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Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise Author(s): Françoise Dastur Source: Hypatia, Vol. 15, No. 4, Contemporary French Women Philosophers (Autumn, 2000), pp. 178-189 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810684 . Accessed: 26/08/2011 16:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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Phenomenologyof the Event: WaitingandSurprise1 FRANQOISE DASTUR Translatedby FranqoiseDastur,translationrevisedby the editor
How, asksFran,oiseDastur,can philosophyaccountfor the suddenhappening in particularthe and thefactualityof the event?Dasturasks howphenomenology, as offeringsuch workof Heidegger,Husserl,andMerleau-Ponty,maybeinterpreted an account.Shearguesthatthe "paradoxical capacityof expectingsurpriseis always in questionin phenomenology," andfor thisreason,sheconcludes,"Weshouldnot andthethinkingof theevent.Weshouldconnectthem;openopposephenomenology Thearticle ness to phenomenamustbe identifiedwithopennessto unpredictability." of birth. offersreflectionsin thesetermson a phenomenology
Can philosophy account for the suddenhappeningand the factualityof the event if it is still traditionallydefined, as it has been since Plato, as a thinking of the invariability and generality of essences?This is the general question fromwhich I will begin. The question of time and of the contingency of time has always,as EdmundHusserlrecalls at the beginning of his On thePhenomenologyof theConsciousnessof InternalTime(1991), constituted the most crucial problemfor philosophy.This problemmarksthe limits of its enterpriseof intellectual possessionof the world.Fortime, which is, as Henri Bergsonsaid, the stuffof which things aremade,2seems to escape conceptual understanding in a radicalmanner. As MauriceMerleau-Pontyshowsin his Phenomenology of Perception(1962), philosophy can give neither a realist nor an idealist solution to the problem of time. It does not succeed in locating it either in things themselves or in consciousness. If, on the one hand, we consider time to be no more than a Hypatia vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 2000) © by Francoise Dastur
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dimension of reality,we can no longer explain the relationshipbetween what comes firstand what follows. The successionof events can only be established by consciousness, a consciousness which requires,in orderto have a general view of the succession of events, not to be completely immersedin time. But what if, on the other hand, we considertime to be a mere constructionof consciousness?Temporalityitself becomes incomprehensible, insofaras it is the essence of time to be incompletelypresentto consciousness,to remainincompletely constituted, as Husserlwould say.Fortime, precisely,is not identical to being, it is a processwhich is alwaysin becoming. It is alwaysof the orderof the process,the passage,and that which comes. Thereforerealism(which immersesthe subject in time to the point of destroyingall possibility of a timeconsciousness)and idealism(which places consciousnessin a position of overviewing a time which no longerproceeds),areboth unableto clarifywhat they pretend to explain, that is, the relation of consciousness to time. For in both cases, what remainsout of rangefor a philosophical inquirywhich wants to see in time either a realityor an idea is preciselyits transitionalcharacter,its nonbeing or non-essence, which is not, but proceeds. Philosophy cannot succeed in accounting for the passageof time when it takes the form of a simple realismor idealism. In both cases it is led, inescapably,to think of the connection of the differentpartsof time as alreadyrealized either in the object or in the subject. But this "time-synthesis,"farfrombeing given, must on the contrary be considered the most difficult philosophical problem.Its solution shouldbe consideredthe most importanttask of philosophy.This "true"philosophy,which wouldbe neither realistnor idealist,should be able to account for the discontinuity of time and for the fact that there are, for us, events. Such a philosophy should be able to explain the discontinuity of time, or what we could name the structuraleventuality of time.3The word eventuality should not be taken here in its normal meaning of possibility.4Speaking of the eventuality of time does not mean that time could "be"or "not be." It should, in my view, mean that time is in itself what bringscontingency, unpredictability,and chance into the world.I would like to demonstratethat this "true"philosophy which could take into account the contingency of time is nothing other than phenomenology itself. What is phenomenology, in fact? For Husserl, it was nothing other than the restitution of the most original idea of philosophy which found its first coherent expressionwith Plato and Aristotle and which constitutes the basis of Europeanphilosophy and science. Husserldoes not see in phenomenology, as did Hegel, who was the firstto make an importantuse of this word, a mere propaedeuticto philosophy as such. He considers phenomenology to be the propername of a philosophy which no longer situates truth beyond phenomena. And when Heidegger declares in one of his MarburgerVorlesungenthat
