Nuclear Safety
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Nuclear Safety GIANNI PETRANGELI
Amsterdam Boston Heidelberg London New York Paris San Diego San Francisco Singapore Sydney Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
Oxford Tokyo
Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 8DP 30 Corporate Drive, Suite 400, Burlington, MA 01803 First edition 2006 Copyright ß 2006, Gianni Petrangeli. Published by Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. All rights reserved. The right of Gianni Petrangeli to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone (þ44) (0) 1865 843830; fax (þ44) (0) 1865 853333; email:
[email protected]. Alternatively you can submit your request online by visiting the Elsevier web site at http://elsevier.com/locate/permissions, and selecting Obtaining permissions to use the Elsevier material Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 13: 978-0-7506-6723-4 ISBN 10: 0-7506-6723-0 For information on all Butterworth-Heinemann publications visit our web site at http://books.elsevier.com Printed and bound in the UK 06 07 08 09 10 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface xiii Acknowledgements xv
3-3 Future safety systems and plant concepts 3-3-1 General remarks 23 3-3-2 Some passive safety systems for nuclear plants 27 3-3-3 Inherently safe systems in the process industries 30 References 32 Chapter notes 32
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1-1 Objectives 1 1-2 A short history of nuclear safety technology 1-2-1 The early years 2 1-2-2 From the late 1950s to the Three Mile Island accident 2 1-2-3 From the Three Mile Island accident to the Chernobyl accident 7 1-2-4 The Chernobyl accident and after 8 References 10 Chapter notes 10
2
Chapter 2 Inventory and localization of radioactive products in the plant 13 References
15
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions 17 3-1 Plant systems 17 3-2 Safety systems and accidents
18
23
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples 35 4-1 Classification 35 4-2 Design basis accidents 35 4-2-1 Some important data for accident analysis 35 4-2-2 Example of a category 2 accident: spurious opening of a pressurizer safety valve 40 4-2-3 Example of a category 3 accident: instantaneous power loss to all the primary pumps 41 4-2-4 Example of a category 4 accident: main steam line break 43 4-2-5 Example of a category 4 accident: sudden expulsion of a control rod from the core 44 4-2-6 Example of a category 4 accident: break of the largest pipe of the primary system (large LOCA) 46 4-2-7 Example of a category 4 accident: fuel handling accident 47 4-2-8 Area accidents 50 v
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4-3 Beyond design basis accidents 51 4-3-1 Plant originated accidents 51 4-3-2 Accidents due to human voluntary actions 51 4-4 External accidents of natural origin 51 References 51 Chapter notes 51
Chapter 5 Severe accidents 53 5-1 Existing plants 53 5-2 Future plants: extreme and practicable solutions 55 5-3 Severe accident management: the present state of studies and implementations 57 5-4 Data on severe accidents 58 5-5 Descriptions of some typical accident sequences 58 5-5-1 Loss of station electric power supply (TE ¼ transient þ loss of electrical supply) 58 5-5-2 Loss of electric power with LOCA from the pump seals (SE ¼ small LOCA þ loss of electric power) 61 5-5-3 Interfacing systems LOCA (V) 61 5-5-4 Large LOCA with failure of the recirculation (ALFC) 62 5-5-5 Small LOCA with failure of the recirculation (SLFC) 62 5-6 ‘Source terms’ for severe accidents 62 References 64
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases 65 6-1 The most interesting releases for safety evaluations 65 6-2 Dispersion of releases: phenomena 66 6-3 Release dispersion: simple evaluation techniques 70 6-4 Formulae and diagrams for the evaluation of atmospheric dispersion 71 Reference 76 Chapter notes 76
Chapter 7 Health consequences of releases 79 7-1 The principles of health protection and safety 79 7-2 Some quantities, terms and units of measure of health physics 79 7-3 Types of effects of radiation doses and limits 80 7-4 Evaluation of the health consequences of releases 81 7-4-1 Evaluation of inhalation doses from radioactive iodine 81 7-4-2 Evaluation of doses due to submersion in a radioactive cloud 81 7-4-3 Evaluation of the doses of radiation from caesium-137 deposited on the ground (‘ground-shine’ dose) 81 7-4-4 Evaluation of the dose due to deposition of plutonium on the ground 81 7-4-5 Indicative evaluation of long distance doses for very serious accidents to nuclear reactors 82 7-4-6 Direct radiation doses 82 Reference 83 Chapter notes 83
Chapter 8 The general approach to the safety of the plant-site complex 85 8-1 Introduction 85 8-2 The definition of the safety objectives of a plant on a site 85 8-2-1 The objectives and limits of release/dose 85 8-3 Some plant characteristics for the prevention and mitigation of accidents 86 8-4 Radiation protection characteristics 86 8-5 Site characteristics 87
Chapter 9 Defence in depth 89 9-1 Definition, objectives, levels and barriers 9-2 Additional considerations on the levels of Defence in Depth 89
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Chapter 14 Notes on some plant components 119
Chapter 10 Quality assurance 93 10-1 General remarks and requirements 10-2 Aspects to be underlined 93 Reference 94
93
Chapter 11 Safety analysis 95 11-1 Introduction 95 11-2 Deterministic safety analysis 95 11-3 Probabilistic safety analysis 97 11-3-1 Event trees 98 11-3-2 Fault trees 99 11-3-3 Failure rates 105 References 105 Chapter notes 105
Chapter 12 Safety analysis review 107 12-1 Introduction 107 12-2 The reference points 107 12-3 Foreseeing possible issues for discussion 107 12-4 Control is not disrespectful 108 12-5 Clarification is not disrespectful 109 12-6 Designer report 110 12-6-1 Introduction 110 12-6-2 Conclusions 110 12-6-3 Hydrodynamic aspects 110 12-6-4 Effective mass of oscillating system 111 12-6-5 Evaluation of fluid damping 111 12-6-6 Vibration analysis 111 12-7 Discussion 114 References 115 Chapter notes 115
Chapter 13 Classification of plant components 117 Reference
118
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14-1 Reactor pressure vessel 119 14-1-1 Problems highlighted by operating experience 119 14-1-2 Rupture probability of non-nuclear vessels 120 14-1-3 Failure probability of nuclear vessels 122 14-1-4 Vessel material embrittlement due to neutron irradiation 124 14-1-5 Pressurized thermal shock 126 14-1-6 The reactor pressure vessel of Three Mile Island 2 126 14-1-7 General perspective on the effect of severe accidents on the pressure vessel 127 14-1-8 Recommendations for the prevention of hypothetical accidents generated by the pressure vessel 128 14-2 Piping 130 14-2-1 Evolution of the regulatory positions 130 14-2-2 Problems indicated by experience 130 14-2-3 Leak detection in water reactors 132 14-2-4 Research programmes on piping 133 14-3 Valves 134 14-3-1 General remarks 134 14-3-2 Some data from operating experience 134 14-3-3 The most commonly used types of valve 135 14-3-4 Types of valve: critical areas, design and operation 136 14-3-5 Valve standards 140 14-4 Containment systems 141 References 142
Chapter 15 Earthquake resistance 145 15-1 General aspects, criteria and starting data 145 15-2 Reference ground motion 148 15-3 Structural verifications 158 15-3-1 Foundation soil resistance 158 15-3-2 Resistance of structures 162 References 182
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Contents
Chapter 16 Tornado resistance 185 16-1 The physical phenomenon 185 16-2 Scale of severity of the phenomenon 16-3 Design input data 186 Reference 187
186
Chapter 17 Resistance to external impact 189 17-1 Introduction 189 17-2 Aircraft crash impact 189 17-2-1 Effects of an aircraft impact 189 17-2-2 Overall load on a structure 189 17-2-3 Vibration of structures and components 191 17-2-4 Local perforation of structures 191 17-2-5 The effect of a fire 192 17-2-6 Temporary incapacity of the operating personnel 192 17-3 Pressure wave 192 17-5 Other impacts 193 References 194
Chapter 18 Nuclear safety criteria 195 18-1 General characteristics 195 18-2 The US general design criteria 195 18-3 IAEA criteria 196 18-4 EUR criteria 196 18-5 Other general criteria compilations 197 References 198 Chapter notes 198
Chapter 19 Nuclear safety research 199 Reference
199
Chapter 20 Operating experience 201 20-1 Introduction 201 20-2 Principal sources 201
20-3 Some significant events 201 20-3-1 Mechanical events 201 20-3-2 Electrical events 202 20-3-3 System events 202 20-3-4 Area events 203 20-3-5 Reactivity accidents 204 20-3-6 Possible future accidents 204 20-4 The International Nuclear Event Scale References 207
205
Chapter 21 Underground location of nuclear power plants 209 References
212
Chapter 22 The effects of nuclear explosions 215 22-1 22-2 22-3 22-4 22-5 22-6 22-7
Introduction 215 Types of nuclear bomb 215 The consequences of a nuclear explosion 215 Initial nuclear radiation 217 Shock wave 217 Initial thermal radiation 218 Initial radioactive contamination (‘fallout’) 218 22-8 Underground nuclear tests 218 22-8-1 Historical data on nuclear weapons tests 218 22-8-2 The possible effects of an underground nuclear explosion 219 22-8-3 The possible radiological effects of the underground tests 220 References 220
Chapter 23 Radioactive waste 221 23-1 Types and indicative amounts of radioactive waste 221 23-2 Principles 222 Reference 223
Chapter 24 Fusion safety 225 References
228
Contents
Chapter 25 Safety of specific plants and of other activities 229 25-1 Boiling water reactors 229 25-2 Pressure tube reactors 231 25-3 Gas reactors 231 25-4 Research reactors 232 25-5 Sodium-cooled fast reactors 232 25-6 Fuel plants 233 25-7 Nuclear seawater desalination plants 233 25-8 VVER plants 234 25-9 Ship propulsion reactors 234 25-10 Safe transport of radioactive substances 234 25-11 Safety of radioactive sources and of radiation generating machines 234 References 235
Chapter 26 Nuclear facilities on satellites 237 26-1 Types of plant 237 26-2 Possible accidents and their consequences 238 Reference 238
Chapter 27 Erroneous beliefs about nuclear safety 239 References
241
Chapter 28 When can we say that a particular plant is safe? 243
Chapter 29 The limits of nuclear safety: the residual risk 245 29-1 Risk in general
245
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29-2 Risk concepts and evaluations in nuclear installation safety 245 29-2-1 Tolerable risk 245 29-2-2 Risk-informed decisions 246 29-3 Residual risk: the concept of loss-of-life expectancy 247 29-4 Risk from various energy sources 247 29-5 Risk to various human activities 248 29-6 Are the risk analyses of nuclear power plants credible? 248 29-7 Proliferation and terrorism 250 References 250
Additional references 251 Appendices Appendix 1 The Chernobyl accident 279 A1-1 Introduction 279 A1-2 The reactor 279 A1-3 The event 281 References 284
Appendix 2 Calculation of the accident pressure in a containment 285 A2-1 Introduction 285 A2-2 Initial overpressure 285 A2-3 Containment pressure versus time 286 A2-3-1 Introductory remarks 287 A2-3-2 Calculation method 287 A2-3-3 Heat exchanged with the outside through the metal container 288 A2-3-4 Heat released by hot metals 288 A2-3-5 Heat exchanged with cold metals 289 A2-3-6 Heat exchanged with concrete layers 289 A2-3-7 Decay heat 290 A2-3-8 Heat removed by the spray system internal to the containment 291 A2-3-9 Solar heat 291 A2-3-10 Thermal balance in the interval 292 A2-3-11 Considerations on the performance of the calculation and on the choice of the input data 292 A2-3-12 Example calculation 293 References 296
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Appendix 3 Table of safety criteria 297
Appendix 4 Dose calculations 315 A4-1 Introduction 315 A4-2 Virtual population dose in a severe accident 315 A4-2-1 The reactor and the released isotopes 315 A4-2-2 Source term at three days (I, Cs, Xe) 315 A4-2-3 Dose at the fence after three days of exposure 316 A4-2-4 Ground shine long-term dose 316 A4-3 Explorative evaluation of the radiological consequences of a mechanical impact on a surface storage facility for category 2 waste 316 A4-3-1 Type of repository 316 A4-3-2 Reference impact 316 A4-3-3 Fragmentation and dispersion of material 317 A4-3-4 Doses 318 A4-3-5 Conclusions 319 A4-4 Explorative evaluation of the radiological consequences of a mechanical impact on a transport/storage cask containing spent fuel 319 A4-4-1 Characteristics of the cask 319 A4-4-2 Reference impact 319 A4-4-3 Amount of significant fission products in the internal atmosphere of the cask and external release in one day 319 A4-4-4 Effective committed doses 320 A4-4-5 Conclusions 321 References 321
Appendix 5 Simplified thermal analysis of an insufficiently refrigerated core 323 A5-1 Analysis of the core without refrigeration 323 A5-2 Other formulae and useful data for the indicative study of the cooling of a core after an accident 325 References 326
Appendix 6 Extracts from EUR criteria (December 2004) 327 2-1-8-3 List of design basis conditions 327 2-1-8 Tables 328 2-1-8-1 Table 1: Radiological criteria for radioactive releases in normal operation and incident conditions 328 2-1-8-2 Table 2: Frequencies and acceptance criteria for normal operation, incident and accident conditions 328 2-1-B-1 Criteria for limited impact for DEC 329 2-1-B1-1 Table B1: Criteria for limited impact for no emergency action beyond 800 m from the reactor 329 2-1B 1-2 Table B2: Criteria for limited impact for no delayed action beyond 3 km from the reactor 330 2-1B 1-3 Table B3: Criteria for limited impact for no long-term actions beyond 800 m from the reactor 330 2-1B 1-4 Table B4: Criteria for limited impact for economic impact 330 2-1 B2 Release targets for design basis category 3 and 4 conditions 330 2-1-B-2-1 Table B5: DBA release targets for no action beyond 800 m from the reactor 331 2-1-B-2-2 Table B6: DBA release targets for economic impact 331 2-1-2-3 Operational staff doses during normal operation and incidents 331 2-1-2-6 Probabilistic safety targets 332 2-1-3-4 Single failure criterion 332 2-1-4-3-2 Complex sequences that may be considered in DEC 333 2-1-6-8 Classification of the safety functions and categorisation of the equipment 333 2-1-6-6-3 Requirements according to level of safety functions 334 2-1-6-8-4 Assignment of equipment and structures to a safety category 334
Contents
2-1-6-8-5 Requirements on equipment and structures according to safety category 335 2-1-6-8-6 Classification of structures and equipment according to the design and construction codes 335 2-1-6-8-7 The relation of seismic categorisation to safety level of functions 335 2-1-6-13 Accident management 335 2-1-6-14 Radiation protection 336
Appendix 7 Notes on fracture mechanics 337 A7-1 Introduction 337 A7-2 Current practice 338 References 341
Appendix 8 US general design criteria 343 A8-1 Introduction 344 A8-2 Definitions and explanations 345 A8-3 Criteria 345 A8-3-1 Overall requirements 345 A8-3-2 Protection by Multiple Fission Product Barriers 346 A8-3-3 Protection and Reactivity Control Systems 348 A8-3-4 Fluid Systems 349 A8-3-5 Reactor Containment 351 A8-3-6 Fuel and Radioactivity Control 352 Notes 353
Appendix 9 IAEA criteria 355
Appendix 10 Primary depressurization systems 357 A10-1 Initial studies 357 A10-2 Depressurization systems for modern design reactors 359 References 363
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Appendix 11 Thermal-hydraulic transients of the primary system 365 A11-1 General remarks 365 A11-2 General program characteristics 366 A11-3 Program description 366 A11-3-1 Macro Stampa dati 366 A11-3-2 Macro Copia_dati 368 A11-3-3 Macro HF 368 A11-3-4 Macro HFG 369 A11-3-5 Macro VF 369 A11-3-6 Macro VFG 370 A11-3-7 Macro QS 370 A11-3-8 Macro GU 370 A11-3-9 Macro GE 372 A11-3-10 Macro DT 373 A11-3-11 Macro PS 373 A11-4 Using the program 377 A11-5 Other formulae for the expanded use of the program 377 A11-5-1 ATWS 377 A11-5-2 Pressure in a depressurization water discharge tank 378 References 378
Appendix 12 The atmospheric dispersion of releases 379
Appendix 13 Regulatory framework and safety documents 385 A13-1 Regulatory framework 385 A13-2 Safety documents 385 A13-2-1 The safety report 386 A13-2-2 The probabilistic safety assessment 388 A13-2-3 The environmental impact assessment 388 A13-2-4 The external emergency plan 388 A13-2-5 The operation manual, including the emergency procedures 388 A13-2-6 Operation organization document 390 A13-2-7 The pre-operational test programme 390
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A13-2-8 The technical specifications for operation 390 A13-2-9 The periodic safety reviews References 391
391
Appendix 14 USNRC Regulatory Guides and Standard Review Plan 393 A14-1 Extracts from a regulatory guide 393 A14-2 List of contents and extracts from a sample chapter of the Standard Review Plan 395 A14-3 Sample chapter 400
Appendix 15 Safety cage 405 A15-1 General remarks 405 A15-2 Available energy 405 A15-3 Mechanical energy which can be released 405 A15-4 Overall sizing of a structural cage around the pressure vessel 406 A15-5 Experimental tests on steel cages for the containment of vessel explosions 408 Reference 408
Appendix 16 Criteria for the site chart (Italy) 409 A16-1 Population and land use 409 A16-2 Geology, seismology and soil mechanics 409 A16-3 Engineering requirements 410 A16-4 Extreme events from human activities A16-5 Extreme natural events 410
410
Appendix 17 The Three Mile Island accident 411 A17-1 Summary description of the Three Mile Island no. 2 Plant 411 A17-2 The accident 413 A17-3 The consequences of the accident on the outside environment 419 A17-4 The actions initiated after the accident 421 References 422
Glossary 423 Web sites 425 Index 427
Preface
Introduction I have written this book because of my firm belief that it is necessary to try to gather and to preserve in written form, and from one perspective, the accumulated experience in the fields of nuclear safety and of radiation protection. This is particularly important for countries where nuclear energy exploitation has been stopped, but where it might have to be resumed in future. The main accent of this book is on Nuclear Safety. From another point of view, many areas developed in nuclear safety studies are of interest in the safety of process plants too and, therefore, it is worthwhile writing about them. Given this perspective, I have tried to collect the ideas, the data and the methods which, in many decades of professional work in several countries, are in my opinion the most useful for ‘integrated system’ evaluations of the plant safety. I have emphasized the complete site–plant system more than single details, so the data and the methods discussed are not those applied in the many specialized disciplines devoted to the in-depth study of safety but are those required for overall, first approximation, assessments. In my opinion, such assessments are the most useful ones for the detection of many safety-related problems in a plant and for the drafting of a complete picture of them. The more accurate and precise methods are, however, essential in the optimization phase of plant design and of its operational parameters. Specialists in reactor engineering, in thermalhydraulics, in radiation protection and in structural
response issues may, therefore, be surprised to read that simple methods and shortcuts suggested here are very useful, as my experience and that of other ‘generalists’ suggests. Additionally, this book aims to cover some general and some unusual topics, such as: the overall conditions to be complied with by a ‘safe’ plant, the trans-boundary consequences of accidents to plants or to specific activities, the consequences of terrorist acts, and so on. On some crucial issues, the views of the world’s nuclear specialists are not the same, for example, the views in Western countries compared with those in former soviet-bloc countries on the pre-Chernobyl approach to nuclear safety in Eastern Europe: the West considered the soviet approach to be a relatively lenient one, while the soviets thought that they concentrated on prevention of accidents rather than on the mitigation of them. In these cases, the text tries to be objective and to quote the ‘Eastern’ view besides the ‘Western’ one, leaving future engineers and technical developments to decide on this issue. Except where explicitly indicated, the text refers to the pressurized water reactor. Extrapolation to other kinds of plants is, however, possible. The text complies with internationally recognized safety standards, and in particular with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. On occasions I have digressed, in notes, from the main thrust of the text. I have done this for several reasons: many notes relate facts that qualify or justify what is written in a preceding paragraph; some of them are numerical examples added for clarification; xiii
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Preface
others are simple comments and personal reflections on the subject. These notes are set at the end of each chapter. I have provided a list of references at the end of each chapter, however a complete chapter (Additional references) is almost completely devoted to a list of some ‘institutional’ references (i.e. those published by the IAEA, by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) which is one of the richest sources of publications among Regulatory Bodies). These additional references are labelled with the superscript AR. Many of these references can be consulted and even downloaded from the web sites listed in the Web sites chapter (see p. 425). Calculation sheets mentioned in the text may be downloaded from the publisher’s web site (http://books.elsevier.com/companions/0750667230); the way to use them is described in the text. Finally, I wish to underline that all my experience suggests to me, after many positive and negative lessons learned, that today’s nuclear plants can be
completely safe and that significant accidents can be avoided. This is, however, only true on the condition that safety objectives are carefully pursued by the organizations involved in the plants; in this arena, as it will be shown, even organizations apparently very far from any specific plant must be, up to a certain extent, included (e.g. the bodies responsible for the general energy strategy of a country and the ‘media’). I will be very grateful to my readers for any suggestion concerning improvements to the text and also corrections to the mistakes which are certainly present in it. I am fully aware, in particular, of the subjective nature of the choice of the material included: the subject of nuclear safety, as does that concerning the safety of process plants in general, has become, over time, a discipline composed of many specific rather autonomous subsections. It is not easy, therefore, to choose the material to be included in a general text like this one; in this, practical experience of what is necessary while doing assessment work of plants has been my guide.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to all the colleagues who have cooperated, deliberately or by chance, in supplying me with the material for these pages. I apologize to
them if I don’t name them individually; this is not only because they are many, but because I am sure that I would inadvertently miss out some names. Gianni Petrangeli
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1-1. Objectives The objectives of nuclear safety consist in ensuring the siting and the plant conditions need to comply with adequate principles, such as, for example, the internationally accepted health, safety and radioprotection principles. In particular, the plant at the chosen site shall guarantee that the health of the population and of the workers does not suffer adverse radiation consequences more severe than the established limits and that such effects be the lowest reasonably obtainable (the ALARA – As Low As Reasonably Achievable – Principle) in all operational conditions and in case of accidents. These objectives are frequently subdivided into a General Objective, a Radiation Protection Objective and a Technical Objective: for example, in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criteria (see www.iaea.org). The General Nuclear Safety ObjectiveAR1 is to protect individuals, society and the environment from harm by establishing and maintaining effective defences against radiological hazards in nuclear installations. The Radiation Protection Objective is to ensure that in all operational states radiation exposure within the installation or due to any planned release of radioactive material from the installation is kept below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable, and to ensure mitigation of the radiological consequences of any accidents. The Technical Safety Objective is to take all reasonably practicable measures to prevent accidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate their consequences should they occur; to ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all possible accidents taken into account in the design of the installation,
including those of very low probability, any radiological consequences would be minor and below prescribed limits; and to ensure that the likelihood of accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely low. The target for existing power plants consistent with the Technical Safety Objective has been defined by the INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, advisor to the IAEA Director General)AR185 as a likelihood of occurrence of severe core damage that is below about 10 4 events per plant operating year. Implementation of all safety principles at future plants should lead to the achievement of an improved goal of not more than about 10 5 such events per plant operating year. Severe accident management and mitigation measures should reduce the probability of large offsite releases requiring short-term off-site response by a factor of at least 10. It has to be observed that these principles, while indicating the need for strict control of radiation sources, do not preclude the external release of limited amounts of radioactive products nor the limited exposure of people to radiation. Similarly, the objectives require to decrease the likelihood and the severity of accidents, but they recognize that some accidents can happen. Measures have to be taken for the mitigation of their consequences. Such measures include on-site accident management systems (procedures, equipment, operators) and off-site intervention measures. The greater the potential hazard of a release, the lower must be its likelihood. The chapters of this book, except the few of them not concerned with the safety of nuclear installations, deal with the ways for practically achieving these objectives.
1
2
Nuclear Safety
1-2. A short history of nuclear safety technology
1-2-1. The early years The first reactor, the ‘Fermi pile’ CP1 (or Chicago Pile 1, built in 1942) was provided with rudimentary safety systems in line with the sense of confidence inspired by the charismatic figure of Enrico Fermi and his opinion concerning the absence of any danger from unforeseen phenomena. The safety systems (Fig. 1-1) were:
gravity driven fast shutdown rods (one was operated by cutting a retaining rope with an axe); and
Cadmium solution
(Samuel Allison)
Ax man Spectator
(Norman Hilberry)
ZIP rod 57 layers of uranium and graphite Cadmium rod
Detector Recorder
Compared with the set of safety systems subsequently considered essential, an emergency cooling system was missing as decay heat was practically absent after shut down, and there was no containment system (except for a curtain!) provided as the amount of fission products was not significant. Other reactors were soon built, for both military and civil purposes, and since they were constructed on remote sites (e.g. Hanford, WA), they didn’t need containment systems. In the light of subsequent approaches used in reactor safety, probably, in this first period, not all the necessary precautions were taken; however, it is necessary to consider the specific time and circumstances present (a world war in progress or just finished, status of radiation protection knowledge not yet sufficiently advanced, etc.).1 In the 1980s and 1990s, a revision of the ‘simplified’ approach used for these first reactors (mainly devoted to plutonium production) was made. They were, as a consequence, either shut down or modified. In particular, the following characteristics or problems were removed or solved:
(Enrico Fermi)
(George Weil)
THE FIRST REACTOR 2, December 1942
Figure 1-1. Drawing of the CP1 pile. Scram – this term means ‘fast shutdown of a reactor’: various explanations have been proposed for its origin. The most credited one assumes that it derives from the abbreviated name of the CP1 safety rod which could be actuated by an axe. In the original design sketches of the pile, the position of the operator of the axe was indicated by ‘SCRAM’, the abbreviation of ‘Safety Control Rod Ax Man’. The designated operator was the physicist Norman Hilberry, subsequently Director of the Argonne Laboratory. His colleagues used the name ‘Mister Scram’. The drawing is courtesy of Prof. Raymond Murray.
a secondary shutdown system made of buckets containing a cadmium sulphate solution, which is a good neutron absorber. The buckets were located at the top of the pile and could be emptied onto it should the need arise.
the open cycle cooling of the reactors and nonpressure-resistant containments; the disposal of radioactive waste using unreliable methods, such as the location of radioactive liquids in simple underground metallic tanks which were subject to the risk of corrosion and of consequent leaks; the storage of spent fuel elements in leaking pools of water.
1-2-2. From the late 1950s to the Three Mile Island accident Since the early 1960s and even before, in the West, the criterion of locating power reactors in a leakproof and pressure resistant containment vessel was established and consolidated. In those cases where a significant release of radioactive products could be possible, the design pressure of the containment was
Chapter 1 Introduction
chosen on the assumption that all the primary (and part of the secondary) hot water (for a water reactor) was released from the cooling systems. Indeed, since the 1950s, the US ‘Reactor Safeguards Committee’, set up by the Atomic Energy Commission with the task of defining the guidelines for nuclear safety, had indicated that, for a noncontained reactor, an ‘exclusion distance’ (without resident population) should be provided. This distance, R, had to be equal, at least to that given by Eq. 1.1. pffiffiffiffiffiffiffi R ¼ 0:016 Pth km,
ð1:1Þ
where Pth is the thermal power of the reactor in kilowatts. For a 3000 MW reactor (the usual size today), this exclusion distance is equal to approximately 30 km, which is equal to the distance evacuated after the Chernobyl accident (Bourgeois et al., 1996). Evidently, the reference doses for the short-term evacuation were roughly the same for the two cases. An exclusion distance of this magnitude poses excessive problems to siting, even in a country endowed with abundant land such as the USA, therefore, the decision of adopting a containment is practically a compulsory one. The first reactor with leakproof and pressure resistant containment was the SR1 reactor (West Milton, NY, built in the 1950s). Built to perform tests for the development of reactors for military ship propulsion; this reactor was cooled by sodium and the containment was designed for the pressure corresponding to the combustion of the sodium escaping from a hypothetical leak in the cooling circuit. In Western countries, moreover, it was required that the whole refrigeration primary circuit should be located completely inside the containment, so that, even in the case of a complete rupture of the largest primary system pipe, all the escaped fluid would be confined in the containment envelope. The design pressure of the containment for water reactors (starting with the Shippingport, Pa, reactor, moderated and cooled by pressurized water) was derived on the basis of the assumption of the complete release of the primary water. In Eastern Europe, these criteria were applied to a lesser degree, as it was accepted that the pressure vessel alone would be located within the containment
3
(the rupture of large pipes was considered sufficiently unlikely to justify this assumption) and that the leakproof containment characteristic need not be very stringent. Thus, at the second Atoms for Peace conference in Geneva in 1964, the Western visitors were impressed but surprised by the model of the Novovoronezh reactor, which showed only one small containment enclosure around the reactor pressure vessel and was located in a building that from the outside resembled a big public office building. Still many years afterwards, the Russian reactors of the VVER 230 series, although provided with complete ‘Western-style’ containment, had a leakage rate from the containment of the order of 25 per cent each day (to be compared with figures of the order of 0.2 per cent each day from typical Western containments).2 Apart from differences of approach between world regions, in this period of time and in all the countries with nuclear reactors, the systems installed in the plants according to the requirements of the safety bodies and having the sole purpose of accident mitigation, were frequently the subject of heated debates; in particular, the emergency core cooling systems and the containment systems were often discussed. More precisely, the opinions on the accident assumptions evolved in the West were divided. The reference situations for the reasonably conceivable accidents were chosen by the judgement of expert committees. These situations included the worst ‘credible’ events (such as the complete severance of the largest primary pipe). The assumptions concerning the initiating event were accompanied by simultaneous conservative assumptions concerning malfunctions in safety systems, such as a ‘single failure’ consisting in the failure, simultaneous with the initiating event (pipe failure and so on), of one active component of one of the safety systems devoted to emergency safety functions during the accident (water injection system, reactor shutdown system and so on).3 On one side, the more cautious experts, generally members of public safety control bodies, many scholars and members of non-governmental organizations for the defence of public rights, supported the need for keeping these conservative assumptions; on the other side, more optimistic people (members of manufacturing industries and of electric utilities) maintained that the above mentioned accident
4
Nuclear Safety
assumptions entailed a true waste of resources (those necessary to provide nuclear plants with huge containment buildings and powerful safety systems). It has to be noted that the ‘optimists’ were by no means imprudent or reckless: a sincere conviction existed in the industry that the current accident assumptions were not well founded.4 The contrast between the optimists and the pessimists was exacerbated by the foreseeable circumstance that not all of the logical consequences of the initially adopted accident assumptions were from the start clear to technical people. As an example, as far as the effectiveness of emergency core cooling systems is concerned, it was not understood from the start that Zircaloy fuel cladding (stainless steel behaves in a similar way) could react with water in an auto-catalytic way at relatively low temperatures and could release large quantities of hydrogen. Neither was it understood from the start that the same cladding could swell before rupturing and could occupy the space between fuel rods, preventing the flow of cooling water. The existence of these phenomena was demonstrated by studies and by tests performed by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on the Semiscale facility at the US National Laboratory of Idaho Falls towards the end of the 1960s, when many US reactors had already been ordered and were being designed or built. Similarly, at the beginning of the 1970s, the possibility was demonstrated that the break of a pipe could damage other nearby pipes or other plant components, starting a chain of ruptures (known as the ‘pipe whip’ effect). All of these discoveries, made late in the design and procurement phases of US reactors, persuaded the control bodies to stipulate that the inherent safety systems be improved in order to take them into account. Other requests for improvement concerned the resistance of the plants to natural phenomena or to man-made events, in order to reach a balanced defence spectrum against all of the realistically possible accidents; in such a way the defence against new phenomena became analogous to the defence against the already considered phenomena having a comparable or lower probability. These requests for improvement (‘backfitting’) extended the construction times of the plants, together with their costs.
It can be understood that the industry, which already considered the initially adopted accident assumptions to be excessive, strongly opposed these aggravating requests. As previously said, up to the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, not all nuclear technical experts believed in the reasonableness of the current accident assumptions and in the need to pursue them with logical rigour and, in the light of the up-to-date scientific knowledge, up to their extreme consequences.5 The increase in costs as a consequence of the continuous requests for plant improvements, was strongly in contrast with the initial industrial expectations, which were concisely summarized by the then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss, who famously stated that nuclear energy would become ‘too cheap to meter’. In this period, the expression ‘ratcheting’ was created to describe the action of the control bodies in the field of the improvement of the plants concurrently with the indications of the progressing studies and research. This continuous process of improvement produced, where it was performed, very safe but also very costly and rather complicated plants. Indeed, the plants were subject to a series of safety feature additions to a substantially unchanged basic design. In this period a diverse approach to plant siting developed and was consolidated in the USA and in Western Europe. In the USA, the plant siting criteria, as far as demographic aspects were concerned, were substantially decoupled from the design features of the plant. On the contrary, in Europe, criteria for the site-plant complex were adopted. The US site criteria (except for seismic problems and for other external natural or man-made events) can be summarised as follows:
The existence of an ‘exclusion zone’ around the plant, where no dwellings or productive settlements exist, with access under the complete control of the plant management. The existence of a ‘low population zone’ around the plant, which could be quickly evacuated (within hours) in case of accident to the plant. The radioactive products release from the core to the plant containment conventionally established as a function of the plant power only: the TID release (Di Nunno et al., 1962).
Chapter 1 Introduction
A dose limit of 250 mSV (25 rem) total body and of 3 Sv (300 rem) for the thyroid (children) within two hours after the accident at the border of the exclusion zone.6 Dose limits equal to the preceding ones for the whole accident duration at the external border of the low population zone.
The exclusion zone was established at a radius of 800–1000 m around the plant and the low population zone at roughly 5 km from the plant (US Code of Federal Regulations, 2004a). The conventional release from the core was as follows:
For iodine-131:50 per cent of the core inventory, of which 50 per cent only is available in the containment for external release (deposition and plate out in the primary circuit). The iodine available for external release is 91 per cent elemental, 5 per cent particulate and 4 per cent organic iodide (methyl iodide). Noble gases are totally released to the containment.
Independent criteria were then established for the design of the plant. In this approach, the decision about the adequacy of a proposed site could be taken only on the basis of the plant power level and, possibly, on the specific characteristics of its fission product removal systems (to be evaluated and possibly validated on a case by case basis). On the other hand, in Europe, the site selection criteria usually consider the site-plant complex. Therefore, for example, if a plant with the usual safety systems could not be located on a specific site because accident doses exceeded the reference limits, it was possible to make the plant acceptable for the same site by the improvement of the systems for fuel integrity protection in case of accidents. The dose limits varied somewhat between various countries, but they were of the order of 5 mSv (500 mrem, effective dose) to the critical group of the population outside the exclusion zone for every credible accident (design basis accidents); some increase of this limit up to the level of tens of millisievert for single specific accidents could also be accepted. In order to evaluate the consequences of these accidents, then, no conventional figure for the
5
releases is used (such as the TID figures). On the contrary, conservative but more realistic assumptions are adopted; typically, the iodine released in the containment is assumed equal to the inventory in the fuel-clad interface, equal to one to five per cent of the total core inventory, instead of the TID 50 per cent. In Europe, the need to take account of the specific plant features for the evaluation of the acceptability of the site arises from the much higher population density in Europe in comparison with that of the USA (approximately 200 inhabitants per square kilometre and 30 per square kilometre, respectively). It is therefore much more difficult to find low population sites in Europe. The different population densities in Europe and the USA has also brought about differences in accident emergency plans: in the USA, the provision of a complete evacuation of the population within 16 km of the plant in a few hours is adopted, while in Europe the maximum comparable distance is equal to 10 km. It is indeed difficult to assure the evacuation of population centres with tens, hundreds or thousands of inhabitants. Here too, the countries’ differences in demographic conditions has to be compensated by additional plant features (generally, the use of double containment provided with intermediate filtration systems and the use of elevated stacks). The practice in the Far East (Japan, South Korea) is similar to the European one. These differences in the fundamental approach to safety among various countries have always been thought by the general public to be a weakness of the nuclear industry, thereby affecting their acceptance of nuclear energy. These differences have always been a source of confusion in the mind of the public and, therefore, they aggravate the public distrust in the safety of this energy source. Many attempts have been made, in the international and community arenas where nuclear safety is discussed (IAEA, OECD, EU), to adopt unified criteria (see Chapter 18). The aim of agreeing common criteria has been reached only at the expense of unification at a higher logical level, therefore leaving untouched the differences previously described, for example leaving to the freedom of each country the definition of acceptable distances or doses.
