launched.
full,
time
as
that
given.
that
what
Aristotle's
walking
, hat its
X is state
a for
from which
terms
the
is
it would
ten miles
can do.
Why
After
all 9
not
even
~eem
1
(It
~1e cone lusion of
first
but
is generally agreed
that
from
it
is
finitely-cp
not want
the
even
possibility of
as
Aristotle meeting
precisely this
objection:
but
think
capacity
fifteen
having
to
miles
the
exercise
in full,
somehow meant
capacity
for
that
thirty,
on another. we
then
could
If
no
his walking
longer
regard
him
if capacities are assumed to
be constant we should have to admit that thirty was never his maximum. Now
suppose
to
be
for
a
that
X is
interrupted
q> altogether.
determinate
for always,
while
It becomes not-~;
time,
either
finite
or
always-q>
so
that
it
ceases
but this being not-q> must be for
always.
It
because nothing could begin to be always-11:
cannot be
if it begins,
exercise.
Hence we
cannot
say that
it has or ever did have
the capacity for being always-not-cp. For
a
capacity
in
the
abstract
sense
does
not
really exist
if
if
X becomes will
capacities are constant,
exist
are
not-
return
grounds
this must
again
to
preceding argument. then
to
have
the
for be
by
grounds
that
it
for
never
saying did.
finitely determined.
being
our
saying
But the
capacity for
not
that
it
Hence if
In that case it
to being always
-cp,
by
the
same argument. could it be thought
always
-q>.
Hence
it
never did
have
or exercise it, even for a short time; which contradicts the assumption. The Ci!_elo into
I
coherence l2
relief
mentioned. .-:onfl let •H·m
in
some
with Aristotle's one
important
respects
statements
extraordinary
of
elsewhere
discrepancy
position
in ~
only serves to
throw
the
which has
not
His account of the infinite in Physics III
with
resistance
the to
idea governing the De Caelo argument. the
to Aristotle's classic
notion of
the
infinite
so
far
been
is in direct Indeed, our
as a totality owes much
disposal of it in the Physics.
to depend on implicit special considerations concer-
the physical objects which he in fact believes are eternally doing
_..;hat
they
i.e.
the
only
suppose then has
~ing
do,
always-q:~,
being
with
the circumstances are such as to entail that 1t cannot be fully reali-
I 12, which is presen~ed as an ar8ument from universal
principles,
that
the
Logically, .it •.Jould
Aris cot le would
seems
is too late to exercise to the full the capacity of which that would
can walk
not
"-"€
it
inconsistent
A man who does not walk to his limit on one occasion still
and
that
So
not
U
that the longer the natural span, the mere vulnerable to premature
'-'xtinction.
has
find
not
everything
is actually permitted to reach its natural limit.
can.
,~ed;
a while always -q> in the sense explained,
interrupted?
he
does
when he
then should
to
in which
follow
is
be
a capacity need not
not
always,
have not been able in the densely packed later pages of Chapter 12
given then
basis
for
becoming not-q>.
But a challenge
analogical
As we know,
A man who walks
thirty-miler
fact
lie
thirty ~s still, we may suppose, doing (so far as he does it) the kind nf
in
For
relatively
proof,
formal charges against it must be dropped.
realized
:
to be
also
momentarily consider
Hence 'what always is, cannot not be'.
ls not given at some other.
puts them beyond disruption.*) if
with this to suppose X ever not-
The omnitemporally given is itself (although not
-~.
same way)
what
sense of
'distributive' warns us not to confuse.
the temporal quantifier
we
for
(as distinct
tus
quantification
distributive
the point by saying that since
a sentence with the variable of
·'riAPTER J
properties are
the
consistent
one might
the
special
acknowledge
if
For
n'.ned earlier.
is
and
to
nN THETA
the
heavenly
spheres whose
position and
substdnce
*Thus Aquinas' appeal (Comm. ad lac.) to '.omnia natura appetunt esse' is inadequate. He derives from it 'unumquodque tantum est quantum f2.2Sest esse', but this depends on non-interference, which in general is a contingent matter. He does not, I think. show how the terms .,f the current argument alone (as distinct from cosmological require·::ents) exclude interference in the case of 'what al~~ ts'. 89
:luTES UN 1HETA :HAPTcR
'It turns out that the infinte is the opposite of what people say, for it is not that which has nothing beyond it. No, the infinite is that which has always something of itself beyond it ... that of which, in taking a specific amount (l(O."t
This
determinate of
more considered vtew, then we should expect to find no mention of nite
the
Is
exercise.
first
sentence?
Aristotle's
This
past
self
with a
belongs
bag
of
De Caelo.
of
reconciliation;
But
conclusion of 6
•,yas
on any view of for
Aristotle
the
'people'
questions about
Caelo
De
composed
later,
12.
I
how
the chronology there is a problem
appears If,
could
never
to
have withdrawn
the
Physic~
III
as seems more likely,
the
earlier
findings
still
stand?
If Physics III 6 came first, how in De Caelo I 12 could he have failed to
defend
would
explicitly
the
conception of
a
determinate
infinite
(which
And if he could
have made things easier for the interpreter)?
not defend it, how give the argument we have? Perhaps,
a reversion to
however,
'what people say' needs no public
And as for a change from that holistic notion of the
justification.
infinite, this too perhaps would have left Aristotle still in possession of For
adequate
grounds
argument
the
holds
between what provided
needs, •Jf
and
time'
sumption
i.s
to
also
for
need
to
he
position of in
couched
De
the
naive
this
contrast,
equivalence
of
course
To
call the
still this
of
he
terms
has
all
in
I
of
the
'always', with
not, that
I
stand
think,
sense
that
'infinite'
impossibility
impossibility was
does
Caelo
of
in
'always'
it
assigning
infinite.
absurd Only
it
he
infinity
~vas.
The assome
k.ind
the sense of ~~~ III 6
never in question. make
an
denotes
to is
a
specific
However, regard not
as
~
quantity;
the impossia
whole what
whole
that
infinte, nor
~
infinite a whole.
~·
338a
II
(cf.
ibid.
~·
III
9,
335a
6,
6;
33-14
and
ll,
1048b 9 ff.
for
a
N 2,
Metaph.
To conclude.
always
is
we
at
any
t.;ord
conveys
extraneous it
is a
fact
not
rate
is,
to
find,
203b 30 (where the
far
the present point);
statement
1088b 23-25;
so
Metaph.
for
I
De Gen.
l050b 7 ff.
!18,
conclusions
of
and,
as
reached
in
E 2,
good measure,
l9a 9 and 35-36.)
Aristotle has not shown or tried to show that what
cp might
that
we do Ill 4,
l-3;
l026b 27-28; K 8, l064b 32; and De Int. 9,
so
the
have
been otherwise
seem to to
understand.
speak,
entire
of
the
in
some
sense
of
'm1ght'
The possibility which this
unavailable
history
except
actual
from
a
standpoint
universe,
of that universe that X is always <.p.
given
that
The contradictory
is an option perhaps for God, although not even for him on some conceptions of divinity, but certainly not for anything embedded in the actual order of nature.
So if X's not betng cp is in some sense a possibility,
it
sense
is
regard
not
in
any
it
as
representing
a
capacity of a
divine
an actual
subject:
capacity.
But
in
unless
that
case
we it
would hardly make sense to test it by referring the corresponding sup-
In
it
If this represents Aristotle's
itself,
Aristotle's
time-relative
idea
of
possibility
seems
perfectly coherent, especially since in itself it does not entail possibilities (particular or general) are in fact realized.
that
For that
he needs the additional notion of properttes defined by inherent temporal us
spans. as
treatment of time, enter tion
His
strained
though,
handling of
to
the
'always'
point
this of
in
De Caelo
absurdity.
is an obvious target
I
The
12 may well consequent
of suspicion.
strike
holistic
At the same
a clear understanding of the way in which temporal maxima
into the argument certainly helps to salvage Aristotle's reputafor
logical
sanity.
Hintikka has maintained that in connecting
as he does the omnitemporal with the necessary, Aristotle is dominated hy
a
'statistical
model
The difference,
of
modality'
then,
he simply the difference of
'JO
exactly what
affect
)).
is
is
(See e.g.
reference to infinite body does not
'infinite
premisses
'for
thts
'infi-
but 1mly
position to 'another time'.
12 ·
a measurable period and what holds for always·
retains
emphasize
bil1ty is
he
must
a whole.
that
not
essential
can be quietly dropped - as indeed perhaps it
•Jf
but
does
the
The phrase is a natural one to use to point the contrast
time' at all.
~ut
for
And
the De Cae~ position,
~Carr.
relative datings of different parts of the Physics and different parts of
in his later statements of
~d and
one-way or both-
among
time'
have been able to verify.
is as such incapable of functioning as the field of a temporally
ways,
l
between
(Time
and
'necessary'
Necessity, and
'always' from 'at some time'.
·)[
pp.
'possible'
102-
would
Thus 'neces-
CHAPTER 3
sary'
:.lairns
no more
than
the
continuance
ad
iHfinitum of some state
of affairs which had it been interrupted would properly have been called 'contingent'. neccr,sary,
·.;r~at
It is not
the
but
fact
that
it
is
tesque
position
as
any
of
,,..,hate';er
his
of integers.
that makes whatevr:-r is necessary it
is,
it
But pe Caelo 1 12 :.>hmJS Aristotle as far
on.
elusion of the infinite series of t->rime numbers in the infinite series
simply
goes
on
and
from holding this gro-
admirers could hope
The
to find him.
Would time exist (that
of
As
is,
it
the
fixed
time
is
if
there was simply one rotating heavenly sphere
stars),
and
no
indicated
by
the
in terms of the motion of the first
otherwise
frame of spatial reference,
of
The
being <;> •
longer
(much
limit
of
longer)
the suggestion that <1re
difference
between
duration
To suggest that
the genus.
s~mply
and
the
is
specifically different the
differentia.
they are
occui"rt:!nces
of
ways
being Ill
the
same
attribute
matches
the lion dUd the mouse, being both of them animals, No
essentially larger and smaller versions of the same creature.
doubt ever
the it
his
De Caelo
did;
but
argument
perhaps not
metaphysics,
is
to each other as shorter
will
by
the
to
cCJnt inue
now we
failure
can see
of
his
a lien to
seem as
that it is the
logic,
that
takes
seems But
Aristotle
to
an
the
centre?
at
least
frame
being at
of
two
motions
reference
the
.!.!
heaven.
there is no absolute
the existence of motion, and hence of time,
centre
of
differing
is
suggested
the
universe;
from by
one
the
for
the centre would be
there (de Caelo 2.
the centre even if the earth was not
another.
argument
14 296b 6 ff.,
cf. 297a 9 ff.). It was
suggested
bility be realised gories, being
beyond our company in this chaptei".
require
absolute
the earth's
us as
thrust of
earth at
relative motions of the different
spheres, in any case; but the main argument of Physics VIII is conducted
difference (in the central cases) between the necessary and the possibly reflects
stationary
in
the paper that
the requirement that a possi-
at some time applies to being in the various cate-
but not to the case of the cloak which can be cut up,
cut
up
is
not
a
itself
case
of
being
that
falls
under
because one
or
another of the categories; rather it is a ~ of passing from categorial being (in this case, not -being.
Discussion of paper by Sarah Waterlow In
connection
out that
with
the
argument
that
infinity
in a sense defin-Lt~ (de Caelo I
directions is
unbounded
in both
12 283a 9) it was pointed
at
al.l;
!:ined
on the othet: hand a
as
1
to
its
length
nly at
the
beginning starts,
was
one inf 1 n1ty in another
tion that ~as
_:-tat e~ng
-.ust ·, md,
.-as
(e.g.)
the
five
starting
provided t:hat it
under
1.nfinite; oe
(~.
reluctdnt
point
and
is
not
is infinite thereafter? to accept the inclusion
lll. 5 204a 20 ff.; where t.he assump-
indivisible,
Ji.nce
a
available
the
proof in
infinite
characterised precisely by
as
in
of
n1e
i\ristotle's
the
pos.~._tivn
infinity
t1.me,
of
o£
:-•ali_··.-~'iS.)
the
~erics
of
in
the it
prime
numbers tl 1 e
any
not
case
relates
so
much
must
be
that
any
more
'whatever
expression
is
to
to
at
unexercised
directly
'Principle
more
concerned
actualised
of
is
and
is
logical as
will
with
necessary'.
Plenitude'
metaphysical
here
the
time',
capacity
concerned
always
make
some
the
be
corresponding
Hintikka 's
issues
the
exercised;
doubly misleading;
theological
point,
to make
than
use
of
for
(a)
to
the
purely logical ones in terms of which Hintikka tends to interpret Aristotle;
and
(b)
Aristotle's
concern
too
is
metaphysical
rather
than
logical, ~ Hintikka. There that
has
them.
he :-;hnuld 1:':i'·'e aJlcno1ed f·n
is
point
implication,
its
It follows that an act•1al infinite substance
204a 26.
but there might be problems with the category of e.g.,
possibility
metaphysical
from the fact that lt is the infinite as a substance
discussion,
Aristotle 'every
years is de-
the parts of an infinite must themselves be infinite results,
t!bserved,
is
1
even if
pointed out that Aristotl~ is
L..
·
l\~ast,
at
')f
:t
finite period of
But does it :nake any difference uhen an infinite period bounded
known.
few categories;
paschein, and certainly with that of time.
in the case of an infinity bounded in one direction only (the
starting (or [in1shing) point has to be specified if it is to be defined
being a cloak - a substance?) to the corresponding
It was observed that this applied well enough to the first
but
is the
a
difficulty
potential
for
in two
finding opposed
plausible examples of something states
and
alternates
between
Possible cases include the changes connected with the seasons;
there
is
then
the problem of identifying the subject
i.n
93
(which will,
· iiAP fER
::QTES ON THETA
a moreover, being
it
was
it
is
the
between
15 ff.
hot
a
general
problem in all
earth
that
is
alternately hot
and
cold
-
cf.
Boethius,
notion of
cases
of
alternating
on
the
formation their
19
-
and
cf.
possibilities,
of
forms
the
but
has
elements
this water Int.
in 1
ed.
'this water'.
2.
also
15
-
summer
alterna-
sec.
thought
different
again,
in
that
potentialities
life; cf. ~· VIII.
1 252a 11 -
in what is natural.
It was also felt
to
suppose
that
from
not
at
Alexander
those any
(ii)
to
the
elements,
and
higher
level.)
of which a man
different
stages
of
his
and
it
was
pointed
sitting do
discussion of maximal
in
families
of
incompatibles;
not
out fit
potentialities like
very well
capacities in ch.
11,
into
the
which
those
framework
it
of
for
amples
the
lb excludes
having
the
capacity
to
lift
500
that
time?
-
each such no,
capacity
except
in
So
lb.
he is not exercising a capacity to lift
lb, but partially exercising his capacity to lift 500 lb. sary
Interest to
talk
the
maximal
in
about
the
should
case
maximally
be
of
a
claim that
has
capacity to
a
the
being who
if
he
a
in
real
note
thing
capacity
to
400
Is it neces-
exercised
at
always~,
that
of
an
infinite
was
argued,
but
in ch.
that
has
bounded
capacity
would
immortal
immortality would
or
in nature-
a
story
only
at
such
the
(What
possessed
this
life-
too
it
to always-q~,
always-cp.
principle
transgressed,
that, But
in
capacities,
capacity
further
some
which
is
he
things
inevitably
one end;
Aristotle
he
makes
to always-cp,
make
life, be
leads 12
of a myth about
but
was told that,
taken away? don't
Probably
happen like
involves
at the end,
the
always
the
that.
possibility
if the being had
ning has not always existed, but retained immortality.)
5
28lb
impossible
or
With
Aristotle
true
on the other. are
16;
the argument,
and in the course of this he
distinguishes
false,
between
what
is
possible
or
hypothetically on the one hand and haplos
The examples given for what is hypothetically impossible
things which, the
or
example
on usual of
assumptions,
are mathematically necessary.
the triangle compare,
possibility without
concerning himself
unduly as to whether
perhaps, Physics II.
9 200a
flUestion
for-all-future-time
was
raised,
why
is
there The
not-
to do that for a finite time). not
the
answer,
third
possibility of
that Aristotle simply
with
such-and-such.
the
about
angles will
The
Euclidean
parallels. not
add
So,
proof
if
we
of
the
point
make differing
up to two right angles.
What
Perhaps,
that the same number can be both odd and even.
'maximal
i.t
was
asked
whether
then,
haps,
the
being
commensurable;
ply', capacities''
what,
will
be
examples
of
things
which are
impossible
~aplos, if even mathematical examples are related to assumptions?
t·ively',
does not allow such capacities. connection
is
assumptions
suppositions,
But
and (by the same argument),
its
on
i.t must either always-not- cp (which is already
to~.
The
line
triangle is two right angles since the
is the corresponding supposition in the case of the diagonal?
e.xcluded) or not-cp for a finite time (in which case it would then have to h again,
straight depends
It had been argued in the paper that, if a thing with the capacity to-always-cp ceases
the sum of the angles of a
employs stock ex-
they are suited to the context of the argument as a whole.
In
lift
In answer to this it was suggested that the basic argument
12.
of
400
had been argued
has already been stated by 28lb 2; what follows is Aristotle's explanation of
this man lifts 400 lb,
At that
lift 500 lb also has the capacity to
always existed but lost its immortality; at the beginning, if the begin-
was the context that should be borne in mind in assessing the argument of ch.
lifting
if
a very appropriate one?
Further, standing
of
that it would be rather implau-
come
is a picture of men spending their lives in alternating between standing and sitting
to
the
there is always order and proportion
predicates
capacity
238.
discusses
and
the matter at
the
Answer, on this doctrine, no; for to have a (maximal) c~pacity
exercised in full the only time (i.e. all time) that it is exercised.
succession,
but
is rather
man w.th
400 lb?
with a marked absence of ex-
bodies
compound
dissolution
Perhaps Aristotle's composed
of
homoeomerous
subsequent
sible
1
cold,
In ibid. 2. 20 he suggests that it applies (i) to prime matter
amples. taking
1.
Quaest ·
and
in de
Meiser _ except for difficulties over
Aphrodisias,
is
be
(Another possible example would be
and winter?
of
out,
something and not-being something in the category of substance).
Perhaps
t ing
pointed
_I
things which
but
so
to
in
that
fact
impossible
'hypothetically'
-
such as
will
mean.
be
true' .
but
Per-
the diagonal not
'cteriva-
'on an unreal assumption', and hapl;s will mean, not
'underivatively',
assumed
are
'sim-
'relative to something else which is itself
Does
Aristotle
then
recognise
a.E_I
underived
necessities? The principles of the sciences? - hut perhaps they are only
94
·~;_"rES
Hll1l • ·~r1
lilt..
'''dY
dence
lAnd, it was n0ted,
relative to our assumptions about space·
inability to form intuitions which do not correspond
., 1 t~Lotle our
,,
ON THETA
really are would not be a limitation; the correspun-
LILI.ngs
between our
cognitive
capacit Les
and
the
way
things
really
Translation by R.W. Sharples of part of Ps.-Alex:ander's comments on
are
2. l
a.n arbitrary matter.)
tl•Jt
J
l'he motive suggested in the paper for the relativisation of possi-
[AlexanderJ
574. 6
11iUty 1.;a 5
of whdt vf
whdt
the
~possitle?
rhey
,_onl Ladictory
1.he
test
the present.
supposition must
by
presumably do, is
apply
to
a
are not, but
impossible;
if it
the is
necessary taking
by
is
that
something
that
is
true, and of which the contradictory is therefore false, and considering what ~e ,1
the
implications
P~t~hlish
i
3
1
r 11 r
be
is
the
contradictory
whether a thing is necessary or not.
impos.<>ible,
ro ;"tlways
tr
would
so,
Aristotle)
presumably,
always
~ere
true
that
10
that
some
Just as some things
'dlways'
Ts
annot
the
a
modal
capacity
possessed
he
by
notion,
for-
to-always-cp is
something
,_ilcularity here.
1•f
·iJ.nl'!;tt
It
Aristotle? a
sort
accidentally;
of
is
capacity
thp whole
1·eal
of
there
is
a
true
11
1 ~as
hP
111 any
f 'll
•inni S •l.
I•.;HO f"<>S
observed
true
to
but
will
not
For
possible
is
15
'IS
that
'!lume
rnatter;
FIT~
"irnnlv ·f)
on
it
this
interpretation of Aristotle,
Existence
was
and
emphasised
would no~ accept
he
l·~r:ause
it
is
always,
modal
as
notions
a
for instance.
Possibility',
that
this
is
there
matter may
w<\•Jld have shared this view of
seem
of
fact,
weak;
able
does
them or regarded them,
in cnn-
to
be,
is
possible
follows
1047b
[Aristotle}
something
for
it to come it 294 - it is
for is
not
possible,
be
able
indeed,
to
come
to
to the actuality of that for
possibility.
something
us
not
but
is
results;
and
it
is
is
and a
if
But
possible, indeed,
posited a
but
results. is
it
is
unclear
is
possible
thing
[that not
what
For
example,
log
to be
someone
but
as
is
is
But
if
possible,
it
not
is.
·when it
[if},
nothing
is]
posited
295
indeed
being,
thing
what
impossible
impossible
as
being,
someone but
[if],
something says
will
not
20
I
is
possible
and
what
is
that be
or
impossible?
when
it
is
burned,
if
someone says that it
for and
it the
possible
to
be
same for
said to be possible for
burned, person
the
but says
diagonal
but it will not he measured -
it also to
will that he
the
is indeed not
be
it
is
measured,
how will this differ
from that, when both are said to be possible [though} they will
96
come
and will
the
that
indeed [Qll•lW
it
to come
say
possible
ne~...essary
not
I
have
escapes
burned,
true. it
9 4
things are possible which
to
actual that
be
we
between
(But
how A.ristrotle
a thing being
(on
result in actuality, how are we to know the difference
A~Snc.
Proc.
not
say
they
something
the suggestion that modal state"-
simply functions of assertoric ones,
.hist\Jtle•s he
on
there are no golden mountains,
But
17~37).
rhe
that,
17
For those things are said to be possible
that
when
hims~lf
things that are necessary for him but nnly universal au.. i-·
'•mithl!t'H,
:nf>nt~
t.tt
being
impossible !L
those
able
in that
and
not
sible
tn some cases, the impossibility of some-
time - which is the only time he concerns
6-575.
able to come to be and result in actuality, the impos-
'.'i\!1.
,,., 1
be
which are
whlch
lhing derives, fur Aristotle, from things which themselves cannot change, irl
possible,
says
itself
him,
[.,r
be to
which
human being or other
>hnultl be standing.
1 !lut.
are
actuality.
some things are always possible;
possible
5 74.
'if what has been said is possible in that 293 follows• -that is, if something is said to
it
the
which
of
metaph.
says that
situation
Do similar motives apply in the case of
in
Having said that
so that
possible,
is false is the only interesting one, and in the ca3e
false
ts
tho~n
ut_!wL
that what is true is ipso facto
the fact
292
M. Hayduck, CAG 1, Berlin 1891.
not
be
[the
case]?
J7
Accordingly,
the
log
3);
4.
ed.
'Hl!'ES UN THEtA
is
combustible
and
the
if this is so,
but lS,
Hhether
the
log's
it
is
being
dL.tgonal
.neasurable
it escapes us what diagonal's
the
So,
burned.
equally;
is
the impossible
being
measured
[Aristotle]
or
says,
25
sible
is,
and
[what]
it and the possible, prevents to
it
I
the
difference
{is)
that man would say that
that something,
for which it
the
as
a
it
is
10
he
and
[both
in
the
log,
readily,
So
it
not
have
said
the
case
ofJ
the
other
and
it
that
is
cLear laid
it
be),
hut
is
able
I
sitting,
walk
that
IJOsit
be
burned
former by
this
pair
the
man
however
i
I
one
Suppose,
says
that
that
what
is the case,
you
are
however, this
->dred,
but
latter
case
.Js
in
the
so
ne~ther
that
we
is
not not
former (will
15
is
the
the
false, false
I
around,
and
measured.
the
that case.
if something is poscase. 300 And this
of
not
being contrary
'let it be granted that
the
cant-
impossible would
man who
is
sitting
[But] there the conclu-
impossible,
impossible.
between
that
be
For if it were
impossible were
difference
impossible
not
something
case
but and
which supposes that
not,
the
the
while
So, same,
two
if
here
the
there
it
false
would
suppositions,
be
that
the man who is sitting is walking which
But since
says
that
the
diagonal
}the false and the
is
impossible
J
are different, the suppositions are different too.
when you
around,
nothing
Oe
who
t..;ill
is
sitting,
too
is
from
nothing
'icl
indeed
lf, the
then,
former,
impossible
latter.
