Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy

This collection makes available in English twelve papers by a distinguished French scholar of ancient philosophy. The essays deal with problems arising in the texts and doctrines of the three major philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period - Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism. The author's strategy is to focus on some specific problem and then to enlarge the conclusion of his discussion so as to reformulate or reassess some more important issue. The main subjects tackled are: problems in Epicurean cosmology and linguistic theory; aspects of Stoic logic, ontology and theology; the history of Scepticism; and analysis of some of the conceptual tools used by the Sceptics in their antidogmatic arguments. Two of these pieces are published here for the first time. The others, with one exception, have previously appeared only in French. This will be a most valuable book for all scholars and advanced students working in the field of Hellenistic philosophy.

Papers in Hellenistic philosophy

Papers in Hellenistic philosophy JACQUES BRUNSCHWIG Professeur d'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne, Universite de Paris - /

Translated by Janet Lloyd

| CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY IOOI 1-421 I, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1994 First published 1994 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data Brunschwig, Jacques. Papers in Hellenistic philosophy / Jacques Brunschwig; translated by Janet Lloyd. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 0 521 41712

1. Epicurus.

0

2. Stoics.

3. Sceptics (Greek philosophy) I. Title. B512.B78 1994 i8o-dc2O 93-7923 CIP

ISBN 0 521 41712 0 hardback

Transferred to digital printing 2003

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Preface I

xi

EPICUREANISM 1 Epicurus' argument on the immutability of the all 2 Epicurus and the problem of private language

II

page ix

i 21

STOICISM 3 Remarks on the Stoic theory of the proper noun

39

4 Remarks on the classification of simple propositions in Hellenistic logics

57

5 The conjunctive model

72

6 The Stoic theory of the supreme genus and Platonic ontology

92

7 On a Stoic way of not being

158

8 Did Diogenes of Babylon invent the Ontological Argument?

170

III SCEPTICISM 9 Once again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho

190

10 The title of Timon's Indalmoi: from Odysseus to Pyrrho

212

11 Sextus Empiricus on the Kpirrjpiov: the Sceptic as conceptual legatee

224

12 The ooov inl TO) Xoyco formula in Sextus Empiricus

244

Bibliography

259

Index of subjects

267

Index of names

269

Index of passages cited

273

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chapters 1-7 and 10-12 appeared in their original form in the following publications, and we are grateful for permission to publish them in English. Chapters 8 and 9 are previously unpublished. 1

'L'argument d'Epicure sur l'immutabilite du tout', in Permanence de la philosophie (Melanges Joseph Moreau), Neuchatel, La Baconniere, 1977, pp. 127-50.

2

'Epicure et le probleme du "langage prive"', Revue des Sciences humaines 43, 1977, 157-77-

3

'Remarques sur la theorie stoi'cienne du nom propre', Histoire Epistemologie Langage 6, 1984, 3-19.

4

'Remarques sur la classification des propositions simples dans les logiques hellenistiques', Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans VAntiquite, Brussels/Grenoble, 1986, pp. 287-310.

5

'Le modele conjonctif', in Les Stoi'ciens et leur logique, ed. J. Brunschwig, Paris, 1978, pp. 59-86.

6

'La theorie stoi'cienne du genre supreme et l'ontologie platonicienne', in Matter and Metaphysics, Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. J. Barnes and M. Mignucci, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1988, pp. 19-127.

7

'Sur une fa9on stoicienne de ne pas etre', Revue de theologie et de philosophie 122, 1990, 389-403.

8

'Did Diogenes (unpublished).

9

'Once again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho' (unpublished).

of Babylon

invent

the

ontological

argument?'

10 'Le titre des "Indalmoi" de Timon: d'Ulysse a Pyrrhon', Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage 12, 1990, 83-99. 11 'Sextus Empiricus on the /criterion: the Skeptic as conceptual legatee', in The Question of'Eclecticism'- Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, ed. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 1988, pp. 145-75. ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

12

'La formule ooov eirl rco Xoyco chez Sextus Empiricus', in Le Scepticisme antique, Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophies ed. A.J. Voelke, Geneve/Lausanne/Neuchatel, 1990, pp. 107-121.

PREFACE

I am very happy and proud to have been given the opportunity of presenting the following papers, for the most part translated from French, to an Englishspeaking readership. At a time when voices are heard in my country, sometimes with distinctly chauvinistic overtones, standing out against the socalled tyranny of the 'Publish in English or perish' injunction, I do not feel any urge whatsoever to apologize, especially since a similar, if not exactly identical, collection is about to be published by the Presses Universitaires de France. But I must confess that I am by no means displeased that the present volume will slightly anticipate it. This is because its publication is something of a tit-fortat: for my taste for Hellenistic philosophers and my attempts to work on them have been, if not wholly aroused, at least enormously stimulated and fostered by the powerful revival of interests which they have enjoyed in Englishspeaking countries (not to mention others, Italy in particular) for the last twenty years or so. Not that French scholarship and academic teaching have neglected them: witness the works of Victor Brochard on the Sceptics, of Emile Brehier on the Stoics, of Victor Goldschmidt on the Stoics and Epicurus: pioneering works indeed, as everyone would agree, I believe, and not in the least dated. Similarly, French academic teaching never forgets the Hellenistic philosophers for long: the national programme for the 'Agregation de Philosophie' always contains some ancient philosophy, and when Plato, Aristotle, and sometimes Plotinus have had their turn, either the Stoics or the Epicureans come next, thus compelling all French universities to make room for them, at a quite high level, in their teaching schedule. Thus, as a student, I was lucky enough to follow a memorable course of lectures by Victor Goldschmidt, at which all who attended were rewarded by very good marks: this course of lectures was to become Le Systeme sto'icien et Videe de temps (1953). Nevertheless, to devote one's attention to Hellenistic philosophy in my country always smacks, to a greater or lesser degree, of accepting some sort of pis aller. The royal road in ancient philosophy, and for many people in philosophy tout court, is still the Platonic way, as it has been for centuries (so much so that any student who ventures to criticize Plato on some point still expects his instructor to be utterly scandalized). Since the beginning of the sixties, Aristotle in France has eventually emerged from a long 'Cartesian' xi

Xll

PREFACE

purgatory. Compared to these giants, the Hellenistic philosophers are considered, at best, as interesting dwarfs. Even after the 'rehabilitation' of Stoic logic by Lukasiewicz and others, Hellenistic philosophies still look coarse, rudimentary, all too easy to understand. If a tree is to be judged by its fruit, there is nothing really delectable in the Hellenistic philosophical output: a utilitarian distaste for disinterested speculation; various forms of 'sordid' materialism, pantheistic immanentism, sceptical deadlocks on the doctrinal level; a mixture of dry pedantry and talkative populism on the formal one. Quite significantly, introducing a volume in the series of the Symposium Hellenisticum, Victor Goldschmidt drew a parallel between the philosophical situation of post-Aristotelian Hellenistic times and that of our own postHegelian contemporary period (nor was this a matter for self-congratulation): the Hellenistic period, Goldschmidt wrote, offers us a mirror, even if we do not take any pleasure in contemplating ourselves in it. Recent English-speaking work in Hellenistic philosophy helped me to shake off the last traces of such unease and come fully to appreciate the argumentative wealth, the intellectual vigour, the philosophical radicality of Hellenistic debates. In a way, I can also boast of having been, albeit through my shortcomings, a quite indirect and fortuitous cause in a not unimportant part of this development. If I may evoke a personal recollection, the crucial encounter took place for me in September 1976. At that time I had been entrusted by my University (then the Universite de Picardie at Amiens) to organize a conference; the subject chosen was 'The Stoics and their logic'; the conference was to meet in the Centre Culturel des Fontaines in Chantilly. I was then new and inexperienced in organizing conferences, and it seemed quite natural to me to send invitations to many people whom I had not personally met before, but whom I knew from their work as interesting people, and interested in the subject, whether French or not. The conference was a success in one sense (as can be seen, I think, from its publication two years later under the title Les Sto'iciens et leur logique); but in another it was a downright failure. In proportion to the time allotted to the conference, there were too many participants, too many speakers, too little time left for discussion. Much later on, I heard that two English participants managed to have a private talk together, when walking around the little pond at the back of the garden. They considered the possibility of organizing more conferences on this kind of subject. I was not present, but I have no doubt that they assessed the possibilities of keeping the good sides of the Chantilly meeting, while avoiding its blatant drawbacks. This talk by the pond eventually gave birth to the 1978 Conference at Oriel College, Oxford, published later as Doubt and Dogmatism. This conference, in its turn, was so to speak the number zero of the Symposium Hellenisticum series, so called after its respected ancestor the Symposium Aristotelicum. From 1980 to the present day the Symposium Hellenisticum has met every third year; the successive volumes of proceedings constitute, in my opinion, one of the brightest pieces of evidence of the vitality and

PREFACE

Xlll

philosophical interest of recent studies in Hellenistic schools. For me, they also incorporate the memory of most enjoyable meetings with other scholars whom I respected and admired from the outset and who are now also very good friends of mine. 1 The papers included in this collection do not conform to any definite, preconceived strategy, and I have made no attempt to disguise their miscellaneous character. I simply wrote each one of them when I came across a text or a problem about which I imagined I had something new, and hopefully reasonable, to say. I would like to think that their method and style of research give them a unity of sorts; but it is not up to me to say whether that claim is justified. Apart from correcting one or two obvious mistakes, I have not revised or added to them or tried to answer the objections which might be raised or have been raised against the views I express in them - not that I find them perfect, far from it, but because I do not feel myself able to improve upon them further. I preferred to leave them as they originally were; I doubt whether texts of this kind are really substantial enough to warrant more than one version. Out of laziness, I have not even attempted to bring the oldest ones up to date, from the bibliographical point of view: I am sure that many valuable instruments are available to the reader who would wish to do so. With the agreement of the Cambridge University Press, I have not included in this collection a number of papers which bear on similar subjects, but either are too recent, or have already been published in English, in journals or collections easily available to the English reader. These are the items mentioned in the bibliography as Brunschwig 1980, 1986, 1991, 1992 and forthcoming. On the other hand, I have included two pieces as yet unpublished: the paper on Diogenes of Babylon and the one on Aristocles, Timon and Pyrrho. It is my pleasure and my duty to thank all the persons, known or unknown to me, who made the present publication possible. Quite special and friendly thanks must go to Janet Lloyd, who bore my pedantic observations with equanimity, and produced a magnificent translation, which I have read myself with an unexpected pleasure. She also kindly agreed to revise the two unpublished papers, which I had ventured to write directly in English. I dedicate this book to all my English-speaking friends, past and present. Through them, I would like to acknowledge a much more general debt to the British people, a debt of which it is easy to understand why I shall be conscious as long as I live. J.B. La Roque-Gageac, August 1992 1

For a different, more poetical version of the story, cf. Sorabji in J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (edd.) Matter and Metaphysics (Naples, 1988).

I EPICURUS' ARGUMENT ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

The few lines in the Letter to Herodotus (39.4-8)1 that I propose to study here have often been discussed by editors and translators of Epicurus. As early as 1920, Ettore Bignone, in his translation of the fragments, devoted a three-page appendix to this passage, which he described as 'very difficult'.2 More recently, these lines have constituted one of the - in truth, numerous - points over which Jean Bollack, who has proposed a new interpretation of the text, has been strongly criticized, in particular by Pierre Boyance and Olivier Bloch.3 One of my own reasons for returning to this controversial passage is that I believe I can suggest for the problem that it poses a solution which I (of course) consider satisfactory. Another is that, by closely linking our analysis of the text with an analysis of the discussions to which it has already given rise,4 we shall raise questions to do with methodology and, more generally, hermeneutics, the interest of which may even eclipse that of their pretext - questions which are, perhaps, not unconnected with the preoccupations of Joseph Moreau, the Greek scholar and philosopher in whose honour these pages are written. Our text comes at the beginning of the Letter to Herodotus. It follows on immediately after the statement and demonstration of thefirsttwo fundamental physical theses: nothing is born from the non-existent and nothing is lost in it. Although the word for the all, TO nav, has not yet been mentioned in the text, a new thesis is introduced which affirms and demonstrates the immutability of that all. This thesis is constructed as a set of three propositions, the first presented as an assertion, the next two as explanations. ( A ) Kal fJLTjV Kdl TO TT&V OL€l TOLOVTOV YjV OLOV VVV €OTL KCLl OL€L TOLOVTOV €GTaL'.

'furthermore, the all has always been what it is now, and will always be such'. (B) ovSkv yap ioTiv els o /xerajSaAAei (/xerajSaAeiUsener). (c) napa yap TO irdv ovdev €OTLV o dv elaeXOov els avTO TTJV fieTa^oXrjv TTOirjoaiTO.

For the moment, I shall refrain from translating propositions (B) and (c) for, as we shall see, their contents and the way they are linked are precisely what are 1

2 4

For convenience's sake, the Letter to Herodotus is quoted according to the traditional paragraphs, using the line numbering of the edition produced by Jean Bollack. Cf. Bollack, Bollack and Wismann 1971, p. 76. All three authors are referred to by the name Bollack. 3 Bignone 1920, pp. 253-6. Boyance 1972, pp. 72-3; Bloch 1973, pp. 457-9. Apart from the works cited above, I have consulted the following: Usener 1887; Hamelin 1910, pp. 397-417; Apelt 1921; von der Muhll 1922; Ernout 1925; Hicks 1925; Solovine 1925; Bailey 1926; Gigon 1949; Arrighetti 1973; Isnardi Parente 1974. I

2

EPICUREANISM

problematical. In connection with statement (A), let us immediately note that it is no more than weakly connected with what precedes it, seeming to be juxtaposed to it rather than coordinated with it.5 Nevertheless, this statement does seem to be logically related with the theses established before it: for if nothing is created absolutely nor is lost absolutely, it is clear that the sum total of all that exists can undergo no modification, in the sense that nothing can be added to it or taken away from it. If this is why the immutability of the all is affirmed at precisely this point rather than at any other, one would be led to understand that immutability as quantitative (the all is immutable in that it can neither increase nor decrease); however, the vocabulary used to state the thesis (TOLOVTOV . . . otov) definitely prompts a qualitative interpretation (the all is immutable in that it cannot change). Herein lies a first difficulty, upon which the explanations (B) and (c) should throw some light. It is important that they should do so because, at this particular point in the Letter to Herodotus, one of Epicurus' preoccupations must be to prevent his reader drawing from the classically Parmenidean principles that he has just set out equally Parmenidean conclusions. His concern to do so reveals itself in the very name of the subject to which Epicurus attaches the predicate of immutability, which is also altogether Parmenidean. It is 'the all' that is immutable; and although we do not yet know what this all is composed of (only later are bodies and the void mentioned), the use of that totalizing term already deflects us from the monism and immobilism of the Eleatics and allows us to assume that the immutability of the all is itself a global immutability, which by no means rules out the possibility of movements and changes affecting the parts of this all.6 But the fact that we already have an inkling of the sense in which we should not understand immutability makes it all the more pressing for us to know the sense in which we should understand it. Without further ado, then, let us pass on to an examination of the explanatory statements (B) and (c). Both are introduced by yap: at a first reading, it would thus seem that the function of (B) is to explain thesis (A) and that of (c) is to explain (B). This 'Chinese box' structure is automatically reflected in the translations (all those, that is, which respect the double occurrence of yap).7 Sentence (B), ovdkv yap ionv eh o /xerajSaAAei, has not posed many problems for translators and commentators. All understand it more or less as 5 6 7

8

Cf. Denniston 1954, pp. 351-2: *#cat jxiqv often introduces a new argument, a new item in a series, or a new point of any kind'. 'The invariability of the all, as all' is what Bollack, quite correctly, says (p. 175). As do Bignone, Apelt, Hicks, Solovine, Bailey, Gigon, Bollack; Hamelin, Ernout, Arrighetti, Isnardi Parente do not. Later, we shall have to consider whether or not it is out of pure negligence that they do not do so. Cf. Hamelin ('il n'y a rien d'autre en effet en quoi il puisse se changer'), Bignone ('perche non vi e nulla in cui possa mutarsi'), Apelt ('denn es gibt ja nichts, worein es sich verwandeln konnte'), Ernout ('il n'y a rien en effet en quoi il puisse se transformer'), Hicks ('for there is nothing into which it can change'), Solovine ('en effet, il n'y a rien en quoi il puisse se transformer'), Bailey ('for there is nothing into which it changes'), Gigon ('denn es existiert nichts, in das es sich verwandeln konnte'), Arrighetti ('nulla esiste in cui possa tramutarsi'), Bollack ('car il n'y a rien en quoi il change'), Isnardi Parente ('nulla esiste in cui esso possa mutarsi').

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

3

8

follows: 'in effect, there exists nothing into which it (i.e. the all) changes (or can change)'.9 The nuances that crop up from one translation to another are of little importance alongside the unanimity with which all the different translators, having given the verb fjuera^aXXetv its most natural interpretation, which is 'to change', 'to alter', 'to be transformed', consequently understand the preposition els as referring to a change described metaphorically as a movement, rather than as an actual movement: the complement of els is accordingly understood as the state in which the thing that changes finds itself once the change is completed, rather than the place that would be reached by the thing moving through space.10 The traditional interpretation thus gives this part of Epicurus' argument the following meaning: the all cannot change because for it to change, there would have to exist something into which it could change, something other than the all, for otherwise the all would not change by changing into it; but, by definition, nothing other than the all does exist. So the all is immutable.11 We shall be returning to the particularities of this argument. For the moment, let us see how, in the traditional interpretation, it fits in with the argument contained in sentence (c), whose function appears to be to justify (B). This sentence (c) (7rapa yap ro TTOLV ovdev eonv o av eloeXOov els avro rrjv fjLerafioXfjv TToirjoairo) is understood, very generally,12 as follows: 'for, apart from the all, there exists nothing which (o, nominative, the subject of 7Toir)oaiTo), by introducing itself into it (i.e. into the all) could bring about a 9

10

Some scholars have considered the present tense iierafiaXXei unsuitable for conveying the idea of a. possibility of change; Usener, followed by von der Muhll, Hicks and Arrighetti, substitutes the future iierafiaXei. Bailey, Bollack and Isnardi Parente preserve the manuscript reading. No correction is necessary since, as we shall see, in Epicureanism, the consequence follows not only from esse to posse, but also from posse to esse. Linguistically speaking, it is change that is a species of movement, rather than the converse; passing from one state to another is described metaphorically as moving from one spot to another. Introducing the term indicating a process of change by els is, of course, classic practice in Greek. Still in paragraph 39 of the Letter to Herodotus, the term occurs twice, first in line I (el e<j>Be(,pero 8e TO d(f>avL^ofxevov els ro /AT) 6V), then in line 3 (els a SueXvero). Cf. also

11

12

41.2; 42.9; 54.8; 55.8. In English, the metaphor is somewhat obscured by the existence of two prepositions of place, each with a special function: compare 'to change into a devil' and 'to move from Oxford to Cambridge'. It is worth quoting the following comment from Bailey, who is, as usual, very clear and explicit (1964, pp. 277-78): 'Among phenomena two conditions are always required for change, (1) something for the original "thing" to change into, something which it may become . . . B u t . . . the universe cannot change into something else, for there is nothing else which it could become.' For the second condition, see below, n. 14. Cf. Hamelin ('il n'y a . . . rien non plus, en dehors de lui, qui puisse agir sur lui pour le faire changer'), Bignone ('infatti oltre il tutto non vi e nulla, che possa penetrandovi produrvi mutazione'), Apelt ('denn ausser dem Ganzen gibt es nichts, was in es eindringen und es dadurch verandern konnte'), Ernout ('et en dehors de l'univers il n'y a rien qui puisse s'y introduire pour le modifier'), Hicks ('for outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change'), Solovine ('car il n'existe rien en dehors de l'univers qui puisse y penetrer et y produire un changement'), Bailey ('for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about a change'), Gigon ('denn neben dem All gibt es nichts, was in es eindringen und die Verwandlung hervorrufen konnte'), Arrighetti ('ne oltre il tutto vi e nulla che penetrandovi possa produrre mutazione'), Isnardi Parente ('ne al di la del tutto vi e alcunche che, penetrando in esso, possa provocare in esso un mutamento'). Bollack's translation, which differs widely from all these, will be cited and examined below.

4

EPICUREANISM

change there (TTJV fjLerafSoArjv Troi-qoairo, middle with an object, with an active meaning)'. 13 This interpretation is in itself perfectly plausible: change requires there to be not only a final state that is different from the initial state, but also an agent that is external to the thing which changes and that is capable of producing this change in it; and it is this second condition that is now, following the first, excluded in the case of the all. 14 However, this interpretation of sentence (c) raises two considerable difficulties when it is set alongside sentence (B) as it is generally understood: (1) The preposition eh, used metaphorically in (B) to describe a process of change and the end result of that process, is used here with its literal meaning, to designate the movement in space of a hypothetical agent external to the all, which could introduce itself into it (elaeXdov els avro) and thereby bring about changes in it. Such an alteration in meaning between line 6 and line 7 would in itself be upsetting. But even more so, surely, is the abrupt switch that Epicurus is here supposed to make, from a level of thought so abstract as to be impossible to express except through metaphor, to a completely different level of thought, where the representations are all concrete and the spatial expressions are to be taken quite literally. In the earlier proposition (B), the 'outside', where it would be vain to seek something into which the all could change, is not a real space that contains that all, but - as it were - a space of possibles that 'surrounds' the 'real' with a margin of variation; in the second proposition (c), in contrast, it is in a physically real 'outside' that it would be vain to seek a place external to the all that could serve as a 'launching base' for an agent of physical aggression which, erupting into the universe from the outside, would bring about hypothetical transformations there. (2) There is a second difficulty: it is impossible to see how sentence (c), as generally understood, could serve as a justification for sentence (B), as usually interpreted, although it seems that that is what it ought to do (irapa yap TO TTOLV). If there exists no place outside the universe, no existent that is not included within the all, which could act upon it by invading it from outside, in what way can these declarations support the idea that there exists no state in which, on completion of a supposed change, the all could possibly find itself? The disparity between the levels on which the two sentences are situated prevents the one from functioning as a proof of the other. Furthermore, (B) excludes the very possibility of a change, in principle, whereas (c) excludes only one possible source of change; for the argument to function correctly, it would also be necessary to establish that there exists no other possible source of change, and this the text does not do. This disparity between the two levels and this fault in the logical construc13

14

Usener corrected TroirjacuTo to Trooyaat, and Cronert suggested TTOLrjoau (hvvai)To. The following editors return to the form given by the manuscripts: von der Muhll, Hicks, Bailey, Arrighetti, although some find it 'curious' (Bailey). As we shall see, the argument over the form of the verb restarted following Bollack's adoption of his position. Bailey (cf. above, n. 11) refers to this second condition as follows: '( 2 ) some external agent to effect the change - by means, as Epicurus held, of a blow'.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

5

tion of the passage will now be manifest, I think, if we reread the text in its entirety in the translation of, for example, Solovine, which, rendered into English, runs as follows: The universe has always been the same as it is now and will be the same throughout all eternity. For there is nothing into which it can be transformed, for outside the universe there exists nothing which can penetrate it and produce a change.' There is clearly something amiss in these few lines. As we shall see later, a number of interpreters and editors have more or less clearly perceived this difficulty, to which they have responded by proposing to operate upon the text in various, sometimes heavy-handed, ways. But, in the interests of clarity, let us first examine Jean Bollack's more recent attempt to rectify the traditional interpretation without tampering with the text of the manuscripts. The reasons for Bollack's dissatisfaction with the traditional interpretation are not those that we have seized upon above; and perhaps the inadequacies of the new solution that he proposes may eventually be traced to an inadequate analysis of the faults in the solution that he sets out to supplant. Here, at any rate, is how Bollack sums up and criticizes the work of his predecessors: The argument is usually understood as follows: the all is always as it is: for (yap), in order for there to be a change, it would be necessary for there to exist an into which (eh o . . . ) it could turn itself; for (yap) outside the all there is nothing from which something could come and penetrate into it (o .. . elo-) so as to produce a change. The absence of an outside, as a place towards which, would thus be justified (see the second yap) by the absence of an outside as a place from which that which produces the movement could come (nothing into which . . ., for outside . . . nothing which into . . .). It is a vicious circle . . . 15

The summary of the traditional interpretation (thefirstsentence in the passage quoted above) produced by Bollack is absolutely correct, even if he explains the metaphorical meaning that is usually given to sentence (B) in rather unusual terms ('in order for there to be a change, it would be necessary for there to exist an into which it could turn itself). But when he moves on to criticize that traditional interpretation (from The absence of an outside . . .' on), Bollack, curiously, produces a kind of retranslation of the metaphorical acceptation, changing it into a spatial one, the effect of which is, in the first place, to give the traditional translation of sentence (B) an interpretation which, so far as I know, has been suggested by virtually nobody else (to wit: there exists no outside as a place towards which the all could go, and by doing so change).16 The second effect of Bollack's retranslation is to do away with the traditional interpretation's incoherent shift from metaphorical to real space, 15 16

Bollack 1971, p. 175; author's italics. The fragments of English, given without any reference, may come either from Hicks or from Bailey. The elliptical expression 'the absence of a place towards which' is imprecise anyway. No doubt we should understand not 'there is no place where the all could go, where it could undergo any qualitative changes', but rather 'there is no place to which the all could go, undergoing a change through that very removal or expansion'.

6

EPICUREANISM

since in the image that Bollack now produces all the expressions of place are literal and spatial ('the absence of an outside, as a place towards which, would thus be justified by the absence of an outside as & place from which that which produces the movement could come'). Thirdly and lastly, Bollack's retranslation exposes the traditional interpretation not to the reproach for incoherence which it deserves, but to the criticism that it is a vicious circle ('on tourne en rond') which it does not seem to merit. Bollack's retranslation of the traditional interpretation seems to recast Epicurus' argument as follows: (A) The all is always as it is. (B) For outside it there exists noplace towards which it could go; (c) for there exists outside it no place from which that which produces movement could come. Strictly speaking, this schema does not really deserve to be accused of being a vicious circle: if the absence of an outside as a place towards which is justified by the absence of an outside as a place from which, for there to be a vicious circle you would have to go on also to justify the absence of an outside as a place from which by the absence of an outside as a place towards which. Nevertheless, it certainly does seem, to say the least, a hollow and tautological argument: there is no outside as aplace towards which because there is no outside as a place from which, which simply boils down to saying: there is no outside because there is no outside. Having forged this phantom of an interpretation, which falls into a vicious circle or what appears to be one because all the spatial expressions in it are taken literally - both in (B), where the traditional interpretation was otherwise, and in (c), where it was not - Jean Bollack, logically enough, proposes a new solution which goes to the very opposite extreme, and attempts to give a metaphorical sense to all the spatial expressions in the passage (both those in (B), where he thus finds himself in agreement with the true traditional interpretation, 17 and those in (c), which is precisely where he explicitly diverges from it). 18 The treatment of the spatial expressions in this passage may thus be described schematically as follows:

Sentence B Sentence c

traditional interpretation

'phantom' interpretation

Bollack's interpretation

Metaphorical Literal

Literal Literal

Metaphorical Metaphorical

Bollack's reworking is accompanied by two other suggestions for changing the traditional interpretation. In the first place, being keen to make sentence (c) authentically explanatory regarding sentence (B), for which one can but applaud him in principle, Bollack is led to see the expression els avro rfjv 17 18

That agreement is clearly detectable when one reads the various translations of sentence (B): cf. above, n. 8. Bollack's translation - for once - is in agreement with the others. Cf. the very definite affirmation of pp. 175-76: 'The movement towards the outside . . . is here (i.e. in sentence (c)) only a metaphor for transformation into something' (author's italics).

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

7

lA€rafSo\r)v TTonqoairo, in (c), as a periphrastic development of the expression els o fierafidWei, in (B). And he detects confirmation for this idea in the middle form TTOLrjoairo, which, ever since Ambrogio Traversari, the first translator of Diogenes Laertius, has been mistakenly rendered by an active ('to produce change'), thereby for years on end attributing to Epicurus a 'vicious argument', 19 when all the time the intransitive and reflexive sense of this middle form should have been respected ('to change itself, transform itself). Secondly, this correction makes it necessary to recast the grammatical structure of sentence (c) in its entirety: given that the all is now the subject of TTOLrjoaiTo, the relative o, which has ovdev as its antecedent, can no longer be in the nominative and now has to be interpreted as the prepositionless complement of the compound verb els-eXdov; this participle eloeXdov can no longer itself refer to a hypothetical agent which might penetrate the all, but must instead refer to the all itself, which is the subject of TT-OI^CTOUTO; finally, avro designates no longer the all but, instead, the hypothetical term for the process of change that is to be denied. When put all together, these corrections produce the following translation; '(B) for there is nothing into which it changes, (c) since outside the all, there is nothing into which, if it penetrates there, it can transform itself. One of the weaknesses of this solution is obvious: namely, that it is not integrally in agreement with the main idea behind it, which is to give all the spatial expressions in the passage a systematically metaphorical sense. Jean Bollack summarizes his own interpretation in non-spatial terms. He writes as follows:20 'the all cannot change ( = B), because there is nothing that it is not already ( = c)'. But that metaphorization is not followed through in his translation as a whole: in the words 'if it penetrates there', a trace of spatial literality subsists, immediately creating an unease and uncertainty analogous to the unease and uncertainty aroused by the traditional interpretation; one and the same entity, ill-defined and difficult to define, plays both the spatial role of a place into which the all might penetrate and the metaphorical role of a term of transformation into which it might change. 21 At this point one wonders why, having taken the plunge, the translator did not give a metaphorical meaning to the words o dv elaeXOov, instead of rendering them by this awkward 'if it penetrates there'. But the answer is not hard to find: he would then have ended up with a patent absurdity, for a wholly metaphorized translation, with the grammatical construction that he has adopted, would produce something more or less as follows: 'outside the all, there is nothing into which, if it changes itself into it, it can change'. It is so as to avoid this absurd repetition that Bollack finds himself forced, at the cost of the coherence of his interpretation, not to carry through his original intention but instead to retain a little literal island amid his flow of metaphor. But should one not 19 2J

20 Cf. Bollack 1971, p. 18. Bollack 1971, p. 176. A point that was not lost upon Boyance, who writes, in the review cited above (p. 72): 'Bollack seems not to notice the strangeness of this all which changes into that into which it penetrates'.

8

EPICUREANISM

abandon a trail when one cannot follow it right to the end? This attempt to rectify the traditional interpretation seems no more satisfactory than what it seeks to supplant.22 To rescue the debate from the situation in which it has become bogged down, should we turn to Lucretius for help? Many scholars have thought so, and Jean Bollack has shocked several of his critics by refusing, as a matter of principle, to make use of Lucretius to explain Epicurus. Pierre Boyance taxes him severely for forgetting that Lucretius too had written about the immutability of the all, when the comments of other scholars (Giussani, Bignone, Bailey, Arrighetti, Robin) should have 'spurred him in that direction'.23 Olivier 22

Let us not get too deeply involved in the debate over the meaning of the middle TroLr/oairo, t h o u g h it is one that has been fuelled from all sides. T h e g r a m m a r here seems to provide interpreters with contradictory instruments and does not appear to be able to resolve disagreements in interpretation. In m y own view, however, the matter is of no m o r e than secondary and derivative importance c o m p a r e d with the crucial choice between a literal or a metaphorical meaning for the expressions of place and movement. However it is worth recalling a few of the points m a d e in this debate! ( i ) Boyance (1972, p . 73), basing his remarks on the Bailly and Liddell-Scott dictionaries, points out that, in classical usage, the middle 7TOLCLodaL with its object forms an expression that is the equivalent of a verb of the same family as that complement; for example, oSov noieiodai is frequently used to m e a n 'to m a k e a journey'; so TTJV ybera^oX-qv Troieladat means the same as nerafiaXXeiv, with the active meaning o f ' t o change', just as it is u n d e r s t o o d in the customary interpretation of the passage in question. (2) In the pamphlet which he published in reply to Boyance's criticisms, Jean Bollack alluded briefly to this objection, maintaining that he alone respects ' b o t h the g r a m m a r and the internal logic of the text' (1971, p . 29). (3) Bloch (1973, p. 458) acknowledges that the presence of the article before /xerajSoA^v is 'unusual', but nevertheless agrees with Boyance and other supporters of the usual interpretation. H e points out that, in another passage (53.7-9), Bollack himself has n o qualms a b o u t giving iroitlodai an active meaning. T o set the record completely straight, I should p e r h a p s add that, in my own view, this passage does not include an article {roiavTTjv €K6XH/JLV ... Troieiodai), and that elsewhere, where the same expression does include an article (54.8: ras ^era^oXas . . . 7roi€io6ai), Bollack produces a translation which is consistent with his translation of the passage in which we are interested. F o r polemical ends, the occurrence of the article that it would have been w o r t h citing is rather the one at 44.2-3, where it appears, with an article, in the expression TTJV virepeioiv . . . TroieioQai, yet where Bollack a d o p t s an active meaning ('to provide support'). Finally, Bloch adds a few more suggestions to explain the use of the middle form. Given that this form characterizes a process where the subject is 'internal to the process in which it is the agent' (Benveniste), the agent whose intervention is first invoked, then p r o m p t l y denied by Epicurus, could be a divine power which 'changes itself in and by its action u p o n the universe', like the Stoic logos or its Presocratic antecedents; or, alternatively, it might be a god intervening in the universe, like the Demiurge of the Timaeus, to organize it with particular ends in mind, that is to say, in Epicurus' view at least, in his own interest. These suggestions, however ingenious, are probably unnecessary, as we shall see at the end of this investigation. (4) In a reply to Bloch's review (1974, 395-97), W i s m a n n , Bollack's c o - a u t h o r of L a Lettre d'Epicure, again returns to this point, and defends his interpretation, appealing to the parallel of p a r a g r a p h 54 and seizing with rather too m u c h alacrity u p o n the half-concession m a d e by Bloch with regard to the presence of the article. In my own view, the example of 44.2-3 shows that these squabbles should not be assigned too m u c h importance, for they are clearly inspired by other preoccupations.

23

A p a r t from the references given above, n. 4, cf. Giussani 1896, vol. 11, pp. 195-96. Boyance (1972, p . 72, n. 1) complains of being unable to find, as indicated, the note 22 to which Arrighetti refers on p. 452 of the first edition. His reference is in fact to the texts and references collected under no. 22 on p. 186, all of which concern Book 1 of the IJepl ucrecos\ In the second edition of Arrighetti's work, the reference cue appears on p . 494 and refers to note 23, that is to say to the texts collected under n o . 23 on p p . 189-90.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

9

Bloch, for his part, is amazed at Bollack's virtually constant refusal to resort to Lucretius' interpretations, when certain passages in the Letter to Herodotus, in particular the one in which we are interested, in his view 'demand' to be compared with the De rerum natura. It is, however, only fair to recognize that, to judge by the diversity of the readings extracted from Lucretius by those who have turned to him in attempts to illuminate this passage, a study of Lucretius gives rise to as many if not more problems than it resolves. If we rapidly consider a few of those attempts, we shall see that in making the comparisons that they consider 'demand' to be made, these interpreters, in their selection of 'parallel' texts, exercise a free and fallible choice that leads to widely divergent conclusions. From a first analysis, the relevant texts from Lucretius seem easy to identify and isolate. Pierre Boyance cites two of them, the first from Book n, lines 303-7 ('Nor can any power change the sum total of things; for there is no place without into which any kind of matter could flee away from the all; and there is no place whence a new power could arise to burst into the all, and to change the nature of things and upset their motions' (tr. W.H.D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library, 1943, slightly modified). 24 The second passage appears both in Book in, lines 816-18, and in Book v, lines 361-3 ('even as the sum of all things is eternal,... there is no place without it into which its elements may leap apart, nor bodies to fall upon it and dissolve it asunder with a strong blow'). 25 In my opinion, as in Olivier Bloch's, a comparison with these texts is fatal to Jean Bollack's interpretation of Epicurus' sentence (c). Pierre Boyance is assuredly correct when, in connection with the first of those two passages from Lucretius, he writes: . . . it is clear that the second part of the sentence, which begins with neque in omne, corresponds exactly with Epicurus' rrapa yap TO TTOV KTX. In omne inrumpere is parallel to elaeXOov els avro, and one can see that, for Lucretius as for Traversari, avro designates the all and that, for both of them, that which penetrates into the all (this time referred to as omnem naturam rerum in Lucretius) determines the change within it (Lucretius adds: 'and upset their motions'). He is also correct in saying, of the second passage in Lucretius: 'Incidere corresponds to the elozXOov in the text of the Letter and applies, quite obviously, to that which penetrates the all, not to the idea of the all penetrating something else'. 26 24

25 26

Nee rerum summam commutare ulla potest vis; \ nam neque, quo possit genus ullum material \effugere ex omni, quicquam est (extra}, neque in omne \ unde coorta queat nova vis inrumpere, et omnem \ naturam rerum mutare et vertere motus. Sicut summarum summast aeterna, neque extra \ quis locus est quo diffugiant, neque corpora sunt quae \ possint incidere et valida dissolvere plaga. Boyance 1972, p. 73. In his Lettre a un President, Jean Bollack responds to the attack simply by swamping it with disdainful generalities: 'Because you know of a passage in Lucretius which presents a few resemblances with Epicurus' reasoning on the immutability of the all which, you see fit to pretend, is unknown to me, you rule against respecting both the grammar and the internal logic of the text, issuing the solemn warning: " / trust that nobody would wish to accuse

10

EPICUREANISM

But although we are bound to recognize that Boyance scores a point here, we should also note how deliberately he proceeds to delimit the field in which he knows he can win. Let us see how he plays his cards. On the first of Lucretius' texts, he writes: 'If we leave aside the first leg of the sentence introduced by 'neque\ it is clear that the second, which begins with neque in omne, corresponds exactly with Epicurus' irapa yap TO TT&V KTX\21 And on the second, he writes as follows: This eternity (i.e. that of the all) is founded on the fact that there is nothing outside it into which its constitutive elements could escape, nor anything that could penetrate it and dislocate if.28 It could hardly be made clearer, both by the words themselves and by the typography, that Lucretius is here invited to speak only when his evidence is favourable, and that Boyance has no hesitation whatever in leaving aside what Lucretius says wherever the correspondence with Epicurus becomes less 'clear' and less 'obvious'. What does Lucretius actually say? He establishes a close coordination between two possible sources of change in the universe: (i) the all could, in theory, transform itself by expanding, by a kind of leakage or outpouring of its parts to outside itself; it is prevented from doing so because, precisely, there is no place outside it; (2) in symmetrical fashion, the all could also be transformed by being penetrated by some body from outside itself; however, it is protected from that kind of aggression since there is, precisely, no body outside it. To set out the symmetry of these two hypotheses schematically, let us call the former excursive, and the latter incursive. It is immediately apparent that nothing in the passage of Epicurus which interests us, as it has been interpreted so far, corresponds to the excursive hypothesis: sentence (B), as understood by all interpreters (Bollack included), expresses a completely different idea, namely the impossibility for the all to change itself into anything that it is not already. As we have already noted, what it thus excludes is the very possibility of change in the all, not, as in the excursive hypothesis, a particular source of such a change. In contrast, Epicurus' sentence (c) corresponds exactly to the incursive hypothesis in Lucretius. It is also noticeable that the two Lucretian hypotheses are coordinated {neque . . . neque), whereas the two propositions in Epicurus are subordinated (A .. .Jor B .. .Jor c). That is why it is fair to say that Pierre Boyance was only able to score a point against Bollack by dint of lifting out of Lucretius' text whatever he needed in order to do so, and that he was only able to make that selection by dismembering the structure of Lucretius' text. The partiality of this use of the Lucretian evidence will become even more apparent if we compare Pierre Boyance's attitude with the attitudes of a number of his precursors in this field. Carlo Giussani, in the notes to his edition of Lucretius, starts off by declaring Book 11, lines 303-7 to correspond closely

27

Lucretius of having at three points misunderstood Epicurus' thought" No doubt in your view, a scholar's objectivity amounts to no more than an accumulation of evidence. If Lucretius were to say something different from Epicurus, Mr Chairman, that would not be called a contradiction, a mistake or even a solecism.' 28 Boyance 1972, p. 73; my own italics. Boyance 1972, p. 73; author's italics.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

II 29

to the passage from the Letter to Herodotus that we are studying. But he soon notices that the distinction between on the one hand a mode of transformation of the all through addition (or 'incursion' originating from outside) and, on the other, a mode of transformation through loss (or 'excursion' of matter towards the outside), a distinction that is 'clearly expressed here by Lucretius' 30 is, in contrast, no more than 'confusedly present' in Epicurus' text. That is why, instead of ignoring the faults in the parallelism so as to retain only the convergences between Lucretius and Epicurus, Giussani has no hesitation in proposing to rewrite Epicurus' text entirely, in order to make it agree with Lucretius', and he suggests that it should be read as follows:... del TOLOVTOV ecrrcu. Flapd yap TO rrdv ovdev eoTiv els o /xera/JaAef rj o dv eloeXdov els avro KTX.31 This extraordinary suggestion is assuredly one that no scholar would hazard today. It treats the data provided by the manuscripts as so many pieces in a puzzle, to be moved about at will. Drawing the material now from one side, now from another, it puts together a text the structure of which has nothing at all in common with that of the text of the manuscripts. 32 It should be added, furthermore, that the exact meaning that the text in its reconstituted form was supposed by Giussani to possess does not emerge at all clearly. 33 However, despite these considerable faults, which have been pointed out by, in particular, Bignone and Bailey, Giussani's suggestion was prompted, as we shall see, by a remarkably accurate intuition. Ettore Bignone, for his part, certainly criticizes Giussani for having 'rewritten the text too freely' and for having assumed there to be a corruption the origin of which is unintelligible. Nonetheless, he too believes that, in the light of the Lucretian data, Epicurus' text is in need of correction. According to Bignone, of the two possible causes of change mentioned, not only by Lucretius but also by Plutarch, 34 (that is to say the loss and the addition of 29

30 31

32

33

34

' 3 ° 3 - 3 ° 7e tal quale la sentenza di Epicuro, e traduce quasi il testo della epitome a d E r o d o t o ' (Giussani 1896, vol. 11, p . 195). Giussani also alludes to line 296 (nam neque adaugescit quicquam neque deperit inde). ' L a distinzione t r a Yadaugescere e il deperire, espressa chiaramente qui in Lucrezio, appare confusa nel testo di Epicuro, che io leggerei: TOLOVTOV e a r a t . IJapa yap TO ndv KTA.' W e should note in particular that one of the y a p s disappears a n d is replaced by a n 17, of which there is n o trace in the manuscripts. T h e structure of Lucretius' text has been imported into the text of Epicurus. Giussani gives n o translation of his hypothetical text. T h e logic of his correction dictates that he should give the first occurrence of els (in els o /xerajSaAcf) the same, spatial, meaning that this proposition has when it occurs later (eloeXdov els CLVTO). But he undoubtedly interprets the verb /LterajSaAAeiv in its traditional sense o f ' t o be transformed'; for, pointing out (p. 196) that Lucretius uses the verb effugere in his description of the excursive hypothesis, at line 305, he notes: 'it is because the idea of a. place outside the all is naturally implied that Lucretius was able to substitute effugere for Epicurus' /u-erajSaAAeiv'; so he was n o t tempted t o see effugere as a translation of/LterajSaAAetv. Accordingly, it m a y be assumed that he would have translated his hypothetical text m o r e o r less as follows: 'the all has always been as it is now, a n d it will always be such. F o r , outside the all, there is nothing into which it c a n transform itself o r which, penetrating into it, could p r o d u c e any change.' It is true that Giussani adds that the t h o u g h t is 'tutt'altro che perspicuo'. Adversus Colotem 13, 1114A (Usener 296): TO TTOV . . . /XTJT' av^ofievov \JLT)T€

Bignone also refers to Empedoclean precedents (DK 31B 17, 27f.).

12

EPICUREANISM

elements), Epicurus here recalls (sic)35 only the second. Accordingly, it seems to him highly probable that a number of words have been dropped out. He proposes making good this lacuna as follows: ovdev yap iariv els o /zera/3aAer irapa yap TO irdv ovdev iartv, O(TTOL av TL e£e\6oi, rj o^> av elaeXdov els avro rrjv iJLerafioArjv nonqoano', which would produce the following meaning: 'there is nothing into which the all can change for, outside the all, there is nothing which, by penetrating it, could produce a change there'. Bignone is thus faced with a parallelism between Epicurus' sentence (c) and the incursive hypothesis of Lucretius' text, and another parallelism (forged by himself) between 'Epicurus' and the excursive hypothesis. But he does not let it rest there. There is still Epicurus' (B) sentence to cope with, the affirmation of the impossibility, in principle, of any change in the whole. None of the commentators so far mentioned has proposed any Lucretian parallel for this sentence. Bignone has two points to make on this subject: (i) in Book n, lines 297-302, which immediately precede the first of the passages studied above, Lucretius affirms the permanence of atomic movements and likewise the permanence of the laws of birth and development for natural beings; 36 (2) in the summary of Epicurus' physics given by the pseudo-Plutarch, we encounter the idea that nothing absolutely new comes about in the all. 37 This idea is set out immediately after the thesis of the immutability of the all (cf. Letter to Herodotus 39.4-5) and immediately before the idea that the all is composed of bodies and the void (Letter to Herodotus 39.13) 38 . From these two observations Bignone draws the conclusion that Lucretius and the pseudo-Plutarch, following an Epicurean model more fully developed than the Letter, but similarly arranged, are here summing up the well-known doctrine according to which, in the infinite universe and throughout the infinite time of the existence of atoms, which are infinite in number but whose forms are not themselves infinite in number, all the possible combinations of atoms and the void have already been realized at one time or another, in one place or another. 39 This 35

36

37

38

39

'Epicure qui ricorderebbe solo la seconda' (ibid., p. 256). It would be amusing to find a scholar such as Bignone writing that this text of Epicurus' does not recall all the points mentioned by Lucretius and Plutarch. But, to be absolutely fair, perhaps he simply meant that he does not mention them. Apparently, the Italian verb ricordare does lend itself to this ambiguity. Quapropter quo nunc in motu principiorum \ corpora sunt, in eodem ante acta aetate fuere, \ et post haec semper similirationeferentur, \ et quae consuerintgignigignentur eadem \ condicione, et erunt et crescent vique valebunt, \ quantum cuique datum est per foedera natural. Pseudo-Plutarch, Stromates 8 (Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 581, I7(f.): ovSev £evov iv TW TTCLVTL d7roTeAeiTCu, napa TOV 17817 yeyevrj/jievov xpovov a-neipov. Usener places this sentence at the beginning of his collection of fragments of physics (no. 266), adding in a note: gravissimum est axioma et disciplinae Epicureae necessarium. Although that is true only if a conjectural emendation is accepted in each text. Pseudo-Plutarch reads as follows: o n TTOLV ion acofxa, which Bignone suggests completing as follows: on (TO) rrdv ion acL»/Lx,a
THE I M M U T A B I L I T Y OF THE ALL

13

same doctrine, condensed to the extreme, is, he claims, recognizable in Epicurus' sentence (B): there is nothing into which the all can change, precisely because there are no combinations of atoms that can be produced in the universe except those that are to be found there already. As can be seen, according to Bignone, the Epicurean argument boils down to denying all possibility of change in the all by successively excluding, not two possible causes of change, but three: the two transitive sources of change that we know ('excursion' and 'incursion', both of which relate the all to a hypothetical 'outside') are now supplemented by an immanent source of change, the appearance of a new combination of parts, actually within the all. In Bignone's view, the texts should now be organized as follows: New combinations

'Excursion'

'Incursion'

Epicurus

Sentence (B)

conjectural addition

Sentence (c)

Lucretius

11.297-302

11.304-5

11.305-7

Cyril Bailey's reaction to these suggestions is extremely curious. 40 Addressing himself, in his turn, to Lucretius' 'parallel passage', which he reckons to begin at 11.304, he immediately declares that there would be three possible ways for the universe to change: (i) if there was something outside it into which its parts could escape ('excursion'); (2) if there was a place from which a new force could enter into it and alter it ('incursion'). These two causes, says Bailey, are the most 'prominent' in this section (i.e. line 3O4ff.). But, he adds, there is also another possibility: (3) change through internal rearrangement, which is, in a sense, at work in the Epicurean universe, but which cannot be counted as a change in the all {qua all), because, by virtue of the principle of equilibrium (loovofjLLa), nothing entirely new can be created by combinations of atoms. Bailey is well aware that this third cause of change is presented, indeed presented 'vividly', by Lucretius before the other two, in lines 297-302, that is to say before what he considers to be the passage that is 'parallel' to the argument that Epicurus sets out in the Letter. He does not emphasize the fact, but it is clear that he cannot decide whether or not to recognize the presence of this third cause in Epicurus' argument. He writes as follows about Bignone's suggestions: Bignone hasrightlycalled attention to this third point, and sees a reference to it in the words ovQtv yap iartv els o ^erajSaAet. I think, on the whole, that it is more probable that this sentence refers to the first of the causes enumerated above, change due to dissolution into something else [= 'excursion', J.B.]; but the idea of change by internal alteration seems to be lurking in Epicurus' mind, as is shown by his use of although the authenticity of this last passage has been challenged). This is the Epicurean form of the idea whose history A. Lovejoy has studied as 'the principle of plenitude' (cf. Lovejoy 1936). On the presence and place of this principle in the work of a number of ancient 40 philosophers, cf. Hintikka 1973. Bailey 1926, pp. 180-1.

14

EPICUREANISM

Despite the hesitancy with which he puts forward this extremely original proposal to consider Epicurus' sentence (B) to correspond to Lucretius' 'excursive' hypothesis, Bailey immediately deduces that, in consequence, Bignone's conjectural addition serves no purpose: for, if we take it (as he 'on the whole' does) that change through excursion is what is meant in sentence (B), there is no need to assume a lacuna and fabricate a text to fill it so that this mode of change should alsofinda place in Epicurus' text.41 The price paid for that hesitation is nevertheless considerable: one remains uncertain as to how clear it is that Epicurus' argument does indeed appeal to the principle of isonomia, and equally as to exactly where the 'parallelism' with Lucretius' text is supposed to start andfinish.The reader of Bailey's commentary is thus left with an impression of doubt and indecision. We may now bring this long doxographical survey to a close. As the reader has no doubt noticed, its successive stages, though seemingly inconclusive, have gradually sketched in the solution to the problem. Let us sum up the main points that it establishes: 1i) The mainflawin the current interpretation of Epicurus' argument is that it passes incoherently from a metaphorical use of spatial expressions (in sentence (B)) to a literal use of those expressions (in sentence (c)). (2) The only attempt to produce a homogeneous overall interpretation of the text, made by Jean Bollack, sought that homogeneity in a systematically metaphorical reading of those expressions. Given that it failed to stick to that reading right through, it remains unconvincing. (3) The only point on which Lucretius' testimony is unequivocal is its confirmation of the literal nature of the spatial expressions of sentence (c). This proposition of Epicurus' exactly corresponds with the 'incursive' hypothesis in Lucretius' argument. (4) Apart from this, Lucretius does not seem to put forward any unquestionable 'parallel'; and, if forced conjectures are excluded, it seems pointless to try to superimpose the structure of his argument upon the argument presented in Epicurus' Letter. (5) The 'excursive' hypothesis in Lucretius seems to have no equivalent in Epicurus' text; one is accordingly led to 'leave it aside' (Boyance), unless, that is, onefitsit in by means of an ad hoc conjecture (Giussani, Bignone) or else risks suggesting, extremely hesitantly, that this might be what is, more or less clearly, suggested by Epicurus' sentence (B) (Bailey). (6) Is the third cause of change (an internal rearrangement of the parts) that Lucretius perhaps sets on the same level as the other two ('excursion', 'incursion') present in any form in Epicurus' text? Bignone detects a reference to this third cause in sentence (B) and also an allusion to the 41

According to Bailey, the schema of correspondences is as follows: new combinations: 'lurking' in sentence (B); 'excursion': sentence (B) ('on the whole'); 'incursion': sentence (c).

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

15

principle of isonomia, which makes it possible to exclude it. Bailey only recognizes that reference to be present in a 'lurking' fashion. (7) Now we perceive that the real problem is not so much Epicurus' sentence (c) as his sentence (B). It is the former sentence that has been the focus of recent discussions because, of the two, that is the one in relation to which Jean Bollack distanced himself from the interpretation that is generally recognized. Meanwhile, sentence (B), which everybody translates in more or less the same way,42 seems uncontroversial. Nevertheless, the diverse attempts to unearth a Lucretian equivalent to it (Bignone, Bailey) show, by their very multiplicity and, in Bailey's case, by their indecision, that the meaning of this sentence is still far from clear in many scholars' minds. Let us now concentrate our attention upon this point. The meaning that it is usually given, one that presupposes a metaphorical interpretation of the preposition eh, is as follows: 'there is nothing into which the all can change itself; or, alternatively, according to Bollack's vigorously shortened version: 'the all cannot change because there is nothing that it is not already'. These formulations need to be analysed, for despite their apparent, even peremptory, plausibility, they are open to several different interpretations, according to the exact meaning that is ascribed to the term 'the all'. And, as we shall see, not one of those interpretations can be easily attributed to Epicurus. If the 'all' means what Epicurus seems to have taken it to mean, 43 namely the sum total of physical beings, comprising bodies and the void, considered regardless of the state in which theyfindthemselves and the combinations that they form, the proposition is true only if the word 'change' is understood in an unusual, almost fraudulent way. Both the creation and the disappearance of matter are totally excluded: the all is thus constituted and always will be constituted by the sum total of these bodies and this void of which it has always been composed. In a rather tortuous sense, it could thus be said that it can change as much as it likes (by passing from one state into another), but nevertheless it will not really 'change', because it will forever retain the same material composition. Suppose, for example, that all the atoms were dispersed in the immensity of the void and no composite body remained; or, on the contrary, that all were concentrated in one single region of space, forming a single, huge compound: such cosmic upheavals would not count as a change in the all, as defined, because they would be changes of state, and the all was described in terms such that the different states that it can assume are, by definition, not taken into account in that description. Given that the notion of change is usually understood to mean a process through which an existent passes from one state to another, it would be rather dishonest of Epicurus to 42 43

Cf. above, n. 8. Cf. Letter to Pythocles 86; Sextus Empiricus, M ix. 333 (Usener 75); Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1112E (Usener 76). T h e same formula has been introduced by conjecture in the Letter to Herodotus 39.13 (cf. above, n. 38).

l6

EPICUREANISM

claim in this way to have established that the all does not change; for the permanence of its material composition is not all that the notion of its immutability ordinarily encompasses. One might just as well claim that a man does not change from his birth to his death, simply because he bears the same name throughout his life. It would seem, then, that that is not how Epicurus' proposition is generally understood. For there to be nothing 'that the all is not already', the all must be defined in such a way as to include, not only the totality T\ of beings that are physically existent (bodies and the void), but also the totality T2 of the states or ways of being of those beings. In that case, T1 can perfectly well pass (through change) from any one state to any other, for both states are, by definition, part of T2. And it could be said that the 'all' (which is T1 in all the states included in T2) has not changed. But it should immediately be pointed out that Epicurus appears never to have defined what he understood by the 'all' in that fashion.44 It should also be pointed out that such a way of demonstrating the immutability of the all would be hardly less sophistic than the last way. Just now we defined the subject that was to be demonstrated to be immutable, leaving out of account the states in which it may find itself; and in those conditions it was easy enough to go on to say that, even if it changed its state, it did not 'change'. Now our definition of that same subject does incorporate the totality of states in which it mayfinditself; but it is still easy enough to conclude that, even if its state changes, it does not itself'change'. In the example we used just now, the man did not change because he kept his name; now he does not change because the identity of a man is made up of what he is at every stage of his life. Despite these prejudicial obstacles, it is worth sticking to this line of investigation a little longer. It subdivides into two paths, according to whether totality T2 is understood as a totality of the real states of the universe or as the totality of its possible states. In the first case, the all means the totality of physical beings, considered as the totality of the states in which it has found itself finds itself and willfinditself Seen from this point of view, Epicurus' proposition would be tautological: by definition, every real state of the universe, whether past, present or future, is included in the totality thus described. Every state of the universe is included in the totality of the states of the universe: that is a truth that can hardly be challenged but is not particularly 44

The only text which could suggest this is a passage in Cicero (De nat. deor. 11.32,82 = Usener 75) which runs: 'Some thinkers again denote by the term 'nature' the whole of existence (omnia), for example Epicurus, who divides the nature of all existing things into atoms, void and the attributes of these (corpora et inane, quaeque his accidanty (transl. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1965). This is certainly a remarkable text, but it is hardly enough to undermine the authority of those cited above, n. 43. It is worth pointing out that this is a Stoic speaking; his purpose is to contrast the extensional and material character of the Epicurean idea of nature, which he criticizes, with the dynamic and organic character of the corresponding Stoic idea. The better to emphasize the unity of the force which, according to the Stoics, informs and governs living beings and the whole world, he stresses the multiplicity of elements in the Epicurean formulae, possibly to the extent of tacking an item on to the canonical list.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

17

interesting. If, on the other hand, one defines the all as the totality of physical beings, considered in the totality of the states in which it couldfinditself, the proposition ceases to be empty and tautological. It means that it is possible to totalize the possible states of the universe, that these cannot increase indefinitely, forever producing combinations of elements that are altogether unprecedented. As we have seen, that is how Bignone understood it; probably it is also how Jean Bollack understands it, so far as can be judged from his bald formulation. What remains to be discovered is whether any allusion to this authentically Epicurean doctrine can legitimately be supposed to exist at the point in the Letter where the argument that we are studying occurs. Before paragraph 39, only two physical theses are stated and demonstrated: the impossibility of absolute creation and likewise that of absolute destruction. The reader has as yet come across no mention of atoms, nor of the void, nor - a fortiori - of the infinite number of atoms, the non-infinite number of their forms and the infinity of space and time. Now, all these are necessary to make it possible to demonstrate the non-infinite nature of the possible combinations of atoms, and to be certain that all have been realized at one time or another and in one place or another. It will be agreed that it is highly unlikely that such a complex doctrine can have been mentioned, implied or used so soon after the beginning of the physical exposition. From whatever angle it is approached, then, the 'metaphorical' interpretation of sentence (B) leads to dead-ends or to improbabilities. At this point, the principle for a solution appears with blinding clarity: we must give up this 'metaphorical' interpretation that has hitherto been accepted unanimously (with the sole, timid exception of Bailey) and weigh up the chances of a literal' interpretation of this sentence. Whatever Bailey may say, the use of the verb fiera^aXXeiv is not an obstacle in principle and does not dictate the idea of change into something; for the verb itself is a metaphor and its literal meaning, 'to pass from one place into another' had certainly not been eclipsed in Greek usage. Aristotle, for one, uses it in this sense on many occasions, in his description of the behaviour of migratory animals.45 There is, thus, in principle, nothing to prevent the sentence ovdev yap eonv eh o fxera^aXXei from being understood as follows: 'for there is nothing where it (i.e. the all) can take itself. The difficulty that remains stems from the logical connections in the argument as a whole and from the succession of the two yaps. How can the immutability of the all (sentence (A)) be explained by the absence of any place to which the all could betake itself (sentence (B)) and this absence in turn be explained by the absence of any body which might come from outside and 45

Cf. HA VIII. 12, 596b26, 597a4~5,15,23,25,27-8,30. It is interesting to note that Aristotle does not hesitate to use the verb juerajSaAAeiy in the same context, to refer to the movement of animals migrating from one region to another, and the noun /xerajSoA^ to refer to the seasonal changes of temperature (cf. 596b23 and 24). Perhaps this makes less surprising an interpretation which attributes the same use of these words to Epicurus (/xerajSdAAeiv in the spatial sense, sentence (B); fjueTapoXr/ in the sense of change, sentence (c)).

18

EPICUREANISM

penetrate it and upset it (sentence (c))? The coherence and intelligibility of the argument, which we are laboriously trying to restore, seem further out of our grasp than ever. Yet very little indeed is needed to recapture them; and it is the grammarians, all too seldom consulted by interpreters of texts, who will help us to spring the bolt that has so far impeded all attempts to understand this passage fully. From the grammarians we learn that when one yap is soon followed by another, as in the schema A yap B yap c, it is not necessarily the case that B justifies A and c justifies B: in many cases B and c both justify A. 46 It becomes immediately clear that if Epicurus' argument may be construed in this way, the last obstacles in the way of a satisfactory solution to the problem are smoothed away. We may now translate the text as a whole as follows: '(A) The all has always been what it is now and will always remain such; for, (B) on the one hand there is nothing where it might betake itself, and (c), on the other, outside the all there is nothing which, entering into it, could produce change in it'

A few comments remain to be made. First, we should note that the parallelism with Lucretius is much closer than might have been expected but that, in order to find it, it was in a sense necessary not to be looking for it. Those who have studied the passage in which we are interested taking Lucretius' text as their guide have seenfiteither to pick and choose according to their needs (Boyance) or more or less to force the Epicurean text into a new mould, in order to reduce it to the Lucretian model (Giussani, Bignone). Such behaviour at least partially justified scholars such as Bollack, who preferred, as a matter of principle, not to read Epicurus in the light of Lucretius. However, as can be seen, an internal analysis of Epicurus' text and patient elucidation of its obscurities has led to an interpretation which eliminates all the apparent discrepancies between the master's argument and that of his disciple, as regards not only content but also structure. That goes not only for the Lucretian passage upon which we have mostly concentrated (n.303-7), but also for the other passage mentioned (111.816—18 = ¥.361-3). Here Lucretius quite simply gives a more concrete form of expression to Epicurus' argument, making it clear that, beyond the 'whole of the wholes', there exists neither any place into which its parts could escape and disperse, nor any body which could fall upon them, disintegrating them by the force of its impact. It was legitimate for him to be more specific in this fashion, since at the juncture where he makes these explicit points, his reader has already long been aware that the all is composed of place and bodies. At the level of paragraph 39 of the Letter, Epicurus could not provide this specific information which makes the argument clearer and more forceful, since he had not yet analysed the notion of the all or named its constituent parts.47 46

47

Cf. Denniston 1954, p p . 6 4 - 5 : 'Successive y a p s have the same reference'. M a n y of the examples provided come from the tragedians, historians and orators; one comes from Aristotle. It is worth noting that, in m a n y of these examples, some philologists have proposed reading 8e in place of the second yap. Lucretius m a y also help to resolve the problem that we have left in the air: is the change in the all that Epicurus seeks to exclude of a quantitative or a qualitative nature? II. 294-6 show that

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

19

I should also like to point out that the solution that I am proposing is not entirely new, not that it matters whether this is in its favour or not. A number of earlier scholars have already come close to it, some of them very close. Several translators have omitted the second yap in their renderings of the argument, 48 and from an objective point of view they were quite right to do so if, as I believe, the reference of this conjunction is the same both times it occurs. On occasion, what has been regarded as their 'negligence' in this respect has been severely criticized. 49 In the absence of any justificatory notes left by these translators, there is no way of knowing whether they translated as they did truly as a result of negligence, or in full awareness of the grammatical implications of the passage. Alternatively, they may even have done so prompted by a correct, if no more than instinctive, intuition as to the structural necessities of the argument. Whatever the case may be, all that I, retrospectively and laboriously, have done is show that they were right. Similarly, the solution that I am proposing is, in principle, no different from the one that Bailey hesitantly suggested in his commentary. All I had to do was override its hesitancy and liberate it from the false reasoning on which that timidity was based. More distantly, I hold the conjectures of Giussani and Bignone in considerable respect. Too extreme to be defensible they may be, but they were prompted by a recognition of the need to rediscover in Epicurus' text something that these philologists rightly believed ought to be discoverable there - as indeed it is, and perfectly detectable, moreover, without our needing to alter the text as transmitted. That is why, instead of baldly setting out this interpretation in the few lines necessary to contain it, I thought it better to leave in evidence the quite massive

48

49

in t r u t h no choice need be m a d e : a qualitative change, t h r o u g h an increase or a decrease in the density of the matter in the universe, would result from a quantitative change, matter having been either added or lost. By excluding b o t h additions a n d losses, in the first of the two theses stated in the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus provides himself with the means to deny all qualitative change, and this constitutes his third thesis, which we have been studying in the present paper. F o r example Hamelin ('II n'y a rien d'autre en effet en quoi il puisse se changer, ni rien n o n plus, en dehors de lui, qui puisse agir', etc.), E r n o u t ('II n'y a rien en effet en quoi il puisse se transformer. Et en dehors de l'univers', etc.), Arrighetti {'poiche nulla esiste in cui possa tramutarsi, ne oltre il tutto vi e nulla', etc.), Isnardi Parente ('nulla esiste in cui esso possa mutarsi, ne al di la del t u t t o vi e alcunche', etc.). Similarly, Joseph M o r e a u , in a recent article entitled 'Le mecanisme epicurien et l'ordre de la n a t u r e ' , translates this passage as follows: 'II n'y a rien, en effet, en quoi il puisse se transformer, de mime qu'en dehors de lui il n'est rien qui puisse s'introduire en lui p o u r y causer une transformation' (1975, p. 476, n. 3). T h e italics are mine. T h u s , in his reply cited above, W i s m a n n sternly addresses those w h o are not in agreement with him: 'the interpretation supported (i.e. by Bloch, Boyance and the tradition) takes no account of the causal construction of the argument. In an altogether arbitrary fashion, it omits the second yap, which A. E r n o u t dispenses with: II n'y a rien en effet (yap) en quoi il puisse se transformer. Et (yap!) en dehors de l'univers (that is to say the all) il n'y a rien qui puisse s'y introduirepour le modifier. A simple word-to-word check immediately shows that the omission serves to mask a m o r e profound error, e t c ' Philological discussions would be improved if they did not seem so concerned to h a n d out dunce's caps. In this particular instance, I hope to have shown that E r n o u t knew exactly what he was doing, or at least that all the indications are that he did. It is all too easy to become hoist with one's own petard.

20

EPICUREANISM

scaffolding that has helped me to reach it. A debt of gratitude was involved here: without the work of those who have gone before me, and without analysing their efforts, their differences and their conflicting arguments, I should certainly not have been able to put my finger on the objective difficulty in this text, nor to keep on exploring the labyrinth of its culs-de-sac until the true way out was revealed. Sometimes one does not register the presence of a complaint until someone else suggests a remedy, even if the cure turns out to be worse than the evil itself.50 That is why I feel sure that, if the ancient philosophical texts still contain passages whose meaning needs to be elucidated, the best way of tackling the task is neither to reject the 'tradition' as a whole nor to follow respectfully in its footsteps. In the history of philosophy, progress surely entails a critical analysis of its own history. 50

A good case in point, so far not mentioned, is the suggestion made by Brieger (1901, p. 520), who proposes suppressing els in sentence (B), thereby obtaining the following meaning: '(B) in effect, there is nothing that can change the all. (c) In effect, outside the all, there is nothing which, by introducing itself into it, can bring about a change there.' Of course, this truism is not altogether satisfactory; but the correction rests upon the justified conviction that, in the customary interpretation, sentence (c) does not fulfil its presumed role of justification for sentence (B). Bollack's interpretation (in substance: there is nothing into which the all changes, since there is nothing into which it can change), by slightly different paths, follows an analogous logic; and its shortcomings and merits are, in my view, comparable.

EPICURUS AND THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE*

Many modern scholars1 have considered that, of all the ancient philosophers' many theories on the origin and nature of language, the most remarkable and interesting is that produced by Epicurus. But the difficulty of the texts through which we know it, in particular the principal one, the famous passage in the Letter to Herodotus (75-6), is also generally recognized, and many widely divergent interpretations of it have been put forward.2 It is not my intention to embark in this study upon a full examination of the problems of comprehension posed by this theory. My more limited aim is to focus upon a number of specific aspects in the light of a question which is bound to arise when one confronts the various competing interpretations. The question is this: does the Epicurean theory incorporate a notion of what, in our day, is sometimes called a 'private language', that is to say, roughly speaking, a language that is not (or not yet) a means of communicating with other users of it, but is simply (or in the first instance) a purely individual way of organizing one's own experience and expressing one's own thoughts without anyone else being able, even in principle, to understand this language?3 Epicurus' account is presented as a historical description of the birth and development of language. A number of phases in this process are distinguished clearly, the last of which is the only one that corresponds to the kind of development and functioning of language of which the observer will, himself, have had any experience. The earlier phases reconstructed by Epicurus in accordance with his general methodology, such as those whose existence must be supposed if what we now perceive, produced through a progressive process of elaboration, is to be intelligible, necessarily differ in some respects from the * The original version of this work was delivered as a lecture on 7 April 1976, at the Centre de Recherches sur l'histoire des doctrines de l'Universite de Lille III, organized by Jean-Paul Dumont and Pierre Trotignon. I should like to thank all those whose comments, both oral and written, were so helpful to me in the preparation of this new version, in particular Jean-Paul Dumont and Jean Bollack. 1 See Reinhardt 1912, p. 502 ('die beste und durchdachteste [Theorie] des ganzen Altertums'); a number of similar judgements were collected by Dahlmann 1928, with his seal of approval. 2 In relation to the Letter to Herodotus I have consulted the following editions, translations and commentaries: Usener 1887; Hamelin 1910, pp. 3978*.; Bignone 1920; Ernout 1925, vol. 1, pp. LIX-CXXIII; Hicks 1925; Solovine (1925) 1968; Bailey 1926; Arrighetti (i960) 1973; Bollack 1971; Isnardi Parente 1974. 3 In the sixties, the notion of'private language' was the subject of an intense discussion based on L. Wittgenstein's critique of it in Philosophical Investigations. For an account of that debate and a bibliography, see Castaneda 1967. See also Jones 1971. 21

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EPICUREANISM

last phase. Now, one of the most clearly distinguishable of the oppositions that structure the contrast between the past of language and its present is that between what is private and what is common. Both those words appear prominently and insistently in the sections that treat, respectively, of the origins of language and language as it is now. It is therefore understandable that some interpreters should have reckoned that, for Epicurus, language became a social institution and a means of communication only at a certain point in its history and that up until that moment, although language had certainly existed, it had lacked that social dimension and that function of communication. In other words, it had existed in the form of 'private language'. Before assessing whether that interpretation is well-founded, it is worth emphasizing one of the purposes of the present discussion. It is not simply a matter of correctly reconstructing the succession of phases marked out by Epicurus in his history of language. It is clear enough that, for him as for other 'archaeologists' of Antiquity, the elaboration of the history of phenomenon X must also be an analysis of the concept of X. The succession of stages in what happened first and what came later reflects the order of the assembling of essential and accessory properties. In other words, if it were claimed that Epicurus' linguistic archaeology makes room for a primitive phase of 'private language', it would be necessary to declare that, for him, to be a means of communication is not a part of the essence of language; and then, of course, it would be necessary to state positively exactly what does, for him, constitute the essence of language. Now let us examine the text of the Letter to Herodotus. Paragraphs 75 and 76 succinctly set out a theory of the origin and development of language, which is incorporated within the wider framework of a general theory of the origin and development of culture and civilization. For that reason, we must pause for a moment to consider this general theory, in the first place because Epicurus goes on to apply most strictly the very same terms to the particular case of language; and secondly because language is in fact the only particular case to which Epicurus applies his general theory - which is somewhat surprising, even in a short summarizing text such as the Letter to Herodotus. Not a word does he say about crafts, law or religion, the three subjects that usually follow in the wake of language in ancient attempts at Kulturgesch ich te.4

What Epicurus says on the subject of his general theory may be translated more or less as follows: 'We must imagine that nature (UCTI?) was instructed (StSax^vat) and constrained (dvayKaadrjvai) by things themselves, receiving from them many and various lessons; but that reasoning (Aoyia/xos), at a later stage (vorepov), specified {eiraKpi^ovv) the things that had been provided by it (VTTO TavTris\ 'nature' is the only possible reference), adding to them new 4

See Cole 1967.

THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE

23

discoveries {Trpooe^evpioKeiv), more rapidly in some cases, more slowly in others.' We may skip the next two lines, which pose a textual problem a discussion of which would lead us too far astray and to little avail, since they are clearly still concerned with variations in the rhythm of progress. It is clear that the doctrine consists essentially in distinguishing between two successive phases, the description of the first being dominated by the idea of nature (and also by that of necessity), that of the second by the idea of reasoning (and also that of contingency, which is implicit in the mention of different degrees of rapidity in the process). Reasoning takes over from nature, perfecting and completing its contribution. It will, however, be noticed that these two principles do not play strictly parallel roles, to judge from the respective grammatical functions of the nouns. Reasoning is introduced as the subject of active verbs (it specifies the contributions of nature and adds new discoveries to them). And that it should be so is perfectly normal. More unexpectedly, however, nature is presented as the subject of passive verbs (it is instructed, constrained by things themselves); so it is not that which instructs (for example, that which instructs man as to the means of satisfying his needs); rather, contrary to all expectation, it is that which is instructed. It is probably in order to play down this strange fact that many interpreters have decided, more or less explicitly, that the nature in question here must be human nature. Some have even specified that what the author has in mind is natural man, man in a natural state. 5 This substitution of human nature for nature in general has been forcefully criticized by Jean Bollack, who regards it as a characteristic deformation of the thought of Epicurus, a way of masking the boldness of a doctrine which detected in culture 'nature rebounding upon itself (le retour de la nature sur elle-meme) and did not flinch from describing nature as 'undergoing instruction from its own productions'. 6 Perhaps the debate can be advanced if we note, still on the level of grammar, that, while it is true that 'nature' serves as the subject of passive verbs in the first part of this sentence, in the second part it serves as the agent of another passive verb (reasoning perfects things that have been provided by it). In other words, implicitly, it is the subject of an active verb (it is nature that has provided the things that reasoning perfects). From this we may draw the completely unforced conclusion that, in this affair, nature is both an agent and a patient. It receives lessons but it has itself provided them in the first place. When we attempt to explain this paradox, it no longer seems so necessary to choose between human nature and nature in general: if nature is capable of affecting itself in this way, in all likelihood the specific place in which it affects itself is none other than man (of whom there has been no mention in the sketched-in cosmogony and zoogony that has preceded the sentence that we are studying, but who is nevertheless bound to be introduced at some point since the 'reasoning' in question in this sentence can only be his). There is no 5

See Hicks 1925.

6

Bollack 1971, pp. 22 and 236.

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EPICUREANISM

need to mention man, because he is not an empire within an empire. Rather, it could be said, developing the above-quoted formula of Jean Bollack, that he is that part of nature through which nature finds the means to educate itself. The next question to be tackled is the following: what is the basis of that privileged position of man? Presumably, the fact that man is physically and psychically organized in such a way that his contacts with the rest of the universe are not exhausted in the moment and at the spot where they take place, as are those of a rolling stone or even a sentient animal; rather, they become lodged within him, accumulating in the form of experience, concepts, language. As it creates a sediment, experience renders progress possible, progress that includes the selection of useful gestures, the graft of new discoveries one upon another. 7 And it is language that is probably the essential instrument of this cumulative fecundity at both an individual and a collective level, for language as it were plays the role of an information bank. It is therefore no accident that, having sketched in the general framework of his theory of human evolution, Epicurus proceeds to apply it to only one particular case, that of language. The reader of his Letter is implicitly invited to understand that this is not simply one example among others of man's natural productions, later to be perfected by reasoning; rather, it can be representative of all the others, because they are all conditioned by it.8 This first result of our enquiry will be of considerable use to us when we come to tackle directly the text devoted to language, that is to say the end of paragraph 75, on the phase of nature, and the beginning of paragraph 76, on the phase of reasoning. It is in the first of these two passages that some commentators have believed it possible to detect the idea of a 'private language'. According to them, Epicurus conceived original language as a purely individual language, neither affecting any outside party nor controlled by any, and corresponding to the vocal expression of purely idiosyncratic sensations and affections. (Interpreters remain divided as to whether or not that expression was truly linguistic). As these commentators see it, the second phase of linguistic evolution, in which reasoning and deliberately constructed conventions play their part, is simultaneously and fundamentally a phase in which the private languages and personal lexicons, which separate individuals initially elaborated purely for their own use, were socialized. It is this interpretation of the text that the present study sets out to examine and discuss. Afterwards, I shall try to explain the preconceptions on the basis of which Epicurus has been credited with an idea which, in my opinion, he never held and why, on the contrary, given the principal essentials of his

See Lucretius v.1456: namque alid ex alio clarescere corde videbant. See Cole 1967, p. 67: 'Language is not merely something which society makes possible. From the very beginning it symbolizes the benefits of cooperation and mutual defence and directs men to them. It is thus the essential medium for the whole process by which men go about securing these advantages.1

THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE

25

anthropological and linguistic doctrine, he could never have accepted the notion of a private language. First, let us try to give as literal a translation as possible of the passage that concerns the natural phase in the history of language. Epicurus writes: 'This is why names (rd ovo/zara), likewise, originally, did not appear through any institution (deaet).9 It is the very natures of men (auras rds vo€is TWV avdpcoTTcov), people by people (/ca#5 l/caara eOvrj), which, experiencing private affections (ISia naoxovoas irdOrj) and receiving private images (ffita Xa^avovaas ^avTaa^ara), expel air, imprinting upon it a private configuration (ISiws rov depa €K7T€^7T€iv oreXAofjievov), under the effect of each of those affections and images, according to the difference which may also (KCU) arise between different peoples as a result of the places where they live.' The essential problem posed by the interpretation of this text, especially from the point of view that interests us, is how to determine the exact meaning ofi'Sia, which is three times repeated in either adjectival or adverbial form (i'Sia nddr), tSta (fyavrdafjuara, ISioos areXXofjievov) and three times emphasized by being placed at the start of the sentence section in which it appears. Whether one chooses to translate it as 'private', as I have done, or to use other words such as 'appropriate' (Hamelin, Ernout), 'special' (Hicks, Bignone), 'particular' (Solovine, Bailey, Arrighetti, Bollack, Isnardi Parente, Sedley), makes little difference to the problem, since what remains to be determined is the complement to these adjectives: private to whom or to what? Similarly, since whatever is private clearly stands in opposition to whatever is common (see vorepov 8e KOLVCOS at the start of paragraph 76), it is also necessary to identify the second term in the opposition, that is to say specify what is meant by the 'common' in relation to which the property of the 'private' is defined as such. The first possible answer to this question would be to say that nouns which appear naturally with their 'own private configuration' are private to each individual. This individualistic interpretation could, seemingly, be supported in the first place by the remarkable plural in the expression 'the natures of men' (a plural the most normal purpose of which might be said to be 'to differentiate between individuals' 10 ); and secondly, even more so, by the correspondence that the text clearly establishes between the privacy of the vocal configurations and the 'privacy' of the affections and figments which prompt these vocal emissions. It is easy to read the 'privacy' of these affections and images from a solipsistic point of view: whatever each individual perceives when confronted with the same physical object is an impression which nobody can contemplate in his place nor can compare with an impression of his own, and it is as impossible to see what somebody else sees as to suffer from toothache in the 9

In my own view, it seems impossible, both grammatically and doctrinally, to understand the sense as follows: originally, no nouns at all appeared (for institutionalization is the only explanation for their appearance), which is how David Konstan understands it. See Konstan 10 1973. Bollack 1971, p. 236.

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EPICUREANISM

mouth of somebody else. So it follows that, if vocal productions espouse the particularity of the mental events that prompt them, it is to be expected that they be individually differentiated, as are the events themselves. This individualistic interpretation is clearly detectable in the translations of Hamelin and Ernout; and it is absolutely explicit in the commentary of Jean Bollack, who speaks of the 'immense variety of differences in the expressions that are linked with the particularity of individuals and of their affections', and who reckons that every idiosyncrasy results in 'a system of sounds which is individual, precise and coherent (un systeme de sons individuel, precis et coherent)'\ 11 However, that is not the only way of understanding this text. When Epicurus speaks of the 'particularity' of affections and images and of their vocal expressions, he might well simply be referring to the particularity of different peoples and intend his description of the first phase in the development of language simply to reflect the perfectly observable fact that there are many different languages. This 'ethnic' interpretation may be supported by the presence of the expression 'people by people' (Kad* eKaara edvrj), which, by reason of being placed next to the mention of the 'natures of men', could be considered as an explanation intended to specify the level to which the multiplicity of different natures refers. The opposition between 'private' and 'common' would then be that which distinguishes between the various peoples and the human race as a whole, not between an individual and a group. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that Epicurus considered that all the individuals who made up a particular people receive the same images (given that they all live in the same geographical location, the identity of the objects they perceive would serve as a criterion for the identity of their perceptive images), and that they all feel the same affections (since they all come from the same ethnic stock - the identity of their affected 'natures' serving as a criterion for the identity of the affections felt). These images and affections, which are identical for individuals in the same ethnic and geographical group, but vary from one group to another, would, according to this interpretation, be expressed in linguistic reactions which presented the same forms of identity or differentiation. This is the interpretation that emerges more or less clearly from Solovine's translation and, above all, from the translation of this passage that David Sedley proposes in the commentary in his edition of Book xxvm of the Tlepl cjtvoeajs.12 There remains yet a third interpretation, which commentators do not seem to have clearly perceived or explored, but which is nevertheless worthy of consideration. It involves relating the 'particularity' of the images, affections and linguistic effects to the diversity of the material objects which provoke those images and that of the internal processes which provoke those affections. Each image is private to an object to the extent that it differs from the image conjured up by a different object. And the same goes for affections. This 11

Bollack 1971, pp. 236 and 237.

12

See Sedley 1973, pp. 5-83, in particular pp. I7ff.

THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE

27

'objective' interpretation might be justified by the fact that the problem facing Epicurus here is not the genesis of language in an indeterminate sense of the word, but the genesis of a lexicon or of several lexicons (TO, ovofjuara). Hence, it is completely relevant of him to stress the differentiation of images and affections, a differentiation which stems on the one hand from the diversity of the objects that prompt them, on the other from the phonetic diversity of the vocal expressions that designate them: before explaining why it is that several words exist, in various languages, to designate for example the sun, it is necessary to explain why, in any given language, there exists one word for the sun and another for the moon. Looking at it from this point of view, Epicurus could be supposed to have perceived the differential nature of linguistic signs and to have coordinated the system of linguistic differences with that of the differences between objects, through the mediation of the sensations and affections. *3 Quite apart from its intrinsic pertinence, this interpretation could also derive support from the expression that Epicurus uses in the immediate context of this description of'private' vocal configurations: air, he declares, is expelled in a differentiated form 'under the effect of each of the affections and images' (v
This certainly

seems to imply that it is the diversity of the impressions, rather than the diversity of the individuals who receive those impressions, that is coordinated with the diversity of linguistic expressions. It will be noticed that this 'objective' interpretation does not belong to the same level as the 'individualistic' and 'ethnic' interpretations. Even assuming that, in mentioning the particularity of images, affections and expressions, Epicurus simply has in mind the differentiation of names within a single lexicon, it would still be necessary to determine whether he conceived the formation of such a lexicon to be a process reiterated from one individual to another, or from one people to another. In other words, assuming the fundamental linguistic fact that Epicurus sets out to explain to be the production of two distinct words to designate, for example, the sun and the moon, we still need to know whether his view is that, in the first phase of language, as many pairs of words of this type appeared as there were individuals, or only as many as there were peoples. It is thus possible to imagine two variants to the objective interpretation: one individualistic, the other ethnic. Another factor will help us to make some progress in this debate. In the last statement of paragraph 75, Epicurus does mention the differences between peoples, suggesting that they arise from the places where they live. The clear implication is that a natural language is, at any rate, not a universal language. The difference between languages that experience shows us to exist is assumed 13 14

On the 'diacritic' function of nouns, see Plato Cratylus 338B. See also Lucretius v. 1057-8 {sigenus humanum, cui vox et lingua vigeret, | pro vario sensu varias res voce notaret), especially if one retains the manuscripts' reading of varias, which is adopted by Ernout.

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to have existed right from the start. This point is of capital importance, and Sedley has skilfully shown that one of the great features of originality in Epicurus' theory of language was to make the argument based on the differences between languages rebound in favour of the naturalist thesis, despite the fact that that very same argument had been tritely used by the partisans of conventionalism to support their own thesis.15 In a move that was to have a far-reaching impact, the author of the Letter to Herodotus ceased to consider universality as the criterion/?opa, dependent upon the difference which may also exist between places). Many translators have overlooked this important point. If one does take it into account, it becomes necessary to specify what it is that this new factor seems to be introduced to supplement. In the individualistic interpretation, the solution at first sight seems easy: the differentiation of the lexicons peculiar to each of the different peoples is quite naturally superposed upon the differentiation of individual lexicons. However, it is difficult to see how the existence of a particular language for each particular people could be presented as an extra difference, over and above the existence of a particular language for each particular individual. For if one supposes there originally to have existed a multiplicity of private languages, the appearance of a language peculiar to a whole people is a phenomenon whose most striking aspect is not that this is a language that is different from that of another people, but rather that it is common to all the individuals who make up the people under consideration. Epicurus would be unpardonably at fault if he had assumed the right to posit the appearance of a whole group of individual languages at the same time as that of a whole group of collective languages, without even attempting to explain the process by which the human race moved on from individual languages to collective ones. In the ethnic interpretation, the problem posed by the last sentence in the paragraph is no easier to resolve: the sentence becomes inexplicably redundant in relation to what precedes it. Supposing that the only problem that the preceding lines set out to resolve were the appearance of different languages peculiar to different peoples, it would be hard to see why Epicurus should then introduce ethnic differences as though these were a new element. That is why the translators who adopt that type of interpretation tend to ignore the 15

Sedley 1973, p. 18: 'Epicurus' theory . . . is able not merely to explain language differences in naturalist terms, but even to make them part of its proof. Aristotle had said (De interpret. 1) that language varies while TOL irpdyixara remain constant, but for Epicurus it is precisely because TOL npay[iara vary from region to region that language also varies.'

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29

bothersome /cat (one case in point being Solovine); others, such as Hamelin and Ernout, assume that Epicurus is here referring to dialect variants, which divide the language of a single people into a multitude of regional ways of talking. But that is a desperate ad hoc solution which commands little credence, given the level of generality at which the text as a whole unfolds. The ethnic variant of the 'objective' interpretation runs into fewer difficulties in its attempt to account for the text. According to this interpretation, the distributive expression at the beginning of the text, which introduces the ethnic differences (/ca#5 eVaara edvrj, people by people) implies that the description that follows applies to a process that takes place for each people, since the possibility of that process taking place in different ways among different peoples is not considered. It is within each separate people that the natural elaboration of a lexicon takes place, a lexicon in which the distinctions correspond to the mutual differences of images and affections. Since each people elaborates a system of differences in ignorance of that being elaborated by its neighbours, the overall result of all these processes is the production of many different systems of differences. Epicurus' hypothesis thus manages to give the most economical account possible, both of the fact that each language contains different words (i.e. different from each other) for the sun and the moon (a difference that he attributes to the difference in the impressions that these different objects produce in us), and also of the fact that the words used to designate the sun (or the moon) vary from one language to another (a difference that he ascribes to the different impressions that one and the same object will make upon different 'natures of men'). Nevertheless, the hypothesis remains too schematic. It assumes that the environment in which these different peoples live is identical, and it could only account for precisely superposable lexicons, in which all the words in one particular language found their homologues in all the other languages. That is why, at the end of his text, Epicurus, by way of an extra factor of diversification, reintroduces differences that separate one people from another 'as a result of the places where they live'. Since, in many of the domains of their experience (landscape, flora, fauna), they do not encounter the same objects, different peoples are distinct from one another not only by virtue of the way in which they refer to certain objects, but also in that they have names for some but not for others. In this respect, the diversity of languages not only constitutes a false objection to their naturalness, but indeed positively supports it. After that long discussion, we must now test out the interpretation by determining whether it is compatible with what follows in the text, that is to say the beginning of paragraph 76, in which Epicurus moves on to describe the second phase in his history of languages, the phase in which reasoning, convention and artifice intervene. This description also falls into two parts. In the first, the new developments in language are related to conventions that have become accepted within the ethnic group concerned. In the second,

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further innovations are related to various individual initiatives the end results of which are the creation and adoption of new words. I will, if I may, limit this study to the first of those parts, which is the only one that is really relevant to the present discussion. (The second part raises an extremely thorny problem of textual interpretation which would lead us far beyond the bounds of the present study.) Let us begin with as literal a translation as possible of the portion of the text that interests us. What Epicurus says is: 'Later, however {vorepov Se), in common (KOIVCOS), people by people (/
17

We should retain the manuscripts' reading dAA^Aai?, with Bollack, rather than adopt the correction dXXrjXois, which goes back to the seventeenth century (Meibom) and which, inexplicably, has been adopted by all other modern editors. It was probably this representation that prompted Meiboirfs correction cited in n. 16.

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31

all its members (dans la suite settlement, chaque nation a institue un langage a elle propre, mais commun a tons ses membresy) and Ernout ('within each people, a common language was substituted for an individual language (dans chaque peuple, au langage individuel on substitue un langage commun)'). Jean Bollack has tried to reconcile an individualistic interpretation of the first description with a single meaning being maintained for the word t'Sta in both descriptions. He produces the following translation: 'afterwards they agreed in common, within in each tribe, upon which particular sounds to retain (apres coup, Us convinrent en commun, dans chaque tribu, des sons particuliers a retenir)\ This translation has the merit of introducing the idea - well attested in most areas of Epicurean doctrine - of a selection: the group is said to sift through, not the individual lexicons as they stand in their entirety, but the best expressions contained in each one of them. The group is assumed to pick out the most effective and adopt them for its own use. However, the decisive objection to this ingenious solution is that the text contains nothing at all that corresponds to the 'to retain' (a retenir) that appears in the translation. The idea of a selective process has thus been imposed upon a text that does not contain it. Besides, in what language is the group supposed to have discussed the 'pros' and 'cons' of the various languages invented by its members? If Epicurus is to be credited with such a theory, he must have exposed himself to the very objections that he himself directs against his conventionalist opponents. 18 If an individualistic interpretation of the first phase makes the connection with the second incomprehensible, the ethnic interpretation would appear to deprive it of any precise meaning at all. What would be the point of an agreement the only effect of which would be to confer the force of a law and institution upon a language that had already been evolved naturally? If paragraph 76 does not describe the substitution of a public language in place of a chaos of private ones, what is there that it possibly could be describing? In order to find an answer to that question, let us first note that the conventions mentioned here possess an explicit purpose: the act of institutionalization is deliberate, willed; and it is intended to obtain a result which the parties involved represent to themselves consciously, seemingly through their already acquired linguistic experience. Moreover, this graft of artifice upon a natural basis that necessarily preceded it is in conformity with all that we know of the Epicurean conception of technical creation. 19 Epicurus here describes the conscious aim of the linguistic conventions very carefully, and what he says about the end in view makes it possible - as is so often the case - to form a better understanding of what he says about the means. The purpose of the conventions is clear: it is to render the words for things less equivocal and more concise. In passing, we should do well to admire the sureness of touch of a theory which submits the evolution of languages to a double principle of 18 19

See, for example, Lucretius v. 1050-5. See for example the account of the origins of metallurgy in Lucretius v. 1252-68.

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gradual elimination of (a) misunderstanding and (b) redundancy, both of which are implicitly indicated to be specific hindrances to communication. Above all, however, we should note the use of the two comparatives fjrrov afjLcfriftoXovs and ovvroyLODTepas: they convey that what is being attempted is just slightly to improve the univocity and economy of language. The transformation that the linguistic conventions produce on the natural language is merely one of degree: it is not a transformation in kind. It would have been difficult for Epicurus to use those comparatives if he had conceived of the interconnection between his two phases as a substitution of a public language for a private one, a substitution which would assuredly constitute a profound transformation in kind, affecting the very function of language. On top of all this, we should note the recurrence, in both parts of the text, of the expression 'people by people' (KCL0' eKaora edvr]), which makes it clear that the scale of the processes described in the two phases is identical. One can now see that, even in its original phase, language is conceived as a public language, an instrument of communication in which many interlocutors are engaged. It is, of course, an instrument that is still imperfect, marred by ambiguities and redundancies, but it would not change radically in its essence even when, as a result of rational conventions, it received improving touches that made it more effective and more practicable. What these conventions instituted were particular names for each object in a given language (so the sense of the word TSta remains unchanged from what we have seen it to be in the preceding paragraph, yet truly does designate what are the names that emerged after the convention, not those that existed before it). Those names are now more precise and more sober, but the contract confers upon the language no fundamental dimension of which the contractors were not already aware. 20 I believe that we may thus conclude that neither the literal text nor the structure of the theory behind it dictates the hypothesis of an original phase of 'private language'; indeed, both can be explained perfectly well if we dispense with that hypothesis. To extend the discussion, I should now like to show that the hypothesis of a private language was only read into this Epicurean theory as a result of a number of general preconceptions concerning Epicurean philosophy as a whole, and that a critique of that hypothesis makes it possible to dispel those preconceptions, with encouraging results. Despite the paradoxes that it incorporates from a conceptual point of view, 10

Here again the restriction is in conformity with a condition that the Epicureans censured their opponents for not respecting: what is useful cannot be aimed for unless it is known, through experience, to be useful (see Lucretius v.181-6 and 1046-9). This perfecting which does not alter the essence of what it perfects corresponds exactly with the idea expressed by the verb inaKpLfiovv (to describe in detail, with hindsight), used by Epicurus at the beginning of paragraph 75 to denote the first of the two functions fulfilled by 'reasoning' in the overall evolution of culture. The second function, expressed by the verb npooegevpLOKeiv (to add new discoveries), was also to be strictly matched in the description of the second conventional modality for enriching language.

