Personal Value
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Personal Value
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
1
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Personal Value
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Personal Value
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
1
3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York # Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen 2011 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn ISBN 978–0–19–960378–7 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To Elly, Anna, and Sofia
Preface Values accrue to objects. They are not free-floating entities that exist independently of other things: necessarily, they are ‘carried’ by objects in a wide sense of this term. Clearly, not all objects carry the same kind of value; and some (perhaps most) have more than one kind of value. Some objects have only minor value, while others seem worth fighting hard for. Moral values such as justice or equality belong to this latter category. Some valuable objects—whether material in nature, such as the concert ticket we have kept all these years because something extraordinary happened that evening, or something less tangible, like having a certain memory whenever you hear a particular song on the radio—are distinctly connected with one person. They carry special value for that person. Valuable objects like these are often historical in character, tying us to some particular event in our past, but they need not do so. What is valuable might rather be a future state of affairs. It may be something you strive hard to realize (say, fame or clearing your name in a scandal); or again, it may be neither a material thing nor an abstract entity (such as a state of affairs) but rather involve some person— your children, parents, spouse, or friends. Some of these persons and objects are obviously very important to you; others carry only minor value for you. The discovery that your dog has eaten the concert ticket will probably have no real, or at least no enduring, impact on your life. Of course, people tend to react differently, and it is probably true of many objects that most of us consider to have trifling value that their loss or damage would make a major difference in a person’s life. Here we differ, and there is obviously room for disagreement about how much we should value such objects. In fact, we might even think that something can be of great value to a person even if it plays no actual role at all in that person’s life. I am inclined to believe that it is at least an open question what to think about a case like the following: unknown to you, you have a living child (either because you never realized you were a parent, or because a child you thought had died is in fact alive). I imagine that, in many people’s eyes, an unknown child would nevertheless be of value to its oblivious parent. There are certain patterns of behaviour, and certain attitudes, that we would expect the parent to display as a matter of what is ‘fitting’, or of what one has reason to do, when one learns of the existence of a child of one’s own. So the impact of an object, or person, in one’s life is not necessarily (or so we may suspect) a measure of the value the object actually has for someone. The role of values is different: they function, generally speaking, as reason-grounded incentives or disincentives to action and the formation of attitudes. Objects like those mentioned set more or less negotiable boundaries dictating what we must, should, may, or have reason to, do or not do with them. In some cases we ought perhaps to help another person to achieve fame, or see to it that
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someone’s name is cleared, or simply respect a person’s wish to live life as she thinks fit. It may be that we should have overcome our fear, stuck fingers into the dog’s mouth, and saved the ticket. Of course, we should not do so for the sake of the ticket but rather for the sake of the person (and perhaps for the sake of the dog, too) whose value we think is at stake here. It may be that the thing to do for the sake of your friend is to buy her record, or to stop people talking behind her back. Personal values, as I will refer to these sorts of value, are what this book is about. Any attempt to analyse personal value will at some point have to face the following two questions: In what sense is personal value a kind of value? And (if it is a value) in what sense is this value personal? I will suggest that personal value is in fact a kind of value. One way to elaborate this suggestion is to say that in ascribing personal value to something we are, as I will claim, actually evaluating. That is, we are employing a particular notion of value, and one that we standardly express with the help of the following bona fide locutions: value-for, good-for. Now, I might be mistaken about this in more ways than I care to think. For instance, I may be making an evaluative blunder in saying that the examples I will invoke are in fact examples of value-for. Since I will not be getting involved in substantive value theory, I will have to choose my examples carefully so that they do at least appear to be plausible bearers of personal value—that is, bearers of something that most of us would be ready to say is good for or valuable for themselves or someone else. Here I will have to trust my intuitions. (Needless to say, this will also be the case when it comes to impersonal values.) Equally, I might make another kind of mistake. I want to work with the assumption that there is a kind of evaluation that is conducted in terms of notions such as good-for, but it might be objected that there is no such notion as good-for, and that therefore genuine evaluation cannot make use of that notion. Whenever we speak about what is good for person a we are merely reporting on what is good according to a, or from a’s perspective. We are not committing ourselves evaluatively, in the sense of agreeing or disagreeing with what we take to be the view of a. Sometimes, certainly, good-for judgements are indeed like this; and when they are they should perhaps be enclosed in scare quotes. But I am convinced that there are other times when we are genuinely evaluating, genuinely attributing value-for. And the two kinds of case must not be confused. The occasions on which we genuinely evaluate what is good-for someone are not rare. The best way to show this, as far as I know, is to present a plausible analysis of the more questionable notion. A caveat is now required regarding the verb ‘to value’ and my use of it. What precisely we are doing when we value something will in this book be left open. This is, of course, in some ways regrettable, but it would be even less satisfactory to set out from something that is not yet settled.1 1 This work is a contribution to mainly formal value theory. Traditionally such theory admits of two relatively independent approaches. On the one hand, we have a number of semantic theories about the
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What I will be proposing in this work, then, is that we should employ a certain pattern of value analysis, one which has recently attracted much attention and which has roots in the writings of the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano. If we fine-tune this kind of value analysis it will come to cover personal values, too. I believe these goals can be achieved. A fortiori such an achievement supports the idea that we are dealing with a genuine value (because, in important ways, the finely tuned analysis structurally resembles the way in which values have been analysed according to a plausible pattern). Moreover, I think this approach has many advantages. Since my proposal is novel, my concern is less with evaluating rival proposals and more with articulating and defending my own positive view. In trying to understand value-for it will be helpful, as I mentioned, to have a better grasp of value, period. But anyone who has followed value theory in recent years will know only too well that there are a number of more or less interrelated value concepts. Therefore, it will be necessary at the outset to outline the more important and fundamental ones. So before elaborating my views on the particular pattern of value analysis I endorse, I will introduce, and distinguish between, various kinds of value. The presentation of a value taxonomy often leads to discussion of the nature of things that bear value. That there must be an object of some sort that value accrues to is something over which value theorists, with very few exceptions, agree. Most philosophers would also say that many different things can be ascribed value. Thus, in everyday talk we speak of physical objects such as paintings bearing value (e.g. beauty), but we also refer to events, facts (e.g. that it is more valuable that two persons feel well than that one person feels well), places, times, and so on, as having value. The consensus that exists today on this matter—i.e. the wide agreement that there is a relation between value and something that bears this value—does not, however, dissipate when we ask questions about the nature of these value bearers. While some philosophers argue that just about everything can be a bearer of value, others have taken a much more restrictive view, and, in effect, allowed only one kind of thing to bear value. Investigation of the metaphysical nature of value bearers may at first glance seem rather inconsequential. However, I do think there is reason to more carefully look at this issue, and not only to satisfy a philosopher’s curiosity. In fact, one of the things I will argue in Chapter 10 is that, by excluding certain types of value bearer, we limit the substantive views available. Equally, by endorsing certain types of substantive theory of meaning of our value terms (e.g. versions of cognitivism, non-cognitivism, expressivism). But not every formal value theory makes it a priority to improve our understanding of the ‘semantic meaning’ of value terms. What I will be doing in this work falls, for instance, beyond the scope of these semantic theories. Rather, the general aim of work of the kind undertaken here is to reach an understanding of value (in particular, final personal value). A good way of doing this is to exhibit structural connections that exist in the field of value, and in particular those holding between our central evaluative concepts. In other words, the focus is the logic of value: the relevant conceptual distinctions, the relations between different types of value, and the relations between value concepts and deontic (normative) notions such as ‘ought’, ‘reasons’, and ‘fittingness’.
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value, we will quite naturally be led to certain positions regarding the nature of value bearers. I suspect both of these claims will be looked at with some scepticism. This work easily divides into three parts. First, there is the scene setting of Chapter 1. This is followed by a much longer part, Chapter 2 to Chapter 8, which contains the analysis, together with discussions more directly concerned with my proposal. The third part, consisting of Chapter 9 and Chapter 10, discusses some rather different ideas which have had a significant influence on my analysis. The notion of personal value plays only a minor, indirect role in these last two chapters. Since I believe this book to be somewhat dense, I shall now brief the reader on the main structure. In Chapter 1, I introduce some contrasting notions of value. G. E. Moore’s influential views on intrinsic value, as well as his much employed, so-called isolation test, are discussed in some detail. This test, as I shall explain, might have done more bad than good to value theory in general. At least, it may well have blinded value theorists to a value notion that is central to both the chapter and the book—namely, the notion of final value, or what is valuable for its own sake. This kind of value plays an important role throughout the book. Chapter 1 also discusses the common claim that values are supervenient features: the notion that, whatever values are, they are dependent on something else, some subjacent set of properties (which set is generally taken to contain natural properties). In particular, I disentangle two intuitions involved in the idea that value is a supervenient feature which, regrettably, are often lumped together. These are what I call the ‘consistency intuition’ and the ‘dependence intuition’. Although closely related, these intuitions seem to be different in nature. My discussion leads me, among other things, to identify what is missing in Jaegwon Kim’s formulation of supervenience. In this work, supervenience plays a special role, in that it is one of the key elements I employ in order to get clear about the often misconstrued distinction between subjectivism and objectivism about values. Since I take it to be an advantage of my analysis of personal value that it is essentially neutral on this vexed issue, I want to make clear at the outset just how I conceive of the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism. So much has been written on this topic that it would require a very substantial work or two to do it justice. I have decided, therefore, to set out, in as much detail as is possible in the present discussion, just how I conceive of the debate, and to leave the writing of the substantial books to someone else. This is not a very nice thing to do to my forerunners, and I can only hope that they will bear with me. The two core ideas at play in this discussion are those of supervenience and value constitution. The notion of value constitution is a particularly tricky one, and I am painfully aware that much work remains to be done here. The ‘Invariance Thesis’, the claim that what is valuable for its own sake is invariant over possible worlds, is often thought to serve as a line of demarcation between subjectivists and objectivists. However, I argue that the Invariance Thesis, which often divides value theorist into two camps, is only reasonable given certain assumptions about the nature of the bearer of value. Once we take into consideration the fact that the supervenience base might contain non-essential properties it becomes clear that the thesis should be rejected.
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Chapter 2 opens with a discussion of the fitting-attitude analysis, or buck-passing account (as it is also called), that I will be employing.2 Besides commenting on two of its more important architects, Franz Brentano and A. C. Ewing, I outline the central features of the analysis and consider some possible objections to it. One objection stands out as being particularly troublesome to this pattern of value analysis. If we want to distinguish the right kind of reason from the wrong kind (where only the former justify value ascriptions), which it seems we must do, we ought to be able to say what makes a reason right or wrong. Unfortunately this has proven to be a rather stubborn problem. Chapter 3 is devoted to it. My suspicion is that fitting-attitude analysts face a further, related problem—one that concerns whether we should regard value as a reason-providing property on its own. At the end of Chapter 3 I explain why I think this might, in effect, be the case. In the next chapter I formulate my analysis of valuefor. I also consider some influential views on personal value. The first, and most important, is G. E. Moore’s famous attack on the very notion of a personal good. Another approach that I examine is a competitor to my own position. In this alternative, value-for is understood in terms of the de facto attitudes of its beneficiary (i.e. the person whose value it is). In discussing these views I take the opportunity to clarify my own analysis on several important points. The normative has primacy, according to my analysis, over the evaluative: value is explained in terms of what we have reasons to favour. The reason element in the analysis carries much of the weight in this view (but not all of it, as we shall see). My suggestion is that the analysis of personal values requires a special kind of attitude type—what I refer to as a for a person’s sake-attitude. Such attitudes are both very common and important; they have received less attention than they merit. In Chapter 5 I describe what I believe is a defining feature of these peculiar attitudes. To do this, I introduce a distinction between two roles that properties may play in the intentional content of such attitudes. The general aim of Chapter 6 is to deepen the analysis, and I seek to do this primarily by discussing a range of issues which, I believe, my analysis accentuates. The first concerns the possibility that more than one sense, or notion, is associated with the expression ‘good for’. One notion in particular interests me here, namely that whatever is welfare-constitutive is good for the agent. A second issue concerns the extent to which the analysis permits us to identify intrinsic personal values. I also ask to what extent personal values can be treated as ‘private’ values once they are understood in terms of agent-relative reasons for action. Finally, I consider a more complex matter. This is the question whether universalizability seriously undermines an analysis like mine. This alleged problem has nothing to do with the fact that the notion of reason employed in the analysis is likely to be agent-relative. It is generally recognized that 2
There might be something in the idea that these two analyses differ in some respects. For instance, it might be that, as a matter of fact, they have been applied to different things. However, in this work I will not seek to separate the two notions.
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agent-relative reasons are as universalizable as supposedly neutral ones. The obstacle seems to arise elsewhere, and in fact it turns out to be connected with the peculiar nature of the for a person’s sake-attitudes. Since at least some of these take non-fungible (i.e. non-replaceable) persons as their intentional objects, they are not obviously universalizable. There is no cause for alarm, though. The chapter concludes by highlighting some plausible responses to this challenge. Chapter 7 is devoted to discussion of the views of Thomas Hurka, Michael J. Zimmerman, Donald Regan, and Connie Rosati. Hurka and Regan have launched separate attacks on what they take to be a number of confused ideas about good-for. I try to respond to these. I also comment on Rosati’s and Zimmerman’s recent analyses of good-for. In particular, I explain why I wish to distance my views from Rosati’s suggestion as to how we should understand personal value. Moreover, I explain why I find Zimmerman’s account of good for in terms of benefit not promising. In Chapter 8, I consider remaining objections to my analysis. I also look at Stephen Darwall’s theory of welfare, and at an objection to fitting-attitude analyses of good-for recently raised by Chris Heathwood. It will probably prove useful in what follows to keep in mind that, throughout the present book, I understand reasons as what are sometimes called ‘good’, ‘justifying’, or ‘normative’ reasons for action or the adoption of an attitude. The contrast here is with explanatory reasons for action and attitudes (and also with motivating reasons for action). The precise nature of these normative reasons will be left open in this work. However, I will take them to be facts favouring action or the adoption of an attitude. In other words, I am inclined to share the views of the large number of philosophers these days who think the notion of a normative reason defies non-circular analysis, and who therefore treat it as a primitive. Of course, this does not mean that we cannot try to improve clarity when it comes to normative reasons; and in fact on one particular issue I hope to do just this. Thus in Chapter 9 I argue—against what I myself held for a long time—that, given plausible assumptions, all normative reasons are agent-relative. If I am right about this, a number of things follow about the dichotomy between personal and impersonal value. For one thing, obviously this distinction cannot now be accounted for in terms of the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. We will have to look elsewhere if we want to understand these two kinds of value. Hence my suggestion that the analysis of personal values requires the special kind of for a person’s sake-attitude. Prior to Chapter 10 I assume that very different kinds of thing can be valuable. I think this assumption is reasonable, but some value theorists have expressed reservations about such pluralism. In Chapter 10 I therefore present an argument that has implications for the question whether we should be monists or pluralists when it comes to the bearers of final non-derivative value. The idea is quite simple. The argument sets out from the notion that a formal analysis of value should be accessible to as many plausible, substantive value theories as possible. A pair of commonly held, substantive views about value—preferentialism and hedonism—will be considered. Much speaks in their favour: pleasure seems quite obviously to be something of value and many
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people would agree that the satisfaction of preferences is valuable. I argue that, given certain plausible assumptions about the nature of pleasure and preference, the value accruing to pleasure (from a hedonist point of view) cannot be accounted for by preferentialists. This will probably strike many observers as a rather incredible idea. However, my reasoning is quite straightforward: the two positions are most plausibly regarded as ascribing non-derived final value to different kinds of value bearer (even if they ascribe derived final value to the same sort of bearer). Since these positions do not ascribe non-derivative value to the same kind of value bearer, we have reason to endorse a formal view of value that is consistent with value-bearer dualism. The focus of this book, to repeat, is not value in general but personal values. I should stress that by ‘values’ here I do not have in mind that which is valued (a new car perhaps, friendship, or medical care). I have in mind rather that which is ascribed to such things, namely value and value-for. Personal values accrue to objects in virtue of the fact that those objects have value-for, or are valuable to, someone—not in virtue of the fact that those objects have value simpliciter, or are valuable, period. The objects are considered not just valuable but valuable for someone. This suggests that the expression ‘to value’ is subject to an ambiguity. As well as thinking that objects are good or bad, we may also think they are good-for or bad-for someone. Sometimes we value in terms of the impersonal ‘to value’ (examples include judging that something is good and judging that something is bad). Sometimes—at least, this is the contention I shall try to render credible in this work—we value in terms of what is ‘good-for’ or ‘bad-for’ somebody.3 In the latter cases we are valuing something with someone in mind; in the former we are valuing something with an eye to nothing but the object of value.
3 Valuing something need not involve so-called thin value concepts such as ‘good (for)’ or ‘bad (for)’; often it will involve only thick value concepts such as ‘admirable (for)’, ‘loveable (for)’.
Acknowledgements A number of people made the work on this book a much more pleasant, albeit not necessarily easier, endeavour than I had anticipated. One person in particular who should be mentioned is Wlodek Rabinowicz. For about a decade he has been my regular lunch companion, and the generosity with which, over the years, he has served me with new ideas, arguments, and philosophical know-how simply cannot be overestimated. (My weight gain is the most tangible proof of who has been doing the talking and who has been doing the learning.) So entangled are his views with my own that I am quite certain they do not appear explicitly in enough places in this book. Were it not for my bad memory, and my equally bad custom of transforming clear ideas into less clear ones, I would have mentioned his name a good deal more often. I have been fortunate in other ways, too. David Alm, Johan Brännmark, and Michael Zimmerman, who read and criticized earlier drafts of this book, provided me with invaluable help and encouragement. They forced me to clarify the exposition and sharpen many of my arguments. I also wish to thank Erik Carlson, Finn Collin, ¨ sterberg, who were subjected to readings of a very early version. Their kind and Jan O comments were greatly appreciated. I have had a privileged working situation. My office at the Department of Philosophy, Lund University, lies between the offices of my two good friends Bjo¨rn Petersson and Dan Egonsson. Over the years I have spent a tremendous amount of time in Dan’s room, discussing more or less every aspect of life. His original and down to earth way of approaching any subject in philosophy, and especially my metaphysical problems, has been a constant reminder that I now and then ought to put on the brakes and reflect on what I am actually doing. Over the years I have also learned much from my discussions with Bjo¨rn about many of the book’s themes. His gentle way of managing the department makes Kungshuset such a splendid working place. Core ideas of the book were presented at various places during a hectic 2004: thus I want to thank the members of a workshop I attended at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and in particular David Brax, Johan Brännmark, John Broome, Krister Bykvist, Erik Carlson, Sven Danielsson, Margaret Gilbert, Jonas Olson, Wlodek Rabinowicz, the late Howard Sobel, and Daniel Svensson; thanks are also due to Michael Stocker and David Chan, and the other audience members who attended my talk at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point. (David did a great job in organizing such a splendid conference.) Kind invitations from the University of Stirling and King’s College, University of Aberdeen, were followed by stimulating discussions, and for this I am especially grateful to Peter
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Baumann, Michael Brady, Rowan Cruft, Adrian Haddock, Alan Miller, and other members of these audiences. In Krakow, in 2008, I attended the European Congress of Analytic Philosophy and a workshop arranged by Kevin Mulligan and Wlodek Rabinowicz. I received many acute comments on topics dealt with in the book from members of the audience, some of which I have already mentioned. In particular, however, Jonas Olson, Christian Piller, and Andrew Reisner gave me much to think about. Later that year I was invited to give a talk at the meeting Metaphysics of Value, (the first Eidos-Thumos-Episteme meeting, convened in Geneva), and I am grateful both to the organizers and audience at that event. The latter gave me valuable feedback on a couple of arguments that ended up in the book; I owe particular thanks to Graham Oddie, Olivier Massin, Kevin Mulligan, and Nishi Shah. I was also grateful for the responses I received from Albert Musschenga, Robert Heeger, Simon Kirshin, Michael Quante, and Andreas Vieth during a visit to Münster in 2010. Lunches and dinners have played a most nourishing role in the work on this book. I had some very rewarding ones in Lisboa, and later on, with Jonathan Dancy, in Skano¨r. I am also grateful for the advice and encouragement I received from Kevin Mulligan during our occasional meetings—would that I possessed his knowledge of the Austrian–German value theorists! I learned much from correspondence with John Skorupski. I was honoured by his talk in Lund, and our discussion about reasons over lunch in Copenhagen’s Glyptotek the day after it helped me steer clear of some bad ideas. Åsa Wikforss and I had some not-so-good sushi in Lund, but fortunately the dialogue was all the better; she gave me insights into areas of philosophy of which I am quite ignorant. Michael Zimmerman merits a special place in this list. My friendship with Michael goes back many years now, and I am really very thankful for his great support and excellent advice, and for the arguments we have had on a wide range of topics over the years. I have learnt much from the people at my department, especially those who attend the weekly Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy. I have also benefited from occasional comments and email correspondence with a number of people over the years. I cannot thank all who merit my gratitude, in part because of their number, but chiefly because my memory does not allow me to recollect all of the many times that I have benefited in this way. But I can at least mention some: Gunnar Bjo¨rnsson, Fred Feldman, Fritz-Anton Fritzson, Alan Goldman, Christopher Grau, Ish Hadji, Chris Heathwood, Noah M. Lemos, Ia Maurin, Derek Parfit, Ingmar Persson, Douglas W. Portmore, Connie Rosati, Tim Scanlon, Mark Schroeder, Caj Strandberg, Folke Tersman, Alex Voorhoeve, and Heath W. White. Comments sent by two anonymous readers from Oxford University Press were very helpful in the later stages of revision. Paul Robinson polished the English in this work, for which I am very grateful. My work was also supported by generous grants from The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Swedish Research Council. This work includes, with the kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media, revised portions of my articles: ‘On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes’ (2009b),
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‘Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy’ (2009a), ‘Love, Value and Supervenience’ (2008b), ‘Buck-Passing Personal Values’ (2008a), ‘Analysing Personal Values’ (2007a), ‘Instrumental Values—Strong and Weak’ (2002b), and ‘Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers’ (2002a). I dedicate this book to my wife and our two daughters.
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Contents Preface Acknowledgements 1. Types of Value 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
Preparing the ground—different value concepts Isolating intrinsic value Isolating extrinsic final value Competing notions of intrinsic value The source of value Supervenience The Invariance Thesis Constitution Subjectivism and objectivism
2. Fitting-attitude Analysis 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
The origins A. C. Ewing The primacy of the normative over the evaluative Different value idioms The FA analysis of final positive values W. D. Ross’s objection
3. The Wrong Kinds of Reason 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
The wrong kind of reason problem Dual-role attitudes Solving the WKR problem? Danielsson and Olson on the WKR problem The biconditional buck-passing account
4. Mistaken Value Analyses 4.1 Moore’s objection to good-for 4.2 Instrumental value 4.3 A bad approach to personal value
5. For Someone’s Sake 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Types of attitude Sake, end, and objective Discerning attitudes Identifiers and justifiers Two kinds of FSS attitude Summing up
vi xiii 1 2 3 5 7 9 10 12 13 14
19 20 22 24 25 27 30
33 33 37 38 40 42
46 49 51 53
55 57 60 63 68 73 75
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6. Examining the Analysis 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7
Dropping an FSS attitude Non-fungible persons and identity Good-for and welfare Two sorts of personal value Personal intrinsic value Agent-relativity and private values Personal value and universalizability
7. Mo(o)re Objections 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5
Hurka’s views on good for Regan’s views on good for Rosati and good occurring in a life Personal and impersonal value Thin-thin and thin-thick conceptions
8. Problems and Possibilities 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6
Janus values Some counter-examples Darwall on welfare Different strategies Heathwood’s objection The good life and the argument from fetishism
9. One Reason Dichotomy Less? 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8
Introductory notes The essentialist sense The number approach Reason-for Meeting the challenge An overcrowded boat More replies to the challenge A positive argument
10. Value Bearers and Value Pluralism 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9
Extrinsic final values Hedonism and preferentialism Preferentialism Value bearers Value-bearer monism Simplicity Some reductions Separating the concrete from the abstract Recapitulating
Bibliography Index
77 78 80 83 86 88 91 92
95 96 98 99 104 105
109 110 111 115 118 121 122
126 127 128 131 132 137 140 141 144
152 153 156 158 159 160 161 163 166 168
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1 Types of Value
Certain things we value are best described as possessors of impersonal value. That the world is just, and that there are more happy people than there are unhappy people, are states of affairs that are, in a clear enough sense, impersonally valuable: such states of affairs are valued, when they are, in themselves, without reference to anything else. Other things appear to carry a different kind of value: they are seemingly personal rather than impersonal in nature. They are examples of value-for rather than value, period. For instance, some time ago, tidying my desk at home, I found a poem in a drawer that Anna, my oldest daughter, wrote for me when she was just a young girl. It was a typical child’s poem. Despite the fact that my room was cluttered with paper, I could not throw it away. The piece of paper, with its few lines of Swedish, had some value for me, i.e. it was a value that related in some way to me as a person in a way other valuable things do not. It was clear to me that although this poem carried value, it was not the sort of value that people are ready to ascribe to, say, Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal or a sonnet by Shakespeare. Many people (whether they are right or wrong in this is another question) take poems, television series, rock bands, special parts of our planet, to be valuable. Now it might, of course, be the case that what remains of the Amazon jungle carries personal value for someone, as my daughter’s poem does for me, but whether or not this is the case, it is also quite common to value nature that is largely untouched by man in an impersonal way. Wild nature, untouched by human beings, is just valuable. So is the fact that more people feel well than feel bad, or that justice rather than injustice prevails. In contrast with my daughter’s poem, these facts do not carry person-relative values—they are just valuable, period. This distinction between value, period, and value-for, or—as I shall also be referring to it—between impersonal and personal value, is just one among many distinctions in the area of value that philosophers have focused on. However, at this point it is probably not wise to proceed directly to an analysis of personal value. To set the stage something needs to be said about the various types of value that have played an important role in modern value theory; personal values will be subsumable under at least some of these value types.