-
_!3ut,
the just
resulted, if
1 1
The commentary on books E-N of the Metaphysics attributed its
to
Alexander
present
form,
is
certainly
although
it
is
not
authentic
uncertain
in
how much
material from the original commentary is incorporated.
able to be mea-
measured.
the
is
not walk around, and,
different
i.n
292.
that this is true, but some-
man.
case it J
is
both
and no
nothing im-
suppose,
walking
the diagonal
will
in
the
and and,
For jf, when you are sitting around,
.1ble tn •..Jalk around, but similarly,
is
is
impossible will result from the supposition. 5 75.
also
of will
measured'.
supposition,
sian
to
laid down (and it has been
come to be,
to
follow
is
the
impossible possible,
[a matter of)
it
said
be
to
is not
but is said to walk around.
[the
impossible;
if we
possible will result.
Jre
for
But
diagonal
-
}in the case of}
is able to come to be will come
that
to
are
:!_')7
been
what
namely,
but
possible
the
has
that
able
rary
proclaimed
is
of
from what
to
the
J are what would
ignorant
down
the and
one
one,
results
mean an even number being equal
I
po5sible
odd
this
the
the
the supposition that says
for
burned.
be
will
statements
who
have
I -
be
And
follows
even
the
this that,
indeed
to
the other to be burned and it will not be burned. he would
from
will
impossibility
it will not be measured,
is
clear
it
but
it
an
of
saying
the diagonal and
for
Rather,
it
this,
possible,
an
that
and
of
it
to
and
nature
to
to
measured
10
the
between
indeed is
is
uncautiously
[in
be
that
so
0ne
of
35
of]
would
seeing
result
sible,
equivalent impossible. 299
utterly
not
between
is possible
number
difference
'nothing
or come to be, should not be, now or in the 296 future'. But if he knew the nature of what is
odd
is
from the
be
i.mposssible,
an
which
person who does not reck,1n or discern what the i!Tlpos-
that the diagonal !.~ measured,
granted
that
it
Cf.
Hayduck's preface to CAG 1;
tingen Gelehrte Anzeiger Alexandre toteles,
1
d Aphrodise der
AGPh 49 (1967),
Lehrer
168
(1942)
99
Praechter in GOt-
14-19,
Alexanders
181 f.
K.
( 1906) 882-896;
von
and
id.
Meraux, 'Aris-
Aphrodisias',
.Jetd~.
9 4
l047b
in
that',
ead
t
burned,
J.
with Al~xander;
howe,,er
J
11,
has
be
below,
rurther A'u has -rh .Juva."tbV 'if the imp•JSSible
',,r
'..Jhat
is
has
Zeller quggested buvn-rbv
been said'.
~~&.6uva.·d'JvtJ.)i"\d.xoXouOet,
has
[a::.j
'if,
been
even
thought
is
ii
to
is
not' .
was
simply
33
('it
has
been
come
to
be
might
It.
this
574.
able
it
that
a laid
..:orne
will
therefore
3lip.
But
down
to
1
be
c f.
that
what
and
),
nn.
294, 300.
said,
l that [ i.:3 possible un which nothing impossible folLn..'s';
below n.
cf.
Ross
2Y5,
(above n.
264) ad lac.
298.
<0~>
seems
('that,
as
be
required
one
might
this
after
61-JoCw~
in
575.
2;
add O'tt. before W~; in 575. l
man ••. ,
so
similarly
the
diagonal,
1
too .•• 0::94.
to
alternatively,
and Hintikka, Time and Necessity 107.
).
seems very unlikely that this interpretation accu-
It
iately
t·eflects
- whatever ~rgues ~s
the
exactly
intention
they were
that ~ 4xoAou6£t
can
of
last note.
0nly
mean
it is convertible',~ dxo~oueet
•.;ith
itj,
~Jupts
dues
commit
that
him the
every
32a
words
299.
'in
so
Hintikka
to what
lf
possibility
must
be
Greek
the
l.
23
41a
Hathematics,
case and
2
=
the
2 Zb
b • and even,
the
f.;
26
T.
Oxford
diagonal
2 2b ,
=
so
is
in its
But,
if
a
b are
which to
2
2 4c ,
::::1
2
a
ratio
odd.
impossible
911bsequent discussion.
ratio of
terms,
If
Then a
his
of
is
therefore
realised;
ind this has a bearing on certain features
of
lowest
even.
the principle
eventually
a/b
its
107
would appear to be a strong
principle of plenitude,
History
Heath,
1921,
91.
The proof is given by Euclid 10 app. 27; summarising,
far
'or is convertible 24;
~~·
Aristotle
CE.
A
Ross
But [Alexander's} interpretation
the latter).
... ersion of
~
comparing
Arislotle's
(cf.
is 2
the
the side in 2
and
terms,
let 2
= 2c
a
a
are b
is
= 2c.
But in that
•
b is therefore both odd
impossible.
is
express
a
lowest
even,
so that b even,
to
that
Therefore
ratio of
the
it
is
diagonal
to
the side on its lowest terms.
i'.l
s.
Fct
this
A_!!.:___!'_r_,_
4
q
definition l.
ot
the
possible
13 32a 19 ff., l:i_etaph.
l047b
Cf.
ff.
Hintikka,
cf.
;\ristotle
9 3 1047 a 23 Ef., ib1.d.
30
E.,
154
300.
This is
does
that
is
12, 22 ff.
indeed
possible
one of 297, :.·J()'
:leta ph.
94 1047b 8 E.
this
Llearl:; asserts
(575.
01ppl1es ;'he
to
c•.Jntrast
llJateiy
individual with
expressed
the by
that
Lhe principle of plenitude
cases
(cf.
diagonal 'it
is
above
would
possib.ie
nn.
have for
13
course the
for
a
type
that
is
clear
The present statement
of thing will happen to but cf.
above,
nn.
some 294,
and the summary of this discussion in the sequel 20)
-
'having
will
also
shown come
has the potentiality ..• '.
f.).
to
all
be interpreted only as saying that what
been adeit
follow;
things, which will never be the
the type in question;
something "!7.
of
case, are not possible either. could
ii.
not
some of
be
I'll
that to
what
be
can come
that
for
to
be
'..Jhich
it
inP rr:R 4
i 04 7b 10
l047b l
12-14 which ~ate
i'1etaphysics
G.~.L.
by
uwen
potentiality and actuality. with not
84:
Intra.
l047b ~ E & A;
3:
('earliest extant ms. of
the Metaphysics',
'appears to preserve the true reading',
clv)
~ dxo\ou6EL
11
viz.
Ross
JxoA.ouBe!, seems
which
far
negating
p
is
we
a
less
find
shows
due disregard if
likelier: what
the
for
the accenting of
impossibility
constitutes
the
of
possibility
apparently circular
tvep-
some
of
that
they are
possible
but
will
not occur,
TJ in r: A .
consequence
'possible')
if
of
follows
the
intent
oracles
that',
Lt
won't
it)
it
be
run
with
requests
but
be;
verbs
and
(since we
upset'.
of
that'
is
speaking-to-a-purpose,
persuadings.
The
'to
(but):
e.g.
inter locutor
has
He
proof'.
entertain
the
possibility
is
even in denying
'After all,
arguments can
'not taking into account' and not
'not accepting
he does
but
not:
a
simple,
He
from any suggested case.
to be
non-realization never entails
-on not'.
EN
2
VI
1139b
vs.
hin.Q,;S
that
are
t
5-11,
·.nth Y€-v6ueva.
and
the
where
(b)
(?)
De
have
YEVo~J.tvwv
universals); as
signify
what
cannot
Int.
l8a
present and future cf. be
deliberated
28-34,
v,
the
come
one
(c)
about
might
..;nich
Rhet.
future,
1418a 2-5:
thlnk
Ov'ta.
and as r.ecessary;
lCZ
past
of
time-connectives
which exercised
' ••. can
conjunction
'The
write-when-not-writing' The
argument
of
non-writing or
l047b
' ... when 8-14
can not
requires
'There is nothing to prevent its not being capable of being' .
(A~ B)
On
II:
(poss. A
-
~poss.
about
of
f1
B)
~(A -+B)
(poss. A_,poss. B)
II
There are two parliamentary seats in Kilmarnock.
If a Conser-
vative is allowed to stand for one,
there must be a Socialist standing
for the other.
But if the Conservative is elected
to
the
one
other.
Pass. A .... pass. B.
this More
entails
the the
does
not
entail
generally,
possibility
of
of
the election of
two
alternatives
the other;
realization of
the
my car
out
because
of
I
is
a
direct
cannot imply impossibles;
is
alternatives with
'not
and
actual
'exactly when and how'
application
Scotch
voting Int.
De
you
I
of can
this depends on
of the axiom that possibles (A~ B).
it relies on the assumption
alternatives?
always
one
I.
driving - opening, but this is The defence
The
What has Aristotle in mind?
can open the garage door;
I
to the
possibility of
but the realization of one pre-
other.
1047b 29-30 do not affect this.
the Socialist
the
find
are
9
19a
what
ruled 9-22:
can be
out. In
and
Here,
How would Ar general,
not-be
(not
in what cannot),
is consequently what can come to be or not come to be;
and there are
distinguishes
from future cases
still
the
possibility which is not realized; the present has not become
104 7b 17:
plenty
for 11 nquantified
future;
agalnst
Dunaton einai has gone together in e.g. 1047b 15.
and past
as
necessary.
then, past,
allocation
can write'.
a present
deal :a)
may
writing,
drive to eliminate them
is perhaps invented as the extreme anti-
On the necessity of
the
81.a.cpe\rye:Lv: escape,
inv<-'nted.
to kill them but
'can never entails realization,
3lmply
on
In write'
eludes
his prime object is not
away:
result
He might have continued
could be'.
(le~arian,
(intended)
in any case of alleged impossibility he insists 'No doubt
which standardly means the
the
standard
votes,
and
his motive:
13-14:
104/b 26-30:
'!.f
future
us in 9 3 cf. SE 166a 24-32 on fallacies of rrUvBEuL' (here distinguished
1047b 14-26:
Not
5:
the
this is a general
move vs. tmpossibles.
!04/h
with
Our 1047b 13-14 belong with (d).
or at least (if
p,
definition of
iJ.>TJ
from the definition, we must presernve Lnpossibles against the suggestion
present
(Ross ib.).
suggests a lacuna, and ps. Alex (57~. 8) supplied ~o
'Nhich is not to be had from 8 3; Zeller supplied <~ d.E>Uva't'OV
yT)c"a.L.
Ti
.J
the
a hlnt of power
or potency !U4lb
couples
as the field of dunamis.
(and if it
quantified ~lh Ov'ta.
of
into bits;
plain cases
of
and it won't;
this.
For
instance,
this
it will wear out first.
vs. it
was
capable
of
not
being
cut
into
bits;
for
coat can be cut
On these same terms there
would
not have
coupled
(d) De 1:nelo 283b
been ~q!
the
possibility
of
its wearing
to be cut into hits ...
103
out
first
if it hadn't been able
lJ47b
l047h 4
l
1_~
.Y,.
the
reading
rr.e
!)f
oldest
MS
seemed
J,
ril;:ra.L (574.
n could nis
8i
but not
indicate
'definition'
possibility
be
will
'JQV
of
a
·'lf
be had
(.0
that
Aristotle
possibility
worried
in 9
understood
as
3,
if
better definition,
£vEp-
subject
dnd
about so
the
circularity of
keeping
TNas
one could be
found.
or
of Axo-x.au6e't:
if
open
rlecause of
a
supposition
is possible?
d 1) or Zeller's <..~ &.E>6va.'tOV f-L)i,.
frcm
·. . as
to ~
preferable
'.,Thich was felt to require a :-;upplement - eith.cr lAlexander j 's 'tO
the
position to
reduce
that
(what
is
and
own the
actual
not
happen;
e:Iva.a. in
-
on
Aristotle
would
this
was
felt
to
be
S()mewhat
elliptical.
the actuality of which entails no impossibility'
'that,
(cf. 9 3 L047a
he
to
is
~~_!:__:.§.
Werre::
Hintikka
(and
that'.
On
'if
Owen and Kneale "" pseudo-Alexanaet·,
the
latter
view.
and
the
the (intended) result is that';
the
Loeb),
argument
is
'the that
result
'i.Wuld
absurdity
happening',
of
l047a
21
is present;
an
extension
'slip through',
sible'?
The
'get away with it
latter,
be
of
the
word
better,
anyone who denies
at
any
rate
implied.
one
thing
that
won't
But
possibilities.
possible
from
happen is
Aristotle does
the
i.mpossible;
possible, provide
once
you
allow
there can't be any im-
such a
criterion in what
the
the Owen view,
supposed
to
be
it
was
asserting
suggested that
'this
1s not
true in any case,
:) with
the intended result that q'.
(p and q)'.
or
Ls
possible
but
Lt
was
'it
~"tt.
not
meaning
to say
be'.
isn't,
might
'beca,tse'
':"e.cause
someone rather
added than
it
be
so such a of
his
.:Jut
they the
failed
by
'this
in every case.
an accusative but
the
and
•'AxrtE
to
see that O·ta. meant
cor!"uption would
have
to
be
Ahy,
in any case,
should anyone suppose that ~auld
as
he
had
sense felt
e:Yvcu.
seemed
that
the
to suit the general sense former,
stronger
on d.OGva:ta..
depends
It
assert that a thing is possible,
what
we
have
attempt
of
an actual or
here
sense is
may seem odd
but will not be,
'should get away with it'; less
is Aristotle's
report
of,
fictional opponent
to
and
react ion
to,
reduce his (Aris-
i1ansion means
that
the
it
suggests the
that
the
Owen
passage doesn't
opposes
only things
impossible. than that
it.
interpretation
support
Plenitude,
of but
We
that
never
felt
that
happen
this
was
(in any
Ox.Tte
questionable;
case?)
not
only
actually means
be
are
it
isn't
the case that those
that
are
(Hintikka himself elsewhere does not seem to assert more what is possible will happen in some case,
not that it will
happen in this case; Time and Necessity 100.) It
was
also
suggested
say (in some sense, be
that
it
is
a
that
the
point
of
the denial that one can
at least?) .'this is possible but will not be' might
contradiction in
terms.
a
denial
of
the
very notion
,,f the possible; note that it is 'this is possible but will not happen',
··arlier rnan ps.-Algxander.
t,le but will not be'
should
we
that
'therefore';
this
'disappear altogether',
actually ruled out that it might as a matter of fact
For p,
1
Megarian attack
position,
'it isn't true to say
false
followed
Wc:rte:
the
Perhaps t'Ix:rte ~..ras not in the original
b~cause
'that'?
itself,
though
'this is possible and will
'it isn't true to say
(p implies q)'.
.1ud
:.>P.emed odd, and duplicated -roU1:-r;1. but
possible but will not be'
rather than
true
that EC1tetv
suggested
infinitive,
is
if
so
~~
since Aristotle i.s
it is odd that we have
isn't
will
that,
(Note
possibility of
totle's) position to absurdity.
Eollows; the fact that something impossible is implied (l047b 9-12). On
i'legarian attempt to
'successfully masquerade as pas-
,
that
the
someone
weaker, but
1
with the intention that the impossible
~ext,
for
involve
for
ow
a
by exaggeration?
not
stated
a difference between the pas-
only argued
plenitt1de, who says 'this is possible but will not be', has no criterion distinguishing
significantly
reduced the Megarian
resisting
What is the sense of &t.a.cpe:Uye:Lv in l047b 5; or
11
be
exaggerated theirs.)
<4-26).
chat
can
there ~
that
had
~ not
been stated) (at any rate) follows (from the definition of the possible)' though
-
A
in
and
whatever
so here
position -
Aristotle
possible
that
is it that, as Aristotle in 9
absurdity,
his
sible
'tb e:Cp11~has
Or,
i:nply that
sayin~
'this is pos-
there are no impossibilities?
t'n the Hintikka view of (':(J"te. this is a belief Aristotle himself holds; 1n the Owen v1~w, it is an imputation he is concerned to ~uard a~ainst.)
')4
not
'this is possible ~ven if it doesn't happen'. (l047b
3.
Zeller's CuvCL't"ov <~ M6v<11:ov ;~>n cho;>.ou6et is attrac-
tive at first sight,
as the consequences of postulating the occurrence
of '..rhat
seem more
ls
possible
to the point.
LOS
in view of
l047a 24 ff.,
b
tf.,
9
may
be
than
the
(o•,ercautious?)
implication of
an
than being identical with it. But
tikka).
-
this context,
cf.
statemeilt
above
not Aristotle's;
,.;hat
has
been
satd
any
(So Ross r)n the MSS readings, and Hin-
(?
since
-
be co;1vertible with it.
A."X.o\,)1Jdetv is
Diodorus'
term
in
has Zeller been led .1st ray by the appa-
i1ight the point not be, the
form
impossible, ~
the
i.n
that
namely,
this,
•..;hich
Aristotle possible
but
cannot (ii)
sees
will
it
the
that
"1ut
be
this
seems
\.Jhile
1 ike
the
on
the Owen
we
assert
assert be,
and ~hat
(ii)
of
cut
in
the
rather
the
and
the
flut the trouble rather
assertion
view.
Aristotle's
of
a
thing
because
(rather
from
this
than
from
'this
uf
some
is
assertions
(i)
point
might
that
involves
it a
be
is
that
possible
we and
contradiction;
to
implies - cf. the Sea-Battle - that
Pickwickian)
the
tortuous.
it
might
can't
say
any up
as
And this might be felt to lead to the disappearance
commensurability
it
be
regards
impossible
Him:ikka
the
be
of
possible
is
in d~~
9
everything
hut
that
Aristotle's
posJ.tion
we
can
:Jince
Jt
is
say he,
stilJ
j
t
in
is
of cases general
though we can't 0pen whether
it
0n r-he other hand (i) we do ha'Je -ro6C here; l9a
14 Aristotle actual.J.~,
. . ays
'i.t
is
possible
that,
we
'not
entertain
the
isn't
he
accepting the proof'.
The opponent asserts
if it may well never happen,
even
possibility
making
the
even
in
it
is
denying
sophisticated
claim
possible
that that
it
will
arguments
prove impossibility can always be upset, but simply doesn't consider arguments
at
all;
a
simple-minded character,
didn't
happen was
possible.
(Or
invented
perhaps
he
is
the
perhaps
as
not_~ that
93 who held that
the extreme oppos1te to the Megarian of
e
Megarian of
3
going to the other extremes to show that, even if Aristotle can ridicule his position,
he can ridicule Aristotle's as well.)
can be construed in three ways:
as
the
'what
concept)
is
unable
~66vo:ra. e!va.s., diagonal)
is
to
1047b
with
5;
the
the
point
about
the
opponent,
or
that
(c)
clause
and
(b)
is ;}t
has
doesn't
in
an
force
against by
the
the
~uclidean
But
it
was
point
in
·~ontext
shows
method
of
that
which
that
issue
the
surability
of
that
the
not
of
elva'- ,
ca.::;e
to
after
it
salvage
the argument
there
even
opponent little
between
the diagonal. does
complement
while in (c)
is
the
redundant,
it
is a specific
our
respect
'the fact
isn't
though will
for
that vou
a
rational
value'
it
Aristotle not
doesn't
the
against
then be disregarding.
evidence
CC)!JCerned with impossibilities in general,
·wn-occurrence
of
for
however -rO &.E>6va.'t'ov elva.L
and,
"tO.
commensurability
proof of the incommensurability of
was
context;
(b)
cf.
2 by the method of successive approxi-
exhaustion,
there
on &.E>6va:rov -
indicate that it is a general point
attempt
prove
an attempted
reductio,
felt
the
itself
as
of Elva.&.;
subject
which
(in
was pointed out that
in
the impossible (in general,
(the
issue,
~ever reach a rational value for
mations
'that
with d.66va:tov
whole
diagonal;
it
'that
with e:lva.L depending
(a)
impossible
(a)
with 'tO ci66va."tov as
exist',
pointed out).
as was
about
the
exists',
impossible',
going
Jiagonal
counterfactual.
possible but will not be'
the diagonal,
,e_articula:r:_ coat,
or not.
that
ro take acco,Jnt nf the point about
suggested
'this
sense
so that the impossible could
cases llke coats which can be cut up but won't
·..;i.ll
opponent
the
to
rather than
case
happen);
111d 'tO
that
distinguished
Sea-Battle,
in
from
happen would be impossible,
lonlil;er
that,
of
not
-
thing will not be
impossible
did
the
be'
not
it is impossible. 0f
taking Uxrte
following
suggested
will
say truly that a
between
assertion
away with the
assertion.
simultaneously
that
to
as
not
also
does
Aristotle's
distinguishing
~.!!Y
to allow
be',
is that the conseqnence in 5-6 is clearly one which
from_~
was
what
that nnt
the non-nccurreuce of the former?
himself
of it, not
but 1vill
removes
amounts
in the Owen sense,
It
it
.::~.sked,
it was
possible,
criterion for
possible ~vith
is
'this
ever
Lhe
rent parallel with the Master Argument'q formulation here?)
of
account', of
9 3
on
that
rather
the possible,
and
such a is his
the
opponent
is
just with the
The
opponent
is
itself
lndtcate
impossibility;
right
to
specific
taken,
tncommen-
real1se but
that he
is
wrong to refuse to allow any other criterion.
t.his coat will he cut up, and ("" .
1.t won'r he'.
:.dsses 'not
106
trtking
it
into
·-;hich
is
the
In de Int. present
still open
':1
with (Eth.
18a 28-34 and ~het. 3. 17 1418a 2·-5 Aristotle
the
past,
Nic.
VI.
~.07
distinguishing 2
ll39b
5-ll
it
from
doesn't
the
future
mention
the
41b 4
<'JlAPTF;R
~o'resent
in
this
connect1.on
dt
In st_e Caelo I
future.)
the
simply
contrasting
the
::tnd
past
t2 2d3b 12-14, on the oLher hand, he seems
tu regard the present as •Jell as the future as the fielJ of possibllity, the
unlike
not
past;
and
case
not
now the
dmbiguous; get
up
the
here
ynu re
and
·..:hat
and
now'?
could
now,
he
but
now,
grounds
here
r_herefore
point
standing
on
13-14
:-toreover,
be1.ng
you
'it
{i) 1
impossible could
say
'it
Sl.tggest
LO
have
is
is in question;
too
1t
realisation of
a
possi~ility
the and
l047b 8-9,
present
'it's But,
of
present
too,
possibility
false
that
get
(i),
&t,
suggests
counterfactuals
(ii)
indicates that it ts the non-
that
is
Ln
question,
as well
as
that of a future one. l$
fhere Q~
Cae~
on
the
thus
12
l
on
an
apparent
of
oue
the
discrepancy
between
and ~e~E_!..·
hand,
possibility
of
and
the
this
Rhet.
passage
on the (It
present·
and
other,
was
noted
that Diodorus Cronus relates possibility to the present and the fut\lre~ and
that
was
pointed
d~sappear
have at
the
be
matter
the
either
the
on
which
in
present
P:l~~·
that
influenced
different
the
been
out
into
been
sense
have
he may
that
is
drawn
''"',
some
qualified
l4
her·e
should have It
C() 0
r
that
h2
ro
of
the
this
and
is
more not
0f
ways
to
the
here
may
is necessary (and
9 (cf.
L9
just
a 24)
and
though not in 9-ll itself, the con-
spelled
was
out
f1'.Jinted
counterfactual present
ones:
wna~~sort
out,
too,
should
past
so,
1.t ·..;as
have contrasted
that
extend
~vents
of
felt
'false'
and 6.7tXWc; impossi--
that Aristotle in 13and
i:npossl.Ollity the to
'impossihle he
possilnlity, past
was in
1 ,
but
reierring
some sense,
counterfactuals
rather
than
however,
were
tense
y')v€vcu was
not
intended
permanent,
it
was
rather
and
those
nP.cessary. 10
indicr~te
could
that
the
past
and
that
the
pairing
to
truths
relating
as
1047b
felt
clear,
omnitemporal
di.agonal)
in
accommodate (like
to
the
things
the
possihil ity
implications
distinction
to
the
between
incommensurability
subject
of
and ye:-
of ETvcu
change.
of
the
(But
are
there any omnitemporal unrealised possibilities?) We also disc,lssed the relation of this discussion to tlte 1ilstinct:ion
heU-leP.n
r"'!~"tuired
powers
for
the
and
possibi1ities.
It
a present
assertion of
was
f":'lt
possi.bi1ity
that
than
more
was
[or that of
a power; one might have the power of standing without its being possible f0r
nne
But
in
to
be
standing
-
if,
the present passage,
fact
that
for instance one was tied to the chair.
at least,
is clearly n_~!- held that
it
the
the opposite of one 1 s standing is the ~asp removes the
poc;.qibility of one's standing.