6
Nuclear Safety
In this period up to the TMI accident, three other facts influenced nuclear safety technology: defence against non-natural external events; the preparation of the Rasmussen report, WASH 1400; and the introduction of Quality Assurance (QA) in design, construction and operation of plants. The first of these, the defence against non-natural external events, would not deserve specific mention and discussion, except that its motivation has changed with time. For example, the initial official incentive for the reinforcement of plant structures and components of many reactors consisted in the defence against the accidental fall of an aircraft, while, subsequently, it was provided to defend against sabotage performed by the use of aircraft, but also by explosives of various kinds. In effect, the strengthening of structures and components was initially made in Germany as a consequence of the high number of crashes of the Lockheed Starfighter fighter plane in the 1960s. Subsequently, with the onset of terrorist activity in the 1970s, the need arose to defend nuclear plants against hypothetical external attacks conducted with the use of projectiles and of explosives. At this point, it was discovered that the German protection against the plane crash could also envelope a sufficient number of sabotage events based on the use of explosives. Therefore, as many people preferred not to mention these sabotage protections explicitly, the corresponding provisions were named in the official documents as ‘protection against plane crash’. Plant protection against the various effects of the impact by a fighter aircraft (weighing about 20 t) was adopted at least in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, while in other countries the protection against the fall of a smaller sports aircraft was chosen, frequently only if justified by the proximity of an airport. No country explicitly adopted the protection against the impact of a wide-bodied airliner of the Jumbo Jet type (weighing about 350 t), which would be far more onerous (possibly requiring the underground location of plants). It was calculated that the protection against the fall of a fighter aircraft included the protection against the fall of a large airliner too if the impact takes place with less damaging characteristics (lower speed of impact, shallower angle of impact, and so on) than those which would cause the worst structural consequences. (See Chapter 17 for more on aircraft impact.)
The second influence, the Rasmussen report, first published in 1975, was sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC – the successor to the Atomic Energy Commission in control of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and the regulatory body on nuclear safety matters) with the aim of outlining an overall picture of all the conceivable accidents and of their probabilities, in order to identify the risk connected to a nuclear plant. It was the first time a study that included all conceivable accidents had been made. It included less probable scenarios too, such as the catastrophic explosion of a reactor pressure vessel and an estimate of the probability of each of them. It should be understood that the probability data concerning the most unlikely phenomena are scarce or even absent given the impossibility of studying these phenomena by experimental tests and the scarcity of applicable real-life data. In some ways, quantifying these events in a report was a bold decision, but, once the objective of the study was decided upon, nobody questioned the feasibility of it. Subsequently, once the report was published, criticism ensued: some people said that it was inscrutable, others criticized the completeness of the database, and others criticized the inconsistency of the executive summary with the main report. In the second, and final, edition some evident insufficiencies were corrected, but some of the criticisms remained unresolved. Whoever it was who started a risk study of the first cars, of the first railway trains or of the first airplanes, would have met the same difficulties. However, with the passing of time, the report has remained a fundamental reference for any safety and risk evaluation. Nobody could support the validity of the absolute quantitative risk evaluations contained in it, but, at the same time, the validity of this study and of the similar ones which followed is universally acknowledged as far as the relative probability estimates are concerned for detection of weak points in a specific design. In substance, the Rasmussen report and similar studies are possible judgement instruments in the nuclear safety field, although they cannot be used alone. Sound engineering evaluations, based on operating experience, even in different but similar fields, and on research results, are the necessary complement to the probabilistic evaluations. In the history of nuclear safety technology, the Rasmussen report did not solely represent a
Chapter 1 Introduction
methodological advancement. Severe accidents (those accidents more serious than those up to then considered credible) were included, especially after the TMI accident, in the design considerations for nuclear plants. Finally, the start of the application of QA in nuclear engineering has to be mentioned. According to this management system, the quality of a product is guaranteed by the control of the production processes, more than by the control of the products themselves. Certainly this represents remarkable progress towards the achievement of products better complying with their specifications, however the implementation of this system requires a significant effort in the field of activity planning and of the management of the documentation, entailing a corresponding cost burden.
1-2-3. From the Three Mile Island accident to the Chernobyl accident In March 1979, during a rather frequent plant transient, a valve on top of the pressurizer of the TMI plant (Pennsylvania, USA) remained stuck open, giving rise to a continuous loss of coolant. In an extremely concise way, an opening in that position (although this fact had not been sufficiently studied and publicized in the technical literature) generated over time a situation of a void reactor pressure vessel and of a full pressurizer. This accident demonstrated that the attitude of many technical people towards nuclear safety was careless and optimistic. It could also be concluded that bad ‘surprises’ caused by a nuclear plant could be avoided only at the expense of a strong change in their mindset towards safety itself. These conclusions were shared by practically all technical people and all over the world. Some optimists still existed, however. They were convinced that all the blame for the accident had to be placed on the operators who had not correctly diagnosed the plant conditions in time, and that all the problems could be solved by the use of more stringently screened operators. It can be said that this accident completely changed the attitude of the industry towards safety in all the OECD countries. The provision of features previously considered to be pointless by some (such as the presence of a leakproof, pressure
7
resistant containment) were acknowledged as valid in the light of the possibility of unforeseeable events. Two organizations were created for the exchange of information on operational events at nuclear plants and for the promotion of excellence in the nuclear safety field: the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) in the USA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) internationally. In the USA, within the NRC, a specific Office was created (Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data – AEOD) for the analysis and the dissemination of operating experience. Long lists of ‘lessons learned’ were prepared and a ‘Three Mile Island Action Plan’ compiled which contained a large number of specific provisions against the possible repetition of similar accidents in the future. The implementation of these provisions cost each plant an amount of money ranging between several million dollars and several tens of millions of dollars. Above all, two concepts were underlined and reinforced: the concept of Defence in Depth and the concept of Safety Culture. According to a number of experts, in particular from the former USSR, the attitude of the industry towards safety also changed in Eastern Europe after the TMI accident: already in early 1980s, Russian designers of VVER reactors proposed a number of measures for safety improvements. The Defence in Depth initiative is a concept meaning that many, mutually independent, levels of defence against the initiation and the progression of accidents are created. The various levels include physical barriers, such as the fuel cladding, the primary system, the containment, etc. Five levels are defined: good plant design, control systems, emergency systems, accident management, and emergency plans. The Safety Culture concept is defined as the set of convictions, knowledge and behaviour in which safety is placed at the highest level in the scale of values in every activity concerning the use of nuclear energy.7 The result of these initiatives, together with the Rasmussen report and the TMI accident convinced many countries to give attention to severe accidents. Severe accident occurrence was introduced as a consideration in the design and operation of plants.
8
Nuclear Safety
A severe accident is defined as one exceeding in severity the Design Basis Accidents, which are those against which plant safety systems are designed in such a way that:
the core does not exceed the limits of irreversible damage of the fuel (e.g. 1200 C maximum temperature, 17 per cent local oxidation of the claddings, etc. (US Code of Federal Regulations, 2004b); the external releases do not exceed the maximum tolerable ones, according to the national criteria in force.
In many cases it is considered, as an accident progressively worsens, that the limit for which it becomes ‘severe’ is the attainment of 1200 C in the fuel cladding since at about this temperature the progression of the water–cladding exothermic reaction becomes auto-catalytic and proceeds at a high rate. The IAEA definition for severe accidents is ‘accident conditions more severe than a design basis accident and involving significant core degradation’.AR49 All the OECD countries (but also others) agreed on the advisability of studying and of implementing severe accident management techniques on their plants. These provide equipment and emergency procedures for severe accidents which, in the extreme case of reaching a situation close to a severe accident, prevent its occurrence or, at least, prevent it from worsening. Examples of typical equipment and procedures for severe accidents are the following:
portable electric energy generators, transportable from the plant to another on the same site or on a different site; procedures to supply electric energy to the essential loads, in case of total loss of electric power; procedures for the voluntary depressurization of the primary system in case of loss of the high pressure emergency injection systems, and so on.
By the 1980s, practically all the plants in the OECD area were equipped with Severe Accident Management Plans to various degrees of completeness. Some countries have progressed further than others, instigating real plant modifications as a means of implementing their Accident Management Plans. France, Germany and Sweden (and others)
have installed filtered containment venting systems designed to avoid the rupture of the containment in case of a severe accident entailing the slow overpressurization of the building beyond its strength limits (this situation could happen in every accident scenario without sufficient cooling of the core and of the containment). Other countries, such as the USA, concluded that these systems were not needed, on the basis of a cost–benefit analysis. In Italy, a set of criteria was developed, the ‘95–0.1 per cent criterion’, according to which, by the installation of appropriate systems (including a filtered venting system for at least one reactor), a release of iodine higher than 0.1 per cent of the core inventory could be avoided with a probability higher than 95 per cent, conditional upon core melt (defined as attainment of a cladding temperature higher than 1200 C). Obviously, no single events of very low probability were considered, such as a pressure vessel explosion due to a mechanical defect. A similar criterion was adopted in Sweden. Among the proposals at this time was one that concerned a preventative system for the voluntary depressurization of the primary system in pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and for the passive injection of water into the primary system for about 10 hours. This core rescue system (CRS) could decrease the core melt probability by a factor of at least 10. The system was proposed as a modification of the design chosen for the Italian Unified Nuclear Design, but was not considered necessary by the designers at that time. A few years later, the designers applied it, with modifications, to the passive reactor AP 600. Another reactor design (this time German) has a similar system. The voluntary primary system depressurization has subsequently been adopted by all the more modern PWR designs, such as the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) and the System 80.
1-2-4. The Chernobyl accident and after In my opinion and the opinion of other experts, there were two primary causes of the Chernobyl tragedy. The first was that although the plant was certainly very good from a production point of view, it had been designed with excessive optimism as far as
Chapter 1 Introduction
safety was concerned. Indeed, in some operating conditions (low power, low steam content in the pressure tubes) the reactor was very unstable, in the sense that an increase in power or a loss of coolant tended to increase its reactivity, increasing the power auto-catalytically. In this way, the destruction of the reactor and of the plant could be initiated. Moreover, with completely extracted control rods (a situation forbidden by the operating procedures), the potential instability was more severe and, additionally, the use of the scram acted as an accelerator and not as a brake in the first moments of the rod movement (an ‘inverted scram’). The second fatal circumstance was that the operators were working, on that night in April 1986, in a condition of frantic hurry for various reasons. Although this reactor had been provided with leakproof and pressure resistant containment as a result of the prevailing changes in attitude already discussed, the containment did not include a significant portion of the reactor itself (a remarkable design decision). In particular, the fuel channel heads were directly put in a normal industrial building. A completely uncontained accident, therefore, happened. The reasons for the adverse design characteristics may have been financial (but expert opinion differs). The general lesson to be learned is always the same: no weak points compromising safety must be left in a plant. Human errors, as in the cases of TMI and Chernobyl, will succeed in finding them and will cause disasters and fatalities. I don’t believe, as some anti-nuclear people maintain, that ‘if an accident can happen, sooner or later it will happen’, however, experience indicates that accident possibility must be seriously considered during all the phases of the life of a nuclear plant.8 However, for the sake of completeness, it has to be said that the Chernobyl-type reactors were not well known in the Western world. The pertinent information was kept somewhat confidential because this reactor could potentially be used for plutonium production and therefore it was interesting from a military point of view.9 A confidential safety analysis of an RBMK reactor, similar to the Chernobyl one, was performed some years before the accident by a European design company. It concluded that this reactor, in many respects, did not meet the safety standards in use in the Western world. Copies of this safety analysis were
9
circulated among the experts after the Chernobyl accident. The Chernobyl accident, with its consequences (both local and afar) had not much to teach the Western nuclear safety engineers as the reactor’s shortcomings were all accurately known and avoided in their designs.10 Obviously, it was not possible to convince the public that such an accident could only happen in that specific design of reactor. In Italy, for example, some political parties exploited the evident fear generated in the population and, substantially, led the country towards the immediate and sudden dismissal of the nuclear source of power, with understandably prohibitive costs. In general, after Chernobyl and as a consequence of that accident, two ideas gained momentum:
Nuclear plant design, evolved by successive additions, had become too complicated and it was useful to think of simpler systems, based on concepts of passive rather than active safety. Accidents, even the most severe ones, should have modest consequences beyond the exclusion zone of the plant and so should require smaller emergency plans, especially concerning the quick evacuation of the population.
The USA was frequently against any simplification of its emergency plans in order not to change their well-established system of siting decoupled from the characteristics of the plants. This system, after all, was well accepted by the technical bodies and by the population. The concept of passive safety meant the use of systems based on simple physical laws more than on complex equipment. One example is represented by safety injection systems on water reactors which use gravity as a motive force and not pumps. This principle was, for example, adopted in the passive PWR AP600, certified by the NRC in 1999. It comprises a voluntary fast depressurization system of the primary circuit and the provision of a water reservoir in the containment located at an elevated position with respect to the reactor vessel. Passive cooling of the containment was also incorporated in the design. Evidently, however, neither of these new concepts nor the industrial weight of the NRC certification are sufficient to immediately convince the investors because, up to now (2005), no new AP600 has been ordered.
10
Nuclear Safety
A weak point of this concept has always been the reduced power and its consequent bad scale economy. The 600 MWe rating was initially chosen on the basis of a poll among the US utilities on the basis that this was the preferred size of a power station (lower financial risk and correspondence with the dimension of the electric grids served by the single utilities). The designers thought that they could in any case be competitive because of the use of passive components (i.e. with a reduction of installed components) and because of a general simplification of the plant. It seems now that this objective can be more easily reached by the AP1000 design (namely with a power of 1000 MWe), whose design has been recently (2004) approved by the NRC. A design where the passive safety has been adopted with a higher degree of caution but with a strong tendency towards the reduction of emergency plans is the French–German EPR of approximately 1400 MWe, where many precautions against severe accidents have been taken (e.g. molten core containment structures, ‘core catchers’, multiple devices for the quick recombination of hydrogen, voluntary primary system depressurization, etc.). New concepts based on passive safety presently under study are the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR – gas cooled, high temperature, helium operated, direct cycle turbine generators) supported by an international group based in South Africa, the IRIS reactor (a PWR with steam generators integrated in the reactor pressure vessel) and the already mentioned AP1000. Other concepts still under study but already proposed exist.AR152, AR244 As usual, the future is difficult to forecast, however, when nuclear energy will be unquestionably necessary, it will be generally accepted. The investors will not have the continuous concern of its competitiveness, and the safety of the plants, which is already at a very good level, will be still more guaranteed.11
References Bourgeois, J., Tanguy, P., Cogne´, F. and Petit, J. (1996) La Surete Nucleaire en France et dans le Monde. Polytechnica, Paris. Di Nunno J., Baker, R.E.D., Anderson, F.D. and Waterfield, R.L. (1962) ‘Calculation of distance factors for power and test reactor sites’, USAEC, TID-14844.
Glasstone, S. (1963) Nuclear Reactor Engineering, Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ. US Code of Federal Regulations (2004a) ‘Part 100: Reactor Site Criteria’, US Government. US Code of Federal Regulations (2000b) ‘Part 50.46: Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors’, US Government.
Chapter notes 1 What radiation dose did Fermi and the other scientists absorb during the first criticality? Taking into account that the reactor was kept in a critical state for roughly half an hour and that the power was equal to about 0.5 W, an order of magnitude evaluation using current data [Glasstone, 1963] shows that the dose due to neutrons and to gamma rays was of the order of 10 Sv (1 mrem); very low indeed. 2 According to a number of experts, in particular from the former USSR, this situation is not to be viewed as the outcome of a more rigorous attitude in the West than in the East. There were different safety philosophies in East and West: the former focused on accident prevention without much care of the high cost (at least in the case of VVER reactors), the latter focused more on mitigation of accidents, with a strong effect on the results from cost–benefit considerations. The debates on relativism in philosophy (ethics or epistemology, for example) have some similarity with these arguments. Indeed, relativism has not to be identified, as some of its critics say, with the thesis that all points of view are equally valid, but with the thesis that one thing (moral values, beauty, knowledge, taste, meaning and nuclear safety criteria, too) is relative to some particular framework or standpoint (e.g. the individual subject, a culture, an era, a language or a conceptual scheme). Moreover, no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others. With these kinds of highly controversial similarities, it is easy to understand that any attempt to resolve the issue by discussions may scarcely be productive and that only the future will indicate where the relative merits are higher. 3 This method of defining the accidents to be considered in the design was subsequently named the ‘deterministic method’, to be distinguished from the ‘probabilistic method’ based on the evaluation of the probability of the various accidental events. Presently, however, the choice criteria are generally a combination of the two approaches. 4 ‘Pipes leak, pipes crack, pipes are corroded, but pipes don’t break’, one of the senior US industry engineers used to repeat. And indeed, in the light of subsequent ‘experience’ (now equivalent to more than 10 000 reactor-years of operation) very few guillotine breaks of large pipes have happened. Moreover, most of these cases have not
Chapter 1 Introduction
11
Isolation valve
Normal cooling line Pressure channel
Emergency injection line
Figure 1-2. Sketch for a discussion on a break in a pressure tube reactor.
happened in primary pipes, but in pipes not submitted to the most stringent design and operation practices (periodic inspections and so on). Only two cases have happened in two feed-water pipes, weakened by erosion. On the other hand, the figures based on the assumption of a complete break of the largest pipe in the plant affords protection from a number of different events not explicitly considered, such as the flange bolts breaking in large valves (several cases of ‘near misses’ of this kind have happened), the partial rupture of pump casings caused by rotor failure, etc. 5 Towards the end of the 1960s, two eminent nuclear designers discussed with a safety reviewer the pipe rupture assumptions for a pressure tube reactor under design. The technical problem under discussion is sketched in Figure 1-2. If the cooling water pipes ruptured, the designers declared that the cooling of the fuel contained in each pressure channel was ensured as a valve at the inlet of each channel (shown in the drawing) would be closed in order to force the emergency cooling water to flow into the channel and to cool the fuel before reaching the rupture point and spilling into the containment. When the safety reviewer pointed out that this design objective would not be reached if the rupture had happened in the position marked with an X, their answer was ‘Safety is not a game with rigid and meticulous rules, sir! More room should be left to technical judgement!’ It has to be appreciated that in the nuclear safety profession everybody knows that an accidental break has to be assumed at every location on every pressure pipe and that, in these conditions, the plant must continue to be safe; so, it is ridiculous that somebody tries to resort to the difference between nuclear safety and a game in order to justify a departure from this rule concerning the break location. Many years afterwards, this sentence came again to my mind after the TMI accident in which the only rupture position for which the primary water loss could have created the situation of an ‘empty pressure vessel and filled up pressurizer’ which totally confused the operators and induced them to shut off the emergency injection system was precisely the one which happened, namely at the top of
the pressurizer. This anecdote is representative of a state of mind prevalent in the industry in the period of time up to the TMI accident, that is that the current accident assumptions were excessive so that their implementation could be rather flexible without adverse consequences. 6 The reference, in the US criteria, to 250 mSv total body and 3 Sv thyroid doses may be intriguing for some people. Indeed, nowadays, no acceptance criterion includes such high figures: the effective dose limits for design basis accidents (credible accidents) are 10 to 100 times lower. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s, the figures adopted in the US criteria were officially considered as maximum tolerable doses for serious accidents. Over time, however, progress in radiation protection knowledge has brought about an additional decrease in the tolerability limits, therefore the figures initially adopted in the USA have become ‘completely conventional numbers’, losing their (uncertain) original physical–biological meaning. The question arises as to why these figures have not been updated. Here, as in many other cases in the nuclear safety field, perhaps the consideration has prevailed that any reduction of the limits could be interpreted as a disapproval of already built and operating plants, for which the original figures were adopted. The site criteria have, however, always been thought to give acceptable protection to the population. 7 Two things are surprising when the operating experience of nuclear plants is considered. The first one is the astonishing coincidence of different adverse facts which is at the origin of many serious accidents (TMI and Chernobyl included). The second is the surprising intervention of resolving factors in sequences of events already well advanced in their progress towards a disaster (the Browns Ferry Fire (Alabama, 1975), many discoveries ‘at the last minute’ of very dangerous cracks in pressure vessels, and so on). It is thought that the motivation of many of these surprising events is the presence of a special atmosphere or mindset in the group of people responsible for the construction and the operation of a plant. This atmosphere can be either favourable or adverse to safety. Perhaps, the
12
Nuclear Safety
possible presence of it should be in some way considered in probabilistic analyses as a ‘concurrent event’ of any accident studied. As an example, letting our imagination wander, the initiating event ‘small pipe break’ could be studied in coincidence with ‘hectic atmosphere because of the need to conclude an operational phase or a test’, with a probability which now could be estimated of the order of 10 per cent. Obviously, the practical answer to these remarks is ‘prevention’, namely the strengthening of Defence in Depth and of Safety Culture. 8 The forgotten safety criterion: Many safety criteria have been discussed and written about, but one which requires that a nuclear plant should never be constructed and operated in haste has not been proposed yet. Perhaps, more than one criterion is involved here. For example, one of the specific requirements might be that ‘no nuclear plant can operate if its power is essential to the grid’, as happens when reserve energy is not available to allow it to be stopped in cases of unforeseen events, emergencies, or to perform inspection, maintenance or tests. In the case of Chernobyl, the existence of a similar criterion would have allowed the power station superintendent to oppose the request to continue to operate beyond the programmed time. Obviously, such a criterion could be opposed by the strong supporters of the cost convenience of nuclear energy. I think, on the contrary, that without subtracting anything from the great merits of nuclear energy, a more realistic attitude is necessary. A good example in which a plant was operated for production needs with a lack of power reserve in the grid, against the opinion of many experts, happened between 1995 and 1996 (American Nuclear Society, 1996). In that period, a power station was operated in various months in order to support the power demand during the winter period, despite strong doubts about the strength of the reactor pressure vessel (presence of cracks and doubts on the possible excessive neutron embrittlement of the vessel material). These doubts were expressed by a group of European specialists, which opposed the continuation of the plant operation. What the most pessimistic people feared did not happen but, for those knowing the facts, it was a worrying situation: the burst of a reactor pressure vessel of a water reactor must be absolutely prevented within reliable safety margins, as it can give rise to an accident of the severity of the Chernobyl one. 9 At the time when Finland was planning its first nuclear power station, because of existing commercial agreements, technical experts contacted Russian experts in order to explore the possibility of the supply of a Russian-designed reactor. When, during one of the meetings, the Finn responsible for nuclear safety and the Russian responsible
for the peaceful use of nuclear energy were discussing the various types of reactors available, the RBMK reactor (the Chernobyl type) was considered too. The Finnish expert asked for a copy of the safety report of this reactor, but the Russian answered that the safety report could be provided only to the buyers of the reactor. The Finn persisted, saying that Finland seriously intended to buy, but received a final answer that this type of reactor could not be sold outside the Soviet Union (for national security reasons). 10 The major lesson which was learnt from the Chernobyl accident was that it was demonstrated that a catastrophic accident could have consequences up to distances not yet imagined before. In this connection, it is not completely true, as many people have said, that the dispersion of the releases up to great distances was due solely to the upward propulsion caused by the explosion and by the fire of the reactor. The very large quantity of radioactive releases was the primary factor, although with an additional contribution by the explosion/fire phenomenon. 11 The symptoms of an illness might be around us, a desire to disregard past experience of accidents, which, if it should continue to grow, might really impair the safety of nuclear plants. On the one hand, a past WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators) president has publicly declared, from his special observation point, that the interest in the lessons of experience is decreasing among operators. On the other hand, discussions with some designers of specific countries indicate that the pre-TMI accident mindset is surfacing again, exemplified by self confidence and optimistic bias. Moreover, some plant operators have stated with annoyance that after more than twenty years since the TMI accident, people still keep on studying it and that it is time to forget because what had to be learnt has been learnt already. These are all wrong attitudes because keeping alive the memory of the lessons of the past will avoid the carelessness that has caused the accidents in the first place. It is just as important to extract lessons from lesser incidents, those ‘semi-accidents’ which could have evolved into a disaster. In this field, the NRC keeps records that include the evaluation and publication of results. The media, too, can strongly contribute to the progress of safe nuclear energy. It is not necessary for it to always praise its virtues, but it should give special attention to the exactness of the news given and avoid emotive reporting, in particular as far as the gravity of the small accidental events which continuously happen in every industrial plant and therefore also on nuclear plants. As a reaction to sensationalism, the stakeholders in the nuclear industry react with a confidentiality policy which is detrimental to the progress of safety.
Chapter 2 Inventory and localization of radioactive products in the plant
One of the primary objectives of nuclear safety is to contain within the plant the radioactive products there present. It is, therefore, essential to know the amount and the normal location of these products. Almost all the radioactive products are contained in fuel located in the reactor itself or in used fuel which is still stored at the plant, in the spent fuel pool or, less frequently, in dry containers for temporary storage. Table 2-1 lists the half-life and total radioactivity for the nuclides in a 1000 MWe water reactor in equilibrium conditions (that is after a certain operation time). At the start of the operation, the amount of some nuclides with a long half-life continuously increases until it reaches, after several months, a practically constant saturation level. For the preliminary evaluations of the consequences of accidents, it is usually sufficient to consider the doses due to:
noble gases (direct cloud radiation dose); iodine (inhalation dose); caesium (mainly long-term doses due to radiation from the radioactivity deposited on the ground – ‘ground shine’); tritium (fusion machines and specific reactors), plutonium (fall of satellites, fuel treatment plants which handle plutonium).
The nuclides are grouped according to a criterion adopted in many ‘source term’ (complex of external releases in an accident) studies. This classification takes into account important factors in the release evaluation, such as the volatility of the element or its probable compounds and their chemical/physical properties.
In a rather indicative way, it can be assumed that if in an uncontrolled (severe) accident X per cent of the noble gases inventory is released, the releases of iodine and of caesium may reach 0.1X per cent, and the releases of other products roughly the 0.01X per cent. Each conceivable accident, however, has specific aspects which may strongly alter these indicative percentages, here mentioned in order to give an average measure of the natural release potential of the various isotopes. The radioactive products contained in the fuel are normally located in the sinterized uranium dioxide of the reactor fuel (the uranium dioxide fuel is shaped into pellets, roughly 1 cm in diameter, inserted in long zirconium alloy (zircalloy) cylinders). The matrix of these cylinders (roughly 40 000), grouped in bundles to form the fuel elements, is the reactor core. A fraction ranging from 0.5–5 per cent (USNRC, 1992) of the more volatile radioactive products (noble gases, iodine, caesium) is contained in the gap between the uranium pellets and the containment cylinder (cladding). For sake of conservatism, however, sometimes the accident release evaluations are made assuming that this percentage is equal to 10 per cent (this is the value suggested, for example, by USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.25 on fuel element drop accidentsAR316). During accidents without core melt but entailing a severe threat to the fuel (of a mechanical and/or thermal nature), these radioactive products may escape from the fuel and be released to the primary system. In general, it is assumed that at least noble gases, iodine and caesium are released in this way. 13
Table 2-1. Nuclides, half-life and radioactivity for a 1000 MWe PWR Radioactivity
Noble Gases
Krypton
Xenon Iodine
Iodine
Caesium & Rubidium
Caesium
Tellurium & Antimony
Rubidium Tellurium
Antimony Alkaline Earths
Strontium
Volatile Oxides
Barium Cobalt Molybdenum Technetium Ruthenium
Non-volatile Oxides
Yttrium Zirconium Niobium Lanthanum Cerium
Praseodymium Neodymium Neptunium Plutonium
Americium
18
Nuclide
Half-life (days)
(Bq 10 )
(MCi)
85
3950 0.183 0.0528 0.117 5.28 0.384 8.05 0.0958 0.875 0.0366 0.28 750 13 11 000 18.7 0.391 109 0.048 0.34 1.25 3.25 3.88 0.179 52.1 11 030 0.403 12.8 71 1920 2.8 0.25 39.5 0.185 366 1.5 2.67 59 65.2 0.71 35 1.67 32.3 1.38 284 13.7 11.1 2.35 32 500 8.9 106 2.4 106 5350 1.5 105
2.072 0.888 1.739 2.516 6.290 1.258 3.145 4.440 6.290 7.030 5.550 0.2775 0.111 0.1739 0.00096 0.2183 0.0407 1.147 0.1961 0.481 4.44 0.2257 1.221 3.478 0.1369 4.07 5.92 0.02886 0.01073 5.92 5.18 4.07 2.664 0.925 1.813 0.1443 4.44 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.92 5.55 4.81 3.145 4.81 2.22 60.68 0.002109 0.000777 0.000777 0.1258 0.0000629
56 24 47 68 170 34 85 120 170 190 150 7.5 3 4.7 0.026 5.9 1.1 31 5.3 13 120 6.1 33 94 3.7 110 160 0.78 0.29 160 140 110 72 25 49 3.9 120 150 150 150 160 150 130 85 130 60 1640 0.057 0.021 0.021 3.4 0.0017
Total activity (EBq) 193
Total activity (MCi) 5202
Kr 85m Kr 87 Kr 88 Kr 133 Xe 135 Xe 131 I 132 I 133 I 134 I 135 I 134 Cs 136 Cs 137 Cs 86 Rb 127 Te 127m Te 129 Te 129m Te 131m Te 132 Te 127 Sb 129 Sb 89 Sr 90 Sr 91 Sr 140 Ba 58 Co 60 Co 99 Mo 99m Tc 103 Ru 105 Ru 106 Ru 105 Ru 90 Y 91 Y 95 Zr 97 Zr 95 Nb 140 La 141 Ce 143 Ce 144 Ce 143 Pr 147 Nd 239 Np 238 Pu 239 Pu 240 Pu 241 Pu 241 Am
Chapter 2 Inventory and localization of radioactive products in the plant
Even during normal operation, the primary coolant contains a certain amount of radioactivity, partly due to nuclides formed by the irradiation in the core of elements dispersed in the coolant (oxygen, hydrogen, cobalt, iron, etc.) and partly due to the presence of defective (fissured) claddings in the core which let a part of the gap inventory escape into the coolant. The concentration of radioactive products in the water depends on the entity of fissures (in general, it is assumed that 1–2 per cent of the elements have fissures) and on the effectiveness of the primary water purification system. The degree of contamination of the primary coolant by iodine-131 (the most significant isotope) normally assumed in the study of accidents is equal to roughly 104–105 Bq g 1, corresponding to a total of the order of tens of terabequerels for the whole primary system (i.e. hundreds of curies). For iodine-131 (the same considerations are valid for caesium), the effects of the phenomenon of ‘iodine spike’ are, in addition, taken into consideration (this is an increase in the release of these radioactive products from the fissured fuel rods caused by power variations). The phenomena involved are connected with the ingress and subsequent exit of water through the gap and with likely fracturing of the fuel matrix. Guidance on figures to be used can be found in USNRC (1996). The normal values are:
A factor of 50 on the normal iodine content in the primary water (that is up to a total of 100–1000 TBq for all the primary system).
15
A factor of 500 on the rate of release of the iodine from the fuel, whose order of magnitude can be, for each fissured rod, 10 4–10 3 TBq h 1. A peak time duration of 1–5 hours.
Radioactive products are present in decay storage tanks for gases extracted from the primary water before their release to the atmosphere. Not all the plants use these tanks since the decay of waste gases is frequently obtained by delay lines that temporarily adsorb the gases on activated carbon. Where decay tanks are used, a rupture of one of them is serious. The total inventory of the stored gases is subdivided in several (typically eight) tanks. The most relevant external doses are those connected with the irradiation from the cloud of noble gases, whose total inventory may be of the order of 104 TBq. For completeness, although the accidents discussed may have minor consequences, it must be added that other radioactive products are contained in the plant, mainly in the form of solid waste.
References USNRC (1996) ‘Standard review plan for the review of safety analysis reports for nuclear power plants’, NUREG-0800. USNRC (1992) ‘Accident source terms for light-water nuclear power plants’, NUREG-1465.
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Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
3-1. Plant systems By necessity, a nuclear power plant is composed of the parts required to generate electric power (the ‘process’ parts or systems) but also of a complexity of safety systems. The name ‘safety systems’ here indicates all those systems which are not strictly necessary to the plant operation or to health protection under normal conditions, but rather to those
that prevent the progression of accidents and therefore avert the large release of radioactive products. Accident prevention is a major activity of designers, operators and control bodies. Figure 3-1 will remind the reader of the components of a typical pressurized water reactor (the PWR – the most common design in the world). The process components are: the reactor (R) itself, where the nuclear chain reaction takes place and the Primary containment
Secondary containment
Secondary circuit S Steel liner
V
Spray
V
T G
SG
Cooling
C
PR AC
V
Pump Filtered suction
CR A
Primary circuit
F
I
R EC Foundation
Figure 3-1. Simplified schematic of a pressurized water reactor (PWR). 17
18
Nuclear Safety
heat is produced which will finally be transformed into electric energy; the steam generator (SG), where the heat is used to produce high pressure steam; the turbine (T), where the steam energy is transformed into mechanical rotation energy; and, finally, the electric generator (G), which produces the electric energy to be supplied to the grid. As can be seen in the drawing, the process fluid, that is water in the form of liquid or vapour, circulates in two distinct systems, the primary and the secondary system, which mutually exchange heat in the steam generator. Another important component of the primary system is the pressurizer (PR), whose function is that of an expansion volume and of a pressurization component. The latter function being obtained by electric heaters. The pressurizer keeps the circuit water at a higher pressure than its saturation pressure, thereby suppressing the steam production in the primary system. (The pressurizer was significant in the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident.) The safety systems have three main objectives: the quick emergency shutdown of the chain reaction; the emergency cooling of the reactor after shutdown; and, finally, the containment of radioactive products after their accidental release from the reactor. The quick shutdown is obtained by the insertion, by gravity, of control rods (CR) in the reactor and, as a backup, by the injection of a liquid neutron ‘poison’ (boron) in the primary water. The emergency cooling of the reactor is necessary because the radioactive products accumulated in the nuclear fuel continue to generate heat after the shutdown of the chain reaction (decay heat) (see Figs 3-2 and 3-3). The emergency cooling systems are both passive ones (that is those practically without moving components, such as pumps) and active ones. By way of examples, Figure 3-1 shows a passive system (accumulators, AC, kept under pressure by compressed nitrogen) and an active system (I). The containment comprises a combination of special buildings and engineered systems. The figure shows a complete ‘double containment’ system, similar to those adopted in many countries. In this design, an internal reinforced concrete building, strong enough to resist the accident pressure of the worst design basis accident, is internally lined by steel in order to guarantee optimum leakproof characteristics (primary containment). Isolation
valves (V) will close in case of accident, always for leak proofing reasons. The first building is enclosed in another reinforced concrete building (secondary containment) in order to further improve the retention of radioactive products and the shielding from direct radiation; it has also the function of affording protection against external impact events. The area between the two containments is kept at a negative pressure with respect to the external environment by means of filtered suction systems (A and F). The primary containment is provided with cooling and water spray systems in order to decrease, in case of accident, both the internal pressure and the amount of free radioactive products.