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"thereis not an ontologybesidesphenomenologybut scientificontologyis nothingelse thanphenomenology" (Heidegger1979,98), he situateshimself in continuitywith Husserlwhilegivinga moreradicalformto his thinking. Beyondall thatseparatesthem,whatunitesboththinkersis preciselythe idea thatthereis nothingto lookforbehindphenomena,behindwhatshowsitself to us.The objectof philosophyis nothingotherthanphenomenalityitself.It is not the idealworldof a being-in-itselfwhichwouldbe completelyseparated the maximof the return"tothe fromus. This is whyHeideggerappropriates with whichHusserlfirstdefinedthe themselves" 1962, 50) things (Heidegger taskassignedto phenomenology(Husserl1970b,252). The questionis thereforeto findan accessto the phenomenathemselves,because,as Goethealreadysaid,"theyarein themselvesthe doctrine"(Goethe 1968,432).5The task is to abstainfromall speculation,such as metaphysicalconstruction, whichcouldleadto the elaborationof an abstractontology.And one should deductionswhichendeavorto identifyphenomena putasideall psychological andsubjectiveexperience. canbe identifiedbythe mere Butthisdoesnot meanthatphenomenology to descriptionof whatis given experience.When Heidegger,in section7 of BeingandTime,declares"Andjust becausethe phenomenaare proximally andforthe mostpartnotgiven,thereis needforphenomenology" (Heidegger one of Husserl'sideas.As earlyas in TheIdea 1962,60), he only appropriates does Husserlhaddeclaredthat the taskof phenomenology of Phenomenology, not consistonlyin lookingat thingsasif theyare"'simplythere'andjustneed to be 'seen,"'butin showinghow theyconstitutethemselvesfora consciousness which is no longerconsidered,as it had been in classicalphilosophy, the merecontainerof theirimages(Husserl1964,9). To let the constitutive operationappear,whichis at the originof the completelyconstitutedobject whichcomesinto viewforus,requiresthat the existenceof this objectbe, as Husserlsays,putinto bracketsorputto one side.Thisepoche,thissuspension of the ontologicalvaliditythat thingshaveforus in dailylife is, accordingto Husserl,whatindicatesin a decisivemannerthe accessto the philosophical attitude.Butthis doesnot amountto the philosopherturningawayfromthe realworldin orderto accessa celestialworldof eternalessences.On the contrary,one lets thingsappearas they aregiven as phenomenain the natural attitudewhichis oursin dailylife.In thisway,one becomesattentiveto their modesof appearingand givenness.What Husserlcalls "phenomenological reduction"doesnot permitone to escapefromthe sensibleto an intelligible world.It doesnot permita movementof becominginto the stabilityof ideal essences.It lets appearthe temporalcharacterof whatis given to us. It lets at the originof whatwecall"reality." appeartheprocessofphenomenalization thiskindof philosophywhich Husserlcalls"transcendental phenomenology" allowsus to attendto the apparitionof that whichtranscendsconsciousness,
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that is, to the birth of the object which consciousness constitutes as its opposite. Husserlcannot remainon the level of a static phenomenologywhich could only account for the alreadyconstituted object, for what is empiricallygiven. Very early on he feels compelled to develop a genetic phenomenology whose task is to elucidate the process at the origin of the opposition of subject and object. The entire phenomenology of temporalitythat Husserldevelops in his Lessonsin 1905 can be considered as a phenomenology of the advent of the subject to itself. For what is at stake in these Lessonsis to bring to light what Husserlcalls "whatis ultimately and trulyabsolute"(Husserl 1962, 216): this enigmatic intimacy of consciousness and time at the origin of the double constitution of worldand subject.Such a taskis paradoxical.It meansallowing the appearanceof the conditions of all appearingand bringing to light the processof "the segregationof the 'within' and the 'without"'(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 118) which Merleau-Pontysays is "never finished"(jamaischosefaite) ( 1968, 237), but, on the contrary,alwaysin becoming. Husserltries in his Lessons to reconstitute "afterthe event," with the help of such concepts as protention, retention, and original impression,the movement of the temporalization which remains in itself invisible. In this regardhe remains in close proximity to Kant, who had alwaysaffirmedthe invisibility of time and who defined schematizm,the process by which consciousness constitutes the object, as "an art concealed in the depths of human soul" (Kant 1933, 183). The phenomenology of the becoming of subject and world can therefore des Unscheinonly be a phenomenology of the inapparent (Phanomenologie baren),to quote one of Heidegger'sexpressionsfrom his last seminar in 1973 (Heidegger 1977, 137). But in his structureof eventuality this inappearance or invisibility of time does not