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I will turn to this in a moment. First of all, however, I must enter a minor but not unimportant caveat: in what follows, I shall take the idioms value for and good for to refer to personal values. Likewise, ‘value’ and ‘good’ will be terms for impersonal values. ‘Good for’ will be taken to refer to a positive value for, ‘good’ to a positive value, ‘bad’ and ‘bad for’ to negative values. (There are other, so-called ‘thick’ evaluative terms, such as ‘desirable’ and ‘admirable’. We shall consider these later, but for the moment I wish to focus on ‘value’ and ‘goodness’.) Often the context in an example being discussed makes it quite clear that ‘value’ refers there to ‘positive value’, but sometimes I shall not specify the sense in which I am using the word ‘value’. The benefits of making it clear, on each occasion, what kind of value—positive, negative, or neutral— I have in mind are for the most part extremely limited. Little clarity is gained, I have found, from such an approach. ‘Value for’ and ‘good for’ (and their negations) are expressions that can reasonably be expected to carry more than one sense, and it is quite likely that the analysis I present in Chapter 2 and on will fail to suit all the different senses of these expressions. Much later on I will discuss a couple of these, as it were, errant senses; although at least some of them are, from a value-theoretical perspective, less interesting, they need to be commented on.
1.1 Preparing the ground—different value concepts There are many ways to sort values. In fact, philosophers of value in the nineteenth century concerned themselves a great deal with sorting tasks. Values were organized into more or less important sets of subject matter, such as moral, aesthetic, cultural, and natural values; they were ranked and placed along one scale or another. For instance, higher values would typically be those which (in contrast to lower values) play, or ought to play, an important role in our lives. However, none of these tasks will be mine in this work. My concern is a different one. The value notions that I want to draw attention to next are in some respects philosophers’ phrases of art. Notwithstanding this, many of these notions do play an important role in people’s everyday reasoning about what is valuable. Parents (and grown-up children, for that matter), are likely to recognize, for instance, the perhaps most common of all value distinctions—namely, that between something being valuable as a means and something having final value. The child who asks why she must brush her teeth, and who is not satisfied with ‘It is what every good boy or girl ought to do!’ will soon turn the conversation into a search for the final value, or end, that makes it no longer necessary to ask, once again, ‘But why is that good?’ Why is having clean teeth good? Why is fresh breath good? Why is it valuable to be liked by one’s fellow men? Typically (I know I did), people end up appealing to the pain connected with toothaches, or the pleasures that come from having healthy teeth, or both. The history of the distinction between something’s being valuable as a means to something—what is commonly referred to as ‘instrumental value’—and something’s
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being valuable, not as a means, but for its own sake, is impressive.1 Nonetheless, it is a distinction which, over the years, has been expressed in a number of ways. Consider again the earlier example. Pleasure is one of the most common items invoked to put an end to iterated ‘But why is so-and-so valuable?’ questioning. At least many people do seem to think it is unnecessary to continue asking why experiencing pleasure is something good. It seems pointless to search for some consequence of one’s feeling pleasure that would somehow justify our conviction that pleasure is valuable.2 In the light of this axiologists3 have said that when we value pleasure in this sense we value it ‘for its own sake’ or ‘for the properties it has in itself ’, or ‘as an end’, or ‘in its own right’, instead of valuing it as a means to something else or for its consequences. In fact, recently philosophers have seriously pondered the possibility that these distinctions should be taken more seriously than has historically been the case. But it is not only ‘end’ values that have been described differently. Instrumental values, also, though to a lesser extent, have received different descriptions, as we shall see later on.
1.2 Isolating intrinsic value One major issue in recent value theory is whether something’s being valuable for its own sake (that is, what I will refer to as final value) and something’s being valuable for the properties it has in itself (what I shall call intrinsically valuable) are coextensive. Up until recently, the distinction barely attracted attention. One major reason for this is, perhaps, that G. E. Moore, in his seminal Principia Ethica (1903a), regarded this division as being of little importance. To value something in virtue of its internal properties is to value it for its own sake and, vice versa, to value something intrinsically is to value it for its own sake, and not, say, for the sake of its consequences.4 To understand why such an approach seemed perfectly legitimate for a long while, we need to say something more about G. E. Moore’s views on value. He went to quite some pains in the Principia to determine the nature of intrinsic goodness, but arrived somewhat paradoxically at the position that the concept defies analysis. And by ‘analysis’ he had in mind a quite particular activity. To analyse a concept was to 1
The distinction appears in the Timaeus, where Socrates asks what is good as such (pleasure). For more historical examples, see the introduction to Recent Work on Intrinsic Value (2005), by myself and Michael Zimmerman. 2 Although people generally have fairly strong hedonist instincts (an odd exception to this being one of Plato’s nephews, who considered both pain and pleasure to be evils), it is easy to imagine examples that create problems for this kind of intuition. Think of someone who finds pleasure in torturing another person. Again, what should we say about a case where someone finds it pleasurable when he falsely thinks he is making someone suffer (unaware that his victim is in fact not suffering)? 3 The term ‘axiology’ is used here as a synonym of ‘value theory’; apparently it was given this sense by Paul Lapie in his doctoral thesis Logique de la Volonte´ (1902). Two other early references are W. Urban, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws (1909) and E. von Hartmann, Grundriss der Axiologie oder Wertwägungslehre (1908). 4 Moore does not actually express himself in this way. He rarely applies the phrase ‘for its own sake’ to goodness. There are many works in which final and intrinsic value are treated as the same sort of value. See, for instance, Gregory Vlastos, ‘Human Worth, Merit and Equality’ (1969).
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break it into simpler concepts, but, as he argued, not all concepts are capable of such a treatment. We cannot, he claimed, do it with a colour concept such as yellow, but we can do it with complex notions such as, say, a mule or a mare. Goodness is like yellow in the sense, he thought, that it cannot be broken into parts. What we can say, he thought, about what is intrinsically valuable is that it is a value which depends on the internal properties of its bearer, i.e. the thing which is valuable.5 In due course we shall return to the idea that value is a dependent, in fact, supervenient, notion. Meanwhile, it must be stressed that Moore did provide his readers with guidelines to improve their grasp of intrinsic value, and, in particular, of what things carry (or possibly would carry) this kind of value. One of Moore’s more discussed ideas is the method he proposed for finding out what things are intrinsically valuable, by which he wanted to ensure that we did not confuse what is valuable in itself with other kinds of value (in particular, instrumental values). Thus, Moore maintained that: it is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good.6
The instruction is quite clear and simple: think about the alleged value bearer as if it existed all by itself. Doing this we should be able, he thought, to determine whether the existence of the thing is good or not. This so-called ‘isolation-test’ was supposed to enable us to sort what is valuable in itself from what is either valuable for something else’s sake or has no value at all.7 But Moore’s thought-experiment has not been generally accepted. In part this is not that difficult to understand. As Noah Lemos points out: ontological isolationism is not very helpful since there are certain sorts of things that are intrinsically good but simply could not be the only things that exist. Consider the fact of Smith’s being happy and let’s suppose that it is intrinsically good. If there are certain abstract entities such as numbers or properties or states of affairs that necessarily exist, it would be impossible for Smith’s being happy to be the only thing that exists. More important, though, is the fact that Smith’s being happy could not exist without Smith’s existing, as well as, I suppose, Smith’s having certain pleasures and certain desires satisfied and his having certain beliefs to the effect that he had those pleasures and that his desires were satisfied. Since it is necessarily false that Smith’s being happy could be the only existing thing, this sort of ontological isolationism is not very clear or very helpful. (Lemos, 1994, p. 37; cf. Zimmerman, 2001a, p. 132)
5 Moore did not use the term ‘supervenience’ for the dependence relation between evaluative properties and non-evaluative ones. Johan Brännmark informs me (personal communication) that the term was used among British emergentists. See Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (1920), C. D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), and C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (1923). R. M Hare’s The Language of Morals (1952) introduced the notion to many moral philosophers. 6 Principia Ethica (1903, p. 187). 7 See Principia Ethica (1903, p. 187). As is pointed out by Lemos in Intrinsic Value (1994), Moore is not the only one to propose such an isolation test. David Ross did so in The Right and the Good (1930, pp. 68–9). According to Zimmerman in The Nature of Intrinsic Value (2001a), Richard Price made a similar claim. See the latter’s ‘A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals’ (1897, p. 148).
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The shortcomings of Moore’s isolation test led Lemos, and, later, Zimmerman to propose an amendment to it.8 The novel proposal is that we should reflect on the supposedly valuable object, setting aside the consequences of it without paying attention to the circumstances. The demand that we contemplate the object in this way is not incoherent. It might be hard to comply with sometimes, but it is not asking the impossible of us. This new proposed test tells us, then, to consider the thing without reference to context and what it brings in its train, and then to evaluate it. Lemos refers to it as the ‘intentional isolation test’ as opposed to Moore’s ontological one.9 If this kind of contemplation ‘leads’ you to believe that the thing is valuable, or good, and granted that you have in fact managed to keep circumstances and consequences out of your contemplation, you will have arrived at what is valuable, or good, in itself or for its own sake. Or so the argument goes.
1.3 Isolating extrinsic final value Moore’s isolation test has presumably played some role in the story of why, for a long time, value theory treated the distinction between being valuable in itself and for its own sake as one of little importance. By focusing so firmly on things in isolation, not admitting external, relational properties to be considered as ‘valuable in itself ’-making properties, the perspective of value definitely came to be, for quite some time, too narrow. Not everything that we value for its own sake carries a value that supervenes only on the internal features of the value bearer. The intentional version is an improvement.10 However, once things are able to carry extrinsic final value, i.e. be valuable for their own sake in virtue of at least some relational property that is not internal to the value bearer, matters become much more complicated. Obviously, the foolproof air of Moore’s original test has evaporated; what is left is a more modest mode of determining what has final value. The test continues to be a catalyst that helps us trigger substantive evaluative reactions. However, we must now be on our guard; even the improved isolation test may be doing more harm than good. For instance, we cannot conclude, just because we are not ready to ascribe goodness to something when we contemplate it in isolation, that the object is not valuable for its own sake. We can only say that it is not a final intrinsic value. It might be retorted that we can always extend the intentional isolation test to cases of extrinsic final value; after all, there is nothing particularly difficult about 8
Zimmerman shows that the ontological version is not only incoherent, but also misleading in certain cases. It can lead us to identify “certain states as parts of other states when they are in fact not parts of them at all” (2001a, p. 141). 9 Lemos introduces these expressions in (1994, pp. 10–11); cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Defining Intrinsic Value’ (1981). 10 However, I think it is a mistake to suggest, as Chisholm appears to have done, that by saying that something is intrinsically good we mean by this that it is what we should evaluate as good if we applied the intentional isolation test. It is one thing to regard the test as a method for learning what things are intrinsically valuable; it is quite another to maintain that this test is part of the semantic analysis of value.
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contemplating a thing being related to something else. True, I do think the improved isolation test can help us determine whether some object has or does not have extrinsic final value. But it is important to steer clear of some complications here. For one thing, the kind of contemplation that we are now considering cannot merely be the contemplation of a state of affairs involving relata; focusing our attention on that would tell us at most whether this state of affairs has an intrinsic value. The relata would be internal to the state, which is quite consistent with the state’s being an intrinsically valuable object. Rather, the contemplation must concern an object that is related to some other object. If we manage such contemplation, we should at least in principle be able to arrive at more or less well-founded judgements about the extrinsic final value of objects. Again, this does not amount to the 100 per cent test of Moore’s original method. Nor, however, does it leave us empty-handed. Naturally, we cannot be certain that taking more relational properties into the picture will not tilt our all-things-considered judgement of a particular object’s value. But this kind of tilting is just to be expected.11 Moore’s view that goodness is a simple, non-natural property has probably intrigued as many people as it has offended. The critics form a rather heterogeneous group. Without going into details that soon would take us far astray, we can at least identify the following camps. Some object to what they deem mystical, namely that goodness is non-natural. Others react to what they believe is only an expression of a false view on what we do when we evaluate. It is not difficult to find representatives of these views today. Whether goodness and value are natural properties or not, is something that I will leave open in this book. An answer to this question would, eventually, emerge if we knew the answer to various questions on the semantic side of formal value theory. For example, can evaluations be true or false? Is their main function to express beliefs or desires—to express attitudes that should fit how the world in fact is, or attitudes that are such that the world should change to fit the attitudes? However, today’s metaethical consensus leaves questions about the semantic nature of value judgements very much open, and so will I.12 (Much of interest can still be said about value and goodness that does not depend on taking a decisive stand on these semantic issues.) Some critics have gone a step further and argued that it does not make sense to speak of goodness in the way Moore apparently thought we are doing. This strain of thought goes back to Peter Geach’s influential paper ‘Good and Evil’.13 Geach argued there that every meaningful use (what he referred to as attributive use) of ‘good’ presupposes a certain domain of things to which the use applies. Things are never plain good. There Moore is not alone in coming up with a test for what has value. Another towering figure in value theory, Immanuel Kant, suggested a different method. Instead of contemplating things in isolation, Kant wanted us to place the presumed bearers of value in a different context (my own suggestion resembles this idea). For a discussion of Kant’s view, see Brännmark, Morality and the Pursuit of Happiness: A Study in Kantian Ethics (2002, sec. 2.2.). 12 In short, utterances of sentences containing value terms express the speaker’s value judgement. The nature of these judgements throughout the present work, then, is regarded as being consistent with both cognitivist and non-cognitivist metaethics. 13 Geach, ‘Good and Evil’ (1956). 11
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is no such thing as the predicative—as he called it—use of ‘good’. This discussion is important, and much can be learned from it. Despite this, I will sidestep further discussion of it. However, although I think this is an interesting approach, and clearly worth pursuing, perhaps I should add that I also think it faces a couple of problems. Let me briefly state one. In maintaining that there are only attributive uses of ‘good’, we seem to assume the truth of a certain metaethical position—namely, one according to which we can understand the goodness of, say, a car purely in terms of its nonevaluative properties. But, of course, this is not an obviously correct position. We might argue, for instance, that whatever the constitutive properties of the car are, in the end it takes a genuine evaluation to say which car is a good car. Now, since I believe that ‘goodness’ does have a genuine evaluative meaning (although it is not something that I argue here), the attributive sense seems to me to be at most a non-interesting, but probably common, way of expressing what is not a genuine evaluative judgement. The ‘Geach camp’ could certainly deny this; they might argue that there are only attributive senses. However, so far no one has managed to come up with an altogether convincing metaethical view, and hence it is perhaps best to leave this issue open. (The analysis that I will be proposing does just this.) Moreover, although Geach and others may have a point as regards the use of “plain goodness/value”, it would be a mistake to confuse this ‘goodness’ with a different sort of goodness that is used interchangeably with ‘intrinsic (final) value’. The phrase ‘object x is intrinsically (finally) valuable’ easily splits into ‘x is an object and x is intrinsically (finally) valuable’, and there seems to be nothing necessarily wrong or odd about this.14
1.4 Competing notions of intrinsic value So far I have suggested that objects may exist that are valuable for their own sake but whose value nonetheless does not depend exclusively on their internal features. It is, as mentioned, the task of substantive value theory to determine whether there is this kind of value. Still, we have to at least make the idea plausible. One reason the idea of an extrinsic final value has met with suspicion has been an assumption among some influential value theorists concerning the sorts of thing that can bear final value. The main reason for limiting oneself to just one kind of value bearer has been simplicity. This is a very understandable motive, but it has not convinced me to give up a pluralistic position when it comes to the nature of value bearers. I will return to this issue later on in Chapter 10, where I present an argument for value pluralism. (Since a pluralist position seems intuitively plausible, I prefer the more direct way to the analysis of personal value.)
14 This response to the Geach position comes originally from Zimmerman. In his (2001a) he rejects the main arguments put by Peter Geach, Bernard Williams, Philippa Foot, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. See Jonas Olson, Axiological Investigations (2005, pp. 32–44), who also defends the notion of final (intrinsic) value. Recently Sven Danielsson has come to Geach’s defence in ‘On Geach on Good’ (2007). See also the recent article by Brännmark ‘Excellence and Means: On the Limits of Buck-Passing’ (2008).
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It is not difficult to find examples that plainly appear to be inconsistent with the traditional Moorean view that all final values, without exception, are intrinsic. I will present some examples in a moment. Meanwhile, another possibility that has so far not received any attention here must be addressed. The fact that there is seemingly no agreement on what sort of things have, say, intrinsic value, may not necessarily mark a difference in substantive views. It might just be the case that there is more than one concept of value circulating. In fact, it has recently been argued by Ben Bradley15 that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value but two: Mooreans accept the three tenets that intrinsic value: (a) supervenes only on the value bearer’s intrinsic properties; (b) accrues to the value bearer by necessity; and (c) is such that something that has it would continue to have this value “even if it were alone in the universe” (2006, p. 113). Kantians reject these principles. On their view, intrinsic value is “the sort of value that requires respect”. Bradley also argues, in many ways convincingly, that on certain points Mooreans and Kantians have been talking past each other. Whereas the Mooreans regard intrinsic value as something that ought to be promoted, or something that makes the world a better place, Kantians look upon it as something that should be respected or honoured. The position defended in this work is obviously not Moorean. It does recognize something like Moore’s intrinsic value, though. However, it also claims that since it can be subsumed under the notion of final value, this is not the fundamental value notion. Nor is the position Kantian, however, although it bears some resemblance to what Bradley characterizes as such. Thus, on my view, certain valuable objects ought to be respected or honoured; but equally there are a great number of different attitudes that one ought to take with regard to objects that are valuable. Bradley’s idea that there are just two value notions is not that intuitive from this perspective. If there are indeed valuable things that we should cherish, protect, love, admire, and so on, it might well be suspected that there are not two value concepts but many—one each, say, for objects that ought to be cherished, promoted, loved, desired, and so on. This is, of course, a possibility. However, we might also try to look for a theory of value that could bring all of these values under one and the same roof. Later on, in Chapter 2, I will outline a pattern of value analysis which has received considerable attention lately and purports to do precisely this.16 Let us consider some examples that seem inconsistent with Moore’s views on intrinsic value. Shelly Kagan, for instance, discusses the value of a unique or rare stamp; John O’Neill refers to a wilderness that may be considered valuable precisely because it is untouched by humans,17 and Wlodek Rabinowicz and I have suggested the following:
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Bradley, ‘Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value’ (2006). Bradley recognizes this. See his discussion of the fitting attitude analysis (2006, pp. 127–8). O’Neill, ‘The Varieties of Intrinsic Value’ (1992).
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Another class of examples involves cases in which a thing is valued for its own sake in virtue of its special relationship to a particular object, event, or person. An original, say, an original work of art, may be valued for its own sake precisely because it has the relational property of being an original rather than a copy. Its final value supervenes, in part, on its special causal relation to the artist. Princess Diana’s dress may be another case in point. The dress is valuable just because it has belonged to Diana. This is what we value it for. (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2000, p. 41)
Being unique or rare, untouched by humans, original, or related to someone of importance are all external relational properties, so they would not be admitted in the supervenience base of an intrinsic value. Examples of this kind can easily be multiplied, which makes one wonder why the Moorean dogma has not been very widely abandoned once and for all.
1.5 The source of value Recently a number of philosophers have argued that there can be final values that are not intrinsic. One argument in particular, by Christine Korsgaard, has been widely discussed. Korsgaard calls an object intrinsically valuable if the “source” of its goodness lies in the object itself. But, in her view, not all things valuable as ends are intrinsically valuable. Separating the two distinctions in goodness [intrinsic/extrinsic and final/instrumental], however, opens up another possibility: that of something which is extrinsically good yet valued as an end. An example of this would be something that was good as an end because of the interest that someone took in it, or the desire that someone had for it, for its own sake. (1983, p. 252)18
The source of some end values is located outside the value bearer. Thus, instead of being internal the source may well lie, say, in our interests, or in desires directed onto the objects themselves, in which case the source will be external (Korsgaard, 1996 [1983], p. 252). Now, the notion of a value source is not straightforward. As Rabinowicz and I have argued elsewhere, it is important to separate two possible interpretations of this notion; but when this is done it becomes clear that Korsgaard’s argument is misdirected. To identify the source of value may be either to detect the supervenience base of the value or to discover the constitutive grounds of an object’s final value. The distinction between supervenience and constitution is important if you want to understand why value theorists understand value in so many different ways. But both notions are far from transparent, and a more detailed discussion of the distinction is required. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, I will outline how I think these notions should be understood. Let us begin with supervenience. 18 See her ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’ (1983), which is also published in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996), from which the quotation comes.
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1.6 Supervenience Supervenient properties are ‘dependent properties’.19 To insist that value always accrues to an object because it has certain other, non-evaluative properties is to express a belief, by implication, that there is a relation of dependence between value and those other, subjacent (i.e. underlying) properties. This does not seem obviously true in the case of mental predicates. At least, it is not obviously implausible to suggest that we, as language users, were mental ‘predicaters’ long before we became aware of the body/ mind problem. The second job the supervenience claim is customarily taken to do is that of capturing what we might call the consistency intuition. This is the conviction that if you assert that x is valuable, and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x in its natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y, too, is valuable. To deny this would be to leave the listener in a kind of perplexity similar to that which follows the detection of a contradiction. I take it that if we were to believe that values are, so to speak, free-floating ontological entities that just land on objects (either haphazardly or because, say, they were bestowed in accordance with God’s will), we would not be logically committed to ascribing value to y here. It is at least not a requirement of consistency to draw the conclusion that y is valuable, for x and y may differ precisely in that value has ‘landed’ on one but not the other. It might be suggested that the fact that we can imagine such ‘value butterflies’ shows the supervenience thesis to be, not a conceptual thesis, but an expression of our deeply rooted beliefs about what and how things are. However, this reasoning is flawed. From the fact that we seem to be able to imagine, without contradiction, ‘free-floating entities’, it does not follow that we are conceptually able to imagine that values are such entities. The discovery that this ‘butterfly’ reasoning seems to be fundamentally confused should not obscure the fact that it is hard to come up with a knock-down argument showing that the supervenience thesis is not, at bottom, based on ontological convictions. I am not sure what such an argument would look like. Whether this mistrust warrants serious disbelief in supervenience is another matter. For my own part, I do not think so. At any rate, I am certainly inclined to say that value terms are, for purely conceptual reasons, supervenient terms. Hence, in what follows I will treat the supervenience thesis as a conceptual thesis. Here I merely wish to make it clear that I am unable to see how to settle beyond question whether or not my intuitions are purely linguistic.
19 In other words, when, henceforth, I talk about value-makers, I have in mind those properties on which value depends, leaving it for discussion how ‘depends’ should be read. Perhaps dependence here is one involving “makers”, or “enablers”, or both. See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (2004). Cf. Caj Strandberg, Moral Reality: A Defense of Moral Realism (2004, pp. 229–39).
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As mentioned earlier, there is, or so it has been argued, more to supervenience than the claim that if two things, x and y, are similar in their natural properties, they must— and ‘must’ here is conceptual—have similar value properties. In recognizing that the supervenience thesis expresses a consistency intuition, we must not lose sight of a further important relation that is said to hold between natural properties and value properties—namely, that the former necessitate the latter. This necessity relation might be moral or metaphysical, or it might be some other kind of necessity. It might mean, as Sven Danielsson has expressed it, “something like ‘fact-independently’. If Socrates is good because he is brave and wise, then, whatever the facts that may obtain, anyone brave and wise would be good” (2001, p. 95).20 The remedy for butterfly properties seems rather obvious. If our aim is to dislodge butterflies from value supervenience we need to formulate a relation between value properties and natural ones such that if the latter are present, then, in every possible world, the former are too. We need, in other words, to go from intra-world to interworld supervenience. Taking ‘V’ to refer to value, ‘N’ to refer to natural properties, and ‘Nec’ as a necessity operator, we need the relation captured by the following formula, due to Jaegwon Kim:21 Strong Supervenience: Nec 8x (Vx ! ∃N (Nx and Nec 8y (Ny ! Vy))) If this strong relation is what the supervenience relation is all about, properties that behave on the analogy with the butterfly are blocked; such properties cannot be supervenient. There is a necessity relation (the second one above) of some sort (moral necessity, metaphysical necessity?) between N-properties and V-properties that excludes this possibility. Strong Supervenience captures something essential about value supervenience. However, the question is whether it catches all there is to this dependence relation. One problem with it needs to be resolved. As far as I can see, it leaves out an important aspect, namely what we might call the ‘direction-feature’ of the ‘because of ’ or ‘in virtue of ’ relation. These relations suggest that moral and natural properties are connected in a special sense—the latter give rise to (or support) the former, and not vice versa. Consider the relation between ‘x is coloured’ and ‘x is extended’. This relation is not, in my view, a ‘because of’ or ‘in virtue of’ relation. But suppose we reformulate Strong Supervenience in terms of properties of colour and extension. Strong Supervenience would then seem to fit the relation that exists between colour and extension. In other words, if we do not want to say that colour and extension exemplify the kind of relation found between moral properties and natural ones, we need to qualify Strong Supervenience in some way. At present I do not know how to do this.
20 21
Danielsson, ‘The Supervenience of Intrinsic Value’ (2001). See Kim, Supervenience and Mind (1993).