3-2. Safety systems and accidents The safety systems are designed to cope with a set of accidental events (design basis accidents or DBAs), either originating inside the plant or outside it. This set also includes events of such a low probability that their occurrence during the life of the plant should not be feared. As an example, the following events are included within the DBAs: an instantaneous guillotine break of the largest pipe of the primary circuit; the sudden expulsion of a control rod from the core; and the maximum potential seismic event on the plant site. An accident at a nuclear power plant can be caused by many combinations of anomalous initiating event, malfunction and human error. The types of possible accidental situations are studied in the specific safety analysis of each plant and the safety systems described above are designed to prevent, or mitigate the effects of all the accidents chosen as DBAs. Table 3-1 provides an approximate indication of the effectiveness of various safety systems in limiting external releases in a typical loss of coolant accident (the break of a large primary circuit pipe). The figures are for the release of iodine-131 (often assumed as the reference isotope in indicative evaluations of ‘source terms’ and for a 1000 MWe reactor). As can be seen, the reduction of the releases caused by the safety systems is very significant and corresponds to a factor of the order of one million. The study of the safety of a plant is not, however, limited to the study of the serious and unlikely design basis accidents. For many years, the most serious
19
4 Mw
Kg/sec
Kg/sec
Burning kerosene
Kcal/sec 25000
Vaporizing water
Percent of nominal power
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
100
90 3
20000 80
40
2
70 30
15000 60 2 50 10000
20
40
1
30
1 5000
10
20
10 0.1 10E2 (=100)
1000 10E3
10E4
10E6 10E5 Time after shutdown [sec]
1hr
10hr
1d
7d
Figure 3-2. Decay power for a 2775 MWt reactor (10% over best estimate). accidents, named ‘severe accidents’ have also been the subject of studies and research. Some definitions of safety criteria (IAEA Safety Criteria and EUR Requirements) specify a third class of accidents that lies between the two already mentioned. These include:
operating transients without scram (ATWS); complete loss of alternate electric power in the power station; containment bypass accidents.
This class does not require the same conservative design provisions required by DBAs (high safety margins for mechanical strength, strict quality assurance requirements, etc.). However, substantial core integrity is required as a consequence of the implementation of accident management measures. The main reasons for the general interest in severe accidents are primarily the intention of improving the protection of the plant by its extension to the field of the most serious accidents, and the need to know
Nuclear Safety
Full power seconds
Mwh
10E9
Kg
1000 1000
10E8
10E6
Kg
Burning kerosene
Kcal
Vaporizing water
20
10E5
10E4
100 100 10E5
10E7
10E3
10 10 10E4
2*10E6 10E2 (=100)
10E3
10E4
1hr
10E5 10E6 Time after shutdown [sec]
10hr
1d
7d
Figure 3-3. Decay energy for a 2775 MWt reactor.
phenomenologies and probabilities of these accidents in order to perform less uncertain evaluations of the global risk of a plant (probability risk assessment or PRA) of the type of the famous Rasmussen report. What are the possible causes, the typical phenomena and the possible course of events in a severe accident? Here, a concise and necessarily incomplete description will be attempted. The typical sequences entail damage and melt of the core, interaction of the molten core with the pressure vessel and afterwards with the containment floor and, finally, perforation of the containment itself.
The damage and the melt of the core may happen for two reasons only, notwithstanding the large number of the possible sequences:
the late or missing shutdown of the chain reaction, when required; insufficient decay heat removal from the reactor.
For PWRs, in particular, the decay heat dominates the stage in severe accidents. Figure 3-2 illustrates the behaviour of the decay power with time for a 2775 MWt reactor. It shows the correspondence between this power and the amount of
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
Table 3-1. An example of the effectiveness of safety system. Release of (current reactors) Location
Activity (TBq)
Safety systems
In core In the gaps
3.5 106 3.5 104
Primary containment
3.5 103
Secondary containment
1.8 102
Environment
21
131
I due to loss of coolant
Effect
fast shutdown; emergency cooling.
Prevent releases from the fuel matrix and decrease releases from the gaps (dissolution, plate out).
primary containment; removal and cooling systems.
Leak proof: reduction factor of 20 for a 0.5% leakage per day and 10 days of pressurization.
secondary containment; activated carbon filters.
Segregate radioactive products.
1.8–18
water which could be evaporated per second by it (the corresponding amount of equivalent burnt kerosene per second is also shown). As can be seen, after a few hours, a really small flow rate of water is sufficient to cool the core (about 10 l s 1, that is the normal flow rate of a 50 mm diameter pipe). Contrasting this is the transient situation of a reactor where the rupture of a large diameter pipe has occurred (a large loss of coolant accident or LOCA). In this case the reactor vessel quickly empties (in a few tens of seconds) and therefore it has to be quickly refilled in order to keep the core covered and therefore adequately cooled. In this situation, it is essential that the emergency cooling systems have large flow rates (of the order of thousands of litres per second). The ‘re-flooding’ of the core places the largest flow rate demand on the safety injection systems. The first consequences of uncontrolled overheating of the core are the fissuring of the fuel claddings (at about 1073–1173 K (800–900 C)), while their normal operating temperature is about 623 K (350 C)) and their subsequent oxidation reaction with water or with steam (above 1473 K (1200 C)) which generates heat and hydrogen. It has to be remembered that, during their life in the reactor, the fuel tubes become significantly pressurized because of the development of fission gases inside them (up to several tens of atmospheres) and, therefore, once fissured, they tend to quickly release to the outside (if the reactor pressure is low, as in many accidents) all the accumulated volatile products.
The amount of hydrogen which can be generated by a normal size reactor may reach 700–800 kg: a very large quantity! The most severe hazard caused by hydrogen release is that it will be released, sooner or later according to the conservative assumptions made in severe accident studies, into the primary containment atmosphere where it may cause, in the presence of air, explosions or relatively slow combustion. In both cases, the internal pressure in the primary containment will increase and its integrity will be endangered. The containment safety margins against internal pressure are, however, normally high.1 If the accident is allowed to progress in an uncontrolled way, the temperature of the reactor core will continue to increase and it can be assumed that at about 1973 K (1700 C) the not yet oxidised, zircalloy claddings will melt, and at about 3073 K (2800 C) the uranium oxide pellets will melt completely. The liquid mass that could be formed in this way (named ‘corium’) collects on the bottom of the reactor vessel and may perforate it as the generation of decay heat continues. The TMI accident progressed up to the threshold of this event, without trespassing it, however. A large quantity of molten and re-solidified ‘corium’ was indeed found on the bottom of the vessel, which, however, was not perforated. Once the base of the vessel has been breached, the corium could pour on the bottom of the primary containment, usually made of a very thick layer of reinforced concrete (1–5 m). On contact, any water residing here would be vaporized increasing the pressure inside the containment.
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Nuclear Safety
Today a ‘steam explosion’ under these conditions (the sudden contact and physical interaction of high temperature corium with water on the containment bottom) is generally thought to be very unlikely and, perhaps, physically impossible, at least not of such a magnitude to cause the rupture of the containment. Contact between the corium and the containment concrete is, on the contrary, certain. The chemical– physical attack of the concrete itself with the consequent production of gases (even of explosive ones, such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen) raises the possibility of perforation of the containment wall. Gas production and combustion, and the continued production of heat from the corium will necessarily cause the pressure to increase within the containment up to its rupture value (2–4 times the design pressure), unless the perforation of the containment floor, due to the concrete attack by the corium, intervenes first. This typical scenario is the one foreseen under the extreme assumption of a lack of any intervention able to stop the progress of the accident in the time period from its inception up to the rupture of the containment (which is expected to happen after 20 hours to 5 days, depending on the specific characteristics of the plant). The time periods indicated here refer to a reactor which had operated continuously for a long time before the accident. More than 400 civilian power reactors operate in the world today and they have altogether accumulated more than 10 000 reactor years of operation. The principal accidents which have occurred are the TMI accident (1979) and the Chernobyl accident (1986). The accident at the experimental Windscale reactor (1957, see Chapter 20) is also an interesting reference for the study of the consequences of serious accidents. The TMI accident (see Chapter 1) was due to a relief valve on the pressurizer (indicated S in Fig. 3-1) remaining stuck open during a normal plant transient. The operators didn’t become aware for hours of this opening in the primary circuit because they had, from the available instrumentation, contrasting indications about the level of water in the circuit itself. Indeed, the pressure and temperature instruments indicated that the water in the core was boiling, while the level instruments in the pressurizer indicated a primary circuit full of liquid. In deciding what to do, they made the wrong choice and believed the level instrumentation.
Consequently, they blocked the emergency water injection systems which had been automatically actuated. The core overheated and partially melted. The releases were negligible from the health protection point of view because of the presence of an effective containment. The fact that TMI didn’t result in a public health catastrophe has to be ascribed to the Defence in Depth principle systematically adopted as Western safety practice. The concept provides multiple redundant and diverse barriers against radioactive releases, well beyond what could be thought strictly necessary. TMI showed that this principle offers protection against the unforeseen and the unknown possible events. Chernobyl, on the contrary, is an example of what can happen if a completely opposite principle is applied, that to do only what is necessary for safety. In RBMK reactors, like the Chernobyl reactor, the safety margins were not stringent enough. For example, the plant had a containment system for the primary circuit but it was only partial: the reactor itself, and in particular the fuel channel heads, were not included in it. The designers thought that it was sufficient only to install protective monitoring instrumentation. Figure 3-4 shows the containment for a typical 900 MWt PWR and the Chernobyl reactor containment. In addition to the Chernobyl design deficiencies, there was evidence of human error and the voluntary violation of safety rules, both for production reasons and in the incorrect appreciation of the real danger. Chernobyl can with good reason be considered representative of the maximum possible accident to a power reactor. Unfortunately, the abundant information supplied by the designers does not allow us to conclude that the corrective measures adopted in other reactors of the same type (about 20) are sufficient to rule out the danger of another severe accident, possibly with different modalities. The accident, indeed, has highlighted a dangerous vulnerability of this type of reactor, which is generic in nature, and which is not specifically tied with the sequence of events that happened at Chernobyl in 1986. In particular, a weak point of the reactor is its upper closure plate, to which 1700 fuel channels and the control rods are fastened. There is no containment present above the plate: a major hazard during possible accidental internal over-pressurization of the reactor.
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
PWR
23
CHERNOBYL
60 m
Light upper containment
Figure 3-4. PWR containment and Chernobyl (RBMK 1000) containment (roughly to the same scale).
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 show the significant differences between the dynamics of the Chernobyl and the TMI accidents. Figure 3-5 illustrates the crucial phase of the Chernobyl accident and shows how it essentially comprised an uncontained ‘explosion’ of the reactor. Figure 3-6 shows the damaged state of the TMI-2 reactor core and vessel after the accident, and results from many years of research (OECD, 1993). As can be seen, in the case of TMI-2, and unlike Chernobyl, a slow ‘core melt’ took place, without explosive phenomena and with the absence of intrinsic instabilities. The following, also derived after many studies, gives a quantitative measure of the sequence of events in the same accident:
0–100 minutes: Loss of coolant and core exposure; 100–174 minutes: Start of core damage; 174–180 minutes: Temporary operation of the primary pump; 180–224 minutes: Prolonged heating-up of core; 224–226 minutes: Displacement of core material; 226 minutes: Stabilization of the debris.
It is possible to classify the types of significant accidents on a scale of increasing severity and, on the basis of available data, assign to them orders of magnitude of releases and of probabilities (see Table 3-2). The download file, DRYCORE (on this book’s companion website, http://books.elsevier.com/ companions/0750667230) provides some data and
methodology for evaluations on a barely refrigerated or completely dry core. These methods help, for example, in evaluating the time to the start of melt down after shutdown of a core (or part of a core) without refrigeration.
3-3. Future safety systems and plant concepts 3-3-1. General remarks The nuclear reactors now operating incorporate both passive and active safety features (see pp. 9 and 26). For example, reactors have a passive limitation of power excursions through a negative power coefficient of reactivity, which is, for most of them, the outcome of the early recognition that a power excursion might be difficult to limit in the presence of self-enhancing dynamic reactor features. On the other hand, most reactor emergency cooling systems are active. The variety of solutions does not reflect a precise choice in the early days of nuclear power towards active or passive systems, rather it reflects the best choice for the designers of that time. Passive and intrinsic safety solutions were adopted when they were recognized as being effective and economically convenient. Moreover, the fundamental safety functions required in a nuclear reactor are limited to reactor shutdown, reactor and containment cooling, and containment of radiotoxic
24
Nuclear Safety
Figure 3-5. The destruction of the Chernobyl reactor. products. The most natural engineering solutions for these functions were in general adopted, with obvious variations, in all of the reactor designs developed. With the passing of time, in depth safety studies and data from operating experience both tended to widen the safety requirements beyond those originally devised. Plants became more complex and some
of the passive safety features originally present tended to disappear. This is evident, for example, in containment cooling, which was originally entrusted to passive, natural mechanisms. The accidents at TMI and at Chernobyl, although, as discussed, different in many respects from one other, were equally rich in lessons in their applicable technical environment.
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
2B inlet
Upper grid damage
Coating of previously molten material on bypass region interior surfaces
25
1A inlet
Cavity
Loose core debris Crust Previously molten material
Hole in baffle plate
Ablated incore instrument guide
Lower plenum debris
Possible region depleted in uranium
Figure 3-6. The final configuration of the TMI core. (Reproduced from ‘Three Mile Island Pressure Vessel Investigation Project: Achievements and Significant Results’, OECD, 1993.) Additionally, the integral safety studies of typical plants (see Section 1-2), starting with the Rasmussen study, caused the technical experts to completely rethink the safety approach hitherto followed. Now the design engineers and operators were
convinced (or even more convinced) that accident prevention and mitigation in nuclear plants deserved very special attention: serious accidents could be avoided, but continued attention to safety in design and operation was warranted, including
26
Nuclear Safety
Table 3-2. A possible classification of accidents, their external releases and their probabilities (current reactors) 131
Types of accident A – Maximum design basis accidents (DBA) B – Maximum DBA (degraded safety systems) or accidents with partial core melt C – Severe accidents with quick intervention D – Severe accidents with delayed intervention E – Severe accidents without intervention
I release fractions
10 10
7 5
10 4 10 3 10 2–10
the consideration of important plant design alternatives. Some facts, in particular, became even more evident than before: firstly, the potential importance of multiple failures in complex safety systems and, secondly, the possible serious consequence of human errors. Hence, attention focused on passive safety systems and on inherent or intrinsic safety systems. These needed fewer auxiliary systems, they were simpler, with a lower number of parts which could potentially fail, and they did not require as much operator intervention as active systems. ‘Passive’ safety systems are defined as the operating safety features of structures and devices designed to counteract specific events without the reliance on mechanical and/or electrical power, forces or ‘intelligence’ signals external to the same structures and devices (Lo Prato et al., 1990; IAEA, 1991). These features should rely only on natural laws and the properties of materials, and should not require any human action. Different degrees of passivity exist, for example a safety system may operate without external power but may require some sort of active actuating signal. In this case, too, the system is deemed passive even if not to the full definition of the term. ‘Inherent’ safety means the elimination of hazard by choice of material or design concept, for example the elimination in a plant of any combustible material (if possible) would demonstrate inherent safety from the danger of fire. In the last few years, a great deal has been discussed on the merits of passive and intrinsic safety Although it is evident that a substantial research and development effort on simpler and less vulnerable nuclear plants is still warranted, it appears now more
1
Order of magnitude of the release (TBq)
Associated probability each year
0.3 30
10 5 10 5–10
300 3000 30 000–300 000
10 10 10
6
6 7 8
generally recognized that the best possible and safest plant, at this point in time, and one in which serious accidents can be avoided throughout all of its life, probably includes both active and passive features in an optimization perspective. Passive systems, although at first sight attractive for their simplicity, may have drawbacks (e.g. they are less powerful and slower in their action than their active counterparts). Moreover, their reliability is more difficult to evaluate. Safety system development in the process (mainly chemical) industry is somewhat similar where a number of TMI–Chernobyl-type of events have occurred, for example Flixborough, Seveso, Bhopal, and others. The Flixborough nylon plant accident in the UK (1974) was caused by an open-air explosion of a flammable gas released into the air. It killed the 28 plant employees present and caused extensive property damage in the surrounding area. The failure to perform a full technical assessment of a modification was given as the main cause of the event. The Seveso pesticide plant accident in Italy (1976) is well known for the dangerous release of dioxin due to poor plant safety features and to the underestimation of the possibility of a runaway reaction. The Bhopal incident in India (1984), at another pesticide plant, killed an estimated 4000 (although the total number is still unknown). This disaster was attributed to too large an inventory of toxic substances and to very poor staff attention to the operability of safety features. As in the nuclear arena, the process industry plant designs tended to grow bigger and bigger with time, becoming, therefore, more complicated and dangerous as a result of the large amounts of stored chemicals, and the need for complex modifications
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
and operating procedures. The accidents initiated a rethinking period pointing to the study of ‘more inherently safe’ plants. The wording chosen is indicative of the need to eliminate the wrong idea of a completely safe plant. The following two sections respectively explore some of the main ideas brought about by this rethink of safety in the nuclear and process industries.
3-3-2. Some passive safety systems for nuclear plants The passive systems and components discussed in the last few years range from complete reactor concepts to single components (Forsberg et al., 1989; Petrangeli, 1992). A rather arbitrary selection of a few of these proposals is presented in this section. They are all well-known concepts in the nuclear industry and they discussed here because they are considered among the most interesting ones. Passive plant reactors (e.g. the AP600W) are proposed future reactors that use the technology of current reactors, but include also significant changes in plant design and layout. Safety, in the event of an accident, depends on truly passive safety systems and on safety systems which are passive in operation although started up by a simple action such as valves opening. In the AP600, a passive cooling containment system (PCCS) is provided to remove heat from the steel reactor containment (Petrangeli, 1992). The operation of the passive safety injection system (PSIS) following a LOCA results in steam released from the reactor core being passively condensed inside the containment. Steam condensation reduces containment pressure. In the first instance, the PCCS comprises a large tank above the containment structure that allows the drain of water by gravity on the outside of the steel containment vessel. Secondly, the opening of air dampers supplies natural circulation air cooling of the external surface of the steel containment. The air and evaporated water exhaust through an opening in the roof of the shield building. The PCCS is capable of removing the thermal energy following a DBA so that the containment pressure remains below the design value with no operator action required for (three) days. The PCCS is designed to reduce containment pressure to less than one half its design pressure
27
within 24 hours following a LOCA. After three days, if there is no supply of water, the heat removal is assured by air alone with an increased pressure (up to about design pressure). In nuclear power plants, the containment is the final barrier that prevents radioactive release to the environment during accident events. Because of containment importance in mitigating the consequences of an accident, it is necessary not only to assess its integrity during an accident, but also to ensure that it is and stays leakproof after the accident has occurred. Typical allowable primary containment leakage rates lie in the range of 0.1–1 per cent of volume a day, but the operating experience sometimes has indicated ‘real-world’ values above these allowable limits. These are usually due to excessive valve or penetration leakage, valves or penetrations left open after testing, airlock failure, etc. Studies have been made on the following aspects:
containment leak proofing enhancement (e.g. improved choice of valve types, reduction of the number of penetrations, valves stems leakage reduction, etc.); the root causes of leak proofing degradation (e.g. debris reduction and deposition on valve seal surfaces and valves behaviour under severe accidents); the concept of a secondary containment to reduce the primary containment releases by hold-up, deposition, filtration, elevated release (e.g. a secondary containment that envelopes possibly affected buildings equipped with filtration systems); monitoring capabilities to detect pre-existing openings in the containment boundary (e.g. monitoring nitrogen leaks in inert containments).
The advanced light water reactor (ALWR) passive plants, employ safety grade passive decay heat removal (PDHR) systems in order to enhance the capability (relative to current plants) of maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition following non-LOCA events. The approach developed for these systems is founded on meeting the following requirements:
The PDHR system is employed for both the hot stand-by and long-term core cooling modes. This system can operate at full reactor coolant system pressure and places the reactor in the long-term cooling mode immediately after shutdown.
28
Nuclear Safety
The operation in the long-term cooling mode is automatic. The operation of the system does not require any a.c. power, either on- or off-site. The operation of the system does not require any pumps or valve operation once initial alignment is established. No make-up water is required for a period of at least three days following reactor shutdown. The systems are located entirely within containment.
The passive decay heat removal (PDHR) systems, however, do not have the ability to bring the plant to the cold shutdown conditions of 373 K (100 C). This is inherent in the passive heat removal process itself because heat removal is accomplished by heat exchangers located within a pool of water, and the temperature on the reactor coolant side of the heat exchanger tubing will, by necessity, exceed the boiling point of water at normal pressure. Cold shutdown can be achieved by the reactor shutdown cooling system, proposed as a non-safety-grade system. The AP600 PDHR system, for example, is designed to perform the following functions for non-LOCA events:
The automatic actuation to provide reactor coolant and to prevent water release through the pressurizer safety valves. The removal of core decay heat assuming the steam generated in the in-containment refuelling water storage tank (IRWST) is condensed on the containment vessel and returned by gravity into the IRWST. The PDHR should provide decay heat removal for at least 72 hours if no condensate is recovered. Cooling the reactor coolant system to 473 K (200 C) in about 72 hours. Removal of core decay heat and reduction of reactor coolant system temperature and pressure, during a steam generator tube rupture event, equalizing primary pressure with steam generator pressure and terminating break flow, without overfilling the steam generator.
During the TMI accident, one of the strategies unsuccessfully tried by the operators to regain control of core cooling was to depressurize the reactor system. The reactor was not designed for that operation and the manoeuvre did not succeed. A reactor depressurization system would probably
have helped. Moreover even the initial probability risk assessments (PRAs) did highlight the possibility of high pressure severe accident sequences for current light water reactors (LWRs). The idea then started to be studied of designing a depressurization system into LWRs. This was a new concept, especially in PWRs. Boiling water reactors (BWRs) had a relief system in order to cope with loss of condenser accidents. In principle, a primary depressurization system has many advantages: its operation tends to create an immediate, yet temporary, reactor shutdown effect; it decreases the primary water temperature and favours core cooling; finally, it allows water to be supplied to the core either by high pressure injection systems or by low pressure ‘jury-rigged’ emergency systems (fire truck water, etc.). New passive LWRs incorporate a powerful depressurization system which allows emergency water injection to be made by gravity driven (passive) arrangements. Moreover the operation of the primary depressurization system also ensures that the reactor coolant system would be depressurized during a severe accident. Therefore, violent ejection of molten core debris from a pressurized reactor coolant system is highly unlikely for the passive plant with a corresponding reduction in the potential for direct heating of the containment atmosphere. This is also applicable to the evolutionary LWRs, in fact NRC staff has concluded (USNRC, 1990) that ALWR designs (evolutionary and passive) should include a depressurization system to preclude the ejection of molten core debris under high pressure from the reactor vessel. Nevertheless the reactor coolant release to containment has the potential for adverse effects on in-containment equipment. Accordingly, the ALWR plants should be designed to minimize such adverse effects by ensuring that the frequency of inadvertent actuation is extremely low (2 10 3 per year) for passive plants according to US Electric Power Research Institute requirements (EPRI, 1990) ensuring that recovery from such inadvertent actuation is feasible without compromising plant availability for a long period (recovery within 30 days or less according to EPRI requirements). As an example, a short description of the AP600 depressurization system follows. The AP600 automatic depressurization system comprises 16 valves divided into four depressurization stages. These valves are installed in the reactor coolant system at three different locations. The valves
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
in the first three stages are connected to nozzles on top of the pressurizer. The fourth stage valves are connected to the hot leg of reactor coolant loop. The main actuating signals for each depressurization stage come from different level set points in the core make-up tanks (CMTs that provide high pressure make-up by gravity). When the CMT is going to deplete, the depressurization takes place to allow low pressure injection from the IRWST by gravity. Moreover the depressurization system, together with passive injection of borated water from the IRWST, could ensure safe shutdowns in the long term in case of ATWS if other active systems are not available for this purpose. The design of hydraulic engineered safety features for LWRs has traditionally been performed according to high reliability and leak proof standards. These systems are usually called into operation to protect the fuel barrier in the case of a loss of the primary system barrier. In addition, being strictly connected to the primary circuit pressure boundary, they have to be equipped with leak proof isolation devices, normally closed during plant operation. Squib valves, initially used for applications in the space industry, have been considered very attractive for use in an advanced passive reactor. These valves are characterized by a no-leak capability and, once actuated, they are designed to maintain the open position. The inlet chamber of the valves is normally closed by a sealing cap. When the valve is actuated, an explosive initiator pushes a plunger that shears the cap off. This kind of actuation has been found to be very reliable from operational experience and qualification tests. These valves require very limited maintenance. In fact no periodic intervention, other than the substitution of the initiator, is necessary. There are additional benefits associated with their use in automatic depressurization systems relating to the possibility of providing a flow area larger than that traditionally obtained with standard safety relief valves (SRVs). Such a large area is very important in passive reactors to depressurize the primary system at very low pressures, consistent with the operation of injection systems based on gravity. The installation of such valves in the core cooling injection system, in addition to the benefits associated to the leak proof characteristics, ensures, during normal operation, a pressure shielding function on the upstream check valves. Therefore, these valves do not remain forced in the closed position for long
29
periods, thus improving their reliability when called to open under a low differential pressure. Density locks (or ‘hot–cold interfaces’) are passive devices which perform a similar function as normally-closed valves during normal operating conditions. However, in case of transient or accident conditions, they allow cooling flow without the need of a power supply or the motion of mechanical parts. Density locks have been applied in the process inherent ultimate safety (PIUS) reactor concept (Fosberg et al., 1989). In this design, the reactor core is immersed in a large pool of pressurized, cold, borated water. The hot primary water and the cold pool water are in contact at two ‘hot–cold interfaces’ (high and low elevation in the cooling circuit) where, during normal operation, substantial mixing is prevented by design details and by pump speed (head) adjustment, governed by the lower interface temperature. In case of uncontrolled accidents of any origin, the core will tend to overheat causing water boiling and a decrease of the hydrostatic head in the riser pipe above it, beyond the correction capability of the pump speed control system. Under these conditions, natural circulation between the cold pool, the core and the riser pipe will be established through the two ‘hot–cold interfaces’ along an always-open natural circulation path. The pool of cold, borated water will then enter into the core and will shut the reactor down and remove the decay heat. In a certain sense, PIUS safety is based on the use of an essentially unstable cooling circuit, which needs active pump action to ensure stability during normal operation; in off-normal conditions, the system automatically switches to its stable condition which also is a safe shutdown condition. Density locks perform a fundamental role in PIUS ensuring core cooling during emergency conditions, and thus the potential for blockages caused by gas collection, material distortion or plugging by detached insulating materials should be analysed in depth. The density lock concept has been used in other new reactor schemes. Fluidic diodes and vortex valves are passive devices whose use in future nuclear power plants (NPPs) is currently under evaluation with reference to their potential use as check valves or actuation valves in safety-related systems. Fluidic diodes, used in reprocessing plants and chemical industries, are one-way valves with no moving parts. They are characterized by a very high flow resistance in one
30
Nuclear Safety
direction with respect to the other. This characteristic allows them to be used as flow limiters to maintain core coolant boundary integrity in the case of a LOCA event. A potential application in a typical PWR system, might be to install a fluidic diode on the reactor pressure vessel nozzle of the cold legs of the circuit to avoid reverse flow conditions following a pipe break. Due to the diode’s characteristics, instead of a massive release of coolant, only limited leaks would occur. Vortex valves are ‘normally active/passive during emergency’ devices designed to maintain a separation between environments normally operating at different pressures. This function is performed by the fluid movement provided by a normally operating pump. A potential application to NPP safety features is as actuation valves in case of transients or accidents. During normal operation the two environments remain isolated as the vortex valve functions as a standard isolation valve. Following a transient, the pump operation is interrupted and water flows from the environment at high pressure to that at low pressure.
3-3-3. Inherently safe systems in the process industries In process industry plants, the concept of more inherently safe design is a recurring theme in the three reports of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH – set up in the UK after the Flixborough accident). These reports set the general principles of ‘new’ process industry safety in the UK and they represent in their field what, for example, the IAEA ‘Safety Fundamentals’ documents do in the nuclear industry. A full account of the developments of this concept is given in Lees,AR587 Kletz (1984) and UMIST (1982). The Loss Prevention Bulletin (published by the Institution of Chemical Engineers, England) is also a ‘must’ for interested people. It is available in most technical libraries and a list of its main articles over the years is included in Lees.AR587 The basic principles of inherently safer designs in the process industry are:
Intensification: namely carrying out the chemical reaction in a smaller volume in order to have a lower inventory of dangerous substances and smaller consequences of an accident.
Substitution: of a dangerous process or substance, for example a heat transfer medium with a less dangerous one. Attenuation: adoption of a less hazardous process condition, for example a lower pressure in combination with the improvement of a catalyst. Simplicity: for example designing a vessel or pipe for full over-pressure instead of adopting a pressure-relief system. (As Henry Ford has supposed to have said, ‘What you don’t fit costs nothing and needs no maintenance’.) Operability: adoption of a process which can be easily controlled and adjusted to off-normal conditions. Fail-safe design: where the failure of the system leads directly to a safe condition. Second chance design: second line of defence.
Interesting examples of proposals in the process industry follow The first typical example concerns the manufacture of nitroglycerine. It has to be classified as an ‘intensification’ of the process, namely the drastic reduction of the inventory of the dangerous substance. Nitroglycerine is manufactured by the reaction between glycerin and a mixture of concentrated nitric and sulphuric acids. The reaction is highly exothermic and the mixture has to be continuously cooled and stirred otherwise a violent explosion may occur due to the uncontrolled decomposition of nitroglycerine. Originally the reaction was performed in batches using large (1 t) pots. The operator had to continuously monitor the temperature and check that stirring was effective. Since the reaction lasted a rather long time (hours) there was the danger of the operators falling asleep and, therefore, they used to work sitting on onelegged stools, as it can be seen in historical pictures (Fig. 3-7). This kind of process continued to be used until fifty years ago with a number of casualties and complete plant losses. The same reaction is now obtained in a small injector where the acid jet entrains the correct amount of glycerin and, due to the turbulent mixing, the reaction time has been reduced down to minutes. The reaction is complete at the exit of the injector. The amount of nitroglycerine in the reactor is reduced to a few kilograms and the operators can be protected by a blast wall.
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions
Figure 3-7. Manufacture of nitroglycerine in old times.
Another reaction, the adipic acid reaction (used in the manufacture of nylon), was previously performed in a huge reactor with external circuits for cooling. Today, it is carried out in a smaller integral vessel with internal cooling and agitation, and with a very smaller possibility for leaks. A similar evolution has taken place in nuclear reactors which changed from external to internal recirculation units (or to integral proposals for future reactors). It is also worth mentioning the ICI’s Higee process, where the process of gravitational separation is enhanced by centrifugal forces in a rotating unit, with a consequent decrease in amount of substance in the separator. Many examples are available concerning the substitution of one process with a less dangerous one. In a number of cases in the chemical industry the choice has to be made between the availability of a large storage of substances and the reduction of stored substances concurrent with the continuous production of them on site. In the first case,
31
continuity of production is better assured but the risk attributable to the storage is present. The situation is reversed in the second case. The concept of inherent safety leans thinking towards the second choice. It has to be remembered that in the case of Bhopal, the situation was exacerbated because it had been decided to produce methyl isocyanate (MIC – the poison which was released in the accident) on site instead of importing it from another factory. However, the already existing huge MIC tanks continued to be used with the consequent risk. In the industry, subsequent major reductions of inventories have taken place on safety grounds brought about by new regulations concerning, in particular, hazardous substances such as ethylene oxide, propylene oxide and sulphur trioxide. Huge strides are being made in chemical industry safety, in areas that are of strong interest for nuclear plants as well (e.g. a reduction in the possibility of leaks from containments through the reduction in the number and the dimension of penetrations). The simplification of complex designs is also pursued by such measures as design for over-pressure and design modification to avoid instrumentation. Simple cases of the latter operation is the use of suitable piping arrangements to avoid reverse flow and to provide for automatic sump voiding (high turns of pipe with anti-siphon openings, self-priming siphons, etc.). Concerning the ‘operability’ concept in the previous list of principles of more inherently safe design in the process industry, it seems worth noting that, in the parallel field of nuclear plants, designers tend now to provide a longer ‘grace period’ in case of mistakes or accidents (e.g. an increase of the water inventory in water reactors, and so on). Speculative proposals for the future process plants also exist. One of them considers the advantages of distributed manufacture of chemicals using miniaturized plants at the user’s site. Such plants would be more environmentally friendly and would deliver their products on a ‘just in time’ basis. They should also be completely automated, highly reliable, selfcleaning and sealed for life. As is apparent from this section, in a number of instances the process industry has gone beyond the study phase and has adopted more inherently safe provisions. Safety experts in the process industry, however, complain that, as yet, not enough has been
32
Nuclear Safety
done (Kletz, 1984). Some of the restraints towards a higher level of inherent safety are:
the technical options available for the next plant are usually limited by time, so if major advances are to be made there has to be a ‘plant after next’ design policy, namely during the design stage of a plant there is not enough time to discuss and to develop alternative designs); the desire for certainty of production (if a new process or a new equipment is used, then unforeseen difficulties may cause trouble during start-up, perhaps delay or prevent the achievement of design output or efficiency); the process licensing authorities are often on the side of tradition (possibly to prevent unforeseen snags and surprises); technical misconceptions (like the belief that, for example, the reduction in the inventory of dangerous substances may render the control of the process more difficult); the organization of a company in business areas instead of in functional departments is not favourable to innovation because of the strong influence of the control of expenditures (i.e. illdefined responsibility for design innovation by research departments or design departments).
It has been remarked that it is difficult to convince people close to the industry that there is a need to improve safety levels. Many are accustomed to think that hazard is inherent in the industry (which may be true to a certain extent) and it does not occur to them that in many cases it may be possible to reduce the risk and consequences of the hazards.3
References US Code of Federal Regulations (2004) ‘Part 100: Reactor Site Criteria’, US Government. EPRI (1990)-NP 6780, Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document. Forsberg, C.W., et al. (1989) ‘Proposed and existing passive and inherent safety-related structures, systems and components (building blocks) for advanced light water reactors’, ORNL-6554, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. IAEA (1991) ‘Safety-related terms for advanced nuclear plants’, IAEA TECDOC 626.
Kletz, T.A. (1984) Cheaper, Safer Plants or Wealth and Safety at Work? Rugby: The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Lo Prato, E., Petrangeli, G., Tononi, R. and Zaffiro, C. (1990) ‘Terminology for future nuclear power plants’, IAEA TECDOC 550. OECD (1993) ‘The Three Mile Island Pressure Vessel Investigation Project: Achievements and Significant Results’, OECD. Petrangeli, G. (1992) ‘Fifty years from the Fermi Pile’, Proceedings of CIRTEN Safety Technologies and Safeguards 1992, Pisa University. USNRC (1990) SECY 90.016 Evolutionary Light Water Reactor Certification Issues and their relationships to current regulatory requirements. UMIST (1982) ‘Inherently safe plant’, Proceedings of Safety in the Chemical Industry 1982, University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology.