referto a level transcendingperception.On the contrary,it refersto the genesis of perception itself. The limit that phenomenology encountershere is not external but internal. It can only be discovered in and by the phenomenological attitude. For such an invisibility is not, as Merleau-Pontyrightly underlines,an absolute invisibility,but the invisibility of thisworld. It is the dimension of invisibility which is implied in the visible itself and which can therefore only be discovered within the visible (1968, 225). This is the reason why, in his unfinished last book The Visibleand the Invisible(1968), Merleau-Pontysketches the outlines of an "ontology from within" (Merleau-Ponty1968, 225), of an "endo-ontology"(226) which constitutes the true achievement of his Phenomenology of Perception(1962). But is such a phenomenology of becoming, which identifies itself with an ontology which remainsinternal to phenomenality,and which pretendsto let the dynamic characterof phenomenality appear,alreadyin itself a phenomenology of the event? Forit is possibleto think the coming of time, its advenire, its coming up to us, without properlythinking its suddenrise, its coming out of
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itself, which refersto the Latin verb evenire,literallyex-venire,fromwhich the word "event"comes. But what is an event, in fact?At first,we can only define it as what was not expected, what arrives unexpectedly and comes to us by surprise,what descends upon us, the accident in the literal meaning of the Latin verb accido from which the word accident derives. The event in the strong sense of the word is therefore always a surprise,something which takes possession of us in an unforeseen manner, without warning, and which brings us towardsan unanticipatedfuture.The eventum,which arisesin the becoming, constitutes something which is irremediablyexcessive in comparisonto the usual representation of time as flow.It appearsas something that dislocatestime and gives a new formto it, something that puts the flow of time out of joint and changes its direction. So the event appearsas that which intimately threatens the synchrony of transcendentallife or existence, in other words,the mutual implication of the differentpartsof times: retention and protention for Husserl;thrownness and project (Geworfenheitund Entwurf)for Heidegger.The exteriorityof the event introduces a split between past and future and so allows the appearance of differentpartsof time as dis-located.The event pro-duces,in the literal meaning of the word, the difference of past and future and exhibits this difference throughits suddenhappening.The event constitutes the "dehiscence" of time, its coming out of itself in differentdirections, which Heideggercalls "ekstasis,"the fact that it never coincides with itself, and which Levinasnames dia-chrony(Levinas 1987, 32). Forthe event, as such, is upsetting. It does not integrate itself as a specific moment in the flow of time. It changes drastically the whole style of an existence (Husserl 1970a, 31). It does not happen in a world-it is, on the contrary,as if a new worldopens up throughits happening. The event constitutes the critical moment of temporality-a critical moment which nevertheless allows the continuity of time. This non-coincidence with oneself which allows the possibility of being open to new events, of being transformedby them or even destroyedby them, is also that which makesof the subject a temporalbeing, an ex-istant being, a being which is able constantly to get out of itself. Openness to the accident is thereforeconstitutive of the existence of the human being. Such an openness gives human being a destiny and makes one's life an adventure and not the anticipated development of a program. It becomes clear that a phenomenology which obeyed its own injunction to return to things themselves could not be content to remain an "eidetic" phenomenology-the thinking of what remains invariable in experience. It must become, accordingto the young Heidegger'sterminology,a "hermeneutics of facticity"6:an interpretationof all that can be found in existence and is not reducible to ideality, which is essentially variable and transitory.Such a
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phenomenologycouldno longerbe a thinkingof beingandessenceonly.It mustalsobe a thinkingof whatmaybe andof contingency.It shouldnot be It mustalsobe a thinkingof only a thinkingof the a prioriof phenomenality. the a posteriori andof the "afterevent."The questionis not to opposeradically a thinkingof beingor essenceto a thinkingof the otheror of the accident. Ratherit is a matterof showinghow a phenomenologyof the event constitutesthe mostappropriate of the phenomenological accomplishment project. It is not the destitutionorthe impossibility of phenomenological discourse,as somethinkersof the radicalexteriorityof the Other-I meanLevinas,butalso Derridain his lastwritings-seemto believe. What in HusserlianandHeideggerian couldmakepossiphenomenology ble a phenomenological thinkingof the event?Weshouldtryto answerthisin a syntheticandorganizedmannerin