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1.7 The Invariance Thesis The idea that values are constituted by subjects is at heart of subjectivism. Now, subjectivists are vulnerable to an objection that we need to examine. The attitudes we have appear to depend heavily on arbitrary factors. Hence, if we tie values to such capricious entities as attitudes, we make the question of what values there are highly contingent; and this is not how we normally conceive of values. The suspicion, in other words, is that if we relate value to attitudes, value becomes a relative notion, and value relativism is hard to combine with the following: The Invariance Thesis: The final value of an object is invariant over possible worlds. It follows from this thesis that if an object is valuable, the object (and any object exactly similar to it) will carry precisely this value in every possible world in which it is present. Or, more accurately: if something is a supervenience base in the actual world, it will be such a base in every possible world in which it is present. It is a standard objection to subjectivist accounts that they have to reject the Invariance Thesis. If we fix value to desires and other kinds of attitude, the complaint runs, a valuable object x will not be valuable (i.e. its value will not have been constituted) in possible worlds in which x is not the object of a desire. If the world were different, with an alternative geography of desires, the set of valuable objects would be quite other than the actual one. On this matter we may expect various subjectivist responses. I have discussed which ones elsewhere (Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2003), and I will therefore not repeat them here. In this context it is paramount to appreciate that the idea that value is invariant is contentious. Although a number of influential axiologists, including G. E. Moore, have defended the Invariance Thesis over the years, it has come under considerable fire more recently.22 Its plausibility depends on the nature of the value bearer x or, to be more precise, on what kinds of property are included in the supervenience base. If x is valuable in virtue of its non-essential properties, the Invariance Thesis looks too encompassing. If La Gioconda had been painted with, say, different colour properties, it would not have been valuable (that is, assuming that the colours are not essential properties of La Gioconda). However, things are different if x is a value-bearing object like an abstract entity which is valuable in virtue of its essential properties. Such an entity will be the same in all possible worlds, and hence its value will remain the same in all worlds. If x is not the concrete La Gioconda itself but rather some abstract entity such as the fact (the obtaining of the state of affairs)23 that La Gioconda presents such and such features, then we cannot ‘tamper’ with the features making this very fact what it is. To do so would be to create a distinct fact whose possible value or disvalue would have no bearing on the issue under discussion.
22 23
For a recent defence of this thesis, see Zimmerman (2001a). See, here, Lemos, Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant (1994, pp. 25–6) and Zimmerman (2001a, p. 50).
1.8
CONSTITUTION
13
In an unqualified form, then, the Invariance Thesis is ruled out as a test of demarcation between objectivists and subjectivists. Advocates of either position can agree that if an object supervenes on non-essential properties, then, in a world in which the object lacks some of these properties, it will no longer be valuable. It should be noted, however, that the objectivist’s view may be quite a different one, for they (like subjectivists) can adopt a certain kind of value-bearer monism. On this view it is only entities that have whatever features they have essentially (e.g. states of affairs) that carry (final) value. If objectivists and subjectivists share this view, their responses to the Invariance Thesis will inevitably differ. Subjectivists will naturally reject the Invariance Thesis, but they have quite a lot of leeway as to how they go about discarding it. Some ways, for instance, will be more ‘objectivistic’, or attitude-independent, than others. Suppose there is a state of affairs that I want to see realized for its own sake—say, that people look at, and appreciate, La Gioconda. Putting aside the substantial question whether this is a good example of a value bearer, the nature of my attitude here is taken to be universal. In other words, I have this attitude not only for the actual work of art, people, and world. Rather, the scope of my attitude ranges over all the possible worlds in which people appreciate a painting that is exactly similar to the actual La Giaconda in universal features; in any such world I prefer this sort of appreciation to be a fact.24 Given my actual preference, the value of the object x will, in other words, be invariant. One salient aspect of this example is that, in it, the constitutive ground of value does not coincide with the supervenience base. Actually, there is nothing particularly odd about this; we need just remind ourselves that some objects of our attitudes (say, objects of preferences) do not coincide in time with our preference. I may, for instance, now prefer that, when I am old, no one will seek to ensure that I go on living at any price. I may prefer this although I have good evidence that most people do in fact want to go on living, even if the cost is very high, when they grow old. Again, some of my preferences are conditional in form. For instance, in the bath I can prefer that, were I on the train, I would have clothes on.
1.8 Constitution The idea that we should differentiate between the constitutive grounds and supervenience base of value has appeared in several places in recent years.25 I first became 24
Here I sidestep a complication, namely whether value can supervene only on universal features. In Chapter 6 I shall return to this matter. 25 However, it is also a distinction which, over the years, has been overlooked. Thus Henry D. Aiken (1950) objects to views that have defined intrinsic value in terms of “the object in which interest, satisfaction or pleasure is taken” (p. 11). On his view, it is rather satisfaction in itself that is valuable (a position which he refers to as subjectivism). In comparison with the former views, his own avoids the paradox of ascribing intrinsic value to something on the basis of a relational feature (e.g. that it is an object of someone’s desires). The separation of the supervenience base of the value and its constitutive grounds would clear away this ‘paradox’, though.
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¨ sterberg.26 Their familiar with it through a work by Wlodek Rabinowicz and Jan O distinction illuminates the division between subjectivists and objectivists, i.e. between those who believe value is necessarily related to subjects and those who deny this.27 Rabinowicz further clarifies the distinction between supervenience and constitution ¨ sterberg, 1996, by looking at the role conventions play in chess (Rabinowicz and O p. 21). Thus, in a chess game certain moves will be permissible and others will not. The permissibility of a particular move depends on how the board is set at the time of the move. For instance, a white rook at square a1 can take the black queen on a7 because the features of the game now make it possible to move the rook all the way up to a7 (while before there was, say, another piece blocking that row of squares). Now, the permissibility of the move a1xa7 does depend (supervene, if you like) on the (internal) features of that particular game, at that particular time. However, the constitutive ground for this move is to be found in the social convention that maintains the rules of chess, and which, among other things, specify how the rook and other pieces move. Rabinowicz’s analogy is illuminating. Of course it does raise important issues that need to be commented on. However, since I have done so in Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003), and since it would lead us too far astray from our main concern, I prefer to consider a problem for this subjectivist approach.
1.9 Subjectivism and objectivism There is, then, a possible objection to my approach here that I need to address. This will lead to yet another way of illuminating the difference between supervenience and constitution. The objection, which would most likely figure in an objectivist response to the subjectivist approach, is this. What the subjectivist refers to as the constitution of value is nothing but itself a supervenient feature. When the subjectivist claims that an object x is valuable, and that x’s value is constituted by the subject’s attitude, the constitutive attitude in question is really part of something else that is valuable— namely, the subject’s direction of a certain attitude on x. It is this obtaining of a state of affairs rather than x that is valuable. Since the attitude is in a sense part of the value bearer, it is more appropriate to regard it as a value-making, subjacent feature. Hence there is no need to distinguish in the original way between supervenience and constitution. Accordingly, subjectivism should be regarded as a position that ascribes value only to certain kinds of object: it ascribes value only to those facts that involve the subject directing an attitude on some object. 26 ¨ sterberg, ‘Value Based on Preferences’ A detailed elucidation of it can be found in Rabinowicz and O (1996). See also Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake’ (2000) and Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘Subjectivism and Objectivism: An Outline’ (2003b). I owe Wlodek Rabinowicz a great deal for having so generously discussed the distinction with me over the years. However, he is not to be blamed for anything that I say here. 27 David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement (1986) is a good example of a subjectivist position. I owe FritzAnton Fritzson for pointing this out to me.
1.9
SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM
15
There is some truth in this reply. Thus, it seems correct to say that if the obtaining of the state of affairs of a favouring x is valuable, then it is reasonable to regard the attitude as an element of the supervenience base. The problem with the reply lies elsewhere. Why should a subjectivist confine herself to the analysis of value judgements concerning facts about the subject directing some attitude on something? Of course, we might have taken a stand on what things are, and what things are not, in fact valuable; and we might have made the restriction in accordance with our evaluative views. But if subjectivism and objectivism are positions designed to answer questions about value and valuing, there is something fundamentally wrong when either subjectivism or objectivism is depicted as a position that says, necessarily, that certain value judgements cannot be analysed according to their own pattern of analysis (i.e. in the case of subjectivism, patterns of the kind ‘Object x is valuable’). This would be to describe the two positions from a standpoint that is both evaluative and, in this case, biased in favour of objectivism. Of course, objectivism might be true. If this is shown, subjectivists will have to give up their idea that attitudes have constitutive powers. But subjectivism might also be true, and if it is objectivists will have to face up to the fact that there is more to value than supervenient features. The above brings me to another way of elucidating the difference between supervenience and constitution. This will further support the idea that we should not include a subject’s attitude too readily in the supervenience base. Properties (or facts about these) belonging to the supervenience base are customarily invoked as reasons for or against various actions taken for the sake of the object. To appeal to the subject’s attitudes—say, those of his preferences or desires directed on the object—as a reason for acting is not always plausible. At least, it is not if what you have in mind here is not what caused you to act, but rather what you take to be your normative reasons for acting.28 In case we have in mind actions performed for the object’s own sake (rather than for the sake of being desired by us) this possibility is ruled out. The attitudes should therefore remain in the background, not the foreground, of our motivational set. They can be the constitutive grounds of final value, but this does not make them a part of its supervenience base. Let us pick up the threads and return to Korsgaard’s suggestion that we should understand the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic final values in terms of the location of the source of value. Recall her point: if the source is found in the object itself, we are dealing with intrinsic value; if it lies in the interests or desires that are directed on the object, the value is extrinsic (1996 [1983], p. 252).29 28 We shall return in Chapter 5 to the difference between what is part of the intentional content of an attitude (say, some features that call for you to act) and what caused the subject to have the attitude. 29 Thus Korsgaard writes: “Separating the two distinctions in goodness [intrinsic/extrinsic and final/ instrumental], however, opens up another possibility: that of something which is extrinsically good yet valued as an end. An example of this would be something that was good as an end because of the interest that someone took in it, or the desire that someone had for it, for its own sake” (1996, p. 252). As noted by Bengt Brülde in The Human Good (1998, p. 390), in her discussion of final value Korsgaard does not clearly
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That this is not a compelling way of understanding the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values should be clear. ‘Source’ may refer either to the properties of an object on which its final value supervenes or to the constitutive grounds of the object’s final value. The latter may well lie outside the object itself—that is at least what subjectivists want us to believe—even though the former are internal to the object. For instance, the value of an object is, on a preferentialist conception, constituted by the preferences or desires directed on the object. But notice, where the object is desired only for features that are internal to it, then, on this subjectivist position, this externally constituted value is nonetheless intrinsic. The object’s good-making properties are all internal properties of the object: they are those for whose sake the object is preferred.30 To relate value to the desires of a subject under the heading ‘value source’ may be to conflate the supervenience base with the constitutive grounds of value. To establish that values can be externally constituted is in itself not an argument for extrinsic final values. Final values may all still be intrinsic values if what makes them final is their supervening only on features internal to the value bearer.31 Before we proceed, there is something I would like to emphasize. An anonymous referee for Oxford University Press pointed out that even if we grant that subjectivism, as I have presented it, is compatible with supervenience, it will remain a contingent fact that the values constituted by attitudes actually deliver that supervenience. This should certainly be underlined. That is, subjectivists cannot guarantee supervenience whenever an objectivist claims there is value supervenience. As I pointed out in Section 1.7, subjectivists cannot agree with all that objectivists want to say about value supervenience. However, they need not agree with everything objectivists say about value. Supervenience, according to the subjectivist, is a relation that holds between value and an object in virtue of the value bearer’s non-essential properties. Subjectivists recognize the logical requirement that if you say that x is valuable, you must agree that something about x makes it valuable. Since they do so, unless they change their minds about what is valuable, they are therefore forced to apply their value predicates in a consistent way. Of course, objectivists will claim there is more to “force” than “consistency”.
distinguish between being valued and being valuable (as an end, or for its own sake). In what follows, however, I focus on the latter. 30 When, in ‘The Limits of Well-being”, Kagan maintains that on “a radically subjectivist conception of value, [ . . . ] nothing would be valuable as an end in the absence of there being some creature who values it” (1992, p. 184), he (too) conflates the constitutive grounds of value with its supervenience base. Subjectivists will locate the constitutive ground in the subject, and not the supervenience base; and it is the nature of the latter which determines whether or not the value is intrinsic. See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). 31 See also Korsgaard’s later work, ‘Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer and Schneewind’ (1998), in which she claims that our particular ends “have only extrinsic value, since their value depends on our own desires and interests in them and is conferred on them by our own rational choices” (p. 63). Here, Korsgaard conflates supervenience with the constitutive grounds of value.
1.9
SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM
17
Obviously, subjectivists cannot constitute “objectivist” value—at least, not the sort of value that supervenes on the essential properties of the value bearer. But this is quite consistent with the idea that (subjectivist) value is constituted by a subject’s preferences and other attitudes. Supervenience tells us something about “where” a value is located. The difference between objectivists and subjectivists is that whereas the former think that if we know where a value is located we also know (or, chances are, we also know) what grounded (constituted) the value, the latter deny this, believing that it is one thing to identify a value location, but quite another to settle what constitutes the value. There are several serious problems with subjectivism, and these incline me to reject it. The most important is the fact that the very notion of value constitution remains somewhat obscure. However, objectivism is also problematic. But, my goal here has not been to settle the subjectivism/objectivism issue, but rather to outline how the debate should be understood. My contention is that the disagreement does not, in the first place, concern the location of value—both parties can agree on what is valuable; it concerns the basis (constitution) on which the value is located where it is located. G. E. Moore was a stout defender of the idea that intrinsic value is in a sense the property of objectivists; only objectivists can speak of it coherently. I think Moore was wrong about this—just as I think those (mostly subjectivists) who argue that the notion of intrinsic or final value is incoherent are wrong.32 There is nothing to prevent subjectivists from recognizing the final or intrinsic value of something. There is an important difference, of course, between subjectivism and objectivism, but it is not one that prevents subjectivists from ascribing intrinsic or final value to things. The distinction between supervenience and constitution is not the only tool needed to separate subjectivists from objectivists. Nonetheless, its being overlooked continues to give rise to unnecessary confusion. It is also true that proper appreciation of its significance allows one to move beyond certain casual, one-dimensional assumptions—for instance, the idea that the subjectivist only locates value in subjective states, or the idea that objectivists cannot share the evaluations of a subjectivist. On the approach defended here, subjectivists and objectivists may well share each other’s evaluations, and they need not disagree about what objects are the appropriate bearers of value.33
32 Moore found at least two faults with subjectivism—it makes the objectivity of good disappear, and it makes it impossible for things to be intrinsically valuable. The following passage is often taken to express, by implication, the latter point: “To say that a kind of value is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question” (‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’ (1922)). The subjectivist, according to Moore, makes value dependent on something external, the subject, and the subjectivist’s alleged value is therefore not an intrinsic value. For another early attempt to argue that subjectivists cannot coherently speak of intrinsic value, see the German value theorist Erich Heyde’s Wert: Eine philosophische Grundlegung (1926). 33 The distinction has a clear bearing, for instance, on the way we should understand a central claim in L. W. Sumner’s Welfare, Happiness & Ethics (1996) that only subjectivists make welfare logically dependent on the attitudes of the welfare subject.
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Sometimes positions in this area (in particular subjectivism) are depicted as first-order normative claims. For example, it has been said that you are a subjectivist if you think that each individual ought to do whatever she happens to think she should.34 Of course, there is no real point in quibbling about names. But in my view, since subjectivism and objectivism are naturally seen as arising from questions about how to understand the nature of value (and ultimately evaluative and normative-judgements like the one mentioned above), a great deal would be gained if we could retain ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ for second-order views on values.
34 See, for example, J. L. Mackie, in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), who refers to this as a kind of first-order subjectivism. Moreover, when Josiah Royce refers to the enquiry ‘Why should I obey the moral law?’ as “the old question of subjectivism” he is obviously not thinking of subjectivism in the same way (‘Discussions: The Outlook of Ethics’ (1891, p.109).
2 Fitting-attitude Analysis
To think that something possesses personal value is to evaluate it as having value for someone; in cases of positive or negative personal value we think the thing is good or bad for this someone. In my view, evaluations, whether they involve personal or impersonal values, may be more or less well grounded. Perhaps they may even be true or false. But whether or not they carry truth-value, the fact that it is my evaluation does not in itself make these evaluations true or invulnerable to criticism. And this, I take it, holds for impersonal as well as personal evaluations. I am not going to argue for this here. Though it is tempting to do so, I will spare the reader such a digression from my main task. The literature on well-being (philosophical, as well as non-philosophical) is inundated with suggestions as to what is good, and what is bad, for you. But these more or less wellgrounded pieces of advice and suggestions are seldom accompanied by analysis of the very notion they employ. Of course, there are some important exceptions to this, and we shall consider these in due course. Naturally, the literature is rich in suggestions about the kinds of thing that contribute to human welfare or well-being; and in all likelihood welfare or well-being are bona fide examples of things that have personal value to us. Philosophical works on what makes us feel well, or what makes our lives go well, devote much space to the discovery of the constitutive parts—or the necessary and sufficient conditions—of a good life or good mental state. For many years this has been, and still is, a stimulating and vivid area of philosophical analysis. However, it is also a field which, perhaps too readily, has tended to monopolize the notions good-for and value-for. The present monograph tries to put up a bit of a fight and resist this trend. That is, if am right there is more to value-for than well-being or welfare. The latter may well be typical cases of what is good for a person, but they do not exhaust the category of things that are good for us. A word on the very nature of this resistance: philosophical analysis is mainly reductive—it typically splits concepts into smaller conceptual elements wherever it makes sense to do so. This has proven to be a most fruitful intellectual enterprise, gradually affording us more and more fine-grained conceptual tools. I will not depart from this approach. However, what I will initially be proposing is that the reader should take a step back and be open-minded enough to entertain, as at least a
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possibility, the idea that value-for is a more complex notion than ‘welfarists’ have assumed. Doing so, we shall eventually be led down another reductive avenue. The kind of analysandum that I have in mind is one typically accruing to certain mental states, but also to things like poems, tombstones, and the like, and to the obtainings of (abstract) states of affairs such as, say, the fact that my favourite football team wins. My way of arguing for this more complex notion of value-for is, then, this: I shall simply try to outline an analysis that is sufficiently cogent and attractive, and that is such that it becomes evident that the list of things just mentioned are all, at least potentially, more or less plausible carriers of value-for, as my analysis understands this notion. Now in recent years a certain pattern of value analysis—what I will refer to as the fitting attitude (FA) analysis—has had something of a renaissance. This pattern leads, not necessarily, but very naturally, to a position that admits many different kinds of value bearer; and it is a promising pattern, since it shows what all values—thin ones (like goodness) as well as thick ones (like admirability)—have in common. Later on, in Chapter 10, I will present an argument for why I think we should recognize different kinds of value bearer. I shall argue that a well-known substantive view of value, hedonism, is best understood as ascribing value to sensations with a particular quality—a hedonic property. Hedonism alone is a rather imperfect value theory; things other than mental states carry value—things indeed that do not belong to the same metaphysical category as mental states. This initial contention leads quite naturally to a search for a pluralist value theory. The argument requires some unravelling, though. It seems therefore wise not to let it get in the way of the analysis’s main steps. In this and the next chapter I will outline some of the more important features of the FA analysis. I shall also highlight some of its more problematic elements. Unfortunately, the FA analysis does not only have much that speaks in favour of it; it also introduces a considerable number of more or less serious problems, some of which presently appear to lack any obvious solution. My aim is not to solve, or even to discuss, all of these problems, but to argue that if we fine-tune this kind of analysis, we may add yet another positive feature to it—that is to say, it will become apparent that it is capable of giving us an account of personal value. Of course, the possibility that values are more heterogeneous than traditional FA advocates have so far realized cannot be regarded as a positive feature of the FA approach if, eventually, it is shown that we must give up on the pattern anyway (because, say, we cannot solve the problems mentioned above). However, my hope is that, by pointing at a fairly easy way of extending the analysis, we shall keep the focus on what is a most intriguing, and for years too-much neglected, view of value.
2.1 The origins A detailed history of the FA analysis has yet to be written. Here I shall confine myself to saying something about two major exponents of it,1 although in fact the list of 1 For discussion of some of the leading proponents of FA analysis, I refer the reader to Jonathan Dancy’s excellent ‘Should we pass the buck?’ (2000a). See also Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004a). This section of the present text rests heavily on this work.
2.1
THE ORIGINS
21
prominent figures who, at one point or other, have advocated it is arguably quite long: it includes C. D. Broad, A. C. Ewing, and more recently Richard Brandt, Sven Danielsson, Alan Gibbard, Jonas Olson, Thomas Scanlon, John Skorupski, and Michael J. Zimmerman.2 The Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1838–1917) appears to have been the founding father of the analysis.3 However, his insights left no lasting, salient impact on his contemporary value theorists in Austria and Germany. There is at least no clear trace of the FA approach in the mature work of prominent Brentanists like Alexius Meinong and Christian Von Ehrenfels; and again, if we consider works on the history of ethics produced during, and for many years after, Brentano’s life, we find that, strangely, the FA view is often neglected or misunderstood. The core idea of Brentano’s view can be expressed in a few words. Here is an example: . . . the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct.4
Notice that he is saying not that the good is worthy of love, but rather that what is worthy of love is good. The attitude is, in other words, directed not on the goodness, but on something else. Brentano had a quite specific idea in mind when he talked about love. ‘Love’ refers to what he regards as a “higher mode” of taking pleasure in something.5 Moreover, this feeling of pleasure has a further feature that distinguishes it from what he thought of as mere compulsive and instinctive feeling, namely that it is “experienced as correct [als richtig charakterisiert]”;6 and because the experience of correctness is conceived of as a part of the very attitude itself, Brentano is able to argue that such attitudes function as the basis of our knowledge of the good. Some further points about Brentano’s views ought to be made. He distinguished between what was good in itself (that which is “pleasing in itself ”) and what might be referred to as good as a means (that which is “pleasing in virtue of what it brings about or preserves or makes probable”).7 But what is more interesting is that he also applied the analysis to value comparisons. As a consequence, his analysis accommodated the idea that 2
C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930); and A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (1947). See also Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990); Richard Brandt, ‘Moral Valuation’ (1946); Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998); Michael J. Zimmerman, The Nature of Intrinsic Value (2001a); John Skorupski, ‘Buck-Passing about Goodness’ (2007); and Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson, ‘Brentano and the Buck-passers’ (2007). 3 Franz Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1969 [1889]). Other names sometimes mentioned in this context include Adam Smith (1759/1790) and Henry Sidgwick (1907 [1874]). 4 Brentano (1969 [1889], p. 18). 5 Brentano conceived of this higher mode as an emotive state. But taking pleasure in something is not necessarily being in an emotive state. In fact in recent years Fred Feldman has objected to what he refers to as the “distinctive feeling view”: the idea that pleasures are phenomenologically uniform; see his Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism (2004). 6 Brentano, (1969 [1889], pp. 21, 22). It should be mentioned that Roderick M. Chisholm’s translation deviates from the German original but may still be faithful to it in spirit. On this point, see J. N. Findlay, Axiological Ethics (1970, pp. 21ff.). Cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value’ (2004a). 7 Brentano (1969 [1889], p. 18).
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the sphere of value should be understood in terms of more than one kind of attitude or emotion. This is an important move. It suggests that value might need even more attitudes to be fully understood. Moreover, if these attitudes take different sorts of object, then this manoeuvre can be seen to carry the seeds of a pluralistic position on value. Brentano understood value comparisons of the kind reported when we say that something is better than something else in terms of the former being “worthy of greater love”.8 He carefully stressed how this greater love should be understood. It was not a question of more intense love, or of a more strongly felt pleasure. Instead ‘greater’ refers to: . . . the peculiar phenomenon to be found within the sphere of emotions—namely, to the phenomenon of preferring . . . When we call one good ‘better’ than another, we mean that the one good is preferable to the other. In other words, it is correct to prefer the one good, for its own sake, to the other.9
Evidently Brentano regarded preferences as emotive, rather than purely connative, states (the latter being a common view today).10 That apart, the twist, or turn, which value analysis takes via this expansion is of great importance. “Worthy of greater love” can apparently be read as meaning fitting to be preferred. The value analyst’s toolbox is enriched by one more item besides love.