Chapter notes 1 An explosion of roughly 350 kg of hydrogen occurred during the TMI accident without any damage to the containment. 2 The TMI accident progressed up to the threshold of this event. A large quantity of molten and re-solidified corium was indeed found on the bottom of the vessel which, however, was not perforated. 3 The following short story, attributed to a chemical engineer, demonstrates the similarity of thought between safety engineers in the nuclear and process industries. It is so enjoyable, I think that it deserves reproduction here. It has been slightly adapted from Kletz (1984). The tiger and the treasure: A king offered a challenge to three young men. Each young man would be put in a room with two doors. The young men could open either door they pleased. Behind one door was a hungry tiger, the fiercest and most cruel that could be procured, which would immediately tear them to pieces. But if they opened the other door, they would find a precious treasure. So I leave it to you, which door should they open? The first young man refused to take the chance. He lived safe and died poor. The second man hired risk assessment consultants. He collected all the available data on tiger populations and on ways to detect treasures. He brought in sophisticated technology to listen for growling of tigers and to detect metals and precious stone from some distance. He completed checklists. He developed a utility function and assessed his
Chapter 3 Safety systems and their functions risk averseness. Finally, sensing that in a few more years he would be in no condition to enjoy the treasure anyway, he opened the optimal door. Some sources maintain that he was eaten by a low-probability tiger. The third man took a course in tiger taming.
33
Is the optimal combination of the course of actions chosen by the two young men who opened the door very dissimilar from the Defence in Depth concept, well established as a foundation block of the nuclear safety? It seems not, and this seems to also be the conclusion of the chemical engineer who invented the story.
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Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
4-1. Classification
4-2-1. Some important data for accident analysis
Accidents are usually grouped as follows:
Accidents of internal or external origin. Area accidents (fires, internal floods). Accidents of natural origin. Accidents of human origin (explosion of a tank near the plant, sabotage, etc.). Voluntary accidents (sabotage). Design Basis Accidents, Beyond Design Basis Accidents, Severe Accidents (see Section 1-2 and Chapter 3).
Design Basis Accidents are usually subdivided into four categories:
4-2-1-1. Initial conditions
Operational transients. Moderate frequency sequences. Rare sequences. Limiting accidents.
The EUR criteria give an idea of the probabilities assigned to these accidents (see Appendix 6 on EUR Criteria).
The core nominal power is usually increased by 2 per cent in order to take into account possible calorimetric errors. The average coolant temperature is taken as the nominal one 2 C due to measurement errors. The pressurizer pressure is varied by 200 kPa (2 bar) in order to take into account normal fluctuations and measurement errors. The initial values of the various parameters quoted are chosen in such a way to minimize the initial departure from nuclear boiling ratio (DNBR – the power ratio margin from nucleate boiling, usually kept higher than 1.3 in normal operation and in ordinary transients). The fast shutdown trigger levels and the corresponding time delays considered in the analyses (including errors) are of the order of magnitude indicated in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1.
4-2. Design basis accidents
4-2-1-2. Doppler coefficient
Design basis accidents (DBAs) are those accidents chosen by the deterministic method or with the help of probabilistic considerations, in order to design all the plant systems, but particularly the safety ones. Some of the following considerations are of interest for DBAs and for the other accidents. Most of the quoted data are taken from examples of typical 1000 MWe pressurized plants.
It is well recognized that the Doppler coefficient is one of the most important counter-reactions during reactivity excursions. The increase of the fuel temperature causes an increase in the amplitude of the uranium-238 neutron capture resonances and, therefore, a decrease in the core reactivity. In some transients, it is conservative to assume a most negative Doppler coefficient (when a higher power 35
36
Nuclear Safety
Table 4-1. Fast shutdown signals and corresponding delays (core safety limits, p ¼ 15.51 MPa (2250 psig) Origin of fast shutdown
Trigger level in the analyses
High neutron flux Core T (excess temperature) Core T (excess power) High pressurizer pressure Low pressurizer pressure Low recirculation flow Turbine trip Low-low level in steam generator High level in steam generator, feedwater pumps stop, feedwater system valves shut-off, turbine trip
118% Automatically variable Automatically variable 16.65 MPa (normal 15.51 MPa) 12.31 Mpa 87%
Time delay (s) 0.5 6 6 2 2 1 1 2 2
140 Overpower DT trip 120 Overpower trip 100
% Power
Operating point Over-temperature DT trip
80
60
Technical specifications safety limit
Steam generator safety valves open
40
20
0 573
593
613 Tavg (K)
Figure 4-1. Core safety limits ( p ¼ 15.51 MPa/2250 psig).
633
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
PCM per per cent power
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
37
120
−5 Most negative Doppler power coefficient −10 −15 −20
Least negative Doppler power coefficient
−25 Per cent power Figure 4-2. Doppler coefficient for transient analyses. and temperature decrease is contrary to a conservative evaluation, e.g. for steel over-cooling reasons) and in others (the majority), the opposite applies. Figure 4-2 shows, the curves for the two cases. According to the two curves, at practically zero initial power, an increase in power until 10 per cent causes a reduction in reactivity ranging from 0.1 per cent to 0.2 per cent. The Doppler coefficient varies with the fuel burnup, that is with the operation time, becoming less negative (i.e. less effective as a safety counterreaction) when the burn-up increases. In fact, with time, four phenomena cause a variation of the coefficient:
The variation of the composition of the gap gases in the fuel rods (which includes helium at the start only, but then also fission gases); the conductivity of the gap decreases with increasing time and, therefore, the fuel tends to become hotter. The densification of the fuel pellets which tends to increase the gap with an effect similar to the preceding phenomenon. The increase in the content of plutonium-240 which shows strong resonance peaks for neutron capture in the thermal zone and the consequent magnification of the uranium-238 effect (which, on the contrary, tends to decrease). The deformation by mechanical creep of the claddings, which tends to decrease the gaps and, therefore, the Doppler effect.
The last factor predominates over the others and, at the end of the core life, the Doppler coefficient is less effective. The two curves in Figure 4-2 to be used for transient analysis, are the result of the fuel burnup and the uncertainties of evaluation. As can be seen from the figure, the variation of power from zero to 100 per cent entails a variation of Doppler reactivity of the order of 1–1.5 per cent; this figure doesn’t include the effect of the variation of the moderator temperature, which is separately evaluated.
4-2-1-3. Coefficient of moderator temperature and of the voids The moderator temperature reactivity coefficient is also important for safety. In fact, when the moderator temperature increases, its density decreases and, as a consequence, the moderating effectiveness also decreases. This decrease causes an increase in the loss of neutrons from the core and an increase in the parasite captures, so that the reactivity tends to decrease. As, however, PWRs adopt chemical shim, that is the control of reactivity through dissolution of boric acid in the reactor water, the presence of this neutron absorber decreases the safety effectiveness of the moderator temperature coefficient; in fact, if the temperature increases, the amount of boron
38
Nuclear Safety
20
Moderator temperature coefficient (PCM/°C)
10
2000 ppm
0 −10 0
100
200
300 1500 ppm
400
−20 −30
1000 ppm
−40 500 ppm
−50 −60
0 ppm
−70 −80 −90 Moderator temperature (K−273)
Figure 4-3. Moderator temperature coefficient (start of life, no rods). 0
Moderator temperature coefficient (PCM/°C)
−10 0
50
100
150
200
250
−20
300 Unrodded
350
−30 −40 −50 500 ppm
−60
Rodded
−70
0 ppm
−80 −90 Moderator temperature (K−273)
Figure 4-4. Moderator temperature coefficient (end of life).
contained in the reactor water decreases and consequently the reactivity increases. For this reason, when the boron concentration is high (start of life, cold conditions) the overall temperature coefficient of the reactor water may be positive. Additionally, it must be emphasized that, in any case, the power coefficient (which includes the Doppler effect) must be always negative. Figures 4-3 and 4-4 show the behaviour of the temperature reactivity coefficient of the reactor water.
4-2-1-4. Reactivity of the boron content The content of boron in the cooling water is usually measured in parts per million (ppm). Generally, boric acid is used as the soluble boron compound: 1000 ppm of boron corresponds to about 0.6 per cent of boric acid. The reactivity of the dissolved boron is equal to about 800–900 pcm per 100 ppm, therefore in an operating condition with 1000 ppm boron, the reactivity in the dissolved boron is roughly
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
8–9 per cent. The usual values of the boron content are 2000 ppm boron at start of life and in cold conditions, 1000 ppm in hot conditions and only some hundreds of parts per million at end of life and hot conditions. It has to be remembered that boric acid may precipitate from the solution as various kinds of deposits (crud) which form on the inside primary system surfaces and especially on the hot surfaces of the fuel elements. Subsequently, in case of thermal or hydraulic transients, some of these deposits may peel off from the core giving rise to a reactivity transient. Over the years, no accidents due to this phenomenon have happened, notwithstanding the fact that the boron deposition on core surfaces has been observed and studied. The maximum reactivity which could be released can be evaluated of the order of 0.1 per cent in half a second (Petrangeli, 1967).
4-2-1-5. Reactivity of the control rods The reactivity of the complex of control rods is typically of the order of 10 per cent. The reactivity available for fast shutdown, however, depends on the position of the rods (e.g. rods are usually inserted under zero power and hot circuit conditions, but less often inserted under full power conditions), on the axial shape of the neutron flux and on the core burnup. Moreover, in order to evaluate the reactivity available for a fast shutdown, the assumption is usually made that the most reactive rod stays stuck in its position (generally it is considered completely extracted).
Overall, the reactivity available for a fast shutdown typically ranges between 6 per cent (under hot conditions and zero power conditions) and 9 per cent (at full power). Theoretically, a single rod may reach a worth of two per cent or more (as an example, a rod at the centre of the core with all the other rods inserted, which increases the worth of the rod) but the reactivity corresponding to the ejection of any rod (one of the DBAs) is always kept below the ‘prompt reactivity’ value (0.6 per cent): typically a limit of 0.5 per cent is adopted. The integrated worth of a control rod has the shape shown in Figure 4-5. Figure 4-6 shows the typical trend of the start-up rate, expressed in decades of growth of the neutron flux per minute, as a function of reactivity. The relationship connecting the start-up rate to the period T (s) is: Start-up rate ¼
26 decades min T
ð4:1Þ
Core reactivity is strongly influenced by the dynamic variation of the fission products as a consequence of the operational states of the core. Of course, the fission products accumulated in the core as a function of the fuel burn-up have also a strong influence on reactivity. Xenon-125 and samarium-149 are, in different ways, the most important nuclides in this context.
2 Reactivity, %
1
4-2-1-6. Reactivity of fission products (xenon and samarium)
2.5
1.5 1 0.5 0 0
39
20 40 60 80 Control rod position, percentage withdrawal
Figure 4-5. Integrated worth of a control rod (indicative).
100
40
Nuclear Safety
Reactivity (Dk/k * 10E-4)
100
10
1 0.01
0.1
1
10
Reactor start-up rate
Figure 4-6. Start-up rate as a function of reactivity.
Under stationary power operation conditions, the reactivity absorbed by xenon and samarium varies between two and three per cent. However, after shutdown, the reactivity of xenon may increase many times showing the well-known peak at about 11 hours. The negative reactivity due to samarium increases asymptotically up to a few per cent.
4-2-1-7. Reactivity balance Taking into account the above sections, the typical reactivity balance of a PWR could be similar to that shown in Table 4-2. The use of burnable poisons in the core to compensate for the burn-up reactivity of the fuel, normally adopted at least for the first cycle of the core, significantly reduces the need for compensating reactivity by soluble poison (Table 4-2 does not consider the use of burnable poisons). Table 4-2. The reactivity balance of a PWR Motivation
Reactivity (%) Rods
Cold shutdown (variation between hot and cold core) Doppler Xenon Samarium Operation margin Fuel burn-up (life)
Boron 2
2.2 2.2 0.8 0.8 9
4-2-2. Example of a category 2 accident: spurious opening of a pressurizer safety valve This scenario assumes that a pressurizer safety valve opens and stays open during the full power operation of the reactor. In the following, results are from studies made on a modern 1000 MWe reactor, but it can reasonably well apply to any PWR. After the opening of the valve, the primary system starts to quickly depressurize while the mixture of water and steam contained in the pressurizer reaches the temperature and pressure conditions of the primary hot leg. The valve has a flow area of 27.9 cm2 and the voiding of the pressurizer, for this opening, takes place in about 600 s. Subsequently, the depressurization of the entire primary system continues following the trend shown in Figure 4-7, where the curves obtained by the simple code ps.xls (available on the downloadable file ‘Primary System’ on this book’s accompanying web site) are also shown (the pertinent calculation will be commented on later). The reactor is shut down by the intervention of the low primary pressure signal at 10.93 MPa (abs) (109.3 bar (abs)). The normal primary pressure from which the transient starts is 15.82 MPa (abs) (158.2 bar (abs)). At a pressure of 10.93 MPa (abs), the safety injection system is automatically actuated which starts to inject water in the primary system through the high pressure pumps. Conservatively, it is
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
41
Primary pressure (105 Pa)
100
80
60 Safety report 40
ps.xls program (steam efflux)
20
ps.xls program (homogeneous efflux)
1200
2400
3600
4800
6000
Time (s)
Figure 4-7. Spurious opening of a safety valve on the pressurizer: calculated primary system pressure trend. assumed that one high pressure injection pump only operates (single failure), the injection flow rate is initially equal to about 1200 kg min 1 (20 kg s 1), increasing to 2700 kg min 1 (45 kg s 1) when the primary pressure decreases to 5 MPa (abs) (50 bar (abs)). Subsequently, as the primary pressure continues to decrease, the safety accumulators and the low pressure injection pumps start operating. During this accident scenario, the heat transfer from the fuel rods to the water does not usually reach the threshold of nucleate boiling, that is the conditions of ‘film boiling’ are not reached. In other words, the DNBR (or ‘burn-out’ ratio) never goes below 1, with some safety margin. In the transient described, the maximum fuel clad temperature is of the order of 843 K (570 C), well below the limit of 1477 K (1204 C) specified by the US regulations (US Code of Federal Regulations, 2004) universally followed in other countries. For interest, the other limits given in the abovementioned regulations applicable to DBAs are listed here:
Maximum oxidation of the cladding in the core: 17 per cent.
Less than one per cent of the total clad metal consumed by the metal–water reaction which generates hydrogen. The core geometry variation due to thermal and mechanical effects (swelling due to creep, etc.) insufficient to prevent its ability to cool.
None of these limits is reached in this accident, weighting the scenario as lower among other DBAs. Throughout accident duration, when very soon the primary system saturation conditions are reached (after about 600 s), the average steam–water mixture quality in the primary system always stays at a very low level. Obviously, if, as at Three Mile Island, the safety injection was shut off, the accident would continue to the start of core melt and beyond.1
4-2-3. Example of a category 3 accident: instantaneous power loss to all the primary pumps This scenario assumes that the accident starts at full power, then evolves through a number of stages
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Recirculation flow rate (%)
100
50
10
10
20
Time (s)
Figure 4-8. Total loss of power supply to the pumps: coast-down of the flow rate. concurrently with a progressive slowing down of the pumps. The initiating cause may only be the instantaneous loss of all the external electric power sources. The fast shutdown is quick (<2 s) actuated by the slowing down of the primary recirculation. The actuation signals vary according to design preference and they may comprise loss of pump speed, inadequacy of their electric power supply (voltage and frequency) and reduction of recirculation flow rate. The temperature of the primary water, as well as the primary pressure, initially tend to increase and subsequently to decrease after the reactor scram has operated a few seconds from the start of the accident. The heat loss from the secondary side occurs by steam dump to the atmosphere as the turbinegenerator combination stops on the scram signal. The condenser is lost if there is a total loss of electric power. The safety and steam dump valves open within seconds of the start of the accident. During the first seconds of the transient, the greater risk is the reduction of the DNBR (its limit is generally 1.3) and fuel damage: the coast-down curve of the pumps’ flow rate, influenced by the pump flywheel inertia, can prevent this danger.
A typical curve of the pumps’ coast-down is shown in Figure 4-8. It is generally assumed that after half an hour the operators will regain the plant control and start a controlled cooling of it. This cooling down will generally be performed through the manual actuation of the high pressure safety injection pumps (HPSI) and by controlling their flow rate by the actuation of the relevant control valves. At a certain point in this process, the automatic initiation of the safety injection system has to be prevented by changing the set points of the same automatic action. This initiation could have negative consequences (pressure). The pressure accumulators have to be disabled at the appropriate moment (when the pressure approaches the initiation value of roughly 4 MPa). At the start of the accident, on sensing the low voltage signal on the station auxiliary bus, the diesel generators automatically start and all the emergency loads are progressively connected to them (emergency safety features – ESF) as soon as each generator has reached its working voltage and frequency. In this scenario, it is assumed that no single failure aggravates the plant conditions, mainly because the
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
most critical situation (DNBR) is reached within a few seconds from the start of the accident, that is before the intervention of any safety system (except, naturally, for the reactor scram, for which the usual assumption of the worst stuck rod is made). As far as modelling the decrease of flow rate with time after the loss of electric power is concerned, the codes used balance the momentum in each cooling circuit and in the core. This momentum balance is combined with the continuity equations, with the momentum balance of the pumps and with the pump characteristic curves. In these calculations the head losses are overestimated for sake of conservatism.
4-2-4. Example of a category 4 accident: main steam line break In this scenario, it is assumed that one of the outlet lines of a steam generator suddenly breaks. The concept of ‘leak before break’, which excludes the guillotine break of the large primary lines, cannot be applied to the steam lines because it is difficult to demonstrate that a steam leakage from a quasicritical crack can be detected in time with certainty. This accident, therefore, has to be considered less unlikely than a primary pipe break. According to the position of the rupture, to the initial reactor conditions and to the accompanying malfunctions assumed, a variety of accidents with different consequences arise. In general, however, the rapid voiding of the affected generator causes:
a decrease of the primary temperature and, therefore, a significant increase of the core reactivity (the moderator temperature coefficient is usually negative), with a consequent increase of the neutron flux and possible overheating of the claddings and of the primary overpressure. In this regard, it should be remembered that, as a consequence of the usual assumption of the most reactive rod being stuck, the applicable peaking factors of the neutron flux are particularly high, although they are partly compensated by the increase in the void fraction near the extracted rod; the pressurization of the room where the rupture happens (container or nearby building); the release of radioactive products due to leakages from primary to secondary which, although small (of an order of magnitude of some kilograms per
43
minute) must always be considered, exacerbated by the possible damage of the fuel during the violent transient following the break. The accident is analysed for various locations of the steam line break (anywhere along its length, for example before or after the isolation valve/s, inside or outside the container, etc.). Various initial operating conditions (full power or hot shutdown), as well as various additional malfunctions (loss of the external power supplies, highest worth control rod fully extracted, etc.) are possible. Some of these situations, in fact, are the worst for potential fuel damage, others for the primary over-pressure or for external radiological consequences. In order to understand the various possible situations, the following facts have to be remembered:
the isolation valves take several seconds to shut (conservatively, 10 s) and in this time a significant amount of water can leave the steam generators. It has to be assumed that this water is contaminated, because of the unavoidable leaks between primary and secondary systems during normal operation, and it has to be remembered in this connection that the primary system typically contains some thousands of Gigabecquerels of iodine-131 and that the secondary water contains only a few tens of Gigabecquerels of it; a flow limiter (Venturi tube) is usually installed at the exit of each steam generator. This reduces the equivalent efflux area to about one third of its real value; the injection of highly borated water (e.g. with 5000 ppm boron) by the high pressure injection system (HPIS) pumps has some tens of seconds delay after the corresponding actuation signal, due to the pumps’ inertia and to the water expulsion from the lines containing a lower boron concentration (e.g. 2000 ppm); that besides the radioactive products present in the water from the start, during the transient an additional release from the fuel elements can happen if the DNBR goes below the safety limit (e.g. <1.3) (i.e. the release of the radioactive products contained in the gap between pellets and cladding, conservatively assumed equal to 10 per cent of the total fuel rod inventory for volatile products, like noble gases, iodine and caesium;AR316
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depending on the particular characteristics of the reactor under consideration (e.g. volume of water in the primary and secondary systems, and in the pressurizer, the scram signals and line isolation signals adopted, etc.) the worst transient among the possible ones may vary. In general, the transients starting from zero power are considered the worst ones because the scram intervenes later, given the usual characteristics of the protection systems.
Figures 4-9–4-11 show the trends of some particularly significant quantities for some steam line break accidents. As it can be seen, the accident causes a quick depressurization and temperature decrease in the primary system, with consequent significant thermal stresses in the structure. The containment pressure, too, may reach significant levels. The outside doses may be of the order of 1 Sv to the thyroid of an individual for a two hour exposure at the edge of the exclusion zone.
4-2-5. Example of a category 4 accident: sudden expulsion of a control rod from the core This accident might happen if one of the control rod drive housings circumferentially breaks and is projected into the containment by the primary system pressure. In this scenario, the control rod drive and the control rod itself would be expelled (in a few hundredths of a second) and the rod would be completely and rapidly expelled from the core. This accident has been included in the DBAs since the early days of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Relevant protection initially comprised:
a procedure for the management of the control rods’ location in the core which limited the maximum reactivity connected with a control rod expulsion: these limits were established in such a way that the consequences of the expulsion on the
Primary pressure (105 Pa)
150
100
10
100
500
Time (s)
Figure 4-9. Main steam line break at full power with external electric power supply available: primary pressure as a function of time.
Exit temperature of primary coolant (K−273)
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
45
350
300
250
200
150
100
500
Time (s)
Figure 4-10. Main steam line break at full power with external electric power available: core exit temperature.
Containment pressure (105 Pa)
3
2
1
10
100
1000 Time (s)
Figure 4-11. Main steam line break at full power inside the containment: containment pressure versus time.
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fuel were not destructive (average enthalpy in the hottest point of the most endangered fuel rod less than 1.17 MJ kg 1);AR360 the protection of the containment wall from possible perforation by the missile (control rod housing), usually implemented by a steel shield (centimetres thick) or by a concrete shield, located above the control rod housings complex.
At the start of the 1990s, several cases of throughwall cracks were found in French reactors (Bourgeois et al., 1996). Similar cracks were found in other reactors. These were attributed to stress-assisted corrosion of Inconel 600, the material used for the housings. A systematic replacement of all the pressure vessels’ heads was implemented, with substitution of Inconel 600 housings with Inconel 690 ones. Moreover, the leak detection systems were improved and a device capable of preventing the expulsion of the corresponding rod drive mechanism, in case of a break of the housing, was installed. Additionally, the most dangerous event since TMI occurred at the Davis Besse power station in February 2002 (see Chapter 20). In general, it is possible to ensure that the additional reactivity due to a control rod expulsion is of the order of 0.15 per cent (but, in any case, well below 0.6 per cent, which would originate a ‘prompt criticality’). The accident reactivity excursion is mitigated by the Doppler coefficient and is terminated by the reactor scram. Roughly 10 per cent of the fuel can be damaged (DNBR < 1) and the effective whole-body doses outside the plant may reach 10–20 mSv in two hours at the edge of the exclusion area. The releases from the plant are due either to the leakages from the containment (assumed to be single containment type with ground release) and those from the secondary steam dump and the leaks between the primary and secondary systems (some litres per minute). The containment pressure increases because of the release of primary liquid. The release from the secondary system is caused by the opening of the relief and safety valves. The reactor power in the transient may reach 200–400 per cent of the nominal power (the highest values correspond to zero initial power), obviously for very short times. The analysis of this accident scenario is performed by suitable computer codes, capable of simulating the
multi-dimensional neutron kinetics and the thermal– hydraulic behaviour of the fuel and of the reactor cooling systems.
4-2-6. Example of a category 4 accident: break of the largest pipe of the primary system (large LOCA) Since the early days of nuclear power generation, this accident has been considered to be the most serious of the DBAs. It remains so to this day as it originates a large part of the specifications of the plant safety systems. Operating experience and probabilistic studies, however, indicate that the largest risk of severe accidents (more serious than the DBAs) comes from other accident sequences (e.g. small breaks). In particular, a break in a small instrumentation line in the vessel bottom is very dangerous: in fact, in this case, the primary system depressurizes rather slowly as the rupture allows liquid water to escape, while a large mass of coolant is lost. The safety injection systems might in some reactors not operate properly as the reactor pressure stays high (preventing the safety injection) while the coolant level in the core decreases, with consequent uncovering of the fuel elements and their overheating. Very different is the case of a small break in the upper part of the primary system. In this case, in fact, steam exits from the break, the primary pressure tends to decrease rapidly and liquid water is forced to vaporize with consequent rapid cooling and decrease of the pressure. At low pressure, all the safety injection systems may operate injecting water in the circuit and cooling the core. In a large LOCA, a very rapid depressurization occurs and the primary circuit loses almost all the water (only a small part of it remains, at low temperature, on the vessel bottom) in 15–20 seconds. In the meantime the reactor shuts down (even if the power could initially increase slightly if the void coefficient is positive) and the safety injection through the accumulators and then through the high and low pressure pumps, starts. The core is re-flooded in some tens of seconds (when the fuel reaches its worst conditions in the transient) then, the core cools steadily. The operators then initiate the long-term cooling procedure. The container is pressurized, but usually this is favourable to core re-flooding. Therefore, the
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
calculation of the transient in the core is performed under conditions of minimum pressurization of the containment (indeed the minimum intervention thinkable of its cooling systems is assumed: e.g. of the spray system). Table 4-3 show the sequence of events for a typical accident of this type. Figures 4-12–4-17 depict the important phenomena of the transient and show the critical parameters. The difficulty of keeping a high mixture level in the core is evident. The presence of a second clad temperature peak is a consequence of this fact. See Table 3-1 in Chapter 3 for a list of typical external releases in this type of accident.
4-2-7. Example of a category 4 accident: fuel handling accident This accident is classified among the most serious of DBAs because, although it concerns only one fuel element, it may happen outside the containment, that
Table 4-3. Sequence of events in a large LOCA Event Break Peak power Pressurizer pressure at scram actuation and initiation of safety injection Scram and safety injection signal Accumulator discharge starts Core re-flood starts Maximum secondary pressure HPSI injection start Accumulator voiding LPSI injection start Clad temperature peak Signal of actuation of recirculation from containment bottom
Value
Time (s)
114% 10.9 MPa (abs)
0 0.2 10
11 4.1 MPa (abs)
15
8.4 MPa (abs)
30.7 5.4
1423 K
Core power (normalized to 1)
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
1
2
47
3
Figure 4-12. Large LOCA: core power.
4
Time (s)
31 78 31 300 1500–7000
Nuclear Safety
Containment pressure (×105 Pa)
3
2
1
100
200
300
400
Time (s)
Figure 4-13. Large LOCA: containment pressure.
40 000
Mass of water supplied to core (kg)
48
30 000
20 000
10 000
100
200
300
400
Time (s)
Figure 4-14. Large LOCA: mass of water supplied to core during re-flooding.
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
Mixture level (m)
2
1
100
200
300
400
Time (s)
Heat transfer coefficient in the core (1.16 W/m2s K)
Figure 4-15. Large LOCA: mixture level in the core during re-flood.
400
300
200
100
100
200
300
400
Time (s)
Figure 4-16. Large LOCA: heat transfer coefficient in the core (hot spot).
49
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Clad temperature (K-273)
1200
1000
800
600
100
200
300
400
Time (s)
Figure 4-17. Large LOCA: clad peak temperature.
is in the fuel building which is provided with a dynamic containment system (blowers and filters) that allows a certain amount of external releases. It is assumed that during the handling of a spent fuel element, it falls in the pool on the spent fuel elements rack. The element will be damaged and it is usually assumed that all the gap radioactive products (10 per cent of the total volatile products of all the rods) are released. This assumption, as the others made in Regulatory Guide 1.25,AR316 are conservative and it is usually possible to demonstrate that no more than 30 per cent of the rods are damaged. A decontamination factor of 100 is assumed for iodine in the pool water and a factor of 10 and of 1.5, respectively, for inorganic and organic iodine, in an activated carbon filter 5 cm thick. With these assumptions, the two hour effective whole-body
dose at the edge of the exclusion zone may be of the order of 5 mSv, which is significant.
4-2-8. Area accidents Accidents originating inside the plant but which affect the entire plant area are termed area accidents. In particular, these maybe fires and internal floods, typically started by breaks in the service water system. The physical separation of redundant sections of plant protection systems is usually one of the fundamental defences against the consequences of these events. Operational experience indicates the possibility of rather peculiar accidents of this kind. For example, the complete loss of external electric supplies caused
Chapter 4 The classification of accidents and a discussion of some examples
by a grass fire which was allowed to grow too much in the power station switchyard; the fire triggered the fire protection of the transformers, so electrically isolating the power station from outside. An accurate examination of the risks relevant to each specific plant may reveal all the possible accidents and suggest pertinent prevention/mitigation provisions. For fires, in particular, every regulatory system has issued guide criteria and requirements which, in general, necessitate the implementation of a complete fire protection program. This includes provisions for the separation of redundant safety systems, other prevention measures, anti-fire equipment and operating procedures.
4-3. Beyond design basis accidents During the long debates on nuclear safety, the need arose to study some accidents which can neither be termed DBAs (because of their low probability) nor severe accidents (since they do not lead to severe core damage). They are dealt with using specific prevention and mitigation measures even if, because of their low probability, the corresponding margins of safety are rather smaller than those adopted for DBAs. The most important among these accidents are:
transients without scram (ATWS – anticipated transients without scram); and total loss of external and internal electric power supplies (station blackout).
By analogy, the voluntary accidents of human origin are included here and dealt with in a similar way.
4-3-1. Plant originated accidents As far as ATWS accidents are concerned, usually a duplicated and diversified fast shutdown system is required, see US Code of Federal Regulations (2006) and the EUR criteria (see the pertinent Appendix). The need to cope with a station blackout has shown the need to foresee the voluntary depressurization of the primary system with water injection by independent means. See the EUR criteria in Appendix 6 for a list of other accidents of this type.
51
4-3-2. Accidents due to human voluntary actions The spectrum of situations considered in the protection framework against these types of accident varies from country to country. Usually, in all cases protection is provided against malevolent intrusion in the plant by the use of access control measures. Other protections adopted are those against aeroplane crash and external impact, and those against pressure waves (see Chapter 17).
4-4. External accidents of natural origin Chapters 15 and 16 discuss accidents resulting from earthquakes and tornadoes. Protection against floods has to be considered in the choice and the improvement of a site: usually, no possible flood water is permitted to reach the level of the station, whose elevation is frequently raised by an embankment. Obviously, the choice of a site includes the study of the possible collapse of nearby dams and of the consequent flood waves. Other possible events are much more specific in nature (oscillations of lakes due to earthquakes or to wind, sand storms, volcanic eruptions, etc.) and must be studied on the merits of the local conditions.
References Bourgeois, J., Tanguy, P., Cogne´, F. and Petit, J. (1996) La Surete Nucleaire en France et dans le Monde. Polytechnica, Paris. Petrangeli, G. (1967) ‘Factors involved in the evaluation of the maximum credible boron release from the core surfaces of a PWR with chemical shim’, Euratom, EUR 3609 e. US Code of Federal Regulations (2004) ‘Part 50.46: Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors’, US Government. US Code of Federal Regulations, 2004, Part 50.62: US Government.
Chapter notes 1 As discussed, the accident can be summarily studied also using simple calculation methods similar to the one included
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on this book’s accompanying website. Given the limitations of the downloadable file PRIMARY SYSTEM (one volume only represents the primary system), only the phases when saturation conditions are present can be studied: this means that, if the initial transient of the pressurizer has to be simulated, up to the moment when saturation conditions are reached in the primary system (at about 600 s after the accident initiation), then the pressurizer has to be studied separately from the primary system, while, if the complex of the primary system has to be studied, this can be done only after the first 600 s. In Figure 4-7, the pressure curves (dotted lines) obtained from ps.xls, assume steam and homogeneous efflux. A better approximation could be obtained by subdividing the transient in phases, to which one or the other of the assumption above would be applied, according to the estimated level of the water in the primary system. It is worth repeating, however, that simple codes like ps.xls are only suitable for a first orientation and for overall comparative evaluations. They are not suited for accurate studies of accidents. The following lists the input data for ps.xls in the steam efflux case: Ab ¼ 27.9 cm2 As ¼ 0 cm2 DP1 ¼ 2 DP2 ¼ 0.2 DT ¼ 1 s FL1 ¼ 0 FL2 ¼ 0 GS ¼ 0 kg s 1 HA ¼ 49 kcal kg 1 KA1 ¼ 711 kcal s 1 KA2 ¼ 12 kcal s 1 KQD ¼ 1.45 Mp ¼ 298 830 kg P ¼ 2871.3 MWt P0 ¼ 94 kg cm 2 PA1 ¼ 40 kg cm 2 PA2 ¼ 15 kg cm 2 QS ¼ 0 kcal s 1 TU0 ¼ 600 s TU1GS ¼ 600 s TU2GS ¼ 6000 s TU1QS ¼ 0 s TU2QS ¼ 0 s TUF ¼ 6000 s VA1 ¼ 0 m3 VA2 ¼ 675 m3 Vab ¼ 463,3 m3 VAT1 ¼ 118 m3 VAT2 ¼ 1012 m3
Vp ¼ 463.3 m3 Where the symbols have the following meanings: A1 A2 are the intermediate pressure (4 MPa) and low pressure (1.5–2 MPa) accumulators, respectively; Ab is the area of the break in the primary system; As is the equivalent efflux area of the depressurization line; DP1 DP2 are the pressure variations in each step, high (from about 0.2 to 0.5 MPa) and low (20–50 kPa), respectively; DT is the time increment in a calculation step; ECCS is the emergency core cooling system; FL1 FL2 are useful ‘flags’ for calculating efflux from the depressurized line and from the rupture, respectively; GS is the efflux flow rate from the ECCS system; HA is the accumulator and ECCS water enthalpy; KA1 KA2 are the efflux coefficients from accumulators A1 and A2, respectively; KQD is the decay power multiplier (¼1.05 for ANS curve); Mp is the mass of water in the primary system (liquid and steam); P is the thermal power rating; PA1 PA2 are the A1 and A2 accumulator pressures, respectively; TU0 is the start time of the transient; TU1GS TU2GS are the start and shut-off times, respectively, of the ECCS system; TU1QS TU2QS are the start and end times for heat exchange with steam generators; TUF is the end time of the calculated transient; VA1 VA2 are the volumes of water in accumulators A1 and A2, respectively; Vab is the primary volume below the assumed rupture; VAT1 VAT2 are the total volumes of accumulators A1 and A2, respectively; Vp is the primary system volume. In the ps.xls calculation, the possibility of simulating heat exchange with steam generator water has not been used; indeed, since the depressurization is rather slow and the primary system is always nearly filled up with steam– water mixture, it is believed that the pressure behaviour can be simulated using the assumption that all the steam generator water and the primary water will be mixed together. In order to implement this model, the initial mass of water has been assumed equal to that of the primary system (210 000 kg) plus that of the steam generators (80 000 kg). Consequently, the volume of the system has been adjusted on the initial assumption that all the water is in a liquid state. The decay power multiplier KQD has been chosen in such a way as to agree with the power curve used in the safety report (i.e. KQD ¼ 1.45).