orderto defendthe thesisof a possible phenomenologyof the event. Forthe momentI mustbe contentwith some reflectionson the possibilityof a phenomenological discourseon the phenomenon of expectationandsurprisewhichcouldbe derivedfromthe analysesof HusserlandHeidegger. Againstall expectation,even if it hasbeenpartiallyexpectedandanticipated,such is in fact the "essence"of the event. Basedon this we couldsay withoutparadoxthat it is an "impossible possible."The event, in its internal is the which contradiction, impossible happens,in spiteof everything,in a or marvelous manner. It orfromthat terrifying alwayscomesto usbysurprise, sidewhence,precisely,it wasnot expected.The difficulttaskof phenomenologyis thereforeto thinkthisexcessto expectationthatis the event.The pheof nomenologyof eventualityis in a similarpositionto the phenomenology mortality.Death,as an event, is also that which alwayshappensagainstall expectation,alwaystoo early,somethingimpossiblethat neverthelesshappens.It comesto uswithoutcomingfromus. It takesplacein the impersonal mannerof this event thathappensalsoto othersandit is the mostuniversal eventforlivingbeings.One couldsaythatdeathis the eventparexcellence, exceptthatit is neverpresent,it neverpresentlyhappens.It doesnot openup a world,butratherclosesit forever.It doesnot constitutea blankorgapinside or a diachronicmomentwhichcouldbe the originof a new contemporality figurationof possibilities.It is the simple,simultaneousdestructionof synchronyanddiachrony.That is whydeath,farfrombeingan event,hasbeen legitimatelydefinedby Heideggeras the possibility parexcellence (Heidegger 1962,307). Deathremainsforus a possibilitythat we will neverrealize,not even in suicide,whichis onlya wayof escapingthe essentialpassivityof death whichdefineshumanexistencemostdeeply(see Heidegger1962,299-311). But if death is for us the pre-eminentpossibility,as Heideggersays,this
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implies a redefinitionof the traditionalconcept of possibility.For in the philosophical tradition,possibilityis opposedto reality.It is consideredsomething less than reality.But here, in the light of death, possibility is defined as something morepre-eminentthan realityand cannot be comparedto it. In the phenomenological perspective, possibility is the locus of excess with regardsto reality.This allows us to consider possibility as a higher categorythan reality. Possibilityis something other than a categorywhich is a structureof things. It is a structureof existence, an existential, as Heideggercalls it, since the mode of being of human existence is not the mode of being of the res (that is, realitas),but the mode of being as having to be (in other words,as possibility). Because the human being is a mortal being and, in existing, has a constant relation to its own death, it constantly remains in the mode of possibility.It remainsin the mode of a structuralanticipation towardsits own being, which remainsunrealizedfor as long as it exists. In fact, this determination of possibility as existential in Heidegger had alreadybeen preparedin Husserl'sintentional analysis. Husserl himself underlines in his CartesianMeditations(1960) the originality of this kind of intentional analysis in comparisonwith the ordinary,unbracketedanalysis of human life. This originalitycomes from the specificityof intentional life that can never be understood as a totality of data, but rather as an ensemble of significations.What does it mean for consciousness to be in the mode not of something "alreadygiven," but of signification?According to Husserl it implies "asurpassingof the intention in the intention itself,"7in other words,the fact that the intentional act alwaysexceeds what is given in itself. Phenomenological explanation deals not only with given data, but with potentialities. This means that phenomenology is not merelythe theoryof the correlation of noesisand noema, or of the cogitoand of its cogitatum,but establishesthe principleof the necessarysurpassingof the intentumin the intentio itself. This implies that the cogitatum,the "object"of consciousness, is never given once and for all. It can alwaysbe explicated in a more complete manner in regardto the context in which it appears,or, as Husserl says, in regardto its internal and external horizon. The original operation of the intentional analysisconsists in unveiling the potentialities implied in the actual state of consciousness.The intentional analysiscan thereforebe consideredas the basis of a phenomenology of expectation. This is a phenomenology of the tension of consciousnesstowardsan object which remainsopen to the validation or invalidation of its anticipations according to the development of forever new horizons. We could even say that excess is the rule here, because there is alwaysan addition in what is experienced which can never be completely correlated with the intention. It can even be consideredas at the originof the intentional movement itself, in the sense that a total fulfillment of intentionality, or a