The contrast
hili tv thus did not seem relevant
sage and ~-~.!.·
and Rhet.;
between powP.r and possi-
to the discrepancy betw£>en
and there was no need to
j
1 hi.s
pas-
nt roduce powers,
as opposed to possibilities, here or anywhere else in q 4. [t
in
further
W<'\S
terms
of
the
noted
that
positioning
the
of
point
temporal
at
l047b
adverbs,
IJ-14
and
of
I•
trP.ated
th-=-
fall
0f composition, at Soph. El. l66a 24-32.
looking
convincingly,
impossible
dctual
ln de int.
tends
that Aristotle may
hetween d:Jt.\W<; falsehood
[f
sense.
not
p~rfect
lt
chapter.)
closely,
natural
But,
present
imposs.Lble)
one
by
past,
equally
occasions.
12 28lb 8-9,
is
the
counterfactual
in which
counter factual
this
when considered
different,
present
in
which leaves it ooen that what is j~~W< false may be impossible
hi l i.ty;
>hOlild
future
by
ln ~~-~~lo I
trast
present,
different
the
from
influenced
accidental
perfect yeyovtvnL
past;
the
~ere
the
question
in
as
the
here
up
12 28lb 9-11,
d6uv~~ov
obx
is is
against
will
you
fuller version in de Cae!~ I
the
is
here
that
( ii)
that
what
false that you will
been'.
false
same,
Admittedly
1.s
or
,
~ 0 yap ~E ~h l~w~~ ~v~• t~dv~• fEUCo4 ~tv,
that
rhe
impossible.
either
not
but
can •..;re
seems
~cribed
th'lt
4
as
'·1ell
well as present ones could be de-
l_0_47b l_l~::~·
Aristotle here argues that
(A~B) ~(~A "*B)
(I)
ThP argument
sihle,
it
is
impossihle snmethin~
possi.hl e sible
takes the form of a !'_eductio; assuming that deduced
follows
from
i.mposstble either.
what
follows
hetnp;
somewhat
awkward.
hA
So
is ls
possible' itc;elf
repetitive; it
-
viz.,
impossible'
was
-
20 but
suggested
should the that
he
'nothing
from
'that
that
is the suggestion th~·t
in
B is_!!?_.!:. pos-
of the converse of
as if referring back?
-tO B)
(sc.
by means
in 20,
put in the past tense,
indePd
t hr-:-n
this,
Bnt why,
!-hat lrrrw Or, &.6Uva:'tov )!l
from
A
8 is
which is
not
tmpos-
It was suggested
tr~nsferred to
double f(J"'tw in
lc;-r;o Erh tO A
17
17,
would
E>~va:tov in
17 IR might be a corruption (in capitals) of an original lc:rr:,,l OT,
~E>6vc:tov
i
and that
EcJ'tw 01, &.56va:tov in 20 mtght be an Intended correc-
109
~~
7b 1.:0 i il4 7h 16
tion of 17-18 that had been misplaced. Even so, it was of
proof
a direct
fromO A and is already a
~11
by 20,
'nothing
'what
without
needing
impossible
implied).
of
2roof
o:::ither
pointed out. that Aristotle has all the ingredients
And
to
follows
the whole
is
is of
(for,
possible',<> B
little
value as
follows from the possible is itself possible',
it does is to derive the truth of this
yllp in l047b 16 indicates
the
e
of
J l047a 24-26).
the proof.
b.
e.g.
since
dlso for
a
In bl7,
the
A.
the
converse of
(I),
namely (II)
..-(A~)
-l'CB)
(C,A
here asserts
An attempt
i.Jhat
then are
that
A
=
house,
was
that &.ud.yxn
in 27 introduces protasis of
the
felt
not
that
che
this
protasis
conditional which,
was of
as
grammatically
the
entire
a whole,
impossible.
sentence,
forms
sidering cases
(like
that
in de
where
the
9)
of
may
elected
at
imply the
the
the
coat
one
same election,
but
of it
"l
is
is
time
a
matter
and
that
possibility of
would in
be
which
if
it
being
that
the
only way
in •.-;hich a
happens,
t>,1
hich
Furthermore,
-1lternative the
very
with
possibilities, next
chapter
regard it
was
refers
to
the
pointed out
be cut
to
llO
potencies
at
least, also im-
It was sug-
to
that
~A_,¢- B)
(OoA ~<>B)
has itself
saying
hardly surprising.
And indeed
= 'this is how I got to it'? that &.vd.yxT} appears
corresponding clause
throughout
14-30
in 22-23.
applies
up or burned
the
elected
being
case
that
in
the same
thing were possible
created
that
out
which is
to
the
in 26,
while
However, relation of
it does not it
t.;as
felt
implication,
rather than qualifying the terms involved (unlike 6uva-r6v and d66va:tov);
involves
problem
pointed
Aristotle has in mind precisely such
and the only ·way in which the qualification
actually
,...,as
healing
but Aristotle clearly holds
amounts
is
which
In the case of the election
each
It for
3nd it was not clear that any contrast was intended between implications
identifying
possible and the actual and saves (II) only by making it a
logy.
in
the
in the same way;
could help, •..;ere
of
10).
potency
but the
Conservative candidate
Nor do the qualifications in 29-30 help.
the
indicate
possible alternative pre-
certainly not
a
those cases where
actual election of the one implies the actual election of the other.
~he
it
(A ... B);
pointed out
in the
This
precisely
The possibility of a Labour candidate being
possibility
be
in which (II) does apply?
as can be seen by con-
which can
realisation of
eludes that of the other. elected
cases
qualified by
The trouble is that (II) is plainly false,
1048a
5
the apodosis of
the entire sentence.
Int.
in
from
CT'r'jj.J.aCvE&.
(t
but
generally
the
= foundation.
B
in 29 may
appear
was
e
they are those in which B is a necessary prerequisite for
(A ..... B)
27, as in 22-24, the (complex) apodosis precedes the (complex) protasis;
it
(
can
A, and in which that is the reason for asserting() A~¢ B; if for example
cases;
was made to save him from this by suggesting that in 26-
there
plies that for harming in a similar way.
implies
Aristotle
results
that
potency for healing by the use of reason,
been derived
l047b 26-30
opposed fact
potency for harming does not of itself entail that ~ potency
the
.;;ested
In b 22, -rO 1tpW-tou =
15.
two
healing implies a potency for harming;
that
from the principle 'nothing
(cf.
start
r
third E ua.l. depends on Ouva-tbv ; cf.
=
what
argument
impossible follows from what is possible'
B, ·~o 6E~~Epov
~!-luctio
employ a
from
of
the mere
that
for
Aristotle
which may
tau to(II)
by
himself
bring
about
I[]
~s
2.
a
thing
vis.1ble
dt
c. Litle~
·n~hen
there
dre
not
beings
who
can
;ee? 8 1 & 5
5 PHILOSOPHICAL I SSUZS _ ARIS_ING FROM METAPH.
,\nother perhaps
l.
~l]l_ng
wonder nature
of
a
that
r1r.
if
l0413a
are
It
against
is
relevant
t.:•,
Hill
its 6Gva.J.H'
has
or.ly
i.f
at
prev~nts
r.:o
a
it
is
times
it__ being seen?
'.:ertain debate to
when
Le
on
as
rearl
external
then
Philo
Aristotle
1n
the
\·:ill
ensuing
in
effect
saying
be
to
siding with
of the 'bare fitness' disagreed, ·,-1e
hcve
in
eff•~cr-
[n
a
said
allows 2
a
second
the
Philo's
view,
The
possibility according
to
of
'"hile
Al8xand~r
1
nhstacles.
external
in effect
before
tible
than
answer
of the
~rong,
can vary
being q> 'd context
removing
On the other
visible.
for
there is
according
to
or q>-abi..lity, of
no one answer to the
whether according
we
are
L.
t~and,
possibilities
a
~
piece
least
(i)
Cat.
7
7b
33-Sa
6:
or
interested first
Aristotle,
one.
counting?
discussi.ons,
4
there
YBs,
might
Would !:here be
(The
in
would
perc~ptlbles
(ii)
~·
IV
14,
22
3a
21-9:
absence
of
such
probable
chronological
<>till
be
knowables
and
without animals.
Reverse
ccuntable
verdict:
nothing
there'd
(so
be
no
would
be
time),
if
rhere were no souls. (iii)
~etaph.
0. 5, l010b l0-10lla 2:
of
it
was
called
s~~cing
Agrees:
!_:h,eta,
if
no
,;oulr!
3till
perhaps (i:aw<;) no
ensouled
be
the
on
beings,
but
a isthere
substrata, '.-Jhich give
.) ,\~::I_t:l:..:!:.!:3_~_e
18, p. 12 ff. 1j l
·n,
III
2,
:1'..l!lcU:_ (Rabe) 146, 10-13; ll r.--:.cknowl<:."dg;ements t:.o
15--26:
426a
:-lore
complex:
their
active
-1ctual
perceptlon,
qtate
perceptibles
exist
but
only
insofar
as
in
during merely
exist \.Jhen perception
is not actually going on . People
have
been
so amazed hy the claim about
ti.me in (ii), that 1 But Ar's
they have sought to put other constructions on Ar's words.
mistake here becomes more intelligible when the difficulty of the issue about possibility is recalled.
If the context
i.11~isible.
r>.ridence in Necessity, Cause dnd Blame 78-9. Philonian examples: )hiloponus ~n An. Pr. i69, 20 f.; Alexander in An. Pr. 184, 12 :~f.; ::~mpLicius i~~· 196, 1. ~:Q1.tedei_?tes, a~; u:3ed in later mti1uity, is interpreted by Gwil Owen in an a1T!lost oppoaite sense 1:s t:ne absence of interfering ccnditions. I should be interested ~·) ~ee whether it could not be interpreted as still having the ")hilon:i.an sense. (A.C. Crombie, ~d., ~_.::__~nti.f~~'!!_~ N.Y. 1963,
l'1urus .2..E· Philoponum, De \lPxander (?) Quaest1.ones ,:,arnLos and ~.!!~.:.... tar~,
Anima
pntent:Lally active,
it and
visible would depend
visible.
!Je
of
Lf the context were distlngui.;hing between
it ·.wuld rank as
(iv)
is,
it •,.,rould more often be called combus-
one of a slght-seeing holiday, it would rank a:;
)]
at
talking
to what
F.xample:
discussion.
equally
'..Thether
_•1tell Lglbles and visibles,
~.
much
rise to perception.
!:he context of discussion.
~~re
has
sides with
lhe
Uu.rning it.
very
perceiving,
Taurus
the intervening earth would normally
as
knowing,
it
·.;ood hundreds of feet underground: of
the
Aristotle
the
.,_Je
thought
do
Most Stoics
fulfilled
be
condition must
absence
..rhich
1.
special case of the
sea is perceptible, in virtue
(psile epitedeiotes) of the subject. that
both sides are
fact,
qne-:;tion,
,\nd
and
a •possibility:
r:he Stoics.
0f
~he
similarly a shell at the bottom of
a
order:
is possibLe for a piece of wood at the bottom of the ocean to be burned, n~d
as
beings mi~ht be seen as a special case of an external obstacle.)
preventing
:\<;cording to Philo,
debate.
crmtroversy, seen
knowables, perceptibles, or countables, 1f there were no ensouled beings
the
If this is 3pplied to 6uvd.J..LE~c; like visibility,
absent.
ccmbustibilLty,
Stoics
15-20
possibility.
thing
factors
sum~thing
'Jisible at times •..;hQn
be
His successors could not agree on the issue. (a)
Roethus Jisagrees ,.,ith (ii) and (iii) on countable and perceptiblJ
(b)
Alexander agrees with (ii)
(c)
Slmplic.1us agrees with (ii) +
3 1
dnd disagrees with the rival view in (i)
1. 2. 1. 4. 5.
5
Details in P.F. Conen, Die leittheorie des Aristoteles, Munich 1964. 156-69. Boethus, a__E. Si.mplicium t!!.._f..~~- 766, 17-19 (= Ihemistius, i!!..__!'_b_y_§_. 163, S-7), and 759, 18-20. Alexander, ~.£· Simplicium in Phys. 759, 20-760, J. :;Lrnplicius in Ph....Y2. 760, 33·-"161, 5. :JimolicilJS (acknowled~ements to R.W. Sharples) i__!!_J~ii..!:.· 196, 12 and 27-l). llJ
n~J
"l()TF:S
3.
If so,
Ti-iETA
visibility (the passive power)
CJn
able,
not
or
so,
it
Juspect, in suitable contexts, be r~garded as a count-
something,
quantifiable,
permanently
lost
the
constitutes
e
makes in
visible
or
power
a
of
about
power
even
entity,
counting,
warning
1 between the
thOltgh
quantifying,
Aquinas
suffer
a
For he
is unable
change
hand
he
both
before
is 'NhO of
had
the
and a
the and
after
lost
a
of
to the
prevent loss
the
Once again,
power. a
power
to
has
prevent
and
is
prevention.
impossible, view,
a
that
there
the
change
does
about God has changed:
is a
God
Admittedly,
lt.
not
take
place
:!:_.!! God,
when the virginity
but
still
something
take place !.!!_ the virus,
the change does not
the virus has changed:
because we have
lost our power
it has
to he killed.
lost
In this example, unlike
9 1 leads us to expect.
(the vulnerable humans),
'Ve
the
~_ctive
don't
know,
(the
there
(the active parties)
nbstacle, 2lo
parties but
the
plex.
that
obstacle
question
whereas
when
>1y point is:
are
in
the earlier PXamples it
counting,
quantifying.,
examples of
permanently lose (the
fhomas Aqninas,
that
argument
be
for
some
lwP,inning.
where
tht=:>re are
i.s
PlUch
exdmple,
other
5.
,q '5 rrn\'ed
At
the fir:n
'.iny T'Jte,
there are .JlternJtive possibilitor
location of the physical
rhP
discussed
by
fslamic
scholars.
Is
Where there is a capacity to produce
the
factor
ctoctor 's capacity to
which
(~..inai
dec1des
kill or cure,
to kurion),
and
5 L~El:Y determin!_~..:~
Does ~ 5
has
been,
dnd
the analysts r>f
ltlS
cited
q 5 along
may
'can'
easily
be,
taken
ta
imply
determtnlsm.
'ls 'will, if .. ' i1as been reinvented by modt.:rn
,\ga:in, .Jith 0ther
Jadkko Hintikka has,
that 'in one of his least he rAr1 thus comes fatrly close •o Diodorean cteterminism.' 2
Finally,
Elizabeth Anscombe Clt'2S
1
p.-1ssages,
for different reasons,
moods ar
-;hall
'lerely
,~J9,
136-1.
t_alking
to
about
He ls not,
summarise
show
that
c.;pecial
for
here
when
.;ho1ving
to . how that
,\ristot:le beli.eves
3 the
determi ni ·;m
cases,
example,
.JS
a 5,
lhat what lS caused is necessitatect.
or
the npposite the
e_assive party)
took place
s~eing
sort.
humans)?
E.g.
if
power
of surmounting some
ceas>2s
to be surmountable.
active and passive powers are correlated is
com-
tikka In
h~
, '3
arguments not
u_~ed
implied
in ~
by
says AvO.yxn ( HH8a
6
NCB
52-3;
5.
Ar
and a
is
14).
talking about e•.rerything ~.;e should call action,
certainly allows
97,
1048b
37-1049a
that
Aristotle
18,
,\r
Ls
talklng dhout
dist-inguishes
the
soecial cases.
-1bility
of
a
seed,
'lnce implanted in t_h0 'VOmb, to f)ecume a !luman r.etng from the mere possibility
!:hat
::>orne
bronze statue. o:arth does
pJece Surely
indeed
of
elt:mental
85 does
t11rn into
CJ:
rtnt.
SLitU€,
"arth
·..;ill
one
day
turn
into
d
·:0_l~~.
1;nply that,
ever:;
in the process will
">t"li!e
if
that
IJe necessitdted?
not always. l.
l.
·~hich
but dbout actions springing from a rational <.::apacity like medicine. Hin-
D0es it help that the last change took place in the passive parties
in
of
results,
mu~t
but
its power to kill,
the first ones, we have the close correlation between active and passive powers that
in
this fact•n is desire or choice.
being
would compare a lethal
he has lost a power.
something ~bout
I
pattern
lack
Surely, it does not remain lethal, if we have all become immune
virus. to
Admittedly,
think this can be right.
'•<-~Y
-.: c
It
not
possibility of
that,
it not very close to l048a 10-11 '?
there
is
1·~!'1pural
is
is ~~ed
it
dS
argument
.3oft determinists.
don't
lost,
ties,
it; yet beforereply
that
'-'orld, there must be a ~_Ul whil..h decidP.S wh1ch possibility is realised.
opposite
become
on Thomas'
that
lost
Thomas'
loss.
Does God
correction,
the w-0rld with a
nf
Thi.s
1
prevented. I
';tep
loses her virginity?
God has the power of which
1.
example.
to prevent her having
virginity
hetween
correlation
anaLogous
loss of power when somerme
power
If
tne close connexion that Aristotle
an
pending
influent1al was in inspiri.n~ a cc:rtutn TsL1 mic ':lrgument for 1-;nd's having
had
seeing?
1> dnd the power to be cp'd, although
to
off~r
to
thereafter
retention
has
tries
everyone
or
doubt if it actually contradicts anything he says in 8 rhomas
LtlS~_Eing~-~--~~~~~~:_:r:_~~·_:::__~.::reat~·l_t'~~t_____:__:~J"~-J:....!!
(-~~-
(]Ctive power). Might
c.~s
L2
0:..
exist without sight (the
~l!_n:!~f_~€_E.l.Q.g__~~ I, q.
25, a. 4.
,:
.
L,wayni a..E_. >~aimonidem, ,-;.\!_~-~-~~t~-:~fplex~. I /4, 5th argument -1nd ae_ . .\verroem 0:a:>~ (' r. H.:\. Lfson, The Philosophy ')f rhe ~~. .:i~· -U7-8). -----" ~~~kko Hintikka, ·~.E.
:t • .-\nsc0mbe.
r1·L;C!
t )_4
r"cme and Ne~~sitz, Oxford t973, 2Gl-2; A_jat~ l957,
l'Jll,
fnJ..t~ural
2. 15
l.>2cture, C:tm-
.;n fES u:.--.1 THETA
I
are a
expect
that
Aristotle
determinism inter
,__)f
~o
right'.
oart
alia
doubt,
would
because he
have
of
would
his
imagined clause
think that
tn whether conditions are right,
he
was
well
'when the
clear
conditions
coincidences often play
and in Meta ph. E 3 he believes
he can prove that coincidences are not necessitated. To together
get
Ar
with
looking
some
of
more his
deterministic
other
we would Thus
ideas.
need
to
an efficient
put
9 5
cause is
that whence comes the origin of a change (~. II 3 and 7), and change is defined (~.
l) as involving the activation of a O~VCLf!L~.
III
If
1Q_47b_l_l-_-35
Jl-33 dtstinguishes rt'rr~e t_-;pr~s · 1 t
(uuyy£vt'Ov),
\b)
frl)rn
learni.Dg.
.JS
the
result
or
to
rasstve
assert
31·-15
previous
of
powers
34
picks
too,
not
\Oytf in
3mples
[l•JLenl.y,
tnose resulr.ing fro.n habir.uatil1n,
up u.aef]m._
ther~
(c),
1_t1e
em ()nlv he doc!S
possessed
(a)
classification). he
110t
·-.~here
tnnate
apply to
not
i.r~itial
the
:1ay
or
(b)
(c)
this
in
13.
in
under
·ind
\.Jhile
mentioned
(not
falling
(b)
t:1..1t
activity,
(a)
r_hnse resulting
(c)
other ex-
':J()TUe
previous activity is
required? -those under (a) indeed are innate, hut 15 the classification
we put all rhese ideas together, it looks as if all efficient causation
in
involves the activation of a &Gva.~L' while ( 95) &uv~eL~ are activated
ample, the power of begetting is natural, but is not possessed ~t birth,
we
are
closer But
necessitated.
to Anscombe 's
I
formula,
aot it
an
logically
implied
And,
that whatever
1s not ruled out that effect
before
the
that what
Ou~L'
conditions
even if he had, it is still
is caused
is
necessitated.
For
may sometimes be activated and produce
have
actually
become
The effect would then be caused, but not necessitated.
Further, what
is caused is
am sure from his other remarks that Ar had not
put all these other ideas together.
exhaustive
as
far
as
active
powers are cc>ncerned?
if C""l)YYE:'JWV has that strong sense.
of necessity, once the conditions are right. ~ow
11-33
necessitating.
it
a
previo'JS
resulting
potency ~_!:!
nf t.:;Et.S in 33);
on
the previous activity ref~rred
is
occurrence is
a
the
2dme
potency,
1 would
II.
the other h,1nd,
lity su~gests
Pf
or
activity as
not?
Anal·l~Y
that
su~gest:
is
it
Alternatively,
we
the
9
cf_
9
lU49b
l').gical c~latinn of 1ctualtty co potentia-
the
actual:Lv ~-ing presupposes th1:;> power to t.p,
that
Is
which
for
cvith the treatment
(and
case r:he activity that pr\3cedes the power ro c.p must be Vity.
in JJ-34?
t0
that
dppeal
m1ght
something and doing it :. . ell;
it
1...s
to
5( 1 me
in wnich
other acti-
contrast h~tween doing
the
:,y _;i_ngin~ that we d<:!·J~lup the power
t:o sing well.
l047b l5-l048a
The
if
the
suggest1on that
is
in a
Ul
3
7),
J:
or
this
15
rer
is
does
it
the
expression
1c- t ng -or -·not- qr ing?
:·1ave
used.
correspomHn\S
potencies
nckness
or
r3tional
potencies cannot.
· L·-,n ·.;nuld result.
ll6
are
B) 1t
Btlt what is
'lll rwo
n.Jo
~'oposit~.§_.
\lecause.
1
are those
t0
~or
rational
health,
cover
'there
-
Ln
which
relevant
cl
•vay,
contradict11ries, dr14uments '-.lays CIS
>Jf
t:h(lt r -~~in~
~joctoring-
all
0f
1046b
2
cases
Ar~stotle
_r1r()duce
<'!S
hothi
nf
could
tva.v-rCwv.
can
une ~-~~yoc; ·-:,~·:ers
an •;bserved f~ature
to
tvav~Cwv
the force of
ne a....:tualised aut•;matically, lS
is
L 11 terruption.
like health J.nd ~>ickness (A
'opposites;
:;imply
A z
i.n some st~nse dn
are
A 3-4
ilnd is of opposites.
soul
is
point of t~e reference to soul at • 5-6 ls clea-
in conjunction w1th
rE>ad
(A)
either and so
a contradic-
rational behaviour
1 r',,~
/h
:!'·rES
j5
1L.• o
t:he
has
the
power
argument
in 8.
Worries
rational
potencies;
1nd
7-8
here
rational i.n
uses
were
suggest
€
rva.C
it
is
that
was
cf.
is
potencies,
EN
the contrast with tvOc; ltOLT'J't't.XT)
"'tpoa.Cpe:cn<;
seems to play a similar part
claimed
the
r
In xa.t ). n;
't'E
It
here;
senerally agreed
expressed over the ddequacy of
but
potencies. by
(B)
not-to-cp.
Aristotle
~HETA
;N
that
conclusion Aristotle
4
rather
is
would
(B)
determinism
involve
-
though
2
5,
1046b
contradictories,
as
though Ev6.v't'La. could
(It might also be remarked
a more obvious begging of the question against for
Aristotle,
presupposing
that
human
actions
are not predetermined, there would be no question here to be begged.) Rather . . . hould
stmilarly,
not
ioctoring '...rhether
be or
to
drawn between, not
use
Lt
a
at
all
one's
(corresponding _;peak of
11-12,
in
to
e.g.,
was
(i)
asked
tvhether
skill
But
not
it
to was
a
cure
and (ii)
the
observed
the decision
patient that,
or
For
kil
(ii),
l-by-doctorin~.
~ristotle's
corresponding to (A),
these
in
at
in
turn
rerhaps
e the
'in
has the advantage
6
picks
picking
us
up
the
Does
this
Sorabj i 's
necessitas
9 4
1047b
29-30
in
(which
1047b
manner
in
accordance
which
with
they
the
possess
We;; OUva.-
6 we should
So in the
35-1048a
has a bearing on
94); tc W~ 66va.v-ra.~ in a 6 corresponds
5 to
extra
lised
the
ar-"!ument;
discussion
premisses
have
It
notes)?
consequentiae
~);so
,,f
in
the
more
the deterministic
escape
route;
given
from
existence
ut
setti..t:d
d
general an'!;ument cuncerning
implications J.l·e realised,
the
condition a,
fact
that
b and c,
that
a and b;
So
are
far,
'only
concerned, however,
what
below.
that
we
happens It
potency
was
is
case it follows it
only (at
each
observed
be
it may
given merely
q:l
from 5-7, where irrational patenas
soon as
13-15, must
too, be
a
and b (only) apply.
happens
given moment)
there
will
follow that
the capacity to
'whatever
that
actualized,
its actualization.
must
have
to
Against this it might he Stig-
this only shows that X had
and in that
Sorabji sug-
capacity
X's
it does not
not
nece~sary',
is
is
possible';
do
suggest
something
see
that,
that
not
further whenever
necessitates
For otherwise, if we could suppose that an irratio-
was
potentialities',
qualification which
sometimes
apply
co
the
min ism 'Nhich
deterministic
implications
(cf.