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33

the notion of private language may easily be imported into a doctrine that it has become customary to summarize using three labels: sensualism in the theory of knowledge, atomism in physics, individualism in ethics. The general view is that, where Epicurus is concerned, all knowledge stems, directly or indirectly, from the senses. But if man's only contact with external reality is through his senses, that contact through sensation is not far from being a separation; the opening on to the world becomes a closing-in upon oneself, sensualism becomes solipsism. Even if my own sensations are aroused only by the physical action of another body on my body, they remain, for all that, my sensations, that is to say modifications of the self which conceal their causes from me to the extent that they are only the effects of those causes. Hence the temptation to read into the mention of 'particular' images and affections which give rise to natural language an allusion to this consciousness immured in itself. This temptation may be encouraged by an impression that has struck many commentators on Epicurus, even if they have not formulated it as decisively as did the young Karl Marx in his doctoral dissertation on Democritus and Epicurus:21 the Epicurean atom appears not only as a physical concept but also as a figure or metaphor for self-awareness. The obvious parallelism between the description of the association of atoms in compound bodies and that of the grouping of individuals in social 'bodies' provides a particularly striking illustration of this metaphorical relationship.22 However, the relationship is easy enough to reverse: if the atom is a figure for self-awareness, self-awareness may be represented on the model of the atom, that is to say as an undeformable unit, a monolithic block closed upon itself, a little island of self-presence which is delimited and separated from others by the void. Can the language that such a consciousness invents naturally for itself be anything other than a language whose signs have meaning only for the one who produces them? If one furthermore remembers that Epicureanism is so susceptible to the radical individuality of beings that, long before Leibnitz, it expressed a principle of the discernibility of non-identicals,23 one might easily ascribe to Epicurus the idea that natural language is differentiated just as individually as the internal world of which it is the instinctive expression. The logic of this interpretation would be to deny any truly conceptual character to the instinctive language of the first phase of Epicurus' theory: according to this view, that phase would involve variously modulated cries corresponding to the various feelings and emotions, rather than signs whose discriminatory and informative quality only appears when there is an intention to engage in relations of exchange and communication with some interlocutor, that is to say at the stage of socialization. Such an interpretation has indeed been proposed,24 but it is worth noting not only that it runs into difficulties of an internal nature (thefirstvocal sounds 21 22 23

See Ponnier's translation, M a r x 1970; see also G a b a u d e 1970; M a r k o v i t s 1974. See for example Lucretius 11.111 (consociare . . . motus). 24 See Lucretius n.342ff. D e Lacy 1939, p p . 8 5 - 9 3 .

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correspond to cu>Taor/xara, which are images of objects, as well as to 7ra0rj), but also that it involves a historical error. 2 5 It seems that Epicurus may indeed have known of conceptions of the origin of language in which the earliest phase of human language was represented on an animal model, as the inarticulate expression of emotions, and that he deliberately rejected that representation. It was probably present in Democritus, if we agree to follow the many historians who attribute to him the fundamental elements of a cultural history traces of which are to be found in much later authors such as Vitruvius and Diodorus Siculus.26 In Diodorus, for example, the first stage of the genesis of language is constituted by the appearance of confused sounds devoid of meaning (
does an articulated language emerge, with distinct names for everything and reciprocal communication between several interlocutors. But the Epicurean tradition spectacularly dispenses with such a hypothesis: its naturalism never lowers the barriers that separate humanity from animality, and the natural language that it envisages is, right from the start, an articulated language with conceptual meaning and objective reference. Lucretius, it is true, does compare the cries of animals and human speech, but he does so a fortiori, in order to establish the natural character of the latter, without, however, passing over what makes it specifically different from the former: if the animals without language (muta) emit various sounds (yarias voces) which correspond to their various sensations (varii sensus), then, and even more so (quanto magis), men have been able, ever since the earliest times, to designate different things (dissimiles res notare), using a gamut of different sounds (alia atque alia voce).28 Diogenes of Oenoanda, the author of the extraordinary mural inscription summarizing Epicureanism for the benefit of his fellow-citizens, rejects even more emphatically any theological or conventional theory of the origin of articulated sounds ((/>66yyoi) and deems it necessary to specify that by this he means the nouns and verbs (ovofjidrcov KOLL prjixdrcov) that men 'born from the earth' emitted for the very first time. 29 Natural language is thus represented as possessing a semantic and syntactic organization from the very first moment of its emergence. In that case why, on an apparently speculative point, did Epicureanism insist upon distancing itself from a representation of the genesis of languages which, if it is true that that representation originated in Democritus, probably formed part of its horizon of references? The answer to this question will require us to specify what was at stake when Epicureanism declared its own position to be different. In the first place, it may be assumed that its rejection of that representation constituted a response to its 'positivist' desire to advance no hypothesis concerning a past that, by definition, is impossible to seize upon 25 28 29

26 27 See Vlastos 1946, p p . 51-9. See Cole 1967. D i o d o r u s 1.8, 3. Lucretius v . i 0 8 7 - 9 0 . See Chilton 1967; 1971 (fragment 10); 1962, p p . 159-67; and the judicious assessment of the discussions on this point by Rodis-Lewis 1975, p p . 312-18.

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35

directly unless it is guaranteed, in one way or another, by some phenomenon that is perceptible in our own current experience. Now, the current use of language, as the Epicurean authors saw it, contains no perceptible trace of a presemantic and inarticulate state of voice usage, nor of any phase of purely private language. Lucretius notes that, in the individual evolution of a child, what precedes the use of language is the gesture of pointing a finger at things, and this behaviour already refers to the things that the child wants and the people to whom it is appealing. 30 No doubt Epicurean epistemology does admit, indeed even recommends, the practice of making conjectures that are impossible to verify directly, in order to explain phenomena that it is possible to apprehend. But it does not recommend, indeed positively forbids, forging hypotheses which cannot be checked by any direct or indirect method of confirmation - or, at the very least, 'non-infirmation'. But it is possible to move beyond this first response to the question. As has already been pointed out, one genetic theory can be set up in opposition to another, not simply on the grounds that it gives a better account of the observable data concerning the phenomenon under inspection, but also because it believes itself to be more faithful to the essential characteristics of that phenomenon. A diachronic analysis, an account of origins, the conjectures to which these give rise, and the polemics that they provoke very often are substitutes for the discussion of problems to do with essences, and also for the synchronic analysis of concepts and the necessary links between concepts. To include or not to include a phase A in the history of phenomenon B is to pronounce upon the essential content of the concept of B. If that is so, it is possible to see that the Epicurean refusal to conceive of primitive language as an animal and inarticulate expression of the subjective states of human consciousness corresponds to an analysis of human experience in which sensations and affections are through abstraction separable from the language that articulates and structures them. The label 'sensualism' is particularly misleading here, because there is a danger that it will make one forget that what ensures the epistemological (incontestable) quality of sensation in Epicureanism is, precisely, an analysis which, in abstract fashion, takes to bits a totality whose elements are never apprehended separately in psychological experience: the famous thesis of the infallibility of sensations is only valid for a sensation defined as the abstract limit of the analysis. Epicurus says: 'All sensation is mute (aAoyo?) and admits of no memory (^77^77? ovSefjiias SeKTLKrj)\3 1 in other words, as soon as there is added to a sensation a memory which links it synthetically to other previous sensations of the same kind together with the word which formulates that which is felt in the sensation, something other than the sensation itself has already come into play. This other 'something', which does not possess the infallibility of sensation, but is unaffected by the limitations of the present moment and the 30

Lucretius v.i030-2.

31

Cited by Diogenes Laertius x.31.

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proviso that it be unexpressed, is §d£a, judgement, the fundamental tools of which are notions and words. The role of concepts and judgements in the Epicurean psychology of knowledge is so vast and so fundamental that it would not be exaggerated to speak of intellectualism in this connection. To be convinced of that, one has only to read the rather astonishing passage in which Lucretius analyses the illusion that makes us believe that our shadow is following us and copying our movements.32 It informs us that our eyes are only judged capable of seeing light and shade wherever the latter happen to be and at the particular moment when they happen to be there. In contrast, it is up to reason (ratio) to decide (at the risk of making a mistake) whether a series of images which successively occupy adjoining positions should be interpreted as the perception of the movement of a single object which remains identical even when it moves (as is usually the case), or whether, on the contrary (as in the case of the shadow that seems to be moving), it is a matter of an illusory synthesis which confers the status and consistency of a real object upon what is in reality no more than a cinematographic succession of apparitions which then disappear immediately. There could be no better way of showing that, in Epicurean doctrine, the fundamental categories of objectivity (unity, identity, permanence) stem from what, in Kantian vocabulary, might be called logic, rather than aesthetics. What we perceive of our sensations is not the brute fact of them but the result of the form that conceptual structures impose upon that brute fact. It is thus impossible for the history of human culture to dissociate, in a succession of separate phases, two moments that may be distinguishable in theoretical reflection but which, as experienced, are inseparable. Language, in its original form, could not be the pure expression of sensation, for when sensation speaks it is no longer sensation that is speaking. Yet - it might be argued - there would be nothing to prevent primitive language being a conceptual elaboration of experience, even if it were elaborated in a purely individual fashion which differed from one individual to another. It would be mistaken to confuse an interpretation which presents it as a multiplicity of'individual, precise and coherent systems' (Jean Bollack), with an interpretation which imagined it as 'emotional cries, expressing love, fear and other sentiments of this kind, but saying nothing that could be specifically related to external objects' (Phillip De Lacy). Nevertheless, having recognized that difference, in every individualist interpretation, whatever form its details may take, we notice the effect of the questionable extrapolation of the model of the atom into the psychological domain. This model - if it is a model - seems to me to play a normative role in Epicurean thought, rather than a descriptive one. The ideal of the individual self (the ideal of the sage) is to come to resemble an atom, to become, like it, invulnerable, imperishable, inviolate. In this respect, Epicurus' morality might be presented as a programme for imitating an atom, which really is the same as a programme for imitating God. But when 32

Lucretius iv.365-86.

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37

it comes to describing the constitution of man, Epicurus never forgets that man is an atomic compound. This physical status includes negative aspects (every compound is decomposable), but also positive ones: it is thanks to his composition that man is able to sustain ordered exchanges with the environment that surrounds him, and to derive from it enrichment on the physiological and the psychological levels; it is man's composition that makes him capable of possessing a history. So if physics can provide a model of intelligibility for the history of human culture, we must expect that model to be at the level of compound bodies, which evolve in constant interaction with other ones, rather than at the level of atoms, which pass through the void of space and time without being intrinsically affected by it. This compound nature is at the same time a specific nature, and if we take the specificity of human nature into consideration, we are bound to rectify the effects of a unilateral accentuation of the principle of individuation in Epicurus on the interpretation. It is perfectly true that, in his eyes, no natural being is exactly the same as another; but it is equally true that individual differences only count within a field of variation strictly delimited by the laws of the constitution of natural species. It is a prototypical case of the application of a schema of free variation within well-defined limits - a schema the importance and polyvalency of which have been judiciously demonstrated in every area of Epicurean thought. 33 The stability and specificity of human nature are but one of the aspects of the regularity that reigns throughout nature universally, and that, basically, is why it is legitimate for us to extend our knowledge by the use of induction and analogy. In this respect, it is very revealing to observe the positions adopted by the Epicureans in the discussions in which they were opposed by the Stoics over the norms for interpreting natural signs. (An echo of those discussions is preserved in the De signis of the Epicurean Philodemus.) 34 According to a simplistic and stereotyped schema (Stoic 'rationalism', Epicurean 'empiricism'), one would expect to find the Stoics taking their stand on the basis of the rationality of reality so as to anticipate regularities by means of reason, and the Epicureans checking the tendency to generalize by underlining their warnings on the score of the unpredictable diversity of experience. However, it is, on the contrary, the Stoics who draw attention to the anomalies of the universe, the possibility that there may be exceptions to any rule, and the dangers of extrapolating from a few particular cases noted in the course of experience; while the Epicureans are busy underlining the analogies of experience, the faithful adherence of nature to its own laws and the legitimacy of amplificatory induction. Within such a framework, the Epicurean version of the naturalist response to the problem of the origin of language may well have passed beyond a summary equation between what is natural and what is universal, but it was unlikely to go to the opposite extreme and profess that originally there 33 34

See D e Lacy 1969b, p p . 172-4 (summary of a study published in full in Phoenix 23, 1969). See D e Lacy 1978.

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appeared as many different languages as there were individuals. It is much more likely that Epicurus imagined the original languages in the form of a diversity tempered by the limitation of possible divergences and by the regularity of the determining conditions. The identity of the environment for the inhabitants of the same geographical zone and the similarity of the natural reactions of the members of the same ethnic group are in all likelihood the factors which, in combination, were judged necessary and sufficient to account for the appearance, here and there, of linguistic codes common to a particular group of individuals, even before those individuals consciously worked something out together. In support of this hypothesis, two other arguments may be mentioned:first,the fact that late doxography attributes to Epicurus a total assimilation between linguistic emissions and the production of sounds such as coughing or sneezing, which may be observed amongst all individuals placed in identical conditions35 (in a mood of polemical irony, this testimony certainly seems to simplify the matter since it overlooks the ethnic differentiation of languages which, for Epicurus, emerges right from the start; on the other hand, it prompts one not to carry the indispensable rectification beyond the point at which this doxographical tradition would become unintelligible); secondly, the few texts which attest, like it or not, the existence of an Epicurean form of'racism', asserting, for instance, that the Greeks alone are capable of philosophizing.36 The Epicurean theory of language, which reflects the essence of the philosophy of Epicurus, can thus be seen as a construction whose coherence with the Epicurean system as a whole is such that it can serve as a point of departure for a more precise and more discriminatory definition of the fundamental axes of this system. 35

36

See Proclus, In Platonis Cratylum 16 (Usener 335): the first users of language (according to Epicurus) did not institute n o u n s in a scholarly way (iTTiorrjiJLovws), but t h r o u g h a natural p r o m p t i n g (^VGIKOJS KLVOVJJL€VOL), like those w h o cough, sneeze, shriek, cry out, groan. See Clement of Alexandria, Stromates 1.15 (Usener 226). Diogenes Laertius says, similarly (x.117) that, according to Epicurus, one would not be able to become a sage without a particular physical disposition or unless one belonged to a particular people. Strangely, this passage elicits no c o m m e n t a r y in Bollack 1975, p . 23.

REMARKS ON THE STOIC THEORY OF THE PROPER NOUN*

There is not much chance of being wrong when one declares the theory of the proper noun to be positioned at a strategic crossroads in Stoic thought. It is fair to say (with the modulated reservations that such a declaration demands) that it was the Stoics who invented the grammatical category of the proper noun and it was by no mere chance that they did so. Their logic, unlike Aristotle's, allots to the singular proposition a place of fundamental importance. Their ontology attributes to every existent an individuality which makes it, in principle, discernible from every other; their theory of knowledge extends to representations the discernibility of the objects that they represent. That is to say, by tugging on the metaphorical string of the proper noun, one could easily unravel the entire skein of Stoicism, thereby vindicating the constant claims of systematicity that partisans of the doctrine were in the habit of advancing. 1 In the limited space available here, I shall do no more than sketch in just such a claim on my own behalf.

The framework for the invention of the proper noun is the theory of the parts of discourse which the Stoics did not themselves invent but to which they attached great importance and also made decisive contributions. 2 In listing the classes of words that make up the logos qua discourse, the description of linguistic structures per se seems not to have been their sole concern; for they thought that such an inventory would reveal to them the very elements of the logos qua reason.3 However, in their divisions of the logical 'place' of * The present paper is a revised version of one given at the 'Logique et Grammaire' Colloquium, on 28 January 1983. In it I have tried to take account of the comments that were put to me, in particular by Claude Imbert and Francois Recanati. I delivered later versions of this paper at the Universities of Pisa and Rome, where I benefited from further extremely useful remarks. I am also particularly grateful for the comments of Anthony Lloyd and David Sedley. They should in no way be held responsible for my failure to heed all their prudent advice. 1 Cf. Cicero, Definibus m. 74; iv. 53. 2 Texts in FDS 536-93. (The abbreviation FDS refers to K. Hiilser (ed.), Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4 vols., Stuttgart 1987-9.1 should like to thank Karlheinz Hiilser most warmly for putting this monumental work at my disposal before publication.) 3 Epictetus, Discourses iv.8. 12; Chrysippus in SVFn, p. 41,11. 27-33. Cf. Frede 1978, pp. 59-60. (The abbreviation SVFrefers to J. von Arnim (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Stuttgart 1903-5; unless otherwise indicated, the number of the volume is referred to in Roman numerals, the number of the fragment in Arabic numerals.)

39

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philosophy, they drew a fundamental distinction between the study of signifiers and that of what is signified; and it is where the signifiers are concerned that they inserted their theory of the parts of discourse. 4 In this respect, they were working as grammarians when, for the first time, they introduced the proper noun as a type of signifier which they deemed it necessary to isolate and classify separately. Actually, they did not introduce the proper noun under its traditional name. The traditional name came from the ancient grammarians who, according to Philo of Alexandria, had simply elaborated the discoveries of the philosophers; 5 and on the whole modern scholarship agrees with him, dubbing the Stoics the founders of western grammar. 6 But although the grammarians themselves frequently refer to the 'philosophers' (namely, the Stoics), they do so as to a group to which they do not themselves belong; and they are often at pains to distance themselves from their doctrines, their classifications and their vocabulary, as if to underline the philosophical neutrality of their own scholarship. The case of the proper noun is one example of this: the grammarians rebaptized the child found by the Stoics. To be more precise: by Chrysippus. Before him, Zeno and Cleanthes had recognized only four parts to discourse: the noun, the verb, the article and the conjunction (or rather what they called by names which are the sources of the modern grammatical terms 'noun', 'verb', etc.); under the heading noun (OVO/JLO) they included (as had their predecessors) the common noun, the proper noun and the adjective (which is easy to turn into a noun in Greek 7 ). From Chrysippus on and in particular at the hands of Diogenes of Babylon, his disciple and second successor and the author of an influential treatise entitled Tlepl (frcovrjs, the list was increased to five8 (and in this form was to continue to be considered specifically Stoic 9) by the addition of the TTpoarjyopta (appellation). This corresponded to the common noun (and to the adjective); the word ovo[xa now designated only the proper noun. The grammarians were to preserve the distinction using a different vocabulary which distinguished the ovofia Kvpiov (proper noun or, to be more exact, noun properly speaking) from the ovofjua TTpoor/yopLKov (appellative or common noun). 10 The change in vocabulary draws attention to one peculiarity of Stoic nomenclature: OVO/JLCL and Trpoorjyopia are terms that do not resemble each other. The Stoics did not wish to subdivide 6vo\xa in its wide sense into two sub-species. For them, 'proper noun' and 'common noun' are two autonomous parts of discourse which possess no more affinity with each other than they do with the three other parts (although, as we shall see, this tendency is counterbalanced by an opposite tendency to conceive each on the model of the 4 6 7 10

5 Diogenes Laertius vii.43, 44, 57, 62. De congressu 146-50 (SVF 11.99; FDS 4X6). Cf. Pohlenz 1939, Barwick 1957, Pinborg 1975, Frede 1977/87. Dionysius of Halicamassus, De Demosthenis dictione 48 (FDS 537), De compositione verborum 8 9 2 (FDS 538). Diogenes Laertius vii.57-8. Cf. FDS 542-44, 548, 549. Dionysius of Thrace, Ars grammatica 12 (FDS 564).

THE THEORY OF THE PROPER NOUN

41

other). Only the proper noun is called 6Vo/xa: it and it alone fulfils the function of naming. The TTpoarjyopta is not an ovofjua; there is nothing that is named by a common noun, for example 'man' (a critique of Platonism is latent in this refusal to identify the irpoorjyopia with a species of oVojua11). Can we understand why the common noun was called a Trpoo^yopial At first sight, the term seems ill-chosen: people are called by their proper names, addressed by their proper names; 12 and most beings with a proper name are people, beings who understand language and who answer to their names (so far as I know, the Stoics did not consider any other cases). But it is also possible to call individual X (for example, Agamemnon) 'Y' ('pastor of peoples'); such a construction may have led to the distinction between appellation and naming, as two linguistic operations that can both be carried out upon the same object, hence two operations, each of a different type. As we shall see, the Stoic definitions of the ovofjua and the Trpoorjyopia are semantic. It is worth noting, however, that morphological considerations (differences in the declension system, the presence or absence of patronymic derivations) and also syntactical ones (the possibility or impossibility of construing the noun with articles of different genders) had also been invoked to support the distinction. On the basis of a number of (over-) particular cases, the Stoics had tried to show that the proper noun and the common noun had different grammars. 13 But they had not been able to proceed very far along this track as, in Greek, their grammar is identical in two crucial respects: (a) both can be construed with an article; (b) both can be declined. I imagine that the Stoics were very much aware of these characteristics held in common. In principle, whether the Greek proper noun is presented with or without an article is not simply a matter of chance. A typical case is where, in a story, a character is introduced by his own name, X; the next time he appears, he is presented as 'the X' (i.e. who has been mentioned above). This anaphoric force of the article stems from its past as a demonstrative pronoun, of which the Stoics were well aware: they referred to both articles and pronouns as 'articles', and, in justification of this, cited Homeric examples in which the article patently possesses a pronominal character. 14 They called the article itself an 'indefinite article' on the basis of expressions such as 6 Trepnrarcbv KIVZITCLI (he - whoever he may be - who walks, moves). 15 We may suppose, accordingly, that the possibility of construing a proper noun with or without an article then suggested the following analysis: just as 6 TTepnrarcov designates him whoever he may be - who is walking, just so 6 ZcoKpdrrjs designates him whoever he may be 16 - who is Socrates; correlatively the proper noun Cf. Bestor 1980a and 1980b. Cf. the Stoic name for the apostrophe, irpooayopevrLKov (Diogenes Laertius vii.67, complemented by Ammonius, In Arist. De interpr., p. 2, 26 Busse, SVF11.188, FDS 897). Cf. Scholia in Dionys. Thr., p. 356, i6ff. Hilgard (FDS 567). Apollonius Dyscolus, Depronominibus, p. 5, 2off. Maas (FDS 550). * 5 Ibid., p. 6, 306°. For example: whether he is young or old, seated or standing, etc.

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g, considered in isolation, must designate the property that being Socrates consists in possessing. In support of this hypothesis, let me begin by citing a passage from Diogenes Laertius (vn.6i) where the notions of the supreme genus and the smallest possible species are set out alongside each other: 'the most general' (yeviKwrarov) is that which, being a genus, itself has no genus, for example the being; 'the most specialized' (elSiKwrarov) is that which, being a species, itself has no species; and the example here is not the species infima, the species beneath which there are only individuals, but the individual himself, designated by a proper noun construed with an article: 6 EcoKpdrrjs. If 6 IcoKpdrrjs designates the individual who, on his own, constitutes a species, it is plausible to interpret ZcoKpdrrjs as the designation of the property that characterizes this species. The particular syntax of the Greek proper noun must thus have made it possible for the Stoics to take up an anticipatory position on the classic problem of the theory of the proper noun, namely the problem of whether it has a meaning, as a common noun does, or only a reference. And we may suppose (but will need to produce supplementary verification) that their solution closely resembled the one that a philosopher of our own times summarizes as follows: '[proper names] have essentially a sense and only contingently a reference - they refer only on the condition that one and only one object satisfies their sense'. 17 For the Stoics, the use of the article expressed that distinction graphically, by indicating that the condition in question is indeed fulfilled. Before proceeding with an examination of this hypothesis, let us turn our attention to the second grammatical characteristic that is shared by the proper noun and the common noun: declension (in which, as we know, the 'cases' still bear the names conferred upon them by the Stoics). We should note that, for the Stoics, the theory of declension belongs to the study of what is signified, not what signifies: they inferred this from the fact that a genitive, for example, is formed differently in different Greek dialects, 18 but they probably also had other reasons for thinking in this way. The declension of a proper noun raises a problem: does Socrates have but one name or several, and if he has but one, what is it? Why should it be the nominative ZcoKpdrrjs rather than the accusative ZtoKpaTrjv, or any other case? More generally, in connection with the common noun as well as the proper noun, the Stoics had argued against Aristotle on the question of whether the nominative should be considered as a case (a TTTCOOLS); but it so happens that the examples used in the sources that record this debate are all taken from proper nouns. 19 For Aristotle, Socrates' name is the 'nominative' IcoKparrfs; only the other declined forms are TTTO)O€LS of that noun, literally 'clippings' from it, various figures of its 'decline / declension'. His justification for favouring the nominative in this way is that only the nominative can 17 19

18 Searle 1958/67, p. 92. Scholia in Dionys. Thr., p. 230, 24 (FDS 773). Cf. Ammonius, In Arist. De interpr., p. 42, 3off. Busse (FDS 776).

THE THEORY OF THE PROPER NOUN

43

combine with a verb to constitute a Xoyog that may be either true or false.20 The Stoics accept neither his argument nor his conclusion. Taking into consideration not only the standard example to which Aristotle had confined himself, but also the non-standard one in which an impersonal verb is construed with an oblique case (for example, icoKpdrei fxeraixeXec: 'Socrates repents', but literally: 'there is reason for Socrates to repent'), 21 they conclude that the expression of the subject is not always monopolized by the nominative, but always appears as one or another case of a declinable term. The nominative ceases to be that in relation to which the other cases 'decline', and itself becomes a form of'declension-declining' in relation to a matrix which is not itself able to be presented linguistically and which may be described as something signified without a specific signifier, something signified by a family of signifiers. These ideas certainly played a role in the conception of the proper noun as possessing a meaning; for when asked whence the 'cases' could 'decline', the Stoics replied 'from the concept that exists in the soul', and it was again the example of a proper noun that constituted the basis of their demonstration. 22 We have within us a 'concept of Socrates' (TO ZcoKpdrovs vorjfjia), which we 'indicate' (S^Aouacu) when we pronounce the name ZcoKpdrrjs. Leaving aside the matter of what is peculiar to the case of the proper noun, this analysis makes it possible to understand how it was that the theory of declension could be considered as belonging to the study of what is signified, and why commentators continue to put forward conflicting interpretations of the notion of UTCQOIS, the position of which is difficult to pin down in relation to the distinction between signifiers and signified.23 The fact that the Stoics took into account the two grammatical characteristics that the proper noun shares with the common noun, - i.e. it can be construed with an article and it can also be declined - may thus explain how it was that they considered the proper noun to have a meaning. However, there is also the possibility that those two characteristics may lead one to represent that meaning differently, in relation to the dogmas of Stoic ontology. Following the former of these two possibilities, one is led to conceive the proper noun as the linguistic correspondent of the property which characterizes the species that a single individual constitutes; to the extent that it makes from a piece of matter an individual unlike any other, this quality may be defined as an agent and so as something as real and corporeal as the individual whom it qualifies. In contrast, following the second possibility, one is led to give the proper noun a conceptual meaning. Now the status of concepts, in Stoic ontology, is extremely flimsy: they are 'figments of the soul' of which it cannot even be said that they are 'something' (like the incorporeals which the Stoics admitted to 'subsist'); the most that can be said of them is that they are 20 21 22 23

Aristotle, De interpr., 2, i 6 a 3 2 - b 5 . A m m o n i u s , In Arist. De interpr., p . 44, 1 iff. (SKF11.184; FDS 791); cf. FDS 793 a n d 795. Cf. the text cited above n. 19. O n this point, see Frede 1978, Graeser 1978, Sedley 1982b.

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'almost something' (cboaveLTLva).24 Both these statuses are distinct from that of the well-known and problematical XeKrov (which is incorporeal but is nevertheless a 'something') - a matter to which we shall have to return. Furthermore, they are also distinct from one another; but there is no reason to doubt their compatibility. A physical object fits into a certain concept if and only if it possesses a certain quality, and this is not to prejudge either the ontological status of the concept nor that of the quality. The name that it bears relates both to the quality that it possesses and to the concept into which it fits. II

The Stoic definitions of the common noun and the proper noun that have come down to us are those of Diogenes of Babylon. It is time that we took a look at them. The appellation (Trpoorjyopia) is a part of discourse which signifies a common quality (cr^/u-cuvov KOLVTJV TroLorrjTa), such as 'man', 'horse'; the noun (OVO/JLCL) is a

part of discourse which indicates a particular quality (SrjXovv Ihiav TTOLOT^TO), such as 'Diogenes', 'Socrates' (Aioyevrjs, ZWparr?? - no article). 25

These definitions are worth examining by reason of both what they share in common and also what is particular to each of them. Both define their object by its relation - a semantic relation - to a term which, in both cases, is a quality, common in the one case, particular in the other. But these definitions did not become generally accepted and the grammarians later in both cases replaced TTOLOTI^S by ovata (possibly understanding this word to mean essence in the case of the common noun and substance in that of the proper noun). 26 Neither the Stoics nor the grammarians appear to have thought of saying that a proper noun designates a substance, a common noun a quality. The categorical homogeneity of the two types of nouns seems to have been presupposed by both parties. But the reform introduced by the grammarians draws attention to what is felt to be paradoxical in the Stoic definitions: namely, the idea that a noun (whether proper or common) signifies a quality (TTOLOTTJS) rather than an object qualified in a particular manner (TTOLOV TL). And this provides confirmation that the idea was a specifically Stoic one - which is exactly what we suspected above. On the other hand, our two definitions do differ on one important point: they do not use the same word to express the semantic relationship which links the noun and the quality. The common noun signifies (orj/jiaLvov) a common quality; the proper noun indicates (SrjXovv) a particular quality. Here again, the grammarians were to intervene to restore the homogeneity between the 24 26

Diogenes Laertius VII.6I; Stobaeus, Eclogae 1, p. 136, 21 Wachsmuth (SKF1.65; FDS 316); on 25 this text, see Frede 1977/87. Diogenes Laertius vii.58. Cf. Choeroboscus, Prolegomena, p. 106, 3-12 Hilgard (FDS 563); Dionysius of Thrace, Ars grammatica 12 (FDS 564).

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27

two definitions, using OTHJLOLLVOV in both. The difference that the Stoics tried to establish is certainly significant and one might be tempted to say that it calls into question the hypothesis that I have put forward above: in avoiding the use of orjjjLdLveiv in connection with a proper noun, might not Diogenes have wished to indicate that he attributed to it no connotation, only a denotation? However, that is not a very plausible explanation, precisely because it is the quality, not the individual who is qualified, that is the object of the controversial participle SrjXovv.28 It would be more satisfying to seek the reason for the change of terminology in the difference between a particular quality and a common quality. One attractive solution might run as follows: a common quality is definable. One can state without hesitation that the noun which designates it has a meaning, because other expressions which mean the same also exist. By refraining from using the verb cr^/xcuWiv to describe the proper noun's manner of signifying, Diogenes may have wished to suggest that, on the contrary, the proper noun has no synonyms and can be replaced by no definition or paraphrase. The 'indicating' of the particular quality is a task that nothing else can accomplish in its place. Whatever the fact of the matter may be on this particular point (to which we shall also be returning), Diogenes' definition relates the proper noun to a unique correlative, the particular quality, which is a corporeal reality but is not identical to the individual whom it qualifies. In view of this, it needs to be compared with Sextus Empiricus' famous text which is traditionally cited as the canonical exposition of Stoic semantics (M VIII.I 1-12). The comparison is all the more desirable given that in this text too a proper noun is used as an example. Here, then, is a translation of this passage; but in studying it, we should not forget that it is part of a more general account of the various answers that the dogmatic philosophers produce in reply to the question of what is the proper subject of what is true and what is false. According to the Stoics, what is properly true or false is what is signified (orjfjLaLvofjLevov). Sextus comments upon this answer in the following terms: There are three [items] that are linked together: the signified, the signifier and the bearer (rvyxoivov).29 The signifier is the vocal sound ((fycovrj), for example the vocal sound 4Dio' (ALCDV, no article); the signified is the thing itself (avro TO TTpayfjia)30 which is indicated (S^Xovfjuevov) by the vocal sound and which we seize in exchange (dvTiAa/zj3avoju,£0a: in exchange for hearing the vocal sound?) as subsisting in our thought, whereas Barbarians do not understand, even if they do hear the vocal sound; the bearer is the external subject (TO IKTOS V7TOK€IJJL€VOV), such as Dio himself (OLVTOS 6 Ala>v, with an article). Of these 27 29

30

Or 8r]\ovv in both cases: cf. Scholia in Dionys. Thr., p. 357, 18 Hilgard (FDS 567), p. 215, 1 28 (FDS 568). Cf. Graeser 1978, pp. 82ff. This term was for a long time understood as 'what h a p p e n s to exist'. O n the possibility of a different interpretation, derived from the expression, tTTtooecos Tvyxdvetv, cf. Pinborg 1962, p . 84; Frede 1977/87, p . 64; Graeser 1978, p . 84; Sedley 1982b, p p . 198-9. M y own translation draws on Sedley's. O n this use of TTpdyixa, cf. H a d o t 1980, p . 315, w h o translates it as 'sense'.

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[items], two are bodies, namely the vocal sound and the bearer; the third is incorporeal, namely the thing signified, that is to say what is said (/cat XCKTOV), and it is precisely this that is true or false. What this text seems to be saying, as explicitly as possible, is that a proper noun possesses both an incorporeal meaning (which is a lekton) and a corporeal reference (which is the actual individual who bears this name). However, it is not certain that this passage makes it necessary to call into question all that has been said up to this point. There are several hints which suggest that the example of a proper noun does not altogether correspond to the doctrine that it is supposed to be illustrating, and that it may have been mistakenly slapped on to an exposition for which it was ill-suited.31 (i) Sextus mentions the vocal sound 'Dio' to illustrate the <WT], and the physical person of Dio to illustrate the rvyxdvov; but he maintains a prudent or embarrassed silence as to what is signified by the sound 'Dio'. (2) The XCKTOV is what Greeks understand and Barbarians do not, upon hearing the same sequence of vocal sounds; Barbarians would understand if they heard a different sequence, determined in an appropriate fashion as a translation of the first sequence. But a proper noun is the worst possible example to choose in order to put one's finger on the distinct existence of such a reality, for it is the one element in a language which, in principle, it is neither necessary nor possible to translate. (3) The example of a proper noun is no better adapted to illustrate the central thesis of this passage, to wit the designation of what is signified as the proper subject of truth or falsehood; for what is signified by the proper noun, however one conceives it, is certainly neither true nor false. Indeed, Sextus himself seems to notice this: immediately after the lines cited above, he hastens to introduce a distinction between an incomplete Ac/crov and a complete one, explaining that it is only the complete XeKrov, the d^tcofjua, that is properly true or false. To this it is worth adding that in most other sources an incorporeal XeKrov is associated with only two types of linguistic expressions, neither of which is a noun, common or proper: one is a complete sentence, of which one species, the a|ico/za, carries a true or false meaning; and the other is the part of that sentence which contains the verb and whatever may complement it. There is no reason at all to believe that all the parts of a complete XCKTOV must express an incomplete Ae/crov.32 For all these reasons, it does not seem necessary to attach any particular importance, in this text of Sextus', to the example of the proper noun, or to believe that one must take account of it in order to rectify, complete or in one way or another rearrange Diogenes' definition. That definition, which associates with the proper noun neither the expression of an incorporeal XeKrov nor the immediate reference to the physical individual, may continue to serve as our guide. 31 32

Cf. the different interpretations of L o n g 1971, p p . 7 6 - 7 , 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 , n. 11; Frede 1977/8, p p . 64ff. Cf. Diogenes Laertius vii.63; L o n g 1971, p p . 104-5; Frede 1977/8, p p . 63ff.

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III

The Stoics studied the conditions of truth in various types of propositions, including those which are composed of a proper noun and a verb. By studying their conclusions vis-a-vis the latter and trying to understand the reasons for their decisions, we may hope to throw a bridge between their grammar of the proper noun and their logic of the proper noun. As we know, they drew a distinction between simple propositions and those that are composed of several simple propositions linked by connectors. Where simple propositions were concerned, they introduced a tripartite division. This is transmitted to us by two texts, one by Sextus Empiricus (M vm.96-8), the other by Diogenes Laertius (vn.68-70). These two simple expositions are not exactly interchangeable,33 and I lack the space to compare them thoroughly, so have decided to concentrate on the text by Sextus. That by Diogenes poses a number of textual problems and does not take into consideration truthconditions, despite the fact that these seem to have played a decisive role in the establishing of this classification. According to Sextus, there are three types of simple propositions: definite ones (oopicTfxeVa), indefinite ones (dopiora) and middle or intermediate ones (fieaa). Propositions in which the subject is a proper noun fall into the third category (but are not the only propositions to do so). Definite propositions are those that are 'stated in an ostensive mode' (Kara Sel^iv eK^epofjueva), and accompanied by a gesture of showing, for example: This one is walking' (OVTOS 7T€pLTrar€t). In stating this proposition, says Sextus, T indicate, point to (SeLKvvfit) a particular man.' It could be objected that there is really no need for that: there is nothing to prevent one uttering that sentence without bothering to gesture. Possibly the Stoics were at this point thinking of the movements of the cheeks that accompany the emission of the sounds made by OVTOS. Chrysippus had pointed out that when pronouncing the word cyc6, we tend to drop our chin towards our chest, and from this he argued that the heart is the seat of the directing part of the soul. In the context of this argument, he goes on to mention the demonstrative eKetvos (that one over there, as opposed to OVTOS, this one right here), apparently in order to make the point that when the former word is pronounced the speaker gestures outwards with his chin, towards an object in the distance. We may presume that the demonstrative 34 OVTOS was analysed in terms of gestures in a similar fashion. This hypothesis is of more than merely anecdotal interest: given that the speaker always has a portion of matter before him, it implies that the deictic always has a reference, which would not be the case if it had to be accompanied, in a contingent fashion, by the pointing of a finger. Indefinite propositions are those in which an 'indefinite particle' governs the statement, for example: 'Somebody is seated' (TLS KadyTai). Of the various Cf. Goulet 1978.

34

Galen, PHP 11.2 (SVF 11.895).

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individuals to whom the predicate could apply, the one of whom it is said to apply is indeterminate, so that the statement could be verified by various states of affairs. It is worth noting that the labels chpioyieva and aopiora are chosen in such a way as not to constitute an exhaustive dichotomy. They leave room for a third category and this is the one that interests me most directly: the middle propositions. Unfortunately, Sextus provides no definition; he simply declares them to be neither definite nor indefinite and, as a sop, he offers us two examples, remarking that middle propositions are those which are 'of this model' (ra OVTOJS exovra). The two examples that he provides do not appear particularly homogeneous. In the first, the subject is a common noun, construed without an article: avOpajiros Kadrjrat, meaning 'a man is seated'; in the second, the subject is a proper noun, also construed without an article: ZcoKpdrrjs irepnTarei ('Socrates walks'). The problem is to understand why these two types of proposition are considered to be homogeneous and are classed in the same category, when there would seem to be plausible reasons to consider the first as indefinite (since it does not determine who the seated man is) and the second as definite (since it does define who is the subject who is walking). Sextus does volunteer a few explanations on this matter. He says that middle propositions cannot be classified as either indefinite or definite. They are not indefinite because they do 'determine the species' (ethos) - by which, of course, we should understood 'the species to which the subject belongs'; but nor are they definite, because the stating of them is not accompanied by any indicatory gesture (ov yap jjuera Se^ews €/«/>€pera.!,). At first sight each of these explanations seems apposite for one of the two types of'middle' propositions and less apposite for the other; but that is precisely why they are instructive. In the interests of brevity, let us agree to refer to the type of proposition illustrated by 'a man is seated' as C, and to the type of proposition illustrated by 'Socrates walks' as P. The Stoic decision to consider neither P nor C as indefinite was, as we have seen, easily understood so far as P was concerned, but counter-intuitive in the case of C: P seems to determine its subject unequivocally (we can leave to one side cases of homonymy, even though these were frequent in the distribution of Greek proper names; grammarians often refer to them 3 5 but - so far as I know - the Stoics never do). On the other hand, C seems to differ from indefinite propositions only in the degree of indeterminacy. It is accordingly C that raises a problem in this double decision. That is precisely why the argument that is provided to justify it has the air of being tailor-made to dissipate whatever is counter-intuitive in the case of C: 'A man is seated' differs from 'somebody is seated' in that the species to which the subject belongs is determined (even if the subject himself is not), and it is this that rules out classing C as an indefinite 35

Apollonius Dyscolus, Depronominibus, p. 10, 8-17 Maas (FDS 917).

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proposition. Does this argument apply equally well to P, in which the subject seems to be determined as an individual, not simply as a member of a particular species? Clearly, the Stoics think so, for they apply this argument to C and to P indiscriminately; and this constitutes weighty confirmation for the hypothesis upon which the present exposition rests. For what emerges is that a proper noun construed without an article is interpreted as determining (just as does a common noun) the species to which the subject belongs. In this particular case, the species comprises only one member; but that difference is not deemed a sufficient reason not to assimilate the two cases; a noun, be it proper or common, only ever designates the quality that characterizes a species, whether that species be a 'most specialized' one or not. True, this seems to result in a paradox: if ZajKpdrrjg designates the peculiar quality, not the individual peculiarly qualified, should the Stoics not have criticized the usual turn of phrase ZajKpdrrjs irepnrarei, since it is clear that it is Socrates himself who is walking, not his peculiar quality? Only with an article (o ZajKpdrrjs 7T€pnraT€i) would the expression seem to be well formed. If the Stoics in fact do nothing of the kind, that is because they assimilate P and C; in C, manifestly, that which is designated by the grammatical subject (the common quality) is not identical to whatever the predicate needs to belong to for the proposition to be true (some individual who possesses that quality); in parallel fashion, P must be interpreted as a turn of phrase in which what is designated by the expression of the subject (the particular quality) and that to which the predicate belongs if the proposition is true (the definite individual who possesses that quality) do not coincide.36 Now let us consider the second of the decisions which underlie the constitution of the category of'middle' propositions: the decision to consider neither P nor C as definite propositions. The situation here symmetrically balances that which obtains in thefirstone; this second decision goes without saying so far as C is concerned, but is counter-intuitive in the case of P. As is to be expected, the justificatory argument is designed first and foremost to cover the problematical case, that of P, that is to say to show how 'Socrates walks' differs from 'this one walks' to the point where it cannot be classified, as can the latter statement, in the category of definite propositions. Sextus tells us that this is so because the stating of 'Socrates walks' is not accompanied by a gesture of indication. Atfirstsight, the argument seems disappointing: it is as if the Stoics were stipulating that deixis is the only way of determining a subject, and that it is in order to abide by that stipulation that they refuse to attribute to P the quality of a definite proposition.37 But one might also think that the Stoics' refusal is dictated by their perception of what it is that is authentically 36

37

F o r different reasons a n d without taking into consideration the question of the article, Frede 1977/87, p . 66, arrives at c o m p a r a b l e formulae, a fact that has encouraged me to maintain the hypothesis. T h e extension of the notion of deixis has been m u c h discussed; cf. Frede 1974, p p . 54ff; Lloyd 1978, pp.286ff.

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specific in the use of the deictic, as compared simply with the use of a proper noun: namely its 'egocentric' nature, the nature of a term whose reference is fixed if, and only if, one takes into consideration the spatio-temporal conditions in which the statement is made. One forms an idea of the difference in nature between the deictic and the proper noun when one bears in mind that an operation of reference demands the presence (both spatially and temporally) of a body that is being pointed out faced by a body that is pointing it out; this is effected by the deictic, and by it alone. The reason why a proper name is not enough to render a proposition definite is not that it is equivocal; it is because its use does not require that presence and even makes it possible to speak without ambiguity of people when they are absent or dead. For the Stoics, an essential quality of the proper noun is that it can dispense with the deixis (and, correlatively, what is essential about deixis is that it is what a proper noun can do without); if the proper noun can contribute to fixing a reference, it does so under a condition such that making use of the proper noun is not sufficient guarantee of the condition being fulfilled. To specify the nature of that condition, we must examine the information that Sextus provides on the difference in the truth-conditions that apply to the various types of simple propositions; for, as we shall see, that difference dictates how they should be classified. Unfortunately, the text contains no precise information regarding the case in which we are interested, that of 'middle' propositions. In order tofillin the lacunas, we shall have to undertake a detour. A reliable hint is provided by the strategy that Sextus adopts in his attack upon the claims of dogmatists. His strategy unfolds in three phases: (i) first, one shows that it is impossible for a definite proposition to be true; (2) next, that (1) implies that the same goes for an indefinite proposition; (3) and finally, that it follows from (1) and (2) that the same also goes for a middle proposition.38 Presumably this strategy is modelled as a reflection of the Stoic doctrine, so this must have provided a direct definition of the truth-conditions for a definite proposition and must have gone on to define first those for an indefinite proposition in terms of the preceding definition, then those for a middle proposition, also in the terms used in both preceding definitions. The first two points in this programme are attested by Sextus. According to the Stoics, a definite proposition is true 'when the predicate belongs to that which falls under the deixis'39 (if it is indeed the case, as has been suggested above, that there is always something that falls under the deixis, it follows that a definite proposition is always true or false). For an indefinite proposition to be true, some definite proposition has to be true: 'Somebody is seated' is true if and only if, for some individual who can be pointed out, 'This one is seated' is true. This text of Sextus' does not define the truth-conditions for middle 38 39

M viii.99. I can d o n o m o r e than d r a w attention to the interest of the Sceptic objections to this proposition, in the next part of Sextus' text.

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51

propositions; it merely allows us to suppose that they must have referred to those of the two other classes of propositions. A passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias 40 enables us to verify the legitimacy of that supposition. The context is provided by an exposition of the Stoic theory of propositional negation. As is well known, the Stoics stipulated that, to obtain a contradiction to a given proposition (which is false if the former is true and vice versa), it is necessary to prefix the negation at the beginning of the proposition as a whole. The contradiction to 'Socrates is white' is not 'Socrates is not white', but 'Not: Socrates is white' (in other words: 'It is not the case that Socrates is white'). The arguments recorded by Alexander include the following one: if the negation is not placed in that position, both the affirmative and the negative may be false. For example, 'Callias walks' (KaXXtas TTepnrareL, no article) and 'Callias does not walk' are both false if Callias does not exist. According to Alexander, the meaning of these statements is, in effect, the following: 'some Callias exists (eWi rig KaXXlas) and to him (rovrco Se) belong, respectively, the predicate "to walk" or the predicate "not to walk".' This analysis provides us with a number of important pieces of information. The first is that a middle proposition is not logically simple: it may be falsified by two different situations, one in which Callias does not exist, the other in which he does not walk. The notion of simplicity in relation to which it is classified as simple must fulfil criteria other than that of logical simplicity (on a rereading of the collection of examples used by Sextus, one might suggest that what gets a proposition classified as simple are the facts that its expression comprises no more than two words, one for the subject, the other for the predicate, and that its truth does not depend upon that of another proposition expressed within its context). Furthermore, Alexander's text implies that the truth of the middle proposition 'Callias walks' is not defined simply by reference to that of the definite proposition 'this one [pointing out Callias] walks'. 'Intermediate' as it is, it is true if and only if two other propositions are true, neither of which is simple from the point of view of the criteria that I have just indicated: (i) 'Some Callias exists' {eon ns KaXXias), a proposition which the presence of the indefinite ng makes it possible to consider indefinite, but which does not fulfil the first criterion of simplicity, since it comprises more than two words; (2) 'This one [that is to say this Callias] walks' (ovrog TTepLTraret), a proposition which fulfils the first criterion, but not the second, since the demonstrative here has an anaphoric sense, not a deictic one, its reference being determined by the context. The state of the documentation is such that there is no way of knowing if and how the Stoics then proceeded with this analysis up to a point where all that one had to deal with were simple propositions; nor will I attempt to fill this lacuna by a conjectural reconstitution of their argument. The essential point to grasp is that a proposition whose subject is expressed by a proper noun without an article is interpreted as 40

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal, pr., p. 402, iff. Wallies (FDS 921).

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incorporating in its very meaning two distinct components: (i) a piece of information concerning the species whose name designates its characteristic property: namely, that this species is not empty but comprises one individual and one only, who is its sole member; (2) a piece of information concerning that individual, namely that the predicate of the proposition belongs to him (this analysis would also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the middle proposition of type C). As a result, the proper noun, in itself, has no existential value: if Callias is dead, the statement 'Callias walks' is false, but not absurd, nor impossible; the assertion of existence that it contains in what it signifies may be true or false; it is not presupposed to be true. There is another case - and a famous one - in which the Stoics analysed as false, but not impossible, a proposition in which the subject was a proper noun, the antecedent of the famous conditional 'If Dio is dead, this one is dead.') Chrysippus introduced this proposition into his discussion of Diodorus' Master Argument. 41 It is a complex affair to which many commentaries have been devoted, 42 but let us try to concentrate upon the aspects that concern us directly. As is well known, the Master Argument rests upon the incompatibility of three propositions. The one that Chrysippus chose to reject was the second, to wit: 'from what is possible, the impossible does not follow'. 43 His argument for rejecting it was to propose, as a counterexample, the conditional in question: el reOvrjKe ALOJV (no article), redvrjKev OVTOS. According to Chrysippus, this conditional is true 44 if Dio is pointed out (SeLKWjjLevov rod AIOJVOS, with an article); in this case, the antecedent 'Dio is dead' is false, but possible, for it may become true at any minute; but the consequent 'this one is dead' is impossible, because the deictic OVTOS can refer only to a living person. The substitution of a proper name for a deictic thus alters the modality of the statement, which is hardly surprising if it is true - as we have seen it to be on other bases - that the use of a proper name does not presuppose the physical existence of its bearer. I have, in passing, drawn attention to the absence or presence of an article in front of proper nouns. On rereading in its entirety the passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias which informs us of Chrysippus' position in the quarrel over the Master Argument (and which has a good chance of being close to an original text 45 ), one cannot help noticing that its constitution follows the rules that one would expect on the basis of the hypothesis that I have advanced. Every time that Dio is mentioned as a living person who can be pointed out, the article is present: thus p. 177, 28-9 (heiKwybevov rod Aitovos), 34 (v^Lorarat 6 AICJV), p. 178, 3 (ore e^rj 6 ALCDV). In contrast, every time he is mentioned as dead, the article is absent: thus p. 177, 28 (el redvrjKe ZliW), 31 41 42 43 44 45

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal.pr., p. 177, 25ff. Wallies (SVF 11.202a, FDS994). Cf. Mignucci 1978, who provides n u m e r o u s earlier references. Epictetus, Discourses 11.19, iff. I a m leaving aside the question of the criterion of t r u t h for conditionals that is used here. Cf. (f>r]GL yap (Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal, pr., p. 177, 28 Wallies).

THE THEORY OF THE PROPER NOUN

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(airodavovros yap Aicovos), p. 178, 2 (jjuera rov ddvarov rov Aicovos), p. 180, 33 (SeLKWfjLevov Aicovos). The regularity of these instances suggests that there is nothing accidental about them. The expression 6 A LWV seems to be understood as 'this Dio whom we know, you and I, as an individual who is currently alive', so that a statement such as redvrjKev 6 ALOJV, unlike redvrjKe ALOJV, is in principle as impossible as the statement redvrjKev OVTOS. One difficulty remains and needs to be examined. If Dio is alive, 'Dio is dead' is false, but not impossible. But what if he is dead? If every proposition that begins with a proper noun X can be construed as a conjunction in which one of the conjoined propositions is 'there exists (currently) a certain X', it would appear to be impossible to say anything true about a dead man, even that he is dead; for the conjunction will always be falsified by the falsity of that first proposition. According - once again - to Alexander of Aphrodisias, this was indeed an objection that was raised against the Stoic analysis; 46 but he also records the Stoics' reply to this. Let us consider a statement in which the verb is in the past tense, such as 'Socrates died' (ZcjKpdrrjs aTredavev). The Stoics claim that there are two ways to account for such a pronouncement: one that is incorrect, to wit by stating it to be composed of the noun 'Socrates' and the verb 'died'; another that is correct, to wit by interpreting the statement as a whole, in a block (SXov), as an 'inflection' (eyKXtois) of the statement in the present tense: 'Socrates is dying' {diTodvr]GK€i). As has been most pertinently pointed out, 47 this suggestion boils down to prefixing a temporal operator in front of a proposition in the present tense, the judgement of existence that this proposition incorporates being included within the scope of that operator. In other words, the correct paraphrase of 'Socrates died' is not 'There exists currently a certain Socrates who died', but 'There was in the past a moment when it was true to say "There exists currently a certain Socrates who is dying."' This analysis legitimizes historical discourse but does not mean that one should suppose that the individual's quality has survived the individual that it used to qualify, and that it is through that survival that it remains capable of providing present discourse with its subject. On the other hand, that same analysis is applicable to all the elements of a biography, so the individual's quality must determine that unique individual not only at every moment of the duration of his existence, but also that same individual from one moment to the next in that existence. The logic of the proper noun thus leads into a study of what it is that is constitutive of physical individuality. IV

The problem of this Stoic criterion of identity has recently been tackled in a remarkable study, 48 which does not treat the grammar and the logic of the 46 47

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal, pr., p . 403, 1 iff. Wallies (FDS 921). 48 Cf. Lloyd 1978, p p . 293ff. Sedley 1982a.

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discourse on the individual as its specific themes. That makes it all the more impressive when it shows how exact are the correspondences between the physical side of Stoic thought on individual identity and the linguistic side. The Stoic theory of identity was evolved in response to a paradox known throughout Antiquity as the Growing Argument (av^avofjuevos Aoyos).49 In substance, the argument runs as follows: a number to which one adds or from which one subtracts something does not remain the same number. A piece of matter to which any particle is added or from which any particle is detached does not remain the same piece of matter. Now, living creatures, men for instance, are constantly receiving and losing particles of matter. So one should not say that they are growing or shrinking, as if there existed a permanent entity which constituted the subject and which remained identical to itself throughout time, in the course of a growing or shrinking process. What one should say is that at every instant beings different from one another appear and disappear. The man X does not grow between instant t and instant t1; the man X who exists at instant / is replaced by another man X 1 , who is bigger than X and who exists at instant t1. It is fair to observe at the outset that this paradox is impossible to get around if one adopts a language in which the only authorized statements are those that make use of the deictic. Whatever falls under the deixis is a transitory segment of a part of the corporeal universe: a certain mass of matter that can be pointed out, which currently possesses certain qualities, finds itself in a certain state and entertains certain relations (starting with the relation that involves being pointed out, which connects it with the body which is pointing it out). The deictic identifies its reference at each successive moment: it cannot reidentify it on the basis of the moment before. If I say first This one is seated', then This one is getting up', then This one is walking', nothing in that sequence indicates whether the reference of the deictic is the same in all three cases or different in each of them. If the only objects about which something could be said were those that are determined by deixis (that piece of matter there, in front, here and now), suspicion could systematically be cast upon their identity over time. The Stoic response to the Growing Argument consists in relativizing the notion of identity, by considering it to be defined only in relation to a given description: an object can remain the same F without remaining the same G as one instant succeeds another. The fact that a man, inasmuch as he is a material substance, possesses no permanent identity does not prevent him, inasmuch as he is a being qualified in a particular way, from remaining the persisting subject of all the processes and changes that affect him, starting with the process of living that begins with birth and ends with death. So what can one put in place of X in order to say that an individual remains the same X throughout his life? No common property seems able to fill that function, because its very nature as a common property renders it vulnerable to the 49

Evidence collected by Sedley 1982a; see in particular Plutarch, On Common Conceptions io83b-c (SKF 11.762); Philo of Alexandria, De aetern. mund. 48 (SVF 11.397, FDS 845). The obscurity of this last text has been illuminated in masterly fashion by Sedley 1982a, pp. 267-70.

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Growing Argument: since it can, by definition, belong to several different beings, it could belong in common to a series of individuals, the succession of whom could be that which, if we described it differently, we could call the life of a single individual; each one of them, for example, would be a man, but not the same man as the others. This argument disqualifies not only common properties but also the collections of common properties that could be made in such a way as to obtain a definite description, intended to identify its object in a unique fashion; for every collection of common properties, whatever it might be, remains open to the objection that could be levelled at its components.50 In contrast, the notion of individual quality is constructed in such a way that, by definition, it escapes that objection: the quality of being Dio is such that it would be immediately contradictory for Dio both to cease to be Dio and to continue to be Dio, to remain the same Dio and not to remain the same Dio. The distinction of principle between a common quality and an individual quality seems to imply the irreducibility of the latter to the former. It could be said of this reply to the Growing Argument that it is at once naive and secure, which is what Socrates said of the explanation by means of the Form, in the Phaedo.51 It is through the form that F things are F. It is through his individual quality that 'the Dio' is Dio. Platonic ontology treats the Form in its own particular way, which is to conceive of it as intelligible. Stoic ontology treats the individual quality in its own particular way, which is to conceive of it as corporeal. The agent which makes Dio the individual he is and remains throughout his life must, as an agent, be a body which mixes with the material substratum to which it communicates its particularity, meanwhile receiving from it its anchorage in space and time. And if it is true that the individual quality must not only preserve the identity of an individual throughout the duration of his existence but also make him recognizable and reidentifiable as such, it is perfectly normal that the epistemological status of perceptible reality should be attached to its ontological corporeal status. Even if, as we have seen, there are reasons to think that the Stoics believe that individual quality to be indefinable, there can be no doubt that they consider it to be, at least theoretically (that is to say: for the sage) perceptibly unmistakable. In confirmation of that point, we have only to remember with what tenacity they opposed the Academic thesis according to which two nonidentical individuals might be indistinguishable.52 The Stoic doctrine incorporates consequences which have been considered peculiar and incomprehensible. Plutarch's complaint53 is that it makes each one of us into a double being, a couple of twins, a pair of subjects (uTTo/cet/xeva), one of which is a substance in a state of permanent flux, which is the subject of no process and no permanence; the other a qualified54 individual 50 51 54

However, cf. the late texts mentioned by Sedley 1982a, p . 261 and p . 273, n. 27. 52 53 iood-e. Cf. in particular Plutarch, Comm. not. 1077c. Ibid., 1083C-C There are lacunae in this part of the text, in the manuscripts. The conjecture TTOLOV, or ISlcos TTOLOV, seems preferable to TTOLOTTJS; cf. Sedley 1982a, p. 273, n. 26. Cherniss (1976) suggests TTOI6T7)S in the text, but explains it in a note by LSLCOS TTOLOV.

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who possesses all the opposite characteristics. But, he mockingly remarks, no human being has ever been able actually to see that duality. Taking the part of the Stoics, perhaps one might retort that to discover such a tangible manifestation, one has to turn to the language involved. The composition of the linguistic expression 'the Socrates' corresponds graphically to the composition of the physical individual; in its totality, it designates a qualified individual, while each of its parts designates the indeterminate material substratum and the individual quality the mixture of which constitutes this qualified individual. If 'Socrates' designates the quality, it is the function of 'the' and 'the Socrates' to designate, respectively, the substratum that is in itself unqualified and that carries that quality, and the qualified subject that results from this qualification, that is to say the two viroK^eva which so scandalized Plutarch. The hypothesis that I have put forward in this paper could thus resolve a historically recorded difficulty concerning Stoicism, while at the same time contributing new data to the case to be made out for the solidarity that obtains between the Stoics' grammar and their ontology.

REMARKS ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS IN HELLENISTIC LOGICS T h e first and chief difference among propositions (d£ia>/xara), the dialecticians say, is that between simple (a7rAd) and non-simple (ovx a-nXd)' These are the words of Sextus Empiricus (M vm.93) and nobody would challenge the importance of that distinction. The declaration introduces a long passage (93129) which sets out the subdivisions within this fundamental division. It is a passage which historians of logic tend to use as one of the sources that provide us with information on the Stoic classification of propositions, despite the fact that the Stoics are not specifically named, for it is generally accepted that Sextus does refer to them as 'the dialecticians'. The task that faces us, then, is to compare his text with the classification transmitted to us by Diogenes Laertius (vn. 68-76), who possibly bases his remarks on Diocles of Magnesia, a classification which, for its part, is explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus and a number of his successors. These texts, which have often been studied, present a number of similarities and also a number of differences. They pose many problems involving an inextricable mixture of historical questions, conceptual complications and textual difficulties (Diogenes' text is not in a good state). I shall leave aside many of these problems, in particular that of the identification of Sextus' 'dialecticians', limiting myself to pointing out that it can no longer be taken for granted that he was referring to the Stoics, since David Sedley (1977) has demonstrated the existence of a 'dialectic' school which was quite separate from the school of Megara and whose principal representatives were Diodorus Cronus and his disciple Philo of Megara. More recently, Theodor Ebert (1991), in a study which was still unpublished at the time of writing this paper (see now the bibliography), has powerfully argued that the views which Sextus sets out in the passage in which we are interested, along with those set out in many other passages in which he cites 'the dialecticians', are not the views of the Stoics, but those of members of this 'dialectic' school. Whether Sextus' classification and that of Diogenes come from two different schools (the second having known and made use of the research completed by the first) or from two logicians or groups of logicians within the same school makes little difference if one intends simply to analyse the differences in the contents of these classifications, as is my present purpose. In any case, Sextus' classification, which is simpler and at the same time more clearly explained, is certainly earlier than Diogenes', which has the air of a conscious re-elaboration of it. In 57

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order to avoid pre-empting the case, I have not mentioned the Stoics in my title, and from now on I shall simply refer to DL or SE to designate the authors of the doctrines set out in the two passages. What I propose to do is study the formal characteristics of the classification of simple propositions, as it is set out by SE and by DL. My principal question will be whether or not this division is a true partition, that is to say whether it is of such a kind that every simple proposition necessarily belongs to one, and only one, of the classes that the division comprises. But in considering that question, I shall also be addressing myself to another: that of the criteria of the simplicity of a proposition. The two questions are clearly linked, insofar as they respectively concern the extension and the comprehension of the concept of propositional simplicity. That is why I think it a good idea to start off by saying a word or two about the division of propositions into simple and nonsimple, before moving on to the subdivision of simple propositions. The nomenclature used in the fundamental division is the same in both the texts that we are considering: simple propositions are designated positively as 'simple', while the other propositions are designated purely negatively as 'nonsimple'. Both authors avoid mentioning compound or complex propositions, probably because they are reserving such terms for the description of the internal composition of simple propositions, that is to say as subject and predicate (cf. M vm.79, 94), and more certainly because, even at the level of nomenclature, they are anxious to suggest the exhaustive nature of the division: it is made immediately clear that no proposition can be neither simple nor non-simple; and equally clear that none can be at once simple and non-simple. Let us nevertheless quickly deal with two possible objections on this point, (i) Just before the sentence that I cited at the beginning of this paper, Sextus was preparing the way for his sceptical offensive by writing: 'If what is true is a proposition (d£uo/xa), it is assuredly a proposition that is either simple or nonsimple, or at the same time both simple and non-simple (/cat airXovv KOLI OVX airXovv)'. However, we should not imagine from this that he envisages the possibility of a proposition being at once simple and not simple: despite the bizarre fashion in which he expresses himself, what he means, quite simply, is that truth, if it exists, will be found either in simple propositions or in propositions that are not simple, or in both, (ii) Could not a proposition be simple from one point of view and not simple from another? As we shall see, these logicians paraphrase certain types of propositions whose morphological expression resembles that of simple propositions and thereby reveal that, by virtue of their meaning, they are complex. But that does not mean to say that it would be correct to present them as at once simple and non-simple: the classifications are concerned with d£ia>/zara, that is to say Ae/crd, incorporeal items that are signified; the propositions in question should thus be classified purely and without qualification as non-simple.

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If one passes on from the nomenclature to the definitions of simple and nonsimple propositions, the matter becomes rather more complicated. Assuredly, these definitions aim to guarantee the exhaustivity of the division inasmuch as they make the simplicity or non-simplicity depend upon the presence or absence of the same group of characteristics. In the two texts with which we are concerned, simple propositions are the first to be defined, albeit in negative terms. According to SE (93), Those are simple which are not constructed out of a simple proposition stated twice (his Aa/zjSavo^zcVoi;), nor out of different propositions by means of one or more conjunctions, e.g. "It is day", "It is night", "Socrates is talking", and every proposition of similar form (rrjs ojjLOLas ISeas).' The lines that follow specify what that common form consists of: a simple proposition is not absolutely uncomposite; it is composed of elements which are not themselves propositions but which are 'certain other things (e£ aXXcov TLVOOV), about the number and nature of which - it should be pointed out - we are told nothing at this point except, again negatively, that none are conjunctions. Were that not so, one would presumably be faced with either a badly formed expression ('Socrates and speaks') or a disguised nonsimple proposition ('Socrates and Plato speak' = 'Socrates speaks and Plato speaks'). In DL, the definition of simple propositions is disfigured by the text that has come down to us. The best of the conjectures proposed gives a sense that is very close to that in SE: 'Simple propositions are those that are not composed either of a repeated proposition (hiopovfjL€vov) or of several propositions.' The absence of conjunctions is not mentioned, nor is the sense in which a simple proposition is itself composite. The technical term S^opovfjievov replaces the more telling expression used by SE, 8ls Xa/jb^avofievov. Some manuscripts and editors in fact hesitate between Sujtopovfjuevov and hia€p6vTiov), the composition being effected by means of one or several conjunctions: for example, 'If it is day, it is day', 'If it is night, it is dark', 'It is day and it is light', 'It is day or it is night'. (95) If this definition is taken literally, the general division is not exhaustive: it does not include propositions that are composed of more than two simple propositions, for example 'if/?, then (if/?, then /?)' or '/? and q and r\ To make the division exhaustive, it would be necessary to interpret the terms 'two', 'double' as 'at least two', 'at least double', which is what Ebert (1991, p. 109) suggests; but there is nothing that dictates that interpretation except - precisely - a

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desire to make the definition exhaustive. Actually, the insistence that the text lays upon the number two (StTrAd, 8LS) seems to me not to favour such an interpretation, and the same goes for the examples provided by SE, for these are all 'double'. Nor could one invoke, in favour of that interpretation, the expression olov hnrXd (which seems to me intended to differentiate a nonsimple proposition such as '/? and p1 from a badly formed expression such as '/?/?'), nor the gloss Sia awSea/xou re 77 ovvSeo/Jicov (which can be accounted for by the repetition of certain connecting words such as KCLI . . . KOLL, YJTOL . . . 77, which just happen to be used in the examples). It seems more reasonable to conclude that, in the account given by SE, the division of propositions into simple ones and non-simple ones is not exhaustive, that it includes only the most simple of the non-simple propositions and that a complete classification would necessitate a distinction between different degrees of complexity. In DL, the definition of non-simple propositions runs as follows (68): they are propositions 'composed of a repeated (Si^opovfjuevov) proposition or of (several) propositions (e£ d^ia^arco^)'. The word SiTrAd is not employed here: the only indication that the number of propositions in the composition is limited to two is the prefix to Si^opovfjievov. The variant hiaopoviievov (which should be understood as meaning 'multiplied n times') thus elegantly, by using one extra letter, restores the exhaustivity of the division. As Frede (1974, p. 50, n. 5) points out, basing his remarks on a point made by Mutschmann (1914, p. 127), both variants may well have been used. If, as he does, one considers SE and DL to be Stoics, one will tend to assimilate the two texts as much as possible and will thus read 8i
THE CLASSIFICATION OF SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS

6l

Is this division exhaustive? The question certainly does arise because, on the one hand (as Ebert 1991, pp. 88-9, points out), the nomenclature that it employs appears to imply that it is: by calling the third class 'intermediate' one implies that it incorporates all the simple propositions which do not fall into the first two classes; and the fact that this third class, in contrast to the other two, is not determined by a definition, but only by a reference to the two examples (which, at first sight, are not particularly homogeneous anyway), reinforces that impression. On the other hand, however, the examples used to illustrate the three classes share common characteristics about which one may well wonder whether or not they are pertinent with regard to the general definition of propositional simplicity: in particular, all these examples are affirmative and all of them comprise two and only two words, one for the subject, the other for the predicate. In these circumstances, we might undertake an experiment involving variation. It would consist in examining various types of propositions which in one form or another did not possess those characteristics, while at the same time did resemble, through other features, the examples provided in the text under examination; and we could try to decide whether these propositions should still be considered as simple and whether, if so, they could be classified as one or another of the species distinguished by SE. It seems to me that there are four different theoretical possibilities: (i) propositions of a given type do, after all, fall into one of SE's three classes, because the characteristics by which they are distinguished from the examples provided are not incompatible with either the general definition of simplicity or the specific definition of one or another of those classes; (ii) they are not, in reality, simple propositions; it is therefore to be expected that they do not fall into any of the three classes; (iii) they are not, despite appearances, true propositions; (iv) they are indeed simple propositions, but they do not fall into any of the three classes in SE's division, because that division is not exhaustive. Although we may set out the problem like this in general terms, the only way to tackle it is case by case, separately examining various types of propositions the situation of which is not immediately clear from SE's classification; obviously, the situation is not necessarily the same in all the cases that it is possible to envisage. Let me begin with the problem most often discussed in the relevant literature, namely the problem of negative propositions. Probably the reason for it being so frequently discussed is that DL proposes, as well as the three classes of simple propositions which by and large correspond to those of SE, three other classes, all of which possess a negative aspect (I shall return to this point later). A comparison between the two texts invites one to suppose that SE's classification is not an exhaustive division of simple propositions, but only a (possibly exhaustive) division of affirmative simple propositions. Such is the thesis put forward by Frede (1974, pp. 66-7), which starts off by detecting in SE a number of general indications that are of a kind to suggest that (as a

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division of simple propositions) the division is not exhaustive. The classes are presented in terms that in no way imply exhaustivity (rwv Se airXcbv nvd fjuev.. . Ttva Se . . . TLVOL 8e . . .); and, above all, Sextus says (vm.99) that if Sceptics manage to show that none of the three species of simple propositions mentioned in the division can be true, they will by the same token have shown that no simple proposition can be true; for these three species, he claims, are 'like the elements of simple propositions (ojoTrep oroixeia rwv dirXtbv d^iajfjudrcovy. This expression gives one to suppose that the three classes mentioned represent only a sub-set of simple propositions, that is to say only the most simple of simple propositions. To these two arguments, the following could also be added: the section as a whole ends (99) as follows: 'Such, in summary terms (o>? iv K€(j>a\ai6is), are the pronouncements of the dialecticians on the subject of simple propositions'. It is not certain, but is possible, that what is left out of this 'summary' account concerns types of propositions which, although simple, still do not fall into any of the 'elementary' classes studied above. Where negative propositions are concerned, Frede (p. 66) puts forward a specific argument to show that these do not fall into the classes defined by SE. According to the text (98), an indefinite proposition, such as 'someone is walking', is true when the corresponding definite proposition is true, that is to say when there exists an individual of whom it is true to say: 'This one is walking'. According to Frede, these truth-conditions are not valid for negatives. Let us consider the following proposition (in which the negation is positioned in conformity with the well-known Stoic rule): 'It is not the case that somebody is in Athens'. Far from it being true when there does exist an individual of whom it is true to say 'It is not the case that this one is in Athens', this proposition is only true when there exists no individual of whom it is false to say: 'It is not the case that this one is in Athens'. The conditions of truth specified by SE would thus seem to be valid only for affirmative propositions. Admittedly, this argument has been challenged by Ebert (p. 88). According to him, it is not at all evident that the proposition which Frede takes as an example should be classed as a negative indefinite one. Construed as it is, with the negative at the beginning of the sentence, it does not satisfy SE's definition of indefinite propositions: instead of the indefinite constituent, it is the negation that is 'primary' (and it is worth remembering, at this point, that Sextus uses the same verb Kvpievew when he sets out the Stoic theory of negation, vm.90). On the other hand, if, running counter to the Stoic rule, one is prepared to position the negation in such a way that it modifies the predicate, not the subject-predicate relationship, then there is nothing to prevent the inclusion of negative propositions in the classes mentioned by SE: 'Someone is not walking' satisfies both the definition and the truth-conditions for indefinite propositions, and by analogy the same applies in other cases. The advantage of Ebert's position is that it makes it possible to understand why DL's Stoics could not be satisfied by SE's division: as soon as a distinction was

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drawn between 'X is not walking' and 'it is not the case that X is walking', and the second of those two propositions was held to be the only true negation of 'X is walking', it became impossible to include the affirmative and its corresponding negative in the same class, as a general rule, and became necessary to increase the number of types of simple propositions beyond the three that had sufficed for SE. However, if we take it that SE did not conceive negatives according to the Stoic model, it is easy to see why they did not contradict the exhaustivity of his division. Now, what happens when what is added to the standard examples is something other than a negation? Let me first consider the modifications that concern the expression of the subject. In the standard examples, this is expressed by a single word (this is true of DL as well as SE). The first modification to envisage is the one (studied by Ebert, pp. 127-9) m which a single compound subject would combine several of the simple subjects which characterize those examples: such would be the case in This man is walking' and in 'Some man is walking'. These propositions were probably interpreted as disguised conjunctives, hence as non-simple propositions: 'This one is a man and is walking', 'Someone is a man and is walking'. If this treatment is applied to the Aristotelian particular proposition, there are good reasons to suppose that, by analogy, the same went for the Aristotelian universal; this could be interpreted as a disguised conditional; 'Every man walks = If someone is a man, he walks' (cf. Sextus xi.8). And these analyses of course remain valid for negative forms of these propositions. Less often discussed but no less interesting is the problem posed by propositions which, like SE's 'intermediate' ones, have as their subject a noun (proper or common) but, in contrast to the examples provided for this class, construe that noun with an article. This problem can be grafted on to that of the very constitution of this class of 'intermediate' propositions which, paradoxically enough, groups together types of propositions which have the air of being heterogeneous. I have already tried to resolve this second question in another study (above, pp. 39-56), to which I take the liberty of referring the reader; so at this point I shall limit myself to pointing out, in connection with the first question, that in any event propositions whose subject is a noun construed with an article should not automatically be placed in the same class as those where no article appears. That is particularly clear in the case of a common noun: whatever the sense of the expression 6 avdpcoTros, that sense cannot be the same as that of avdpajiros in the proposition avdpoj-nos Kddrjrai, namely 'a particular man whose identity is not otherwise determined'; clearly, here the sense and the truth-conditions are modified by the addition of the article. Is it possible to be more precise and determine what those modifications are, doing so in terms that may be applied both to the case of the common noun and also to that of the proper noun? As a conjecture, let me suggest two ways of treating a proposition accompanied by an article, both of which are based

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upon Stoic documents and are, furthermore, not incompatible, each one being suited to a specific situation. (a) We know that the Stoics referred to what we call 'definite articles' as 'indefinite articles' (dpdpa dopLarcoSrj). To justify this, they adduced a turn of phrase such as 6 TrepnraTtbv Kivelrai, 'The one who is walking is moving', which they interpreted as the equivalent of dns TTepirrarei tKeivos Kiveirai, 'if someone is walking he is moving' (cf. Apoll. Dysc. De pronom., p. 6, 30 Schneider = FDS 550). In some cases at least, the article construed with a noun can have the same meaning as the article construed with a participle: o dvdpojTTos TTV€L, for example, could be interpreted as meaning: 'If someone is a man, he breathes'. This same paraphrase is also applicable in some cases where a proper noun is construed with an article. To be persuaded of this, one has only to remember that, according to the Stoics, a proper noun designates a particular quality (18(a 77010-7-77?), not the individual whom it qualifies (DL VII.58). ' 0 ZajKpdrrjs + verb' can thus be paraphrased either in the form 'The one who is Socrates (verbs)' or in the form 'If someone is Socrates, he (verbs)'. This way of treating propositions with subjects accompanied by an article thus reveals them as implications, that is to say non-simple propositions. It is specifically suited to cases where the proposition attributes to the subject (whether designated by a proper or by a common noun) some essential and permanent property. (b) When, on the contrary, the predicate designates a temporary and accidental action or state (for example, TrepLTTarei or KddrjTcn,) the above analysis will not do. A statement such as 6 dvdpamos irepnrarei is used to signify not that every man walks, but that the individual man, of whom we are speaking, walks: it is the context that removes the indeterminacy of his identity, and the article here has an anaphoric function. (It is this use that Apollonius Dyscolus stresses, in the passage cited above, to criticize the Stoic conception of the article as 'indefinite'. He writes: 'Every anaphora signifies a pre-existing knowledge, and that which is known is definite.') It seems to me that from this one must conclude that such a statement, considered in isolation, does not express an a^ico^a at all. At this point, I would remind the reader of the Stoic description of the a^i'oo/xa (DL vii.65; Aulus Gellius xvi.8.4; Sextus PH 11.104) as 'a complete signified item which, so far as itself is concerned, can be asserted (ACKTOV avroreXes diro^avrov OGOV €' avrco)'. The case is, I think, comparable to that of ypa€i, 'he writes', which can be a complete statement when the context determines who it is one is speaking of, but which the Stoics consider to be the expression of an incomplete Ae/croV, precisely because, outside any context, it provokes the question 'Who?' (DL vii.63). In similar fashion, out of its context, the statement 6 dvOpamos 7T€pLiraT€L provokes the question 'What man?' Despite appearances to the contrary, this analysis remains applicable in a case where it is with a proper noun that the article is used. It turns out that, in certain Stoic texts, the construing of a proper noun with an article presupposes

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that the individual who bears this name is a real individual, currently living and known to be so by the person to whom the statement is addressed. I came to this conclusion by analysing the text (In Arist. Anal, pr., p. 177, 19-178, 8 Wallies) in which Alexander of Aphrodisias sets out the famous conditional el TedvrjKe ALOOV, redvrjKev OVTOS, that Chrysippus had introduced into his discussion of the Master Argument (once again, see the study cited above, pp. 39-56). Consequently, if I say 6 ©eohovXos TTepnrarei, I am liable to provoke the question 'Which Theodoulos?', not because there might be several of them, but simply because I have - perhaps wrongly - assumed that my interlocutor knows the individual in question, as I do. On the other hand, suppose I say KaXXlas Trepiirarei (no article): another text from Alexander of Aphrodisias (ibid., p. 402, 16-18) tells us expressly that for certain people (which is generally taken to mean the Stoics), this sentence means: 'There exists a certain Callias to whom the predicate "to walk" belongs'. In this case, the assertion of existence is part of the meaning of the statement; my interlocutor will not ask me 'Which Callias?', because my sentence does not presuppose that he knows of the existence of this Callias, but is telling him of it, in case he is unaware of it. By virtue of this difference, KaXXias TreptTraret may be superposed exactly upon the examples which illustrate the class of 'intermediate' simple propositions in SE, and the corresponding class in DL (leaving aside, for the moment, the problem posed by the complex meaning that the Stoic analysis reads into it); in contrast, 6 KaXXtas irepnrarei, I would venture to claim, is not an d^Lcofjua at all. Now let me pass on to a number of cases of propositions which differ from the standard model, not in the expression of their subject, but in that of their predicate. In SE's examples, the predicate is expressed by a single word, the verb. It is an intransitive verb which calls for neither an attribute nor an object. In conformity with the method I have adopted above, I should like to investigate, in relation to SE's classification, the situation of (i) propositions which use the verb 'to be' as a copula, that is to say with an attribute, and (ii) those which use a transitive verb accompanied by an object. (i) With regard to the first question, we should remember that, in the days before these Hellenistic logicians, two symmetrical attempts had been made to reduce the difference between propositions of the 'X (verbs)' type and propositions of the 'X is (adjective)' type. On the one hand, certain sophists, concerned not to damage the unity of the subject by seeming to identify it with an attribute other than itself, had recommended replacing a proposition of the 'X is (adjective)' type by a paraphrase of the 'X (adjectives)' type (cf. Arist. Phys. 1, i85b28~3i). On the other hand, Aristotle, concerned to reveal the role of the verb 'to be' as a universal instrument of predication, had, for his part, affirmed the equivalence of all propositions of the 'X (verbs)' type with a paraphrase of the 'X is (verbing)' type (cf. Metaph. v, 1 0 ^ 2 7 - 3 0 ) . In both cases, at a morphological level, the difference between descriptions of actions and descriptions of states thus disappeared. So far as I know, no text exists

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which tells us how the Hellenistic logicians reacted to these two symmetrically opposed ways of abolishing the difference in question. However, I am inclined to believe that they would have condemned them, insisting that, on the contrary, it was necessary to respect a difference that ordinary language picks up. SE attests that they adopted the 'X (verbs)' type for their examples of simple propositions. What would they have made of the 'X is (adjective)' type? Perhaps they would have noted that its most frequent, if not exclusive, use is to attribute to the subject a permanent property, in contrast to the 'X (verbs)' type, which generally attributes to it a temporary action prompted by the existing circumstances, which is contemporaneous with the utterances of the statement. On this basis it seems reasonable to suggest that they might have interpreted descriptions of states as non-simple propositions or, to be more precise, as conjunctions of propositions dated in relation to the moment when the statement is made: 'X is (adjective)' would thus be the equivalent of'X has been (adjective) (before the present moment), is (adjective) (at the present moment) and will be (adjective) (after the present moment)'. It is true that this analysis assumes that 'X is (adjective) (at the present moment)' is itself a simple proposition; and this again raises the question of whether such a proposition belongs to the same class as 'X (verbs) (at the present moment)', or whether it represents a different type of simple proposition, which is not covered by SE's classification. It seems to me difficult to provide a firm answer to this question; perhaps an analysis of the truthconditions would reveal between the two types of proposition a difference that the Hellenistic logicians would be happy to respect. From a phenomenalist point of view, which would detect in actions the signs or symptoms of properties, one could argue that 'X is P' is true if and only if there exists an action A which is of such a kind that (i) if X does A, X is P, and (ii) X does A. If this speculation were accepted, we should have to conclude that SE's classification is incomplete in relation to propositions which use a copula. (ii) Now, what can be said of propositions which, unlike SE's examples, comprise an object in the accusative and/or some other oblique case? In Antiquity, these propositions (for example: 'Socrates loves Plato') were not interpreted as 'relational judgements' or as propositions which bring into play a many-placed predicate. According to our Stoic documentation (DL vn.64), the notion of a predicate (/car^yo/cn^a) could be used with two meanings: the one a narrow meaning, in which the predicate is that which the verb (pfjfJLa) on its own expresses, whether this be transitive or intransitive, active or passive; the other a wider meaning, in which the predicate is what is expressed by all that remains in a complete statement once one removes the subject, which is normally expressed in the nominative (I am not taking into account the extra information which is provided by Porphyry in Ammonius, In Arist. De interpr., p. 44, I9ff. Bmse = SVF n.i$4 = FDS 791). In the first sense, the predicate of 'Socrates loves Plato' is 'loves'; in the second, it is 'loves Plato'. But the texts that we are studying do not relate the division of predicates to

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that of simple propositions. We may attempt to fill in that lacuna in the following fashion. When the subject and the object are equally definite, there is no problem: it is clear enough that This one loves that one' would be classed as definite, 'Someone loves someone' as indefinite, and 'Socrates loves Plato' as intermediate. But what of the six possible cases in which the degree of determination of the two terms is different? Given that the role of the subject is preponderant in the classification, which is what Ebert quite correctly stresses (1991, pp. 117— 18), one might be tempted to say that it is the degree of determination of the subject which decides the way in which the proposition should be classed. But this solution runs into two difficulties: (i) This one loves someone' would never, despite the determination of the subject, be considered as a definite proposition; its truth-conditions are those of an elementary indefinite proposition inasmuch as it is true only if a proposition of the This one loves that one' type is true; (ii) in the hypothesis that I am examining, This one loves Socrates' ought to be classed as definite, and 'Socrates is loved by this one' as intermediate, even though the meaning of the two statements is identical. In these circumstances one is tempted to fall back upon a different rule: propositions of this type could be classed at the level of determination which is that of the most weakly determined of their terms. This rule would make it possible to class as indefinite the proposition cited above at (i) and to class as intermediate the two propositions cited above at (ii). But there are disadvantages to this solution too: it would make it necessary to class in the same category, the category of indefinite propositions, 'Socrates loves someone' and 'Someone loves someone', even though it seems intuitively clear that the two propositions should not share the same fate. So the only satisfactory solution is to accept that propositions that comprise one or more objects do notfitinto the classes of simple propositions defined by SE. Given that, on the other hand, it is unthinkable to treat them as non-simple propositions (This one loves Socrates' is not reducible to the conjunctive This one loves and Socrates is loved'), I conclude that these propositions are situated at a different level from the species mentioned by SE, that is to say the level of non-elementary simple propositions, a group for which a more complex subdivision is required. This confirms that SE only took into consideration the simplest of simple propositions. I would like to round off with a few remarks on DL's classification. A number of differences between it and SE's classification leap to the eye and it is mainly these that I shall be considering, referring the reader, for the remainder, to the more systematic studies that have already been devoted to this text. (1) Three of DL's classes clearly correspond to the three classes of SE. But even here, the nomenclature of DL is somewhat different. SE's indefinite propositions reappear in DL with the same name, aoptara; but in DL, what corresponds to SE's definite propositions is called KarayopevrtKov, and what

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corresponds to SE's intermediate proposition is called KarrjyopLKov. This new nomenclature strikes me as somewhat heterogeneous and does not seem to me to obey a single principle, unlike SE's nomenclature, which was based on the degree of determination of the subject. In DL, the name of the aopiora is the last remaining vestige of that principle of division. The other terms that are used, KarrjyopLKov and KarayopevriKov, seem prompted by a desire to characterize affirmative propositions as such, now that extra classes have been introduced in the classification, to cover negative propositions. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the KaTrjyoptKov, the new name for the fjieaov, possesses an 'intermediate' status, in between the aoptarov and the KarayopevTiKov, the new name for the ajpiofxevov. On the contrary, the new nomenclature suggests a desire to indicate a natural affinity between KarrjyoptKov and KarayopevrtKov; the ternary division here (but not in SE) can thus be analysed as a system of successive binary divisions, according to a schema which some authors have described as characteristically Stoic (Goulet 1978, p. 191, n. 20, following P. Hadot). As we shall see, this impression is confirmed when one examines the definitions of the propositions that are involved here. (2) The definitions of the classes of propositions are different in DL and SE so far as they can be compared, for SE does not always provide definitions. Where comparison is possible, we find that DL's definitions are grammatical or, to be more precise, syntactical; the semantics of the degrees of determination of the subject play no role here and no appeal is made to a dialectic consideration of the truth-conditions (it is only when interpreting DL in the light of SE that Goulet 1978, p. 173 detects a 'dialectic aspect'). A categoric proposition is defined as consisting 'of a direct case ( = nominative) and a predicate', for example 'Dio is walking'; a catagoreutic proposition as consisting 'of a direct deictic case and a predicate', for example 'This one is walking'; an indefinite proposition (if we agree to the generally accepted addition made by von Arnim), as consisting 'of one or several indefinite particles and a predicate', for example 'Someone is walking' (I am leaving aside the second example, c/ceiVo? Kiveirai, the interpretation of which is difficult and controversial). These new definitions appear to be dictated by a desire to provide objective and public criteria of identification, at the risk of having it forgotten that the entities to be classified are a^tc6/xara, that is to say they are signified, not signifying. Perhaps the Stoics were indeed positively disposed to take that risk since, as we have seen in connection with KaXXias 7T€pnraT€i,they sometimes detected a complex meaning in a proposition which they nevertheless considered to be simple. It will furthermore be noticed that, upon a closer look at their definitions, the catagoreutic turns out to be presented as a particular case of a categoric proposition; formally, it satisfies the definition of the latter. In consequence, the classes described here are not mutually exclusive. (3) The principle difference between SE and DL is that instead of presenting

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only three classes of simple propositions, all illustrated by affirmative examples, as SE does, DL proposes six, three of which present a negative character (without, however, being regrouped under a common label). Mentioned and defined, curiously enough, before the others, they are: (i) the negative (airocfxiTLKov), defined (according to the text reconstructed by Goulet 1978, pp. 179-80) as being composed of a negative particle and a proposition, for example, ovxi rj^pa iorlv; (ii) the denegative (apvrjTLKov), defined as being 'composed of a denegative particle and a predicate', for example ovSels TrepiTraref; (iii) the privative (areprjrLKov), defined as 'composed of a privative particle and a potential proposition (Kara 8i)vaynv)\ for example OL(f)lXdvdpCx)TTOS ioTLV OVTOS-

These classes, which are of a negative nature, prompt a number of remarks. (a) The first thing that one notices is that, in contrast to the definition of simple propositions in SE, DL recognizes that a simple proposition may comprise another, as one of its elements: one obtains a negative by prefixing a negation to an affirmative. The case of a privative proposition is rather different, for in this a complete proposition is also incorporated, but only 4in a potential position'. This piece of information probably means that, in contrast to rjfjiepa €OTLV, which is present as it stands in oi!^i rj/jiepa ioTtv, (ftiAavdptojros ioriv OVTOS is no more than virtually present in a<j>iAav9pam6s ionv OVTOS, in the sense that the unity of the word a<j>iAavdp<x>TTos has to be dismembered in order for the compound proposition to be revealed. A contrario, one may deduce that for DL the affirmative is actually present in the negative (a fact that furthermore implies that no distinction is made between the assertion and the propositional content: on this point, see Kneale 1962, p. 145). (b) A second problem seems to arise as to how the affirmative and the negative classes interrelate. This question is particularly thrown into relief by the example that illustrates the privative, a^iXavdpconos eonv OVTOS'. here the subject is the deictic OVTOS, the subject that is characteristic of catagoreutic propositions. How should this situation be interpreted? (i) Supposedly such a proposition is both privative and catagoreutic (Egli 1967, pp. 37-8): for it does in fact satisfy the definitions of both these classes, (ii) If one supposes, on the contrary, that DL's classes are mutually exclusive, one will maintain (with Ebert 1991, p. 123) that the proposition concerned should be classed as privative, but not simultaneously as catagoreutic: the presence of a privative particle would then be the necessary and sufficient condition for such a classification, without considering the other characteristics of the proposition under consideration, (iii) Finally, it might be supposed that the privative propositions were subdivided later, according to whether their subject was deictic, nominal or indefinite, but using different labels from those used for affirmatives. Against (ii) the following objection may be made: if there are good reasons for distinguishing between the attributions of an adjective such as cjuAavdpajTTos, according to whether the subject is deictic, nominal or indefinite, it is hard to see why those reasons should cease to be valid when the

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attribute is a^iXavOpooiros. A choice would still have to be made between (i) and (iii); for reasons of economy, (i) seems to me to be more plausible. (c) The example of the privative proposition, a^tXdvdPCDTTOS iariv OVTOS, is also interesting from another point of view: it is the only example in our texts of a simple proposition that contains a copula and consequently comprises three words. Should we conclude that DL in general no longer sees any difference between the 'X (verbs)' type of proposition and the 'X is (adjective)' type? That would probably be an exaggerated conclusion, for there is a more economical way of explaining the exception that this example constitutes to the two-word rule. A linguistic factor may account for it: Greek verbs which include a privative alpha are formed not by adding that alpha directly to an existing verb, but by derivation from an adjective that itself includes a privative alpha (for example aSiKeiv, ahwartiv). It would therefore be impossible to find a proposition which satisfies the definition of privatives (that is to say which contained a 'potential' proposition) whose predicate consisted solely of one verb. The solution that is adopted involves an anomaly: a proposition such as ovros dSi/cef does not satisfy the definition of privatives and so, despite its resemblance to privatives, would - like it or not - have to be classed amongst the ordinary catagoreutic propositions. I will not further prolong this set of remarks, but will now propose two series of rather more general conclusions. (1) DL's classification is in all probability based upon SE's (see, already, Egli 1967, p. 37). It seems to have been arrived at by means of introducing a series of modifications and additions to the initial system, rather than by systematically re-examining the problem from start to finish. This could explain the anomalies that it presents and also the violations to some of the principles upon which SE's classification - at least tacitly - rested. SE's classes were mutually exclusive; taken as a whole, they did not exhaust the totality of simple propositions and do not seem to have been designed to exhaust it. DL's classification aims to be more complete; however, it does not manage to take in all the propositional types which, as we have seen, appear not to be catered for by SE's classification. In his attempt to produce a more complete classification, DL has abandoned the principle of mutual exclusivity for the classes and also that of limiting the classification to elementary types of propositions, composed of no more than two words. In my view, the result is somewhat chaotic and not particularly satisfactory. (2) I have been at pains to leave open the question of whether Sextus' 'dialecticians' are the members of the 'dialectic' school, as Ebert believes, or are indeed the Stoics, as has generally been believed in the past. Within the framework that I have set myself, I am not in a position to support either view. My only working hypothesis has been that SE's doctrine is earlier than DL's, and it seems to me that all the remarks I have made in this paper tend to confirm that. However, in conclusion, I would like to underline the following point of method: if the presupposition that Sextus' 'dialecticians' should be

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identified with the Stoics is abandoned, a more lively reading of these two texts by SE and DL would be possible: I mean, a reading that would pay more attention than those of the past to the differences and irregularities within each text and also to the irregularities of each in relation to the other. The present paper is designed to be a contribution towards just such a new reading.