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complete adequacyof the signification to the object, would entirely destroy them. It becomes clear that, accordingto Husserl,there is a parallelbetween the perception of an object and the perception of the other human being. In both cases, there arepartswhich arenot perceived,but areonly "appresented," as Husserl says. This means that their existence is co-implicated in what is actually perceived:for example, the hidden faces of a cube, or the actual experiences (die Erlebnisse)of others. That there is a part of experience not actually present is the rule of intentional phenomenology,since the mere idea of a complete fulfillmentof the intention would destroythe basisof intentionality. The intentional relation to the other human being cannot be understood as a special case of the generalintentional relation to objects. On the contrary, it must be understood as the very matrix of intentionality. It unfolds itself where expectation will never be completely fulfilledand where the menace of non-fulfillment can never be completely avoided. If there is the foundation for a phenomenology of expectation in Husserlian intentional analysisas well as in Heideggerianexistential analysis,could one find the basis for a phenomenology of surprisein these philosophies?Is not the very idea of a phenomenology of surprisean absurdity?We know that it is possible and even necessaryto hope beyond all hopes and to "expect the unexpected"as Heraclitus says in fragment 18 (Heraclitus 1987, 19). To my mind there is no doubt that Husserland Heideggerwere able to thematizethis openness to the indetermination of the future, but what is happening when this excess implied in the event fracturesthe horizon of possibilities in such a mannerthat the mereencounter with the event becomes impossible?How can we account for these moments of crisis, of living death, of trauma,when the whole rangeof possibilitiesof a human being becomes unable to integratethe discordanceof the event and collapses completely? Two examples could be mentioned here: the mourningof a loved one and religious conversion. In both cases a transition is made not with regardsto a loss of a particularpossibilitybut with regardsto the radicalloss of the totality of possibilitieswhich we call a world.In such criticalperiods,we experienceour incapacity to experience the traumatizingevent. In spite of having expected the death of somebody seriously ill, it remains a surprise.It feels beyond all anticipation. What happens is "not included in the program."It is the unforeseen, in the true sense of the word. It is what contradictsand ruinsexpectation in its very structure. Such experiences are very rare, and Husserl and Merleau-Pontyexplain that ordinaryexperience presupposesan originaryfaith in the stability of the world and the presumptionthat experience will alwayshave the same "style" (Merleau-Ponty1968, 3-4; Husserl1970a, 31). But we find a strikingimageof such "existential"crises in psychosis.The schizophrenic,for example, experiences the loss of what seems evident to other human beings. S/he experiences
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the lossof worldandthe breakingof the ordinarycoherenceof experience.8 of communicatS/he is thereforecondemnedto terrorandto the impossibility ingwiththingsandotherhumanbeings.Sucha subjecthaslostthe abilityof of posopeningoneselfto eventualityandof experiencingthe reconfiguration sibilitiesthata newandunexpectedeventrequiresfromus.Forit is the event itselfwhichrequiresintegrationin a new configuration of possibilities.One doesnot decidefreelyto changeone'sworld,orto becomeconverted.Wecan speakof the eventneitherin the activenorin the passivevoice.It canchange us andeven "happen" to usonly if we arein the rightdisposition.This is prewhichis missingin the psychoticperson. ciselythe "disposition" We can speakaboutthe event only in the thirdvoice and in a pasttime, in the modeof "ithappenedto me."We neverexperiencethe greateventsof Thisis quiteclearasfarasthe firstgreateventof ourlife ascontemporaneous. ourlife is concerned.Wedidnot askforourbirth,andthis is testimonyto the factthatwe arenot at the originof ourownexistence.Tobe bor meansthat we areconditionedby a pastthat wasneverpresentto us. It can only be apof ourexistencethat byus later,by assumingthesedeterminations propriated we havenot chosen.Thereis thereforea surprisein us in relationto ourbirth. It is the permanentsurpriseof beingbornwhichis constitutiveof ourbeing. It is testimonyto the uncontrollablecharacterof this proto-event.In each new event thereis a repetitionof the proto-eventof birth.It is as if we reexperience,in a newevent,thisradicalnoveltyof whathappensforthe "first of coincidingwiththe event itself,whichin time,"aswellasthe impossibility the pastfromthe future. disconnects its suddenapparition andit is in a waythe The existingbeinghasno controloversucha surprise eventwhichgivesthe orderhere,butto be orderedrequiresthe collaboration of the one who obeys. One is not completely passive in relation to the event, even if its meaning still remainsobscure.We keep tryingto give a meaning to