(5)
than
required,
consequentis
(cf. dvd.yxT)
in
a
and Aristotle might not have reaSorabji
outlines
it can be further strengthened by an appeal One :-n.Jy compare.
a
positive
to the necessity
in the case of rational
arbitrarily
be
he
generally, Aristotle
it
actualized
seems
had
probably did not
(i.n
'Aristotle
~scape
by
on
-
Modality
deterministic
pointing
out
in
the
one
1c.;ay
rather
than
the
Heak
and
objection
deterministic that
to
deter-
implications,
things may sometimes
one may compare Hintikka's suggestion Determinism')
of
the
realization
that
possible nf
some
and
Aristotle the
tries
actual
possibilities
is
to
merely inter-
(in a predetermined way, for all that the argume11t says?) before
it is completed.
,(upCwc; in
('Aristotle on Modality and Determinism', 59-79.)
1048a
12
refers
rautologously,
that
which
in
x6p~ov
to
problem of whether the strongest
'',,lit hout
rather
just to suggest
equation
that
a
realised
happen sooner than they have to;
impulse
fact
any misapprehension about
in
10
(1.;hich
raises
the
old
is that most strongly feltor,
prevails)..
xupCw<;
·night
the circumstances (etc.)',
iesires accompanied by misapprehension lead to action. in Eudemian Ethics II. cr:~s
1] 8
more if
rupted
implications.
the past as Irrevocable.
may
zation in one particular way?
agreed that d.vO.yxT'J in a 6 must express
rather
are
deterministic
too
dnother, even without the presence of desire to 11ecessitate its acttiali-
-\nd,
qualifications
!1ot::o:ntialities which they possess'.
'Jr
if
an
actualized
does (i}.
a 12, and this in turn is expanded in a 14. 'in
decision
argument that it throws greater emphasis on the decisive
66vnv-ra.~
ranslate lr
past
the
to that which ~ight be played
tion is necessitated, why should we not suppose that a rational potency
the relation of ca.~
the
there
was doubtful whether we could speak of a decision to do some docto-
cO<;
~
Even gests
him
while we might
of
25-28;
nal potency may somtimes arbitrarily be actualized before its actualiza-
role of ope~'' and ~po~Cpe~'' than
2,
kill
necessity
1147a
3
to do any doctoring at all on this occasion,
ring independent of a decision to cure-by-doctoring or else a lo
the
cies
distinction
the decision whther to do some
(corresponding to (B)),
medical
(A)).
decision
it
hy
VII.
irrational potencies too.
intended to apply to all
by lvd.v"t~a.
than
(A)
to cover all
(A)
in 9
does
expresses
rover (B) in the sense of 'incompatibles'. that
it
that
suggest but even
fhe reference
6 1222b 21 to )(()p~at. d.px_aC which are fi.rst sour-
of motion was compared.
li9
\:-',
-':2~~_____!._2_~
L1tv oy
(I)
lS ,15
the
different assert
does
way
from
the in
thing
We
possibility
·Jldt
the
commentators
CAlexander
Lf. ' f
also at
in
least
nasaive
is
interpreted by Aristotle,
An.
of
who
have
de
10-18, Gen.
like
type
Philoponus
passage
present
and
rather as
does
long
not mean
This means
(I)
in An.
302.
in mind;
the
Philo
removed.
view of
Gorr.
of that
since
thesis,
these lines
that
to
Pr.
Aristotle
169.
21-23,
ti.) are in error -
JO they
are
passage
is
speaking
about
concerned with
1ctive poLencies.
__;o
that
his LS
·uly
Jr
of
the
only
power
of
is
being
of
fire
to
burn wood
happens
to
be
wood
present
if
the
restricted
wood
is
should Aristotle make such a imagined, and
rr~nts,
who so
try
to
wet, not
'power is
Hot
rather
wet.
of
removed
than that The
point?
burning dry stuff', just (I)
question was
Answer,
in
the
extreme
case,
to
raised,
toresist those,
to argue away possibility by pointing
tend,
because
the power
restrict
to
real
impedi-
possibility
to
vhat actually happens when it happens, like the Megarians. This, •nd
;,.~
·s
indeed,
against LO-'I·~a
t5,
t.Je
~un,
tl
have
all tn
tend
1nl•.:>:r
"llpiwls
to 1. wo
was the
that
and,
· r1ng about vl
(I);
.·ondltions
the
second
the the
main
combination of
possjbilities
for
their
argument
(I) with the
are
realisation
of
support
of
implication of
(II)
are
rational
fulfilled-
that,
as
(including absence of
potencies,
presence
of
soon
preven-
desire
to
the particular result),
we also have sufficient conditionsthe
push
push
Aristotle
him
premisses;
into \a)
orever,ted
into
it,
Megarian
Hintlkka,
possibilities from
doing
so
(Time
position. and
realize (dcri'Jed
Necessity lhemselves from
':) 5
(Indeed, 201
f.)
~~
l048a
6-
l049a 5-9, must
(so far
·-~~12.
13-1'5),
be
some
(b)
f.1Ctnrs
(a))
to
tt . 1 ~,u->stDll.L'? i.::> ,,,Jt rea-
that
external
equivalent
:··.-sa ')
'
preventing
~s ~e
'or,
making it impossible for it to be realised'. On
the
not',
it at
must
be
other
other
~!
hand,
once follows
something
'whatever
than what
preventing
could
factors
potency
necessitates
its
happen',
possibly
is possible'.
clarifies
does
not
his
~
(above) that
(b)~
on
J~-~rti.al
the
18
are
actualised
ff.
which
is
relevant
In de Motu Animalium 4 699b
c;ay
that
see
the
1.t
is
men
on
impossible the
moon,
(in even
one
hut
to
the
issue
of
it
of is
than those
determinism;
ff. Aristotle is prepared to
17
sense
of
'impossible')
though they are not
<Jf
for
us
tn
nrcessity invi-
which might seem to suggest (l) rather than (II).
f<>.ren
with
(I)
\·le
might
find
an escape Loute
fnr Aristotle
sisting that the absence of
any dctual
pr~~·enting
'Jalent
sufficient
conditions
(and
that
'nothing
presence
possibilities,
the question •Nhther there are any total possibilities other that
possibly
'Aristotle on Modality and
to
the
pointed
the
presence
Stoics out
may
that,
of
well
even
fnr
there
are
certainly
a builder is prevented by something from builrti11g; so t:he
implication
not
actually
and
lose
that
he
building,
his capacity
loses
his
<::1pacity
are
still
forced
we
the
m1ny
to t•)
hn1cl
to build many times a Jay
Bnt
'..Ja"i
it
.Jhen
1
if we escape
whenever
that
(whever
in-
realisation
occastons
,~veT!
build
by
is not equi-
used some Sl\Ch nr~ument).
have so,
tact~rs
he it
he
is
may
gain
rains,
for
example). furning '~xpressed
if xot
it
WOt
Ouvfroe;'ta.L
capacity'.
--;crce ~.ent
r he
then,
it was pointed cut thdt Lhis requires Jt0t£'i:v
in
15-l6i
of -
i.t
is
l:HleP.d
by
(One external
other rioes;
absence
in 16 as
of
might
necessary but
la)
'he w1.ll try
factors
e.xternal
to
is
the
~1SS.
( Hor..Jever,
not
;,y
U:i.s
remov~
~.g
'!l
lll) requires
fact<Jrs
is
lb)
that,
:.-tyc11g
rne
those
implausible and
preventing
Further,
he~ able, altho11gh he retains
110(
~scape
does
conditions-
this
in
dw 6Uva{JLv) 't'oU '11"a.p6v-roc; -rr1U ~a.fu]·HxoU
lx6v'toc:;: 1tOLELv might have been clearer.)
ob
prevention
t
(II)
understood
is retained, Exet &e <~~c.
caking the
to
or
'~ilpacltV,
1.nternal
to
i:1cJudcd
L!t
while
the ahthe
18-20 snggests
1'lalifications, rather \han being cr1nrraJted '>Jith tbtm.)
' '0
'not
and hence
position
remove
being
ls actualized, there
actualization'
In
frnm
italics throughout).
'necessary'
'whenever a
it
m~~~~~~~·
(;-tv
th;:lt
not
happens
Hintikka
>?;rant
'..Je
from
that
happens
Determinism'
1047b
actualised when and only when all
necessary conditions case
in
to
:1nt
realised
it was a~g~ed that 18 dues suggest that (e.g.)
(11),
burning'
piece
g 7
there
~1hle;
In support of '\)ower
; and lised
Stoics will
the
explicit
but
~s
too,
a
et
whereas
an
by
interpret
happen,
so,
attribute
this
possibilities,
not
doing
184.
in
as
to
possibility does
its
Pr.
they
determinism ho,.,ever,
it
of
Philophonus
removed.
is
in whi·..:h it
view
the
c,ccurrence
inteL·pLeted
prevented,
hat
its
uf
is prevented
Ls
causal
a
~~LHnething
if
this
inclined,
(II)
is
Sloic.s~
possibility
which
that
universal
not.)
expressing -1
Lhis expre;:.ses a vLew of possibi-
to tnat held by the
factors,
cJlHSe,
'.hey '·e
sLmilar
~!xternal
nf •1e
Sorabji (.l) :ju5gests Ln.tt
.L.I.
1he
pathat
other
~048a
·.-1
15
[Alexander} Philonian
in Metaph.
way:
E
C
~~;civ-cwc; ob JtOLfJaEL.
t
fn
however,
06voi-!LY,
577.
ya.p £'xe: ~ ;
he
16
33
l.ifl
expands EC Ot
and he does
icns on which even the
f . .1eLt.nitely
takes
16-21
6UvafJ.~V -roU 1tod')01U, xwA.UE'ta.~ Ot
interpret
e;t
as
in
the
~t, Exet. 'ti)v
6€
15-16 as expressing condi-
potency is no longer present;
presumably
applies
to
rational
potencies
too,
though
things It
(2))
if
visible
was
doubted
there
it
whether
~ in
Lhis
fact
a
special case of the
like
lost,
(paras.
(2)
in
is
not
he
ever
or, the
strictly,
that
•:o regard
Hhich power he retains.
The discus-
must now be talking of passive powers.)
(We
,lne
1flight
si.on in (iii) is in terms of a.Ccr&rr":6v rather than of &uva.'t6v; the con-
as
nection may
and
God
the
tains
not
as strongly felt
be
'possible'
in
English,
systematic
ambiguity
Might a.Cafhyt6v
in
and
of
the
·words
(iii)
not
as that
point in
be
between 'perceptible'
(iii)
in
-'t6v rather
taken
as
may
than
be
one
about
'perceived •
about
possibility.
rather
than
as
If b~:
no
(iii)
is
not
perceptibles
therefore
without
only assertion of
this -
ments
on
We
,rJeans
'r.ounted'
this.
str3ight
perceivers,
and
cannot
!"ather
a
(b)
and
argue
than
we
assertion are
left
that
with
the
'countable',
case
(ii)
of
because
of
not
t ion?
-
1 re
no
we
may
men
to
'Ji
trP.:Ps
be
claimed,
'lr
a
<10
HI
'weed'
men,
a
be
special one about
'counting'
have
as
say
t.he if
there
~'hades
'has
of
the
trees,
there
of
were
are
no
anything
that
than this;
nothing
meaning
last
rational
capability
of
we
beings
exactly one
if
even
just as,
ii
"tb the
If But
there
quintet it might
nothing could be
year?
'late'
there were Aristotle's
it is not just that notlling would be counbe.
'has
belng
the
We
observed
that
possibility of
counted
1
may
enable
the
contrast
being counted' English
doesn't
he
brown
have
table
evermore,
L.O
in and
express
Against
but
that
at
nity?
God will
ginity,
but
What
about
he
-
no
he
·3 pe-
d
hi:"inging
to have
losing her vir~
it
<Jbout
that
she
1
power of
the
lla$n't
it
But did preventing
already
so''?-
done
tinte
of
virginity
her
(he
that
table alwdys
chv;
n~edn't
t~~~_!_cise
re-
the power,
ct different coloc1r, but that doesn't he
lost
-"!HV
power
lf,
tFJs
the
fli~··w.er
ld
(1Jhich ile ,:ltJn't
that,
that 1ve
Loss of his the
pmo~er
too
l1.1Vf!
paint
it
brown
her•Jie)
to _k_eep
Late, we do feel
rnissed an opportu-
the case of X's vir-
in
df
opportunity vlrus?
once we keep
h.'!Ve
if ·...,·e are
rather
missed
example
losin~
A
either e'luivalent or tantologous.)
lon5er
or is it
have
Sorabji 's
is supposed from
lnses i1er virginity'.
to ·~nsure
Has
then suffer no will
ilf
X
only have
Ls
that
only the power
power
X
he
this it was objected
we have lost a
pm;er i~(•d
'the power to prevent but
it).
green,
it ~£~ for evermore?
may
be
(To avoid the t0mporalqualiftcarton 'already'
has
the
that d.p~8f.!T'}'t"6v
pnwer
Hhich is :.;hy ·.,;e can paint a table mean
Lhe
provided
at each time,
it
as
(11)
..:annat have a
them,
all happy with this).
for
could
between
but
power.
colour
for
rather than about percep-
to .:aunt
the
the
or did
rather
can
the contrast
a matter of fact,
five,
someLone
(though we were not
'.olould
but
that
absence
rlaim is stronger ted,
five
suggest
'the
virginity,
there
But point
has
the first passage in (c) are com-
in
her
long as she has it'i
~he
'perceptible'?
different
\li
•nL~ht
'(nuntctble'
preventi:I~
of
(tenselessly)
have this power,
losing
is
pn~Ver
'The
more case
What
2-3).
3?
para.
X from
the absence of anyone who can see as a hindrance to a thing's
~hat
the suggestion dbove
first issue about possibility in Sorabji' s notes; is it entirely natural
heing seen?
ctlso not-:'d that there
Je
Can an active power exist Hith~~__r:_~2E£'::..?_E~!~.~~~~ii_P_~~tve __ E.'~~~I
ginity';
no beings who can see? (Sorabji
are
tile Greek Cdllnot.
cial case, in our discussion about !Jossibiljty 1n l04Ha 15-21.
Sorabji
is in the context of the rational ones that it is introduced. Are
predicates,
one doesn • t have
the power to cure a man if he isn't ill (577. 27 f.). 16-21
subtle distinctions which
is no suggestion of a distinctiGJlbctween rhe 3ppl~c~bi1itv
tl?t6 'tt.vo<;
Can
preserving
'-•'e
::1rgue
it.
that
the
0nly power it ever had was the power t') kill peopie \,"hO 1.vere susceptible 1
1)
it
(which
need
of •.vhat made thou~h,
change
our
in
the
tautologous,
fact,
be,
may
in
any
retain
1:ase
denotes
the
capacity
1
lo
power to kill rnany ar most
'!~thal'
it
n:>taius
heen a
o
the
~·.ill
olr
f.Jct
tJ'-"!nple,
":f
r-hat
power, even.
(rlecisive .-tnd permrPJent) 1s
it!
a u::ndencv, to
•..;e c.Jn ;;i·.'e a speci.fication
th<-It
susceptible
in such a case,
if
tlnd that
thece has
make-upwhich :rreans
future
rather directed,
·:ir•:s
be
as a matter of
fvreseeable
l1;ls
not
people susceptible),
rhat
and
Ln
t ~1e
dttentlon
not
•,Jr
Ultr
Hill
t1te .,iJns previously
nmv rlo"'s
r1.ther r•v•rr:-
ll•JW, ;S
nut?
~'Prhaps
: !mn a capacity; 1•:;
person
who
i
~
l
• } ~I) a
l J
•·HAi'IER VI
_;usceptible to is
it,
iethal.
Out
True,
we
:night
if
even
the
not
rilercfore
make-up
of
be
prepared
to
say
it
all changes so that it
us
l048a 25-JO no
:an
lcmo;;er
kill
any
of
us,
we
say
might
that
has
it
the
as
potencies, ·o
kill
i.n
soo as
1gain
virus
sense
the
might
to make
be
that
it
could
killus
if
our
us susceptible to it again;
lethal,
if
we
rould
specify
structure
9 t-2
and
is lve:pye:Ccr.
what
in that case any
the change in us
is conce-rned not wi rh C)l.JvdLLEI.c; to i.'S x1.vry::ra.1. and simildr
in
9 5,
changed to
but
86
potency
(however
1048a
28-30
This
apologise,
as
but
it
were,
is btJv6.ue:l.
with \-Jhat
passt1ge
picks
for
e
llp
the
l045b
l
rhgression.
upposed
as
35-l046a
4;
't'l.v
-rp6xov
in 1048a 29 takes up the 'lC.a.N]c; of 8 1 1046a 17, rather than the qual if!-
improbable) that '..Jould give it the power to kill.
cation of A 5 1048a 17-18. i048a
middle ~dsy
1048a
(cf.
33);
in Aristotle,
there
Lut
not
are
genitive
absolute?
passive?
One would expect the for cicpa,l.pe'toiKu
parallels
in
the
Nor is the use of ~vLa.
in such a use.
But
the
general
sense is not affected in
argument
is
power
1
This,
.!..2-24
(II),
a
is
rather
')toic;
see
there
is
power,
ad.
concerned
may
than(l),
notes a
being
provide
of
l04Ra
Un
how we
limitations
further
15-21
lac.).
problem over
with
(the
either
can
support
of
for
'Philonian' (I)
know what
or
(II),
that of which interpretation
rather than the it was argued,
a man's capacity is
ot the potential and actual.
Aristotle gives examples one by analogy (36-37;
in Aristotle
\:H:B:C). l.:_)_~~~
is
read
-r.q;
in 37,
der
r-eference
must
to
be
a pr·oportional relation, A:B:C:D (or
always
l -
but it might be from the genuine Alexan-
6~.a~E'tpq.J; this
supplies
the
is
In 13 [Alexander
a
seems
right
ypa.~l-'li
line,
(the
feminine
t:hou~h
),
,~hat
'le
;r(!,
Megarian
actually
is
can
position
have
dnd
can
a
9 3
happening.
t,eneral
thus
of
know
csLapes
579.
by
limiting capacity
of
~;.Jhat
the
relevant
We;
l~t ~o ,~~;o~U
C_IA.G
from
a
text
diffC>ring
from
( lAlexr~.nder}
rJurs.
i!'
~letaph.
6).
-
conditions
or not particular men have particular
apacities ~n particular circumstances.
that
the
th~t
!Jetween matter
to
But Aristotle would no doubt reply that
understandin~S ~o.'hether
this
shows
ilayduck,
editor of Alexander, was Hrong to print 6~rxue-.:p~ as it it •;ere an actual quotation
One case of the potential-actual disti11ction is the
comparing l048b
but not all l,~~;a.y(JJ"'('fl
a matter of analogy - not that from species to genus. for example.
'Analogy'
case.
~1y
1048a 30-1048b 3 The
7, with Jaeger), which is a type of l1ta.ywy-ti (35-36);
So delete £'v1.n, and take "t'Wv - 1tp00"6v-
to parallel in Aristotle.
twv as J.
Is &.<pa.LpEi''tnl. middle or
20-ll
,Jassive
and
the
torm-matter compound
distinction
is
in 23, of
there is leaving
here
only
only
(a 32-.33,
'prime
matter'.
The
',!hat
is it,
then,
that
i1ll
but
P~rhaps,
is
c.
hat
in
lS
is
~
each
but
a
t:he
point
~
no
lS
to
the
th examples have
the
as
·j\lggestion,
of the substrate,
1'\.Va.
\S\11v
in
potential
way
the
it
cnn1rl
cc,me
(in
way),
i'l
in
be
l048b
fhe '.·mod
potent idlly a half.
the '-"Or:ld potentially, ~jay
that the actual
thou~h
potentially,
one
might
:;ay
So perhaps the cu:nrnon feature is that A
is
f)
;nust
he
B (cf. Ci.v Ouva.'tO<;
that whole has a half
has knowledge (in a wav).
~-r:!.
l3ut one can hardly
knower
which
tu
in cu1nmont
not
is
Lhat the Hermes ts
the Hho1e?
case
H~-rmes
reference
the whole line
the actual knowledge was.
'V)W,
~an
then,
the halfllne
knower
Lhere
with this.
is r;otentially a Hermes,
dnd
It '"'as noted that
det~rminations
the removal of a_"!:._l_
at anv rate. 9, too, fits
one;
relative
d
b2-3).
.:£.
l(J48h 12--13.
-lUaiified:
ry, in
a it
A
isn't
B
rhar_
•..mod
(in a way),
that
34).
.l~b
'tlTES ON THETA
l048a 30
were
Worries
expressed
about
really
exampl~
the
of knowledge (a 34-35);
loeavin~~;
appropriate,
"tCO<; "'t'oiJ'to to <:uver
the other alternative,
the rest.
is Aristotle right to suggest that a man who knows something, but isn't considering
at
was
present,
remarked
knows
that
it
with
a different way from one who
is
'know'
we
don't
use
the
l048b 9-17
'I
like
am knowing',
while with
for example, we can say
'hate'
w~s hating her from ten till ten-thirty'
Thatcher, and I
hate Mrs.
if that is when I saw her on the television so that my hate was fully actualised. l1tCO'"'fa.aea.~
r.ot
Would by
understand
True,
but
Aristotle's point be more acceptable if we render
'understand'? a
One
particular
may
understand
something,
of
one
exposition
a man is asleep and we expound
if
we wouldn't say that
is
it
if
is
Pythagoras'
but
yet
distracted.
theorem to him,
'he understands it, but he isn't understanding it now';
because,
when
he
is
so
obviously
not
listening,
to
say
an
anacolouthon,
l048b
Jaeger
4-9
guished,
as
argues
one member
require 6 ~wpHllJ.lliTl), refer
from
to
the
1.,rhat 0
of
this.
rather
is
wanted
than
l048a
an
here;
actualization
f
<+!>
d.qxup~CJ}..1lvn and
a
restriction
explanation
and are
33, and B 5 l002a 24).
(ii). cases
it of
of
to
in'
tity
mean
distin-
takes the term
But,
<-/)>
(i),
particular
type
ding on Cl.AM.oc;
in
(cf.
the
knower
in a
· Jistinguished
in
division 1
the
,
1
but
the actual, in general,
here is a reference to actua-
So c:Lpwp~outvT} without<+!>
general.
marked
must off
mean, in
not
the
indeed
division'.
the
nominative ed:tEpov J..16pLOV ; .even
the alternative interpretation the
nominative seems much more natu-
interpretation
required
What would the sense of the dative
ral.
oe:
'~ one
part
1 ,
'in the
•Jther'?)
rather
,_aken
in
construction
sense
is
in
one
hand,
cases
any case like
clear;
those
by l)~~!...!!.Lbeen.
this
way
it
can be
If
the
switching
Lhere
ll-12,
in
first
restricted
supplement
avoids
is
a
contrast
and, v.;rhich
of
the
infinite
and
void
the
·ra\ha. in 12 = ~pWv,0a.OCl;wv,
between,
on the
vhere what is said to be poten-
those
to
on the other, cases like this
does
not
apply.
etc.
the
in
but tc:rt't. ; second
13-l4
in
first
that
sense
for
cL1use,
the
former
i.n
13-14, nther
It
is,
in
is
the
operative
as well
as
the
to
alternative, lv 't'06't~, those
cases
•Nhere
'in
1
is
.:~J so
would ~hat
and
t.wrds,
one
second
the is
have
be
to
not
an
tirst
(d
the
case
nf
~vhat
is
the
in
rme;
understood of d.11:AWc;
example
,wa1lable,
but
two
clauses
is seen the in
the case
the
lnfinite
of the infinite and the void this is not .'>o. What is
the
force
of
exists
potentially yv1.&oe:1.?
always
be
possible;
not
divisions,
for 11p
better to
then
the is
there
reasons point
we
we
know
but rather
(at
heyond
the point
perfect
least
in
in
14-15
that
knc'w
that
further division will
that
'there is a possibility of
that we know that
always a possibility ·Jf more'
than
that
have
'~e
have
now reached
theory)
reduce
always rhe
i.n
the corresponding claim about
always
a
•.Je
is
statement
That
that
..my number of divisions', of
the
found
the
it
amount
and presumably so
tn
practice
process.