2.2 A. C. Ewing If Brentano founded the FA analysis, Ewing is its foremost cultivator. During the period in which Ewing presented his views on value in a series of works, formal as well as substantive value theory was rapidly becoming marginalized in certain influential English-speaking philosophy circles. This explains in part why his views were somewhat neglected for several decades. Ewing objected to naturalism as well as to the idea, widespread at the time, that goodness was some indefinable quality. Actually, his dismissal of this Moorean idea (and the corollary that we somehow discern such a quality) becomes the springboard from which he launches his own definition (Ewing, 1959, p. 81). While he thought that we are unable to obtain a clear idea of goodness, he maintained that this is not the case with obligations. In his view it was: . . . quite clear in fact, that we are aware of obligations and that the concept of obligation is quite distinct from an empirical concept. (p. 82)11 8
Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 26. 10 Brentano would not, in other words, regard preferences as attitudes that aim (at least, directly) at the realization of some state of affairs. 11 Just how much trust Ewing had in introspective knowledge is not clear to me. There are passages in Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy suggesting that he regarded introspective awareness (e.g. of obligations) with some suspicion, as something that does not necessarily disclose something in the real world (see 1959, 9
2.2 A . C .
EWING
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Originally, in the early work The Definition of Good (1947), Ewing distinguished between two sorts of obligation and two corresponding oughts: he understood the first, and primary, notion as “signifying ‘fittingness’” (1947, p. 151), which he took to be an “irreducible ethical concept”; and the second as the “‘ought’ of moral obligation” (see 1959, p. 90). It is not obvious why he refers to ‘fittingness’ as an ethical concept. The passage would make more sense had he characterized it as a normative concept. He then defined goodness, in terms of the first kind of ought, as a “fitting object of a pro attitude”.12 However, later, in Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, he modified this view: I still recognize these two meanings of ‘ought’, but now I wish to lay more stress on the moral ‘ought’ and to reduce the ‘ought’ of fittingness to reasonableness. (1959, p. 90)
He still defines ‘good’ as “what ought to be the object of a pro-attitude”, but his new position stresses that both the moral ‘ought’ and the ‘ought of reasonableness’ are unique in the sense that they cannot be reduced to other concepts. Certain things may be morally good, and we morally ought to adopt a favourable attitude to these objects. Other things are good in a non-moral sense: they justify, or provide reasons for, the attitude. For example, my own pleasure is such that I ought to adopt a positive attitude to it, but the ‘ought’ here is hardly the moral ‘ought’ but rather the ‘ought of reasonableness’: pleasure provides a reason to adopt a pro-attitude towards it, but not necessarily a moral reason.13 Brentano worked with a limited set of pro-attitudes. Ewing’s notion of a proattitude extends to a much wider range of attitudes.14 In fact, he takes it to cover “any favourable attitude to something”: “choice, desire, liking, pursuit, approval, admiration”.15 He also underlines the notion that different pro-attitudes, or even conglomerates of such attitudes, fit different kinds of valuable object; and he takes this to show that ‘good’ can have different senses.
p. 54). For a most interesting essay on Ewing’s metaethical views, see the forthcoming ‘A. C. Ewing’s First and Second Thoughts on Metaethics’, by Jonas Olson and Mark Timmons. At the end of his career Ewing developed a peculiar metaethical hybrid theory combining elements of both non-cognitivism and cognitivism. Olson and Timmons argue convincingly that this theory is flawed in several respects. 12
Ewing (1947, p. 152). As mentioned earlier, Ewing’s metaethical views changed considerably over the years, and in ways that are not always entirely transparent. Perhaps the most noteworthy change was that he gave up on the idea he once had (in 1947) that evaluative language is primarily concerned with describing (i.e. ascribing properties), replacing this with a more prescriptivist (expressivist) account (in 1959). He then tried to combine the latter with the idea that value judgements have truth-values. 14 His account of preferences is interesting and quite different from Brentano’s: “‘Prefer’ is such a general word that I think it may be used to cover any case where a more favourable attitude is adopted to something A than to something else B, whatever the pro-attitude in question” (Ewing, 1959, p. 85). This seems to suggest that, of two attitudes, x and y, if the former is more favourable than the latter, and I apply x to object A, and y to object B, then I have a preference for A over B. Needless to say, such an account raises a number of difficult issues. For instance, what makes us say that one attitude is more favourable than another? Is admiration of A a more favourable attitude than the attitude of respecting B? 15 Ibid., p. 149. 13
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2.3 The primacy of the normative over the evaluative Brentano’s and Ewing’s decision to give primacy to normative concepts (such as fittingness, correctness, ought, should, and reason) over evaluative concepts (principally, the good) is, in my view, highly persuasive. Thus, the FA theory that will be proposed here reduces evaluative claims to deontic claims about attitudes, to the valuable objects in question, that it is fitting to have, or that one ought to have, or that we have reason to adopt. The theory developed here departs from Ewing’s later view, however. Where he distinguished between two sorts of ought—the moral ought and the ought of fittingness, interpreted as an “ought of reasonableness”—I will be more cautious. True, it is a central feature of values that they are primarily normative in character: we think there is a reason why a valuable object demands, requires, or calls for, certain attitudes from us, and that this reason derives from the object. But whether or not the reason is moral in character seems to me a secondary matter.16 At least, I have not found any compelling reason to follow Ewing here. This is not to deny that there are two oughts. It is merely to leave the matter open, and to assume that what is essential to an analysis of value is that it brings out the normative character of value. Here it might be a good idea to point out, as Joshua Gert17 recently did, that normativity has two dimensions: There is the strong level of requirement—what we ought to do—and there is the weaker level of permission—what we may do. Although I will not pay any particular attention to these two levels, it is an important point to keep in mind when I give examples of what there might be reasons to favour. These reasons may not all be about what we are required to do. A noteworthy feature of the FA analysis is that, in it, it is properties other than the value property that provide reasons to respond to the valuable thing by taking up an attitude to it.18 The reason we ought to take a certain responsive stance is to be looked for among the subjacent properties and not in what supervenes on those properties.19 It
16 Zimmerman, in ‘Understanding What’s Good for Us’ (2009), does not seem to agree with this. The fact that I leave it unspecified whether the reason I have in mind is prudential or moral is a problem for my view, according to Zimmerman. Perhaps. However, the concept of personal value I have in mind does not imply anything other than that something is a reason—what this reason is will become clear, eventually, when we take into consideration the supervenience base of the value. However, since there is no mention of any subjacent properties in the analysis, it cannot be determined whether the reason is moral, prudential, or some other kind of reason. There is nothing peculiar about this; in my view we often identify something as a reason without having a clue as to whether the reason is moral, prudential, or of some other kind. 17 See Gert, ‘Value and Parity’ (2004). 18 Fittingness (worthiness, correctness) might be regarded as a primitive notion that cannot be subsumed under standard generic deontic notions, including notions such as ought, must, and should. On this view, fittingness constitutes a special kind of deontic notion. Ewing took this approach in his early work The Definition of Good (1947). See also Danielsson and Olson (2007). 19 Cf. Dancy, ‘Should We Pass the Buck?’ (2000a, p. 161): “Ewing seems . . . to be in a position to say that goodness is not a distinctive evaluative and intrinsic property in objects, one whose presence we can discern and to which we do or at least should respond with approval and admiration. The goodness of the object just is the relational fact that we should respond to it with approval, admiration or other pro-attitude. The evaluative ‘good’ has been defined in terms of the deontic ‘should’. And with this result, the intuitionists
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is the set of value-making properties that provides us with a reason to take a proattitude to the valuable. Following Scanlon (1998), we could say that what carries the buck is not value but what value supervenes on! In other words, to be valuable is to have the property of having a value-making base that gives us reason to have a proresponse to the valuable object. A caveat is in place here, however: although I referred a moment ago to the supervenience base of the valuable object in order to explain what the analysis is all about, it must not be assumed that the analysis somehow directly refers to the relevant subjacent properties.20 The FA analysis is, in effect, a very simple analysis; it neither mentions nor refers to the properties in virtue of which the object is valuable. It just says that to be valuable is to be an object there is reason to favour. The FA analysis defended in this work is pluralistic in the sense that it acknowledges that final value accrues to different kinds of metaphysical entity, including abstract states of affairs and concrete objects such as persons.21 Great importance is attached to the idea that different kinds of valuable object invite different kinds of pro-response. For instance, a brave person ought to be admired, a precious artefact calls for care and protection, and a desirable state should be desired. In fact, in many cases we may describe the response that is fitting more accurately as a conglomerate of different kinds of attitude—or even as a conglomerate of various kinds of attitude-cum-behaviour. Some of these attitudes are especially thing- or person-oriented: we care for our children; we cherish and preserve objects of historical importance like the Magna Carta; we protect a part of the Brazilian rainforest that is as yet untouched by humans. Other attitudes are instead state of affairs-orientated. The most obvious cases are desires and preferences, both of which typically take states of affairs (e.g. that Denmark will qualify for the World Cup, or that people do not say bad things about one behind one’s back) as their objects rather than (concrete) things and persons.
2.4 Different value idioms The FA analysis has typically been employed to analyse what is valuable ‘for its own sake’ or ‘as an end’ or has value ‘in its own right’. However, none of these descriptors is
reversed Moore’s position . . . Moore defined the right, that which we ought to do or should do, in terms of the good. Ewing defined the good in terms of how we should respond.” 20 This is important when it comes to the question whether evaluative properties may themselves be reason-providing. As outlined here, FA analysis leaves this issue open, and as far as I can see there are good reasons to allow that value may supervene on other kinds of value. Scanlon, for instance, was originally of a different opinion, believing that the subjacent properties were all natural properties. However, he changed his mind in response to R. Jay Wallace, ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism’ (2002, pp. 447–9): see Scanlon, ‘Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh’ (2002, p. 513). 21 See, for instance, Elisabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993); Christine Swanton, ‘Profiles of the Virtues’ (1995); Marcia W. Baron, ‘Kantian Ethics’ (1997); Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni RønnowRasmussen (2003a). For monist approaches see Noah M. Lemos (1994); Michael J. Zimmerman (2001a) and his ‘Intrinsic Value and Individual Worth’ (2001b); and Jonas Olson, ‘Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’ (2003).
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quite satisfactory. The notion that something is valuable as an end, for instance, appears not to be consistent with the possibility that the value bearer is a non-propositional object, such as a thing (a painting, a stamp, or the like). It seems right, at least, to agree with W. D. Ross that ends are objectives and never things. In this sense, the other two expressions seem to represent an improvement. Both ‘in its own right’ and ‘for its own sake’ imply something about whether or not the value is dependent on something other than the valuable object. Of the two expressions ‘in its own right’ and ‘for its own sake’, I prefer the second. The notion that something is valuable in its own right might lead one to wonder whether the object has value in virtue of a capacity of the object that has been realized. If that were so, this kind of value would also exclude, it seems, certain objects from the field of value bearers. (Would a state of affairs, say, have value in its own right in this sense?) ‘In its own right’ also seems to suggest that the value accruing to an object does so without the help of a subject. This suggests that the expression would lend itself to some extent to an objectivist analysis of value. Admittedly, the advantage of the phrase ‘for its own sake’ may not be immediately obvious, and certainly it has a somewhat counter-intuitive ring in expressions such as ‘x is valuable for its own sake’ (compare ‘x is desired for its own sake’). However, I prefer it. Following others, I will say that something that is valuable for its own sake has final value. My reason is that the value in question here is a natural counterpart, in a sense in which the value picked out by ‘in its own right’ is not, to two other familiar kinds of value: contributory value (or what is valuable for the sake of some whole) and instrumental value (or what is valuable for something else’s sake rather than for its own). Moreover, ‘valuable for its own sake’ does not impose bias on the value-bearer issue; it rules out neither abstract states nor concrete things, unlike the notion of something being valuable as an end. Therefore, in what follows I will speak of final values in terms of what is valuable for its own sake (and, accordingly, of what is good/bad for its own sake and desirable for its own sake). If the value is intrinsic (one kind of final value), the object is valuable for its own sake in virtue of its internal features; if the object has extrinsic final value, it is valuable for its own sake in virtue of at least some external relational feature. Rae Langton has objected to this sort of characterization: “to talk of something having ‘final value’ that is ‘extrinsic’ is to talk of valuing for the thing’s own sake, something that has extrinsic value. We keep the talk of finality and ends to a distinction, not in the way things have value, but in the way we value things” (2007, p. 165). Although Langton’s proposal has its merits, ultimately I think we should resist it. What determines whether a value is intrinsic or extrinsic is, in the end, the nature and scope of the supervenience base. Moreover, her suggestion is not obviously consistent with the pattern of value analysis that I employ. It should be stressed, though, that there is a sense in which my aim here concerns only indirectly final values. My main concern in this book is to discuss the extent to which some version of the FA analysis, if true, is helpful when it comes to understanding personal values.
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The caveat ‘if true’ here is important, and it will occupy us in a moment. Meanwhile, some further features of the FA analysis need to be highlighted.
2.5 The FA analysis of final positive values For reasons of simplicity let ‘favour/disfavour’ be schematic place-holders for a range of positive and negative responses called for by various kinds of valuable object. Applied to final positive values, the analysis then says the following: The FA analysis of final positive values: The final value of an object x consists in the existence of normative reasons for favouring x for its own sake. This pattern of analysis can be extended to other kinds of value, too. For instance, an object’s instrumental value might be said to consist in the existence of reasons to favour it for its effects’ sake. That is, given that instrumental value is in fact a kind of value. That this is not obviously the case is something that I will comment on in Section 4.2. The FA approach also applies, and equally well, to both thick and thin varieties of final and instrumental value.22 Thus an admirable person is a person whom there is reason to admire, a respectable person should be respected, and so on. Of course, the match between the value and the fitting attitude is not always as obvious as it is in these cases. For instance, to be brave is also, for the FA analyst, to be the object of a normatively required attitude. The question, of course, is what kind. That the FA pattern of analysis might encounter a problem with certain values has recently been pointed out by Roger Crisp: A painting may be beautiful because of its sublimity, delicacy, profundity, boldness, imagination, vitality, grace, honesty . . . According to the version of BPA [i.e. buck-passing analysis23] we are considering, since these properties are evaluative, we might assume that buck-passing accounts of them also ought to be available. How will BPA distinguish them? Reference to the appropriate response may be appropriate in certain cases, especially those in which reference to a response is analytic to the concept in question. ‘Being awesome’, then, may be said to be the higher-order property of having lower-order, natural properties that provide a reason for awe. But the BPA is unlikely to be able, by reference to different responses, to distinguish properties with no such analytic reference to responses themselves. Consider, say, grace and delicacy. To be sure, they call for certain responses, but the responses themselves are too similar to enable us to distinguish the properties.24
22
For the distinction, see Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985). The term “buck-passing analysis” is due to Scanlon (1998, pp. 95–100). 24 Crisp, ‘Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck’ (2005). See also Andrew Reisner, ‘Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value’ (2009). That it is often not possible to pair up emotions and values in any neat way was also argued by Kevin Mulligan in ‘From Appropriate Emotions to Values’ (1998, see pp. 174–5). 23
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Is this pattern of analysis too blunt an instrument, then, to deal with values like grace and delicacy? Could it discriminate between these kinds of value? Crisp offers two reasons for thinking that the buck-passing, or FA, analysis fails. First, thick values do not always connect with a unique attitudinal response. For instance, being delicate does not have an attitude or emotional response that is appropriate to it. Second, the properties in virtue of which the object is delicate—what Crisp refers to as the lower-order natural properties—are too coarse-grained to enable us to distinguish between values such as delicacy and gracefulness. Crisp’s first observation is correct. As to his second point, I am not sure whether it really is impossible to detect a difference between delicacy and gracefulness in terms of their supervenience bases. Crisp thinks that an account of these values in purely naturalistic terms will not do. With this I fully agree, but that is because I am inclined to deny that naturalism is a viable theory in the first place. However, this denial does not commit me to holding that we cannot differentiate between values in terms of their lower-order properties, or what I would refer to as their supervenience bases. We can, even if doing so is often a difficult business; it is just that there might be more to value than their supervenience bases. Thus, in response to Crisp, I would suggest that it is the combination of lower-order properties and their reason-making nature that enables us, in principle, to differentiate between these two values. In the case of a delicate object there will be a set of properties such that they provide us with a reason to feel, say, delight. In the case of grace, another set of properties will give us reason to have another attitude—say, aesthetic enjoyment (as has been suggested by Jonas Olson).25 In fact, since the two values are very similar, they might well provide us with a reason to adopt the same attitude to the object. The difference would then be accounted for only in terms of the supervenience bases. For instance, the properties that make a vase into a delicate vase do not seem to be the properties that make it into a graceful vase; among the latter we would find, say, its flowing shape, whereas a delicate vase (in at least one sense of ‘delicate’) would have properties that have something to do with how easily it is damaged—say, that it is made of porcelain. Of course, things are often both delicate and graceful, and so the supervenience base will contain common elements. Again, this is not in any way to assert, or imply, that these values can be captured in a purely naturalistic analysis. A rejoinder might be to say that, if these claims are correct, we will have to admit that we are really dealing not with two different values at all, but with one kind of value that we refer to differently because it has two distinct supervenience bases. But supposing that this were the case, would that be a serious problem? I do not think so. Crisp also suggests that the buck-passing, or FA, analysis fails in another aspect. The experience of beauty is not merely the experience of the natural properties in virtue of which the object is beautiful. The reason we admire the artefact is that it is beautiful:
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Olson, ‘How to Pass the Buck’ (2004).
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. . . the reason for admiration lies not in the natural properties—these could be understood by someone with no aesthetic sense—but in the beauty.26
The issue Crisp raises here is both complex and deserving of detailed discussion. However, I will confine myself to a short reply. Even a buck-passer might go along with the possibility that two persons do not reach an agreement on whether something is beautiful or not despite perceiving the same natural properties. But instead of invoking the ability of one, and the disability of the other, to perceive non-natural properties, the explanation would be that one grasped and the other failed to grasp that the natural properties are reason-providing properties. Moreover, I am not confident that my own ‘value phenomenology’ rules out the latter explanation; I cannot be certain that for phenomenological reasons the first explanation is better (or worse) than the second. Given this, and given that the second explanation does not require us to posit a nonnatural property, the FA pattern of analysis appears to be the more plausible one.27 There is another recent objection to the FA analysis that deserves a comment.28 It was first pointed out by Wlodek Rabinowicz in ‘Value Relations’,29 and later Mark Alfano has expressed a similar point.30 Alfano’s argument sets out from the idea that it is conceptually true that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are polar predicates, i.e. they are contraries. And so an analysis of good and bad should keep this polarity in its analysans, but the FA analysis runs into problems here since it understands value in terms of attitudes that are not necessarily contraries. There is nothing conceptually problematic about being in an ambivalent state of favouring and disfavouring one and the same object. So if we suppose that it is actually fitting to be in such a state, then on FA, we need to say that the object is both good and bad. Now, a modified FA need not be endangered by this. Suppose we take the FA to say something to the following effect: x is good if and only if it is fitting to favour x and it is not fitting to disfavour x. This should handle this sort of challenge.31 Rabinowicz’s point (2008, p. 40) is more general, though; FA reduces conceptual truths concerning value notions to formal constraints on appropriate attitudes. For instance, consider the ‘betterness’ relation. As Rabinowicz suggests this seems to be as a matter of conceptual truth, a transitive relation. However, it is not obviously a conceptual truth that preference in all permissible preference orderings is transitive (e.g. I may prefer x to y, and I may prefer y to z, but it is not permissible that I, at the same time, do not prefer x to z). So if the FA analysis forces us to treat a permissible preference ordering as transitive, (which is not unreasonable but nonetheless not conceptually true), it obviously has non-tautological implications. Of course, 26
Crisp (2005, p. 82). Crisp raises other objections as well. For discussion of these, see Olson (2004). Recently Crisp has returned with a new objection to the buck-passing account. I will return to this objection at the end of the next chapter. 29 Rabinowicz, ‘Value Relations’ (2008). 30 Alfano, ‘A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory’ (2009). 31 The point is not mine. Unfortunately I cannot remember its source, or the person who originally suggested this solution to Alfano’s challenge. 27 28
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an FA analyst should perhaps bite the bullet here. After all, as I have pointed out earlier, FA is to some extent a revisionary analysis. However, there is another, albeit more radical, possibility, namely that we need not understand ‘better’ in terms of dyadic attitudes (such as preferring x to y). Perhaps we could understand ‘better’ in terms of it being fitting to have certain monadic attitudes rather than other monadic attitudes. We could then account for the ‘betterness’ of x over y in terms of the difference of strength between the two monadic attitudes. For example x is better than y, if and only if, it is fitting to, say, like x to a degree n+1, and it is fitting to like y to a degree n. Needless to say, whether such an analysis can be worked out in a plausible way is an interesting issue. However, I will not pursue this matter here.32 Instead, at this point it is convenient to draw attention to one of the earliest attacks on FA analysis.
2.6 W. D. Ross’s objection Ross objected to the whole FA project.33 Attempts to reduce statements such as ‘x is good’ to ‘it is fitting to admire x’ appeared to him not to offer a genuine analysis:34 in Ross’s view, FA ‘analysis’ got things backwards. However, this was not his only worry; FA seemed to him to also involve a circle: [A]dmiration is not a mere emotion; it is an emotion accompanied by the thought that that which is admired is good. And if we ask on what ground a thing is worthy of being thought to be good, only one answer is possible, namely that it is good. It would be absurd to say that a thing is good only in the sense that it is worthy of being thought to be good, for our definition of ‘good’ would then include the very word ‘good’ which we were seeking to define.35
To analyse goodness in terms of the attitude of admiration would be circular, if admiration involves a judgement to the effect that the object admired is good. This is an important objection.36 Given his other claim, then—that goodness is the very feature in virtue of which the object is, to use Ewing’s original phrase, worthy of admiration, and cannot therefore be understood in terms of being worthy of admiration—Ross appears to be challenging advocates of FA analysis on two fronts.37
32 Recently Rabinowicz has developed what a modelling of value relations would look like from a monadic-centred perspective; see his ‘Values Compared’ (2009). 33 Ross, Foundations of Ethics (1939, pp. 276, 278). His direct target was Ewing’s view. 34 At least, if what is valuable is an action. If it is instead an experience of pleasure, then, insofar as it is valuable, it is a fitting object of satisfaction rather than admiration (ibid.). 35 Ibid. p. 279. 36 According to Mulligan, “Meinong [in (1968) Abhandlung zur Werttheorie, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 3, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt] noted that analyses of value in terms of justified or correct emotions avoid circularity only if justification and correctness are deontic properties and if deontic properties and axiological properties are different types of property. He accepted both claims and took deontic properties and value-properties to be formal objects of desire and of emotions, respectively” (2009b, p. 490). 37 The circularity need not be vicious. It depends, I suppose, on what we hope to accomplish by the analysis. For instance, David Wiggins accepts the circularity. He argues that, owing to its “detour through
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Ewing replied to Ross’s criticism, arguing: [T]he reason why it is proper to admire anything must be constituted by the qualities which make the object of admiration good, but it does not follow that the thought that it is good must, if the admiration is to be justifiable, intervene between the perception of the factual qualities admired and the feeling of admiration.38 [T]he ground [for a pro attitude] lies not in . . . goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. Certain characteristics are such that the fitting response to what possesses them is a pro attitude, and that is all there is to it.39
Thus (i) admiration is a response to the object’s ‘good-making’ qualities and not to its goodness. For this reason, (ii) the attitude of admiration need neither involve, nor presuppose, any judgement that the object admired is good. Do pro-attitudes have to involve any evaluations? In recent years Ross’s position has been questioned. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson,40 in particular, have mounted an attack on various forms of ‘judgementalism’ and ‘quasi-judgementalism’41 that purport to analyse emotions: the fact that evaluative language may be useful for describing our emotions should not lead us to believe that all emotions essentially involve some judgement of value. And likewise, it would be a mistake to think that to be in an emotive state the agent has to be entertaining evaluative judgements or concepts.42 The evaluative concepts we employ to depict emotions need not correspond to any ‘phenomenological’ reality in the emotion itself. D’Arms and Jacobson therefore join ranks with Ewing in rejecting the Ross-style circularity objection to the FA analysis. D’Arms and Jacobson have a point, as I see it. However, even if they were mistaken, and emotions somehow did necessarily involve evaluations or were defined in terms of certain values, this would not in itself be an insuperable obstacle to the FA approach. It would probably present a problem for any attempt to provide a semantic reduction of value claims to claims about the attitudes and emotions we have reason to have. But the FA analysis is not (at least, primarily) an exercise in semantic reduction. Suppose that the attitudes FA employs can be characterized in ways other than by their relation to value. If so, there is a point to explicating value in terms of a normative component and these attitudes. At some level such an approach might well be circular, but the circle would be informative. sentiments”, the analysis remains informative to some extent; see David Wiggins, ‘A Sensible Subjectivism?’ (1987, p. 189). Cf. D’Arms and Jacobson, ‘Sentiment and Value’ (2000b, pp. 732ff.). 38
Ewing, The Definition of Good (1947, p. 158). Ibid., p. 172. 40 See D’Arms and Jacobson, ‘The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasi judgmentalism)’ (2003). Also relevant is their ‘Sentiment and Value’ (2000b). 41 Quasi-judgementalism is, according to D’Arms and Jacobson, a revision of judgementalism in that it “still type-identifies the emotions by their defining propositions, and claims that certain thoughts are partially constitutive of being in an emotional state, but loosens the requirement that these thoughts must be affirmed by the agent” (2003, p.130). 42 For an overview of different positions on this matter, see Mulligan’s ‘Emotion, Value, and Morality’ (2009b). 39
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Skorupski has recently addressed this issue. Supposing the morally wrong is that towards which there is reason to feel blame, he considers the objection that this (FA) proposal: cannot yield a definition of ‘morally wrong’, since ‘blame’ in the relevant sense should be defined as that sentiment which is appropriate—which there is reason to feel—towards the morally wrong. A good objection, but not the end of the story. Suppose that there is a distinctive sentiment of blame whose object is the morally wrong; suppose also that we can be given an independent characterization of this sentiment, say in terms of the actions to which it disposes, or by having it explained as the sentiment we feel when we consider some specific paradigm cases. Suppose, finally, that when we have been made familiar, in the first-person way, with the sentiment, we find ourselves able to go on spontaneously, and reasonably convergently, making confident new judgements about when there is reason to feel that specific sentiment. In that case we have everything we need to grasp the concept of moral wrongness. The morally wrong is that which is blame-sentiment-worthy in the absence of an excuse. The concept can in this sense be exhaustively captured in terms of the concept of a reason and the concept of a certain sentiment, even though ‘morally wrong’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘reason’. Furthermore if we can individuate the sentiment by these methods we can also use them to introduce a term to refer to the sentiment, say ‘BS’. The morally wrong is that which is BS-worthy (which there is sufficient reason to respond to in that way) in the absence of an excuse.43
Skorupski is right, I think. We can indeed say something about what it means to be in possession of the concept moral wrongness even if we cannot semantically reduce statements about what is morally wrong to statements about what there is reason to blame. Once we grasp the concept of a reason and the concept of blame (particularly in terms of a morally wrong independent characterization) we are in a position to grasp moral wrongness. Even if we allow, then, that emotions and attitudes necessarily involve evaluations or somehow relate to values, it remains to be shown that the sort of circularity involved in FA analysis, given such an allowance, would be devastating to the analysis. Some, but far from all, circles are vicious.44
43 Skorupski, ‘What is Normativity?’ (2007b, p. 249). That FA analysis need not involve a vicious circle was considered as a possibility in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004a, 2006). 44 See I. L. Humberstone’s seminal ‘Two Types of Circles’ (1997). See also J. A. Burgess, ‘When is Circularity in Definitions Benign?’ (2009).