of everythingthat it. It is only in relationto this attemptedinterpretation behavioris nothingotherthanthe beingin happens(andthis interpretative theworldof the human)thataneventcanbe experiencedasa trauma.Husserl andHeideggerbothsawa passivitywithinourintentionalactivityitselfanda facticityof existencewhichcan onlybe assumedandnot chosen.Husserldid so with his theoryof passivegenesisor synthesis.Heideggerdid so by tightly connectingfacticityasthe beingthrownto the worldof the humanbeingand of the of facticityinto the configuration existentialityas the incorporation projectof thisprospectivebeingthat Heideggercallsman. andthe thinkingof the event.We We shouldnot opposephenomenology shouldconnectthem;opennessto phenomenamustbe identifiedwith openThis paradoxicalcapacityof expectingsurpriseis ness to unpredictability. declaresin TheVisible Merleau-Ponty alwaysin questionin phenomenology. hasneverspoken... of the passivityof our that "philosophy andtheInvisible
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activity, as Valeryspoke of a bodyof thespirit"(1968, 221). This passivityof our activity is nothing other than the processof temporalizationwhich happensin us as thinking beingswithout being the productof ourthought. Foras MerleauPonty underlines,"Iam not even the authorof that hollow that formswithin me by the passagefrom the present to the retention, it is not I who makes myself think any more than it is I who makes my heart beat" (1968, 221). New as our initiatives may be, they come to be born in this field of being that is human spirit, in which something, or the absence of something, can be inscribed.A great, contemporaryFrench phenomenologist, Henri Maldiney, createda new word,"transpassibilite," to expressourcapacityto undergoevents, insofaras this implies for us an active opening to a field of receptivity (Maldiney 1991, 114). To lack the capacity to open oneself to what happens, no longer to welcome the unexpected, is in fact a markof psychosis. Phenomenology privileges neither the interiority of expectation nor the exteriority of surprise.It establishes as preliminaryto experience neither the receptivity of the subject nor the activity of the object. It tries to think the strangecoincidence of both. One could demonstratethat Heideggertried to think this almost unthinkablecoincidence of Being and "man."He attempted this by means of the word Ereignis.Ereignismeans not only "happening"(the ordinarymeaning of the word in German) but also, following its double etyand "appearingto mology in both popularand scientific use, "appropriation" view."In takingthis position I am arguingagainstthose contemporarythinkers who have declaredthat the thinking of the event and the thinking of the other requiresa mode of thinking other than the phenomenological one. There can be no thinking of the event which is not at the same time a thinking of phenomenality. NOTES We verywarmlythankthe editorof EtudesPhinomenologiques forpermissionto reproducethis versionof the article.Ed. 1. Lecturegiven in Prague,September1998, in the seminarorganizedby the Instituteof Philosophy.SimplifiedEnglishversionof "Pourune phenomenologie de l'evenement:l'attenteet la surprise," EtudesPMnomenologiques 25, 1997:59-75. 2. See, forexample,Bergson(1963, 71-72) andBergson(1944,371-72). 3. See, in this regard,the remarkable articleby ClaudeRomano,"LePossibleet l'evnement"(Romano1993),fromwhichI havedrawnmuchinspiration. 4. Here,the readershouldbe awareof differencesbetweenthe connotationsof eventualite in the sensegivento thiswordby FrancoiseDasturhereandeventuality in in this context,refersmoregenerallyto possibility,chance,unEnglish.Eventualite, refers certainty,contingency,and the hypothetical,whereasthe Englisheventuality eitherto thatwhichultimatelyresults,or to a possible,fixedevent.Ed.
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5. Cited in Heidegger (1976, 12). 6. "Ontologie(Hermeneutikder Faktizitat)"was the title of Heidegger'ssummer semestercourse of 1923. See Heidegger (1923). 7. See Husserl (1960, 48): "Phenomenological explication makes clear what is included and only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum (for example 'the other side') by making present in phantasy the potential perceptions that would make the invisible visible." 8. See, for example, the discussionin Blankenburg(1991), cited in Dastur(1997). Ed.
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.1991. On thephenomenology of internaltime.Trans.John of theconsciousness Kluwer. Barett Brough.Dordrecht: Kant,Immanuel.1933.Critique ofpurereason.Trans.NormanKempSmith.London: Macmillan. Levinas,Emmanuel.1987.Timeandtheother.Trans.RichardA. Cohen.Pittsburgh: DuquesneUniversityPress. et lafolie.Grenoble:J. Millon. Maldiney,Henri.1991.Penserl'homme Maurice. 1962. Trans.Colin Smith. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception. London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul. . 1968.Thevisibleandtheinvisible. Trans.AlphonsoLingis.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress. 40 (decembre1993): Romano,Claude.1993.Le possibleet l'evenement.Philosophie 68-95 andPhilosophie 41 (mars1994): 60-86.