What
Perhaps that
we can
dividing
the \'uid?
'for any number -
of
air
in
a
container
to ·c~hich He have ii.lready reduced it, but never produce
void.
It
t.Jas
remarked
tha.t
A,ristotle
rejects
the
void,
in P..bY§J:_~~ IV, on physical grounds, whereas the point c1hnut the infinite
types
of
reasons
in
the
way ~.;e
but, does Aristotle distinguish these do,
and
is
the
infinite
of ~atter not a physical AS well 38 a C11nceptual pol11tl
is
'U
l26
from 'tb d:u ~poll \~y,:;-ra.~
tially is at some time unqualifiedly so,
livisibility is a mathematic une;
Trt h 7 Hermes ts not said to be in actuality by being in the wood, but
the
involves
the following datives could he explained by attraction.
The
of
in general which
is indeed the case that not all separation
but •..,hat we want
the potential),
Jaeger Is
on
one
actuality
tion to stretch the language so as to say that 1
cannot
5
production of the actuality by its being separated off
(cf.
€'tL 6~
e.g.
former
If ~o~~or~ with no addition were tolerable as a dative depen-
8a.t. 7tO'tE
with ~cProo (that would rather
the division'
and hence reads
in
1
though it was pointed out that there might always be the tempta-
34-5;
is
Jaeger a whole clause,
In 13 understand, with 6p~evov 1 not lv6~xe--ra.~ xa.t d1tAW<; d.A:r,8e:6e:o--
that d.l.fiWpLO'}.llvTJ
that &q>wp~O'}.ltVll is
'3uggests
cases
the
potential
actuality, is
ll,
in
Jaeger's
he isn 1 t understanding is superfluous.
to
11
Ross supplies
continuous rhe
tenses
'I
it
It
is?
divisibility
'
on~
With 14-15
may
compare
contrast between what is separable
tite
In 15-17 'tO 6€ xwpC~a6a.~oo9 is
SpYtp and what is separable only A.6Y
rJEULv;
rut
::;econd ~ect, p.Jrallel to -tO i.J.TJ {llto"-.E:CJte::Lv 'ti"jv Ot.aC-
taken as a
the
structure
in way
in
B•,
is
chiastic,
in
14-15
15-17 (the .,explanation)
'potential
not
in way A
'warranted (Hope's transla-
tion) as potential by B, not by A'.
are totle,
18-35
These
lines
a
than
reason
the
to
for
this
between
himself
recensions
second
supposing
relation
Aristotle
the
going
a
of
later
the
and
But,
purely mechanical
(due
chapter
addition,
theory
their
the
that
and we
EJ;
in
the
if
himself,
loss
of
we
to
us
as
weren't
happy about
a
addition
later
~
there
were really two
would
expect
signs
a page,
for example) it is odd
that it corresponds so exactly with a section of the argument.
one must
the
winning
of'
is
the
J ae~er
end',
though one
reads -cb (O""X.va.C vE «. v
it
would
be
in
29 Ca"';(vCl.()Ca.
in force.
implied
example
cTlCludeS ·.:nl~h
'l
.1rt~
rotle. •vtth ~c
J.
compared of
a
a
There
21
a
as
end
xlvT)c:n.c;.
Jv is
things
concerned than 1te:pt.
because
otherwise
of lcrxva.Cve«.v,
[IJ""'X.va.!vE!.v
tOWards
(with a
E'rr'tL ~tpa.«; in a
shift
is
transitive
qualification
qualification).
18, a.i,..ra. in
in the
20
being
of "Jtpa.;u;, which
use
This
u3e
-
of
but the
see same
below) term
and
both
in for
and for one of its species, however, 1s characteristic of Aris~ore
~~:Epnc
·::nd.
in
action
the
the
though Stoic
another,
being desired I.
21-?.2?
ft
was
noted.
7.
bo~
for
that one end may
itself
not
realise
<>ake
between the skopos
it?
-the gcJal
'for
this
at
value
the
sake
here.
We
(aim or goal)
action, and the telos which is the action itself (Long,
Phronesis 12 ( 196 7) 78 f.). Does Aristotle remarks
on the
11)?
have
the
squaring
of
notion of
mathematical
a
circle
the
in Physics
I.
limit 2
(cf.
his
§.9~.
and
Yes, he does, but the limit is not part of the sequence.
0f
we cdn still reach B;
infinite
repeated
A1-
B is not any point in the series
but
divisions
of
the
remaini.ng
intervening
that the idea that
space,
and similarly a circle is not any rectilinear figure, however many sides the rectilinear figure might have.
23-35
l048b the
Jdeger's
perfect
have
an
end
place.
-
not
once
supplements compatible
it
had
in
23-24 are not needed.
with the present,
taken
place
X!.vfp-e:Lc;, unlike lvtpye:La.L,
(Ethics) just
were
that
they can be the
done
present
or that the present
is
~mplie~
culties over the fact
quickly or <;;ompatible
a change,
too
it
can
could
not
be
done
slowly.
Is
with
the
lvtp-
26:
st i 11
be
Aristotle's
perfect
time), ·.Ja lk.
with
hut we can't
32-J/.j.: Penner,
·...;e
r,lther
and point
for tvtpyELa.L,
The former would avoid diffi-
the perfect?
that one cdn assert xe::xCvrrtoL at the first moment
(~ysics
doesn't
taking
incompletely;
VI. 6 ); but
'has moved'
(simply) is different
'has built a house'. 'is
fr\lm A trJ B'
lf
the actuality would
and for the
Is this, rather than a worry
1r.:pli.!;u; the reason for the qualifi-
though,
the
if one plays chess
In other words,
distinction
from 'has walked from A to B' or
to
most valuable;
playing.
is
in Nicomachean Ethics
for
here would not allow it
Aristotle does
of
contrast the argument
rather than to that
but that does not mean that one must
difficulty was felt over the claim in 18-19 that no action itself an end;
Does
whereas
ends in 18, but iS limited tO those
. bout t ~e shift in the application to
·--uon
the
win,
than
later
virtuous
in Aris-
Ethics X.
the sense of what is most valuable about
always
to
more
the
elsewhere
though we cJ.nnot reach B by completing an infinite number of intervening
[
-rWv ~tpti.!;e:wv
directed
in
·~nds
subordinate
1Jrther
==
these.
actions
(without ~enus
1
21
of
i1
deletes f) lo-xvCl.()Ca.
and
£<J"Xya.crCa.is
described
is
Bywater reads
-r:a.U'ta. in -1n
that
among
have expected 7tp0c; rather
might
the
in
not
play
ambiguous,
~ivisions,
'are with
done,
an action is
all
of
if the omission in EJ were
on the other hand, to
seemed weak
18-35 were
umission
back to Aristotle
elsewhere.
by Jaeger as a later addition
bracketed
half
is
found
in racomachean
')E:I,L,lp(a.
For - although Aristotle's argument
Jaeger's Qrgument that 35-36 refer to the first,
by Aristotle himself. rather
are
it
of
the sense of 1LX.oc;. or is there a distinction, 1(tpa.<;
the ~ of
to
which
; li.:OHh
Lhan x~ vi)O"E Lt; is
valuaole treatment
18 have
referring of
more
in the
,-,:lpa.c; in
of
1048b
as
n
~.R
t'
',:4Sb g
rule out
'has '...Jalked
infer this, preferred t:han
as
from A to
B'
(at
walking
some other
and he certainly hasn't completed this to
take l'ttpov
subjects;
1L9
Clnother
and
't·,_, a.U't6 as
possibilitY,
objects, 'are
not/
!A
'10 l'ES ON THETA
l048b 23
that nothing can be unless it will be!,
are
the
same
thing'
would
• are the same thing'
object
in
easier
is weak. for
is not reciprocal, for as
be
32-33
with
infinitives
'one implies the other'
'has seen' doesn't imply
answers
in
the
objection
33-34,
(the relation ~"t'Epov
'is seeing').
that
you
and
can't
be walking
(from B to C) and have walked (lrom A to B).
Second
thoughts
is
attached
of
having
is
not
suggested,
the wrong
a SUva.IJ.I.c; to
'When does
''..Jhen
is
to
is
be
F but
something
something
however.
question.
a distinction between
of
have
potentially
a
these
that
The
a
the
talk in
capactty
F.
The
is
it
not
quest ion
to he(come) a man?',
potential
questions,
exposition
chapter
being 6uv
man/a
above
this
man?'.
lf
but
there
t:ould presumably be true
0f earth that it has the capacity to be(come) a man (Ar is not denying CHAPTER VII
that
the
earth has the capacity it has),
r!vBpw~o<;.
1048b 37-49a 18
e
It was thought that
7 Is discussion of when one thing
is potentially another might shed light on the issue we debated earlier (see on the
1048a
as
15-21)
actualization of
a
to whether
not the circumstances on which
or
capacity depends
belong
inside
or
outside
issue of how much goes into the specification of a 66va.!-LI.t;·
that
the
Thus, is a piece of wood at the bottom
of the sea (a) visible (because 'visible' means 'can be seen if circum-
c
stances be
seen'
If
this
obtain')
if
so
the
earth nor
a
'can be(come)
a
18 as
not
visible
87's answer
question,
circumstances
(come)
'b)
(because
'visible'
means
'can
and at the bottom of the sea circumstances C do not obtain)? is
quantity of 1 _ 3 ),
or
man',
c
seed a
man'
obtain'
'in
with
but
seems
to be
(b).
Neither
a
must mean not (b)
present
'can
(a)
'can be(come)
in present
circumstances'
a man
circumstances be-
elucidated
in 49a
5-
nal in the case of artistic production, internal in the case of natural
cause
(the
Given these circumstances, nothing prevents the efficient artist's
wish,
if
he
has
it,
initiating the process of actualization,
the
seed's
inherent
nature)
in the way it would be preven-
ted if some further change was required before that process could start, as e.g.
earth must be changed to bronze before it
is ready to be(come)
a statue. Note bronze even
being made in
wish
interferes to
it
to
exclude by
could be true in this way that nothing prevents the into a
fact
it
or
it
statue
won't
because
prevent
it.
it
F
that the artist wishes. set
up
events.
will
be
pr.Qvided
a
to
proceed
that
things
go
Even if we
common
sense
Ar assumes that we can say that things
to a
certain
outcome
cannot spell out
way
what
sorts
of
Ln
normal
the
course
of
the proviso in detail, we know thing would
as an abnormal interference with the normal ~·,urse
18-b 2
l049a
one
(in
11f
count
legitimately
events.
lhis
chapter
if
the
artist wishes (all is ready).
be
- won't be either because the artist
some
outside agency (earthquake, sabotage)
The
!at ter
'nothing prevents i t ' ,
ilO
is
not
what
Aristotle means
is a lexical device for picking out the tE; o~
lxe:Cv1.vov
sense
of
that
term:
(cp.Z l033a
ff,)
7
identifies
subject \ve describe as lxe:Cv1.vov.
y. of
then
for
that
y
there
is
x which is the matter of y.
matter
(49a
24-7):
earth-wood-box,
down.
is
not
all.
first
last
what
is potentially the
in
the
in
not
the
Nor
do
the
conditions
The
an
same
is
reducible
ascending (purely
traditional given
to anything else,
series
'traditional'
such
illustrative)
prime matter require
it does not
that
nr y
fr;J1,Jw
the terminus of one <;eries nef.:d
only
for any value
no x which is potentially y,
i.e.
no
In that precise sense y is prime or first
This
is reducible to y; nf
as
Thus y is x-en if x is potentially
It follows that if there is a y which is not x-en,
x,
stuff. that
though
doesn't
also are
in
is 6uvd.tJ,e:1.
something
from here as normal and (in the case of artistic production) provided
is such that it can be(come) a man (49a
the obtaining of all the required bar the efficient cause (exter-
production).
if
The thesis
thing is Suv~e:" F only if it T..Ji!l he F, but rather
is still not that a
r)n
specification of the capacity.
false that it is 6uv~EI.
tmt
In which case the chapter offers no guidance on the general
as
fire-air-
series
tntally
going
neutral
he unique:
if y
that everything
not he the terminus
use of iS\T] in ,\r is tvhen he <;peaks
of Plato's xWpa. as \)\.,.
Accordingly,
to say that prime matter, e.g. fire,
or else he lapses into the thesis
131
is not 't66e: -n is
~!,_rTES
•J:i
l'HETA
CHAPTER VII I not
to
that
it
the at
say
that
is
not
talk at
it a
is
a
stuff without qualities
the first
is
a
but Note by G.E.L. Owen
Is this compatible with
reidentifiable something.
longer have ~6be ~L?
Priority in 9 8
i.Je pre-
1049b 4:
49a 27-36 is a quite general contrast
alternative.
which are 't66e: n
between subjects 4 offers
attributes,
24 of 'toOt 'f0 >;6Aov or does Ar mean that it is only
49a
the terminus of a series that you no
ferred
or
and subject
as
What 23-
matter.
this wood is to this box as wood ~xhW~ to
proportion:
We took ~~XW~ here to mean:
such
refs.
are
generally
is not in Bz. Ind. 626b 30-31). Qualified priorities
taken
as
pointing
1018b 29-31),
(cf.
1018b 9-29,
is stressed, b 15-19),
(c) in change (nearer to
stood
of e.g. ~·
242b 72, cf. Met.
that
place of
is ~UA1.vov
a box
x-en'
'wood';
this
mover
of
(which
Now, this box is not 't6Se:.
is
reidientifiable
as
this
were "t60e:. ·tL,
it
would
because it was is 't60e
~L
because
it
is
this;
again. have
rather,
~L,
because
Correspondingly, to
be so because
reidentifiable it
is a box it
then,
it was wood,
because it is wood - that is the point of 49a 27-36. is
not -t60e:
it
it
the wood of
other words,
It
"tl.
this
this not
can only
be called this wood
Therebecause
II
by logos,
of
but
(a) in place
'prime mover' in sense
1050 b 4-6, not the proximate
(d)
in dunamis
not
generalised to cover
is
(more
powerful), the
(e)
in
preceding
1018b 30-1019a 2,
for knowledge, viz.
(a)
universals over particulars or a sumbebekos over
Z 1030b 12-13), (a.2) for perception;
such prior things
(pathe,
corrected
to
(b) as proper-
intrinsic
properties,
1019a 1). III
(not
expressly connected with the
1019a
11-14):
without
box'.
be
e.g.
the composite (cf. ties
'this wood' is derivative from that of 'this
its own right.
1049b 26),
could
Unqualified priorities,
(a.l)
but
in
ours
cases as III is in 1019a 11-12).
tion,
which is ~60E "t'-
242a 53,
243a 32,
In
box,
the notion of
if
But it is certainly not the case that it
this wood.
fore, is
information
order
the
wood
the
a statement of the form
given that
as
box,
from
'y is
laid down for the latter. same
directly
'x is potentially y' and the conditions already
(22L
is equivalent to
results
(but
(nearer), (b) in time (earlier, where the contrast with spatial priority
without the sort of qualifica-
tion (concerning intermediate changes) that ~auld be required is 'earth' in
to 6
6 11 distinguishes
apparently
B but
given
focal
qualified-unqualified distinc-
application
Priority by nature and ousia, not
B without
A.
I
to
as well
viz.
as II
in
where A can exist
(Ross,Jaeger, Reale take 1019a 4-11
as parenthesis.) In fire ,-:;orr.
connection
is described
as
with
the most
tnis
it
form-like
was of
remarked
the
Z 1 l028a 31-b2 distinguishes priority in logos,
that elsewhere
elements
(De
Ge~
2. 8 335a 19; Meteor. 4. 1 379a 16, the other elements are matter
but
apparently
it
third
(I
(b)
dnnounces
the
completion
beginning of the chapter.
of
the
topic
introduced at
the
knowledge,
above)
with
time;
III;
and
although it prima facie distinguishes II (a) from II (a.1), it is effect
and not taken up in 2-.3
the
conflates them by connecting II (a) with ti esti.
fur fire).
liJ49b
identifies
g
argues that energeia is prior to dunamis
A
In
logos
Not a neat r~sume',
e.
(1049b
10-17)
recognizing connection in II ignorning (II) (a.2) and (b).
and (a)
hence
for
-(a .1)
as
knowledge formally
(1049b
z
17),
1 did not,
thus and
Examples are the logoi of oikodomikon,
horatikon, horaton, though at ~· III 1 20la 9-b 15 oikodomein-oikodomesis
is
a kinesis
requiring definition by dunamis
(as even horan is
in such causal explanations as De Sensu 438b 2-5); no doubt Ar is thinking
l 32
here
of
building as
an achievement,
133
not
the
process whose
com-
llQTES nN THETA
• 'd7a :SO~b 16 by R. i!elnJrn.1n
Analysis of De Anima II.
pletion
cancels
the
oikodometo'!_
C.~Y!·
20lb
Contrast
ll-12).
on B
(ii)-(iii) below.
After
In time (1049b 17-IOSOa J), sophisticating on I (b) by distinguishing hetween numerical and specific identity in the temporal items: actual
(i) but
this
by
indtvidual (other,
is
but
preceded
by
specifically
(same)
same)
potential
actual
level
~ (
'hence'
individual
417a 30
which
31
First,
32
and must be an independent
Secondly is building an achievement here (implying
application of B.
betw·een
second
the
level
first
level
actuality
of
potentiality. knowledge,
first
Aristotle
Both of the first are potentially knowing
but
the
one
actually
knowing) by
(a]
being changed
through learning and often
'x can build' entails 'x has built'.
l049b 29)
has nothing to do with B (i) or A,
and
says: individual
is the proximate agent of change (ctr. I (b) on proton); (ii)
distinguishing
actuality
changing from a contrary state [Ot.c\ ua&ftm;wc; d.~~ot.w8e:L<; xcrt .~to':\Mxu;; l~ ~vav't(at:;; p.E't~o~Wv it~e:w~] but the other < becomes actually knowirig) [b] from possession of sensation
that when building his first house the builder does not have the abi-
or grammatical knowledge, .~tt tve:pye:tv &•e:t<: 'tO ~ve:pye:tv 0\~ov 'tp6nov
lity) or an ongoing activity any part of which is building (as kithari-
Being affected (-rb "Jtd.cry_et.v) is
~!!!.
nne is the destruction the preservation of the
and
the
proximity of
B (iii) would suggest)?
i-J.l7b
Neither exactly
suits ~· III 1;
been
completed,
building
is
an
e.g.
if
x
analogue,
is learning x this
takes
has
learnt
(something):
the second option under
if
by
having
form
which
through
coming
later
in
time
is
So it is not right to say that what thinks is altered thinks
prior
(1. b)
viz.
the
form,
l050a 7) the
even
when
the
~E.£.1)~
end
~~esis
of
is
10
(I]
11
~povonv is not correctly called teaching but something else.
12
But {II] that whlch from potentiality is learning and taking knowledge (TO 6 'lx Oui.IOIJ.e: L Ov'toc; IJ.ai.l8d.vov xa.t f..<J+lad.vov l"Jtc.O'T'ft • f.LTW)
(eti) matter is potentially the form to which it tens (conjunc-
tion or generalization of (i.a) and (i.b)?).
(ii)
this for
'more strictly• (lOSOb 6), in
either
being or
possibility. opposites,
ctr.
not-being, (On e.g.
that
and what
5,
see
the
'../'hat
ts
possible
is capable
is ecernal must exist without
the extension of
e
all dunameis
to a
capacity
half-defence at
1050b 33-34:
does an irrational power include the power to be absent?).
By applica-
l~ading
into actuality from potentiality xaTa 'tO voaUv xat
13
by the agency of the actual and the capable of teaching
14
either should not be called affected (;td.cJxe:~v). as was said, or there should be said to be two kinds of alter-
15
ation [A] ~qv << l~\ ~~~ JTEp~
\6
xal[B] TT]v h:\ <~~ e~;E•' xa\
thv 'p(xnv.
tion of III there cannot be potentiality/ contingency without actuality, hut this need not entail Plenitude; merely that there cannot be contin,;;ent beings without non-contingent heings.
lJ4
it
realized some kinesis/ergon or
Nothing yet which specifically takes up A III; but now
of
when
is its end or purpose,
some product (cf. (i.e)); (i.e)
[l] the
just as (it is not right to say that) the house builder< is ,1ltered >when he house builds. Now
to the potential (no more than a conjunction of A and B (i)?), ( ~!!i hoti,
but
the other rather
and into actuality), or it is another kind of alteration (
'less strictly' (cf. 1050b 6):
(La)
either, [2]
the l?tt.
B (ii),
In ousia (l050a 4-b 34)
(i)
simple
potentiality is related to actuality; for what has
conflicting with~~· 201b 11-13. C
not
the contrary,
potential by the actual and the like, in the way
further (alla) if a process is going on some process must have
(iii)
by
: l)
Dlscussion
began
rreatment 4l7a
of
30-b 16.
Owen's
Hein~Hnan
with
transitions
nntes
from
introducing potential
(His r~nalysi.s nf
e
on
8 which
t-~~
had
He
his
!-'assa~e
hefort:!
,Janer
actual
to
analysing
in
the
Anima
De
L:; attached.
I.
5
as are also
realises his nature most fully when he has understanding. with
'preservation'
(2)
important word in (l). tible
US,)
in
with
as
(a)
shows that
it is
The cant rast
'destruction'
that is the
The point is not so much that ( 1) is incompa-
it
stands;
rather
( 1)
warns
against
a
particular
misinterpretation of (a). After
much discussion
following as
that
the
views. between
fam1liar
first The
The (a)
and
contrast
actuality
contrast
(a)
!..~e
the
That
from
(1)
and
(2)
and
(l)
(•mtrast
~:.ransition
first
passage we
Anima
between
(b).
between
and
betwen
of
contrast
(2)
hetween
frvm
first
then makes
the
l1f
sensation
we
and (b) is
{a)
have
to
understand
point,
to
which
that in the context 'being
affected'
not
in the sense of being destroyed by the contrary (1) but rather ln terms
-1f
preset"vation
That
(2)
rtoes
(2);
both
t"elate
to
l:.ty
that
(B),
at
used
is
14-16,
to
ctre
as
(b)
of the force of
acquisition of '1llb IH 1e
2-1
the
knowledge contrast
',.J!_l_y itself
in
affected'
riifficulty.
is
is
( L)
not is
between
~trict
central
lt
roint
destroye~
an
a.pt
-
is
at S-7,
and
that
as
for
t,:.:1tT'JCt1.ve Out
in
the
ts
as
is the
Or is Aristotle claiming that the general potential for lear-
ning is enhanced by each particular act of learning? learning a
for
it
but
Is it preserved by being actua-
particular
actualisation; no
longer
it
seems
on
have
the
the
rather
piece
of
contrary,
potential
odd to
once
for
refer
knowledge
to
I
have
learning the
is
For the potential
not
preserved by its
learned
it.
this
On
the
actualisation of
a
theorem other
I
hand,
(particular)
potential as destroying it.
not
between l((VTl
contrast
The is
directly
3.
43la
5-7 i
the
5-7.
Housebuilding
fact
and ~vtpye\a.
that
it
is
not
e
in
relevant to the present passage,
6
1048b
18
ff.
in spite of De Anima
and contemplating an alteration of
are the
linked
in
house builder
417b (9)
simultaneously be happening and have happened.
VII.
247b 14.
two
of
H
the
the
to
become 6e:wpo;sv
It is true that at
it
becomes,
remarks
'being
about
affected',
while at
but
·:ither;
{a)
of
(a)?
frum
:-t
this
only
a real
not
The
:-.hat
ul
the
~r~en
...:han~e
trom
all,
in
state;
(a)
and at
tv -n:oA."\6.XLt;. noth~ng
colour
Ls
from water
'.•nne
t_,l
tf)
vinegar
an even more positi'Je chans.!;e
precisely,
6)
does
knowing
There is, in
De
this
the
(H
i.s
case
ls not
wine
5 1044b
than that,
For what has knowledge
involve the
an
fact
alteration, that
it
because
contemplates
passage
and
a
where to
thing's
shown
that
a parallel between Aristotle's concern
own
in
the
beginning
'alteration'
nature
is
'potentiality'
fulfilled,
also
covers
of
9 8,
in
that
here
in a sense also covers cases and what
there
he
changes
is
concerned
itself
( 1049b
5-10).
But
actual
in
not
through
it was suggested,
Anima
he is concerned to show that
Arter
learning
(417b
(Hicks).
14 it is not
is
cuntrary
qualified
ls
case
exampole,
same way
learning
en.::
is destroyed in (1),
'into
c.h2nge
that
ln
that
c.nange to ~omethi~~ (cf.
descriptio:1
true
is
lised?
potential
does not mean that the building of a house is not a xCvT)CTLf.: which cannot
·3ense
1iescribed as
,f a change from green to red.