5 THE CONJUNCTIVE MODEL

As we know, the conjunctive proposition, called au/xTreTrAey^eVoy by the Stoic logicians, is a 'non-simple proposition', obtained by linking two or more propositions by the conjunction 'and'. 1 I should like to show that this conjunctive proposition constituted a sort of model in Stoic thought, by reason of the particular features of its truth-conditions. We shall find that the presence of this model may be detected in several different sectors of the Stoic system, - its physics, ethics, psychology and epistemology. I shall be trying to prove that the notion of the conjunctive model may illuminate a number of difficulties and obscurities in the dogmas of the school. If my proposed enquiry proves fruitful, we shall thus possess concrete means to verify the organic unity of Stoic philosophy in one specific instance. It is a unity that is frequently asserted by the Stoics themselves, as well as by their commentators, and is solemnly illustrated by the famous images of the orchard, the egg and the animal, 2 but all too often it remains by and large elusive as an effective reality and so far as details are concerned. First, it is worth pointing out that what I propose to call the 'conjunctive model' in point of fact already appears in certain expressions that the Stoics used to vaunt the systematic coherence of their doctrine. Cato, in Cicero, stresses the 'marvellous structure of the Stoic system', saying that it would be impossible to find anything 'so well constructed, sofirmlyjointed'; all the parts are linked together in such a way that 'if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure'. 3 Now, this structure that is so close-knit that it would disintegrate were anything to be pulled out of place, is precisely what is essential in what I understand by the expression 'conjunctive model'. The conjunctive proposition is characterized by the following twofold feature: for 1 2 3

Cf. Diogenes Laertius \ll.j2 = SVF 11.207: ovixTreirXeyyiivov 8e eonv a^lwfjia o VTTO TIVOJV OV{JLTT\€KTIKO)V avvheoixcjov ovfjLTreTrXeKTai, olov KCLI rjjjLepa iorl /cat (f)d)s ion. Cf. Sextus, M VII. 16 and Diogenes Laertius v\\.Ap = SVF \\.T$. Cicero, De finibus in.74 (tr. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge (Mass.), 1967); admirabilis compositio disciplinae . . .; tarn compositum tarn compactum et coagmentatum (note the insistence upon the prefix, which calls to mind the redundancy of ovvin the definition of the conjunctive cited above, n. 1); sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut si ullarn litteram moveris, latent omnia. Cf. also ibid., iv.53; et ais, si una littera commota sit, fore tota ut labet disciplina; this second text possibly suggests that, in the first, unam should be read in place oiullam (cf. the note by J. Martha adloc). J.-P. Dumont has drawn my attention to the use of conjunctio {De nat. deor. 11.147) to describe the reasonable soul's aptitude for connecting consequences to premisses.

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it to be true, all its components without exception must be true; for it to be false, it is enough for a single one of its components to be false. Modern logicians summarize this by saying that the truth-table of a conjunctive proposition is iooo. 4 The text that will guide us throughout this study is a well-known passage from Sextus, M vm. 125-9, which is very incompletely reproduced by von Arnim (SVFn.211); it is the most detailed text that has come down to us on the Stoic theory of the ovfiTreTrXeyfjievov, which is here set out and criticized. Sextus starts off as follows: 'The dialecticians say that a conjunctive proposition is valid if all its components are true, for example "It is daytime and it is light", and that it is false (ipevSos) if it comprises a false component (TO exov if)€v8os5)\ This doctrine is confirmed by several other texts, some to be found in Sextus himself, some in other ancient authors. 6 Modern commentators have regarded this as proof that the Stoics gave a truth-functional definition of the conjunction; in other words, that the truth or falsity of a conjunctive proposition, according to them, depended - and depended solely - upon the truth or falsity of the conjoined elements, to the exclusion of any consideration concerning the extra-logical content of those elements. Galen, in his Dialectic Introduction (chapter 4), deplores precisely the fact that Chrysippus' school used the word ovfjureTrXeyfjieva to refer to all compositions obtained by means of 'conjunctions known as co-joiners' (Sia T<2>V OV/JL7TX€KTIKCL)V KaXovfievcov ovvSeoidLoov), even if they were made up of incompatible (/xaxo^eVow) propositions or where one was the consequence of the other (OLKOXOVOWV). That is why the modern historians who are most concerned to avoid anachronisms, such as Michael Frede, accept that of all the propositional connectors, the conjunction is, par excellence, what the Stoics unanimously conceived as a truthfunction (in contrast, in particular, to the famous aw^/xevov). 7 Moreover, this simple and rigorous doctrine has seemed so self-evident and natural to modern scholars that they have granted the Stoics scant credit for formulating it and have attached little importance to the objections that certain ancient authors, in particular Sextus and Galen, put forward to the Stoics on this point. It is as if, in this connection, the Stoic logicians were 4 5

6 7

If one considers a conjunctive that links no more than two propositions,/? and q, it is true if and only if/? is true and q is true. In all of the other three possibilities, it is false. The conjecture TO eV exov ipevSos was suggested by Heintz 1932 and adopted by Mutschmann (ed. Teubner), Bury (ed. Loeb) and Russo 1975, but not by von Arnim. Notwithstanding the parallels on the basis of which it appears to be justified in paragraphs 126 (TO eV exov 0eu8o? . . . €vds Se ipevSovs) and 128 (KCLV ev JJLOVOV exj) ipevSos), it is an unhelpful, even fallacious suggestion. The fact is that, in the passage cited, if it is important to stress that one single false constituent is enough to render the conjunctive proposition false, it would be absurd, in the general definition of the conditions of falsity, to use ev, which means one single, one at the most. See also PHII.139 (ipev&os yap ion ov^nreTrXeyyievov TO exov iv iavrco ifrevSos). Cf. PH 11.139, 234; Aulus Gellius, Noct. An. xvi.8. 9ff. (incompletely cited by von Arnim, SVF II 213). Frede 1974, pp. 77, 79, 96-7. See also Mates 1961, p. 54; Kneale 1962, pp. 148 and 160; Mignucci 1967, pp. 149-50; Gould 1970, p. 72 (in which the errors in the statement of the third indemonstrable should be corrected).

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considered by their twentieth-century colleagues to have done no more than recognize an unimportant truism,8 while their critiques were judged to be hopelessly beside the point.9 Yet correct historical methodology indicates that it would probably be wiser to suppose that those very objections tend to suggest that, at the time when the Stoics decided to adopt their position, it was by no means a trivial matter; rather, it constituted one option among other possible solutions - perhaps the very option that best expressed the Stoicism of the logicians who favoured it. 10 If the theory of the ovixireirXeyixevov were really so trivial, and if the intellectual obstacles that it had to overcome were 8

Cf. Kneale 1962, p. 160: 'Of conjunction the Stoics had not much to say'. Frede 1974, p. 77: 'In the conjunctive statement, one does not know how else the Stoics would have determined the truth-conditions; it is true that with "p and q" we usually mean more than simply that both p and q are the case; but it seems impossible to ask here for more than that some connection between p and q must hold; and this requirement is so vague that we could as well give it up.' Ibid., p. 96: 'In this case, the truth of a non-simple statement is actually made to depend only on the truth or falsity of the component statements. But, as we saw, this is no wonder at all, since there is no logically relevant requirement one could reasonably put on the conjunctive statement.' 9 Cf. Mates, 1953/61, p. 54: 'Apparently there were in ancient times, as now, persons who thought that a conjunction with only one false member should not be considered wholly false.' Kneale 1962, p. 148: 'This view was apparently in need of defence; for opponents who failed to understand that a conjunctive statement should be treated as one said that it would be naturally described as "no more true than false" if some of its constituents were true and others false, though they allowed that it might perhaps be called true "if most of its components were true" (Sextus).' Mignucci 1967, pp. 149-50: 'it is worth noting the strange criticism that Sextus Empiricus produces against this Stoic theory. Any conjunction - he claims - that has one true part and one false part cannot be said to be more true than false, just as whatever is composed of white and black is no more white than black. In reality, Sextus' criticism is a proper ignorantia elenchi, since it does not take into account the purely functional purpose of Stoic definition.' 1 ° A model of the method to be followed is provided, in this respect, by the lines that Brehier 1908, p. 25-6, devotes to Galen's criticism: 'Already in Antiquity and on this very question, Galen had reproached Chrysippus' school for being more attached to language than to facts. In a conjunctive proposition, for example (this is Galen's own example), there is no way of distinguishing purely from the verbal form whether the facts that are affirmed in each part are or are not linked consequently: instead of distinguishing between two sorts of conjunctives, Chrysippus' pupils confuse them as one. The reason for the Stoics laying themselves open to this reproach is that, right from the start, they had made it impossible for themselves to proceed in any way other than by grammatical analysis . . . Only the language, with its conjunctions, enables us to express the different modes of liaison, which correspond to nothing real, and that is why one not only can, but should, limit oneself to the analysis of language.' Brehier himself applies the same method, but with less success, it would seem, when he goes on to write, on the subject of Sextus' criticism (p. 29): 'We only have one critical remark from Sextus on the truthcondition of the conjunctive proposition. According to him, the Stoics are wrong when they declare that only a conjunctive in which all the terms are true is true: if one term is false, the conjunctive is only false in part while the rest of it remains true. Thus criticized, the thought of the Stoics can only make sense if the conjunction indicates some link between each of the separate propositions. The criticism is not valid in the case of a simple enumeration.' If, as the context would appear to suggest, by 'link' Brehier means a consequential link, that is to say the relation of an antecedent with a consequence in the ovvrmiiivov, he would certainly appear to be mistaken. The Stoic thesis bothers Sextus because it declares a conjunctive with one single false part to be false, even if that part is not linked with the other parts in any way except by the conjunction 'and', that is to say even if, to use Brehier's own terms, it constitutes no more than a 'simple enumeration'. It is in just such an extreme case that it is most difficult to understand how the falsity of one part could communicate itself to all the rest.

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really so frivolous, it would be hard to see why Chrysippus devoted to the subject a treatise that ran to two books, 1 x and why Sextus and Galen expressed their objections at such length and so bitingly. The better to understand what is arbitrary, and consequently specific, about the Stoic theory of the avixTTeirXeyiiivov, let us take a closer look at the difficulties raised by Sextus and also by Galen. Sextus' critique falls into two parts, each situated on a clearly distinct level. Sextus begins by reproaching the Stoics for 'making up their own rules' (vojjLoderovGLv avrol avTois), that is to say laying down rules that may be viable and intrinsically coherent but are nevertheless arbitrary and contrary to common usage. They are, no doubt, committing no fault in so doing and they must certainly be granted the right to proceed in this way; however, they should also accept the fact that others deem it right not to accept those rules, and prefer to follow others that are less paradoxical and more 'logical' 12 (OLKOXOVOOV). This criticism which, for Sextus, is rather unusual, but crops up several times in Galen, where it is accompanied by a somewhat unpleasant note of xenophobia, 13 falls into two parts, the first showing that the rules arbitrarily laid down by the Stoics lack logic, and second that they lack common sense. Sextus claims that, logically, if a conjunctive composed of two true propositions (TT) must clearly be said to be true, just as a conjunctive composed of two false propositions (FF) must be said to be false, a conjunctive composed of one true proposition and one false one (TF or FT, which I suggest we call a 'mixed conjunctive') is no more true than it is false ((JLTJ JJL&XXOV aXrjdes etvai 77 i/jevSos). This suggestion does not necessarily deserve to be treated with scorn and, to discredit it, it is not enough to say - as Martha Kneale does 14 - that Sextus has failed to understand that a conjunctive proposition ought to be treated as a single proposition; for it is indeed to the single proposition 'p and q' (when p is true and q is false, or vice versa) that Sextus proposes to attribute a truth-value that is neither true nor false but rather 'no more true than false'. Thus, strictly speaking, his disagreement with the Stoics concerns, not the unity of the conjunctive proposition, but the number of truth-values involved. And it must be recognized that in a strictly bivalent logic, the mixed conjunctive poses a problem analogous to that of Buridan's ass: what reason is there to attribute to it one rather than the other of 11

12

13

14

Cf. Diogenes Laertius vn. 190 = SVF 11.13, title 9; and compare the only book devoted to disjunction (title 17) and the four books devoted to the ovviq^fxivov (title 18). Apart from in the passage with which we are concerned, vofxodeoia (applied to the laws 'decreed' by the dialecticians) appears only in Mvm. 108, where there seems to be no derogative connotation. Cf. Introductio dialect. 4, pp. 10-11 K = SVF 11.208 {avrol vofjuoOeTovvres 181a orj^aLvo/jLeva); De diff. puts. II.IO = SKFII.24 {yofxoderti fxev yap ovd/uara irXelov rj ZoXcov *Adr]vaiois lord TOLS OL^OGL vofAioiJLaTa and further on: vvvl 8e TO Seivorarov ovre yevvrjdels 'Adr/vrjoiv ovre rpa€LS, aXXa X@*s KCLI Trpcorjv yKtov €K XiAi/cta
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the two different truth-values which attach to each of its components? And in the absence - at first sight, at least - of any such reason, why not call the bivalency back into question and why not invent for the mixed conjunctive a third truth-value, which Sextus calls fjurj (JL&AAOV aArjdes rj i/jevSos, but which might equally well be called '£' or '0.5', mid-way between 1 = T and 0 = F? Thus reconstituted, Sextus' position is not absurd; and it lays emphasis, by contrast, upon the wilful and paradoxical - and on that account specifically Stoic aspect of the Stoic logicians' attachment to bivalency, even in cases where retaining it may raise difficulties. As for their reason for declaring the mixed conjunctive to be false rather than true, the Stoics would probably have been able to quiet the Buridanesque scruples of Sextus by explaining that the unilateral privileging of the F value, in the conjunctive proposition, stems from the very nature of the conjunctive 'and', and that it is to some extent compensated by the symmetrical privileging of the T value in the disjunctive proposition; for if, for a conjunctive proposition to be false, all that is necessary is that one of its parts be false, for a disjunctive one all that is necessary for it to be true is that one of its parts be true (truth-table 1110). According to Sextus, the Stoic rules also clash with common sense in a second case, that of what might be called a 'majority' conjunctive proposition, that is to say a case in which the conjunctive proposition comprises a large number of constituents all of which are true except - for example - one. For the Stoics, numbers and percentages mattered little: the minute there existed a minority, however tiny, of false constituents, the conjunctive proposition became false. Sextus, on the contrary, believed that one ought to be allowed to disregard what is relatively negligible and accept a majority conjunctive proposition of this kind as true. 15 Here again, his position is not completely absurd: in a polyvalent logic comprising a finite number of truth-values, one might well agree to accept its legitimacy. 16 And, once again, it highlights one of the paradoxical consequences of the Stoic position: if one considers that in a true conjunctive proposition comprising a very large number of constituents, all its constituents must be true, then as soon as one adds a single false constituent, a new conjunctive proposition is created, one which, for its part, is totally and definitely false (as is pointed out by Aulus Gellius, after the text which is incompletely recorded by von Arnim 17 ). As we have already noted, in the next section of his critique, Sextus moves on to a different level. As he sees it, this is not simply a matter in which one can 15 16

17

Cf. Sextus, M VIII. 126: i^earat 8e KOLI OLXXOLS avTiSiaraTTea^cu KCLL Xeyeiv TO IK irXeiovwv aXrjdtbv ivos Se ipevSovs ov/JLTTenXey^evov dXrjOes vnapx^LV. To give a distinct truth-value to conjunction with n elements according to the proportion of true elements to false elements, there must be (n + 1) truth-values involved. In logic such as this, a conjunctive of («+ 1) elements, of which only one is false, could reasonably enough be assimilated to the conjunctive composed of n elements all of which are true, since its 'truthrating' is higher than the truth-value immediately below. Cf. Noct. Alt. xvi.8: Nam si adea omnia quae de Scipione Mo vera dixi, addidero 'et Hannibalem in Africa superavit', quodestfalsum, universa quoque ilia quae conjuncta dicta sunt, propter hoc unum quodfahum accesserit, quia simul dicentur, vera non erunt.

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make rules in a totally free and arbitrary fashion: for there is such a thing as a 'nature of things' and to this one can and should try to conform (rfj
Cf. the texts collected in SKFu.463-81, and Sambursky 1959, pp. 11-17. Cf. Gen. corr. 1.10, 328327.

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would remain no portion of the sea where the wine was not present, Plutarch protested, declaring that he knew of nothing more absurd than this theory, which implies that the drop of wine can stretch to the dimensions of the universe. 20 To my mind, there is a clear relationship between the paradox of the drop of wine contaminating the purity of an entire ocean and that of a single false proposition infecting by its own falsity the set of as many true propositions as one cares to imagine conjoined with it in some gigantic conjunctive proposition. However- no doubt due to the incomplete character of this logico-physical parallelism, which we have already noticed - the Stoics do not seem to have elaborated a rigorous physical model of the mixed conjunctive proposition. We know, from Sextus himself, how they set about replying to the physical objection that he had raised (which proves that this objection was not an invention of the Sceptic), although unfortunately it is not possible to pinpoint the precise source of their reply, as Sextus introduces it, with no particular reference, by a simple aoL Finding themselves attacked by means of a physical model, the Stoics quite skilfully defended themselves by shifting their ground and referring to daily experience, as it is expressed in everyday language. They pointed out that one commonly describes a coat as torn as soon as there is a rent in it, however small and localized that rent may be; and in so doing, one completely disregards all the parts that remain intact (vyicov). In similar fashion, a conjunctive proposition becomes false as soon as one of its component parts is false, however isolated that part may be amongst all the others; the case of a majority conjunctive proposition cannot be considered any differently from that of a mixed conjunctive proposition. Clearly, here they have not sought to construct a model of a physical mixture, but rather one of an artificial object, a combination of material parts unified by its form or, even more, in this case, by its function. If a tiny rent in it causes us to say that the coat, as such, is torn, that is because ordinary language assumes an anthropocentric and utilitarian point of view, and that is perfectly legitimate when it is a matter of a fabricated object: the function of the coat, which is to cover the body, protect it or adorn it, ceases to be correctly fulfilled the minute it is, however slightly, torn. This assimilation of the av^-n^TrX^y^ivov to a woven garment may be well suited to its very name and also to an image that is far from new in the logico-linguistic analyses of the Greek philosophers, 21 but it is not quite as innocent as it seems. The fact is that it seems quite naturally to lead into a unilateral and preferential evaluation of the true conjunctive proposition; it encourages one to think that the ovfjuTeTrAeynevov has a function of its own which it fulfils when all its component parts are true but fails to fulfil as soon as it includes a false proposition. Despite the extra-logical nature of this evaluation of the true conjunctive proposition, its presence in 20

21

Cf. Plutarch, Comm. not. 37, 1078c = SVF 11.480 (von A r n i m left out Plutarch's own comments). Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 202B; Soph. 259E; Aristotle, Categ. 2, i a i 6 : 4, i b 2 5 ; 10, I 3 b i o , etc.

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Stoic thought seems undeniable. The word vyies (healthy, valid) is, after all, used in this text to qualify both a coat in a good state of repair or the parts of it that are untorn, on the one hand, and, on the other, a conjunctive proposition all of whose conjuncts are true. 22 Just as an untorn coat is a better coat than a torn one, in that it is a true coat, and worthy of that name, it would seem that only a true avfjureTTXeyixevov is a proper ovfiTTeTrXeyfjievov, for it is a better representative of the ovynreTrXey^ivov species than a false ovfX7T€7rXeyiJL€vov can be. The extra-logical (and, as we shall see, in the last analysis probably ethical) prizing of the true conjunctive proposition is strikingly attested by a passage from Epictetus, which neatly provides a moral panel to complete the triptych whose logical and physical panels we have already encountered. The text in question is Discourses 11.9, which is constructed around the following theme: incapable though we are of correctly fulfilling the function, or 'profession', of a man, we nevertheless presume to fulfil that of a philosopher. Remplir la fonction de Vhomme ('to fulfil the profession of a man', English tr. by W.A. Oldfather, Loeb 1967) is the rather good translation suggested by J. Souilhe to render rrjv avdpco-rrov errayyeXiav irXrjptboat. In view of the way the term eirdyyeXfjia is used by the Sophists and by Plato, 23 for whom it designates that which the Sophists profess to be and to teach, or the programme that they advertise, one might equally translate this as: 'to complete the programme of a man'. This programme, or function, of man is clearly to live as a reasonable animal; whoever behaves as an animal unendowed with reason destroys the man in himself, fails properly to carry out his job as a man. It is at this point that Epictetus abruptly goes on (paragraphs 8-10) to say: 'When is it that a conjunctive proposition is saved (cra^crcu)? When it fulfils its programme, in such a way that the salvation (aajrrjpLa) of the conjunctive proposition is to be a conjoining of true propositions (TO ££ dXrjdcbv avfjuTTeTrXexOai).' It is perhaps only fair to note that the conjunctive proposition is not the only logical illustration that Epictetus uses here; he immediately follows on with another sentence, which concerns the disjunctive proposition. This is a parallel to the preceding sentence, but is significantly shorter. 24 It does not explain what a disjunctive proposition needs to do in order to 'fulfil its programme'; and the probable reason for that omission is that the truth-table of the disjunctive proposition (1110) was hardly of a kind to produce an adequate illustration of the idea of a 'fulfilment'. On the contrary - and this is a point that should be stressed - it is the conjunctive proposition which, by virtue of its own particular truth-conditions, first comes to Epictetus' mind when he seeks a parallel to the notion of moral fulfilment: in this passage, the opposition between 'salvation' and 'perdition' is effortlessly superimposed upon the idea 22

23 24

M a t e s 1953/61, p . 136, points out that the passage with which we are concerned is one of the few in which vyirjs is used to refer to the t r u t h of a proposition (as an equivalent usually, it designates the validity of an a r g u m e n t or an a r g u m e n t schema. Cf. Plato, Laches 186C5, Gorgias 447C2, Protagoras 319A6, Euthydemus 274A3. IJore Sie^evyfxevov (i.e. aco^erai)', orav TTJV inayyeXiav TrXrjpwor).

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of the truth or falsity of a conjunctive proposition, according to whether or not it is completely full of truth. Logical and ethical concerns are thus closely intertwined here, so closely that it is hard to decide whether one should speak in terms of the logical principle of bivalency being imported into the ethical field here or, on the contrary, of a moral view of the logic of conjunctive propositions. In any event, it is worth noting that Epictetus has no hesitation in referring to a true conjunctive proposition as one that is 'saved'; and this implies that a false conjunctive proposition must be a iost' or 'ruined' one. 25 The true conjunctive proposition is thus an image of moral perfection and philosophical salvation. The parallelism between what is true and what is good was certainly a commonplace of Stoicism and had been used in a number of well-known texts. 26 But standardly it rested upon the concept of truth as it is applied to propositions in general. Such texts declare that, just as there are no degrees in truth and falsehood, no more are there degrees in errors and mistakes. It is easy to see that the parallelism becomes more precise and stronger given the type of truth that is peculiar to conjunctive propositions; for the all-or-nothing paradox, the exclusion of degrees, the lack of distinction between a little and a lot became more acute here, by reason of the cumulative structure which seems to call for degrees of truth or falsity to be accepted but is at the same time frustrated in this respect by the laws of conjunction: a false conjunctive proposition is no more false than another if it comprises a greater number of false conjuncts; nor is it less false than another if it comprises fewer false conjuncts. It is easy to see the link between this model and the famous theory of the equality of sins 27 - a point to which we shall be returning. At this point we may perhaps consider the existence of a conjunctive model in Stoic thought to be established. Now let us test out the usefulness of this model, that is to say, see whether it makes it any easier to understand certain texts and points of doctrine that have to date remained obscure or illexplained. At the moment, I detect three areas in which it seems to me that the conjunctive model may indeed further our understanding: they are the theory of right action, the theory of knowledge and the theory of passions. In connection with the theory of right action, I wonder whether it is not possible to discern the presence of the conjunctive model in the definitions of the Karopdcofjua (and of moral concepts in the same configuration), which introduce the idea of number, apidfjuot in Greek, numeri in Latin (sometimes with no complement, particularly in Greek texts; generally completed by officii or virtutis in Cicero). The occurrences ofapidfjios in this context are quite frequent;28 they seem generally to have been considered enigmatic, to judge by 25 26 27 28

In the context, ao>£ercu is opposed to airoWvTai (7, 10, 11). Cf. Diogenes Laertius VII.I2O = S K F m . 5 2 7 ; Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.7 = SVFm.528. In this connection, see Rist 1969, pp. 81-96. The references are collected by Rist 1969, p . 82, n. 5. See Cicero, Definibus iv.56 = S F F m . 8 3 ; Seneca, Epist. 71.16 (not 75.16, as Rist mistakenly has it); Marcus Aurelius m . i ; vi.26 (ndv KadrjKov ef apidfjucbv TLVOJV ovfjL7rXrjpovTai, where it is interesting to note the recurrence of the idea of'plenitude'). Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.93.14 = SVFm.500 could also be included in this list, as well as Seneca, Epist. 95.5 a n d 12.

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8l

the vagueness of the translations and the scarcity of commentaries. Most scholars try to rule out a literal and purely quantitative interpretation of the term apid^os. Rist 1969, for example, points out that Diogenes Laertius provides two different definitions of the KCLXOV. The first makes use of the idea ofdpiOfios (the KOL\6V is the perfect good, so called because it retains or takes in, OL7T€X€LV, all the 'numbers' required by nature). The second definition seems more qualitative (the KCL\6V is, again, that which is perfectly proportioned, reXeicos av^iJieTpov); it might be designed to discourage a quantitative interpretation of the first. Rist, prudently enough, concludes that the term aptdfios seems to be used to convey the idea of exact or inexact proportion; and he translates numeri officii, numeri virtutis, as 'aspects of duty' and 'aspects of virtue'. Nevertheless, it would seem that a quantitative interpretation (however 'crude' it may appear) is dictated by the contexts, which refer to 'all' the apidfjLOL, or to 'a greater or lesser number' of aptdfjuoL.29 On that account, and in perfect conformity with the conjunctive model that we have been studying, I am inclined to regard these apifyzoi as the various 'articles' or multiple 'items' which are all, without exception, present, fulfilled or satisfied in the KCLXOV or the KaropOcojjia; if a single one of these is absent or transgressed, absolute perfection forthwith turns into its opposite. It is even possible to detect a further ethico-logical parallelism: for just as all moral sins are equal, yet remain 'tolerable' to varying degrees according to the greater or lesser number of duty 'items' that they transgress (as Zeno, according to Cicero, put it 30 ), so all false conjunctive propositions are equally false, despite the fact that there is obviously more information to be gleaned from a conjunctive proposition in which all the conjuncts but one are true than from one in which all the conjuncts but one are false. In the texts relating to notions of knowledge and truth, one often comes across terms such as ovoriqixa or adpoio^ia, terms to which the conjunctive model similarly invites one to give a literal or quantitative meaning (even if, here again, there is a risk of it seeming crude and, as such, to be avoided if possible). At the risk of complicating the difficult question as to how the knowledge of the Stoic sage should be conceived (a question which was tackled several times in the course of the Chantilly colloquium, 'Les Stoi'ciens et leur logique'; now see Kerferd 1978), it seems fair to say that the Stoics regarded truth and knowledge each as an integral sum of true propositions, that is to say as gigantic and flawless ovuireTrXeyixeva.31 One point in particular deserves to be clarified in this connection because, if I am not mistaken, the conjunctive 29

30

31

Cf. Cicero, Definibus iv.56 {propterea quod alia peccata plures, alia pauciores quasi numeros officii praeterirent); 111.23 (omnes numeros virtutis continent); Diogenes Laertius VII.IOO (napa TO irdvras a.7re^eiv rovs iTTL^rjTOVfJLevovs apidfjiovs vrro rrjs (frvoews). Cf. Definibus iv.56: peccata autem partim esse tolerabilia, partim nullo modo, propterea quod etc. (what follows is cited in n. 29). Cf. Sextus, M VII.386°. = SVFII.841 (inLorrjiJLr) irdvTtov aArjOwv dno^avTiKrj, avonqixariKr] r e KCLI TT\€L6VOJV adpoLOfJuo)', Galen, PHP V.3 = SVF II.841 (A6yos = ivvoiwv re TLVOJV KOLI 7TpoXrn/j€OJv aOpoLo/jia); Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.74.16 = SKF m.i 12. These texts are collected, with a pertinent commentary, by Long 1971, p. 99.

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model makes it possible to dismiss the marked hesitation on the part of the commentators. The relevant text here is one from Stobaeus, 32 in which knowledge (en-tcrny/x^) is first defined as 4a firm KaraXrjifjis, impossible to undermine by reasoning'. Having produced this definition,33 Stobaeus immediately proceeds to give another which may seem like an alternative definition designed for the same definiendum as the first one, but which could equally well be a definition of a second meaning of the word eiriGT^ixr]. This second definition runs as follows: ovGrrj/jia i£ iTnorrjiJLwv TOLOVTCOV, olov fj Tcbv Kara fjiepos XoytKTj iv rep orrovSaicp imapxovoa. This text perplexed Wachsmuth, who proposed emending eTnoT-qixcbv to KaraXruJjewv. A. Long translates it as follows: 'a systerna of specific ideas, like the rational apprehension of particulars present in the good man.' 34 But he expresses his misgivings in the following note: 'I cannot be certain that this translation is quite accurate: my "items" is a translation of the mss. iTTiorrjiJLcov, for which Wachsmuth offers the likely emendation KaraXriipecov. My translation of Aoyi/o? "rational apprehension" is based on the assumption that a word like KardXrjifjis must be supplied.' 35 As I see it, it is possible to dismiss these hesitations and conjectures by applying the conjunctive model: the two definitions handed down by Stobaeus are of two different meanings of the word ^77-1(7x77^77, the second of which is a Gv^-neirXey^ivov of units which correspond to the first; the expression ITTIGT^^OJV TOLOVTOJV shows clearly that knowledge in the second sense is the Gv^iTreTrXey^evov of the totality of different items of knowledge in the first sense. These are isolated, particular items of knowledge corresponding to what is conveyed by one particular true proposition; they may be found in the mind of a man who is not a sage, just as an isolated item of virtue may be displayed in his behaviour. Knowledge in the second sense is a ovorrjiJLa, a totality whose elements are conjoined and indissociable, as is probably indicated by the last stage in the famous lesson by gestures that Zeno had delivered on the theory of knowledge: at this point, the left hand moved across to fasten upon the right, which was already clenched into a fist.36 It is this kind of knowledge, knowledge in its second sense, that is possessed by the sage, as Zeno's lesson suggested and as Stobaeus in his turn indicates, when he describes it as 'the rational knowledge of particular truths, as it is present in the person of the sage' (a formula in which it now transpires that the correct noun to complete the expression rj TCOV Kara fxepos XoyiKr} is none other than iTnarrujLT]). In exactly the same way, the practical activity of the sage includes every item of virtue, without exception. The perfection of the sage, in both the speculative sphere and the practical, is thus constructed on the model of the true 32 33 34 36

Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.74. I 6 = S K F I I I . 122. The link is made by the words erepav St €7norr}^rjv. 35 I97i,p. 99. 1971, p. 112, n. 109. Cf. Acad.pr. 11.144 = SVF'1.66. In an unpublished paper on 'The body and speech in the Stoics', delivered at the Seminaire de philosophic ancienne de Strasbourg, I tried to analyse the parallel exegesis to this text and that of Acad. post. 1.408". = SVF 1.55.60-2, which expounds the doctrinal content of Zeno's reading.

THE CONJUNCTIVE MODEL

83

Finally, the theory of passions enables us to pursue the influence of this model a little further: for the intrusion of passion into a rational mind is, by reason of the devastating power of its effects, in every respect comparable to the addition of a false conjunct to a true conjunctive proposition - an addition which, as we know, is enough to render false, in its entirety, the new conjunctive proposition that is produced by this addition. I do not propose to break new ground in this domain; rather, using a few extra arguments, I aim to confirm an interpretation which has already been put forward by a number of other commentators3 7 and which runs counter to the interpretation that has in the past traditionally been attached to the Stoic theory of passions. It generally used to be said that Chrysippus' famous thesis, according to which the passions are judgements made by the hegemonic part of the soul, was a thesis of extremely frenzied intellectualism, bordering on the absurd, and it was generally believed that Posidonius had certainly been right to oppose it in the name of psychological experience and current moral practice.38 In opposition to this presentation of the matter, it has now justifiably been shown that the assimilation of passion to a judgement was in no sense a means of rationalizing it, - quite the reverse.39 If passion could really be reduced to no more than an erroneous judgement, without at the same time being a sickness of the soul, all that would be necessary to annihilate it would be to correct the error of judgement, just as one corrects an error of arithmetic or grammar. Yet it is quite clear that the Stoics place no confidence at all in an intellectual therapy of this kind. Chrysippus, on the contrary, constantly draws attention to the impotence of the logos where those who are impassioned are concerned, stressing that in their case the logos falls upon deaf ears. He distinguishes 37

38

39

Cf. Goldschmidt 1969, p. 237 ('So it is fair to say that, notwithstanding first appearances, there are few ancient doctrines which take such account of the passions or so fully recognize the "irrational passions" as the Stoic doctrine: it is true that it does so n o t to condone them, but to attempt to exorcize them.') Cf. for example, D o d d s 1951, p. 239: 'The dogmatic rationalists of the Hellenistic Age seem to have cared little for the objective study of m a n as he is; their attention was concentrated on the glorious picture of m a n as he might be, the ideal sapiens or sage. In order t o m a k e the picture seem possible, Zeno a n d Chrysippus deliberately went back, behind Aristotle a n d behind Plato, to the naive intellectualism of the fifth century, . . . There was n o "irrational soul" to contend with: the so-called passions were merely errors of judgement or morbid disturbances resulting from errors of judgement. Correct the error, a n d the disturbance will automatically cease, leaving a mind untouched by joy or sorrow, untroubled by hope or fear, "passionless, pitiless, a n d perfect" (Tarn). This fantastic psychology was adopted a n d maintained for two centuries, not on its merits but because it was thought necessary to a moral system which aimed at combining altruistic action with complete inward detachment. Posidonius, we know, rebelled against it a n d demanded a return to Plato, pointing out that Chrysippus' theory conflicted both with observation, which showed the elements of character to be innate, a n d with moral experience, which revealed irrationality a n d evil as ineradicably rooted in h u m a n nature a n d controllable only by some kind of catharsis.' Galen's text, which D o d d s himself cites, p p . 256-7, n. 16, suggests that, far from reflecting a disinterested desire to m a k e an 'objective study' of m a n as he is, Posidonius' psychology is motivated just as much as that of the ancient Stoics by a desire to provide a rational basis for a very specific concept of pedagogical practice. Cf. Rist 1969, pp. 22-36, in particular p. 31. T h e most important texts in this connection are Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.89.4 = S K F m . 3 8 9 ; Plutarch, De virt. mor. 450c = SVFm.390; Galen, De Hipp, et Plat. deer. IV 6 = S FT7 in.47 5.

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clearly between purely speculative errors, which can be redressed by verbal instructions, and the errors that account for passion, which remain obdurately unresponsive to that same treatment. He often supports his views by citing the most 'pathetic' of the poets (Euripides, for instance), those who are the most convinced of the devouring force of passion and the inefficacy of words to cure those gripped by passion. As a number of texts so forcefully note, 40 what strikes the Stoics most about passion is precisely its irrationality, its impermeability to speech and reason (whether proffered by others or by oneself), a profound irrationality that is nevertheless accepted by the subject. So what is the explanation for the apparent reduction of passion to an intellectual error? Probably the alienation caused by the passions was perceived as so radical that it could no longer be explained by a conflict between two distinct forces, one rational, the other irrational. If the logos of the impassioned man was in conflict with his instincts, he would remain intact in himself. He would still be capable of allying himself with the external logos of the moralist or the director of conscience, in order to battle to overcome his passion with a better chance of success. To say that passion is an error of judgement is to say that it has taken possession of man's very reason, invaded his being and perverted him to the very marrow of his bones. If the passions are judgements, it is not because they give way before words of good counsel, but precisely because they do not. Only a logos is capable of resisting another logos, but in this case the logos that resists is an internally vitiated one. When passion breaches the defences, the bulwark of reason crumbles and disintegrates just as that of truth does in a conjunctive proposition as soon as the least falsity slips in. A military metaphor of Seneca's, in the De ira (1.8) describes this process clearly in terms in which we are at liberty to detect another echo of the conjunctive model: The enemy . . . must be stopped at the very frontier; for if he has passed it and advanced within the city gates, he will not respect any bounds set by his captives. For the mind is not a member apart, nor does it view the passions merely objectively, thus forbidding them to advance further than they ought, but it is itself transformed into the passion (in adfectum ipse mutatur) and is, therefore, unable to recover its former useful and saving power when this has once been betrayed and weakened. (tr. John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge (Mass.), 1985) Faced with this description of a kind of law of the expansion of the irrational, which invades the entire available psychic space, one is again put in mind of the physical model of the total dilution of one body within the integral field offered by another. At the same time, the two sides to this theory of passions, the one psychological, the other moral, are attested: if passion is a judgement, it is an affection in which the entire person is engaged. The self commits itself totally to it and bears the entire moral responsibility for it. If pluralist theories of the 40

Cf. in particular Cicero, Tuscul. disp. in.61-73, and the comments of Brehier 1910/51, pp. 246R.

THE CONJUNCTIVE MODEL

85

to it and bears the entire moral responsibility for it. If pluralist theories of the soul are unacceptable, for the master of Stoicism, that is because they tend to diminish the responsibility of the self and to appease the sense of guilt. If there is an 'irrational part' in my soul, I can make it into the scapegoat for all my imperfections; it is not I who am immoral, but another inside me, against whom I struggle, even if I do so in vain; it does not really involve me in its turpitude. In opposition to that possibility, which is open to bad faith, Stoic monism appears as a doctrine, or perhaps an experience, of the total responsibility of the self. After that threefold and, I hope, conclusive test of the productivity of the conjunctive model and the enhanced comprehension that it makes possible, I should like to round off these remarks by putting forward two hypotheses which may make them easier to understand. The first hypothesis is of a historical nature, the second of a structural one. The historical hypothesis concerns Posidonius, whose name has already been mentioned in connection with the famous critique in which he attacked Chrysippus' theory of passions. I shall try to show that Posidonius may also have opposed the classic Stoic doctrine of the conjunctive proposition and that the coexistence of those two critiques is by no means fortuitous. I am aware that I shall be venturing into very uncertain terrain here; however, if real grounds do exist for my belief, it could perhaps be held that Posidonius detected the presence of the conjunctive model in the theory of passions, and on that account found himself goaded into combating both that theory and the model that it embodied. Let us look into the matter more closely. First, let us return to an examination of Sextus' text. Sextus, it will be remembered, had taken it upon himself to reproduce the Stoic response to the first objections that he himself had raised against the theory of the conjunction: the Stoic reply had appealed to the paradigm of the torn coat. Returning to the offensive, Sextus is very scornful of this humble comparison with its overtones of the tattered Cynic philosopher. He calls it a 'naivety' (evrjdes), suggesting that one does perhaps have to allow ordinary, everyday language the use of certain catachrestic terms (Karaxp^oriKois ovoixaoi) since it is not applied to what is really true but only to that which appears to be so. 41 For example, we say that we 'sink a well', 'weave a tunic', 'build a house', but that is a misuse of language; for if the well exists, one is no longer engaged in sinking it since it has already been sunk (OVK opvootrai aXX opdjpvKrai); and if a tunic exists, one is no longer engaged in weaving it, for it has already been woven. The abuse of language (Karaxpyois) thus has a place in daily life and current usage. However, once we set out to explore the very nature of things, it really is necessary to insist upon precision (rrjs aKpifieias). Much could be said about these few lines, in thefirstplace about the notion of catachresis, which was destined for such a brilliant and turbulent future in 41

Cf. Sextus, M VIII. 129: fjurj TTOLVTOJS TO 7Tpos TTjv (f>voLV aArjOes ^TJTOVVTL dXXa TO npos

86£

rrjv

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STOICISM

the later history of rhetoric; 42 secondly, about the examples that show the use of the different tenses in the Greek verb, a clearly Aristotelian theme. 43 However, lack of space prevents me from following those particular paths, so let me limit myself to drawing attention to the comical side to this lecture on philosophical rigour which Sextus takes it upon himself to address to his adversaries even though, in this instance, all the rigour is manifestly to be found on their side while he himself is clearly somewhat short of it, given that he has just suggested considering as true a conjunctive proposition that comprises a false conjunct - an instance of being hoist with one's own petard, if ever there was one. But there are other reasons, too, why this passage of Sextus' deserves our attention. If I am not mistaken, it presents a number of quite unusual features. In the first place, the critique formulated by Sextus runs contrary to the habitual respect that he shows for ordinary language and dayto-day practice: frequently, in his writing, he invokes the awrjdeia in a positive sense. 44 Secondly, the accusation of laxity and lack of rigour is somewhat at odds with the criticism of the Stoics' excessive rigour that he expressed only a few lines earlier. It is bizarre to find these logicians accused, within a few lines, on the one hand of being pointlessly and paradoxically punctilious, on the other of being imprecise and more concerned about seeming than being. Now, strangely enough, this double reproach reappears in Galen, in the passage to which I have already referred, that is to say in connection with the theory of the conjunction. 45 Galen writes as follows: 'Here too, the school of Chrysippus, paying attention to verbal expression rather than to the facts (rrj Ae^ei (JL&AAOV rj TOLS TTpdyfjuaGL TTpooexovres rov vovv),*6 gives the name

"conjunctives" (au/xTTCTrAey/xeva) to all sentences composed by means of the conjunctive particles (SLOL TOJV GVJJLTTA€KTIK<JI)V KaAovfievcDv ovvSeajjuov), even if

composed of incompatible propositions, or of propositions such that one follows from another.' Then he goes on to say, '[They use] names carelessly in matters in which accuracy of expression is important (iv oh fiiv avyK^nains d/cptjSeta ScSaaKaAias dfieAws xp^tievoL TOLS ovofiaaw41)', but in matters in which the words have no difference in meaning, [they legislate] for themselves private meanings (iv o?s 8e ovSev hia(j>€pov al a>val Grj/jLatvovacv avrol

vofjLodeTovvres ?8ia aT^cuvo/xeva48)' (Kieffer 1964, p. 35; the translation is slightly modified). It is noticeable that the two symmetrical criticisms, which in Sextus are quite clumsily juxtaposed, in Galen are set out in an elegant chiasmus which tones down the paradox of their co-presence and makes it 42

43 44 45 46 47

48

Cf. in particular Genette 1968; 1966, p p . 21 iff.; Ricoeur 1975, p p . 8 4 - 6 . O n the Stoic roots of the theory of tropes, cf. Barwick 1957, p p . 88ff.; K e n n e d y 1963, p p . 297ff. Cf. for example Metaph. 0 6, 1048523-35; Eth. Nic. x, 1173b2; Phys. vi.6. Cf. Mi. 170-220, 227-247, a n d the commentaries of Russo 1975, p . X L V I . Introductio dialect., chap. 4, p p . 1 0 - n Kalbfleisch. Cf. Sextus, M VIII. 127: el Se rrj voei T&V irpayixarojv irpooeKriov eoriv. Cf. Sextus, ibid. 129: O>OT€ iv fxkv rep j8ia> K<XI rfj Koivfj avvrjdeia TOTTOV €LX€V 77 K orav Se TOL irpos TTJV voiv ^rjTcbfAev TTpayfjLaTCL, TOT€ €)(€o6ai Set rrjs d/cpijScias Cf. Sextus, ibid. 126: el [izv yap e^eanv avrots a BeXovoi vocoderelv.

THE C O N J U N C T I V E MODEL

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possible to lay it at his adversaries' door. But although the form in Galen may be different, the substance, polemical tactics and a number of details of vocabulary in the two texts present undeniable affinities. In view of all this, the hypothesis of a common source cannot be dismissed (especially since we have already come across one indication that Sextus is here reproducing objections of which he is not himself the author). And although the name of Posidonius comes a little too trippingly to the tongue of those who are in need of a link to complete their chain of argument, I myself would also be inclined to invoke it. J.S. Kieffer, the most recent commentator upon Galen's Introductio dialectical9 points out that, according to a suggestion made in oral discussion by Ludwig Edelstein, the particularly sharp tone of the polemic directed against Chrysippus in chapter 4 of Galen's pamphlet could be accounted for if the source was Posidonius. Although Kieffer has not himself followed up this suggestion, in fact has seemed rather to distance himself from it, 50 it is certainly worth considering. Edelstein presumably had in mind Posidonius' Ilepl owSeufxcbv, of which a fragment has come down to us. 5 x To judge by this single fragment, this treatise was a polemical work directed against those who claimed that conjunctions designate nothing at all (ou STJXOVGL fiev TL) and do no more than link the discourse together (avro Se JJLOVOV TTJV <j)pdcnv ovvoeovcn). Posidonius, on the contrary, for his part included conjunctions in the same 'part of discourse' as the verbal prefixes, which certainly are considered as significant parts of discourse since they modify the meaning of the verbal roots to which they are joined. It would thus appear that Posidonius was opposed to a purely syntactical theory of conjunction and proposed elaborating a semantic theory. 5 2 Of course, what are at issue here are conjunctions in the grammatical sense of the term, not simply the conjunction 'and', which is the operator of conjunction in its logical sense. But concepts relating to the former necessarily affect the notion of the latter; and it is surely the same anti-formalist point of view that engenders the idea that Galen presents in criticism of Chrysippus, namely that it is impossible to speak of a conjunctive proposition without first examining the contents of the conjoined propositions in order to determine whether or not they are incompatible or consecutive. It is thus, at the very least, not unreasonable to suppose that Posidonius was behind those attacks of Galen and Sextus which converged against the Stoic theory of the GvixTTeirXeyfjuevov; and if that is so, the link that I 49 50

51 52

Kieffer 1964, p. 24. Kieffer (p. 84) points out that the use of vofxoBeTovvTts might reflect an Aristotelian influence, on account of the use of that term in Anal. post. 83a 14 to describe the conventional assignation of a meaning to a word. Elsewhere (p. 25) however, he states that Galen's argument, in this chapter 4, 'reads as if it were its own. This chapter, too, seems to be more Galen's than a transcription from a textbook source.' Apollonius Dyscolus, De conjunctione, p. 214,4-20 Schneider = Posidonius, ed. Edelstein and Kidd 1972, no. 45, pp. 59-60. The question of whether conjunctions have a categorematic or a syncategorematic value was to be examined by the commentators of Aristotle's Categories. Cf. Simplicius, In Categ. 64, 18 ( = Aristotelis Fragmenta, ed. Ross, pp. 102-3), a n ^ Graeser 1978a.

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believe I have detected between the conjunctive model and the theory of passions would be indirectly confirmed by the fact that Posidonius directed his attacks against them both. I shall now, as promised, follow that historical hypothesis with a structural one. Once one thinks one has detected an isomorphism between several theses of different types (logical, psychological, ethical), one is understandably tempted to try to determine the relations of priority or even the relations of causality between those different theses, and to aim to discern which elements in them were original and which derivative. Perhaps it would be more prudent to resist that temptation. I cannot do so, however, because the expression 'conjunctive model' that I have used might suggest that I thought that the model originated in the field of logic and was then simply exported into the otherfieldsof Stoic thought. However, that is not my view: if I had to attribute a determining role to one in particular of the structures of thought between which I have attempted to discern the links, I should be inclined to attribute it to the field of ethical structures and to normative options in Stoic thought. From a strictly logical point of view, the conjunctive connection is simply one interpropositional conjunction among others, with nothing particularly special about it. The reason why it served as a model in extra-logical sectors of Stoic thought is that, by virtue of the particular structure of its truthconditions, it presented features which could be adapted to the extra-logical role that it would be possible to give it. The conclusion that it was ethics that played the determining role could be reached, negatively, in thefirstplace from the difficulties that arise as soon as one tries to have a thesis of Stoic ethics stem from any thesis external to ethics, whether it be logical or physical. That is something that I realized when reading the study that John Rist has devoted to the theory of the equality of sins,53 a study to which I nevertheless owe much in other respects. Rist tries to link the moral thesis of the equality of sinsfirstto a logical thesis, namely that of the non-existence of degrees of truth, then to a physical one, namely that of the properties of 'pneumatic' movements. On the logical thesis, he writes as follows: 'If therefore we can see why the Stoics did not wish to posit degrees of truth, we may be helped in our enquiry [concerning the moral thesis].'54 In Rist's views that reason is 'fairly obvious': if truth tolerated degrees, there could be nothing that was absolutely true: if a is more true than b, there can exist no x of such a kind that nothing could possibly be more true than it. Now, some things are manifestly true; so truth cannot be one of those realities in which degrees are tolerated. I must confess that I find this argument less than persuasive: its major premiss is presented as self-evident; yet does not Platonic philosophy consist, precisely, in drawing from the antecedent of that major premiss a consequence that is diametrically opposed to that of Rist's argument? A Platonist would start from the same principle: some things are more x 53

Rist 1969, pp. 81-96.

54

Rist 1969, p. 83.

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than others and some things are less x than others. And his conclusion would be: there must, then, exist such a thing as x itself, an absolute x, through which everything that is x in some degree can be so. Wherever there is more and there is less, there is also a maximum. We know furthermore that this way of arguing a gradibus was given a perfectly clear formulation on the technical level in Aristotle's early writings.55 In view of this, it seems hard to believe that the Stoics' reasons for rejecting the idea of degrees were the same as those which led some of their most impressive predecessors to accept that same idea, and one feels inclined to reverse the reasoning: if the consequences that stem from accepting or rejecting degrees are unclear on a general level (the Platonists' acceptance leads them to believe in the necessity of a maximum while the Stoics, according to Rist, conclude that a maximum must be impossible), one will not be inclined to base the exclusion of degrees, in the ethical theory of sins, upon their exclusion in the logical domain; on the contrary, one will be inclined to interpret the Stoic decision to exclude them in the logical domain as a lateral effect or reflection of their decision to exclude them, as a matter of principle, in the ethical domain. However, Rist moves on from his first suggestion. He also proposes deriving the ethical thesis of the equality of sins from another thesis that is also external to ethics, belonging as it does to the domain of psychophysiology. He writes as follows: The only possible explanation, therefore, of the Stoic position is that something of great importance happens in a similar way whenever any kind of guilty act is committed. In order to understand what this is, we shall have to turn to problems of the physiological or rather psychosomatic structure of man.'56 According to him, this important event is the physical disordering that affects the movements of the 'pneuma' in all guilty behaviour. Rist goes on to say: 'It seems, therefore, that the Stoics held that all sins are equal and that there are no degrees of guilt, because the vibrations in the human rrvevfjua are either orderly or disorderly.'57 Here again, one may hesitate to follow him, for while it may be true that the alternative between what is orderly and what is disorderly may be considered to be entirely logical, the existence or inexistence of intermediate degrees between order and disorder and equally the existence or inexistence of degrees of order and disorder are a more debatable matter, and the inexistence of such degrees cannot be affirmed in all cases without making a particular examination of the pertinent data and the meaning taken on by the notion of order in the context under consideration. The movement of a marble on an inclined surface will be ordered if the surface is smooth and the marble round, disordered if one of those conditions is not fulfilled; but the movements of a dancer will not appear so clearly as either ordered or 55

56

Cf. 7T€pl (f>i\oooLas, fragment 16 Ross (KaOoXov yap, lv ots ean n jScArtov, iv rovrois eon n KOLI apioTov, K T \ . ) . T h e Platonic character of the a r g u m e n t is noted by Simplicius, w h o passes it o n t o us. F o r m o d e r n discussions of this argument, cf. in particular Jaeger 1923, 1934/48, p . 158; Wilpert 1957, p p . 155-62; D e Vogel i960, p p . 2 4 8 - 5 1 ; Berti 1962, p p . 353-5. 57 Rist 1969, p . 86. Rist 1969, p . 88. M y italics.

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disordered. How is it possible to affirm that the vibrations of the 'pneuma', which are not observable phenomena, can only take place in absolute order or else in total disorder? And if one decided to maintain that moral faults are not equal, would it not be extremely easy to imagine that those vibrations can be, correlatively, either more disorderly or less disorderly! The thesis of the equality of sins is, moreover, a paradoxical thesis which is not really concerned about verifications; one would be hard put to it to find any kind of confirmation for the thesis in legal institutions or in common moral discourse. So it would certainly be strange for it to have been deduced from a psychosomatic thesis that itself had no empirical basis and could accordingly provide it with not the slightest credibility. Faced with the difficulties that are thus encountered when one seeks the derivation of the moral thesis of the equality of sins either in a logical thesis such as that of the absence of degrees of truth or in a physical thesis such as that of the variations in the pneumatic rovos, one is tempted to reverse the schema of derivation and, instead, consider the moral thesis to be fundamental, in the manner of an existential choice, an option for a style of life. The theses that correspond to it on levels external to ethics would thus be considered as transpositions, objectivizations or rationalizations of that fundamental choice. That, eventually, is the direction in which Rist's study moves for, in the last analysis, he suggests that the key to the dogma of the equality of sins is to be found in a particular way of responding to moral experience. He writes as follows: It is often noticed that those men who are morally the noblest do not have a high opinion of their own moral excellence. In ecclesiastical language, this comes out as the view, often held by 'saints', that they are the greatest of sinners. This does not mean that they are committing what are commonly thought of as heinous crimes. It means that they have a very strong sense of what it means to be guilty. They recognize guilt where the ordinary man would be insensitive.5*

That last sentence to my mind sums up the essence of what I understand by 'conjunctive model', and pinpoints its ethical kernel. Just such a moral hypersensitivity seems to be what is expressed in the Stoics' conviction that a partial imperfection is enough to spoil the whole, that anything that is not totally successful is no better than something that is completely unsuccessful and that one fumbled note is enough to warrant going back to replay the piece of music right from the beginning. The Stoics, more than anyone else in Antiquity, had a sense of the contagious nature of defilement, impurity that spreads like an oil-stain. 59 Using psychological terminology, one might say that there is something obsessional about their perfectionism. All the Stoic theses that can be associated with the conjunctive model manifest a common decision: not to neglect what seems negligible to others. 59 The drop of wine does not disappear 58 59

Rist 1969, p . 9 1 . M y italics. Professor Verbeke a n d F . Zaslawsky have pointed out to me that this pessimism, this principle of the expansion of evil, which is n o t counter-balanced by a n y principle of the expansion of

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in the ocean, the grain of falsity is not drowned in the sea of truth, the peccadillo is not wiped out in the good conduct of the honourable citizen. The explanation for the Stoics' recognition or decision that one should not cheat with the logic of the conjunctive proposition,60 and for their acceptance of the purely logical reasons for this,61 is that the truth-conditions of the conjunctive proposition provided them with precisely the ingredient that they needed to satisfy their appetite for purity and rigour, spiced with the pinch of paradox that appealed to their underlying cynicism. All of which perhaps goes to show that, to be formalist in logic, it is necessary to be formalist in everything. good, posed a problem within the framework of the radically optimistic interpretation of the world that the Stoics professed. It is not possible here to develop this point as it deserves; but perhaps one could say that to be as optimistic as the Stoics are, it is probably necessary to be extremely pessimistic. 60 This formulation in itself makes it possible to glimpse the implicitly polemical value of the conjunctive model to which J.-P. Dumont has been good enough to draw my attention: the non-negligible reveals itself as such to the extent that others neglect it. However, I am not convinced that the much-discussed transformation of the 'Chaldaean' conditionals into negations of conjunctives, suggested by Chrysippus (according to Cicero, De fato vin.1516 = SVF .954), can be interpreted in the light of this idea; the truth-table of the denied conjunctive, in that it is the reverse of that of the affirmed conjunctive, namely 0111, no longer presents the characteristics of the 'conjunctive model'. 6 * There is no question of reducing the force of these arguments (I hasten to say this in response to the anxiety that has been expressed by Professor A.C. Lloyd). However, it may perhaps be agreed that, through its general structures, Stoic thought favoured taking them into account and dismissed obstacles which, in other authors such as Sextus and Galen, on the contrary very clearly do diminish their force.

THE STOIC THEORY OF THE SUPREME GENUS AND PLATONIC ONTOLOGY*

TOVT

€LVai [JLOVOV O7T€p €\€L TTpOG^oX^V

TCLVTOV OCJfJLCL KCLl OVOldV

Kdl ilTa^V

TIVCL,

6pL^6fl€VOL.

Clem. Alex., Strom. 11.4.15 = Plato, Sophist

A number of texts are in agreement 1 in attributing to the Stoics a doctrine which may be summarized by the following four theses: (1) (2)

(3)

Something is an existent (I shall hereafter use the abbreviation E to refer to the term 'existent') if and only if it is a body. By the same token, something is a 'non-existenf ( = NE) if and only if it is not a body. The term incorporeal (daco^arov) applies, not to any and every nameable item which is not a body, but only to a limited and determined group of such items, namely the void, place, time and the XeKrd. I shall hereafter refer to this list using the expression 'canonical incorporeals'. Only bodies and canonical incorporeals may be called something (TI'=ST).

(4)

The term not something concepts

(OVTL = NST)

denotes the ontological status of

The most striking feature of this doctrine, in the eyes of its ancient critics and modern commentators alike, is that it presents the rl as the supreme genus (yevLKcorarov), rather than the 6V, which is relegated to a lower level of ontological classification; that is why I shall hereafter refer to it as the 'TSG * This text is a much reworked version of a paper that I delivered at the Symposium Hellenisticum held at Pontignano. I should like to express my warmest thanks to all those who, either through their spoken or written comments at the time of the symposium, or in correspondence later, have contributed so much towards the final elaboration of this study: in particular, Jonathan Barnes, Bernard Besnier, Myles Burnyeat, Pierluigi Donini, Andre Laks, Tony Long, David Konstan, Mario Mignucci, Martha Nussbaum, Malcolm Schofield, David Sedley and Richard Sorabji. I have unfortunately not been able to study the paper entitled 'Une occasion manquee: la distinction du ri et de Yov dans le Sophiste de Platon', presented by Pierre Aubenque in the course of his Sorbonne seminar. It is now being revised prior to publication and is to appear in a collection of essays edited by Pierre Aubenque, entitled Etudes sur le 'Sophiste'. I deeply regret having 'missed the opportunity' to compare my views with his. (This article has now been published as 'Une occasion manquee; la genese avortee de la distinction entre "l'etant" et le "quelque chose", in P. Aubenque (ed.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, Naples 1991, pp. 365-85.) 1 Alexander of Aphrodisias,/« Top. 301.19 = SVFw.^i^FDS 711; ibid. 359.i2 = 5'K/7ii.329B, FDS 709; Sextus, M 1.17 = SVF 11.330, FDS 710; ibid. x.2i8 = SVF 11.331, FDS 720; ibid.

x.234 = SVFu.33i,FDS 719. Also Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 15, mfoc = FDS 721.

92

THE SUPREME GENUS AND PLATONIC ONTOLOGY

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doctrine' (the doctrine of the ri as the supreme genus) and, more specifically (as we shall have to consider a number of variants), as the 'standard TSG doctrine'. The standard TSG doctrine may be expressed by the following table: Something I Bodies (existents)

I Incorporeals (canonical)

Not something I Concepts

I ?

The TSG doctrine has often been studied, from both the historical and the philosophical points of view. It poses many problems by reason of its intrinsic obscurity, the scarcity of sources and the hostility towards Stoicism evinced by most of our informants. Amongst its many difficulties are two which have been the subject of many recent studies and about which I do not intend to say anything in the present paper: (a) the question of whether and how the Stoics tried to specialize certain verbs (in particular virapx^v and v^Loravai) so as to turn them into distinct expressions of the modes of reality or existence of bodies and incorporeals; 2 (b) the question of how the TSG doctrine fits in with what is commonly known as the Stoic theory of categories. 3 These two problems are undeniably related to those that I do propose to discuss here. However, so far as (a) is concerned, it is impossible to decide in advance whether the question of verbs with an ontological meaning can throw any light on the contents of the TSG doctrine or whether, on the contrary, this is a question that can only be resolved once the contents of that doctrine have been set out clearly; and so far as (b) is concerned, the question, in itself extremely complex, arises in a relatively autonomous fashion and I can see no major disadvantage in leaving it aside. My intention, essentially, is to attack a common image of the TSG doctrine, which has both historical and philosophical aspects, and - if possible - to replace it by a different image. The view that I shall be criticizing depends upon a number of indications which might suggest that the TSG doctrine is a 2 3

On this question, Hadot( 1969), pp. 115-27; Graeser 1971, pp. 299-305; Goldschmidt 1972, pp. 331-44; Sandbach 1985. According to an interpretation which goes back at least to Plotinus (VI. 1.25) and has found a number of authoritative partisans among modern scholars (cf. Brehier 1910/51/71^. 133; id. 1936, pp. 30-1; Robin 1948, pp. 414-15; Pasquino 1978, pp. 375-86), the four Stoic 'categories' fall into two groups, the first of which (substances and qualities) corresponds to bodies, the second (ways of being and relative ways of being) to incorporeals. Other commentators, in contrast, are of the opinion that the distinction established by the so-called 'categories' simply represents four aspects in which each individual body may be envisaged; cf. for example Rieth 1933, p. 90; Goldschmidt 1977, p. 21 n. 5; Hadot 1968, vol. 1, p. 161 n. 1; and most recently Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, pp. 163-6. (This book had not yet been published at the time of the Pontignano Symposium. I should like to emphasize how very useful it has been to me in preparing this paper for publication.) Many doubts have been expressed as to even the reality of the 'Stoic theory of categories', cf. for example Pohlenz 1967, pp. 1298*. n. 1; Gould 1970, p. 107; Sandbach 1985, p. 40.

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relatively late innovation in the history of Stoicism and that, in the course of that history, it came to replace a less exceptional doctrine, accepted by the earliest Stoics, according to which the existent (6V) was the supreme genus. I shall refer to this hypothetical doctrine as the ESG. The explanation as to why the ESG was replaced by the TSG doctrine at some point in the development of the Stoic school is supposed to run more or less as follows: when the Stoics combined the, in itself unexceptional, ESG doctrine with their 'materialist' identification of the existent (6V) and the body, they realized that they could no longer ascribe a precise ontological status to things (if there turned out to be any) which it would be impossible to conceive as bodies, yet which could not be reduced to purely mental fictions. Having discovered that such 'things' did exist and having analysed their nature, particularly in the course of developing their physics and their theory of language, they could hardly deny them any kind of reality at all. However, being unwilling to jettison their equation between the existent and the body and in order to accommodate these recalcitrant realities as well as possible, they proceeded to construct the strange status of their 'incorporeals' which are 'something' yet are not 'existents' (NEST). At this point, the existent had necessarily to lose its status as supreme genus, ceding this to the 'something', a genus which included both bodies and incorporeals. Seen in this perspective, the TSG doctrine appears as some feat of theoretical acrobatics designed to save one paradox - that of the 'materialist' thesis threatened by the attacks of 'common sense' - but succeeding in doing so only at the cost of introducing a second paradox, even more violent than the first: namely, by dethroning the 'existent', which now lost its traditional status of supreme genus. In these circumstances, more or less the only interest of the TSG doctrine would be that of a baby ontological monster born of the embraces between a stubborn dogmatism and a strategy of despair improvised in order to escape the most immediately disastrous consequences of that dogmatic stubbornness. Even amongst historians who accept the antiquity of the Stoics' TSG doctrine, one often comes across the idea that they only adopted that doctrine under constraint, to some extent forced to do so by (as Aristotle would have said) 'the pressure of things'.4 In opposition to this image, I would like to try to show that the TSG doctrine is an essential element in the Stoic philosophy, maturely elaborated in the crucible of their critical thought on Platonic ontology. The central concept 4

Cf. Zeller 1904, vol. m.i.i, pp. 94(-5) n. 2; Brehier 1970, p. 2; Pohlenz 1967, pp. 120-1 ('It is only bodies that can be said truly to exist. But that does not rule out there being also something incorporeal, in the first place the contents of our thoughts and words . . . Apart from the contents of our words, there are also other things that we are obliged to recognize to be "something", even if they lack the mark of true existents (i.e. place, the void, time). [. . . The TSG doctrine] is the necessary consequence of the assumption of the aacjfjLara). This interpretation, according to which the Stoics were (so to speak) dragged bodily into adopting the TSG, has been summarily but decisively rejected by Goldschmidt 1977, p. 14: I t (i.e. this doctrine) cannot be explained away as merely a response to polemics, for it was this doctrine itself that provoked them.' I find the rest of Goldschmidt's commentary, which presents the TSG doctrine as a development of Aristotelianism, or at least of one of its 'tendencies', less convincing, for reasons that I shall be explaining below.

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of the doctrine, namely that of NEST, does not appear to me to be one that could possibly have been constructed using the inductive method, that is to say by collecting the properties common to a certain number of items which could only be grouped together by virtue of the impossibility of denying them some kind of reality. In my view, it is possible to suggest that this concept was constructed on the basis of theoretical considerations, within the framework of a general and abstract ontology, without paying any particular attention to the items (canonical incorporeals) which were to constitute its extension. The critical analysis of Platonism seems to have led the Stoics to discern two distinct ontological criteria: the one a strong criterion (let us agree to refer to it as the criterion of existence), in the name of which, in opposition to Plato, the existent was held to be whatever is corporeal; the other a weak criterion (let us call this the criterion of reality), in the name of which the Platonic Forms were denied any extra-mental reality. The relative independence of these two criteria (all that satisfies the strong criterion also satisfies the weak one, but the converse does not apply) leaves room for a perfectly well-determined theoretical position for items (if any such there be) which satisfy the weak criterion without satisfying the strong one, in other words for 'realities' without 'existence'. This theoretical position is that of the NESTs. The discussion upon which I shall now embark is divided into six parts. In the introduction (i), I shall make a few observations on various structural problems which spring to mind once one examines the TSG doctrine. In part n, which is devoted to the chronology of the TSG doctrine, or more precisely to a kind of chronological topology of this doctrine, I shall be analysing a number of texts which could have been and/or were used as arguments to support the adoption of the TSG doctrine at a relatively late date in the history of Stoic thought, and I shall try to show that these texts do not justify such a conclusion. In the next two parts, I shall try to establish the role that may have been played by the reading of Plato's Sophist (m) and that possibly played by critical reflection upon the Platonic theory of Forms (iv) in the elaboration of the TSG doctrine. In the last two parts, finally, I shall try to put together two kinds of arguments that confirm my general thesis: to refute the idea that the TSG doctrine is the fruit of an induction based upon an analysis of the canonical incorporeals, I shall try to bring to light the disparities that those incorporeals present and the discrepancies between the various arguments used by the Stoics tofixtheir ontological status (v). To confirm the role played by the mediation of Platonism in the construction of the TSG doctrine, I shall examine some of the objections put to the Stoics by their adversaries on the subject of this doctrine and the varying degrees of attention that the Stoics paid to those objections (vi).

The TSG doctrine raises several structural problems which it may be helpful to mention, if only briefly. Those that seem to me worthy of attention are the

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following: (a) (in connection with thesis 2): is the list of canonical incorporeals fixed ne varieturi (b) (in connection with thesis 3): is the division of STs into bodies and incorporeals exhaustive? (c) (in connection with thesis 4): are concepts the only NSTs? (d) (also in connection with thesis 4): can natural species and fictional species be distinguished within those NST concepts? (e) (in connection with theses 3 and 4): why did the Stoics apparently refuse to assign a common genus to STs and NSTs? (a) It being my intention to maintain that the concept of NEST was constructed independently from what was to constitute its extension, it would have been very much in my interest to discover variants in the descriptions of that extension that are provided by the texts. However, the hunt for variants proved disappointing. By calling the four classic incorporeals mentioned in the texts 'the canonical incorporeals', I am acknowledging this situation and do so without regret: time, the void, place and the XeKra do indeed constitute a 'canonical' list. The only variant of any importance afforded by our documentation is the list provided by Cleomedes (De mot. circul. p. 16, 2-5 Ziegler) in a passage not expressly designed to provide it and the text of which is in some doubt. 5 According to what seems to me the most likely reading, Cleomedes' list differs from the canonical one in two respects: first, it features 'surface' (€7TL
Cleomedes, seeking to prove the infinity of the extra-cosmic void, here wonders whether that void could be limited by an incorporeal. But what kind of an incorporeal could that be? In the Ziegler edition (Leipzig 1891), the following text appears: 77 av ovv ei'77 TOVTO; Xpovos; *E7n(j)dv€La; AeKreov erepov TL TCOV TrapaTrXiqoiwv; Goulet 1980, p. 186 n. 52, suggests, very plausibly, that XZKTOV should be read instead of Ae/creov (without, however, pointing out that XCKTOV is to be found in the L MS, one of the three MSS used by Ziegler, and not the least important; cf. Ziegler's preface, pp. III-IV). If we accept Ae/crov, an extra question mark should of course be added after this word, as in Goulet's translation, ibid., p. 92.

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alongside place and the void, but without regrouping the three items under a common heading; Chrysippus himself (according to Stobaeus 1.142.26 = SVF 11.482, FDS 724) associates surface, line, place, the void and time under the common heading of 'things that resemble bodies' (ra TOLS oajfjuaaL TTpoaeoLKora). According to Diogenes Laertius vii.135, Posidonius maintained that surface possessed both a mental reality and an objective existence (KOLL /car' kirivoiav KOX KCLO VTTOOTOLOIV) and this may suggest that his precursors ascribed to it no more than the status of an ens rationis. What is certain and is consistent with all this evidence is that, for the Stoics, limits were not bodies (cf. Plutarch, Comm. not. io8oe = SKF 11.487). But that negation is compatible with three different ontological statuses: (i) limits could have the same status as the four canonical incorporeals;6 and in that case they would either be coordinated with the latter, or subordinated to one of them, probably place, or might even be identified with place;7 (ii) they might be STs neither corporeal nor incorporeal, as Long and Sedley, with some hesitation, admit (1987, pp. 163, 165, 301), which presupposes that the bodies/incorporeals dichotomy does not exhaust the class of STs, a problem that I shall be examining in section (b); (iii) finally, geometric limits could be considered as purely mental constructions with no objective reality, that is to say as NSTs. The most trustworthy sources of testimony concerning the early Stoics do not, in my opinion, favour (i); and I believe, as will be seen below, that the bodies/ incorporeals dichotomy is exhaustive, the consequence of which is that (ii) may be excluded. Solution (iii) is the one that seems the most plausible, bearing in mind the Stoics' fundamentally continuistic conception of the physical universe. A more specific argument may also be advanced in favour of (iii): if the Stoics class concepts as NSTs, that is essentially because they are items that are common or universal (KOLVOL);8 now, geometrical limits are, or may be, common to several bodies (a surface belonging to at least two bodies, a line belonging to at least four bodies, a point belonging to at least eight bodies, as becomes clear when one assembles congruent cubes). That may be a reason for attributing to them the same ontological status as that of concepts, namely the status of NST. (b) Is the division of STs into bodies and incorporeals exhaustive? I believe it to be so, according to the common interpretation. As noted above, Long and Sedley are more sceptical. They point out, not without reason, that trichotomies are frequent in Stoic thought (type A, the opposite of type A, neither the former nor the latter) (1987, pp. 165 and 301). But what could STs be if they were neither bodies nor incorporeals? Long and Sedley make two suggestions: (1) they might be geometrical limits; but I have already adduced a number of reasons for rejecting that idea; (2) they might be 'fictitious entities', such as the 6 8

That is the consequence drawn, in polemical fashion, by Plutarch, in the continuation of the 7 passage cited by SVF; cf. also Brehier 1970, p. 8. Cf. Goulet 1980, p. 186 n. 52. Cf. Simplicius, In Categ. 105.7-20 = SVF 11.278, FDS 1247.

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Centaurs and Giants mentioned by Seneca in a text (Epist. 58.15) to which I shall be returning at some length. For that suggestion to be acceptable, Centaurs and Giants have, of course, to be taken here as fictitious individuals, not fictitious species, for otherwise they could not pass for STs. 9 It is, however, interesting to note that Seneca speaks of Centaurs and Giants in general despite the fact that he could quite well have mentioned the Centaur Chiron or the Giant Atlas. Furthermore, according to at least one testimony, 10 STs can only be bodies or incorporeals (Kara JJLOVOJV oco/jidToov KOLL docofjudrcov), and

this clearly excludes any third, 'neuter' species of ST. Finally, there undeniably were some items that the Stoics called 'neither bodies nor incorporeals' but it is certain (in some cases) or probable (in the rest) that they did not count as STs. (i) That is certain in respect of concepts. They are neither bodies nor incorporeals, but NSTs. 11 (ii) It is probable in respect of the 'all' (TO TTOLV), that is to say the combination constituted by the world and the infinite void which surrounds it, a complex that is referred to in this way to differentiate it from the universe (TO OXOV), which consists of only the physical world, without the void (cf. SVF11.522-4). Plutarch declares explicitly that, according to the Stoics, 'the all is neither a body nor an incorporeal (OVT€ acofjia TO irdv OUT' dowixaTov eivai Xeyovoiv)'12 But is this all, which is a compound of a finite body and an infinite incorporeal, a ST? That is a difficult question, for this notion of the 'all' is a nest of paradoxes (aToirtoTaTov) which Plutarch certainly makes the most of in the context of the passage cited, in terms that irresistibly call to mind the first hypothesis in the Parmenides. All the same, in my view, there are good reasons to deny the status of ST to the all: there is no link, either physical or conceptual, that can unite the body constituted by the world with the incorporeal constituted by the void that surrounds it, or that can turn the combination of the two into an objectively unified totality; the universe (TO oXov) which in itself does constitute such a totality does not stand in the same relationship to the all (TO irdv) as a part of the oXov does to the oXov itself.13 Still in this same passage, Plutarch says that the all is infinite, by reason of the infinity of one of its components, namely the void; and that, as a consequence of that infinity, it is 'indeterminate and disordered (dopiGTov KCLI araAcrov).' In his article entitled 'Bits and pieces', J. Barnes draws an apposite comparison between this Stoic notion of the all and the arbitrarily composed collections that modern set-theory is prone to evoke, for example a combination such as 9 10

11 12 13

That is probably why Long and Sedley (1987), in their commentary, hasten to substitute Mickey Mouse for Seneca's Centaurs and Giants (p. 164). Alexander In Top. 359.12-16 = SVF 11.329b, FDS 'jog. According to Long and Sedley 1987, p. 165, this text is 'probably too polemical to carry much weight'. But by how many pages would their book be shortened if they adopted that criterion in a consistent fashion? Alexander ibid. On this point, Long and Sedley accept the testimony of Alexander (p. 181). Plutarch, Comm. not. \oq^D = SVF 11.525. On the (jL€pos-o\ov relationship, cf. Sextus, M ix.336 = SVF 11.524, FDS 869.

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the Duke of Edinburgh, Pythagoras' Theorem, North Dakota and Roquefort cheese.14 If, as I suspect, he is right, the Stoic irdv may be considered to be a purely mental construction, possessing no true unity nor any objective reality and, accordingly, to be a NST. It is furthermore worth noting that texts devoted to the distinction between TO TT&V and TO OXOV (SVF 11.522-4) stress

how free one is to consider - or even how arbitrarily one may consider - the world either 'together with the void' (GVV TCO K€VO>, /xera TOV Kevov), or 'without the void' {xojpls TOV Kevov), The 'all' thus appears as some kind of ontological monster whose composition depends upon an imaginary (or fantastical) transgression of the physical and conceptual dividing line between bodies and incorporeals. Perhaps this diversion to take in the notion of the 'all' makes it possible similarly to settle the position of fictitious individuals such as the Centaur Chiron or Mickey Mouse, that is to say to classify them (despite their apparent individuality) among the NSTs rather than among the STs that are neither bodies nor incorporeals (as Long and Sedley do). These authors are certainly correct when they observe (1987, p. 165) that 'it would be odd to say of Mickey Mouse either that he is corporeal or that he is incorporeal'. However, that argument could equally well be used to classify him as a NST rather than a neutral ST. Despite the fact that he is schematically given an individuality by his name, his image, his history, his character and so on, Mickey Mouse nevertheless remains a fictitious monster composed from bits and pieces borrowed from real men and real mice, a monster which is in many respects incompletely defined and bound to remain so: for it would be just as odd to say of Mickey Mouse that he is bigger than a real mouse or not bigger than a real mouse, that he is more than five years old, or less, etc. If it is the case that a true individual is altogether individualized (and we are aware of the Stoics' insistence upon the discernibility of non-identicals, at least in principle), then it must be said of Mickey Mouse, as of all fictitious individuals, that he is a false individual, a fiction of an individual, a NST. Thus none of the candidates proposed to justify the creation of a class of 'neutral' STs (neither corporeal nor incorporeal) seem admissible: neither geometrical limits, or fictitious individuals. (c) Are concepts ( e w o ^ a r a ) the only NSTs? My answer to question (b) has already partly answered this one, for I have suggested that all fictitious individuals are NSTs. Now I shall try to establish two sub-classes: that of ivvorujLdTa or universal concepts and that of voovfjueva that are not immediately conjured up by sensible experience. We possess several texts which provide a classification for voov^eva (a term which might be translated, in the most neutral way possible, by the expression 'items conceived'), a classification which is based upon the mode of their 14

Barnes 1982/3, p. 250.

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formation. The texts vary in value and credibility: Diogenes Laertius vii.52-3 ( = SVF 11.87, FDS 2 55) i s particularly disorganized; Sextus Empiricus M vm 56ff. ( = SVF 11.88, FDS 279) is incomplete; M m.40, which is both wellorganized and complete, is not to be found in either SVF or FDS; Mix.393-5, which is very close to the latter, is no more than mentioned in SVF 11.88. By and large, what all these various texts say is that items that are conceived include some that stem directly from sensible experience (a77o alodrjoecos, OLTTO TTepnTToooeoos), whilst others are produced by a number of different mental operations (augmentation, diminution, assimilation, composition, transference, etc.) carried out upon the material constituted by those 'conceived items'. 15 It is important, though difficult, to understand whether these voovjxeva of various kinds are particular (even fictitiously, as Mickey Mouse is) or universal. So far as the voovfjueva Kara TT€PLTTTO)GLV are concerned, the texts that we possess are tantalizingly obscure. The only examples that Diogenes Laertius VII.53 provides are things that are sensibly perceptible, ra alcdrjrd; Sextus Empiricus, M 111.40 and ix.394, speaks of the white and the black, the sweet and the bitter, that is to say simple sensible qualities, but does not make clear whether these represent classes of qualities or particular samples of those qualities. As regards other classes of voov^eva, some examples, even if expressed in the singular (the Cyclops, the hippocentaur, the pygmy) may be interpreted equally well as the names of species or of individuals; but other examples indisputably are individuals (the Giant Tityos, Diog. Laert. vn.53) and some are individualized by the context (thus Sextus, at Mm.42, is certainly referring, not to the cyclops in general, but to the individual Cyclops described by Homer, Od. ix.191, that is to say Polyphemus). In fact, in Sextus, these examples are set upon the same level as Socrates, the prototypical example of an individual, as conceived through his resemblance to his portrait as perceived. It is also worth noting that, amongst the various operations that produce non-immediate voovfjueva, no mention is made of any that relate in some way to a generalization or abstraction: that remarkable absence perhaps supports the idea that, at least in its original sense, the Stoic notion of the voovfjL€vov is not that of a universal. This conclusion, reached through an analysis of fabricated or fictitious voov/jueva, may perhaps be retrospectively extended to cover voov/jieva that are produced immediately by sensible experience, those which constitute the primary material for the various operations of fiction: if the initial voov^eva were not particulars, it is hard to see how derived voov^eva could be. Sextus, it is true, says that in order to conceive of the Cyclops or the pygmy, one has mentally to increase or diminish the size of a KOIVOS avdpcorros (M 111.42, vm 59-60); but whether or not what he means by that is Universal Man, whom he 15

It is in the first of the texts cited by Sextus Empiricus that the following sentence appears: ovhiv ioriv €vp€LV tear €7TLVOLCLV o fjLTj €^€iTLS OLVTO) /caret TTepLTTTcooiv iyvojofxevov.

source of the famous Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit primum in sensu.

It is clearly the

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has not mentioned in the context of that expression, remains unclear. At M ix.395, he says more specifically that augmentation takes place ano rod opdv TOV KOIVOV Kara jjueyedos avOpcoTrov KOLL VTTOTTLTTTOVTCL, which shows that what

he has in mind is not intelligible man, but ordinary man, as perceptible when seen. It may be concluded that, according to him, it is not conceptually necessary to have seen more than a single man in order to be able to imagine a cyclops. If my analysis of the ontological status of Mickey Mouse and others like him, in the Stoic system, is correct, the NST category may be extended to include a whole class of items which are not universal kworniara but particular voovfjueva or, to be more precise, quasi-particular, fictitiously particular. It comes as no surprise to find these two classes coexisting within the NST category for, as we shall see in more detail when we come to examine the Stoic position regarding the Platonic Forms, Plato's Universal Man is considered by the Stoics to be a 'quasi-individual', a 'mental construction composed on the basis of the experience that we have of individual men who exist prior to that construction, which is one that corresponds to nothing in reality and is highly suspect since it tends to encourage us to make the logical mistake of treating that Universal Man as if he were himself a special kind of individual.' 16 The Universal Man (whom D.N. Sedley appositely likens to the statisticians' 'Average Man' who is the father of 2.4 children) 17 is thus a 'figment of the soul' 18 who is every bit as unreal as Polyphemus or Mickey Mouse. (d) As we have seen from the texts, the domain of fiction contains not only individuals or quasi-individuals, but also species or quasi-species such as those of the Centaurs, the Giants and other frequently mentioned mythological species. Their status as NSTs, within the framework of the standard TSG doctrine, can, naturally, be in no doubt: composed as they are of quasiindividuals which are themselves NSTs, these fictitious species could even be considered to be NSTs to the power of two. But this situation simply renders the question that I should now like to raise even more acute. The question is this: did the Stoics find means to distinguish between the ontological status of natural species, such as man and horse, from that of fictitious species such as cyclops and centaur? In reducing the ewoiqixa of man to a 'figment of the soul', did not they use up the lowest shelf in their ontological cupboard and thus find themselves obliged to stack the iworjfjLa of the centaur on that same shelf, despite the differences that those two ivvorjfjLara seem to present? To resolve that difficulty, it seems that we must distinguish between three 16

17 18

These expressions are borrowed from D.N. Sedley's remarkable article (1985), now summarized in Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, pp. 181-3.1 owe a great deal to this article, even in relation to the points on which my own views differ from those of the author. Cf. Sedley 1985, p. 88; Long and Sedley 1987, p. 181. Cf. Stobaeus, Eclogae 1, p. 136, 21 Wachsmuth = SKF 1.65, FDS 316; Aetius, Placita iv. 11 = SVF 11.83, FDS 277.

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levels: that of items conceived or voov/jieva, that of conceptions or cWoicu, and that of concepts or ivvornjuara. At the level of items conceived, if we accept the analysis that I have given above, we are dealing only with individuals or quasi-individuals; the difference between an individual man and an individual cyclops is basically absolutely clear, in that the former is conceived immediately through direct experience (Kara TrepLirroooiv), while the latter is conceived through mediation, by various mental operations (increasing the size, decreasing the number of eyes, shifting the sole eye to the middle of the forehead, and so on). Conceptions (evvoiat) differ both from voovfjueva and from evvor^xara. I think that they differ from voovfjueva in that they possess a universal character that voovjjueva lack: the prefix iv- seems to serve to indicate that they are somehow stored in the soul, starting from a multiplicity of individual voovfjieva;19 Also, they differ from kvvo^ara in that they constitute a species of avracria, not a species of avraa/xa;20 on that account, they are corporeal modifications of the corporeal soul. They are not the inert contents of thought, but rather constitute dispositions for thinking and speaking correctly. As A. A. Long so nicely puts it, 'to have the evvoia of man is to be able to complete a statement of the following form correctly: 'if something is a man, then it is .. .'. 21 On this level, there is a perfectly clear difference between conceptions that correspond to real species and conceptions that correspond to fictitious species. The type of ability to which A. A. Long's statement refers can no doubt be acquired where it is a matter of dealing with centaurs, just as it can where it is a matter of dealing with men, but not in the same fashion: the evvoia of a man is formed in the rational soul as a result of one's living in the natural world, that of a centaur as a result of one's reading myths and looking at paintings. The difference that, at the level of voov\xeva, distinguishes items that are conceived through direct experience (Kara TrepiTTrajoiv) from those that are not is, at the level of evvoiai, mirrored in the difference that distinguishes between conceptions formed naturally in us without the intervention of any artifice (^VOIKOJS KOLL aveTTirexv-qrcos) and those that are due to teaching and culture (Si' rj/jierepas SiSaoKaAias KCLI eTTifieXeias).22 This difference suffices to explain how it is that the Stoics gave a special name, to wit TTpoXrfifje is, to the former type of conceptions and ascribed to them an epistemological value of the highest grade. 23 19

20 21

23

Cf. €vaTfoypd(j)€raL in Aetius, Placita iv.11 ( = SVF 11.83, FDS 2ll), a n d the correction (iv}a7T0K€i[jL€vas proposed by Pohlenz and a d o p t e d by Cherniss in his edition of Plutarch, Comm. not. 1085A ( = SVF 11.847, FDS 281). Cf. also [Galen,] Def. med. 126 ( = SVF 11.89, FDS 271), where Pearson {Classical Review 19, 1905, p . 457), also with H. Cherniss's approval, proposes reading evvoia instead of enivoia. Cf. Plutarch, Comm. not. io84F = 5 ^ 1 1 . 8 4 7 , FDS 281. L o n g 1971, p . 113 n. 120. O n the ontological a n d epistemological status of the eWoia, cf. also 22 Aetius, Placita 1v.11 = S F F 11.83, FDS 277. Sedley 1985, p. 88. Chrysippus, assailed by the polemics of his o p p o n e n t s , had especially devoted his attention to this question (cf. Plutarch, Comm. not. io$<)B = SVF 11.33, FDS 301); he had p r o m o t e d the irpoXiqifjis to the rank of a criterion of the truth (Diogenes Laertius v n . 5 4 = SKF11.105, FDS 255).

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Natural species and fictitious species are thus clearly differentiated at the level of their basic ingredients, the voov/jueva whether immediate or mediated, and also at the level of the psychic dispositions which control their conceptual content, the natural or cultural eVvoicu. There is no major problem about it no longer being possible to differentiate them at the level of kwo^ara, which are internal objects or, if you prefer, the intentional objects of the eWoicu.24 That lack of differentiation should not be considered as a regrettable lacuna or as a defect in the systematization of Stoic concepts: on the contrary, it is a desired and accepted consequence of the theory. Universal Man, a phantom-object created in our imagination by our noetic activity, is a chimaera just as much and for the same reasons as the universal centaur is. Having completed the above analysis, I think we are in a position to complete the right-hand side of the table shown on p. 93, as follows: Not something

1

I Concepts I Natural (real species)

1

77.

. I

Fictitious Individuals Artificial (fictitious species)

I have not included in this table two items to which my analyses led me, incidentally, to attribute the status of NST: the all and geometrical limits. If challenged to do so, I should assign the all, without hesitation, to the class of fictitious individuals; and geometrical limits - with a degree of hesitation - to the class of natural concepts. (e) It would be quite natural to seek also to complete our table at the top, by ascribing a common genus to STs and NSTs. Although some thinkers, both ancient and modern, have been swayed by the temptation to do so, I believe it better to resist it. No text tries to subsume STs and NSTs into a common genus, nor does any propose a name for such a common genus. On the contrary, by insistently presenting the ri as the supreme genus (yevLKcorarov), the texts implicitly reject the idea of a genus which, incorporating both STs and NSTs, would be superior even to the TL and would alone merit the name of supreme genus. The Stoics, much to the horror of some of their opponents, thought that incorporeals and bodies shared enough in common to be subsumed into a single genus, that of STs; however, they appear to have 24

Cf. the excellent remarks of Sedley 1985, pp. 88-9: 'For the Stoics, it is not conceptions, ennoiai, that correspond to Platonic Forms, but the objects of ennoiai, which they distinguish by a change of grammatical termination as ennoemata, or "concepts". After all, the universal man is not identical with my generic thought of man: he is what I am thinking about when I have that thought.' Cf. also Long and Sedley, ibid., p. 182.

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rejected the idea that STs and NSTs shared correspondingly common properties. It will be easier to understand the reasons for that rejection if we examine the candidates that have been suggested as occupants of the position of a common genus to include both STs and NSTs. Some modern commentators have put forward the idea of the voov^evov25 giving this word the extremely wide sense of a possible object for thought and, accordingly, also for discourse: STs and NSTs are both conceivable and nameable. However, if my remarks about the Stoic notion of the voov^evov are correct, it is immediately possible to see why that suggestion is not acceptable: given that this notion, in the first instance at least, applies only to items that are really or fictionally individual, it could not subsume NSTs of a universal type Another interesting candidate was proposed, in a polemical spirit, by Alexander of Aphrodisias, 26 namely the One. According to the Commentator, the Aristotelian theory of the Topics authorizes a refutation of the TSG doctrine. He points out that if the ri is the genus of all things, it must be the genus of the One and must accordingly possess an extension equal to or greater than that of the One. But the One can refer also to a concept, which is neither a body nor an incorporeal, whereas the TL refers only to bodies and incorporeals. What is worth noting in this critique is that it draws attention to the interesting fact that the Stoics set up a contrast between a something and, not a nothing (which, so far as I know, is used in Greek only in the singular), but a not something.21 They thereby reserved the possibility of using their two terms in the plural (rtva, OVTLVOL) as well as in the singular (rt, OVTL). But more fundamentally, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Stoics would have rejected the objection on the basis of the following argument: some NSTs, at least, are arbitrary constructions and, as such, there is no criterion of unity and identity that can be formally applied to them. Now, such a criterion would clearly be required for the One to be accepted as the common genus of STs and NSTs. After all, NSTs are 'figments of the soul'; they have no reality outside the mind, and the prototypes of those figments are dreams and hallucinations or - to be more precise - for Chrysippus, they are the hallucinations of Orestes in the grip of his madness. 28 And who can say whether the Erinyes that he believes he sees are really three in number, or whether there is just one that he is seeing in triplicate? Who can say whether the Erinyes that he thinks he sees on one day are the same that he thought he saw the day before? There is no answer to these questions or to others like them and they make it possible for us to understand why the Stoics could never have accepted Alexander's suggestion. 25

Cf. Rieth 1933, p . 90; H a d o t 1968, vol. 1, p . 162 n. 1.

26

Alexander, In Top. 3 5 9 . I 2 = S K F I I . 3 2 9 B , FDS

27 28

jog.

As Sedley (1985) has pointed out, p . 87. Cf. Aetius, Placita IV.I2.1 = S K F 11.54, FDS 268.

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II Following the above observations of a structural nature, I shall now approach the TSG doctrine from a developmental and, in the first instance, a chronological point of view. On a philosophical level, chronological considerations are not necessarily decisive. Nevertheless, it is certain that if there were good reasons to believe that the Stoics initially professed a theory that attributed to the existent the rank of supreme genus, and only at a more or less later date came to replace the existent by the something in the position of supreme genus, we should have good reasons to regard that substitution as a defensive strategy, rendered necessary by the difficulties raised by the original doctrine in conjunction with the other dogmas to which the Stoic School was attached. The TSG doctrine would then take on the aspect of a made-to-measure, not to say ad hoc theoretical asylum, designed to provide a refuge for realities for which it was difficult to find a place in the initial ontological construction. In this respect, it matters little whether the correction was made at one moment rather than another in the history of the Stoic School, or whether the idea of doing so should be credited to any particular Stoic master: it is the chronological schema that interests us (the temporal topology, so to speak), not, strictly speaking, the problems of historical dating. Certainly, the historical schema suggested by Zeller a long time ago29 seems to have exerted a considerable philosophical influence even upon more recent historians of Stoicism, who no longer accept that schema. According to Zeller, the earliest Stoics adopted the ESG doctrine. Later, possibly as early as Chrysippus, that doctrine was supplanted by the TSG doctrine, under pressure from the fact that 'many of our ideas refer to incorporeal and unreal objects'. According to Zeller, two traces of the original doctrine survived: a passage in Diogenes Laertius (VII.6I) and Seneca's Letter 58. Ever since Zeller, all the historians who have tackled this problem have felt in duty bound to study those two texts, and most of them have tried, in one more or less laborious way or another, to diminish their value as evidence for Zeller's thesis. Before embarking upon my own examination of those texts, I should like to point out that other passages also exist which might equally appear to provide evidence pointing to a late introduction of the TSG doctrine: some, indeed, have been used for that purpose by A. Schmekel,30 who tried to show that the date of the appearance of this doctrine was even later than Zeller believed, and attributed it to Antipater. However, these texts have disappeared from more recent discussions and there is, I believe, no reason to regret that, since they were of no fundamental value anyway. But it is on that very account that it is worth devoting some attention to these past episodes in the history of our problem: by dint of understanding how and why some of the positions 29

Cf. Zeller 1904, vol. m . i . i , pp. 94(~5) n. 2.

30

Schmekel 1938, p. 627 n. 1.

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defended by supporters of the late introduction of the TSG doctrine have been swept aside, apparently once and for all, we shall perhaps discover motives and means to address ourselves, with more energy and chance of success, to the remaining bastions which still appear to offer some resistance, namely the two texts invoked by Zeller. (a) Schmekel attached importance, for example, to the fact that the most ancient evidence concerning the TSG doctrine, namely a text by Philo of Alexandria, is already far removed from the origins of Stoicism. 31 However, what does this text tell us? Philo declares, making no particular reference to the Stoics, that a 'something' is 'the most general of existents (TO yevtKcorarov rcbv 6VTOJV)\ It is immediately evident that this formula does not represent the TSG doctrine at all, since it altogether passes over the latter's most salient characteristic, namely that the generality of the ST is superior to that of the E. Far from testifying to the lateness of the TSG doctrine, this text seems rather to indicate that, by Philo's day, the doctrine was old enough to have been affected by serious distortions. In another passage, 32 not actually cited by Schmekel, Philo appears to be equally ill-informed about the specific characteristics of the TSG doctrine, as indeed about those of Stoic thought in general: he attributes, not to the Stoics, but to 'the entire chorus of philosophers', a general division of existents (ovra) into bodies and incorporeals, the latter being in turn subdivided (albeit with serious lacunae) 33 into terms that are manifestly borrowed from some handbook of Stoic dialectics. Another example of a similar type of confusion is provided by a scholium to Aristotle's Categories** which lists 'the three most universal homonyms', namely the one, the existent and the something, associating them respectively with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. But the scholiast betrays his total incomprehension not only in respect of the three doctrines that he is comparing (as can be seen from his indiscriminate use of the term 'homonym', which is correct only in the case of Aristotle and, even there, only taking account of the well-known reservations), but also in respect of the originality of Stoicism, for according to him each of these three terms refers, in each of the three cited philosophies, 'to all existents (Kara TTOLVTOOV . . . rcov ovrcov). It would clearly be foolish to expect texts such as these, which blithely confuse the TSG doctrine with the ESG doctrine, to provide us with any useful information concerning the historical order in which those doctrines appeared. But Schmekel tried to go one better: he thought that he had discovered, in Sextus Empiricus, proof not only that the TSG doctrine had only been professed by some Stoics, but also that, on the question of the supreme genus, 31 32 33

34

Philo of Alexandria, Leg. alleg. 111.175 = 5 ^ 1 1 . 3 3 4 , FDS 714. Id. Deagr. 139-41 = SVF 11.182, FDS 695. H e thus divides u p the incorporeals as if they were purely and simply confused with the Aexrra; time, place and the void are not mentioned at all. 3 4 b 8 - n Brandis = SKiMi.333, FDS j 13.