3 The Wrong Kinds of Reason
The fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value has many attractions, but it also faces several more or less serious internal problems, and these will need to be acknowledged and examined. Its more salient positive features will emerge, eventually. But at this stage it is only fair to the reader to present what has been thought of as a major problem for the analysis. This is far from the only problem. Some of the problems concern the analysis in general;1 others relate to my specific application of it to personal values. The latter will be examined in due course. In this chapter I focus mainly on what Wlodek Rabinowicz and I have called the ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem (henceforth, the WKR problem). At the end of the chapter I will comment briefly on another problem, one that concerns whether an FA analyst has to admit that goodness cannot be a reason-giving property.
3.1 The wrong kind of reason problem The FA analysis equates value with the existence of reasons to favour the object carrying the value. One obvious advantage of the FA analysis is that it satisfies a requirement that all formal axiological theories should meet: it is silent as to what objects carry value. Substantive axiological reasoning aims to tell us what kinds of thing are in fact valuable, but this is not the objective of formal axiology. This notwithstanding, if the analysis is too generous and implies, counter-intuitively, that certain kinds of
Although I do not share his conclusion, Krister Bykvist’ s recent article ‘No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails’ (2009), contains an interesting discussion concerning fitting attitude analyses that take non-obtaining states of affairs to be valuable. Bykvist considers whether we can favour a (nonobtaining) state of affairs such as “there being happy egrets but no past, present or future agents (i.e. beings who intentionally bring something about)” (p. 5). He considers several possible ways of understanding “to favour” something, but none of them, he thinks are such that we can reasonably say that it is fitting to favour such a state. For example, it would not make sense to say that it is fitting to promote such a state or to desire it. This certainly seems true. However, it might be fitting to direct some optative attitude on this state of affairs. We can certainly wish that it obtains even if we know that it cannot be promoted. 1
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apparently valueless objects are valuable, then there is obviously a reason to be sceptical about it. The problem—perhaps, indeed, the biggest problem—facing advocates of FA analysis is precisely this: the FA analysis seems to open the door to worthless objects, and to construe them as bearers of value. Equally, we might have reasons not to have pro-attitudes to objects that obviously are valuable.2 Discussions of the WKR problem have focused mainly on the first kind of case. Most likely the explanation is that in cases of the second kind we do have reasons to have a pro-attitude, but these reasons are outweighed by reasons not to have such an attitude. So, these are not counterexamples to FA analysis. Here are two examples in which there seem to be perfectly good reasons to take pro-attitudes to objects of no value at all:3 (i) A demon threatens you with punishment if you do not admire a saucer of mud.4 (ii) A demon threatens you with punishment if you do not admire him.5 These examples appear to take the FA analyst straight into a cul-de-sac. Here is why: the saucer of mud has no value (or so we assume); yet, if the analysis is correct, we are forced to say that it does have value, since there are reasons to take up a positive attitude to it. The same goes for the demon in (ii). What is significant about not only (i) and (ii) but WKR cases in general is that it is seemingly the pro-attitudes themselves, rather than the objects, that are valuable in these cases: it is the admiring of the saucer or demon, not the saucer or demon in themselves, that carries value. However, in the context of the FA analysis, the fact that we have reason to admire the object is just another way of saying that these objects are in fact valuable. We are apparently cornered. Objects which obviously are not valuable are depicted in the analysis as being of value.
2 Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have identified and discussed this difficulty, which they refer to as the “the Conflation Problem”, in their ‘Sentiment and Value,’ (2000b). See also D’Arms and Jacobson (2000a) and their ‘The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasi judgmenta-lism)’ (2003). 3 As Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson have pointed out in their recent ‘Brentano and the Buck-passers’ (2007), G. E. Moore raised a kind of WKR objection that would be an example of the other type of case. In his review of the English translation of Brentano’s Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis, Moore argued that beautiful objects are such that we should favour them. However, this does not mean, he thought, that value accrues to the beautiful object; it is rather our appreciation of them that is valuable. Moore’s contention is not uncontroversial, though. It is not obvious that it is only our appreciation that is valuable, but not the beautiful object itself. 4 This example is from Roger Crisp’s review of ‘Value . . . and What Follows’ by Joel Kupperman (2000a). If you prefer a more realistic example, recall the scene from the movie Catch 22 in which the two corrupted colonels, Cathcart and Korn, offer to send Captain Yossarian home from the war (they want to hush up an ugly affair they are involved in), something the captain has wanted for a long time. There is a catch, though. Yossarian hates the colonels, and their offer comes with a price. Yossarian has to, as the colonels put it “like us”. The scene is at the end of the movie. 5 This example is discussed in Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004a); it was originally suggested by Folke Tersman (personal communication).
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Several philosophers have tried to solve this problem. To do justice to all the attempts would require too much space, but I will say something about what is perhaps the most popular general approach. It sets out from Derek Parfit’s distinction between state-given and object-given reasons for attitudes:6 Of our reasons to have some desire, some are provided by facts about this desire’s object. These reasons we can call object-given. We can have such reasons to want some thing either for its own sake, or for the sake of its effects . . . Other reasons to want some thing are provided by facts, not about what we want, but about having this desire. These reasons we can call state-given. Such reasons can also be either intrinsic or instrumental.7
In other words, facts provided by the very attitude, and not the object of the attitude, introduce what Parfit calls state-given reasons; and facts that have to do with the object of the attitude introduce object-given reasons. How does this distinction offer a solution to the WKR problem? Suppose we have identified a reason for favouring an object. Given this, we can ask: Is our reason for favouring the object an object- or a state-given reason? The straightforward solution on offer at this point is to claim that the right kind of reason will always be an object-given reason, and the wrong kind of reason always a state-given reason.8 Recall the example of the saucer of mud. This is an object without value, as (we are supposing) is the demon. In cases (i) and (ii) we seem to have a reason to admire the object (the saucer or the demon), but the properties that provide these reasons are of the wrong kind: they belong to the attitude rather than to the object. If I do not admire the saucer or the demon, I will be punished. This is a fact about the attitudes involved, not about the saucer of mud or the demon. But the success of this approach is not quite as clear-cut as it seems to be. There is a complication, as Rabinowicz and I pointed out: It is easy to see that for any property P of the attitude there is a corresponding property P’ of the object: If a pro-attitude towards an object a would have a property P, then, ipso facto, a has (or would have, if it existed) the property P’ of being such that a pro-attitude towards it would have the property P. Consequently, to the attitude-given reason, provided by P, corresponds the object-given reason, which is provided by P’. In exactly the same way, of course, for any property P of the object of the attitude there is a corresponding property P’ of the attitude itself: the property of being such that its object has (or would have) property P. Thus, to each objectgiven reason corresponds an attitude-given reason, and vice versa.9
Parfit, ‘Rationality and Reasons’ (2001). Ibid., pp. 21f. Parfit returns to this distinction in his forthcoming ‘On What Matters’. See its Appendix B. 8 Parfit himself denies in ‘Climbing the Mountain’ (circulating ms) and in ‘On What Matters’ (circulating ms) that state-given reasons are reasons for favouring, and so he would deny that there is a WKR problem in the first place. I will return to this approach in a moment. 9 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004a, p. 406). 6
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To differentiate between these two sorts of property—between “object” properties and “attitude” properties—will, then, not obviously serve to remove the present difficulty.10 Now, there might in fact be a rather easy way out of this problem, namely to exclude all relational properties from the supervenience base of value. At least, it might seem we can do this for final value. If it is only among an object’s internal, nonrelational features that we find value-making properties, and if, therefore, final value is nothing but intrinsic value, which the object has in virtue of its internal features alone, then the WKR issue seemingly will never arise. And so it can be argued, then, that not every kind of FA analyst has this problem to contend with—only those, like me, who consider final value to be extrinsic in some cases.11 There is a rejoinder, however, that questions the idea that the WKR problem only arises for final extrinsic value. All we need to do is to find an object whose internal features are such that they provide us with a reason to favour the object despite the fact that it is obviously not valuable. If there were such an object we would have to be able, as FA analysts, to distinguish the sort of reason involved in such a case from the kind employed in an FA value analysis. Perhaps there are such objects. Rabinowicz recently suggested to me (personal communication) that a fact of the following kind might be an example: I will be punished if I do not favour this fact (that I will be punished . . . ). This is a peculiar fact—a self-reflexive one. It does seem to give me a reason to favour the threat. So if we are ready to accept this particular kind of fact, then it does seem as the nature of this sort of reflexive fact is such we have a reason to favour a valueless object in virtue of In ‘How to Deal with Evil Demons: Comment on Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’ (2005), Phillip Stratton-Lake is worried that if we tolerate such properties as that of being an object whose favouring would have property P, we will end up with an objectionable ontology. This might be true if all such ‘mirror properties’ had an ‘imaginary’ touch to them, but this is not the case. For examples of more robust object properties that reflect the properties of the attitudes, see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004a, p. 407). For example, take the case of the demon who demands that we admire him rather than the saucer of mud, and who makes it clear that he will strike us if we do not. We seem to have a reason to admire the demon which is of the wrong kind. That the demon is disposed to strike is not something that makes him admirable or valuable in a positive sense. Nonetheless, his disposition to hurt us provides us with a reason for admiring him. But this feature of the demon certainly is a most robust feature. 11 Even if we were to allow relational properties among the value-makers, could we not get rid of the WKR problem by qualifying the supervenience base in some way? For instance, I discussed the following example with Heath W. White (personal communication): consider a thick value such as praiseworthiness. We might want to say that if, and only if, a property contributes to the overall purpose for which we have the general practice of praising can it be a praiseworthy-making property. So if we were to find some object that does not contribute, or even runs counter, to this overall purpose, we could be sure that it is not valuable. But whether or not we believe that there is such an overall purpose, this is not the way to handle WKR problems. Suppose we did argue that a certain alleged valuable object cannot be valuable, because the properties in virtue of which it is claimed to be valuable are not, or are not consistent with, the properties belonging to ‘real’ valuable objects. But is it possible to determine the purpose of the practice of praising without taking a stand on what are the right and wrong reasons for praising? I suspect it will be quite hard to do so. In other words, if what we do here is merely set out from a substantive view of the right kinds of reason, we have not achieved very much. In this particular case, I think it would be a mistake to restrict the properties on which praiseworthiness depends in the manner suggested above. Why should we be excluded from praising someone just because he or she, say, tries to change the practice of praising? 10
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its internal features alone. Rabinowicz’s suggestion therefore indicates that the WKR issue has a more general relevance than what Rabinowicz and I originally believed (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004a). At least certain objects give rise to the WKR issue in virtue of only their internal features.
3.2 Dual-role attitudes Several attempts to deal with this sort of problem have been made. The following suggestion is one that Rabinowicz and I have considered: On the FA-analysis, the value of an object consists in there being reasons to favour the object in question. But favouring is not supposed to be a non-discerning attitude. Rather, the idea is that we are to favour the object on account of some of its properties. These properties, then, appear in the intentional content of the pro-attitude. At the same time, they are supposed to make the object valuable. Consequently, they also provide reasons for favouring the object. Thus, they have a dual role. On the one hand, (i) they appear in the intentional content of favouring as the features on account of which the object is favoured. On the other hand, (ii) they justify favouring the object in that way; i.e., provide reasons for the pro-attitude in question.12
In cases where the right kinds of reason are in play, properties of the valuable object justify our favouring of the object, but these properties also appear in the intentional content of the attitude as those for the sake of which we favour that object. For instance, someone I am fond of, whose friendship I value very much, will call for various pro-attitudes, and these attitudes will have in their intentional content such properties of the friend as his kindness, wit, generosity, and so on. These are the qualities for which I like him. They are part of the intentional content of the attitude. But they also provide reasons for my liking him. Consider now the saucer of mud example again. Here the idea is that we should desire it for its own sake, since doing so would protect us from the fury of the demon. In this case the property that justifies our favouring the saucer of mud for its own sake (i.e. the property of being such that favouring will protect us from the fury of the demon) cannot appear in the intentional content of that favouring as the property on account of which we favour it in this way. The requirement that reasons play a dual role appears to explain why certain cases involve the wrong kind of reason. Unfortunately, however, it cannot handle every kind of case. There are examples in which the reason for favouring an object does play a dual role but is still the wrong kind of reason. To see this, consider the demon case, (ii), in more detail: the demon wants us to admire him for his own sake precisely on account of his determination to punish us if we do not do so (i.e. he wants to be admired as an individual making that threat). Under these circumstances, the dual-role requirement seems to be satisfied: the demon’s determination to punish us if we do not comply with his wish 12
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004a, p. 414).
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provides the reason for our admiration and at the same time appears in the intentional content of that attitude as the feature for which its object is being admired. Certainly, the demon’s determination to inflict punishment if we do not admire him provides us with a reason. But it is the wrong kind of reason, since it relates to a feature that makes him worse, not better.
3.3 Solving the WKR problem? Should we then consider the WKR problem unsolved? Perhaps not. Let us return to the saucer of mud example, and consider what might provide us with a way of tackling WKR cases. Let us call the attitude involved in admiring a saucer of mud W. As we have seen, two sorts of reasons seem to be involved here. That is, certain features of the mud give us a reason not to admire it. (These are, in Parfit’s terms, the object-given reasons for the attitude.) On the other hand, in cases involving a threatening demon, intuitively, we also seem to have reason to admire the saucer of mud, and this reason has to do with the positive effects of having this attitude. Admiring the mud would prevent us from being punished. Now, Parfit argues that the way I have just described this case is not ideal.13 It is a mistake to think that the property of the attitude (of seeing to it that the demon does not carry out his threat) gives us a reason for the attitude W. Rather, what we are given, according to Parfit, is a reason for a second-order attitude: a pro-attitude favouring possession of the first-order attitude of admiring the mud or bringing it about that we admire the saucer of mud.14 John Skorupski has taken a similar approach to the WKR problem:15 Suppose the violin performance is not good, but the evil demon will punish me with eternal torture if I fail to admire it. Is that not sufficient reason for me to admire it, even though it is not good?16
Skorupski then suggests that: . . . we can apply the distinction between reasons to believe or feel on the one hand and reasons to bring it about that one believes or feels on the other. Thus: there is no sufficient reason for me to admire the performance, though there certainly is sufficient reason for me to bring it about
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Personal communication. Personal communication. For clarification of Parfit’s case for saying that we should describe facts about attitudes as giving us a reason to have a second-order attitude towards the attitude, see his ‘Climbing the Mountain’, Chapter X. 15 See also John Skorupski, ‘Buck-Passing about Goodness’ (2007a), and Ingmar Persson, ‘Primary and Secondary Reasons’ (2007). Though the distinctions presented in these works are not identical to Parfit’s, all three works take the same broad approach. 16 Skorupski, ‘What is Normativity?’ (2007b, p. 258). 14
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that I admire the performance, if I can. In other words, in this case there is reason for me to bring it about that I admire something which there is no reason for me to admire. (p. 258)
Skorupski’s solution is then quite straightforward: the wrong kinds of reasons are reasons to cause or bring it about that we have attitudes (say, that you intend to do some action); these should not be confused with the right kind of reasons to favour (say, admire the demon). But Parfit and Skorupski’s contention is surely somewhat contentious. It rests on the far from obviously correct idea that having a reason to adopt an attitude can never give us a reason to actually favour the object of the latter; it is always a reason to bring it about that we favour some object (while not bringing about our actually favouring it). But it is hard to understand on what ground we make this categorical exclusion. What difference between first- and second-order attitudes ensures that only the latter, not the former, can be called for by certain kinds of reason-giving property? (Moreover, it might be suspected that we have smuggled in a substantive conception of reasons in order to shut out the conceptual possibility that a reason to have an attitude provides the subject, in effect, with a fully-fledged reason to favour the object rather than giving her merely a reason to bring about our favouring the object. However, since I am not sure whether this is in fact what is going on here, I will not press this point.17) Suppose we go along with the idea that facts about an attitude do not give us reasons to have the attitude; they only call for us to favour having it. If we are ready to ignore the ad hoc character of this move, we have a way of tackling WKR cases. However, this still does not clear the way for the FA analysis, for, as Rabinowicz and I have previously pointed out,18 a problem remains: we need next to distinguish what makes something a reason for admiring, wanting, or desiring an object from what gives us a reason to a have a second-order attitude to these ‘direct’ attitudes. The challenge is to do this without involving our notion of what is valuable. At the moment I am not sure this can be achieved. It might be replied that we could just say that something X is a reason for an attitude F if and only if X makes F fitting or correct. This would, in effect, be to follow in Franz Brentano’s and A. C. Ewing’s footsteps and regard notions such as ‘correctness’ or ‘fittingness’ as primitive notions in the analysis. Of course, it is never ideal to rest one’s analysis on an unexplained notion. For one thing, it seems quite pointless to replace one obscure notion (value) with another one (correctness, fittingness). If we do not know how to distinguish between considerations that make firstorder attitudes fitting or correct and considerations that make second-order attitudes fitting or correct, nothing seems to be gained by taking such a step. 17 See Andrew Reisner, ‘Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value’ (2009), who proposes a counter-example to Skorupski’s solution: “One difficulty with Skorupski’s view is what I have called elsewhere blocked ascent. In blocked ascent, the evil demon will cause trouble for you if you cause yourself to have the relevant pro-attitude. The only way to get the prize, so to speak, is just to have the pro-attitude. If you are lucky enough to already have it, then necessarily you can have it. So, there can be at least some cases in which the Skorupski solution will fail to provide any reason at all” (p. 388). 18 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004a).
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I would like to consider yet another approach, recently suggested by Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson (2007). What they are proposing is not, according to themselves, identical to the Skorupski (and, we might add, the Parfit) solution. This might, strictly taken, be true. Nonetheless, as I shall be arguing, it is quite difficult to spot any real difference.
3.4 Danielsson and Olson on the WKR problem Danielsson and Olson’s approach is strongly influenced by Brentano. They distinguish to begin with between two sorts of reason for attitudes: a ‘holding-reason’, which they understand as a reason for having the attitude, and a ‘content-reason’, which is a reason for the correctness (or fittingness) of the attitude. To give a holding-reason for an attitude is, then, to provide arguments supporting the idea that we ought to have the attitude. On the other hand, to give a content-reason for the attitude is to argue that the attitude is correct. (We shall return to this notion of ‘correctness’ in a moment.) Moreover, Danielsson and Olson believe that: a content-reason for some attitude, a, implies a defeasible holding-reason. But crucially, that there is a holding-reason for some attitude does not entail that there is a content-reason for that attitude. In other words, that there is a reason to have an attitude does not entail that the attitude is correct. (2007, p. 515)19
The distinction between these two kinds of reason furnishes Danielsson and Olson with a response to the WKR problem. Consider again, the demon case. Danielsson and Olson can acknowledge that the demon does give us a reason to favour the saucer of mud or the evil demon (when the demon insists, on pain of a severe punishment, that we admire him rather than the saucer of mud) but insist that it is the wrong kind of reason. We ought indeed to favour the saucer of mud (or admire the demon), but that is not the correct attitude to take towards the mud (or demon). The authors’ proposal, then, is that “‘x is good’ means that ‘x has properties that provide content-reasons to favour x’” (2007, p. 520). This is a neat suggestion. However, how to distinguish between holding- and content-reasons remains a problem. Danielsson and Olson suggest that we follow Brentano and take correctness as a primitive. As I mentioned earlier, this is obviously not an optimal way of dealing with these issues, but perhaps it is in the nature of things that we are forced to take such a step. So I will not repeat my reservations, but rather address the more interesting issue, namely whether their approach adds something substantially different to the Parfit–Skorupski solution. Danielsson and Olson are quite 19 Later the authors claim that “to say that there is a holding reason to favour the evil demon is to say that there is a content-reason to favour favourable attitudes towards the evil demon, or possibly a content-reason to disfavour the non-occurrence of such attitudes. This implies that favouring the demon is good, which is the right implication; favouring the demon is instrumentally good since it shields us from punishment” (2007, p. 519).
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explicit about this matter: their distinction between holding- and content-reasons does not coincide with the one between reasons for attitudes and reasons to bring it about that one has an attitude (nor with Parfit’s distinction between state- and objectreasons). Notwithstanding this, I think it is hard to see that their approach is substantially different from the Parfit–Skorupski solution. To see this we need to understand in more detail how Danielsson and Olson conceive of the relation between holding- and content-reasons. Consider the following passage: . . . the notion of a holding-reason should be analysed in terms of the notion of a content-reason. To say that there is a holding-reason to have some attitude is to say that there is a content-reason to favour the occurrence of this attitude, or possibly that there is a content-reason to disfavour the non-occurrence of this attitude. (2007, p. 518)
Apparently, the talk about there being two kinds of reason is not entirely accurate. What Danielsson and Olson in effect are saying here is that holding-reasons are nothing but a certain kind of content-reason, namely content-reasons to have second-order attitudes. But if Danielsson and Olson’s approach is to reduce holding-reasons to contentreasons, what difference is there between their solution and the one provided by Parfit and Skorupski? Parfit, for instance, recognizes only object-given reasons for attitudes.20 On his account, there is no reason to admire the demon but a reason to favour admiring the demon. Danielsson and Olson would concur: there is no content-reason to admire the demon, but there is a content-reason for the second-order attitude (admiring the demon). Danielsson and Olson’s talk of “holding-reasons” becomes therefore empty if holding-reasons are nothing but content-reasons for second-order attitudes. Thus, the difference between the two positions seems purely verbal if holding-reasons are analysable in terms of content-reasons.21 Danielsson and Olson also maintain that what we ought to do and what we have the right kind of reason to do do not necessarily coincide. Thus, it might not be correct to admire the demon (in the sense that there is no right reason to do so, and hence no content-reason to do so) even though that is what we ought to do, where this ‘ought’ should be understood in terms of holding-reasons. Intuitively, we do seem to admit that there is a difference between what we ought to 20 Parfit’s ‘On What Matters’, Appendix B (circulating ms), ends in a way that I find puzzling. After making it clear that “we do not, I suggest, have state-given reasons to have beliefs or desires”, he adds the following paragraph: “We may have state-given reasons to be in some other kinds of state. I might truly claim, for example, that I have a reason to be in Paris next April. But as I have argued, such reasons would have no importance. It would be enough to claim that I have reasons to want to be in Paris next April, and to go there, if I can” (p. 426, with reservation for changes). If there can be state-given reasons of this kind, why cannot there be state-given reasons for attitudes? I owe Rabinowicz for drawing my attention to the paragraph. 21 Cf. Gerald Lang, ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’ (2008), who argues (and I believe for different reasons) that Danielsson and Olson’s solution is “uncomfortably close to John Skorupski’s favoured solution to the WKR problem”. That Lang’s view is based in part on a misunderstanding of their views is argued by Olson in ‘The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’ (2009).
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favour and what it is correct to favour. That I ought to favour the demon seems to say something different from that it is correct to favour the favouring, say, of the demon. However, since holding-reasons are just content-reasons for second-order attitudes (of the kind exemplified in the claim that we should admire the demon), then Danielsson and Olson might in effect be said to offer a solution that blurs this distinction. So unless Danielsson and Olson can explain in some other way why we should divide contentreasons in the way they suggest, little will have been gained. Resort to the claim that a certain attitude is correct (as Brentano would say) or fitting (as Ewing would say), and to the further claim that correctness, or fittingness, are primitive notions, is not quite the optimal solution to the WKR problem (cf. Reisner, 2009). The ‘primitive’ way out of the problems with the FA analysis might nonetheless be quite tempting. Let me therefore finally express yet another worry about the Danielsson and Olsson approach. The notion that something is correct is problematic in that there seem to be ways of understanding it that are of limited present interest. For example, it is incorrect in some circles to clean your dinner plate by licking it, but this does not show that we are dealing with a fully-fledged normative notion of correctness here. Nor does the fact that it is correct to drive on the left side of the road in England but not in Sweden express something fully prescriptive. This suggests that we need to distinguish between at least two kinds of correctness: one that is somehow conditional, and one which is not. If we can achieve this without employing or presupposing any value judgement, the Danielsson and Olsson solution will be unaffected. However, if we need to separate the fully normative notion of correctness from the conditional one by invoking value, it will turn out that we are not well served by their approach. At any rate, little can be gained if we are obliged to understand value in terms of a notion of correctness that itself needs to be illuminated by invoking value.