29-35);
fact
learning Ls ,i_escri.bed as the rl0str~tction of ignorance
465a 22
knowledge.
b~ing
the
the
the
is preserved in (2).
sense
in
Compare Aristotle's ~~·
at
by
(II) picks up (a), and (I) presumably (b).
le.Jrning
P~~--~~!_.
t:he
16).
shown
not that
strict
not
of ·.;hich is alteration in the strict ~;~nR~.
'being
~;y
also
is
that hnth (2),
a1terat~on
as
l t self'
3.nd
note
(2);
t~ecause
6,
(a)
from first actuality to second actua-
lllustrate
descrLbed
to
is
potential
falt under (2) rather than (1). as
well
tr~nsition
5-7 it is the
that at
and
(a)
(b)
It
the
the same
potentiality
further
the central concern of the rest of the passage, thought
not
.1c.tuality to second actuality (b).
ts
and
arrived at is
since
l049b
txEt
4-12
presupposed. tiality X?
The initial reference is to 6
11
(cf. Owen's notes).
The
clause in 4 serves to indicate that a previous discussion is being
for
1049b
examples
of
Is there a problem over the contrast between (i) patenchanging 4-12 (ii)
in
or
being
changed and (ii) potentiality for being
isolation suggests we
appear
at
l049b
19 ff.
l37
are dealing
with
(i),
but
On the other hand, ylvEcn.'
L\nc'R H
l049b 17-lOSOa 3
The priority of
Again,
potential
is a type of xCv'T)Cf"l.t;; and is there any difference between the capacity of
a house doesn't have the capacity r:o become do~!':~
·1
is true that
It
becoming a man a'1d thP.: capacity of being a man?
than
is
it
the
potentiality
The priority of the actual to the potential in ~!~f~nitio~.
7tp
5
10491)
of
here replaced by -rb C uva:t6v.
is
The
13-14?
in
p(Jwer
cause
to
the power to change something else
other types of potentiality in b 16;
't6v
for
example
visible
things
(1(J49b 6-7),
:\,,jyoc; Q!_
the A6yot; 0f
1·
'seeing',
reference
to
ion
nr
'seeing',
tov l\Oyov
cf.
1 l04Sb 35;
contrasted with
invisible
( 1 5),
qua dogs
not
or
tn b
:an
not
the-y
actual
of
the
be
the
rity, 'Nith 13)
latter,
i.s
actual point
l:e
of
r.eed
linked
in
Z
there
seeing
and
to
the
~n
-
be
the
former
rather
but this does not seem to be the case for the individual.
distinct
1049b
arguments,
29-lOSOa
subdivided
at
(cf.
least,
lOSOa
(see below);
are
2-3),
advanced,
though
the
at
18-29
l049b
latter may
in
and
turn
be
only the first argument, at 1049b 18-29, really
fits I049b 11-12.
18-29
I049b
illustrate d.pL8fl(j> 0'0~
19-23
apparently
acq,J::._ring
potential
in
Knowled~e
17 ff. tiMe.
that
If 1tpo"MpxE~v
here.)
dc:es not
,~xpress
q
(13-16),
the
therefore
structure p
of
(16-17),
the
the
actual the
is
a sub(cf.
~
that
the knowledge which would
re.mporal
prio-
is
an ARA structure,
p
in
19;
things
the
same
the individual; certainly;
and
contr~st
to which does 12-17 'loply?
to
tndividuals,
indivi!]11-'lls as such at all.
llB
in
90
far
bet·~een
To ..;pecific
·1s
the
embryo;
the
first
seeing;
but
also
activity should not
actuality
6 6pWv the
is
eye
itself when
need
for a cause the same in species is stated twice, Does
it rule out the evolution of species?
:writes; that it
so
from 'the
that
'every ancestor
is
a
another
of
this
peculiarity of substance
to o~crCa
in
28
of
any
goat
goat
substance
existing
here.
seeing
-
the The
at 24-7 and 27-
Not if
'goat', e.g.,
problem will essentially be that of
the
parent
present
be distinguished too sharply.
9.
1s a vague term,
already
in 20 is the second actua-
is
was
a
that
goat'
it
goat'.
it
in actuality
Whiteness,
a
has
to
need
the
not follow
In Z 9 l034b 16-19 be
brought
cf.
beforehand;
on the other hand,
about
by
the reference
can be produced
without the pre-existence of something else white as its cause.
Health
in Z 7 1032b 23 ff. can be produced spontaneously because of heat which
is, or produces, a part of it.
Health is not a substance; what about
the spontaneous generation of grubs?
Z 7 unfortunately doesn't say.
(12-
thrmgh
fs tJbscured by .Jaeger's and ~'lSs's pareucheses.
The next section. trom b 1/, draws a
of
and
visibility
section
eye
lity,
course argues
of
not
the
thing
conflated
of
is
at birth (and for some time before).
former;
any temporal priority between ac-
is prior to the J<nowledge of the potential,
addition of yvWcn.t;;
because
ties,
Two
'defini-
16-17 is not a new point but the repetjtion nf what has preceded, the
t-1-)i.s
1nd
includes
The
in 17 indicate temporal
6 tl
they are
1
( lf)!.9b
9imultaneous?
prior
'visible'
'seeing'?
~poU~dpx£~V
And does
"'tnd
But
knowledge
A.6yor; of
term
logical dependence ot one thing on another in fact;
the
notes).
quiring
the
the
0f
cl"'..ss
the
the
in which we come to Know things may not he the
here X.6yo<; and yviilO"'-<: are
Owen's
that
Jhould t...Oyo<; then be translated by
16.
The order
same as that of
just
'visible', for exa1aple, presupposes
includes
or more loosely?
priority?
hut
are discussed,
in species (l8) are not illustrated until 23 ff.
Is the point that ~-h-e
that
Aristotle is concerned by the fact
equivalent to -rb xup(wt; &uva-
or,
qua
is TO
What
(~
change
houses.
a
actual
actuality.
that the priority of actuality in substance would seem to imply priority in time too,
The &\ivC!lJ.L c;
the actual to the potential in time.
the
hn11se; but that difference
not seem relevant here.
l049b 12-17
and
and
'!)49h 17
the specific not~ntiali
there -1re ~.6yoc. of
i049b
29
'<~here
the
ability
actuality but does
1050a 1
-
does
not
-
that
first
act
the
previous
only
precede
in a way not'
the
A new argument,
is
of
(cf. in
by
potentiality
some
sense
but
the
the
the
in
1049b 11-12).
housebuilding,
argument,
from examples. involving learning,
produced
and
so
not
We might object
in
only ~but
this 'in
general
&~.-b in
point
that
b
29 the
case a
way
Aristotle
ability to housebuild must
though.)
139
activityi
time,
picks
precede up not
actuality
is
'lOTES
pr 1.or
in
time;
we
have
now
lises the claim of 24-7, previous
the
&o-.:et
1lleged
in
po.tnt
illustrating
does plc.k this up, the
hl"~"'"eb•Jtld.i:1g
of
tn
?.7--9,
29;
or
general
fur
reason
.1.cc
6
~arne
the
what
the
analysis
princi!Jle
follows,
of
of
in
~oiat
being
species
real
32.
236b
Clearly
not
1..11 Z
coming-to-be
priority
of
12-Xplanation
With ._,;__
~~-
though the
this,
Or ls it that 27-9 genera-
but
This however doeq rnt fit the reference to prodt!Ction
~ctr:.ethi.ng
from
new
1Ht::TA
and 29 ff.
acts
.. ~ ;umet i ·.al 1_y?
~.B.
JN
11-12 has been dropped.
qualification of
that
a
1
the in
is
31
only fore~
ff.;
of JS-6 compare
~rinciple
'anyone who
7-9.
actual
building
a
house
must already have compl~ted a house'; activity of housebuilding, rather than of building of
_f?~.
\4
.;J.ys
VI.
(complete) houses?
6 not
to
<:::~.n' t.
you
be
a
built sumethlng; 35 ff.
vr.
housebuilding, builder
th~n
Or,
rather,
but
to :
(capable
of
~ar
35 ff. a}:lplles point
t.hat
:·~ome
'i'}Jeoremi
without
having
gtlpports this by applying theory of Physics
6 not to building, or to being a btlilder, but explicitly to learning
the
n
the
l2-t4
seems
to
make
·J[Z.
B (iii).
ot
.,_~
X
is
t~mporal
against
the
and
actuality
Suggestions:
this is
(a)
the argument was
r)'[
the E6va~1.c; is
wrJuld
the
1lready
.),-)vt'LIJ.~c;
some
pret:..eding
1t
reduced l049b
sense:
29-·50a
2,
ti1e
~:mtcum~
IJresent r:laim,
of
which
process.
Lite
on one reading on 4'JO 29-50a J
to the effect that what a
bit
was
present
an
of
at
the
The
corresponding
stage
elit..itB:.t
uf l.r;
the the
tl1E:-
mai.J. th;·ust
precedr:s J.ctual possession activity,
which ..loes requiTe
any
aberrat1..or
Even so,
not
bit of
process
of
.:H·r:histj_c
a
bit
of
the 66vrq.u.c
uc..;.uiLLng
ar'il;ument
even with 1049b 35-50a 2 set aside,
"icatlon
Lo
the
earlier
~
in
the
activity.
ngag1ng
if this
do
the
"'a·1
you
have
Pytndgoras'
Uut
as
the
!:Jast~r
the
to have
on
not
items n:~der control'
having svme
in
14:
,;xercise
l1.1.s
the
master
is havlnl2;
whole
of
it.
the whole remains a neces~ary condition for B£wp£tv
sense.
Consequently,
the 8£wp£'Cv
might
to
3eem
tu
be
to
and
thi.s is the main point Ar has
of ~!£'X.E:'tWv'te:<;
thes1s
the
ls
not
counter-example
the
'Jt BEo;poOO'lY Lva Bt:wprruxflv
that
:E-xux::nv but the uther way round. This :;nggestion
,-,n t:1e
relies
thought
that
:1aving some and having the whole of a ·:>ubject Ln how much is l.::n0vm but invr)lves :'he
thought
sur~ly
ls
the
c-latr:l
t~rior
t.hat
(1CJ!+9b
prior
1)
and
not explicitly announced
ls
14 remains in a state of tension
proc:~.s.:,
in the
it
hut
l1)!~9h ?9-';0a
2Q-50a
the difference heu.;een
is not just a difference
lii [terence in the manner of knowing,
3
Aristnt_elian,
wirh ':he tesult lh-3.t
rellly
nf
l1:;..;.rning actuality is tempo-
t::e clalrn that
1s
temporally
t·hat
Alex.' s
it
pos-
because prior in o6rrCa (1050a 4 ~ .trld ff.).
of
claim ':?·n
that now
in turn implies
· r,e 6~ivauLc; it ~"hat
~s
he
must
<m1; ,L6C ":~:;
\Ve
d
face a
r- i_r,n
viz.
be ~hat
.1;_r
,,
the
embedded
P~rhdps
228h.
the
in
nearest
But
this
comment.
the
L~cause
'.1r
lemma
the quota-
don't
they
this use lS lhe practisin~ of
tn
is
irrelevant
r_rnposal to treat
to
the
claim •..;hic.h
none
required
·.,uuld
lwlp
for if
it
neorize,
,_he'.'
do
; hat
.,;ont radicts
·"p"ul·,,-·
··lrHi,
1
rn~y
:Jo
't"~t
Rc.>s
\•.laS
to',
need
R0ss'
,wd
being met,
(JH
st:nnd
·'.lld
:r.ean
't.h;:o•,r
do
and
third
!.nt•.!rpn~tattuns,
secrmd ~->ince
'>O :~atn
(reallv)
jo
11p.
the
·~ase
1s
~va. AF'~')PTJ'tc.xhv
,Jf
l_hesis
l,heorl.?.e
;.~e
(1)
not
l
ft
to
c1ave
to
think that theorize',
nor be
that
one
Sxwcnv,
but
not
in
l·J·-l L
\ ii)
if,
on
the
LI-'C,tuse
th0y dn 1
L'.;{)
did not
'lupposed
J ii)
not The
that
to Diels'
Hhat?
tl1at
could,
rhe
speeches at Phdr. 1::>
sympathetic
thjs clattse ac; a r~loss, hut a ~loss
33-
·uv
t.his is misleading:
t::X.e:-rtOv-ce:c; theori.ze to get knowledge?
1 ::arner
f!cquired. th,__,.
i.s
but
because this :1£'X..E-rdv is the mere mechanical practice of the expert?
the
~uali-
says
Ross
1us B't~ but not his interpr~tation,
-JS ' 0l)
not
29-50a
theretore tiE:wpe:t:v, 1
and likewise
~astery of
t ull
1s
control
(an "ffer Ar t! 18 following
'.../f!
tr}49b
The woLd does not typically
cmoarrass
intended
l049b 35-SOa 3,
he
immediately
in
Pliority argued for in B (ii) and B (iii) ts not in play here.
nf
·~
except
geometry Hr;der exercise
then
,Jf
•.vhule
mean that at any ~tage of acquiring knowledge
WOC
May
in Ar.;
·~he
that
not '3EWfH::tv
pari:. of X is a1 ready atr ainP.d?
back
rcfeL
do
l-l£X£'tciY'tE:'
the
·~st:1blish,
tn
l>etwf~en
1050a
:lour
on
tT;.; lJtLJ'tf1U11S but
11,..,1"':;,
to build.
from
do it,
1:c~plcte 1.
gloss
icerns
t.;ould n
nnly in a reduv'ri '.-.'ay,
tuo
rccunciling
29-
nlng to build.
building)
hut
:1,::~:::d
tr1,
it
where a
way
other they
'";ilme ohjection
'Jnn:s
'0 ';Oa 14
applies
if
there
are
particular
do not need to theorize, r)f subjects such that
of
riucing
group
Exoxnv because
'They
Oewpet'v,
or
for
We
also
thought,
wet,
&:u'i\
tvithout
(sc.
at
~~' o6
enthusiasm,
all)
-
intro-
dunce ,ue).e'TWv,;ec;
who oU Ber..opv\Xn.v ~va 8EwprrnxTw to
not
not
even up
theorizing,
the
sake
theorizing
of
the truth), the
in
doing
except
the
n
exercises.
There
(O~L] obOEv &tov~aL
in a quaified sense of
(sc.
t'va. 6Ewp11~Lxt]v Exux:nv,
it).
For
discussion.* even an
could
not
some And
because
since
unintelligent find
sense)
reasons
a spot
en -" '
'otherwise
proper
have
be
the student needing
Apelt suggested
(v)
first suggestion: ~xx•n WOe,
are
about which they
that
(theorizing in the proper sense being for the sake nf theorizing
word'
are
~or O't~
are
of
r~mains (vii) Ross'
c~
(iv) if there are 3Ubjects or parts
6Uvav'ta.~ Bewpet'v
ob
0'tL.
they
CJ
10\lla 16
they can be acquired without
(sc. d7t:\Wc;).
&:x.A'T; W&e Yl
(vi)
[upi.cs
~gain
and
to practice in the activity.
6Uva.v'taL Aewpetv
ON THr.TA
in
el 6€ j...rr;, i.e. if they
have
they
that
no
case
need they
to must
already
we
could on
not
r,
believe
woe, or
11
that
B'tL
on anything
x'tA..
could
else,
and we
from which the words could have been displaced,
we remained in a state of dissatisfied &.1top £a..
16-19
Ihe
argument is extended to cases where the potentiality
form.
'(a.e
in 17 should be explicative.
for
motion
(19;
cf.
n. eo,
15
the
l97b
treatment
32,
'may
come'
For the optative as
(Apostle). cf.
not
O:v:
l98a
of
tuche
'what
6:
place and collecting,
(Ross,
1050a
19-21
Inside/outside:
would
'might
come'
usually
at
be
~·
196b 22,
e.g.
purposed',
197a
going
some
strate the telos:
the inside po-
The teacher
forward:
surely outside.
if the pupils cannot be seen in action, it is unclear whether
the knowledge you are teaching them has been successfully internalized. But
what
do
the
inside/outside
words
mean
on
comparison?
the
alternative
Perhaps this:
understanding
of
the
if you do not distinguish
6Uva.j.JLc; and l.vlpyeLq.
between inside and outside,
when giving the 't~'X.o<;
it will be unclear in which sense of l?tLO""r-fu.i.TJ t7tL
text
sounds
more
concerned
with
a
question
of
fact than a question of meaning.
35,
lOSOa 21 Epyov, (34),
At 197b 26 the phrase is equated with TO ~epuxbc;
'work'
and
as
between
on the Ross reading el y&p ~~ oU~w yeyv~~aLis straight-
Objection:
priate
dispute
contrast
or (Ross) between the absorbed know-
ledge inside and the still unattained knowledge without?
18,
was
the
wants to show the pupils' knowledge in overt practice and thereby demon-
to a
---lA.).ou ~vexa.. There
is
'would normally except in odd cases', ~utomat~
and
nor
both of which are &uv~eL' needing
-
tential and the oputside activity,
of teaching, Reale),
lOSOb 29-30)
no external agent.
But 1050a
The cases envisaged include
both 8uvU~eLc; that come from teaching (17-19) and the natural tendencies
theorize'
this interpretation was left out .in our
gloss
1050a
is a potentiality for a certain x(vry:nc; instead of for having a certain
to whether
the
Physi~
parallels
were
covering both characteristic activity and, where appro-
the
end
'job'.
which also
product. See,
No attempt to connect the uses:
for a fuller version of
uses x.piicnc;:; (popular
in~
23~27,
in this use:
EE
cf.
1219a 13-
cf.
here
30,
24).
1arallcl, but the use of ~X9€LV (implying no need of an external agent) .1nd
a
of -r6 confirms
table
b11t
which
rather
turn red. acq11ire, ,-ense
'-,--1.n
so
(might)
reading
be
painted
that
one
stronger be
is
a can
say that
green.
green,
definite
than
The
the
here:
'~hich
that of the apple There
much
the
could
that
will
or
case
a
the U\11 is
pntential
stron~er
n0t any
of
e.g.
colour,
F
is
programmed to
•..;hat
it
is
in a
one says •Jf the table that it sense
is
•..;hat
the argument to show that actuality is prior obrrCa., not
*save for the credentials of
that other
tn che Hormal course of events
form which
in which
is or
r~d.
is
required
just A6Ytp.
for
lOSOa 28 plained duct,
Why f'il.l\l\ov?
by
the
the house,
house
(29)?
Ross says,
and directly
c,Jmes
into
being
obv~ously
ex-
in the pro-
(only) more the 't~'X.oc; than
But then how is the housebuilding simultaneous with
perly
is
in such cases:
the lv€pyELa. must be found
so that the o£xo06j.Jry:TLc; is
the 66v<J.f'<~ is. the
Rather than the activity,
following ydp:
resides with
it
'that in which it
(the ~oer11:nc;:;) most
is that which exactly answers to it, and
exists
simultaneously with
the house rather than the builder'.
[o~~J
143
it.
This does not
prowhich This face
i.J()h 15
\.
cf.
32,
clue
A
b.1illiing. 31,
33,
be
the
34:
But what
..
being-bu~lt
have
may
the
house
the
we
present
~anger
•10
building coincides with house
tr,e
r.uHk'-
the
house-that-is-
The troubles of Z 7-9 are
this?
is
have
Elsewhere
participles olxoOoiJ.OUfJlVq.J 29, alive
is
upon us, and seem to be ignored.
variant
p0ses. the seeing man; in 30,
not
'eternal'
better
This
therefore
taking
of
the changes/ activities,
up
the Oawv
e.g.
the
in 34 answering to that
'in
removes
each
the
according to Alexander,
See
case'.
supposedreference
l049b to
for the exact parallel.
26
the
Ross, Reale, Apostle,
Prime Mover, whose activity
( 23):
why,
in
clear
We
could
advance
that
of
not
find
a
satisfactory answer
the xvp!.w'tlpwc;
actuality
ts
prior
argument
Tfl o6o-C9-
to
of
6
to
ff.,
the it
question
is
as
is
that
'tl:\.oc; is
; ssue
6
ff.
the
prior
the
in explanation,
viz.
y
emphasis of
that
X must
already
potentiality.
The
section is on ways in which form
not
exist
is
the
beings.
but
some
eternal
include
prior ~ ofx:rCq. in if Y is
to exist
seen
that,
in a
unchangeable
ones,
Aristotelian of>pn.v6~
the
he
locomotion
Aristotelian we
is
system the are
el~e
the
But '.vhy?
tailored to present pur-
true
changeable
of
the
universe
unswer
to
things,
would
the
stop
fears
of
1.19 is assertion, not argument. sun
asking '..Jhy
things.
dS
universe
One
is the
might
needed
for
the
system must argue:
genesis of
be
such as
suppose
there
to was
noLhing eternal, why should anything have come into being or why should not
tst
all
the
~very
stop?
Rut
equally,
why
shouldn't
sequence of non-eternal ones?
the
eternal
thing
be
One could ngree with Ar that
event must have a sequel and yet deny that this entails the exis-
r0nce of any 8ternal, continuously
~xisting
thing.
No doubt,
as Ross says, what makes it clear is the whole section a 4-b 2. trouble
some
finite
) 1
2-4
be
:nthin
Lt
should in any case not be temporally prior.
lOSOb
must
3llm.;oing
not
llf
but here he ~JJr\ts to admlt some not being for dC6La;
argument
l'he
there
advantages
classification '3hnuld be
earlier physicists (22-4).
'in those actualizings of a 6Uva1-1"c;'.
105Gb 6
subjects
a.nti-Eleatic
the
1s ~Bopd,
to count
Lhe
to
the but
sense not
at
vice-
l ()SOb are
'if
~
f-l~~J.t:t'ta.l.
not 5r.p8a.p'ta. 337a
1-l),
in the properly Pldtonic sense that
(immortal not
.'iS
by
':onstantly
an explanation
of
changing t:heir
into
they ure and one
heha'liour,
another
-
'Nhich stems
fr11m their own nature (30).
versa (SOb i9, Ross ad loc.) lOSOb
L050h 8-l.Q
Is this out of style with Ar' s usual thesis that only ra-
tional 6nvd.~e1.c:; are 'ti'Ov lva.v'tCwv, i.e. between i.t
2-track and
r.ne.s
not
1.nntrartes, ;nm8thing J.pplies
be
An argument for
that d.v'tC~I.c:;
refers
to
thinking that
contradictories,
not
and the point is simply that a possibility is by definition that
to
:hwqever,
would
does it retract the distinction
1-track &uvd.j.let.<:?
any 30-4
can
be
(realized)
and
potentiality,
rational
both
on
insists
the
also or
not
be
(realized),
irrational (cf. esp.
which ll-i2).
1 track/2-track distinction
and
·:;haws how to reconcile it with the claim that every &6vnf..1Lt; is "ti')t; civ'tt.prio-e::wc;: ':JJ
~~.eir
. dl }b
li
;1resence
irrational 6uv<4tet.c; produce the opposite of their proper effect absence.
Parallels to this point at
16 with the presence or absence of of absence of the
&Uva.u~c;
here.
144
~·
195a 11-14, Het .
the pilot in place of
Cf. Ross ad l05la 3.
the
34-Sla
l?latonic
distinction, which
is
2
applies
forms~
the
1-~rinciple
of
tlte
preceding argument
to
The Piatonists do not 1aake the actuality-potentiality
so the arguments which are s•1pposed to give them something
e.g.
;. hE. txLrr'tlif..l0\.1 'han t'JVd.fJ.E!.c;,
~XLD"'tl\.twv in the
be 1
exercising
Vith
the
best
possible way do
knowledge.
result
that
~TtL
there
The
forms
ou)<',ht
not are
insist thus
that
no more
robe something more
the corrl'!spondin~ activity.
lOJla Ll
l05la 17-19: 8, esp. ~late
see
notes
of
misplaced lOSla 5-10:
dunamis ton enantiOn dgain.
not
zation:
enantion to
bring
effect
by
its
own
irrational
absence.
dunameis
under
the
dnd
~...ompare
is responsible for ~·
At
l95a
l050a
3?
or
a
from
e.g.
l050b
fresh argument
2-3?
or
for
l05la 4-5?
P~.
e,g,
II
su~gests)
Ross
(as
fhe
capacity of
If the last,
generaliis
~unamis
an irrational
session,
Tn l050b 30-34 Ar uses antifrom
phasis
last
1 Q9a 33-b 7.
by G.E.L. Owen
the
good
dunamis
involved?
being
\.,!hat
'divided'
in
the absence of some
11-14 and
mathematical
1'1"!·
constructions
(21-24)?