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the other Stoics certainly professed the ESG doctrine. Upon examining his reasoning more closely, however, one unfortunately perceives that the first part of his thesis rests upon a sophism of the crudest kind: one after another, he refers to a whole collection of passages in Sextus, in which the author mentions the TSG doctrine, attributing it now to 'certain people' (PH 11.223), now to the 'Stoics' (Mx.218, 234, xi.224), now even to public rumour (PH 11.86, (fraocv) and he coolly concludes that Sextus attributes the doctrine only to 'certain Stoics'. 35 As for signs that other Stoics may have adopted the ESG doctrine, Schmekel discerns these in a single passage of Sextus (M vm.32), in which the author examines a Sceptic aporia concerning truth. According to the text unanimously established by the MSS, this aporia rests upon 'the supreme genus, the existent (and TOV yevLKcordrov TOV OVTOS)''. This, Sextus goes on to say, 'is the genus which is positioned above all others and which is not itself subordinated to any other (TOVTL yap TTOLVTOOV fjuev eoriv errava^e^rjKos yevos", avro Se ovSevl erepco vTreoraAKev).' As Schmekel points out, these formulae are undeniably very close to those used by Seneca to describe the quod est (= 6V), to which, as we shall see, he attributes the status of the supreme genus. 36 But there are, after all, not that many different ways of describing the notion of the supreme genus and none is organically linked with the adoption of any particular term to take that role. How is it, though, that since the time of Schmekel, this passage from Sextus has not attracted the attention of historians of Stoicism? Probably the answer to that is, in the first place, that it does not actually mention the Stoics and, no doubt for that reason, does not feature in SVF.31 Secondly (with the exception of Mutschmann), modern editors of Sextus have corrected the text of the MSS, the end result of their emendations being to align this text with those that do attribute the TSG doctrine to the Stoics. Are there good reasons to accept one or other of the proposed corrections, despite the legitimate suspicion always attached to the elimination of anomalies and operations designed to bring texts into line? I think that there are, in the first place because the text of the MSS has a somewhat bizarre air 38 and secondly - and above all - because the aporia revealed here by Sextus is exactly identical to the one that he indicates elsewhere (PH 11.86), in that case in connection with the 'something', 'which is, it is said, the highest genus of all (TO rt, oTrep (ftaalv elvai TTOLVTOJV yevLKCOTarov)'. There can be no doubt that the parallel techniques adopted demand that these two texts should be set alongside each other. Furthermore, since everywhere else Sextus only ever refers to the supreme genus in order to ascribe that position to the ST, 39 we 35 36 37 38 39

A. Schmekel 1938, p p . 622-3. Cf. Seneca, Epist. 58.12: Mud genus 'quod est' gener ale, supra se nihil habet, initium rerum est, omnia sub Mo sunt. FDS makes just one reference to it, in the commentary o n fragment 718. The position of the two words TOV OVTOS perhaps suggests an interpolated gloss. Cf. the passages cited above, n. 1.

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may rest assured that the text of M should be brought into line with that of PH, rather than the reverse. Once the principle of the correction is accepted, there are plenty of ways in which to render that correction in a plausible manner. The simplest is that suggested in Heintz,40 followed by Bury: it consists in ridding the text of the two words rod OVTOS, and not replacing them with anything at all.41 This was a correction that was so successful that it eventually managed to be forgotten which is, without doubt, the happiest fate that any correction can hope for: M VIII.32 is nowadays cited, in all good faith, either as a text that speaks of the supreme genus without specifying what it is,42 or even as one that testifies, as do so many others, to Sextus' familiarity with the TSG doctrine.43 That is how it has come about that this passage which, given its literal form in the MSS and the use that Schmekel made of that, ought to have been discussed by all those who regard the TSG as the doctrine common to all Stoics, has been quite simply eliminated from the most recent discussions. (b) I must confess that I would be delighted if the two stumbling-blocks constructed by Zeller succumbed to the same fate, instead of forever continuing to giveriseto knotted commentaries and more or less tortuous attempts to skirt around the obstacles that they appear to constitute. In my opinion, there is no need to skirt around those obstacles for the very good reason that they can be demolished. First, let us take the simpler case, that of Diogenes Laertius VII.6I, in which, in present-day editions, the following statement occurs: The supreme genus is anything that is a genus without having a genus, such as the existent (yeviKcoTCLTOv 8e eonv o yevos ov yevos OVK €X6t> olov TO 6V).' There can be no

doubt that, if this statement were taken literally, it would testify that the ESG doctrine could still, even at a relatively late date, be slipped into some or other handbook of Stoic logic, in the form of an example or illustration provided in passing; and such a situation would be bound to affect any assessment of the date of birth of the TSG doctrine. In fact, though, that statement belongs to a relatively unified sequence of definitions which all relate to the vocabulary of definition and division. By reason of its technical character, that sequence certainly seems to belong to a phase of evolution in the Stoic School which cannot have been the very first: the authors cited are Chrysippus and Stoics later than him, such as Antipater and Crinis.44 We know, furthermore (from 40 41

42 44

Cf. Heintz 1932, adloc. A m o r e complex and elegant solution was proposed by Kayser in 1850; namely, to read ano rov yevLKtoTOLTov [TOV] OVTOS, and to correct TOVTL, in the next sentence, to TO TI. 43 Cf. Hiilser, c o m m e n t a r y to FDS 718. Cf. Long 1971, p . 110 nn. 61 and 63. T h e notions defined in this sequence are the following: opos (here in the sense of 'definition', not that of 'term', pace Hicks adloc, cf. Alexander, In Top. 42.27 = SVFn. 228, m Antip. 24, FDS 628; the text provides two definitions of this term, one borrowed from Antipater, the other from Chrysippus), viroypafyr) (two a n o n y m o u s definitions), yevos (one a n o n y m o u s definition, as in the cases of all the terms that follow, except the last), ivvorjixa, €L8OS, 8iaip€cns, avTidiaipecns, vTroStaipeoLS, fji€pLOfj,6s (definition borrowed from Crinis). Only the definition

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Diogenes Laertius vn.41-2), that the theory of definition (TO opiKov elSos) was not an essential part of Stoic logic in its earliest versions: some writers had added it to the traditional divisions of logic (namely rhetoric and dialectic), while others rejected that addition or subordinated this theory of definition to one or another chapter of dialectic.45 In order not to have to draw the obvious conclusion that the statement would force if it possessed an unquestionable authenticity, many recent historians have suggested complicated and - to my mind, at least - pointlessly subtle interpretations of it. 46 I hope I may be excused for examining them in detail. I would simply like to observe that the literal meaning of the text is not sufficiently well attested here to warrant its being treated with such protective zeal. In the absence of any completely trustworthy critical edition of Diogenes Laertius, admittedly, the most that one can do is reluctantly note the considerable divergences that exist between the critical apparatuses to the various available editions. If we accept the information provided by U. Egli, whose interpretations are in this instance backed by the authority of P. von der Muhll, 47 the reading olov TO OV is not to be found in any of the principal MSS of Diogenes. B gives olov TOV, P gives olov TOV (sic, no accent), a reading which has been condemned by a later hand; and F gives nothing at all, which leaves

45

46

of the ivvorjfxa, in psychological and ontological terms, stands out in this list of definitional terms, but it m a y be regarded as an insertion, p r o m p t e d by the occurrence of the word evvoiq^a in the definition of the yivos (as it is by Mansfeld 1986, p . 367). A p a r t from that exception, the list is perfectly unified by its subject matter a n d clearly stands out from the rest of the context. It is preceded by a definition of the Troir^^xa borrowed from Posidonius' flepl Ac£ecos" etcraycoyTJ, a n d is followed by a definition of the d/x<^ij8oAia as a variety of the Aef t? which may be borrowed from the same source (as Egli believes (1967, p p . 13 and 18)). It would be tempting to attribute it to a single a u t h o r , were it not for the n u m b e r of sources mentioned. J. von Arnim, SVF 11.226, 228, in A n t i p . 23, 24, attributes to Antipater and Chrysippus themselves their respective definitions of the opos; and to Antipater the two definitions of the closely related idea oiviroypaufrr), without attempting to dissociate them (SVF m A n t i p , 23). As for the yivosfjLepLOfJLos sequence, he attributes the whole of it to Diogenes of Babylonia, as a guess at least (SVFn Diog. 25). Pohlenz (1967, p . 363 n. 5) criticizes that suggestion, probably on account of the mention of Crinis which accompanies the last definition in the sequence, that of the IJiepLOfjLos; perhaps that is also why Egli (1967, p p . 17-18) prefers to attribute the sequence in its entirety to that same Crinis. Again as a guess, one might suggest picking out two sub-sequences in this passage: the first, u p to and including the definition of the Siaipeois, takes its examples from the d o m a i n of natural species, such as 'animal' or ' m a n ' ; the second, which introduces refinements by distinguishing sub-species in the division {avTihiaiptois, VTT oh ialpea is and fjuepLGfJios) takes its examples from the field of goods and evils. It could thus be argued that the two sub-sequences come from different sources: the second might well come from Crinis, who is n a m e d at the end of it. T h e first might come from a different source, perhaps Antipater or Chrysippus, b o t h of w h o m are n a m e d at the beginning. Those w h o proposed such an addition justified it by declaring that the theory of definition contributed towards recognition of the truth: hia yap rwv evvoitov ra Trpay\xara Xafju^dverai (Diogenes Laertius vii.42). It is tempting to attribute b o t h the new idea and the argument to Chrysippus, in the first place because the dialetical-rhetorical pair seems to be strongly structured in Zeno (SVF1.J5) and in Cleanthes (SVF1.4S2), and secondly because Chrysippus, as I have already pointed out, had introduced the TTpoXrji/jis, which he defined as evvoia voiKr) TCOV KCLOOXOV, into the list of criteria of the t r u t h (Diogenes Laertius vn.54). Cf. Rieth 1933, p. 90; Pohlenz 1967, p. 121 n. 5; Goldschmidt 1977, p p . 13-14 n. 5; Rist 1971, 47 p. 42. Cf. Egli 1967, p. 7.

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the notion of the supreme genus bereft of examples. A later hand has made good this apparent lacuna by adding in the margin what has become the traditional reading, otov TO 6V. AS can be seen, this reading, which passed into modern editions after being adopted by Menage, on the basis of Aldobrandini's translation, cannot really boast a very impressive pedigree. And there are hardly any serious objections to U. Egli's rather cautious suggestion of olov TO TL (1967, p. 8), nor even to K. Hulser {FDS 621), who baldly prints that reading with no indication at all that it is based upon any more than conjecture. Even if Hiilser's solution may seem somewhat cavalier, the fact remains that the embarrassing otov TO 6V reading does not deserve the excessive respect that has been accorded to it by treating it to the most refined of exegeses. I will take the liberty of dismissing it more forthrightly. (c) The difficulties presented by Seneca's Letter 58 are more complex. In the first instance, they may be summarized as follows: in this letter, Seneca takes over a version of the ESG in which the existent or 'what is' {quod est) is expressly presented as the genus common to both bodies and incorporeals (14); the latter, represented by two of the canonical incorporeals, namely the void and time (22), are described as 'quasi-existents' {quae quasi sunt), which is no doubt the reason why this doctrine assumes justification in classifying them within the supreme genus of quod est. Elsewhere in this same letter (13), Seneca attributes to 'the Stoics' the introduction of a supreme genus above even the 'existent'; but, in an apparently contradictory fashion, he attributes to only 'certain Stoics' {quibusdam Stoicis) (15) the identification of that supreme genus with the 'something' {quid) (15). When it comes to illustrating the class of NEST, these Stoics refer not to the School's canonical incorporeals but to fictitious entities such as Centaurs, Giants and other mythical creatures (although the text does not specify whether these fictitious beings are here considered as individuals or as species; yet, as I have already had occasion to remark, there was nothing to stop Seneca speaking of the Centaur Chiron or the Giant Atlas, had he wished to do so). Do these data help us to form some idea of the evolution of the theory of the supreme genus in the history of Stoicism? If we are to make use of them with confidence, we must replace all the information that Seneca provides within the context of his Letter, which is presented essentially as an account of Plato's ontology. 48 Seneca declares that he has just been discussing Plato with a scholarly friend (8). The conversation once again brought home to him the poverty of Latin philosophical vocabulary. To render the vocabulum TO 6V, the only translation that he can suggest is one using a verbum, to wit quod est, a translation with which he is not altogether satisfied (7). According to his scholarly friend, Plato himself uses the term TO 6V in six different ways, to refer to six distinct entities or classes of entities (8,16). However, before expounding 48

As such, it has been much studied (as has Letter 65) by historians of Middle Platonism: cf. for example Theiler 1930, p. 11; Hadot 1968, vol. 1, p. 156; Dillon 1977, p. 135.

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the comments of his friend to Lucilius (8), Seneca embarks upon a longish parenthesis (8-16), in which he sets out for his correspondent, this time in his own name, the notions of genus, species and supreme genus. As this parenthesis develops, it first (8-12) provides a list of species and genera in ascending order of magnitude, starting with species of animals and ending with quodest, the first and supreme genus, which is reached by rising above the most all-encompassing division, that between bodies and incorporeals. Seneca provides no illustration of the class of incorporeals, so it is not possible to tell whether he is thinking of the canonical incorporeals of Stoicism, nor whether he speaks here as a Stoic. It is, on the other hand, worth noting that he certainly does not present this as a Platonic classification. 49 He cites Aristotle as guarantor of the expression homo species est (9), and his use of the first person is quite insistent. 50 The first mention of the Stoics (Stoici, taken as a whole) appears at the end of this first part of the parenthesis (13). Seneca declares that, in contrast to the partisans of the ESG doctrine, in the form in which he has just set it out, the Stoics wish to superpose upon the quod est another genus that is even higher (magis principale); but he does not immediately name this rival to the quodest. Opening another parenthesis within the major one, he promises to come back to it in a moment (statim), as soon as he has proved that he himself was right to place in the supreme position the genus that he has just mentioned, namely the quod est (de quo statim dicam, si prius Mud genus, de quo locutus sum, merito primumponi docuero, cum sit rerum omnium capax). In other words, the Stoics' common doctrine concerning the supreme genus will be set out only once it has been shown to be false and that there is no valid reason to unseat the quod est from its position as supreme genus, as it has been recognized in the preceding lines. Seneca has thus committed himself to two promises, which he undertakes to keep in a somewhat surprising order: (a) first to criticize the Stoic doctrine of the supreme genus and (b) then to set it out. Promise (b) is in effect kept in paragraph 15, so the only possible place for promise (a) to be kept is paragraph 14. In fact, though, the contents of paragraph 14 hardly rate as a delivery on his promise. In it, Seneca contents himself with once more running through, this time in reverse order, the series of genera and species set out in ascending order in 9-12. This time he starts with the quod est, which is immediately subdivided into bodies and incorporeals, and gradually works his way down to the animal species. In other words, Seneca simply reaffirms that incorporeals are a species of the quod est, although that was precisely what he earlier promised to prove {merito poni docuero, 13). Only such a demonstration would have made it possible to establish, in opposition to the Stoic thesis, that it was pointless to go seeking the supreme genus above and beyond the quodest. The failure to keep that promise constitutes the first anomaly in this text. 49

Pace Rist 1971, p. 42.

50

Cf. 9 rettuli, 10 sic dividam, 11 inposuimus, ut dicamus.

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On the other hand, it cannot be said that promise (b) is not kept. Yet the way in which it is kept is disconcerting; and this constitutes the text's second anomaly. As we have seen, Seneca declared that he would be speaking of the Stoic theory of the supreme genus which is superior to the quod est. By paragraph 15 he is already speaking only of 'certain Stoics' {quibusdam Stoicis). And the arguments and doctrines that he attributes to this particular group of Stoics are as follows: in their opinion, the first genus is the 'something' (quid). I will explain to you the reason for their holding this opinion. They say that in nature there are things that are (quaedam suni) and things that are not (quaedam non sunt): and even those that are not are incorporated in nature. These are things that present themselves to the mind (quae animo succurruni), such as Centaurs, Giants and all that, having issued from false thinking (falsa cogitatione formatum), ended up by taking on some imagistic consistency (habere aliquant imaginem coepit), despite having no existence (quamvis non habeat substantiam).

It should be pointed out, without more ado, that Seneca provides not one word of commentary or criticism on the subject of this exposition. Before trying to account for the two anomalies that we have noticed in the unfolding of this text, we should note a salient feature in the development that follows. Having concluded the major parenthesis which began in paragraph 8, Seneca returns (16) to the account that he earlier promised to give of Plato's ontology in six parts. Having listed in turn the universal intelligence, God, paradigmatic ideas and immanent forms, he comes (at 22) to the 'fifth genus', that of things which are 'in the ordinary sense of the term' (at least, that is what I understand the term communiter to mean). He then remarks: 'These are things that are beginning to concern us' (haec incipiunt ad no s per finer e). What is the meaning of that nosl It might be thought to refer simply to ordinary man who, hearing familiar existents such as 'men, animals, things' mentioned, comes down from the Platonic heights and begins to find himself on familiar ground. But it seems more likely still that Seneca is here establishing a link with the classification of existents that he himself, on his own account, set out in the major parenthesis (8-16): with those few words, he indicates that, for the first time, one of the divisions in the Platonic series coincides with one of the divisions in his own series, namely that of bodies. If this convergence between the two series 'begins' to manifest itself at the level of bodies, we may expect to find it continuing at the next level; and that is indeed exactly what happens, for the sixth 'Platonic' genus consists of the 'quasi-existents' (quae quasi suni), the void and time being given as examples (22). This class manifestly coincides with that of the incorporeals, that is to say with the second species of the quod est in the classification that Seneca himself adopts. The indications provided by paragraph 22 thus teach us two things. In the first place, they make it possible to reconstitute the critique that Seneca directed against the Stoic theory of the supreme genus. As we have seen, that

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critique was promised in paragraph 13, but did not appear in paragraph 14, which should have contained it. Despite that, its impact is taken for granted in paragraph 22.51 Whether it has disappeared from the text or was never more than implied, there can be little doubt as to its content: if the Stoics consider that the quid must be taken to be the supreme genus, not the quod est, that is because they consider that incorporeals, such as the void and time, do not constitute existents. But equally, could not the void and time be said to be quasi-existents and quasi-existents be said to be at least a kind of existents?52 If that is the case, there is no longer anything to stop the promotion of the existent to the status of supreme genus (or to prevent it remaining in that position) and that is a simpler and less paradoxical doctrine than the bizarre TSG one. If this reconstruction of the reasons why Seneca (or the friend who inspired him) rejected the Stoic position is correct, it is apparent that the ESG doctrine which he favours is the fruit of a critique and reworking of an earlier TSG doctrine and that Letter 58, far from testifying to a late adoption of the TSG doctrine in the history of Stoicism, proves precisely the opposite. As for the doctrine which Seneca, in paragraph 15, attributes to 'certain Stoics', it is certainly one which makes the quid the supreme genus and it is accordingly a TSG doctrine. However, upon comparing the 'quasi-existents' of paragraph 22 with the 'things that are not' of paragraph 15, one realizes that this TSG doctrine is quite different from the one which Seneca's ESG doctrine assumed to be in the background. The class of NEST is represented, not by the canonical Stoic incorporeals, but by fictitious entities such as Centaurs and Giants. It is important not to write off that difference and not to tone it down,53 for what we have before us is a TSG doctrine that is heterodox or, at the very least, non-standard. If, as I have pointed out above, Seneca describes it without making the slightest attempt to criticize it, that may well be because he considers it to be in no way incompatible with his own ESG doctrine. And as his account of it gives no particular indication of the position reserved for the canonical incorporeals, there is every reason to believe that they retained the same status there as in Seneca's ESG doctrine, namely that of a species of existent. This non-standard TSG doctrine ought thus to integrate the ESG doctrine adopted by Seneca, doing no more than add to it one extra layer. It represents an attempt to synthesize the original TSG doctrine with the ESG doctrine constructed upon the critique directed against it. As such, it must be later than both the doctrines that it sets out to combine. In the light of all this, 51

52

53

One might be tempted - as, at first, I was - to explain this situation by a lacuna in the text, which ought to be placed at the beginning of paragraph 15. But the situation could probably be equally well explained by a kind of mental lacuna or short-cut. This 'lax' kind of procedure does not seem to be in conformity with the authentic inspiration of Stoicism, the 'formalistic' nature of which needs n o demonstration (cf. chapter 5 above). F o r the Stoics, even if X is quasi Y, X still is n o t Y (cf. SFF1.65). A s d o , in o n e way or another, Zeller 1904, vol. I I I . I . I , p p . 94(~5) n. 2; Pohlenz 1967, p . 121; Goldschmidt 1977, p . 13 n. 5; H a d o t 1968, vol. 1, p p . 1566°.; Pasquino 1978, p . 377.

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the chrono-topological development of the classifications may be represented by the following schema, in which the chronological order should be read from left to right: (A) Standard TSG ST NST bodies (E)

incorporeals (NE)

(B) ESG (Seneca) E bodies

incorporeals (quasi-E)

(c) Non-standard ESG ST NST? E

NE (fictitious individuals) ;

bodies

I

incorporeals (quasi-E) This table 54 should help us to understand how heterodox Stoics, the authors of schema (c), may have proceeded. Having accepted schema (B), for the reasons indicated above, but anxious to renew links with the tradition of schema (A) by restoring the ST to the position of supreme genus, their task was to find possible new occupants for the position of NEST, which the canonical incorporeals could no longer fill since they had been promoted to the status of 'existents' in schema (B). They might have considered the e w o ^ a r a as a possibility for that role. But that would not have been an economical solution, since the e w o ^ a i a are classified as NSTs in schema (A); they could, accordingly, only be made NESTs by producing a further critique of schema (A). The fact that they did not pursue that particular path may indicate that their purpose was to preserve, from the early Stoic tradition, everything that could possibly be preserved following the appearance of schema (B). And it seems likely (despite the reticence of Seneca's text on this point) that they preserved intact the opposition between STs and NSTs and classified the evvor^jLara as NSTs, as had their predecessors. In these circumstances, it is equally likely that their Centaurs and Giants constituted, not fictitious species, but fictitious individuals, items which had not been explicitly considered in any previous schemas and which were thus available to fill the position of NESTs, now left vacant in consequence of the change in status of the categorical incorporeals. As I have already pointed out, Seneca's text is not really explicit on the subject of the individual or specific status of the Centaurs and Giants mentioned in paragraph 15; but his expression quae animo succurrunt may perhaps be recognized to render the voovfjueva which, I have suggested, do not possess a universal character. And the expression aliquam imaginem probably has a similar meaning. The acceptance of fictitious individuals in the ranks of NESTs is thus compatible with maintaining fictitious species amongst the ranks of NSTs. Interpreted thus, Seneca's Letter 58 is evidence neither that the ESG 54

Compare with Wurm 1973, pp. 176-7; Pasquino 1978, pp. 375ff.

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doctrine predates the TSG doctrine nor that it postdates it. Rather, it testifies to the fact that the ESG doctrine postdates one version 0/the TSG doctrine, that is to say the standard version, while it antedates another version of the TSG doctrine, namely the non-standard one.55 Hence the inadequacy and uncertainty of interpretations which have judged it necessary to minimize the differences between the two versions of the TSG doctrine in order to be able to extract from this text whatever lessons it contains.56 It is, on the contrary, by acknowledging those differences that we can avoid having to accuse Seneca of ambiguity and confusion.57 In truth, no more than the disputed passage in Diogenes Laertius does Seneca's Letter 58 contain any obstacle to our regarding the TSG doctrine (in its standard form) as an original and fundamental dogma of the Stoic School.

in If the TSG doctrine was not elaborated at a late date, it seems reasonable to suppose that its purpose was not to forge an ad hoc status for items that proved difficult to classify, which could neither be granted a corporeal existence nor denied some kind of reality; and presumably the status of NESTs was not constructed by means of an inductive analysis of what was shared in common 55

57

I realized somewhat late in the day that this laborious exegesis of Seneca's text more or less coincides with that provided, with admirable concision, by Hiilser in his commentary on fragment FDS 715: 'Seneca, selbst ein Stoiker, beschreibt anscheinend ein spateres Stadium der stoischen Lehre: wenn der Begriff des Korpers neu gefasst wird und daraufhin auch Unkorperliches zum Seienden gehort, wird das alt-stoische Etwas entbehrlich - so Seneca -; oder man muss es uminterpretieren. Und das taten einige andere Stoiker, die in Erinnerung an die Nicht-Etwasse von ehedem ihre neuen Etwasse konzipierten.' I would disagree with this analysis on the two following points: (1) I am not of the opinion that this doctrinal recasting was prompted by a transformation of the body (no text testifies to such a transformation nor indicates any reasons as to why it might have taken place); what seems to have been decisive, rather, is the notion of the 'quasi-existent' and the authorization that that notion provided for subsuming the canonical incorporeals into the genus of the existent; (2) it cannot be said that the new NESTs are a 'memory' of the old NSTs, since the latter differ from the former as to both their ontological status (NST vs. ST) and the items that they include (the old NSTs comprise concepts, including those which correspond to natural species, whereas the new NESTs are - 1 believe I am right in thinking - fictitious individuals). The only thing that could be said to justify the idea of a 'memory' is that in schema (c) there are NESTs, as there are in schema (A), and as there are no longer in the schema (B); perhaps this might be called a 56 structural memory. Cf. the authors cited above, n. 53. 'A most excusable confusion', according to Hadot 1968, vol. 1, p. 161 n. 4; an 'ambiguity' according to Rist 1971, p. 43. In this study, Rist describes the succession of doctrines in terms very close to my own, but situating the whole of this development within the Stoic School. It should be pointed out that, on the contrary, Seneca is not sheltering behind any Stoic authority when he presents schema (B); he testifies, conversely, that all the Stoics postulated a genus superior to the quodest. The case of Basilides cited by Rist, pp. 38-9, seems to be both late and isolated; and the exact meaning of the thesis that is attributed to him {jxrjScv ehai aodjuarov, Sextus, M vin.258) seems unclear to me. As for the 'inexhaustible quarrel' concerning the existence of the Ae/crd {ibid. 262), there is nothing to suggest that it took place inside the Stoic School and the most obvious interpretation is, on the contrary, that it was a quarrel which set the Stoics in opposition to their adversaries.

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by those remarkably heterogeneous items, the canonical incorporeals. So what can have been the theoretical motives for that construction? I have already briefly indicated the reply that I would suggest. The construction seems to me to have been prompted by critical reflection upon Plato's philosophy - or, to be more precise, by the combination of a critical reading of the ontological exposition of the Sophist and an analysis of the motivations of the Platonic theory of Forms. To be even more precise, that critical reflection on the Sophist seems to me to have led to a strengthened recognition of the equation between the existent and the corporeal and the adoption of the ability to act and be acted upon as a strict criterion of corporeal existence. Reflection on the Forms, meanwhile, seems to have led to an attempt to specify their mode of unreality by classifying them as NSTs, which boils down to establishing the notion of ST as a criterion of reality that is different from and less strong than that applying to corporeal existence. The relative independence of these two criteria makes room for a class of items which, by satisfying one criterion but not the other, qualifies for the status of NEST. Before examining these two points in greater detail, the first thing to point out is that the ancients clearly regarded Plato as an interlocutor on the subject of ontology who was particularly important for the Stoics. We have already seen how Seneca expounded the non-standard TSG doctrine in the context of a letter devoted to Platonic ontology. Plutarch, for his part, noted a point in common between Plato and the Stoics: 58 both he and they introduced reforms into the ontological vocabulary, and the restrictions that they imposed upon the legitimate use of the term 'existent' were so exacting that even they seem to have been unable to respect them invariably. Plato draws a radical distinction between the intelligible and the sensible, the model and the image, what is participated in and the participant. When he wishes to express these differences in a 'purist' vocabulary (KaOapwrepov rrjs Siacfropas arrro^vos rols ovojtxaat), he reserves the use of the word ov for the first terms of each of these pairs, referring to the second terms simply as yuvofjuevov; but that does not mean to say that he wishes to deny any 'nature', any 'use', or even any 'existence' (v-nap^is) at all to what becomes. According to Plutarch, the same happened to the vewrepoL, that is to say the Stoics. Having refused to call 'many important things' (that is to say the canonical incorporeals) 6Wa, and being unwilling to refer to them otherwise than as STs, they nevertheless persist in 'using' them both in their lives and in their philosophy just as if they were 'subsistent and existent things (cos v^eoroooi KCLI vnapxovoivy'. By virtue of this structural parallelism between their two varieties of dualism (which are in many other respects so very different), Plato and the Stoics run into similar difficulties when they need to say things which apply both to what they call 'existents' and to what they do not wish to call 'existents' even though they recognize the latter to possess some kind of reality. The adoption of two 58

Plutarch, Adv. Colot. III6B-C = FDS 721.

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frankly distinct ontological criteria was certainly the neatest solution that could be found to resolve this problem. At this point one might even go so far as to evoke - albeit, I suspect, only to reject it - the hypothesis of a 'direct' Platonic influence upon the Stoic promotion of the 'something'. That hypothesis might be supported by such vestiges as remain of the ancients' interpretations of the Timaeus, As it stands, this famous text seems to be one of those in which Plato expresses himself at an extreme level of 'purism', to borrow Plutarch's term. At places where the context might have provided the opportunity to name a supreme genus of which the ov and the yivo^vov would have constituted the first subdivisions, he seems both unwilling and unable to give a name to any such genus. Such is the situation in the famous opening lines of Timaeus' speech (27D): 'First of all, we must, in my judgement, make the following distinction (rrpwTov § tat pereov raSe): What is that which is existent always (TL TO OV del) and has no becoming? And what is that which is becoming always (TI TO yiyvo^evov fxev &€L) and never is existent?' This strange distinction in the form of a double question gives no name to what it divides and does not specify what type of relationship it establishes between what it is dividing and what this is divided into. In his commentary on this passage, Plotinus (vi.2.1) criticizes the idea that Plato might here be distinguishing between different species of a supreme genus (such as the Stoics' TI would be): given the difference between the ontological levels of the ov and the yiyvofxevov, these two could not possibly be coordinated as two species of a single genus. Some modern commentators have supposed that Plotinus' criticisms implied that the unnamed commentator on the Timaeus whom he is criticizing had read Plato's sentence without any question mark, so that the meaning of the sentence would be: 'something is that which is and that which becomes is also something'. It has even been thought possible to identify one of the partisans of such a reading without a question mark, namely the Stoically inclined Platonist Severus, the second-century AD author of a commentary on the Timaeus which Proclus cites in his own commentary on the same work. 5 9 It is certainly not impossible that these late documents reflect traces of a Stoic reading of the Timaeus, and it would be amusing to think that the Stoics' TL might have been born from a misreading of that double question in the Timaeus. However, these intriguing chimaeras must be totally rejected. Neither Plotinus' critique nor Severus' interpretation truly provides evidence that the sentence was read as an assertion. Commenting on it, Proclus considers a number of possible ways of understanding it: either as the division of a whole into its parts, or as the division of a genus into its species (which is clearly the interpretation criticized by Plotinus), or as a distinction between the various meanings of a single term, or else a number of other possibilities which we may leave aside as irrelevant here. But, in Proclus, all these possibilities are 59

Cf. Wurm 1973, p. 159.

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based upon a definitely interrogative reading of the sentence in question.60 As for Severus' interpretation, Proclus tells us of it 61 and, from what he says, it is quite clear that Severus' originality consisted in reading Plato's sentence not as an assertion but as a single question, namely: what is the single genus of which the ov and the ytyvo/juevov are species? According to Severus, the correct answer to this question, introduced by the interrogative TI, an answer in keeping with Plato's own thought, was: the all (TO TT&V).62 The Stoics, for their part, had never confused the TI', the common genus of both bodies and incorporeals, with the all, the combination of a body (the world) and an incorporeal (the infinite void which surrounds it).63 So there is no reason to think that, in interpreting the sentence as he did, Severus had accepted any handed-down Stoic reading of the Timaeus. One detail in Proclus' commentary provides an extra argument which leads to the same conclusion. Proclus mentions the Stoic ri in his exegesis of the passage from the Timaeus with which we are concerned. But, strangely enough, he refers to it in connection with the interpretation according to which the Platonic division should be understood as an exposition of the various possible meanings of a single term. In this hypothesis, Proclus says, the only term in question could be the Stoics' TI; however, he goes on to say, such a hypothesis must immediately be rejected, for Plato could not have accepted the existence of a single term of which the ov and the ycyvofievov were two different meanings. Now, so far as I know, the Stoics themselves never conceived the TI as an equivocal term that might mean either body or incorporeal. We may conclude from all this that Proclus was indulging in a kind of erudite game here and did not have before him any Stoic text based, in any way, upon the passage from the Timaeus in which we are interested, which provided any justification for the TSG doctrine. I believe we must therefore reject the hypothesis that the Stoic ri is directly derived from Platonic texts or concepts. In the field of ontology, the relationship between the Stoics and Plato should be described, not in terms of a direct influence, but rather in terms of a challenge to be taken up. It may be that the Stoics had noticed, in the Sophist, the passage (237D) in which Plato seems in advance to oppose their attempt to dissociate the rl and the ov: 'And this is plain to us, that we always use the word 'something' (TI) of some being (€77'6VTI), for to speak of 'something' in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings, is impossible.'64 More likely, though, they were aware of the long ontological passage, the 'gigantomachy' at 245E-249D, in which Plato, once again in anticipation, seems to be launching a critique against Stoic 'materialism'. 60 62

64

61 Proclus, In Tim. 1, p. 224, I7ff. Ibid., p. 227, 13-17. A J . Festugiere, in his annotated translation, Commentaire de Proclus sur le Timee, Paris 19668, vol. 11, p. 49, suggests, reasonably enough, that Severus read, or proposed the reading: rl TO 63 ov .. . /cat [TL] TO yiyvopevov. On the all, cf. the texts cited above, pp. 98-9. The argument was to be used again, against the Stoics, by Alexander, In Top. 301.19 ( = SVF II.329, FDS 711): el yap rl, SrjAov on /cat ov.

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It is certainly nothing new to point out the affinities which establish a link between Stoicism and the position that Plato attributes, in this famous passage, to those whom he calls the 'Sons of the Earth'. They are affinities of which the ancients themselves were already aware. The images that Plato uses to characterize the attitude of the Sons of the Earth were used again to portray the Stoics;65 and if Proclus imagines - quite incorrectly - that the Stoics 'despise' (KaraiT€(f>p6vrjTaL) the incorporeals, claiming that they are 'inactive, not existent, and consist only of thoughts',66 the reason is no doubt that he is lumping the Stoics together with the Sons of the Earth, whom Plato had described as 'despising' (Karac^povovvres, 246B) all that is incorporeal. But that is not all: Plato, in anticipation, painted such an accurate picture of the Stoics that a textual fragment of the Sophist (246AB), cited by Clement of Alexandria, eventually landed up amongst the Stoicorum Veterum Fragment a, as I have ventured to note in this paper's epigraph.67 Many other modern commentators have also noted this.68 However, it seems to me that usually scholars only mention this analogy in passing, as a quaint curiosity, apparently assuming that the Stoics simply took up the mantle of the Sons of the Earth, in a spirit of defiance. My own opinion is that they in truth subjected this passage from the Sophist to a much more attentive and serious study. In this long passage Plato, as we know, sets out to get over the antagonism between those who ascribe existence only to sensible bodies, namely the 'Sons of the Earth' (from now on I shall call them SE) and those who ascribe it only to the intelligible and incorporeal Forms, namely the 'Friends of the Forms' (FF). But the point of synthesis was only reached at the cost of proposing or imposing a number of corrections for the antithetical doctrines, corrections to which Plato himself draws attention with an openness and honesty not always detectable in philosophical operations of this kind. It seems to me that the Stoics made precisely the same attempt as Plato, but they tried to produce a more rigorously formal synthesis, rejecting the deliberate distortions made by Plato and making skilful use of issues that Plato had indicated in passing without, however, exploiting them or, indeed, presenting them as impracticable impasses. Stoicism thus succeeded in toppling Platonism more subtly and more completely than it is usually credited with doing, for it was not 65

66

67

68

Cf. Elias, In Porph. hag. 47.26-33, David, In Porph. hag. 111.3-17 = FDS 739, who, to characterize the Stoic attitude, refer back to the autochthony of Soph. 247c, and the rocks and oaks of Soph. 246A, which themselves come from Homer, Od. xix.163. Proclus, In Tim. in, p. 95, 7-15 = S K F 11.521, FDS 716. This erroneous identification of the inexistent and the unreal is still to be found in certain modern commentators, for example Christensen 1962, p. 25; Watson 1966, pp. 38-40. Long and Sedley's reaction to this seems entirely proper (1987, vol. 1, p. 307). Hiilser (commentary to FDS 739) gives the most charitable interpretation of this situation: by this J. von Arnim 'clearly meant to say' that Clement was referring to the Stoics through this quotation from Plato, the better to disqualify their materialism. This would be easier to believe if von Arnim had given the reference to the Sophist. For example, Pohlenz 1967, p. 120: 'Zeno was not intimidated by Plato's jibes against the "Sons of the Earth" who only recognize as existent whatever they can touch with their hands (Soph. 247c)'. Cf. also Frede 1987, p. 344.

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content simply to rehabilitate an idea that Plato had himself considered outdated, namely that of the SE; it extracted from Plato's own text the means of preserving both the concept itself and a way round it, in a form that was entirely new and different from the Platonic model of getting round it. Let us return briefly to the text of the Sophist. In the 'interminable battle' (246c) between the great ontological options (246A), the SE maintain that only whatever offers resistance and contact is existent, and they identify what is corporeal with what is existent (246A-B). The FF, for their part, recognize true existence only in 'certain intelligible and incorporeal Forms' (246B), granting to bodies no more than a 'mobile becoming' (246B-C). Plato says that, when it comes to arbitrating in the debate, requesting both camps to justify (Xd^aj^v Xoyov, 246c) their positions, the first difficulty arises: the SE are not willing to engage in a rational dialogue to justify their ideas. It would appear that, in Plato's view, their archaic 'sensualism' is impossible to justify by argument or, to put it another way, that their empiricism is not capable of logic. The only solution is to 'improve' them if not 'in fact', for that cannot be done, at least 'verbally' and 'by hypothesis' (246D). In other words, the only way forward is to replace the original doctrine of the Sons of the Earth (let us call it the doctrine of the OSE) by a different doctrine, which we may call the doctrine of the revised Sons of the Earth (RSE). The RSE agree to modify the position of the OSE on several important counts: (a) When asked what they think of the soul, they acknowledge that it is an existent (246E); to be sure, they maintain that it is a body (247B);69 but they recognize that it is invisible and intangible (247B). At this stage, then, they retain corporeality as a criterion of existence but abandon perceptibility as a criterion of corporeality. There is nothing in the text to indicate what replaces that second criterion. (b) When asked about the virtues and vices of the soul, the RSE are led to make a more radical concession. If they acknowledge that the soul can be described as either just or unjust, they have to accept that those qualifications correspond to the possession and presence (e£ei KCLI rrapovoia, 247A5) of the correlative qualities and that those qualities, which can both apply to something and also disappear from it {irapayiyveodai KOLL aTroyiyveodai, 247A8-9), possess existence. But the same 'bashfulness' that prevents them from denying their existence also prevents them from making them bodies (247B-C); they are thus forced to abandon corporeality as a criterion of existence. Plato notes that it is in this respect that they distance themselves decisively from the OSE. What, then, would be the position of the OSE with regard to the virtues and vices of the soul and, indeed, with regard to qualities generally? At this point the text is extremely interesting from the point of view 69

Or, to be more precise, that it has a body. But Plato does not seem to make any difference here between 'having a body' and 'being a body': OW/JLOL TL loxeiv (247B6) and acb^id n K€KTrjodan, (247B8) are echoed by TTOLVT efvai OOJ/JLOLTCL (247C2).

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with which we are concerned. According to Plato, the impudence of the OSE is such that they will not back off, whatever paradox confronts them: they are as capable of denying existence to the qualities as of maintaining them to be bodies (247c). In other words, impervious to any impulses of 'bashfulness' such as those that prompted the RSE to agree to important concessions, the OSE would be capable of using the equation between existents and bodies either (i) to limit the domain of existents by ejecting from it any realities that they judged not to be bodies, or (ii) to extend the domain of bodies by including within it realities that they judge not to be non-existents. But Plato does not give them the chance to exploit that double possibility fully. In the very next sentence (247C5-7), he shows them falling back upon their initial criteria and using them in such a way as to follow course (i): only bodies exist, and only things that are tangible are bodies. In the name of these criteria, they deny existence to the qualities of the soul and, by a seemingly necessary implication, also to the soul itself.70 In a sense, this position is in conformity with the logic of Plato's strategy: given that the OSE were not willing to take part in debate, it is to be expected that their position will not have evolved since it was first stated (246A-B); if the OSE did agree to 'justify their position', they would not be OSE. However, course (ii), which Plato has fleetingly indicated, was not to be lost upon everybody. Now let us return to the RSE. They have acknowledged a minimal sample of incorporeal realities: namely, the virtues and vices of the soul. That concession was enough to make it possible to insist that they produce a definition or common mark of an existent, which can be applied to bodies and incorporeals alike (247D). So Plato suggests to them, at least provisionally and keeping open the possibility of revision, the famous formula: whatever has the power to act or be acted upon, however feebly and even if only on one occasion, is an 6v (247DE, cf. 248c). He does not explicitly say how it could be shown that the virtues and vices of the soul satisfy that criterion of existence; but it is clear that it is to the extent that, through their presence or absence, they allow the soul itself to be either virtuous or vicious. As we shall see, this causal efficacy of the 6v was to provide the Stoics with an argument that they could turn inside out without having to modify it in any way. Now let us turn to the FF. These are of a less rebarbative nature than the SE (246c). Yet they too are required to make concessions and in their case equally it is possible to distinguish between an original position (OFF) and a revised one (RFF). The position of the OFF may be summarized in three essential propositions: (a) the existence of incorporeal Forms is completely 'separate' from the becoming of bodies (248A7-8); (b) existence and becoming nevertheless both relate to us, in the sense that we 'communicate' (cognitively, 70

It is worth noting the interesting variant to the Y MS at 247C6-7: chs dpa TOVTO [TOVTOJV Y] ovSev TO Trapdrrav ianv. The singular TOVTO is grammatically justified by the -ndv of 247C5; the plural TOUTCOV could be an 'intelligent correction' made by some reader who understood that in substance the conclusion applied to the soul as well as to the virtues.

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with bodies through sensation, and with Forms through reason (248A10-11); (c) only bodies in the process of becoming have the power to act and be acted upon, and true existence is incompatible with both those powers (248C7-9). If those three positions were tenable without contradiction, the OFF would be able to avoid agreeing with the RSE in recognizing in the powers of acting and being acted upon a character common both to true existents and to bodies in the process of becoming. But Plato holds over them the threat of a contradiction, by means of the following argument: (i) to know and to be known are forms of action and passion; (ii) to act and to be acted upon are modes of movement; (iii) so whatever knows moves and whatever is known is moved; intelligible Forms cannot be at once known, as is held by thesis (b) of the OFF, and unaffected, as is held by their thesis (c). It would appear that the OFF would avoid that conclusion by rejecting premiss (i): 71 for them, cognitive relations have no physical significance. But if they did so, they would avoid contradiction only to fall into improbability; for Plato took care to define action and passion in the widest possible terms (KOLI irpds TO oiALKpoTOLTov, 248C5), so that anything that can be expressed by an active verb (for example, 'to know') passes for an action, and anything that can be expressed by a passive verb (for example, 'to be known') passes for a passion. Subjected to this pressure, the RFF accept the premisses (i) and (ii) of Plato's argument and come to terms with his conclusion (iii), acknowledging it to be admissible after all: if the notion of movement is given a meaning sufficiently wide for it to encompass the purely spiritual movement of knowledge, the Forms may provide objects for the cognitive movement, meanwhile remaining immutable in every other respect (249B-C). Plato neither indicates nor explores another possible way of extricating oneself from his argument, which would be to accept premiss (i) but not premiss (ii), that is to say to acknowledge modes of action and passion that are not movements either produced or undergone. It is now possible for us to see with what precision - one might almost say how systematically - the Stoic ontology was constructed upon the rejection of all the concessions that Plato demanded from these antagonistic doctrines, in order to get round their antagonism without forcing rectifications upon them. As is well known, the Stoics preserve the strict identification between existents and bodies to which the OSE clung. As is also well known, they are 71

Like Cornford 1960, p. 240 n. 3,1 understand lines 248D10-E5 to be setting out the reasons why the OFF refuse to regard knowledge as an action: if, in the counterfactual hypothesis, knowledge were an action, the object known ought to be acted upon; now (at least according to the OFF, see their thesis (c)), to be acted upon implies to be moved; if the existence of the Forms were passive in that it is known, it would be moved in that it was acted upon, but that is impossible since (according to the same thesis (c)) it has been stated to be 'at rest' and immutable. I consider this interpretation to be preferable to that of Dies (1950, p. 356), who regards this passage as setting out a concession to the RFF. For one thing, that would be an insufficient concession because it would be purely conditional (if one agrees that to know is to act, then it must be agreed that the object known is moved); for another, a conciliatory move at this particular point in the text, on the part of the FF, would hardly account for the famous explosion from the Stranger at 247E7 (TL 8e irpos ALOS KTX).

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not embarrassed by the question of the ontological status of the soul, which they have no hesitation in declaring to be of a corporeal nature. 72 Where the virtues and vices are concerned, they do not allow themselves, as do the RSE, to be drawn into making concessions: taking up Plato's own suggestion, one that he did not develop fully but considered to be concomitant with the 'impudence' of the OSE, the Stoics maintain that they are bodies, even perfectly perceptible bodies. 73 We even find them lifting from Plato, and proceeding to adapt to their own theory of causality, the examples and vocabulary of the argument which, in the Sophist (247A2-B2), concluded from the qualifications of the soul that its qualities were real existents: just as, in Plato, the soul is called povnxos, thanks to the presence {iTapovoia, 247A5) of the povr]OLs within it, so, in Zeno, the soul is said to (frpovetv if and only if the
Let m e simply refer the reader to SVFi. 137, 142, 518; 11.467, 773, 774, 790-2, 807; m.305. Bodies: SKF1.89; 11.797, 848; m.84, 305. Perceptible bodies: SFF111.85. Cf. Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.138.14 = S F F 1.89, FDS 762.

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the criterion which makes it possible to distinguish between what exists and what does not exist. And if these realities are of a kind that can be known by us or can make themselves known to us, that knowability must be interpreted without in any way diminishing their inactivity and their impassivity. To begin with this last point, it may be noted that, in the polemics directed against them by the Sceptics, the Stoics had to face up to a difficulty similar to that with which Plato had confronted the OFF: if their incorporeals are knowable, do not the cognitive relations which are established between them and us imply that they possess some kind of activity or passivity? It is true that the problem is not posed in exactly the same terms in the two cases: Plato, taking the verbal expressions of the cognitive relations literally, envisages the process of knowledge as a process in which the subject possessing knowledge is active in that he knows, and the object known is passive in that it is known; the Stoics, on the other hand, envisage the process of knowledge the other way around, as a process in which the subject with knowledge is passive in that he is affected by a representation, and the object that is known is active in that it produces that representation. That is an effect of the sensualist model which dominates their theory of knowledge. But apart from that reversal, the general problem is identical: namely, is it possible to maintain both that incorporeals are knowable and, at the same time, that they are inactive and impassive? Sextus Empiricus (M vm.4o6-io = SVF 11.85, FDS 272) tells us the answer that the Stoics produced to one particular version of this difficulty, a version that concerns the comprehension of proof. He formulates the difficulty as follows: proof is not a body, since it is composed of incorporeal Ae/avTaoioviAevoi\ and Sextus adds, a little further on, 'on the occasion of their occurrence but not under their action (in avrois, oi>x VTT avrcov)\15 That is quite an acrobatic reply; it seems to imply that the rjyefioviKov can be affected of its own accord, if not in an entirely spontaneous fashion, at least on the occasion of an external stimulus; certainly, when representing proof to itself, it is passive (cf. (JHivraoioviievoi) and all passivity in principle presupposes an agent. If that agent is not the external incorporeal, it can only be the rfye/juovLKov itself. Sextus' criticisms (406-8) certainly presuppose the Stoics' acceptance of the notion of auto-affection. To strengthen their reply, they had resorted to some quite carefully chosen images. The gymnastic trainer can teach his pupil a 75

Cf. a similar use of eVt + dative, in Simplicius In Cat. 333.31 = SVF 11.185, FDS 801: it may happen that the action of the agent ceases before the passion of the patient; for instance, a son may be long-since dead, but his father will continue to grieve for him (iir'avra)).

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movement by taking hold of his hands and impressing the movement upon them, a procedure which illustrates a case where an external body affects the rjye/jLovLKov physically. But the gymnastic trainer can also himself make the movement that he wishes to teach his pupil, at a distance, presenting himself as a model to be imitated; and it is this procedure that is regarded as illustrating what happens when the -qyeixoviKov apprehends a proof, which is a complex of incorporeal Ae/cra. Whatever the demonstrative value of these illustrations, their example shows how hard the Stoics tried to avoid having to recognize that cognitive relations involve a relationship of action and passion between the subject that knows and the object that is known. Here they adopt a variant of the reply with which the OFF might have countered the argument in the Sophist, a reply which, as we have noted, Plato neither indicated nor explored. They accept a premiss which corresponds to premiss (i) in Plato's argument, namely that, when we understand a proof, we are subjected to a passion (cf)avTaGLoviJL€voL). But they reject the premiss which would correspond to premiss (ii) of the Platonic argument, namely that every passion implies the action of an external motor upon the patient. As the Stoics see it, then, we are impressed not by the Aex-rd, but on the occasion of their occurrence and, in all probability, by ourselves. They are accordingly able to reject the conclusion that Plato forced upon the RFF; the Stoics are in a position to accept a cognitive relationship between a body - the rjye^ovLKov - and a complex of incorporeals - a proof- and this is a relationship which is compatible with the completely different ontological statuses of all the terms involved in it. If we now return to the more fundamental problem of the criterion according to which certain incorporeal realities can and must be recognized, even if the equation between the existent and the body is maintained, we are bound to recognize that here the Stoic ontology can no longer be presented as a simple juxtaposition of the OSE doctrine and the OFF doctrine. So far, we have noted the precision with which the various parts in the debate organized by Plato were re-used in the Stoic construction, once they had cleared out of the way the modifications that the author of the Sophist had introduced in order to make them fit into his own construction. 76 The coincidences are probably striking enough for it to be reasonable to suggest (even in the absence of any decisive external proof) that this dialogue played a seminal role in the formation of the Stoic ontology. Clearly, though, a fundamental difference still separates the Stoic synthesis from the hybrid system that would be obtained by purely and simply amalgamating the doctrine of the OSE and that of the OFF. The difference consists in the fact that, in Stoicism, the place of inactive and impassive incorporeal realities is no longer occupied by the 76

It is worth quoting the following passage from Cornford i960, p. 247: 'Just as the reformed materialist was induced to surrender the mark of tangibility and enlarge his conception of the real to include some bodiless things, so the reformed idealist must surrender the mark of changelessness and allow that the real includes spiritual motion, as well as the unchanging Forms.'

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intelligible Forms, but instead by the collection of canonical incorporeals whose common ontological status is that of NEST. It is to explain that difference that at this point we must, I think, introduce the second component of the Stoic elaboration: namely their critical analysis of the Platonic theory of Forms. IV

As I have indicated above, the criterion for accepting those incorporeal realities had necessarily to be distinct from the criterion to be satisfied by existents, that is to say bodies. Now, that criterion (also, a fortiori, satisfied by bodies) consists in being 'something'; and we know already that the Stoics' attitude to the Platonic Forms may be summed up by their refusal to grant those Forms any extra-mental reality, for the precise reason that they are not 'something'. One is inevitably tempted to collect together all these data. The use of the idea of a NST in the ontological disqualification of the Forms was necessarily complemented by the promotion of the idea of a ST as a criterion of reality, and if it was in the name of that criterion that the Forms were denied any extra-mental reality, one had to be ready to grant some kind of reality, in the name of that very criterion, to items which did not necessarily possess the substantial existence of corporeals. It is remarkable that, so far as we know, the Stoics never thought of challenging Plato's ontological exaltation of the Forms (as their 'ancestor', Antisthenes had) 77 by declaring that they are not bodies, that one could neither see them nor touch them, or that one could attribute to them no causal activity or efficacy (v/hich, as is well known, was Aristotle's favourite criticism).78 It is in this respect that one sees that the heritage of the OFF is combined with that of the OSE in the Stoic doctrines. The mode of being that they ascribe to bodies is not that which they deny to the forms and, in this connection, nothing could be more misleading than the formula by which von Arnim attempts to sum up their doctrines: 'sola corpora esse, non esse ideas'.19 To render that formula acceptable, one would have to draw a radical distinction between the two uses of the verb esse here. The strange, new expression ovriva was certainly not introduced haphazardly to serve as an instrument in the critique of the Platonic Forms; for that critique, which is a well-known element in Stoic thought, rests upon a less frequently noted effort to understand and interpret the reasons for Plato's error. The Forms certainly are chimaeras, but the motives for introducing them were respectable, if ill-interpreted. A somewhat enigmatic passage from Syrianus,80 without parallel so far as I know, attests in its own fashion that throughout the long existence of their school, the Stoics continued to ponder 77 78 79

Cf. the famous declaration attributed to him by Simplicius, In Cat. 208.28. Cf. on this theme the excellent comprehensive study by G. Fine (1987), pp. 69-112. 80 SVFn, p. 123. Syrianus, In Met. 105.19-30 = SKF 1.494, 11.364, m Arch. 13; FDS 31 8A.

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the genesis of Platonism: according to this testimony, the reasons for the elaboration of the Forms were of a linguistic nature for Chrysippus, for Archedemus and for 'most of the Stoics', of a semantic nature according to Longinus, and of a conceptual nature according to Cleanthes; whilst Marcus Aurelius merged the ideas of Longinus and those of Cleanthes. It is true that this late text does not rate highly as documentary evidence, for it makes no mention at all of Zeno and confuses dates blithely, placing Cleanthes after Chrysippus and Longinus (third century) before Marcus Aurelius (second century). Nevertheless, it may reflect the reality of an enduring tradition of interest in the theory of Forms, interest which was not content to take it for granted that the theory had long since been refuted once and for all, and which persisted in pondering the reasons for such an unforgettable and ever-renewed mistake. The most famous texts attribute to Zeno himself and to the Stoics who followed him the reduction of what 'the ancients' called 'Ideas' to 'concepts' (ivvorujLOLTa), or, to be more exact, to 'our concepts (eworHxara Ty/zerepa)'; and by that what was meant was no more than 'figments of thought', which are 'neither something nor (something which is> qualified, but almost something and almost (something which is> qualified {fJirjre TLVOL eivai fji^re rroia, cboavel 8e Twa /cat woavel TTOLa.81 It would be impossible to underestimate the degree of the ontological devaluation to which the Forms are subjected in this verdict: the (f)avrdaiJLara are mirages, phantom-objects, the intentional objects of 'empty movements of the imagination', the prototype for which is provided by dreaming and hallucinations. 82 Nevertheless, the irreality of Ideas does not condemn Plato's statements to absurdity: it is possible to produce perfectly acceptable conceptualist paraphrases for them and, as Long and Sedley emphasize, the Stoics do not appear to have felt any compunction about reusing the vocabulary of participation, declaring for example that 'we participate in concepts'; 83 that presumably means, despite the doubts of some commentators, that, as existent individuals, we belong to the genera and species illegitimately hypostasized by Plato and that we possess the common qualities which define them. 84 It is clear that, in Zeno's view, it is the universality of concepts that makes it impossible to attribute extra-mental reality to them. But it would clearly be desirable to know whether, by using the expression ixrjre nvd . . ., waavel Se nva to characterize their way of not being real, he explicitly meant to distinguish that mode of unreality from the mode of inexistence which might belong to incorporeal realities, supposing that there were any such things. In other words, one would like to know whether the dissociation between the rl and the 6v had already been made by Zeno. What may make one hesitate to 81

83 84

Cf. Stobaeus, Eclogue 1.136.21 = SVF1.65A, FDS 316; Aetius, Placita 1. 10.5 = SKF1.65B, FDS 82 317. Cf. Chrysippus apud Aetius, Placita iv. 12.1 = SVF 11.54, FDS 2 6 8 Cf. what follows in Stobaeus' text cited above, n. 8 1 . At this point, I a m enormously indebted to the excellent c o m m e n t a r y by Sedley 1985, p . 89, summarized in Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 11, p . 182.

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advance such a claim is in particular the fact that there exists a variant to the expression considered above, a variant put forward in the anonymous definition of the ivvorjiJLa to be found in Diogenes Laertius. According to this definition, a concept is a figment of thought, ovre rl ov ovre TTOLOV, ojoavel 8e n ov KQX (baavel TTOLOV.85 The function of the word ov in these formulae prompts discussion: either one regards it as a simple copula, in which case the two variants have the same meaning and both withold from a concept the status of ST; or else ov is construed in apposition to TI, in which case, in Diogenes Laertius' version, what would be denied of a concept would only be that it is 'something existing'. In this second construction, the dissociation between ri and ov, which is a fundamental element in the TSG doctrine, would still not be clearly attributable to Zeno. But it is probably possible to argue in favour of the first construction, pointing out that the ambiguous ov in Diogenes Laertius' version in all probability represents the ehai in Stobaeus' version which, for its part, quite unambiguously does possess a copulative function. Even if a degree of uncertainty did remain on this point, other arguments could be found to attest the precise intentions nursed by Zeno when he formulated his critique of the metaphysics of the Forms with the aid of the notion of the ST. Zeno's critique may be compared with that of Stilpo, which probably provided his starting point. 86 Stilpo, we are told, used the following argument: k'Xeye rov Xzyovra avdpamov efvcu ynqheva. ovre yap rovSe €LVCLL ovre rovSe. riyap fiaXXov rovSe rj rovSe; ovS' dpa r6v8e.81 The text is far from clear and, to improve it, a number of rather heavy-handed corrections have been proposed. 88 But what at any rate is certain is that the nub of the objection was the distinction between man in general (avOpaj-nov) and any particular, determined man (roVSe). The situation envisaged by Stilpo may have been one in which man in general was simply referred to, or else one in which something was said about him; and in the second case, what was said may have been that he exists or that he is this or that. In any case, to mention man as such is not to mention any man in particular, and to state something about him is not to state it about any man in particular. To clarify the matter and because in this case it is the most probable supposition, let us assume that Stilpo had in mind a situation in which it is declared that man (in general) exists. In making that declaration, it is not affirmed that any particular, determined man exists: for why should it be one rather than another? From this, Stilpo seems to have concluded that the existence of all men, one by one, was denied; so that, 85 86

87 88

Diogenes Laertius VII.6I = SKF1.65C, FDS 315. Zeno h a d been Stilpo's pupil, cf. Diogenes Laertius 11.114, 120; vn.2, 24; a n d it is certainly correct to describe as 'Stilponian' the primacy of the particular which immediately characterizes the logic a n d the ontology of the founder of the Stoic School, as Rist does (1978), p . 349. Diogenes Laertius 11.119 = fr. 199 Doring (in Doring 1972). Roeper 1854 proposed reading Xeyetv twice instead of elvai. T h a t correction is accepted by Doring 1972, pp. 155-6 n. 6, and by a n u m b e r of scholars before him. There are other possible solutions, cf. n. 89.

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paradoxically, the declaration 'man exists' in his hands came to mean 'no man exists'; /XT/SCIS may be substituted for avdpaj-rros.89 It seems to me highly likely that Zeno discerned a flaw in this argument of Stilpo's: not to affirm the existence of any man in particular is not the same as denying the existence of all men. Even if the affirmation 'man exists' does not imply any affirmation such as 'Socrates exists', 'Plato exists', etc., the lesson to be learned from this is not that avOpooiros may be replaced by firjSeis, as Stilpo believed, but simply that avdpajiros cannot be replaced by rig. We can see from this just how much interpenetration - almost to the point of indistinguishability - there is between interpretation and critique in the Stoic reading of the theory of Forms. What Zeno understood, in the argument that I am attributing to him, is that the existence of a Form does not imply the existence of any of its sensible participants. In other words, it could perfectly well happen that man as such existed although no individual flesh-and-blood man did. Even today, that is a perfectly respectable interpretation of the Platonic XojpiafjLos.90 The status of 'figment of the soul' attributed by the Stoics to universals is simply a more economical ontological way of taking account of their 'separation' from sensible particulars, that is to say of taking account of the very character that prompted Plato to turn them into eternal Forms. 91 In the adjustment that Zeno made to Stilpo's critique of the Forms, there can thus be detected at the very least the seed of the crucial dissociation between the ri and the 6V: what the Forms do not have, and what prevents them from being seen as extra-mental realities, is not only the full mode of existence of any particular individual body, taken with all its sensible determining characteristics (oSe); furthermore, and from the start, they also lack the mode of reality that is possessed by any particular individual, even an indeterminate one (TIS). What they lack even more fundamentally than determination is particularity. 89

90

9J

T h e textual correction best suited to this interpretation of the a r g u m e n t is probably the following: rov Xiyovra avdpconov efvcu (avdpajirov elvai) fxrfSeva. Or at least of the Platonic ^topia/Ao? according to Aristotle. Cf. on this point, Fine 1984, p p . 31-87 a n d in particular the following passage (p. 44): 'if to say t h a t F o r m s are separate is just to say that they can exist independently of sensible particulars; and if, as Aristotle and I believe, F o r m s are universals, then to say t h a t the F o r m s are separate is just to say t h a t (some) universals can exist uninstantiated (by sensible particulars).' See also p p . 78-81 of this article, on the Timaeus, and the very interesting discussions between Fine and M o r r i s o n (1985, p p . 125-57, 159-65, 167-73). This could be a way of resolving the p a r a d o x of the Stoic attitude to the Platonic F o r m s , a p a r a d o x that is excellently described by Sedley (1985), p p . 89-90: 'the logical a n d metaphysical outlawing of concepts is not a denial of their epistemological value. It is a warning to us not to follow Plato's p a t h of hypostatising them.' Cf. also L o n g a n d Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p . 182. T h e fact that one and the same a r g u m e n t m a y be used to support diametrically opposed conclusions is a c o m m o n p l a c e in philosophy as it is elsewhere. Siparva componere licet, I will cite the following dialogue between a F r e n c h m a n a n d an Englishman on the comparative advantages of powdered sugar a n d l u m p sugar. I guarantee its authenticity. T h e F r e n c h m a n : 'The good thing a b o u t l u m p sugar is that you k n o w exactly h o w m u c h you are taking.' T h e Englishman: 'The good thing a b o u t powdered sugar is that you k n o w exactly h o w m u c h you are taking.'

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All that Chrysippus had to do was pick up and proceed with Zeno's thought on the Platonic Forms and also his use of the notion of the ST in the recasting of their ontological status. In his case too, a polemical intention was inseparable from an attempt at analysis and theoretical comprehension, as is shown by the remarkable interpretation of the Platonic theory that he is said by Geminus92 to have produced. He declared that certain mathematical theorems established the equality of an indefinite number of surfaces or volumes contained within the same limits; for example, all parallelograms with the same base and the same height are equal, whatever the angle at which their sides meet their base; similarly, according to Chrysippus, 'the Ideas embrace within determined limits the genesis of an infinity of things (eKetvat rwv 0L7T€ipa)v iv irepaaiv (LpLo/Jievois rrjv yeveaiv TrepiXayifiavovoivy

— a statement

which Brehier judiciously comments upon as follows: The Idea only indicates the limits that an existent must satisfy in order to exist, without determining that existent's nature more closely: it can be what it likes within those limits; consequently, what is determined is not a single existent but an endless multiplicity of them.'93 Another document attests that Chrysippus may have meditated upon the debate between Stilpo and Zeno. In a passage of his commentary upon the Categories (105.7-20 = SVF 11.278, FDS 1247), Simplicius ponders the question of whether, in the opinion of those who grant existence (VTTOOTCLOIS) to the genera and the species, these may or may not be called rdSe. In this connection, he notes that Chrysippus, likewise, wondered {airopel) whether the Idea can be called roSe n. This Aristotelian expression does not appear to have constituted part of the ontological vocabulary of the Stoics; furthermore, Simplicius immediately goes on to note that, in the general opinion of the Stoics, common or universal terms (KOLVO) are called ovnva. In these circumstances, one may wonder whether Chrysippus' problem actually was formulated in these terms, and it is quite tempting to read r o S e ^ ) TL, which would make the contents of Chrysippus' aporia more interesting: should the problem of the ontological status of the Idea be posed with reference to the determined peculiarity of the roSe or with reference to the indeterminate peculiarity of the TI ? Whatever the value of that suggestion, Chrysippus may certainly be attributed a role of capital importance in elaborating a sort of test for distinguishing between STs and NSTs. We know that he had thought much about the paradox known as the paradox of the ovns, devoting to it at least two treatises, or possibly three, one comprising eight books.94 Now Simpli92 94

93 Cited by Proclus, In Eucl. 395.21-31 = SVF 11.365, FDS 458. Brehier 1970, p. 3. Cf. the list in Diogenes Laertius vii.198. Sandwiched between the two titles of treatises expressly devoted to the ovns is a third which, as Frede 1974, pp. 56-8, has shown, relates to the same subject. The exact wording of the paradox, which is incompletely cited or imperfectly transmitted by the usual sources (Simplicius, ibid.; Diogenes Laertius vii.82 = SFF11.274, FDS

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cius, in the passage cited above, shows that this paradox constituted the basis of the Stoic reduction of the KOLVOL to the ovnva. The paradox is set out as follows: 'if someone (ris) is in Athens, he (OVTOS) is not in Megara; now man is present in Athens; so man is not present in Megara.' 95 The lesson to be learned from this paradox is that it is not legitimate to substitute a universal term such as 'man' for the indefinite ris. As Simplicius accurately notes, such a substitution boils down to using a 'not something' as if it were a 'something'. So one can see how, correctly interpreted, the paradox becomes a test for reality. It goes without saying that individual bodies pass the test successfully: if Socrates is in Athens, he is not in Megara, and he thus qualifies, without any problems, as a ST. But we should note that his corporeal nature, as such, is not in question in his lack of ubiquity. This may be borne out by submitting two antithetical examples to the ovns test: on the one hand the example of a body designated in terms of mass, 'water', for instance; on the other, the example of a particular incorporeal, the place occupied by Socrates, for instance. Although a body, the first example does not pass the test: the fact that there is water in Athens does not permit one to conclude that there is none in Megara. The second, though incorporeal, does pass the test: if the place occupied by Socrates is in Athens, that place is not in Megara. It is thus as a ST, not as a body, that Socrates himself was successful in passing the test. By collecting together the conclusions provided by the Stoic reading of the Sophist and those that may be drawn from the polemic directed against the theory of Forms, it may thus be said that their critical analysis of Platonism made it possible for the Stoics to distinguish two separate ontological criteria, a physical criterion of existence and a logical criterion of reality, and the independence between those two carves out an ontological niche for NESTs. Before bringing this section of my investigation to a close, I should like to draw attention to the care with which the Stoics so to speak mounted guard over the borders of that ontological niche. If it was not to be invaded by its neighbours, it had to be defended on two fronts, as the following schema shows: ST

E

NST

NE

In the next section, by examining the canonical incorporeals, we shall see what arguments the Stoics used to secure their peculiarity, thus avoiding both

95

1207), has been re-established by this author on the basis of a scholium to the commentary on the Categories by Philoponus (app. crit. p. J2 = FDS 1248); cf. also Elias, In Cat. 178.112 = FDS 1249. To translate this into more or less correct English (or French), one has to manipulate the Greek, which is much more direct: ei TLS ianv iv 'Adrjvais, OVTOS OVK ZOTLV iv Meydpois ' avdpioiTOS 84 ioriv iv *Adr}vais • avOpcoTros apa OVK eonv iv Meyapois.

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conceptualizing them and also thereby allowing the NSTs to cross the frontier separating them from the STs. I would like to show here that, as they developed what I have called an inflationist somatology (by virtue of which they presented as bodies many things that were not habitually conceptualized as such - qualities, virtues, etc.), the Stoic philosophers handled their criterion of corporeality, that is to say of existence, with precaution and moderation, so as to avoid having the Es encroach unduly upon the NEs. By themselves imposing a certain number of restrictions upon the legitimate use of this criterion, they demonstrated once again that their theory of incorporeals that are NESTs is not a concession that they were driven to make, but a complementary element that they were only too happy to add to their critique of the Platonic incorporeals, which are relegated to the status of NSTs. To be sure, a thing is a body if and only if it acts or is acted upon.96 But what is it to act, what is it to be acted upon? In contrast to Plato who, as we have seen, gave these words as wide a meaning as possible, the Stoics understood them in a strictly physical sense; in this way, they were not obliged to confer corporeality upon any and every item which, in a true statement, would appear in the position of the subject of an active or a passive verb. When they undertake to show that such-and-such an item is a body, they stress the purely physical character of the actions that it executes or the passions to which it is subjected. What is common to the acting and the being acted upon is the movement that impresses or is impressed (SVF 11.497) an< l that movement is defined as a local movement (SVF 11.492). The action presupposes proximity and contact (SVF 11.342); the action and the passion imply impulse, resistance and impact (SVF 11.343). To show that the voice ((/XJOVYJ), for instance, is a body, the Stoics show that it moves physically from the speaker to the hearer (SVF in, Diog. 18) and that, in the phenomenon of the echo, its trajectory may be broken by a wall, just as the trajectory of a ball would be (SVF 11.387). Similarly, to show that the soul is a body, Chrysippus supplements Cleanthes' rather impressionistic argument (*SKFi.5i8) with one whose blatant physicalism borders on provocation (SVF 11.790: 'death is the separation of the soul and the body; now nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body; for neither can the incorporeal touch the body'). In all these examples, the insistence upon the physical nature of the actions and passions which serve as 96

Like Plato, the Stoics are here using a disjunctive formula (I should like to thank R. Sorabji for showing me that the exceptions to this rule that I believed I had found were in fact no such thing). An important consequence is that the two fundamental principles of Stoic physics, the Logos-God which is active and only active, and matter which is passive and only passive, are both bodies. That is what Diogenes Laertius VII.I34 = SVF 11.299 declares, according to the MSS. However, such is the power to shock that this conclusion retains that von Arnim corrected ocofjuara to aoojfjidrovs, on the basis of the article apxrj in the Suda, and that correction has enjoyed a surprising success. It is accepted by the modern editors of Diogenes Laertius, R.D. Hicks and H.S. Long; and several commentators who are in favour of preserving the text of the MSS consider that Diogenes Laertius' testimony is substantially erroneous, either so far as the Logos on its own is concerned (e.g. Kahn 1969, p. 168, n. 21), or even concerning both principles (e.g. Sandbach 1985, pp. 73-4).

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indicators of corporeality ends up, paradoxically, by depriving the criterion of its operational value: for in order to show that x is a body, it is necessary to show that x acts or is acted upon; but for the demonstration to be conclusive, it is necessary to show that x acts or is acted upon 'corporeally' (croo/xaTiKcos, cf. SVF 11.343), not in some metaphorical or catachrestic sense (SVF 11.345). These constraints affecting the implementation of the 'official' criterion of corporeality perhaps explain why it is that, in practice, the Stoics often resort to other ways of demonstrating statements taking the form of 'x is a body'. Sometimes these supplementary procedures are used to reinforce the normal procedure; but sometimes they supplant it, and one thus perceives that the criterion of action and passion will perhaps not suffice to demonstrate the corporeality of everything that the Stoics take to be bodies. The most distinctive of these supplementary procedures is what I shall call 'the graft of corporeality'. It rests upon the following argument: x is a body because it maintains with y, which is a body, a relationship r which implies that x is also a body. 97 This procedure is used to reinforce the normal one in, for example, the case of the ojvrj to be found in Plato {Tim. 67B) and Aristotle (De an. 11.8, 42ob29): both had called it TrXrjyr] aepos. The opponents of Stoicism did not fail to seize upon that reversal and criticize it: Simplicius (in Phys. 426.1 = SVFm, Diog. 19, FDS 480) censures the Stoic definition for substituting the affected subject, namely the air that is struck, for the affection, namely the striking of it, and for wrongly concluding that the C/XJOVYJ is a body and presenting it as a species of the genus 'air'. 98 In the case of the c/xjovrj, this type of argument is a supplementary procedure, but it is used on its own when it comes to demonstrating that truth (as opposed 97

98

Naturally, not all relations have this 'corporealizing' effect: a place, for example, is occupied by a body, but does not on that account become a b o d y itself. It would be interesting to discover where the Stoics had at their disposal a precise criterion to distinguish relations that 'corporealize' from those that do not. T h e same objection, with a reminder of the Platonic definition, is to be found in Schol. in Dion. Thr. 482.5 ( = FDS4% 1), and also, with a different example, in Alexander In Top. 360.9 ( = SVF 11.379, FDS 839): a fist is not 'a h a n d in a particular state', for it is not a hand; it is in a h a n d , as in a subject. It is worth noting that this is precisely the objection that Aristotle himself (Top. iv.5, I27a3f.) m a d e to some of Plato's definitions, for instance that of snow as 'frozen water' (Tim. 59E), and that of m u d as 'earth mixed with moisture' (Theaet. 147c). The Stoics are thus using, against one of Plato's particular definitions, a type of definition that Plato himself had also used. In so doing, they take no account of the objections that Aristotle had raised against that type of definition. O n this particular point, it is fair to say that Aristotle remains outside the debate that the Stoics are engaged in with Plato.

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to what is true) is a body." In this demonstration, no attempt is made to suggest that truth acts or is acted upon. The only argument used consists in declaring that truth is a science and that science is the '^ye^oviKov (that is to say a body) in a certain state', just as a fist is 'a hand in a certain state.' 100 Perhaps the author of this demonstration decided that it would be too difficult to claim that truth acts in any other sense than metaphorically. At any rate, he made no attempt to do so. By thus combining a principal criterion of corporeality, which they handle very strictly, with secondary criteria which enable them, when necessary, to make use of the 'grafts of corporeality' to which I referred above, the Stoics as it were provided themselves with a driving-wheel that enabled them to steer their course with great precision between excessive rigour and excessive laxity in their selection of candidates for membership of the club of bodies or fully paid-up existents: all of which shows yet again, should it still need to be shown, that there was nothing naive about their 'materialism' and that, far from being overwhelmed by events over which they had no control, when they safeguarded the position of the NEST they knew exactly what they were doing and were doing exactly what they meant to.

In this section I shall, as I have said, attempt to find means of confirming my hypothesis from two different points of view. In the first place, if it is true that the TSG doctrine and its essential element, the status of NESTs, were not fabricated expressly to accommodate the four canonical incorporeals on the basis of an inductive analysis of their common properties, but instead were produced from the purely theoretical interaction between two ontological criteria that had emerged from the critical analysis of Platonism, then we may expect to find the Stoics running into a number of difficulties when it comes to having to accommodate a whole collection of relatively heterogeneous items within a single ontological category which was not specially created to hold them and them alone. In my view, that expectation is fulfilled on a number of counts. It is nothing new to point out the heterogeneous nature of the group of canonical incorporeals. 101 The most glaring disparity is that which separates the 'logical' incorporeals (the Ae/cra) from the 'physical' incorporeals (place, the void and time). But that is not the most serious disparity. These days, there is an increasing tendency to devise ways of stressing that the status of the XeKTov was first defined on the basis of the case of the Kar^yoprj^ara (SVF 99 100 101

Cf. Sextus, M v n . 3 8 = SVFn.132, FDS 324; P//11.81 = FDS 322. O n this text, see L o n g 1978c. A definition which, as we have seen above, n. 98, is criticized by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Cf. Brehier 1970, p . 60 ('The profound originality of this theory is to have associated within the same g r o u p such very different beings'); with a slightly different perspective, Goldschmidt 1977, p . 26 ('Incorporeals are not all inexistent to the same degree'); L o n g and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p . 199 ('Why are they [i.e. the Aefcra] grouped together with place, void and time whose incorporeality seems unproblematic?').

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1.488, FDS 763), which subsequently, within a more comprehensive theory, were interpreted as incomplete XeKrd. Now, the incorporeal status of the KarrjyoprjjjLa is connected with a characteristic theory of causality, in which it represents the incorporeal effect of a corporeal cause acting upon a patient that is also corporeal. 102 This status is thus defined in physical terms, not logical, dialectical or semantic ones - or at least that is the case initially. Of all the differences that separate the four canonical incorporeals, I would myself stress rather those that are directly related to the various modalities of their insertion into the class of NESTs. If it is by virtue of their universality that, as we have seen, concepts are classed as NSTs, then STs are necessarily particulars, whether they are bodies or incorporeals. In this regard, two cleavages appear within the group of the four incorporeals: the first is that which separates three of them, which are continuous and infinitely divisible, namely time, place and the void (cf. SVF 11.482a, FDS 724) from the fourth, which is not (the complete XeKrov certainly does have parts some of which constitute incomplete XeKrd, but clearly division cannot be continued ad infinitum). The second cleavage is that which separates off the two of them which are both unique and infinite (namely time and the void) from the other two which are multiple and finite (places and the XeKrd). This twofold division illuminates something which is immediately manifest anyway: the special position of the XeKrd, which are multiple, finite and not infinitely divisible. There can be no shadow of a doubt that the XeKrd are particulars, even if it is quite difficult to pin down exactly what it is that constitutes their particularity. To resolve that problem, or even to express it correctly, it would no doubt be necessary to study each species of the XeKrd separately, since not all XeKrd are complete, not all complete XeKrd are d^Lcofiara, not all dgicofjuara are simple, etc. For example, an incomplete XeKrov such as is expressed by a verb without a subject ('... walks'), certainly seems to be common to an indefinite family of complete XeKrd, those that are produced by combining some subject or other with that verb ('Socrates walks', 'Plato walks', etc.). Accordingly, if two of these complete XeKrd are taken into consideration, it is highly likely that we should count them as two complete XeKrd and one incomplete XeKrov. Furthermore, one might wonder whether the peculiarity of a XeKrov results from the peculiarity of the sequence of sounds that expresses it (and if so, whether that sequence should be considered as a type or as a token, a particular sample of that type); or, alternatively, does it result rather from the peculiarity of the 'logical representation' (^avraata XoyiKrj) which might be expressed in words in such a sequence (and in this case too one ought to resolve the ambiguity between type and token, probably settling for type). 103 102 103

Cf. S F F 1 . 8 9 , FDS 762; SKF11.341, FDS 765. I c a n n o t go into these difficult problems in detail here. O n the one h a n d , the Ae/crov seems to be individualized by the 'logical representation' that it expresses: it 'subsists' /caret XoyuK-qv <j>avraoiav, as Sextus Empiricus puts it at vm.70 ( = SFF11.187, FDS 699), that is to say in liaison with a mental event which differs from one person to a n o t h e r as it does at different m o m e n t s within a single person. O n the other h a n d , however, the d£ia>/u,a, which is a

I36

STOICISM

However, whatever the difficulties to be resolved in order to determine from precisely where each XeKrov derives its peculiarity, it certainly does possess a peculiarity and, even if there exist situations in which one might be uncertain whether one was dealing with a single XZKTOV or with several, it would in principle be possible to dispel that uncertainty. The infinite divisibility of the other three incorporeals - time, the void and place - raises difficulties of a different order. If they are infinitely divisible, how can one attribute to them a peculiarity that does not forthwith crumble into an indefinite multiplicity of parts, not one of which has any chance of, in its turn, passing for 'something', since its own singularity is liable to give rise to a new dissolution? However, this problem would only be truly serious if infinite divisibility were a quality that belonged only to these incorporeals and was incompatible with the nature of corporeals. In a physical system in which bodies are not infinitely divisible, that is to say in atomist physics, the physical indivisibility of the atom would coexist uneasily with the infinite divisibility of the place that it occupied, since the unity of the atom was assumed to be incapable of impressing the slightest form of unity upon the place that it occupied (which is why Epicurean atomism very logically conceived of indivisible minima of geometrical extension at a sub-atomic level). But, as we know, the Stoics avoid that distortion by adopting the opposite course: they attribute an infinite divisibility to bodies as well as to the three incorporeals in question. They even go so far as to maintain that those three incorporeals, and likewise the geometrical limits mentioned above, are in this respect 'similar to bodies'. 104 In these circumstances, the whole problem takes on a different aspect: if infinite divisibility is a property of bodies, it must be assumed that it threatens neither their existence nor their unificatory principle (whether this, according to the well-known distinction, be e^ts", vois or ifjvxr])', nor, a fortiori, the peculiarity through which they are STs.1 °5 If that is the case, there is, in principle, nothing to prevent infinitely divisible incorporeals from enjoying an analogous peculiarity. It is in connection with place that it seems possible to resolve the problem in the most simple fashion. If bodies, whilst being infinitely divisible, at the same

104 105

particular species of ACKTOV, certainly does seem to subsist, and remain identical to itself, quite independently from any actual assertion m a d e at a particular m o m e n t by a particular person. It is 'assertable to the extent that it is itself concerned' (airo^avrov ooov e 0 ' eavrw), as Chrysippus says, cited by Diogenes Laertius vii.65 ( = SKF11.193, FDS 874); and it remains the same d^ico/xa as the changing circumstances render it now true, now false (ibid.). Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p. 202 seem to me to strike the right note: ' N o r should it be a s s u m e d . . . that rational impressions are nothing m o r e t h a n the thoughts of their corresponding lekta. The same proposition can be thought in a variety of ways by the same person or by different persons. The rational impression that my cat is hungry will be a different thought if I see the cat or hear the cat or reflect that I failed to feed it this m o r n i n g . W h a t lekta correspond to will be the propositional content, not all the circumstances and individuality, of a rational impression.' Cf. Chrysippus a p u d Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.142.2 ( = 5 f KFn.482A, FDS 724). Cf. Goldschmidt 1977, p . 38: 'one should n o t conclude from this text (SVF 11.509) that Chrysippus, teaching the infinite divisibility of time, intended to show the unreality of time, for just such a conclusion would equally reduce the reality of bodies to nothing.'

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time possess a true and objective unity, the places that they occupy must benefit derivatively from that unity, once it is divested of the purely physical aspects (that is to say those related to modes of action and passion, and in particular avrirviria, i.e. resistance) which characterize it as the unity of suchand-such a particular body. To put it another way, the relation of bodies to the places that they occupy is enough, it would seem, to guarantee the latter their multiplicity, their limitation and their peculiarity: 'place subsists in liaison with bodies {rrapv^iGrarai TOLS oco/jLaoLv) and from them it receives its limit to the exact extent that it is filled by those bodies'. 106 To be sure, we should not over-simplify the question and imagine that there exists between a body and its place a bi-univocal correspondence: even if every body occupies a place, it is not strictly true that one body corresponds to each place; for in Stoic physics, which is known to admit total mixture, a single place may be occupied by several bodies. It is no doubt so as to do justice to that possibility that Chrysippus produces a disjunctive definition of place: 107 'place is what is entirely occupied by an existent (VTTO OVTOS = by a body), or which is of a kind to be occupied by an existent and is entirely occupied either by something or by several things (eire VTTO TWOS CLTC VTTO TIVOJI/)'. Provided one does not imagine that the use of TWOS and TLVCOV in the second definition introduces incorporeal STs, this second definition clearly seems to resolve the difficulty raised by the possibility of total mixture: even if a place is in fact occupied by one or several bodies, that does not prevent it from being 'occupiable' by a single body, and this restores to it the unity that might seem threatened by the multiplicity of bodies which, in certain circumstances, might in effect occupy it. Given that two bodies could occupy the same place, there was an urgent need to find a means of preserving the identity and unity of that place, for otherwise it would not be possible to distinguish this case from one in which two bodies occupied two different places. The definition of place as 'occupiable' by a (single) corporeal existent answers that need. If we now pass on to the cases of the void and time, other difficulties come to light, stemming first from the two characteristics which are common to both of them and that distinguish them from the other two canonical incorporeals: in the first place, they are both infinite, the void in all three dimensions of space, time in the directions of both the past and the future; 108 secondly, their names both function as 'mass-terms', as likewise do the names of certain bodies: 'the word "time" can be used in two senses, as can "earth", "sea" and "void". These words designate both the whole and its parts.' 109 It is, of course, when they are considered as wholes that time and the void are infinite (except insofar 106 107 108

109

Iamblichus a p u d Simplicius, in Cat. 135.25-8 = SVF 11.507, FDS 734. Stobaeus, Eclogue 1.161.8 = SVF 11.503, FDS 728. Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.106.5 = SVF 11.509A, FDS 808. Cf. also Posidonius a p u d Stobaeus, Eclogae 1. 105. 17 = Edelstein-Kidd fr. 98: time as a whole (au/u,7ras) is infinite Kara -nav\ the past a n d the future are infinite Kara r t , since each of t h e m is limited only at the level of the present (Kara TOP irapovra fxovov). Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. 1.106.5 = S T F 11.509A, FDS SoS.

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as two parts of time, the past and the future, are equally infinite but 'only in one direction'). Moving on from there, one may well wonder whether it is the representation of time and the void as wholes or as parts that is dominant in determining their status as NESTs. But the question cannot be posed in the same way for these two cases. Let us begin with the void, which is the less complex case. Although, as we have seen, it 'resembles bodies' insofar as, like place, time and geometrical limits, it is infinitely divisible, in another sense it presents itself as the purest of all incorporeals, even, one might say, as the incorporeal par excellence. By definition 'a desert devoid of bodies (iprj [xla ac&^aros)' (SVF1.95), it does not pose either the Stoics or the ancient 'physicists' in general the problem of whether it is incorporeal, but only that of whether it is real, and in what sense. For if it is real, it could not be other than incorporeal. The distinction between the void and place allows the Stoics not to conceive of the void as remaining that void once it is occupied by a body; it has the capacity to accommodate a body without ever actually accommodating it, as such;110 this capacity to accommodate a body is the only positive determination that may be attributed to it.x 11 Limitless (SVF11.503, FDS 728), without internal differentiation (SVF 11.550) and without dimensional orientation (SVF 11.557), t n e notion of the void is 'as simple as could possibly be' (SVF11.541); it coincides so perfectly, with neither excess nor default, with the notion of incorporeality that one might be tempted to wonder how there could possibly be any incorporeals other than it. Accordingly, the Stoics' main argument to prove the reality of an extra-cosmic void (that is, the need for a space in which the world can dilate when periodic conflagrations take place, cf. SVF 11.537 a n d 609) is not concerned also to show that this void is incorporeal: given that the world, by definition, contains all things corporeal, whatever leaves it room to expand must be incorporeal. The same applies in the argument of the 'space traveller',112 one which, curiously enough, does not even envisage the possibility that the traveller, having reached the limit of the sphere of the fixed stars, could then stretch out his hand through a body that does not offer sufficient resistance, be it subtle aether or even air of a more vulgar nature. The difficulty in these circumstances is to understand why the void, lacking 110

111

112

Cf. Alexander apud Simplicius, In De cael. 285.28 ( = SVF 11.535B). This capacity to accommodate a body without being actually occupied by any body itself implies incorporeality, as is indicated in a passage of Diogenes Laertius vn. 140 ( = SKF11.543, FDS 723), which seemed 'absurd' to von Arnim (cf. app. crit. adloc, and 1.95B, app. crit.) only because he took it to be a definition of the incorporeal, whereas it is no more than a justification of the incorporeality of the void. Cf. the description by Cleomedes, De mot. circ. 8.11-14: 'its notion is extremely simple: it is incorporeal and intangible, it has no form and cannot receive one, it is neither acted upon nor does it act, it is purely and simply capable of receiving a body' {SVFu.541). Cf. Simplicius, In De cael. 284.28 = SKF11.535A. I should note in passing that this is the only text I have come across which uses rt twice in the same breath, the first time to designate the void outside the world, and the next time to designate the body which would prevent a traveller from extending his hand if he was not truly at the edge of the world.

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positive determining features to such a degree, should still be classed as a ST, rather than as a NST or even, in the manner of the early Atomists, as 'nothing'. 113 It is worth noting that the oifrt? test does not justify classifying the void among the STs; for that test is disqualified for 'mass-terms' and, as we have seen, the Stoics had recognized the void to be one of those terms. Let us consider the following syllogism: if something is outside the world, it is not in the world; there is (the) void outside the world; so there is not (the) void in the world. The position of the Stoics vis-a-vis this syllogism is a strange one: for them both premisses and the conclusion are all true, as is the consequence that may be drawn from the syllogism, namely that the void is a ST. However, the syllogism is not valid since the void is a mass-term. In that case, two alternatives follow: either the Stoics consider that it is valid, in which case they are clearly mistaken; or else they consider it invalid, in which case they forgo the means of applying to the void their habitual instrument for proving that a given item is a ST. How did the Stoics steer clear of this double reef? The first thing to note is that it did not occur to them to use the syllogism that we have imagined: even if the existence of the void outside the world is proven, they do not consider that they are dispensed from demonstrating the inexistence of the void inside the world. The two theses are presented as logically independent (cf. fjuev and 8e in SVF1.95 and 96); and the second rests, not upon an argument analogous to the syllogism cited above, but upon the 'phenomena' (SVF 11.546), that is to say the avfJLTTvoLa, the Gvvrovia (SVF 11.543) a n d the avfjiTrddeia (SVF II.546) which, between them, unite the various parts of the world. In view of all this, the solution to the problem appears to be as follows: once it has been proved, by two independent demonstrations, that there is no void within the world and that there is one outside it, the term 'void', while remaining a term denoting mass, applicable in the same sense both to the whole and to its parts, no longer means anything more than a continuous whole of a single nature when it is applied to the whole (cf. SVF1.94, ddpoov; SFF1.96, awexrj), except, that is, for the enclave within it represented by the world, which limits it internally just as a hole limits the continuity of a Gruyere cheese; 114 and when the term 'void' is applied to the parts of the whole, it 113 114

It will be remembered that the ancient Atomists had called the void ovSev, as opposed to the body or whatever was full, which they called hev (DK 68A37, A49, B156). In more poetic vein, I would like to cite the following lines from P. Valery ('Ebauche d'un serpent', in Charmes): Tu gardes les coeurs de connaitre Que l'univers n'est qu'un defaut Dans la purete du Non-etre! (You keep hearts from knowing That the universe is simply a fault In the purity of Non-being!) Needless to say, this reversal of ontological values is in no sense Stoic.

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simply designates parts arbitrarily selected from that continuous whole. In these circumstances, the void successfully passes a revised form of the OVTIS test. The double demonstration of its existence outside the world and its inexistence inside the world bestowed upon the term 'void' the more precise meaning of 'void outside the world', whether considered as a whole or in its parts. Accordingly, it may be said that if it exists outside the world, it does not exist inside the world; it thereby qualifies as a ST by the ordinary means of the OVTLS test. The Stoic theory of time is much more difficult than their theory of the void, for reasons that have to do with the very nature of the thing (well known to have embarrassed many philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle down to Bergson and Heidegger, and including Saint Augustine, and many other minds of comparable calibre), and also with the obscurity of the few remaining passages that testify to the thought of the early Stoics on this question. Finding myself following on after Victor Goldschmidt's great work, Le Systeme sWiden et Videe de temps, and in the same field as the very fine study which Malcolm Schofield (1988) devotes to a crucial aspect of the problem, I will, if I may, limit myself here to a few remarks on one particular question: is the ontological status that the Stoics attributed to time, namely that of a NEST, primarily motivated by an analysis of time as a whole, which is then extended from the whole to the parts, or is it, on the contrary, initially attributed to the parts (or to certain specific parts) of time and then extrapolated to apply to time as a whole? In studying this question, we cannot depend on the characteristics that are common to both time and the void, although these are by no means unimportant: time, like the void, is a term that is applied both to the whole and to the parts of that whole; and time, like the void, is infinite, although not in exactly the same sense. 115 However, the parallelism collapses at several points that are no less important. The parts of the void (like the parts of space) are strictly homogeneous amongst themselves and also in relation to the whole, whereas the parts of time (or at least those which could be called 'egocentric' parts: the past, the present and the future) are ontologically different from one another and also from time as a whole. 116 Furthermore, in the temporal domain, there exists no concept - or at least no term - which stands in the same relation to total and infinite time as place does to the void. It is true that one can try to re-establish the symmetry, as Goldschmidt does, by appealing to the following analogy: what the infinite void is to a place limited by the body which occupies it, total and infinite time (what Marcus Aurelius was to call the alcov) is to time limited by the action which occupies it, that is to say the present. 117 115 1x6

117

Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. 1.106.5 ( = SKFn.5O9A, FDS 808). Ibid. This is the famous text in which Chrysippus says that only the present virdpx^iv, whereas the past and the future v^eoravai. Despite having decided not to go into the question of interpretation raised by these verbs, at this point I cannot refrain from remarking that it remains a complete mystery to me why Chrysippus is not willing to say that the past vvrjp^ and that the future uTrapfei (particularly in view of his theory of destiny). Goldschmidt 1977, p. 39.