3.5 The biconditional buck-passing account I want to close this chapter with a discussion of another feature of the FA analysis. To introduce this idea it will be convenient to consider what Crisp recently has said are the two key elements of a buck-passing account.22 Crisp thinks we should reject what he refers to as the biconditional buck-passing account on which “whenever something has lower-order properties such that there is reason to respond to it” by favouring it in some way, “that thing is valuable”. One reason this account should be abandoned is that there are what Crisp calls deontological reasons that do not ground value. Here is one example of such a reason: suppose I sincerely utter “I promise to ç”; the fact that I have said these words gives me, according to Crisp, a reason to choose to ç.23 On a biconditional account, “because ç-ing has the property that I have Crisp, ‘Goodness and Reasons: Accentuating the Negative’ (2008). Notice that Crisp formulates the buck-passing account in terms of responses. However, I will for the sake of simplicity and discussion simply assume that choosing to ç is in fact a form of favouring ç If this is to strain the meaning of ‘favouring’, just think of an example in which my promise to ç gives me a reason to favour to ç 22
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promised to do it”, it follows that ç-ing is therefore valuable. But is it? Crisp quite rightly questions this; ç-ing does not seem to be valuable. Noteworthy here is the discovery that we are stuck, apparently, with a WKR problem whether or not we actually think there is a distinction between ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons. As Crisp himself notes, this distinction “has no purchase” when it comes to this kind of example. Crisp goes on to argue that biconditional accounts are eliminativist theories of value; and this, he thinks, is too big a step to take. He formulates what he takes to be the two key elements in a buck-passing account: Negative component: Being good is not itself a reason-providing property Positive component: Being good is merely the higher-order property of having lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond in particular ways. (2008, pp. 263–4)
Of these, he thinks it is the positive component that we need to throw overboard. We should retain the idea that goodness, or value, is not itself a reason-providing property. But is this what we should do? Is it really clear that goodness, or value, is not a reason-provider on its own? At this point one might be tempted to interject that we should give up on the negative component but that buck-passers have no choice: they have to endorse the negative component, qua Buck-passers. This is a mistake, however. Let us therefore consider the matter in more detail, and let us do so from the perspective of the FA analysis. Suppose I am told that an object x is good: someone tells me that I should give money to a certain organization; I believe the organization is good; and this is pretty much all I know about the organization. On the FA approach, what I believe is that x has the property of providing reasons to favour x. Let us focus on this very property. Could it not be argued that it is itself reason-providing? Might not the very property of being a reason-provider provide us with a reason to favour O? In other words, is it not possible that the fact that something is such that it gives me a reason to (say) desire it furnishes me with a new reason to desire it? Now, although I am not quite sure what kind of reason we are talking about here, I am nonetheless inclined to think that we are dealing with some sort of reason. But if the property of providing-reasons-to-favour indeed provides us with a reason to favour,
PR property the property of providing reasons to favour
Figure 3.1
is in itself reasonproviding
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then, obviously, we should give up what Crisp refers to as the negative component of the buck-passing account: goodness (the positive component) in the FA analysis is itself a reason-providing property. In passing, we should recall that the goodness of x provides us with a reason to favour x and not (at least not necessarily) with a reason to favour the goodness of x. This distinction is important not to overlook. We might otherwise end up believing that value accrues to goodness. It does not. It accrues to the bearer of goodness. Goodness plays a role, then: it tells us that certain properties are reason-providers. To shed some light on the issue of whether goodness also is in itself reason-providing, we need next to say a bit more about what a reason is, and in particular about what a normative (i.e. justifying) reason is. Letting ‘R’ refer to a fact, we might follow John Broome and suggest the following: (R1) R is a normative reason to ç iff R explains why we ought to ç24 Suppose this is correct. To believe there is a reason for me to ç (favour something) is to believe, by implication, that there is a fact that explains why I ought to ç But now, if this fact signals that there is an explanation of why we ought to ç we appear to have a reply to the question above. Neither goodness nor value is a reason-provider. This is easily shown on Broome’s account: the fact that there is a reason to ç is not itself a reason to ç since this fact does not itself explain why we ought to ç. Hence, value and goodness are not reason-providers. (R1) needs to be qualified. Explanation is a success notion; if a fact fails to explain something it is obviously not a reason according to (R1). However, as I do not think the notion of a normative reason is a success notion, I find it hard to understand reasons in terms of explanations. But suppose we could find a way of dealing with this complication.25 There is still, I think, a drawback with the Broomean response. Although Broome’s notion catches something important about normative reasons, it seems to fail to capture all there is to our notion of a normative reason. There is, at least, a different notion of normative reason in play, namely: (R2) R is a reason to ç iff R bears positively on the question of whether one ought to ç Pamela Hieronymi has argued that the fundamental relation in which a consideration becomes a reason is something like that adumbrated in (R2).26 (By ‘consideration’ she
24 See Broome’s ‘Reasons’ (2004). I am here simplifying matters. Broome summarizes his view in the following way: “A reason is either a perfect reason or a pro tanto reason. A perfect reason for you to ç is a fact that explains why you ought to ç. A pro tanto reason for you to ç is a fact that plays a characteristic role in a potential or actual weighing explanation of why you ought to ç or of why you ought not to ç or of why it is not the case that you ought to ç and not the case that you ought not to ç” (p. 55). Broome treats ‘explain’ as a primitive. 25 I am not quite sure what Broome would say about this. 26 See Hieronymi, ‘The Wrong Kind of Reason’ (2005).
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T H E B I C O N D I T I O N A L B U C K - PA S S I N G A C C O U N T
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has in mind a broad notion that includes, among other things, facts and propositions; this is how I, too, would regard this notion.) By differentiating the questions, she manages to separate different kinds of reason. For instance, that it is raining bears positively on the question of whether we ought to believe that it is raining. It should be pointed out that Hieronymi wants to deal with the WKR problem in cases of value, as she deals with reasons for belief. The fact that you would get beaten by the demon unless you believe that London is the capital of France obviously does not bear on the question of whether London is the capital of France. Hieronymi, then, goes on to argue that we can reason in an analogous way when it comes to cases of value. But, from the perspective of the FA analysis, this conclusion does not follow. The fact that the demon wants to hurt me unless, say, I favour a saucer of mud, clearly bears on the question of whether we have a reason to favour the saucer of mud (i.e. whether it is valuable). Now, depending on what kind of reason we have in mind (R1 or R2), the question ‘Is the buck-passer’s goodness reason-providing?’ will receive rather different answers. As we saw earlier, on Broome’s account the answer would be a clear ‘no’. On Hieromymi’s account, by contrast, the answer is ‘yes’: the fact that there is a reason to ç is itself a reason to ç, since this fact bears on the question of whether I ought to ç Thus, if you are a buck-passer who does not want to give up on the idea that goodness is a reason-provider, endorsing (R2) rather than (R1) will be of great help; (R2) explains why we should, as FA analysts, throw the negative component of the buck-passing account overboard. Embracing (R1) (with the proviso mentioned) on the other hand, paves the way for the negative component. FA analysts have, in other words, a choice: they may or may not throw the negative component of the buckpassing account overboard.27
27 Cf. also Mark Schroeder’s recent ‘Buck-Passers’ Negative Thesis’ (2009). Schroeder contests what he refers to as the “buck-passing inference” (p. 342)—that the negative thesis follows from the positive one.
4 Mistaken Value Analyses
The general aim of this work is to develop a novel way of understanding values that we regard as personal, i.e. as being in some way good or bad for us. Sometimes what has personal value will also have an impersonal value. This fact complicates matters in more ways than I care to think about. What if these values conflict with each other? How do we compare them? Which should we give priority to? These and many other questions are all important; but although I will have more to say about some of the issues later on, I have had to leave out the general question about the relation between personal values and other values. My own welfare and well-being are examples of something having both kinds of value.1 Certain of my mental states are good for me, but such states, regardless of whether they have value-for me, might also carry impersonal value. The link between good-for and welfare or well-being is tight, though. In fact, numerous writers treat this connection as analytic. This is not obviously the best way to regard the relation between these notions. Depending on what one takes it to be, well-being might be just one of the things that exemplifies value-for. Other ‘things’ might carry value-for as well. In what follows I will examine various possibilities of this sort. I will seldom discuss well-being. This does not reflect my view of its importance. Most examples I discuss will, most likely, not be especially important values—not by comparison with the value of well-being at any rate. But the less important values need to be understood if we want to obtain a complete picture of value. Moreover, in my experience it is often easier to discuss cases that appear to be rather trivial. It is easier in the sense that one can focus on what is really relevant. Here is an example of a putative personal value which I am inclined to say carries no impersonal value. My father made a bookshelf for me when I was a child. It was, perhaps, not an aesthetic revelation—more a piece of robust and heavy furniture that served its function well. As an adult I took it with me as I moved from place to place 1 I do not take well-being and welfare to be the same. However, in what follows I will not pay any attention to these differences, since they are not of crucial importance to what is discussed.
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(a bookshelf always comes in handy). Each time it looked more and more shabby. At one point, it was in such a bad state that I decided to get rid of it, and finally I got around to throwing it away. Or so I thought. Now, many years later, bits of it still pop up in the most unexpected places. I find this quite amusing, and I have begun to wonder whether, in my own life, I shall ever see the back of this item of furniture. These screws, shells, wood pieces, ornaments, and so on, hardly have impersonal value, but they do seem to carry some sort of value for me. However, it would be a gross simplification to conclude that personal values, and in particular those that are not also of impersonal value, must all be found in objects relating to one’s past. I mention these examples since they appear to me as more obvious. All examples of personal value have this much in common: they are receptive to the FA pattern of value analysis. What we need to do is fine-tune the relevant analysans so that it brings into the analysis a reference to the person whose personal value it is. But here a caveat is in place. This requirement on the analysis (that it should somehow bring in the person whose value it is) is ambiguous. It might refer to what is perhaps best described as an owner claim relation between the value and the person whose value it is. Like G. E. Moore, to whom I will return in a moment, I have a problem with this kind of view. The suggestion I endorse sets out from another idea, namely that personal values are just like other kinds of value but for the fact that they stand in a certain relation to some person (or perhaps group of persons). But this relation has nothing to do with the value being ‘his’ or ‘her’ private value. Here, then, is how I want to modify the standard analysis, where FAP stands for the Fitting Attitude analysis of Personal value: FAP: An object x’s value for a person a (i.e. x’s personal value), consists in the existence of normative reasons for favouring/disfavouring x for a’s sake FAP is not as original as I once thought when I proposed it in a series of talks in 2004; there are points of contact between it and the view Stephen Darwall takes on welfare. There are also some important differences, though; but more about this later, in Chapter 8. Also, as we shall see in Chapter 7, there is a chance that Henry Sidgwick understood good-for along the lines of FAP. The analysis is stated in terms of reasons and pro- and contra-attitudes; as may be recalled, “favour” is a notational alternative to “having a pro-attitude”. In the chapter that follows I will say something more about how I understand the reason component of FAP. The notion of a pro-attitude (and with the proper adjustments, a contraattitude) is here understood to cover quite a large set of different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer. I will not try to specify what makes a certain mental state into a pro-attitude. I trust that this notion is sufficiently clear to render FAP intelligible. Some cases will clearly fall outside FAP. To feel thirsty or hungry would not, in my view, count as having an attitude. Other cases will be more difficult. What should we say, for instance, about a specific kind of thirst—say, feeling thirsty for orange juice?
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There are all sorts of problems involved here, but I will not pursue them.2 (FAP will eventually be modified somewhat in Chapter 5, where I seek to say something more detailed about one feature of the attitudinal element.) As to the variable x, it should be understood as gathering a wide variety of things, including living beings (persons and animals that carry the personal value to x). One advantage with this pattern is its wide range: very many different kinds of value are analysable in terms of the same general formula. But perhaps more important, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude, rather than reason, part, the analysis allows that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value but everyone else too. In this way we avoid introducing two completely different notions of value, one impersonal and the other personal. Of course, it is not immediately obvious why not having two completely different notions of value is a good thing. Why, for instance, should we not locate the distinguishing mark in the much-discussed agent-relative/neutral dichotomy? Just as personal values are well suited to be understood in terms of agent-relative reasons, so impersonal ones appear connected to agent-neutral ones. One can imagine that this might indeed come in handy. However, as will emerge in Chapter 9, there are powerful reasons to be wary of such a move. However, for the time being I will not discuss in any more detail just how we should understand the normative component of the analysis. Moore saw that there is something intuitively odd about the idea that value is relative. His scepticism is shared by many philosophers, though. A more recent opponent of good-for is Donald H. Regan, whose views I will return to in Chapter 7. Regan expresses well what is strange about this notion: The good for Abel must be peculiarly Abel’s—the goodness or the value must be peculiarly Abel’s—in a way that the mere occurrence of universal good in Abel’s life does not necessarily satisfy. But if the good for Abel is peculiarly Abel’s—if its value is somehow essentially a value for Abel—then why indeed should Cain care? We think there is a deep connection between value and reasons. That suggests precisely that if the good for Abel is a matter only of value for Abel, then it creates reasons for Abel, and for no one else.3
However, notice that even if you think that value-for is a coherent notion which does not depend on value period, it does not follow that it must be analysed in terms of agent-relative reason. Connie Rosati has argued in ‘Objectivism and Relational Good’ (2008) that these reasons may be agent-neutral. She suggests, contrary to Regan, that
2 See Thomas Scanlon (1998), where the issues are delineated in the following way: “The class of attitudes for which reasons . . . can sensibly be asked for or offered can be characterized, with apparent but I think innocent circularity, as the class of ‘judgment-sensitive attitudes.’ These are attitudes that an ideally rational person would come to have whenever that person judged there to be sufficient reasons for them and that would, in an ideally rational person, ‘extinguish’ when that person judged them not to be supported by reasons of the appropriate kind” (p. 20). 3 See Regan, ‘Why am I My Brother’s Keeper?’ (2004, p. 211).
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the notion good-for does not involve a relativization of normativity or goodness. When I started writing on personal values in 2004 (later published as ‘Analysing Personal Values’ (2007a)), I had the same thoughts as Rosati. The way to avoid the problems that Moore pointed to was to understand these values in terms of agent-neutral reasons. I now believe that the real distinction between good and good-for is not to be found in the reason element, but rather in the kind of attitude that is called for. More about this in the coming chapters, though. Moore’s sound scepticism about ‘private’ values led him astray, to the mistaken conclusion that we should give up the notions of good-for and bad-for altogether (or at the very least be aware that these expressions are elliptical). His arguments are not convincing, as I shall argue in the next section. We need not give up these notions. We just have to find a more appealing account of good/bad-for than the one Moore objected to.
4.1 Moore’s objection to good-for In his much-discussed attack on egoism in Principia Ethica,4 Moore expresses great scepticism about certain ways of understanding the expressions ‘my own good’ and ‘good for me’:5 What then is meant by ‘my own good’? In what sense can a thing be good for me? It is obvious, if we reflect, that the only thing which can belong to me, which can be mine, is something which is good, and not the fact that it is good.6
The passage is bewildering (perhaps especially as it comes from Moore). First, Moore is, of course, right that the fact that something is good is not something that can belong to me. Facts are not the kind of object that can be in someone’s possession. But this does not force us to say that ‘my own’ in ‘my own good’ cannot refer to anything but the object that is valuable and hence cannot refer to the value itself. It is quite surprising that Moore in the first place takes our relation to facts to be an issue. It is hard to believe that any of Moore’s opponents would actually disagree with Moore on this matter.7 It is important to underline the fact that Moore cannot simply assume there are no facts about ‘my own good’. As yet he has given us no reason to suppose that there are 4 For a classic and quite devastating objection to Moore’s attempt to show that the doctrine of egoism is self-contradictory, see C. D. Broad’s ‘Moore’s Ethical Doctrines’ (1942). 5 As Rosati (2008) has recently put it: “Moore appears to have found the expression ‘good for me’ akin to the peculiar expression ‘true for me’” (p. 324). Rosati’s interesting paper contains detailed discussion of not only Moore’s, but also some modern objections to the notion good-for. Her idea that critics of this notion “need not be understood as advocating that we purge ordinary discourse of good for talk (as if we could do that), or even (more realistically) that we theorists refrain from such talk” is, I believe, correct. Of course, it remains possible that Moore was trying to make us stop using the expression ‘good for’. 6 Moore, Principia Ethica (1993 [1903a], p. 150). 7 It may be that, in concluding the passage quoted with the words “and not the fact that it is good” Moore intended no more than to assert that goodness is not something that can belong to a person. However, whether or not this is true, it does not change our assessment of what Moore accomplishes argumentatively.
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not two different kinds of value fact: one, that something is good, period (for everyone), and another, that something is good for person a. The states of affairs involved in these two cases may well, when they obtain, constitute two different kinds of fact. Here is Moore’s own conclusion as to what we can mean by ‘my own good’: When I talk of a thing as ‘my own good’ all that I can mean is that something which will be exclusively mine . . . is also good absolutely; or rather that my possession of it is good absolutely. The good of it can in no possible sense be ‘private’ or belong to me; any more than a thing can exist privately.8
Again, if it is not merely that it is mine or that it exists that is valuable, but the thing itself, then Moore has not shown that the value of such an entity cannot, in an interesting sense, be private. If there is something like a peculiar ‘good-for fact’, then it will be a fact for everyone, since facts are not the kind of thing that can be in someone’s possession. But this should not prevent us from saying that the fact contains a ‘private’ element that makes it distinguishable from facts involving good, period. Moore’s objection to understanding ‘my own good’ as meaning anything but that which is exclusively mine carries an absolute good must be understood in the light of his criticism of egoism—a view he believes he can refute. Moore is not easy to follow here, but a core idea concerning his objection to ‘my own good’ seems to be a claim to the following effect: (1) To be a good at all, the good must be (a) good in itself, i.e. an intrinsic form of goodness, and (b) a ‘universal good’ (cf. pp. 150–1)9 Moore’s famous attack on egoism and the idea of something being ‘good for me’, which runs over several paragraphs, boils down to this very idea that to be a good at all the putative good must be a universal intrinsic good. However, he does not support the idea—at least, not in a persuasive way. Therefore, the attack is in effect not so much an argument as an assumption that Moore is asking us to join him in making, or work with. He has not given us any convincing reason why the notion good-for should be rejected. As mentioned, Moore is not alone in finding the notion of good-for objectionable. Thomas Hurka (1987) argues: As currently used, ‘good for’ is multiply ambiguous, and for none of its meanings is ‘good for’ the appropriate term. (p. 72)
For this reason Hurka thinks it should be “banished from moral philosophy” (p. 72). The senses he lists are: “‘good for’ means satisfies the desires of, or further the interests
8
Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 150. The notion of a ‘universal good’ is left undefined. A natural interpretation (especially since he is discussing Sidgwick’s view on the matter) is that Moore has in mind everyone’s good. 9
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of”; it may also mean “good from the point of view of ”; what is ‘good for’ a person may be what “she believes good”; and finally it can “mean that portion of the good (from whatever point of view) that falls within a person’s own life” (pp. 72–3). Hurka has misgivings about all of these suggestions. I share these, and do so for the reasons he gives. However, as I hope to make plausible by developing an analysis of the notion, this does not mean that ‘good for’ cannot be given, or associated with, a single sense of its own.10
4.2 Instrumental value FA analyses of final impersonal value say that an object has final value if there is reason to favour it for its own sake. Applied to final personal values the FA approach adds that the attitude must be of a certain kind: it must be a favouring of x for a person’s sake. (This kind of attitude has not received much attention in the literature, so we shall need to examine it below in Chapter 5.) An object of impersonal value is then said to be instrumentally valuable if there is reason to favour it for the sake of its effects. In the case of instrumental personal value we have, on the analysis, a reason to favour, for a person’s sake, something for its effects’ sake. Here it is important to pause for a moment, though. For this analysans is, of course, only plausible to begin with if instrumental value is a genuine kind of value in the first place. However, this is not obvious. Standard suggestions—such as ‘x has instrumental value’ means x is conducive to something that has final value—are not very helpful if the aim is to find out just what the speaker means by ‘instrumental value’. Such suggestions tend to leave us in the dark with regard to whether x is a bearer of something that belongs to the category of value or whether x is merely related in some way to something belonging to this category. In other words, to say of an x that it is an instrumental y does not yet determine whether or not x is a kind of y. What happens here is something that seems to occur with many expressions we employ to qualify something. Just as ‘quicksilver’ does not refer to a kind of silver, ‘instrumental value’ may not refer to a kind of value. In the literature it is possible to detect at least two distinct usages of ‘instrumental value’. To begin with, there is what I will refer to as the Strong evaluative sense: S: ‘x has instrumental value’ means ‘x bears a (certain particular) value, and it does so only if x is conducive to (the existence of something with) final value.’
10 Regan (2004) suggests that instead of speaking about good-for, we would do better to employ “goodness occurring in a person’s life”. Rosati has convincingly shown, I think, that this notion of a value occurring in a person’s life faces a number of difficulties of its own. More importantly, she shows, too, that what is “picked up” by good for is not covered by the notion of “goodness occurring in the life of ”. I will return to Regan’s views in Chapter 7.
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The second conjunct here is open to more than one interpretation; but since I have considered these elsewhere, I will keep things simple and side-step the complications that ensue.11 For instance, George Dickie’s way of expressing the traditional distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goodness suggests that he takes the latter to be a kind of value: ‘‘Philosophers distinguish between intrinsic goodness, which is good all by itself (independent of its relation to anything else), and instrumental goodness, which is the goodness that something has because it is a means to something else which is good” (1979, p. 157; my emphasis). Here Dickie appears to assume that there are at least two kinds of goodness: intrinsic and instrumental.12 The point I wish to emphasize is that the value described in S should not be confused with instrumental value in the Weak evaluative sense: W: ‘x has instrumental value’ means ‘x is conducive to (the existence of something with) final value’.13 In contrast with their stronger cousins, weak instrumental values do not belong to the category of value. But, it might be asked, is not that which leads to something of final value a good example of something with a kind of value—namely, the kind of value accruing to objects that lead to what is of final value? The suggestion implied here seems to set out from the idea that ‘being valuable’ is somehow part of the meaning of ‘being conducive to value’. But that is surely a mistake. Notice that the definiens says, merely, that x is conducive to what is of value. There is no reason why ‘being valuable’ should somehow logically follow from the meaning of ‘being conducive to value’. To conclude that what is conducive to value must therefore be of value is to commit what we might dub the value-by-association mistake. Since the expression ‘instrumental value’ is equivocal and does not, in itself, clearly exclude either S or W, we will have to turn to metaethical theories of what constitutes value to settle what an instrumental value is. (That is to say, we need here something more than value’s supervenience base; we need some kind of account of how it is that the subjacent properties ground or constitute the value.) Meta-theories of value might imply, of course, that there is only one way of understanding ‘instrumental value’. In that case, we should expect a reason for this exclusion. For my own part, I believe that there are S-values. Moreover, I think that FA analysis gives us a good account of
11
Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002b). See also R. T. Allen, The Structure of Value (1993, p. 59), in which the author seems to assert that the instrumental value of objects is ‘realized’ when we use these objects. Cf. Robert Nozick’s claim “[ . . . ] there is something’s originative value which is a function of the value it newly introduces into the world, the new instrumental or intrinsic value it introduces that was not presaged by or already fully counted in previous instrumental value’’ (1981, p. 311). 13 Johan Brännmark has pointed out that there might be a structurally similar but nonetheless different sense of instrumental value—one relating the instrument to a goal rather than to a value (personal communication). I think he is probably right, but I will not discuss the suggestion further. 12
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A B A D A P P RO A C H T O P E R S O N A L VA L U E
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them as objects that we have a reason to favour for their effects’ sake.14 The important thing is to be aware of the two senses, S and W. I will not argue for this contention. Doing so would lead me astray. The point I wish to make clear, however, is that the analysis of instrumental value mentioned earlier is an analysis of an evaluative notion of instrumental value.
4.3 A bad approach to personal value I now want to open a discussion of the two key elements of FAP—the attitude and normative parts—by considering an approach which, in my view, is mistaken. This approach quite naturally suggests itself. It sets out from the notion of extrinsic final values. What it suggests is that the road to an understanding of personal value is clear once we accept the idea of extrinsic final value. Thus, according to what I will refer to as the De Facto Attitude analysis of Personal Value (or DEFA), personal values make up a subgroup of extrinsic values. As I say, DEFA is not a good approach to personal value. However, it might prove useful to glance at this erroneous alternative if that helps us to appreciate the merits of the more serious suggestion presented in the next section. DEFA is arrived at by the following path. If final values can be extrinsic—i.e. accrue (at least, in part) to objects in virtue of their non-internal relational properties—we can expect some object of extrinsic value to carry this kind of value in virtue of its relation to a particular person. Once value is relativized to persons in this way, the stage is set for an analysis of personal values: we need, next, to specify the relata to which personal value accrues more carefully. This must be done in order to distinguish personal value from other kinds of extrinsic value accruing to objects merely in virtue of being related to a person. Intuitively, it seems reasonable to assume that a personal value is something more than a value that is related to a person. We need, that is, to analytically separate from each other cases like the following: Napoleon’s hat and a drawing made by my five-year-old daughter. It can certainly be argued that Napoleon’s hat has some kind of final, impersonal extrinsic value.15 Even if Napoleon never endorsed any evaluative judgement whatsoever about the hat, it might still be of value because it belonged to, and is famously associated with, a historically important person. My daughter’s drawing, on the other hand, is unlikely to have impersonal value. It appears rather to be a carrier of personal value, if it has value at all. Suppose we accept these examples in the terms they are described. The question then is: How should we account for the difference? What makes the first example a case of impersonal value and the other a case of personal value? 14 This will particularly be the case if we take into account the fact that “favour” refers not only to various different attitudes but also to attitudes-cum-behaviour and perhaps even to choices. That the latter possibility should be taken into account was pointed out to me by Brännmark (personal communication). 15 Cf. Shelly Kagan, ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’ (1998) and Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000).