But
mathematical
I013b IInot
susceptible
of
change
698a
(DMA
~·
25-26,
19Jb
objects
34,
Met.
are 989b
16 he uses enantia for such cases, and in the second passage (repeating 32-33, the
example
of
the
steersman)
adds
that
the
presence
etc.),
though this is suggested by 23, 29-30,
and absence are must rather be the inquirer's capacity for noesis
equally
aitia
h6s
kinounta,
which
would
need
to
The potentiality
be
reconciled
(30), with the deri-
with vative
(kata sumbebekos) capacity in the objects for being discovered:
Ross's explanation that our present passage uses looser language because '.·lith dunamei in
l046b
5 and
l048a 8
'he was thinking of dunameis kat a
positive powers or forces, while here he is thinking of mere potential!ties'.
Certainly Ar' s examples
here take no special notice of cases
be
,)f
responsibility by 1U48a
10.
7,
and
absence:
note
the
all
are coveredby the
positive
29
supply no eta.
have
no
connection with
the
It might be argued that
for poiein or
l05la
9-
the
first
geometrical
example
is strajghtforward,
that
previous
texts
in 9
2,
5
those
on one side of a straight
line,
and this implies the ex-
and
the
triangle's
be
what
can
dunameis
assigned
be
this
the
guaranteed
to
mere dunamis
depended
carried the weight.
on
be
the
of
always
argument
being from
so;
so
and
never
but for
~1051a
absence,
and
antiphasis
the
to
~D
Not in our passage.
what is it
10:
side
c
E
be sure,
~ABC is
to
like
their
CD
oarallel
'seen'
and QAc to ~CD;
LncE
equal
viz.
(26),
Then
AB.
counterparts, LABC
with 'ACB
make
up
to
and
two
be
hence, bAG
right-
that can either be built or be demolished (fall angles.
To
BCE:
line parallel
not-s0
irrational
together down)?
base
it takes up the general argument of l050b to
cannot
though
The angles about one point (24-25) are evi-
the other addition is the 8-34,
~
eremein/kineisthai
tension of 8.
seems to
In short our passage seems
oikodomeisthai too indirect.
direct
still
On the question whether
in the intellectual object recall (of course) Soph. 248a-49d.
dently to
argument
being or coming to be understood requires a dunamis
the moral is less clear. are too wide,
The
in value.
poiein-paschein
oikodomein/katabalein of
Nor is he preoccupied with rational dunameis:
in
one for priority in ousia, not
~~ein
of
ant a
ten kinesin,
a house:
but,
i.s Z 7-9 is 0n us ,1gain.
3econd), what house?
-
What
is
the 9ia
which
ti
on the first option (but not the ~·
201a 29-34 taken
immediately clear
proof
employing
:vhich
intersects
a
to
one who
theorem about
sees the
the
construction
angles
formed
by
(26)?
(a)
a straight
A
line
>'ith e.g. 188a 15-16 might suggest that what can be built up and knocked down
is
t-he
plinthoi,
but
one
does
not
think kataballein.
Are we to say that
0nce
though
could
he
built
now it
oikodomein plinthous,
nor
present
is
bizarre,
i
~;
~re
can
pulled
be
built
dmvn
rhat
the
No:
t:o_inde.
of
at
a
ship have
sea
Building
and
used'
(pace to
Eudemus.
prove
the
who ascribed to T.
construction
(b)
something more
valid)?
theorem that he Alex.
seems
to
is being and It
both ways
(deixomen,
596. 15,
'It's a house' on seeing a house,
is what j96. 20); recent edd. opt for the first.
pulling down
not even congeners.
;
Or
calculating the distance
the past without a
and in Z 8 l033b 22-26 \vhat
~de
lines?
device for
the built house, tode toionde,
cannot?
is not a tode toionde but a toionde. is
straight
as perhaps with Thales'
have it st1ll
parallel
intuitive,
'must !:>rev1ous
two
I
,~6
14/
I.HAPTER 9
~._hld
Ll~t.'.;;
~ass.
Heath,
:-,;t L~
pr,,ves
l.ne
second
5eornctricat
che
theorem first
example
i~
a11d Reale complicate
for
Bvnitz,
debatable.
is
Arts~
needlessly by supposing that isoc<2lt:!s
an
triangle
in the semi-
Biancano*
also
external
angles
uses
(as
but
construe
I
in
conformity
to our diagram.)
rtnd then generalizes this
In figura tres lineae sunt aequales,
king a theorem (e.g. Eucl. iii. 21) to the effect that all,angles having
duae
~he
dividitur,
as
diameter in
EucLid,
mention of rem
as
just
base
all
in the semi-circle are equal (or. more generally
angles
in
the
same
this further theorem; mentioned,
that
the
Aristotle
segment).
makes no
the ekeino in a 29 is surely the theo-
angles
a triangle are equal to two
of
right angles; and its introduction spoils the picture of simple recognit ton
at
a
Orth~
28-29.
in a
28
does
not
mean
as
'perpendicular',
Ross Reale and Apostle translate it (and as Heath supplies in brackets); a line
used of
,straight
line
(not an angle) it means erected
from
the
'straight', and the whole phrase
centre'
applies
to
any radius within
Then:
the semi-circle.
l.et ACD ~ith
be
any
diameter
circumference, the
centre
BA,
BC
both
LoAB
as
base
let BD be erected from
the
BD
So
is
equal
Hence
trian$1;le to
p,les DAC,
ACD
the
But
DCA.
is
.\DC
equal
to
is
equal
to
ii:J>s
total
Hence
_:.::t-=rna l ;.,~les
;1:B.
a
DCA.
the angle ADC
L', •)
rL~nt
lAne j ungles.
is
equal
But.
to
given
the
sum
'lf
of
this,
viz.
(from i
c-.pposite
32)that the
since
these
sint
si
cuipiam
trium
aequalitas
continuo
ei
etiam manifestum erit in
rectum,
quia
statim apparent
isoscelia ad
CBD,
bases
ABD,
CD,
invicem;
et
quibus
AD,
conflatur
anguli
aequales
totus
sed
duo
B sunt
ADB,
anguli
ADC;
esse
anguli
duo ad
angulorum
Ergo duo
dupli
qorum sunt
anguli
duorum
ADC.
semicirculo
(How does he reach this?
and
internaJ
angulus
to the triangle ABD is equal to the two
duo
anguli
therefore,
ad B sunt aequales duobus rectis ••.
opposite
is
internal
them;
ABD
and
angles
and
given that the triangle
isosceles,
of
to
twice
similarly with the
triangle
either
the
angle
But
BDC.
he does not spell it out.) Why do Euclid and (on my reading) about
the
angles
1051a last
external
29
of
a
would
theorem
angle
triangle
and
takes
lie on a straight line they amount
case
r~~ht
the angles of a triangle.
without
the
I
course
him use
drawing
the
the
directly
right
theorem about
in
then makes
more
two
Because,
the
established
Biancano base the proof on a theorem
not
equal
suggest?
our
So
suggest
arguing that the angle CBD external
B sunt
system
triangles
I
BDC,
ad
the
angle.
harum
ADC
LcDE
isoceles
keeps
innotescat,
which is
internal
suggestion
adapt the lettering
(1
circuli.
DAB,
the
So ADC is une
omnes
eiusdem
angle ADC
is also equal to the sum of those angles. and
cum
eri-
angulum
the
two
BD,
same theorem about
et
basis
the remaining an-
half
the
Aristotle's
AC
BA,
the angles of a tri-
3l) extends AD to ADE and 3.rgues
.lm"';le CDE DAC.
'"'~ua L to 'l
(iii
basis
CB,
medic
metri
actum,
ex
·1ne right angle. ~·Jclld
in
hence are
quas sunt
ex
estque
linearum
and
CBD
below)
Educta itaque linea BD de potentia
radii
1ngle are equal to two right angles; hence
L
gitur.
dupli
ABD,
in
quae
quae
semidia
apex.
the
sum of
the
tertia,
the
LCDB is equal to j,pcB.
and
the
all
on
nimirum
to
triangles
isoceles.
in
apex
circle
are
the
and
semi-circle
and
of
and
equal.
in a
triangle
him with
the construction internal to the semi-circle.
circle (viz. one whose apex is vertically ahove the centre of the circle) to other triangles in the semi-circle by invo-
ln5ta 27
of
take it, the
prior
particular
the as
theorem
Ar's
that
ekeino
in
Euclid • s proof of this
external
the
on
angles,
proof,
and more
angles and
as one step
the
economy
of
general
theorem
in
unnecessary
corollary
about
Ar. by contrast is following a narrower path.
*Loca mathematica Aristotelis (1615) 149
:lOTES ON THETA
lOSla !5
I
1') d:pa. ~v~pyeLo ~E:\'tCwv
t05la 15
The
actuality
is
better
a
potentiality
musician
t.hat
plays
be
It
realized in either way.
in actuality better
than he
is
able
is
to
not
play
that
(ii)
one
might
1)Ja
!tapO:, -thv ~cUnv
have expected
that
rather
~a.p
than
Both objections could he met hy redrawing (ii) as (iii):
paten-
Rather, it is better that he should be playing actually than
tially.
it
could
~
because to
the
! ; I{
' [
he
is
better
should
just have
the
more
than
corresponding ~~Lt;;,
the
worth
potentiality.
something
~, .. ,w""
Hence
_!lli maintains
having. so
the
that
( Sla 4):
activity is
possibility of
exercising
a &6v~L~ for the worse is not crucial.
!OS!a !7-!9
It is not clear "why the bad actuality is
As Ross,
far
268 points aut,
p.
llo-cepov
1:~ q>6a"£<
all we have settled so
is that it is less desirable than the latter.
Perhaps we should
supply some thoughts about the need to understand the bad as a deviation from
the
to
take
is
an
the
good. of
~pit
We
'good' are
in
things
set
there
notes
the
passage,
better
than
from
-
were inclined there
that which things strive for,
'cosmic'
comparable
i.e.
but there is not in the same way
they merely fail
absolute
man.
the view we
no evil xa.p& 'tO. 1tpd.YJ.l«l.'fa.
is
viz.
to achieve,
things run
this
connect with
1:1t xp4y..a~a,
they are
something that fully.
would
the claim that
&yaabv
nature
This
to
(not
the
Compare
to strive success-
kind-relative)
remark in
also Physics
~
VI
II.
use
of
that there
8
esp.
l99a
33-b7. ~!!9.9!~.!.12!!_.ill.:.. __ 2~!-Q!!!!!!~~-t!2!!
Suggestion (ii) one
set
of
alternate
corresponding two Thus, Proculs,
in Euc.
I,
p.
squares with Ar's
sets
where
angles,
of
{i) and
to
one
(ii)
alternate
according
uses of
uses
angles.
Eudemus
~
379, 2-15, the Pythagorean proof of the theorem. mentioning
only one
line
to
Euc.
berg,
III 3!.
claims
construction
that Ar
Heath (Euclid's Elements I,
p. 320-l) following Hei-
our passage proves that
rather than (ii) is the
has
in mind
in his
(i)
many references
because &.viix"to (25) means the line is drawn up.
!50
to
this
theorem,
It was also objected
The
&~6't't that
asyndeton
it
makes
understanding
of
clear
who
Ar
to
could
one well
enough.
We
it
so
li
in Ross's
the
version
explanation
(28):
the
is
of
we
express
and
the
did
not
himself
think there the
were
second
objects
theorem dependent
theorem does But
Ross
dwkward;
the
knows i:xEtvo.
hetween the two texts. On
not
hold
because
thought
this
was
point
comes
geometrical
of
example,
it
is
pedantry:
across
any differences
to
on our
clearly
substance see
Owen's
note. The geometrical moral What is the 6 ~6. ·d
which is immediately apparent
to one who sees the construction (26)?
of
from
the
cp.
~
that
24-6
first.
and
grounds
for
step
from
the way
the
of
the Eqa"tov in mathematics). a
rejecting
Euclid-type Ross'
'graspings'
of
story
connections
It would not follow
proof is seen. about
two-stage procedure is too cumbrous for .:1nd
This seems
second example uses the theorem
And it must be seen from the construction (6Ldyp~~a:
on vo\3<; of
every
What is seen is at least some-
'E because 9.', not just the fact that E.·
thing of the form
the
Thus it
second
•seeing'.
intermediate
in
is further
example
that
his
There are 'seeings' articulateness
between
a proof using a theorem and something more intuitive.
to be drawn and with
his not using exterior angle·s in the second example either, in contrast
Jaeger 6~\ov.
tav •••
tttv...
clear
rn~_!!r~!_9~2~!!!!£~l-~~~~~!! 'QHL~~~~~
(ii)
1:C;
6,a
1:C. tv ~.. ,xux\C~ 6p6~ xa66\ou tv -l!.. •ux\C'f' 6p61i xa86\ou; 6,6H
Ross reads 6~\ov 6•n
Text of !OS!a 26-7
It is another question whether Ar thinks that what is seen in these examples is the 6 L~ "tC in the full APo.
sense.
The writing is compa-
tible with this,
but he is surely not here addressin~ Euclid's problem
of which
to bring in where in the
science.
thorem (And
if
not,
neither
finished organization of
is he correcting APo.,
273.)
l 51
pace Ross,
the p.
J/
ignoring the imperfection, "! 9, draw
\4r>'l1d
]r)rwthan
by
attention
rietail
on
(~
Lear As
that
int~resting
agree with,
to
published
Aristotle's
•)fl
l
me
an
Aristotle's
sensible world of at
tary geometrical shape. ~weds
1982) thdt
su~gests
Lear's suggestion 1s in the
m11ch
9 9
~;ery
c_he
.-\pril
against
'..i'hich
to
1051a 21 "JJ
philosophyof mathe-
there
alternative
theory
article
is
one
point
the
existence
least one perfect specimen of each elemen-
lOSla 21-33 suggests to me that all Aristotle
in connexion, say, with a sphere is that there should be an imper-
fectly
spherical
actuali_~
orange,
perfect
that
dnd
sphericity
in
the geometer should by a mental act the
orange.
His
mental act
would
involve attending to the features of the orange relevant to sphericity, ,vhile
ignoring
the
tmperfcction
in
a manner
is described
for
449b 30-450a 7 (q.v.).
different kind of case in De Hemoria
-'l
l<~hich
kind
(II)
(b)
of
case
might
in a manner which is rlescribed for a diffe-
in De Hem.
be
found
at
Objections:
(i)
the
449b 30-450a
Xet.
geometry can be lv-re\e:xe:Cc; or
of
im:.erpretation.
requires
rent
7.
Further
M 3 1078a 29-31:
the
support
ov"a.
for
stated by
b)..t.xWc:;.
meaning of
this
last
passage
hecomin~
bronze in itself does have the potential of
could be that
a perfect material
sphere even if the bronze-smith cannot ensure its coming out just right -
a
thesis
On (II)
about
physical
matter,
not
intelligible
(ii)
matter.
(b) it would be true to say that every book is a sphere, albeit
the sphere actualizable in it by v&-rp-c.c:; may be psychologically difficult to realize. perfect
(iii) If Ar agreed that no physical object was an actual
sphere
commonly
or
cited
the
for
like
this
(Met.
997b
B
agreement,
are
35-8a
6,
K 1 1059b 10-12,
statements
of
the
Platonist
view that Ar is worrying over - Lear, p. 175-9), this would be an important
problem
for
him,
and
one would
expect
to
find
texts discussing
it and discussing the thinking away of imperfections in spherical oranl05la 29-33 and its relevance to Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics suggestion was
The
for
an
advanced
interpretation of
Ar 's
that
our
overall
passage
could
that
(I)
least
one
mathematics,
actual
geometrical
in Ar's
perfect
figures
can
sphere be
view, and
found
requires
one
by
the
ges.
basis
IJhilosophy of maths alternative
to that presented by Jonathan Lear in Phil. Rev. 1982. ts
be
The Lear thesis
the
actual
existence
straight
construction).
of
line
To
this might
be opposed the strong view
(a) that there are no actual perfect spheres physical
(b)
1n ~
that
there
it.
ne
[(a)
example
plexin~
._ne
Lines
-
these
'ldssa.Q;e
1
may is
of
the
in
the
the
be
but
the
disproved,
as
heavens;
the
world
truth
of
as
far case
the
·_heir T~.,e
lines
in support of
.JOtential
scometer
,1f
to
the
weaker not
existing
in
can
take
r:he
in
view
depend
spheres are concerned,
straight
lines
is
more
actuality?]
The
role
of
by
perBut
our
(a) or (b) ·,wuld be to suggest that what guaran-
of
existence,
•;(Jheric~ty
tendin1.1;
or
natural motions of the sublunary elements, perhaps?
stra1.ght
physical Horld
'eru:::cr.
Ar,
mathematics does
the
of
tees the truth of geometrical theorems :__n
for
an it
teatures
the
is not
primitive
(I)
the actual existence
geometrical
elements
but
(II)
actualizable by the mathematician's v6r,
spherical
v-5T)<JL~.
r:he
Pran<J;e
His
orange
mental
relevA-nt
to
act
and
actualize
would
involve
talks often of
thinking
away
the
colour,
motion,
etc., of
properties other than its sphericity, but not of thin-
king
and
away
dents
.!.£
imperfections
its
sphericity.
The
De
Mem.
account is of the former rather than the latter.
at
(other
•}r
straight
Ar
the orange, i.e.
Against (I) one objection is (i) that if the last physical straight line were
to
perish,
geometry would
quite Aristotelian to reply, try
is
true
there will
An alternative (p.
with
perfectly straight
a
180-1)
point.
mattered
touches
cannot
the
grounds
first and
the
touch that
place. the
point
false.
It seems, however,
be straight lines in the world. put
up of
De An.
(ii)
403a 13, cited by
as proof that Ar did think there are physical objects
Namely,
but
always
interpretation was
Lear
fall
reversing the objection, that since geome-
the it
This, about
edges capable of
the
touching
a
hronze sphere
at
claim could be that the straight line if en-
sphere at a point if we perform the abstraction, sphere cannot
at
all
even be
if
separated
separated
from
from
its
the
matter,
matter
in
on the
it was suggested,
fitted better with the context
the
does
soul;
but
it
require
the
reference
to
ab5traction to be supplied in the first clause. On the whole,
however,
these larger issues.
we doubted that 9 9 •..Jas the place to decide
Our passage makes no suggestion that all mathe-
sphericity while
153
clOTES ON THETA
1051d 29
matical
objects
discussion
is
are
a
by v6ncn.c;.
actualized
potentiality
·;~APTt:R
of
The
something which
potentiality
under
already a mathe-
is
and the point made here about the priority of lv~pyet.a.
matical object,
Wherever it is best placed (see above),
is special to constructions.
a footnote to the chapter which
the passage is what it purports to he, proves that actuality is first.
of
asuntheta Ar
Rz.,
(Etudes
cas
sur
simplicit~
la
lOSlb
into
three,
( lOSla
34-b2)
the
chapter
divides
broadly
it is a question whether the third part attaches more
and
directly to the first or the second. 1051b 2-17
(i)
Reale, most recently Aubenque est
a
comparable
celui
de
1a
17-1052a
2,
with backward
glances
at
(i)
in 1051b 18-24,
do in
they
include
Z and
the definable
(Cf.
H?
on unity
.Jhat are these?
1
essences whose
unity was
"' indivisibility Met.
1052b
(a)
H 3 1043b 28-32 seems to contrast the definable which is composite
with
the
14-23 proem
have
15-16, 1041a 18-19.)
Note by G.E.L. Owen
a
'leur
being and truth with respect to incomposites.
an interest
After
86-87,
others
logique ••. ').
Specifically,
Structure
Met.,
flut
S. Maurus apud Reale Li 94 ('Circa
simplicia cognita ut immobilia ... '),
(ii)
X
~ntheta').
to ct:rtain
read (iii) as an extension of (ii):
34-35:
CHAPTER
now recurs
lO
Ar
indefinable
incomposites
which
make
it
up;
argues
if
asunetheton
it
is
ousia
is
definable only in some way still to be explained. in
105lb
25-28
substances,
(with back-ref. in (ii) at 1051b 34-35):
that
Ar
while
seems still
to distinguish claiming
at
and
Z 1039a
indefinable
(l..Jhere?)
the
ti
esti
something
in
common
from
-
or
Similarly incomposite
for
them
(see
truth invol-
below). ving
combination
and
separation
in
the
pragmata
thought/spoken
of. But
((b)
Truth/falsehood of
their
are
objective
treated
as
properties cf.
correlates:
E
of
thought
or
1027b 25-33
4
speech,
and
tr.
16a 9-18,
abandons
his
at
whole
at
De Anima 432a 11-12, Cat.
principle
but about
the hoper
argument
einai
about
ti
is given as the subject of
incomposites.
In
view of
this,
what is claimed to be common to the ti estin and incomposite substances
that
'the Cat.
contrast
2a 4-10 (?-Here Ackrill's not ...
is
That they cannot come to be and cease to be is not
1051b 25-30?
for this is true of the composites at 1051b 15-17.
enough,
incomposite
substances,
error
is
simply
not
possible
the
ti estin,
it
is
possible
only kata sumbebekos
The spoken/thought
the things that names signify').
Concerning
( 1051b
26-28);
explicitly about concerning
ndmes,
105lb 30
preceding
Combination/separation are treated as properties
29 1024b 17-1025a 1.
Int_.
the
contrast 6
of pragmata not explicitly of their spoken thought correlates: De
not
This
may
suggest
(using
the
familiar
contrast
from
~Po
(25-26).
B 10)
that in
the
intended
correlates of combination and separation in pragmata seem to be respectively true positive and true negative predications: 253c 1-3, cf. Met.
falsehood,
not
E 4 1027b 20-23.
vice-versa,
1n
conclusion,
1051b 6-9,
that
are
understood a
description of
~eometrical
So
to be
definition one
concerning
things
that
unchangeable them true
at
there one
cannot.
be
be
object but at best (erroneously) of a name.
speaking
of
(Met. 1026b 13-14?)
'Incomposite substances'
Still
can hardly be those
identified by a definition by contrast with those introduced by accidental description,
cannot
cannot
The first
14b 13-22.
be
otherwise
seems to lead naturally to (iii), maintaining that with things
supposing
21.
cf. Cat.
not truth/falsehood.
opinion/statement cannot be true at one time but not ·another (lOSlb
15-17),
The
that
~·
faulty
there is a distinction.
have being/not being (lOSlb 11-13),
The
ancestry in
But the pragmata ground the truth/
producing a
the
error
of
for do not the first
fall under the suntheta of 1051b
l5-17?
(iii)
1052a 4-11,
developing
(i)
introducing a pate from ( ii) but otherwise apparently
1051b 9-16,
unless it is assumed that (ii) has reduced
eternal verities to expressions of what is asuntheton and left synthesis
time but not at another. to accidental time-bound truths.
example
seems to echo the type (i) truth of 1051b 18-
apparently ps.-Alex.
601.
16
ff.,
Ross ('From the treatment
On simplicity-plus-definability cf. of
points
~·
to lines and letters to syllables,
fined via the latter but definable (Bz.
i.54 155
VI
4 141b 3-9 on priority
the former
701b 25-29).
not to be de-
[ I \ )
L ..l
J
,\!db 2
~~
a hridge to section II (~_t_~~!_c!.uction
are
Why
(dnd,
r-1h 0v
E
truth
been
has be
t)ne
with
rhougn
it
mentioned; the
truth,
Lt
It
is
t-his
of
expressly
of
were.
to
however,
application
not
is
deleting xupLtirta:ta. or
objection
appl1cation
and
as
truth
stated will
xup~oOytCL'ta.
lJe
seen
that
Ls
Jcleted
in
the
or
Ov
trdnsferred,
S"!ntence
t.o~ether.
makes
Jaeger
it
that
very
could
with
but
the
difficult
be
fact to
and
fills,
a
marginal
that
Ov
is
lacuna; gloss
~-·-~hand
fruth and
falsehood tte
nnd
cf.
ngs
here
Lhought
fal.sehood
·~~·
~~retties
ot
.Ls
18,
L~~nim~
or
l 1J)ih
;;unE'
depend
in
way
:nisplaced
spei'lking
r.~re
on
1
the
as
in
(lOSlb 11-13); by
15-17
dnd
thinking,
E 4
l027b
Truth
rather
25-33;
than
whereas
not
vice
always
either
is
things 15-17,
that and
are
always
so;
the dia)?,onal
N.B.
fhere
still
is is
to
to
are
ZH
of
simple
they
concepts,
definable
(and
on
the
the
definable
is
incomposite
be
the
explained argument
irreducible
essences?
fhe unity
link between
unity
and
cf. H 6 1045b
and Z 13 1039a 14-23 argued (dia1ecti-
1043b28-32
what
appeal
perfectly or
composite;
it is
the
latter
indefinable,
(where?),
st1ggesting
or definable only
One possible course would
Z 12, where the entire definition is
of
but
that did not remain Aristotle's
lOSlb 25-28
seems
30-31
seems
to
about
the 't( ~CT'tLV
to distinguish essences
suggest
that
what
The
distinction
per
accidens ,
from
incomposites;
but
has
been
said
relates
to
whatever
is
made
that
one
be
mistaken
but
about
can
incornposites
not
at
all
.'3eparat ion
are
ltJir::h
cr'.JE'
defined without dn
identity
cerned
false.
reference
statement
with
the -rC
the incomposites are a sub-class of things
x~l
to
(cf.
b
in
26-7 is restrictive); namely, forms
their
De
matter,
Anima
so
that
the
6 430b 27 ff.,
3.
riefinition
is
intellect con-
is true and does not say one thing xa'tO. an-
l()"t'LV
other; Sorabji in Language and Logos, 296-9).