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But this analogy seems to me to be flawed by several differences: in the first place, the limited parts of time are not necessarily determined by an action in the present ('last year'; 'the day after tomorrow'); and secondly, there is no such thing as 'empty' time which is beyond the limits of the time occupied by the movements of the world (SVF 11.510, FDS 807). So let us return to the specific problem of time, taking as our point of departure the extremely original idea recently put forward by David Sedley. According to him, 118 the items of a temporal nature which in the eyes of the Stoics count as 'actual incorporeals' are 'individual portions of time' (for example, 'yesterday'); time itself, as a 'species' to which those individual portions belong, is a universal concept, and so is a NST. The textual basis for this interpretation seems somewhat inadequate: it is true that, according to Sextus Empiricus, 119 the Stoics recognized four ecSr] of incorporeals, one of which was time. But that does not necessarily mean that each of the items on this list is a species that incorporates individual members of its own; the text may simply mean that the Stoics recognized four forms of incorporeals; and even if the term ciSos should be understood to mean 'species', that term, as Sedley himself notes, 120 can be used by the Stoics with a 'supremely specific' (elSiKtoTdTov) sense, according to which an individual such as Socrates is himself an eiSos with no etSo?. 121 Otherwise, so far as I know, there is no text that attests that the Stoics considered time (or the void, another massincorporeal) as a whole whose relation to its parts was that of a species to its individual members. Furthermore, in the work which he has produced with Anthony Long, David Sedley himself seems to have appreciably toned down the boldness of that interpretation. It is true that he still writes that an incorporeal 'like a time' does not exist, insofar as it is not a body; and he continues to take 'today' as an example of an expression that is taken to 'name something even though that something has no actual or independent existence.' 122 But nowhere in this work, unless I am mistaken, is time 'as a species' assimilated to a 'universal concept' (certainly not in the commentary on the texts on time, pp. 306-8). On the contrary, Long and Sedley (quite rightly, in my opinion) criticize Proclus for having inferred the incorporeality of time from its purely conceptual nature, 123 remarking that this is 'probably an incorrect inference' (p. 307). Having said which, it might still be supposed that the ontological status of time was determined on the basis of an analysis of its individual parts, or those of its parts that were individualized by the particular movement of a corporeal individual, an analysis then extended to apply to time as a whole. However, the surviving texts do not support that supposition; and the infinity of time, which belongs only to time as a whole and to those parts of it that are limitless, 118 119 120 121 122

1985, p . 91 n. 5. Sextus M x . 2 l 8 ( = SVFII.331, FDS 720): TCOV SC aocofJidrcov reoaapa e'i8rj Kar 1985, p . 91 n. 19. Cf. Diogenes Laertius vn.61. O n this point, p e r h a p s I m a y refer the reader to chapter 3 above. 123 1987, vol. 1, p . 164. Cf. Proclus, In Tim.iu.9s. 7-15 ( = S K F n . 5 2 i , FDS 716).

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STOICISM

namely the past and the future, seems to have played a decisive role in the demonstration of its incorporeality. Chrysippus, speaking of the infinite and incorporeal void, associates it with time in the following terms: 'just as whatever is corporeal is finite, so that which is incorporeal is infinite: thus, time is infinite, as is the void.'x 2 4 This text presents infinity and incorporeality as the necessary and sufficient conditions of one another, which is something that could put the Stoics in a tricky position when they have to attribute the status of incorporeality to non-infinite realities, such as places and the XeKrd.125 At any rate, it shows clearly that when they think of time as incorporeal, they above all think of it as infinite, that is to say in its totality, and, more precisely, as being composed of the infinite past and the infinite future. 126 Nor is that all: not only does the incorporeality of time appear as a characteristic attribute of time taken in its totality, but furthermore one may well wonder whether that incorporeality is truly transmitted to all its parts, particularly the parts of time that one might call 'natural' or 'cosmic', those that are determined by the cycles of the sun and the moon. According to Plutarch, 127 Chrysippus set out the following argument in Book I of his Questions on Physics: It is not the case that the night is a body and the evening and the dawn and midnight are not bodies; and it is not the case that the day is a body and the first day of the month is not also a body and the tenth and thefifteenthand thirtieth and the month and the summer and the autumn and the year. This passage and its context are worth examining closely: are the 'cosmic parts' of time bodies? In presenting Chrysippus' argument, Plutarch tells us that it takes the form of a sorites (Kara yuKpov Xoyos). According to the current interpretation, that sorites should be understood as a modus ponens: the initial premiss ('night is a body') is considered to be accepted by Chrysippus, and the other statements that are 'step by step' implied ('the evening is a body', 'the dawn is a body', etc.) are considered to be justifiably deduced from that initial premiss. 128 This interpretation produces a definitely paradoxical consequence: namely, that 124

Cf. Stobaeus, Eclogue 1.161.8 ( = SVF 11.503, FDS 728). T h e deployment of the articles rules out any ambiguity as to the distribution of subjects and attributes: KaQairep Se TO ooj^ariKov

125

T h e contradiction between the theoretical finiteness of bodies and the infinity of the void, which can nevertheless be occupied by a body, is exploited by an anti-Stoic objection m a d e by Alexander a p u d Simplicius, In De cael. 285.28 ( = SKF11.535B). Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. 1.106.5 ^ S K F 11.509, FDS 808): TOV xpovov iravTa aneipov elvai l(f> €KaT€pa • /ecu yap TOV TrapeXrjXvBoTa /cat TOV /xiXXovTa aneipov efveu. Plutarch, Comm. not. 1084c ( = SVF 11.665, FDS 971). Here are a few samples of this current interpretation: Zeller 1904, vol. m . i . i , p . 124 ('Wollte Chrysippus mit diesem freilich hochst ungelenken A u s d r u c k wohl schwerlich etwas anderes sagen als, dass das Reale, was jenen N a m e n entspricht, in gewissen korperlichen Zustanden liege'); Goldschmidt 1977, p . 41 ('We k n o w , for example, that the Stoics defined winter as " t h e air above the earth, which cools as a result of being distant from the s u n " (Diogenes Laertius VII. 151 = SVF 11.693); similarly, a m o n t h , taken n o t as a purely temporal determination (and, as such, incorporeal (cf. Cleomedes, de mot. circ. 202.11-23)), but as a body, is " t h e m o o n turning its shining side towards u s " (Chrysippus a p u d Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.219.24 = SVF

7T€7T€paOfJL€VOV

126

127 128

€?VCU, OVTOJS

TO aOOJ/JLCLTOV OL7T€LpOV.

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the cosmic parts of time are bodies and that time as a whole is incorporeal. Yet this is not an intolerable paradox: for one thing, it is not the case that there are no examples of incorporeals having parts that are not incorporeal; 129 for another, a number of texts give definitely 'corporealizing' definitions of one or another cosmic part of time. 130 This explains how it was that the positive interpretation of Chrysippus' sorites became accepted, so far as I know without challenge. I myself shall nevertheless now challenge it, for the following reasons: (a) When you look closely at the set of definitions that the Stoics produced for the cosmic parts of time, you notice that they were operating on a number of different levels, tending now to 'corporealize', now to 'decorporealize' them. The definitions of the four seasons in Diogenes Laertius (vii.151-2) are extraordinarily diverse in this respect. Those of winter and summer are, so to speak, directly corporealizing: the position of the definitional genus is occupied by a body, namely the supra-terrestrial air. 131 The definition of spring might be said to be indirectly corporealizing: here, the position of the genus is occupied by a quality, the balanced mixture {evKpaola) that affects a body, to wit the air; 132 since this quality of a body is itself corporeal, the spring may be said to be the object of one of those 'grafts of corporeality' that I referred to earlier. As for the autumn, it is defined as an effect, 133 that is to say as an incorporeal. A similar heterogeneity reappears in other contexts. Chrysippus produces different definitions for a month (/XT^) and a lunar phase (jLtet?). His definition for the former is definitely decorporealizing ('the period of the course of the moon'). For the latter, he produces two alternative definitions linked by the conjunction rj: the first is, so to speak, de-objectivizing ('the visible aspect that the moon takes on from our point of view', TO
(/>aw6fjL€vov TTpos ^/xd?). 1 3 4 The somewhat pedantic

mind of Cleomedes imposes appreciable order upon all this: according to him, 135 the word 'month' may be understood in four senses: (a) the moon itself, when it is shaped like a sigma; (b) the very state of the air from one conjunction-point to another; (c) the temporal interval {XPOVIKOV Staarry/xa)

129

130 131

132 133 134

11.677B)'); L o n g a n d Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p . 308 ('If time as such is not a body, Chrysippus was prepared to treat day and night a n d longer durations of time as bodies. H e seems to have reasoned that these are physical changes produced by the sun's movements'). According to Frede's analysis (1977, p p . 63ff.= 1987, p p . 347ff.), a complete XCKTOV is an incorporeal all of whose parts are n o t incorporeals. O n the same point, cf. L o n g and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p p . 2 0 0 - 1 . Cf. the texts mentioned by Goldschmidt, in the passage cited above, n. 128. Winter: 'the supra-terrestrial air cooled by being distant from the sun'. Summer: 'the supraterrestrial air warmed by the sun moving n o r t h w a r d s ' . Spring: 'the balanced mixture of air produced by the sun drawing closer to us'. A u t u m n 'is produced (yiveoSai) by the opposite course of the sun moving away from us'. Cf. Stobaeus, Eclogue 1.219.24 ( = SFF11.677B). T h e definition cited by Goldschmidt (above, n. 128) as that of a m o n t h is in reality the second definition of the lunar phase; furthermore, I 135 Cleomedes, De mot. circ. 202.11-23. consider the translation to be questionable.

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which separates one moment in time from another; (d) any period of thirty days. Cleomedes explains that a 'month' is a body in senses (a) and (b) and an incorporeal in senses (c) and (d), 'for time, too, is incorporeal', This last remark suggests that incorporeality is indeed transmitted from time as a whole to its cosmic parts, but only on condition that these be considered as temporal intervals, not inasmuch as their names can designate bodies or the qualities of bodies which determine those intervals. We may conclude from this analysis that Chrysippus' sorites might be a modus ponens, but that this is not necessarily the case; and that if Chrysippus is here using the names of the cosmic parts of time in their strict sense, his sorites must, on the contrary, be a modus tollens. (b) Positive arguments in favour of interpreting this sorites as a modus tollens do exist, (i) As Jonathan Barnes has shown in his masterly study of these kinds of arguments, generally speaking, Chrysippus did not object in principle against the logical validity of the sorites as such. 136 When the sorites claims to gain acceptance for a conclusion that is manifestly false, it is possible to object that at least one of its premisses is false, even if it seems to be plausible, (ii) More specifically, the context of the quotation favours such an interpretation. Plutarch himself has just constructed an anti-Stoic sorites which is without doubt presented as a modus tollens (if, as the Stoics claim, vices, virtues and activities are living existents, they must also recognize that laughter, weeping, coughing and sneezing, etc., are likewise living existents; the manifestly absurd consequences dictate the rejection of the Stoic premisses). He then goes on to comment that the Stoics cannot complain if they are subjected to this type of argument Kara fjuKpov, since Chrysippus himself proceeds in this fashion (OVTOJ Trpoodyovros) in his argument concerning the cosmic parts of time. It would be remarkably clumsy of Plutarch to cite a sorites of Chrysippus' in modus ponens in order to get the Stoics to accept his own sorites in modus tollens, for he would thereby lay himself open to the retort: 'yes, we are in the habit of accepting the consequences of our premisses, even when they are paradoxical.' Plutarch's strategy only makes sense if one assumes that, on the contrary, he is aware of the context of Chrysippus' sorites and knows that it involves an argument that is used as a modus tollens. (iii) Carneades had been fond of using the sorites as a modus tollens.131 One of his arguments uses the same series of subjects as Chrysippus' sorites (day, month, year, dawn, midday, evening) but with a different predicate ('. . . is a god' instead of'. . . is a body'). Very likely he is, as is his wont, playing with the weapons provided by Chrysippus. 138 In view of the change in predicate and in context, we cannot totally dismiss the hypothesis that he may be twisting into a 136 138

Cf. Barnes 1982, esp. pp. 47-53 (Chrysippus a 'conservative opponent of the sorites', not a 137 'radical opponent'). Cf. Sextus, Mix. 182-4. His acknowledgement of his debt to Chrysippus is well-known, Diogenes Laertius iv.62. A comparison between the two texts does not seem to have been envisaged by Burnyeat 1982.

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modus tollens a sorites which Chrysippus had used as a modus ponens. However, it is far more likely that, in order to reject a premiss that is unquestionably Stoic ('the sun is a god').139 what he is doing here is parodying a sorites of the modus tollens variety, which Chrysippus has already used, (iv) We have seen above that the Stoics were not inclined to use their criteria of corporeality in a lax fashion: apart from their direct applications of the criterion of action or passion, the only auxiliary argument to which they resort is what I have called the 'grafting of corporeality'. But I do not think that there are any texts in which that grafting of corporeality is used repeatedly so as to demonstrate the corporeality of a whole chain of items. If the sorites cited by Plutarch was used in modus ponens, this would - so far as I know - constitute a unique case in which a Stoic sorites links together a whole chain of demonstrations of corporeality. From all this one may, it would seem, conclude that, just as there was no reason to set the incorporeal parts of time in opposition to time conceived as a whole, there is no reason to set the corporeal parts of time in opposition to incorporeal time as a whole. Our initial problem was badly set out: the determination of the ontological status of time operates in exactly the same way whether one considers time as a whole or in its various parts. Time is incorporeal insofar as it is the dimension according to which the speed or slowness of movement of bodies is measured, whether the body involved be the world or a chicken which steps across the farmyard, and whether that movement be the revolution of the cosmos which is punctuated by periodic conflagrations or the progress of the chicken which pauses when itfindsa grain of corn. Chrysippus is not contradicting himself when, on the one hand, he takes over Zeno's definition of time as a general 'interval of movement' (SVF 1.93,11.509) and, on the other, he replaces that definition as follows: 'an interval in the movement of the world' (SVF 11.510). The coexistence of those two definitions corresponds to a double acceptation of time: inseparably both a whole and its parts. The status of NEST that is attributed to time is not attributed in thefirstplace to time as a whole, and derivatively to its parts, nor is it the other way round. Whether infinite or finite, total or partial, time is always characterized by the individuality of the body whose movement it measures and by the unity of that movement which it measures. I hope I have now shown that each of the canonical incorporealsfitsinto the category of NESTs in its own particular way and in accordance with arguments which are adapted to the particular characteristics of each of them. The very variety of those ways of fitting in confirms that the category in question was not constructed simply by fastening upon their common properties. 139

Cf. Cicero,Acad.pr. 11.119( = SKF11.92); Philodemus,Depiet. 11 ( = nat. deor. 1.15.39 ( = SKFn.iO77).

SVFu.1076);Cicero,De

I46

STOICISM VI

To confirm that the TSG doctrine was born from Plato's thought, I must now apply myself to the objections to that doctrine raised by the ancient opponents of Stoicism, and also to the degree of attention that the Stoics themselves paid to those objections. I think we may summarily classify the ancient objections to the TSG doctrine into three categories: (a) First, by way of a reminder, let me mention - but not dwell upon - the objections which may be termed prejudicial, because they do no more than reject the propositions of the doctrine that they are criticizing, in particular the idea that ST is a genus that is superior to E and that the relations between the two, as between the ST and its other species, are those that ordinarily exist between a genus and its species. Sextus Empiricus, for example, seeks to prove that if ST can be neither a body nor an incorporeal nor both at once, it is nothing at all.140 Similarly, Plotinus postulates that a ST must be either an E or a NE and proceeds to draw disastrous consequences from both those alternatives.141 We may place in the same category the argument by which Alexander of Aphrodisias, on the basis of the common evidence that anything which is ST is also E,142 thinks that he can prove that ST cannot be a genus of E: a ST receives the definition of an E, whereas a genus cannot receive the definition of one of its species.143 True, Alexander does realize that this objection is misleading in relation to the Stoic theory, since the latter in point of fact rejects the implication (x) (STx->Ex). Accordingly, even as he protests against the arbitrary reduction of Es to bodies,144 he tacks on another argument, which is of a kind to undermine the Stoics' thesis despite their 'loophole'. But this new argument is quite different from the earlier ones. (b) Another type of objection consists in not stopping the Stoics postulating a genus superior to E, but showing the technical difficulties to which they expose themselves by setting up this genus as the supreme genus, either because there exist other candidates better suited for that role, or because the very notion of a supreme genus raises insurmountable difficulties. The former tactic is adopted by Alexander of Aphrodisias, who tries to catch the Stoics in the following trap: (a) if the ST were the supreme genus, the One would have to be subordinated to it; but the One is predicated of the ST itself;145 (b) not only can the One not be subordinated to the ST, but the ST must be subordinated to the One, for 'the One is equally predicated of the concept, whereas the ST is predicated only by bodies and incorporeals, and the concept is neither the one 140 142 143 144

145

141 Sextus, M x . 2 3 4 - 6 ( = SF/'ii.33i, J FDS' 719). Plotinus, Enn. vi. 1.25 ( = FDS 712). Evidence already mentioned by Plato, Soph. 237D; cf. above, n. 64. Alexander, In Top. 301.19 ( = SVF 11.329A, FDS 711). H e claims that, in this respect, the Stoics 'are making u p their own rules (vofMoOerrjoavres avTois). It is a reproach frequently levelled by opponents of Stoicism: cf. Sextus Afvm. 125-6 ( = FZ)S968), 108 ( = FDS952); Galen, Introductio dialect. 4 ( = SVF 11.208, FDS 951). This is the agreement introduced in the passage cited above, n. 143.

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146

nor the other, according to the partisans of this doctrine.' The second tactic is adopted by Plotinus, who points out that the Stoics 'have not held in reserve differences which could help them to divide the ST. 147 This is the rule according to which the genus can be divided into species thanks to differences that these have acquired outside of it. Aristotle had made use of it to establish that being is not a genus.148 It may, of course, be used to block all attempts to set up as supreme genus any kind of notion of universal extension. These technical objections are of definitely Aristotelian inspiration. The first makes use of the Aristotelian laws relating to the genus, as they are established in the Topics', the second applies to the ST Aristotle's argument against the idea that being is a genus. So far as I know, no Stoic text or document attempts to respond to these difficulties. The Stoics use the notion of a supreme genus seemingly unaware that it has already given rise to objections of principle. The simplest explanation for this is that they were indeed unaware of the fact. (c) A third type of objection stems, in contrast, from Platonic inspiration. These are metaphysical objections, which establish such a great ontological distance between bodies and incorporeals as to rule out the position of a genus that could be common to both. It is for a reason of this kind that Plotinus considers the Stoics' ST to be 'incomprehensible and irrational (dovverov Kal a\oyov)\ Nothing could possibly be suitable both for incorporeals and for bodies; it is not possible to include in the same genus both the anterior and the posterior, the being and the non-being.149 Yet had not Plato himself proposed defining a being in terms of its ability to act and to be acted upon - a definition that was intended to include both the incorporeal being and the corporeal? Admittedly, he had taken care to present that definition as a provisional one that was subject to revision; and in the remaining part of the Sophist he seems to have forgotten about it. 150 Unlike in the cases of thefirsttwo kinds of objections, the Stoics do seem to have thought very seriously about the problem brought to light by this last type of objection. Possibly some of their opponents who claimed to belong to the Platonic tradition attacked them on this point. It is also possible that their internal development of the theory prompted them to pose the following question themselves: what is it legitimate to attribute to bodies and incorporeals in common? On the one hand, they did indeed claim that the qualities of bodies are corporeal and the qualities of incorporeals are incorporeal; 151 on 146

148 149 150

151

Alexander, In Top. 359.14-16 ( = SVF 329B, FDS 709). I have tried above (p. 104) to 147 Plotinus, Enn. vi.1.25 ( = SKF11.371, FDS 712). reconstitute the Stoic reply. Cf. Aristotle, Top. iv.2, I 2 2 b i 5 ; Metaph. B. 3, 989b23~7; / 8, iO58a6-8. Cf. Plotinus, Enn. vi.1.25.5-7 ( = SVFn.3'ji, FDS 712); vi.1.25.15-23 ( = FDSS2-j); vi.2.1. Soph. 247DE, 254AB. M a n y m o d e r n translators and c o m m e n t a t o r s still refuse to translate the opov of 247E3 as 'definition', preferring instead to render it using terms such as ' m a r k ' or 'characteristic'. Cf. Simplicius, In Cat. 209.1 ( = S K F 11.388, FDS 859); 217.32 ( = SVF11.389, FDS 1 858). We possess very little information as to the incorporeal qualities of incorporeals. T o understand this state of affairs, it is perhaps worth remembering that the Stoics' originality lay in the first

148

STOICISM

the other, they presented the ST as the common genus of both corporeals and incorporeals. Now, qualities do not determine things accidentally or superficially. It is they that make things what they are, determine wherein they differ from all other things and what they identically remain throughout time. So how is it possible for corporeal realities and incorporeal realities, whose respective identifying qualities necessarily belong to distinct genera, to belong to a common genus? It was to tackle this internal doctrinal difficulty that an obscure idea about which we know very little seems to have been developed: the notion of the KOLVOV ov/jLTTTaj/jLa acofidrcov /cat daco/xaraw.

This idea, which one might attempt to translate as 'a coincidental characteristic common both to bodies and to incorporeals', surfaces a number of times in the long and difficult chapter on quality, in Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories. Given that chapter 8 of Aristotle's Categories had received the traditional title nepl TTOLOTTJTOS /cat TTOLOV, the problem of the relationship between items of the 'whiteness' type (TTOLOTTJS, quality) and items of the 'white' type (TTOLOV, something qualified or a qualifier) occupies a large part of this commentary. To make my exposition as clear as possible, I shall begin by examining a passage which is not concerned with either the rt or the KOLVOV ov/jLTTTcofjia, because an analysis of it will prove useful for the rest of the exposition. (A)

Aristotle had defined the TTOLOTTJS as 'that according to which some are said

to be 7T0L0L (TTOLorrjra 8e Xeyco KCL8' rjv TTOLOL TLV€S Aeyovrat)'. This definition

assumes that, each time a being is qualified in a certain manner (for example as 'white'), it is possible to designate the quality (here 'whiteness') by which it is thus qualified. This law of correspondence had been challenged by 'some of the Stoics (TCOV Se ITCX)'LKCOV TLVZS), Simplicius tells us (212,12ff. = SVF 11.390, FDS 852). These Stoics distinguished three meanings of the TTOLOV, the first two of which were wider (inl -rrXeov) than that of the TTOLOTTJS, while the third, or - to be more precise - part of the third, coincides exactly (ovvaTrapTL%€Lv) with it. (a) In the first sense of TTOLOV, which is the widest, everything which is determined or differentiated in some way or other (TTOLV TO Kara StaopdV) is TTOLOV, whether that determination is constituted by a movement (for example, part of their thesis, that is to say in their conceiving the qualities of bodies to be themselves bodies. Simplicius, in the first passage cited, sets their doctrine in opposition to that of the 'ancients', who conceived all qualities to be incorporeal (he is thinking of the Platonic idea and the Aristotelian form). This is also the point on which he criticizes them in the second passage cited: 'they are mistaken because they believe that causes are of the same nature (o^oouaia) as what is realized through them, and because they suppose there to be the same relationship (KOLVOV \6yov) between the cause
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'the one who is running') or by an attitude or a more or less lasting disposition of the body or soul ('the one who brandishes his fist', 'the prudent one'). It would seem that we are to understand that 'the one who is running' is qualified, even though that does not mean that it is by virtue of a quality that he possesses: the 'running' is not a quality by which a person can be qualified as 'a running person'. (b) In the second, already more limited, sense of TTOIOV, movements are eliminated, but the differentiated attitudes and dispositions of the soul and the body are retained. 'The prudent one' and 'the one who is on his guard (o TTpoPepXrjfjLevosy are said to be TTOLOL. However, these qualifications still do not correspond to particular qualities, because some of them remain 'external' to the subject, whereas a quality must be possessed intrinsically by the subject (cf. Simplicius' critique, 213.1-6). (c) Finally, in the last and most specific (elStKcoTarov) sense, 152 only subjects qualified in a stable and permanent fashion are said to be TTOLOL (which excludes fleeting physical attitudes such as brandishing one's fist or being on one's guard). Only then is there established a correspondence between the qualifications of the subject and the quality upon which that qualification is based or, at least, only then can such a correspondence be established; for the subtle Stoics whom Simplicius is citing introduce an extra distinction at this point: (ci) Some subjects are qualified in a rigorously adequate fashion, both linguistically and conceptually (dTTrjpTLOjJLevajs Kara TTJV eKopdv avrtov Kal

TTLvoLOiv €LGL TOLOVTOL), in the sense that they are nothing more nor less TrXeovd^eL ovre eAAeiVei) than what the dispositional quality that they possess makes them be: for example, the scholar, the prudent person, and also the gourmet and the wine buff (^t'Aoi/fo?, <J>L\OLVOS). (c2) In other cases, the subject is qualified in a way that implies not only an internal disposition, but also an external activity and the possession of the physical organs necessary for the exercise of that activity. In this respect, the gourmet and the wine buff are distinguished from the heavy eater and the heavy drinker (di/jo^dyos, oiVo'0Au£). The latter are only said to be heavy eaters and drinkers if they possess not only the dispositional qualities which characterize the former, but also the physical organs which allow them to function; if those organs are not operational, even if the disposition remains, the qualification disappears. A gourmet who loses all his teeth remains a gourmet; a heavy eater who loses all his teeth remains a gourmet but ceases to be a heavy eater. If a quality is a permanent disposition, a constituent part of the identity of the subject throughout the course of time, one can see how it is that the qualification 'gourmet' corresponds adequately to a quality while the qualification 'heavy eater' does not. Who were the individual Stoics whose views this passage of Simplicius 152

I should point out here that lines 212.19-22 of Simplicius' text are omitted in SVF, as a result of a haplography. They should be restored between lines 38 and 39, vol. 11, p. 128.

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STOICISM

transmits to us? The vocabulary in which the distinction between (ci) and (c2) is expressed may suggest Antipater. In a passage which we have already examined from another point of view, Diogenes Laertius passes on to us the definition that this second-century BC Stoic gave of the definition: \6yos KCLT* 153 avdXvoLv aTTdpTL^ovTOJs €Ac<£epo/x€vos. Alexander of Aphrodisias records the same definition anonymously and explains the adverb aTrapn^ovrajs as follows: TO fjbrjTe virepfiaWeiv

fju-qre ivSeiv.15*

If we apply this concept of the

definition to the text of Simplicius that we have considered, we could say that the TTOLOV corresponds to a TTOIOTT/? when it is defined by the possession of that quality: according to Antipater's criteria of definition, a prudent individual is defined as one who possesses prudence. (B) Antipater also crops up, but this time with full credits, in a slightly earlier and more complex passage in Simplicius' Commentary (209.10-29 = FDS 860). The previous context is spoilt by a lacuna, which does nothing to improve our understanding of it. According to what Simplicius tells us here, the Stoics also referred to the TTOLOTTJS as e£t?, while the 'Academicians' called the etwees 4€ACTa', a word derived from the verb ex^odai, on the model of a number of technical terms which it is not necessary for us to consider here. In giving the name S exovaav,lss

TTvevna aco^aros

OVV€KTLKOV.156

and the e£is itself as

"E^LS thereby acquired meanings which

could be rendered as 'disposition', 'habit', 'tenor' 157 or 'characteristic'. It is perhaps in order to give full weight to other aspects of the notion that the 'Academicians' cited by Simplicius call the e|eis 'e/cra', derived from the passive exeadai; in this sense, the €KTOL are 'possessibles'. But this does not involve any profound doctrinal divergence: as we shall see, according to Simplicius, the Stoics themselves were quite prepared to call qualities 'e/cra'. In the next part of the text, Simplicius describes a kind of drift in the meaning of £KTOV which, though at first firmly at one with the sense of e£is, progressively drifted away from it and came to apply to items increasingly different from egeus. As used by certain unnamed philosophers, the term €KTOV was extended successively to cover: (a) attitudes (oxeoe is), such as being on one's guard or sitting down; then (b) movements, such as walking; then also (c) patterns of movements and attitudes, such as dancing. Simplicius also mentions, as having been successively annexed into the extended meaning of the term e/crdv, various items even further distant from the point at which the drift in meaning began (relative movements, relative attitudes, items accepted by some as belonging to the category of movements and attitudes, but not by 153 154 155 156 157

Diogenes Laertius VII.6O ( = S K F 11.226B, m A n t i p . 23, FDS 621). Alexander, In Top. 42.27 ( = SVF 11.228B, m Antip. 24, FDS 628). Alexander, In Top. 360.9 ( = S K F 11.379, FDS 839). Achilles Tatius, Isag. 14 ( = SVF 11.368, FDS 854). ' T e n o r ' is the translation adopted by L o n g a n d Sedley 1987, cf. in particular vol. 1, p . 289.

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others), and he illustrates these by examples some of which are extremely puzzling and which I shall leave aside. For my purposes here, what is essential is Simplicius' recapitulation of that progressive extension of the meaning (209.22-6): 'Some think that the £KTOV is extended only from the egeus to activities; others include the passions; finally Antipater extends the word £KTOV to the KOLVOV au/LtTTTco/xa acofjudrcov /cat daoD/xaraw'; and in the Kalbfleisch edition, Simplicius' text adds, by way of illustration or explanation: olov rov TL TjV 6LV0LL.

Let us begin by clearing out of the way this unusual mention of Aristotelian 'quiddity', for it clearly has nothing to do with the context. Here again, the explanation is to be found in the critical apparatus, which tells us that the word y\v is crossed out of the J MS and omitted in the A MS, which makes it altogether justifiable to write olov rov TL elvai. If we admit this correction, and if we attribute to olov the meaning 'that is to say', which is highly probable in the context, the text tells us that, according to Antipater, 'the coincidental characteristic common to bodies and incorporeals alike' consisted in 'being something' and that 'something', inasmuch as it is 'possessible', is the meaning furthest away from eg is, that is to say from 'quality'. It is worth noting an obvious reversed symmetry between passage (A), which lists the meanings of TTOLOV starting with the widest and ending with the narrowest, the latter being the only one in which the TTOLOV coincides with the TTOLOTTJS, and passage (B), which lists the meanings of £KTOV starting with the narrowest, which is the only one in which the £KTOV coincides with the e£is, and ending with the widest. The correspondence between the two passages is confirmed even in the detail of the successive stages: as its meaning narrows, the TTOLOV eliminates first movements, then non-permanent attitudes; as it widens, the £KTOV takes in first non-permanent attitudes, then movements. So in all likelihood we were not mistaken in supposing that the 'certain Stoics' of text (A) in fact did refer to Antipater. What exactly was Antipater's role in all this? The texts that we have considered so far in no way suggest that he should be regarded as the inventor of the TSG doctrine, as Schmekel believed he should. 158 On the other hand, they do suggest that he invented the formula KOLVOV ov^nToy^a aajfjbdrwv KCLL dooj^drojv, and hint at his motives for doing so and for using it as a correct description of what it is 'to be something' and also to distance that ontological determination as far as possible from the e£i? and from quality. As I have noted above, the TSG doctrine incorporated an internal difficulty: how was it possible to attribute a common genus to bodies and incorporeals if the qualities of bodies are corporeal and those of incorporeals are incorporeal? The notion of KOLVOV av/jLTTrajfjua, as Antipater understands it, seems directly designed to resolve that difficulty. To say that 'something' is the KOLVOV of bodies and incorporeals is a way of not saying that it is a KOLVTJ of bodies and incorporeals. Thanks to the disconnection effected 158

Cf. Schmekel 1938, p. 627 n. 1. It is strange that the textual correction that I have suggested above did not occur to Schmekel, for it might have seemed to support his thesis.

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STOICISM

between TTOLOV and TTOLOTTJS, and between €KTOV and e^cs, it is possible to maintain both that bodies and incorporeals share no common quality and that one can notwithstanding qualify them equally as being 'something'. Being something is certainly a determination of every body and every incorporeal, a 'possessible' feature; but it is not a 'way of being', a c^is, for there is no way of being which is not either specifically corporeal or, by analogy, specifically incorporeal. Whatever is something is, by that very token, differentiated from whatever is not something; to that extent, it is 77010V in the widest sense of the term, the sense that comprehends TT&V TO Kara 6\aopdV. Yet no quality corresponds to this qualification. If some Antisthenes redivivus were to come and tell the Stoics: I can certainly see something, but I can see no 'somethingness', Antipater would explain to them why and in what terms they ought to agree with him. (c) A third passage in Simplicius' Commentary FDS 853) will, I think, allow us to throw some light upon Antipater's work, by noting what material he selected for it. Here mention is made of the Stoics, not further specified, so presumably the classic masters of the School before Antipater's time. They too were against the idea that whatever is qualified owes its qualification to a quality. But their reasons were not the same as those of the particular Stoics referred to in text (A). For these, it was because of the differences between certain types of predicates that certain qualifications depend on qualities while others do not. For the Stoics of the text in question here, the determining differences are those between different types of subjects: only unified subjects possess qualities; subjects made up of contiguous parts, such as a ship, or even separate parts, such as a chorus or an army, have none. Nevertheless, they are 7701a: a chorus continues to exist over a period of time, as a differentiated entity, by reason of the type of exercise that ensures its organization and its finality. But these are things that are qualified without reference to any quality (Si'xa Se TTOLOTTJTOS eanv 7701a); their lack of unity is also a lack of egts. Thus, the Stoics had managed to dissociate TTOLOV from 77010T77?; but because they called qualities 'possessibles' (c/cra, 214.26-7), that dissociation was not accompanied by a parallel dissociation between CKTOV and e£ts; in their system, only unified subjects had €KTOL (214.27). If we accept that the doctrine attributed in this passage (c) to the Stoics in general is that of masters earlier than Antipater, we may attribute to Antipater himself a work which involved, on the one hand, going back to and systematizing the dissociation between 77010V and TTOLOTTJS, by showing that even a unified subject (a man, for example) could have qualifications some of which corresponded to a quality but others of which did not (text A); and, on the other hand, exploiting and extending a parallel and analogous dissociation between CKTOV and e£is, an endeavour to which philosophers from other schools also seem to have set their hands (text B). That double dissociation made it possible for him to attribute to the 'something', a determination with

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no determined content or, so to speak, a naked determination, the status of a 'possessible' as far removed as possible from any determined egts, of a qualification as different as possible from qualifications which correspond to a quality. That, it seems to me, is how we should understand his notion of the KOLVOV CVfJiTTTCOfXa GOJ/JLOLTCOV KOLL daCO/JLOLTCOV.

Before bringing the examination of that notion to an end, it is worth mentioning two other passages from Simplicius' Commentary, for they raise problems with regard to the interpretation that I have suggested, in that one of them appears to deny that any such KOLVOV au^Trrco/xa of the bodies and the incorporeals exists, while the other seems to maintain that more than one does. (D) At 222.30-223.2 ( = SVF 11.378, FDS 857), Simplicius draws attention to the Stoics' attitude to the question raised by the Aristotelian thesis according to which a 'quality' has several meanings: do these different meanings share anything in common and, if so, what? Simplicius tells us that, according to the Stoics 'what is common to the quality which pertains to bodies (TO KOLVOV rrjs TTOLOTTJTOS TO €TTL Ttov oojjjLaTojv) is to be that which differentiates substance (8La(/)opav OVOL'OLS), not separable per se, but delimited by a concept and a peculiarity (els ivvorjixa KOLL ISLOTrjra diroXriyovoav), and not specified by its duration or strength, but by the intrinsic "suchness" (TTJ i£ avTrjg TOLOVTOTTJTL) in accordance with which a qualified thing is generated.' 159 Without dwelling upon this passage, which is not directly relevant to my thesis, let us simply note that Simplicius, seeking a Stoic solution to the problem of the common essence of a quality, leaving aside all the diverse species and varieties of such a thing, seems only to find an answer that is limited to what exists in common to qualities where bodies are concerned (em T
160

161

In translating this difficult sentence, I have been helped by the translation that Long and Sedley provide, 1987, vol. 1, p. 169, and also by their c o m m e n t a r y , p. 174. So this passage cannot be used to elucidate the notion of a c o m m o n quality, since this stands in opposition to the notion of a particular or individual quality, pace Rist 1971, p . 51. T h e index of the SVF, for which M . Adler is responsible, s.v. ovfjLTTrojfxa, notes only this occurrence of the expression, with the following gloss: fjurj olov r e KOLVOV eivai o. Kdl aoojfxdrojv.

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STOICISM

them (8iaopav OVOLOLS); in this particular domain (iv TOVTOLS) there can be no KOLVOV GVfjL7TTcoixa between bodies and incorporeals. It thus seems to me that this passage does not contradict the idea that there does exist such a KOLVOV aviJiTTTcofjia, and that it confirms the idea that this KOLVOV GV\XTTT(X>[I(X is not a KOLVTJ 7TOLOT7JS.

Antipater used it (text B, 209.25-6), the KOLVOV Gv\nmxi\xa of bodies and incorporeals was presented as being unique: the coincidental characteristic common to both consisted in their being something. All the same, it should be pointed out that in another passage of his Commentary (216.19-24, absent from SVF and FDS), Simplicius refers to the doctrine of 'certain' (TLVCS) philosophers, not further specified, and his description of this doctrine uses the expression KOLVOL ovpLTrrcj^ara aojfidrcov /cat daco/xarajv in the plural. This passage, the text of which is not in a good state, follows a reference to a number of philosophers (the Eretrians, Dicaearchus and Theopompus) who, like Antisthenes, denied any but a purely mental existence to abstract qualities such as gentleness, humanity, 'horseness'. Such company is ill suited to the Stoics; but as the passage that follows has sometimes been studied as though it related to them, 162 we should take a look at it. What Simplicius says is: 'Some people derive qualities (irapdyovoL ras TTOLorrjras) from what we customarily (E) AS

call predicates (CXTTO T<X>V eloydorojv AeyeoOaL KarrjyoprjiJLdTcov), in just the same

way for things that exist /xara aoo/xaraw /cat docojxdTcov)'. for example, they derive roofing (SOKOJOLV) from being-roofed (diro rov ScSo/ccoorflai), equality from being-equalized (d-rro rov locoodaL laorrjra) and corporeality from being-corporeal {drro rov acbfjua virapx^w oco/jLarorrjray. Despite the bizarre nature of these examples, the thesis set out is relatively clear, and the criticisms that Simplicius makes of it in the lines that follow also help us to understand it. The philosophers in question here maintain that the presence of a quality in a subject is nothing other than the fact of the corresponding predicate attaching to or supervening on this subject, and also that the quality itself is nothing other than the fact of being predicated for the corresponding predicate. Simplicius objects to this idea, pointing out that a quality may be present even without the predicate having attached to the subject (for instance, there may be a space between columns without their having been spaced out one from another), and that, far from deriving from or being consequent upon the predicates, qualities must be ontologically and causally prior to the predicates that they import into the subjects that possess them (for instance, the pov€Lv which really belongs to that particular subject). 162 163

Cf. Rieth 1933, p . 55; Graeser 1975, p . 87. This part of the sentence is added by Rieth t o improve a text which Kalbfleisch considered to be incomprehensible.

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In this context, it seems to me that the controversial expression /card ra KOiva ovfjuTTTcofjuara aojjxdrojv /cat dato/xartoy may be understood in the

following fashion: these philosophers need there to be a law of correspondence between predicates and qualities, in order to be able to derive the latter from the former. Borrowing from the Stoics, if only to serve their own purposes, the idea that qualities are bodies and predicates are incorporeal, they describe this law of correspondence as being founded upon 'the coincidental characteristics common to bodies and incorporeals alike': to each predicate, expressed by a verb, there corresponds a quality, expressed by a noun. What is common to the predicate and the quality is expressed linguistically by the morphological proximity between the name of the predicate (SeSoKaxjOai, loioodai) and that of the quality (SOKCOGIS, IOOTTJS). In each predicate/quality pair there exists such a 'coincidental characteristic', - hence the use of this expression in the plural. This would appear to be quite different from Antipater's KOLVOV ovfjLTTTcoiJLa, which was a predicate common to all bodies and all incorporeals ('to be something') and to which, precisely, no quality (no 'somethingness') corresponds. To confirm that the philosophers whom Simplicius mentions here are not Stoics nor any particular group of Stoics, even if they were involved with the Stoics (probably polemically), the following arguments may be adduced: (a) The general intention of these philosophers is clearly to depress the ontological status of qualities, by reducing their presence to the supervening of corresponding predicates. Even if, to further their own argument, they make use of the Stoic thesis of the corporeality of qualities and the incorporeality of predicates, that use seems ironical and polemical, since the being of qualities turns out, in the conclusion to the argument, to be dependent upon the being of predicates. The Stoics, in contrast, aimed to promote the ontological status of qualities by making them bodies. (b) As we have seen, Simplicius introduces these philosophers in the context of a review of the doctrines which consign, or threaten to consign, qualities to 'non-existence' {awn 6 or aros), by making them appear to be 'pure conceptions expressed in the void and corresponding to nothing that is existent' (iptXas 8e fjuovas ivvocas avras VTreXd^avov StaKevcos Xeyofxevas /car' ovSefjLL&s vTToardaeojs). Elsewhere, he obviously classes the Stoics amongst those who do grant them an 'existence' (VTTOOTCLOLS) (209.1-3 = SKF 11.388, FDS 859). (c) Some of the bizarre examples used in the passage that we have considered reappear in a discussion in Sextus Empiricus, of which we possess two parallel versions (.P//111.99, Mix.343). Admittedly, the context is different here: it is not a matter of comparing qualities and predicates, but rather wholes and parts. 164 The hiaoraois is nothing other than TOL SteoTcbra, the SOKQJGLS nothing other than the SeSoKcofxeva; here, these examples seem to support the idea that the whole is nothing other than the sum of its parts, it is nothing but 'a 164

These passages of Sextus Empiricus have been studied in detail by Barnes (1982/3), p. 277-80.

I56

STOICISM

name and an empty appellation, with no existence at all of its own (vTrooracnv IScav). Despite the difference in the problems under consideration, the two arguments are prompted by a common intention: in both cases the purpose is, by means of reductionist tactics, to inflict an ontological devaluation upon the terms illustrated by the hidaraais or the SOKCOGIS, that is to say, in Simplicius' text upon the qualities, and in Sextus' upon the wholes. I am not sure whether the double appearance of these externally unusual examples makes it possible to identify the philosopher who is behind both passages. (d) Andreas Graeser, 165 for his part, believes that Simplicius' text relates to the Stoics: to illustrate their tendency to 'determine qualities on the basis of the predicates suited to the body', he cites a passage from Plutarch 166 in which Chrysippus is criticized for having generated 'a swarm of virtues', by inventing abstract nouns for virtues never before heard of, on the basis of existing adjectives: for example, just as in common speech we find avhpeia derived from avSpeios, one introduces a virtue known as iadXorrjg deriving it from the adjective iodXos, and so on. We are certainly confronted here by the same problem as that of the philosophers evoked by Simplicius, namely the problem of the relationship between qualificatory predicates and qualities. But Chrysippus' point of view is diametrically opposed to that of the philosophers with whom we are concerned. They regard predicates as the ratio essendi of qualities, the ontological status of which is thereby devalued and relegated to secondary rank. Chrysippus, in contrast, treats qualificatory predicates as the ratio cognoscendi of qualities: they make it possible to discover the reality of certain virtues which have no name in common speech, but which nevertheless exist as particular qualities, on the model of the qualifications which correspond to them in ordinary speech. 167 For all these reasons, it seems to me that the philosophers cited by Simplicius may be considered as opponents of Stoicism, opponents with Sceptic or Academic tendencies, 168 who make use of the vocabulary of the Stoics and certain of their theses in order to turn them against the hyperrealism of the Stoic theory of corporeal qualities. This collection of extracts from Simplicius' Commentary undoubtedly deserves to be studied more systematically and in greater depth than it has been in this preliminary sketch. However, I hope that this essay has managed to indicate that a long dialogue developed between the Stoics and certain interlocutors/opponents, sometimes expressly stated to be Academicians, sometimes plausibly identified as such, around the problem which, right down to the period of Neo-Platonism, was to constitute the major objection against 165 167

168

166 Graeser 1975, p . 87. Plutarch, De virt. mor. 441 AB ( = S K F I I I . 2 5 5 ) . V o n A r n i m prints as a q u o t a t i o n from Chrysippus the general principle which Plutarch vofiL^wv. ascribes to him here: Kara TO TTOLOV aperrjv I8iq TTOI6TT)TI ovvioraodai In a long letter on the subject of this chapter in Simplicius, which has been of great assistance to me in preparing this study, David K o n s t a n has suggested to me that they might have been a g r o u p of Academicians w h o t o o k u p T h e o p o m p u s ' challenge. I should like to t h a n k him most warmly for his help.

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the TSG doctrine: namely, what can there be in common between bodies and incorporeals? From Plato's Sophist down to the critiques of Plotinus, a single thread thus runs through the many twists and turns in the argument, the replies and also the replies to those replies, a thread that in my opinion confirms the fact that the Stoic doctrine of the supreme genus, which evolved out of their critical meditation on Platonic ontology, never ceased to be a subject of hot debate with the various heirs of Platonism.

7 ON A STOIC WAY OF NOT BEING*

There are many Stoic ways of not being, or - to be more precise - of not being a 'being' (6V). The only one with which I shall be concerned here is that which consists in being the intentional object of an impulse (o/o/xiy), or of some kind or other or a sub-kind of impulse (opegis, tendency; eTndvfjita, desire; j8ouArjcns, will; ai'pecns, choice, etc.). The technical formulation of this aspect of Stoic 'meontology' can be summed up in three statements: (i) impulses are directed towards (cvrt) predicates (Kar-qyoprujLara); (ii) predicates are incorporeals (as, in general, are the Ae^ra, of which they are a species); (iii) incorporeals are not beings, for only bodies are beings. Statement (i) is to be found in particular in the Ti text (see Appendix to this chapter). I shall henceforth refer to it as the POI thesis (it is a Predicate that is the Object of an Impulse). Statements (ii) and (iii) crop up all over the place. To explain my choice, let me take as my starting point two extracts from Long and Sedley's splendid work (1987). On the one hand, they note in their bibliography (vol. 11, p. 498) that 'there has been much interest in the thesis that the object of a practical impulse is a predicate'. Yet on the other hand, they write as follows (vol. 11, p. 165): 'Since interaction is exclusively the property of bodies, the Stoics cannot allow these incorporeals to act upon bodies or be acted upon by them. How then do they play any part in the world? No satisfactory discussion of the problem has survived. But E [ = my T4] is evidence that they attempted an answer in at least one connection - how our corporeal souls can think about incorporeals.' T4 does indeed set out a Stoic response to the following problem: how can our corporeal soul seize upon a demonstration, that is to say a XEKTOV composed in a particular way, which is, accordingly, an incorporeal? The Stoic answer to this question may be less unsatisfactory than Long and Sedley appear to believe,1 but this is not the place to go into it. My only concern here is to note that these two authors present T4 as the sole testimony of the Stoics' * Two slightly more detailed versions of this study have been given as lectures, one at the Colloquium organized by the University of Geneva in memory of Henry Joly, who was a very dear friend to me, the other at the seminar of ancient philosophy run by Monique Dixsaut and Denis O'Brien at the Universite de Paris-XII. On those two occasions I benefited greatly from the valuable remarks made by many of the participants, amongst whom I must mention at least Jacques Bouveresse, Myles Burnyeat, Monique Canto, Curzio Chiesa, Claude Imbert, Jean Lallot, Kevin Mulligan and Andre Voelke. My thanks go to them all. 1 I am grateful to Myles Burnyeat for having helped me to understand it better.

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only attempt to explain how incorporeals can 'play some part in the world'. Yet they are clearly familiar with the POI thesis and aware of the interest that is being shown in it these days. Now, whatever the exact meaning of this thesis, it certainly shows that incorporeals 'play some part in the world'. Moreover it assuredly shows this better than T4, since T4 is regarded as explaining how we think of certain incorporeals, whereas the POI thesis is supposed to explain how we desire certain incorporeals. Now, while it is possible that our thoughts do not modify the world, our desires certainly do, at least to the extent that we gratify them through and in our actions. So here we are presented with a case in which an incorporeal, the KaTrjyoprjjjLa which is the object of the impulse, incontestably does 'play a part', in the first place in the mechanism of human action, secondly, and indirectly, in the transformations that this action produces 'in the world'. Perhaps the reason why it did not occur to Long and Sedley to cite the POI thesis in this context is that it may have the air of a marginal curiosity in the way in which Stoicism is organized. It is particularly likely to assume that air if one starts off by explaining the Stoic psychology of action in 'materialist' terms as, in an initial analysis at least, it seems opportune to do: the soul, the impressions that it receives and the actions that it performs in response to those impressions are all bodies, or corporeal movements, in other words they are invariably corporeal (SVF 11.385, 848). If one approaches the question from this point of view at the outset, one is bound to be puzzled later, when faced with texts which introduce into the analysis of action incorporeals such as the KaTTjyoprjfjLara. These texts seem to introduce into the picture a conflicting, non-materialistic analysis which is incompatible with the basic Stoic doctrines or those regarded as such; at this point, one wonders why the Stoics went to the trouble of creating such difficulties for themselves.2 My main purpose in this paper will be to try to show, albeit in summary fashion, that the POI thesis is no marginal curiosity. Perhaps the first thing to say is that the relations between desire and non-being were a subject of longstanding interest well before the Stoics. The Stoics were not the first to point out that one desires what one does not have; one desires to be what one is not; one desires things to be as they are not. That is why to say that one desires something that exists, such as a particular fruit or a particular woman, involves something of a paradox, or at least a misuse of language. In reality one desires to eat the fruit, or to possess the woman. As Tsekourakis (1974, p. 107) has noted, in Plato a number of remarks in a sense make that very point. In the Symposium, for example, Diotima raises the following question (204E): 'Someone who loves good things, what is it that he loves?' Socrates' reply is: 'that they should eventually be his' (yeveodai avrcp, 204E). Later on (T5), admittedly, Socrates seems to forget that reply and to accept the 2

For a typical presentation of the problem in these terms, see Kerferd 1983.

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statement 'men love the good'. But Diotima reminds him that he should add the clarification (in view of the context, that is how I understand TTpoodereov) that 'they love the good to be theirs' and also that 'they love it to be not merely theirs but theirs forever' (transl. N.R.M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1967, slightly adapted). However, it is worth noting that the complete construction that Plato suggests here to determine the precise object of the verb ipdv is an infinitive proposition ('what is good to be theirs forever') rather than a simple infinitive ('to possess what is good'). Perhaps Plato deliberately avoids the latter formulation in order to leave pride of place, in the subject position, to 'what is good'. Such preoccupations were not necessarily shared by those for whom such an observation possessed not so much an ethical or ontological relevance but rather stemmed primarily from the study of language or what might be termed the grammar of desire. Such people might consider the normal form of an expression of desire to be a construction with an infinitive: 'I want to walk', 'I want to eat this fruit', etc. Now, we do possess some evidence of the interest in this construction that was evinced by certain 'dialecticians' who preceded the Stoics and influenced them on this point. It seems that these dialecticians had, in this very context, used the notion of KarrjyoprjjjLa - which is not altogether surprising, given that Clinomachus, said to be the founder of the 'dialectical' school (DL 11.19),3 was also considered to be the first philosopher to have written irepl d^LCJfidrojv KOLL KaTrjyoprjfjLdrajv (DL II. 112).

The first item of testimony comes from Cicero (T6). Speaking of the libido (indubitably irndv/jLia), he says that 'it has as its object things that are said of a thing or things (the term used by the dialecticians being Kar^yoprj^ara, as for instance a man longs to have riches, to obtain distinctions' 4 (transl. J.E. King, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1966, slightly adapted). This text attests the 'dialectical' origin of a version of a thesis of the POI type that is already perfectly precise, but is restricted to desire and its object: let us refer to it as the 'POD thesis'. In the context of Cicero, the libido, which is borne towards predicates ('to have riches', 'to receive honours') is set in opposition to another form of psychic movement the objects of which are the very things mentioned in those predicates, namely honours, money. Unfortunately, the identity of the term that is thus contrasted to the libido is illdetermined: in the latest manuscripts and according to most editors, it is indigentia; in the oldest manuscripts, approved by Giusta (1967, vol. 11, p. 228), it is diligentia. Indigentia is defined, a few lines earlier, as a libido inexplebilis, that is to say a particular species of libido; so it is hard to see why its objects should be of a different type from those of the libido itself. For that reason one 3 4

On the dialectic school, see the decisive study by Sedley 1977 and also the more recent work by Ebert 1987. It is interesting, in passing, to compare the definition given here of the Kar-qyoprjixa, 'things that are said of a thing or things', with one of the definitions which Diogenes Laertius cites in his book on the Stoics (vii.64), attributing it to Apollodorus: TTpdy/xa OVVTOLKTOV ixepi TWOS rj

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is strongly tempted to stick to diligentia, as Giusta proposes, but forced to recognize that a Greek equivalent would be hard to find (afpccris?) and that its meaning remains somewhat obscure. The second item of testimony comes from Seneca's Letter 117 (a text which should be included in its entirety in the collection of texts bearing upon this subject). It gives an account of the Stoic distinction between sapientia, wisdom (which is a good, acts usefully and is, accordingly, corporeal) and sapere, being-wise (which is an inactive incorporeal). Hampered by problems of translation as he is, Seneca does not explain the POI thesis very clearly. However, he does provide one precious piece of information when he says (T7) that the type-distinction between a substantive subject and an infinitive predicate (sapientialsapere, on the model of ager/agrum habere) originated with the dialectici veteres, and that the Stoics took it over from them. This confirms that Cicero's dialectici were themselves not Stoics, but pre-Stoics. Pooling the information provided on the one hand by Cicero, on the other by Seneca, we may thus take it to be highly probable that these pre-Stoic 'dialecticians' attributed a predicative status to the objects of desire. It is also worth noting that in both these texts the 'predicate' is expressed as a verb in the infinitive. The first concern of the Stoics seems to have been to generalize this grammar of desire which was part of their heritage, by transposing it from the particular case of desire (eindv^ia) to what they regarded as the genus of desire, namely impulse (opfjufj). That generalization produced the POI thesis itself, as it is set out in Ti and is referred to, comparatively, in T2. A development of that generalization can, furthermore, be perceived in T8, despite the facts that the logic of the passage (and even its text) remain uncertain, and that Clement's Stoic terminology here co-exists alongside religious preoccupations of a purely Christian nature. It may nevertheless be noted (i) that all the concrete observations mustered in the text relate to the predicative nature of the object of the eTnOv/jLLd, that is to say the libido of Cicero's dialecticians ('nobody wants a drink, what one wants is to drink the drink; nobody wants a heritage, what one wants is to inherit it', etc.); (ii) that the case of the erndv^ia is certainly the one from which the other cases are extrapolated; (iii) that the 'pagan' part of that extrapolation takes place within the field of a controlled and hierarchized lexicon, in a fashion altogether in conformity with the Stoic system, through the concept of op/x^y (cf. KOLI OXCJS at op^ai). T8 may thus be regarded as testifying to a transition between the POD thesis of the 'old dialecticians' and the POI thesis of the Stoics. The fact that the Stoic POI thesis is rooted in the robust realism of the preStoic POD thesis makes it easy to find a reply to those who have found the Stoic thesis artificial and unrealistic. In identifying an incorporeal predicate, rather than a corporeal, active and beneficent good, as the object of impulse,

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the Stoics are not, whatever the appearances, letting go of their prey in order to chase after shadows. On the contrary, they are simply stressing the very simple idea that a particular good only concerns us and stirs us into action to the extent that we wish to enjoy it personally, through ourselves and for ourselves. But one may still wonder whether that idea is correctly expressed by saying that our impulses are directed towards 'predicates'. The expression remains strange because it seems to imply that we are chasing after linguistic items. One accordingly feels obliged to get around the difficulty by saying, for example (Kerferd 1983, p. 95) that the doctrine can be made to make sense if one points out that an impulse is always an impulse to do something, and that 'to do something' itself already implies what is expressed by an infinitive verb. But as an impulse 'to do something' is an impulse to do something in the real world, it is hard to interpret it as a movement of the mind towards a XZKTOV. It is thus necessary to say (as did already Zeller) that, strictly speaking, the object of the impulse is not the KarrjyoprjiJLa, but rather the activity that the Karrjyoprjfjia designates. This analysis presupposes that the Kar^yoprj/jia is taken to be a 'grammatical phenomenon', a 'purely grammatical term' (as Kerferd puts it), that is to say a signifier (confusion is no doubt encouraged by the traditional translation of the Greek term as 'predicate'). To dispel the difficulty, perhaps all that is necessary is to remember that the KarrjyoprjfjLa, like the XEKTOV in general, is not a signifier but something that is signified. So when the Stoics declare an impulse to be an impulse to do something, there is no need to oppose the KarrjyoprjiJLa and the activity that it designates or to distinguish between them; for that activity is none other than the Karr}y6prjixa itself, and this is exactly what is signified by the infinitive verb which constitutes its signifier. One remarkable application of the POI thesis may be observed in definitions of the Stoic reXos and the commentaries designed to justify those definitions. As Tsekourakis (1974, p. 108) points out, it is assuredly not by chance that all the Stoic formulations of the reXos use an infinitive, usually substantiated: to resolve the question of the reXos is, after all, to insert something between the article TO and the infinitive ^rjv.5 The corresponding noun, the jSi'o?, qualified in one way or another, should be called OKOTTOS, an aim, rather than a Te'Aos, an end. It is the active and substantive entities such as 'happiness' (rj €uScu/x(Wa), a 'happy life', that corresponds to the OKOTTOS, an external aim that exists physically as does the target facing an archer. And it is the predicates associated with those substantive entities, 'to achieve happiness' (TO TVX^IV TTJS evSatfjiovLas), 'to be happy' (TO evSaifioveLv) (T9, Ti 1) that correspond to the re'Aos, the internal object of one's aim. Catachrestically, one could probably define the T<EXOS as a particular kind of life, /3LOS; but the point is that to do so would be to substitute a OKOTTOS for a T4XOS, and that is legitimate only Cf. Arius apud Stobaeus, Eclogae p. 76,3: Zeno's successors, imagining that his formulation of the reAos, TO ofxoXoyovfxevcos £,rjv was an incomplete predicate (eAarrov Kanqyopy^fxa), added to it the famous complement rfj <j>vo€L. Cf. also the interesting T 11.

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because one is then referring to the 'associated predicate' (TO irapaKeLfjuevov KarrjyoprujLa) which is 'to live' (£,fjv) in a particular manner' (Tio). Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 1, p. 400) consider this distinction between evSatfiovia and evSacixovetv 'rather strained'. That seems to be because, as they can see it, the normal form of a predicate is a personal verb without a subject ('... is happy'), an impersonal infinitive ('to be happy') being only a secondary form of predicate. So they think that, to explain the idea that our end is 'a predicate', that is to say something essentially 'incomplete', it is necessary to say that our wish is that this predicate should become true of us. They write as follows: 'We aim at happiness in order that 'being happy' can be truly predicated of ourselves' (my italics). I must confess that this explanation seems to me even odder than the oddity that it is supposed to explain. To be sure, 'to be happy' can be truly predicated of us if and only if we are happy. But in an intentional context it is not legitimate to substitute one of these expressions for the other. What a peasant wants is that it should rain, not that it should be true that it is raining. What we actually want is to be happy, not that the predicate 'to be happy' should be truly predicated of us. There is no advantage in suggesting that the POI thesis is more adequately represented by the second formulation than by the first; all that this achieves is to create a difficulty which can, on the contrary, be avoided if one accepts that in the context of the POI thesis, as in that of its pre-Stoic antecedents, the normal way to express the 'predicate' is by the infinitive.6 What remains to be done is examine the most difficult and best known texts that relate to this subject, namely T1-3. Leaving aside, for the moment, the major difficulty that they incorporate, - namely the question of the exact meaning of the verbal adjectives alperov and alpereov, the doctrine that they present is a transposition of one with which we are already familiar. The general distinction between the corporeal things that we desire to possess and the incorporeal predicates that we desire is transposed, at the level of the sage's psychology, into a distinction between goods, ayaOd, and 'benefits', OX/^AT?IJLaTa. Virtues, such as <j>povr]Gis, are goods; the corresponding 'benefits' are predicates such as (f>poveiv or e'x^v rrjv p6vrjoiv. In my view, there is no need to distort that transposition by untimely injections of'morality'. For example, there is no good reason for thinking that the beneficiary of the 'benefit' must be someone other than the virtuous man himself (even if it is also true that those close to him - his friends and fellow-citizens - may well derive some advantage from his virtuous actions). Nor can I see any reason to draw a distinction between €x€iv TVV p6vrjoiv and (f>povetv, interpreting the former expression as 6

The formulation of the predicate in the infinitive is customary, as we have seen, in the dialectici veteres, and it is equally so in the context of the POI thesis (see T2) and in that of the theory of causality, which is possibly the original context of the notions of Ae/cTov and Kar-qyopiq^a (cf. SFF1.89,488, n.341,349, and the study by Frede 1980). The formulation in the indicative is, on the other hand, customary in the possibly later context of the analysis of language (cf. SVF 11.183, 184).

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a description of a disposition ('to possess wisdom', 'to be of a wise disposition') and the latter as a description of an exercise or activity ('to exercise wisdom', 'to act in conformity with a wise disposition').7 What remains to be understood is why the distinction between the good, which is a body, and the benefit, which is a predicate, is also expressed by a distinction between two types of verbal adjectives, the one ending in -TOS, the other in -reog. If we try to give these suffixes a meaning authorized by usage and limited to whatever sense is strictly necessary in the context, I think the following suggestions may be made: (i) The benefit, which is a predicate, is alpereov, 'to be chosen'. However, the texts with which we are concerned do not say that it is alpereov because we have to choose it, or because we ought to choose it (in any sense of psychological necessity or moral obligation); they simply say that it is aipereov because we do choose it (cf. T2). The suffix -reov could thus mean no more than that the benefit is 'to be chosen' because it is, in this instance and in the domain defined by the corresponding good, the only thing that we can choose. Presented with a liquid that is drinkable and of a kind to quench thirst, the only thing that we can wish is to drink it; presented with a virtue that is 'possessible' and of a kind to make us happy, the only thing that we can wish is to possess it. (ii) The good, which is a body, is alperov. Here the situation is complicated by the multiplicity of the possible meanings of the Greek suffix. Those meanings include two to which the texts in question make no allusion: they do not say that a good is aiperov because it is possible to choose it, nor that it is aiperov because it is worthy of being chosen. They simply say that, even if goods are not alperia as benefits are, they nevertheless relate in some way to the ai'pecis, and the relationship may be expressed by the term alperov (cf. jjL€vroL in T2 and el apa in T3); and they also say that goods are alperd because to have them is what we choose (cf. Sio in T2). The term alperov - and this is also a possible meaning of the suffix - could thus mean simply that goods are 'chosen', it being understood, as is indicated by the context, that they are chosen in the particular sense that we choose to possess them. In other words, they are 'chosen' in the sense that the notion of choice is an essential element in the expression of our relationship to them. 7

Lack of space prevents me from discussing as I should the interpretation given of this passage by a number of authors, such as Dumont and Long. Favouring a differentiation between pov€Lv and e'xciv TTJV p6vr)oLv, Long (1976, pp. 87-9) bases his thesis on the difficult expression TO (f>pov€iv, o deuiptirai napa TO €X^LV TTJV $p6vr\oiv (T3), which he understands as follows: 'the exercise of practical wisdom, which is understood to depend upon the possession of practical wisdom'. Perhaps it could be objected that in the parallel texts, a perfect equivalence is posited between the simple expression of the predicate and its compound expression (cf. T 9 : TO TVX^LV TTJS evdaifjiovLas,

oirep TCLVTOV efvcu TO> €V8OLL[JLOV€IV); in T 3 itself,

that equivalence between pov€iv and ex€iv TTJV povr)oLv seems implicit (cf. aipovfjueOa JJLCV . . . TO pov€Lv, a n d e^eiv auTO [ = TO alp€T6v = T7]v <j>p6vr)oiv] alpov^ieQa). These arguments

suggest that the controversial expression of T3, TO <j>pov€iv, o dewpehaL -napa TO ex€iv TTJV (/>p6vr)oiv, should be interpreted as an equivalence. For my own part, I would suggest the following: Wo pov€Lv, which is the conceptual equivalent to TO CX^LV TTJV <j>povqaiv\

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The distinction between the alperov and the alpereov could thus result from there being two possible ways of breaking up statements of the alpovfjueda €X€LV TVV P°vr)<JLV type. By breaking it as follows: atpovfjueda / e'x 6tv TVV

(f>p6vrjGiv, the verbal expression of choice {alpovixeda) is isolated and the exact nature of the proper object of the choice is determined, for that object is designated by the rest of the statement (ex^tv TT)V cfrpovrjoiv). By separating da ^x^iV I TVV P°vrIGLV' o n e isolates the designation of the good (rrjv and one determines the exact nature of the relation that we have with that good, a relation which is designated by the remainder of the statement { Now we must replace the POI thesis within the interesting and important context in which it appears in Ti. Nothing in Ti is incompatible with the distinction drawn between the corporeal good and the incorporeal predicate, which is the distinction with which we have been concerned so far. However, that theme is now replaced by another, in which incorporeal predicates are contrasted no longer to corporeal realities, but to other incorporeals: the d^LOjfjiara or propositions. This pair of XeKrd of different kinds is here related to two different types of psychic acts: assents (ovyKaradeoeis) are given (when they are given) to propositions whereas, in conformity with the POI thesis, impulses (opfxat) are directed towards predicates, to wit the predicates that are in some way contained (nepLexofjievd TTOJS) within the propositions which constitute the object of assents. In the texts which we examined earlier, the predicate was essentially considered as an incorporeal, and inasmuch as it was distinct from the corporeal realities to which it was related. In Ti, the predicate's essential feature is that it is incomplete, and distinct from the incorporeals which are complete, that is to say the propositions, to which it is related in some way. 8 The Stoics were faced with the task of accommodating the POI thesis with the theory of assent. In itself, the POI thesis was in danger of short-circuiting the moment of moral responsibility in an action: in a possible description of the action, the <j>avraoia of a good automatically brings into being an impulse which is directed towards the predicate associated with that good; and that impulse in its turn prompts a corresponding action. But, as is well known, the Stoics were concerned to introduce into the analysis of human action the moment of assent which lies 'within our power' and in which the responsibility of the agent is concentrated. They also held (as it is reasonable to infer from the testimony of Sextus, M vn. 154) that the normal and primary object of assent is a proposition. To accommodate both the moment of assent and the moment of impulse, they accordingly had to accommodate both the propositions which are the object of assent and the predicates towards which impulses are directed. That is what Ti does, albeit, unfortunately, in a somewhat covert 8

This double perspective corresponds to the one sketched in above on the basis of the double expression of the predicate as both an infinitive and as an indicative without a subject.

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fashion, by declaring the predicates in question to be 'contained in some way (TTCOSY within the propositions in question. Is it possible at least to conjecture the substance behind that exaggeratedly unspecific TTOJS! The simplest hypothesis is to assume that the proposition which is the object of assent is what might be called a judgement of appropriateness which bears directly upon the action towards which the agent is impelled. For example, one could say:9 by giving our assent we accept the truth of a proposition such as 'I ought to take some exercise'. A genuine assent to that proposition is accompanied by an impulse to take some exercise, an impulse which would be expressed linguistically as an imperative: Take some exercise!' The impulse is directed not towards the proposition 'I ought to take some exercise' in its entirety, but towards the action to which we are impelled by the assent that we have given to it and which is expressed by the predicate contained by that proposition, namely 'to take some exercise'. But I detect in that suggestion the following difficulty. According to the analysis proposed, the predicate ('to take some exercise') is not, strictly speaking, 'contained in some way' in the judgement of appropriateness which is supposed to constitute the object of assent: on the contrary, it is contained there as explicitly as it possibly could be. 10 Furthermore, it is hard to understand the necessity for the ploy undertaken by Ti, which starts out by suggesting that all impulses are assents and then corrects that assimilation (77S77 84) by distinguishing between assent and impulse by means of the type of category to which their respective objects belong. If the proposition which constitutes the object of assent was the judgement of appropriateness 'I ought to do such-and-such a thing', there would seem to be no difference between assenting to that judgement and having an impulse to do that thing. At any rate, one of the properties of assent and impulse is necessarily common to both: if the judgement of appropriateness is true, the assent and the impulse are both correct; if that judgement is false, both the assent and the impulse are incorrect. In these circumstances, to distinguish between the assent and the impulse by invoking a difference between the types of category to which they respectively belong seems to be pointlessly pedantic. That would not be the case if there were reason to take into consideration cases in which the parallelism between the correctness of the assent and that of the impulse is broken. If, for example, it happened that assent given to a false proposition were accompanied by an impulse to act correctly, it would become crucially important to draw a distinction between on the one hand the proposition approved by the assent and, on the other, the predicate to which the impulse is directed. And this is indeed a situation which the Stoics not only studied but also considered to be of the first importance. They studied it in the context of their famous distinction between what is 9 10

See Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 11, p. 200. This remark remains valid whatever the more or less imperious formulation of this judgement of appropriateness ('I ought', 'I must', 'it is necessary', etc.).

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true and the truth. T12 explains, in this connection, why and how it is that the sage can 'speak falsely' on occasion without, however, being 'a liar'. The same applies to certain ordinary types of expert - doctors, generals, grammarians; and their example helps us to understand the behaviour of the sage. For example, a general may forge letters announcing the arrival of reinforcements, in order to raise the morale of his troops. In this way, he gets them to give their assent to a false proposition, namely 'reinforcements are arriving' and also (but implicitly) to a true judgement of appropriateness, which in a way results from that false proposition, namely 'we ought to remain at our posts'; and this also produces in them an impulse to remain at those posts. The predicate which constitutes the object of their impulse ('to remain at our posts') is, in this instance, not spelt out within the proposition which constitutes the object of their explicit assent ('reinforcements are arriving'). However, the link that I have just indicated perhaps justifies our saying that it is contained there 'in a way'. It may be objected that the above is an exceptional situation. But, on the contrary, so far is it from being exceptional that it provides the Stoics with the model according to which they conceive the operation of divine and providential destiny where men who are not sages are concerned, that is to say with regard to all of us ordinary people. According to T13, Chrysippus, wishing to show that an impression was not a sufficient cause of assent, went back to the example of the sage telling a falsehood and thereby producing false impressions in the mind of a non-sage: if the impression were a sufficient cause of assent, the sage would be morally responsible for the prejudice to which the non-sage is subjected when he gives his assent to the false proposition - and this cannot be the case. But, according to Ti 3, a god acts exactly as a sage does: both produce false impressions in the minds of non-sages, that is to say all of us ordinary people; not because they need (SeofxeVou?) us to give our assent to those impressions but because, to realize their providential plan, they need us to feel the particular impulse that will accompany our assent, and to act according to that impulse. It is we ourselves, poor, predictably credulous fools that we are, who give our assent to those false impressions; so it is we who bear the moral responsibility for that incorrect assent.11 However, that does not prevent us from acting exactly as the god 'needs' us to act. 11

It is true that the position which Plutarch here attributes to Chrysippus has sometimes been considered 'absurd'. According to Inwood 1985, pp. 85-6, Chrysippus could not have adopted it unless under extreme polemic pressure which forced him to take refuge in it in the absence of any other alternative. However, that disqualification of Plutarch's testimony would only become necessary if the text attributed to Chrysippus the notion, clearly unacceptable from a Stoic point of view, of a human action without assent; but in reality, this notion is clearly presented as a consequence that Plutarch is trying to force upon Chrysippus. For Chrysippus, the god does not need the avAos to give assent to a false proposition; but that does not mean to say that he does not need the av\os to give the slightest assent to any proposition at all. The av\os does not act without giving assent; he acts as destiny wills him to act, without destiny willing him to give the assent that he does in fact give. The idea that an end may be willed without the inevitable means to that end, as such, being willed may be disputed, but it is certainly not absurd.

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In this way - and let this be my conclusion - we can see that the POI thesis, which may have derived from the fascinating discourse of Clinomachus Ilepl d^icujjidTcov KCLL KarrjyoprjiJidTojv, eventually, having been further developed by the Stoics, served to accomplish one of the most difficult tasks that these philosophers set themselves: that of reconciling divine providence and human responsibility. God makes us chase after good predicates, at the same time giving us the chance to grant our assent to bad propositions. The Portuguese have a way of expressing this. They say that 'God writes straight in curved lines'.

APPENDIX Tl = Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus, Eclogae n, p. 88, 1-6 W = SFF111.171 = LS 331. IJdoas 8e rds op^ids ovyKaraOeoeis etvat, rds 8e Trpa/crt/cas" /cat TO KLVTJTLKOV 7T€pL€X€tv. "H8rj 8e dXXto JJL€V elvai ovyKaradeoeis, err dXXo 8e opfids- /cat ovyKaradeoeis /xev a^taj/xaat'rtatv, 6pp,ds 8e eirl /car^yopT^aTa, rd irepiexoyievd TTOJS ev TOIS d^LCOfjLaoiv < ols > at

ovyKaradeoeis.

T2 = ibid, n, pp. 97, 15-98, 6 = 5KFm.9i = LS 33J. Ata /cat aVo^e/CTea, Kary]yopy\\xara ovra, irapaKelyLeva S' dyadols. AlpeioSai fJL€v yap r)[JLas rd alperea /cat ftovXeoOai rd fiovXrjrea /cat opeyeoOai rd opeKrea. Karrjyoprjfjidrcxjv yap at' re alpeoeis /cat ope^eis /cat fiovXrjoeis ytvovrat, ojovep /cat at opfjuai • €X€LV ^VTOL alpov^eOa /catfiovXofjieda/cat OJJLOICOS opeyop^eda rdyaOd, 8LO /cat alperd /cat flovXrjrd /cat ope/cra rdyadd ion. Tqv yap (frpov-qoiv aipovfAeda c^etv /cat rrjv oaxfrpoovvrjv, ov jLta Aid TO (frpovetv /cat oaxfipoveiv, doajfJLara b'vra /cat Kar^yoprj/jLara. T3 = ibid. n.jS.j-i2 = SVF 111.S9. Aiacf>€p€iv 8e Xeyovoi TO alperov /cat TO alpereov. Alperov fjuev etvat < aya^ov> 77av, alpereov 8e dxf)eXr)p,a rrdv, o Becxipeirai irapd TO eyeiv TO dyadov. AC o alpovfjieda \xev TO alpereov, otov TO (frpoveLV, o dewpeiraL irapd TO ex^iv rrjv (frpovrjotv • TO 8e alperov ovx alpovfjueda, aAA' el apa, ex€lv CIUTO alpovjjueda. T4 = Sextus Empiricus, M viii.409 = SVF 11.85 = LS 27 E. "Qorrep yap, aoiv, 6 7Tai8orpl^T]s /cat OTrAojLta^os" eoO' ore fjiev Xafiofievos rcbv ^^tpcoF rod TratSo? pvdfjLi^ei /cat StSaa/cet rtva? Kiveiodai KLvrjoeLS, eod' ore 8e drrwOev eorajs Kai 77cos KLVOV(JL€VOS iv pvdfia) TTape^et eavrov eKecvco irpos fiifjurjaiv, OVTOJ /cat rcbv (f>avraorchv evia fjuev olovel i/javovra /cat Oiyydvovra rod rjyefjLOVLKOV rroielrai TTJV ev TOVTCO TV7TCOGLV, OTToiov eon TO XevKOV teal fieXav /cat KOLVtbs TO acDjtxa, eVta 8e Tocavrrjv exet (jtvotv, rov TjyefjLOViKov err avrols c^avraoLOVfjuevov /cat ovx ^7r> avrtov, oiTOid eon rd dacofxara Xexrd.

T5 = Plato, Symp. 206A. Mp' ovv, fj 8'^, ovTws dirXovv eon Xeyeiv on ol avdpooiroi rdyadov ipcbotv; - Nai, e(f)7]v. — TL 8e', ov irpoodereov, ecfrrj, on /cat etvat TO dyadov avrols epcooLV, — npoadereov. — ^Ap ovv, €rj, /cat ov JJLOVOV etVat, aAAa /cat act efvat; — Xat rovro TTpoadereov. — "Eonv apa £vXXrjl38r}v, e
A WAY OF NOT BEING

169

T6 = Cicero, Tusc.disp. i\.2i=SVFm. = FDS 7S9. Distinguunt illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur de quodam aut quibusdam, quae /car^yo/o^ara dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores, diligentia rerum ipsarum sit, ut honorum, ut pecuniae. diligentia codd. vett. Giusta (11,228): indigentia codd. recc. edd. T7 = Seneca, Epist. 117.12. Dialectici veteres ista [sapientia, sapere] distinguunt: ab illis divisio usque ad Stoicos venit. Qualis sit haec, dicam. Aliud est ager, aliud agrum habere, quidni ? cum habere agrum ad habentem, non ad agrum pertineat. Sic aliud est sapientia, aliud sapere. T8 = Clement of Alexandria, Strom, vii.7 = SVF m. 176. ' Qv fJL€V OVV a t 6p€^€LS 8lO7T€p

OvSeiS

€IQI KCLL €7Tldv[JLiai

€7TLdviJL€L TTOfJLOLTOS, dXXd

KOLL oXtOS a t OpfJLCLl TOVTCOV €L(jl /Cat a t C U ^ a i ' ' TOV TTl€lV TO TTOTOV ' Ot>8e fJLTJV KXrjpOVOfJLLOLS,

dAAa TOV KXrjpovofjLrjoai • OVTOJOI 8e ov8e yvwoetos aAAa TOV yvcovai • ov8e yap TToXiTtias opOrjs, dAAa TOV TroXireveoOai • TOVTLOV OVV at evx^h ^>v KOI atV^aets" • KCLI TOVTCOV at atTT/act? cov /cat at €7rt^u/xtat • TO Se evxeodai KCLI opeyeodan, KaTaXXrjXous yiyveadai els TO %x€iv T®- d y a ^ d /cat TOL TrapaKeLfieva c u ^ ^ T9 = Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus, Eclogae 11, p. 77, 23-7 W = SVF 111.16 = LS 63A. . . . TTJV €v8atfjLovLav elvai XeyovTts [sc. Cleanthes, Chrysippus and all their followers] ov\ €T€pav TOV evSaifJiOvos j8toi>, /catrot ye Aeyovre? TTJV fjuev evSaifjLOVtav OKOTTOV €/c/cetor$at, TeXos 8'efvat TO ri>^€tv TTJS euSat/xovta?, oirep TOLVTOV etvat TW ev8atjLtov€tv. T10 = Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus, Eclogae 11, p. 76, 16-21 W = SVF111.3. To Se TeXos XeyeoOaL Tpix&S . . . Aeyoucrt he /cat TOV OKOTTOV TeXos, otov TOV OfJLoXoyovfxevov jStov avaopLKtos XeyovTes errt TO TrapaAcetjLtevov T i l = Herophilus, De Stoico nominum usu, apud Origen, In Psalmos, PG xn, 1053 A B = FDS 241. TEXOS 8'etvat Aeyouat KaTrjyoprjfjLa, ov eve/cev TOL XOLTTOL npaTTOfjiev, avTO 8e ovSevos €V€KCL, TO Se ov^vyovv TOVTCp, KaddiTep rj evScufjuovia TCO evSaifjioveiv, OKOTTOV • o Sr) k'

€OTL TLOV alp€TtOV.

T12 = Sextus Empiricus M vii.43-4. . . ./cat chs ol apioTOL TLOV oTpaTr^ywv irpos evdvfjLiav TLOV vnoTaTTOfjuevcov OLVTOIS OTpOLTltOTtOV IToXXaKIS €7TLGToXds OL7T6 OVjJLfJLaXL&tOV noXetOV TrXaodfJieVOL lfj€v8oS (JL€V TL Aeyofat, ov i/»euSovrat Se oca TO fjurj diro Trovrjpds yvtojjirjs TOVTO iroieiv, . . . cbSe /cat o GO(f)6s, T0VT€OTLV 6 TY)V TOV dXrjdoVS lTnGTr\\XV)V e^tOV, ip€L fJL€V 7TOT€ l/j€v80S, l/j€VO€TCLL 8e OVO€7TOT€ Old TO (JL7) €X^LV TTjV yVO)jJL7]V l/j€VO€l 6^ T13 = Plutarch, De Stoic, repugn. 1055F-1056A, 1057A-B. . . . TTJV yap avTaoiav fiovX6(j,€vos [sc. Chrysippus] OVK ovoav avTOTeXrj ovyKaTadeoetos atVtdv diTooeiKvveiv, e'iprjKev OTL flXdi/jovoiv OL oocfroi f avTaoias efnroiovvTes, dv at (^avraatat TTOLCOOLV avTOTeXcbs Tas auy/car TroAAd/ctS" y a p ol aool i/jevSet ^pcuvrat irpos TOVS (f>avXovs /cat cfravTaoiav TrapiGTaot 7ndavrjv, ov JJLTJV air lav TTJS avyKaTadeaecos, lirel /cat TTJS VTroXrji/jecos curia rfjs /cat TOV deov ip€v8eis i/jevSovs eorai /cat TYJS dwarfs. . . . avdis 84 (farjoi Xpvonnros ifjL7TOi€iv <j>avTaoias /cat TOV oocfrov, ov ovyKarariOeiJLevtov ov8' €IK6VTLOV Seo/xcvoi;? rjfjLcov dAAa TTparrovTcov JJIOVOV /cat opfxcovrcov iirl TO cfraivofjievov, rj^ds 8k (fyavXovs rais roiavrais avTaoiais. ovras vrf daSeveias ovyKararide06ai

8 DID DIOGENES OF BABYLON INVENT THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT?

The so-called 'Ontological Argument' (hereafter: OA), which claims to establish the existence of God on the basis of his essence alone, is probably, together with the Liar Paradox, the Third-Man Argument and some other jewels of the same water, one of the most fascinating legacies of the whole Western philosophical tradition. Its official inventor, as is well known, is Anselm of Canterbury (eleventh century); new versions of it were devised by Descartes and some of his most prominent followers; a radical criticism was offered by Kant; and some modern philosophers have tried to revive it under new guises (Plantinga 1965, Hick and McGill 1967, among others, offer comprehensive reviews of this long story). As usual, some historians invoked the nil novi sub sole philosophico, and claimed that the OA had been already adumbrated, or even actually elaborated, by some ancient philosophers. Plato's name was mentioned in this context, by virtue either of some 'ontological' moves in the final argument for the immortality of soul in the Phaedo (e.g. Gallop 1975, p. 217; Schofield 1982, p. 2; Dumont 1982, p. 389 n. 6), or of the unique ontological properties of the Good in the Republic (Johnson 1963); some statements of Aristotle's about necessary and eternal being have also been invoked circumstantially (Hartshorne 1965, pp. 139-49); passages from Philo, Boethius and Augustine are standardly quoted as well. But the most promising candidates for the role of Anselm's forerunners seem to be the Stoics, first because one of the key phrases of Anselm's Argument, the famous 'something than which a greater cannot be thought of, is to be found in a number of Stoic texts; 1 but also, and much more importantly, because a 1

Anselm's standard formulation is aliquid quo nihil majus eogitari possit (Proslogion 2). Compare in particular Cicero, De nat. deor, 11.18 (atqui certe nihil omnium rerum melius est mundo, nihil praestabilius, nihil pulchrius, nee solum nihilest, sedne eogitari quidem quidquam melius potest), Seneca, NQ 1. 13 (sic demum magnitudo illisua redditur, qua nihil majus eogitari potest). But the phrase is not used as part of a premiss to the conclusion that God (or the godworld) exists; the argument standardly takes the existence of the world for granted, and proceeds to establish that it possesses various predicates (reason, divinity, etc.). Strangely enough, what seems to be, in the whole of Cicero, De nat. deor., the closest approximation to an 'ontological' proof of (more than one) God's existence is attributed to Epicurus, cf. 11.46 (placet enim illi [ = Epicurus] esse deos, quia necesse sitpraestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius); the Epicurean school seems to have endorsed, generally speaking, inferences from notion to existence (cf. Sextus, M vm.337). But the crucial eogitari potest is missing in the De nat. deor. passage (and the argument is possibly Stoicized, cf. Pease (M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum libri m, Cambridge, Mass., 1955) adloc. 170

DIOGENES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

171

definite anticipation of the OA has been found, on apparently good grounds, in a passage of Sextus Empiricus (M ix. 133-6), which reports an argument elaborated by Diogenes of Babylon.2 A disciple of Chrysippus, and later on of Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon (or of Seleucia) was the fifth scholarch of the Stoa, between his master Zeno and his own disciple Antipater. According to Obbink and Vander Waerdt (forthcoming), he 'has not yet been accorded the attention his philosophical and historical importance merits'. There are many signs that this situation is beginning to change. Diogenes' chronology, standardly located between c.240 and c.150, has been revised and put somewhat later, between c.230 and c. 140 (Dorandi 1991, pp. 29-30,61,69-71); a side effect of this move is that Diogenes was a little less old when he visited Rome in 155, at the time of the famous embassy of the three Athenian philosophers; thus he was possibly able to make a better show, next to the brilliant Carneades. His originality and intellectual powers have been recognized for quite a long time, albeit in general terms (cf. e.g. Baldassari 1971, p. 549): he was known as an important philosophical writer in grammar, linguistics and dialectic (his treatises Ilepl (fxjDvrjs and Ilepl SiaXeKTiKrjs have left crucial traces in DL vn), in music and rhetoric (his views in this field being tolerably well known through Philodemus), in ethics and the theory of reXos, and also in theology. But his originality and personal contributions have been traced out much more precisely in quite recent times: suffice it to refer to the works of Frede 1977 on Diogenes' grammatical studies, Delattre 1989 and Nussbaum 1993 on his views about music, poetry and education, Nussbaum 1993 again on his psychology and theory of passions, Annas 1989 on his social ethics and his famous debate with Antipater (reported by Cicero, De off. in), Vander Waerdt 1991 and Obbink 2

I have not found out when the parallel between Diogenes' and Anselm's arguments was first proposed; I was not able to consult Esser 1910, who, according to Hartshorne 1965, p. 149, actually concludes that no genuine proof from the mere idea of God is to be found before Anselm. Diogenes' argument seems to have gone unnoticed by the hundreds of commentators of the OA; it has not been commented upon very often by scholars in ancient philosophy. Baldassari 1971 thinks that the OA has indeed been formulated by Diogenes, at least in its essential structure; he does not claim priority for his thesis, but does not mention any real predecessor either. That some of the Stoic arguments for the existence of the gods qualify as 'ontological' is taken for granted by Dragona-Monachou 1976 (cf. the index and references, p. 318). In France, the pioneering paper is Dumont 1982, to which I owe much, even if I disagree with its main claim and some of its arguments. In an unpublished, fascinating paper on the subject, composed in 1982, Schofield could still write: 'to my mind the page of the Loeb edition which contains this sequence [M ix. 133-6] is one of the more interesting pages of the four volumes which Sextus fills both from a philosophical and an historical point of view. But it has not excited much comment in the scholarly literature, nor is there any standard authoritative treatment to which the curious reader may turn.' I am extremely grateful to Malcolm Schofield for having kindly allowed me to read his excellent piece and to quote from it, although he did not wish to publish it; I shall try to indicate clearly the many borrowings I made from his work in the present paper, which is a constant dialogue with him, and which has been the subject of new talks between us. I also thank my Paris students, who diverted me from reading with them Cicero's De nat. deor. 11 (where Diogenes' argument is not mentioned) by defying me to make satisfactory sense of each and every detail of Sextus' passage. It is not for me to say whether I succeeded.

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and Vander Waerdt (forthcoming) on his political philosophy. Diogenes thus seems to emerge as responsible for some very important innovations or shifts of emphasis in Stoic doctrines, which used to be standardly attributed to the so-called 'Middle Stoa' (in particular to Posidonius), and to the general influence of the Roman world and to its particular ideology. This recent revival of interest in Diogenes should shortly take a concrete form, in new editions of his fragments, announced from various sides, and designed to replace the old collection of SVF 111.210-43 (by taking into account, in particular, the new readings of the Philodemian papyri). Here, then, is the picture before us: a fascinating argument in search of ancestors, a brilliant and long-neglected philosopher in course of reevaluation, a precise piece of apparent evidence that the philosopher came close to the argument. It is tempting to match all these terms together, and to take sides with the scholars who have already claimed that Diogenes of Babylon is the inventor of the OA. However, my main claim in what follows will be that we must resist this temptation. It is not only, in my opinion, that Diogenes simply failed to invent the OA, which would be a rather uninteresting conclusion; it is also - and this might prove more interesting - that he distinctly saw the possibility of reasoning on the lines of the OA, and he quite consciously refrained from doing so. A close and perhaps boringly meticulous analysis of the text will support this claim - or so I hope. And now, let us turn to the text (Sextus Empiricus, Mix. 133-6 - 1 give the Greek text in the Appendix to this chapter). For convenience's sake, it will be easier to set it out in the following way.3 [A) Zeno propounded the following argument: (AI) A man may reasonably honour (evAoyws av rt? TLficorj) the gods. (A2) But: those who are non-existent (rovg 8e (JLTJ ovras) a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (A3): the gods exist. (B) TO this argument some people make an objection in the guise of a parallel (BI) A man may reasonably honour wise men. (B2) But: those who are non-existent a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (B3): wise men exist. Now this conclusion [i.e. (B3)] was repugnant to the Stoics, who hold that their wise man has been undiscovered till now. (c) But in reply to the parallel Diogenes the Babylonian says that the second premiss (AT/JU^CI) in Zeno's argument [i.e. (A2)] is virtually (SzW/zei) as follows: 3

Bury's text (Loeb); translation after Bury and Schofield (1982). Divisions and lettering are mine; when quoting other scholars who adopted different numberings and letterings, I modify them accordingly.

DIOGENES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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(C2) Those who are not of such a nature as to exist (TOVS Se fxrj ire^vKoras etvai) a man may not reasonably honour. For if this premiss is taken that way, it is clear that: (C3) The gods are of such a nature as to exist. (D) But if so [i.e. if (C3)], then (D3): they do actually exist (/cat elalv r/Sr]). For (DI) If they existed once upon a time (el yap arra^ irore rjoav), they also exist now (vvv) -just as, if atoms existed, they also exist now; for such things are indestructible and ungenerable according to the concept (ewoia) of bodies. Hence the argument will be conducive to a consequent conclusion. (E) AS for the wise, it is not the case that since they are of such a nature as to exist, they d o actually exist (ol 8e ye oocf>ol OVK eirel ir€vKaoiv efvcu, T/STJ KCLI

Other people 4 say Zeno's first premiss [i.e. (AI)], 'A man may reasonably honour the gods', is ambiguous: for one of its meanings is (A 1 *) 'A man may reasonably honour the gods' another is (Ai**) 'hold them in honour (TLfjLTjTiKcbs e'xoi)'. But one must take the first as a premiss, which will be false in the case of the wise. (F)

Roughly speaking, what we have here is, under (A), an argument by Zeno; under (B), a 'parallel' to (A) (a irapafioXrj) by an unnamed opponent, designed to nullify (A); under (c + D + E), Diogenes' defence of (A), claiming to avoid the TrapafSoXrj by making explicit the appropriate 'potential' (hvvaixei) meaning of the second premiss of (A); 5 (F) introduces another defence of (A), based on an alleged disambiguation of the first premiss of (A). Before examining the whole passage step by step, let us first raise a general problem. On the one hand, Diogenes introduces in the whole story a new and crucial expression, 'of such a nature as to exist', which seems to convey the notion that existence is included in the concept of certain entities - an inclusion which is, of course, the very nucleus of the OA. On this account, Zeno's argument (A) was not an ontological argument, since he did not make use of this characteristic phrase. Diogenes of Babylon may thus be thought to have transformed a non-ontological argument, Zeno's, into a properly ontological one. On the other hand, Diogenes only claims to make explicit the appropriate 4

5

It is of course perfectly clear that this second defence of Zeno's argument against objection (B) has nothing to do with Diogenes of Babylon (cf. aXXot 8e <j>aoiv); SVFm Diog. Bab. 32 quite rightly omits to quote it. However, it will be seen that we should preferably keep it within sight when discussing Diogenes' argument. It seems clear (in spite of some doubts raised by Schofield 1982) that (c), (D) and (E) go together, and quite likely that they may be jointly attributed to Diogenes, at least substantially, (c) exposes what becomes of Zeno's argument when the new premiss (C2) is substituted for (A2). Since the conclusion of the revised argument is (C3), which is not an assertion of the existence of the Gods, Diogenes is committed to offer something like (D), showing the route from this new conclusion to the existential conclusion (A3) of Zeno's original argument. As for (E), it locates the exact difference between the case of the gods and the case of the wise, a task which is mandatory for Diogenes if he is to disarm this or any irafi

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meaning of one premiss in Zeno's argument; so that if we trust him, and if his own argument is actually a genuine version of the OA, Zeno's argument already was an ontological one, at least covertly. Hence there are reasons for considering Zeno's argument as substantially ontological; and there are also reasons, on the other hand, for considering Diogenes as responsible for the decisive 'ontologization' of a non-ontological argument. Both positions have found more or less confident partisans in modern literature: Zeno's argument is essentially a version of the OA according to Schofield 1982, pp. 1-14 (but not according to Schofield 1983), and Dragona-Monachou 1976, p. 41 (the latter with a question-mark, however); only Diogenes' argument is a genuine form of the OA according to Baldassari 1971 and Dumont 1982. Both positions have their drawbacks: if we adopt the first, we have to accept that the introduction of the notion of 'being of such a nature as to exisf does not, after all, make a big difference; if we adopt the second, we have to think that Diogenes was mistaken when he claimed that Zeno's (A2) was 'virtually' identical with his own (C2). These symmetrical drawbacks give some a priori reasons for preferring a third option: namely, that neither Zeno's nor Diogenes' argument is 'ontological'. This is the course I shall follow. In order to be convinced that Zeno's argument (A) is not equivalent to any version of the OA, it is enough, in my opinion, to look at the transformations imposed upon it by the scholars who did see in it a version of such an argument.6 Schofield 1982 refers to a brief passage in Barnes 1972, pp. 17-18, in which Barnes discusses a version of the O A sometimes presented (wrongly) as Descartes' argument, namely: (GI) A God is perfect. (G2) Everything perfect exists. Therefore (G3): A God exists. If such an argument can count as a form of OA, then, Barnes says, 'there is an OA to be found some 1500 years before Anselm'. He proceeds to quote Zeno's argument in Sextus, M. ix.133, which he translates as follows: (Aa): (A 1 a) A man can properly honour the gods. (A2a) A man cannot properly honour what does not exist. (A3a) Therefore: There exist gods. This argument, Barnes adds, 'might fairly be set out as follows:' 6

This is only one among the very interesting problems raised by Zeno's seemingly strange argument; these problems are acutely discussed in Schofield 1982, and more compendiously in Schofield 1983. Here I wish to concentrate on Diogenes' argument, therefore I shall be very brief on Zeno's; but I do hope that Schofield will consider publishing his paper, or some version of it. On the other hand, it does not seem necessary to defend Zeno's argument against the formal objections questionably raised by Dumont 1982, pp. 391-2.