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The role that Napoleon played in the past, and my, and my daughter’s, historical insignificance, may explain why the hat has impersonal value while the drawing does not. But these facts do not account for the fact that the drawing, and not the hat, has personal value. Here we need to look for something else. A natural strategy would be to search for something special about the two salient objects involved in the drawing example, i.e. the drawing x and the person a for whom, ex hypothesi, the drawing has personal value. On the face of it, it is likely that a as a matter of fact favours the drawing. DEFA could, but need not, be cast in some kind of fitting analysis mould. That is to say, it could say something to the following effect: x has personal value for a if and only if we ought to favour x in virtue of the extrinsic property that x is de facto favoured by a. Thus, my daughter’s drawing would have personal value only if the value accrued to it in virtue of being an object that is favoured (say, cherished or esteemed) by me, a. Whatever intuitive appeal it has, however, DEFA establishes at most that the value accruing to the drawing is relative; and that is not specific enough if it is personal value we are looking for. It might be objected that DEFA need only make an alternative, and quite reasonable, subjectivist claim, i.e. that we should regard the attitude of a as having value-constitutive powers. This might well be true. However, while the issue between subjectivism and objectivism is not settled in a convincing way, I will allow, as might be recalled, the analysis to reflect this by formulating a neutral analysans. Personal value is in a sense relative: since it is value-for, we need to mention, in analysing it, the person for whom it is valuable—but relative values are certainly not necessarily personal values. In other words, although the inference from “x is a personal value” to “x is a relative value” is valid, the reverse inference is invalid. There are two more reasons why we should regard DEFA with scepticism. First, it places personal values exclusively among extrinsic (final) values. But this seems to be an arbitrary restriction. An account including intrinsic values would be more appealing. Of course, it might be that all personal values are in fact extrinsic final values. A substantive evaluative argument might force us to take such a view. But the issue now is whether we could coherently think that some object x carries value-for in virtue of x’s internal properties and nothing else. I am inclined to think that examples of phenomena of this sort will be fairly controversial. (I will discuss some later on.) But in principle I do not see why the relation picked out by the expression ‘good-for x’ cannot supervene on the internal features of an object alone.16 Second, it is not obviously a necessary condition of something being a personal value that it is valued by the person for whom it is a value. Surely a convincing case could be made, albeit on substantive grounds, for the idea that there can be objects of personal value that are not valued (esteemed, cherished, and so on) by the relevant person.
16
I will return to certain problems with this idea in Chapter 6.
5 For Someone’s Sake
If one wants to understand values in terms of reasons, there seems to be a perfect dichotomy to use—namely, the dichotomy of agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. After all, value-for is a relative notion, and what would be more logical than its connection with agent-relative reasons? However, as I shall argue in Chapter 9, there are good reasons to be cautious about this distinction; we should therefore be equally cautious about understanding the distinction between personal and impersonal values in terms of the dichotomy between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. But whether or not my scepticism concerning the reason dichotomy is sound, the sort of analysis that I am proposing stresses that the defining feature of personal value is not to be found exclusively in its normative element, but is rather located in the analysans’s attitudinal element. Objects of personal value are such that there is reason to direct a certain type of attitude—i.e. what we might call a ‘for-someone’s-sake’ attitude—on them. I believe that these reasons are all agent-relative. Be that as it may, what is typical about objects that are good for, or bad for, persons is that a for-someone’s-sake attitude is called for. This is what distinguishes such values from impersonal ones.1 In this and the next chapter I attempt to add flesh to the bones of these forsomeone’s-sake attitudes (henceforth FSS attitudes). They have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. How we should delineate attitudes in general, and how, in particular, we should isolate FSS attitudes in what follows from, on the one hand, pure non-propositional cravings such as hunger and thirst, and, on the other, purely cognitive beliefs, are matters I will bypass here. As might be recalled, what I have in mind by ‘attitudes’ are not only desires and preferences, but also ‘thicker’ attitudes such as admiration, respect, and love, to mention only a few examples. Moreover, I will assume that favouring (i.e.
1 Given the great variety of values, and given the ‘monotony’, to borrow Kevin Mulligan’s description (personal communication) of the normative, if we are to understand the former in terms of the latter, we had better come up with something more than a reduction of the valuable to the normative; this is precisely what my account purports to do here.
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wanting, admiring, and so on) x is an attitude that differs from favouring y, and that they differ because their intentional contents are different: the former contains a propositional element involving x; the latter, one involving y. I am, then, setting out with the tentative assumption that there might be a special kind of attitude, namely the FFS attitude, which, intuitively, is the kind of attitude we have when we favour x with an eye to someone (else); and that this too is reflected in the intentional content of the attitude, which we describe as favouring x for someone’s sake. Here a caveat is in place. The idiom ‘to do something with an eye to’ is somewhat unclear. Often it means that we are doing something with regard to, in view of, or for the purpose of something. My way of using the expression here and throughout this book is not quite idiomatic, though. As will emerge later on, since I wish to stress that it is the person rather than the effects on or the implications of my favouring for that person that we have in mind when we ascribe personal value to something, I will be as bold as to strain the English and say that we can favour an object with an eye to a person. Unfortunately, there is no simple way to characterize ‘favour x for-a’s-sake’-attitudes. In fact, my own view is that the prospects of specifying the characteristic features of this sort of attitude in a fully satisfactory way are bleak. The fact that they seem resistant to analysis might suggest that they are not genuine attitudes. Perhaps this is so. However, since analysis of these attitudes has been largely ignored by philosophers, to brush them aside at this stage would be premature. Of course, although they remain something of a puzzle, this does not mean that we cannot say anything about them. FFS attitudes are discerning attitudes: like most attitudes, they are directed on objects on account of a particular property, or some properties, of the objects on which they are directed. However, as I shall be arguing, not all attitudes are discerning in the same way. Some discerning FSS attitudes are, as I shall put it, ‘identity-involving attitudes’ (for the sake of brevity I shall refer to these as Identity attitudes), while others are non-identityinvolving.2 To support this categorization, I will later consider two contrasting sorts of discerning attitude, namely love and admiration. Love, I shall claim, falls in the first category; admiration in the second. Different conceptual barriers constrain the kinds of property that can be invoked to justify love and admiration. The kinds of property that typically justify love (on certain conceptions of it, at any rate) are not the kinds of property that justify admiration. In fact there is a good reason to believe that the properties justifying love could not justify admiration. In Rønnow-Rasmussen (2008b), I introduced the distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which refers to two kinds of property differing from each other in the role they play in the intentional content of the attitude (justifiers justify, and identifiers identify). I argued that when it comes to admiration, properties of the admired object play the role of justifiers rather than identifiers, but that in the case of love, properties of the beloved are identifiers. This distinction needs to be further clarified, to be sure.
2
I owe thanks to Christian Piller for these expressions.
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However, once that is done, the distinction will help us to separate two kinds of FSS attitude, both of which are pertinent to the analysans of personal value. It will take some unravelling, in this and part of the next chapter, to make this identifier/justifier distinction comprehensible; and in the course of this unravelling I shall need to touch upon certain issues that have been much debated by contemporary philosophers. Thus I will say something about the intentional content of the sort of attitude that I will be discussing, and as I do so I will run into various problems concerning the sense and function of proper names in an attitude’s propositional content. Since I do not know how to settle these issues in a satisfying way, and since I am not familiar with any theory that provides all the right answers to the intricate problems that arise in this area, I have two options: to omit speculation in this area, or to enter into it regardless of the fact that it is bound to involve claims that are problematic on certain views on reference. With some qualms I have decided to take the latter option. Moreover, I have taken the decision to keep the discussion as simple as possible, and to ignore a number of views that have a bearing on much that I say even if they would not have settled the issues. Of course, I would very much have wanted a general theory about how to understand the propositional content of attitudes to back up some of the points I make in this chapter, but I do not have such a theory. Had I one, I would probably have written a book about this kind of theory in the first place rather than one about personal values. In this and the next chapter I will also say something about the importance of people’s identity. From experience, I know there is a chance that some of my claims will suggest that I take a firm stance against certain views on what matters when it comes to ‘identity over time’, i.e. diachronic identity. But, as I hope will become clear in the next chapter, what I say here is, in my view, consistent with a number of positions regarding who we ought to care for in different possible scenarios.
5.1 Types of attitude Let us begin to fill out the attitude required in the analysis in a more substantive way. To begin with, consider the following two attitudes, where a, as before, refers to some person, and x to some object (understood in a wide sense): (1) a favours x for its own sake (2) a favours x for some other object’s sake Here (1) describes what I shall call a final attitude—the attitude I have, for instance, when I desire pleasure for its own sake. If we take the attitude in (2) to be about x’s effects on the object, then Claim (2) describes an instrumental attitude. I have this kind of attitude when I desire to drink a glass of water for the effects of drinking; drinking gives rise to, say, pleasure. Recall next the content of FAP: an object x’s value for a person b consists in the existence of normative reasons for favouring x for b’s sake.
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What should we say about the kind of attitude referred to in FAP? (3) a favours x for b’s sake Although it may be hard to specify the details of this attitude, it is quite easy to think of examples in which it figures. Here is one: one treats a stranger amicably for a friend’s sake—the stranger being the friend of a friend, say. Interestingly, emotions also seem capable of this sort of construction. For instance, on learning that someone for whom we care has had good fortune, we are glad for his or her sake. Here is another example: I sometimes want to go to the theatre for my wife’s sake. She enjoys a good play, and although I frequently fail to see what is so good about these plays, I want nonetheless to go. Not for my sake, but for hers.3 To avoid yet another possible misunderstanding, it should be clear that FFS attitudes, and attitudes-cum-actions (and perhaps emotions) need not involve other people and frequently do not do so. I take it to be uncontroversial and familiar to most of us that we often favour things for our own sake. For instance, I may desire to know for my own sake whether or not I have a fatal illness, and I may have this desire whether or not I have the further desire to know this for my family’s sake. It is not especially hard to find other examples. Here is a different example which suggests that we can believe that something has personal value without us knowing whose values they are. As a tourist I have visited a number of churches and I have often overheard comments from other tourists that one should not behave in certain ways for the sake of the religious believer. People are supposed to treat, say, the statues of Madonna as special objects for the sake of people attending worship. Two kinds of FFS attitude in particular are relevant to my analysis of personal values. One is needed to understand final personal values, and the other to understand instrumental personal values—as is the case with impersonal values, personal values can be final (as when something is finally good4 for us) or instrumental (as when something is good for us as a means). There may be other sorts of personal value too, such as personal contributory value. However, I will mostly be discussing final personal value, which is the most interesting sort. I propose to explain final personal value in terms of what I shall call final FSS attitudes (FFSS attitudes for short): (4) a favours x for its own sake for b’s sake
3 So what is carrying the personal value in this particular case? The play? Perhaps, but it would be somewhat strained to say the play gives me a reason to want to accompany her to the theatre. More reasonably, what is valuable for her is rather seeing a good play together with someone whose company she enjoys. This is more likely to give me a reason to accompany her. I will address objections to the analysis in Chapter 8. 4 ‘Finally good’ should here and in what follows be understood as referring to what is good for its own sake, and not as what is good, at last, or something to that effect.
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In (4), x ranges over abstract as well as concrete objects; and, among the concrete objects, x may refer to things as well as to people. Things as well as persons have value for us. The idea I am advancing here, then, is that one way of understanding the attitude in (3) is to read it as a special case of (4). Of course, the very idea that we can favour something for its own sake for someone’s sake is counter-intuitive and linguistically awkward. Let us therefore consider in more detail what this sort of qualification might mean. Admittedly, the inclusion of two for-the-sake-of qualifications appears at first sight confusing. We might therefore be tempted to understand such descriptions as referring not to a single kind of attitude but rather to a complex consisting of at least two attitudes. This suggestion should not be rejected out of hand. There are, then, at least two salient ways to split an alleged FFSS attitude (such as the one we think is present when a favours x for its own sake for y’s sake) into more basic attitudes. The first is to treat the example as one involving these attitudes: A1: a favours x for its own sake A2: a favours x for b’s sake This is a likely scenario. That is, a person we describe as having an FFSS attitude can, quite naturally, be taken to have attitudes like those in A1 and A2. Certainly, if a favours x for its own sake for b’s sake, then it is true that a favours x for b’s sake in some sense not yet specified and it is true that a favours x for its own sake in some sense not yet specified. However, from this we cannot simply conclude that an FFSS attitude is merely the conjunction of the attitudes in A1 and A2. This becomes evident once we realize that these attitudes are less specific than the FFSS attitude. As we shall see in a moment, they can be made more precise in two principal ways. Meanwhile, consider the following second suggestion as to how FFSS attitudes can be regarded as multipart attitudes. In connection with the example above, the idea is that we should take the FFSS attitude to be a combination of these attitudes: A1: a favours x for its own sake A3: a favours A1 (i.e. a favours favouring x for its own sake) for b’s sake Notice that A3 is a normal second-order attitude. There are at least two problems with this deployment of A1 and A3. I shall confine myself to the more obvious of these.5 A1 and A3 cannot be the whole story behind FFSS. (The points I shall now make apply mutatis mutandis to the combined deployment of A1 and A2.) This becomes clear once we realize that A3 can be made more precise in two main ways: we can favour A1 either as a means (i.e. we can favour it for
5 The second problem (whose details would require considerable unravelling) has to do with the fact that if the only thing we favour when we are having an FSS attitude is another attitude, it would appear to follow, given the pattern of value analysis employed in this work, that the only kind of object that could have personal value would be other attitudes.
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the effects it has on something else) or non-instrumentally (i.e. for its own sake). Suppose it is the latter we have in mind. In that case we are back where we started, namely with an FFSS attitude. For the attitude described in A3 has the same form as the typical FFSS attitude: a favours some object x (e.g. the attitude referred to in A1) for its own sake for b’s sake.
5.2 Sake, end, and objective FFSS attitudes seem to involve an ability to harbour attitudes for someone else’s sake—an ability, by the way, that appears to be an important part of empathy. To recognize that something is of personal value to a, on this line of reasoning, is in some way to echo, for a reason, a favouring that a has or ought to have vis-a`-vis the object of value for a’s sake. One might object that if we take this route we shall be left stranded with two notions of personal value: one employable only by the person for whom something is a personal value and another for those who recognize that something carries this person’s personal value. We would have to face, in other words, a first-person value-for, and a second- and third-person value-for. However, this need not follow. The attitude that I am ready to take to, say, the stranger who is a friend of a friend of mine has something to do with my friend’s attitudes to the stranger. But it is hardly my friend’s de facto favouring that I will ‘take over’. Rather it is the kind of attitude that a has reason to take in those circumstances—a reason that has met with my approval. Given this, I cannot see why a’s claim that something has personal value should not be analysed in the same way. These speculations apart, the following response—with the focus on final rather than instrumental pro-responses—can be anticipated: make up your mind! Either you favour x for its own sake or you favour it for your own sake. You cannot have it both ways. Actually, I am convinced that we can have our cake and eat it here. At any rate, I have failed to identify a single, precise content of ‘a’s sake’ that cannot be combined with ‘favouring x for its own sake’. This seems to suggest that the word ‘sake’ is ambiguous: it does not necessarily have the same content in sentences containing ‘for its own sake’ and those containing ‘for a’s sake’. Two things in particular complicate the evaluation of these FFSS attitudes. First, we should keep in mind that ‘favours’ is used here as a technical term that covers a wide range of attitudes. So what is possible with regard to one kind of attitude may be impossible with regard to some other kind of response. However, I have not found a clear example of an attitude that could not take the form of ‘a favours x for its own sake for b’s sake’ (or the instrumental attitude ‘a favours x as a means for b’s sake’). Of course, when we look at more specific attitudes various issues will arise. Still, since I obviously will not be examining all of the different attitudes covered by ‘favour’, we should watch for questionable generalizations on this matter. There might well be attitudes that cannot be transformed into the ‘for someone’s sake’ pattern. Evaluation of the FFSS attitude is problematic, secondly, simply because it involves awkward, unnatural-sounding descriptions. In general, it is surely a good policy to be
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suspicious about descriptions of this sort. But, of course, the fact that we need an unnatural-sounding formulation to capture a complex mental state is in itself no reason to dismiss the associated attitudes on logical grounds. (Moreover, in this particular case the FFSS description is actually an attempt to specify an attitude rather than to give a more general description.) I am inclined to think that the perplexity created by the two for-the-sake-of qualifications derives to a great extent from a particular way of reading ‘sake’. Claims about a’s sake and x’s sake might suggest that I am ascribing, at least to the former, a sake or an end, in the sense of an objective (cf. the German ‘Sache’; see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2000). However, generally, an analysis of attitudes does not essentially require (as a description of a psychological profile might do) reference to an objective in the analysans. This needs to be kept in mind. Moreover, FFSS attitudes may be directed on a large number of different kinds of thing, only some of which can be understood, in a reasonable sense, as having objectives. Furthermore, the kind of final personal value in which I am interested also accrues to objects that often cannot be understood as having objectives (cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2000, p. 48). A poem that my daughter wrote to me, which plausibly carries personal value for me, is a case in point. However, as I hinted above, there is a simpler way of understanding ‘sake’. Suppose all attitudes are either final or instrumental. Obviously, this simplifies matters. I might, for instance, favour something for its part or contribution in a whole (organic unity). However, I am quite sure that the inclusion of a discussion of these attitudes would not change the general picture—other than by making the presentation more complicated. So in what follows I will set these attitudes aside. Supposing, then, that there are only final and instrumental attitudes, I can mean one of only two things by saying that I favour x. First, I might favour x as a means. We might explain this further by saying that we favour x for its instrumental properties, these being the properties that we believe make x causally efficient in some way. That the attitude is directed on a means will then be reflected in its intentional content; this occurs when the instrumental properties are part of the intentional content of the attitude, i.e. when a favours x only for its instrumental properties. As to the second possibility, sometimes we favour x not as a means. In that case x’s being causally efficient is not that for which x is favoured. The features for which x is favoured do not, or at least do not only, include x’s instrumental properties. I propose that we take ‘for its own sake’ to indicate that we are favouring the object in a final, non-instrumental way, as specified above. There need not, therefore, be anything perplexing about having two for-the-sake-of qualifications in our description of an FFSS attitude. There is further complication here. As has been argued in recent years, sometimes we value objects for their own sake in virtue of their instrumental properties (e.g. see Korsgaard, 1983; Brännmark, 2001; Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2002b). The attitudes involved in such cases would have to be distinguished from the two attitudes I am discussing here. I am not sure about the details, but I suspect the intentional content of an attitude might include an object’s instrumental properties, though it would not do
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so only for the sake of their instrumentality or causal effectiveness. Whether this is possible remains to be shown. However, if it is we should be able to differentiate such attitudes from the two I discuss above. To advance the process of clarification, then, I shall take the first and second ‘sake’ in ‘a favours x for its own sake for b’s sake’ to indicate what sorts of property of x and b are part of the intentional content of a’s attitude. If x as well as b are not viewed merely as means, the properties for which we favour x for b’s sake will not be their instrumental properties.6 As to the values understood in terms of these attitudes, the first ‘sake’ in ‘favouring x for its own sake for b’s sake’ specifies that the value accruing to x need not be conducive to something else that is valuable. Final personal value is best described, then, as an end-point value or an ultimate value; this sort of value is not determined by something else being valuable. Similarly, the second ‘sake’ indicates that the favouring attitude is not instrumental. Our attitude is to b, and it is final in the sense that it does not depend on some other favouring. An attitude with the attainment of some objective as its object will only be relevant to the analysis of personal final value if the attainment of the objective is favoured for the person’s sake. It might well be incoherent to interpret the attitude ‘favouring x for its own sake for a’s sake’ in terms of the ‘end/objective’ sense of ‘sake’. Certainly it would be reasonable to request more details about the ‘objective’ a person might be said to have. However, in the ‘end-point value’ sense, there is nothing strange about ‘sake’ referring to one set of properties in the case of x and another in b. Why a particular set of properties supplies us with a reason to finally favour something for a person’s sake is ultimately an evaluative issue; attempts to address this issue will require substantive justification. (Think of the hedonist who only acknowledges that certain kinds of experience are finally valuable; such a person will reject alleged examples of non-derivative final personal values that are said to accrue to things other than experiences of pleasure.) The interpretation of ‘sake’ in terms of b (rather than in terms of b’s objective) is perhaps, therefore, most plausibly understood as being about b’s (discerned) properties. However, at this point it is important to see that the idea that attitudes take as their intentional object properties can be understood in various ways. As I have recently argued (2008b), when it comes to at least one kind of love, and one kind of admiration, the former but not the latter is a bona fide example of an attitude that can, in a certain sense, be said not to take properties as its object. Here, this claim needs to be amplified, so in a moment I shall say a little more about the way love and admiration differ from each other in an important respect. Meanwhile, in order to avoid a possible misunderstanding, let me say something about how I do not understand personal values. Suppose that it is the case that:
6
One more possibility ought to be mentioned. I might have the non-instrumental properties of x and the instrumental properties of b in mind. This would be a complicated (but, I believe, genuine) attitude involving yet another object or person.
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(1) x has final personal value for b. And that the following therefore is true: (2) There are normative reasons to favour x in a final way for the sake of b. That we can have normative reasons to favour something because we favour something else is plausible. But in that case, the question is whether we should understand (2) and final personal value along the lines of (3)? (3) There are normative reasons to favour x in a final way because b is favoured. As one referee from Oxford University Press suggested, this would seem to be confused: “If one has a normative reason to favor x because one favors b, then how can that be a normative reason to favor x in a final way? To have a reason to favor x in a final way is to have a reason to favor x that is not dependent on one’s favoring some other thing.” This is a fair worry. However, my analysis is not assuming the truth of (3). I also want to emphasize that I am not taking (2) to mean (3), and hence, do not understand final personal value along the lines of (3). What follows from (1) is that we should favour x, not as a means but as an end for the sake of b. This is not confused, at least not necessarily, if we understand ‘sake’ as I suggested above. It depends on what role the properties of x and b play in the intentional content of a’s attitude. If your attitude can be directed to two objects, x and b, then there is the possibility that the properties of these objects can play the role of “instrumental properties” or “end-properties” in the intentional content of such an attitude. Moreover, if there are no conceptual obstacles for thinking that the properties of x and b are not instrumental properties in the intentional content (i.e. they are not discerned with an eye to what they can lead to) then I do not see why it cannot be the case that there is facts that call for us to have such attitudes. In other words, if we can make sense of such an attitude, we should also be able to make sense of the claim that there is a reason to have such an attitude. When there is a reason for such an attitude there is an object that carries final personal value.
5.3 Discerning attitudes Although we often invoke FSS (i.e. for someone’s sake) attitudes, it would obviously be desirable if we could describe them in a more precise way. Ideally, we do not want to rest our case on linguistic reports which, in my view, rarely if ever capture the full propositional content of our attitudes. For instance, it is not hugely clarificatory to say that we are dealing with an attitude the propositional content of which is ‘that something is favoured for someone’s sake’. I think the attitudes at issue here display several quite different kinds of propositional content, and I suspect that these contents are seldom of the above-mentioned type. Still, although I am unable to give a full account here, I will at least separate two kinds of for-someone’s-sake attitudes, both of which are pertinent to the analysans of personal value; and I will do so by considering the intentional content of these attitudes.
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I suggested above that it might be incoherent to understand FSS attitudes in terms of the ‘end/objective’ sense. I also said that there is another approach—one pressing ‘end-point value’ into service—and that this approach looks plausible. On that latter view there would be nothing odd in allowing the two instances of ‘sake’ in FAP refer to different sets of properties. In one sense (the precise content of which I will come to shortly) this talk about understanding ‘sake’ in terms of properties is quite understandable. However, this fact should not hide another fact, namely that not all attitudes take properties as their intentional content. Love, for instance, is a bona fide example of an attitude that does not in any obvious way have properties as its object. Moreover, I believe that the most interesting group of FSS attitudes have a good deal in common with love, and so, I think, there is good reason to clarify what is so particular about love. At least, on one conception of it. The notion of love is highly complex. For instance, is it, as different authors have argued, an apprehension of something in the beloved, or an emotional response or perhaps a volitional state that has the beloved as its object? The latter suggestion is Harry Frankfurt’s, and my view, which I briefly touch on in this chapter, is in several respects similar to his, and in particular his account of what he calls “active love”.7 People are inclined to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident if love is depicted, as I think it should be, as an attitude that takes non-replaceable persons as its intentional objects. The extent to which people do in fact display the kind of love depicted here is a matter I leave open. The romantic literature is full of references to this sort of love, though. For instance, consider how W. B Yeats ends his poem ‘For Anne Gregory’: But I can get a hair-dye /And set such colour there, /Brown or black, or carrot,/ That young men in despair/ May love me for myself alone/ And not my yellow hair.
Love is an attitude typically directed on some person. I will not discuss here whether this happens in a more direct or indirect way. However, this much can be said right away: many of our attitudes require for their explanation mention of the fact that we love someone. This lends some support to the ‘indirect’ idea that love plays a ‘master’ role among our attitudes. We love persons, that is, and not, say, the properties of the persons or states of affairs involving the beloved.8 Of course, people can love things other than persons (animals, and perhaps even things, including their cars or football teams). But that apart, we 7 See Frankfurt, ‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love’ (1999a). See also his description of love in ‘On Caring’ (1999b, p. 165). 8 For example, Max Scheler, as Mulligan pointed out to me (personal communication) rejects the property view of love. See Mulligan, ‘Scheler: Die Anatomie des Herzens oder was man alles fühlen kann’ (2008).