Chapter 5 Severe accidents
5-1. Existing plants Severe accidents are defined as those which entail at least an initial core damage, in many cases specified as the overcoming of the regulatory fuel limits, such as a temperature of 1473 K (1200 C) in the fuel claddings, etc.). The need to consider severe accidents aside from DBAs became apparent after the final edition of the Rasmussen report was issued in 1978, when it demonstrated that core melt could have a probability (of the order of 1 in 20 000 reactor-years) which was higher than that at the time rather implicitly estimated for the then worldwide reactor list (which was roughly 500 units). This probability figure indicated an expected core melt event every 40 years on the average. Since many reactors had at that time been operating for about twenty years, the outlook was not completely reassuring. It has, however, to be considered that the same Rasmussen report envisaged that only one in about 100 core melt events could cause severe health consequences (up to 10 casualties). In any case, the prevailing ideas of nuclear safety were not substantiated by these figures. Therefore, responsible people started to think about the best way severe accidents could be prevented, or at least mitigated. The Three Mile Island event reinforced and confirmed this need for progress in nuclear safety. Although none of the Rasmussen report sequences replicated exactly the course of events in TMI, the report sequence TMLB was rather close to what happened there. TMI was certainly a severe accident, even if the degree of devastation suffered by the core was not clear from the start. TMI was a real shock for all in the nuclear industry. Many, dubious that the efforts made for nuclear safety were really needed, were indeed struck by the new evidence: human errors, communication
defects among organizations, and insidious design weaknesses. That a core melt accident could happen and had happened was indeed a wake-up call! It is true that the foresighted adoption of Defence in Depth provisions at TMI prevented any casualties. It can be recalled that only 666 GBq (18 Ci) of iodine were released to the environment, with a correspondingly minute virtual dose at the fence of 0.8 mSv. Besides the post-TMI plant improvement programmes (prevention) which cost millions of dollars for each plant, in the Western countries investigations were started on what else could reasonably be done to the plants with the goal of stopping the progression of an impending severe accident or to mitigate its consequences. Since then, the studies and the programmed and implemented provisions against severe accidents have been assigned to three consecutive phases of action. In the first phase, soon after TMI, mitigation measures against the ‘certain’ consequences of a core melt (the slow over-pressurization of the containment up to its burst and the attack of the containment bottom by the molten core deposited there after reactor vessel perforation) were implemented. For the protection of the containment against over-pressure (caused by burning of hydrogen gas which would definitely be produced), procedures for the more or less filtered venting of it were adopted (filtered venting), as it was considered preferable to release some radioactive gases rather than risk bursting the containment. For the protection of the containment bottom, plant specific procedures were adopted, generally consisting of additional passive protective means and bottom-flooding procedures. As already mentioned, in this first phase, only the ‘certain’ consequences of a core melt were considered. Theoretically possible but less well known (and, in any case, low probability) phenomena (like steam explosions due to the contact of a 53
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Nuclear Safety
molten core with water having such a high intensity to be able to threaten the integrity of the containment) were left out. In the second phase, lasting from about 1982 to about 1985, studies of severe accident prevention and mitigation were more systematic. Additional probabilistic studies were performed and mechanistic models, more elaborate than the Rasmussen report ones, were developed. This work, in particular, indicated which phenomena, besides the above mentioned ‘certain’ ones, were important for risk reduction. They are briefly listed in the following (which also includes the ‘certain’ ones):
Slow containment over-pressurization. Scenarios of core melt with high primary pressure: direct containment heating (DCH – due to the violent expulsion of part of the molten core from the vessel and to its fragmentation in the atmosphere with consequent combustion and heat production) and destructive forces on the vessel (due to the expulsion of molten material from the vessel at high pressure). Lack of leak proofing of the containment systems: containment bypass sequences (the V sequences of Rasmussen) and presence of leaks higher than the design values in the containment, either because of defects which existed before the accident (preexisting openings) or because of the actions of the aggressive containment environment (pressure, temperature, aggressive and heat generating aerosols, radiations). Destructive reactivity accidents due to accidental expulsion of control rods or to control rod melting before fuel melting during a severe accident. Destructive steam explosions either inside or outside the reactor vessel. Destructive hydrogen explosions. Attack of the containment bottom by molten masses and lack of coolability of core debris.
The studies of this period led to a definition of severe accident protection criteria (see Section 1-2 and Chapter 18) similar to those already in force in Italy and to those developed in Sweden. In Italy, it was thought possible to provide a defence against severe accidents by accident management provisions and by some reasonable plant modification, up to the point of limiting iodine and caesium releases to 0.1 per cent with a probability higher than 95 per cent in the case of core melt (conditioned probability).
The absolute probability of this release would be lower than the product of the core melt probability and 0.05 (¼ 1 0.95). The releases of other elements were defined on the basis of their ‘propensity’ to external release, according to the mechanistic models and the then available data. This period of time is also characterized by some new scientific views on some phenomena of interest, which were somewhat different from those prevailing (e.g. enhanced importance of the release of iodine as a compound with caesium, and the enhanced importance of aerosols) and by some characteristic technical choices (huge filtered venting systems, such as the Swedish FILTRA, see Figs 5-1 and 5-2, installed on the Ba¨rsebeck reactor). The third phase of the studies on severe accidents started after Chernobyl. This terrible accident taught the industry that even a small contamination risk, like the one which affected Western Europe as a consequence of the accident, may generate panic in the population and turn public opinion against nuclear energy power generation. Therefore, the third phase of the studies on severe accidents is characterized by release restrictions even more stringent than those taken as a reference in the second phase: in practice, many, especially European, countries strive for severe accident releases so small that population evacuation and land decontamination measures can be eliminated or reduced to a very low level, at least for health reasons (leaving alone possible needs for psychological well being of the population). This, in particular, is the position taken by France, by Germany and, at the appropriate time, by Italy. Now, reference levels of 1–10 TBq of caesium should be reached (the second phase reference releases of the above mentioned studies were 0.1 per cent iodine and caesium, corresponding to about 160 TBq of caesium). Therefore, this change of position corresponds to a reduction factor of about 100! In order to comply with this stringent goal, it is understandable that attention has been mainly switched to future reactors which now include substantial design modifications. Moreover, the importance of a ‘perfectly’ leak-proof containment in case of severe accident is now clear. Another tendency consolidated in the third phase is the use, when possible and advantageous, of plant solutions based on ‘intrinsic’ or ‘passive’ safety.
Chapter 5 Severe accidents
55
To stack
40 m
From containment
Figure 5-1. Schematic of the FILTRA system.
5-2. Future plants: extreme and practicable solutions The ability to choose between extreme solutions and simpler, more easily implemented, solutions is hindered by the uncertainty still present in our knowledge of some key phenomena in the field of severe accidents listed in the preceding section. The practical feasibility of the studied solutions must always take account of inherent drawbacks compromising safety itself (in many cases a safety provision adopted with certain situations in mind is detrimental in other conditions) and cost (which, if excessive, could put a plant out of the market). Among the extreme solutions imagined are the following:
A super-strong pressure containment, passively cooled in order to sustain without failure slow over-pressurizations, hydrogen detonations and over-pressurizations from direct containment heating (DCH).
A structural cage around the vessel resistant to the burst of the vessel itself (destructive steam explosion, destructive reactivity accident) or to jet force caused by its perforation in conditions of high pressure in the primary system (the energies involved are illustrated in Fig. 5-3). A ‘core catcher’ to contain the molten core, as a protection for the bottom of the containment.
Figure 5-4 shows one of these extreme approaches studied by the KfK Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre. Appendix 15 on Safety Cage shows an example of dimensioning a solution of the ‘extreme’ type, with the objective of listing the orders of magnitude of the dimensions and of the provisions required. ‘Practicable’ solutions have been the subject of an international study promoted by Italy (Petrangeli, Zaffiro and Arru, 1995; Theofanous and Corradini, 1995). In order to give an idea of the solutions suggested in this study, the following summary is given which
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Nuclear Safety
Figure 5-2. FILTRA on site. relates to one of the two reactors taken as a reference: the AP600 design equipped with a passive pressurized reactor. A first cornerstone of the defence strategy, already incorporated in the AP600 design, is the voluntary depressurization of the primary system in case of the danger of inadequate core cooling. A feature of this type was proposed and thoroughly studied for the first time at the start of the 1980s for pressurized reactors (see Appendix 10 on Primary Depressurization Systems). The primary depressurization eliminates at the source, all the severe accident sequences with a pressurized primary system (i.e. direct containment heating, destructive reaction forces due to perforation of the vessel, etc.). Moreover, in case of malfunction of the high pressure cooling systems, it allows the cooling of the core by intermediate pressure accumulators and low pressure systems. A second cornerstone of the proposed defence strategy is the voluntary flooding of the reactor
cavity and the cooling of the molten core inside the vessel. The final proof that this measure is effective for all plant sizes, including the largest (1300 MWe) doesn’t yet exist. The expectations are, however, good at least up to 1000 MWe and studies are underway. The problem of the high leak-proof level of the containment would be tackled by the reduction of the number and of the size of the penetrations, by the collection of the leaks in closed rooms with discharge to the stack, by continually monitoring for excessive leaks (at least in the containment configuration pertinent to operation conditions) and by the pressurization (or flooding or draining) of the space between the two seals of each penetration after the accident. The probability of destructive reactivity accidents is considered negligible, but an uncertainty remains for up to one hour between the melting of the control rods and the fuel melting in the core. The situation might be more critical for a BWR where the
Chapter 5 Severe accidents
57
Total missile mass: 200 t Kinetic energy of missile: 150 MJ
ENERGY DISSIPATION:
4.70 MJ (bolts)
3.70 MJ (upper internals) 2.150 MJ (pipes) 700 MJ kinetic energy
1.260 MJ (barrel)
Molten core
2 GJ explosion
Figure 5-3. Possible partition of energy associated with a steam explosion in the vessel. re-flooding of the core would be performed by fresh water, not containing any neutron poison.
5-3. Severe accident management: the present state of studies and implementations A Nuclear Energy Agency report (NEA, 1995) contains the summary and conclusions of an international specialist meeting on the implementations of severe accident management, in the framework of an OECD activity lasting many years on the subject of accident management. The document makes clear
that, at last, an international consensus exists on intervention measures applicable to water reactors, such as the following: the injection of water in a damaged core, the cooling of the containment and the need to provide reserve systems for the emergency electric power supply. The troubles in reaching this agreement demonstrate the degree of difficulty in the technical problems of the severe accidents: every intervention can, here more than in other cases, result in a counter-productive action (e.g. the water on the core provides the necessary cooling but may enhance the metal–water reaction; containment cooling will condensate the steam and may so de-inert the already
58
Nuclear Safety Reinforced concrete (200 cm) Section A–A
Double containment 100 cm
Steel shell (38 mm) A
A
Safety cage
Natural convection cooling
Core melt cooling device 65 m
Figure 5-4. Conceptual scheme of a composite containment for a PWR (internal steel shell and external structure in reinforced concrete; from J. Eibl, reproduced courtesy of Forschungszentrum, Karlsruhe, Germany).
present hydrogen, etc.). The degree of knowledge is not yet complete in this area, for example, the cooling mechanisms of the ‘core on the floor’ are not yet known to the desired degree. However, the uncertainties are not such as to prevent definite action in the field of accident management which leans essentially on the optimization of the accident management procedures.
5-4. Data on severe accidents Table 5-1 shows some data which can be useful in performing order of magnitude evaluations on phenomena connected with severe accidents. The transfer of scientific knowledge on phenomena into actions and procedures is a difficult process (see the above quoted case of the pouring of water on a degraded core): research still plays an important part in the implementation of accident management. Moreover, additional work is needed in the field of severe accident management under low power or shutdown conditions.
5-5. Descriptions of some typical accident sequences The following describes some typical severe accident sequences for a PWR. The nomenclature, the choice of the critical sequences and the descriptions made by the US Nuclear Industry Degraded Core Rule Making (IDCOR) programme (IDCOR, 1984) is adhered to in line with a general illustration of the trend of the phenomena. As far as the quoted numerical figures are concerned, other studies may in some degree differ. The plant considered by IDCOR is ZION, a typical PWR. Table 5-2 gives a summary of the events with the most significant external releases, and the consequences.
5-5-1. Loss of station electric power supply (TE ¼ transient þ loss of electrical supply) This sequence is caused by a loss of all the external electric supplies of the power station with subsequent
Chapter 5 Severe accidents
59
Table 5-1. Severe accident data (indicative figures) Production of hydrogen per kilogram of zirconium: Zircaloy in a 600 MWe PWR reactor: Structural steel in the core: Hydrogen combustion heat: Heat developed in the metal–water reaction: Fe > 0.4 MJ kg 1 Penetration velocity of a molten core in the containment floor: Gas generated by the attack of floor by a molten core:
Limit power for coolability of a molten core on the floor: Total mass of molten fuel and structural materials (corium) in a 1000 MWe PWR: Maximum theoretical energy of a steam explosion: Theoretical total energy: Mass of molten core which may reasonably react with water: Assumed mechanical efficiency of the steam explosion: Assumed maximum pressure (for steam explosion) in the vessel cavity: Exit velocity of a ‘corium’ jet from a hole in the bottom of the vessel for an internal pressure of 15 MPa (150 bar): Minimum primary pressure for which DCH is possible: Maximum thermal energy released in a very serious reactivity accident (AP600): Maximum mechanical energy released in a very serious reactivity accident (AP600): Pressure generated in a containment (AP600) by detonation of H2 at 13% without steam starting from 150 kPa (1.5 bar): Bursting pressure of a containment in quasi-static conditions: Removal coefficient for released iodine and caesium in the ground after penetration of the containment floor (collapse mode " of the Rasmussen report):
loss of all the sources of alternate emergency electric power. Scram follows, then the coast-down of the pumps starts and the loss of the auxiliary feed-water to the steam generators takes place. Under these conditions, no core cooling system is available, except the passive pressure accumulators. The containment engineered safeguards are not available, either. This sequence could be considered similar to that at TMI, although here the lack of
44.4 g 19 000 kg 29 000 kg 121 MJ kg 1 (57.8 kcal mole 1) Zr > 6.7 MJ kg 1 Siliceous concrete:
0.0001 m/s (40 cm/hr)
limestone concrete: siliceous concrete: limestone concrete:
0.00005 m/s (20 cm/hr) 0.07 kgH2O kgcalc 0.26 kgCO2 kgcalc þ 0.065 kgH2O kgcalc 0.02 m2 MWt 1 (MWt of the core at full power) 110 t (incl. 61 t UO2 þ 19 t Zr þ 29 t stainless steel) 1 MJ kg 1 corium 110 000 MJ 10% 2–15% (probable value 4–5%) 10 MPa (100 bar) 60 m s
1
2 MPa (20 bar) 80 000 MJ 80 000 MJ 10% fragmented fuel 3% (efficiency) ¼ 240 MJ 2.9 MPa (29 bar) (duration 13 ms)
2
4 pd ( pd ¼ design pressure)
100
some essential safeguards is due to the loss of electric power and not to an erroneous diagnosis of the situation by the operators. From a thermo-hydraulic point of view, the steam generators eliminate heat at the start, but afterwards their water reserve finishes. The primary pressure increases because of decay heat up to the point where the pressurizer relief valves (PORV) open. The primary system loses water through the PORV up to
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Nuclear Safety
Table 5-2. Events and consequences of some significant sequences Sequences with the most significant external releases
Probability for reactor-year Uncovering of the top of the core Start of melting Vessel break Containment break due to over-pressure Start of radioactive products release Release fractions of radioactive products Xe–Kr I–Br Cs–Rb Te–Sb Sr–Ba Ru–Mo External consequences: Prompt casualties Immediate physical damage Late tumours index (fractional increase of cases beyond normal occurrence within 80 km from the plant and within 30 years from the accident) External costs (106$US) Whole body dose [man Sv]
TE ¼ transient þ loss of electric power
SE ¼ small LOCA þ loss of electric power
V ¼ interfacing systems LOCA
2E 7 2.3 hours 3.1 hours 4 hours 32 hours 32 hours
6E 6 2.2 hours 3 hours 3.8 hours 32 hours 32 hours
1E 7 20 hours 23 hours 26 hours
1 2E 3 2E 3 2E 5 <1E 5 <1E 5
1 2E 3 2E 3 2E 5 <1E 5 <1E 5
1 8E 5 8E 5 8E 5 5E 5 <1E 5
0 0 1E 4
0 0 1E 4
0 0 2E 5
700 8E3
70 8E3
60 9E2
the point where the core starts to uncover. After that, the additional heat produced by the metal–water reaction increases the steam production rate. When a significant part of the core is molten, its support plate fails and the ‘corium’ enters the lower plenum of the vessel. The possibility of a steam explosion is negligible. It is then assumed that the vessel fails at a weld of one of the lower head penetrations and that, therefore, the corium is released at high pressure, together with hydrogen and water, into the reactor cavity. The molten core migrates, through the instrumentation tunnel, on the floor of the lower compartment of the containment. The residual vessel water flows (including the water supplied by the passive accumulators) in the same space. The corium continues to flow in the cavity because the core continues to melt. Here, too, the probability of a steam explosion is considered negligible. It is estimated that the water in the cavity completely vaporizes in about nine hours, that the corium again reaches the concrete melting temperature after about one hour and that at this
24 hours
point the erosive attack of the bottom starts. Hydrogen is produced by the interaction of corium with the concrete and it partially burns until the temperature is reached where a global combustion initiated by the corium takes place. Hydrogen and the other non-condensing gases generated by the concrete–molten core reaction slowly pressurize the containment which is assumed to burst (at a pressure of about 2.9 times the design value) 32 hours after the start of the accident. As far as the behaviour of the radioactive products of the core is concerned, almost all the volatile ones are released in the upper plenum before the vessel rupture. The remainder is deposited in the cooling circuits and in the steam generators. After vessels burst, a small part of the radioactive products enters the cavity and is swept away in the containment compartments where it is deposited on the various horizontal surfaces and adheres on the vertical ones due to condensation of steam. The material deposited in the upper plenum and in the circuits heats the structures up, vaporizes again and
Chapter 5 Severe accidents
is deposited in the high parts of the circuits and in the vessel down-comer, where it is effectively trapped, dissipating the generated heat through the thermal insulation towards the containment. At the moment of the containment failure, vapours escape from the primary system towards the containment, because of the depressurization, and hence towards the environment. The external consequences are not disastrous. No quick casualties are envisaged and late developing cancers are few (with reference to the natural occurrences): about 0.5 per cent of the natural occurrence in a radius of 80 km from the plant. In this evaluation a reasonable implementation of the existing emergency plan is assumed. As far as possible effects of operator actions are concerned, if electric power is recovered before the core is uncovered, cooling is re-established and the accident is terminated without damage, or with only modest damage, to the core. The operator has also to open the PORV in order to decrease the pressure in the primary system and to allow the use of the low pressure injection pumps for cooling the core. If the power is recovered after vessel break, flooding of the cavity will take place as an effect of the containment spray system and consequently the end of the accident destructive processes will occur.
5-5-2. Loss of electric power with LOCA from the pump seals (SE ¼ small LOCA þ loss of electric power) The assumption here is that, as a consequence of the total loss of electric power and with a delay of about 45 minutes, the pumps’ seals are damaged because of the loss of the cooling system. This sequence of events and the consequences are very similar to the preceding scenario (Section 5-5-1). In this case no safety valve opening takes place because the pressure is kept low by the efflux through the pumps’ seals.
5-5-3. Interfacing systems LOCA (V) This sequence is caused by the break of the two double-disk valves between the primary system and the residual heat removal (RHR) system. The release of high pressure water in the low pressure pipe causes the seals in the RHR pumps to break discharging
61
water into the pump room (auxiliary building). The following systems are assumed to be operational: the auxiliary feed-water system, the relief valves of the steam generators and one train of the high pressure injection system (HPSI). The accumulators are available, as well as the containment cooling system. It is assumed that the operator manually blocks the reactor pumps at the start of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The start-up of ECCS ensures core cooling until, at six hours into the accident, the water tank (RWST) for the fuel-handling pools empties. The core remains covered for 20 hours because of the reflux refrigeration in the steam generators and the operation of the auxiliary feed-water. A large amount of steam is released in the auxiliary building during this period. After 20 hours the core starts to uncover and overheats, zircaloy is oxidized and subsequently the fuel starts to melt. Steam is continuously released in the auxiliary building, the core drops down in the vessel lower plenum and the vessel itself is perforated at about 26 hours. The discharge of corium into the cavity causes a quick attack of the concrete in the absence of water. Gases are evolved and released in the auxiliary building through the primary system. During discharge of gases and vapours in the auxiliary system, a simultaneous transport of radioactive products takes place; these products finally deposit on interior surfaces because of the continuous condensation of steam. It is estimated that the percentages released to the outside are rather small and the external consequences are negligible. No short-term casualties result and only an increase of a fraction per ten thousand of the natural occurrence of tumours in the surrounding zone are estimated. Procedures have been, moreover, studied to further mitigate the consequences of the accident by the intervention of operators. The first is based on keeping the RHR pumps submerged by flooding their room by the use of fire-fighting hoses routed through the stairs. In this way the wash down of fission products is increased and their release is decreased. The second technique, even more effective, is based on preserving core cooling through:
the RWST tank; the boric acid mixer; the fuel pool; portable pipes and hoses;
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a jury-rigged sump pump to take water from the bottom of the RHR pumps’ room and make it available again for injection in the reactor by the ECCS system.
5-5-4. Large LOCA with failure of the recirculation (ALFC) This scenario assumes a break in the cold leg of the primary circuit with operation of the ECCS in the injection phase (although it could also fail in the recirculation phase). It is assumed that the auxiliary feed-water of the steam generators operates correctly, as well as the fan coolers of the containment. Additionally, it is assumed that one train of the containment spray system operates in the ECCS injection phase. After the break, scram occurs, pumps slow down progressively and the auxiliary feed-water starts. The ECCS operates until the moment the recirculation mode is switched from the containment bottom (after 30 minutes), which does not succeed. The core remains without refrigeration except for the effect of the water present in it which is sufficient for 50 minutes. The metal–water reaction starts after 1.1 hours and about 450 kg (49 per cent of the claddings have reacted) of hydrogen are produced in the vessel. Core melt starts after 1.7 hours and the penetration of the vessel by corium intervenes after approximately 2.3 hours. Afterwards, the corium, the remaining water and the hydrogen are released in the cavity (presumably two hydrogen deflagrations occur which increase temperature and pressure in the containment up to 650 C and 150 kPa (1.5 bar), respectively, for a short time. The pressure in the containment increases in an initial period (up to 230 kPa (2.3 bar) at 3.5 hours) and is then controlled again by the fan coolers. The reactor cavity remains flooded and the molten core is cooled, so the concrete is not massively attacked by the corium and the production of gases which would tend to repressurize the containment, is avoided. The containment building remains intact and no unforeseen releases of fission products occur.
5-5-5. Small LOCA with failure of the recirculation (SLFC) This scenario assumes that a break occurs in the cold leg of the reactor recirculation system. The
thermo-hydraulic behaviour is similar to the preceding scenario but with an expanded time scale: switch to recirculation mode after 6.5 hours, fuel top uncovered after 7.2 hours, start of rapid metal– water reaction after 8 hours. Roughly 600 kg of hydrogen (65 per cent of the claddings, that is more than in the preceding case due to the presence of steam–water in the core for a longer time). After 12 hours, the fuel starts to melt and the vessel is perforated after 13.8 hours. Here, too, a generalized combustion of hydrogen takes place, but the containment is not damaged and the releases are small.
5-6. ‘Source terms’ for severe accidents In 1962, the US Atomic Energy Commission (at the time the regulatory body on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy) published a technical information document, TID-14844 (Di Nunno et al., 1962), in which a release (‘source term’) within the containment was defined for a light water reactor, corresponding to a typical accident with core melt, to be used for the verification of the compliance with the site acceptance criteria from the radiological point of view contained in the rule 10 CFR 100 (see Section 1-2). It is worth noting that the ‘source term’ envisaged the immediate release into the containment of:
100 per cent of the core inventory of noble gases; 50 per cent of the core inventory of iodine isotopes (of which 50 per cent is assumed to be immediately deposited on various surfaces of the containment so that the iodine available for external release through the containment leaks is equal to 25 per cent of the total); 1 per cent of the remaining ‘solid’ fission products, which however were always neglected by the standards and in the subsequent practice (for example in NRC Regulatory Guides 1.3AR299 and 1.4AR300 for the calculation of external consequences).
Iodine, moreover, was assumed to be mainly in elemental form (I2, 91 per cent), for five per cent in particulate form (particles or aerosols) and for four per cent in the form of organic iodide (methyl iodide and similar compounds). It is surprising to consider that these simple rules have dominated a large part of the nuclear safety
Chapter 5 Severe accidents
technology for more than twenty years. They had important consequences on the plants either from the amount of releases, from the assumption of practically instantaneous release from the core, or from their composition and chemical–physical form. The engineered safety features, for example, have been optimized for the removal of elemental and organic iodine, while the closure time of the isolation valves has been established on the basis of the immediate release from the core. The Technical Information Document 14844 (TID) releases, as they were then named, have been used for the verification of the resistance to radiations of equipment inside the containment, as well as for the evaluation of control room habitability after an accident and for the design of liquid and gas sampling systems. After publication of the Rasmussen report (1975) and the TMI accident, the validity of the ‘old and glorious’ TID was questioned, much research on the subject was carried out and, in 1992, after years of debate in all the scientific and regulatory centres all over the world, a NRC report was published (USNRC, 1992a) containing a new proposal of ‘source term’, which should replace the TID. The new proposed releases for a PWR are shown in Table 5-3, expressed as a fraction of core inventory. The releases for a BWR are slightly different. The new proposal derives from the consideration of the sequences studied in USNRC (1990) and USNRC (1992b), and intends to represent an average of meaningful cases. The releases due to interaction of the molten core with concrete (late out of vessel releases) are those deriving from the assumption of an absence of water above the molten layer.
If the case where a water layer is present is of interest, then the release will be lower due to the effect of removal of the water. As far as the chemical–physical form of iodine is concerned, the following suggestions are given:
at least 95 per cent in the form of caesium iodide, (CsI, aerosol); 5 per cent in the form of I or of HI with at least 1 per cent in each one of the two forms; the iodine dissolves in the containment water as I and may subsequently evolve as elemental iodine if the water pH is low (also as a consequence of radiolysis). In this case organic forms of iodine can be formed (to be particularly feared as they are difficult to remove by filters and by other systems). In the case where a pH control is envisaged for the containment water with the goal of keeping it above 7, then it is possible to assume that not more than 1 per cent of dissolved iodine is freed from the water and can produce organic iodine. Moreover, the other isotopes, besides noble gases and iodine, released are assumed to be in particulate form.
The report on the new source terms (USNRC, 1992a) also gives guidance on the removal factors by filters, containment spray systems and water pools. Typical values for these factors are:
Removal by carbon filters 90–99 per cent for elemental iodine and 30–99 per cent for organic iodides. Decrease of the radioactivity in suspension in a containment by a factor of about 100 as a result of a spray system in the first half an hour (subsequently the removal is much slower and
Table 5-3. New source terms
Duration (hours) Noble gases Iodine Caesium Tellurium Strontium Barium Ruthenium Cerium Lanthanum
63
Gap
Prompt releases in the vessel
Releases outside the vessel
Late, in vessel, releases
0.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.3 0.95 0.35 0.25 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.008 0.01 0.002
2 0 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.12 0.10 0.004 0.02 0.015
10 0 0.07 0.06 0.025 0 0 0 0 0
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depends on the water pH), under the condition that all the volume of the containment can be considered covered by the spray. Removal by a factor between 10 and 100 as a result of the passage of the effluents through the pool water of a BWR.
It is worth repeating that the ‘source term’ has the purpose of replacing, using the modern research data now available, the releases given in the TID-14844 report in their specific applications, essentially of US interest. The new source term represents a reasonable average reference for severe accidents with extensive core melt. Obviously, for each specific case of interest, that is for every accidental sequence which has to be studied in depth, the calculation codes used to determine the new source term (SCDAP-RELAP and MELCOR) are capable of adequately supplying the required specific answer. It has to be expected, however, that the new source terms will be extensively applied, in particular for order of magnitude evaluations, to those scenarios of main interest in this book.
References Di Nunno, J., Baker, R.E.D., Anderson, F.D. and Waterfield, R.L. (1962) ‘Calculation of distance factors for power and test reactor sites’, USAEC, TID-14844. IDCOR (1984) ‘Nuclear power plant response to severe accidents’, Technology for Energy Corp., Knoxville, TN. NEA (1995) Summary and conclusions. Report NEA/CSNI/ R(95)16: Specialist meeting on severe accident management implementation, Niantic CT, 12–14 June, Nuclear Energy Agency. Petrangeli, G., Zaffiro, C. and Arru, L. (1995) ‘Design of containment systems against severe accidents’, Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 15(5/6), May/June. Theofanous, T.G. and Corradini, M.L. (1995) ‘The containment of severe accidents in the Advanced Passive Light Water Reactors’, ANPA, March. USNRC (1990) ‘Severe accident risks: An assessment for five US nuclear power plants’, NUREG 1150. USNRC (1992a) ‘Accident source terms for light water nuclear power plants’, NUREG 1465. USNRC (1992b) ‘Estimates of radionuclide release characteristics into containment under severe accidents’, NUREG CR5747.
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases
6-1. The most interesting releases for safety evaluations This chapter deals with some simple and quick methods for the evaluation of the dispersion in the environment of gaseous releases (gases, volatile products, aerosols and particulates). Chapter 7 describes some methods for evaluating the health consequences of releases. There are three steps in the evaluation of the consequences of accidents: (1) Evaluation of the releases (the ‘source term; amount, chemical–physical form, trend with time). (2) Evaluation of the dispersion of releases in the environment. (3) Evaluation of the health consequences (see Chapter 7). The gaseous releases which are dealt with here, are the most relevant ones for the evaluation of the immediate accident consequences and for the preparation of short-term emergency plans. Solid and liquid releases are less important for a nuclear power station because the radioactive products released to the environment are mainly gaseous and have high velocity (which may cause adverse consequences outside the plant). However, liquid releases have to be taken into account under some circumstances. The situation, then, is very different from many non-nuclear process plants where the prevailing accidental release from the point of view of the consequences may frequently be the release of flammable or toxic liquids. The radioactive isotopes which could in theory be released during an accident from a nuclear power station are listed in Table 2-1. In practice, however,
as recalled in Chapter 2, for order of magnitude evaluations and in order to only evaluate the scale of the accident consequences, it is sufficient to evaluate the following effects:
direct radiation dose from noble gases (xenon-133, krypton-85) contained in the plume released; inhalation dose from iodine-131; radiation dose due to ground-shine from caesium137 deposited on the ground (this effect is generally important only over long periods, that is weeks or months).
In some cases, the safety reports used for licensing evaluate only the releases of the above listed isotopes, even if this practice doesn’t satisfy many specialists. Ultimately, it is totally unsatisfactory when the consequences of releases evaluated in this manner are relatively close to the limits fixed for them in the design criteria. It is necessary to consider plutonium and tritium only for specific plants and accidents. Some physical–chemical properties of the listed isotopes are particularly important for studying the consequences of accidents, and are briefly discussed here:
The half life, short or long, of the isotopes: Xenon133, very abundant among the fission products, has a half-life of roughly five days and, therefore, it is important immediately after an accident. Krypton-85, on the other hand, has a half-life of about 11 years and, therefore, the defence against it doesn’t consist in waiting for its decay. However, it tends to disperse and to dilute in the atmosphere without depositing out on the ground and, therefore, if released to the outside of a plant, it soon becomes innocuous. Even if it remains trapped in the containment after an accident, it is possible 65
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to get rid of it by venting it to the outside in favourable meteorological conditions and in a controlled way.1 Caesium-137, too, has a long half-life (about 30 years) but, in addition, tends to deposit on the ground with its compounds. It is, therefore, the cause of prolonged irradiation of people from the ground. Moreover, the measurements performed on the ground after the Chernobyl accident have demonstrated that, even after many years, the deposited caesium remains concentrated in the first centimetres of soil without penetrating in deeply and without dispersing, in contrast with what might be expected. Higher or lower volatility of the nuclide or of its more probable compounds: From this point of view, xenon, krypton, iodine, caesium and tritium must be considered volatile, in contrast with the other nuclides; Strontium has an intermediate position, approaching that of a non-volatile element. The higher or lower tendency to be removed and retained by the impact against walls and by rain (natural or artificial): Iodine, except for its organic compounds which tend to be formed in a very modest proportion (from 0.01 to 1 per cent according to the surrounding conditions), must also be considered easily removable even if in some conditions it may, subsequently, re-enter the atmosphere in suspension. Caesium too is removed rather easily.
In case of accident, the releases outside the plant would probably occur by slow infiltration through the leakage paths of the containment system, generally through the leak paths of the personnel and equipment airlocks, or through the leak paths of the electrical or mechanical penetrations of the containment. These leakages would generally be routed to a high (80–100 m) chimney and hence released to the outside. Part of the leaks might, however, bypass the emergency ventilation systems and be directly released to the outside at ground level. In both cases, the dispersion in the environment occurs by diffusion activated by the existing wind and by transport due to the wind itself. In particular cases, the releases might happen in an explosive way and be projected, therefore, to a great height. This happened in the Chernobyl accident. In this case the dispersion in the environment would occur under the influence of the high altitude air currents and by diffusion (to distances up
to several tens of kilometres from the site) with mechanisms a little different from those governing the releases near the ground (or from a chimney).2
6-2. Dispersion of releases: phenomena In general terms, gaseous releases may give rise to dense (heavy) clouds (i.e. heavier than air) or to light clouds. Chlorine and ammonia, for example, give rise to heavy clouds. The dispersion of a light cloud in the environment occurs by diffusion, generally in a turbulent regime. On the other hand, the dispersion of a heavy cloud occurs firstly by fall and by gravitational spread (in a similar fashion as water in a bucket placed on the ground would disperse if the bucket suddenly disappeared). Subsequently, at a certain distance from the source, the heavy cloud is also dispersed by diffusion. In the case of the release of radioactive substances from nuclear plants, light clouds are always formed: only the substances released as particulates or as aerosols show a gravitational motion of deposition towards the ground which is simultaneous to the dispersion by diffusion. The fact that the releases happen at ground level or at the mouth of a chimney has a large influence on their dispersion pattern. As can be seen from Figure 6-1, during a ground release all the zone of ground downwind from the release point is exposed to the contamination of the products transported by the cloud (a). However, during release from an elevated chimney the ground is not contaminated up to a distance D from the release point, and people who stay within this distance are effectively protected by being in its ‘shadow’ (b). Moreover, at distance D, at ground level, the contaminant concentration is lower than in the ground release case for two reasons. Firstly, the release plume has diffused in all directions (at a distance D from the plant, the concentration of contaminants at the centreline of the plume is lower than in the ground release case by a factor of two according to the diffusion theory. Secondly, at distance D the ground is affected by the outside border of the plume (where the concentration, by definition of ‘plume border’, is equal to 10 per cent of the value at the centre of the plume itself), while in the ground release case, at distance D, the centreline concentration is present.3
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases
67
(a)
(b)
D = protected distance
Figure 6-1. Diffusion plume for (a) ground and (b) elevated release from a chimney.
The following parameters have an overwhelming influence on the atmospheric dispersion:
the wind speed; the vertical thermal gradient (i.e. the change of the temperature with height).
The effect of the wind speed on the air turbulence and on its dispersion capabilities is self-evident. The importance of the vertical thermal gradient can be understood by the following points:
If a small volume of air is ideally displaced because of turbulence from position 1 upwards to position 2 (Fig. 6-2) without heat exchange with the outside (a valid assumption for quick movements due to turbulence), then its pressure, in order to be in equilibrium with the new external environment, must decrease (at low elevations atmospheric pressure decreases by about 9 mmHg every 100 m
increase in elevation). (In this example in the figure, the spherical volume of air is displaced by 100 m upward so that a substantial pressure variation results.) As the displacement has taken place without thermal exchanges, that is in an adiabatic way, the temperature T2 (kelvin) will be given by the law valid for adiabatic transformations (equation 6.1):
T2 ¼ T1
P2 P1
ðk k 1Þ
,
ð6:1Þ
where, k is the ratio of specific heat at constant pressure to specific heat at constant volume (for air ¼ 1.4).