DIOGENES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

I75

(Ab): (Aib) A God is worthy of honour. (A2b) Non-existent things are not worthy of honour. (A3b) Therefore: A God exists. Schofield has pellucidly shown, in both his papers on the subject, 7 that Barnes' very interesting suggestion is the product of a definite choice between two construals of (AI); let us call them the anthropocentric construal and the theocentric one. In any interpretation, the meaning of (AI) must be such that it does not make (A2) redundant or pre-empted; in other words, (AI) must be construed as if it was prefixed by something like: 'whether the gods exist or not, it is reasonable to honour them'. Now, why is it or might be evXoyovl The anthropocentric answer to this question would be something like this: because it is prudentially safer. 'The gods', in this perspective, are those beings which are talked about by religious traditions, the poets, and so on. To honour them is to make sacrifices, to utter prayers mentioning their names in the appropriate form, and so forth. It is evXoyov, here 'highly reasonable', to engage in this sort of activities, because all in all it can do no harm, and it could do some good. This first, anthropocentric answer has been very aptly expressed by Schofield 1982, p. 9 (in terms which strongly recall Pascal's wager, explicitly mentioned in Schofield 1983, p. 39): I do not know whether or not there are gods, nor whether - if they exist - they care for man and pay attention to his prayers and praises. I do not know whether to trust Homer and the poets and the traditional beliefs of the Greeks in these matters. But it would be prudent in any event to honour the gods with sacrifices and the other traditional observances. If there are no gods, no great harm is done: a little time may be wasted, but after all time saved is often wasted in some other way. If there are gods, and they are as most Greeks and most of the poets believe them to be, they may well cause me injury if I omit to honour them but reward me if I give them worship. The second answer, the theocentric one, instead of paying attention to what good and harm the gods are traditionally supposed to do to men, relies rather on the intrinsic properties conceptually assigned to a god (if there is any such being) by virtue of his very nature. 'The gods', in this second perspective, are whatever beings answer to the concept of a divine being (involving every kind of conceivable perfection). To honour them is to pay them the intellectual and spiritual homage we owe to such a cluster of perfections. It is evXoyov, here 'perfectly appropriate', to endorse this sort of attitude, not because of the expectable advantages and disadvantages of playing or not playing with the gods the game of give and take, but because respect and homage are the right attitude to adopt towards their conceptual perfection, whatever may come out of it. The crucial word evXoycos, used by Zeno, does not by itself commit the 7

With more details, and more sympathy for Barnes's suggestion, in Schofield 1982 than in Schofield 1983.

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STOICISM

reader to any of these alternative interpretations: it may be evXoyov for X to adopt a given attitude towards Y either because this attitude is prudent, given X's basic desires and interests, or because it is justified, given Y's intrinsic nature. It is perfectly clear that Barnes's rewriting of (A),firstin the form (Aa), where the translation of evXoyws as 'properly' unobtrusively points to specific intrinsic properties of divine being, and then in the form (Ab), where 'honour' is something a God is worthy of, rather than something a man would be welladvised to pay him, implies a theocentric view of the argument.8 Such seems, then, to be the condition on which Zeno's argument can be considered as a (rather well concealed) version of the OA. It is certainly very hard, if we look only at this very brief argument, to decide which interpretation, the anthropocentric or the theocentric, hence the nonontological or the ontological, is the right one. Schofield 1983, who advocates the anthropocentric interpretation, offers only presumptions.9 Of course I could argue that Diogenes' argument is not ontological (as I shall try to show later on) and that it is just a transformation of Zeno's argument (as Diogenes himself claims it to be), so that Zeno's argument would not be ontological either. But it would be vastly preferable to have independent reasons for arguing that neither argument is ontological. As far as Zeno's argument is concerned, two indications might be invoked in favour of the anthropocentric, i.e. non-ontological interpretation: first, that the word evXoyov, in Zeno's usage, seems rather to point to prudential considerations,10 secondly, that the Stoic general line, regarding religious behaviour, seems to endorse much of the traditional notion of an exchange of services between gods and men.11 These arguments perhaps do not go much further than Schofield's 'impressions'; but I give them for what they are worth. Section (B) of our passage contains the anonymous objection raised against 8

9 10

I1

Cf. Schofield 1982, p. 13 ('One of the distinguishing features of Barnes's reading, in fact, is the way it confines the scope of the reasons adumbrated in "reasonably" to considerations about the nature of the gods or the non-existent, excluding separate attention to the rationality of propositional attitudes to them' - his emphasis) and 1983, pp. 38-9 (The major drawback to this [i.e. Barnes's] reading of [Zeno's] syllogism is its interpretation of the first premiss: it converts what looks like a thesis about the rationality of human behaviour, based presumably on empirical or at least contingent considerations, into an a priori statement about the nature of the divine (viz. that it is such as to give us reason to honour it).'). Cf. Schofield 1983, p. 39: 'It seems preferable to stick with the impression that the premiss (AI) is indeed about the rationality of pious or religious behaviour.' Cf. the definition of the KadrJKov as o npaxOev evXoyov ur^ei ajroXoyioyiov, 'that for which, when done, a reasonable defence can be adduced' (DL vn.107). Diogenes Laertius adds that Zeno was the first to use the term KadfJKov, and that he explained it through the etymology and TOV Kara nvas rJKew, 'from what is incumbent on certain beings'. It seems clear that nvas refers to the agents which have a reasonable motive to behave in such and such way, not to the beneficiaries towards which, given their intrinsic nature, it is reasonable to do so. Schofield 1982, pp. 4-5, discusses at length an argument quoted by Sextus, Mix. 123, which has some obvious affinities with Zeno's argument, and which might be by Chrysippus, namely: 'if Gods do not exist, piety (euae/Seia) is non-existent; but piety exists; therefore Gods exist'. In explaining the argument, Sextus quotes what apparently is a Stoic definition of eiWjSeia as 'the science of service to the gods' {kiriariqixiq Oecov depairzias). The word Oepaireia seems to imply that gods are to be pleased and taken care of, not just disinterestedly venerated. But cf. n. 15 below.

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Zeno's argument (an objection which has often been compared with the celebrated Lost Island objection of the monk Gaunilo to Anselm), in the form of a 'parallel' (TTapafioXrj). A 'parallel' is an argument which is formally and semantically as close as possible to the argument under attack, and which comes to a conclusion which is either absurd or repugnant to the adversary. It was described in some detail by Philodemus (Rhet. I . I I . 17-30), and more recently very aptly christened as 'the "You-might-as-well-say" manoeuvre' (Wisdom 1952, p. 80, both quoted by Schofield 1983, p. 35). We know of other objections to arguments by Zeno which follow the same strategy: one of them is attributed to the Dialectician Alexinos (cf. Sextus, M. ix. 108-9, who also reports the answer made by 'the Stoics' to Alexinos' rrapa^oXiq.12 The Trapa^oXrj in (B) is a fine instance of the kind. The premiss (BI) is quite close to (AI), the only difference being the substitution of the wise men for the gods; and it is hard to see, at first view, how one could find (A 1) plausible and (BI) not equally plausible (the authors of the second defence (F), in 136, will make a brave attempt in this direction). The premiss (B2) is identical with (A2). The conclusion (B3) is not absurd in itself; but it is unpalatable to the Stoics, who made a notorious fuss about the empirical existence of their Wise Man. The objection is therefore strictly ad hominem. It would be open to the Stoics, among other courses, to abandon, or to mitigate, their dogma about the Sage, to realize that a totally uninstantiated ideal is little sustenance, and to admit that there are or were indeed some Wise Men after all. Section (c) shows that this is not the line of argument Diogenes adopted. In order to disarm the TrapafioXrj, he rather suggested that the real meaning of (A2) was what he expressed by (C2): 'Those who are not of such a nature as to exist (TOVS Se firj ire^vKorag elvai) a man may not reasonably honour.' The exact meaning of the crucial phrase ne^vKores elvat is not immediately clear; I shall provisionally, and conventionally, refer to it by the phrase 'naturally existing'. But I think it preferable to defer the detailed discussion of what it means until we see what sort of conclusions Diogenes allows himself or forbids himself to draw from a statement saying that beings of such and such type are or are not naturally existing. For the moment, I shall only offer some preliminary remarks. It is likely that the predicate 'naturally existing' is supposed to constitute the relevant difference between the gods and the wise; the gods are 'naturally existing', the wise are quite probably not (more on this later); the introduction 12

Alexinos, a contemporary of Zeno, seems to have been a specialist in anti-Zenonian TrapafioXai (cf. Schofield 1983, pp. 34-8). In view of the narrow parallelism of the sequence in M ix. 104-1 o (argument by Zeno - TTapafioXrj by Alexinos - Stoic answer to the TrapafioXrj) and the one in M ix. 133-5 (argument by Zeno - anonymous TrapafioXr] - answer to the irapafioXr) by Diogenes of Babylon), it is more than tempting to attribute the anonymous irapa^oXiq of ix. 133 to Alexinos (thus Schofield 1983, pp. 36-7 - better than to Carneades, pace Baldassari 1971, p. 549 n. 114, and Dumont 1982, pp. 391-3) and the anonymous reply of ix.109-110 to Diogenes. This is of course speculative, but note the use of the idea of'absolutely (or: once for all) better (Kaddna^ Kpelrrovy in this latter reply, and Diogenes' visible concern with various aspects of the notion of the absolute (Baldassari 1971, pp. 549fT).

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of this predicate is presumably designed to break the irapafioXri. We must understand that from (AI) and (C2) it is legitimate to conclude (C3). Are we supposed to understand that from (BI) and (C2) it would not be legitimate to conclude that (C3*) the wise men are of such a nature as to exist? In other words, is the revised syllogism immune to any new TrapafioXrp. The answer to this question is far from clear. Schofield 1982, pp. 17-18, asks the question: why could not an opponent build a new irapafioXrp. It would have the following form: (BI) A man may reasonably honour the wise. (C2) Those who are not of such a nature as to exist a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (03*): The wise are of such a nature as to exist. (C3*) is probably no less repugnant to the Stoics than (B3) was: whatever the exact meaning of'naturally existing' may be, the wise are likely to be conceived as not naturally existing; otherwise the substitution of (C2) for (A2) could not be expected to work efficiently against the first irapafioXrj. If so, the only way of not being saddled with the conclusion (C3*) of the second irapafioXri would be to question ( B I ) , 1 3 and to turn the syllogism upside down, as follows: (Not-C3*) The wise are not of such a nature as to exist. (C2) Those who are not of such a nature as to exist a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (Not-Bi): A man may not reasonably honour the wise. The only trouble is that this course of reasoning could perfectly well have been used against the first irapafioXr} as well: if the Stoics are committed to agree that it does not make sense to honour the wise, it matters little whether it is for the simple reason that they do not exist or for the sophisticated reason that they do not 'naturally exist'. The first premiss of the irapa^oXr} (BI) should have been rejected out of hand. By choosing to revise Zeno's second premiss (A2), kept untouched by the opponent in his (B2), Diogenes seems to have aimed at the wrong target: it would have been much more reasonable of him to attack the first premiss of the irapa^oXrj (BI) and to show that it was no real 'parallel' to Zeno's first premiss ( A I ) . 1 4 Let us note that this is exactly what the authors of the second defence (F) tried to do, by distinguishing two different meanings of 'honouring', one strictly applicable only to the gods ('honouring strictly speaking'), another applicable both to the gods and to the wise ('holding in honour'). If (AI) is 13

14

Schofield 1982, p. 17, detects in Section (E) 'an attempt to show why no convincing T p j to the new version of the argument [i.e. (c)] can be devised'. In my opinion, this section (E) deals not with the first step of Diogenes' argument, i.e. the revised syllogism to (C3) offered in (c), but with the second step of Diogenes' argument, i.e. Section (D), which goes from (C3) to the assertion of the gods' actual existence. Schofield 1982, p. 18, makes the point roundly: 'Diogenes' proposal to save Zeno's syllogism by reading (A2) as (C2) is ( . . . ) a disaster'.

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meant in the stricter sense, then (BI) is simply false, and Alexinos' collapses. However, it might be said that the distinction made by the authors of (F) in respect to the gods, at the level of (AI), was implicitly made by Diogenes, at the more general level of (A2) read as ( d ) , in respect to the 'naturally existing' beings. I here quote some excellent remarks on this point by Schofield 1982, pp. 18-20: '(C2) contains an idea of great interest. It is only a pity that Diogenes spoilt its presentation by offering it as a general claim about giving honour, when it is really a persuasive and penetrating observation about something else. What he has actually put his finger on is a feature of the concept of worship,15 i.e. of the concept of a particular form of honour appropriately bestowed only upon divine beings. 16 (...) We may accordingly rewrite Diogenes' argument as follows: (ci*) A man may reasonably worship the gods. (C2*) A man may not reasonably worship those who are not of such a nature as to exist. Therefore [03): The gods are of such a nature as to exist.' Such an argument, Schofield says (1982, p. 20), is immune to any since by definition there is no genuine 'parallel' whatsoever to the gods as worthy of a reasonable worship. Now, whether we consider Diogenes' original formulation of his revised syllogism, from (ci) and (C2) to (03), or Schofield's rewriting of it, from (ci*) and (C2*) to (C3), we should observe that (C3) is, precisely, a conclusion. This should drive us to make a radical distinction between Diogenes' argument (thus far) and at least some versions of the OA, namely those where the inclusion of existence in the very essence of God is given the status of an immediate and evident truth, straightforwardly readable, so to speak, in the concept of God, and only in that concept. The notion of being naturally existing, far from being discovered in the sole occasion of a scrutiny of this peculiar concept, is introduced by Diogenes in abstracto, in (C2), and then applied to the gods in the conclusion (C3). The only immediate truth about the gods is that it is reasonable to honour them; the only immediate truth about 15

16

A word which, according to Schofield, has no exact equivalent in Greek, as far as range of use and connotation are concerned. Perhaps, however, OOIOTTJS would fill the bill, at least to a certain extent. Sextus M ix.124 quotes an argument parallel to the piety argument (cf. n. 11 above), where OGIOTTJS is substituted for euaejSeia and defined as SiKaioovvr) rig npos deovs. The force of TLS could be to expel the utilitarian connotations of hiKaioovvrj, so that OOIOTTJS would correspond to a disinterested conception of the god-man relation, as opposed to evoefieia conceived as a kind of utilitarian depaneta. I cannot quite see, however, how Schofield (1982, pp. 18-19) c a n h°kl (i) that the implicit delimitations of the concept of worship by Diogenes is 'a persuasive and penetrating observation'; (ii) that the authors of the second defence (F) 'were perhaps driving at the same sort of conceptual differentiation between honouring and worship which (...) is the true basis of Diogenes' proposal'; and (iii) that this second defence 'otherwise looks like a remarkably feeble attempt to defend Zeno's argument'. It seems to me that this defence does not contain anything in addition to the conceptual differentiation in question.

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naturally existing beings is that it is reasonable to honour only such beings. There is no immediate truth linking the concept of god with the concept of a naturally existing being. Of course, the conclusion (C3) might serve as a premiss in a new argument which would be some version of the OA; but it is not a primary premiss in such an argument. Still more importantly, we must observe that (C3) is a conclusion different from Zeno's original conclusion (A3), i.e. from the assertion that the gods exist. Diogenes' revised syllogism (c) is no OA whatsoever, for the simple reason that it does not conclude to the gods' existence. To this extent, Diogenes' implicit claim that he just saved Zeno's argument against the irapafioXr} by eliciting the real meaning of its second premiss is seriously misleading: actually the substitution of (C2) for (A2) entails a radical watering down of Zeno's original conclusion, since the new conclusion (03) is not identical with (A3), but considerably weaker. In this respect, the Trapa^oXrj has been quite successful: Diogenes has not been able both to disarm the irapa^oXr] and to preserve the existential import of the original conclusion. If he wants not to leave the matter at that, he is committed to devise a supplementary argument, leading from the conclusion of his revised syllogism (C3) to the conclusion of Zeno's original syllogism (A3), an argument for which the model provided by Zeno obviously offers no clue. This is, I think, the job which Diogenes assigns himself in the following section of the Sextian passage, i.e. (D). 1 7

Section (D) is probably the most difficult and unmanageable section of the whole Sextian passage. It has been rather ill treated by those scholars who discussed Diogenes' argument. Dumont 1982 is silent about it. Baldassari 1971, pp. 561-2, has an enormous and tortuous sentence on the subject, the essential meaning of which seems to be that he is pretty well embarrassed by this section. Schofield 1982, p. 23, candidly confesses that something in the deduction of (D3) from (C3) is incomprehensible to him. The temporal considerations (airai; TTOT€ rjoav, vvv eloiv) which show up in the argument are obviously intriguing. Can we hope to make things a little better? A first important lesson of Section (D) is to be drawn from its very existence. For we could be otherwise tempted to think that (03), T h e gods are of such a nature as to exist', means that they actually exist and that their existence is of a 17

As a matter of fact, Diogenes commits himself to coming to the slightly different conclusion (D3) that 'the gods actually exist' (elolv ^ST?). The adjunction of rjSrj (rightly translated by Bury, I think, as 'actually') seems to be dictated by a concern for stressing the conceptual and logical distance between 'to be of such a nature as to exist' and '[actually] to exist'. Diogenes obviously wants to emphasize both that (C3), the intermediate conclusion of his revised syllogism, is not equivalent to an assertion of existence, and that nevertheless it can be used as a way to reach a full assertion of existence. Zeno's conclusion will be reached at one remove, but without losing anything of its force. But it seems clear that in Diogenes' view, (D3) does not differ substantially from (A3).

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particularly strong type of existence, let us say 'necessary existence' (not only that if they exist, then they enjoy necessary, not contingent existence). 18 If such were the case, Section (D) would be pointless: (D3), the Diogenian version of (A3), would be immediately implied by (C3), since (D3) is one of the conjuncts of (C3) if (03) is read as the above conjunction. The existence of Section (D) thus rules out giving to the predicate 'naturally existing' the meaning 'existing and enjoying necessary existence'. This is a first constraint, helpful though negative, on the meaning of 'naturally existing'. Another possible way from (C3) to (D3) would be to make use of an implicit universal premiss which would run as follows: 'Everything which is of such a nature as to exist actually exists', or else, still more generally, 'Everything which is of such a nature as to be F actually is F'. Combined with (C3), this premiss would yield (D3) without more ado. Such an argument would undoubtedly count as a version of the OA, since it would use a particular feature of the essence of God (C3) to deduce his actual existence (D3). We can only observe that Diogenes does not proceed in this way at all. He claims to have a way of going from (C3) to (D3): what I have dubbed Section (D) begins with the expression of this claim: el 8e rovro (i.e., if (C3)), KCLI elalv rjSrj (i.e., then (D3)). But Diogenes' way of justifying the inference from (C3) to (D3), as we shall see, is quite unexpected (and utterly frustrating) for anybody who would be tempted to see in him the inventor of the OA. On the other hand, it is quite refreshing for anybody who is suspicious about the philosophical virtues of the OA, since it is hard to deny that Diogenes was on the verge of offering some version of it (he had all the ingredients in hand). For such a reader, it is rewarding to see that the first philosopher who clearly foresaw a possibility of demonstrating the existence of gods along the lines of the OA consciously refrained from offering such a demonstration. What does he offer instead in the way of demonstration? 19 Why and how are bizarre temporal considerations (ctVa^, vvv) smuggled into the argument? The text is difficult, perhaps compressed or abridged by Sextus or his source; but I think that nothing essential to its understanding is really missing. The transition from (C3) to (D3) (el 8e TOVTO, KCLI elalv rjSrj) is supposed to be 18

19

Schofield 1983, p. 39, in his rather brief discussion of our passage seems to take this line. He glosses (C2) in the following terms: 'This interesting proposal is perhaps best considered as stating a feature of one sort of honour, namely worship: it is appropriately offered only to necessary beings (not contingent, like the wise).' If (C2) is construed this way, (C3) would presumably mean that the gods are indeed necessary beings, i.e. beings who exist and necessarily so {not: who exist necessarily if they exist at all). The reasoning from (C3) to (D3) is presented as 'conclusive' (OVVOLKTIKOS, cf. Kara OLKOXOVOOV €Tnopav ovvdgei 6 Xoyos, 135). It seems to me that, taken by itself, it possesses the characteristics of a demonstration, in the Stoic technical sense of the term (cf. Brunschwig 1980). By contrast, the syllogism concluding to (A3) or to (C3), either in the Zenonian form or in the Diogenian, seems to fall short of a demonstration, in virtue of its €v\6ya>s premiss (cf. Baldassari 1971, pp. 565, 574).

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justified (cf. yap immediately after) by a syllogism in modus ponens, the second premiss of which is left unexpressed: (DI) If the gods existed once upon a time (el yap aVa£ rrore rjoav), they also exist now (vvv). (D2, suppressed premiss). The gods existed once upon a time. Therefore (D3*):20 The gods exist now. A first problem with this syllogism is the following. As we just saw, the syllogism is supposed to justify the transition from (C3) to (D3); but it completely fails to mention (C3) among its premisses. The idea that the gods are of such a nature as to exist does not play any explicit part in the reasoning. However, it would be hard to suppose that it has been forgotten halfway through. So we have to try to find out if and how (C3) is still present and logically active, in some sense, either behind (DI) or behind (D2). Let us first try ( D I ) as a possible candidate. The principle behind the hypothesis would be something like this: (DI *) For all X, if X is of such a nature as to exist, then if X existed once upon a time, then X exists now. But to say that if something existed once upon a time, then it exists now is the same as to say that it is imperishable. Thus we can abbreviate (DI*) and express it as follows: ( D I * * ) For all X, if X is of such a nature as to exist, then X is imperishable. ( D I * * ) is not very plausible by itself in the first place, given the ordinary meaning of'nature' in such philosophical contexts. What happens to things is by no means coextensive to what they are of such a nature as to do or to undergo: lots of things happen to things contrary to their nature, if only 20

I dub this conclusion vvv elaiv (D3*), because it is at least morphologically different from (D3) (eiCTiV 17S77). But I take it that (D3*), i.e. 'the gods exist now', implies (D3), i.e. 'the gods exist actually', so that if (D3*) is validly deduced, so will (D3) be. Why does Diogenes undertake to deduce (D3*) in his modus ponens syllogism, instead of directly deducing (D3) ? Possibly because the best conditional premiss he could find to do the required job was (DI), the consequent of which involves the notion of existing now. In any case, the yap in el yap a-nat; -nork rjoav seems to indicate clearly enough that elalv 17817 is a way of anticipating the conclusion (namely vvv eloiv) of the supporting argument which follows. I realize, however, that this way of dealing with the difference between (D3) and (D3*) might be a weak point in my interpretation. Another way of construing the argument (suggested to me by Malcolm Schofield in correspondence) could be summarized as follows, (i) Elolv fj8r) (D3) means 'they actually exist at some time or other', (ii) (C3) immediately entails (D3), by virtue of a version of the so-called 'Principle of Plenitude', (iii) The modus ponens syllogism is a way of disarming the possible objection that (D3) could be true without the gods existing now. The yap-clause explains why the objection does not work, by introducing the new premiss (DI). The entire train of reasoning is thus: (C3), so (D3); now (DI), SO (D3*) - from (D3) + (DI). This is undoubtedly an attractive suggestion; however, it seems to me that the crucial inference from (C3) to (D3) needs some justification (in Schofield's reading, Diogenes would take it as obvious); now, if some justification is needed, the yap-clause is more naturally construed as precisely giving this justification (instead of answering an unexpressed objection). I am therefore inclined to stick to my proposal, which is, as will be seen below in more detail: (C3), so (D2); now (DI), SO (D3*) from (D2) + (DI); hence (D3).

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appropriate external causes act on them in the appropriate way, preventing the standard display of their nature. Man e.g. is something which is of such a nature as to see; this does not prevent some men from being or becoming blind; similarly, something which is of such a nature as to exist can perish, if only it meets some external cause strong enough to destroy it, that is contrary to its nature in some appropriate degree. In addition to that, to suppose that (DI*) is present in the argument of Section (D) raises a number of difficulties, as might be shown by the problems which Schofield finds himself involved in when he claims (1982, pp. 22-3) that '[Sextus'] source seems to be trying to explicate the notion of "having a nature such as to exist" and its consequences by precisely assimilating them to the conception of the imperishable and its consequences' (his emphasis). The basis of this claim is the analogy with atoms which is developed in ix.135. Like the gods, the text says, the atoms are such that if they existed once upon a time, 21 they also exist now; the equivalence of this implication with the attributes of imperishability and ungenerability is ensured by what comes after (adapra yap Kal dyevrjra TOL TOIOLVTOL ian). Now the imperishability of the atoms is contained in the very notion of such bodies (Kara rrjv ewoiav rcov creo/zcn-cov). It is of course tempting to assimilate what is implied by the nature of something and what is contained in the notion of something. Thus Schofield: 'Where [C3] speaks of its being in the nature of a god to exist, Sextus' source here remarks that "according to the conception of atoms they are incapable of being created or destroyed"' (his emphasis). But the price to pay for this assimilation (which is not explicit in Sextus' text) is high, first of all because one might hold, as Schofield himself says, that there is 'a world of difference between having such a nature as to exist and being conceived of as imperishable'. Moreover, assimilating the two notions creates an insuperable muddle in Diogenes' argumentation. For the imperishability of atoms cannot and does not imply their existence - least of all for the Stoics, who are notoriously hostile to any atomistic conception of the physical world. So if (C3) was the ground for (DI), that is to say, if the 'naturally existing' character of the gods was taken as a ground for their imperishability, no advance at all would be made along the road to a demonstration of their existence, and the modus ponens syllogism from (DI) to (D3*) would be seriously in danger of total inefficiency.22 In order to save the argument from this fatal collapse, I think we must, on the contrary, keep carefully separate the two predicates of 'being of such a nature as to exist' and 'being imperishable'. The second predicate belongs both to the gods and to the atoms. It seems quite likely that, in Diogenes' view, the first belongs only to the gods. 'Being imperishable' pertains to the atoms in 21

22

T h e text simply says el aro/txot tfoav, but it is clear, from the context, that a V a f is to be understood. Cf. Schofield 1982, p p . 2 2 - 3 (after noticing t h a t the imperishability of a t o m s does n o t imply their existence): 'Is not this exactly analogous to what we should say a b o u t Diogenes' attempt to derive the existence of gods from their nature?'

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virtue of their evvoia: the word is important, because we know that in the Stoic conception, there are lots of ewoiai which are notions of nothing existing (cf. DL VII. 53); the famous irpoX^Ls, which does have the force of a criterion (DL VII.54), is only a very special kind of eWoia. 23 Even for a Stoic philosopher, who does not believe that there are atoms, it is perfectly possible to say, on the basis of the evvoca of atom, what properties an atom would have if there was such a thing as an atom. The choice of atoms as a support for the analogy, which has embarrassed some scholars because the Stoics do not believe that there are atoms, is, on the contrary, quite helpful: it is precisely designed, in my view, to isolate hypothetical statements about things we have evvoiai of from categorical ones about things we have 7Tpo\r)ifj€Ls of: //"something like an atom existed, it would be imperishable, an implication which is all the more interesting and useful in the argument as there is nothing like an atom. Presumably, the same implication holds good of the gods, on the sole basis of the simple evvoia of god: if there were gods, they would be imperishable. But this implication does not make use of the idea that gods are of such a nature as to exist, which is presumably based not on the eWoia, but on the TrpoXrjifjig of god. 24 Thus it seems better to give up the idea that the mode of presence of (03) in the modus ponens syllogism is its being the ground for (DI): 'being of such a nature as to exist' and 'being imperishable' must be considered as independent predicates, neither of which implies the other. Now we can turn to the second candidate, namely the suppressed premiss (D2): the gods existed once upon a time. This fairy-tale-looking premiss is charming but intriguing; we need it all the same, if the modus ponens is to work at all. So where are its credentials? Is it anyhow likely that (C3) is the justification for (D2), i.e. that because the gods are of such a nature as to exist, they existed once upon a time? There are two ways of giving an affirmative answer to this question. The first is to say that (C3) means (D2); the second is to say that (C3) is a premiss out of which (D2) can be obtained. The first way is not as completely silly as it appears. We could perhaps understand rre^vKores efvcu, in an etymologizing mood (from C/)VGLS as 'birth'), as 'having existed at the beginning of things', in particular 'having existed before the time when men began to exist'; then to say that the gods 7T€(f)VKaaLv elvai would be to say that they existed once upon a time, namely at the beginning of things, as the poets say. However, we cannot go very far along this road: for such a reinterpretation of the phrase TrecfrvKores elvac should be 23

24

O n the non-existential import of cWota or kirlvoia in Hellenistic philosophical vocabulary, cf. Sextus, M VIH.334A-336A: it is 'just a m o t i o n of the intellect', which involves no judgement, no assertion whatsoever concerning whether the conceived object exists or not. See my comments o n this question in chapter 11 below, p p . 224-43. The main distinguishing feature of the irpoX^ifjis is that it is the p r o d u c t of a natural genesis ( D L VII.53-4). Presumably, a knowledge a b o u t what things naturally are is to be reached t h r o u g h the irpoXrjifHs which they causally imprint into the mind, by virtue of their own nature, and in a natural way.

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referred back on its first occurrence, i.e. ( d ) ; and the Diogenian revised premiss would then mean that a man may not reasonably honour those who have not existed at the beginning of things. This principle would leave reasonable honourability to those beings who indeed existed at the beginning of things, but disappeared since then, e.g. evil powers overcome by the first gods; it would debar from reasonable honourability those beings who did not exist at the beginning of things, but who share some relevant features with the first gods, e.g. their sons and descendants, or the founding heroes of the cities. Whatever interest Diogenes might have in such mythological niceties, it is very doubtful that he had this sort of thing in mind. We should accordingly try the second way, namely to explore the possibility that (C3) is a premiss out of which (D2) can be obtained. In order to get this result, we must admittedly suppose a second suppressed premiss, ( D I * * * ) , SO as to build the following syllogism: (03) The gods are of such a nature as to exist. (DI ***) Everything which is of such a nature as to exist existed once upon a time. (D2) Therefore, the gods existed once upon a time. (DI ***) is interesting, because it helps to give its exact meaning to the predicate 'naturally existing'. I have already given some reasons for arguing that this predicate cannot be equivalent to 'existing and enjoying necessary existence'; (DI ***) confirms this point, since the predicate now turns out to imply nothing more than existence 'once upon a time'. On the other hand, 'naturally existing' appears to mean more than just 'possibly existing' since according to (DI ***) a being of such a nature must have actually existed once upon a time. 25 In sum, the predicate 'naturally existing' must be weaker than 'necessarily existing', and stronger than 'possibly existing'. It must be weaker than 'necessarily existing', since otherwise it would immediately imply 'actually existing', and Diogenes' argument would be a form of the OA; but the needed premiss (DI ***) shows that it implies less than that. It must be stronger than 'possibly existing', because possible existence implies no form whatsoever of actual existence, even 'once upon a time', and ( D I * * * ) precisely shows that 'being of such a nature as to exist' does imply having existing once upon a time. 26 How then to define more precisely the meaning of'naturally existing', if we try to avoid both the Charybdis of a too strong reading and the Scylla of a too 25

26

Here I disagree with an oral suggestion m a d e by A. L o n g and quoted by D r a g o n a - M o n a c h o u 1976, p . 4 3 : ' "If something is of a n a t u r e to exist" is equivalent to "If something can exist". A n d it does not follow from the fact that something can exist that it has existed, unless we a d d the premiss that nothing can exist which has not previously existed.' It seems to me that suppressed premisses are not multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, so that it is preferable to take the implication in ( D I * * * ) at its face value, rather t h a n inserting an additional premiss in order to m a k e it intelligible (even if L o n g interestingly claims that his additional premiss should be accepted by the Stoics, on the basis of their theory of the cyclical repetition of events). A n additional reason is that in the Stoic view the wise presumably are possible beings, and are not 'naturally existing'.

186

STOICISM

weak one? If we rely on the entailment expressed in ( D I * * * ) , we can perhaps suggest the following solution. As I briefly hinted above, the properties which a given type of being possesses by nature are normally possessed by any token of this type; a given token of the type cannot be deprived of any of these properties, unless by accident, or, if this language looks too Aristotelian for Stoic 'determinism', unless through the action of prohibiting external causes. This seems to be just an essential part of the concept of nature, as conveyed by phrases like 7T€vKaoiv etvai; and that is why no principle such as the OAdirected 'Everything which is of such a nature as to be F actually is F' was assumed in the first place. Let us admit, then, that (C2), 'those who are not TTt^vKores €IVOLL a man may not reasonably honour', means that it would not be reasonable to honour a being who exists only accidentally, or through the action of specific external causes which would counteract its normal inexistence (a perfectly defensible idea by itselF 7 ); and that (C3), 'the gods 7T€(f)VKaGLv elvai\ means something like: tokens of the type must normally exist, they are not such that if they exist, they do so only accidentally. It is not excluded that there are no such tokens now, or that there has been none or will be none at some other time; but if such were the case, it would be by accident, through the prohibiting action of specific external causes (cups are of such a nature as to be broken; they normally break, unless one - or even lots of them have sunk in the depths of sea). On the other hand, it is excluded that at every time in the past, the gods did not exist, because any failure of them to exist can only be accidental or contrary to their nature; now prohibiting, anti-natural causes do not regularly overcome natural ones; by definition the accident cannot be the rule (it cannot be the case that no cup ever broke). Thus, even in the case where the gods did not exist now, it would be legitimate to say that there has been, in the indefinite past, one moment (at least) when they existed. In this interpretation of'naturally existing' as 'normally existing' (understood as above), the implication expressed by ( D I * * * ) seems perfectly justified: if we give to 'normally' the appropriate meaning, everything which normally exists has existed at least at some moment of the past. Now that I have established, or so I hope, that (C3) is indeed tacitly present in the modusponens syllogism which starts from (DI) and concludes to (D3*), not however as the ground for (DI), but as the ground for (D2), we can come back to this syllogism as a whole. The two independent ideas that (i) z/the gods exist, they are imperishable, and that (ii) they are of such a nature to exist, can now combine to generate the desired conclusion. The first idea, probably extracted from the evvoca of god (given the comparison with the atoms), is the ground for the conditional premiss (DI); the second one, the conclusion of Diogenes' first revised syllogism, is the ground for the separate assertion of the antecedent (D2). All in all, Diogenes' careful procedure ensures the transition 27

'We can't help feeling that the worthy object of our worship can never be a thing that merely happens to exist' (Findlay, quoted by Schofield 1982, p. 20). But 'not merely happening to exist' is compatible both with 'normally existing' and with 'necessarily existing'.

DIOGENES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

187

from (03) to (D3*), i.e. from the conclusion of his revision of Zeno's syllogism to (a slightly revised form of) the conclusion of Zeno's syllogism. Let us see, before recapitulating the whole story, whether Section (E) confirms or disconfirms the present analysis. This section is obviously designed to point out where exactly the difference is between the gods and the wise, this time in order to disarm a possible TTapaftoXrj against Diogenes' second step. 28 At the beginning of Section (D), it was said that if (03) the gods are of such a nature as to exist, then - but not by any immediate inference - (D3) they do actually exist. Section (E) precisely says that it is not so with the wise: 'as for the wise, it is not the case that since they are of such a nature as to exist, they do actually exist (01 8e ye oool OVK €7T€i rre^vKaoiv cfvcu, 7/877 /cat ciaiV)'. In other words, the transition from (03) to (D3), successfully realized in the case of the gods in Section (D), could not be paralleled in the case of the wise. Why is it not possible? The text does not say why; and we can hesitate between two solutions: either the wise are not of such a nature as to exist, so that any inference, whether direct or indirect, from the false premiss that they are of such a nature, is straightforwardly blocked or nullified (if one accepts that e falso sequitur quodlibet); or the wise are of such a nature as to exist, but for some reason the argument which successfully proceeded from the analogous premiss about the gods to the assertion of the gods' existence is not applicable to the wise. In order to elucidate this point, we should pay attention to the form of the sentence (OVK iirei KTX): what we have here is what the Stoics dubbed a (negated) Trapaavvvrj/jievov, the distinctive feature of which, in respect to the ovvrjiJLiJLevov, is the use of eVet ('since') instead of el ('if). According to the Stoic Crinis's Art of Dialectic, quoted by DL vii.71, the force of the specific conjunction 'since', in statements of the form 'since /?, q\ is (i) that q follows from/7 (i.e. that if/?, then q\ in other words, that the associate crwT/jii/zeVov is true) and(ii) that/? is the case. DL also says (vii.74) that the irapaovwiqixevov is true if p is true and q follows from /?, false if p is false or (obviously nonexclusive) if q does not follow from/?. To understand why the TrapaowvrjiJLevov 'Since the wise are of such a nature as to exist, they actually exist' is false, let us then consider its components: (EI), the associate awq^evov. 'If the wise are of such a nature as to exist, then they actually exist'. (E2), the antecedent: 'The wise are of such a nature as to exist'. We have got several options: either (EI) is false, or (E2) is false, or both. Embarras de richesse. Let us try to find our way through these three options. First option: the -napaovv^^ixevov is false because (EI) is false, (E2) being 28

Schofield 1982, p. 17, tries to read this section as if it was designed to disarm a TrapafioXrj to Diogenes'^*™/ syllogism (his revision of Zeno's syllogism). No wonder he finds the section 'not very clear', and concludes that 'we must convict Diogenes or at least the commentator of massive ignoratio elenchf.

188

STOICISM

true. This means, first, that it is true that the wise ire^vKaoiv etvai. Now, the Stoics certainly would not be ready to accept that the wise normally exist, and that if they 'remained undiscoverable up till now', it is a mere matter of accident. So, in order to get a way of making (E2) true, it would be necessary to weaken the meaning of ire^vKaotv etvat down to 'possibly existing', which actually is an acceptable predicate for the wise. Secondly, in order to make (EI) false, we must give the same phrase a meaning weaker than 'necessarily existing': 'possibly existing' and 'normally existing' would both fill the bill. Thus, if we want to keep a consistent meaning for the phrase in both premisses, 'possibly existing' is the only choice. But we have found just now independent reasons for not giving such a meaning to this phrase. The first option, therefore, has nothing attractive in it. Second option: the TrapaovvrjiJLiJLevov is false because (E2) is false, (EI) being true. Now, in order to get a way of making (E2) false, we can give to TTZ$VK
DIOGENES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

189

is out of reach. Both premisses of the attempted irapafioAr} could thus be legitimately rejected by Diogenes. To conclude, after this examination of each step of Diogenes' argument, it will probably be helpful to recapitulate it, in the terms of the analysis which has been offered. (AI) A man may reasonably honour the gods (from Zeno). ( d ) Those who are not of such a nature as to exist a man may not reasonably honour (by implication from the right meaning of 'honour'). Therefore (C3): The gods are of such a nature as to exist. Everything which is of such a nature as to exist existed once upon a time (in virtue of the meaning of'nature'). Therefore (D2): The gods existed once upon a time (from (C3) and ( D I * * * ) ) . (DI***)

(DI) If the gods existed once upon a time, they also exist now (from the evvoLd of god). Therefore (D3*) The gods exist now (from (DI) and (D2)). Not too bad. But nothing 'ontological' in it. Rather, the long way from (03) to (D3*) seems to mean: beware of the snares of- ontologicality.

APPENDIX Sextus Empiricus, Mix. 133-6: (A) ZTJVOJV 8e /cat TOLOVTOV rjpwra Aoyov • TOVS deovs evAoyws

dv TLS ri/jiayq • TOVS 8e

jjiT] b'vTas OVK dv TLS evAoycos TLfjuarrj • elolv dpa deoL (Bl) ' Q L Aoyco TLves TrapafidAAovTes (j>aai' TOVS ooovs dv TLS evAoyojs TL/jLorr) • TOVS 8e firj b'vTas OVK dv TLS €vA6ya)s TLfjianj - €LOLV a p a oo
(c) ' AiravTcov 8e TTpos TTJV TTapajSoArjv ALoyevrjs 6 BaftvAwvLOS TO SevTepov r)OL ArjfjLfjLa TOV Zrjvtovos

Aoyov TOLOVTOV etvai TTJ 8VV&(JL€L • TOVS Se fjLrj TrecfrvKOTas €LVOLL

OVK dv TLS evAoyws TLfJiarr). TOLOVTOV ydp Aafi^avofjuevov SrjAov (hs 7T€
aTOfjLOL rjaav, /cat vvv elalv • d9apTa ydp /cat dyevrjTa Ta TOtaura IGTL /card TTJV evvoLav T(x)v ooufJidTajv. ALO /cat /card aKoAovOov €iTLopdv ovvd^eL 6 Aoyos(E) 01 84 ye oocf)OL OVK iirel 7T€(f>VKaaLV etvat, i]8rj /cat elolv. (F) 'ylAAot 8e aoL TO rrpojTOv ArjfjLfjia TOV Zrjvajvos, TO TOVS Oeovs evAoycos dv TLS TLfjLCxn], dfjL(f>L^oAov €LVOLL - ev fji€v ydp orjfjLaLveLV TOVS deovs evAoycus dv TLS TLfxc[yrj9 erepov 8e TLfjurjTLKWs ^X ot - AafjiftdvecdaL 8e TO npcoTOV, oirep i/jev8os eoTOLL eirl TWV O0(f)d)V.

ONCE AGAIN ON EUSEBIUS ON ARISTOCLES ON TIMON ON PYRRHO*

I should perhaps apologize for devoting a longish paper to a very well-known document, which has been glossed again and again by every historian of Pyrrho and ancient Scepticism.l My excuse for doing so is double: first, there is a general agreement, I think, on the crucial importance of this document for any attempt to reconstruct Pyrrho's thought; secondly, I would like to offer a new, and I hope reasonable, reading, of some of the most disputed points in it. The text comes from Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, Bk.xiv, ch. 18, paragraphs 1-5 ( = Aristocles fr. 6 Heiland = Pyrrho test. 53 Decleva Caizzi. See the Greek text in the Appendix to this chapter). Eusebius, as is well known, writes at the beginning of the fourth century AD, with the aim of exposing the absurdities and inconsistencies of most pagan philosophy. He makes abundant use of some good sources, in particular the Peripatetic philosopher Aristocles of Messina, whose date has been recently pushed back from the second half of the second century AD to the end of the first century BC. 2 The work of Aristocles used by Eusebius was an important treatise in ten books, with the title /7ept ^iXooo^ias. Most of Eusebius' chapters 17 to 21 comes from Book vm of Aristocles' On Philosophy, dealing successively with * Afirstversion of this paper was delivered in May 1992, before the Cambridge B-Club. Many searching objections were presented to me, in particular by Myles Burnyeat, Michael Frede and David Sedley; others, no less impressive, were communicated to me in carefully written letters I received from Jonathan Barnes, Marcel Conche, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi and Nick Denyer. I thank them all warmly. If I did not draw from this salvo of criticisms the conclusion that I had better not publish the paper, it is because I still have a hunch that it is basically on the right track. I have attempted, in this new version, to answer the most powerful objections directed at the original one. Thanks are also due to Michel Poirier for his Greek expertise. Finally, I must acknowledge that I received the first insight into the views I am here expressing from two sentences in Groarke 1990, p. 81 n. 1. A propos of the possible influence of Indian thought on Pyrrho, Groarke writes en passant. 'Buddhism eliminates all individuality and duality, establishing that things are indeterminate and unmeasurable and that beliefs are neither true nor false. All distinctions are eradicated and no category is more applicable than its opposite' (my emphasis). 1 The bibliography of the subject is more or less identical with the general bibliography on Pyrrho and ancient Scepticism. Up to 1980, such a general bibliography has been compiled by L. Ferraria and G. Santese in the second volume of Giannantoni 1981. Cf. also Decleva Caizzi 1981, pp. 17-26, and now Barnes 1992, pp. 4295-301. The most important publications will be quoted or mentioned, I think, in the paper. 2 Cf. Follet's notice in Goulet 1989, s.v. Aristocles de Messine. Aristocles apud Eusebius, PE xiv. 18.29 contemptuously speaks of 'a certain Aenesidemus, who quite recently (ixOes /ecu 7Tpu)rjv), in Alexandria in Egypt, tried to revive this [Pyrrhonian] rubbish'. If Aenesidemus wrote around 40 BC, as is generally agreed, Aristocles cannot have written this way much later. 190

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

191

Xenophanes and Parmenides, the Sceptics, the Cyrenaics, Metrodorus and Protagoras, and finally Epicurus. The extracts usually include a short doxographical section and a long critical section. Eusebius quotes directly from Aristocles' book, which he seems to have to hand; at any rate, in the extract in which we are interested, he claims to quote Aristocles' ipsissima verba or nearly so (cSSe TTTJ irpos Xe^iv k'xovTOs, XIV, 17.10).

Here is the translation I propose of this controversial text: 3 [Title of the chapter]: Against the people called Pyrrhonian Sceptics, or Ephectics, who declare that nothing is graspable. (1)

It is necessary, first of all, to inquire about our knowledge; for if by nature we are unable to know anything, it will not be necessary to look at the rest. (2) There were some people in older times who told such a story; Aristotle contradicted them. Pyrrho of Elis gained some fame by saying such things (LOXVO€ fxev rotavra Xeycov /cat TIvppcov 6 'HAetos), but he himself

did not leave any written work. In any case, his disciple Timon (6 8e ye fjLaOrjrrjs avrov TL/JLCOV) says that it is necessary, for whoever is to enjoy happiness, to look at the three following points (cfrrjol 8eiv rov fjueXXovra evSai/jLOvrjoetv eh rpia [1*]

First, how things are by their nature {irpcorov ^ev,

ravra

OTTOLOL 7reu/ce TOL

TTpdyfjuara)',

[2*] Secondly, in what way we must be disposed towards them (Sevrepov Se, rt'va XPV rpoirov rjfjb&s rrpos avra Sta/cetcx0at);

[3*] Finally, what the benefit will be for people who are so (reXevralov §e, ri Trepieorai rots OVTOJS e'xovoi). (3) [1] (la) As for things, he [i.e. Timon] says that he [i.e. Pyrrho] declares them equally indifferent and unstable and undecidable 4 (ra yiev ovv irpdyfjuard (f>7]otv avrov a7TO
dorddynqra

/cat dv€77t/cptra), [lb] that for this reason neither our sensations nor our beliefs are either true or false (Std TOVTO \vf\re r d ? alodiqoeis

TJJJLOOV jji-qre ras

86£as

aXr)deveiv rj ifjevSeodcu). [2]

[2a] For this reason then, that it is necessary not to trust them (Std TOVTO ovv fjirjSe TnoTeveiv aurats" 8etv), 3

4

The numbers in plain type are those of the traditional paragraphs; those in bold type are mine, and will be useful for my discussion. When discussing the views of scholars who introduced other symbols, I shall adapt the latter accordingly. The meaning of the three adjectives, and the question whether eirioiqs goes with the three of them or only with the first, have been hotly discussed. But not much depends on it for the points I am here discussing. I adopt the translation given in a paper to which I am much indebted (Stopper 1983, p. 274).

192

SCEPTICISM

[2b] but to be unopinionated, impartial and unwavering5 (dAA' d8o£dorovs

Kal OLKALV€LS Kal OLKpaSdvrovs

etvat),

[2c] saying about each one that it no more is than is not, or that it both is and is not, or that it neither is nor is not 6 (irepl evos eKaarov Aeyovras on OV fJL&AAoV €OTIV 7] OVK €GTIV Tf Kal €OTL Kal OVK €OTLV rj OVT€ €GTLV OVT€ OVK €<JTLV).

(4)

[3] Now, for the people disposed that way Timon says that the benefit will be first abstention from assertion (d^aciav), then absence of trouble (drapagiav), and Aenesidemus says pleasure. (5) Those are the main points of their sayings (rd /JL€V OVV Kecf>dAaia rcov Xeyofievcov); let us see if they speak rightly (el opdcog Xeyovoiv).

I shall here mainly concentrate on the controversial meaning of the inference marked by Sid rovro at the beginning of the sentence I have numbered as [lb] (not the following inference, also marked by Std TOVTO at the beginning of [2a]). This inference has been labelled as 'a zany inference' by Stopper (1983, p. 293 n. 53); and I shall hereafter designate it as 'the zany inference'. I have two claims about it: first, that we should not attribute the zany inference to Pyrrho, but to Timon; and secondly, that it is not a zany inference at all. I shall first argue in some detail in favour of these two claims, about which I feel myself reasonably certain. Then, in the second part of this paper, I shall try to draw, from the results of the first part, some more general and more speculative consequences. To begin with, I shall briefly recall the complex, many-layered structure of Eusebius' text. As indicated above, Eusebius is quoting Aristocles, presumably verbatim. Aristocles himself relies on Timon (C.320-C.230); but his relation to Timon is certainly not of the same nature as the relation of Eusebius to him. Aristocles devotes the whole section to the critical account of the opinions of a group of people, 'called Pyrrhonian Sceptics or Ephectics' (this phrase comes from the title of chapter 18, a title which also seems to stem from Aristocles himself)- He essentially considers them as ancient representatives of an epistemological version of scepticism, i.e. of the claim that we are by nature unable to know anything (cf. §1). After noting that versions of epistemological scepticism were already known to Aristotle, and impugned by him, Aristocles introduces Pyrrho as a man who uoxvoe roiavra Xeycov. The meaning of this sentence is unclear between (a) 'Pyrrho was very good at saying such things' and (b) 'Pyrrho gained some fame by saying such things'. I have adopted (b), 5

6

These three adjectives too have been carefully dissected by the scholars, but their exact meaning does not matter much either for my discussion. I adopt here the translation offered in another recent paper to which I owe a great deal (Ausland 1989, p. 406). The above translation of this all-important sentence corresponds to one of its possible syntactical analyses, probably the most usual. Stopper 1983, pp. 272-4 contrasts it with - and rejects it in favour of- the following one: saying that it is no more than it is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not. I am inclined to prefer the usual construction, but here again the choice does not have any bearing on my claims.

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

193

because it makes a fairly neat contrast to the sentence which follows, namely: 'but whereas he himself did not leave any written work, his disciple Timon says, etc' Aristocles thus seems to say: Pyrrho is credited with having been a notorious proponent of epistemological scepticism; but unfortunately I cannot substantiate this reputation by producing direct evidence, because we have no direct evidence from Pyrrho at all. Then Timon, Pyrrho's disciple, is introduced in the story, but visibly as a second-best solution (see the contrast between avros \xev and 6 he ye jjLadrjrrjs avrov). Aristocles does not even suggest that Timon is an especially authorized disciple; he does not introduce him as Pyrrho's 'spokesman' (TTpo^rrjs), like Sextus, M 1.53.7 He claims to give what Timon said (jfirjoi, three occurrences in the text, in (2), [la] and (3)), but he does not refer to any definite work; only later on in the chapter will he mention Timon's Pytho and Silloi. Many people have suggested that Aristocles' source here is the Pytho, since this work apparently was a prose work, unlike the Silloi, and Aristocles is going to quote precisely from the Pytho in §14. But, according to Diogenes Laertius ix. 111, Timon's prose works amounted to 20,000 lines, so that there is no certainty at all about the Pytho being the source here as well. And of course it is important to notice that the whole extract is labelled, at the end of it, as a summary (/c€aAcua). A summary of what, and a summary made by whom? Certainly not a summary of what Pyrrho said, made by Timon himself, since Aenesidemus (first century BC) is mentioned in the text (as he will be later on in the chapter, §§11,16 and 29). Not even a summary of what Timon said, made by Aristocles, since it is presented as a summary of what was said (rd)v Xeyofjuevajv) not by one man only, but by a number of people, whose views will then be scrutinized, after having been summed up (note the plural in transition at the end of the extract: oKei/jtofjieda 3' el opdtbs Xeyovoiv). Hence, I suppose we are dealing at best with a summary of what was supposedly said by the Pyrrhonian Sceptics in general, made by Aristocles himself (or an intermediate source), on the basis of something that he had good reasons to think that Timon, Pyrrho's disciple, had said. We can only hope, at the very best (to quote Stopper 1983, p. 271), that 'Aristocles, hostile though he was to Pyrrhonism, [was] an honest reporter.' But we cannot expect him to report about anything other than what he says he is reporting about. If he is an honest reporter about what he claims to report, we have to look very carefully at his report. And here will be my first question: what exactly does Aristocles say about what Timon was saying about Pyrrho! Surprisingly 7

This point has been criticized by Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, who claims (in correspondence) that ye has very often (and very often particularly in Aristocles) an emphatic force, so that we should think, on the contrary, that Timon is presented by Aristocles as a very good source, as Aristocles needs him indeed to be, in order to polemize with him in the following pages. I do not deny that at all, (after all, a second-best solution is a second-best solution); but I maintain the trivial truth that Aristocles would have been happier, in order to polemize with the 'Pyrrhonian Sceptics', to have something to quote from Pyrrho himself. And it is equally true that he does not say anything explicit about the privileged status of Timon, of all Pyrrho's disciples, as a witness to Pyrrho's thought.

194

SCEPTICISM

enough, as far as our passage is concerned, the Timon-Pyrrho question has been largely ignored by modern interpreters, whereas the perhaps less important Aristocles-Timon question has been much discussed. Modern scholars are almost unanimous in considering our text as a crucially important document about Pyrrho's thought, tacitly relying on an assumption of transparent faithfulness on behalf of Timon, supposed to be Pyrrho's 'spokesman' and just that. 8 They usually have no qualms in quoting a part or the whole of our text as indiscriminately reporting Pyrrho's views, or Timon's views (assuming that they are identical), or, at their most prudent, Timon's views about Pyrrho's views. But that is still not to be prudent enough, it seems to me. We must actually resist the temptation to assume that Timon attributes or refers to Pyrrho, either explicitly or even implicitly, everything that he says or is supposed to say in the Aristocles document, and this for a very simple reason: whereas we find in our passage two occurrences of the phrase TL^uyv rjoi, we find one sentence, and only one, beginning with the more complex phrase (f>rjoLv OLVTOV arro^aiveiv: (frrjGiv, i.e. Timon says; avrov arro(j>aiv€iv, i.e. that Pyrrho declares. It is the [la] sentence, which deals with TOL Trpay^ara: 'Timon says that Pyrrho declares rd Trpdyfiara equally indifferent', etc. If this sentence, or the sentence beginning with these words, is the only one which Timon explicitly attributes to Pyrrho, we must conclude, a contrario, that the rest of the text, either in part or wholly, contains things which were at least not explicitly attributed to Pyrrho by Timon. 9 Thus we have an urgent task to perform, or to try to perform: namely, to determine where we have to put the end-quote sign, in order to demarcate what is explicitly attributed by Timon to Pyrrho from what is not so. When trying to answer this question, we come across a very disputed point, namely the syntax, meaning and value of the clause [lb], beginning with Std TOVTO (the first occurrence, which is in [lb], not the second one, which is in [2a]). At least two syntactic problems are raised by this clause, I think. One of them has been raised by Stopper: there is, he says (1983, p. 293 n. 53), 'a strange asyndeton in the text': the Sid TOVTO clause has indeed no linking particle with what comes before. I shall come back to this question later on. But another syntactic problem has, as far as I can see, been largely ignored. Most people seem to construe, more or less explicitly, the infinitive proposition jjur/Te TOLS 8

9

The only frank exception I know of is Michael Frede, who sounds a note of warning in Frede 1973Fernanda Decleva Caizzi objects that it would need very clumsy Greek sentences, with three infinitives, to express each time explicitly that Timon says that Pyrrho said that, etc., and that it was unnecessary, since the master-pupil relation between Pyrrho and Timon had been laid down from the outset. But the fact is, precisely, that such a clumsy phrase (perhaps not so clumsy after all) is used once and only once (<j>r)Giv avrov dno^aiveLv), and then not at the beginning of the report. Precisely at the beginning of the report, we do have a sentence with three infinitives (8eiv, euSou/u-ovqcreiv, pXeneiv), but it is simply prefixed by TIJACOV <j>rjoi. Let us add, above all, that there was a very simple and economical way of expanding the scope of (f>r)oiv avrov airofyaivziv to both [la] and[lb], by writing ra fxev ovv irpdy^xard (f>rjGiv avrov a7TOaLV€LV in LGTJS aoia<j>opa /ecu a.Grdd[ir\ra teal aveniKpira ^cfvai), Sia rovro /xrjrc ras alodrjoeis TJ/JLCOV firjre ras oo£as aArjOeveiv 7/ i/jSd

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

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. . . ipevSeoOac [lb] as dependent on avrov ano$alv€iv\ so that Pyrrho is made directly responsible for the Sid rovro clause, i.e. for the zany inference, for its contents as well as for its logical link with what comes before. According to this analysis, the text would mean: Timon says that Pyrrho (a) declares the things indifferent etc., that for this reason our sensations, etc. This analysis I do not hesitate to call wrong. Why? Because in the previous clause, namely [la], we find the verb <j>r]oiv (subject Timon), followed by an infinitive proposition (avrov drr offtake iv, subject Pyrrho), which is itself followed, not by a second subordinate infinitive proposition dependent on a-no^alveiv, but by an attributive construction (airo^alveiv ra TTpdy^iara dSidopa, without any eivai). On the face of it, therefore, it is much more natural to consider that we have indeed two infinitive propositions, but coordinated, and both dependent on faoiv (subject Timon): the first one having avrov (i.e. Pyrrho) as its subject, and airocfraiveiv as its verb; the second one having pnqre ras alodrjceis etc. as its subject, and aX-qdeveiv rj ifjevSeadai as its verbs. The meaning then is: Timon says (a) that Pyrrho declares the things indifferent, etc., < and > (b) that for this reason our sensations, etc. This is the analysis which I venture to call right, not because the alternative one is grammatically impossible (some colleagues who are good at Greek have told me that it was quite acceptable), but because it is the simpler and more natural of the two possible analyses: nothing tells against it, I think, and absolutely nothing compels us to prefer the other one. If this argument is not totally mistaken, we can thus conclude that the zany inference was not attributed by Timon to Pyrrho. The scope of the quotation of Pyrrho's views by Timon, opened by avrov airocftaiveiv, ends with aveiriKpira', it includes [la], it does not include [lb]. And if Timon did not attribute the inference to Pyrrho, the most economical and likely hypothesis is that he made the inference himself. He said himself what followed from what he said Pyrrho had said. Let us turn at present to the meaning of this inference. If it is a zany inference, well, we have just succeeded in exonerating Pyrrho from a zany inference. But we have charged Timon with a zany inference. Now, is it a zany inference? A long time ago, Zeller suggested, without explanation, that we should read Sid TO instead of Sid rovro. The meaning of the logical sequence then became the following: 'things are indifferent, etc., for the reason that our sensations, etc' The motivation of this proposal is clear enough; it is very well explained by Stopper, the most confident modern supporter of Zeller's emendation. I quote him (1983, p. 293 n. 53): How does Timon's remark about the senses connect with his remark about the dSia(j)opta of ra Trpay/xara? The transmitted text is clear: since things are indifferent,/<9r that reason (Sid rovro) our senses are unreliable. But that is a zany inference, as a little reflexion will show. Moreover, it leaves a strange asyndeton in the text. The inference should go the other way about, as it does in later scepticism. We should accept Zeller's Sid TO for Sid rovro, which restores sense and syntax at one blow.

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And Stopper goes on: 'I am not assuming that Timon thought in the same way as later Pyrrhonists and then emending the text to suit this assumption: the received text is wholly puzzling as it stands, and the emendation is compelling without any such assumption.' Let us develop the Zeller-Stopper position a little, before trying to challenge it. What makes the inference 'zany', and the emendation of the text 'compelling', is a natural enough, but quite determinate interpretation of the three Pyrrhonian adjectives kir Lorjs dhidcjyopa KCLL doraO/ji^Ta KCLL dverriKpira. The first thing which comes to mind is indeed to give to these adjectives a 'subjective' meaning, i.e. a meaning which includes a reference to our own cognitive and discriminating capacities: 'things' are dhid<j>opa in the sense that we cannot differentiate them; they are dordd^ra in the sense that we cannot assess them; they are dverriKpna in the sense that we cannot make any decision about them. 10 If we give to the three adjectives such a 'subjective' meaning, the SLOL TOVTO inference is zany indeed: for it does not make sense to say first that we are unable to differentiate 'things', and then that/or this very reason our senses and beliefs are unreliable. Our epistemic powerlessness, if anything, is the ground for the indifference of 'things' understood that way; it cannot be a consequence of it. Once turned upside down by the emendation, the sequence is faultless: our sensations and beliefs are neither true nor false; then how are things? They are equally indifferent and unstable and undecidable. There are two big drawbacks to this reading of the text. First, how can we know, or simply assert, that our sensations and beliefs are neither true nor false? This assertion seems only to be made possible on the basis of a long and sophisticated scrutiny of the credentials of such sensations and beliefs11 - a scrutiny which should be at least mentioned as an all-important step on the Pyrrhonian road to happiness, if it is to be conceived in this way. Secondly, and still more seriously, it seems totally forbidden to ask the question 'then how are things?', since Aristocles' text is absolute clear on the injunction (however puzzling it might seem on behalf of Pyrrho) to look first at the nature of things {-npojTov JJL€V, 67701a TT€(f)VK€ Ta TT pay paT a). How could we obey this injunction if we had to look elsewhere (i.e. at what Aristocles calls 'our own knowledge') beforehand? That is, I suppose, why a number of modern scholars reject Zeller's emendation, albeit for various reasons. 12 But they have to try to escape the 10

11

12

Quite consistently, Stopper 1983, pp. 274 and 292 n. 50 argues that if the question is obscure as far as the two first adjectives are concerned, the 'subjective' sense is indisputable in the case of the third adjective aveiriKpLTa, so that the same type of sense should be transposed to the two others. Still quite consistently, Stopper writes (1983, pp. 274-5): 'Pyrrho urged, no doubt on the basis of some of the arguments later collected by Aenesidemus, that "our perceptions and our beliefs are neither truthful nor liars"' (my emphasis). Let us notice that in order to keep the manuscript reading, it is not possible to rely on the recurrences of Sid TOVTO in Aristocles' following critical considerations (§5.3; §7.1), for these recurrences go back to the 8LOL TOVTO in [2a], not to the one in [lb]. The criticism launched at §10.1-2, moreover, seems to imply that the Pyrrhonians did not say wherefrom they had learnt to say that all things are dS^Aa.

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quite real difficulty this emendation was meant to dissolve. Roughly speaking, in order to give a plausible meaning to the zany inference without emending the text, it was necessary to find for the three Pyrrhonian adjectives of [la] another meaning than the 'subjective' one which had prompted the ZellerStopper position. These attempts, I think, are mainly of two kinds: either you take the adjectives to refer to 'objective' properties of 'things', properties which 'things' have quite independently from our capacities or incapacities to assess them, and you deduce the epistemological impotence of our sensations and beliefs from this so to speak intrinsic inapprehensibility of things; or you take the same adjectives to refer to the 'moral' indifference of'things', and you try to show that a destruction of the epistemological claims of sensations and beliefs is a kind of middle term between the awareness of this indifference and the attainment of happiness. The most detailed attempts to argue these two solutions to the puzzle have been put forward, I think, by Decleva Caizzi (1981) for the first one, and by Ausland (1989) for the second one. I do not find those attempts to be satisfactory; but since I want to come as soon as possible to the constructive part of this paper, I shall say only a few words about each of them, hoping, however, not to be unfair to them. According to Decleva Caizzi (1981, 225-7), the logical succession does indeed go, as the received text clearly implies, from the 'nature of things' to the impossibility of sensations and beliefs to be true or false. In order to make this move legitimate, the three adjectives which describe the status of'things' must have an 'objective' meaning, i.e. to designate properties which 'things' do possess in themselves, independently of any relation to our cognitive capacities. Decleva Caizzi suggests the following meanings: 'without differences between them' for aScdfopa, 'unstable' for darafyx^Ta, 'confused' for aveiriKpira. The inference from the 'things' having such a 'nature' to the unreliability of our senses and judgements is then glossed in the following way: 'Timon's words [i.e. his words in la] do not refer to a dichotomy between a reality which remains unknown and a world of phenomena, i.e. ofappearances of something, but imply the negation of the concepts of <j)vcns and r68e n\ it follows that, once the notion of being as determination is dissolved, everything is reduced to appearance, for which it makes no sense to speak of truth or error'. Here Decleva Caizzi seems to be clearly indebted to Marcel Conche's nihilistic view of Pyrrho (in Conche 1973), which relies on the same distinction between the notion of an 'appearance of something' (which is the very basis of the later, 'phenomenistic' neo-Pyrrhonism) and the notion of 'sheer appearance' or 'appearance of nothing' (which would be, according to Conche, the genuine Pyrrhonian notion). Whatever we may think of this interpretation, it is hard to attribute such a view to Timon, since he is credited (by DL ix.105) with the typically 'phenomenistic' formula: 'That honey is sweet I do not posit, that it appears to be so (^cuWrcu) I admit' - a formula which Conche can only accommodate by saying (1973, p. 57) that 'the Pyrrhonian thesis is immediately betrayed when it is expressed'. In addition to these general difficulties, Decleva Caizzi's suggestion does not properly fit our text: Timon does not say

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that, since 'things' are indifferent, 'it makes no sense to speak of truth or error'; he says that since 'things' are indifferent, it makes perfectly good sense to say that our sensations and beliefs are neither true nor false. If this means, as Stopper (1983, p. 292 n. 53) quite reasonably suggests, that they are 'neither constant truth-tellers nor constant liars', then it is perfectly meaningful to say that they sometimes tell the truth and sometimes lie; the only trouble is that we cannot say when they tell the truth, and when they lie.13 On the other hand, Ausland (1989) powerfully argues in favour of giving to the three Pyrrhonian properties of'things' a 'moral' meaning, mainly relying on the well-known use of ahia<j>opa in the ethicalfield,with the specific sense of 'neither good nor bad'. In this long and important paper, Ausland does not dissimulate the trouble he faces when trying to account, in this perspective, for the zany inference: 'it is still unclear', he says on p. 407, 'what the reference to our senses and opinions is doing in the argument and, in particular, why they are untrustworthy (.. .) on the basis of the nature of things'. It seems difficult indeed, as a matter of principle, to infer a conclusion bearing on the unreliability of sensations and beliefs from a statement about the ethical 'indifference' of'things'. I shall not try to sum up the very complicated and even tortuous moves, occupying no less than twenty pages (407-28), by which Ausland tries to solve this problem. Rather unexpectedly, Ausland first invokes a definitely epistemological argument set out by Diogenes Laertius (ix.92-3), which he finds 'parallel' to the Timonian argument from [la] to [lb], and having 'a definite affinity' with it. This argument in Diogenes Laertius explains that neither aiod-qcis nor vorjois can distinguish truth from falsity, that no other faculty can help us to make a decision between opposite Sd£cu concerning objects of sense or of thought, and that this undecidable conflict eventually suppresses any fxerpov by which we could think it possible to determine anything. This argument, as can be seen, is thoroughly epistemological, and it deals explicitly with matters of truth and falsity. How can Ausland hope to extract from it any help for his moral interpretation of our Timonian passage? I must confess that I do not understand very well what he says on p. 413: 'The argument in 13

Variants of Decleva Caizzi's position (or so I think) have been orally presented to me by Michael Frede and Myles Burnyeat. According to Frede, the zany inference is not zany at all as it stands, because there are many reasons, independent of the unreliability of our senses and beliefs, which could support [la], and from [la] it is easy to infer [lb], since according to [la] there is nothing left for the senses and beliefs to be reliable about. In the same vein, Burnyeat claims that [2c] explains why the inference is not zany; which I take to mean that the intrinsic indetermination of 'things' similarly removes the ground for senses and beliefs to be reliable about anything. I remain unpersuaded, because (i) it seems difficult to see how any general pronouncement about the 'nature of things', such as [la] in the standard view, could be made without any examination of our cognitive ability to grasp it (that is what prompted Zeller's emendation, which however meets all the problems mentioned above), and (ii) [2c] is not an 'objective' statement, but expresses what we should say (Xeyovras), i.e. in what way we should be disposed towards the 'things', given their nature [2*] and the unreliability of our senses and beliefs [lb]; so that [2c] is a consequence of [lb], not a ground for it.

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Diogenes shows how the Pyrrhonians could argue from claim [la] in Timon's argument, through applications on the successive levels of appearance and opinion, to claim [lb] in such a way as to make claim [2a] a reasonable inference from the latter.' Ausland's general conclusion is a little clearer, if not completely clear: Ancient skepticism (. . .) comes first into view as a philosophy which takes its beginning, not from a challenge to account for our cognitive access to an external world, but rather from the problem of human happiness. The Pyrrhonian way to the good life relates a human disposition productive of undisturbed calm [3] directly to an undecidability inherent in practical affairs [1]. But the critique of our senses, opinions, and reason [lb + 2a] that it includes for the sake of demonstrating this relation is not pursued in a fashion suitable to the intention of exposing any comparative or general unreliability of our several faculties in relation to external things, but is instead practised with a view to showing it wrong for us to exercise a preference between competing claims on our choice that are similar in dignity. Viewed from this new (really old) perspective, Pyrrho's skepticism stands revealed as integral, and not incidental, to his moral philosophy. (pp. 427-8;figuresadded are mine) This conclusion shows that, in Ausland's view, Pyrrho was indeed an epistemological sceptic, but en passant: his epistemological scepticism, instead of being an end in itself, was only a moment in the demonstration of his main concern, i.e. his ethical indifferentism. 14 I cannot help finding that, throughout the long and tortuous moves effected along these pages, the tiny and precise problem of making sense of the zany inference has somehow fallen out of the picture. In any case, I cannot see, from his paper, what exactly Ausland's answer would be to the simple question: how and why does [la] provide the reason (Sta TOVTO) for [lb]? I find his paper convincing in many respects; but on this particular point I find it rather disappointing. Now, it is time to come to the solution which I venture to offer as the obviously correct one. The complicated and ingenious moves of Decleva Caizzi, Ausland and others are, I think, superfluous and in some sense misguided, because, in fact, there is a much simpler way to get things right, and to draw from [la] to [lb] an inference which has absolutely nothing 'zany' in it. We have just to suppose (i) that 'our sensations and beliefs' are Trpay^xara,15 and (ii) that the proper way for sensations and beliefs to be ahiaopa /ecu aorddix^ra KOLL 14

15

Cf. also the programmatic statement: 'it remains unclear why and in what way [lb] acts to mediate the clearly symmetrical formulations of [la] and [2]' (p. 407, my emphasis). The 'epistemological' statement [lb] is nothing more than an intermediate link between two (in Ausland's view) 'moral' statements, [la] and [2]. In the ordinary, predicative sense of'are', not of course in the sense of identity. This is to avoid possible misunderstandings (Fernanda Decleva Caizzi told me that she found it hard to swallow that Pyrrho's Trpay/zara might be conceived of as alodrjoeLs KOLI Sof at; but this is miles away from what I mean).

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av€7TLKpira is to be neither true nor false. Then everything falls into perfect order. Point (i) is the crucial one. Formally speaking, it obviously provides a trivial Barbara: All Trpay/xara are indifferent (according to Pyrrho) [la]; all our sensations and beliefs are (special kinds of) rrpdyixara [implicit premiss]; therefore, all our sensations and beliefs are indifferent. From the structural point of view, the legitimacy of bringing sensations and beliefs under rd TTpdyfjuara is wholly confirmed, I think, by the following remark. The first question [1*] bears on the nature of rd irpdy^ara, and only on that; the second question [2*] bears on the right attitude we should adopt irpos avrd, i.e. towards rd -npdy^ara. The answer to the second question begins with the second hid rovro [2a], which introduces the advice or invitation to adopt a certain attitude (SeiV). So it is not artificial at all, but on the contrary mandatory, to consider [lb] as a part of [1], i.e. as a part of the answer to the question concerning the nature of rd TTpdyfiara; therefore, sensations and beliefs are introduced into the story as (a kind of) TT pay par a. This point is also put beyond any doubt, if needed, by the fact that question [2*] asks for the right attitude to adopt towards rd rrpdyfjuara (note the neuter npos aura), whereas the first element of the answer to this question, namely [2a], describes the right attitude to adopt towards sensations and beliefs (note the feminine avrais). This would simply not be possible if sensations and beliefs did not count as rrpdy^ara. As such, they have certain intrinsic properties, described in [lb], which dictate (through the second Sid rovro) the right attitude to adopt towards them. This account of the argument is therefore supported by good and strong reasons, I believe. However, I realize that it is a somewhat difficult and paradoxical task to defend my claim. The bringing of sensations and beliefs under rd -npdy\xara must be both perfectly obvious and somewhat unexpected: perfectly obvious, on one hand, since it gives a straightforward justification to the zany inference; and somewhat unexpected, on the other hand, since the text has been read by dozens of learned and careful people, none of whom has ever read it this way, so far as I know. In other words, if I claim to correct a misreading, I must also explain why this misreading has been so widely shared. Such a peculiar mixture of acceptability and unexpectedness must be accounted for. But it can be accounted for, I think, both conceptually and historically. From the conceptual point of view, I assume that the word rrpdy^ara usually refers, in Greek, to external 'things' or 'states of affairs', particularly, but not exclusively, when they have some relation with our activities (irpdrreiv), i.e. when we can by ourselves obtain them or bring them about; so that bringing our own sensations and beliefs under rd 77payyzara must sound prima facie slightly paradoxical. However, this usual connotation is perhaps unduly strengthened by our usual translations in modern languages, whether we adopt 'things' or 'states of affairs'. It is almost a commonplace to point out that, for ancient philosophers, mental items are not of a radically different type

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from physical items: they are just the same type of natural items, differentiated only by their 'inner' or 'outer' location. 16 So there is nothing to prevent our sensations and beliefs counting as Txpdy\xara after all. 17 From the historical point of view, it is still easier to account for the impression that bringing our sensations and beliefs under rd TT pay para is both an obvious move and a slightly unexpected one. On the basis of the grammatical structure of the sentence, I have already claimed that [la] was explicitly attributed to Pyrrho by Timon, but that the zany inference was not, and that this inference was drawn by Timon himself. The mixed impression we have in front of this inference can thus be accounted for by the distribution of roles between our two characters: the song sounds strange, because it is a twopart song, written on a single line. I suggest that Pyrrho, when he talked about ra Trpdy/jLara, had in mind external 'things' or 'states of affairs' - presumably in so far as they are related to our practical activity - and nothing else; so that he would have been himself somewhat surprised by the unexpected application of his statement to sensations and beliefs. But after a moment of bewilderment, he would probably have conceded to Timon that there was no compelling reason to reject this application. x 8 Our sensations and beliefs, after all, are TTpdyfjuara of a sort. If I may indulge in following up this sketch of a historical novel, I shall venture to say that it could perhaps also account for the 'strange asyndeton' (Sta TOVTO without a particle) which was pointed out by Stopper, if it is an asyndeton at all. 19 I do not claim to be able to explain how Timon's intervention managed to leave this trace in the text; but I would be fairly ready to admit that if there is any asyndeton here, it is, in some way or other, a textual trace of Timon's intervention. So much, for the moment, for bringing our sensations and beliefs under TOL TTpdyjjLara. What I have still to do is to account for the fact that the supposed Timonian syllogism, instead of mechanically applying Pyrrho's statement 16 17

18

19

Cf. e.g. the interesting remarks of Everson 1991, pp. 131-2. Perhaps it is not completely irrelevant to point out that in the Charmides 169A, Plato brings together, under the label ra ovra ('things that are'), various items like science, sight, audition, sensation, desire, will, love, fear, belief, movement, heat. Within such a list, it seems to be the case that the items which would have a special claim to be called TT pay \xaTa are mental items involving some sort of internal object, like all kinds of presentative or representative acts or states of mind - or, by extension, their internal objects themselves. For instance, according to a famous passage in Sextus, M vm.12, the Stoic 'signified', orjfxaLvofxevov, was defined as 'auro TO TTpdyfjua which is revealed by the vocal sound, and which we apprehend as subsisting in our thought'. However we understand the word TTpdyyia here, this definition shows that a npayfia may perfectly well be an item which has no existence at all outside the thought. I do not claim that Timon brought our sensations and beliefs under the concept of TT pay para exactly in the same sense as Pyrrho himself had understood this concept (I shall come back to this later on). Pyrrho would have to accept an extension of his notion of it. It has been pointed out to me from various sides, either that the asyndeton is not in the least strange in the style of K€d\aLa, or even that 8LOL TOVTO does not need any particle at all, especially when followed by fxr/Te . . . /X^TC (Fernanda Decleva Caizzi learnedly refers me to Plutarch, Anim.procr. IOI8B6, Philoponus, Aetern. mundi 278.28 and 439.14; Simplicius In De Cael. 563.7; Plotinus, Enn. 5.1.7.20 and 6.7.16.20). In consideration of these objections, I would not rely too heavily on this argument.

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about irpdyfiara to sensations and beliefs (and thus getting to the conclusion that sensations and beliefs are dhidopa /cat dardOfjirjTa /cat dveTrt/cptra), draws the conclusion that they are neither true nor false. This is quite plain sailing, in comparison with the previous question. It would be fairly uninformative to say that sensations and beliefs have the three general Pyrrhonian properties of'things': what is interesting is to know what specific aspect these properties take on, when applied to sensations and beliefs. What are the relevant 'differences' they do not exhibit? What sort of 'stability' are they deprived of? What kind of 'decision' are they unable to allow? Since their ordinary claim is to discriminate between what is the case and what is not the case, it is clear that the relevant form of loss which they suffer from being brought under ret Trpdy^ara, as characterized by [la], has to do with their power of giving access to truth and avoiding error; e.g. the relevant difference in reference to which they are dhidopa is the difference between dXiqdevtiv and ifjevSeodaL. In this way, let us notice that we can completely clear away the difficulty some people have felt in understanding why the text says that sensations and beliefs are neither true nor false, instead of saying simply that they are false. If all of them were false, they would not be any longer 'indifferent' with respect to the relevant difference, namely the difference between truth and falsity: they would be uniformly 'differentiated', through being always on the same side of that difference. In addition to that, it might be suggested that there is, between the Pyrrhonian properties of 'things' and the Timonian properties of sensations and beliefs, a relationship exactly similar to that between the Pyrrhonian 'things' themselves and the Timonian sensations and beliefs. In other words: just as Pyrrho's -npay^ara quite probably did not originally include sensations and beliefs, so Pyrrho's properties of 'things', expressed by the adjectives d8idopia.

So far, I hope to have shown that the zany inference from [la] to [lb] does not come from Pyrrho, that it comes from Timon, and that it is not a zany inference at all. I am fairly confident that these results are correct. I would now like to raise the question of what consequences we can draw from them; and here I must confess that what I shall say is much more speculative. Within the small section [1], if I am not mistaken, [la] is explicitly attributed by Timon to Pyrrho; [lb] is not, and we have found good reasons to think that [lb] is the result of a personal intervention by Timon. Can we extract from that a general rule, and extend its bearing over the whole passage? In other words, should we consider that everything in the text which is not explicitly attributed to Pyrrho is implicitly not attributed to Pyrrho, and should be similarly attributed to Timon? Since only [la] is explicitly attributed to Pyrrho, the

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application of such a rule would be extremely damaging for the master, and extremely generous for the disciple. We would have to take away from Pyrrho, and to give to Timon, an enormous part of the text, namely: the whole description of a philosophical programme for happiness, the division of this programme into three main points, the second half of the fulfilment of part [1] of this programme, and the whole fulfilment of parts [2] and [3]. This would be a bit frightening, and also a bit silly: Pyrrho certainly did not describe 'things' as indifferent, etc., just for the sake of describing them that way. That is why I am not inclined at all to such a maximalist proposal. On the other hand, we must admit that the whole piece is very tightly articulated: the threefold programme is first described, and then carried out, in closely related terms: the repetitions of ra Trpay/zara, SiaKeia&u, Trepiefvcu, are especially striking. Moreover, within each section, ternary sets are conspicuously present: the three Pyrrhonian adjectives in [la], the three other adjectives in [2b], the probably ternary structure of the Sceptical formulas in [2c] again, the three results of the Sceptical attitude according to [3] - even if they are somewhat perturbed by the insertion of Aenesidemus' 'pleasure'. The texture of the piece is thus so closely knit that it seems very hard to dismantle it, and to try to render to each of the two Caesars the things that are his own. The job can only be done in a very tentative way. Nevertheless, I think that some plausible arguments should be given a chance. Timon was probably rather more of an independent thinker than is usually believed; his intellectual and human personality seems to have been quite different from Pyrrho's. In any case, there is one big difference between them, namely the fact that Pyrrho wrote nothing, or hardly anything (cf. Sextus, M 1.282), whereas Timon was a prolific writer, in vastly different literary genres (cf. DL ix. 110-11). So it could be legitimate to leave him at least a fairly important role in the literary shaping of Pyrrho's teaching. Nevertheless, whatever we may think about the extent of his intellectual independence, he is obviously a devoted, almost fanatical disciple of Pyrrho. Whatever he says and writes, he probably takes it to be quite faithfully true to his master's thought. Therefore, it is certainly very unlikely that Timon would have taken it upon himself to change the overall meaning and intention of Pyrrho's philosophy. When he presents it as a quest for happiness (quite unexpectedly after Aristocles' own epistemological introduction in §§ 1-2), he is certainly neither innovating nor wanting to do so. His own dialogue with his master, reflected in fragment 48 of the Silloi and in fragments 67 and 68 of the Indalmoi, shows that he felt himself fully entitled to attribute to Pyrrho such a basically eudaimonistic intention. As far as the threefold programme for happiness is concerned, its schoolmasterly style and its rigidity might be ascribable, to a certain extent, to some sort of Timonian reshaping; but it is hard to believe that the contents and succession of its three steps are completely foreign to Pyrrho's original thought. In particular, first asking a question about the 'nature' of T<X , a feature which looks fairly strange to the reader of the neo-

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Pyrrhonian classical texts, can hardly be the product of a personal initiative by Timon: as we shall see later on in more detail, putting this question first would already have been unexpected from his point of view. Things become a little more problematic when we look at the fulfilment of the threefold programme. Within point [1], as we have seen, [la] is certainly Pyrrhonian; and [lb], I think, is certainly Timonian. Of the two remaining points, let us first look at point [3]. Aristocles explicitly gives it to Timon (TLJJLOJV (f>rjaC). Indeed, the sequence 'first aaaia, then drapagta is possibly a piece of genuine Timonian pedigree; for we read in DL ix. 107 that, according to Timon and Aenesidemus, the Sceptic reAo? is the en-o^, which brings with it drapa^ua like its shadow; the substitution of eiroxf] for dcfxxoia in the first position (as in Sextus, PHi.S) might be the role of Aenesidemus in the story. Of course, the third item in answer [3], Alv7)oi§r)ixos 8' rjSovrjv, cannot come from Timon. If I had to guess what the third item was in Timon's original answer - 1 assume, with many people, that there was a third item - my own bet would be for evhaiyLoviav, rather than for diradeiav or eTro^^, which have been suggested by various scholars: it would be strange indeed to promise us happiness at the beginning, and not to say at the end that if we follow the recipe we shall eventually get it. But even if Timon might be responsible for an ordered sequence daoia - drapa^ia - evhai^ovla, this obviously does not mean that the three corresponding notions were unknown to Pyrrho himself. The most interesting and problematic case is answer [2]. It seems perfectly clear that [2a] is so closely linked together with [lb] that there is no question of dissociating them: they are, from the grammatical point of view, on the same level (the infinitive helv in [2a] has the same syntactical status as the infinitives aXiqdzvtiv 77 ifjevSeodaL in [lb]); and the necessity of our mistrusting our sensations and beliefs is a direct consequence (cf. the second Sta TOVTO) of their intrinsic indeterminateness in respect to truth and falsity. If [lb] comes from Timon, then [2a] must come from Timon as well. 20 But what about [2b] and [2c]? Concerning [2b], we must remember that [la] is the only absolutely 20

David Sedley noticed that the vocabulary in the sequence [lb] -I- [2a] is typically Hellenistic, by contrast with the context. In addition to that element of confirmation, I am happy to register here the agreement of Fernanda Decleva Caizzi on the substantial part of this claim, namely the close interdependence between [lb] and [2a] (the question of Timon's authorship and intentions apart). She writes (in correspondence - parenthetical remarks are hers): 'There is no reason why [lb] and [2a] should not have been added by some witness more faithful (but in what sense can we speak of a faithful witness?) to Pyrrho.' She adds, however, in the form of an objection to my claim (parenthetical remarks still hers): 'If the author was Timon (and not Aristocles summarizing the Sceptical source - Timon or a Sceptic later than Aenesidemus?), I still do not see any difficulty in interpreting [lb] as the consequence which Timon believed (that Pyrrho believed?) to derive from [la], and [2a] as the linking sentence which makes it easier to explain [2b]: [2a] is not the direct answer to [2*], but that which makes it possible to understand it in relation to [la]'. But I subscribe to everything in this. Most valuable for my claim is the last sentence in particular: if [2a] is not the direct answer to [2*], but that which makes it possible to understand it (i.e. to understand the direct answer to [2*], namely [2b]) in relation to [la], that implies that the logical dependence of [2b] (quite probably Pyrrhonian) on [la] (certainly Pyrrhonian) was somewhat unclear; this very lack of clarity might have prompted Timon to insert the sequence [lb] 4- [2a].

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certain Pyrrhonian bit in the whole text; and we must also be sensitive to the fact that the three adjectives in [2b] are obviously meant to answer to the three adjectives in [la]. Even if we do not totally accept the valuable attempt by Ausland (1989, pp. 389-97), to establish a close term-to-term correspondence between the two triplets, we cannot deny that at least some sort of correspondence obtains between them. The outcome of this argument is that Timon's personal intervention, beginning with [lb], must come to an end with the end of [2a], and that with [2b] we find Pyrrho again, or at any rate what Timon was ready to attribute explicitly to Pyrrho. Let us bear in mind that we have found good reasons to think that the first item in Pyrrho's own eudaimonistic programme was (rather unexpectedly from the point of view of the standard Sceptical moves) to inquire about 'the nature of things'; if so, it is only natural to think that the answer to this first question was followed, in Pyrrho's own plan, by a carefully articulated answer to the question of which attitude we should adopt towards 'things' of such a nature. For reasons which are not exactly the same, I am inclined to think that the famous formulas of [2c] also belong to Pyrrho, or at least to Timon's official Pyrrho. This is not the right time and place to discuss whether we should construe the complex [2c] sentence as threefold, as I believe with most commentators, or as fourfold, as do some people who incline to see here an echo of the Indian tetralemma, which Pyrrho supposedly came to know in his far away travels. 21 In any case, the use of the ov /JL&XAOV formula, which governs [2c], is of course very well attested by other pieces of evidence concerning Pyrrho himself (in particular DL ix.61); and there are no grounds for doubting that he might have recommended saying at least the kind of things which we find in [2c], whatever might be the exact meaning he wanted to give them. If what I have said thus far is not complete nonsense, I come to the conclusion that our document is a piece of philosophical cutting, in which we can hold Timon personally responsible for the insertion of sections [lb] and [2a]. Now, these two sections are the only ones, in the whole text, which bear a distinctly and unequivocally epistemological character; I mean, the only ones which introduce the notions of truth and error, and the names of cognitive events, faculties and states like sensations, beliefs and trust. On the face of it, therefore, what Timon is responsible for might be called the epistemological twist to the whole story. 22 1 shall now briefly show that such a conclusion is in 21

22

Cf. n. 6 above. The tetralemma is a form of argument favoured by Indian thought, and having the following structure: p , not-p, p and not-p, neither p nor not-p. This epistemological twist does not seem to be perceived as such by Aristocles; but it is obviously what motivates his q u o t a t i o n of this s u m m a r y of Sceptical views, in spite of the contrast betweeen the epistemological perspective opened u p by him in his own introduction and the eudaimonistic perspective opened u p by the beginning of the s u m m a r y he is quoting. M o s t of his objections, in what follows (§§ 5-26), are directed to a version of epistemological scepticism; he does not directly attack Pyrrhonism as a way to happiness (cf. however some observations on the supposed utility of the Sceptic view in §§ 16-17).

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agreement with some other things we know about Timon; and I shall end by trying to say what we should infer from that concerning Pyrrho's own philosophical stance. First of all, Timon's epistemological concerns are fairly well attested by other pieces of evidence. We know, for instance, that he had written a book Tlepl aladrjoecov (DL ix. 105), in which he produced the typical expression of sceptical phenomenalism that I have already mentioned: That honey is sweet I do not posit, that it appears to be so (^alverai) I admit.' Such a phenomenalist position seems also to be attested, whatever its exact meaning, by the famous line in the Indalmoi, quoted by various authors (DL ix.105, Sextus, M vii.30, Galen, Dignosc.puls. 1.2): aAAa TO (^atvofjievov iravrrj oOevei, ovnep av eXOrj (it is in view of this line that I said earlier that it was very unlikely that Timon himself might have put a question about 'the nature of things' first in his personal philosophical agenda). We also know that he had found an opportunity to use his satirical bent even in epistemological discussions: according to DL ix. 114, 'he was constantly in the habit of quoting, to those who would admit the evidence of the senses when confirmed by the mind (npos rovs ras alodrjozis fier^ €TnfjLapTvpovvTos rov vov iyKptvovras), the line "Attagas and Numenius came together"'; whatever the exact meaning of this joke, its upshot is obviously to disparage both senses and the mind; and it is interesting to notice that it was a polemical weapon, apparently directed at a quite definite epistemological position (namely a non-Epicurean version of the theory of iTTijjLapTvprioLs), within the framework of the epistemological discussions in which Timon was constantly engaged (ovvexes re eiriXeyeiv elajdei). Besides jokingly taking up his stand in epistemological discussions, Timon seems to have also dealt quite technically and seriously, in his treatise Against the Physicists, with some of the most fundamental problems in the theory of science, since we know that, in this work, he was calling into question the use of first principles adopted eg vTrodeoeous (Sextus, M 111.2). Still more importantly, we know that Timon was much interested in Arcesilaus, even if this interest was of a rather ambivalent nature. According to Diogenes Laertius IX.I 15, he attacked Arcesilaus in his Silloi (this point is largely confirmed by several fragments of the Silloi, namely fragments 31-4); on the other hand, the same Diogenes Laertius informs us that (quite probably after Arcesilaus' death) Timon praised him in a work entitled The Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus. According to Numenius, quoted by Eusebius, PE xiv.6.5, he even went so far as to call him a GK€7TTLK6S, which is probably not literally true, but might reflect some shadow of the truth. From all this evidence, it seems to emerge that Timon first presented Arcesilaus as a dishonest rival and plagiarist of Pyrrho, mixing up Scepticism with the worse 'sophistical' tradition; let us say, by the way, that Timon's representation soon made its mark, since his contemporary Aristo of Chios, in a famous line - quite in tune with Timon's parodistic vein - depicted Arcesilaus as 'Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle'. The best if not the fairest way of disparaging the originality of Arcesilaus' cognitive scepticism was of course to

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inject retroactively, into Pyrrho himself, the appropriate dose of cognitive concerns and doubts; and this, I submit, is exactly what Timon had tried to do. With this operation successfully achieved - and his rival dead - it was easy for him to display his superior intellectual generosity, and to admit that, after all, Arcesilaus himself was a OK€TTTLK6S of sorts. The attention devoted by Timon to Arcesilaus makes it quite reasonable to assume, in the terms of Michael Frede (1973, p. 806), 'that the Pyrrho of Timon's writings represents the doctrine Timon himself developed under Pyrrho's influence, at a time when the debate between Academic sceptics and the dogmatists was well under way and had reached considerable sophistication'. If I am not mistaken, the above remarks should justify my further suggesting that even when he summed up his own basic positions, Timon could not keep from making a difference between what he thought he had directly borrowed from Pyrrho and what he wanted to add on the basis of his own epistemological concerns. If he felt like making such an addition, the obvious conclusion we have to draw seems to be that he did notfindanything properly epistemological in his memories of Pyrrho's own sayings and concerns. This conclusion, I think, powerfully reinforces the strictly ethical interpretation of Pyrrho's philosophy, an interpretation which has constantly been, from Cicero (perhaps already from Epicurus23) to Ausland through Brochard (to some extent) and others, an unobtrusive companion and rival to the standard epistemological interpretation. If I am right in my suggestions, Timon, a competent authority in the matter, is (albeit quite indirectly) the first to testify to this ethical interpretation being the correct one. Let us therefore return to the Aristocles passage one last time, in order to see what sense we can make of what is left of the text, if we mentally suppress the product of Timon's purposeful intervention, namely the epistemological twist [lb] + [2a]. If Timon inserted this epistemological twist because he found it missing in Pyrrho's own teaching, we have to think that the original meaning of everything else in Aristocles' summary was not epistemological, and that Timon somehow knew that it was not. Accordingly, we should try to construe a number of elements in the text in a non-epistemological way. The ethical way is the obvious alternative. I think it is quite possible, and in some cases almost mandatory, to do so. Let us examine the main elements in this perspective. Question [1*] of the Pyrrhonian programme, the question about 'the nature of things' (TTpdyfjuara), should be construed not as a properly ontological question, let alone a physical one, but rather as a question about 'things' as related to our activity (TrpdrreLv), i.e. as goals or ends for our acts of choice and 23

When writing this paper, I had not yet noticed the judicious remarks of Vander Waerdt 1989, p. 235 ('Epicurus plainly admired his [Pyrrho's] way of life and his tranquillity . . . but may not have attributed these to skepticism. It was Timon, after all, who established the tradition that Pyrrho was a skeptic, and this tradition did not win out entirely in antiquity, for Cicero knows of Pyrrho only as a moralist') and p. 236 ('Colotes' silence about Pyrrho implies, as David Sedley first suggested to me, that he was not even considered as a skeptic in the Epicurean tradition').