On this view a plurality
treated
as
of
that
!-1.'::.__~~·
[
elements
This
l6a 9-
pn,vides
in
the
definition
does
not
imply
the
object defined
is composite; and there is no need to appeal to the argument of Z 12. The P.Ssence
or
6t
(so that 6~oCwc;
6-
Lhey are r10t 8Xplicitly trea-
cnntTast
On one view put forward,
defined
l05lb
versa;
form a sort of ap!Jendix; for things that don't change, are
there
section with the composites dealt with
contained in the last differentia;
things
J. 8 432a tl-12, Cat. 4 2a 4-10.
(tpiniuns
just
in b
1 1052b 15-16 and Z 17 1041a 18-19);
34-
carried over to the things themselves.
the 1tpdy).1a.'ta,
thought,
but
settled view of definition.
A-x..,etc;
from
in this
theme
H
a
l-2, Netaph. E 4 l027b 20-3.
spoken of
However,
an
it was also sug-
no change;
(b 25-6).
.;ombination and
the ~p6.y~..l.a:ta. of
253c
located
13-22.
l4b
~'Utpo:rties
' •"d
't1e
are
19 l'!L4b l7-1025a l they
1n 1:::.
rrtJth '~,
1.11i
Plato ~ophist
23.
in
key term
a
indivisibility cf.
be
composites (104lb 2-17)
cf.
was
second
fa tsehood depend on the combination and separation of
t"'tptiy~a:to.);
latter
not impos-
a
is
as an example of a composite in b 20-1.
incomposites
substance
the
Not
composites
definitions,
if
sentence
take xup Ll.lrta:ta. and a
the
the of
that
the
this was awkward but
of
as
contrasts
that
5.
I
incomposites?
described
cally?)
will have to he predicative if xupt.Urra.-ra.
too),
postulates,
rhat xupt.W-ra.-ra.
the
there
1051b 18-24, 34-5.
elements
he problems if
of
in (I):
below
( 1051 b 26); but that needn 1 t imply
Ov d:XT)6£c;,
felt
sibJ.e t_and indeed the second
these
explicit
inferior
that being deceived about
-rO Ov \l:':ye:'t/'l.C. ••• (3) tO ••• xupLUrta:ta. \Je
an
are
Are
in (II) is
there m1.ght
structure
predicative.
the contrast
in such cases.
with d.XT)Ob;
taken
that
the
being
is
no non-xupCwc; sense of
incomposites
to
there
be
~accidens
that
transferring it
was suggested that
lt
~(}"t Lv can only occur ~cidens
lf
is
indeed stated in ([I)
that truth too is only
tnd
are
incommensurable
proposed
also
II. Truth and incomposites (1051b 17 1052a 4) l,.Jhat
being
Ross
Ov.
gested
13,
he also mentioned the possibility of taking it wi!:h &:>..T)EI€<; rather
34;
31.
than with
,.iLl
1028a
Z
to
a
:)v
Contrast
were
l.021b
-<: C
Ov
described here as )(UpLW'tcl.'ta.
apparently
respectiv·~ly)?
where
1
lOSlb 17) - see further below.
these
It
-
fals~hood
and
presumably,
could
3~_:U
( l05la
rruth
also a contrast (0~
·:::>ne as
claim '..Jill
simply opposed
that
rest
fails to
the
one
on to
cannot
the
refer
fact to
incomposite
be
the 1
in
that
error if
one
essence
at
has
the
all.
is the essence,
l57
a detinition of
about
the
wrong If
an
definition
the -r( trr-r~v
reference to bei.ng
/JTE3 DN
l05lb 17
deceived name,
l3-14)i are
per
accidens
though if
not
the
however
incomposites,
point
26)
forms
,.!!APTER lfl
may suggest
essence
and
might be that
(b
tHETA
that
r:~~st.
(cf.
defined
those defined
•..,rith such the
refer
10, Metaph.
reference
without
in the case of
one will
2.
to
are
posites
are
the
the
objects
of definitions,
truth discussed in (II)
not,
one can at
it clearly cannot
was
objected,
against
the
interpretation
of
incomposites
as
forms defined without reference to their matter, that there were rather few plausible examples, and none that kinds. out it
~wuld
give the essences of natural
'Righteousness' was suggested as an example, but it was pointed
that was
that was
human souls
not
a substance.
that
Aristotle
It had
was
also suggested that, if
tn mind here,
it was
odd that
they were said not to come-to-be or pass away (b 28-9); but this could be
taken as
a denial that they undergo
t~rocesses
discuss
forms
considered apart
from
And Aristotle
their matter
at
the
end of
11.
Another suggestion was that incomposites are predicate expressions without
their
subjects,
e.g.
tnere
There would
'two-footed animal'.
be no possibility of falsehood,
then
as there could be no false combination,
In~
However, there were two objec-
5 17a 10.
tions: !)
'seventeen-footed
context.
It
If the answer is
How can such an incomposite be true?
'because
animal'
noted,
',.,laS
though,
not
by
saying
that
'seventeen-footed'
combine with 'animal', or,
perhaps, that
se-
venteen' does not combine with 'footed'. If the basic point is that a simple term, as opposed to a complete
2)
proposition,
cannot
be false,
why
is
the
point made as
well,
6~oCw'
a
if
it were a
It was argued that
need not refer to definition; it could refer to classification
't( l
as
and
6t
one
MS,
omits 't(
A ,
in b 32;
but N.B. o6crCa.<; in 27.
X4~ in 26-7 could indicate a restriction (as suggested above),
generalising,
cases;
if
unless
one
or
the
the
last,
introduction
the
reference
reads lvfpyec.a.1.
with
of
to
the
a
second,
separate
group
1S1tep e!va.c.
'tL
in b 30
in
and
takes xa.i.
MSS
31
of
is odd, not
as
lOSlb 25-28,
so
epexegetic. But that
there,
is
one
can
be
in
about
attached
to bj.i.oCw'?
the
being deceived at Aristotle
fact,
deceived
deceived
might
a
contrast
about
incomposites If
all,
not
at
all 1
failing
felt
it
per
in
accidens
but
How much force
being deceived
but
have
intended
the 't( lcrtc.
per accidens
is
not
be
should
be
not
really
to make contact with the subject,
necessary to
add
the
point
that
we
can be deceived per accidens in 26-8 as well as in 25-6. Two suggestions had been put forward previously as to how one might
For the
being no combination of subject and predicate at all.
description of a string of words not forming a sentence as a definition, reference was made to De
that
in any
composition
does
of coming-to-be and
passing away, rather than as assertions of immortality. does
rather
true
special one about definitions, which obscures it?
posites in (I) (see above, on lOSla 34-b 2). It
of
the
be the case
not
that it is very tempting to analyse this point in terms
least
inferior to that relating to com-
1-:i
is
If incom-
refer to the matter, even if one does not grasp the essence.
that
defined, but
the
matter
their
reference
latter (only)
to
E 2 1026b
iJ5lh 17
be deceived about
something
per accidens:
failing
to refer to the thing,
to
essence.
the
that
one
could
It was refer
by
(2)
now suggested an
( 1)
by using the name but
by referring to the matter but not
ace idental
( 3)
that
the
description
point might
( c f.
An Post.
there is an implicit reference in the context to the thing it is being
22 83a 6, 2. 8 93a 21 ff.)i
.:1dvanced
human soul yesterday, by saying 'the thing we were talking about yester-
as
a
definition
of',
( i)
would
seem that
by
the
same token
day is a forked radish'
with the subject in the way the simple statement
are
radish'
not
much
false
as
simply
failures
to
refer
to
in
is the
not
just
context
would.
It
was
pointed out
that
where
it
'two-footed' Ls
a
horse
animal
is
not
that is being
dental e.g.
if
and we
those do
where
know
that
we
58
in An.
'the soul is a forked Post. 2. 8 93a 21 a
have
some
knowledge
of
the
thing
thunder is a noise in the clouds,
•,;hat causes it.
j_
that
contrast is drawn between cases where our knowledge of a thing is acci-
definiendum at all.
the point true
so
the
- which doesn't completely fail to make contact
an appeal to the suggestion above, that wrong definitions
~he
( ii)
it
There are two possible solutions:
it could be false as well.
for example, if we were talking about
be 1.
159
itself,
though not
R
'n51 b
1 .J
I
•J
! I
An
application
of
( 2)
to
a
composite
being would
be
our
saying
'the oeing whose matter is f1esh and bone of a certain sort (i.e. man) is
a
forked
radish'.
concerned -
It
su~gested
was
if we are now supposing that
:~::1ccidens
where
these
are
concerned
that
where
26-28 does as
well
incomposites
are
not rule out error
- a part analogous
to
that played by the matter in the case of composites might here be played by
the
lion's
J
that
I.e.,
genus. 1
suul
we
are
we
,
if we say
are
wrong
if
'the human soul has
referring
to
soul,
though
the faculties of
our statement shows That
we think we are referring to human soul.
;Josite
respectively
-
and
a
b~1ng
each
second f.-Lkv understood dfter £~Tt~
an EJ't~ in the rather,
the
introductory words sense
subsequently below)
the
be
noted.
a
similar
is
'being
in
at
like
is
'that
being
construction
in
b
~-!e
indeed
like
(i.s)
this
like
well.
clause
and
are not to understand
('being
is)
and
as
its
being
and -rO 6€: ~v.
(that
33
of
b.:: aJ.verbial, answering
truth .•. ',
-rb Wt; -rO in b 34.
suits
.3uhject
( l).
bJ3-4
between Ev J.l~V
divided sense
lti€
-r.? 6t in (2) ·..lill then
of the following one.
one
subject
rather
Or
cruth');
It
truth');
the
this.
(see it may
might have expected
was
pointed
out
that,
tJne can talk about soul in general, rather than the souls of particular
with Ross's interpretation, one might have expected -rb 6~ l-rEpov rather
species,
than ~o 6~ ~v
is suggested by De Anima L.
l
412a 3 ff.;
on the other hand.
Alternatively
l. lla -b).
If -
the
incomposites
and 1t was
t~J
-
refer what
to
are
forms,
pointed out that coming
into
as
opposed
to
forms
.!...!_ it is taken
LU5Lb 28 supports this,
being
without
a
process
plus matter
(see
p.
158
the wider class of things described as -rC lcrtL?
are
Essences
b
33.
pattern of
should
being
in
we
read tO
things
J.Jc:; or We; -rO
corresponding to
!he
be
latter
fits
the
truth in propositions and
part
33-l052a it
(Because the line numbers of different editions may
seems useful
to set out
this
passage,
10 0~ e[v~• w~ ~0 ~~~et,, ·~t ~b ~~ eTv~• ~0
w,
numbering the clauses:)
~0 teuoo~. (1) EV ~lv
cr(,yxe.~~·.
•:crnv, d
"lis print. 1
n
'",J
1-
at (
the
l)
the
end
of
(4)
in early
,~lause
(1 )
hut {f
·to
0~
except
of
Ross
is
(lOSlb
2-17):
tt1ey
do
not II
relate
directly :~ee
(105lb 7-33i
in so far as CT\.)"'("lte:t'cr13a.L is something that ~esn~_! apply
.u\composites
(105lb
The &..cr-uvee-ra.,
18-22).
on
the
t:..ther hand,
do
,eem to he taken up by (3) + (4). takes ltv f-L~V 't
tn.ese
(J"Lt:ki.ng
in
(1)
to
out a different
be answered by -rO 6E ~\1 in (J),
t60
this
ev
parallel
from
Politics
l285b
38-l286a
it
taken
awkward.
(1).
105lb
But in this case,
(1),
in in
34
could
the
first
(it
to
is)
what
is the subject ~
or prima-
tO 6~ in (3) introducing composite being;
it
is
then to tadke of
presumably
does make sense,
seem particularly if
~~v
12,
taken as referring
And, what are we in
like that'
'but
Ev
that
(cf.
'the other sort of thing (--rQ 6!: ),
just
as
suggested
cruth'
It could be 33-34,
predicative
indeed. one
'vas
single
€v will not of course then be carried over
(2) as well as
is
is
doesn't
the
not
point
like
so
in
if it
(J)
(3)
is
as
(~..£·
and
(4)?
well. at all),
though the reference to unity here;
this,
it
but is
(4) '.Vill have not
(2.!_1~)',
to be
which
is
The general significance of lOSlb 33-l052a 4 and its place in the struc-
What i.1"~
each
composite and incom-
do
the
chapter
these
force
of
concerning
if ,;.Ev in
t~hole.
chat
lines the
add
t:_ruth.
line
to
what
has
observations made
is
Being
ilOt
was
preceded? in
They extend to
the earlier parts of the
referred
to
answered by 0£ in b 13
in
105Lb
(dnd we
23;
even
noted that
·..Jith one reading in b 23 it is answered at once bY -tO Ot: +e:U6ot;). never~heless 'J,1
rype of heinJ?; -
a
to composite being, Hith
a
c 1 early take up again the discuss ton of O""Oyxe::taBa.t.
chapter
Ross, is
chapter).
nd ( 2 ) '!
d
to
'it
ture of the chapter as a
editions
discussion of a-Uv9e;'ta. and drr6v8e;--ra. .in part
_,E'low), t'J
( l) of
part the
mark
Ross's
not lhe sense required .
~v, F.:L~ep Ov, o\hwc;: l
rhe quest.1on
the
to
is l05lb
of
'' f
And
•,-ice versa (cf. above on (£)).
vary,
predicative,
~.·ily
in categories other than that of substance, it was suggested. In
(3);
in
only has ~v o~.
1. 1 402b 7 suggests that soul may not be a genus (cf. Alexander, Quaest.
the
hein~
on
b 22-23 does lead us to expect a subsequent ceference to being. other
hand,
b
33
refers
both
the ccmposite and to incomposite
(see above), whereas b 23 refers only to Llle truth of incomposites;
that
of
composites
in
(105lb
L0l
2-17)
and
that of the incomposites
:51 b
jj
. !JJES 1/N THETA
05lb .lJ
<:IIAPTRR 10
in II (starting at lOSlb
It was poin-
17 and really ending at b 33).
(2) t~d
out
that
this
makes
al;so
truly
a
suppose
that
in separation t1nd falsehood in combination,
that
things which are separated are separated;
compressed
statement which
can only
rf'ally
be
r~marked
It was to
the
it refer to
in
tence
ZH9 carry out the progralllme of E,
with being in the sense of truth and falsity. be
felt
refer '"hat
2;
is
and
•.:f.
under
discussing
rliscussion
incomposites that
A 29)
after
to being again at
the
in
is
necessary,
back
place,
b
truth ff.
33
the
is
type
in But
of
I and II,
sections
in things
to
truth or
truth and
falsehood
(cf.
(3}
been discussed,
doesn't
seem
one
won't
or
to mathematical
1026a 29 he uses obo-Ca. of
intermediates?
to
require
be
But
such
a
tempted
to
it.
(Could
the point of the sen-
metaphysical
e:L ·uc; ...
Perhaps
then
What
is
the
is
potulate,
on
simply to emphasise
attribute
tion
and
in
of xo"tb. 'tO 1to't'f
force
oe
Jto~t ~v ••• Jto~!:
properties
other
respects?
II)?
to point
Only
if
we
(indefinite;
Does it suggest
below)? (See
at
are willing
to
1
not
there
one
1t6"t£.
~an
at some times'
give
a
parallel
Cf.
be decep-
Could Jto-rf mean
below).
'in some cases' rather than strictly
falsity in statements; and it have
etc.
time to what results and not at another.
1051b
1051b 28;
Unmoved Mover
to
it ·.vas pointed out that
being
'Platonic'
interpretation.)
that
is concerned
lt is odd that it should
things which are lvepye:CCf,
are
corresponds
after
any
that since the object of discussion in 9 10, accor-
view that
the
hesitation about the UM at
so b 34-
understood
to
It seems more intelligible to hesitate about the former,
but the ensuing examples are mathematical, and when Ar does express
if one
the light of what has gone before.
ding
&xCvn1'a. refer
Does
1052a 4 ff.
With regard to b 34-5, it was remarked that there
truth
asserts
are
5
be
t0
objects?
takes up only (II).
r:an
'!ven h
it
t052a
loosely
&.el. at
(cf.
interpretation
out how this type of being corresponds to them.
III.
(4)
4-1~2
Deception and the changeless (1052a
This picks up the idea of heing deceived from (II),
but otherwise
seems to be a development of the last part of (I) (10Slb 15-17), (II)
in
t:he
That
(III)
Rossi
that
Reale
of
a
7-11;
l)f
interimhas
picks it
up
is
(I)
continues
himself,
shown
quantification
the
.
is
timeless
truths
are
vi.ew of S.
in
~J2.·
16 ff.
and
Reale i.i.
94,
( Etu~~.!~~·
Aubenque
possible
Maurus
the
case
of
a
class,
centred
around
some
nine
questions,
of
varying
D0es
a
4
belong with what immediately precedes ( "t"b 6~ lv ••••
ff.
at
b 35,
at
the opening of the chapter?
a
introducing composite being), or wi.th the general problem
different
f3r ;f:'c
as
one
t ion).
reason is
for
~iven)
absence
If the former, if must be ,,f
deception
at b 15-7 (';o.Thich
'be
than
belon~ed
that
givin~
given
of
or
thing
particular? that
might
particular
A
change
triangle
its properties,
different
in different cases';
if
or any tri'vary'
we would still get a false
belief as long as necessary properties were taken, but the contrast with what follows would be spoilt.
How
(so
in the composites
does
"tt j.JkV... relate to Xo"tt
about triangles, and
importance. treated here in roughly textual order: ( 1)
or
( 5)
discussion
universal sort
not
an i.ndividual. 'lur
the
The universal would be needed if ~£"taadAX£LV meant
angle.
R6-7). but
be
anything did, but Ar could mean the triangle as such,
~l~ss
incomposite.
the view of ps. ·Alexander 601.
(II)
Bonitz,
that
Is "tb -rpCywv0\1 would
some
in one make
of
g~;~ise
good
ensuing
and
general
governing
another
?
Are
we
still
talking
(or that the triangle in general appears now
but makes
examples.
very More
representation of
verb
Lmmediately
...
This would
and now in another, if 't'\ is predicate)?
sense,
the
~ev
the false belief being that some are of one kind
still
abrupt
by
an
change
likely '
form
being ol-f)ae-ra.L of
illustrated
the
example
163
an error course. where
of subject
o'o6
is
might But
a
take, why
one doesn 1 t
in
vague
is
the it
wrongly
(6)
think some are of one kind and some of another, but wrongly thinks
as
truth
all
of
simples
are
of
one
kind?
though Ar 1 s
We had no very clear answer,
and
falsehood,
and
with
a
the 1:'( lO"'tt.Y
reference
in
9
forward
to
l027b 27;
10 (E 4
the
discussion
where,
it may be
main point seemed clear enough.
noted, the reference to -r<'i. d.~Xd 'X.o.\ 't'h -cC ~rr-tLY does not seem to suggest that
the
Is -cl subject or predicate?
hard
to
On the vague interpretation it could
former resist
a sub-class of
are that
the
l.Jhole
of
the latter).
EZH9 form
The conclusion was
a systematically arranged
discussion of the senses of being - at whatever stage in their develop-
still be either.
ment the arrangement took place. ( 7)
How
does
had
no
T, -cLvb.c: •••
clear
relate
answer.
to
the
Could Ar
~..;ords?
preceding mean
Tr
(with
Again
epexegetic)
we
that
Despite our
a Does &.pL8~4 ••• tva.
(8)
mean
the
number
one,
or
any
single
number?
list
takes
make
says
mistakes
about.
1
false
beliefs)
One
•
But on the whole we
could
not
there
of the form
hold
1
preferred
any single
beliefs (and a fortiori not
'some are of one kind and some of an-
other'.
of
senses
up being we
must
relevant
of
'being',
as
consider
( l027b
Are 'tLvfl ••• -c~ov&
masculine
singulars or neuter plurals?
Nothing
and
the
later
28-9),
but
after
list
Truth
those adds
them (~eCrr6w
i!:p6.y)..J.o.-ca.
in
the
be
cleceived,
31).
But
·heme ·->ut l
falsity
of
exist it
was
in
10-15);
that
to
there
is
potentiality
incomposites,
actuality
felt
only and try
and
not link
about
which
potentially 9 10 as
potentiality and actuality was implausible,
particular
passages
and
this
phrases.
Rather,
it
for
change
It
we
cannot
scrappy
(l05lb 28,
a whole
to the
::H,
having
before
proceeding
been dealt
further
sense
2 l026a
33-l026b
falsity, : ;1e
of
with
lists
is
and
falsity
these
in
E 2-J,
l64
l3 9,
(cf.
three
actuality),
discussed
'being 1
after
a
in
this
since
brief
neither
is
said
being.
E 4
discussion
area
which are
accidental
being
1028a 3) and look at the causes and principles
programme
out,
ZH9 forms a single connected whole car-
let
alone
that
Ar
envisaged
the
whole
of
which presumably no-one would
(the
34-b
with then
E 4
thesis
that
particular
ZH8 form
we
we
noted
refers
still
a
rough whole,
have
earlier
however
the difficulties (see above, yp.
back copiously,
but
not
for
loose
l-3).
H
apparently to
the
Moreover E truth and accidental;
t.ntroduces
being
does
not
refer
back on
9 10 itself does pick up from E 4, does it
to
it
come where
come 1
in
e,
it
but
does?
topic
of
the
as we
matter, Also
it
does
not
seem
Ar get it out of the way at
~ccidental
being?
actuality
and
but there are problems.
Why
There is no obviously better place for
why didn t
ot
this
z
1-9 doesn It dO mUCh piCking Up from !Jlhat. precedes,
this the
It
and
the unifi-
have
a
it.
that
but
anyway the unity of Z itself is by no means unproblematic.
2).
and
in
true
and
categories,
together
l
be
places,
noH
that
8 10 wi.llthen ~o on to
lOSla
uses
catlon
may in
9
noted
being in potentiality and actuality;
by the end of
truth and 2
potentiality
accidental
to
that
accidental
questions
that
entirely
involving picking was
refers back to being in substance and the other categories, the theme
of
saying
not
E 2 starts with
say.
change where
(l051b
remained
Ar does go on to do this of course. but we cannot
assume without futher ado that rying
8 10 in 9 as a whole
and
we
and
1
t:H8 in detail when writing the end of E, T__Q~~of
it
nor being as truth is being in the proper sense (xupCwc;;: b 31) we must dismiss
seems to hang on this.
on
discussion of
truth from
of being qua being.
(9)
discussions
EZHA formed a unified whole.
continues with a
in many ways
It seems easier to think of the number one as something one cannot
number
previous
satisfied about how far
fyl.ng one's belief that some numbers are prime and some not?
EZH9
General considerations on
thinking no evens are prime is a 'Nay one could go wrong in speci-
to
rely on
the rest of 8,
the start in E,
so
as he did with
What connexion has it with the preceding discussion potentiality?
x.up~Utta.,;a.
)1)5
( l05lb 1)
is
embarrassing
on
any
cc,uld some If
view be
defence •..,;oas
we
assume
3 takes till and
if
Ar
had
good a place 6Uvni-J.&.t; at
put
(but
up
for
should
tne
we?)
something
to
so
being ~nding
9 10 was
above),
unificati0n that
the
thesis
programme
but
perhaps
On the other hand as
e
regards
sketched
at
10.
1028a
there would be no room for 9 10 earlier, 810 seems as
· t?t~·· reference to !!wtpye~a. and
lOSlb 28 might gi\·e a positive reason for putting 9 10 after 10 does, in part, focus on truth concerning the ~xCv~~~
arisen without
of
mentioned
as any for him to sa7 it.
the
rest
flirted with the idea that idea
31,
or interpolated.
say about truth and falsity
compared with composites,
have
and
1027b
misplac~d
9 9 to complete,
the rest of 8; as
·.(upCw«; at
(cf.
dealt with as
not
as
truth
which gi·1es 11s a
focussing that wouldn't
of A,
9 8.
up as xup\.
say definitely what
8
\.Je
even briefly
9 10 was written by someone warming
presupposing
by Aristotle,
especially
and
being
being -
to
the
and actuality/potentiality,
but we did not seriously think
ended
by reaffirming that we couldn't
10 presupposed,
and that the unification thesis
had not Oeen freed from all its difficulties.
l66