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typically love persons but not properties. Now this claim has been contested. In fact, it is not uncommon to find it argued that what we love, when we love a person, is the person’s properties. This idea can be found in Blaise Pascal’s Pense´es.9 He refutes the view that what we love is a person with the observation that when one’s beloved changes in some more or less substantive way one’s love also does. If the change is great enough, the love will eventually fade away. This shows, he concludes, that what one loves cannot be a person. Instead, love is love of qualities: A man who sits at the window to watch the passers-by; can I say that he sat there to see me if I pass by? No; for he is not thinking of me in particular. But someone who loves a person because of her beauty, does he love her? No; because smallpox, which will destroy beauty without destroying or killing the person, will ensure that he no longer loves her. And if someone loves me for my judgment, for my memory, is it me they love? No, because I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where is the self, then, if it is neither in the body nor in the soul? And how can you love the body or the soul except for its qualities, which do not make up the self, since they are perishable? For would we love the substance of a person’s soul in the abstract, whatever qualities it contained? That is impossible, and would be unjust. Therefore we never love a person, only qualities. (Pense´es and Other Writings (1995 [1897], pp. 130–1)
It is not obvious why anyone has taken this argument seriously. If the target is the idea that the qualities of a person have absolutely nothing to do with love, he has a point. However, his observation is not sufficient to establish something that he also concludes, namely that the love of persons is a love of qualities. So why the popularity? For sure, the position has a distinctly unromantic ring to it, which I am sure has some attraction to at least certain people. But this cannot be the whole story. Perhaps the argument benefits from the confusion of this non sequitur with the plausible claim that to love someone is, minimally, to stand in a causal relation to some of his or her qualities. There is some truth to Pascal’s sinister claim, though. Nevertheless it is the expression of either a quite confused idea or, at best, an incomplete description of what it means to love someone. The kernel of truth is, of course, that we love persons in virtue of their properties (I will get back to the complex copula ‘in virtue of’ in a moment). But it is a fallacy to go from this to the conclusion that we love the beloved’s properties. To make this move is to overlook the familiar difference between the cause of an attitude and its intentional object. The object of love is a certain person; and we should not confuse an attitude’s causes with its intentional object. Perhaps these might, in some cases, coincide. The fact that Romeo loves Juliet in virtue of her black hair does not mean that what he loves is the blackness of her hair. Her hair might well have
9
For a critical survey of different positions on love, see Christopher Grau, The Irreplaceability of Persons (2002). This dissertation drew my attention to the fact (among many others) that we owe to Pascal the view that it is the qualities we love, not the person.
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something to do with the fact that he loves her, but it is Juliet that he loves, not a feature of her hair. Let us dwell a moment on this idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude. It plays an important role in what follows. Unfortunately, and surprisingly, there seems to be no suitable word or simple expression that indicates decisively whether we have the content or the causal source in mind. All the candidate expressions are ambiguous. Thus, to say that a favours y ‘on account of ’, ‘in virtue of ’, or even ‘for’—to mention some readily imagined possibilities here—is to say something that can be understood both as being about what caused a to have the attitude and as being about the content of a’s attitude. This is a peculiarity of the languages that I am familiar with. To avoid misunderstandings, it must therefore be kept in mind that I will be using these expressions, henceforth, with the attitude’s content (not cause) in mind, leaving it open whether what caused the agent to have the attitude is also what appears in the content. Although English leaves us in the lurch here, there is a further reason not to forget this distinction between attitudinal cause and content. That it is not a case of philosophical pedantry is clear, I think. Here is a down-to-earth case. (I will touch on an analogous matter in Chapter 9, Section 9.4, when discussing the person who believed God had told her to jump into the water.) Suppose you admire a person for her honesty. If asked why you do so, you might truthfully say something to the following effect: ‘because she is honest’. Now, it is quite likely that her honesty caused you to admire her, but it would also be possible, in a different case, for you to admire her for her honesty even though she is in fact a dishonest person. In short, you may be mistaken about her character, but this is consistent with your admiring her for her honesty. Honesty, here, appears in the intentional content of the attitude, but since the person is not honest, it cannot be what caused you to have the attitude. Again, suppose I like my boss because he or she is generous. It is, of course, possible that his or her generosity caused me to like him or her. But it is also possible that I am deluding myself, and that what makes me like the boss is something quite different—namely, that he or she is my boss, or that my positive attitude will, in effect, make it more likely that I will be favoured by the boss. Clearly the distinction between attitudinal content and cause illuminates these examples. It allows us to understand how people can be mistaken about what they favour, and this is important, since, as a consequence of favouring things for what we take them to be, we sometimes favour them for what they are not. Plainly, properties we wrongly take people to have cannot cause us to have corresponding attitudes. However, this is quite consistent with the fact that these properties appear in the intentional contents of the attitudes. Notice, too, that in distinguishing between cause and content I am not implying that non-veridical attitudinal content is somehow without cause. I am merely saying that, whatever the actual causal story happens to be, what caused the content to be what it is
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need not be what caused the person to have the attitude in the first place (which certainly is one of life’s mysteries). It is an interesting metaphysical question, albeit not one I will address here, just how to more precisely understand what it means to say that a property is contained, exemplified, manifested, or more generally figures in a propositional attitude. These expressions, which are the ones I employ in this work, are, as far as I can see, consistent with classical metaphysical views on property instantiation. Let us now return to the attitude of love.10 I think it is clear that, though it is in many ways a special case, love is not the only attitude that takes persons rather than, say, the properties of the person as its intentional object. Attitudes in general seem to be capable of taking this shape. Suppose, therefore, that the identity of a person can in some way be a feature of the intentional content of the attitude. This would at least be one way of understanding the somewhat cryptic claim that love ‘takes a person as its object’. The supposition can be made, I think, in connection with the sort of love that I am interested in here. Naturally, this ‘essentialist’ claim is not easy to spell out in any more detail; but I would like to provide a further indication of what I am driving at. Love appears to consist in a complex set of attitudinal dispositions. Sometimes these dispositions are activated, and accordingly the person then has the attitude. Love, in such a case, is describable as an occurrent attitude. These dispositions often play no active part in our motivational set-up. When this is the case love can be said to be in a dormant phase, being ready to move out of the motivational background when, for instance, one thinks of one’s beloved, or when one actually sees him or her. Suppose we consider a case of occurrent love. One person is, say, directing an occurrent love attitude on a, the person he or she loves. How should we then express the fact that a’s identity is a part of the attitude? The gist of a suggestion I have previously made (in Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2008b) is this: the identity of the beloved plays an indispensable part in love, in the sense that the persistence of the attitude in question is conditional on the lover’s belief that the person on whom the attitude is directed is identical to the beloved. Unfortunately this idea is not as clear as it needs to be, so let me try to develop it further. What is characteristic of the conception of love I have in mind is that it pictures love as taking a non-fungible (i.e. non-replaceable) person as its object.11 Love, thus understood, is nonetheless quite consistent with what are generally taken to be facts about people’s psychology—namely, that a person can love more than one person at a time, or that one can fall in love with someone b despite already loving a. Love, like other attitudes, can be individuated. Hence, in principle, nothing prevents us from having many such attitudes. In his discussion of love’s constancy, ‘A Conceptual Investigation of Love’ (1973), W. Newton-Smith says much that I am in agreement with. However, what I miss in this otherwise insightful work is an awareness of the distinction between what causes us to love someone and the intentional content of love (e.g. see p. 122, where Newton-Smith uses the expression ‘on account of’ without specifying what he has in mind). 11 This conception of love raises philosophically interesting issues that I have had to set aside here. I discuss some of these in (2008b). 10
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Once love is thought of as an attitude taking a non-fungible (i.e. non-replaceable) person as its object, some interesting but rather counter-intuitive features come to the surface. Perhaps the most vital of these is the following: How should we harmonize the idea that the identity of the beloved is a part of the relevant attitude with the idea that attitudes are in general discerning? By the latter I have in mind, as may be recalled, the idea that our attitudes are directed on objects on account of the properties of those objects. That is, at least some of the properties of the object are exemplified in the intentional content of the attitude. To be more precise, what makes an attitude more or less discerning is that the intentional content of the attitude contains these (discerned) properties to a greater or lesser extent.12 Earlier, in Section 3.2, the dual role of properties in attitudes was discussed. This role adds an extra dimension to this matter. If we take into account the fact that, in a value context and according to a fitting attitude account of value, attitudes are called for, the aforementioned properties will also be what makes the object valuable. That is, these properties will make up the supervenience base of the object (they are subjacent properties). Thus in the case of a unique painting, uniqueness will be what (in part) makes the artwork valuable, or at least more valuable. However, facts about this property will also provide a reason for favouring the object (e.g. for caring for it). We should favour the painting on account of its uniqueness. Can there be entirely non-discerning attitudes?13 Could love be characterized as such? Could properties of a beloved individual be wholly absent from the intentional content of the love borne to that individual? Is this what might be meant by the claim that love ‘takes a person rather than properties as its intentional object’? The old refrain that love is blind might suggest as much. But though we cannot just rule out this possibility, the idea of a non-discerning attitude is somewhat puzzling. Attitudes are discerning in degrees, but it is hard to imagine a wholly non-discerning attitude to an object x, if by this we mean an attitude the intentional content of which does not contain, or represent, any of a’s properties. However, there is in fact another approach to be considered, which looks more viable. This will also improve our understanding of the cryptic idea that FSS attitudes take non-fungible persons as their objects.
5.4 Identifiers and justifiers We need, to begin with, to introduce a general distinction that seems applicable to attitudes generally. This is the distinction between what I shall call justifiers and 12 En passant, recall here that by ‘on account of ’ I have in mind what appears in the intentional content of the attitude; whether that is also what caused the attitude is something I leave open. 13 On certain views on reference, when the content of an attitude only contains, say, a proper name, the attitude is not discerning: such an attitude contains an element that has reference but no sense. What I say in this work about discerning attitudes might, therefore, if these views are correct, concern the special case of attitudes that do contain more than a proper name—that is, they contain some of the properties of the object of the attitude.
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identifiers. We can separate two kinds of property which differ from each other in the role they play in the intentional content of the attitude: justifiers justify, identifiers identify. Later on, this division will help us to understand the two kinds of FSS attitudes. I will be claiming that the identity of the person for whose sake we have an attitude may be a part of the attitude’s intentional content, and that this is consistent with the fact that the attitude is discerning. The explanation is that properties can figure in the intentional content in more than one way. Various conceptual barriers limit the kinds of property we can invoke to justify attitudes. For instance, the properties that typically justify love are not the kind that justify admiration. In fact there is good reason to believe that the kind of property that justifies love cannot be what justifies admiration. This suggests that properties may have different functions, or play different roles, in an attitude. This is true of normal attitudes as well as being true of the more complex FSS attitudes. Thus, I shall argue that, when it comes to admiration, properties of the admired object play the role of justifiers rather than identifiers; but that, by contrast, in the case of love properties of the beloved are identifiers. Of course, this needs to be further elaborated. That elaboration will make it quite clear that there is nothing to suggest that FSS attitudes are not capable of being similarly distinguished. Let me therefore return to the case of admiration, which is in many ways a more typical discerning attitude. We admire a person a for his or her wit, or courage, say. Properties such as these are what make a admirable. They form the supervenience base of admirability, i.e. the set of admirability-makers. Now, these subjacent properties may well play some sort of value-making or attitude-justificatory role in associated intentional contents. Actually both possibilities seem likely. Thus, sometimes when we admire a for his or her wit and courage, the content of the attitude is such that these properties of a appear in it as value-makers, as what makes a admirable. At other times we are not quite sure what it is about a certain object that makes us admire it: we just do. When this happens we are often ready to argue our case, or to take measures to find out what it is about the object that we admire. In such cases the role of the properties is likely to appear in the content as that which justifies the attitude rather than as makers of value. There will also be, I imagine, times when attitudes combine both kinds of content. However, for simplicity’s sake let us just make a mental note of this possibility. Let us again consider love. Here things are different; what causes one to love a person a will to some degree appear in the intentional content, but not obviously as what makes a valuable or justifies one’s love. 14 We might try to express the difference as follows: in cases of admiration we admire a, and a is made admirable by his courage and wit. In cases of love we love a, and a possesses such-and-such properties. That we love a person in the sense I have in mind here is quite compatible with the fact that we may 14
Sometimes we might think that our love is justified. I am just not assuming that to love someone is to regard one’s love as justified. There is ample evidence that people sometimes love persons they do not think deserving of their love.
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have a number of other attitudes to the beloved. For instance, Elly, my wife, has a number of qualities; she is clever, unselfish, and considerate. Her having these properties makes her a good person; her qualities are such that I have a reason to favour her in various ways. These and many other features she has make her desirable, someone that I find worth caring for, and so on. If the qualities were somehow lost, I would stop desiring her for the sake of those properties. I would not necessarily stop loving her. In the admiration case the properties figuring in the intentional content are what make a carry value in the first place (ceteris paribus, they are together what justifies us in admiring a). In the love case, the properties are rather identifiers of a; they do not play any value-making or attitude-justifying role.15 This latter role is instead played by the identity of the person. The properties discerned are what identify the person, albeit not necessarily successfully; and it is the identity of the person that justifies our directing of the attitude on the person. It is important to realize that the properties that function in this way as identifiers are unlikely all to be part of the intentional content. This implies that in order for a property to qualify as an identifier it is sufficient that it contributes to identification—whether veridical or not. (The notion of an identifier is, in other words, not a success notion.) That the content of an attitude does not always encircle the identifiers (of a person) is a complication, and one to which I will return in Chapter 6. For the time being we can set it (and the question why it is important) aside. It might be objected that the distinction between identifiers and justifiers is improperly artificial; there is no real argument for ascribing different functions to properties. Admittedly, there is an artificial flavour to this distinction. Despite this, however, the criticism can be deflected, as I shall show shortly. The matter is complicated, though. So let me in the meantime briefly restate what I so far have claimed. Discerning attitudes are attitudes directed on some object on account of some of the object’s properties. In some cases, some of these properties provide a (right kind of) reason for directing the attitude on the object. Suppose I admire a person a for being W. We can then construct the following schema, where the subscript shows that the arrow signifies the justification relation: W !j admiration of a In other cases, our attitude may be of a quite different kind. Love (at least, a certain kind of love) is perhaps the most obvious example. Since it too is a discerning attitude, it will contain the properties of the beloved in its intentional content. However, these properties will not fit into the above schema. It is not my beloved’s possession of the property W that justifies my love for him or her. Rather, it is the identity of the person that appears to have that function. Despite being present, in the intentional content, the properties do not play the same role here as they do in the admiration case. It is
15 Cf. Robert C. Roberts’s point, made in Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (2003), that “love, in the dispositional sense of attachment... is a construal that identifies the object of concern” (p. 288).
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therefore necessary to interpret the arrow in a different way when it comes to love. To mark this need let us use the subscript ‘ij’ to signify ‘identity-justification’: W !ij love of a16 Now, it is not obvious that ‘justifies’ is the right term for what is going on in the case of love. Certainly, one reaction at this point would be to say that the person who loves a has no justification for his love (on this picture of love). He or she just loves a, period. ‘I-justifies’ would then mark the fact that something other than justification is involved. For the time being, however, I will regard it as an open issue whether we should consider such attitudes properly justified attitudes, or whether we need to look at what is going on here in entirely different terms. When it comes to property-justification, with one important exception all or some of the properties of the object on which the attitude is directed are invoked as justification. The exception has to do with the fact, which attentive readers will have considered, that identity is, of course, a property too. But property-justification does not cover the identity of the object. As to identity-justification, only the identity of the object on which the attitude is (either directly or indirectly) directed is invoked. Having stressed this difference—and it is perhaps important to emphasize, in particular, that we should not merely assume that there are two sorts of justification—I believe it is safe to continue without noting on each occasion whether we are discussing propertyor identity-justification. Henceforth, then, I will stick with the term ‘justification’. We will return later on to the question whether I-justification is really a variety of justification or merely a mark of something else. I am inclined to think the former is the case. For the time being I am more interested in establishing that properties can play various roles in attitudes. Thus, having said that the identity of the beloved is what justifies one in loving this particular person, we still need to allow a role to be played by some of a’s other properties. We need to do this because we have agreed that love is a discerning attitude. Where love is claimed to fit into the above schema—and we can leave it open for the moment whether love is held to be like this for conceptual reasons or merely on occasion—a’s properties function as identifiers of a. Let us therefore return to the complaint that the distinction between the two roles is artificial and of no substance. There is more than one reason to contest this reply. For a start, the distinction is backed up by the observation that we have agreed that certain of our attitudes cannot always be properly justified although they are directed on objects. That is, the relevant attitudes are not justified by invoking the subjacent properties of the object (the identity of the object not included). However, a caveat is in place. The problem is not epistemological. Sometimes we might be more or less unsure what the relevant justification is, but this is not what I am discussing now. The point is rather that 16 I owe David Alm thanks for pointing out (in personal communication) that my first attempt to present the scheme was more confusing than helpful.
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in some cases we acknowledge that an attitude of ours is such that we find ourselves merely having it; we have sided neither with nor against it. The properties of the object are ‘there’ all right, in the intentional content—but they are not doing any job at all as justifiers. We have, as it were, been struck by the attitude.17 In fact, at times we do not merely experience the attitude as something planted in us; we also believe that there are good reasons (either moral or prudential) for us not to have the attitude in question. A similar phenomenon has been discussed at great length by theorists analysing emotions. Take a textbook example. Many people suffer from fear of flying although they know very well that it is much safer to fly than it is to drive a car. Their fear remains unaffected by their belief. Another example is a person who has a certain preference for, say, a particular sexual activity, but who believes that there are good reasons for him not to live out his sexuality.18 Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson refer to these kinds of emotion as “recalcitrant emotions”, and this label catches very well what these affective states are all about.19 As far as I can see, emotions are not the only recalcitrant mental states we have. There are many attitudes that we somehow regard ourselves as having, but which we look upon as alien to the kind of person we wish we were; these attitudes are like uninvited guests that we try to show the door but often just have to learn to cope with. Notice that I am here describing a general phenomenon. I am not saying, for instance, that love should be regarded as an alien, uninvited attitude. It might be like that, but it need not be. I am merely pointing out that sometimes we do not intend to, and cannot, justify a discerning attitude in terms of properties of the object on which the attitude is directed. This strongly suggests that the properties of objects can play various roles in attitudes. The distinction is therefore not a pure invention. There is a sound basis for making it. In fact, a further observation—besides the purely phenomenological one that we sometimes experience ourselves as having an attitude we recognize ourselves as just having—a fortiori strengthens the idea that properties which figure in intentional content may be playing various roles. Thus sometimes we are ready to accept that it is logically legitimate for a person not to provide a justification, cast in terms of the properties of the object, for having an attitude. Of course, it is far from obvious exactly how logical legitimacy should be determined. Much could be said here. I shall merely hint at what I have in mind. In some cases, we seem to accept that people have attitudes that they simply recognize as theirs—we allow them, if you like, and crudely put, to be struck by the attitude. Moreover, we recognize that there is no linguistic ground on which to demand justification for the attitude. Certain attitudes are merely had. 17
This observation has been made by some authors: e.g. see Frankfurt (1999a). A case of this is the Swedish priest who declared in the newspapers in the summer of 2007 that he was homosexual. While he thought it was not a sin to be a homosexual, he did think it was a sin to perform homosexual acts, and he had therefore decided to live in celibacy. 19 See D’Arms and Jacobson, ‘The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (or anti- quasi-judgementalism)’ (2003): “We will say that an emotion is recalcitrant when it exists despite the agent’s making a judgement that is in tension with it” (p. 129). 18
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A typical example is having a desire for something. Consider a person who wants her house painted red. She may have no other ‘justification’ than the fact that she desires to have her house painted red. After a period of indecision she just realizes that it is a red house she wants. By refusing to come up with an answer to the question ‘why do you want it red?’ (other than something along the lines of ‘I just do’) this person is not committing a logical mistake. Compare this case with one in which someone a admires another person. Here, a may not be able to provide a justification for her attitude, but, for logical (i.e. conceptual) reasons, she cannot deny that a justification is called for. To say ‘I admire her for no reason at all’ is to commit a conceptual error, to misuse the term ‘admiration’. ‘I desire a red house for no reason’ is not in the same way a logically strange thing to say. Whether the ‘desire’ case should be handled in the way I propose for love is doubtful, but I will not pursue this issue here. Another tricky issue that I will not go into requires us to say to what extent we can genuinely admire something that we acknowledge not to be admirable. However, notice that whether or not we admit this possibility, it remains the case that, for conceptual reasons, if you admire something, you can always legitimately be asked to justify your attitude in terms of the admired object’s properties. We do not so much love a person for his or her properties as we love him or her regardless of his and her properties.20 As a result, we cannot (nor do we recognize the need to) supply a justification for our love cast in terms of the beloved’s discerned properties. This, in its turn, explains why we sometimes feel that we are not in a sense responsible for having the attitude. However, on this view of love we are stranded with a problem. For supposing that attitudes are never wholly non-discerning, we need to understand what role properties do play in the attitude. I suggest that the distinction between identifiers and justifiers accounts for this.
5.5 Two kinds of FSS attitude Let us now return to the FSS attitudes mentioned in the analysis of personal value. I repeat (3) above from Section 5.1, then: (3) a favours x for b’s sake Now it might seem tempting to ask what this kind of attitude resembles more, love or admiration. However, since ‘favours’ is but a notational alternative to ‘has a pro/ contra-attitude’, this question would appear to be too general to admit of any definite answer. Still, we might confine ourselves to the kind of FSS attitudes that we believe will, as a matter of fact, be expressed when we think something has value for someone. We might then ask: Should personal values be understood in terms of love-like or 20 Recall that I have set the psychological realism of these attitudes aside. I am interested in a certain notion of love as a logical possibility.
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admiration-like FSS attitudes? Or to put the question differently: Is favouring x for b’s sake an attitude whose persistence is conditional on the identity of b? Is it, in other words, one, like love, which accommodates identity-justification? Or is it an attitude whose persistence is independent of the identities involved—one we might even be compelled logically to adopt, on pain of conceptual error, vis-a`-vis a person, or thing, that we agreed did not relevantly differ from b? Perhaps the question should be rephrased. We must keep in mind that love is an Identity attitude, i.e. an attitude capable of identity-justification, while admiration is a Non-Identity attitude. The issue then, I believe, is not whether there are FSS attitudes that are dependent for their existence on the identity of a person, for clearly there are. What makes things less straightforward is that it also seems clear that FSS attitudes do not all have to be like love (in this respect, that we are not conceptually compelled to love someone who shares the same features as someone we love). That is, there can also be Non-Identity FSS attitudes—attitudes which, in common with admiration, are such that the persistence of the attitude is conditional not on the identity of a person a, but rather on universal properties of a. If these observations are correct—and in a moment I will argue that they are—the real crux of the matter appears to be whether personal values should be understood in terms of only one type, or both types, of FSS attitude. Consider the following scenario. I am at a dinner. The people at the table are all unknown to me. Suppose person a in front of me politely asks me to pass the salt to b, the person sitting to my left. This person, too, is a complete stranger. If I pass it, I will have acted on what might be described as a desire to pass the salt to b for a’s sake. Is this desire conditional for its persistence on the identity of a? This seems rather unlikely. Still, I can correctly say that I passed the salt to b for a’s sake. Consider next a different scenario. The woman sitting beside you at dinner presents herself in the following way: ‘I am John’s mother’. When you realize that you have the mother of your friend, John, beside you, you decide to take especially good care of her. You soon find her quite boring, but you do your best to be entertaining—and you do so for your friend’s sake. When the evening is over, you realize that she was John’s mother all right, but not ‘your’ John’s mother. Here your attitude of being entertaining for your friend’s sake does seem to be conditional for its persistence on the identity of John. The ‘John’ that figures in your intentional content is not one that corresponds to your real friend. This conclusion may not seem obviously correct, but the following observation supports it. The John of your attitudinal content is obviously a person who is related to the woman sitting next to you in a mother–son relationship; it is when you realize that this ‘content-John’ does not correspond with the real John that your attitude changes. Let us now return to the question I posed earlier: Should personal values be understood in terms of Identity FSS as well as Non-Identity FSS attitudes? Here I am afraid that we have gone as far as formal analysis can take us.
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Certainly, it might be argued that in the case where I pass b the salt for a’s sake it is rather obvious that, in some sense, I am not really doing it for a’s sake. Instead I am doing it for the sake of anyone who exemplifies the universal properties of a that make me pass the salt.21 In this case these properties pretty much amount to being seated in front of me, being a stranger, and asking me to pass the salt to another stranger sitting beside me. However, this does not really answer the question; it only spells out again that there is a difference between two kinds of final attitude. Cogent argument that personal value should never be understood in terms of Non-Identity FSS attitudes would require evaluative reasoning. I think, therefore, that the best approach to this issue (at least, in a work of a formal character) is to acknowledge that personal values can be analysed in terms of both Identity and Non-Identity FSS attitudes. The more interesting personal values—those expected to have a substantial impact on a person’s life—will, in my view, be those that require for their analysis Identity attitudes; and it will be these with which I concern myself as we continue. On the other hand, in my view we should allow even Non-Identity-final attitudes a role in our evaluative reasoning. Consider again the example of the tourists in the church, which indicated that it is possible for us to take something to have personal value even if we do not know whose value it is. The tourist believed that he should behave in certain ways for the sake of the religious believer. People (he thinks) ought to respect certain religious objects for the sake of people attending worship. In cases like this, at least, people appear to recognize that they have reasons to direct Non-Identity FSS attitudes on the relevant objects.22
5.6 Summing up I fear that this chapter covers several somewhat elusive issues. A brief summary might therefore be in place. After introducing some examples of FSS attitudes, I considered the possibility that these attitudes are, in effect, combinations of at least two or more standard attitudes. I am not closing the door on this possibility. However, since the two most salient examples that I can think of do not seem entirely satisfactory, I will continue to regard