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avoidance. This interpretation is in complete agreement, I think, with the initial and overall characterization of Pyrrho's thought given in DL IX.6I, perhaps on the authority of the otherwise unknown Ascanius of Abdera: 'he said that nothing is noble or ignoble, just or unjust; and similarly in all cases he said that nothing truly is (/cat OJJLOLOOS ZTTI Trdvrcjv fjurjSev etvau rfj dXrjdeLa), but

men do everything they do by convention and custom (VO/JLCO Se KCU €0€i irdvra TOVS dvOpcjTTovs rrpdrreiv)', for each thing (eKaorov) is no more this than that.' The scope of the generalization O/JLOLOOS i-rrl navrcov is, admittedly, not immediately clear; but the contrast with the following clause (vofxco Se), which deals with what people do (Trpdrreiv), is enough to show that it does not extend beyond the ethical and practical sphere. For the same reason, I think that /jLTjSev etvai rfj dXiqdeia has nothing to do with 'real existence', but is a cryptocopulative phrase ('nothing is really F'), in which the range of the variable F is restricted to ethical and practical predicates, of the type which has just been illustrated by examples like KOLXOV, aloxpov, SIKOLLOV and CLSLKOV. The same is true with roSe 17 ToSe in the last sentence, introduced by ov /xdAAov. The conspicuous absence of dyad 6v and KCLKOV in the list might be easily accounted for by pointing out that Pyrrho was certainly not ready to say that indifference itself was no more good than bad. Now that we have dispelled the ghost of Pyrrho's epistemological scepticism, we may welcome without qualms the socalled 'ethical dogmatism' exhibited by two famous fragments of the Indalmoi (67-8 Diels), which used to worry so many people so much, and which I think is quite compatible with his 'ethical scepticism', since the second bears on conventional values, which people actually follow in their actions, whereas the first bears on the second-order value of being indifferent to the conventional values, which Pyrrho's perfect happiness is supposed to illustrate. As for the answer to question [1*], namely the three adjectives of [la], these adjectives can be given a specifically ethical meaning, particularly (in the case of the first one) in reference to the well-known use of dStcu^opia, ovSev 8ta€p€L, etc., in ethical contexts. Pyrrho, as we know, is repeatedly associated by Cicero with two typically ethical indifferentists, Aristo and Herillus. If we take €TT' 1(777? dhtd(f)opa in the sense of ethically indifferent, there are good reasons to adopt the same type of meaning for the two remaining adjectives, doTdd/jLrjTa and dveiriKpiTa. On this point I agree with the main claims of Ausland (1989, pp. 378-406). He convincingly shows, I think, that the progression of the three adjectives means something like the following: 'things' (as possible objects for our choices and avoidances) are no more choiceworthy than not choiceworthy (in' lorjs dhid<j>opa)\ they cannot be discriminated by any critical instrument, similar to scales (darddixrjra); their equivalent claims cannot be decided even by appeal to some higher faculty of adjudication (dv€7TLKpira).

A similar account can be given of the three adjectives of [2b] purporting to describe the attitude we should adopt towards such TTpdy^ara. If we admit that these adjectives have a genuinely Pyrrhonian origin, it is not particularly difficult to construe them as describing an ethical attitude, rather than a

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cognitive one. It is true that the first adjective, dSogdorovs, seems to refer back quite literally to the epistemological mistrust towards beliefs, recommended in [2a] (ju/rySe 7TLOT€V€LV aurafs, i.e. Sd£cu inter alia). But, needless to say, suspension of Sd£a may bear on practical beliefs concerning the value and choiceworthiness of 'things', as well as on theoretical beliefs concerning the existence and nature of external objects. The use of the adjective dSotjaoros is by no means restricted to abstention from theoretical beliefs, on the contrary: if Aristo was so firmly attached to the Stoic dogma that the sage will be aSogaoros (DL vn. 162), it is quite certainly in reference to his ethical indifferentism; even in the classical neo-Pyrrhonian tradition, the motto aSogdoTcos JULOVV precisely applies to ]8ios, i.e. to practical life. If there was any doubt on this ethical interpretation of dho^dorovs, it would be removed, I think, by the two adjectives which follow, drivels and aKpaSdvrovs, which pretty clearly refer to ethical attitudes, namely absence of inclination or leaning towards one side of the scales rather than the other, and absence of any wavering between the two sides. The metaphor of 'inclining' seems to be immediately appropriate when the things towards which one is inclining or not inclining are things to be taken or left, and less immediately when they are opinions to be adopted or rejected. And now, what to do with the famous so-called 'Sceptical' expressions of [2c]? If we leave aside the discussion about the right syntactical construction of [2c], which has no direct bearing on my theme, the main question is what meaning to give to eanv. It seems obvious that on any satisfactory interpretation this meaning is not existential, but crypto-copulative ('things no more are F than they are non-F', etc.); but one can still hesitate about the range of subjects and predicates we should admit for the subject-variable irepl ivds eKaoTov and for the predicate crypto-variable. We can quite probably dismiss the hesitation by observing that the range of the subject-variable must cover rd TTpdyfxara and only rd 77pay fxara, i.e. 'things' and states of affairs in so far as they are of concern for our irpdrreiv, since the recommended judgements are supposed to express the attitude we should have towards those very Trpdyfjuara. If so, I believe that the range of possible predicates does not extend either beyond the sphere of ethico-practical predicates, such as 'noble' and 'base', 'just' and 'unjust' (as in DL IX.6I), which could precisely be predicated, by ordinary people, of the TT pay para understood that way. The limitation of this range might seem to be excessively narrow: but we should remember that we have to give exactly the same limited scope, in view of their context, to the seemingly very wide generalizations of DL IX.6I ('similarly in all cases he said that nothing truly is'; 'each thing is no more this than that'). If we are still, and quite naturally, tempted to enlarge the range of possible predicates in [2c], so as to include predicates like 'white', 'sweet' and the rest, it is just because Timon changed the context by inserting [lb] and [2a]; leaving aside this modification, we are entitled to interpret the text exactly as we do the Diogenes passage, namely in purely ethical and practical terms. Before concluding, I wish to make it clear that in my view, Timon's

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epistemological shift does not leave what I take to be Pyrrho's main concepts and advice as they were, i.e. of a strictly ethico-practical significance. Otherwise, I would have to face a difficulty which has been keenly and lucidly expressed by Nicholas Denyer (in correspondence). Denyer supposes that the inference I would like to attribute to Timon is the following one: (a) [la] Trpay/xara (i.e. things that we can by our actions obtain or avoid) are uniformly indifferent (i.e. none of them has those properties which motivate and/or justify their being obtained/avoided). (b) But opinions are Trpdy^xara (e.g. you might look at your watch in order to obtain belief about what the time is). (c) Hence, no belief has those properties which motivate and/or justify accepting or rejecting it. (d) But those properties are truth and falsehood. (e) Hence [lb], no belief is ever either true or false. (f) Hence [2a], we should not put our trust in any belief. If that is Timon's argument, its crucial move would be to bring opinions under Trpdy/jLara in exactly Pyrrho's sense, as appears from the example under (b). But then, one could address him the following question, still in Denyer's terms: 'why should it be supposed that the beliefs we are urged to live without ([2b]] are limited to those which affirm that TT pay para (in the narrow, action-related sense) have ethico-practical properties?' Quite clearly, any 'theoretical' belief, bearing on no narrowly practical irpdy^a, is not to be endorsed (f) if it is neither true nor false (e). And similarly, there is no reason to restrict the range of the subject variables in [2c] to narrowly practical TTpdyjxara, nor to restrict the crypto-variable for predicates there to ethico-practical predicates: rather, these variables should 'range over everything which we might have thoughts about', and 'over every way that we might take anything to be'. All these consequences do follow, and are indeed damaging, if we suppose that Timon meant to bring opinions under irpdyixara in exactly Pyrrho's sense. But I surmise that this was not what he meant to do. The claim that opinions are rrpdyixara in Pyrrho's sense would be plausible only for a restricted class of opinions, namely those which we can and do obtain by our actions; there are of course a lot of opinions which we cannot and do not obtain in that way. When implicitly stating that opinions are Trpdy^ara of a kind, I suppose that Timon was exploiting the vagueness of the word TTpdyfiara, and was simply meaning that they are 'things' of a kind. But this is true, of course, of'theoretical' opinions as well as of'practical' ones. Then, all the consequences drawn by Denyer, instead of being unwanted consequences of Timon's step (b) as read by Denyer, become not only entirely welcome, but also fully intended consequences of Timon's step (b) as I read it. Bringing opinions under Trpdyfjuara turns out to be the crucial Timonian swerve in respect to Pyrrho: it has the double effect of enlarging the meaning of TTpdyfiara, and of paving the way for also enlarging the range of opinions which we will be urged by [2b] to live without. After Timon's intervention ([lb]

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+ [2a]), it is plausible to hold that [2b] has received a broader meaning than its initial Pyrrhonian meaning, and similarly, that the range of the variables in [2c] has been enlarged in comparison with its initial Pyrrhonian acceptation. And it is with this broad meaning and this range that, thanks to Timon, we now associate the label of Tyrrhonian Scepticism'. It is time to sum up, and to conclude. The trouble with Pyrrho is of course that he wrote nothing. In order to know anything about him, we are so totally dependent on indirect tradition, in particular on Timon, that we might well be tempted to adopt a Tyrrhonian' attitude towards Pyrrho, and to share the agnosticism of Theodosius, who refused to be called a Pyrrhonist, arguing that the movement of the thought in somebody else is inaccessible, and that we shall never know what Pyrrho's inner attitude was (DL ix.70). But we must resist this temptation: thanks to Timon, we know what Timon took it upon himself to add to his master's teaching; and we know, by elimination, what this teaching was like. Modern reinterpretations of Pyrrho have been labelled (by Stopper 1983, p. 275) as 'heresies to be anathematised'; I confess my own heresy in similarly religious terms. Jesus was not the first Christian. Marx was not thefirstMarxist. Pyrrho was not thefirstPyrrhonist. This title should go to Timon. APPENDIX

Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica xiv.18.1-5:

npoi TOYI KATA nrppQNA ZKETITIKOYZ HTOI E&EKTIKOYZ EniKAHGENTAI MHAEN KATAAHTITON EINAI ATIO&HNAMENOYI. ( i ) ' AvayKattos S' ex€L ^P® TTCLVTOS StaGKeifjaodat irepl rrjs r)fx(hv avTwv yvajoeais ' el yap av (irjoev rre^vKayiev yva)pi£,eiv, ovSev en oel 7repl rtov dXXwv GKoneiv. (2) ^Eyevovro fxev ovv Kal TWV irdAai Tives ol devTes Trjvoe rrjv a)vrjv, ois dvr€LprjK€v 'ApioroTeArjS' 'Ioxvoe /JL€V roiavra Xiycov KCLL TIvppcov 6 ' i f Aeto? * aAA' auT09 fiev ovSev €.v ypa(f>rj /caraAeAoiTrcv, d 8e ye fjLadr^rrjs avrov TLJJLWV (fyrjol Sefv rov fjueXXovra €v8aL[jLOvrjG€LV els rpia ravra jSAeTietv [ 1 * ] TTptOTOV fJL€V, OTTold 7T€VK€TOL 77pdyfACLT
[2*] 8evT€pov c)€, Tiva xpy Tpoirov rjfJL&s npos avrd [3*] reAeuTcuov 8e, r t TrepieaTat TOLS OVTOJS e^oucrt. )[] [la] 7a JJL€V ovv TTpdyfJLara rjoiv avrov aVcH^aiWiv €TT' ior)s d8id(f)opa dfjLTjra Kal dvcTriVpira, [lb] Sid TOVTO jj,r)T€ rds alodrjoeLS rjfJicbv jjLrjre rds" 86£as dX-qOeveiv rj i

Kal

[]

[2a] Aid TOVTO ovv fjLrjSe rnoTeveiv avrals Seiv, [2b] dAA' d8o£doTovs Kal aKXtvets Kal aKpaSdvTovs etvat, [2c] Trepl evos eKaoTOV Aeyovra? on ov fidXXov €OTIV rj OVK eanv rj Kal eon Kal OVK €OTIV r) OVT€ €GTLV OVT€ OVK €GTLV.

(4)[3] Tot? /xevrot ye Sta/cet/xevots" ovrco Trepieoeodai Tificov (frrjol rrpcoTOv fjiev d^>aatav, eVeira 8' drapa^iav, AlvrjOLorjfjios S' r)oovf]v. (5)7d fjuev ovv K€dXaia TCOV Xeyofjuevcuv COTI r a u r a • GKei/jcofxeda S' el opdtbs XeyovoLV.

10 THE TITLE OF TIMON'S INDALMOL FROM ODYSSEUS TO PYRRHO

Timon of Phlius (about 325 to about 235), known as the Sillograph, was 'spokesman' (77/00^77x779, Sextus Empiricus calls him, M 1.53) for his master Pyrrho of Elis. As his nickname indicates, he is known chiefly for his Silloi, a kind of Homer in disguise into which he had poured all his satirical verve, in the service of Pyrrho. In the fragments by him that have come down to us, 1 the Silloi predominate, thanks to their dashing style and the many explicitly personal attacks directed against a large number of well-known and respected philosophers that they contain. Quite a few fragments of this work are thus preserved, and their spiciness still comes through, despite the sophistication of the vocabulary and the obscurity of the allusions. We also possess an equally valuable and quite detailed general description of the structure of the work and its author's intentions. 2 However, the Silloi by no means constitute the entire output of the Sillograph. The fragments that remain from Timon's writings testify fully to his many-sided ability. He was an enormously prolific author, who had written in the most varied of genres. Diogenes Laertius ( i x . i i o - u ) provides the following information on him: He was known to King Antigonus and to Ptolemy Philadelphia, as his own Iambi (iv TOIS id^oLs) testify. He was, according to Antigonus [of Carystus], fond of wine, and in the leisure time that he could spare from philosophy, he used to write poems. These included epics, tragedies, satyrical dramas (thirty comedies and sixty tragedies) besides silloi (lampoons) and obscene poems (KIVCUSovs). There are also works of his in prose extending to 20,000 lines, which are mentioned by Antigonus, who also wrote his life. (transl. R.D. Hicks, slightly modified, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1965) This list shows, if nothing else, that Timon had managed to 'spare from philosophy' a fairly copious dose of'leisure' time. But, strangely enough, there Principal collections of the fragments of Timon: Wachsmuth 1859 and 1885; Diels 1901; Lloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983; and now Di Marco 1989. A significant proportion of these fragments are, naturally, also assembled in Decleva Caizzi 1981. In the interests of convenience and economy, for the first occurrence of any reference to a fragment of Timon, I shall cite the number given to that fragment in all these editions (using the abbreviations W, D, DC, LJP); for later occurrences I shall simply cite the number in Diels, which is always cited in the later editions. Cf. DL ix. 111-12. Long's fine study (1978) is currently the best commentary on the Silloi. See now Di Marco 1989. 212

THE TITLE OF TIMON'S INDALMOI

213

is one work, the Indalmoi, that it does not mention although its title has come down to us, as have a number of extracts from it which are of the greatest importance.3 The meaning of several passages from this work is crucial to the understanding of Pyrrhonism in its original form and their interpretation has, on that account, been the subject of intense discussion. I do not intend to go into that discussion, but in order to convey a notion of the ideas that these fragments contain (leaving aside all the problems of text, punctuation, syntax and semantics which ought really to be tackled and resolved before any attempt at suggesting a reasoned interpretation is made), let me offer the following approximate translation: (a) Fragment 67D: This, o Pyrrho, is what my heart longs to hear: How do you, who are only a man, manage to live your life4 in such serenity, Always free from care, free from agitation, always of the same disposition, Without paying any attention to the wretchedness5 of knowledge expressed in beguiling language? Alone, you act as men's guide, like the god Who, pursuing his course right around the earth, buckles his buckle, Displaying the incandescent circle of his well rounded sphere. 3

Some (but relatively few) scholars have expressed surprise at the absence of the Indalmoi from the list of Timon's works given by Diogenes Laertius. It is indeed a surprising absence, for Diogenes twice refers to the Indalmoi in his note on Pyrrho, at 65 (p. 21. iW = 67D = 6iB 4 proposed emending lajxfiois, in n o , to ZvSaAjjLois', but even that suggestion was not enough to ensure the inclusion of the Indalmoi in the official catalogue of Timon's works. Wachsmuth (1885, p.20), followed by Decleva Caizzi (1981, p. 251), thinks that the work ought to be included amongst the e-n-rj, for reasons of metric classification. However, in my own view, there is something to be said for emending Kivaihovs to ivSaX/xovs: (i) the unusual term ivSaXfioi was mishandled by the copyists, cf. Sextus, M xi.20, where the introduction of the quotation of fragment 68D ( = p. 22. iiW = 62DC = 842LJP) was restored by Menage and Fabricius as iv TOLS TvSaAfxoLs, on the basis of the following manuscript readings: TOLS OLVSTUJLOLS N,

TOLOIVSTJIJLOLS L, TOLOLV STOOLS E, TOLOL ST^OIS1 S; (ii) faulty uncial lettering and word-breaks, in

conjunction with plain perversity, might explain how ivSaXfjuovs came to be KIVOLISOVS; (iii) the wounding and sarcastic wit of Timon, who had once been a dancer (DL ix. 109) was sufficiently well known for him frequently to be criticized for obscenities (cf. Brochard 1923, p. 84: 'the former tumbler also displays something of the uncouth and insulting manner of the cynics'); (iv) Wachsmuth 1859, p. 8, followed by Brochard 1923, p. 80 n. 2, proposed reading (f>iXoTTOLy}Trjs, 'connaisseur of poetry', in place of ^LXOTTOTTJS 'connaisseur of wines', in DL's text; he may be right, however prudish the emendation may be and despite one or two writers who testify to Timon's Rabelaisian inclinations (Athenaeus x.438, Aelian VH11.41): DL's text, which already contains one malicious distortion, may well have contained another, and the two prudish emendations would be mutually supportive; (v) lastly, and above all, if we accept the proposed emendation, the list of Timon's writings does become more systematically organized: literary works (epics and dramatic poems), philosophical poems (the Silloi and the Indalmoi), prose works. I am here translating Sidyeis, a conjecture on the part of Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 59, and adopted by Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 11, p. 10; the MSS give a number of different readings, none of which make sense. I am here retaining the SeiXots of the MSS, which seems to me to make acceptable sense. Among the many suggestions for replacing this word, let me cite the following: SLVOLS ('to whirlwinds', Nauck, Diels, Decleva Caizzi, Long and Sedley), Xrjpois ('to nonsense', Bekker), SeXrois ('to writings', Bergk, who had, however, initially suggested ivSaXfAols, 'to deceptive images', see below n. 12), CLLVOLS ('to stories', Bury), SOVXOLS ('to servitudes', Decleva Caizzi, p. 254, dubitanter), heXiaoa ('to charms', Lloyd Jones and Parsons dubitanter).

214

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(b) Fragment 68D (unanimously considered to be the reply, or the beginning of the reply, vouchsafed by Pyrrho, in Timon's poem, in answer to the question that his disciple has asked him in fragment 67D): I will tell you how it appears to me (Kara^aiverai) To be, having the word of truth (JJLVOOV aXrjdeirjs) as my correct rule (opdov Kavova);6 I will tell you the nature of the divine and the good (17 rov Qeiov re cf>vois KOLL rayaOov), Whence there stems the most balanced life for man.7 Fragment 69D: But appearance (TO <£cuvo/xevov) predominates everywhere, wherever one goes.

It is not hard to see why these texts have been so ardently scrutinized. Through the comparison between Pyrrho and the sun-god and through the expressions 'word of truth', 'correct rule' and 'nature of the divine and the good', the first two fragments seem to manifest a sort of 'dogmatism' and one wonders whether (and if so, how) this should be reconciled with the 'scepticism' that is traditionally associated with the name of Pyrrho and seems to be present in the third fragment.8 Whatever the exact interpretation of these fragments should be, they at any rate seem to show that at least to a certain extent the Indalmoi constituted as it were a positive counterpart to the Silloi. In the Silloi, Timon, with varying degrees of ferocity, attacked all philosophers other than his own revered master: that was the destructive part of his Pyrrhonist strategy. The Indalmoi, in contrast, is not devoted to denouncing the vices and absurdities of other philosophers, but to showing directly the incomparable excellence of Pyrrho and his recipe for happiness. Most interpreters would accept, at least provisionally (and reserving the right to correct it later) the opinion expressed by Brochard (1923, pp. 84-5): It seems evident to me (insofar as, with such inadequate documentation, one can speak of evidence) that the Indalmoi constituted a truly moral treatise with somewhat dogmatic tendencies. If the idea that I have formed of Pyrrho's work is correct, it contained the essential part of the original Sceptic teaching. The Indalmoi9 constituted a constructive work: it taught the means to be happy, that is to say how to discover happiness in ataraxia and indifference. It is not my intention to return to an examination of these difficult texts in the present paper. My much more modest aim is to see what can be gleaned from 6 7

8

9

Another possible construction: 'I will tell you a word of truth, as it appears to be to me, who follow a correct rule'. Cf. Long 1978, pp. 84-5 n. 16, Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1 p. 19. Another possible construction: '[I will tell you this word, namely that] the nature of the divine and the good always consists in that which renders human life more balanced.' This meaning is obtained by simply suppressing the comma at the end of line 3, as Burnyeat ingeniously suggests (1980). His suggestion, criticized by Reale (1981, pp. 307-9) and by Ferrari (1981, p. 358 n. 32), is defended by Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 1, p. 21 and vol. 11, p. 11). Sextus (M 1.305-6), already, produced a laboriously Sceptic exegesis of lines 5-7 of the first fragment. See now, in particular, the discussions by Brochard (1923, pp. 62-5), Burnyeat (1980), Reale (1981, pp. 306-15), Ferrari (1981, pp. 358-61), Decleva Caizzi (1981, pp. 25162), Stopper (1983, pp. 270-1), Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 1, pp. 20-1, vol. 11, pp. 10-11). An extremely unfortunate misprint in Brochard's text gives 'the Silloi here. However it should clearly read 'the Indalmoi'.

THE TITLE OF TIMON'S INDALMOI

215

the title alone, to help us comprehend the character and intentions of the Indalmoi. The title itself is not easy to interpret, and has already been the subject of many a discussion. However, it seems to me that full use has still not been made of the documentation available. Moreover, as we shall discover, in a way the difficulties in the interpretation of the title reflect and condense the difficulties in the interpretation of the extant fragments of the work and its overall meaning. The word ivSaXfiot is a rare one: according to Decleva Caizzi (1981, p. 251), its only other attested use is in the pseudo-Hippocratic Letters (first century AD?) relating to the story about the meeting between Hippocrates and Democritus (Ep. Pseudhippocr. I 8 . I = D K 68C5). There, the term iVSaA/xoi' unambiguously means Democritean simulacra, which are elsewhere called ei'ScoAa, 'little images'. The neuter JVSaAjua is used in later texts, with the sense of'form', 'appearance', 'mental image' (cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones s.v.). On the other hand, the verb iVSaAAo/zcu is frequently used, even as early as Homer, with meanings such as 'to appear', 'to seem', 'to manifest itself, 'to present itself before one's eyes', 'in one's memory' or 'in one's mind'. Of its occurrences in the Homeric poems, that of Odyssey xix.224, which has been regularly cited by commentators at least ever since Hirzel (1883, p. 52 n. 1), is particularly important from the point of view of the present study, for Timon has obviously drawn upon this line not only for the title of his poem but also in the first line of the question that he addresses to Pyrrho and the first line of the reply that he ascribes to him: (a) Od. XIX 224: avrap iycbv10 ipeaj, a>s JJLOL ivSdXXeraL rjrop . . . (b) Timon, Indalmoi fr. 67D, l.i: rovro /xot, o5 Ilvppajv, i/xetperat rjrop OLKOVOOLI . . .

(c) Timon, Indalmoi fr. 68D, l.i: rj yap iycbv ipeco, a>s etvai . . .

[JLOL

Kara^alverai

Before returning to this comparison, a study of which will constitute the essential subject of this paper, let me briefly summarize the state reached in the discussion concerning the meaning of the title Indalmoi. Nobody doubts or challenges the idea that the kernel of the meaning of the term Indalmoi has to do with the notion of an image (with the proviso that this notion may then develop in various directions: towards representation, appearance, manifestation, deceptive likeness, etc.). Most commentators are equally in agreement 10

Modern publishers of Homer print TOL here, rather than the variant iywv. I prefer, here, to keep the latter reading, which seems to have served as a model to Timon in line 1 of fragment 68D (in which case there is no need to ascribe to Timon the deliberate introduction of eyco in his parody of the Homeric text, nor to consider it as evidence of a reinforcement of the affirmative tonQ,pace Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 259). This is perhaps the place to recall Timon's own interest in the problems of Homer's text and his astonishingly modern conservatism in this connection: 'Aratus is said to have asked him how he could obtain a trustworthy text of Homer, to which he replied, "You can if you can get hold of the ancient copies, and not the corrected copies of our day" (TOLS dp^atot? avTiypdcfxus .. . /cat fxrj rots fj&r] Situpflco/xevoi?)' (DLIX. 113). The same line of Homer, with the same reading, may have served as a model to Parmenides (fr. 2.1), in a strongly dogmatic context: el S* ay iycjv ipeco, /co/xiaai 8e GV (JLVOOV OLKOVOOLS.

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SCEPTICISM

in thinking that xix.224 of the Odyssey contains the key to the riddle.11 But, precisely, and above all in the context of Pyrrho's 'Pyrrhonism' and that of his earliest disciples, the whole point is to decide what is added to that initial kernel of meaning by the Homeric use of the term and Timon's re-use of it. In this respect, the interpretations that have been proposed can by and large be divided into three types: negative, positive and mixed. To many scholars, it has seemed self-evident that, in a context in which Pyrrho was considered as the first of the (neo-)'Pyrrhonist' Sceptics, the term Indalmoi was bound to have a negative sense: many interpreters consider it to refer to the deceptive appearances that lead the common run of men astray. These are appearances that may be produced either by the natural world or by the conventional world of culture and the arbitrary values that men confer upon things that are in themselves neither good nor bad, or even, more narrowly, by the vain speculations of philosophers. Wachsmuth already (1859, p. 11) believed that the term Indalmoi must refer to false and deceptive images. Brochard (1887, 1923, pp. 85-6), having criticized Hirzel's positive interpretation (1883), to which I shall be returning, adopts Wachsmuth's view: 'It is more likely that, as Wachsmuth supposed, the word Indalmoi is here given a derogative meaning; it refers to deceptive images or appearances that the false wisdom of philosophers, according to Timon, presents to the human mind, images that are the principal obstacle to a happy life.' Even though Brochard's negative interpretation is flawed by a singularly weak argument,12 many other commentators (and translators of Diogenes Laertius) have also adopted it: in particular, we may cite Robin,13 11

12

13

Cf. Hirzel 1883, pp. 51-2 n. 1; Diels 1901, p. 203 {wide tituli significatio { — (fxnvoyieva, Sofcu) elucet); Conrad 1913, pp. 12-13; Lloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983, p. 392 ("ivSaX/jiol id est 8o|cu vel ^cuvo^eva, cf. fr. 68D, and Od. xix.224'). Brochard writes as follows (p. 86): 'It is in this sense [deceptive images or appearances] that the word is used in a line of Timon's, from the Indalmoi." The line in question, which he cites in a note, is the fourth line of fr. 67D. But Brochard cites it adopting the suggestion made by Bergk, who substitutes /JLTJ npooex iVSaA/xofr for the reading in Sextus' MSS (fjur) -rrpooexajv SetXois), a reading which, as we have seen, gave rise to many other conjectures, yet still seems possible to retain (cf. above, n. 5). In his note, Brochard merely says 'with Bergk's emendation', without indicating that this 'emendation', which introduces the word ivSaXpois into a text where it does not appear in any of the MSS, is the only justification for his claiming, in the main text, that the word TvSaAfjLoi 'is used in one of Timon's lines'. Robin 1944 translates the title Indalmoi as 'Appearances' or 'Likenesses' in the sense of 'false likenesses' (*Apparences\ 'Semblants\ *Faux-semblants\ p. 28). He comments as follows (p. 31): 'Perhaps these "appearances" are analogous, in particular, to Francis Bacon's "idola theatrf: the deceptive images by means of which philosophers mislead the public before whom they act out their systems, feeling obliged to stick firmly to their role. But it is also possible that Timon's view may have been more general: this is the poem in which there appears the line (fr. 69D) on the universal predominance of appearance (TO (f>aiv6fji€vov), as it presents itself to the conscious mind. In another line (fr. 70D = p. 24. ivW = 64DC = 844LJP), he writes of the distinction between good and evil, which is made arbitrarily by men's minds.' In this last sentence, Robin seems to wish to have it both ways, drawing upon both the text of the MSS (VOCO K€KpLTai) and upon Hirzel's suggested emendation (vofMco KeKpirat), adopted by Natorp 1884, p. 289, Wachsmuth 1885, p. 24 and Brochard 1923, p. 62 n. 1. It is worth noting that recognition of the two possible interpretations indicated by Robin (philosophical illusions, phenomenal illusions) is not the equivalent of what I shall be calling a mixed interpretation, despite what Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252 says.

THE TITLE OF TIMON'S INDALMOI

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Conche, 14 and above all Decleva Caizzi, who came to this same conclusion following a long discussion to which I owe a great deal.* 5 1 shall return later to one particular element in her argument. However, a positive interpretation had long since been suggested by Hirzel (1883, PP- 2 I ~ 2 a n d 46-60 (in particular pp. 51-2 n. 1)). Criticizing Wachsmuth's negative interpretation (1859), Hirzel says that it is impossible to understand why Timon should have entitled a critique of deceptive representations 'Representations', adding that it would be as if Kant had entitled his Critique of Pure Reason 'Dogmatic Philosophy'. 16 But in a 'Sceptic' context, the notion of iVSaA/zot, which Hirzel does not distinguish from the notion of cfxuvofieva, may be put to a positive use: according to Hirzel, Timon is referring to the 'representations' which the sage needs in order to live and to act, the 'phenomena' which serve as guides for his behaviour and which thereby provide him with the practical criterion without which a Sceptic would be exposed to the constantly recurring objection of dvrpa^ta, the impossibility of living and acting. According to this theory, the Indalmoi constitute a work of an ethical nature which presupposes the principles of Pyrrhonist drapa^ta and the 'discourse of truth' of fr. 68D, accepting the consequences of those principles and indicating the stages by which they can be put into practice, in the manner of Democritus' Flepl €vdvyiirjs or a Stoic Ilepl KadrjKovros. Hirzel's thesis has been criticized by Brochard, using arguments some of which, it must be said, cut both ways. He writes as follows (1923/81, p. 85): 'It is difficult to believe that, if he had wanted to speak only of true and useful images, Timon would have entitled his book Indalmoi, without further qualification.' The argument is easily reversed: the title is no easier to understand if we assume that Timon wished to speak only of fake and deceptive images. It is accordingly natural enough that many scholars have been tempted by a mixed interpretation, according to which the word Indalmoi designates both categories of images or appearances, those that are deceptive and also those that are of practical use. This mixed interpretation has furthermore been presented in two versions, depending upon whether the title of the Indalmoi is understood as combining the two categories of images in a conjunctive fashion or as referring to them in a deliberately ambiguous manner. Revising his own negative interpretation of 1859, Wachsmuth (1885, pp. 22-3) merged it with Hirzel's positive interpretation, suggesting that we should understand the 'IvSaA/jioi to cover both the representations that mislead us and those which lead us to drapa^ia.11 The idea of a deliberate ambiguity is argued explicitly by C. Stough. 18 14 15 16 17 18

Conche 1973, p. 89:'... the generally accepted hypothesis according to which the poem Images is directed against the false likenesses of dogmatic wisdom.' Cf. Decleva Caizzi 1981, pp. 251-2 and 258-9. Or, to remain within a Greek context: as if Parmenides had entitled his poem Doxa, or Doxai. According to Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252, a similar interpretation is to be found in Voghera 1904, p. 27, a work that I have not been able to consult. Cf. Stough 1969, p. 24, n. 15: 'There is probably a deliberate play on the title {Indalmoi) itself. It means both "appearances" and "illusions".' Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252 incorrectly presents Stough's position as purely negative.

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SCEPTICISM

Those three possible interpretations, negative, positive and mixed, reappear, logically enough, in connection with the famous enigmatic line, also from the Indalmoi, which on its own constitutes fr. 69D: 'But appearance (TO <j>aiv6iA€vov) predominates everywhere, wherever one goes.' Most interpreters have thought that the cfxuvofjievov of this line must designate the same thing as the ivSaXfjiOiof the work's title. That is how it is that, in strict correlation and mutual interaction with their own respective and divergent interpretations of the title, for some interpreters this line refers to the universal domination of deceptive appearances from which only the sage can extricate himself; for others it refers to the practical usefulness of the phenomenon, which constitutes a sure and major guide for a Pyrrhonist's practical conduct; while for yet others it refers to the inevitable predominance of the phenomenon which both prevents man from knowing the world as it is, yet, despite this, at the same time provides him with a criterion that indicates how to behave in this unknowable world. Tempting though it may be, the assimilation of the IVSCLA/JLOI of the title to the
Cf. D L ix. 113, cited above n. 10, a n d Lloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983, p p . 4 1 - 2 . I have not been able to consult C o n r a d ' s work, cited by Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252. But F e r n a n d a Decleva Caizzi has been kind enough to transmit to me the information that I needed: I a m most grateful to her.

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and separated from his master, Timon set about remembering Pyrrho and recalling his wisdom; he wrote the Indalmoi in order to record his memories and make them known to his contemporaries. This interpretation may seem naive and somewhat anachronistic; but I believe it deserves to be taken more seriously than might at first appear. After all, Xenophon wrote his Memorabilia of Socrates, and Pyrrho's charisma was, in the eyes of his friends, comparable to Socrates' in the eyes of his friends. Without in any way seeking to identify myself with Conrad's interpretation as such, I should now like to reexamine the Homeric reference upon which it rests, making a more thorough use of it than I believe has been made hitherto, and attempting to show to what extent it points us along a path which may not be exactly that indicated by Conrad, but which is certainly not unconnected. First, let us recall the context of the line in the Odyssey (xix.224) which Timon subtly played upon. Odysseus is in Ithaca but has not yet revealed his identity. Penelope questions the stranger, whom she has not recognized, as to his name, his people, his home-town and his family. Odysseus invents a Cretan identity for himself, that of a prince by the name of Aithon. He tells her that, twenty years ago, when Odysseus was on his way to Troy, he, Aithon, received him as a guest in his home. Penelope then requests further details from him, to make sure that he is speaking the truth: what clothes was Odysseus wearing, how did he look, who were his companions? This puts Odysseus in a tricky situation: he must win Penelope's trust by vouchsafing a few precise details, yet at the same time be mindful of his persona's psychological verisimilitude, within the framework of the scenario that he has invented. He acquits himself with all the panache that is to be expected of him: 'Really woman, after so many years it is hard to answer! It is twenty years since he arrived on our shores and then left our island . . .' Then comes line 224: avrap iyd>v ipeoj, OJS JJLOL ivhdXXerai rjrop. What is the exact meaning of this line? It is itself ambiguous, as is most interestingly noted by the Liddell-Scott-Jones dictionary (s.v. iVSaAAojtzcu). It may be understood in a tentative sense: 'I will tell you as my memory seems to me' (LSJ), but also in a positive one: 'I will tell you as my heart pictures him' (LSJ). Those two possible meanings are, as I see it, dictated by the situation in which the character Odysseus finds himself in relation to his wife and also by the situation of the poet in relation to his reader. The tentative meaning corresponds to the psychological caution that Odysseus is obliged to observe where Penelope is concerned: she must be made to recognize that the traveller's memory cannot be expected to be infallible after so many years; and this will cause her to be all the more impressed by the extremely precise details that Odysseus is about to give her regarding the coat that he was wearing at that time and the shape and ornamentation of its clasp - details which Penelope will recognize with delight, for she knows them well, since all these items were gifts from herself to her husband. The positive sense allows the poet to aim a wink in the direction of his reader: the false stranger is, of course, well placed to know exactly what Odysseus was wearing, since he is none other than Odysseus himself- a fact that Penelope does not know but the reader does.

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The line in question, in all its own ambiguity (itself condensed in the ambiguity of the verb tVSdAAercu), thus sums up the complex significance of the whole scene. It is the scene that leads up to the recognition and identification, by means of precise proofs, of the prestigious character who is both present for those to whom the poem is addressed and, at the same time, absent for the one to whom his discourse in the poem is addressed. Describing and described, narrating and narrated, Odysseus-Aithon is at once the subject and the object of his own words. Through the interplay between the same and the other, Homer has him recount what he remembers of himself in the language of the memories of another. With impressive skill, 21 Timon dismantles the Homeric line (avrap iywv ipeto, FIvppojv, ifjietperaL rjrop aKovoai), which keeps the word rjrop, but gets around the word ivSaWercu,, by replacing it with ifi€ip€Tai; and finally, in the first line of Pyrrho's reply (rj yap iywv epeo), (Lg fjuoL KaTas /JLOL

..., but again avoids the word iVSdAAercu, replacing it with Kara<j>aiv€rai etvai. While we may be reasonably certain that this manipulation of the Homeric material would have been perceived as such by Timon's reader, it is clearly much harder to understand exactly what meanings he was supposed to pick up from it. It is nevertheless possible to hazard a few guesses, speculative though they are bound to be. With regard to the first line of fr. 67D, the task is relatively easy. If we bear in mind the contents of this fragment as a whole, that is to say the request to Pyrrho to be so good as to reveal to his questioner the means whereby he achieves his superhuman tranquillity, we can perhaps imagine the distancing effect that Timon's text must have had upon a reader nurtured on Homer. In Timon's line, the verb tVSdAAercu of the Homeric line has been spectacularly replaced by the verb expressing desire, Ifieiperai. That is tantamount to saying, or at least strongly suggesting, that the ivSaXfioi are supposed to satisfy the desire that is expressed in this first line, namely the desire to obtain from Pyrrho, the great man whose name is here spelt out, the revelation of the secret of his contentment. Timon voices that desire in his own name (/xot); but needless to say, he considers it to be a desire felt universally by all men and presupposes that his reader is no exception. 22 However, Timon can provide 21

22

Perhaps I shall be accused of exaggerating the subtlety shown by the a u t h o r of the Indalmoi in his use of the Odyssey, a subtlety with which he also credited the reader of his poem. There is no need to go so far as to invoke Rabelais to justify the co-existence of the most liberated kind of wit with the most sophisticated erudition. Let me simply refer the reader to Cortassa 1976, p. 314, who calls fragment 4 6 D of the Silloi ( = 4 W = 778LJP) 'a closely woven web of subtle satirical innuendos, m o r e or less open allusions and equivocal implications to which the interpreter must be constantly alert lest he gravely misunderstand the meaning of T i m o n ' s poem.' T h e first line of Parmenides' Poem also refers (in terms of dv^xos) to a desire that the reader is implicitly invited to identify as his own.

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221

only images, iVSaAfxoi, of what it is that can satisfy that desire. Perhaps I may at this point be permitted a somewhat irreverent comparison: Timon presents his reader with an image of the product that he wants to recommend to him, not the product itself, just as a mail-order company sends its clients an illustrated catalogue, to make them want to procure the originals of the images that it contains. What, then, do the images that Timon provides represent? Surely not only Pyrrho the man, as in the context of an anecdotal biography made up of'personal memories', rather Pyrrho the inventor and model of an exceptional 'disposition' (Siddeois), the essential components of which are 'apathy' and 'drapa^ta', a disposition which - as we know - had made an intensely forceful impression upon his disciples and contemporaries.23 Naturally, the 'images' of Pyrrho that Timon dispensed to his reader were to be particularly recommended not only because they were so attractive but also on account of their authority, for they were relayed by a witness in a good position to be exact and truthful, Timon having spent a number of years in Pyrrho's company (cf. DL ix. 109). He could say quite literally of Pyrrho what Odysseus said of the shades that he had encountered in Hades: T saw him.'24 Let us press on a little further: Timon is not only the analogue of OdysseusAithon, who is capable of providing first-hand information about OdysseusPyrrho,25 together with proofs to back that information up. Objectively, and for those who know what is not known to Penelope, who is the person to whom his discourse is directly addressed, Aithon is none other than Odysseus. So the re-use of the Homeric episode, with all its contextual connotations, might well imply that Timon, the one who is speaking, is, in a way, identified with Pyrrho, the one about whom he is speaking. The fact that the very line which, in Homer, is pronounced by Odysseus, provides certain of the elements for the question that Timon asks, and certain others for the reply that Pyrrho himself gives, perhaps conveys the same message: Timon is implicitly presenting himself as Pyrrho's alter ego. The 'images' of his master and of Pyrrhonist happiness that he is about to produce are as trustworthy as those that Odysseus, under an assumed name, can present of his own coat and its clasp: 23

24

25

The documentation on P y r r h o (who, as hardly needs pointing out, himself wrote nothing) is m o r e inclined to expatiate u p o n his way of life and his character than u p o n his teaching and arguments, as is clear from the valuable collection of testimony that has at last - most proficiently - been put together by Decleva Caizzi 1981. Some of the contemporaries w h o m Pyrrho h a d impressed explicitly separated his Siddecns from his Aoyoi, cf. N a u s i p h a n e s in D L ix.64, 69. 'I also saw so-and-so' is the standardized expression used of Odysseus' encounters in the U n d e r w o r l d in the course of the Nekuia (Od. xi). The expression had already been used by the Cynic Crates of Thebes (cf. fr. i D = 347LJP a n d fr. 3 D = 349LJP), w h o had also parodied H o m e r , possibly providing a model for T i m o n ' s techniques of p a r o d y (cf. W a c h s m u t h 1885, p p . 72-3 and L o n g 1978, pp. 75-6). However, one m a y wonder whether it was really simply by chance in the transmission of texts that, of all the fragments of the Silloi preserved, the only two to use t'Sov, 'I saw', h a p p e n to be the one concerning P y r r h o (cf. £yd> i8ov, 9 D = 32W = 5 8 D C = 783LJP) and the one concerning a n o t h e r of T i m o n ' s contemporaries, Zeno of Citium (38D = 8W = 812LJP). T h e identification of Pyrrho with Odysseus is attested by fragment 8 D of the Silloi ( = 35W = 5 7 D C = 782LJP), which declares P y r r h o to be 'unrivalled', in a p a r o d y of a line from H o m e r (//. 111.223) which makes the same claim for Odysseus.

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for Timon is as close to Pyrrho as Odysseus, twenty years on, is to himself.26 It is much more difficult to give a plausible interpretation of the distancing effect that Timon aims for and achieves when he again uses that same line of Homer's in the first line of the reply that he ascribes to Pyrrho (fr. 68D, line i): iydjv ipeco, c5? /xot /cara^cuVercu etvai. The reason for this is simple: the verb that is substituted for the Homeric iVSaAAercu is, this time, not the transparent verb [jjL€Lp€Tcu, but the extremely equivocal and controversial /cara^cuWrcu {etvcu). Should this verb be understood as a straightforward equivalent to au>eTcu? Many interpreters believe that it should and that, in conformity, already, with the spirit of neo-Pyrrhonian Scepticism, its use qualifies the entire contents of the discourse attributed to Pyrrho, suggesting that it constitutes no more than a subjective and personal appearance. 27 Unconvinced by that theory, others, on the contrary, think that the compound Kara^aiverat has a different meaning from that of the simple cuWrcu, and that this intrinsically positive meaning ('to emerge from darkness to come into the light', 'to show itself, 'to manifest itself) gives Pyrrho's discourse a strongly dogmatic and assertive character. 28 26

27

28

T i m o n ' s strategy has proved remarkably effective since, twenty-three centuries after the Indalmoi, in an article entitled (as if by chance) 'The image of balance' (L'immagine delFequilibrio), a particularly sensitive and learned scholar describes the four lines of fragment 6 8 D as 'the only fully comprehensible a n d non-manipulated text in which Pyrrho speaks, setting o u t his o w n doctrine in the first person' (Ferrari 1981, p . 357, Ferrari's italics). Ferrari would perhaps not have overlooked the fact that the a u t h o r of those four lines was in fact T i m o n if, not content to write a n u m b e r of remarkable pages on the meeting between Pyrrho a n d T i m o n , which is the fundamental schema for all the works in which T i m o n speaks of his master (pp. 345-61), he h a d probed further into the other-self relationship which became established following and in consequence of that m e m o r a b l e meeting between the master and his disciple. T h a t was h o w Sextus interpreted this fragment of T i m o n (doing so, however, with a prudence rightly noted by b o t h N a t o r p 1884, p . 292 a n d Decleva Caizzi 1981, p . 256): 'We are in the habit of calling each of these things good, or bad, or indifferent, in conformity with the appearance (Kara TO (fxuvofxevov), as T i m o n seems to wish to show (eoiare SrjXovv) in the Indalmoi when he says', etc. ( M xi.20). Similarly, in m o d e r n times, see Stough 1969, p . 25 ('Everything said is qualified by " a s it appears to me to b e " , an indication that he is merely reporting his own experience'); D u m o n t 1972, p . 132 ('Is it not clear that the phenomenon is said, at least according to T i m o n , to be the criterion of t r u t h for Pyrrho?'); Conche 1973, p. 61 ('the cos /LIOI Kara^aiveraL etvcu turns being into seeming'; see also p . 89); L o n g 1978, p . 84-5 n. 16 ( T h e key phrase is cos JJLOL Kara^aiveraL etvat, as Sextus, the source of the lines, understood them ( M xi. 19-20). H e distinguishes between " t h e existence of goods a n d evils a n d neither of t h e s e " and their appearance (TO aiv6ixevov), which the Pyrrhonist is in the habit of calling good, bad, and indifferent. This permits us to regard the "correct r u l e " as the stating of truth " a s it seems to (me) to b e " , a n d n o unqualified existential claim a b o u t <j>vois is made.') See Ferrari's argument (1981, p . 359: 'In t r u t h the Greek term never has the negative meaning of " t o seem", " t o a p p e a r " , in the sense of uncertainty, but on the contrary always has the positive meaning of something which emerges from the darkness into the light and which accordingly " s h o w s itself", "manifests i t s e l f " ) which is taken u p by Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 256 ('the c o m p o u n d term used underlines the assertion rather t h a n obscuring it by giving it a subjective sense, as is proved by the passages in which it recurs (cf. for example H d t . 1.58, in.53, 130; in.69) and the meaning of Kara^>avr)s, /caTcu^aveia'), a n d 258-9 ('it would be h a r d to deny that T i m o n ' s lines have the authoritative tone of the revelation of the truth . . . the second hemistich is replaced by the m u c h stronger cos /xoi Karacfyaiverai elvat . . . which certainly paves the way for the emphasis of the pentameter which follows.')

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It may be impossible to disambiguate Timon's Kara<j>aiv€Tai.29 Indeed, it may be important not to attempt to do so: that ambiguity might quite deliberately be there to echo the ambiguity that Timon had probably perceived in Homer's iVSaAAercu. Different categories of addressees could understand Kara
The problematic syntax of the fragment might be explained by the hypothesis that Sextus cited Timon incompletely (Ferrari 1981, p. 359), or else that there is a lacuna in the MSS of Sextus (Stopper 1983, p. 291 n. 35). In that case, we could not be certain that the meaning of the fragment was unaffected (pace Ferrari 1981, pp. 359-60), and we should have to accept Stopper's agnostic conclusion (p. 271: 'the blank might have been filled dogmatically, it might have been filled sceptically') - although Stopper himself does not conceal his preference for a Sceptic solution to the problem (p. 291 n. 36).

II SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ON THE KPITHPION: THE SCEPTIC AS CONCEPTUAL LEGATEE*

Scepticism, as is well known, is a therapy for philosophical illnesses. But it does not spend much time in classifying those illnesses: the disease to fight against, in spite of its manifold forms, is always dogmatism. To the Sceptic, all nonSceptical schools are dogmatic, whether 'properly speaking' (IBicos, PH1.3) or in a particular way: the Academy itself professes a kind of upside-down dogmatism (PH1.226). Eclecticism is never mentioned by Sextus, although the thing is not unknown to ancient philosophy, nor is the word unemployed. The reason for this silence is perhaps that eclecticism is less a philosophical illness than an alternative medicine, aiming at curing the same ills as Scepticism does (namely, conflicts among the dogmatists), but in an opposite way and on the basis of a different diagnosis. To the eclectic, doctrinal conflicts are superficial conflicts; philosophical doctrines are compatible at bottom, at least piecemeal, and perhaps even globally they converge. When looking at the philosophical stage, the Sceptic sees quite a different play: to him, the disagreement between systems is irreducible. An eclectic philosopher might actually accuse the Sceptic of being himself a kind of metaphilosophical dogmatist, in the sense that he admits not only that philosophers seem to contradict each other, but also that they actually do so; one might remind him of his zetetic disposition and invite him to be more careful before asserting the objective reality of those conflicts. But the Sceptic would not be embarrassed by this objection: he could answer that in this context, there was no difference between saying and doing; if philosophers say that they contradict each other (and they say so rather loudly), this means that they do contradict each other. It would be a piece of real dogmatism to claim that deep-level agreement hides beneath surface-level disagreement. By virtue of his initial decisions, the Sceptic is so immune to eclectic temptations that he does not even feel the need to speak about them. On the other hand, he is never tired of exhibiting the antagonisms between dogma* This is a revised, somewhat enlarged, and as far as possible anglicized version of the paper read in French at the Dublin Congress. I benefited from observations made there, in particular by Pierluigi Donini, Tony Long, Jaap Mansfeld and Reimar Miiller; I am most grateful to them all. Another, more general, version was read at the Freie Universitat, Berlin, in January 1985; I received a number of useful suggestions from my audience there. I first tried to translate the French draft myself; but if it reads as tolerable English, this is entirely due to Jonathan Barnes's generous and careful help. I am afraid there are still many traces in this paper of its French descent; if such a doctor did not cure them, certainly they are incurable.

224

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tists, and he sharpens them by all the means at his disposal. He is so little prone to gloss over differences that he takes great pains to demarcate himself from those philosophical schools which for some reason have been taken as 'close neighbours' to Scepticism (PH 1.210-41).1 This fundamental opposition between eclecticism and Scepticism has certain consequences. Dogmatists contradict each other in their statements; those contradictions make dogmatism a weak position (and eclecticism a fundamentally meaningless one), only if they are real contradictions. The eclectic game will thus be to mitigate the contradictions, by showing that dogmatists do not speak about the same things, do not consider them in the same respects, do not designate them with the same words; their dissensions are merely verbal, since they use the same words for different concepts and different words for the same concepts; because they disagree on the conceptual level, they are able to agree at the level of dogma, to a greater extent than they themselves believe.2 On the other hand, the Sceptic must assume that dogmatists, when quarreling about their opposite dogmas, all have the same notions and use the same words to express them: only on this condition can he claim that he understands what their debates are all about and attack their dogmas from a position of knowledge. Let us notice, however, that this strategy is likely to come into conflict with another tendency, equally natural to the Sceptic. Accustomed as he is to point out the disagreements between dogmatic doctrines, when he notices that dogmatists give different definitions of the same terms he will inevitably be tempted to expose those conceptual disagreements; the reader will thus be presented with the broadest possible 'disagreement' (SiaaWa) between dogmatists. But this is a dangerous game: if he tries to win on this ground too, he weakens his position elsewhere, since he jeopardizes the identity of the conceptual legacy shared by the different schools. We may well expect that he will vacillate over what to do when it is clear that a given concept is differently construed by different schools: he has equally good reasons for pointing out this difference and for saying nothing about it, or even for denying it; but clearly he cannot do all these things at the same time. We can see this vacillation, I believe, in more than one passage in Sextus. I shall content myself with one example, in which it is especially conspicuous. In 1

2

This section of PH was perhaps paralleled in a lost part of M: in this case M vn. 1 would allude to this parallel section in M, not to PH. This suggestion is convincingly put forward by Karel Janacek (1963). To his arguments I would add the following one: the verb €KTV7TOJ6€LS, which occurs in M vn. 1, would be quite inappropriate as a reference to the' YTTOTVTTWOZIS'. it does not mean 'to sketch', but, on the contrary, 'to describe accurately, reproducing all the details of what is described' (cf. avyKexv^evajs KOLI OVK €KTV7TOJS, M vn.171; ef epyaoia, used by Sextus M VII. 1 as a description of the style in which what came before M v n was written, is contrasted with v7TOTV7TO)ois in Plotinus vi.3.7). Emphasis on the merely verbal character of disagreements among philosophers is a recurring feature in the Antiochean tradition: cf. Cicero, Defin. iv.72 (re consentire, verbis discrepare), v.22 (nominibus aliis easdem res), etc. The locus classicus of this conception of error and controversy is Spinoza, Eth. 11.47, schol.

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M vm, Sextus devotes a lengthy section (300-36) to an analysis of the notion (iirivoia) of proof (d7rd86t^?). He barely mentions the disagreement between schools concerning certain aspects of this notion (336); everywhere else in this section, he offers as an investigation of a unitary concept of proof what is in fact (if I am not mistaken in what I said elsewhere about this section)3 a patchwork of several palpably different definitions of this notion. After this analysis, the implicit meaning of which is that all philosophers have an almost completely identical notion of proof, Sextus takes up a new problem, namely, the problem of the existence {v-nap^is) of proof (336-7). He first asks if the concept (iiTLvoia /cat 7Tp6Xrji/jLs) implies the existence of its object. This is a vital question to Scepticism as a whole, and it has a relevance far beyond the particular case of the notion of proof, for if the 'ontological' implication holds (i.e., if we may infer from essence to existence), the Sceptic finds himself in a very awkward position. How could he both claim that he has the notion of a proof and suspend judgement about the existence of proof? His enemies, particularly the Epicureans, 4 as Sextus says here, will try to catch him in the following trap: if you understand what a proof is, if you have a notion of it, then proof does exist; and if you do not understand it, then how can you inquire about something you have no notion of? Answering this objection, Sextus grants one of the premisses: it is indeed impossible to conduct any inquiry without having a notion of what it bears on. But in order to get round the objection allegedly involved in this premiss, he successively adopts two completely different tactics. First (332A-333A), his reply is somewhat ironical. Far from saying that we have no notion of what the inquiry is about, we would say, on the contrary, that we have more than we need, for the dogmatists supply us with a quantity of such notions, and divergent ones at that; we are threatened not with conceptual vacuity but, rather, with conceptual surplus. Lacking any criterion to decide among the competing definitions, we should rather take refuge in suspension of judgement (e^ox^) once again. This answer presupposes that the definitions given of the same term by the different dogmatisms are different and indeed incompatible.5 It seems to imply, moreover, that the Sceptic accepts the ontological implication: if, by counterfactual hypothesis, the dogmatists were presenting a unified front at the conceptual level, the Sceptic would have no other choice than to admit the existence of the object captured by their common concept. Sextus says so explicitly: 'If [by counterfactual 3 4

5

Cf. Brunschwig 1980. It is no wonder that the Epicureans are specifically mentioned in this context: they notoriously insisted that any inquiry, discussion, or research necessarily presupposes a irpoXruJjis of its subject matter (cf. Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 37-8, Cicero, De nat. deor. 1.43, Sextus, M1.57, xi.21, Diogenes Laertius x.33). Diotimus (in Sextus M 7.140) attributes the same doctrine to Democritus, with the rather unexpected support of a Platonic quotation {Phaedr. 237B) which, like the famous problem in Plato's Meno, 8OE, seems to have played some part in the fortune of this idea (cf. Cicero, Defin. 11.4). Cf. 333A TToXXaS €XOfJL€V TOV €VOS ivVOLOLS KO.L TToXvTpOTTOVS fXaXO^evaS KTX.

Kdl €7T IO7)S 7TLGTOLS

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6

hypothesis] we had a single preconception of what the inquiry is about, we would believe, under guidance of this preconception, than an object indeed exists, exactly as it would have been given to us in this unitary notion' (333A). Second, in 334A-336A, Sextus' tactics shift completely. He then quite clearly rejects the ontological implication, and he makes a sharp distinction between (a) conception (eWoia, emVoia), 'mere motion of the intellect' which involves no judgement at all, no assertion whatsoever as to whether its object exists or not, and (b) grasping or understanding (KaraXrji/jis), which has a propositional content and involves the assertion of this content. 7 Now the Sceptic can claim that he has notions of things, 'in the way we mentioned' (334A),8 without being thereby committed to admit that the thing understood exists. Turning the objection back on his opponents, he shows that unless this distinction is made, even a dogmatist like Epicurus could not himself reject, say, a physical doctrine that he disapproved of: if you wish to reject, e.g., the four-elements theory, you must have the preconception (irpoXrji/jis) of the four elements; but this TrpoXrjipis must not imply the KardXrjifjLs that the elements are indeed four. I think this passage shows clearly that two different and, indeed, incompatible answers to the same objection are put side by side. The first one accepts the ontological inference and is based on a supposed fact of conceptual SiaoWa; the second one rejects the 'ontological' inference and admits that the different dogmatists, and the Sceptic himself, have the same concept in mind. The difference is great enough, I think, to prevent us from construing them as alternative strategies, to be adopted as occasion requires. For they do indeed presuppose philosophical assumptions, and those assumptions are at the same time heavy, contradictory, and crucial ones for the determination of the proper Sceptical attitude. It is probably worthwhile to remark that this problem of a common language among philosophers, which is raised in M vin, as we have just seen, apropos of the particular case of the notion of proof, is also dealt with at the beginning of P//11, but in quite general terms and in a place which marks it as a vital preliminary question. The problem is set in slightly different terms from those of M viii. Before beginning the detailed criticism of dogmatic philosophies, Sextus asks whether the Sceptic can legitimately conduct inquiries about whatever the dogmatists say unless he grasps it (KaraXa^dveiv). Now if he grasps it, how can he remain perplexed {drropelv) about what he is grasping? The problem is thus put in terms of KardXrji/j 19; here it is solved via a 6

7

8

The counterfactual force of the el fxiv clause is made clear by vvv Sc in the next one. I take v7rdpx€Lv in this sentence as existential, pace Bury: the whole section is about the existence (viraptjis) of proof; and TOLOVTO is not normally coupled with o-noiov. Cf. 335A, KaT€iAr}(/)€ TO reoraapa efvat oroixcfa, as opposed to 336A einvoel. . . ra riooapa oToixeia. To invert KardArji/jts and virap^is in 334A, as was suggested by Werner Heintz 1932, p. 186, looks quite plausible. I take this to refer to the possession of a single concept, as described before the first answer based on conceptual hia^cDvla. On the connecting particle dAAa yap between the two sections, cf. n. 9 below.

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distinction between two meanings of this word, only one of which matches the use made of it in the M vm passage. In the weak sense, KardXrji/jLs is equivalent to the mere conception (voelv dirXcos = eirivoia in M vm), which does not involve any assertion of existence concerning the object conceived. In the strong sense (which is the Stoic sense of KardXru/jis, and also the sense which in M vm is opposed to cmVoia), KardXrjifjLs involves the assertion that its object exists. Those terminological differences apart, the solution to the problem in PH is the same as the second solution in the M vm text. Sextus shows that if a KardXrjifjLs in the strong sense was required for inquiries, the dogmatists would be unable to criticize each other; but since only KardX^is in the weak sense is a prerequisite of research, nothing prevents the Sceptic from having a VOTJGLS of what his inquiries are about, and this vorjots does not imply the existence of its object (PH II. 10). In this general treatment of the question in PH, the 'ontological' implication is thus firmly rejected, and there is no mention whatsoever of conceptual Siaam'a; the first solution of the M vm passage is not to be found in PH. Although the vexed question of the chronological relationships between M and PH lies outside the scope of this paper, I may remark in passing that on this point the PH version is clearer and more decided than the M version.9 These few general considerations do not claim to be anything more than a sketchy analysis of the problems Scepticism is faced with when trying to deal with the conceptual legacy it has inherited. I hope they will not prove useless when studying the particular notion with which the rest of this paper will deal, namely, the notion of a Kpirr)piov.10 It goes without saying that this notion is supremely important in Sextus' inquiry, as it is central in the philosophical tenets of the Hellenistic period. When Sextus comes to grips with it, it already has a very long history; and this history has been further extended, in its earlier part, by the fact that earlier philosophical doctrines (of the classical and even the archaic period) have been reinterpreted by the Sceptics and retrospectively construed as so many answers to the Kpinqpiov question. During this long history, the word Kpiriqpiov was applied to different entities, construed in different meanings, subdivided along different lines. These intricate developments have been excellently analysed not long ago. 11 I shall rely on this and try, by examining the regularities and irregularities in Sextus' own works, to 9

PH is generally supposed to be earlier than the parallel sections in M, since Janacek's studies (particularly Janacek 1948); on the same lines, cf. Long 1978a. However, there are some dissenting voices: David Glidden 1983, p. 246 n. 24, says that 'his [sc.Janacek's] stylistic considerations are consistent with PH1—11 being a cleaned-up version of M VII-VIII.' I must say I have the same impression, when reading Janacek as well as when comparing PH and M on some particular point I happen to come across. Some more examples will be given below. It is perhaps relevant to point out that the connecting particle between the two different answers in M vm.334A is aAAa yap', 'the sense conveyed is that what precedes is irrelevant, unimportant, or subsidiary, and is consequently to be ruled out of discussion, or at least put in the shade' (Denniston 1954, p. 101). One could not put it better. I ° In order to prevent the reader from automatically understanding this word in its modern sense, I keep it untranslated. I1 By Gisela Striker 1974, pp. 51—110. To give a full idea of my indebtedness to this book I should have to quote it on every page (see also Long 1988, pp. 180—92).

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uncover some traces of this past history, of the problems he inherited from it, and of the labour he had to expend because of those problems. The word Kpirrjpiov, according to Sextus, is used in many senses; he devotes two roughly parallel sections (M vii.29-37 and PH11.14-17) to their orderly enumeration. Before looking at this classification, however, it may be of some interest to point out something peculiar to the M version. In M vii.25 - i.e., even before giving any account of the several meanings of the word Kpirrjpiov Sextus makes use of this word; and the sense in which he uses it is at the same time (1) defined precisely and univocally, (2) determinative of the overall structure of books VII-VIII, (3) missing in the classification given later of the different meanings of this word in vii.29-37 and (4) inconsistent with the sense that, in this later classification, will be marked out as the proper object of Sceptical inquiry. Here indeed are a lot of anomalies. Let us look at them in a little more detail. In the context of the passage I have in mind (vii.24-5), Sextus is giving justifications for the plan he will follow in his 'specific' examination of the three main parts of dogmatic philosophy (logic, physics, ethics). 12 He first explains why he begins with logic: all parts of philosophy employ 'the principles and procedures' (rag apx&s Kal TOVS rponovs) of the discovery of truth; but only logic, inasmuch as it involves the theory of Kpn-qpia and airohel^eis, takes them as its explicit topics. The distinction thus sketched is then taken up again with more detail, so as to offer a methodical subdivision for the whole survey of logic: Since it is generally accepted [8OK€L\ that what is evident [ivapyfj] is known from itself [avrodev] through some criterion [Sta Kpinqpiov rtvo?], whereas what is non-manifest [ah-qXa] has to be tracked down through signs and proofs [Sta

or)iJL€i(x)v /cat aTToSeigecov], by way of transfer [Kara ixerafiaoiv] from what is

evident, we shall ask ourselves in order, first, whether there is a criterion for things that show up from themselves, either perceptually or intellectually [el eon

rt KpLTrjpcov TWV avTodev KO.T aiaOrjoiv 7) StdVotav 77/00aTTLTTTovrajv], and then,

whether there is a semiotic or probative procedure concerning non-manifest things [el €OTL ornjieiwTiKos rj a7To8€iKTLKos TWV aSrjAwv T/OOTTO?].

In this first occurrence, the notion of Kpir-qpiov seems to be a univocal notion, about where there is a consensus (8OK€L) among philosophers; from what is said here, we could not guess that the word that expresses this notion is 'used in more than one way' (TTOAXOLXOOS Xeyofjuevov), as we shall learn later on. The Sceptic himself is a part of this consensus; he is of course about to throw suspicion on the existence of anything satisfying the definition of Kpirrjpiov, but he does not think of criticizing the definition itself as such. This is indeed a case where the Sceptic has an k'woia in common with his opponents, which makes him competent to examine and challenge the dogmatic positions, some of them affirming and some denying that the object of this k'woia exists. 13 12 13

Cf. P//1.5-6,11.1,12,13, Afvii.1-2. Those who deny the Kpir-qpiov are ranked among dogmatists: cf. M vii.46-7. Cf. also 443, where their position is marked off from the Sceptical one.

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This concept of a Kpirrjpiov is given its sense by being contrasted with the concepts of a sign and ofa proof. This contrast is paralleled, aparte objecti, by that between things evident (ivapyrj, and also npocfxivfj, vii.26, and 7rp6SrjXa, Vlll. 141) and things non-manifest (aSrjXa, and also ovveoKiaofjieva, vii.26). The former may be known directly and immediately; the latter can only be attained mediately and indirectly, on the basis of evidence which stands to them as a sign to the thing signified, or a proof to the thing proved. Immediate knowledge is called knowledge through a Kpirrjpiov, so that to say that there is a Kpirrjpiov is exactly the same as to say that we do have some immediate knowledge. No doubt there is some paradox in using the same preposition, Sta, which brings to mind mediation or instrumentality or a middle term, to describe both the role of the Kpirrjpiov in immediate knowledge (Sta Kpirrjpiov nvos) and the function of signs and proofs in indirect knowledge (Sta cr^etW /cat aTroSet'^eajv); this parallelism could suggest, misleadingly, that the Kpirrjpiov acts as a middle term between the knower and the known, exactly like signs and proofs; in fact, what is known 'through a Kpirrjpiov is known spontaneously (avroOev), and thus without any middle term. To explain this paradox, we might well suppose that the theory which here comes into play implies not only that we do have some immediate knowledge, but also that it comes in various kinds. There are immediate truths which are perceptual and there are immediate truths which are intellectual (KOLT' aiadrjoLv rj Sidvoiav). In order to distinguish them without suppressing what they have in common, it is tempting to say that perception and intellection are two different ways of grasping immediate truths. If they were not different from one another, it would probably be pointless to distinguish both of them (under the name of Kpirrjpia) from the knower himself, who grasps these immediate truths 'through them', or, perhaps more exactly, by way of their specific tonality: Sta Kpirrjpiov nvos, let us say, because Sta Kpirrjpiov nvos. The conception of a Kpirrjpiov, which identifies knowledge through a Kpirrjpiov with immediate knowledge, I shall christen prodelic. It is hardly necessary to point out that the prodelic conception of Kpirrjpiov is completely different from our own notion of a criterion in ordinary language. We make use of what we call a criterion when we are unable to answer some question immediately. For instance, when we cannot easily see whether some object a is F or not, we try to find a criterion for F-ness. If there is a property G, other than F, such that (1) (x) Fx iff Gx, and (2) it is possible to decide immediately whether Ga or not, then we say that there is a criterion available. In a similar case, the prodelic conception of the Kpirrjpiov would commit us to saying that here is a case of knowledge through a sign; only if we had been able to find immediately that Fa (or not-Fa) could we say that here is a case of knowledge through a Kpirrjpiov. The prodelic conception of the KpLrrjpiov and the mediate/immediate distinction in knowledge with which it is linked constitute the very basis of the

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ON THE KPITHPION

23I

overall structure of M vii-vm with this qualification, that since the notion of a Kpir-qpiov is specified as a KpLT-qpiov of truth, 14 the first part of the books will fall into two sections, corresponding to the two halves of the phrase. We thus get the following scheme, as Sextus will work it out: ( I . I ) the Kpirr^piov (M vii.27-446); (1.2) the true and truth (M vm.1-140); (2.1) signs (M viii.141299); (2.2) proofs (M vm.300-481). In P / / t h e scheme is roughly the same. 15 Some interesting differences may be pointed out. First, as I said earlier, PH gives no clue as to what is meant by Kpiriqpiov before it distinguishes the several meanings of the word (PH 11.13-14). Secondly, we can see that the prodelic conception of the Kpiriqpiov still determines the structure of the account, if we look at the end of the section devoted to the Kpirripiov of truth (P//11.95-6). This is the way Sextus sums up what is to be learned from this section: The KpirrjpLov of truth proved shaky [aTropov]; so it is no more possible to be positive, either about things which seem to be evident [irepl rd)v ivapycov elvai SOKOVVTCOV], to the extent that we rely on [oaov €TTL\ what the dogmatists say, or about non-manifest things [irepl TWV aSrjXoov]; for since the dogmatists think that they can grasp the latter on the evidence of the former, if we are obliged to suspend [judgement] about things said to be evident [nepl TCOV ivapycov KOL\OV[JL€V<X)V],16 how could we dare to make pronouncements about nonmanifest things? Here we can see that the ivapyrj/aSrjXa distinction is still predominant, but that nonetheless Sextus shows with clarity how greatly altered the ivapyrj are after the theories of the Kpiriqpiov have been subjected to criticism. Now the evident things are nothing more than 'so-called evidences'; and this is because KpLTTjpLov and evdpyeia are conceptually linked together, so that once the existence of anything satisfying the definition of a Kpirrjpiov is made doubtful, the existence of anything ivapyes at once becomes questionable. No similar indication can be found in the corresponding passage of M vm, where Sextus sums up the results of his inquiry about the Kpiriqpiov of truth (140). Thirdly, we may notice a similar contrast between the two versions on the following point. The PH version makes perfectly clear, as may be seen from the quotation above, that criticizing the Kpinqptov leads to two different results: its first upshot, a direct one, is to make impossible any grasping of evapyrj, since these are the proper objects of knowledge through a KpirrjpLov; its second upshot, a consequential one, is to make impossible any access to Aa, by removing any basis on which signs and proofs might be grounded. It This is rather surreptitiously done in M vii.28 (iirel 8vo /juepr] e/x<^eperat rfj irpoTaoei, TO re Kpirrjpiov KOLI 77 dA^flcia). The phrase Kpn-qpiov aXydeias occurs nowhere before this sentence, except in the lemma prefixed to 27-8 in the MSS (et eon Kpirrfpiov dXrjdeias); one might suspect, from this state of affairs, that this lemma comes from Sextus's own hand and that he calls it a Trporaais. (I am grateful to my friend and colleague Jean-Marie Beyssade for this nice observation.) KpLTrjpLov. PH 11.14-79. Truth and the true: 80-96. Signs: 97-133. Proofs: 134-203. Bury's translation omits the word KaXovfxevwv.

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is thus theoretically superfluous to submit these latter procedures to a specific criticism; later on, the text makes clear that this criticism will be given 'just as a make-weight' (e/c TTOXXOV TOV irepiovros, 11.96). In the M version, Sextus is far from showing such an awareness about this situation. True, he describes signs and proofs as procedures 'which start from the Kpinqpiov [OLTTO TOV Kpirrjptov] to arrive at a grasp of those truths which do not show up from themselves' (vm.40); but he also declares that once the criticism of the Kpn-qpiov is brought to an end, 'one still has to deal with the class of non-manifest things' [XeLTTOjjLevrjs 8e en TTJS TCOV aSr/Xcov Sca(f)opds, viii. 142]. In this he seems to have

completely forgotten what he himself had said about the crucial role of ivapyrj in the knowledge of aS^Aa (vn.25). Now let us have a look at the division of the meanings of the term Kpirijpiov. In the M version, a preamble (vii.27-8) comes before this division, the effect of which is to insert it into the overall frame of the discussion about the Kpirrjpiov of truth. Sextus will deal separately, he says, with the notion of a Kpinqpiov and with the notion of truth. To each of these he will devote (1) an 'exegetic' section, in which he will show (1.1) in how many senses it is said, and then (1.2) what nature the dogmatists have assigned to it; after that, (2) a 'more aporetic' section will examine 'whether anything of the kind can exist'. The section about the Kpinqpiov is indeed articulated in this way. 17 This division is in principle clear and well formed. Section (1) corresponds to the analysis of ewoca, first as regards its various meanings (1.1), then as regards its various references, i.e., the various entities which, historically, have been identified as Kptrrjpia (1.2). Section (2) raises the problem of whether there exists some object matching the ewoia and conducts a critical inquiry into the doctrines that solve this problem one way or another. The comparative term more aporetic (aTToprjTLKOjrepov) suggests, however, that the division between exegesis and polemic is not totally watertight. As a matter of fact, we can see that the long historical review (vii.46-262), which answers to section (1.2) and which supposedly is limited to a purely exegetical aim, is not without polemical bearings. There are two reasons for this. First, when Sextus gives an account of various doctrines that made reason, or perception, or both, Kpnrjpia of truth, he cannot keep himself from pointing out delightedly that these views are not only different but also incompatible with one another, and hence rivals to one another (ordoeis, vii.47, 261-2). Second, in this section, which he claims will show that the dogmatists had different views about the 'nature' of the KpiTrjptov, i.e., about the entity which is the Kpirrjpiov, he lists not only those people who admit that there is a Kpiriqpiov and locate it here or there, but also those who claim there is no Kpnrjpiov at all; the latter, he thinks, are no less dogmatists than the former. This extensive 'exegetical' account thus describes a fairly strenuous battle (Siacrracri?, vn.46; hia(jxx>via, vii.261); to say the least, it prepares the way to 17

(1.1) = VII.29-37. (1.2) = 4 6 - 2 6 2 . (2) = 263-446.

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the counterargument (avripprjois, vn.261) that is to follow, i.e., to section (2), the so-called more aporetic section. All the more striking is the contrast between this section (1.2) and the previous one (1.1): here we find a table of the different meanings of the term KptrripLov, in which we cannot perceive the faintest hint that their differences are meant to be viewed as disagreements. True, the notion of a Kpir-^piov now appears as bereft of the univocal character it seemed to possess when it first occurred (vii.25); but no philosophical conflicts are generated, on the face of it, by the plurality of its meanings. On the one hand, it is not at all suggested that the dogmatic schools were unaware of this state of affairs, and that being unaware of it has involved them in artificial quarrels based on conceptual misunderstandings. (This is the way an eclectic would treat the matter). On the other hand, it is not suggested either that the different meanings of the term Kpn^piov are such that if you adopt one of them, you are committed to abandoning the others and to quarrelling with those people who make a different choice. (This is the way a special kind of sceptic would treat the matter, namely, the champion of a conceptual scepticism, denying to philosophers any right to make use of the same vocabulary and to live in common on the same conceptual estate. Sextus does indeed sometimes apply this conceptual scepticism, as we have seen; but here he does not do anything of the kind.) The table of the different meanings of Kptr-qptov, however, has some puzzles and a major surprise in store. Let us first recall its overall structure, which is roughly the same in M (vn.29-37) as in PH (11.14-16); it descends in stages through three different levels of diairesis; (A) (B)

(c)

1. Kpirrjpiov of life or practical conduct. 2. KpLTYjpiov of existence or truth. 2.1. General sense: 'every measure of apprehension'. 2.2. Special sense: 'every technical measure of apprehension'. 2.3. 'Quite special' sense: 'every [technical, PH] measure of apprehension of something non-manifest' (aS^Aou Trpayixaros) = Kpn-qpiov XoyiKov. 2.3.1. As agent (vfiov). 2.3.2. As instrument (St'ou). 2.3.3. As application or working out (fcafl'o, PH;
Of course the surprise is that here the prodelic conception of a Kpirr)piov is supplanted by an adelic conception which is exactly its opposite. Before tackling this big knot, however, I shall make some remarks on other points. It has been plausibly claimed that the three steps in Sextus' division came from different historical areas; he seems to have grafted initially independent divisions onto one another, and to have done so in a somewhat forced way. 18 18

Cf. Heintz 1932, pp. 83-6; Striker 1974, pp. 102-7.

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The (A) distinction is at least as old as Epicurus, 19 and Scepticism made a constant and central use of it. 20 The (B) division occurs in pseudo-Galen's Historia philosopha, which probably draws on the same source as does Sextus.21 A somewhat different version of division [c] occurs in the criteriological considerations of the eclectic Potamo of Alexandria (Diogenes Laertius 1.21), who might have borrowed it from Posidonius, who wrote a lie pi KpLTTjpLov (Diogenes Laertius vii.54).22 From these historical parallels, let us here draw first of all the following conclusion: at every step of the hiaipeois, various meanings are put side by side, which are not there because Sextus himself, or his source, gathered them together in a critical or sceptical mood. Far from being various meanings some of which have been favoured by one particular school and some by another, they are the result of conceptual distinctions worked out each time by the same philosopher or by the same school. Those different meanings are thus not viewed as exclusive of one another. This may be seen most clearly in the case of division (c), which Sextus illustrates by means of a comparison with measuring. In order to weigh some object, for instance, an agent is needed, the weigher; an instrument, the scales; an application of the instrument to the object to be weighed, the using of the scales. Similarly, in order to make a judgement an agent is needed, man; an instrument, perception or intellection; an application of the instrument to the object to be judged, the using of mental impression (Trpoo^oXrj rfjs avraaias). This comparison makes perfectly clear that each of the three conditions is necessary and none is sufficient; hence it would be a mistake to describe man, perception, intellection, impression, as rival candidates to the title of Kpiriqpiov. Some Sceptics, however, did so: they selected different philosophers as the supporters of these different candidates, and thus created an impression that there was a SiaoWa about the KpLrrjptov (Diogenes Laertius ix.95). 23 Sextus ought to be free from this mistake. However, he once lapses into it (at least in the M version), namely in the transition from his exegetical to his aporetic section (M vii.261): As I have already said, (a) some people kept the Kpir-qpiov, locating it within reason, some within irrational perceptions, and some withki both; and (b) some have called this way the agent, e.g., man, some the instrument, e.g., perception and intellection, some the application, e.g., the impression. Let us try to adjust, as far as possible, our objections to each of these parties This rather strange passage puts side by side (a) views about what is the v, and (b) views about what a Kpirr)piov is, namely, those of division 19 20 22 23

Cf. Diogenes Laertius x.31-4, and Democritus according to Diotimus, M vii.140. 21 Cf. PH 1.21-4. Cf. Dox. Graeci, 603-4, 606; Striker 1974, p . 106. Cf. Striker 1974, p . 105. F o r Ptolemy's m o r e elaborate version of (c) cf. L o n g 1988, p. 189. iipOS" TO) KCLl 8lCL
r
aAAcov rov Xoyov, ivicov rr)v KaraXrj7TTi.Kr)v <j>avraaiav.

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(c). The former are obviously incompatible; the latter are not so, and they are described by Sextus as being so, although he knows very well that they are not so. Understandably, some people have been tempted to emend the text, eliminating the (b) section as an interpolated gloss. 24 I believe we must resist this temptation, however, because the tripartite scheme of agent/instrument/ application provides the very framework for the whole subsequent discussion:25 it would be strange not to find it mentioned in the preamble which introduces this discussion. More generally, we already know that Sextus' strategy toward conceptual disagreements lacks continuity; here, as elsewhere, he might have allowed himself to introduce a Stac/xjovia in a context where it was quite out of place. Something should also be said about division (B), which involves difficulties of another kind, in particular because M and PH differ textually. From a formal point of view, the meanings within this division are extensionally decreasing and intensionally increasing notions: there is a general sense of the (KOIVWS), a special sense (iSi'co?), and a 'quite special' sense ) . In the general sense (2.1), 'every measure of apprehension' {irdv fierpov KaraArnfjecos) is a Kpirripiov\ in this first sense, we may call KpLrrjpia those 'natural' Kpirrjpia, sight, hearing, taste, as well as others; they are explicitly mentioned here just because they will be eliminated in the next step of the division. In the special sense (2.2), indeed, only the 'artificial measures of apprehension' (TT&V jxerpov KaraXrji/jecos T€XVIKOV) are KpiTrjpia; in this sense, technical instruments of measure, such as rules, compasses, scales, are KpiT-qpia. Things get more complex with the 'quite special' sense (2.3), which is defined, in the main manuscripts of PH, as 'every artificial measure of apprehension of something non-manifest' (jrav /juerpov KaraArnfjecos rexviKov dSrjXov Trpdy/jLaros), and more briefly, in M, as 'every measure of apprehension of something non-manifest' {irdv fierpov KaraArjifjecos dSrjAov irpayfjuaros). Both versions agree in adding, in very similar terms, that this meaning excludes those Kpirrjpia which are of use in ordinary life (flicoriKa) and is satisfied only by those which are Aoyt/ca (rational, or, perhaps more accurately, discursive), namely, those which dogmatic philosophers introduced in order to discover or to discriminate what is true. Let us put aside, for the moment, the question concerning the dSrjAov object. First, I should like to try to solve the problem concerning the variant readings. Moreover, as we shall see, the two questions are somehow connected. Almost everybody agrees in thinking that the M text and the PH text must be made to coincide;26 but there are two ways of doing so, and each one has its champions. 27 By writing rex^iKov in both texts (so W. Heintz and his 24 25 26 27

Cf. Heintz 1932, 122-4. Respectively: M V I I . 2 6 3 - 3 4 2 , 343-69, 370-446, PH 11.22-47, 48-69, 70-9. Except Bury, w h o gives different texts in b o t h places. M u t s c h m a n n 1958, p . 67, a n d 1914, p . 9, omits rexviKov in both places; Heintz 1932, p p . 83-6, claims that TtyyiKov should be kept in b o t h places; so M a u in M u t s c h m a n n a n d M a u 1958, p . 215, a n d Striker 1974, 106.

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followers), one admittedly gets a nicely articulated system of definitions that satisfactorily matches the KOIVCOS/ISicos/Ihiairara scheme: 7T&v •JT.fl.K. T€XVIKOV

j

OV aSrj

aSrjAov Trpdy^iaros

I

1 11 XoyiKa

(2-3)

A number of objections, however, can be raised against this scheme. (1) It is made suspect by its very formal perfection. The occurrence of T^XVIKOV is what we might call a lectio logice facilior. (2) In order to make this formal perfection complete, we have to reinterpret some elements in the text, in a somewhat forced way. When Sextus presents the (2.2) meaning, he says that it excludes ^VGLKOL, and, when he presents the (2.3) meaning, that it excludes fiiooriKa. In order to get matters quite in order, PLOOTLKOL should form the exact surplus of (2.2) over (2.3), as (^VOLKOL form the exact surplus of (2.1) over (2.2); that means that ^LCOTLKOL are just the artificial measuring instruments and that natural perceptive faculties are not covered by this word. Such a limitation of the concept of KpLrrjpia PLCOTLKOL has found its champions; 28 but a sufficient reason for putting it aside is provided by PH 1.23-4, where Sextus enumerates the component parts of the 'experience of life' (fiicoTLKrj Trjprjois): the first one is 'nature's guidance" (ixfrrjyiqots (fyvoecos), which makes us 'naturally apt at perceiving and intelligizing'. Perceptive faculties are therefore covered by the term ^KJOTLKOL.29 (3) In the PH version of the division, KpLrrjpia XoyiKa are a subset of Kptrripia T^XVIKCL. A proof that this is so is claimed to be found in Sextus's wording: in the (2.3) sense, he says, j3io>TiKa are not Kpinqpia any longer (OVK€TL); only XoyiKa are. This word OVK€TL is supposed, it is claimed, to imply that XoyLKa clearly are already Kpirr\pia in the (2.2) sense. 30 This, I take it, is a non sequitur: from the fact that something is not the case any longer, it is not possible to infer that some other thing was already the case. 31 (4) From the substantive point of view, it seems difficult to claim that Kpirrjpia XoyLKa are artificial Kpirr)pia. In fact, in the (c) division, Sextus distinguishes three meanings which are, he explicitly says, subdivisions of the Kpirrjpcov XoyiKov (M. vii.35, P//11.16); now these meanings are exemplified, respectively, by man, perception and intellection, and the application of the avTaoia - i.e., by entities, faculties, or acts that are wholly natural. In view of all these arguments, I think it better to abandon the idea of 28 29

31

So Heintz 1932, p . 84, following P a p p e n h e i m 1881, p . 102. T h e phrase irepl €KOLGTOV ra>v Kara rov fiiov in M vn.34, t o o , is understandable only if 30 fiiojTLKa covers two different classes, voLKa a n d rzyyiKa. Heintz 1932, p. 84. E.g., 'there is n o m o r e milk, there is only bread'. Y o u c a n n o t k n o w if there was already bread when there was still milk.

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keeping the word TtyyiKov in P//and inserting it in M, within the definitions of the KpirrjpLov in the 'quite special' meaning (2.3), i.e., of the Kpirrjpiov XoytKov. I prefer to depict the [B) division along the following lines: TTOLV fxerpov KaraXru/jeajs

(frvoLKa Ttyy1*®* XoyiKa

1

(2.1)

1 (2-2)

1 TT.fJL.K. dSlfjXoV

TTpayfJLOLTOS

1 (2-3)

This scheme is admittedly less satisfactory from a purely formal point of view, but it seems tofitbetter the ends at which this division is aiming; these are, I believe, to isolate and to specify that meaning of the word Kpirrjpiov which is of interest only to philosophers, and which is the only one really of interest to them. 32 Now, I think, we can finally come to grips with the main problem this division raises: namely, the abrupt substitution of aS^Aov for irpoSrjXov as the specific object of knowledge through a Kpirqpiov. This is indeed a contradiction, since the different meanings of the word Kpirrjpiov that occur in the relevant passages (M vii.25 and 33) are both supposed to be the meaning in which the word will be used throughout the whole inquiry in Book vn. Conceptual contradiction has been officially expelled through the door, in the meanings division; it seems to come back in through the window, in the unexpected form of a SKM/HJUVIOL between Sextus and Sextus himself. This anomaly has seldom been noticed, as far as I know; those commentators who have noticed it have tried to explain it away in two different fashions. One way (that of W. Heintz) is to make it sharper, but so as to lessen its importance. The other (that of G. Striker and also of J. Barnes, as we shall see), on the contrary, is to blunt it and reduce it to ambiguity. I shall say something about both attempts before suggesting a third way out of the puzzle. As we have already seen, Heintz inserts the word T^XVLKOV into the definition of KpLTTjpiov XoyiKov in M vn.33 (on the model of the PH parallel). He knows very well that the later subdivision of this KpLrrjpLov, which specifies it as perception, intellection, and impression (34-7), is not in favour of this 32

In this second scheme, the (2.3) meaning is admittedly not 'still more special' than the (2.2) meaning. But the superlative Ihiairara can mean 'in a quite special sense', i.e., special to philosophers (let us remember that Kpirrjpiov XoyiKov is this type of KpLrrjpiov, which 'philosophers repeatedly din into our ears', M vii.34). The progression from KOLVCOS to ISLCJS and to Ihiairara is thus not necessarily rectilinear. We might also point out that in the M version, Sextus wavers between ISiaiTara (vii.31) and ISiatrepov (vii.33), whereas in the PH version, he keeps Ihiairara throughout (11.15, bis). The original version certainly gave ISiairara (cf. ps.-Galen in Dox. Graeci 604, line 1, and 606, line 10). One might suppose that in the M version Sextus allowed himself, by way of the comparative Ihiairtpov, to introduce a more linear order into the series than was the case in the original source.

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suggestion: all those are natural faculties.33 But he subtly turns the argument the other way around. 34 If T^VIKOV is read in 33, the contradiction between 33 and 34-7 is the same as that between 33 and 25; and he claims that 34-7 (in spite of what Sextus himself says) shows that when subdividing the Kpirrjpiov AoyiKov, Sextus no longer has any thought of the adelic conception of a KpLTr/pLov, which he just described in 33; as a matter of fact, according to Heintz, what he has in mind is again the prodelic conception, which occurred in 25 and will be the single topic of everything which follows in Book vn. Some kind of momentary and unconscious aberration, caused by a laborious attempt to harmonize a number of different schemes, is thus supposed to be the reason why Sextus, if only briefly, attributes to the KpLrrjptov the task of knowing aSrjXa. By the name of KpLrrjpia Aoyt/ca, in 33, he can only refer (contrary to his usual terminology) to sign and proof, i.e., dialectical (hence technical) procedures for grasping aSrjXa; those will be studied only in Book VIII, after the end of the inquiry concerning Kpinqpiov in the normal - i.e., prodelic - sense. This interpretation is questionable in several ways. First, some terminological likenesses may be pointed out, which seem to show that (pace Heintz) the notion of a Kpirrjpiov XoyiKov has the same content in 33 (T& XoyiKa KOLI arrep OL Soy/jLCLTLKol Tcbv (friAooocfxjJv 7Tap€L<jdyov(ji) as in 34 (j^epl TOV XoytKOv Kal irapa rots <J>LXOG6(J>OIS dpvXovfjievov). More generally, Heintz assigns to Sextus

an implausible mixture of awareness and unawareness of what he is doing: he is supposed to try to harmonize different conceptual systems without clearly realizing their differences. But the crucial point is to know whether Heintz is right in claiming that apart from its passing occurrence in vii.33 (and also in PH11.15), the adelic concept of the Kpinqpiov plays no part in Sextus, and the prodelic concept is given pride of place in the whole inquiry concerning Kpir-qpiov. It is perfectly true that the prodelic concept is clearly in the forefront in the prefacing and concluding sections I have already quoted. 35 But in the inquiry proper, things are far from being so clear. A first disturbing factor is that the prodelic concept of a Kpnr)piQv covers both intellectual and perceptual immediate truths (vii.25).36 Is it enough for 33 34

36

Cf. argument (4) above. Here is the central passage in Heintz's argumentation, p . 85: 'Sextus actually gives u p in 346°. the terminological scheme he has followed in 3 1 - 3 , b u t without being aware of this. H e says of course that he wants in what follows to treat only of the XoyiKov KpLrrjpLov, that this is again to be understood in three senses, etc. But in fact the new threefold division shows that here he is n o longer really thinking of the concept of the XoyiKov KpiT-qpiov. T h e XoyiKov KpiT-qpiov should refer to aS^Aa TTpay^iara; the Kpirrjpiov treated by Sextus in 34ff. and subsequently through the whole b o o k has nothing to d o with the aS^Aa, b u t deals with the cognition of ivapyrj or aiv6iieva, the immediate sensible objects a r o u n d us. Sextus first comes to the aS^Aa, in M vn, where orjfxeiov a n d a-noSe^is, as routes to cognition o f a S ^ A a , form his theme (cf. M vn.25, VIII. 140, 142, /7/11.95-6). It is these, arj^elov a n d airoSeigis, the a p p r o p r i a t e cognitive means employed by dialectic in order to grasp aSrjXa, that must be m e a n t in 33 by Kpirrjpta Aoyiwra, at least in the sense of the terminology scheme that Sextus uses there. H e himself seems n o t to 35 have been clear a b o u t this' (trans. A. A. Long). M vii.25, vm.140, PH 11.95-96. Heintz neglects this point.