If the air temperature at position 2 is higher than the final one of the adiabatic transformation, T2,
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Nuclear Safety
100 m
Position 2: pressure = 751 mmHg
0m
Position 1: pressure = 760 mmHg
Figure 6-2. Adiabatic expansion of an air volume.
then the small air volume displaced will be more dense and heavier than the surrounding air and will tend to return in its starting position by gravity (stability). In the opposite case, it will tend to raise even more under the effect of buoyancy (instability). The same reasoning is valid if a downward displacement is assumed. The vertical thermal gradient of air is adiabatic if it corresponds to an adiabatic transformation, it is superadiabatic if it is algebraically lower than the adiabatic one and it is underadiabatic if it is
Adiabatic
h
Underadiabatic Superadiabatic Inversion
T
Figure 6-3. Identification of various distributions of temperature with height.
algebraically higher than the adiabatic one (Fig. 6-3). For a superadiabatic gradient, the temperature decreases with increasing height more than for an adiabatic transformation. The opposite is true for an underadiabatic gradient. Therefore, a superadiabatic situation (Fig. 6-4), is favourable to the instability of the turbulent movements of the atmosphere and therefore it is favourable to an effective dispersion of contaminants. On the other hand, an underadiabatic situation is stable and unfavourable to dispersion (Fig. 6-5). The peculiar underadiabatic situations where the temperature increases with increasing height are thermal inversions (Fig. 6-6). Generally, they occur on clear nights when the earth more easily loses its heat by radiation towards the sky and therefore the lower atmosphere layers also cool down significantly, while the higher layers remain relatively warm. On the following morning, after some hours of insolation, the ground heats up again and the inversion tends to disappear. The inversion condition is favoured by light winds (wind speed <2 m s 1). Another very peculiar condition is fumigation (see Fig. 6-7). It can occur in the first hours of the morning, after a clear night with inversion, when the soil starts to heat up and the inversion raises from ground level up to an elevation H. If the diffusion below the inversion elevation is very good (for example in the presence of a breeze), then, always below the inversion layer, the release concentration
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases
69
Adiabatic gradient h
T
Figure 6-4. The case of superadiabatic thermal gradient (good dispersion).
Adiabatic gradient
h
T
Figure 6-5. The case of underadiabatic thermal gradient (small dispersion).
Adiabatic gradient
h
T
Figure 6-6. The case of superadiabatic thermal gradient with overhead inversion (good dispersion only below the inversion layer).
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Nuclear Safety
Adiabatic gradient h Category F Category B H h T
Figure 6.7. The limit case of a thermal inversion (fumigation conditions).
tends to be constant along the height. This is important because the effect of the presence of the chimney (the ‘umbrella’ effect) is reduced or eliminated. In general, the fumigation conditions don’t last more than a few hours. The diffusion characteristics near a plant at a certain moment can be judged by knowing the air temperature as a function of height, together with other factors which are discussed below. The local meteorology of the site of a nuclear plant is the subject of attentive and long studies with the aim of forecasting environment contamination and getting guidance on the most opportune moments to discharge gaseous waste into the atmosphere. A meteorological tower, roughly 100 m high is a characteristic feature on the site of an important power plant. The above has given basic information on the meteorology of atmospheric diffusion. The following gives some simple techniques for evaluating the concentration of contaminants at a specified distance from the release.
6-3. Release dispersion: simple evaluation techniques ‘Cloud concentration’ ( seconds per cubic metre) is the measure of air contamination at a certain position for health protection evaluations. Sometimes, the symbol /Q is used for the same quantity, where Q is the activity release (Bq). Cloud concentration is inversely proportional to wind speed
(sometimes it is given for a wind velocity equal to unity, i.e. 1 m s 1).
Case 1 (instantaneous release): The radioactivity inhaled by an exposed person during the passage of the contaminated cloud, I ¼ R Q Bq,
ð6:2Þ
where R is the respiration rate of the exposed person (3.4 10 4 m3 s for an adult), Q is the activity released (Bq) and is the cloud concentration (s m 3). Case 2 (continuous release): The radioactivity inhaled by an exposed person during the passage of the contaminated cloud, I¼R
Q Bq s 1 , t
ð6:3Þ
where R is the respiration rate of the exposed person (3.4 10 4 m3 s for an adult), Q/t is the activity released by a continuous source (Bq s 1) and is the cloud concentration (s m 3). In Gaussian theory of diffusion (the most commonly used), is a function of wind speed (inverse proportionality), the values of the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution, the height of release and the position of a point in space with reference to the release point. The relevant formulae and diagrams, valid within several tens of kilometres from the release point, are given in Section 6-4. For simplified evaluations that usefully support quick decisions, they are not strictly necessary. For now it is sufficient to know that the formulae and diagrams
71
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases
Table 6-1. Relationship between turbulence types (categories) and weather conditions A – Extremely unstable conditions B – Moderately unstable conditions C – Slightly unstable conditions D – Neutral conditions (applicable to heavy overcast conditions, day or night) E – Slightly stable conditions F – Moderately stable conditions Daytime insolation 1
Night-time conditions (cloud cover*)
Wind speed (m s )
Strong
Moderate
Light
Thin overcast or > 4/8
<3/8
<2 2 4 6 >6
A A–B B C C
A–B B B–C C–D D
B C C D D
— E D D D
— F E D D
*The degree of cloudiness is defined as the fraction of sky covered by clouds above the local apparent horizon.
applied to a specific condition are, in current practice, connected with six categories of meteorological diffusion (the Pasquill categories, after the name of the specialist who proposed them).4 The categories and the meteorological conditions in which each of them is applicable, are shown in Table 6-1. Although condition F with a wind speed of 2 m s 1 is shown in the table only as a night-time condition, in reality it is currently used as a condition applicable to both day and night in conservative evaluations. For rule of thumb, quick and conservative evaluations, a ground release in condition F with a windspeed of 2 m s 1 is assumed, with:
¼ 3 10 4 s m 3, at a distance of 1000 m from the release: 10001:5and 2 d ¼ s m 3, at other distances d (m) d (that is, variation of the cloud concentration with distance on the basis of an inverse proportionality to the ratio of the distances with an exponent of 1.5–2).
If the release occurs from an elevated chimney (roughly 80–100 m high), is assumed to be ten times lower than the value given for the first kilometres from the release. If less favourable meteorological situations are to be evaluated (as an example of ‘best estimate’ calculations), a D condition with a wind speed of 5 m s 1 is frequently assumed, with a corresponding at 1000 m of 10 5 s m 3.
The concentration of the material deposited on the ground by a cloud generated by an instantaneous release is obtained by the concentration in air multiplied by a deposition velocity v, usually conservatively assumed equal to 0.01 m s 1. We define the concentration on the ground, Ct ¼ Q v Bq m 2 ,
ð6:4Þ 3
where is the cloud concentration (s m ), Q is the activity released (Bq) and v is the deposition velocity, usually assumed equal to 0.01 m s 1.5
6-4. Formulae and diagrams for the evaluation of atmospheric dispersion The value of at ground level is given, in the absence of precipitations and within a maximum distance of 100 km from the release point, by the following equation of the ‘generalized Gaussian plume’: Q e ¼ y z u
y2 2 y2
þ
h2 2 z2
,
ð6:5Þ
where is in Bq s m 3 for a release Q (Bq) for an instantaneous source, and is in Bq m 3 for a release rate Q (Bq s 1) for a continuous source, u is the average wind speed (m s 1), h is the height of the release point (m), y is the distance from the plume axis in the transverse direction (m), y and z (m) are
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Nuclear Safety
B, log sigma y (m)
(a)
y = 0.0027x 3 − 0.0585x 2 + 1.2136x − 1.0106 R2 = 1
4.5 4
log sigma y (m)
3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
log x (m)
(b)
B, log sigma z (m) y = 0.9238x 2 − 3.5634x + 4.4731 R2 = 1 12
log sigma z (m)
10 8 6 4 2 0 0
2
4
6
log x (m) Figure 6-8. Diffusion coefficients for category B.
the Pasquill–Gifford coefficients of atmospheric diffusion, given as a function of x, the downwind distance. The values of y and z are given, for the three Pasquill categories B, D and F considered as the most representative, in Figures 6-8–6-10. The
distance from the point of release is indicated by x (m). It has to be noted, in order to avoid confusion, that, in the trendline formulae written on top of each graph, x is the abscissa, that is log x and y is the ordinate, that is log y or log z, according to the figure considered. This is due to the symbols
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases D, log sigma y (m)
(a)
log sigma y (m)
73
4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0
y = 0.0148x3 − 0.1752x2 + 1.5541x − 1.6231 R2 = 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
log x (m)
(b)
D, log sigma z (m) y = 0.0049x3 − 0.1354x2 + 1.4082x − 1.6325 R2 = 1
3
log sigma z (m)
2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
log x (m)
Figure 6-9. Diffusion coefficients for category D. used by the automatic interpolation program, which always names the abscissa x and the ordinate y. An example will further clarify this point: looking at the upper graph of Figure 6-8, which gives log y as a function of log x, where log means as usual the logarithm in base 10, for 10 000 m (log x ¼ 4), a value of about 3 can be read on the line graph for log y), which means y ¼ 1000. Similarly, the trendline formula gives: y ¼ log y 3
¼ 0:0027ðlog xÞ 0:0585ðlog xÞ þ 1:2136ðlog xÞ 1:0106
2
¼ ð0:0027 43 Þ ð0:0585 42 Þ þ ð1:2136 4Þ 1:0106 ¼ 3:08: Ground concentrations are given in Figures 6-11– 6-13 for the three categories B, D and F considered
the most representative and for three values of release height (10, 30 and 100 m). A simple program for calculating the concentrations is on the enclosed download files. Further data can be found in Slade (1968). Under fumigation conditions, the usual assumption of a concentration constant with height below the impervious inversion layer, leads to Equation 6.6: Q f ¼ e ð2Þ1=2 y z uH
y2 2 y2
,
ð6:6Þ
where H is the height of the base of the inversion layer (m) (see Fig. 6-7) and the other symbols have the same meaning as before.6 In the case where a release occurs from a building or near it, the formulae for a point release are too conservative at a short distance. Indeed, the
Nuclear Safety F, log sigma y (m) y = 0.0044x3 − 0.0713x 2 + 1.2271x − 1.6022 R2 = 1
3.5
2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0
1
2
3
4
5
log x (m) F, log sigma z (m) y = 0.0011x3 − 0.144x 2 + 1.5033x − 2.0967 R2 = 1 2.5
log sigma z (m)
log sigma y (m)
3
2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0
2
4
6
log x (m)
Figure 6-10. Diffusion coefficients for category F. Concentrations, h = 10 m
1,00E-02 Concentrations (m−2)
74
1,00E-03
F
Category B Category F
1,00E-04
Category D 1,00E-05 1,00E-06 100
1000
10 000
Distances (m)
Figure 6-11. Ground concentrations for height of release of 10 m.
6
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases
75
Figure 6-12. Ground concentrations for height of release of 30 m.
Figure 6-13. Ground concentrations for height of release of 100 m.
turbulent wake of the building ensures an initial dilution of the release. A way to take into account this effect consists in using the point release formulae but with an imaginary backward displacement of the source. Figure 6-14 shows this procedure. The presence of a building may reduce the beneficial effect of an adjacent chimney at short distances, reducing the already mentioned ‘umbrella’ effect. The influence of the building can be considered completely absent only if the height of the chimney is equal to at least 2–2.5 times that of the building otherwise the effect of the chimney will be reduced or possibly eliminated by the turbulence generated by the building. In the case when the release occurs from a chimney and the effluent is warmer than the
external air and/or it is released to the environment with a significant initial vertical velocity, the buoyancy forces and the kinetic energy will make the releases behave as if they were released from a higher chimney (thermal and kinetic elevation of the plume). There are many studies and evaluation methods that take into account these effects (Slade, 1968). Here, as an example, is the Stu¨mke formula (Equation 6.7) for the rise of the plume, h: h ¼
1:5wd 65d3=2 T 1=4 þ , u Ts u
ð6:7Þ
where d is the diameter of the chimney outlet (m), w is the exit speed at the chimney mouth (m s 1),
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Nuclear Safety
Backing distance
Real release point Point of imaginary backward displaced release
Figure 6-14. Effect of a building on a plume. u is the wind speed (m s 1), T and Ts are the temperature difference with reference to the environment and the external temperature, respectively (kelvin).
Reference Slade, D.H. (ed.) (1968) ‘Meteorology and atomic energy’, United States Atomic Energy Commission, USAEC, Division of Technical Information, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Chapter notes 1 This happened after the TMI accident, when roughly 3700 TBq (105 Ci) of 85Kr were trapped in the containment. After an exhaustive safety analysis and under the authorization of the US regulatory body, the NRC, it was voluntarily released to the outside about one year after the accident. 2 As already mentioned in Section 1-2, it has often been written that the contamination caused by Chernobyl at great distances was solely due to the violent initial upward projection of the releases. In reality, a ground release too, at distances of several tens of kilometres reaches, by diffusion, a height of several kilometres and, therefore, the exclusive effect of the initial upward momentum on the dispersion of contamination at great distances has not to be considered self-evident. Certainly, an influence at short distances has been present. It is therefore necessary to believe that a large release, even at ground level, may cause extensive contamination at
long distance, as is also demonstrated by the case of the contamination generated by the atmospheric leaks (without violent projection) of radioactivity during defective underground tests of nuclear weapons. Another example might be the path of the chlorinated compounds as a danger for the stratospheric ozone layer. Finally, unfortunately, a nonRBMK reactor design could in theory give rise to extensive contamination. For example, even without considering the catastrophic burst of a light water reactor vessel, a severe accident in one of these reactors with the subsequent explosion of the containment could give rise to consequences similar to those of Chernobyl. It is considered useful to make remarks like this precisely because reactor safety, which can without any doubt be ensured, is also based on the meticulous detection of all the potential hazards. 3 Using methods which will later be explained, it can be shown that a 100 m high chimney, in typical meteorological dispersion conditions, affords very good protection of the land up to a few kilometres from the plant and that at this distance the concentration is decreased by a factor of about 10 (sometimes higher than that) with reference to the case without a chimney! 4 Frank Pasquill proposed his scheme in 1958 in a written note which he didn’t consider worth publishing. Subsequently his method was acknowledged so useful that it was universally adopted. 5 Those surprised by the excessive simplicity of these evaluations, must be, in a certain sense, reassured. In evaluating meteorological dispersion it is much more important to take into account all the dominating factors, than to perform extremely precise evaluations using conceptually defective schemes. For example, it is fundamental, in the dispersion evaluations, to consider the variation of wind
Chapter 6 The dispersion of radioactivity releases direction and speed with time and distance, the effect of rain of various types, and the extent and effect of local topography (presence of settlements on hills or in valleys, and so on). In international comparative exercises performed (‘benchmarks’), the maximum difference between the results of different groups of evaluators and the difference between anticipated evaluations and measures has been, unfortunately, equal to several orders of magnitude. 6 Example calculation of order of magnitude. The purpose here is to get an idea of the importance of neglecting the fumigation effect in a situation such as that in Figure 6-7, where the diffusion conditions below the inversion layer correspond to a Pasquill category D.
77
Equation 6.6, for wind speed, u, and source, Q, equal to 1, and for h ¼ H ¼ 100 m, gives a typical distance of 1500 m.
¼ 5 10 6 s m
3
However, the use of the fumigation formula gives:
¼ 3:3 10 5 s m
3
It can be concluded that the effect of the fumigation condition increases by a factor of 10 the ground concentration, nullifying the beneficial effect of the chimney.
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Chapter 7 Health consequences of releases
7-1. The principles of health protection and safety The principles of radiation protection and safety as summarized by the IAEAAR185 and based on ICRP (1991) and INSAG3 are:
A practice which entails or that could entail exposure to radiation should only be adopted if it yields sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to society to out-weigh the radiation detriment it causes or could cause (justification principle). Individual doses due to the combination of exposures from all relevant practices should not exceed specified dose limits (limitation principle). Radiation sources and installations should be provided with the best available protection and safety measures under the prevailing circumstances, so that the magnitudes and likelihood of exposures and the number of individuals exposed be as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account, and the doses they deliver and the risks they entail be constrained (optimization principle or ALARA – as low as reasonably achievable). Radiation exposures that are not part of a practice should be reduced by intervention when this is justified, and the intervention measures should be optimized. The legal person authorized to engage in a practice involving a source of radiation should bear the primary responsibility for protection and safety. A safety culture should be inculcated that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to protection and safety of all the individuals and organizations dealing with sources of radiation.
In depth defensive measures should be incorporated into the design and operating procedures for radiation sources to compensate for potential failures in protection and safety measures. Protection and safety should be ensured by sound management and good engineering, quality assurance, training and qualification of personnel, comprehensive safety assessments and attention to lessons learned from experience and research.
7-2. Some quantities, terms and units of measure of health physics ABSORBED DOSE: the average energy imparted by an ionizing radiation to the mass unity of a matter, unit of measure: gray (Gy) ¼ 1 J kg 1. DOSE: this term has two meanings:
a measure of the quantity of radiation present in a radiation field or given by this field: notion expressed by the word ‘exposure’; a measure of the radiation received or absorbed by a target.
EFFECTIVE DOSE: the summation of the tissue equivalent doses, each multiplied by the appropriate tissue weighting factor. EQUIVALENT DOSE: the dose absorbed by a tissue or organ, multiplied for the pertinent radiation type weighting factor. Unit of measure: sievert (Sv) ¼ 1 J kg 1 (sometimes, the previous unit, the rem ¼ 1/100 Sv, is still used). GENETIC EFFECTS: the effects on genetic material of somatic or germ cells, used in an imprecise way as a synonym of ‘hereditary effects’.
79
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Nuclear Safety
Table 7-1. Radiation weighting factors Type and energy range of radiation
Table 7-2. Tissue weighting factors
Radiation weighting factor
Photons Electrons and muons Neutrons <10 keV Neutrons 10–100 keV Neutrons 100 keV–2 MeV Neutrons 2–20 MeV Neutrons >20 MeV Protons (except recoil protons) >20 MeV -particles, fissile fragments, heavy nuclei
1 1 5 10 20 10 5 5 20
HEREDITARY EFFECTS: the effects which manifest themselves in descendants of the exposed individual. NON-STOCASTIC (DETERMINISTIC) EFFECTS: the effects for which generally a threshold level of dose exists above which the severity of the effect is greater for a higher dose. RADIATION WEIGHTING FACTOR: a multiplication factor for the absorbed dose which accounts for the relative effectiveness of the various types of radiation in inducing health effects (see Table 7-1). RADIOACTIVITY: the radioactivity of a sample is the number of disintegrations per second. Unit of measure: becquerel (Bq) ¼ disintegrations second 1 (sometimes, the previous unit, the curie (Ci) ¼ 37 GBq is still used (1 TBq, a frequently used unit, is thus equal to about 27 Ci). SOMATIC EFFECTS: the effects which manifest themselves in the exposed individual. STOCHASTIC EFFECTS: the radiation effects, generally occurring without a threshold level of dose, whose probability is proportional to the dose and whose severity is independent of the dose. TISSUE WEIGHTING FACTORS: to account for the different sensitivity of organs and tissues to the induction of stochastic effects of radiation (see Table 7-2).
7-3. Types of effects of radiation doses and limits So far as the deterministic effects are concerned, the following brief and imprecise facts should
Tissue or organ Gonads Bone marrow (red) Colon Lung Stomach Bladder Breast Liver Oesophagus Thyroid Skin Bone surface Remainder
Weighting factor 0.2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05
be remembered:
The lethal dose at 50 per cent probability (LD 50) is equal to about 3–5 Gy, in the absence of a good medical assistance. Impairment of vision may happen between 1 and 10 Gy, according to the type of radiation (high or low linear energy transfer, LET). Permanent sterility may occur between 2.5 and 6 Gy.
For the stochastic effects in the population, the following, again brief, reference data should be noted:
Death risk for low doses ¼ 5 10 2 Sv 1. Risk of serious effects in descendants ¼ 0.5–1.3 10 2 Sv 1.
As far as the limits adopted in many countries by law are concerned, we have:
for workers: 20 mSv for solar year (effective dose); for the population: 10 Sv year 1 for each practice.
These limits hold for normal operation of the plants and not for accidents. Indeed, other limits for accidents do not exist except those fixed by the local Regulatory Body, case by case, or for classes of plants and of sources, for example for a nuclear power station, the most recent trend in Italy was to prevent the overcoming of the reference values for short-term evacuation of the population (taken as equal to 1 rem, which is the lowest value named in foreign and international guidelines) in case of a severe accident.
Chapter 7 Health consequences of releases
Moreover, it is usual to define a design limit for the collective dose of workers: the present value in many countries is of the order of 1 Sv person year 1.
7-4. Evaluation of the health consequences of releases As elsewhere in this book, here only simple methods and orders of magnitude are listed which can be useful for quick dose evaluations for preliminary decisions: more precise methods are described in the references and in the abundant literature in the field.
7-4-1. Evaluation of inhalation doses from radioactive iodine The following is a simple formula which can be used for a quick evaluation. It is most easily remembered if the old units of measurement are used (curie, rem, etc.).1 D ¼ 10 R, where D is the effective dose for adults (rem) (for children a multiplication factor ranging from 5 to 10, according to age, has to be used), is the cloud concentration (s m 3) (see also Chapter 6), and R are the curies of iodine-131 released.2 The dose calculated for all the iodine isotopes (not just for iodine-131) could result in a dose of the order of double that calculated for iodine-131 only. The dose to the thyroid is equal to about 20 times the one here calculated.
7-4-2. Evaluation of doses due to submersion in a radioactive cloud In some cases the term ‘submersion doses’ may not be appropriate because what is generally meant with this expression are the doses of direct radiation from a cloud of radioactive substances travelling in the vicinity. Here xenon-133 (important for accidents to reactors or to gaseous waste decay tanks) and tritium (3H, important for fusion machines, for example) are
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considered. The doses are roughly: For xenon-133: D¼
R , 300
which can give lower dose values than other models (this has been taken from CEC documents). In order to take into account the finite dimensions of the cloud, the calculated doses should be multiplied by a factor (<1) which, for ground release and for F category ranges from 0.1 at 1 km to 0.7 at 100 km. For tritium (skin irradiation, inhalation): D ¼ 0:03 R,
7-4-3. Evaluation of the doses of radiation from caesium-137 deposited on the ground (‘ground-shine’ dose) The figures of interest for any practical case can be extrapolated from the data shown in Table 7-3, which gives the dose at various times after the deposition of 1 kBq m 2. For contamination deriving from an accident to a reactor, the radiation doses from the ground due to caesium-137 are generally more important than the contribution of other isotopes.
7-4-4. Evaluation of the dose due to deposition of plutonium on the ground A deposition of plutonium might happen as the result of an accident to a space vehicle (238Pu) (see Chapter 26) or because of a very violent accident to a nuclear reactor (239Pu and 240Pu). Plutonium isotopes are highly radiotoxic but plutonium is highly insoluble and in general the highest risk originates from the inhalation of very
Table 7-3. Ground-shine dose (caesium-137) First year
Second year
0–50 years
1.2 mSv (120 mrem)
800 Sv (80 mrem)
16 mSv (1600 mrem)
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fine dusts (5 m). The conversion factor for the inhalation dose to adult is, for plutonium-238, in average conditions, 4.6 10 5 Sv Bq 1.AR29 Similar figures apply to plutonium-239 and plutonium-240. The mechanisms by which the plutonium might be inhaled are to be evaluated case by case. The specific activity of plutonium-238 is 6.44 105 Bq g 1 and 2300 Bq g 1 for plutonium-239.
7-4-5. Indicative evaluation of long distance doses for very serious accidents to nuclear reactors Figure 7-1 gives a first impression of possible effective committed doses. It shows data from the Chernobyl, Windscale and Three Mile Island accidents (collected by G. Santarossa), together with a subjective evaluation of the effects of a maximum
severe accident ‘reasonably’ conceivable for a present and future reactor.
7-4-6. Direct radiation doses It is often useful to have an idea of the possible radiation fields caused by a point source. The approximate formula to remember is the following (see Note 1): Rhm ¼ 0:6 C E, where Rhm is rems per hour at 1 m distance in air, C is the source curies, and E is the energy of the emitted radiation (MeV). Figure 7-2 can also be of help.3 Remember that -rays are stopped by the thickness of a simple sheet of paper, while -rays can penetrate several centimetres into human body tissue.
Dose (mSv)
100
10
1
0.1
1
10
100
1000
Figure 7-1. Long range doses from accidents.
Range (km)
Chapter 7 Health consequences of releases
1 Ci
1 Mev
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0.6 rem h−1 Air
1000 m
Water
34 cm
Concrete
16.5 cm
Glass (Ce or Pb)
5–15 cm
Steel
5 cm
Lead
3 cm
1m
Figure 7-2. Activity–dose relationship.
-rays or neutrons can penetrate much deeper into matter. Figure 7-3 shows the thickness of various materials able to reduce the intensity of -rays by a factor of 10. As can be seen, there is a certain inverse proportionality to the material density.
Reference ICRP (1991) Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 60, Pergamon Press.
Chapter notes 1 Relaxation moment! Concerning the use of obsolete units of measure, the subtle truth contained in a popular joke comes to mind. It concerns a professor, very popular with his students, who, answering a question about the reason why he taught so many incorrect notions in his lessons, replied, ‘This way they understand better!’. 2 It is worth recalling from Chapter 6 that can conservatively be assumed to equal 10 4–10 3 s m 3 (Pasquill category F with a wind speed of 2 m s 1) at 1 km and variable for other distances as the inverse of the ratio of the distances raised to the power of 1.5–2. 3 As an example, one curie of cobalt-60, which emits gamma radiation at a total of 2.5 MeV, delivers about 1.5 rem hr 1 at the distance of 1 m.
Figure 7-3. Thicknesses of materials for reduction of 10 in -ray intensity.
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Chapter 8 The general approach to the safety of the plant-site complex
8-1. Introduction This chapter assumes the point of view of an expert who wishes to evaluate the safety of a modern plant at a specific site and firstly decides to perform checks on those key aspects where it is most likely to find areas that can be improved. The content lists and discusses some of these aspects. It is impossible to be exhaustive in the most general terms as many fundamental aspects are connected with the specific features of each single case, for example the compliance between plant characteristics and assumptions made in the study of accidents. In any case, if the evaluation of a case under scrutiny shows that any aspect among those listed in the following, has been omitted or not adequately dealt with, then this fact should be noted and corrected.
8-2. The definition of the safety objectives of a plant on a site This sections discusses some aspects of the approach to safety which pertain to a plant-site complex. In the following, some important issues about the approach to safety will be considered.
8-2-1. The objectives and limits of release/dose The limits of release and of dose to the population should be defined for normal operation, operational transients, design basis accidents and more serious accidents, including severe accidents.
Usually this aspect of the basic approach to safety assumes the form of one or more tables where the following data are collected:
The classes of situations considered in the design of the plant and in the control of site factors (normal operation, anticipated transients, severe accidents, etc.), with an indication of the order of magnitude of the probabilities of the pertinent initiating events or of the accidental sequences (defined as sequence of events originated by the initiating event and by further equipment malfunctions or operating errors). Sometimes (see, for example, the EUR criteria in Appendix 6) a list of all the representative sequences is also given. The corresponding limits and objectives of release and/or of doses to the critical group of the population, with indication of the emergency actions considered in the demonstration of the compliance with objectives and limits.
In particular, the approach to the consideration of beyond design accidents, among which the severe ones, should be especially coherent and complete. The beyond design accidents considered should be clearly identified and the method by which they are prevented and/or mitigated should be explained; for example it should be clarified if the defence from possible events caused by a molten core outside the ‘vessel’ is based on the containment of the molten core within the vessel itself (flooding of the cavity and cooling of the vessel from outside) or on the refrigeration of the molten core on the floor of the containment. The experimental and theoretical basis of the demonstration of the adequacy of the solutions chosen should be clearly identified. 85
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Another typical aspect which sometimes is not well clarified concerns the type and extent (in space and time) of the emergency measures which are acceptable in case of the most serious accidents considered and in view of the compliance with the radiological limits and objectives chosen. The foreseen emergency plan is, indeed, a powerful additional safety measure (the fifth level of the Defence in Depth concept) but may also be seen as an indication that the plant per se is not sufficiently safe. For these reasons, a present trend consists in designing plants which don’t need stringent emergency plans (for example there is a trend towards excluding the evacuation of the population, except from a zone within a few kilometres from the plant). In the extreme, the objective that the most severe accident considered has externally significant consequences completely confined within the plant fence could be adopted. Obviously (but practical experience indicates that it is useful to remind ourselves), where the safety criteria also include an indicative limit of the maximum probability of a ‘large release of radioactivity’ (for example, no large release with a probability higher than 10 6 per year), the amount and the characteristics of the released radioactivity for which the release starts to be defined as ‘large’, must be clearly defined.
8-3. Some plant characteristics for the prevention and mitigation of accidents Among the factors for accident prevention and mitigation, it is useful to check:
the presence of a negative reactivity coefficient for power increase in every operating condition (and preferably also the presence of a negative moderator temperature reactivity coefficient); the abundance of core cooling water (e.g. in the pressurizer and in the steam generators) because the availability of a large amount of water makes transients slower and allows the operators to better intervene; the presence of a fast depressurization function for the primary system (efflux opening of the order of 10 cm in equivalent diameter or higher for a reactor of 1000 MWe;
the existence of a robust accident management system, with procedures and equipment that are complete and up to date; that the reactor pressure vessel has dimensions and other characteristics sufficient to keep the fast fluence, and the embrittlement, at low level during its life (construction such to minimize the presence of welds in the highly irradiated zone); there is a solid and controlled technical basis for the possible application of the ‘leak before break’ concept to the primary pipings (including adequate leak detection methods); the presence of emergency electric power supply sources, including portable ones, but different from the traditional emergency sources, either by type of machine and by type of fuel; that where a microprocessor-based reactor protection system is used, the presence of a backup system of traditional type or of other means to ensure protection against malfunctions, included those involving the software is assured; that the specification of a realistic maximum leakage rate from the containment (‘realistic’ means a leakage rate which is really obtainable in practice for a period of time of more than one year, indicatively). Use, in the safety analyses, of conservative figures for the same quantity (possibly much higher than the specified ones). This last precaution is suggested in order to cope, without too many difficulties, with possible situations where the result of integral or local leakage tests should not satisfy the specified leakage limits.
8-4. Radiation protection characteristics It is recommended to pay attention to the following points, in addition to complying with the limits and objectives mentioned in Section 8-2-1:
The presence in the design of an objective figure for collective occupational doses per year of plant operation (today this figure could be of the order of 1 Sievert person per year or less). The presence of a plant design policy which includes a review of the design details and of the layout of equipment and structures in view of the minimization of occupational doses (room for maintenance, radiation shields, provisions for
Chapter 8 The general approach to the safety of the plant-site complex
‘robotized’ inspections, etc.). A written guide should also be available for these reviews. The presence of a policy for the minimization of the solid, liquid and gaseous waste. The consideration, in the design, of the simplification and optimization of the plant decommissioning from a radiological point of view.
8-5. Site characteristics Given that the foregoing criteria are met, it is good practice for a nuclear plant site to have certain characteristics objectively favourable to its installation, either in normal operating conditions and in a hypothetical emergency. In particular, the following characteristics are noted:
The absence of danger of natural destructive phenomena, such as a strong seismicity (for example historical earthquakes higher than degree IX on the MCS scale), a danger of surface faulting on the site or of tsunami,AR27 a danger of destructive flood waves due to the collapse of dams upstream, etc. In particular, it is advisable that the plant should be immune from the danger of submersion due to floods because of objective situations, such as it being located on a hill or embankment more elevated than the surrounding countryside. In this way the demonstration of safety doesn’t depend on frequently uncertain evaluations of the maximum flood level of rivers
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or alike; this is valid also for other natural hazards different from flood, given the intrinsic difficulty in forecasting the gravity of natural events in general. Possible excessive conservatism in the design parameters can thus be avoided. Favourable population distribution. Some national criteria specify limits for the distribution of population around the site, obtained by assuming a reference radioactive release from the plant and the limitation of doses outside. A minimum distance from population centres is also usually specified, which increases with increasing population in the centre itself (in general, in Europe, it should be necessary to stay a few kilometres apart from centres with some thousands of inhabitants and at least 10 km from centres with tens of thousands of inhabitants). Guaranteed characteristics of accessibility by roads, besides demographic characteristics, in order to have a favourable situation in case of external emergency and of need to evacuate people.
Other essential characteristics of a site are not listed here because they essentially bear on productivity issues, even if they may have an influence on safety too. For example, land average slope (the slope of the surroundings should be compatible with the transportation of huge components) or the availability of abundant quantities of water for the normal cooling of the plant besides the availability of smaller amounts of water for shutdown or emergency conditions.
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Chapter 9 Defence in depth
9-1. Definition, objectives, levels and barriers As already discussed in Section 1-2, the Defence in Depth (DID) concept in nuclear safety consists in providing multiple independent protections against the occurrence of accidents and their progression, in such a way that, should one of them fail, at least another is present whose failure is independent from the operation of the first. It has to be said, however, that the object of independent barriers in totality is only an objective, and it is not always possible in reality in every conceivable accident sequence. The definition of DID has to be understood as a general defence principle, to be implemented to the maximum technically feasible degree. DID is implemented through design and operation provisions in a way to provide a ‘graded’ protection against a vast variety of transients, abnormal events and accidents, including the malfunction of components, human errors in the plant and events initiated outside it.AR177, AR178, AR185 The decision to create DID in the plants was taken at the start of nuclear energy development which indicates a remarkable farsightedness, as subsequent history has demonstrated that it has been the best defence against the uncertainties of the technology and the mistakes initially made (see, for example, the Three Mile Island accident). Obviously, in the first period of nuclear energy, many protests were made against this ‘waste of resources’ which consisted in the construction of costly barriers (e.g. the containment) without, according to some, ‘a real need’ for them. Accordingly, in the most recent documents,AR177 the DID is based on four principal barriers against the external release of radioactive products (fuel matrix, fuel cladding, reactor cooling circuit pressure boundary, and containment system), and on five defence levels in order to best use these barriers (illustrated in Table 9-1).
The actual implementation of DID needs the support of some base requirements which apply to all of the five quoted levels. These requirements descend from the technical principles of nuclear safety which lead to the specific measures: AR178, AR185
The adoption of proven engineering solutions. The classification and qualification of structures and components. Adequate quality assurance measures, proportionate to the safety classification of structures, systems and components. A high quality of engineering applied to all aspects of the design, construction and operation. A safety analysis, including its verification. The provision against common cause faults, such as diversity, physical separation and barriers for internal and external events. Good practices of operation and maintenance, including the provisions for the use of the lessons learned from past experience. A safety culture and attention to human factors. The provisions to ensure the documented adequacy of the operation organization and the independent role of the regulatory control bodies.
As it can be observed, practically all the issues of nuclear safety can be viewed as an implementation of Defence in Depth.
9-2. Additional considerations on the levels of Defence in Depth Among the provisions necessary to ensure the good implementation of defence Level 1, the following ones can be listed:
A clear definition of normal and abnormal operating conditions. 89
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Table 9-1. DID defence levels Defence level
Objective
Essential means
Level 1
Prevention of abnormal operation and of malfunctions. Control of abnormal operation and detection of malfunctions. Control of accidents included in the design basis. Control of the severe accident conditions of the plant, including the prevention of accident progression and mitigation of consequences. Mitigation of the radiological consequences of significant releases of radioactive products.
Conservative design and high quality of construction and of operation. Control, limitation and protection systems and other surveillance characteristics. Engineered safety systems and accident procedures. Additional measures and accident management.
Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Level 5
Adequate margins in the design of systems and of components, including those concerning their robustness and strength in accident conditions, in particular in order to minimize the need to resort to measures of Levels 2 and 3. Intrinsic plant safety characteristics, such as nuclear and thermal–hydraulic stability and thermal inertia of the cooling system. Design provisions intended to give operators enough time to respond to events and to ensure an adequate man–machine interface, including operator-supporting means intended to facilitate their task. Attentive choice of materials and use of adequate fabrication processes of proven technology, together with the extensive use of tests. Exhaustive training of the personnel devoted to operation, maintenance, engineering and management, chosen by appropriate selection, ensuring behaviour fully compliant with a solid safety culture. Adequate operation instructions and reliable control of the state of the plant and of its operating conditions. The recording, evaluating and use of operating experience. Complete preventive maintenance, with priority established on the basis of safety importance and reliability requirements of systems.