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Sextus to be allowed to count as upholders of the KpLrrjpLov (as he does in M vii.47) those philosophers who locate it in Xoyos, as well as those who locate it in the 'irrational evidences' (ev TOLLS dXoyois evapytiaisYl In order to be true to the prodelic concept, one should find Xoyos here construed as a power of intellectual intuition, able to grasp 'rational immediate truths', and not as a discursive and argumentative faculty. But the concept of a rational immediate truth and the phrase evapytia XoyiKr} occur nowhere in Sextus, as far as I know; on the contrary, ivdpyeua and Xoyos are frequently contrasted (PH 111.82, 135, 266, 272, Mxi.239). The early 'inquirers into nature', who are the historical illustrations of the identification of the Kpirripiov with Xoyos (M VII.89-140), are ratiocinators whose theories are based on a rational criticism of sensory evidence (vii.89); the principles and elements they claim to be the foundations of the physical world offer a typical example of aS^Aa entities (M x.252). They cannot thus be saddled with views about the Kpirrjpiov unless a strictly prodelic conception of this notion is left aside. There are also occasions where statements about aS^Aa being knowable or unknowable are explicitly classified by Sextus as views about the existence of a KpirrjpLov. Xenophanes, e.g., says that a true knowledge of gods is not allowed to man (DK 21B34); commenting on this fragment, Sextus says that the gods are here only a representative sample of the whole class of aS^Aa (M VII. 50). Xenophanes' doctrine may thus be summed up by saying that no man grasps the truth, at least in the field of aS^Aa (M vii.51); and this is equivalent to denying the existence of a Kpirrjpiov (vii.52).37 In many other places, Sextus can be seen to be distorting or even breaking the conceptual frame that goes along with the prodelic concept of a Kpirrfpiov (namely, the frame that opposes ivapyes and dSrjXov, avroOev and ^77 avrodev, Kpnrjpiov and cn^eibv KCLI dirohei^is). He admits, at least as a theoretical possibility, that something dSrjXov might be true 'from itself (avroOev), the other horn of the dilemma being that it might be true 'as something proved' (cbs dTToSeLxOev, M vin.21). In M vm.379, he gives a syllogistic justification of the adelic conception of a Kpirrjpiov: every aSrjXov, he says, needs a decision (iniKpLGis), and what needs a decision requires a Kpirrjpiov. In M vm.26, he goes so far as to contrast immediate knowledge and knowledge through a Kpirrjpiov: if anybody is claiming that this dSrjXov is true and that one false, those statements should come either 'from themselves and without any KpiTJ]piov\ i.e., 'immediately' (e£ kroi\xov), or 'with a Kpirr)piov\ No doubt a methodical search through the texts might collect many other such observations, but I think these few examples will be enough to show that the adelic concept of Kpirf)piov is far from being as unobtrusive in Sextus as Heintz claims it to be; when we find the prodelic definition and the adelic one side by side in the first paragraphs of Book vn, we cannot dismiss this fact as a localized accident. According to G. Striker, the paradox should be explained in a completely 37

Cf. also the first of the three KpirrjpLa attributed by Diotimus to Democritus (M vii.140).

24O

SCEPTICISM

different way. She holds that the prodelic definition is the only one that Sextus inherited from previous history; despite the differences between the Epicurean concept and the Stoic concept of a Kptrrjpiov (those differences are very well brought out in her book; but more on this later), neither school is supposed to define a Kpirrjpiov as an instrument for grasping aS^Aa. The adelic definition in Sextus should be construed as a kind of translation of the earlier prodelic definition into Sceptical language. According to the Sceptic, any assumption dogmatically asserted goes beyond what it is permissible to say, and thereby bears on something aS^Aov. What the dogmatist calls evapyes and claims to grasp Sta KpirrjpLov TWOS is exactly the same thing as what the Sceptic polemically calls aSrjXov.38 Along the same lines, J. Barnes sees no escape from the paradox except by supposing a 'systematic ambiguity' in the terms aS^Ao?, TTpoSrjXog, ivapyrjs.39

This suggestion has the undoubted merit of drawing attention to some important features of the Sceptical stance. Sextus certainly does not take the widespread distinction between ivapyrj and aSrjXa at its face value, even if he is constantly making a dialectical use of it. In M vii.364, a definition of what is ivapyeg that is substantially the same as the definition in M vii.25 40 is explicitly attributed to 'our opponents' (VTTO TCOV ivavrccov). Sextus claims on this occasion that nothing can naturally be grasped 'from itself (e£ iavrov); nothing can be said about the external world except by conjecture (aroxd^o/xcu, 365), by inference from signs (a7y/x€tou^at, 365; cr^eiWi?, 367). It follows that nothing is ivapyes (364) and everything is dSrjXov (368), so that the dogmatist would do better to call dSrjXov (in the terminology which he shares with his Sceptical opponent) what he calls ivapyes; the class of ivapyrj is empty, de facto if not dejure. It is no less true that the reason why the Sceptic construes the dogmatic assertions as bearing on aSrjXa, even when the dogmatist does not say so, is that these assertions claim to express what things are in themselves, of their own nature. Any claim to KardXr)i/jis,41 let us say, immediately turns its object into an aSrjXov, however ivapyes it is said to be. As Sextus repeatedly asserts, 38

39

40 41

Gisela Striker's argument is as follows 1974, p. 106; 'Neither the criterion of the Stoics nor those of the Epicureans can be defined in accordance with the terminology of these schools as "measures of the g r a s p " of dSrjXa. T h r o u g h a KaraXrjTTrLKT) ^ a v r a a i a one of course grasps an "evident" fact (cf. M vii.25); a n d the criteria of the Epicureans can, as we saw, be used not just for testing statements a b o u t nonperceptible facts. T h e expression can most easily be explained in the context of the terminology of the Skeptics, according to w h o m nothing at all can be k n o w n a n d who therefore sometimes speak as if every seriously intended assertion refers to an dSrjXov (cf. PH 1.200-2,13,16,197-98). T h a t would m e a n that it is a polemical formula, which reflects not the terminology of the philosophical schools but only the Skeptics' interpretation of their doctrine' (trans. A. A. Long). Cf. Barnes 1983, p . 27 n. 74: 'Sextus plainly states that the Pyrrhonist attack on Kpni)pia undermines belief in ret ivapyrj (PH 11.95, Af vn.25); he also expressly defines a Kpirr)piov as fi€Tpov dSrjXov TTpdynaros (PH 11.15, M vii.33). I see no escape from that inconsistency except the appeal to a systematic and unexpressed ambiguity in such terms as dSrjXos, npoSrjXos, ivapyrjs.' This definition runs TO it; iavrov Aa/x/3avo/Lt€vov KCLI \iiqhev6s XPVK>OV €t's" TrapdoraoLV. In the strong (i.e. Stoic) sense of this w o r d , of course, according to the distinction m a d e in PH 11.4. Cf. above, p . 227.

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24I

giving one's assent to something dSrjXov is enough to land one in dogmatism (PH1.16,197, 210); conversely, it seems that being a dogmatist (speaking in a dogmatic tone or mood) is enough to turn what one claims to assent to into something dSrjXov.42 These arguments, however, do not, I think, entirely justify Striker's interpretation. Dogmatists and Sceptics disagree about the reference of the terms ivapyes and ddrjXov; this does not mean they disagree about the meaning of these terms and about their conceptual contrast. If the Sceptic believes the class ofivapyrj to be empty, this does not imply that he takes the notion of an evapyes as meaningless and freely substitutable by its contrary. When the question is how to define the concept of a KpLrrjpiov, the referential equivalence between what the dogmatist calls an ivapyes and what the Sceptic calls an aSyXov does not allow the latter to substitute ivapyes for ddrjXov within the definition; it is impossible to say that defining a KptrrjpLov as an instrument for grasping 7Tp68r]Xa and defining it as an instrument for grasping dSrjXa are equivalent, undifferentiated definitions. Of course Sextus might have made the mistake, but to be sure that he did not, it is enough to point out that in the definition in M vn.33, the dSrjXov object is mentioned as a specific difference that distinguishes Kpirr\pia XoyiKa from the other kinds of KptrrjpLa; the objects of those must thus be evapyrj. If both the terms ivapyes and dSrjXov did not keep a stable and distinctive conceptual meaning, the differences among the various classes of Kpirr)pia would vanish, and the whole classification (distinction [B]) would collapse. The substantive difference between the prodelic and the adelic conception of a Kpir^ptov looks thus to be irreducible. How, then, to account for their being together in Sextus' text? I would suggest that it is, above all, a matter of conceptual inheritance, although to invoke history, in this circumstance, is not to give up trying to understand what happened. Striker's book, in this respect, offers all the materials required for an explanation which she nonetheless does not elicit. Let us look at the differences between the Epicurean and the Stoic concept of a Kpirrjpiov, as they are pellucidly described in her book. In Epicurus, the predominant use 43 of the notion is fundamentally based on 42

43

Cf. PH 1.202 SoyfjuariKcos, Tovreori nepl aSr/Aov, and Frede 1979, p. 123; 'Every opinion, whatever its content m a y be, can be dogmatic, just as, vice versa, every opinion can be undogmatic. So it is not the content of doctrines (although this too is not entirely irrelevant, as we shall see) that makes them dogmatic, but the attitude of the dogmatist, w h o thinks that his rational knowledge can answer questions and provide him with the sufficient grounds for his doctrines' (trans. A. A. Long). In order to prevent the states of affairs on which he expresses his opinions from turning into aS^Aa, the Skeptic has to avoid the dogmatic traps hidden in ordinary language, above all in the verb 'to be' (PHi. 19-20). H e withdraws into d ^ a a i a , which is not muteness but a non-assertoric way of using language (PHi. 192); he employs the phrases 'indicative of a^aoua put at his disposal by ordinary language - ' p e r h a p s ' and the like (PH 1.195); he makes use of mental translation (PH 1.198), 'co-signification' (PH 1.199), and KardxpyoLS ( P / / 1 . 1 3 5 , 191, 207). Cf. Stough 1984, p p . 137-64. This qualification is needed, because Epicurus also employs the word Kpirrjpiov in the sense of " p o w e r of j u d g i n g " or " p o w e r of k n o w i n g " ; cf. Ep. Herod. 3 8 , 5 1 , and the c o m m e n t s by Striker 1974, p p . 56 and 59. In order to m a r k out the p r e d o m i n a n t use, Striker writes " t h e 'Epicurean' m e a n i n g , " in q u o t a t i o n m a r k s ; I d o the same here.

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an analogy between Kpirrjpiov and KCLVWV. A KOLVCOV, a ruler or a square, is paradigmatically right and allows the problematic Tightness of a line or an angle to be tested. Similarly, a Kpirrjpiov of truth is a purveyor of truths, immediately evident in themselves, that can be used to test the truth-value of opinions (or theories or hypotheses, etc.) that bear on not perceptible or not immediately known states of affairs, and thus are neither clearly true nor clearly false. Their being intrinsically true is what allows them to function as they do; but their value as a Kpinqpiov depends on their being used to test the truth-value of statements other than themselves. 44 On the other hand, the predominant Stoic use of this notion 45 is no longer determined by the /cavo^-paradigm. <Pavraoia Karak^-nriKr] is claimed to be a Kpnripiov, not because it allows one to test something other than what it 'presents', but because it allows one to state that something is the case, which is the very state of affairs 'presented' by it (and causally productive of it); 46 what makes us know that something is the case is the same as what constitutes the criterion of this knowledge being true. 47 There is, therefore, an obvious identity between the Stoic concept and what I have called the prodelic concept of a Kpinqpiov. the truths that (^avraoia KaraXrj7TTLKri is supposed to supply are immediate and evident. But, according to Striker, there is no such identity between the Epicurean concept and the adelic concept of M vii.33. Her reasons are the following.48 The Epicurean KptrrjpLa can be used for other ends than just testing statements about nonperceptible states of affairs; indeed, they can play their role in confirmatory and non-confirmatory procedures, designed to decide about perceptible cases, as well as in contestatory and non-contestatory procedures, which are designed to decide about non-perceptible cases. This observation is perfectly right, but does not establish the point at issue. The opinions tested by way of confirmation ex hypothesi bear on states of affairs that are potentially perceptible but not actually perceived. That is why they need confirmation; they are, Epicurus says, 'waiting' to be confirmed (rrpoafjiivov, Ep. Hdt. 38, KD 24). The distinction expressed in Epicurus by the pair TTpoofievov/dSrjXov is 44 45

46

47 48

Cf. Striker 1974, mainly p p . 6 1 - 3 , 73, 82. Here again, it is only a matter of p r e d o m i n a n t use, which allows some occurrences of the word KpirrjpLov in the 'Epicurean' sense (cf. Striker 1974, p p . 98-9). In order to m a r k out this p r e d o m i n a n t use, I shall similarly write 'the " S t o i c " sense'. I leave aside the question of whether (j>avraola KaraXrjTrTLKrj is only a matter of senseperception (cf. Striker 1974, p p . 107-10); let me just point out that according to Sextus it is not (cf. M vii.416-21) a n d that KpnrjpLov in its prodelic definition is not, either (cf. M vii.25). (fravraoia KaraX-qnTiKr), as u n d e r s t o o d by Sextus, is thus a KpirrjpLov in exactly the same sense as he construes the notion of a Kpn-qpiov when he a d o p t s the prodelic concept of it. Cf. Striker 1974, mainly p p . 8 2 - 4 , 90. Striker 1974, p . 106 (quoted above, n. 38); the backward reference ('as we saw') is to p . 74. I leave aside another argument of a m o r e general character, namely, the claim that the 'Epicurean' sense of Kpnr\piov was fairly quickly supplanted, in the general use, by the 'Stoic' sense (cf. p p . 102, 107). This hypothesis does not at first sight look very plausible, because the m o d e r n use of criterion is, I think, " E p i c u r e a n " o n the whole. But I have neither the space n o r the capacity to discuss this point m o r e accurately.

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thus the same as what is expressed in another terminology (Sextus M vm.i45ff.) by distinguishing two classes of dSrjXa: circumstantial aS (wpog Kaipov), which are such only de facto and for the time being, and dSrjXa by nature (<^i!aei), which are such by right and at any time. In the latter terminology, the 'Epicurean' Kpirr^piov always refers to some dSrjXov rrpayixa, and there is nothing to prevent us from identifying it with Sextus' adelic concept. It remains to be understood how and why, without any explanation or even any indication that he was aware of them, Sextus left in his text those contradictory sediments of the conceptual history of Kpir-qpiov. One might invoke, in quite general terms, his vacillating strategies when conceptual disagreements are at stake; we have seen many examples of this. But in the case of Kpirrjpiov, a more specific reason may be suggested. In its 'Epicurean' meaning, a Kpirrjpiov, as such, bears on some d8r]Xov; but it presupposes the grasping of some ivapyes, since it is in itself evidently true and it is neither possible nor necessary to certify this truth again, by applying a KptTrjptov. It thus turns out that if the Sceptic succeeds in showing that no immediate truth is accessible to us, he will have killed two birds with one stone. He will have established that there is no Kpirr)piov in the prodelic (Stoic) sense, since to say that there is some Kpinqpiov in this sense is to say that we have some immediate knowledge. And he will also have established that there is no Kpirrjpiov in the adelic (Epicurean) sense, since to say that there is some Kpirrjpiov in this sense is to say that we can test aS^Aa by referring them to some immediate evidence. Sextus' stance has thus some justification, even if it is still surprising that he did not make it explicit.

12 THE OZON Eni TQI AOTQI FORMULA IN SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

The ambition of the present study is a limited one: to explain the use of the expression OGOV eirl rco Xoyco (hereafter oerX) in Sextus Empiricus. As it stands, that is to say with no addition of any kind, it does not occur frequently in his work: only on four occasions in all, PH 1.20, 227, m.48 and 72. x On the other hand, the general formula OGOV ITT'I + dative is often to be found not only in Sextus2 but also in other authors, most of them relatively late. 3 Its general meaning could be expressed provisionally as follows: OGOV i-n-l rco E = 'insofar as X is concerned', 'insofar as it is a matter of X'. This sense is particularly clear in reflexive uses of the expression, such as OGOV €<£' eavrco = 'insofar as it is in him', 'insofar as it depends upon him'. 4 But what is the meaning of \6yos in oerA? That is the question. The reason why this formula seems to merit examination is above all because its meaning is so obscure where it first appears in PH, at 1.20, which describes a crucial aspect of the Sceptic attitude. To clarify our ideas, let me first suggest a provisional and incomplete translation of this passage. Sextus is replying to those who accuse the Sceptics of 'suppressing the phenomena' (avcupeiv ra aiv6iJL€va). He protests that the Sceptics do not overthrow the phenomena if by this one means 'the passive impressions which lead us involuntarily to assent'. He then goes on as follows: When we persist in wondering (^Tto/zcv)5 whether the object is truly as it appears to be, we admit the following: that it appears; our questioning bears 1

2

3

4 5

Janacek 1972, p. 13, in his useful examination of the formula ooov em, counts three other occurrences of oaov inl rw Xoyco, PH 1.215, m.60 and 62; but the various complements which accompany the formula in these passages make it impossible to consider them as uses of the O€TX formula, stricto sensu. Janacek 1972, p. 18, counts eighteen occurrences in PH, eighteen in M VII-XI, eight in M I-IV. The exact number of occurrences in PHis in reality sixty-two, as has been pointed out to me by Jonathan Barnes, whom I thank most warmly for his help. For example, Plutarch, Lucian, Marcus Aurelius, Galen; but oaov + dative is also found in Chrysippus (DL vn.65) and in Aristotle {Pol. 11, I27obi2). The most ancient examples of the use of ooov cm, however, are constructed with the accusative, with the sense of'within the limit o f (Xenophon, Anab. vi.4.5; Aristotle, MA 698bn, Pol. vm, I339b29). I am indebted to Andre Laks on this point. Cf. Chrysippus' definition of a£ta>/ua as airo^avrov ooov i iavrtt), apud DL vii.65. I am translating the verb ^rjTetv literally, in conformity with the officially 'zetetic' attitude of the Sceptic (cf. PH 1.1-4); but given that the Sceptic considers in advance that his 'research' is doomed to failure and that he himself is bound to the cTropj, one ought not to rule out translating it more briefly ('call into question', 'put in doubt', 'doubt'). Cf. Janacek 1972, pp. 27-37.

244

THE OION EUl TQI AOTQl FORMULA

245

upon not the phenomenon, but what is said about the phenomenon (ov nepl rov <j>aLVO[JL€VOV dAAa irepl €K€ivov O Aeyerat irepl rod aivofi€vov)', and that is not the same thing as questioning the phenomenon itself. For example, honey seems to us to have a sweetening action (yXvKa^eiv). So much, we grant; for sensuously we undergo a sweetening effect (yAu/ Adya>), is something that we continue to wonder about: that is not the phenomenon itself; it is what is said about the phenomenon (o OVK k'on TO (fxuvofievov dXXa irepl TOV (fxxivofjievov Aeyofievov).

This passage and others like it have, of course, not escaped the attention of the recent commentators whose studies have breathed new life into the philosophical analysis of Scepticism.6 However, they sometimes fail to recognize its ambiguities and consequently sometimes produce a very definite interpretation, without weighing it up against other possible ones or providing precise arguments to support their own.7 On the other hand, when they do perceive ambiguity, they seem to consider the problem of its interpretation to remain open.8 In truth, the ambiguity is twofold: both syntactic and semantic.9 Syntactically, the restriction conveyed by oerX could bear either upon the verb expressing doubt, thereby imposing a restriction upon the modality of that doubt, or upon the proposition which constitutes the object of the doubt, thereby imposing a restriction upon the contents of that doubt. The former construction - let us call it 'adverbial' - has led to semantic interpretations of the following type: the Sceptic doubts oerA that honey is sweet; he doubts this, but only (for example) at a theoretical level; it does not prevent him from assuming it in his practical conduct. The second construction - let us call it 'objectal' - has led to significantly different interpretations: the Sceptic doubts that the honey is sweet oerA; he doubts it but only (for example) to the extent that one might claim that it is sweet by nature and in its essence; and this does not prevent him from accepting the proposition insofar as it could be understood in a different sense from that.10 It is worth trying to dispel this double ambiguity. One of the principal preoccupations of the present-day historians of Scepticism is to define the 'scope' of the various versions of Scepticism. Should Sextus' Scepticism be 6

7 8 9

10

Cf. above all Frede i979 = Frede 1987, pp. 179-200; Burnyeat 1980, pp. 20-53, reprinted in Burnyeat 1983, pp. 117-48; Barnes 1982/3, pp. 1-29; Sedley 1983, pp. 9-29; Burnyeat 1984, pp. 225-54; Frede 1984/7, PP- 255-78. Cf. Frede 1987, pp. i86ff., who translates oerA as 'to the extent that this is a question for reason'. Cf. Burnyeat 1983, pp. 136 and 147 n. 49 ('ooov inl TCO Xoyw. it is a nice question for interpretation how to take Xoyos here'); I refer the reader to all that follows in this note. Prima la sintassi, poi la semantica: I am grateful to Jonathan Barnes for reminding me of the value of this principle, freely adapted from Antonio Salieri and Richard Strauss, and for having thereby encouraged me totally to recast the first version of the present paper. Bury, for example, punctuates the sentence in PH 1.20 in an 'objectal' fashion (el 8e KOLI yXvKv €OTLV ooov em rep Xoyw, ^7}TovfjL€v) and translates it in conformity with that syntactical choice ('but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt'). The 'adverbial' construction appears if one punctuates as follows: el 8e KOLI yXvKv ionv, ooov em rw Xoyw ^ v . Antoine Leandri has also pointed this out to me.

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considered as a 'rustic Pyrrhonism', 11 that is to say as a suspension of all belief without exception, whether it be of the ordinary or the philosophico-scientific type? Or is it rather an 'urbane Pyrrhonism', which restricts the h-nox*} to philosophical and scientific dogma, and preserves the common beliefs of ordinary people? 12 The studies devoted to this question have concentrated upon the notion of 'dogma' and upon the sense in which it should be understood that a Sceptic 'does not dogmatize'. In this connection, the keytext is PHi. 13, which distinguishes between two meanings of the word Soy^a, and specifies that it is in only one of those two senses that the Sceptic 'does not dogmatize'. 13 The care devoted to the study of P//1.13 stands in contrast to the relative neglect that PH 1.20 has suffered, and that is assuredly a pity since, whatever the exact meaning of the oerX formula may be, its function is clearly to specify a limit, restriction or qualification. It is accordingly essential to examine it in order to determine the 'scope' of the ijroxrj more precisely. It may be objected that the necessary work has already been done by one of the best scholars specializing in the study of Sextus: Karel Janacek devoted the first chapter of his study Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Methods (pp. 13-20) to the expression 6'oov k-ni. This chapter, which is certainly most valuable by reason of the material that it assembles and many of the observations that it contains, nevertheless puts forward interpretations which seem to me to be extremely controversial. Janacek begins this chapter with the following loaded declaration: As the double wording of the same idea, viz. the use of a complete expression next to an incomplete one is to my mind one of the characteristic features of Sextus' style, we must be aware of it when reading his works. The concise formulation must be explained by means of a full reading, which often appears only later; it is psychologically quite comprehensible that the sterile sceptical doctrine called at least for a variation or formal improvement. This 'principle of complementation' may indeed be justified on the basis of certain declarations made by Sextus himself (such as PHi. 188-9). However, in his commentaries on PH1.20, Janacek seems to me to apply it without taking the necessary precautions. He writes as follows: 'The oerX construction is a noun form which corresponds to the verbal expression o Aeyercu (i.e. VTTO rcbv SoyfjLOLTLKwv) or to the participle TO Xeyofjuevov.' If my understanding is correct, this commentary leads to the following interpretation: we Sceptics call into question what the dogmatists say, namely that honey is sweet. But is it legitimate mentally to supply VTTO TCOV Soy/xart/ccov here, and so orientate the interpretation of the passage in the direction of an expressly 'urbane' scepticism? There are a number of reasons to think not. 11 12 13

aypoiKOTTvppojveioi'. Galen's expression (Diff. puls. viii.71 iK, Praenot. XIV.628K) is adapted like this by Barnes 1983, p. 8. Burnyeat 1984, p. 231, also, in honour of Montaigne, speaks in connection with this of the 'scepticism of a country gentleman'. Cf. in particular the articles cited by Frede 1987, pp. i86ff., Burnyeat 1983, pp. 130ft0., Barnes 1983, pp. 23ft0., Burnyeat 1984, pp. 229ft0.

THE OXON Em TQI AOTQl FORMULA

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In the first place, the statement 'honey is sweet' (hereafter: statement H) is certainly not a statement on which all the 'dogmatists' would agree. Many would reject it, insisting upon an analysis of the material structure of honey, and would refuse to say that it is really sweet. Sextus, too, rejects such an assertion but does not justify that rejection by means of the oerX expression. 14 Honey, which is a common food product, is not the object of a scientific proposition here. Rather, the statement H is one of those 'sentences of breakfast-time' which, according to Jonathan Barnes, are hard to deal with when you attempt to determine the scope of the Sceptic eVox^, since they constitute neither scientific assertions nor pure 'reports' of the impressions that affect us. 15 Furthermore, the first argument that Janacek puts forward to justify an implied VTTO TCOV SoyfiartKcbv is certainly unacceptable. He points out that in the following sentence Sextus refers to the 'precipitation of the dogmatists'. That is true, but this sentence is not part of the same level of the argument. There are two stages to Sextus' reply to those who accuse the Sceptics of 'suppressing the phenomena': (1) in the passage with which we are concerned he draws a distinction between the phenomenon and 'what is said about the phenomenon'; (2) in the following sentence he explains that if the Sceptic sometimes opposes some phenomena to others, it is not in order to ruin them but to show that 'if the Xoyos (which here means reason, reasoning) is so deceptive as virtually to conceal even the phenomena from our sight, there is all the more reason to mistrust it in the domain of non-evident things (iv rots a8r]\oLsy. The transition between these two stages is clearly indicated at the beginning of the second part of 20 (iav 8e KCLL KTX). The 'urbane' restriction of the eTToxfj to the bold affirmations of the dogmatists, in (2), cannot be considered to be implied by anticipation in (1), where the conflict between different phenomena is not taken into consideration. Janacek also concludes, from a general review of the uses of ooov in I in Sextus, that the particular expression is an 'incomplete', 'obscure', 'vague', and 'subjective' one which Sextus sometimes 'suppresses' when he repeats himself, so as to avoid 'monotony' (PH 111.48, M ix.439) or that he 'replaces' by expressions that are 'more correct', 'more definite', 'wider' and 'better', such as ooov €TTI rots AeyofjLevois VTTO TCOV SoyfjuaTiKcbv (PHU.22,

8 0 , 9 5 ; III. 13? 2 9> 135)

or ooov em rco iXoo6(j)co Xoyto (P//111.65, Mx.49; cf. also Mix.49 and xi. 165), or else by 'more objective' expressions, such as Sea rrjv looodeveiav (Mx.168) or 81a rfjv hiacfxjoviav (sc. TCOV Soy/juaTLKcov) (cf. PH III.65). If, before returning

to PH 1.20, we make a fairly wide detour, following in Janacek's footsteps, I 14

15

Cf. for example the exposition of the third trope (PH 1.93): euphorbia is hurtful to the eyes but not to other parts of the body; so it cannot be said to be either hurtful or not hurtful, ooov i-nl rfj iavTov vo€i, insofar as its own nature is concerned. Cf. Barnes 1983, pp. 256°.It is perhaps exaggerated to say that 'Sextus says nothing about these pronouncements'; but it is certainly true that he says nothing that is very clear.

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think we shall see (i) that the absence or presence of the ooov em restriction is by no means simply a stylistic variation, and (ii) that the various complements provided for ooov em are by no means interchangeable. (i) For example, Janacek considers as 'parallel' PH 11.22, in which Sextus declares man to be 'unintelligible' {aveTTLvorjTos), ooov em rols Aeyojjuevois VTTO ra>v SoyfjLdTLKcov, and M vii.263 where, without using the same expression, he undertakes to show that man has 'so far' shown himself to be 'unintelligible'. But the first passage is cast in the present tense, as is the series of definitions of man that follows it: Sextus has in mind a synoptic table of these definitions, to which he refers using the expression ooov em rols Xeyofxevois VTTO TCOV SoyfjLdTiKwv; a possible translation would be 'on the definite basis provided by what the dogmatists say'. The second passage, in contrast, is written in the style of a story, and precedes a history of the notion of man; here, the corpus on the basis of which man is declared to be unintelligible is not considered to be already constituted; so, quite naturally, the expression ooov em rois Xeyofxevois VTTO TCOV SoyfjLCLTLKtbv is n o t used.

Janacek also treats as 'parallel' PH 11.29, where Sextus passes, without using ooov em7, from the thesis 'man is unintelligible (dveTTtvorjrosy to the thesis 'man is unknowable' (d/caraA^Trros), and M vii.283, in which he makes the same transition by saying that the first point has been shown TO OOOV em TOLS TCOV SoyfjLOLTLKwv ivvoiais. But the technique of argumentation employed in these two passages is not at all the same: in the first, the technique is one of concession {'even if we accepted, as a hypothesis, that man can be understood, we shall see that he cannot be known'); in the second passage, the technique is one of consecution ('it has been shown, on the definite basis provided by the ideas of the dogmatists, that man is unintelligible and consequently that he is unknowable'). At PH 11.29, there was thus no place for the use of ooov, although it is perfectly justified at M vii.283. (ii) Sextus observes a distinction, sometimes with great care, between the various complements that he provides for ooov em. He uses this formula to specify in what respect a statement is legitimate {PH 11.156, 166, m.277, M xi.215), or the criterion according to which it is held to be so by a particular philosophical school {PH 1.235). We should also note the many anaphoric uses of ooov em, complemented by TOVTCO {PH 11.23, m i 9 3 > M vii.367, vm.438) or 2II TOVTOLS {PH 11.203, > 2 I 5 ) ; these make it possible to refer back to the statement or the collection of statements upon the precise basis of which a Sceptic conclusion is inferred (they could be translated well enough as 'on that account'). When the complement of ooov em refers back to the conceptions and propositions of the dogmatists, it is further differentiated by variations which appear to be neither accidental nor purely stylistic. Sextus does not express himself in the same way when he is citing an authority literally (cf. M 1.287, ooov 67Ti TO) VTT EvpiTTioov XexOevTi) as when he is drawing from a corpus of dogmatic assertions a Sceptic conclusion which was neither foreseen nor

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desired by those dogmatists themselves (cf. ooov errl rols Aeyo/zevoi? VTTO rtbv Soy/jLCLTiKoov, PH 11.22, 95, in. 13, 29, 135, and similar expressions in PH 11.26, 104,118,111.56,186,241, Mviii.3, x.33). 16 When he bases his remarks upon the dogmatic definitions of the object that he is examining, the complement to ooov em is evvoca or eirivota(PHll. 23, m.38,46, Ml.65, 90, Vll.283); when he bases them upon non-definitional statements, the complement is Aoyos or Xeyofieva (PH 11.22,95,111.13,29,135,136); cf. also PH 11.26,104,118,111.56,186,241, M vm.3, x.33). Whether it be definitions or statements that are concerned, his use of the singular and the plural is by no means haphazard. If one dogmatic definition in particular is unintelligible or leads to absurd consequences, he W r i t e s OOOV €771 TTj ivVOLCL TCLVTr) (PH

I I . 2 3 , III.46, M 1.65) Or OOOV €7TL TaVTTJ TTj

kinvoia (PH in. 38, Ml. 90); if a large number of divergent definitions manifest the unintelligibility of their common subject, he writes TO OOOV eirl rats rcov SoyfxartKcov ivvotais (M vii.283). Where a certain number of dogmatic theses, by reason of their very discordance, provide the Sceptic with a definite basis upon which he founds the necessity of his e V o ^ , he writes ooov eVi rots XeyofjuevoLS VTTO TWV SoyfjianKcov (PH 11.22, 95, III. 13, 29, 56, 135);17 but he writes ooov iirl rco cf>iXoo6(/)a) Xoyw, or uses similar expressions, when philosophy itself, quite apart from its divisions, is as a whole opposed either to the phenomena (PH 111.65, M x.49), 18 or else to the customs and laws (M ix.49), or the ordinary rules of life (Mxi.165). Let us now return to our original question and examine two cases where the expression used by Sextus is very close to oerX, although not exactly identical to this formula. At PH in.62, Sextus winds up his attack against the physical theory of mixture by declaring that, since all possible modes of composition for the elements have turned out to be unintelligible, that theory is itself unintelligible KCLI ooov em TOVTCO TCO Xoyco. This occurrence is doubly important because its syntax is definitely 'adverbial' (the restriction specifies not the sense in which 16

17 18

One particular and difficult case is that of PH 11.80, in which Sextus presents the famous Stoic distinction between the truth and what is true, saying that ooov i-rrl TOLS Xeyo/jLevois VTTO TWV hoytiariKwv what is true has no existence (avvTrapKTos) and the truth has no subsistence {avvTToorarov). In opposition to the idea that this might be a valuable doxographical piece of evidence on the ontological vocabulary of the Stoics, it is worth noting that at PH 111.253, Sextus himself refers to this passage, saying that in it he showed that the truth was avvnapKrov, thereby confusing the distinction apparently introduced at PH 11.80. At PH 11.22, dogmatic discourses are said to be both discordant if one considers them together, and unintelligible if one considers them separately. At P//111.65, Sextus writes that the existence of movement is recognized both by common sense (o jSios1) and by some philosophers {rives TOJV <j>i\oo6a>v), whereas the Eleatic philosophers deny it. He concludes that movement certainly seems to exist ooov em TOLS (fraivofievoLs, but not ooov inl Ta)i\oo6cp\6ya); the existence of one immobilist philosophy seems to him to be a sufficient reason to claim that philosophic reason per se denies movement. At Mx.45-9, he is more circumspect: he is careful to call philosophers who recognize the existence of movement 'physicists', as opposed to the avoiKoi Eleatics; by the same token, the philosophic Xoyos can easily be presented as negating movement.

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the theory must be taken if it is to be declared unintelligible, but instead the precise basis upon which the Sceptic justifies his declaring it to be so) and anaphoric (the referral operated by rovrco to the preceding argument is exactly what makes it possible to understand Xoyos here to mean 'argument'). This anaphoric use closely resembles the uses of ooov eirl rovrco (without rco Xoyco) that I mentioned above and that I translated as 'on that account'. In fact, that very translation would also do perfectly well here, bearing in mind one of the common meanings of Aoyos. The case of PHi.i 15 is more difficult. Here Sextus examines the relationship between Scepticism and Cyrenaism, which some sought to identify on the grounds that they share in common the thesis according to which 'only affects (TTOLOTJ) are knowable'. Sextus opposes that identification: 'whereas we practise the €770x17, ooov lire T(h Xoyco 7T€pl rcbv €KTOS vTroK€Lfji€vajv, the Cyrenaics

declare that the latter have an unknowable nature.' The general sense may be clear (this is one version, among many others, of the Sceptics' overt hostility to all forms of what might be termed a 'negative dogmatism' or 'meta-dogmatism'). However, the details of the expression are problematical, firstly on a syntactical level. "Ooov errl rco Xoyco may be construed adverbially, by attaching rrepl rcbv eKros vTTOKeijjLevajv to the verb irrexofjiev ('we suspend

judgement, at least at the level of the Xoyos, where external objects are concerned.') One may also, it seems to me, adopt an 'objectal' construction of ooov inl rco Xoyco by attaching irepl rcbv €KTOS VTTOK€.I\L€VCOV to Xoyco ('we

suspend judgement, insofar as it is a matter of the Xoyos relating to external objects.') The sentence about the Cyrenaics, which follows on from the one in which we are interested, perhaps favours the second of these two constructions: these philosophers do not refrain from making assertions {a7ro(j>aivovrcu) about the unknowable 'nature' of external objects; in contrast, it would be logical to take it that Sceptics do abstain from pronouncing upon such objects. But I do not think it is possible to settle the matter definitively. On the other hand, whatever the construction adopted, it is noticeable that the oerX formula here has no anaphoric force: the context contains no statement or argument to which the term Xoyos could refer back. This rapid overview thus provides two alternative models for interpreting the uses of the oerX formula that are not accompanied by any complement. The anaphoric model seems to suggest an ellipse of rovrco, which could be compensated by the context; the formula would thus mean: 'on the definite basis that is provided by the statement, or the argument, that has just been mentioned'. The non-anaphoric model seems, on the contrary, to suggest that Xoyos should be given a sense sufficiently definite for the restriction indicated by oerX to be pinned down precisely. The formula would then mean: 'insofar as the Xoyos is concerned', that is to say either the essence of the object of which one is speaking or the discourse, or type of discourse, that one is producing about it. Of the four uses of oerX mentioned at the beginning of this study, two, in my

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opinion, call for the anaphoric interpretation. At PH 111.47-8, Sextus is arguing against the existence of the body, on the grounds of the dogmatic division of beings into those that are sensible and those that are intelligible; next he shows that the body can be neither sensible nor intelligible. Then he concludes: 'as there is nothing else apart from that, it must be said, oerA, that the body does not exist either' (48). Despite the absence of a pronoun, it seems natural to translate as Bury does: 'so far as this argument goes'. The argument in question, set out in the preceding lines, is but one of those that can be constructed 'against the body' (TOVS Kara rov acofjuaros Aoyovs, 49). The Sceptic distinguishes between them and the critical analysis of the concept of the body, 19 and opposes them to the phenomena, in order to force the 677ox^.20 The negative conclusion of this argument ('the body does not exist') is not the object of an assertion detached from its specific premisses; it is put forward for the reader's approval only on the precise basis of the argument itself. The Sceptic could well put forward other arguments in favour of the same conclusion; he could no doubt also advance other arguments of equal force in favour of the opposite conclusion. The situation at P//111.72 is similar. Against those who maintain that a thing can move in the place where it is, by invoking the example of a sphere turning upon its axis, Sextus says that 'it is necessary to transfer the argument (Adyo?) [already expounded above], which applies to each of the parts of the sphere [and which shows that a thing cannot move from the place where it is to another where it is not]. By reminding [those who hold to the criticized thesis] that, ocrA, the sphere cannot move part by part, one can force them to recognize that neither can it move in the place where it is.' Here the anaphoric interpretation is surely called for, particularly as the absence of a pronoun is compensated by the occurrence of the word Adyo? in the preceding context, and as Sextus speaks specifically of 'transferring' {fxera^epeiv) this argument directed against movement from one place to another, so as to reject movement in one spot. The case of PH 1.227 *s more difficult. Here, Sextus compares Scepticism with the New Academy. The points of divergence that he notes are the following: (a) the Academicians adopt a dogmatically negative position vis-avis theories of knowledge in general; (b) the most manifest divergence, however, occurs in the domain of discerning goods and evils, where the Academicians justify their adherence to their judgements on the grounds of their 'persuasiveness', whereas the Sceptics abstain from adhering to the judgements that they come to in this domain, since those judgements are dictated by an 'adoxastic' acceptance of the necessities of practical life. Sextus then adds (without making it clear whether or not he still remains in the domain of ethics) (c) that, according to the Sceptics, 'representations (avraaiai) are all equal with regard to their persuasiveness or non-persuasiveness (icara TTLOTLV 77 ainariav) O€TA, whereas, for the Academicians, some are 19

Cf. ooov ini rfj kvvoia rov GWfJLaros, 46 end.

20

Cf. beginning of 49.

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persuasive while others are not.' Finally, (d) we find an account of the differentiations that the Academicians introduce between persuasive representations themselves; to judge from the examples cited, the representations in question are sensible, not ethical ones. The main difficulty that this passage presents is that it is not clear whether section (c), in which the oerX formula appears, constitutes a preamble to (d) or an appendix to (b). If the latter is the case, it would be possible to read this formula in the anaphoric sense: the indifferent manner in which, according to section (b), the Sceptic proffers his ethical statements would thus constitute the grounds upon which, when he passes on from statements to the representations that they express, he declares the latter to be themselves all equal so far as persuasiveness goes. If one can say that 'X is good' without being persuaded of it, one can, on that account, represent X to oneself &$ good, without that

representation being any more persuasive than its opposite would be. However, it unquestionably seems more natural to consider section (c) as a statement of a new difference between the Sceptics and the Academicians,21 which is related, not to the particular representations of the ethical domain, but to representations in general. In opposition to the Sceptics, the Academicians distinguish first (c) between representations that are persuasive and those that are not; and they then (d) go on to draw finer distinctions between such representations as are persuasive. In these circumstances, an anaphoric interpretation of oerX would be impossible, since the caesura between (b) and (c) prevents onefindingany anaphoric reference. An adverbial interpretation of the formula that interests us would now seem indicated: 'we say that representations are equal so far as persuasiveness and non-persuasiveness are concerned, at least that is what we say at the level of theory (or rational discourse)' - the implication being: from a practical point of view, we accept their inequality when it is simply a matter of living and acting.

Now, at last, let us return to our point of departure, namely PH 1.20. The possible variations noted earlier dictate that we approach this text without any preconceptions and examine all the interpretations that are theoretically possible. These may be classified schematically by crossing the adverbial vs. objectal distinction with the anaphoric vs. non-anaphoric distinction and, at the same time, allowing different variants to subsist within each schema: (a) A non-anaphoric and objectal construction: 'we doubt22 that honey is sweet, so far as Xoyos goes,' that is to say, for example, its essence as opposed to its appearance. (b) A non-anaphoric and adverbial construction: 'we doubt, so far as a Xoyos goes (that is to say either discourse in general, or discourse of a definite kind, or a theoretical question, or a question for reason) that honey is sweet.' 21

22

Sections (a) and (b) are strongly connected by LOCOS /XCV . . . &ia<j>epovoi Se. Section (c) seems tacked on to these two, by reason of the link established by r e , beginning of 227. O n this translation of ^rjrovfjLev, cf. above, n. 5.

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From other points of view, determined in opposition to the above, we do not doubt it. (c) An anaphoric and adverbial construction: 'we doubt, on the definite basis supplied by a Adyos (an argument or a statement) present in the context, that honey is sweet.' It is not excluded that, upon other bases, we might not doubt it. (d) An anaphoric and objectal construction: 'we doubt that honey is sweet, insofar as the statement "honey is sweet" rests upon a determined basis supplied by a Adyos (an argument or a statement) that is present in the context, and is itself rejected.' Against (a), it may be pointed out that the Aristotelian translation ofAdyo? as 'essence' is, so far as I know, not authorized by any parallel in Sextus. When he sets the phenomenal aspect of things in opposition to their reality, nature or essence, he uses (f>vcns, not Aoyos (cf. P//1.59,78,87, etc.). Furthermore, in the passage with which we are concerned, Sextus twice opposes 'the phenomenon itself to 'that which is said about the phenomenon' (o Aeyercu, Xeyofjuevov); it would seem that the word Aoyos, in the oerA formula, echoes these occurrences of the verb Xeyeiv, and should be understood as relating, in one way or another, to the act of saying. This same argument may be used against the versions of schema (b) which introduce the notion of reason or that of theory. On the one hand, it should be remembered that the airoplai produced by reason where phenomena are concerned are not mentioned by Sextus until the second part of his reply to the objection made by the opponents of Scepticism; to translate Aoyos as 'reason' in the first part of this reply (as must be done in the second part) would be to take no account of the force of the iav Se KOLI avriKpvs KTX transition. Meanwhile, the statement H can hardly pass for a theoretical statement, if by this what is meant is a philosophical or scientific statement concerning 'the non-evident things that constitute the subject of scientific research', in accordance with the definition that Sextus gives of the strict sense of Soy/jua at PH1.13. On the other hand, the versions of schema (b) which give Adyo? a meaning close to 'saying' seem solidly based upon the opposition indicated between the phenomenon and that which is 'said about it'. But we ought also to be able to specify the sense in which the Sceptic abstains from saying that honey is sweet, insofar as that statement is a Adyos. Three possibilities seem feasible. (bi) The statement should be rejected as a Adyos, that is to say as discourse on the phenomenon, since this cannot be equated with the phenomenon itself, for the simple reason that it is discourse on it and all 'discoursing upon' the phenomenon inevitably betrays or distorts it. (b2) The statement should be rejected as a Adyos, that is to say as discourse on the external object, as opposed to discourse which would not be called \6yos, did no more than describe the irddos of the affected subject, and would be acceptable to the Sceptic.

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(b3) The statement should be rejected as a Aoyos, that is to say as an assertion, an assertion being disqualified as such, not on account of its object, for this could just as well be the mental state of the affected subject as the properties of external objects. What would be acceptable to the Sceptic would be a 'speech-act' of a type other than a Adyo?, which expresses the affected subject's irddos in its raw state, without making any assertion concerning this TTOLOOS itself.

Interpretation (bi) seems ideally in conformity with the opposition that Sextus draws between the phenomenon and what is said about it. 23 Nevertheless, it poses a problem: can the Sceptics 'concede the fact of appearance' and also deny themselves all discourse that interprets that appearance, without condemning themselves to silence? To be sure, they recommend d(f>aola; but as the bulk of their writings testifies - this is a far cry from mutism (PH i.i92ff.). They may resort to 'indicators of ac/xioia, such as 'perhaps' or 'possibly' (PH 1.194-5), or even to 'catachrestic' uses of ordinary expressions (PH 1.191, 207); the verb 'to be' itself may, in this sense, be used perfectly legitimately (P//1.135, 198, Mxi.18-19). The chapter with which we are specially concerned also shows that the Sceptic by no means denies himself statements which do not coincide exactly with the description that he himself gives of the 'fact of appearance', and which thus deserve to be considered as 'interpretations' of the phenomenon. When it comes to describing the 'fact of appearance', the Sceptic resorts to vocabulary typical of the Cyrenaic school: 'through our senses we undergo a sweetening effect' (yXvKa^ofjieda aloO^riKibs). But this statement is presented as the reason why (yap) the Sceptic agrees to (avyxcopovfjuev) another one, namely 'honey appears to us to have a sweetening action' (^aiverai -qixiv yXvKa&iv TO jjueXi). Clearly, this last statement, too, 'interprets' the phenomenon, and does so in at least two senses: in the first place, it replaces the passive yXvKa^ofjieda by the active yXvKd^iv, tacitly justifying this by the principle of reciprocity between passion and action; secondly, and above all, it identifies and names the agent of this action, namely honey, the name of which was not pronounced in the statement couched in the passive, nor was there even a place for it there. 24 So the Sceptic does not rule out speaking of the phenomenon; he can only rule out speaking of it in a particular manner, this being characterized either by the subject that the discourse claims to be about (the external world, as 23

24

Cf. Sedley 1983, p . 27 n. 57: ' H e r e [PH 1.19-20] it emerges t h a t when the Skeptic assents to an " a p p e a r a n c e " (phainomenon) he is conceding only the fact of the appearance itself ("that it appears, we g r a n t " ) and explicitly excluding the statement (ho legetai, legomenon, logos) which interprets the appearance - e.g. the statement that the honey which appears sweet is sweet.' O n this point, the Cyrenaics are m o r e p r u d e n t a n d m o r e rigorous; professing t h a t 'the effect which takes place in us shows us nothing except itself (M vii.194), they d o not permit themselves to designate the producer of the affect otherwise t h a n by its function (TO ifJLTTOlTjTlKOV TOV TTOidoVS, I 9 I ; TO KLVOVV CLVTOVS, 1 9 3 ; TO €KTOS KCLl TOV TTOidoVS TTOLTjTLKOV,

194)-

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opposed to the irddrj), or else by the modality of the speech-act that it constitutes (assertivity as opposed to a bald expression of the irddos). The first of those possibilities corresponds to schema (b2). It has certain attractions. As is well known, Sextus frequently refers to the discourse that the Sceptic allows himself as 'reports' or 'accounts' {dirayyeXiai, P//1.4, 15, 197, 200, 203), 'expressions' or 'indications' of his nddrj ((/MJOVOLL ^rjvvrLKai, PH 1.187; a>vri SrjXojTLKrj, PH1.197,201), 'tales of what he experiences' (o iracx^ biriyovjxevos, PH 1.197). It might thus be thought that, in the passage with which we are concerned, Sextus wishes to rule out the statement H, by calling it a Aoyo?, precisely because it refers to the external object and attributes an object property to it. In contrast, the acceptable statement 'Honey seems to us to have a sweetening action' (let us call this statement
26

Cf. Barnes 1983, p . 14: 'The Pyrrhonist of PH, when he is mentally affected, m a y utter the sentence " T h e tower seems r o u n d " ; he thereby expresses his ndOos, but does n o t state that he is experiencing a certain irdBos (he does not state anything at all).' At PH 1.197, the Sceptic expresses precisely his TTOLOOS, by saying that he is experiencing it (cyco OVT(X) 7T€7TOvda VVV d)S

KTX).

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ought to accept it only with the oerX reservation; which is not what he does. As for the statement H, it cannot be rejected on the grounds that it asserts something about the internal state of the subject, for the simple reason that it does no such thing. All the variants of the non-anaphoric schemata thus appear to run into difficulties. Now we must examine the two anaphoric schemata, (c) and (d). At the outset it is worth noting a strong point that they share in common. In this passage, the oerX formula is only used in relation to the example of honey. This is an application of a universal exposition, showing that Sceptic doubt bears not upon the phenomenon but upon what is said about it, namely that the subject which appears is what it appears to be (19). The fact that the oerX formula is not used in this universal exposition would be hard to understand if the restriction that it expresses bore upon either the content or the modality of the doubt which affects 'that which is said about the phenomenon' of honey: for that restriction ought to bear equally upon 'that which is said about the phenomenon' in general. On the other hand, the occurrence of this formula only at the level of the particular example is easily understood if one assumes that it refers back anaphorically to an argument or statement that is present in the universal exposition and that in this argument or statement can be found either the precise basis for the Sceptic doubting that honey is sweet (c), or the precise basis for the non-Sceptic assuming (wrongly) that it is sweet (d). The asymmetry between the universal exposition of 19, which does not contain the oerX formula, and the particular example of 20, which does contain it, thus seems to me a powerful argument in favour of an anaphoric interpretation of this formula. What remains to be done, if possible, is to choose between the (c) and (d) versions of this interpretation. It is not an easy choice, for the universal exposition contains both the basis upon which the Sceptic doubts that honey is sweet (it is by no means certain that the external object is as it appears to be) and also the basis upon which the non-Sceptic wrongly believes that it is (it is tempting to believe that the external object is as it appears to be). The two versions thus seem equally defensible and present no differences that matter from a philosophical point of view. All the same, I shall suggest a reason for preferring version (d). In the chapter with which we are concerned, everything that pertains to the Xoyos is definitely devalued: what is said about the phenomenon constitutes the precise object of the Sceptic's doubt: the Xoyos itself is described as deceptive because it is capable of overturning even the most manifest sensible evidence and, a fortiori, of straying into the domain of the dSrjXa. It is therefore more in conformity with the logic of the passage to think that oerX here refers to a fallacious argument upon which the non-Sceptic bases his belief that honey is sweet, rather than to a valid argument upon which the Sceptic bases his doubt that it is so. It is possible to identify the Xoyos in question even more precisely. We

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should note (i) that, on the basis of the accepted 0 statement, it would be possible, with the aid of the appropriate major premisses, to infer other unacceptable statements as well as H (for example, 'honey seems, to all sentient subjects, to have a sweetening action' or 'honey will, on every future occasion, seem to us to have a sweetening action'); and (ii) that the H statement could be inferred, wrongly, on the basis of major premisses other than that which is here adopted by the Sceptic's interlocutor ('the object has the qualitative properties that it appears to have'), major premisses which might be either more general ('the object has the properties that it appears to have') or less general ('the object has the properties relating to taste that it appears to have'). The rigour of the Sceptic critique demands that the precise wording of the statements that are rejected be specified, and also the precise wording of the premisses on the basis of which the non-Sceptic believes that he can infer them. As I understand it, we might thus paraphrase PHi.io as follows: we grant that honey seems to us to have a sweetening action; but as to knowing whether it is sweet on that account, that is to say on the basis provided by the phenomenon and, apart from the phenomenon, by a general principle of conformity between phenomenalistic qualities and real qualities, which we do not accept, that is something that we do not accept either. 27 By way of an appendix, I should like to undertake a rapid comparison between this interpretation of the Sceptic status of 'sentences of breakfast-time' and that of Jonathan Barnes (1983, pp. 25ft0.). Barnes shows, with admirable clarity, that these statements seem to be neither ruled out (since they do not express any scientific Soy/xa, they cannot be condemned by the 'urbane' version of the €770x77),nor accepted (since they do not take the required form of pure 'accounts' of ndOr), they do not escape the attack that is directed against all criteria of the truth, an attack which strikes, in 'rustic' fashion, against the TTpoSrjXa themselves). According to Barnes, the paradox is resolved in the following fashion: we could not affirm that honey is sweet without the aid of a criterion of the truth, a means of judging that the irdOos that affects us corresponds to the real properties of the object. Now, to affirm that we do not possess a criterion of the truth would be a dogma, and a major one. Once the Sceptic has deprived us of all assurance on this front, we are left with nothing to guarantee our ordinary statements. These are not conclusions drawn from inferences for which we lack premisses: they are judgements for which we lack any bases. 28 There would seem to be a radical incompatibility between this interpre27

28

According to the officially 'zetetic' programme of the Sceptic, it is not theoretically excluded that, on some other basis, the statement rejected here might turn out to be acceptable (cf. PH 1.226). Cf. pp. 27-8: 'The criterion is needed not to infer that the water is tepid (there is nothing to infer it from) but rather to judge that the water is tepid; we require not reasons for an inference but grounds for a judgement - and unless we have such grounds we are not warranted in making the judgement.'

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tation and the one that I have proposed above for PH 1.20: according to me, Sextus here demolishes precisely one of the tacit inferences upon which we base our ordinary statements. In reality, however, the two interpretations are perfectly compatible, even necessarily complementary within the overall Sceptic strategy. If it is true that a criterion is necessary to judge that/?, a Aoyo? is also necessary to infer that/?. The Sceptic wants to prevent his interlocutor affirming that/?. So he has to block the two possible ways that he might adopt in order to do so: he has to show him that he has at his disposal no criterion that would allow him to pass a judgement nor any Aoyo? that would allow him to draw an inference. So far, up to the point that we have reached in the PH exposition, the word 'criterion' has hardly even been pronounced (apart from a brief programmatic mention at 1.5, it is not used until the next chapter); it is thus plausible that the critique of ordinary statements, at 1.20, might be directed against the inference upon which they might be based rather than the judgement that might authorize them. As I stated at the outset, the ambition of this study has been extremely limited. The principal conclusions that I draw from it are negative. If I am not mistaken, the text of PH 1.20 cannot be used to support an 'urbane' interpretation of Sextus' scepticism: the oerX restriction is not designed to protect ordinary statements provided only that they do not lay claim to theoretical or rational truth. But nor can this passage authorize any overall 'rustic' interpretation, with no limitations at all: for its principal message is that no Sceptic conclusion can be detached from the specific corpus of statements and arguments by reference to which, taking each case separately, it is presented as justified. If there could be a general explanation for the frequency with which Sextus uses ooov em, it might be that, as he sees it, one should never generalize about anything. After all, it is we who speak of 'Scepticism': the word that he uses is simply GK€I/JIS.

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INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Academicians, 156, 207, 251-2 adela vs. prodela, 241; see also kriterion all, immutability of, in Epicurus, 1-20; in Lucretius, 8-14; quantitative vs. qualitative, 2, i8n.; possible meanings of, 15-16; vs. universe (in Stoicism), 98-9, 103, 118 apangelia, 255 appearances, in Scepticism, 197, 218, 222-3, 244-58 article, 40-2, 51-3, 63; definite vs. indefinite, 64 assent, 165-7 atomism, in Epicurus, 33, 36, 136 Atomists, I39n. atoms, 183 axiomata (propositions), 165-8 beliefs, in Scepticism, 191, 196-205, 209 bivalency, 75-6 bodies, 92-3, 98, 106, 111-12, 114, 120-3, 125, 132-4, 136-8, 141, 144-8, 151-5, 158-69; sceptical arguments against, 251 catachresis, 85, 254 change, in Epicurus, 3-20; transitive vs. immanent causes of, 13; possible meanings of, 15-16 concepts, in Stoicism, 92-3, 98-9, 101, 127-8, 135, 141, 146; ennoemata dist. nooumena, dist. ennoiai, 99-100, 102-4, l J 4; ennoiai, vs. prolepseis, 184; vs. katalepseis, ii'j; concept and existence, 170-89, 226-7 conceptual vs. doctrinal disagreement, 225-7 conjunction, 40, 72-91 culture, origins of (Epicurus), 22-4 Cyrenaics, 191, 250, 254 declension, 42-3 definite propositions (Stoics), 47-9, 60-2 definitions, 109 deixis (Stoics), 47-52, 54 deloun, 44-5 desire, 160-1 Dialecticians, 57, 70-1, 160-1, i63n. dogma, 246

eclecticism vs. scepticism, 224-5 Eleatics, 2, 249n. empiricism, in Epicurus, 37 ennoemata, see concepts ennoiai, see concepts episteme, see knowledge epoche, 246-7 Eretrians, 154 eulogon, 176 existent (on), 94, 105-7, 110-15, 117—18, 120-3, I25~9> 131-2, 146; 'of such a nature as to exist', 177-89; existent vs. subsistent, 'Friends of the Forms', in Plato's Sophist, 119, 121; original vs. revised position of, 121-6 forms, Platonic, 101, 116, 119, 121-2; Stoic criticism of, 126-31 gar, 18-19 genus, supreme (Stoics), 42, 92-157, part. 103, 105, 107-8, 110-13, I I 6 , 146-7, 151 gods, 170-89 grammarians, 40, 44 Growing Argument, 54-5 haireton vs. haireteon, 164 happiness, in Pyrrhonism, 191, 196, 199, 203, 205, 208, 214, 223 hexis, vs. hekton, 150-3 honey, whether sweet, 246-7, 252-3, 256-7 identity, Stoic criterion of, 53 images, see Indalmoi impulse, 158-69 incorporeals, 92-3, 96, 98, 106, 111-14, 116, 121, 124-6, 132, 134-5, X38, 141-2, 144-5, 147-8, 151-4, 158-69 indefinite propositions (Stoics), 47-9, 60-2 individuals, fictitious (in Stoicism), 98-101, 103, n o , 114 individualism, in Epicurus, 33, 37 'intellectualism', Stoic, 83 intermediate propositions (Stoics), see middle isonomia, I2n., 13-15

267

268

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

katalepsis, 228; see concepts kategoremata, 134-5, J54~6, 158-69 katorthoma, 80 knowledge, in Stoicism, 81-2, 124; in Scepticism, 191 kriterion, 228-43; 'prodelic' vs. 'adelic' notion of, 230, 233, 238-43; 'Stoic' vs. 'Epicurean' notion of, 241-3; various meanings of, 233-7; vs. sign and proof, 230; and kanon, 242; and logos, 257-8 language, private vs. common (Epicurus), 21-38; animal vs. human, 34, 35 lekta, 44, 46, 124-5, X34~6, 142, 158, 162, i63n.; complete vs. incomplete, 135 limits, in Stoicism, 96-7, 103, 138 logos, insofar as is concerned, 244-58 man, unintelligible and unknowable (Sceptics), 248 Master Argument, 52, 65 'materialism', Stoic, 123, 134, 159 methodology, 1 middle propositions (Stoics), 47-51, 60-1, 63 mixture, 77, 137; unintelligible (Sceptics), 249 movement, in Epicurus, 3-20; metaphorical vs. literal use of expressions for, 3-17; sceptical arguments against, 251 nature, vs. reasoning (Epicurus), 23-4; vs. convention or institution, 25, 28-31 negation, 51 nominative, 42-3 'non-existent something', 94-6, n o , 114-16, 126,131, 134, 138, 140, 145 nooumena, see concepts not-being, 158-69 'not-something' (outi), 92-3, 103-4, 114—16, 126,130-2, 139, 141 noun, proper vs. common, 40-6, 63 One, 104, 106, 146 onoma, 40-1 ontological argument, 170-89 ou mallon, 192, 205, 208-9 outis, paradox of, 130, 139-40 parabole, 173, 177-80, 187-9 parts of discourse, 39, 40 passions, 83 place, 134-7, 142 plenitude, principle of, I3n., i82n. pneuma, 89-90 pragmata, in Pyrrho, 200-11 predicates, see kategoremata private language, see language prolepseis, 102, 184, 227 proof, 124-5, 226-7

proper noun, in Stoicism, 39-56; see also noun propositions, in Stoicism, 47; simple vs. nonsimple, 47, 57-60; various types of simple, 47, 60; affirmative vs. negative, 60-2, 69-70 prosegoria, 40-1, 44 ptosis, 42 Pyrrhonism, ethical vs. epistemological interpretation of, 198-9, 205-11; ethical dogmatism?, 214; 'rustic' vs. 'urbane1, 246-7, 257-8 quality, common vs. particular, 44-9, 55; vs qualified, 148-52; vs. predicates, 154-6 racism, in Epicurus, 38 rationalism, in Stoicism, 37 reasoning, see nature Scepticism, scope of, 245; see also Pyrrhonism semainein, 44-5 sensations, in Scepticism, 191, 196-205 sensualism, in Epicurus, 33, 35, 36 sins, equality of, 88-9 something (ti), 92-3, 103-7, 110-16, 118, 126-32, 135-6, 139-40, 146-8, 152 'Sons of the Earth', in Plato's Sophist, 119; original vs. revised position of, 120-3, I 2 6 sorites, 142-5 soul, 120-3 species, infima (Stoics), 42; fictitious (in Stoicism), 98, 101, 103, n o , 114 sumptoma, common to bodies and incorporeals, 148, 151, 153-5 surfaces, in Stoicism, 97 telos, vs. skopos, 162-3; Sceptic, 204 time, 112-13, J 34~8, 140-5; cosmic parts of, 142-5 tradition, 20 truth, vs. the true, in Stoicism, 133-4, ^ 7 , 249n.; degrees of, 88-9 truth-conditions, for simple propositions, 47, 50 truth-functions, 73 universe (holon), vs. all {pan) in Stoicism, 98-9 verb, 40 virtues, 120-1, 156, 163 voice, 132-3 void, 98-9, 112-13, I 34~4° 5 l42 wholes, vs. parts, 155-6 Wise Men, in Stoicism, 177-8, 187-8 xenophobia, 75

INDEX OF NAMES

Adler, M., 15311. Aenesidemus, 19011., 192, 193, 19611., 204 Aldobrandini, n o Alexander of Aphrodisias, 104, 13411., 13811., 14211., 146 Alexinos, 177 Annas, J., 171 Anselm of Canterbury, 170-1, 174, 177 Antiochus of Ascalon, 225n. Antipater, 105, 108, iO9n., 150-2, 154, 171 Antisthenes, 126 Apelt, O., in., 2n., 3n. Apollodorus, i6on. Aratus, 2i5n. Arcesilaus, 206-7 Archedemus, 127 Aristo of Chios, 206, 208 Aristocles, 190-211 Aristotle, 28n., 39, 42-3, 65, 77, 83n., 87n., 94, 106, i n , I29n., 133, 140, 147-8, 170 Arnim, J. von, 39n., 68, 73, 76, 78n., ii9n., 126, I32n., I38n., i56n. Arrighetti, G., in., 2n., 3n., 4n., 8, I9n., 2in., 25 Ascanius of Abdera, 208 Aubenque, P., 92n. Augustine, 140, 170 Aulus Gellius, 76 Ausland, H.W., I92n., 197-9, 205, 207-8 Bacon, F., 2i6n. Bailey, C , in., 2n., 3n., 4n., 5n., 8, 11, 13-17, 2in., 25 Baldassari, M., 171, 174, I77n., 180, 18m. Barnes, J., 92n., 98, 99n., 144, I55n., 174-6, I9on., 237, 240, 244n., 245n., 246n., 247, Barwick, K., 40n., 86n. Basilides, H5n. Bekker, I., 2i3n. Bergk, Th., 2i3n., 2i6n. Bergson, H., 140 Berti, E., 89n.

Besnier, B., 92n. Bestor, T.W.,4in. Beyssade, J.M., 23m. Bignone, E, 1, 2n., 3n., 8, 11-19, 2in., 25 Bloch, O., 1, 8n., 9, I9n. Boethius, 170 Bollack, J., 1-10, I2n., 14-18, 2on., 2in., 23n., 25, 26, 3on., 31, 36, 38n. Bouveresse, J., I58n. Boyance, P., 1, 7n., 8, 9-10, 14, 18, I9n. Brehier, E., 74n., 93n., 94n., 97n., I3on., Brieger, A., 20n. Brochard, V., 207, 2i3n., 214, 216, 217 Burnyeat, M., 92n., I98n., 2i4n., 245n Bury, R.G., 73n., 108, I72n., i8on., 2i3n., n., 23m., Canto, M., I58n. Carneades, 144-5, I 7 I » Castaneda, H.N., 2in. Cherniss, H., 55n., iO2n. Chiesa, C , I58n. Chilton, C.W., 34n. Christensen, J., U9n. Chrysippus, 40, 47, 52, 57, 65, 73, 74n., 77, 83, 85-7, 9on., 97, iO2n., 104, iO9n., 127, 130, 132, I36n., 137, I4on., 142-5, 156, 167, 171, I76n., 244n. Cicero, 80, 160-1, 207-8 Cleanthes, 40, iO9n., 127, 132 Cleomedes, 96, 143-4 Clinomachus, 160, 168 Cole, T., 22n., 24n., 34n. Colotes, 2O7n. Conche, M., I9on., 197, 216, 222n. Conrad, F., 2i6n., 218-19 Cornford, F.M., I22n., Cortassa, G., 22on. Crates of Thebes, 22 m. Crinis, 108, iO9n., 187 Cronert, W., 4n.

269

270

INDEX OF NAMES

Dahlmann, J.H., 2 in. Decleva Caizzi, F., 190, 19311., 19411., 197, 19811., 199, 20111., 20411. 21211., 21311., 21411., 215, 2i6n., 217, 2i8n., 22m., 22211., 223 De Lacy, Ph., 3311., 36, 3711. Delattre, D., 171 Democritus, 33, 34, 215, 217, 22611., 23411., 23911. Denniston, J.D., 211., i8n., 22811. Denyer, N., 19011., 210 Descartes, 170 De Vogel, C , 8911. Dicaearchus, 154 Diels, H., 21211., 21311., 21611. Dies, A., 12211. Dillon, J., n o n . Di Marco, M., 2i2n. Diodes of Magnesia, 57 Diodorus Cronus, 57, 206 Diodorus Siculus, 34 Diogenes of Babylon, 40, 44-5, iO9n., 132-3, 170-89 Diogenes Laertius, 7 Diogenes of Oenoanda, 34 Diotimus, 226n., 234n., 239n. Dixsaut, M., I58n. Dodds, E.R., 83n. Doring, K., I28n. Donini, P., 92n., 224n. Dorandi, T., 171 Dragona-Monachou, M., 17m., 174, i85n. Dumont, J.P., 2in., 72n., 9m., i64n., 170, 17m., 174, I77n., 180, 222n. Ebert, Th., 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 69, 70, i6on. Edelstein, L., 87 Egli, U., 69, 70, iO9n., n o Empedocles, n n . Epictetus, 79 Epicurus, 1-20, 21-38, I7on., 207, 234, 24m., 242-3 Ernout, A., in., 2n., 3n., I9n., 2in., 25, 26, 27n.,29,3i Esser, M., 17m. Euripides, 84, 248 Eusebius, 190-211 Everson, S., 20in. Fabricius, 2i3n. Ferrari, G.A., 2i4n., 223n. Ferraria, L., I9on. Festugiere, A.J., n 8 n . Findlay, J.N., i86n. Fine, G., I26n., I29n. Follet, S., I9on. Frede, M., 39n., 40n., 43n., 44n., 45n., 46n., 49n., 60, 61, 62, 73, 74n., H9n., I3on.,

I43n., 24m.,

171,

n., 207,

Gabaude, J.M., 33n. Galen, 73, 74n., 75, 83n., 86-7, 9 m., 244n., 246n. Gallop, D., 170 Gassendi, P., I2n. Gaunilo, 177 Geminus, 130 Genette, G., 86n. Giannantoni, G., I9on. Gigon, O., in., 2n., 3n. Giussani, C , 8, 10-11, 14, 18, 19 Giusta, M., 160-1 Glidden, D., 228n. Goldschmidt, V., 83n., 93n., 94n 36n., 140, I42n., Gould, J., 73n., 93n. Goulet, R., 47n., 68, 69, 96n., 97n ., 156 Graeser, A., 43n., 45n., 87n., 93n. Groarke, L., I9on. Hadot, P., 45n., 68, 93n., iO4n., non., H3n., Hamelin, O., in., 2n., 3n., I9n., 2in., 25, 26, 29,30 Hartshorne, C , 170, 17m. Heidegger, M., 140 Heintz, W., 73n., 108, 227n., 233n., 235, 236n., 237, 238, 239 Herillus, 208 Herophilus, 162, 169 Hick, J., 170 Hicks, R.D., in., 2n., 3n., 4n., 5n., 2in., 23n., 25, io8n., I32n. Hintikka, J., I3n. Hippocrates, 215 Hirzel, R., 216, 217 Homer, 212, 215 Hiilser, K., 39n., io8n., 110, I48n. Iamblichus, I37n. Imbert, C , 39n., I5 Indalmoi, 212-23 Inwood, B., i67n. Isnardi Parente, M. in., 2n., 3n., i9n., 2in., 25 Jaeger, W., 89n. Janacek, K., 225n, 228n, Johnson, J.P., 170 Joly, H., I58n. Jones, O.R., 2in. Kahn, Ch., I32n. Kalbfleisch, C , 151, I54n.

, 246-7

271

INDEX OF NAMES Kant, 170, 217 Kennedy, G., 86n. Kerfcrd, G.,81, I59n., 162 KiefTer, J.S., 87 Kneale, M., 69, 73n., 74n., 75 Konstan, D., 25, 92n., I56n. Laks, A., 92n., 244n. Lallot, J., I58n. Lcandri, A., 245n. Leibniz, 33 Lloyd, A.C., 39n., 49n., 53n., 9m. Lloyd-Jones, H., 2i2n., 2i3n., 2i6n., 2i8n. Long, A.A., 46n., 8in., 82, 92n., 93n., 97, 98n., 99, 10m., 102, iO3n., io8n., I27n., I29n., I34n., 141, I4 I5on., I53n., 158-9, 163, i64n., i66n., nM 2i2n., 2i3n., 2i4n., 22m., 222n., n., 228n., 234n., 238n., 24on., 24m. Long, H.S., I32n. Longinus, 127 Lovejoy, A., I3n. Lucian, 244n. Lucretius, 8-14, 18 MacGill, A., 170 MansfeM, J., iO9n., 224n. Marcus Aurelius, 127, 140, 244n. Markovits, F., 33n. Martha, J., 72n. Marx, K., 33 Mates, B., 73n., 74n., 79n. Mau, J., 235n. Meibom, M., 3on. Menage, G., n o , 2i3n. Metrodorus of Chios, 191 Mignucci, M., 52n., 73n., 74m, 92n. Montaigne, 246n. Moreau, J., 1, I9n. Morrison, D., I29n. Miihll, P. von der, in., 3n., 4n., 109 Mtiller,R., 224n. Mulligan, K., I58n. Mutschmann, H., 60, 73n., 107, Natorp, P., 2i6n., 222n. Nauck, 2i3n. Nausiphanes, 22 m. Numenius, 206 Nussbaum, M., 92n., 171 Obbink, D., 171 O'Brien, D., I58n. Odysseus, 212-23 Pappenheim, E., 236n. Parmenides, 191, 217m Parsons, P., 2i2n., 213n., 2i6n., 2i8n.

Pascal, 175 Pasquino, P., 93n., 11311., 11411. Pearson, iO2n. Pease, A.S., i7on. Penelope, 219, 221, 223 Philo of Alexandria, 40, 106, 170 Philo of Megara, 57 Philodemus, 37, 171-2 Pinborg, J., 4on., 45n Plantinga, A., 170 Plato, 79, 83n., 88, 92-5, 106, n o 12, 116, 118-26, 126-9, 132-3, 140, 146 7, 157, 159-60, 170, 206; see also Sophist, Timacus Plotinus, 117, 146-7, 157 Plutarch, 11, I2n., 78, 98, 116, 142, 144 5,

Pohlenz, M., 4on.,

n., i02n.,

Poirier, M., I9on. Ponnier, J., 33n. Porphyry, 66 Posidonius, 83, 85, 87, 97, iO9n., I37n., 172, 234 Potamo of Alexandria, 234 Proclus, 96, 117-19, 141 Protagoras, 191 Ptolemy, 234n. Pyrrho, 190-211,212-23 Rabelais, 220n. Reale, G., 2i4n. Recanati, F., 39n. Reinhardt, K., 2in. Ricoeur, P., 86n. Rieth, O., 93n., iO4n., iO9n., I54n. Rist, J., 8on., 81, 83n., 88-90, iO9n., 11 in., ii5n., I28n., I53n. Robin, L., 8, 93n., 216 Rodis-Lewis, G., 34n. Roeper, G., I28n. Russo, A., 73n., 86n. Salieri, A., 245n. Sambursky, S., 77n. Sandbach, F. H., 93n., I32n. Santese, G., I9on. Schmekel, A., 105-7, 151 Schofield, M., 92n, 140, 170, 17m., I72n., I73n., 174-6, I77n., I78n., 179-80, 18m.,

i82n., 183, i86n., i87n. Searle, J., 42n. Sedley, D., 25, 26, 28, 39n., 43n., 45n., 53n., 54n., 55n., 57, 92n., 93n., 97, 98n., 99, 101, iO2n., I34n., 141, 158-9, i6on., 163, i66n., ., 254m Seneca, 110-15, l 6 1

272

INDEX OF NAMES

Severus, 117-18 Sextus Empiricus, 7411., 75, 85-7, 9111., 146, 155-6 Simplicius, 8911., 148-56 Socrates, 219 Solovine, M., in., 2n., 311., 5, 2in., 25, 29 Sophist, 116, 118-26, 131, 147, 157 Sorabji, R., 92m, I32n. Spinoza, 225n. Stilpo, 128-30 Stopper, M.R., 19m., 192, 193-6, 198, 201, 211, 2i4n., 223m Stough, Ch., 217, 222n., 24m. Strauss, R., 245n. Striker, G. 228n., 233n., 234n., 237, 239, 24on., 241-2 Syrianus, 126 Tarn, W., 83n. Theiler, W., non. Theodosius, 211 Theopompus, 154, I56n. Timaeus, 117-18, I29n. Timon, 190-211, 212-23 Traversari, A., 7 Trotignon, P., 2in. Tsekourakis, D., 159, 162

Usener, H., in.,

n., I2n., 2in.

Valery, P., I39n. Vander Waerdt, P., 171-2; 2O7n. Verbeke, G., 90n. Vlastos, G., 34 Vitruvius, 34 Voelke, A., I58n. Wachsmuth, C , 82, 2i2n., 2i3n., 216, 217, 22m. Watson, G. H9n. Wilamowitz, U. von, 2i3n. Wilpert, P., 89n. Wismann, H., in., 8n., I9n. Wittgenstein, L., 2in. Wurm, K., Xenophanes, 190, 239 Xenophon, 219 Zaslawsky, F., 9on. Zeller, E., 94n., 105-6, 108, ii3n., I42n., 162, 195-6 Zeno of Citium, 40, 82, 83n., iO9n., 127-30, 133, 145, i62n., 172-80, 187, 189, 22m. Zeno of Tarsus, 171 Ziegler, K., 96n.

INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

ACHILLES TATIUS

Isagoge (14) 15011. AELIAN

Varia historia (11 41) 21311. AETIUS Placita (1 20.5) 12711.; (iv 11) i o i n . , 10211.; (iv 12.1) 10411., 12711. ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

In Aristotelis Analytica priora (177.19-178.8) 65; (177.25-180.33) 52-3; (402.iff.) 51; (402.16-18) 65; (403.1 iff.) 53 In Aristotelis Topica (42.27) io8n., 15011.; (301.19) 9211., 1 i8n., 14611.; (359.12) 9211., 9811., 104; (359.14-16) 14711.; (360.9) 13311., 15011. AMMONIUS

In Aristotelis De interpretatione (Busse) (2.26) 4111.; (42.30*!*.) 4211.; (44.1 iff.) 4311.; (44«i9ff.) 66 APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS

De conjunctione (Schneider) (214.4-20) 8711. Depronominibus (Maas) (5-2off.) 4111.; (6.3off.) 4111., 64; (10.8-17) 4811. ARISTOTLE

De anima (11 42ob29) 133 Categoriae (iai6) 7811.; (ib25) 7811.; (13I310) 7811. Ethica Nicomachea (x 1173b2) 86n. De generatione et corruptione (1 328a27) 7711. Historia animalium (vm 596b23~97a30) 1711. De interpretatione (Chap) 1 2811.; (i6a32-b5) 4311. Metaphysica(m989b23~7) 14711.; (v 1 0 ^ 2 7 - 3 0 ) 65; (ix iO48b23-35) 86n.; (x iO58a6-8) 14711. De motu animalium (698b 11) 24411. Physica (1 i85b28-3i) 65; (vi 6) 86n. Politica (11127obi2) 24411.; (vm I339b29) 24411. Topica (iv I22bi5) 14711.; (iv I27a3) 13311. ATHENAEUS ( x 438) 21311. AULUS GELLIUS

Noctes Atticae (xvi 8) 64, 7311., 7611. CHOEROBOSCUS

Prolegomena (Hilgard) (106.3-12) 4411. CHRYSIPPUS

SVF (11.41.27-33)3911. CICERO

Academica posteriora (140ff.) 8211. Academica priora (11 119) 14511.; (11 144) 8211. Defato (8.15-16) 9in. Definibus (114) 226n.; (m 23) 8in.; (m 74) 39n., 72n.; (iv 53) 39n., 72n.; (iv 56) 8on., 8in.; (iv 72) 255n.; (v 22) 225n. De natura deorum (139) I45n.; (143) 226n.; (1 50) I2n.; (1118) I7on.; (1146) I7on.; (1182) i6n.; (11 147) 72n. Tusculanae disputationes (iv 21) 160, 169

273

274

INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

Stromateis (i 15) 3811.; (114.15) 92, 119; (vn 7) 161, 169; (vm 9) 14811. CLEOMEDES De motu circulari (Ziegler) (8.11-14) 13811.; (14.1-2) 96; (16.2-5) 96; (202.11-23) 14211., 14311. CRATES OF THEBES (Diels) ( F r . i ) 22111.; (Fr.3) 22111. DAVID In PorphyriiIsagogen ( i n . 3 - 1 7 ) 11911. DEMOCRITUS ( D K 68A37) 13911.; ( D K 68A49) 13911.; ( D K 68B156) 13911. DIODORUS SICULUS

(1 8.3) 34

DIOGENES LAERTIUS (1119) 160; (11112) 160; (11114)12811. (11119) 128; (11120)128n.;(iv62) I44n.;(vii2) I28n.;(vii24) 12811.; (vn 40) 7211.; (vn 42) 10911.; (vn 43) 4011.; (vn 44) 4011.; (vn 52-3) 100; (vn 54) 10211., 10911., 234; (VII 57) 4011.; (VII 57-8) 4011.; (vn 58) 4 4 , 6 4 ; (vn 60) 15011.; (vn 61) 42,4411., 105, 108,128,14111.; (vn 62)4011.; (vn 63) 4611., 64; (VII 64) 66, i6on.;(vn65)64,13611., 24411.; (vn 67) 4111.; (VII 68-70) 47; (vn 68-76) 5 7 , 6 7 - 7 1 ; (VII 71) 187; (VII 72) 7211.; (VII 74) 187; (VII 82) 13011.; (VII 100) 8in.; (VII 107) 17611.; (VII 120) 8on.; (vn 132) 96; (VII 135) 97; (vn 140) 13811.; (VII 151-2) 143; (vn 162) 209; (VII 190) 7511.; (VII 198) 13011.; (ix 61) 205, 208, 209; (ix 65) 21311.; (ix 70) 211; (ix 92-3) 198; (1x95) 234; (ix 105) 19711., 206,21311.; (ix 107) 204; (ix 109) 21311., 221; (ix 110-11)212; (ix i n ) 193,203; (ix 111-12)21211.; (ix 113)21511., 21811.; (ix 114) 206; (ix 115) 206; (x 31) 35; (x 31-4) 23411.; (x 33) 22611.; (x 117) 3811. DIOGENES OF OENOANDA

Fr. 10 Chilton 34 DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS

De compositione verborum (2) 4011. De Demosthenis dictione (48) 4011. DIONYSIUS OF THRACE

Ars grammatica (12) 4011., 4411. ELIAS

In Aristotelis Categories (178.1-12) 13in. In Porphyrii Isagogen (47.26-33) 11911. EMPEDOCLES

(17, 27ff.DK) 1 in. EPICTETUS

Discourses (119.8-10) 79; (11 19.iff.) 52n.; (iv 8.12) 39n. EPICURUS

Epistula ad Herodotum (37-8) 226n.; (38) 24m., 242; (39) 1-20; (44) 8n.; (51) 24m.; (53) 8n.; (54) 8n.; (75-6) 21-38 Epistula adPythoclem (86) I5n. Kuriai doxai (24) 242 On Nature (Bk.xxvm) 26 EUSEBIUS

Praeparatioevangelica(xiv6.5)206;(xiv 18.1-5) i9O-2ii;(xiv 18.5-26)2O5n.;(xiv 18.7) I96n.; (xiv 18.10) I96n.; (xiv 18.11) 193; (xiv 18.14) 193; (xiv 18.16) 193,2O5n.; (xiv 18.29) 19011., 193 GALEN

De differentiispulsuum (11 10) 75n.; (in 1) 75n.; (vm 71 iK) 246n. De dignoscendibus pulsibus (1 2) 206 Introductio dialectica (4.10-11) 73, 75n., 86-7, I46n. Deplacitis Hippocratis et Platonis (11 2) 47n.; (iv 6) 83n.; (v 3) 8in. Praenotiones (xiv 628K) 246n. PSEUDO-GALEN

Definitiones medicae (126) iO2n. Historia philosopha (Diels) (603-4) 234» 237n.; (606) 234, 237n.

INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

275

HERODOTUS (1 58) 22211.; (in 53) 22211.; (m 69) 22211.; (m 130) 22211. PSEUDO-HIPPOCRATES

Epistulae (18.1) 215 HOMER

Iliad (in 223) 22in. Odyssey (ix 191) 100; (xix 163) 11911.; (xix 224) 215-16, 219-23 LUCRETIUS De rerum natura (11111) 3311.; (11294-6) i8n.; (11297-302) 1211.; (11303-7) 9,10-11,18; (11342ff.) 3311.; (m 816-8) 9, 18; (iv 365-86) 36; (v 181-6) 3211.; (v 361-3) 9, 18; (v 828-9) 1211.; (v 1030-2) 35; (v 1046-9) 3211.; (v 1050-5) 3 in.; (v 1057-8) 27n.; (v 1087-90) 34; (v 1252-68) 3m.; (v 1341-6) i2n.; (v 1456) 24n. MARCUS AURELIUS (in 1) 8on.; (vi 26) 8on. ORIGEN In Psalmos (iO53a-b) 162, 169 PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA De aeternitate mundi (48) 54m De agricultura (139-41) 1 o6n. De congressu (146-50) 4On. Legum allegoriae (m 175) io6n. PHILODEMUS

Depietate (11) I45n. PHILOPONUS

De aeternitate mundi (278.28) 20m.; (439.14) 20m. PLATO

Charmides (169A) 20 m. Cratylus (338B) 27n. Euthydemus (274A) 79n. Gorgias (447c) 79n. Laches (\%6c) 79x1. Meno (8OE) 226n. Phaedrus (237B) 226n. Protagoras (319A) 79n. Sophist (237D) 118, I46n.; (245E-249D) 118; (246A-B) 92, 119-21; (246c) 120-1; (246D) 120; (247A) 120, I 2 3 ; ( 2 4 7 B ) 120; (247c) 119n., I2on., i2i;(247D) 121, i47n.;(247E) I22n., I47n.; (248A) 121-2; (248c) 121-2; (248D-E) I22n.; (249B-C) 122; (254A-B) I47n.; (259E) 78n. Symposium (204E) 159; (206A) 159, 168 Theaetetus (147c) I33n.; (202B) 78n. Timaeus (27D) 117; (59E) I33n.; (67B) 133 PLOTINUS (v 1.7) 20m.; (vi 1.25) I46n., I47n.; (vi 2.1) 117; (vi 3.7) 225n.; (vi 7.16) 20m. PLUTARCH Adversus Colotem (1112E) I5n.; (1114A) 1 in.; (1 I6B-C) 92n., 116 De animae procreatione (IOI8B) 20m. De communibus notitiis (1059B) iO2n.; (1073D) 98n.; (1077c) 55n.; (1078E) 78n.; (IO8OE) 97; (1083B-C) 54n.; (1083C-E) 55n.; (1084c) I42n.; (1084F) iO2n.; (1085A) iO2n. De Stoicorum repugnantiis (1055F-7B) 167, 169 De virtute morali (450c) 83n. PSEUDO-PLUTARCH

Stromateis (8) I2n. PROCLUS

In Euclidem (89.15-18) 96; (395.21-31) 130-1 In Platonis Cratylum (16) 38n. In Platonis Timaeum (1 224.i7ff.) n8n.; (1 227.13-17) n8n.; (m 95.7-12) 96, H9n., 14m.

276

INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

SCHOLIA IN ARISTOTELIS CATEGORIAS (Brandis) (34B8-11) io6n. SCHOLIA IN DIONYSIUM THRACEM (Hilgard) (215.1) 4511.; (230.24) 4211.; (356.i6ff.) 4111.; (357-i8) 4511.; (482.5) 13311. SCHOLIA IN PHILOPONI COMMENTARIA IN ARISTOTELIS CATEGORIAS (72) I3II1. . SENECA Epistulae adLucilium (58) 105, 110-15; (58.8-16) 110-11; (58.12) 10711.(58.13-15) 111; (58.14) n o ; (58.15)98, n o , 112-13; (58.22) 112-13; (65) n o n . ; (71.16) 8on.; (95.5) 8on.; (95.12) 8 o n . ; ( i 17.12) 161, 169 De ira (1 8) 84.

Quaestiones naturales (1 13) 17011. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS Adversus mathematicos (Af) (1 17) 9211.; (1 53) 193, 212; (1 57) 22611.; (1 65) 249; (1 90) 249; (1 170-220) 86n.; (1227-47)86n.; 0 2 8 2 ) 203; (1287) 248; (1305-6) 21411.; (m 2) 206; (11140) 100; (in 42) 100; (vn 1) 22511.; (vn 1-2) 22911.; (vn 16) 7211.; (VH 24-5) 229; (vn 25) 2 2 9 , 2 3 2 , 2 3 3 , 273-8, 240, 24211.; (VII 26) 230; (vn 27-8) 232; (vn 27-446) 231; (VH 28) 2 3 i n . ; (vn 29-37) 229,23211., 233; (VII 30) 206; (VII 31) 23711.; (VII 33) 237-8,24011., 241,242; (vn 34-7) 237-8; (vn 35) 236; (vn 38) 8 i n . ; (vn 43-4) 167m, 169; (VII 46) 232; (VII 46-7) 229n.; (vn 46-262) 232,232n.; (VII 47) 232,239; (VII 50) 239; (vn 51) 239; (vn 52) 239; (vn 89-140) 239; (vn 140) 226n., 234n., 239n.; (VII 154) 165; (VII 171) 225n.; (VII 191-4) 254n.; (VII 261) 232, 233, 234; (VII 261-2) 232; (vn 263) 248; (VII 263-342) 235n.; (VII 263-446) 232n.; (VII 283) 248,249; (VII 343-69) 235n.; (vn 364-8) 240; (vn 367) 248; (VII 370-446) 235n.; (VII 416-21) 242n.; (vn 443) 229n.; (vm 1-140) 231; ( v m 3) 249; ( v m 11-12) 4 5 - 6 , 2 0 m . ; ( v m 21) 239; (vm 26) 239; (vm 32) 107-8; (vm 40) 232; (vm 56ff.) 100; (vm 59-60) 100-1; (vm 70) i35n.; (vm 79) 58; (vm 90) 62; (vm 93-129) 5 7 - 7 1 ; (vm 94) 58; (vm 95) 59; (vm 96-8) 4 7 , 6 0 ; (vm 98) 62; (vm 99) 50, 62; (vm 108) 75n., I46n.; (vm 125-6) I46n.; (vm 125-9) 73~7; ( v m I 2 6 ) 76n., 86n.; (vm 127) 86n.; (vm 129) 85n., 86n.; (vm 140) 231,238n.; (vm 141) 230; (vm 141-299) 231; (vm 142) 232,238n.; ( v m I45ff.) 243; (vm 258) 115n.; (vm 262) 115n.; (vm 300-36) 226; (vm 300-481) 231; (vm 336-7) 226; (vm 337) i7on; (vm 332A-3A) 226; (vm 334A) 228n.; (vm 334A-6A) 227; (vm 379) 239; (vm 406-10) 124-5; (vm 409) 158-9,168; (vm 438) 248; (ix 49) 249; (ix 123) I76n.; (ix 124) I79n.; (ix 133-6) 1 7 m . , 172-89; (ix 182-4) I44n.; (ix 333) I5n.; (ix 336) 98; (ix 343) 155; (ix 393-5) 100-1; (ix 439) 247; (x 33) 249; (x 45-9) 249n.; (x 49) 247, 249; (x 168) 247; (x 218) 92n., 1 0 7 , 1 4 m . ; (x 234) 92n., 107,146n.; (x 252) 239; (xi 8) 63; (xi 18—19) 254; (xi 20) 2 i 3 n . , 222n.; (xi 21) 226n.; (xi 165) 247, 249; (xi 215) 248; (xi 224) 107; (xi 239) 239 Pyrrhoniae hypotyposeis (PH) (11-4) 244n.; (13) 224; (14) 255; (15) 258; (15-6) 229n.; (18) 204; (1 13) 246, 253; (115) 255; (116) 241; (1 19) 256; (119-20) 2 4 m . , 254n.; (1 20) 244-7, 252-8; (1 23-4) 236; (1 59) 253; (1 78) 253; (1 87) 253; (1 93) 247n.; (1 135) 2 4 m . , 254; (1 187) 255; (1 188-9) 246; (1191) 2 4 m . , 254; (1192) 2 4 m . , 254; (1194-5) 254; (1195) 2 4 m . ; (1197) 241,255; (1 198) 2 4 m . , 254; (1 199) 2 4 m . ; (1 200) 255; (1 201) 255; (1 202) 2 4 m . ; (1 203) 255; (1 207) 2 4 m . , 254; (1210) 241; (1210-41) 225; (1215) 250; (1226) 224,257n.; (1227) 244,251,252n.; (1235) 248; (111) 229n.; (114) 24on.; (1110) 228; (1112-13) 229n.; (1113-14) 231; (1114-16) 233; (1114-17) 229; (1114-79) 23 m . ; (1115) 237n., 238; (1116) 236; (1122) 247, 248, 249; (1122-47) 235n.; (11 23) 248, 249; (11 26) 249; (11 29) 248; (1148-69) 235n.; (11 70-9) 235n.; (11 80) 247, 249n.; (1180-96) 23 m . ; (1186) 107; (1195) 249; (1195-6) 231,238n., 24On., 247; (1196) 232; (11 97-133) 2 3 m . , 243; (11104)64,249; (11118)249; (11134-203) 23 m . ; (11139)73n.;(n 156)248; (11166) 248; (11203) 248; (11211) 248; (11215) 248; (11223) 107; (11234) 73n.; (m 13) 247,249; (in 29) 247,249; (in 38) 249; (m 46) 249,25 m . ; (in 47-8) 251; (in 48) 244,246; (m 49) 251; (in 56) 249; (m 62) 249; (HI 65) 247, 249; (m 72) 244, 251; (in 82) 239; (in 99) 155; (HI 135) 239, 247,249; (m 136) 249; (in 186) 249; (m 193) 248; (m 241) 249; (m 253) 249n.; (m 266) 239; (in 272) 239; (in 277) 248 SIMPLICIUS In Aristotelis Categorias (64.18) 87n.; (105.7-20) 97n., 130-1; (135.25-8) I37n.; (208.28) I26n.; (209.1) I47n., 155; (209.10-29) 150-1, 154; (2i2.i2ff.) 148; (216.19-24) 154-5; (214.24-215.2) 152-3; (217.32) 14711.; (222.30-223.2) 153; ( 3 3 3 - 3 0 In Aristotelis De caelo (284.28) I38n.; (285.28) I38n., I42n.; (563.7) 2 0 m . In Aristotelis Physica (426.1) 133

INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

277

STOBAEUS (Wachsmuth) Eclogaei} 105.17) I37n.;(i 106.5) 13711., I42n.;(i 161.8) 13711., I42n.;(i 136.21)4411., ioin., 127; (1 138.14) 12311.; (1 142.2-6) 97, 13611.; (1 219.24) 14311.; (11 7) 8on.; (11 74.16) 8in., 82; (11 76.16-21) 163,169; (1177.23-7) 162,169; (1178.7-12) 163,164,168; (1188.1-6) 158,161,163, 165-6, 168; (11 89.4) 8311.; (11 93.14) 8on.; (1197.15-98.6) 161, 163, 164, 168. STOICORUM VETERUM FRAGMENTA (Von Amim) (165) 11311.; (174) 133; (189) 12311., 13511., i63n.;(i93) 145; (194) 139; (195) 138,139; (196) 139; (1 137) 12311.; (1142) 12311.; (1488) 16311.; (1518) 12311.; (11183-4) 16311.; (11341) 13511., 16311.; (11 343) 133; (11345) 133; (11349) 16311.; (11359)92,119; (11385) 159; (11390) 14911.; (11467) 12311.; (11482A) i35;(n5O3) I38;(H5O9) 13611., I45;(ii5io) 141,145;(11522-4)98^9;(11537) 138;(11 541) 138; (11 543) 13811., 139; (11 546) 139; (11 550) 138; (11 557) 138; (11 609) 138; (11 773-4) 12311.; (11790-2) 12311.; (11797) 12311.; (11807) 12311.; (11848) 12311., 159; (m 84-5) 12311.; (m

305)i23n.;(mDiog. 17)133 SYRIANUS

In Aristotelis Metaphysica (105.19-30) 126-7 TIMON (Diels) Indalmoi{¥x.6"i) 203,208,213,214,215,21611., 220; (Fr.68) 203,208,214,215,217,222; (Fr.69) 206, 214, 2i6n., 218; (Fr.70) 21611. Silloi (Fr.8) 22111.; (Fr.9) 22m.; (Fr.31-4) 206; (Fr.38) 22111.; (Fr.46) 22011.; (Fr.48); 203 XENOPHANES (DK2iB34)239