External site emergency plan.
Moreover, Level 1 offers the initial protection basis against important external or internal hazards (e.g. earthquakes, fires, floods), even if some additional protection may be necessary at higher defence levels. The following design principles are followed in order to ensure a high reliability level of the engineered safety features (Level 3):
Redundancy. Prevention of common mode failures due to internal and external events through spatial or physical separation and structural protections. Prevention of common mode failures due to design, fabrication, construction, commissioning, maintenance or other human interventions, through diversity or functional redundancy. Automation in order to reduce vulnerability to human errors, at least in the initial phase of an abnormal event or of an accident. Overall architecture which facilitates periodical tests in order to give demonstration of the availability and of the performance of systems. Qualification of system, structures and components for the specific environmental conditions which may result from accidents or from external events. Reliability: the auxiliary and support systems are designed, built, commissioned and operated in
Chapter 9 Defence in depth
conformity with the degree of reliability required by engineered safety features.
Essential objectives of accident management (Level 4), which includes both preventive and protective measures, are:
monitoring of the principal characteristics of the plant state; controlling the core sub-criticality; restoring the core cooling and preserving the longtime cooling;
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protecting the containment integrity (including its leak-proof characteristics) ensuring the removal of heat and preventing loads and dangerous effects on containment and on all the points of possible localized leakage in case of serious damage of the core or of further deterioration of the accident; regaining the control of the plant in order to avoid further damage.
Accident management is strictly connected with the best use of human factors of safety: essential components for the safety of a plant.
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Chapter 10 Quality assurance
10-1. General remarks and requirements Quality assurance is an essential aspect of good management. A definition of quality assurance (QA) in the nuclear energy arena is the following:
All the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that an item or service will satisfy given requirements for quality. IAEA (1988) Quality assurance is implemented through the definition and the realization of a quality assurance programme (QAP). The QAP is an integral part of the plant design and shall provide for a disciplined approach to all activities affecting quality, including verification that each task has been satisfactorily performed and that necessary corrective actions have been implemented. It shall also provide for production of documentary evidence to demonstrate that the required quality has been achieved. The establishment and the implementation of a QAP for a nuclear plant are essential. However, it shall always be recognized that the basic responsibility for achieving quality in performing a particular task (e.g. in design, in manufacturing, in commissioning, in operation) rests with those assigned the task and not with those seeking to ensure by means of verification that it has been achieved. In the general legal framework for the regulation of nuclear power plants of each country, the requirement that an effective, overall quality assurance programme be established, should be present. The organization having overall responsibility for a nuclear power plant shall also be responsible for the establishment and implementation of the overall quality assurance programme for that plant.
This organization may delegate to other organizations the work of establishing and implementing all, or a part, of the programme but shall retain responsibility for the effectiveness of the overall programme. The following aspects must be included in a QAP: procedures, necessary instructions and drawings; periodical reviews by management; organization; responsibility, authority and communication; organizational interfaces; staffing and training; document control; document preparation, review and approval; document release and distribution; document change control; design control; design interface control; design verifications; design changes; procurement control; supplier evaluation and selection; control of purchased items and services; identification and control of materials, parts and components; handling, storage and shipping; maintenance; process control; inspection and test control; programme of inspection; test programme; calibration and control of measuring and test equipment; indication of inspection, test and operating status; non-conformance control; non-conformance review and disposition; corrective actions; records; preparation of QA records; collection, storage and preservation of QA records; audits; scheduling of audits.
10-2. Aspects to be underlined The QA activities are fundamental in order to attain safety in a plant. Over the years, the QA method has been demonstrated in many sectors of production and service activities as the most effective and efficient means to obtain the desired quality. In many production sectors it has replaced the method of product control, substituting it with the control of the process which originates the product itself. 93
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Product controls are included in the more general QA methods. QA is a rather costly activity (a component can cost much more if a stringent QA requirement is specified), therefore every QA requirement must be accurately weighed against its real need: the approach must always be ‘graded’ and proportionate. It has been known in some cases, for defective application of the method to have produced more ‘paper’ than quality and this must, by all means, be avoided.
Governmental organizations control safety reviews of the QAP and conduct audits on its implementation: this is an important aspect of the control and supervision activity.
Reference IAEA (1988) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: quality assurance. IAEA Safety Series N.50-C-QA (Rev.1), International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
Chapter 11 Safety analysis
11-1. Introduction The objective of a safety analysis is to help define and to confirm, through adequate analysis tools, the safety basis for the parts of the plant which are important for safety and to ensure that the general design of the plant is capable of complying with the dose limits in force and with the radioactive releases specified for any plant conditions.AR17 Safety analyses, which are a part of the safety evaluations used in the licensing procedure of the plant, should proceed in parallel with the design, with interactions between the two activities. They must be kept up to date during the life of the plant in order to account for the progress of knowledge and in case of plant or site modifications.
11-2. Deterministic safety analysis The deterministic approach studies the behaviour of the plant in operational states and under specific accident conditions originally identified on the basis of evaluations of prudent engineering or for compliance with the chosen criteria. Today, probabilistic techniques are sometimes used to aid decisions concerning the deterministic approach, for example if a new candidate appears (e.g. from research or operating experience) for inclusion in the list of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), the decision on inclusion or not can be aided by a probabilistic comparison with other situations already inserted in the DBA list. Usually the deterministic analyses are performed using conservative assumptions on input data, intermediate parameters for the analyses and on the behaviour of plant systems (single failure, etc.). Consequently, the behaviour of the plant as evaluated could be rather different from the most
likely one, even if in a sense beneficial to safety (conservative analyses or ‘licensing basis’). The deterministic analyses have been used for a longer time and, therefore, they are based on a wellconsolidated basis, at least for the rare events included among the DBAs. Severe accidents are now also part of the deterministic analyses. However, because of their very low probability, the conservative assumptions used for DBAs are not used. A ‘best estimate’ treatment of the phenomena is preferred in this case. Safety analysis should consider normal operation, operational occurrences and accidents.AR17 The aim of a safety analysis for normal operation should be to assess that normal operation of the plant can be carried out safely. Therefore, it has to confirm that radiological doses to workers and members of the public are within acceptable limits and that planned releases of radioactive materials from the plant are within acceptable limits. All the conditions met during normal operation, without external or internal disturbances, should be considered. These include start-up, normal power operation and power changes, various shutdown modes (hot, cold, refuelling, etc.), and handling and storage of fresh and irradiated fuel. Both the limits in force, and the ALARA principle (Chapter 7) should be complied with. In particular, reduction to the minimum reasonable amount of the radioactive gaseous and solid releases to the environment, and of the waste produced by the plant, should be pursued. In some cases a balance should be made between doses to the population and doses to workers, as some operating decision may increase the first and decrease the other, or vice versa. A typical example is the frequency of replacement of effluent filtering packs since replacement usually means more doses to personnel and less doses to the public. 95
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Anticipated operational occurrences are offnormal events, usually plant transients, which can be coped with by the plant protection systems and normal plant systems but which could have the potential to damage the reactor if some additional malfunction should happen. Their typical frequency of occurrence may be more than 10 2 year 1. Some of the anticipated occurrences (PIEs – postulated initiating events) are due to the increase of reactor heat removal (as might occur for an inadvertent opening of a steam relief valve, malfunctions in control systems, etc.). Some are due to the decrease of reactor heat removal (such as for feed-water pumps tripping, loss of condenser vacuum and control systems malfunctions). Some are due to a decrease in reactor coolant system flow rate, as in the case of a trip of one or more coolant pumps. Some are connected with reactivity and power distribution anomalies, such as for an inadvertent control rod withdrawal or unwanted boron dilution due to a malfunction of the volume control system for a PWR. Events entailing the increase or decrease of the reactor coolant inventory may also happen, due to malfunctions of the volume control system or small leaks. Finally, releases of radioactive substances from components may occur. DBAs have a lower frequency of occurrence than operational transients, typically in the range 10 2– 10 5, and are not expected to occur during the lifetime of the plant. They, however, are considered in the design of the plant safety systems for emergencies. There are also some groups of PIEs that are traditionally included among DBAs which may have lower frequencies (as could be for the largest pipe guillotine break for plants built to modern standards). All the PIEs considered as initiators of anticipated operational occurrences should also be considered as potential initiators of DBAs. The groups of PIEs considered for DBAs are the same listed above for anticipated occurrences: the severity of the specific events considered, though, is here higher. Typically, DBA initiators include steam line breaks, feed-water line breaks, pump shaft break or seizure, control rod ejection due to breakage of the rod thimble housing, boron dilution due to the start-up of an idle loop, inadvertent operation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), small and large loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs), break of a radioactive gas holdup tank, and fuel damage during handling.
Radiological limits are established for the various categories of operational occurrences and accidents. Lower limits are used for less infrequent transients and higher limits for more rare events (see, for example, the EUR criteria in Appendix 6). Since the number of PIEs is usually large, the natural tendency is to group them and to study only the one which causes the most serious consequences (bounding case). It may well be that one accident is the worst for one consequence and another one is worse for another consequence (e.g. peak rector pressure or peak fuel clad temperature). In this case, both have to be studied. The safety analysis should demonstrate that the plant can be safely shut down and maintained in that condition, that the residual heat can be removed from the core at any time after the accident and that radioactive releases are minimized and below acceptable limits. Here, it must be underlined that the time span covered by the analytical studies of the various accidents must be long enough to allow the plant to reach a long-term stable shutdown and cooled core state. A tendency exists, in order to save precious computer time or to avoid the numerical difficulties of long calculations, to stop the analytical studies at the intervention of the first plant protection or safety system or shortly later. This inadequate behaviour may also have been responsible for preventing the possible peculiar primary system situation that occurred during the TMI accident (pressurizer full of water mixture and core essentially dry) from being public knowledge in the reactor safety profession before the accident. Indeed, this plant situation could have been predicted by thermal–hydraulic codes if the transient time studied had been long enough. The analytical studies of accidents can be performed either by a conservative approach or by a best estimate approach. In the first case, conservative assumptions are adopted for initial and boundary conditions and for the various elements of the evaluation (correlations, parameters, equipment availability, etc.). Apart from the obvious advantages (for safety) of this approach, it, however, frequently leads to a completely unrealistic description of the real accident sequence, with a distorted timing of the events and the masking of interesting phenomena (see also Chapter 27). Because of these shortcomings and the current maturity of best estimate codes, they should be used in a safety analysis in combination with a reasonably conservative selection of input data
Chapter 11 Safety analysis
and a sufficient evaluation of the uncertainties of the results.AR427 This approach is accepted by regulatory bodies. It may also be acceptable to use a combination of a best estimate code and realistic assumptions on initial and boundary conditions. The safety analysis should be performed within a QA system. The following assumptions should be made in a conservative approach:
The initiating event occurs at an unfavourable time as regards initial reactor conditions (e.g. power level, residual heat level, reactivity and reactivity coefficients conditions, system temperatures, pressures and coolant inventory). The operation of control systems should not form part of the analysis, unless their intervention may aggravate the accident. Protection systems only should be considered. All non-safety-grade components should be disregarded, except when there is the possibility that they could aggravate the transient. A single failure criterion should be adopted (the worst single failure should be assumed to occur in the group of safety systems which have to intervene during the accident). For redundant systems it is often assumed that the minimum number of trains start and run. In some cases, the requirement exists that, if n systems are necessary for a specific function, (n þ 2) systems should be provided because one is considered unavailable for maintenance and the other is assumed to fail (e.g. as is the practice in Germany). Safety systems should be assumed to operate at their minimum performance level (with action intervening at the worst end of the possible band). Equipment that cannot be considered fully and demonstrably operable, should be disregarded. Actions of the plant staff should be considered only if there is ample time available, if ample and written information is available for diagnosis or for identification of guiding symptoms, and if sufficient training has taken place. Plant staff actions are assumed to occur no sooner than 10 minutes after the start of the event.
Acceptance criteria should be clearly defined (see Section 8.2.1). An accident may generate more than one unwanted consequences (e.g. excessive system pressure and excessive clad temperatures) and this situation may require different sets of conservative
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assumptions for the analysis of safety for each possible consequence studied. Severe accidents are also studied using a deterministic approach, with less conservative assumptions than DBAs due to their low probability of occurrence. Probabilistic methods are, however, used for the identification of those accidents which should be considered in a safety analysis.
11-3. Probabilistic safety analysis Although in many countries it is not compulsory to perform a probabilistic safety analysis (PSA), in practice it has become common practice for new plants and for existing ones. Moreover, international requirements include that safety analysis reports include a summary of the PSA study of the plant. A PSA is a complete and well-structured method for identifying accident scenarios and to obtain numerical risk estimates. The question of whether PSAs, or probability risk assessments (PRAs) can be used to demonstrate the compliance with numerical safety criteria has been debated at length. It is now believed that their use is not advisable because of the uncertainties in methods, in data and, therefore, in their results. However, all those who experienced the probabilistic method, are convinced, at least, of the following positive aspects of it:
It forces the analyst to examine the complete set of possible sequences of events which may happen on a plant, without excluding any of them beforehand (as is done in the deterministic method). Therefore the risk of forgetting in the analysis some important sequence or situation is lower. It affords a general vision of the plant from the safety point of view, highlighting specific weak points and, therefore, in particular during the design phase, allowing a well-balanced plant to be conceived. The method gives an idea of the global risk and, notwithstanding its possible imprecision, is useful for comparative considerations between different plants and, therefore, it contributes to the creation of an homogeneous reactor overview from the point of view of risk.
It is common for a probabilistic safety analysis to detect weak points of the plant where the normal
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design process had not been able to reveal weaknesses. This, in particular, happens for support systems of primary safety systems, for example the space cooling systems for rooms where the safety injection pumps are located. The present trend for the support of plant safety decisions, including those concerning operation, involves both safety analyses: the deterministic and the probabilistic. Probabilistic analyses are applicable to Levels 1, 2 or 3 (IAEA, 1992, 1995, 1996), because they examine the events up to core damage, up to the evaluation of radioactivity releases from the plant, or up to the external radiological consequences. A less general consensus exists on the inclusion of external events (e.g. earthquakes) in the probabilistic analyses. Indeed the degree of uncertainty in the identification of events of this type at very low probability levels is high. The related doubts are going to become weaker in view of the advantages of a rational treatment of all the phenomena, including the external ones. At the same time, the use of methods and of procedures internationally agreed upon is strengthening (USNRC, 1983; Fullwood, 1999), which decreases the uncertainties present in a specific methodological choice. For the probabilistic treatment of a seismic event the following steps are necessary:
Determine a ‘seismic hazard’ curve for the site which establishes a relationship, for example between the maximum ground acceleration and the corresponding expected frequency (on a worldwide basis, the Gutenberg correlation between magnitude (M) and annual frequency ( f ) can be included: ln f ¼ 4.13–0.844 M. Perform the dynamic analysis of the plant. Determine the fracture probability of structures and components. This is rather conventionally undertaken using fragility curves which relate the conditioned probability of fracture with the maximum acceleration of the component/structure. The simplification introduced by the fragility curves consists in the fact that they are supposed to depend on three parameters only: a median rupture acceleration, Aˆ, and two logarithmic standard deviations (log-normal distribution), AR and AU, related to the intrinsic variability of the component behaviour and to the variability
of Aˆ, respectively. The fragility curves are based on the (few) results of tests and on good engineering judgement. A very important factor in safety management and safety analysis is the recognition of the importance of the human intervention in the related activities. Human errors should be avoided by the establishment of clear interfaces between man and machine, and by the preparation of operating and emergency procedures and of maintenance rules and guidelines. Beneficial human intervention, even in extremely degraded situations, should be implemented by adequate training, procedures and simulation studies and practices. Moreover, one of the most difficult aspects of the probabilistic analyses lies in the probabilistic treatment of human behaviour, that is of the operator actions which may have a decisive influence on the development of the accidental sequence under study. Usually, for the sake of conservatism, focus is placed on the probability of operator error (omission, commission and, more difficult to analyse, diagnosis errors). In the real world, however, the role of operators in an accident sequence is not limited to committing or not committing mistakes in the implementation of operational procedures. In fact, as many events indicate (the Browns Ferry 1975 accident is typical, see Chapter 20), the operators may react to an unexpected situation with creative and resolving interventions. For the present moment, however, except for specific cases, the possibility is taken into account only that the operator makes mistakes in the implementation of emergency procedures, even in the field of the management of severe accidents. Table 11-1 and Figures 11-1 and 11-2 give an idea of the probabilities used for these analyses (Petrangeli and Zaffiro, 1985). The probabilistic analysis of a plant is usually performed by the construction of event trees, for any single group of similar initiating events, and of fault trees, for any single system or component whose fault probability is important for the study of the various accident sequences.
11-3-1. Event trees Event trees are branched graphs which, starting from the initiating event considered, show (in their most
Chapter 11 Safety analysis
1.00 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.01
<5 5–10 10–20 20–30 30–60 >60
<15 15–20 20–30 30–40 40–70 >70
1
Error probability
ms
ste
y ts
n
Pla
1
10 Time available (mins)
100
Figure 11-2. Non-repair probability of a component as a function of the time available.
10−1
Figure 11-3 shows a simplified event tree for the TLMB sequence of a PWR according to the Rasmussen report (loss of all the external power supplies for at least three hours and of auxiliary feed-water due to loss of the diesel generators and of the turbine-driven pump).1
10−2
10−3
11-3-2. Fault trees
10−4
10−5
er
Elsewhere on the component
w
In the control room
00.5 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
po
Non-recovery probability for a component
Non-repair probability (%)
Recovery time of the component (mins)
O ffsi te
Table 11-1. Non-recovery probabilities
99
1
10 100 Time available (mins)
1000
Figure 11-1. Probability of operator error as a function of the time available for the operation. common use) the various possible sequences of plant situations (with corresponding estimated probability) consequent to the good operation or malfunction of safety systems designed to stop the accident or to mitigate its consequences. An event tree, therefore, gives the picture of the various final plant situations, each one with the pertinent overall probability.
The fault trees, unlike the event trees, proceed backward from the final event (i.e. the fault of the component or system) to the various causes which may have originated it, with the corresponding probabilities. Figure 11-4 shows a fault tree for the simple system shown in Figure 11-5 and for the fault ‘insufficient flow from V3’. (Some fault tree symbols are shown in Fig. 11-6.) In order to calculate the fault probability of the component under study on the basis of its fault tree, it is possible to proceed directly combining the various probabilities of the events represented in the tree. This method, however, except for rather simple cases, can be rather tiresome and doesn’t highlight the most important factors. The method more generally used, instead, is based on the use of Boolean algebra (the algebra of binary systems: 1s and 0s) and on the fact that a correspondence exists between its results, when applied to a fault tree, and the results of a direct probabilistic analysis, mentioned above.
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Nuclear Safety
T, transient
M, B, lack of recovery of electric power supplies in three hours
L, failure of the auxiliary feed-water
Core condition
Probability per year
OK 0.2/y
OK
Yes: 1 × 10−1 1 × 10−1
Yes: 1.5 × 10−4
MELT
3 × 10−6
Figure 11-3. Event tree (sequence TMLB).
The advantage of applying Boolean algebra resides in the fact that it quite naturally leads algebraically to the maximum simplification of the fault tree. The correspondences in Figure 11-7 are defined between the Boolean and the probabilistic logical environments. The sample fault tree of Figure 11-4 is simplified as follows using Boolean algebra: Fundamental relationships
So applying these laws to the fundamental relationships of our example, we get: C1 ¼ C þ B þ F þ G þ B C2 ¼ D þ B þ F þ G þ B B1 ¼ C D þ C B þ C F þ C G þ C B þ B D þBBþBFþBGþBBþFDþFB þFFþFGþFBþGDþGBþGF
A1 ¼ A þ B þ B1
þGGþGBþBDþBBþBF
B1 ¼ C1 C2
þBGþBB
C1 ¼ C þ B þ D1 D1 ¼ F þ G þ B C2 ¼ D þ B þ D1 (Here the þ (Boolean OR) symbol represents the union symbol [, and the symbol (Boolean AND) represents the intersection symbol \.) These relationships can be developed and dealt with according to the rules of Boolean algebra, which are similar yet not identical to those of the ordinary algebra. Some of these rules and properties are listed in Table 11-2 (it must be remembered that the þ (OR) symbol and the (AND) symbol mean ‘union’ and ‘intersection’, respectively).
But A1 ¼ A þ B þ B1 and (XX) ¼ X, so A1 ¼ A þ B þ C D þ C B þ C F þ C G þCBþBDþBþBFþBGþB þFDþFBþFþFGþFBþGD þGBþGFþGþGBþBDþB þBFþBGþB Reducing these equations, using (XþX) ¼ X, gives: A1 ¼ A þ B þ C D þ C B þ C F þ C G þ B D þBFþBGþFDþFþFGþGDþG
Chapter 11 Safety analysis
101
Insufficient flow in V3 A1
V3 doesn’t open
Lack of CS signal to V3
A
Insufficient flow to V3 B1
B
Insufficient flow from V1
Insufficient flow from V2 C2
C1
V1 doesn’t open C
Lack of CS signal to V1
01
Insufficient flow from the pump D1
B
Pump doesn’t start F
Pump stops
G
V2 doesn’t open
Lack of CS signal to V2
D
B
Lack of CS signal to V3 B
Figure 11-4. A fault tree for the system shown in Figure 11-5.
Insufficient flow from the pump 01
102
Nuclear Safety Control system (CS)
V1
V3 P
V2
Figure 11-5. A simple system.
Legend of symbols used in fault trees Intermediate event: fault which happens for one or more preceding causes acting through logic gates.
OR - Output fault happens if at least one of the input events happens.
AND - Output fault happens if all the input events happen.
Primary fault.
Event not developed in fault tree (insufficient consequences or basic information).
Transfer ‘from’ or ‘to’: it is used to connect parts of the tree developed elsewhere with the tree under study.
Figure 11-6. Symbols used in fault trees.
Chapter 11 Safety analysis
A
AA
B
103
Boolean UNION = A + B; Probability = P(A) + P(B) − P(A) . P(B)
Boolean INTERSECTION = A . B; Probability = P(A) . P(B)
B
Figure 11-7. Correspondence between Boolean and probabilistic logical environments. Table 11-2. Basic rules of Boolean algebra Property
Expressions
Commutative
AþB¼BþA AB¼BA A þ (B þ C) ¼ (A þ B) þ C A (B C) ¼ (A B) C A (B þ C) ¼ A B þ A C A þ (B C) ¼ (A þ B) (A þ C) Aþ1¼1 A1¼1 A (A þ B) ¼ A A þ (A B) ¼ A AA¼A AþA¼A
Associative Distributive Unity Absorption
Rearranging: A1 ¼ A þBþCBþBDþBFþBG þCD þFþCFþFDþFG þGþGDþCG and using X þ (XY) ¼ X repeatedly, gives A1 ¼ A þ B þ F þ G þ C D The final result allows the easy calculation of the probability of A1 and shows, moreover, the minimal paths (‘minimum cut sets’, that is the minimum number of components involved) which may lead to the final event (the ‘top’ event) A1. They are A, B, F, G and (CD). The calculation of the final probability
is particularly easy if the single events are rare, that is with low probability values. In this case it is generally allowable to neglect in the probabilistic calculation products of events in front of the single events themselves (the result, then, in the case of the probability calculation in presence of various independent originating events and singularly sufficient, is conservative). The calculation and the reduction of fault trees may be done by specific calculation codes (for example see Fullwood (1999)). One of the more delicate aspects in setting up fault trees is the method chosen to take into account the ‘common cause failures’ (CCFs) (CEC, 1987). This aspect of the vulnerability of systems is particularly important for systems provided with a high level of redundancy. In this case, the presence of some CCFs may drastically reduce the probability of correct operation of the system upon demand. This effect is so feared that frequently the safety criteria specify a minimum value of the failure probability of a nondiversified system (that is, a system not made up of systems diverse in operating principle, materials, and so on). Figures for these ‘cut-off’ probabilities are usually of the order of 10 5–10 3 per demand (USNRC, 1983). Various methods exist to account for CCFs in an analysis. One among these, at the level of safety system, consists in introducing, in the logic model representing the system, a basic fictitious event which represents the CCF of the system. Another method, named ‘of the -factor’, consists in supposing that the failure rate of a component results from the sum of an individual term and of a common term ( ¼ i þ c, with c/ ¼ ). Typical values of are of 0.2 for identical redundant components, 0.02 for partial diversity (diverse
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Nuclear Safety
Table 11-3. Failure rates
Table 11-3. Continued
Component
Value
Component
Value
Break of very small pipe (up to about 30 l s 1) Break of small pipe (up to about 80 mm diameter) Break of intermediate pipe (up to about 160 mm) Break of large pipe
3E 2 yr 1 (B) 2E 2 yr 1 (P) 3E 3 yr 1 (B) 1E 3 yr 1 (P) 3E 4 yr 1 (B) 1E 3 yr 1 (P) 1E 4 yr 1 (B) 5E 4 yr 1 (P) 5E 3 yr 1 5E 3 yr 1 0.1 yr 1 4.8 yr 1 (B, FW) 0.56 yr 1 (B, etc.) 6.85 yr 1 (P) 1.56 yr 1 (B) 1.41 yr 1 (P) 1.4E 1 yr 1 (B) 0 (P)
failure to operate unavailability for test and maintenance Diesel engine pumps: failure to start failure to operate unavailability for test and maintenance Heat exchanger: plugging break (leaks) Emergency diesel generator: failure to start failure to operate unavailability for test and maintenance Malfunction of external power supply (not an initiating event) Malfunction of various components: batteries buses battery chargers inverters Unavailability for test and maintenance: batteries buses battery chargers inverters Battery depletion time
5E 3 hr 1E 2/d
Transient for loss of d.c. bus Transient for loss of a.c. Transient for loss of outside lines Transients not caused by the loss of the electric power generation system Transients caused by loss of electric power generation system Spurious opening of relief valve Solenoid valves: failure to operate plugging unavailability for test and maintenance Hydraulic operated valves: failure to operate plugging unavailability for test and maintenance Explosive operated valves: failure to operate plugging unavailability for test and maintenance Manual valves: plugging unavailability for test and maintenance Non-return valves: failure to open failure to close Motor operated relief or safety valves: failure to open failure to reclose Electric motor pumps: failure to start failure to operate unavailability for test and maintenance Turbine driven pumps: failure to start
1E 3/d demand 4E 5/d 2E 4/d
1E 3/d 4E 5/d 2E 4/d
3E 3/d 4E 5/d 2E 4/d
1E 3/d 8E 4 hr 1E 2/d
1
1
5.7E 6 hr 3E 6 hr 1 3E 2/d 2E 3 hr 6E 3/d
1
1
2E 4/d
4E 9E 4E 4E
4/d 5/d 4/d 2/d
1E 6E 3E 1E 5–7
3/d 5/d 4/d 3/d hr
The letters B and P indicate values applicable to BWRs and to PWRs. FW is the feed-water system.
4E 5/d 2E 4/d
1E 4/d 1E 3/d 0.1/d 3E 2/d 3E 3/d 3E 5 hr 2E 3/d
1
3E 3/d (Continued )
‘hardware’ or ‘software’), and 0.002 for complete functional diversity of the redundant elements (Smith, 1997). It is necessary to add here that a remarkable freedom exists in the proportion in which event trees and fault trees can be used in a specific probabilistic analysis. Indeed, ‘large’ event trees and ‘small’ fault trees can be chosen (or vice versa) with all the intermediate grades. Here, reference has been made to the most common way, which uses event trees up to the primary safety systems, and fault trees for the determination of the failure probabilities of the primary systems, also on the basis of the failure probabilities of their support systems.
Chapter 11 Safety analysis
11-3-3. Failure rates One of the fundamental steps in carrying out a probabilistic analysis is choosing the failure rates of components. In principle, specific plant figures should be used, that is obtained by the operating experience of the plant itself. When this is not possible, data of similar plants should be used or, in the extreme case, generic applicable data. Table 11.3 lists some data (average values) used in the study NUREG 1150 (NUREG, 1987). Other sources of failure data are described in Fullwood (1999), Taylor (1994) and Smith (1997), as well as many other sources.
105
IAEA (1996) ‘Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear power plants (Level 3)’, Safety series 50-P-12. NUREG (1987) ‘Reactor risk reference document’, NUREG 1150. Petrangeli, G. and Zaffiro, C. (1985) ‘Regulatory implications of source term studies’, IAEA-SM-281/53. Smith, D.J. (1997) Reliability, Maintainability and Risk. Butterworth-Heinemann. Taylor, J.R. (1994) Risk Analysis for Process Plant, Pipelines and Transport. E. & F.N. Spon. USNRC (1983) ‘PRA procedure guide’, NUREG CR 2300.
References
Chapter notes
CEC (1987) ‘Common cause failures reliability benchmark exercise’, EUR 11054-EN. Fullwood, R.R. (1999) Probabilistic Safety Assessment in the Chemical and Nuclear Industries. ButterworthHeinemann. IAEA (1992) ‘Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear power plants (Level 1)’, Safety series 50-P-4. IAEA (1995) ‘Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear power plants (Level 2)’, Safety series 50-P-8.
1 T is the transient of main feed-water loss due to loss of electric power supply. M, B indicate the lack of recovery of the outside lines and the non-operation of the station diesels for at least three hours (in the Rasmussen report, the probability of non-recovery of the outside lines in one hour is assumed equal to 2 10 1 and the probability, to be combined with the preceding one, of nonrecovery for the other two hours of the same lines, is assumed equal to 5 10 1). L indicates the malfunction of the auxiliary feed-water system and therefore also of the turbine-driven pump.
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Chapter 12 Safety analysis review
12-1. Introduction A safety review is undertaken by the design, construction and operation organizations, and the control bodies. As all the regulatory documents repeate.g. AR17 and as also explained by those who have for a long time been involved in this activity (Bourgeois et al., 1996), it is essential that this control function is independent, competent and credible. I will use some experience accumulated over several decades of involvement in safety reviews to add here some further additional and more detailed considerations on the subject with some examples.
12-2. The reference points In the early days of nuclear energy, in particular in a country without previous experience, for example in military applications, it was very difficult for a safety reviewer to obtain data and information on which a review could be based. The available criteria were scarce, the data on already built plants were in some case difficult to obtain and the research was at an initial stage. Today, data and information are much more abundant. These include:
The international criteria and guides (e.g. IAEA) which offer useful indications, even if necessarily of general nature (see Chapter 18). Compilations of national regulations, such as the technical positions, the ‘Regulatory Guides’ and the ‘Standard Review Plan’ used in the USA are easily available (see Appendix 14). The proceedings of debates within international and community organizations, such as the IAEA, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (Committee for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI), Committee for Nuclear Regulatory Activities
(CNRA), Committee for Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH), Health Protection, Committee for Waste Management (CWM), and the European Union groups. The results of research in the international field and the proceedings of many conferences on any part of nuclear safety technology.
However, there is no ‘Decision Machine’ available, either in the form of technical guides or handbooks, and experts are frequently compelled to take subjective technical decisions and to accept the related responsibility. In fact, the practical cases are always so specific that they cannot be covered by an ‘all-embracing’ handbook. Moreover, even if such a tool existed, in case of judicial trial, the compliance with the handbook could frequently be considered only an extenuation of the possible guilt of the technical expert. ‘Historical’ examples exist of technical specialists who have been sentenced in a case of a pressure vessel explosion, although in due course they had verified its compliance with the technical standards in force. In case of accident, in fact, the technical expert must demonstrate the application of all the means suggested by the ‘status of the technical knowledge’. Only completely new phenomena escape this criterion.
12-3. Foreseeing possible issues for discussion Four of the most respected experts among those responsible for nuclear safety in Europe have written that the principal qualities of the safety controller are the following (Bourgeois et al., 1996):
independence competence credibility modesty (which they call ‘the mother of safety’). 107
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Nuclear Safety
My experience suggests that a very productive quality, but the most difficult to develop, is to be able to foresee, so far as possible, the problems which will come up in discussions with the designer or the future operator of the plant. Following the wise words of the above quoted four experts: We have to start from the idea that our counterparts, whatever their responsibility level may be, never primarily intend to put safety in danger. An industrialist who builds a dangerous factory has not the objective of causing an accident. A technician who is going to set a safety valve has not the objective to make it inoperable. Instead, both of them frequently have in their mind a dominant concern which obscures the others: for the first one it may be to produce at low cost in order to conquer larger market shares, for the second, it may be to get rid as soon as possible of a boring task. The function of the safety expert is to make them understand that the neglect of safety may put everything in danger and that it is certainly more effective for them to take care of safety at the correct moment, rather than to awake too late and have to pay for the consequences. Then, the role of the expert is to help people in charge . . ..
before any action is taken. At this stage it may be difficult for the reviewer to express a judgement for lack of data but he or she can give expert comment, possibly conditional to subsequent verifications. From experience, the reviewer can possibly see future problems and give advice. Finally, the good safety controller must have the courage to take responsibility, and always sensibly balance the designer/operator requirements against the safety requirements without hindering the design process unnecessarily. As implemented in some national regulations, this ‘ahead of time’ intervention should be encouraged and explicitly facilitated by a set of rules on safety controls. However, adherence to this policy should not be taken for granted and it is often opposed by some control experts, worried by an excess of responsibility, and by some managers. In this connection, before the TMI accident (see Section 1-2), there were two erroneous attitudes within the nuclear industry, both held in order to ‘defend itself’ from the control bodies: the first one was to ‘flood them with paper’, that is to overburden them with documents; and the second was to ‘giving them the minimum possible amount of information’. But these were past times and things are changed somewhat.
12-4. Control is not disrespectful In order for this action of persuasion and of assistance to be effective in practical cases, it must be initiated, as far as possible, ahead of time. Frequently the plant designs arrive at the safety reviewer’s table when the design phase has been declared practically finished and when many components have already been ordered, that is when the finished activities represent such a firm precedent that it cannot practically be put in discussion again, unless large penalties and stresses within the owner organisation are accepted. In these conditions it has to be hoped that the design can be considered acceptable by the reviewer too, otherwise every objection mentioned would hit a wall of resistance, which might not have existed if the review had taken place at the proper time. It is therefore essential that the reviewer is involved at the initial phases of the design process
Sometimes, in performing the design review, it is possible to get the idea that some remarks may be offensive and so are sometimes deleted: this is a mistake as shown in the following example. In the 1960s and 1970s an experimental pressurized water reactor was built whose reactivity control for fuel burn-up was not performed by ‘chemical shim’ (i.e. by changing the concentration of boric acid in the cooling water), but by ‘spectral shift’. In practice, cooling water was composed of a mixture of light water and heavy water, in varying proportions during the life of the core: at the start the content of heavy water was higher and decreased with increasing fuel burn-up. At the start of the life, the addition of light water to the primary circuit caused a reactivity increase, as expected. Therefore all the systems were conceived
Chapter 12 Safety analysis review
in such a way to avoid an unwanted light water injection. However, there was a flaw in the design which was not discovered until a safety review by a group of European experts found it. The safety injection system, in fact, was designed to inject a solution of strongly borated light water so that, at any time during the life of the core, the negative effect of the injected boron on the core reactivity would take precedence over the positive one due to the injection of light water. A check made during the above mentioned review showed that, on the contrary, for a period of time at the start of core life, the actuation of the safety injection system would have caused a net increase of reactivity, infringing one of the fundamental system specifications. Although the design team had doubts about the credibility of this finding, the error proved to be real and the safety review committee were thanked for their contribution to perfecting the design.
12-5. Clarification is not disrespectful The solution to any problem found by the controller must be illustrated to the necessary degree of detail, with the maximum confidence in the competence of the recipient but without neglecting any detail, but without assuming that ‘the designer has certainly thought of that’. A lack of completeness may be costly to all concerned. In this connection, here is a long technical digression, which is useful to think about. Many years ago, two pressurized water reactors were built, with the lower support plate of the core subdivided into two plates, about three metres apart in the vertical direction and connected by an external row of round rods in traction (tie rods – TR) and by internal guide tubes for the control rod followers (cruciform) containing fuel rods, as illustrated in Figure 12-1. The core was supported by the upper plate and through the followers in compression, by the lower plate and, finally, by the tie rods in tension. The cooling water coming from the downcomer at the periphery of the core, made a turn towards
109
core tie rods
plate
plate
followers
Figure 12-1. Core support arrangement. the interior in the tie rods zone, then went up along the guide tubes before finally entering in the core. During the safety review of the design by the control body, the fact that, in this configuration, a transversal and longitudinal current of water flowing around the TR could cause their vibration was highlighted; the von Karman vortex wake due to the transversal flow was of particular concern. (It is known that this phenomenon is responsible for the vibration of many chimneys, and, sometimes, in order to break the above mentioned vortices, they are fitted with an external helical foil along much of their length.) The control body had made a quick check of the natural frequency of the TR and of the probable vortex frequency: f¼
0:207u , d
ð12:1Þ
where f is frequency, u is water velocity and d is the round rod diameter, and showed that resonance between forcing frequency and natural rod frequency could exist. The forcing frequency is practically independent from the Reynolds number and therefore from the type of fluid, in the range of Reynolds numbers of interest. On the basis of this first investigation, the designer was requested to give information on the possibility of vibrations of the rods and on significant fatigue stresses. After some months the designer answered with the report which is summarized in the following. The report is long but has been almost fully reproduced here because it gives a good engineering insights. (The original report references have been removed although their citations have been retained
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Nuclear Safety
to show proper check were made, and the original imperial units have also been kept.)
12-6. Designer report 12-6-1. Introduction The core support structure consists of a core plate, upon which the fuel assemblies rest, a casting located approximately 120 in below the core plate, control rod shroud tubes and tie rods which join the core plate to the casting. This structure is located in the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel. The reactor coolant (water) flows downward around the outside of the core and reverses direction in the bottom portion of the reactor vessel to flow up through the core. Thus, the core support structure is in a region of flow direction change and a complex flow pattern exists. The tie rods are located around the circumference of the core support structure and are subjected to fluid flow of varying direction and velocity. The possibility of the tie rods vibrating in the complex flow pattern has been the subject of considerable analysis and study as the reactor design developed. This study and analysis divided naturally into two parts, one which considered the hydrodynamic aspects of possible tie rod oscillations and one which determined the vibration deflections and stresses of the tie rods under the influence of the possible exciting forces. The following paragraphs describe the results of these analyses and studies.
12-6-2. Conclusions The primary conclusion is that in the unlikely event that the tie rods vibrate in resonance with maximum possible excitation the stresses and deflections in the tie rods will be sufficiently small that there is no possibility of fatigue failure. In the actual case, the tie rods are not expected to be in resonance with the exciting force because the maximum local cross flow velocity will probably be less than 7 ft s 1. Furthermore, at high Reynolds numbers, there are experimental indications that the exciting forces will be aperiodic and that the combination of parallel and cross flow will decrease the stability of the flow
which leads to the formation of a regular periodic vortex sheet.
12-6-3. Hydrodynamic aspects Flow distribution in lower plenum The velocity distributions normal and parallel to the tie rods, respectively, were obtained from potential flow analogue studies of a two-dimensional model of the lower plenum. A wake of highly turbulent, but essentially stagnant fluid, was assumed to exist, protruding downwards into the plenum from the lower edge of the core barrel. The extent of the wake was adjusted to give consistency with the experimentally observed flow non-uniformity at the lower core plate. A maximum cross flow velocity of 7 ft s 1 occurs just above the middle of the tie rod. Below this point, the velocity decreases to less than 0.5 ft s 1 at one-third of the distance between the casting and the core plate. The velocity parallel to the rod decreases from 12 ft s 1 at a position two-thirds of the distance between the casting and core plate to less than 1 ft s 1 at the mid-point of the tie rods. The maximum cross flow velocity will probably be less than 7 ft s 1 because some of the net flow will cross through the wake.
Transverse force in cross flow The transverse force due to vortex formation (von Karman) in flow normal to the rod is assumed to be periodic with a frequency calculated for a Reynolds number (Re) greater than 103 assuming a constant Strouhal number of 0.21 (Reference 1). While Rouse (Reference 2) indicates that alternating side thrust exists for Re as high as 106, there is evidence (Reference 3) that for 103 < Re < 105 the flow in the wake behind the cylinder is periodic, while for Re > 105 it is not periodic. For a cross flow of 7 ft s 1, the Reynolds number is 4.7 105. The magnitude of the transverse periodic force is assumed identical to the drag force on a cylinder in steady flow. For a velocity less than 8 ft s 1, the maximum drag force is Fmax ¼ 1.43 lb ft 1. The actual transverse force (lift) is expected to be less than this value. Experimental values (Reference 3)
Chapter 12 Safety analysis review
for Re ¼ 735 are CL ¼ 0.45 compared to CD ¼ 1.09. The same ratio applied to Re ¼ 105 gives Fmax ¼ 0.6 lb ft 1. It seems reasonable to expect that the ratio CL/CD measured at Re ¼ 735 will not change unfavourably as Re increases. As the frequency of the vortex shedding increases, their size becomes smaller rendering the asymmetrical pressure distribution which is associated with a single vortex effective over a smaller area. Also, the combined parallel and normal flow is believed to decrease the stability for the formation of a regular periodic vortex sheet.
12-6-4. Effective mass of oscillating system The effective mass of the vibrating rod is calculated by adding the virtual mass of fluid to that of the rod. For steady flow normal to a cylinder:
meff ¼ mrod 1 þ
fluid ¼ 1:098 mrod :
rod
ð12:2Þ
12-6-5. Evaluation of fluid damping The damping of the vibration due to fluid friction is calculated from the drag on a cylinder in steady motion with the mean velocity um ¼ 4f, where is the deflection and f is the frequency of vibration. The ratio of damping to critical damping becomes: C 2 CD 1 ¼ 2
1 þ fluid Cc rod
! , D
ð12:3Þ
where CD is the drag coefficient. The damping thus increases with deflection. For CD 1, C/Cc 0.02/D.
12-6-6. Vibration analysis The response of the tie rods to the effects of the fluid flow was determined using analyses which are conservative in nature. The natural frequency of the tie rod is a function of the rod diameter and length and the tension in the rod. During assembly of the core support structure, the tie rods are placed in tension by tightening the nuts at their lower ends.
111
The torque on the nuts is specified so that the natural frequency of the rods will be approximately 19 cps in air and with no loading due to core weight. The relationship between this natural frequency and the torque on the tie rod nuts was determined experimentally on the actual structure during initial fit up at the shop. Following installation of the core support structure in the reactor the tie rods will be immersed in water which will cause the natural frequency of the rods to drop by approximately 5 per cent. However, installation of the core will increase the tension in the tie rods and the natural frequency of the tie rods will increase approximately 8 per cent, more than offsetting the effect of the water.
Cross flow In determining the effect of the cross flow, the maximum possible velocity of 7 ft s 1 was used to determine the maximum von Karman vortex frequency of 17.5 cps. The cross flow velocity distribution was taken as shown in Figure 12-2 which is, of course, an approximation of the actual case. The exciting force distribution was taken similar to the velocity distribution and, for each velocity, the exciting force was taken as the drag on the rod due to the cross flow. In the case of the 7 ft s 1 velocity, the drag was determined for a flow velocity of 5 ft s 1 because the velocity–drag curve has a local peak at this velocity. The cross flow drag distribution is also shown in Figure 12-2. Each tie rod was considered to be a series of six lumped masses connected by springs. The tension in the rod was included and the ends of the rods were considered to be clamped. This multi degree of freedom system was excited by alternating forces imposed on two of the lumped masses to simulate the assumed loading shown in Figure 12-2. No damping was assumed and the amplitude of vibration was determined for each of the lumped masses for the first mode of vibration. The amplitude of vibration and the bending moment along the rod are shown in Figure 12-3. It is seen that the maximum amplitude of vibration is 0.0153 in and the maximum bending moment is 39.5 in lb. The corresponding maximum alternating stress is 403 psi.
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Cross flow velocity (ft s−1)
12 10 8 6 4 2 0
Cross flow drag force (lb ft−1)
0
20
40 60 80 100 Distance from top of tie rod (in)
120
140
40 60 80 100 Distance from top of tie rod (in)
120
140
1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0
20
Figure 12-2. Cross flow quantities.
The static deflection of the tie rod due to the forces shown in Figure 12-2 was calculated to be approximately 0.007 in. Thus, the amplification, or resonance, factor was found to be 2.18. In comparing this factor with that which would be expected from a single degree of freedom system with no damping (amplification factor equals 6.5, Reference 4), it was found that the effect of the tension in the rod served to reduce the amplification factor by 2.98. The analysis described above was for the case of the tie rod natural frequency being slightly greater than the exciting frequency (19 cps vs. 17.5 cps). While it is felt that the exciting frequency used will be the maximum possible and that the natural frequency used is close to the actual, the case of the natural frequency being in resonance with the exciting
frequency was also considered. At resonance, the amplitude of vibration will, of course, become infinite unless damping exists in the system. Damping will certainly exist in the tie rod system although it will be small. The principal source of damping will stem from internal damping in the tie rod material. For stainless steel, this will amount to at least 1 per cent of critical damping (Reference 7). The water will also provide a small amount of damping which will depend upon the amplitude of the tie rod vibration. This damping will be approximately 0.2 per cent. Damping will also stem from very small motions in the top and bottom tie rod threaded joints. For a single degree of freedom system at resonance, the amplification factor is approximately 45 for damping equal to 1.2 per cent of critical
Chapter 12 Safety analysis review
113
18
Deflection (in × 1000)
16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Distance from top of tie rod (in) 50
Bending moment (in lb)
40 30 20 10 0 −10 −20 −30 −40 −50 0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Distance from top of tie rod (in)
Figure 12-3. Vibration data. (Reference 4). Reducing this in proportion to the reduction determined above, to account for tension in the rod, the amplification factor was found to be approximately 15.1. The maximum deflection was then determined to be 0.106 in and the alternating stress was found to be 2780 psi.
Parallel flow The vibration of the tie rods due to parallel flow was analysed based upon a method described by Burgreen et al. (Reference 5). The flow velocity was taken as 12 ft s 1, the maximum parallel flow velocity, and the hydraulic diameter was taken as 24 in.
The maximum deflection was found to be 0.074 in and the maximum alternating stress was 1950 psi.
Fatigue analysis A fatigue analysis was made to determine if the tie rods will fail due to fatigue in the unlikely event that the rod vibrates in resonance with the von Karman vortex frequency. The modified Goodman diagram was used in this analysis. This method is described in Reference 6. It was assumed that the stresses and deflections due to the cross and parallel flow vibrations are additive. The maximum deflection becomes, then, 0.180 inches and the maximum alternating stress becomes 4730 psi. The tensile stress in the tie rods,
Nuclear Safety
Alternating stress (PSI × 10−3)
114
20
Sae
10 1
SAFE
45° 10
20
Sb 30
40
Su 50
60
Mean stress (PSI × 10−3)
Figure 12-4. Modified Goodman diagram (for stainless steel at 600 F). with the tie rod nuts torqued as specified and with the core installed, is approximately 4870 psi. This stress is the mean stress in the tie rods. The modified Goodman diagram is shown in Figure 12-4. The values for Su, Sb, and Sae are given by Reference 6 for AISI 304 stainless steel at 600 F. The maximum alternating stress and mean stress values given above determine the location of point (1) in Figure 12-4. This point is well within the ‘safe’ region of the diagram which indicates that the tie rods can be allowed to vibrate at resonance without failure. The report concluded with the references cited in the text.
12-7. Discussion The report was read and commented on by the reviewers: not all the doubts were dissipated, but it was thought possible to discontinue any further action on this issue as the designer (a very experienced one) had demonstrated with his report to have seriously considered the issue raised. It was decided at this point to completely trust the designer. During the pre-operational tests of the reactor no vibration measurements were performed on the reactor internals as, at that time, the problem of the internal fatigue failures inside the vessel had not yet become the serious safety problem which in subsequent years it was to become.
Today, no newly designed reactor is allowed to start operation without having gone through a complete test routine demonstrating the absence of dangerous vibrations in the vessel internals AR 311. After a short operation time, severe failures happened in the vessel internals, among which was the break of the above mentioned tie rods, which might well have been the cause of other damage. The reactor was stopped for about two years for tests and modifications to the internal complex: the tie rods, in particular, were removed and replaced with other duly reinforced internals. Naturally, the above summarized short report was read and studied again in order to discover possible defects and erroneous evaluations which would justify the breaks. The defect that the reviewers immediately found, once the real mechanical drawings of the complex were available (which were not enclosed in the above report), was that the writer of the report, in evaluating the peak stresses for the evaluation of the fatigue strength in the rods, didn’t take into account the stress intensification factor in the notch represented by the upper and lower threads of the rods, which were not protected by stress attenuation grooves or by other provisions. The stress intensification factor might range from 2 to 4, therefore completely capable of reversing the result of the initial evaluations. Another doubt, which unfortunately remained unresolved, concerned the opportunity to base the demonstration of sufficient strength on the presence of a traction in the rods, due to the torque imposed on the lower nuts. Indeed, if this confidence could
Chapter 12 Safety analysis review
be justified in the case of an isolated rod, the case of many rods in parallel is much more uncertain; indeed, in the absence of an estensimetric measurement on all the rods, it might well be that the subsequent torquing of nuts could totally or partially eliminate the traction in the previously tightened rods. It is in fact necessary to consider the uncertainty connected in part with casual factors like the amount of friction and in part with the conditions of imperfect cleanliness of the threads and of the nuts. At least in this case, if the reviewers had been more determinate in their in-depth study of the design evaluations, perhaps significant industrial damage could be avoided, notwithstanding the fact that the breaks didn’t impair the ability to shut down the reactor using the control rods. In any case, the reason why such a mistake, under many respects incredible, happened was never discovered or notified: perhaps it consisted in an erroneous assignment of task (the hydrodynamic analyst was perhaps put in charge of the fatigue verifications too without adequate supervision) or in an erroneous mindset in the treatment of the answers to the questions of the control body (for example, believing that the design had to be necessarily correct and that the answer to the control body had the only purpose of convincing it, as if the requests of clarification were not also a contribution to the verification of the design!). It is not easy to draw precise and general lessons by facts like this one: it is however opportune that the narration of these experiences be freely circulated in order to try to avoid future mistakes of this kind.1
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References Bourgeois, J., Tanguy, P., Cogne´, F. and Petit, J. (1996) La surete´ nucleaire en France et dans le monde. Politechnica, Paris. Ford, D. (1982) The Cult of the Atom. Simon and Shuster, New York.
Chapter notes 1 And perhaps, you will meet this situation too . . . At the time when the technology of pressurized reactors had not yet been stabilized, a safety reviewer noticed that in a PWR no-isolation valve had been placed in the steam generator outlet steam lines; in this situation, if a rupture of a steam line inside the containment occurs, the water inventory of all the steam generators would be discharged in the containment (together with the inventory of primary water, according to a conservative usual assumption). At the end, after long discussions, the owner of the plant accepted the need to install the big isolation valves, which caused delays and significant extra expense (the plant construction was almost complete). The young reviewer was summoned by his ‘boss’ in order to receive the news of the owner’s decision and to hear also the following (semi-serious) remark: ‘. . . however, don’t find these defects any more!’. (Reportedly, elsewhere and in a different context, the same concept was probably expressed by the sentence: ‘‘Don’t turn over new rocks’’ (Ford, 1982, page 198)). All this is understandable, if not condonable. However, it is necessary to remember that it is better to resolve plant deficiencies earlier rather than later. After many years of heated discussions with designers, it is easy to hear sentences like this one: ‘You made us suffer a great deal, but you were right’.
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Chapter 13 Classification of plant components
A general agreement exists that classification of systems, structures and components of a plant from the point of view of safety and from the point of view of resistance to external actions (earthquake, and so on) is necessary to make decisions on the following:AR17
Adequate design, construction and operation provisions for each class. System characteristics, such as redundancy, emergency power supply, qualification for environmental conditions. Systems to be considered available or not in the deterministic analysis of the Postulated Initiating Events (PIE) (EUR, Chapter 18). Gradation of the QA measures, to be proportioned to the importance of the safety component but also to the characteristics of the component such as its complexity and degree of technological innovation.
In general, the following classifications should be defined:
Classification on the basis of the safety function, with reference to the requirements above. Classification for pressure components, on the basis of the mechanical complexity and the pressure level. Classification for the resistance to earthquakes, with reference to the need that the component continue to be undamaged or functional during and after an earthquake of a certain severity, taking into account the aftershocks and therefore the possible incremental damage. Classification of the instrumentation and control systems, on the basis of their safety function, which may be different from that of other
system types because of the existence of classification schemes specific to their field and commonly used. Classification for QA requirements.
The various national approaches to the classification systems strongly differ from each other and in every practical case the choice of the classification criteria and the assignment of the various components to the classes identified need a certain degree of reflection and judgement. The subject of classification is made very delicate by the fact that the pertinent choices have a strong economic relevance. Moreover, it is not always possible to correlate the different classes with levels of reliability or unavailability upon demand in the Probabilistic Safety Evaluations, because of the lack of sufficient experimental data. The probabilistic safety analyses should confirm that the structures, systems and components which ensure that the risk connected to the plant is low, be classified at the appropriate level. It is necessary to stress the adequacy of the isolation and separation systems adopted for different systems having a possibility of mutual interaction and assigned to different classes. The malfunction of a system or component should not cause the malfunction of another system or component assigned to a superior class. If this possibility exists, the affected system or component should also be classified in the superior class. Some examples of adopted classification systems may be found in IAEA (1979), the IAEA Guide on classification (under revision) in EUR (Chapter 18), the EUR criteria, an extract of which, also including the classification system, is included as Appendix 6.
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Some examples of system classifications are given in the following paragraphs, as an illustration. These examples comply with the above listed principles and may be found in IAEA (1979) and EUR (Appendix 6).
The system of vessels, pipes and pressure components which form the primary cooling system of a PWR (reactor vessel obviously included) is in Class 1, the highest one, as the failure (break) of the system constitutes a serious LOCA. The core emergency cooling system is placed in Class 2, as its failure doesn’t cause directly and necessarily an accident. The compressed air system which supports the emergency cooling systems is in Class 3 as it is considered a normal, not highly stressed system.
The station fire fighting system is not placed in a safety class (or it is in Class 4) as it is considered that the specific industrial standards in force already offer sufficient guarantee by themselves if needed.
These examples make clear the degree of subjectivity in the classification choices and therefore the importance of giving classification adequate attention.
Reference IAEA (1979) ‘Safety functions and component classification for BWR, PWR and PTR’, Safety Guide N. 50-SG-D1, Vienna.
Chapter 14 Notes on some plant components
14-1. Reactor pressure vessel 14-1-1. Problems highlighted by operating experience During the past 45 years of peaceful use of nuclear energy, no case of a nuclear reactor pressure vessel rupture has occurred. This hypothetical event is not included in the design basis accidents (DBAs) nor, according to the most recent trends, among the severe accidents to be reasonably considered. This is not, as it will be discussed more extensively later, the only possible choice: it, however, has been considered acceptable and practicable. It is also necessary to remember that the burst of a nuclear vessel without previous mitigation measures, would easily result in an accident of the severity of the Chernobyl one. Every effort, therefore, is made by technical experts involved to prevent a break by design, construction and operation provisions. In order to meet this goal, however, extraordinary efforts and means are necessary. Indeed, even though there is good design experience for ordinary industrial vessels built and operated at the best quality level, the resulting failure rate is unacceptable for the best nuclear vessels, where the risk is kept at minimum level. It must be remembered that the frequency of catastrophic ruptures in Class 1 industrial, non-nuclear, pressure vessels ranges between 10 4 and 10 3 per year. The total service time of nuclear pressure vessels for civil and military uses is now somewhat higher than 10 000 reactor-years. Other additional facts must be considered in the operating experience of nuclear pressure vessels. An example was the case of a nuclear reactor steam generator which was built twenty years ago according
to the rules then in force. It worried some nuclear experts because of what they thought could have happened. The case is described in Chapter 20, but here it is recalled that, during a normal inspection of the plant, a patch of damp was discovered on the exterior of the thermal insulation of the vessel. A subsequent in-depth inspection revealed the presence of a circumferential crack along a weld which extended for most of the circumference and had an average depth of roughly 70 per cent of the wall thickness. The rupture of a steam generator in a nuclear plant would probably cause a lower environmental contamination than the rupture of the reactor pressure vessel, but in any case this is a disruptive accident, not considered among the design basis ones or among those taken as a reference for additional protective measures for severe accidents. On passing, the cause was attributed to impurities in the welds and therefore to fabrication defects. Another case of supposedly serious danger happened when, because of the stringent need for electric power production, a Russian-design reactor built in Bulgaria was restarted after a stoppage, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of a group of European experts. This case, too, is described in Chapter 20. The plant had been shut down because excessive embrittlement of the vessel was feared due to the neutron fluence absorbed in service. During the stoppage, according to some experts, the vessel had at least to be submitted to further inspections and possibly annealed in order to eliminate part of the neutron embrittlement. It was, instead, following the advice of other experts, started up again and operated for several months until, once the winter electricity demand peak had passed, it was stopped again in order to perform the needed operations. 119
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It has to be said, however, that in retrospect, following tests on material samples, the initial estimates resulted to be too pessimistic. Another example is the corrosion damage caused by boric acid of the vessel upper head of the US reactor at Davis Besse in 2002. A cavity as deep as the carbon steel wall and with similar dimensions in plan was produced, leaving the stainless steel internal liner as the only barrier against the massive efflux of primary fluid (see Chapter 20). Whereas the dangers of the above example never materialized, the behaviour of the reactor pressure vessel during the Three Mile Island accident is exceptional. It withstood the outpouring of about twenty tons of molten core on its bottom, in conditions of highly deteriorated internal cooling. This behaviour indicated to the technical experts the presence of a powerful and up to then neglected barrier in the Defence in Depth, which is now utilized in a planned way as a potential asset.
Figure 14-1. The most relevant areas of a vessel from a structural point of view.
A number of relatively small mishaps have however occurred to vessels: cracks in the control rod drives thimbles in PWRs (Figs 14-1 and 14-2); damage to the internal liner due to erosion by broken metal pieces (almost everything has been found in reactor vessels and in steam generators during periodical inspections, including hammers, files, shoes and pieces of wooden planks, etc.!); small cracks at the junction between the internal liner and base metal due to the liner deposition process; defective materials; excessive neutron embrittlement; deposition of large amounts of boric acid (hundreds of kilograms, see Chapter 20) between the control rod drive thimbles and their thermal insulation; leaks of liquid through junctions; and so on.
14-1-2. Rupture probability of non-nuclear vessels Rupture statistics for non-nuclear vessels are not applicable to nuclear vessels as they differ in many ways, for instance they differ in wall thickness (for most cases), service life, conditions of use, in-service inspections, improvements in steel making technology, control of trace elements, stringent heat treatment specifications and rigorous QA practices. It is however useful to consider the data collected on the ruptures in conventional vessels in order to keep in perspective the importance of the additional precautions adopted for nuclear vessels. Table 14-1 shows a summary of some available statistics for both destructive events and nondestructive breaks, the latter include all the cases of fractures discovered in time or which could become destructive and all those minor fractures, probably not potentially destructive, that required intervention because of their size. The principal causes of the reported fractures are fatigue (mechanical, thermal or corrosion assisted) associated with pre-existing fabrication defects, generally corresponding to structural discontinuities such as appendages, penetrations, etc. A statistical treatment of the data summarised in Table 14-1 leads to the conclusion that, at 99 per cent confidence, a potentially destructive event may happen, in non-nuclear Class 1 vessels, with a probability of 10 3–10 4 per year.
Chapter 14 Notes on some plant components
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(a)
10 mm
(b)
Figure 14-2. Types of junction between control rod thimbles and vessel body.
Table 14-1. Data on ruptures of conventional vessels Non-destructive events
Source UK Smith & Warwick IRS–TUV German study Group EEI–TVA EEI Boiler Drum & PV data UK steam drum sample NBBPVI (73–78) ABMA
P
Observed data (Ev/ P YV)
Number of vessels
(years vessels, YV)
20 000
3.1 105
65
7000 1.1 106
6.7 104 1.9 106
30 7435
1033 5000
1 104 2.2 104
10 1
1 10 4 10
3000
6 104
27
4.5 10
4
536 000
3 106
1043
3.2 10
4
68 000
7.2 105
Number of events
2 10
4
4.4 10 4 10 4
4
3
Destructive events Confidence limit 95% 2.6 10 6 10
4
1.7 10 2 10 4
5
6 10
4
4
3
Number of events
Confidence limit 95%
5
3.2 10
5
0 40
4.5 10 8.8 10
5
0 0
3 10 4 1.4 10
0
5 10
6
4
5
115
3.5 10
5
0
4.2 10
6
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14-1-3. Failure probability of nuclear vessels Normal conditions, transients and design accidents Given the absence of statistics for occurred events, the only way to estimate the failure probability of nuclear vessels is by an analytical way on the basis of the probabilistic distribution of the involved parameters and of the available fracture mechanics models. The relevant parameters include: toughness of the material, the number of cracks initially present in the component, the probability that they are detected during the pre-operational and in-service tests, the fatigue crack growth rate, etc. The result of these probabilistic evaluations is useful to verify the safety level of the vessel, to highlight areas on which research effort is still needed, to estimate the safety improvement due to further provisions as an increase of the in-service inspections, changes in design, material and operating conditions, etc. The following describes the method and the results of the most accurate work on this subject: the Marshall Report (UKAEA, 1982). The probability of a catastrophic rupture is determined by the probability associated to: presence of cracks in the original component; detection of them during the pre-operational and in-service inspections; growth of cracks in service; toughness of the material measured by the critical stress intensity factor (see Appendix 7 on Fracture Mechanics); stresses from normal operation; transients; and accidents. Concerning the original presence of cracks, it has to be said that their generation mechanisms are not all well understood. Generally they occur in welds. Concerning their shape, obviously the field of the various possibilities is infinite and therefore, for quantitative evaluations, it is necessary to apply simple conservative assumptions. Usually it is assumed that the cracks are semi-elliptical and superficial, with a depth a. The length 2c of the crack is assumed as a fixed multiplier of its depth (typically a/2c ¼ 1/6). The initial distribution of cracks is given as: NoðaÞ ¼ AðaÞBðaÞ,
ð14:1Þ
where A(a) [n/(mm m3)] is the distribution function of the fabrication cracks of length ranging from a to (a þ da) and B(a) is their probability of non-detection in the pre-service inspection. The current estimates of the total of cracks present after fabrication range from 0.4 to 40 cracks per cubic metre of weld: a figure of about 4 is however certainly conservative even in the light of most recent data. The uncertainty is therefore of one order of magnitude. As far as B(a) is concerned, in the light of the results of the PISC research program sponsored by the OECD, Figure 14-3 gives the best estimate values of the detection probabilities (¼ 1 B(a)) using the ASME XI procedure (PISC). As an example, for a 20 mm deep crack, its detection probability is roughly 25 per cent. Usually the assumption is made that the same non-detection probabilities hold for the in-service inspections too. The critical stress intensity factor, KIC, has, in the light of the many available tests, a unimodal Gaussian distribution. The variation of this parameter with time has to be considered (e.g. as an effect of neutron irradiation).
1
0.5
0 10
20
30 Crack depth ∆z (mm)
80 100
Figure 14-3. Detection probability of a crack of given depth.
Chapter 14 Notes on some plant components
The crack growth rate is given by: da ¼ Cð KI Þn , dN
ð14:2Þ
where N indicates the number of stress cycles of amplitude KI at the crack tip, n has values ranging from 3 and 4, and C has a log–normal distribution for each steel. The probabilities of transients and accidents are obtained from operating experience and from current estimates for probabilistic analyses, respectively. The overall evaluations of rupture probability may be performed in a rigorous, yet onerous, way by Monte Carlo methods, or, especially for sensitivity evaluations, by simplified methods. Figures 14-4 and 14-5 show the global results of these evaluations for normal and transient conditions and for serious accident conditions, respectively. The interest here is the sum of the two contributions. The data shown in the figures does not include the consideration of in-service inspections. These figures have been obtained for a surface semi-elliptical crack with a/2c ¼ 1/6; if, with the same distribution of depth, all the cracks had been considered infinitely long, the final probabilities would have been 10 times higher. The sensitivity to the mean value and to the distribution of KIC is lower than would be thought: less
than one order of magnitude for the variation from 230 to 150 MNm 3/2. The sensitivity of the results to the crack growth rate is strong: the growth rates assumed for the results shown in Figures 14-4 and 14-5 are intended to represent the growth rates in wet conditions and probably, on the basis of the most recent data, they are too high and could have generated excessive failure probability figures by a factor of up to 100. The contribution to the failure probability of the vessel is principally due to the nozzle area and to the vessel bottom as well as to the middle zone corresponding to the core position. If the in-service inspection programme had been considered, significant reductions in the calculated failure probability would have been obtained (up to two orders of magnitude), depending on the inspection intervals and extension as well as on the value of B(a) considered applicable to the same inspections. The above described procedure can also be applied to non-nuclear vessels and a comparison can be made with the statistics of the cracks detected in them: in this way a correspondence will be obtained as, for non-nuclear vessels, the breaks detected decrease with the service life while these procedures leads to an increase of the failure probability with time. This apparent discrepancy can be explained by the fact that in-service inspections are not considered for nuclear vessels.
1.00E−06
Failure probability per vessel year
1.00E−07 High estimate 1.00E−08
Low estimate 1.00E−09
1.00E−10 0
10
123
20 Time (years)
30
40
Figure 14-4. Failure probability for nuclear vessels in normal or transient conditions.
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Nuclear Safety
1.00E+00
Failure probability per vessel year
1.00E−02
1.00E−04 High estimate 1.00E−06 Low estimate
1.00E−08
1.00E−10 0
10
20 30 Time (years)
40
50
Figure 14-5. Failure probability for nuclear vessels in serious accidents.
Severe accident conditions It is practically impossible to perform a probabilistic treatment of the vessel failure in severe accidents, that is where there is major damage and core melt, because of a lack of sufficient data on the phenomena and on their probabilities. In the following, both experience data (from the Three Mile Island accident) and deterministic considerations justified by the existing knowledge are shown. At least a picture of the important factors for the decrease of the vessel damage probability and indications on the still necessary research will be obtained. In particular, the importance of the prevention of severe accidents will be clearly demonstrated.
14-1-4. Vessel material embrittlement due to neutron irradiation This is one of the major safety concerns for the pressure vessel of PWR reactors and, therefore, for the safety of the reactors themselves. For boiling water reactors this problem is smaller because of the lower neutron flux on the vessel walls, which is a typical characteristic of this type of plant, principally due to dimensional factors (the design pressure of BWRs is roughly one half than that of PWRs and
the core is larger due to the presence of voids). For PWRs, the integrated fast neutron flux of interest (>0.5 MeV) expected at end-of-life is almost always a multiple of 1019 neutrons cm 2, while for BWRs it is a multiple of 1018 neutrons cm 2. It is known that the neutron irradiation causes, in the carbon steels used for vessels, an increase of the transition temperature between the brittle and the ductile behaviour of the steel (RTNDT, Reference Temperature for Non-Ductility Transition). This temperature is typically 10 C at start-oflife and, with increasing irradiation, may increase by many tens of degrees in the course of years. It is obvious that below the transition temperature a crack which reaches a super-critical size may propagate and cause the brittle and catastrophic rupture of the vessel and, moreover, the stresses for which a crack becomes critical are lower. As the vessel must not break, the importance of the control of the embrittlement of the material during the plant life can be easily understood. One of the fundamental safety assumptions of water reactors, in fact, is that the break of the vessel is made impossible by design, construction and operation provisions. It must be remembered that an explosion of the vessel might break all the four barriers against the external releases of radioactive products at the same time (see Chapter 9).
Chapter 14 Notes on some plant components
Other vessels located in the containment, such as the pressurizer and the steam generators, might also potentially damage various barriers at the same time, but this probability is intrinsically lower than that of the reactor vessel as they are more distant from the core (it can be lowered by provisions concerning the strength of the structures and because they are not exposed to neutron damage and can more easily be inspected during service). The embrittlement of the vessel material is mainly due to the fast flux integrated during the service life (the ‘fluence’ (neutrons per square centimetre)), the amount of impurities (Cu, P and Ni in particular) and with the irradiation temperature. The fast flux which may generate the maximum damage is >0.1 MeV although in practice >0.5 MeV (Russia and Eastern Europe) or >1 MeV (according to the practice in other countries) are used for the lower uncertainty in its measurement. It is now believed (EUR, 1996a, 1996b, 1997) that, in future, importance should be given to other parameters too, such as the initial microstructure (initial transition temperature), the interstitial elements (carbon, nitrogen) and the synergy between the various impurities present. In fact, the large dispersion in the results of measurements of transition temperature on irradiated materials indicates that not all the relevant parameters have been detected and controlled. Sometimes, low importance is erroneously given to the irradiation temperature, as usually reference is made to PWR vessels which are operated essentially at the same (high) temperature. For different cases, however, the fact that the embrittlement effect is much stronger at lower temperatures must be taken into account (e.g. (EUR, 1996a) for a typical steel and for a fluence of 1 1019 n cm 2, the increment of RTNDT is 50 C for an irradiation temperature of 315 C and 161 C for an irradiation temperature of 232 C (EUR, 1996a)). The practical consequence of this fact is that structural parts need also to be controlled, which, although exposed to a lower neutron flux than that on the vessel wall in the active core region, are however irradiated at lower temperatures (e.g. external supports of the vessel). The problem of the vessel embrittlement is the subject of great attention both during the design and during operation. In the design phase, usually, the embrittlement during the service life is forecast by the use of empirical formulae (EUR, 1996a) based on
125
specimens irradiated in test reactors or on the result of surveillance programmes of the irradiation effect in power reactors. For the various evaluations of fracture mechanics, empirical values of KIC and of KIa for the material of interest are used, as a function of (T–RTNDT). Various design provisions for the reduction of the integrated flux at end of life exist, among which the following can be quoted: neutron shields around the core, the equivalent use of dummy elements at the core periphery or refuelling cycles which minimize fast neutron leakages (‘low leakage fuel cycles’). No general agreement among designers exists on the maximum end-of-life fluence which can be accepted: some designers specify up to 6 1019 n cm 2 at end of life, while other practices (Germany, Italy) specify a limit of 1 1019 n cm 2. Obviously, if the real embrittlement during the life were excessive, costly provisions should be adopted. The most drastic one is the one applied to various East Europe reactors, that is the in-place annealing of the vessel at temperatures of the order of 470 C for several (e.g. 7) days, which restores the desired toughness characteristics of the material. Another provision adopted is the heating up of the emergency injection water for systems which are initiated first when needed (e.g. heating the pressure accumulator water to 60–80 C). As already said, the uncertainties in forecasting embrittlement are still high. It is necessary to recommend a cautious attitude to designers and the adoption of an end-of-life fluence as close as possible to 1 1019 n cm 2. It must be added that some situations which favour the loss of toughness with passing time are not easily measured during operation. For example, even if the maximum Ni content in base metal and welds is specified to less than 1 per cent, it cannot be avoided that the Ni per